AFRICA AND ITS GLOBAL DIASPORA

The Policy and Politics of Emigration

Edited by
Jack Mangala

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Jack Mangala
Editor

Africa and its Global Diaspora

The Policy and Politics of Emigration

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Editor
Jack Mangala
Area and Global Studies
Grand Valley State University
Allendale, Michigan, USA

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. . . effective partnership between Africa and its Diaspora calls for greater understanding, close cooperation, common vision and mutual design of goals, objectives and strategies for the re-unification and rejuvenation of the global African family.
–Report on the African Union Diaspora Ministerial Conference, November 16–18, 2007, Johannesburg, South Africa.

FOREWORD

This book on *Africa and its Global Diaspora: The Policy and Politics of Emigration*, comes at a critical time in which Africa's relationship with its diaspora is assuming serious momentum. Over a long period, the dominant perspective has been to view emigration in purely negative terms as brain drain and the diversion of skilled resources to developed countries, which need them the least. The tendency is reinforced by the brutal history of the forced transfer of African people during the period of the slave trade. These images remain pertinent but there has been a gradual shift towards focusing and using opportunities that are associated with migration flows as the realization takes root that the diaspora of developing countries, particularly in Africa, can be a force for development through the promotion of trade, investment opportunities, the flow of remittances, research, innovation, volunteer support programs, and knowledge and technology transfers. This is a strategy that the Indians, Chinese, and Israelis have perfected over time but is only now flowering in Africa.

The association of African developmental processes with its diaspora is a potential goldmine that has begun to produce results in flows and trickles. If properly harnessed it should become a flood. Africa is confronted with various socio-economic and political problems that are often tempered with knowledge and recollections of history and past glory. The incorporation of the diaspora in the framework of developmental efforts has spin-off and spillover effects because it connects Africa with its missing parts as a captive constituency. Once the solidarity of the Afro-descendant is assured, the continent will not be competing with others for their trade

and investment because the economics of that enterprise has an enabling social underpinning.

Several African countries have developed diaspora policies to foster linkages with their diaspora communities abroad to encourage them to invest in their countries of origin and offer finance capital for development. The decision of the African Union to embrace the diaspora as a force for development reinforces this circle of effort and offers complementarity so that there will be an interlocking system of efforts that envelops and reintegrates the diaspora as an enabling African resource. That effort will turn defeat into victory as the separation of African people will become a force for African rebirth and renaissance.

That realization underlines the attachment of the AU to the diaspora question that was amplified in the policy contribution to this book. The AU has invested time, effort, and resources in connecting with the African diaspora. It has defined the diaspora as a force for African development, engaged it persistently and held regional consultative conferences all over the world culminating in Global African Diaspora Summit that evolve an agreed template for action. The pact involved four main actors, the AU, its Member States, the African Diaspora and the Governments of the countries in which they are domiciled. Through this the AU is serving notice and has secured agreement that it has a right to engage its African people wherever they may be. The concordat serves the purposes of individual African States as well as the African integration venture.

As Nigeria's Ambassador to Ethiopia in the period of the preparation of the Constitutive Act and later as Chief of Staff to two successive AU administrations, I was present at the creation and at the consummation of the Global Diaspora Summit. The Citizens and Diaspora Directorate (CIDO) that led the process was under the direct supervision of the Chairperson through my office as Chief of Staff. I was thus intimately associated with all the processes. CIDO gave all it could to the program but so also did the political leadership of the AU. Dr. Adisa commended the inspirational leadership of Professor Alpha Oumar Konare and I fully associate myself with this position. However, I wish also to highlight the contributions of Dr. Jean Ping who succeeded him as paying attention to and fully supporting the program. I worked closely with Dr. Ping in this regard and travelled with both him and Dr. Adisa on various diaspora missions. The conclusion of the Global African Diaspora Summit was held under Dr. Ping's watch and he played a key role in realizing the outcomes.

At the national level, I was privileged to be a member of the Nigerian National Conference, 2014 and I served on the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Diaspora Matters. This Committee recognized the importance of the Nigerian diaspora to the country's development. It therefore made far reaching recommendations on how to involve the millions of Nigerians outside its shores in the affairs of their country. These included the setting up of a Diaspora Commission and giving voting rights to Nigerian iaspora. I believe most African countries are doing this.

This is why I am very pleased with the trajectory of Dr. Jack Mangala's efforts. I have had various interactions with Dr. Mangala and his commitment and scholarly bearing have always impressed me. More significant is the concern and love for Africa which has occupied the mainstream of his scholarly outputs. This particular book is the fourth in a series of scholarly outputs that x-ray and proffer options and solutions to address African problems. It comes after his books on *Africa and the European Union: A Strategic Partnership; Africa and the New World Era: From Humanitarianism to a Strategic View*; and *New Security Threats and Crises in Africa: Regional and International Perspectives.* This book adds another layer on Africa's capacity for development. He has worked with a carefully selected team of scholars who bring their high reputation to bear on the high standard of the book. I therefore recommend it heartily to scholars and policy makers alike as well as Africans and non-Africans who are interested in learning about Africa and supporting its processes of development.

JKS & Associates Ltd.   Ambassador John Kayode Shinkaiye
Abuja, Nigeria   Chairman
Former Chief of Staff to the Chairperson,
African Union Commission,
February 2006–October 2012.

Preface

Diaspora: The New Eldorado

This volume is the fourth in a pentalogy of critical issues in African politics and society that I have had the privilege to edit since 2010. The first book, *Africa and the New World Era* (2010), focused on the dynamics and factors affecting Africa's role and standing in international politics against the backdrop of the ongoing tectonic power shift marked by deepening globalization, complex interdependencies, and transnationalism. The second book, *New Security Threats and Crises in Africa* (2010), sought to explore emerging security threats and enduring challenges facing Africa by shifting the center of gravity of the discussion from state-centric to human security. The third book, *Africa and the European Union: A Strategic Partnership* (2013), investigated the changing nature of the historical relationship between Africa and the European Union as embodied in the Joint Africa-EU Strategy adopted in Lisbon in 2007 at the second EU-Africa Summit. The fifth book, *The Politics of Presidential Terms Limit in Africa* (2017), will discuss the question of presidential terms limit and its implications for democratic consolidation two decades after the wave of constitutional reforms that swept across the continent at the end of the Cold War. Why a book on Africa and its global diaspora? Why focus on the policy and politics of emigration, and why now?

The genesis of this fourth book stems from my participation in the project *Exploring Critical Issues: Diasporas* under the aegis of the Oxford-based Inter-disciplinary.Net, a global network and forum for exchanging and interaction of ideas, research, and points of view that promotes both inter-disciplinary and multi-disciplinary scholarly encounters that cross the boundaries of intellectual

work. From these vibrant intellectual exchanges emerged some important points that have motivated this book project and form its backbone.

First, if the term "diaspora" lends itself to various scholarly definitions and academic interpretations based on a wide range of historical and spatial considerations, its policy iterations seem more converging. According to the African Union's official definition, "The African diaspora consists of people of African origin living outside the continent, irrespective of their citizenship and nationality and who are willing to contribute to the development of the continent and the building of the African Union."[1] In policy circles, the term "diaspora" is often used to refer to "immigrants and their descendants who live outside the country of their birth or ancestry, either on a temporary or permanent basis, yet still maintain affective and material ties to their countries of origin."[2] Leaving behind the historical roots of the term, this broad definition and empirical description of "diaspora" will be adopted in this volume.

Second, with its estimated 30 million members on the continent and worldwide, the African diaspora is emerging as an economic, political, and cultural force to wrestle with. According to the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), remittance flows to and within Africa are estimated at US\$ 40 billion per year, an amount that represents about 5 percent of the continent's GDP and far exceeds the Official Development Assistance to Africa. However, given the fact that 75 percent of all transfers are informal, and thus impossible to track, remittance flows are estimated to be three to four times bigger, putting the actual figure between US\$ 120–160 billion.[3] It is projected that remittances sent by Africans living outside their country of origin will increase at 9 percent average annual rate between 2014 and 2017, helping to support at least 120 million family members across the continent.[4] With total savings estimated at US\$ 53 billion—of which US\$ 30.5 billion (approximately 3.2 percent of GDP) is attributable to the diaspora located in Sub-Saharan African countries—the African diaspora is increasingly being targeted as a source of investments in capital markets as illustrated, for example, by the Ethiopian diaspora's purchasing of government bonds toward the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.[5]

Third, against the backdrop of the IT revolution, deepening globalization, and complex interdependencies that characterize today's international relations, the African diaspora's economic agency has also been accompanied by growing political and cultural influence, which has impacted both states of origin and host countries. The former, in particular, are being increasingly challenged by diasporas as new transnational agents whose actions and ability to operate across nation-states' boundaries are redefining

the meaning of "peoplehood" as well as reinventing traditional canons of interaction between the government and its citizens. Evolving state–diaspora relations present both opportunities and challenges that highlight the increased deterritorialization of politics in international relations and the emergence of new fault lines whose contours and significance are not yet fully understood and defined.[6]

Fourth, in light of the above disruptions and opportunities, the last decade has witnessed an intense policymaking activity at the global, inter-regional (Africa-EU), regional (AU), and state levels aimed at better engaging with the diaspora which, because of its potential development impact in terms of remittances, investments, and transfer of skills, has become the new Eldorado for many countries of origin in Africa as they chart their paths toward sustainable development and economic growth. The increased centrality of diasporas in the development discourse and strategy has shifted the center of gravity of the migration debate in Africa from immigration (a main concern for western countries) to emigration policy and politics. The latter, it must be noted, has not traditionally attracted the same level of scholarly attention as the former. While some African governments, for example, Senegal, Morocco, and Ethiopia, have historically maintained close ties with their diasporas, the past decade has seen a substantial expansion of attempts by governments across the continent to engage with their diasporas. The significance, nature, extent, and lessons learned from these attempts constitute this book's tapestry.

Fifth, while there have been studies and reports focusing on diaspora engagement policies (DEPs) in individual African countries, there is no book that provides, in a single volume, the substance of the African experience in the area of DEPs as well as the politics of emigration as being played out across the continent. Another gap is the general lack of a comparative approach to DEPs in Africa. The added value of this book is to fill these two gaps. In so doing, it makes an important contribution to the literature on DEPs and emigration politics in Africa. This would not have been possible without the expertise of colleagues who have graciously agreed to lend their talents to this book project by authoring chapters. It has been an enriching experience working with each and every one of them.

The book is structured in two parts. The first part includes 2 chapters which locate the discussion on DEPs within the global, inter-regional (Africa-EU) and African regional contexts. It seeks to capture the contours and outcomes of policymaking on DEPs at these 3 levels against the backdrop of what has been referred to as the diaspora–

development nexus. Many of the policies, institutional reforms, and strategies being pursued at the national level can be linked to the work of the United Nations Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) established by Secretary General Kofi Annan in 2003 as well as the series of global consultations that have taken place, since 2006, in the framework of the UN General Assembly High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development (HLD) and the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMI). The interregional level (Africa-EU) has also seen important consultations focusing on the migration–development nexus over the past decade. At the African regional level, the AU has outlined a broad diaspora agenda and adopted important policy documents that are impacting the formulation of national DEPs.

The second part of the book seeks to capture the essence of state-diaspora relations in selected African countries. Over the past decade, and against the backdrop of the aforementioned global and regional debate on the migration–development nexus, many African countries have developed DEPs of varied consistency, depth and reach. In the guidelines provided to contributing authors, I underscored the fact that each national case study had to address the following points and questions which form the broad outline for each of the 10 empirical studies included in this volume:

- A mapping of the country's diaspora: where are the most important diaspora communities located? What are the factors that contributed to their formation?
- A snapshot of the historical and present nature of state-diaspora relations.
- An overview of diaspora's most important organizations as well as nature and levels of socio-economic and political interactions with the homeland.
- The core questions that have dominated the political and social debate surrounding the development of DEPs by the country's government. What is the rationale put forward by the government to justify the development of DEPs? Has there been any political and social debate around DEPs? What has been the tone and content of this debate and the main issues/challenges that have been exposed?
- The legal and institutional mechanisms forming the backbone of DEPs. This central part of each case study will follow Alan Gamlen's typology of diaspora engagement policies in comparative

research by focusing the analysis on three-level types of state measures:

- those that seek to build capacity by discursively producing state-centric diaspora communities and developing a set of corresponding state institutions to deal with those communities (symbolic and institutional measures aimed at reinforcing claims of shared national identity and fostering a sense of loyalty toward the homeland on the part of the diaspora will be addressed here);
- those intended to extend rights to the diaspora (e.g., measures dealing with dual nationality, voting rights, visas, welfare protection, investment and import privileges);
- those that seek to extract obligations from the diaspora (e.g., measures promoting diaspora lobby, investments, remittances, and skills transfer).

- The key lessons stemming from the development and implementation of national DEP in the country under consideration.

Each chapter included in the book has superbly met the editor's expectations. I am indebted to colleagues who contributed a chapter for their time and commitment in bringing this scholarly project to fruition. A big thanks to Ambassador John Kayode Shinkaiye, former Chief of Staff to the AU Commission Chairperson, for his friendship and for graciously agreeing to review the book and write its foreword. A special acknowledgment is owed to Dr. Jinmi Adisa, founding director of the African Union Commission's Citizens and Diaspora Directorate, for sharing his insights and institutional wisdom on diaspora matters. I would like to thank my editor and the whole Palgrave team for their professionalism and interest in my scholarly endeavors.

Wyoming, Michigan   Jack Mangala
June 2016

Notes

1. See Africa Union, *Report of the Meeting of Experts from Member States on the Definition of the African diaspora*, April 11–12, 2005, 7.
2. Dovelyn Agunias and Kathleen Newland, *Developing a Road Map for Engaging Diasporas in Development* (Geneva and Washington, DC: IOM and MPI, 2012): 15.
3. See International Fund for Agricultural Development, Report on Remittances, https://www.ifad.org/topic/resource/tags/remittances/2039663 (accessed 5 March 2016).
4. See African Union, Directorate of Information and Communication, Press Release 338/2014.
5. Dilip Ratha *et al., Leveraging Migration for Africa* (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2011): 1.
6. Alexandra Delano and Alan Gamlen, "Comparing and Theorising State-Diaspora Relations," in Nando Sigona and all, ed., *Diaspora Reimagined: Spaces, Practices and Belonging* (Oxford: Oxford Diasporas Programme, 2015).

CONTENTS

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AIR	African Remittances Institute
APRM	African Peer Reviewed Mechanism
AU	African Union
AUC	African Union Commission
BEE	Black Economic Empowerment
CIDO	Citizens and Diaspora Directorate of the African Union
CSD	Civil Society Day
CSO	Civil society organization
CPAN	Caribbean Pan-African Network
CSSDA	Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa
DEP	Diaspora engagement policy
DGM	Directorate General for Migration
EAC	Eastern African Community
EC	European Commission
ECOSOCC	Economic, Social and Cultural Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EFLA	European Federation of Liberian Associations
ENP	European Neighborhood Policy
EP	European Parliament
EU	European Union
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IOM	International Organization for Migration
GCIM	Global Commission on International Migration
GERD	Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
GFMI	Global Forum on Migration and Development
HLD	High Level Dialogue
HTA	Hometown Association

JAES	Joint Africa-EU Strategy
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MIDA	Migration for Development in Africa
NIDO	Nigerians in Diaspora Organization
NNVS	Nigerian National Volunteer Service
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PANAFEST	Pan African Festival of Arts and Culture
PAP	Pan-African Parliament
PMME	Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment
PRC	Permanent Representatives Committee
RCC	Regional Consultative Conference
REC	Regional Economic Community
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAMP	Southern African Migration Program
SDPRP	Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
ZPA	Zambia Privatization Agency

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF TABLES

International and Regional Perspectives on Diaspora Engagement

Engaging Diasporas in Development: Contours and Outcomes of International Policymaking

Jack Mangala

INTRODUCTION

Over the past decade, diasporas as transnational agents have prominently figured on the agenda of a number of global as well as regional initiatives, processes and forums devoted to exploring the migration–development nexus. This intense consultative activity stems from the increased realization of the role and positive impact diaspora communities have both on sending and host countries' development. The establishment of the United Nations Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) by Secretary General Kofi Annan in 2003 represented a watershed moment towards a global dialogue on the broad linkages and dynamics between migration and a host of other issues that touch on the mandates of virtually every multilateral institution—health, trade, humanitarian response, human rights, and development. While recognizing that international migration was a transcendent aspect of globalization that the UN system needed to address in concrete ways if it were to remain

J. Mangala (✉)
Area and Global Studies, Grand Valley State University, Allendale, Michigan, USA

relevant, Mr. Annan also candidly admitted that the creation of the GCIM was warranted because the UN was uncertain about how to come to grips with international migration.

In the follow-up to the GCIM's report published in 2005, the UN General Assembly held the first High-level Dialogue (HLD) on International Migration and Development in September 2006. The HLD provided an opportunity for countries and various regional organizations to address the multidimensional aspects of international migration in order to identify appropriate ways and means of maximizing its development benefits and minimizing its negative impacts. Over 140 countries participated in the first HLD and there was widespread recognition and support in the UN for the continuation of an open and transparent dialogue on migration and development. In light of the above and under a proposal by Secretary General Annan, the General Assembly decided to create the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD), an annual and global forum that has become the main consultative forum for governments and actors from the civil society on the migration–development nexus.

In the particular case of Africa, this global consultative process has been accompanied by a sustained interregional dialogue on migration and development in the framework of its relations with Europe in general and the EU and its member states in particular. It suffices to mention the Euro-African Ministerial Conference in Rabat in July 2006, the Africa-EU Ministerial Conference in Tripoli in November 2006, the Euro-African Conference in Madrid in June 2007, the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference in Albufeira in November 2007, and the Second Euro-African Ministerial Conference in Paris in November 2008. EU-Africa dialogue on migration and development has been consolidated and is now being pursued through the Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment (PMME) adopted at the Second EU-Africa Summit in December 2007 in Lisbon in the framework of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES).

In addition to participating in multilateral forums and processes, the African Union (AU) has separately produced a number of important policy documents dealing with the migration–development nexus. It has also—along with its member states—engaged in intense consultations with the African diaspora, a process that culminated in the adoption of the Declaration of the Global African Diaspora Summit in 2012 in South Africa, a policy document that was referred to as "the Magna Carta of the

Diaspora Process, a fundamental law that would guide the Diaspora Process."[1]

This chapter seeks to discuss the aforementioned processes and initiatives, and interrogate the substance of this multilayer policymaking activity on migration and development with an emphasis on questions pertaining specifically to the diaspora. After a decade of global and regional consultation on migration and development, what are the central questions that have been identified? What are the key principles and core policy recommendations that have been formulated to address these questions? Are these recommendations supported by empirical evidence and informed by scholarly insights? What are the synergies between the global and regional processes on the migration–development nexus? These are the key questions that will guide our investigation. This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section undertakes a succinct literature review on migration and development with an emphasis on migrant diasporas. The second section discusses global consultative processes and policy outcomes on migration and development. The third section focuses on Africa-EU interregional processes and outcomes.

Scholarly Insights and Empirical Evidence on the Migration–Development Nexus

From remittances to direct investment, human capital transfer, philanthropy, capital market investment, and tourism, the multiple roles migrant diasporas play in, and the potential value they bring, to the development efforts of their countries of origin have become the subject of growing scholarly interest and empirical studies. This mounting body of evidence suggests that "diasporas can and, in many cases, do play an important role in the economic development of their countries of origin or ancestry."[2]

However, there is an emerging scholarly consensus that the development roles and impact of diasporas is better understood by locating migration within transnational processes in terms of global economies and the formation of transnational migratory groups. Over the past decade, a body of research has provided new insights into contemporary forms of migration and the particular dynamics underpinning modern diasporas, while raising important conceptual issues pertaining the emergence of diasporas as transnational development agents in a global context.

Departing from the conventional binary theory, which frames migration as a one way process of emigration from one country and immigration to another, transnational approaches offer a more sophisticated insight into the migration phenomenon by suggesting it "be understood as social processes linking together countries of origin and destination."[3] Contemporary migrants are thus referred to as "transmigrants" to underscore the fact that they often develop and are embedded in dense networks of familial, social, economic, political, organizational, and religious relations linking countries of origin with those of destination. While conventional approaches to migration emphasize a break with the homeland, transnational approaches highlight a web of interests, obligations, and simultaneous engagements between the homeland and the country of immigration.

This constellation of links and interests spanning sending and receiving societies is what distinguishes a diaspora from any other groups, and is encapsulated in the empirical description of modern diasporas which "are ethnic groups of migrant origin residing and acting in host countries but maintaining strong sentimental and material links with their countries of origin—their homelands."[4] This empirical definition encompasses both migrants who have only left their countries recently or even temporarily as well as long and well-established communities. All of these groups of migrants exhibit affective links and are willing to maintain material ties with their countries of origin. These transnational links and complex ties are said to be "potentially, beneficial to development."[5] But how do diasporas as transnational agents impact development in their country of origin? What's the migration–development nexus?

While there is mounting empirical evidence that diasporas do play an important role in promoting development in their countries of origin, the literature on the migration–development nexus appears unsettled on the question. Various conventional studies highlight a negative development impact of migration on the sending countries due to a number of processes and dynamics. These include, *inter alia*, the selective nature of migration, the lowering of local labor following the emigration of the most productive members of households,[6] the insignificance of remittances among the poorest households,[7] the potential inflationary effect of migration on the local economy and the increased disparities in local income, as well as the fact that returning migrants are likely to be old and unsuccessful with limited transferable skills that can positively impact the homeland's development.[8] However, some conventional studies have

suggested that migration can positively impact development in countries of origin by reducing pressure on the local labor market and through transfer of skills and remittances.[9]

Studies that adopt a transnational approach have generally shown a positive impact of migration on the development of countries of origin.[10] While these studies underscore a wide range of migration–development dynamics and processes, they seem to concur on the fact that transnational networks of people spanning receiving and sending countries play a central role in impacting development in the latter both at the national and local level. Hometown associations (HTAs) of diaspora communities have thus been linked to significant improvements in local health, education, sanitation, infrastructure, and access to services.[11] Other transnational studies have however pointed to some of the negative sides of migrants' transfer of resources on the local socio-economic and political situation including, for example, inflation of real estate prices, concentration of land tenure in the hands of families connected to migration and, in some cases, unemployment.[12]

Recent empirical studies by the World Bank and other development or migration institutions have confirmed these early scholarly assumptions and findings regarding the impact of diasporas on the economic development of countries of origin.[13] While these studies show a positive relationship between diasporas and economic development, they also recognize that some evidence gaps still remain in that many of the findings tend to suggest a correlation rather than demonstrate a causality between specific development drivers and diaspora engagement.[14] Let's consider the empirical evidence of the outcomes of diaspora engagement in regard to three development drivers: trade, investment, and skills and knowledge transfers.

There is mounting empirical evidence that suggests strong correlations between the presence of a diaspora in a country and increased trade ties between that country of settlement and that of origin. Analyzing Canada's trade with 136 countries from 1980 to 1992, Keith Head and John Reis show that a 10 percent immigration from a particular country resulted in an increase of 1 percent of Canada's exports to that country and 3 percent imports from that country.[15] The same correlations between the presence of a diaspora and increased trade have also been established for other countries.[16] Specific factors seem to account for this increase in trade including, *inter alia*, the fact that migrant diasporas remain emotionally attached to and consume products from their countries of origin which, in turn, they introduce to their countries of settlement.

Correlations between the presence of a diaspora and diaspora networks in a country of settlement and an increase in the flow of both direct investment and portfolio investment from that country toward the country of origin are also supported by strong empirical evidence.[17] While investing directly in their country of origin, diasporas seem also to be instrumental in "selling" their homeland as an investment opportunity to other investors from the country of settlement. It has also been shown that members of the diaspora who have reached top positions in the settlement country's corporate world have leveraged their positions to direct investments toward the homeland. Their knowledge of the latter's language and culture as well as transnational business networks are among the factors enabling this investment role on the part of executive migrant diasporas. In testing the hypothesis that diaspora networks impact global investment by reducing transaction and information costs, David Leblanc concludes that "even after controlling for a multitude of factors, diaspora networks have both a substantively significant effect and a statistically significant effect on cross-border investment."[18]

The role of diasporas as investors is especially of particular importance to post-conflict countries and those that don't rank high in foreign investors' confidence indexes, as is the case for many African countries. According to some estimates, a large portion of the investment flowing into Somalia, for example, seems to be originating from its diaspora. Due to its substantial savings—estimated at around US$ 400 billion for diasporas originating from developing countries—the diaspora is increasingly considered to be a potentially important source of financing for countries of origin. Many countries of origin are trying to leverage these savings by promoting trusted traditional financial instruments or designing new ones that are geared toward their disporas.

In the particular case of Africa, it suffices to mention, for example, the establishment by Senegal of a diaspora investment fund that has helped to finance about 804 projects, or the issuance of diaspora bonds by Ethiopia and Kenya to raise funds for infrastructure projects. Israel has also successfully had recourse to diaspora bonds to finance ambitious development projects, whereas India used it to fend off a critical balance-of-payments crisis resulting from economic sanctions imposed on the country after its first nuclear test.[19]

According to the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), remittance flows to and within Africa are estimated at US$ 40 billion per year, an amount that represents about 5 percent of the

continent's GDP and far exceeds the Official Development Assistance to Africa.[20] However, given the fact that 75 percent of all transfers are informal, and thus impossible to track, remittance flows are estimated to be three to four times bigger, putting the actual figure between US$ 120 to 160 billion.[21] It is projected that remittances sent by over 30 million Africans living outside their country of origin will increase at a 9 percent average annual rate between 2014 and 2017, helping to support at least 120 million family members across the continent.[22] Do remittances contribute to productive investments that can positively impact long term development in the homeland?

For a long time, the dominant economic assumption was that remittances were mostly spent on consumption and therefore did not play an important role in facilitating investment and encouraging productivity. However, empirical evidence emerging from a number of recent studies has challenged this assumption. One very common investment coming from remittance is in human capital, or education. A study on remittances in Eritrea—a country where a quarter of the population lives abroad and one in three households depends on remittance income—concludes that receiving households in Eritrea spend part of the remittances on child education. A regression analysis shows that a 1 percent increase in household income (including both formal earning and remittance) increases the education ratio by around 0.04 percentage points in Eritrea.[23] Another study by the World Bank on remittances, consumption, and investment in Ghana concludes that remittances do affect marginal spending behavior of households. A key finding of this study shows that households receiving remittance in Ghana spend less at the margin on food by as much as 14 percent and more at the margin on education by as much as 33 percent.[24] These findings confirm the results of other World Bank research, which shows that, in countries like Kenya and Nigeria, more than half of total remittance spending is invested in homebuilding, land purchases, and farm improvements.[25]

The third area where strong correlations have emerged between diaspora and development in the homeland has to do with skills and knowledge transfers. Diasporas are said to act as a "brain trust" that provides the critical expertise needed in the homeland either in support of development goals being pursued by the government or through private philanthropic or business initiatives by individual members of the diaspora. The involvement of medical professionals from the diaspora in state/international organization-led initiatives or private-led initiatives in the homeland offers

a good illustration of the development potential of skills and knowledge transfers. In many African countries, medical professionals from the diaspora have been instrumental in training and education programs aimed at improving the delivery of medical services.[26] Professionals from the diaspora have also played a critical role in helping to jump start new areas of technological innovation in the homeland or helping the latter achieve a competitive advantage in a particular industry. For example, it is widely accepted that the growth of India's information technology sector, its booming medical tourism, and its dominant position in the global diamond cutting and diamond jewelry industry would have not been possible without the critical role played by its diaspora through skills, knowledge transfers, and leveraging of its global business and scientific networks.[27]

Seizing on the growing body of evidence that stresses strong correlations between migration and development, the international community— through global and interregional consultation processes— has undertaken a range of initiatives aimed at better understanding the migration–development nexus, exchanging experiences and best practices among states, and providing the latter with principles for migration policy as well as specific recommendations for action aimed at enhancing the development benefits of international migration while addressing its challenges. The next sections will review the key policy principles and recommendations that have emerged from global as well as interregional EU-Africa consultation processes.

GLOBAL CONSULTATION PROCESSES AND POLICY OUTCOMES ON MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT

The current round of global consultation on international migration was jumpstarted by the establishment of the GCIM in 2003. The GCIM was created at the instigation of the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan by the governments of Sweden, Switzerland, Brazil, the Philippines, Morocco and Egypt. The creation of the GCIM was motivated by the growing realization that "migration has become a key issue for countries all over the world . . . The scope and nature of migration is such that all countries are affected whether they are countries of origin, transit or destination, or a combination of thereof."[28] More specifically, UN Secretary-General Annan underscored the fact that, even though international migration had become a transcendent aspect of globalization that touched the

mandates of virtually every multilateral institution, the UN was uncertain how to come to grips with it. Finding concrete ways of addressing international migration was thus imperative if the UN system were to remain relevant.[29]

Composed of 19 independent persons with a wide range of experiences and knowledge of international migration and related issues, and supported by a core group of states that acted as an informal consultative body, the GCIM was given a three-fold mandate: first, to put the critical issue of international migration on top of the global agenda; second, to analyze gaps in current policy approaches to migration and examine its linkages with other issue areas; and third, to present recommendations to the UN Secretary-General and other stakeholders on how to strengthen international migration governance. This was, to say the least, a very ambitious mandate given the complexity of international migration. In fulfilling this mandate, the biggest challenge for the GCIM was to avoid addressing international migration from a high level of generality, but offer principles and practical recommendations to accompany states and the international community's efforts.

After two years of intense study and consultations with various stakeholders, the GCIM presented its report in 2005. The report's overarching conclusion was that "the international community has failed to realize the full potential of international migration and has not risen to the opportunities and challenges of migration."[30] While cautiously underscoring the fact that "there cannot be a single model for action by states and other stakeholders," the GCIM report reads nonetheless as a universal framework for policymaking intended to "guide and inspire states and the international community in the formulation of effective migration policies at all levels, and to encourage them to capitalize on the opportunities presented by international migration."[31] The GCIM went on to present its key findings, outlining six principles for action as well as offering 33 related recommendations in the following areas: migration, economic growth and labor market, migration and development, irregular migration, migrants in society, the protection of migrants, and the governance of international migration. Within the confines of this chapter, comments will be limited to key findings, principles of action, and recommendations dealing specifically with migration and development.

The core finding of the report is a confirmation of earlier studies that had established that migrants contribute to development and poverty reduction, through remittances and the reinvestment of their skills.

Another finding has to do with the need to maximize the flow of remittances by reducing transfer costs (through a reform of the financial sector) and to maximize the economic impact of remittances (through financial literacy programs targeting migrants and their families). Finally, the report highlights the need for states to invest in educating their citizens in order to increase their global competiveness as well as refrain from preventing skilled professionals in the health and other sectors from migrating. These findings are consistent with the conclusions of early studies and don't reveal anything new about the profound dynamics impacting migration and development.

In light of the above, the report formulated a principle of action intended to reinforce the economic and developmental impact of migration. It reads,

> The role that migrants play in promoting development and poverty reduction in countries of origin, as well as the contribution they make towards the prosperity of destination countries, should be recognized and reinforced. International migration should become an integral part of national and global strategies for economic growth, in both the developing and the developed world.[32]

The importance of this principle of action shouldn't be understated. This was the first time a report emanating from a commission established by the UN had clearly recognized the contribution that migrants make toward the development of destination and origin countries and called for the mainstreaming of migration in development policies and strategies. In line with this core principle, the GCIM formulated a number of practical recommendations calling on states to, *inter alia*, not appropriate remittances which are private money, to formulate policies and programs maximizing the development impact of return and circulation policy, to combine measures encouraging the transfer and investment of remittances with macro-economic policies conducive to economic growth and competitiveness in countries of origin, and to encourage saving and investment by members of the diaspora and their participation in transnational knowledge networks.

The GCIM report's findings, principles of action, and recommendations stimulated an important global conversation and policymaking process that unfolded in subsequent years in the framework of the UN

High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development, and the Global Forum on Migration and Development.

Following the GCIM report, the UN held its first High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development on the margins of the UN General Assembly in September 2006. The first HLD drew the participation of 127 member states along with a host of governmental and nongovernmental organizations. The HLD held four plenary sessions and discussions were structured around four round tables, each of which addressed a specific topic dealing respectively with the effects of international migration on economic and social development (table 1), respect and promotion of the human rights of migrants (table 2), multidimensional aspects of international migration and development (table 3), and partnerships, capacity building and best practices sharing (table 4).

Under each of these aforementioned topics, the HLD addressed a wide range of issues pertaining to the relationship and synergies between international migration and development. In particular, it was noted that international migration could be a positive force for development both in countries of origin and destination, provided that it was supported by the right set of policies. The HLD also underscored the need to complement national strategies to address the impact of international migration on development with strengthened bilateral, regional, and multilateral cooperation. The key outcome of the first HLD was the creation of a GFMD, which was proposed by the UN Secretary-General as a venue for discussing issues related to international migration and development in a systematic and comprehensive way. While the proposal drew widespread support among the participants, others expressed important concerns that are worth considering.[33]

One concern was that the proposed forum should focus on fostering practical, evidence-based measures aimed at maximizing the benefits and minimizing the negative effects of international migration. Some participants underscored the need for the forum to remain informal, voluntary, and state-led. It aim should be to promote closer cooperation among states on the interrelated issues of migration and development, and not to produce any negotiated outcomes or normative decisions. Finally, some participants didn't agree on the necessity of establishing such a forum either because adequate entities and structures already existed within the UN system (International Organization for Migration [IOM]) or because the regional rather than global was deemed to be a more effective level for consultation and action.[34]

Building on the 2006 HLD, the second HLD was held in October 2013. It reiterated the fact that "international migration is a multidimensional reality of major relevance for the development of countries of origin, transit and destination . . . a cross-cutting phenomenon that should be addressed in a coherent, comprehensive and balanced manner, integrating development with due regard for social, economic and environmental dimensions and respecting human rights."[35] The second HLD's Declaration reads like an omnibus document that touches on a wide range of issues highlighting the complex interrelationship between migration and development. Worth noting is the special attention that needs to be paid to the concerns of vulnerable immigrant populations (women and children), the fight against racism and xenophobia, the impact of the migration of highly skilled persons (health, social, and engineering sectors) on the development of countries of origin, and the need to enhance evidence-based policy and decision making on migration and development. Responding to the initial concerns regarding the creation of the GFMD, the Declaration notes that the latter "has proved to be a valuable forum for holding frank and open discussions and that it has helped to build trust among participant stakeholders . . . "[36] Finally, a notable and particular emphasis of the second HLD was to place the theme of migration and development within the broad framework of the follow-up to the Rio+20 Conference on Sustainable Development and the discussions regarding the post-2015 development agenda with its focus on sustainable development goals. The conceptual link between migration and sustainable, inclusive, and transformative development was an important key takeaway from the 2013 HLD. This theme was the focus of the ninth GFMD held in Bangladesh in December of 2016.

As stated earlier, the GFMD is a voluntary, informal, non-binding, and government-led consultative forum established after the first HLD in order to promote practical, evidence-based outcomes, exchange of best practices, and closer cooperation between governments on migration and development. Since the first GFMD in Brussels in 2007, GFMD annual meetings have evolved to include two components: the civil society days (CSD) meeting and the government meeting. Preceding the latter, the former bring together a wide range of civil society organizations (CSOs) associated with or interested in migration and development. The CSD report—containing a set of outcomes and recommendations—is submitted at the opening of the government meeting and serves to draw attention to the issues that CSOs would like to be discussed by

governments. Since the second GFMD in Manila in 2008, there has been an effort to foster and improve interactions between governments and CSOs through the organization of joint meetings or interfaces during which the outcomes and recommendations of CSD meetings are discussed with government representatives in order to seek a greater convergence. That said, the GFMD remains a government-led process, which has become the most important global consultative forum on migration and development.

Since the first GFMD in Brussels in 2006, successive annual meetings have provided an opportunity for states to discuss a wide range of issues at the intersection of migration and development, and exchange related best practices. Under the leadership of a chair country, each GFMD meeting has sought to bring attention to a particular topic in the migration–development debate.[37] This body of work and consultation has promoted a common understanding—even though informal and non-binding—of the key issues underpinning the migration–development nexus.

The remainder of this section will only focus on principles of action and common understandings related specifically to diasporas' role in development and diaspora engagement policy. The following core principles and understandings have emerged from GFMD meetings and consultations:

- Diaspora activities and resources can and do contribute to development but are not a substitute for the policies and resources of governments. Diaspora contributions are likely to be much more successful if they are facilitated by appropriate government policies and resources.
- National governments are not the only important partners for diaspora groups. Provincial/state and municipal governments, private sector businesses; not-for-profit institutions such as universities, laboratories, hospitals and foundations; NGOs, and civil society structures in communities of origin are also actual or potential partners in diaspora activities.
- Governments cannot expect to direct diaspora resources unilaterally, but can provide incentives to encourage diasporas to invest their money, time, and knowledge in particular sectors or projects.[38]

The nine rounds of GFMD held since 2007 have repeatedly stressed the centrality of evidence-based and coherent diaspora engagement policies for countries of origin as well as countries of settlement. Without

constructive policies and relationships with diasporas, the latter's development potential for countries of origin homeland and destination will not be realized. One of the outcomes of these consultations has been the production, in the framework of the GFMD's Platform for Partnership, of the report *Developing a Road Map for Engaging Diasporas in Development: A Handbook for Policymakers and Practitioners in Home and Host Countries.*[39] Published conjointly by the IOM and the Washington-based Migration Policy Institute (MPI), the report draws extensively on consultations and exchange of best practices within the GFMD as well as on a review of the academic and policy literature and a survey of government and non-governmental actors, to offer the most comprehensive set of policies and programs for constructively engaging diasporas in development while also highlighting both useful lessons and common challenges associated with these policies and programs.

The first part of the report calls on states to develop a road map for effective and sustainable engagement with their diaspora, the core elements of which include, *inter alia*, to need for states to clearly identify their goals and capacities in relation to the diaspora, to know, mobilize, and build trust with their diaspora, to build capacity for effective implementation, and to ensure that policies and programs are rigorously monitored and evaluated. The second part of the report discusses the importance of building diaspora institutions within the inner working of governments as well as of pursuing strategies and policies that promote a sustained engagement of the diaspora which is predicated, among other things, on flexible laws governing citizenship, residency and visa access, political rights, property rights, tax incentives for investment, portable pension, insurance, and health benefits, and formal recognition of diasporas as part of the nation and integral to national development. The third and final part offers policy recommendations and best practices in six programmatic areas in which diasporas have played a positive role in the development of their homeland. They are concerned respectively with remittances, direct investment, human capital transfer, philanthropy, capital market investment, and tourism.

The strategies, policy, and program options outlined in this report represent a vindication of the fact that, at both ends of the migration cycle (countries of origin and countries of settlement), the center of gravity of the migration–development nexus debate has clearly shifted from the question as to whether diasporas can positively impact development, to how they do so and what kinds of governments policies and programs are most conducive to constructive partnerships with diasporas. In parallel with the

global dialogue on migration and development, Africa and the EU have also pursued an interregional dialogue, which has resulted in important policy outcomes calling, *inter alia*, for engaging the diaspora in development.

MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA–EU RELATIONS

Human migrations and settlements between Europe and Africa constitute an old phenomenon. Long a region of emigration, Europe has become a region of immigration for many migrants around the world, especially from Africa. It has been estimated that immigration accounted for 89 percent of Europe's population growth between 1999 and 2000.[40] The African immigrant population in Europe is officially estimated at 4.6 million people, with the actual numbers being probably between eight and nine million. Around 30 percent of migration to Europe is attributed to Africa.[41] The growing African migrant population in Europe is, first and foremost, the result of deepening demographic and economic gaps between the two sides. To take the full measure of the demographic differential between Africa and Europe, and the economic, social, and political challenges—and, if well managed, opportunities—it entails, it is important to note that 60 percent of Africa's population is under the age of 25, while Europe is expected to see its median age increase from 37.7 years old in 2003 to 52.3 years old by 2050 with a ratio of retirees to workers to double to 0.54 by the same year (from the current four workers per retiree to two per retiree).[42] The birth rate differential stands at 1.4 children per woman in Europe versus 5.4 in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).[43]

Given the historical links, human ties, and geographic proximity between Africa and Europe, the latter will remain, *mutatis mutandis*, and for the foreseeable future, a natural outlet for millions of Africans, especially the youth seeking a "better" future. They might well be aware that a harsh reality awaits them on the other side of the Mediterranean, but this is not going to dissuade them from leaving. Better the grim environment of a lawless public housing quarter in Paris than the slums of Bamako or Kinshasa. Better the sporadic and little underground jobs in Berlin or Brussels than a hopeless life in Dakar or Freetown. Everything is relative. This is the reality that European and African policymakers must cope with. It entails both opportunities and challenges.

In the face of this inescapable reality, Europe has, for the most part and up until recently, emphasized the societal, economic, and security perils that "uncontrolled" migration from Africa poses. It has essentially, both

conceptually and operationally, addressed migration through a security framework that posits it as a "problem," a phenomenon that threatens Europe's social fabric and compact. On the other hand, African countries have adopted, for the most part, a reactive attitude by insisting on the respect of international standards and the protection of the human rights of migrant populations in Europe, the brain drain problem, remittances, as well as xenophobia and racism facing African immigrants in Europe. Each party remained locked in its position, with no common agenda on what is intrinsically an interdependent issue that calls for a "frank" dialogue and common approach. Within this context, Europe would unilaterally develop its coercive migration response, while Africa lacked a coherent migration policy framework and strategy on the basis of which to collectively engage Europe.

The tragic events of Ceuta and Melilla in October 2005, during which hundreds of African immigrants died while trying to access EU territory through the North African Spanish enclaves, provided an eloquent and tragic illustration of the unsustainability of the security-only approach which had dominated, until then, European discourse and practice on migration. It is generally agreed that the graphic violation of human rights that accompanied these tragic events "prompted a reconsideration of the current approach [security] and the realization that a policy based on control and repression exclusively would not only remain ineffective but also violate the Union's very own values and thus do harm to its external image in the world."[44] Ceuta and Melilla provided the political impetus to place the management of African migration at the top of the European agenda and initiate a multi-level dialogue with Africa that emphasizes a root cause approach through the migration–development nexus.[45]

This conceptual shift has been endorsed and is reflected in various documents that have been unilaterally adopted by the EU and the AU, as well as in those that have resulted from their political dialogue and other processes devoted to migration and development over the past decade, chief among which the Joint Africa-EU Declaration on Migration and Development adopted in Tripoli in November 2006 and its subsequent operationalization through the Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment (PMME), one of the eight thematic partnerships of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) adopted in Lisbon in 2007. The PMME represents a policy reorientation predicated on a common strategy that emphasizes a more balanced approach and places migration within the broader development paradigm.

UNILATERAL POLICIES

On the EU side, the debate over a new approach to migration in the aftermath of the tragic events of Ceuta and Melilla led to the adoption by the Commission of a communication titled *Migration and Development: Some Concrete Orientations.*[46] This Communication was conceived of as a reflection of the EU common position and contribution to the UN HLD on Migration and Development scheduled to take place in New York in September 2006. Contrary to the dominant thinking that saw migration mainly as a by-product of underdevelopment, this Communication stressed the need for "further steps for improving the impact of migration on development" thus treating the former as a phenomenon that could positively impact the latter, and broadening the migration–development nexus. The Commission outlined some key policy areas ranging from remittances, the role of diaspora communities, circular migration and brain circulation, and mitigating measures intended to limit the negative impacts of a brain drain.

Ensuing discussions within the EU and mounting calls for a balanced approach and increased migration cooperation with Africa culminated into the adoption by the European Council, in December 2005, of an important strategy-programming document titled *Global Approach to Migration: Priority Actions Focusing on Africa and the Mediterranean.*[47] The Council attempted to approach and address migration from a whole range of issues to which it is related, such as legal and illegal movement of people, trafficking and smuggling in human beings, refugee protection, and the possible synergies between development and migration. Within this broad framework, the Council recommended that instruments and resources from different policy areas including development, social affairs and employment, external relations, and justice and home affairs be brought to bear in developing both long- and short-term strategies that deal with the root causes of migration. In particular, the Council underscored the strategic imperative of dialogue with African countries of origin and transit in a spirit of "partnership, solidarity, and shared responsibility."

From a programmatic perspective, the Council's vision was captured and developed by the Commission in a January 25, 2006 Communication, which emphasized, once more, the need to shift the external dimension of migration policy from a security to a development approach intended on addressing the root causes of migration. This Communication is worth a

lengthy quotation for it marks—both conceptually and rhetorically—a clear break from the pre-2005 EU migration policy framework:

> Among these policy developments, those referring to migration and development and to legal economic migration are probably destined to exert the more innovative effects. This goes in parallel with the fact that until recently the external dimension of the migration policy has been prevalently built around the objective of better managing migratory flows with a view to reducing the migratory pressure on the Union. Although this remains a valid goal, the additional challenge today lies in the development of policies which recognize the need for migrant workers to make our economies function in those sectors where the EU is facing labor and skills shortages and, at the same time, which maximize both for the migrants and their countries of origin the benefits triggered by the migration. This presupposes an approach which goes beyond the questions of border control and fight against illegal immigration, to incorporate other dimensions of the migratory phenomenon, in particular development and employment.[48]

Against the backdrop of the tragic events of Ceuta and Malilla and in the lead-up to the first UN High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development, EU internal debates and policy outcomes on migration were matched by an equally intense activity on the part of the AU and its member states. This activity resulted into the adoption, by the Executive Council of the AU, of two important policy documents in the area of migration in 2006.

The first document *African Common Position on Migration and Development* was intended, among other things, "to enable Africa to ensure that its concerns are properly reflected at the Africa/Europe dialogue and other international fora."[49] After noting that "Of the 150 million migrants in the world, more than 50 million are estimated to be Africans (. . .) and [that] the management of migration has necessarily become one of the critical challenges for states in the new millennium," the AU stresses "the need for a comprehensive and balanced approach to migration taking into account migration realities and trends as well as linkages between migration and other key economic, social, political and humanitarian issues."[50] The AU goes on to express African concerns that the emphasis on addressing illegal and irregular migration has been only on security considerations rather than on broader development frameworks and on mainstreaming migration in development strategies. Resolutely root-cause

oriented, this document outlines a set of priority migration-related policies in the areas of development, human resource and brain drain, labor migration, remittances, diaspora communities, peace, security, and stability, human rights, gender, children, youth, and elderly. It also addresses a number of crosscutting issues in relation to health, the environment, trade, and access to social services. The AU recommends especially, at the international level, "collective effort to address the fundamental causes of this phenomenon, which are the disparity in development, conflicts and political instability."[51]

The second document adopted by the AU, *The Migration Policy Framework for Africa*, was intended to provide member states and regional economic communities (RECs) with concrete guidelines and agreed-upon principles for an effective management of migration on the African continent.[52] The formulation of the Framework had been recommended by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) meeting in Lusaka in July 2001. Endorsing a root-cause approach to migration management, this document offers a comprehensive approach to migration management by identifying nine key thematic migration issues and recommending appropriate set of actions to be considered by states and RECs in the areas of labor migration, border migration, irregular migration, forced displacement, human rights of migrants, internal migration, migration data, migration and development, and inter-state cooperation and partnerships. On the issues pertaining directly to the migration–development nexus (diaspora, remittances, and brain drain), the formulations and recommended strategies are quasi identical to those articulated in the *Migration Policy Framework*. This is not surprising giving the fact that the two policy documents were developed concomitantly. The *Common Position* was particularly critical in the context of Africa-EU dialogue on migration and development.

Besides the two aforementioned documents dealing with the general parameters and implications of the migration phenomenon, the AU has also pursued a robust policy agenda targeting the diaspora more specifically. The next chapter by Jinmi Adisa offers a comprehensive analysis of the AU's institutional relations and policy making toward the African diaspora. Within the confines of this section and to avoid overlapping, I'll only offer a succinct commentary on the *Declaration of the Global African Diaspora Summit* adopted in 2012 which seeks to operationalize key diaspora policies and strategies outlined by the AU since 2006. However, before discussing the Declaration, it is important to comment

on the context and historical significance of the 2012 Global African Diaspora Summit itself.

After six years of diaspora diplomacy and policymaking, the 2012 Global African Diaspora Summit, convened in Sandton, South Africa, was held a critical juncture for the AU. To ensure the relevance of its Diaspora Initiative, it was imperative for the AU to move from broad policy pronouncements and prescriptions to a concrete plan of action around which resources could be mobilized. Initially expected to take place in 2008, the Summit had, however, to be postponed for reasons that were not clearly communicated by the AU. The postponement of the Summit would add to the sense that the whole Diaspora Initiative was taking in water and might end up in a cul-de-sac, the way of other ambitious initiatives from the AU. The Diaspora Initiative's lack of focus and the absence of a single and unified document around which the various stakeholders could rally were some of the major concerns expressed at that time.

It took four years for the Summit to be finally organized. In some way, this extended preparation time helped to gather a broad consensus on the Declaration. As stated by Benin's President Boni Yayi, AU Chairperson at the time of the Summit, "that period since then [2008] had been put to good use in order to refine and consolidate the documents."[53] The choice of the location (Sandton, South Africa) highlights South Africa's diplomacy and leadership in mainstreaming the diaspora in Africa's development strategy as had been stressed by former President Thabo Mbeki, one of the architects of the AU. Celebrated as a "monumental historical event in the lives of Africans in the continent and all over the world," the 2012 Global African Diaspora Summit was attended by 500 participants from Africa and various segments of the diaspora, of whom 89 Heads of State and Government as well as other ranking officials representing all 54 AU member states and a number of Caribbean, South and Latin America states.[54]

The highlight of the Summit was the adoption of the Declaration which has been referred to as "the Magna Carta of the Diaspora Process, a fundamental law that would guide the Diaspora Process."[55] The Declaration preamble takes stock of "the imperative of a sustained and coordinated approach and ownership of the African diaspora related programs and projects so as to promote their effective implementation and impact." The historic Declaration stands as a single document consisting of four main parts. The first is a political Declaration, which reiterates the

broad objectives of the Union while highlighting the reasons for including the diaspora and underscoring the commitments undertaken within this framework as well as the agenda and purpose. The second reads as a Program of Action, which outlines specific areas for joint action as well as a set of concrete measures aimed at supporting or enabling progress. The third part focuses on a range of implementation mechanisms and instruments. The fourth and final part identifies a number of priority projects to be undertaken to underscore the practical relevance of the partnership between Africa and its global diaspora. A further discussion of the Declaration's key outcomes is warranted.

In the area of political cooperation pertaining to the diaspora, the Declaration outlines a set of measures and initiatives dealing respectively with intergovernmental cooperation and the mobilization of support and resources for the development of Africa and its diaspora. The Declaration calls, for example, for the strengthening of "the participation of the African diaspora in the affairs of the African Union" as well as for "the contribution of the African diaspora in the strengthening of international partnerships of the African Union."

In the area of economic cooperation, the Declaration lays down a number of actionable items regarding government action to foster increased economic partnership, mobilization of capital, partnership in business, science and technology, knowledge transfer and skills mobilization, infrastructure development, information gathering and dissemination capacity, and climate change. Among these items is, for example, the possibility of creating a Development Fund and /or African Diaspora Investment Fund to address development challenges confronting Africans in the continent and the diaspora. The Declaration also calls for increased support for the development of Africa-related undersea cable and terrestrial fiber-optic connectivity initiatives.

Cooperation in the social area centers around a host of initiatives and ideas addressing issues related to knowledge and education, arts and culture, media and image branding, immigration and human, and people's, rights. Of particular interest are, for example, ideas regarding the coordination and funding of cultural exchange programs between Africa and the diaspora, and the possibility of establishing an African news network service to enhance image branding and imaging of Africa. This represents, to say the least, a very ambitious program of action.

Cognizant of the imperative of operationalizing AU's diaspora agenda and of "giving practical meaning to the diaspora program and in order to

facilitate the post-Summit implementation program," the Declaration identifies five deliverables. These are legacy projects that have been discussed at various stages of the Diaspora Initiative. They include: (a) the production of a skills database of African professionals in the diaspora; (b) the establishment of the African diaspora volunteer corps; (c) the African diaspora investment fund; (d) a program on the development marketplace for the diaspora, as a framework for facilitating innovation and entrepreneurship among African and diaspora; and (e) the African remittances institute.

These are the flagship projects against which AU's diaspora agenda will be assessed in the coming years. As Dr. Jean Ping, then Chairperson of the AU Commission, observed after the adoption of the Declaration, "member states and all stakeholders must recommit themselves to the implementation agenda by providing necessary resources for the program and sustaining focus and interest in its consolidation and advancement."[56] Four years after the adoption of the Declaration, these specific projects are at various stages of implementation. The intent here is not to discuss the implementation process, but simply to identify the policy recommendations unilaterally outlined by the AU and the EU as well those that have emerged, since 2006, from a series of migration dialogues within various fora and frameworks that form the complex web of Africa–EU interregional relations.

INTERREGIONAL POLICIES

The first framework involves European and African countries on a continent-to-continent political dialogue. It started with the Euro-African Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development in Rabat in July 2006. The Preamble of the Rabat Declaration sets the stage for what seems to have emerged as the basis for any credible migration dialogue and cooperation between Africa and Europe:

> Aware that the destinies of our countries are linked and that only the development of an effective, rapid and tangible solidarity embodying both the imperatives of sustainable development and security for all will be able to offer a lasting answer to the management of migratory flows;
>
> Convinced that international migration has a positive effect on the host country and on the country of origin when such flows are well managed;

> Conscious that the management of migratory flows cannot be achieved through control measures only, but also require a concerted action on the root causes of migration, in particular through the implementation of development projects in Africa (....)

> Reaffirming that the management of these flows requires a coherent response that addresses, in a comprehensive and balanced way, the different aspects and various phases of the migratory process as a whole, in the context of an approach involving countries of origin, transit and destination.[57]

Against this backdrop—which reflects a consensus between Europe's security concerns emanating from migration flows and Africa's concerns over the structural factors sustaining those flows—the Rabat Declaration emphasizes the need for a "pragmatic and operational" approach to the migration question as outlined in its Action Plan, which is supposed to be implemented based on the core principles of "ownership," "adherence," and "partnership." European and African countries engaged in this partnership are called upon to consider implementing a wide range of concrete actions grouped into five migration-related policy areas. The Rabat Declaration's first area of cooperation is directly concerned with the migration–development nexus. It recommends a series of measures dealing respectively with the promotion of development; the establishment of financial instruments favorable to co-development; the development of knowledge and know-how and of measures aiming to guarantee that sufficient skills are available for the development of African countries; the development of partnership between technical and scientific institutions; and the strengthening of cooperation in professional training.[58]

The Rabat Conference remains important because it outlined, for the first time, a mutually agreed upon migration cooperation framework between European and African countries. It reflects a broad consensus and establishes a "balanced and comprehensive" policy framework for the management of migratory flows. It has been, *mutatis mutandis*, endorsed by other processes. The outcomes of the Rabat Conference and its implementation process were discussed during a follow-up meeting in Madrid on June 21, 2007, as well as during the Second Euro-African Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development held in Paris in November 2008. Pursuant to the "spirit of Rabat," the Paris Conference adopted a non-binding three-year cooperation program along three pillars that successively address operational issues related to the organization of legal

migration, the fight against irregular migration, and synergies between migration and development.[59]

The second framework of migration dialogue involves EU institutions and member states on the one hand, and the AU and African states on the other. This dialogue had been requested by the AU Assembly meeting in Banjul in July 2006, and it finally took place in Tripoli in the framework of the Africa-EU Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development, which was held in November 2006. It has been argued that the decision to hold the Conference was aimed, from a EU policy perspective, at "building a communicative and decision-making bridge between two areas traditionally separated by EU external action: Euro-Mediterranean relationships and relations with sub-Saharan African, till now predominantly managed, from an operational point of view, under the umbrella of the framework agreements with the ACP countries."[60]

The similarities between the outcomes of the Rabat and Tripoli conferences are striking. The latter did build on the consensus that emerged from the former. Tripoli brought together more or less the same actors that had participated in the Rabat Conference. The reading of the Tripoli Declaration's preamble doesn't suggest any qualitative breakthrough, policy departure, or conceptual advance from Rabat. Building on Rabat's *acquis*, The Tripoli Declaration identifies nine key areas of migration cooperation for which corresponding measures are suggested: migration and development, migration management challenges, peace and security, human resources and brain drain, concern for human rights and the well-being of the individual, sharing best practices, regular migration opportunities, illegal or irregular migration, and the protection of refugees.[61] The follow-up of the Tripoli Declaration has been left to the PMME and its various action plans adopted since the EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon in December of 2007.

The existence of a multi-level EU-Africa migration dialogue raises questions of coherence, coordination, and harmonization between the various policy frameworks. The Second Euro-African Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development acknowledged this challenge when it recommended that:

> In order to enhance synergy with the other process of dialogue between the European Union and Africa, taking account of the interdependence of the various African migratory routes, the work of the Euro-African Process will be brought to the attention of the competent bodies of the Africa-EU

Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment, with a view to ensuring proper link-up.[62]

The question of synergy and coordination set aside, the main impact of this multi-level migration dialogue has been a paradigm shift from a security to a root-cause approach whose center of gravity is on the migration–development nexus. As noted by the OECD, "By furthering dialogue and co-operation with African partners to implement the global approach, a consensus has emerged—theoretically, if not for the moment practically—on the strategy linking 'migration and development.'"[63] We shall now see how this strategy has been reflected in the PMME, which has become the main policy framework through which EU-Africa migration cooperation has been pursued since the adoption of the JAES.

To achieve its objectives, the JAES promotes a set of new approaches intended, *inter alia*, "to encourage the full integration of members of migrant communities/disporas in their countries of residence, while at the same time promoting and facilitating links with their countries of origin, with a view to providing concrete contributions to the development process."[64]

Further elaboration on the migration and development nexus in the JAES indicates what has been termed a "balanced approach" through which the parties seek to harness the positive impacts of the migration and mobility phenomena while also addressing their down-sides. In pursuing the former, the parties intend "to promote and better manage legal migration with a view to supporting the socio-economic development of both countries of origin and countries of destination."[65] The concept of "circular migration" is thus mentioned as a policy tool in migration management. While recognizing the positive sides of migration, Africa and the EU also express their commitment to deal with its negative sides through efforts and coercive measures aimed, among other things, at fighting illegal migration, combating trafficking in human beings, and mitigating the negative impacts of the brain drain, especially on Africa's health and education sectors. Lastly, given the political nature and sensitivity of the migration question, one certainly welcomes the parties' desire to "work to deepen their frank and constructive dialogue" within the framework of Tripoli and other regional processes discussed earlier.[66] The JAES vision and general policy framework on migration and development have been put in music through the first (2008–2010), second (2011–2013), and third (2014–2017)

Action Plans.[67] An overview of the PMME as articulated in these various Action Plans is warranted.

In the first Action Plan (2008–2010), the PMME was structured around three priority actions, namely the implementation of the Tripoli Declaration on Migration and Development, the implementation of the EU-Africa Plan on Trafficking of Human Beings, and the implementation of the 2004 Ougadougou Declaration and Action Plan on Employment and Poverty Alleviation in Africa. A succinct comment on the first priority action, which deals directly with the migration–development nexus, is warranted.

Four broad objectives are pursued under the priority action: to facilitate mobility and free movement of people in Africa and the EU and to better manage legal migration between the two continents; to address the root causes of migration and refugee flows; to find concrete solutions to problems posed by illegal or irregular migratory flows; and to address the problems of migrants residing in EU and African countries.[68] These are, to say the least, very ambitious objectives whose formulation remains, however, intentionally vague.

In pursuing these objectives, the parties expect to achieve, among other things, the following outcomes: a better utilization of potential synergies between migration and development, concrete progress towards tackling the critical human resource situation in the health sector and other sectors of concern, enhanced cooperation on migration management in Africa and the EU, improved cooperation in the fight against illegal or irregular migration, a better integration of African migrants in their respective EU and African countries of residence, further reduction of obstacles to free movement of people within Africa and within the EU, and enhanced mechanisms to facilitate circular migration between Africa and the EU.[69]

A host of activities are suggested to achieve these outcomes. Among the most important ones related to migration are: the integration of relevant issues concerning migration, mobility, and employment into poverty reduction strategies and country strategy papers, the creation of a network of migration observatories to collect, analyze, and disseminate data on migration flows, the facilitation of safer, faster, and cheaper remittances, and the fight against illegal immigration, human smuggling and human trafficking, and the examination of the feasibility of setting up a Fund as provided for in the Tripoli Declaration.[70] Other activities deal more specifically with the question of mobility. It is thus suggested that the parties: promote dialogue and cooperation on visa issues, promote "ethical

recruitment" policies in the EU and in Africa to minimize brain drain pull factors in critical sectors, scale up education and vocational training in critical sectors, set up and maintain appropriate incentive mechanisms that will encourage the retention and return of key qualified personnel, facilitate the mobility of members of the diasporas and/or migrant communities to allow them to act as agents of development, set up Migration Information and Management Centers in Africa, and support partnerships and twinning.

The Second Action Plan (2011–2013) fine-tuned the First Action Plan based on a review of implementation achievements and challenges since the 2007 Lisbon Summit. The Second Action Plan retains the same policy and conceptual underpinning of seeking "balanced and comprehensive" responses to migration, mobility, and employment challenges by addressing both the negative and positive impacts of these phenomena. However, unlike in the First Action Plan, the Second Plan is structured in a more concise and simplified way. The first part of the Plan addresses its overall objectives, while the second lists a number of specific initiatives and activities to be undertaken throughout 2013. Another important highlight of the Second Action Plan is its focus on higher education, which has become a more visible and integral part of the PMME.

The chief objective of the partnership is to "strengthen inter-regional, continental and inter-continental dialogue and cooperation in the area of migration, mobility and employment among countries of origin, transit and destination."[71] In pursuing this dialogue, the parties seek to enhance coherence and synergies between these various policy areas, to which have been added education policies and development/poverty reduction strategies. More specifically, the agenda on political and policy dialogue on migration is expected to focus on the following topics of interest, while taking into account the concerns of countries of origin, transit, and destination: diasporas, remittances, brain drain, migrants rights, social consequences of migration; regular migration, including circular migration, mobility, and visa issues; illegal migration, trafficking in human beings, smuggling of migrants, readmission and return; and refugees, asylum and protection.[72] The dialogue on employment, for its part, includes topics such as strategies and initiatives targeting job creation and sustainable and inclusive growth, and the role of relevant stakeholders, especially the private sector, in these processes. The role of higher education in employment and mobility strategies is particularly emphasized through the parties' commitment to dialogue on "ways of supporting the mobility of students and scholars and the

realization of the African higher education harmonization process."[73] The second part of the Action Plan indentifies 12 concrete actions and initiatives to be pursued in 2011–2013, some of which deal directly with issues of interest to the diaspora, such as support for the establishment of the African remittances institute; the development and implementation of a diaspora outreach initiative; the operationalization of an observatory on migration; the launching of a decent work initiative; labor-market governance and capacity building, the strengthening of regional and sub-regional employment, labor, social protection, labor migration, and the launching of the African higher education and harmonization and tuning initiative, which seeks to review the state of implementation of mutual recognition of higher education certificates and qualifications in Africa.[74]

In the third Action Plan (2014–2017) adopted at the fourth EU-Africa Summit in Brussels in 2014, the migration-development nexus is addressed under Priority Area 3 dealing with the broader topic of human development. The Summit also adopted a Joint Declaration on Migration and Mobility which outlines specific areas of focus. The Declaration reiterates Africa and the EU's "common goal to maximize the development impact of migration and mobility, to improve migration governance and cooperation in countries of origin, transit and destination and to promote the role of migrants as agents of innovation and development," while acknowledging that "migration and mobility between and within our continents present both opportunities and challenges."[75] The Declaration goes on to stress that "diasporas create strong human ties between our continents and that they contribute significantly to the development of countries of origin and destination."[76] Among the areas of focus for the period under consideration, it is worth noting the parties' commitment "to strengthen the nexus between migration and development, including by stepping up efforts to significantly reduce the costs of remittances, consolidate the African Institute for Remittances and strengthen policy frameworks for enhancing diaspora engagement."[77]

An analysis of the PMME implementation process is beyond the purview of this chapter. For an account of the implementation of activities and initiatives included in the three aforementioned Action Plans adopted since 2007, the reader may refer to the review reports produced by various JAES structures and other independent organizations, all of which point to key implementation challenges related chiefly to the lack of synergies between various actors and levels of action as well as a growing "political

dilution," an institutional dynamic that underscores the fact that the partnership has become, for the most part, subject to a technical and bureaucratic management under the responsibility of various levels of officials and experts while contentious and sensitive issues that must be dealt with in order to strengthen the migration–development nexus in Africa-EU relations remain off the table.[78]

CONCLUSION

The past decade has witnessed intense consultations at the global, inter-regional (Africa-EU) and regional (Africa) levels focused on the migration–development nexus, which has been referred to as the new mantra in development discourse and strategy. From the work of the UN Global Commission on International Migration to the High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development and the various rounds of the Global Forum on Migration and Development has emerged a body of principles and policy recommendations on the growing importance of diasporas as development agents and how best to engage with them as an integral part of national development plans and strategies in sending and destination countries of origin.

This global policymaking exercise outlines a four-steps interrelated diaspora engagement process that underscores four major strategic elements to be pursued, at various degrees, by governments of both origin and destination countries. In order to facilitate stronger diaspora involvement in national development, governments must first identify their goals and capacities in relation to the diaspora. Second, governments must endeavor to know the diaspora by mapping its location and characteristics. Third, governments ought to build trust with the diaspora and not simply look it as a cash cow. Building trust is predicated on a number of measures such as dual citizenship, active consular networks, explanation of and feedback on government's diaspora policy, and the provision of various services to the diaspora. The fourth and final strategic element is aimed at effectively mobilizing the diaspora as partners for development once the government has undertaken steps one to three. A set of policy measures has been recommended for effective diaspora mobilization. They range from institutional overhaul, high-profile events involving the diaspora, to facilitation of investment. These policy recommendations draw on best practices that have been substantiated by empirical evidence and scholarly insights gathered over the past decade on the role of diasporas as

transnational and development actors under against the backdrop of deepening globalization challenging the sovereignty and centrality of the nation-state as central promoter of development.

The importance of diasporas as development agents has also been echoed in policy documents adopted in the framework of various Africa-EU interregional processes. The Africa-EU Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment's overarching objective has been to shift from a security approach to a root-causes/development approach to migration. Since its adoption in 2007, the two sides have been trying to strengthen the migration–development nexus in their interregional relations through a number of concrete projects such as the establishment of the African Remittances Institute.

Since its inception in 2002, the African Union has sought to redefine Pan-Africanism by reserving a special place to the global African diaspora in the development of the continent and the building of the Union. The AU's diaspora initiative has led to the adoption of important policy documents that outline, for the first time, the organization's diaspora doctrine as well as the key policies and institutional components of the partnership between Africa and its diaspora. The organization has also called upon its member states to enact diaspora engagement policies aimed at mainstreaming the diaspora in national development plans and strategies, and harnessing the wealth and talents of the global African diaspora.

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Jack Mangala is Professor of Political Science and of Area and Global Studies, and the Padnos/Sarosik Endowed Professor of Civil Discourse at Grand Valley State University, Michigan, where he previously served as Director of the African and African American Studies Program as well as Director of the Area Studies. His publications include *Africa and the New World Era: From Humanitarianism to a Strategic View* (Palgrave, 2010), *New Security Threats and Crises in Africa: Regional and International Perspectives* (Palgrave, 2010), and *Africa and the European Union: A Strategic Partnership* (Palgrave, 2013).

The African Union Perspective on the Diaspora

Jinmi Adisa

INTRODUCTION

The African Union Diaspora Initiative derives its justification from the trans-formation agenda of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU). The OAU that preceded the AU was focused on the agenda of political independence and decolonization. The primary objective of the OAU was to complete the processes of political liberation from colonialism. The pursuit of this political agenda did not ignore considerations of development. It simply gave primacy to the need for self-actualization as a condition for development. The presumption was that development would automatically follow political independence. Hence the declaration by the Osagyefo, President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, that "Seek ye first political independence and all other things shall be added unto it."

This assumption had four logical corollaries. First was that self-rule and political independence would necessarily bring internal democracy and related auto-centered development. Second was that these processes would be nourished by the prevailing ethics of political solidarity within African societies that

J. Adisa (✉)
Citizens and Diaspora Directorate, African Union Commission, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

governed the struggle for independence and that this would persist in the post-independence period. Third was that African political leaders had been forced to accept political independence on a territorial basis as a pragmatic means of ensuring the demise of colonial rule but that once that had been achieved political unity would grow into a wider continental development project. There were differences about the processes and nature of continental unity that will be attained in such aftermath. Nkrumah and his fellow travellers in the Casablanca Group had visions of a rapid process culminating in an African Union Government. The more cautious and conservative elements in the rival Monrovia Group preferred a functional process that would ultimately culminate in the same result after a protracted period of time. Fourth was that these political processes within territorial states and at the wider regional level would have a spillover and spin-off effect in the area of development.

Almost 40 years later on the eve of the formation of the African Union in 2000, the bulk of these assumptions had turned out to be mistaken. The agitation for independence united all social constituencies in the various African states in the struggle for independence but this did not endure in the aftermath. Political independence did not bring the desired prosperity or development. The African State system came under severe pressure with the emergence of political dictatorship, one party states and military rule in the immediate aftermath of independence. There was a proliferation of internal conflicts all over the continent.

This impacted on both the image and agenda of the regional organization, the OAU, which was derided in some quarters as a club of dictators and, in any case, became preoccupied with resolution of conflicts arising from governance issues. As the continental organization began to contend seriously with the resolution of internal crises and conflicts it became clear that the key political problems bedeviling the continent were associated with the issue of development, particularly the need to assure the dividends of self-rule and democracy and the distribution of benefits arising therefrom. Thus, the transformation of the regional organization must be premised on a developmental imperative.

The Logic of Diaspora Incorporation Into the African Union

The emphasis on development highlighted the need for active mobilization of all segments of African society. Thus, the preamble of the Constitutive Act of the Union was specific in its intention to build

partnership between governments and all segments of the African society in sharp contrast to the Charter of the preceding Organization, the OAU.[1] Indeed, beyond the Assembly of Heads of State and Government who were the mainstay of the OAU, the Constitutive Act created institutions and structures such as the Pan-African Parliament, a civil society parliament, the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), the Human Rights Commission and the African Courts, that can promote and hopefully support the desire to create and foster a people-oriented and people-centered community in the African Union that will mobilize the totality of the African people to support the goal of development.[2]

Significantly, the founders of the Union recognized that an important constituency required for this mass mobilization effort was resident outside the shores of the continent among the African diaspora. The reincorporation of the diaspora as an important entity in the building of the Union thus became a priority within the framework of the developmental agenda of the Union. Accordingly, an Extra-Ordinary Summit of the OAU held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in January 2001, adopted a protocol on the amendment to the Constitutive Act of the Union, which in its Article 3(q) "invites and encourages the full participation of the African diaspora to participate as an important component in the building and development of the Union."

Purpose and Agenda

The discussions that preceded the agreement on the Amendment shed some light on the purpose and agenda of the exercise. The motion was formally presented by Senegal that the diaspora should be integrated within the Union as the "sixth region of the continent" to complement the five existing geographical regions of East, West, Central, South and North, that were recognized within the continent. The motion was hotly debated and the Council of Ministers could not agree on the precise implications of "the sixth region" and how it would operate. The African Union, more often than not, operates on the basis of consensus politics and this meant that what was normally agreed upon was the lowest common denominator on which all or most parties could agree.

The common factor in the debate was an agreement on the need to associate the diaspora with the development of the Union and the knowledge that the diaspora could be instrumental to and/or add value to regional-development goals. The amendment therefore, proposed the

rebuilding of the global African family as a platform for renaissance and development. The imperative of the reunification of continental and diaspora Africans recognized the need to come together "to make Africa whole again" in a manner that will heal the wounds of previous separation and also facilitate developmental aspirations. The desire unified both requirements as symbiotic. It implied a requirement of mutuality through which continental Africans will support their brethren and sisters in the diaspora and vice versa.

The debate in both the Council of Ministers and the Summit of Heads of State and Government also highlighted areas of differences. It highlighted the need to define clearly who really is a member of the diaspora. Some felt it should be restricted to only those African Citizens who have gone abroad as recent migrants. Others felt it should include all people of African descent; especially those whose fathers and mothers were products of the slave trade. There was also the question of the nature of reciprocal relationships that is envisaged between Africa and its diaspora. What precisely can the diaspora bring to the AU and what can the AU bring to the diaspora?

TIMING AND METHODOLOGY

The timing of the introduction of the diaspora issue in the agenda of the African Union was a bit inauspicious. If the issue had been introduced in the context of the drawing up of the Constitutive Act, the question of how would have been properly explored and negotiated and agreements secured. Moreover, during the processes leading to the Constitutive Act, the various Member States would have been made fully aware of attendant obligations and responsibilities in a manner that would support appropriate funding. As it was, the Amendment in the Extraordinary Session was a compromise solution and in such cases, it was left to the Commission as the Secretariat of the Union to work out details and negotiate them in successive stages with Member States in the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) of Ambassadors resident in Addis Ababa and through them the Executive Council and the Assembly.

The added complication in this case was that the Amendment on the diaspora required ratification of two-thirds of the Member States to have the force of law and to date almost 14 years after the adoption of the amendment, this has not been secured. The procedure of progressive negotiation through the PRC and the Executive Council is normally

tedious but in this case without a covering law per se the issue became even more difficult. The line responsibility for this difficult exercise fell on the responsible Department, the Coordinating Unit of the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) that later grew into the Citizenship and Diaspora Directorate (CIDO) in the Office of the Chairperson of the Commission. However, in matters involving Council and Assembly the vigor and drive of the incumbent Chairperson is critical for securing the support of Member States and it was fortunate that the Commission at the time was led by Professor Alpha Oumar Konare, former President of Mali, a true Pan-Africanist and visionary who gave genuine support to the process. Konare combined aptitude, skill, and tireless commitment. He taught, listened, and was willing to learn and ever ready to provide credible leadership in support of the integration agenda.

Accordingly, under his leadership, the Commission presented a framework document entitled "The Development of the Diaspora initiative within the framework of the OAU/AU" to the Third Extra-ordinary Session of the Executive Council held in Sun City, South Africa from May 21 to May 25, 2003, to seek support for and outline measures that would be required to develop the project in the absence of a concrete legislative premise.[3] Prominent among this was the need to reach out to and deepen contacts with the diaspora community in various parts of the world, but the most important was to define the African diaspora.

Definition of the African Diaspora

The Extra-Ordinary Session of the Executive Council in Sun City directed the Commission to convene a Technical Workshop on diaspora relations to focus, among other things, on the definition of the diaspora. Council also provided the terms of reference for the work of the workshop. The workshop that was convened in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago from June 2 to June 5, 2004 in collaboration with the Foundation for Democracy (FDA) and the Emancipation Support Committee of Trinidad and Tobago, was opened by the then Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, HE Mr. Patrick Manning.

The workshop concluded with the recommendation that the African diaspora should refer to geographic "dispersal of peoples whose ancestors, within historical memory, originally came from Africa, but who are currently domiciled, or claim residence or citizenship, outside the continent

of Africa."[4] This report of the workshop and the definition was presented through the Permanent Representatives Committee of Ambassadors in preparation for the Sixth Ordinary Session of the Executive Council in Abuja, Nigeria from January 27 to January 28, 2005, but it was rejected mainly on the ground that it was a definition largely proposed by the diaspora that must be reviewed by an Expert Group of Representatives of Member States. The Member States decided that a Committee of State Experts be convened to review and finalize the definition. The decision set a precedence for matters dealing with diaspora relations as proceeding on a two-track model. In the spirit of mutuality, the diaspora would be consulted for recommendations that would then be submitted for review and decision by Member States. The tension between diaspora demands and preferences and the positions acceptable to Member States would continue to define the realities of the assimilation of the diaspora within the processes of the African Union.

The meeting of Experts from Member States took place in Addis Ababa between April 11 and April 12, 2005 and adopted the definition that "The African Diaspora consists of people of African origin living outside the continent, irrespective of their citizenship and nationality and who are willing to contribute to the development of the continent and the building of the African Union[5]" The definition was adopted at the next Ordinary Session of Council and Assembly at the next Ordinary Sessions in July 2005.

This definition has attracted some criticism from some continental and diaspora elements. Moreover, though it was adopted by consensus among the delegations, some delegations showed preference for other definitions. Two delegations wanted a two-part definition that would capture both academic and intellectual aspects on the one hand, and another that would embrace the socio-economic and political needs of the Union. The majority of Member States was against this and preferred an omnibus practical definition allied with the needs of the Union. Another delegation wanted to add "permanently" to "living outside the continent." The majority was not convinced that there was a method through which one could be assured that a diaspora element would remain permanently outside the continent. Others even felt that that consideration was reprehensible. Two of the delegations felt that commitment to building the African Union should be left out and that acceptance of the African diaspora should be unqualified as a moral obligation. The majority contested this on the ground that Union Membership had its obligations and the diaspora

should carry its own weight. Also, the emphasis on "living outside the continent" did not address the case of generational returnees particularly those from the Caribbean that had come back to settle in Africa like the Shashemani community in Ethiopia. These returnees were often not integrated into national communities.

The Decision of the Expert Group was guided by the initial presentation of the Commission through the CSSDCA that a working definition must combine certain key characteristics and necessary and sufficient conditions. The characteristics embodied in this definition are four fold. First are bloodline and /or heritage. The diaspora consists of people whose ancestral roots or heritage are in Africa. The second element underlined the factor of dispersal or migration. The diaspora can only include people of African origin who have migrated from or are living outside the continent. In this context, three streams were identified—pre-slave trade, slave trade, and post slave trade or modern migration. The main assumption here was that one cannot be a diaspora in his own home. The African diaspora must live outside Africa. Third and associated with the preceding characteristic is the factor of inclusiveness. The definition embraces ancient and modern diaspora. The fourth element was that simply being of African descent was not enough to qualify as a diasporan in the African Union. The sense of belonging required a positive value orientation. The diaspora must commit to be part of the African family and willing to contribute to its building and development. This definition offers a critical insight into the African Union perspective of the diaspora.

ENGAGEMENT STRATEGIES

The Commitment of the African Union to mainstream the participation of the African diaspora was purposive and instrumental but also rooted in an ideological perspective. The transformational agenda of the continental organization underlined the need for African developmental processes to be erected on a platform of self-rehabilitation through which Africa connects with its hitherto missing parts within and outside the continent to become dynamic and whole again. The healing process was expected to be catalytic to drive Africa as an essential actor in the development process.

This focus did not permit passivism. It implied that Africa must go out and mobilize its diaspora to support this objective. Thus, the Union complemented the definition with a series of engagement strategies to mobilize the diaspora to support the African renaissance agenda. The

Commission of the African Union embarked on outreach and sensitization programs to popularize the AU in different regions of the world where the diaspora resides. The objective was to facilitate greater understanding of the purpose and objectives of the AU and promote its assimilation by constituencies of the diaspora. Second, the Commission began to associate and involve the diaspora in agenda plans and programs of the Union. The strategic plans of the Commission also gave recognition to the diaspora and had specific diaspora components. Elements of the diaspora were involved in Brainstorming sessions, working groups and network discussions on all aspects of the Union agenda, including in particular, civil society activities. The Statutes of ECOSOCC of the African Union, the civil society parliament of the Union, allocated 20 seats to representatives of the diaspora to begin their inclusion in structures and processes of the African Union.[6] One of the 20 representatives would be a Deputy Presiding Officer or Vice President of the Organ. The Pan-African Parliament and the Commission also initiated a Global African Parliamentary Forum to include all legislators of African origin all over the world. In addition, an associate status was conferred, informally, on countries with significant African populations, particularly in the Caribbean and leaders of various Caribbean countries were often invited to address inaugural sessions of African Union Summits while meetings of African and Caribbean leaders were convened at different times to address matters of mutual concern.

Concurrently, the diaspora program also facilitated working arrangements with counterpart regional organizations such as the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) while AU regional offices also served as contact and liaison offices in regions to facilitate closer interaction with CIDO as the responsible Directorate at the Headquarters. The diaspora had also been closely associated in 2003 and 2004 with recruitment procedures of the AU. Within that period the Chairperson of the selection and interview panels were mostly chosen from the diaspora. These panels were responsible for over 70 percent of the recruited staff, including the leadership of CIDO that managed the diaspora program.

CHALLENGES: NEEDS AND WANTS

The problems associated with the issue of engagement were varied. The first was to move from eclectic strategies towards a consolidated organizational process involving durable and lasting structures. The African Union

embraced a responsibility to nurture and support this process but not to impose upon or to organize the diaspora. The emphasis on commitment was paramount here. The approach was to support the diaspora to organize itself but within a framework that can be related effectively to the organizational processes of the AU.

Within this context, the AU placed emphasis on regional specificity in a manner that mirrored its own organization whereby sub-regional organizations were considered as the building blocs of the AU. This approach favored the development of regional organizational networks as pillars of a wider global diaspora engagement. The networks will operate at a civil society and private sector level. The expectation is that the networks will serve as interlocutors and channels for effective communication flows as well as active partners in the process of mobilization for support of African goals. In turn, the networks will also assist the process of ensuring representation in AU structures and processes.

This will be reinforced by intergovernmental relations between the AU and the Governments of States with majority or significant African populations particularly in the Caribbean. The framework of intergovernmental relations will also facilitate engagements with counterpart regional bodies such as CARICOM. Within this context, the Commission and Organs of these organizations will seek to harmonize positions to afford greater influence and impact on global relations and to push matters of mutual concern such as the demand for UN reform and a permanent African presence in the UN Security Council.

The approach of the AU that places emphasis on voluntarism and commitment is a model that is well adapted to the mobilization of the diaspora worldwide. Except that in this instance, the AU, rather than the diaspora, are the main instigators of the process. Even so, the approach has not been without its difficulties. The first difficulty is the dynamic interaction of needs and wants. The high profile that the AU has given the development of its diaspora initiative has created a phenomenon of rising expectations among the diaspora that cannot be fulfilled. Unrealistic ambitions and hopes have been nourished and there is impatience with the pace of diaspora representation and inclusion in AU structures and processes.

Significantly also, the character of the AU as an intergovernmental organization with procedures and processes, funding challenges and regional diversity, has not been fully appreciated especially among civil society activists in the diaspora. More disturbing is that there is growing

competition for power and influence within diaspora communities that are allied to the AU programs as various factions position themselves to use it to enhance their relative importance. This is not a generalized phenomenon but in places where it has got traction, the agenda and purpose of the diaspora program has been subverted and AU officials are maligned as long as they are not connected with one faction or the other.

The response of the AU to the challenges has been to reduce the focus on power blocs and stress the organizing principle of democracy within and among regions. At the continent–diaspora level, the focus has been on building bridges across the Atlantic and the Asia-Pacific and Gulf regions, establishing cooperative regional structures with emphasis on Pan-Africanism, commitment, common cause, and reciprocal advantages. This approach led to a global process of regional consultative conferences with the diaspora around the world and the convening of the Global African Diaspora Summit involving all nations with a significant African population.

GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS AND THE CONVENING OF THE GLOBAL AFRICAN DIASPORA SUMMIT

The Union recognized the need to get a global legislative mandate in the absence of the vital ratifications required to support the amendment to the Constitutive Act. Thus, the Commission of the Union, in collaboration with South Africa, began the process of organizing Regional Consultative Conferences (RCCs) in various regions of the world with significant African populations, to formulate a roadmap for ensuring effective diaspora participation in preparation for a Global African Diaspora Summit that would produce the fundamental law or Magna Carta for effective diaspora participation in the integration and development agenda of the AU and Africa. The RCCs were held all over the world in the Caribbean, Europe, Latin and South America, and wherevere there were significant African populations.[7] The cumulative effects were varied. They provided deep forums for consultation between Africa and its diaspora, set the stage for mutual learning, the mapping out of common strategies and mechanisms for working together. They also served to galvanize communities in the diaspora and Africa. The results of the consultations across diaspora regions were cross fertilized with that of continental Africa and submitted to a Technical Expert Group for finalization and review by two Executive Council

Ministerial meetings as a prelude to the Global African Diaspora Summit that was held in Sandton, South Africa on Africa Day, May 25, 2012.

THE DECLARATION AND OUTCOMES OF THE GLOBAL AFRICAN DIASPORA SUMMIT

The Global African Diaspora Summit was attended by 89 countries from different states and regions of the world and ended with a Declaration consisting of four main parts.[8]

The first was a political Declaration embodying the broad objectives of the Union, the rationale for its incorporation of the diaspora, commitments undertaken within this framework and the agenda and purpose. This introductory section of the Declaration recalled the process of global Dialogue involving Africa and its diaspora, the various Ministerial and Summit discussions and decisions leading to the Summit and the need to consolidate them into a solid foundation for the rejuvenation of the global African family within the framework of a renaissance agenda. It then committed Africa and its diaspora to a sustained and coordinated approach involving projects and programs to be executed in various areas to facilitate these objectives.

The second was a Program of Action identifying areas for joint action and practical measures that are required to support or enable progress in these areas. These areas included spheres of political, economic, and social cooperation. In the area of political cooperation emphasis was placed on the requirement of intergovernmental cooperation involving closer cooperation between the AU, African States and Governments, and intergovernmental entities of regions in which the African diaspora populations are part, establishing enhanced formal relations with related Caribbean and South and Latin American countries associated with this process, leveraging efforts of the parties to this accord to promote and advance issues of critical importance to Africa and its diaspora, the creation of platforms for closer interaction, solidarity, and effective collaboration as part of this process, the consolidation of regional networks involving non-state actors in the various regions as interlocutors for the process, and the creation of a conducive environment for the African diaspora to invest and work in Africa, acceleration of the process of issuing African Union passports to promote identity, encouragement and support for the elimination of racism and the promotion of equality among all races, among others.

In the sphere of economic cooperation, the parties committed to increased governmental action to develop effective integration mechanisms for enhancing closer interaction between Africa and its diaspora, the need for concrete measures to promote and sustain linkages between the AU and its diaspora in priority areas including trade and investment, science and technology, travel and tourism, communication and infrastructure, energy, information and communication technology, and cultural industries, the mobilization of capital through the use of financial instruments to strengthen linkages between Africa and its diaspora and the possible creation of a Diaspora Investment Fund to address developmental challenges confronting Africa and its diaspora, the building of related business partnerships, promotion of science and technology, knowledge transfer and skills support and mobilization, collaboration for infrastructural development in Africa and collaboration to advance the international agenda on climate change, and so on.

In the sphere of social cooperation, the emphasis was on developing common platforms for African and diaspora educators to address developmental challenges confronting Africa and its diaspora, creation of related linkages between academic, research and development institutions in Africa and the diaspora, involving diaspora experts in the implementation of the diaspora initiative, collaboration in the area of Arts and Culture, media and image building to rebrand Africa and counter negative stereotypes of Africans and peoples of African descent, collaboration on issues of immigration to create favorable regulatory mechanisms governing migration, return of cultural goods taken from Africa in the period of colonialism and imperialism, sports and cultural exchanges, collaboration on the human rights agenda with special emphasis on engaging developed countries to address the political and socio-economic marginalization of diaspora communities in countries of domicile.

The third main component focuses on implementation mechanisms and instruments designed to facilitate achievements of the Declaration outcomes. These included the hosting of rotational AU-diaspora follow up Conferences to review the progress and pace of implementation of the Program of Action, allied communication efforts to popularize the initiative and sell positive images of Africa and the African people, taking measures to secure the establishment of a Diaspora Trust Fund, establishment of multi-stakeholder working groups involving the AU, CARICOM, and diaspora representatives in noted priority areas, the setting up of allied

institutions such as Diaspora Advisory Board and Consultative Forum and the exploration of innovative and practical sources for funding the diaspora program to assure its sustainability.

The fourth and final component are legacy or priority projects that were considered low hanging fruits to give urgent practical meaning to the diaspora initiative in order to facilitate the post-Summit implementation program. These are: a) the production of a skills data base of African professionals in the diaspora; b) the establishment of the African Diaspora Volunteer Corps; c) the African Diaspora Investment Fund; d) a program on the Development market place for the diaspora as a framework for facilitating innovation and entrepreneurship among Africans and the African diaspora; and e) the African Remittance Institute.

POST-SUMMIT EXPERIENCES

The post-Summit experiences of the African Union Diaspora Initiative are intricate and interesting and would require a different study to analyze them as a means of mapping the way forward. Suffice it to note that on several levels the Summit did produce tangible and commendable results. The most remarkable was in the area of political cooperation particularly in the area of intergovernmental cooperation among African and Caribbean and South and Latin American States. More formal relationships were constructed in the aftermath to accelerate the pace of South–South Cooperation. The relationship has been leveraged at various international forums to produce important outcomes.

Second, the process of strengthening the global consultative dialogue through RCCs between the continent and its diaspora continued with vigor. In particular, critical attention was focused on the creation, nurturing, and consolidation of regional networks in various parts of the world as partners and interlocutors for the diaspora program. It is remarkable in this regard that the Caribbean Pan-African Network (CPAN) that was the first of such organizations celebrated its tenth anniversary in Antigua and Barbuda in 2014 with the support and collaboration of the AU and in 2015 held its annual meeting in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, in December 2015, to review the process of its program development and develop appropriate strategies for consolidating diaspora linkages as an instrument of policy. Concurrently, the Commission through CIDO has also held pre-meetings with diaspora groups to prepare the launching of

diaspora networks in Europe and the Gulf and Middle East regions. Significantly also, the Australasia-network for Australia, Asia, and Pacific regions, was launched successfully in the Victoria parliament in Australia in November 2015 at an occasion attended by the cream of Victorian society in government, business, and other circles. AU's ultimate goal is the establishment of effective networks in various regions of the world to support its diaspora initiative.

Nevertheless, there are some challenges associated with the process particularly in the USA, which has witnessed vigorous jockeying for influence and prestige as well as attempts in some circles to assume responsibility for leadership of the process worldwide. However, the Declaration is specific in its direction to the CIDO and the Commission. The preamble exhorts the Union to bear "in mind that the African diaspora represents a historical and evolving experience which calls for an approach that it sensitive to the specificities of the different regions." It also places premium in the area of political cooperation on establishing regional networks as agents of sustainable partnership. The Commission continues to be guided by this reference.

Third, serious efforts have been made to associate and continue to associate the diaspora effectively with the programs and policies of the Union, to familiarize them with ongoing developments and receive their inputs. This has especially been the case with the issue of the continental initiative on Agenda 2063, which is the new flagship project of the Commission that was adopted by Council and the Assembly. A specific diaspora Forum was held in Washington DC in 2013 to solicit inputs and the diaspora are also involved with the spate of continental consultations on both the program and its implementation plans.

In the meantime, consultations have begun on developing a broad framework document for the representation of the diaspora in AU structures and organs. The AU Ministerial meeting on the diaspora held in New York in September 2011 in the lead up to the Diaspora Summit had decided that the process of representation must be decided globally through the Commission to Council and Assembly rather than individually by organs. This was subsequently adopted by the Assembly of the Union. In the meantime, and pending the ratification of the outcome of Commission efforts, AU organs have taken interim measures to have diaspora representatives on temporary basis. The Economic, Social and Cultural Council of the Union (ECOSOCC) which has CIDO as its Secretariat has not, surprisingly, taken the lead

in this direction by appointing leaders of existing networks as members of its General Assembly and Standing Committee and also appointing Diaspora Special Advisers in various regions of the world. These efforts are determined to transform the symbolic picture of the diaspora as the sixth region of the continent into effective substance. The Summit had recognized that this must be work in progress as the Declaration urged that the efforts to build regional networks must be construed as "appropriate mechanisms for their increasing participation in the affairs of the Union as observers and eventually, in the future, as the sixth region of the continent that will contribute substantially to the implementation of policies and programmes."

Another area of note is the manpower support for the implementation process. The Declaration specifically directed that the Union must continue to support the role of the African Union Commission (AUC) as the focal point and hub of all diaspora initiatives in the continent and to strengthen and capacitate the AU Directorate tasked with the diaspora matters in financial and human resource terms. This has two logical implications. First is the demand for interconnectivity between the national and continental diaspora programs that have been a main focus of CIDO attention in the last two years. Second is capacitation of the Directorate. The latter has been a problem because the Commission has not acted appropriately and moreover is now caught up in austerity measures creating serious financial challenges, The Directorate has however, persisted in putting up the pressure and succeeded in recruiting two new vibrant regional Desk officers to give accelerated momentum to the program. Premium must be placed on further capacitation of CIDO as vehicle for execution of a global programme. The demands of program continuity must be addressed in this context with emphasis on increasing staff strength with regular staff. The range of CIDO responsibility goes far beyond the diaspora program and the Directorate requires the necessary staff complement to exercise its mandate which has a global and participatory coverage.

Finally and cumulatively, the Declaration provided a framework for multilateral action involving all concerned parties including the governments of states hosting the African diaspora populations. Significantly also, while the Declaration did not have the force of law as intended in the Constitutive Act, it did provide a framework for legitimizing actions in the aftermath of the Summit. It committed African States to the African diaspora, and vice versa, and paved the path for a framework of

diaspora inclusion, pending until the representative and participating details have been worked out. Within the framework of the AU, that would be a painstaking and negotiated process involving all the key advisory and executive organs. Nonetheless, the Summit was episodic in the sense that it opened a door that could not be cosed. The challenge of Africa and its diaspora is to follow up and walk through the door that has been opened widely.

LESSONS AND DIFFICULTIES

In the aftermath of the Summit, the lesson is that the processes of following through must be thorough and painstaking. To begin with, the financing of the diaspora program must be addressed in a sincere and committed fashion. The Summit outcome was a negotiated document and, as is the case for similar outcomes, embraced several open-ended commitments. The programs were numerous and multi-varied, designed to accommodate the various constituencies. In the aftermath of the Summit, CIDO and the Commission provided a roadmap that prioritized the outcomes into an implementation matrix. The next AU Summit adopted the roadmap as a framework for action.

The difficulty was that budget resources were not committed to assist the implementation process. In the euphoria of the Summit, the aspect pertaining to means of actualizing the Summit outcomes was given scarce attention. When it was raised in planning sessions, the answer was that given the high profile of the initiative and the multi-stakeholder complement, it was inconceivable that it would not be properly funded, as it was a global compact underwritten at the very highest levels. Substantial funds had been allocated to the process leading to the Global Summit outside the normal AU budgetary processes and the assurance was that this would continue, but it did not. Indeed, in the subsequent budget of 2013 not a single cent of Member States funds was allocated to the diaspora. Program managers had to seek funds from Donors and were fortunate to find a willing partner in the World Bank diaspora Unit under the able leadership of Richard Cambridge. However, the funds came too late to be absorbed into the budget circle, which was an AU condition for its use. Thus, the program was paralyzed in the interim. The main problem was that the Summit Declaration did not commit the Member States to make the necessary provision for the program in the AU budget. Instead, the

implementation and follow-up section of the Declaration simply agreed to "explore various innovative and practical sources of funding for the diaspora program, to ensure its sustainability." In the interval Pan-African activists in diaspora civil society circles were often critical of the resort to the World Bank that they painted in imperialist images.

The diaspora also shared commitment difficulties. Some, but not all, saw the opening to the diaspora simply in terms of entitlement. They wanted and clamored for representation in ECOSOCC and AU structures, African passports, rights to consultancies and preferential treatments, attendance at meetings, recognition as AU representatives without any commensurate attention to the duties and obligations attendant on such perceived privileges. It was significant in this regard that no diaspora group came up with any strategy of support for the financing of the program or paid it any serious attention as has been the case with the Jewish and Indian diasporas. This is an area that deserves diaspora reflection.

The third difficulty was in regard of the Legacy projects. Once the funds were secured from the World Bank and properly integrated into the 2014 budget, immediate attention was focused on the realization of the Legacy projects as a main thrust of the roadmap adopted by Council and Assembly of the Union. A seminar was held in Washington in March 2014 to develop the implementation plan to be submitted to Council in June 2014 so that the projects could march forward in earnest. This was interrupted by a policy somersault as an influential Member State moved for the transference of the responsibility for the legacy projects from the AU Commission to a technical Committee made up of Chief Executives of major international organizations or their representatives. The PRC and Executive Council of the African Union, subsequently adopted the recommendation. The Committee was supposed to be self-funding. Not surprisingly, the Committee is yet to function almost four years after the decision. The inaugural session has not even been held. The Commission of the African Union was supposed to convene the meeting but was paralyzed because a standing decision of the Union was that a certificate of financial availability of resources must support proposals for any meeting. The difficulty was how to obtain such certificate for a self-funding entity. There is need for a Member State to come forward to underwrite the program but none has come forward so far. There is however, still time for this to be done. Alternatively, the leadership of the Commission could seize the initiative and commit funds to realize the

project. In the meantime, there is a growing air of impatience within the diaspora community on the legacy projects.

CONCLUSION

The development of the African Union Diaspora Initiative from Addis Ababa in 2003 to Sandton in 2012 and beyond, informs us about the African Union perspective of its diaspora. The diaspora initiative has spiritual and idealistic roots. It is a reaction to slavery and colonialism and clearly associated with lessons learnt in a world where Africans seek and demand rapid economic development and a greater or more significant global status. The association of Africa and its diaspora is seen as a rectification process but in a practical and material sense whereby the African diaspora becomes a resource for the continent and vice versa. The objective is very practical. The opening to the diaspora is not a religious process focused on cultural affinity. This is an important element, among others, that are to be reenergized as a platform for renaissance and development. This is the common thread that runs through the development of the diaspora program from the Amendment of the Constitutive Act in Addis Ababa through the definition and within the framework of the Declaration of the Summit and its Program of Action and Legacy projects. The diaspora outreach is an instrument of collective effort; collective consciousness, collective purpose and collective planning to enable Africans regain their proper place in the world as makers of modern civilization. It associates the lesson of history and its pains with a desire to transform them into purpose and benefits. The program has critical political support, which must be translated into material substance to realize its laudable objectives.

NOTES

1. The Constitutive Act of the African Union.
2. Ibid.
3. Ext/EX/CL/5 (111) "The Development of the Diaspora Initiative within the Framework of the OAU/AU" Third Extra-Ordinary Session of the Executive Council, May 21–25, 2003.
4. General Report, TW/Diaspora 1, "African Union Technical Workshop on the Relationship with the Diaspora, 2–5 June 2004" Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago

5. Report of the Meeting of Experts from Member States on the Definition of the Diaspora, April 11–12, 2005, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
6. Statutes of the Economic, Social and Cultural Council of the African Union (ECOSOCC).
7. See the Reports of the various RCCs and the Continental RCC report in Addis Ababa.
8. See the Declaration of the Global African Diaspora Summit, Johannesburg, May 25, 2012.

Jinmi Adisa obtained his doctorate from the Department of War Studies at King's College, University of London. He was a Senior Lecturer in political science at the University of Ibadan, Nigeria, and has occupied various functions at the African Union. He is the founding director of the African Union Commission's Citizens and Diaspora Directorate (CIDO).

Diaspora Engagement in National Context

Morocco and Diaspora Engagement: A Contemporary Portrait

Leila Hanafi and Danielle Hites

Introduction

Morocco sits at a geographic and cultural crossroads, the closest point between Africa and Europe and its legal foundation bears the tradition of European rule. Accordingly, it is a hub for migration making the diaspora an integral piece of its population's legal and economic profile. Emigration from Morocco has exemplified every significant shift in the broader Euro-Mediterranean migration system over the past 50 years. Throughout that time Morocco has been the focus of academic and policy research into the changing profiles of migrants and the nature and impacts of their movement, much of this research influencing the way we think about migration itself and the most appropriate policy responses to it. It is, therefore, no surprise that the relationship between Moroccan emigrants and the Moroccan state typifies the general trend suggested by this volume: from "controlling" to

L. Hanafi (✉)
University of Kent Law School, Canterbury, UK

D. Hites
Alliance for Rule of Law Promotion and Alternative Disapute Resolution, Washington, DC, USA

"courting" or "from being expendable, minimally endowed subjects, to a valuable resource that generates additional scarce resources."[1] Morocco's modern diaspora engagement policies are marked by a somewhat permissive attitude, particularly regarding assimilation into foreign cultures, in order to foster positive relations and encourage remittances and return to Morocco.

This chapter outlines the history of migration to and from Morocco, the past and present policies toward the Moroccan diaspora, and legal rights and obligations between the government and the diaspora. In addition, it specifically analyzes the diaspora engagement policies as they apply to women in the context of their evolving legal status under Moroccan law.

MAPPING THE DIASPORA

Moroccan emigration evolved at an unprecedented pace starting from the 1960s when the "guest worker" programs leading to large numbers of migrants to Europe was in full swing. As a result, today over five million Moroccans live abroad, representing around 15 percent of the total population, and constitute the largest and most dispersed African immigrant population in Europe.[2] Since the 1990s, emigration of medium and highly skilled individuals to the USA and Canada has also considerably increased. As a result of these new trends and the transition from temporary to permanent migration, today a large multifaceted Moroccan diaspora consisting of professionals from different sectors has been established. The five million Moroccans residing outside the Kingdom play an important role in the development of the country, not least in terms of the remittances that they send home. In 2015, Moroccans abroad sent home over US\$ 6.7 billion.[3] Morocco is ranked third in the Middle East and North Africa in terms of remittance receipts per capita.[4]

The majority of Moroccan emigrants settle in Europe, where they represent one of the largest and most widespread migrant communities. Though the Moroccan diaspora in Western Europe is quite large and has been widely studied—particularly because of the colonial ties between the two regions—little is known about the Moroccans living in distant regions from Morocco like, North America. The primary host countries are France, Israel, Spain, Italy, Germany, and the Benelux nations. Alone they account for over three million of the approximate five million Moroccan citizens living abroad. Recently, emigration to the USA and Canada has increased, particularly among highly skilled laborers. The UK and Arab countries, including Libya,

Algeria, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates round out the other substantial portions of the diaspora.

Morocco's borders have always been semi-fluid beginning with its earliest inhabitants. Early Moroccan history reflects a period of immigration and circular migration throughout the *Maghreb* (Northwest African region). Its early inhabitants, ancestors of the modern day Amazigh people, were Nomadic or semi-Nomadic tribes that moved freely throughout the region. Later it would become home to travelling Arab-Islamic migrants following the seventh century Islamic conquests. Moroccan Jews have always been highly mobile due to large extended networks and participation in trans-Saharan trade; they were one of the first connections between Morocco and Europe in the sixteenth century. However, colonialism was the first real impetus for outward migration.

French colonization of Algeria in 1830 marked the beginning of colonialism in *Maghreb*. The French colonialists' need for labor sparked a new migratory pattern from rural regions to northern cities and a circular transit of laborers between Morocco and Algeria. Both the French and Spanish claimed a stake in Moroccan land; Spain controlling most of the Western Sahara region and the northern tip of the country and France controlling the middle. In 1912 Morocco was officially established as a protectorate, under which the imperialist nations would "protect" Morocco including through policing measures and in turn would control Moroccan resources. The first wave of Moroccan emigration to Europe, as opposed to migration within northern Africa to meet the labor demands of the French, came in the form of tens of thousands recruited to fight for the French in World War I. Although most returned after, they were called to fight under the French flag once more during World War II. Moroccan Jews took a unique path relative to other migrant Moroccans, particularly after World War II and the advent of the Israeli State.

When Morocco and Algeria gained their independence from France in 1956 and 1962, respectively, tensions caused tightening of the border between the two and shifted migration toward Europe instead. The postwar era heralded significant economic growth in Europe and, with it, demand for low-skilled labor. Relatively open borders and "guest worker" laws made for a migratory boom in the 1960s. The estimated number of Moroccan citizens registered as living in Europe increased tenfold 1965 to 1972, from 30,000 to 300,000.[5] Language and cultural familiarity after years of colonial rule made France a natural destination. Labor recruitment was high in France as well as Belgium, the Netherlands, and the former

West Germany. In 1972, the tightening of immigration laws led what had been a temporary labor population to settle more permanently to avoid being denied re-entry to the European job market.

Southern Europe emerged as a destination for Moroccan workers in the 1980s when it had a rapidly rising need for low-skilled labor such as agriculture and construction workers. The geographic proximity of Morocco to Spain and Italy made it an opportune population to fulfill the irregular and often temporary need for migrant workers. Much like in the 1970s in France and the Benelux nations, increased border controls coupled with ongoing demand for laborers increased the number of Moroccans settled in Southern Europe in the early 1990s. On several occasions the Spanish and Italian governments opted to recognize large groups of Moroccans that potentially entered illegally, crossing the Strait of Gibraltar, for example.

A more recent trend shows highly educated Moroccans relocating to the USA and Canada, particularly French-speaking Quebec. France is still home to the largest population of people of Moroccan descent, over 1.1 million; followed by Spain which hosts over 760,000; and Italy with nearly 500,000 in 2010 and the USA with 350,000.[6] Morocco's geographic location, the shortest distance between Africa and Europe, a mere 7.7 nautical miles, separates it from Spain; its colonial and linguistic ties to France; and the economic opportunities of the latter half of the twentieth century have largely driven the migratory patterns and continue to be reflected in the current communities.

The Government lacks a centralized mapping repository of quantitative and qualitative data on investments in Morocco by members of the diaspora as well as profiling of the Moroccan diaspora in terms of education attainment, employment, legal status in host countries which hinders the mapping of the Moroccan diaspora, worldwide and the nurturing of social, cultural, financial, trade, and investment links. The country has a Ministry dedicated to Moroccans overseas, and a Royal Foundation dedicated to enhancing engagement with diaspora, as well as bilateral treaties with France and other countries of destination covering circular migration, including border controls. The website "Marocains du Monde" is intended as a one-stop venue to animate the diaspora relationship. Dedicated agencies aim to promote knowledge and technology transfer and investments by overseas Moroccans.[7] France, Spain, and Italy are the three most important destinations for Moroccans, while the USA, which is the world's most important

country of destination, by far, for migrants from Latin America and from East Asia, is only the fifth most common destination country for Morocco-born international migrants and the fifth largest source of Morocco's remittance inflows. The diaspora in the USA transferred approximately 3.2 billion dirham in remittances to Morocco during 2013, a small fraction of the 21.4 billion dirham from France, the largest source. Morocco's total remittance receipts during 2013 were valued at 58 billion dirham, representing 6.8 percent of the country's GDP.[8] In 2013, the government launched the "MDM invest" program that allows Moroccans living abroad who want to create an investment project or expand an existing project in Morocco to receive a grant amounting to 10 percent of the project cost provided that the total project cost does not exceed five million dirhams. Hence, MLAs can draw on this fund and foreigners can form part of the shareholders of the project. By 2014, 121 projects had been financed in this way.[9]

PAST AND PRESENT STATE–DIASPORA RELATIONS

Since the 1960s, which brought the first big boom in Moroccan emigration, the Moroccan government has encouraged the movement. It recognized the economic opportunities available to its citizens as well as to the government itself, through remittances from Moroccans living abroad. It actively promoted labor recruitment, particularly in poor, rural regions largely home to Amazigh communities.[10] The government viewed it as an opportunity to reduce unemployment and poverty while also appeasing and distancing the frequently rebellious anti-government factions also living in these regions. Despite its perpetual support of emigration, Morocco's approach to engaging with its diaspora has evolved over the decades since it first became a hub for European labor recruitment.[11] Up until the beginning of the 1990s, the Moroccan government did not put in place concrete institutional mechanisms for the engagement of diaspora members.[12] Since the 1990s, the Moroccan Government's attitude has shifted towards a more inclusive approach through the development of a diaspora-engagement program. Gradually, the Moroccan government started to put emphasis on the successful integration of Moroccans abroad, while encouraging them to stay in contact with Morocco through economic, social, and cultural activities.[13]

The Moroccan Government revamped its diaspora engagement strategy in 2007 through the Ministere Chargé des Marocains Résidant à

l'étranger (Moroccan Ministry of Moroccans Residing Abroad) to reflect that the diaspora is an equal stakeholder in the country's development, not only senders of remittances but also as innovators, philanthropists, and investors in human capital and technical knowledge. As such, the Government's strategy aims to promote the integration of Moroccans in the resident countries while maintaining continuous contact with Morocco, through activities directed within Morocco and within resident countries.[14]

Activities directed within Morocco are primarily those that encourage investment and remittance from the diaspora. The initiatives taken in resident countries of the diaspora operate on a two-fold approach: policies that focus on preserving a Moroccan identity through linguistic, religious, and cultural dimensions. For example, summer programs for the youth commissioned by the Moroccan Government promote dialogue between all religions and beliefs as well as openness to the different cultures of European societies; provide spiritual support to Muslims and guide the youth against extremism and deviation; help young people grasp and assimilate the purposes of Islam; and raise awareness of Muslims youth about the values of tolerance, moderation, and peace advocated by Islam. Second, there are policies aimed at restoring the trust of Moroccans residing abroad towards the Moroccan government, and defending their interests by promoting their legal and social situation in the countries of residence. For example, prisoners and single parents are supported by legal assistance in cooperation with resident country institutions and consular services. However, one of the key roles of the Ministry of Moroccans Residing Abroad which still requires attention is the lack of coordination between key Moroccan organizations and Ministries working with the Moroccan diaspora.

In the early years of the migratory shift, the Moroccan government sought to maintain tight control over its citizens living abroad. It dissuaded Moroccans from integrating, including naturalizing, into their receiving countries. It sent religious leaders and educators abroad to teach Islamic principles and Arabic language and to maintain cultural connections among its expatriates. The government also attempted to dissuade its citizens abroad from joining trade unions and political parties in their receiving countries by providing State-organized embassies, consulates, and mosques. In so doing, it hoped to ensure its remittances and prevent the formation of political opposition from outside its territorial boundaries.

The hyper-controlled method of regulation proved to alienate rather than maintain closeness with the diaspora community. Moreover, remittances reached a plateau that officials feared would turn into a decrease without changes in their policy. Accordingly, the 1990s brought a loosening of regulations on the manner in which Moroccans engage with their destination countries. Attitudes toward integration, naturalization, and dual citizenship became more positive. Communities were also given more liberty to establish their own independent organizations, such as aid associations and civil society organizations. In 1990, the government established a ministry for Moroccans residing abroad and the *Fondation Hassan II pour les Marocains Résidant à l'étranger* to foster links between migrants and Morocco. This more tolerant approach continues to dominate the State–diaspora landscape today.

ORGANIZATIONS AND INTERACTIONS OF THE DIASPORA

According to the Ministry of Moroccans Residing Abroad, there are over 2,500 organizations that focus, primarily, on sports, religion, and cultural identity enhancement for the community. In 2014 the Ministry supported projects in England, Belgium, the USA, Spain, France, Italy, Morocco, and various other nations. These projects include cultural activities such as art and music festivals held by Arab Film Festival, INC in the USA, Association Divers City in Belgium, and Agence Liens Culturels 34 in France; sports tournaments, including those held by Football Club Petit Bard in France and Associacio per el Desenvolupament i la Integracio Beni Snasen de Catalunya in Spain; and cultural and linguistic festivals and seminars such as those hosted by Moroccan American Association of California in the USA, Comunidad Religiosa Islamica Mezquita Al Sunna in Spain, and Association Marocaine des Bienfaisances in France. The Moroccan government also supported civil society organizations and projects dealing with vulnerable populations like women and children; these projects included activities sponsored by Arc en ciel Leucémie in France, Fundacion Ibn Battuta and Associacio Cultural Mediterrania de l'Hospitalet in Spain, and Al-Hasaniya Moroccan Women's Project Ltd in England. In North America, civil society organizations have expanded their work into human rights and legal empowerment given the rise of rights-focused issues for the diaspora, such as the American-Moroccan Legal Empowerment, one of the first Moroccan-American grassroot advocacy

networks committed to a progressive movement for legal empowerment, and social and economic justice for the Moroccan-American community.

It should be noted that there is no centralized repository of diaspora civil society organizations, although scattered listings are available through the Ministry of Moroccans Residing Abroad and the Ministry in charge of relations with civil society organizations and Parliament relations.

One of the key interactions that Moroccans living abroad maintain with Morocco is through remittances. They have functioned throughout the diaspora's history as a prime factor in determining government interest in promoting emigration and defining the overarching attitudes towards engagement with the expatriate communities. Morocco is the largest remittance receiver in Africa, receiving an estimated US$ 5.6 billion in remittances in 2006. Despite a few slumps and the ominous leveling in the 1990s, Morocco has successfully managed to maintain a near-consistent increase in remittances since the 1960s. Remittance rose from US$ 23 million in 1968 to over US$ 2.1 billion in 1992. Despite fears that the plateau in the 1990s would signal a downswing in remittances, they surged upward once more beginning in the early 2000s. In 2012, Morocco remittance receipts were valued at $6.5 billion, representing 6.8 percent of the country's $96 billion GDP.[15]

Even when controlling for changes in the valuation of money and other factors, remittances are still seen as increasing substantially and reflecting a key reliable source of foreign income to help address social concerns. Officials point to the high frequency of return holiday travel to Morocco among the diaspora to demonstrate the close social bonds that its citizens living abroad maintain with citizens living within the geopolitical territory. This promotes the transmission of remittances and involvement with the socioeconomic interests of domestic Moroccans.

DEVELOPMENT OF DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT POLICIES

Political and Social Debates

The Moroccan government's interest in promoting emigration through inclusive diaspora engagement policies is focused heavily on the economic benefits gleaned through connection with advanced economies as well as the education, training, and experience that Moroccan residents abroad will presumably bring back to Morocco. On the other side of the balance are concerns surrounding political control over expatriates; maintaining a

unified identity, particularly a religious and cultural identity; and the like-lihood of meaningful education and experience that will stem from engagement and integration with other nations.

One of the predominant areas of tension that exist in the debate over diaspora engagement policies surrounds religion and secularism. Many of the prime receiving nations are decidedly secular and, in some cases, viewed as less tolerant toward Islam than other religions; for example, France is noted for its *hijab* ban purportedly in promotion of secularism. Accordingly, many Moroccans feel that effective engagement policies must include religious education and outreach, both for the protection of Moroccans living abroad and for the protection and promotion of their shared identity with Moroccans residing within the nation, the 2011 reformed Constitution of which reaffirms its status as an Islamic country. On the other end of the spectrum of religious debate is the fear that alienation of Moroccan Muslims abroad makes them targets for extremist manipulation.

The secularist and Western ideals prominent in many destination countries present another area of tension regarding the role of the diaspora in shaping political, social, and economic ideals in Morocco. Some worry that permitting engagement in domestic policies by Moroccans living abroad will cause deterioration of Moroccan cultural ideals in lieu of foreign Western models of governance and society due to integration of Moroccan residents abroad into their lifestyle.

Some have questioned the validity of the aims purported by the government; specifically, the claim that emigration of Moroccans will promote socio-economic growth. With the exception of the recent migration of highly educated Moroccans to Canada and the USA, most of the migratory trends have sought low-skilled labor for temporary and irregular labor needs within Europe. Thus, some question whether Moroccan migrants are truly being granted an opportunity to expand their education, training, and skills or merely being used for the skills they already possess and their willingness to work under conditions that their European counterparts may reject. Moreover, some raise suspicion that those who do find success through education and training opportunities will not return to Morocco permanently. While Morocco boasts a high rate of return for temporary visits, the rate of permanent return is much lower. Accordingly, the justification that Moroccans residing abroad will boost the education and skill level within Morocco may be misguided. Some worry that, quite the opposite, engagement policies that make living abroad more

feasible and desirable for upwardly mobile Moroccans may lead to "brain drain" in which top innovators use their skills outside Morocco to their host country's benefit over that of their country of origin.

Another political area that is stirring a contentious debate between the Moroccan Government and the Moroccan diaspora is political representation. The modern Moroccan diaspora challenges contemporary notions of how political life should be organized. The millions of Moroccans residing outside the Kingdom play an important role in the development of the country, not least in terms of the remittances that they send home. However, even though their economic contribution is essential to Morocco's economy, the non-economic aspect of their involvement remains neglected. This highlights how the Moroccan diaspora remains forgotten in terms of access to rights, notably political rights.

Much like the youth candidates residing in Morocco who are asking for representation in the election process, young Moroccan expatriates are also calling for greater participation in the law-making process of their country of origin. Associations and activists within the Moroccan community living abroad have been calling on the Moroccan authorities to adopt an organic law to allow for the participation of Moroccan expatriates to vote and to run for elected office from their countries of residence. As a response to their calls, the provisions of the 2011 constitution grant Moroccans residing abroad full citizenship rights, including political rights. It remains to be seen how the voices of the diaspora will be reflected in upcoming elections. In the municipal and regional elections of summer 2015, the Moroccan diaspora were still unable to vote directly.

Legal and Institutional Mechanisms of Diaspora Engagement Policies

Policymakers in Morocco increasingly recognize the value that diaspora populations bring to development efforts at home, not just as senders of remittances but also as sources of human capital and direct and indirect investments. The government facilitates such contributions in several ways, from creating conducive legal frameworks and diaspora-centered institutions to initiating programs specifically targeting diasporas as development actors. Yet, the existing mechanisms of diaspora engagement, while positive, are insufficient if not integrated in a broad-based strategy, premised in an inclusive legal framework for positive engagement.

Beginning in 1990 with the establishment of a Ministry for Moroccan Residing Abroad and the *Fondation Hassan II pour les Marocains Résidant à l'étranger*, the Moroccan legal framework around emigration evolved from consular services targeted at political restraint and facilitating remittances to a highly legislated system of citizen development, administration of entry and exit flows, extension of political rights, and development of social protections for Moroccans abroad. The subject matter and institutional mechanisms for addressing the legal issues specific to the diaspora has increased exponentially since the 1960s migration boom and become a sophisticated and important part of Moroccan governance at large.

Diaspora engagement is the focus of several ministries and organizations established by the Moroccan government since its liberalized policy of the 1990s. It later established the Mohamed V Foundation for Solidarity in 1999 to continue supplement the work of the Hassan II Foundation; The Council of the Moroccan Community Abroad, established in 2007; the *Centre Droits MRE* (Migrant Rights Center), which operates under the Ministry for Moroccans Residing Abroad; The Directorate of Consular and Social Affairs, which operates under the umbrella of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation; and the Moroccan Council of Ulemas for Europe, a segment of the Ministry of Habous and Islamic Affairs.

In 2013 the Moroccan Commission on National Dialogue & New Constitutional Prerogatives through its sub-committee on Moroccans Residing Abroad organizations launched Virtual & Physical Consultations for Civil Society Organizations of Moroccans Residing Abroad. This process was an unprecedented opportunity to encourage dialogue with civil society organizations of Moroccans Residing Abroad regarding the implementation of the constitution to promote a strong and fair lawmaking process, and, ultimately, greater confidence in the constitution as a blueprint for future legislative reform through inclusive participation. This Commission was created, under the framework of the 2011 Constitution, to implement the participatory democracy approach enunciated in the Constitution. The Commission created under the leadership of the Moroccan Government Premiership was chaperoned by the Ministry in charge of relations with civil society and parliament to encourage public participation in policy-making, through the establishment of mechanisms such as social audits and proactive public reporting. The initiative came at a critical juncture in Morocco, as the first country in the Middle East and

North African region to rewrite its Constitution to satisfy popular calls for increased freedoms, fundamental rights, transparency, political reforms, and social justice after the start of the Arab Spring. The Commission re-affirmed the Moroccan Government's conviction of the essential role that civil society organizations play in the development process.

This landmark initiative for Morocco, which has the potential to empower Moroccans, in their home country and abroad, to participate in policy-making, through public participation mechanisms could inspire concerted actions in wavering the implementation of the constitution's articles that tackles civil society and diaspora engagement in public affairs. The feedback of Moroccans Residing Abroad community groups and members was quintessential to ushering and concluding this consultative process.

Constitutional and International Legal Framework

The 2011 constitution opens space for greater participation of civil society in drafting legislation, submitting petitions, and partaking in the evaluation of public policies. This is particularly important as the constitution tackles the rights of the Moroccan community residing abroad. As the number of Moroccans living abroad increases, the need to bring them under the protection of the constitution becomes essential.

It is to be noted that Morocco is part of many international legal instruments relating to human rights law. Some stipulations of the 2011 Moroccan Constitution declare that international conventions ratified by Morocco should be applicable directly as domestic law. Some of these provisions relate to the Moroccan diaspora abroad. In this International Law Context, The UN Convention on Migrant Workers' Rights is the most comprehensive international treaty in the field of migration and human rights. It sets a standard in terms of access to human rights for migrants. However, it suffers from a marked indifference: only 40 states have ratified it and no major immigration country has done so. So far, countries that have ratified the Convention are primarily countries of origin of migrants such as Morocco. For these countries, the Convention is an important vehicle to protect their citizens living abroad. However, even though their labor is essential in the world economy, the non-economic aspect of migration remains neglected. This highlights how migrants remain forgotten in terms of access to

rights and the urgent need to focus on a rights-based approach when analyzing Moroccan diaspora engagement.

Capacity Building Through State-Centric Diaspora Communities

Moroccan diaspora engagement policies focus largely on maintaining ties to Morocco and developing a state-centric diaspora. In the early years of Moroccan migration this was executed through strong-arm policies that prohibited integration and forced Moroccan education and consular affairs on Moroccans living abroad without the benefit of reciprocal involvement. The goal of the initiatives was to ensure the continued remittances and to promote a national identity. However, when this was found ineffective and counterproductive, the government opted to expand the rights extended to the diaspora and drop the compulsory elements of their cultural engagement with its citizens abroad. The toned-down approach to promoting cultural unity with the state at its center did not reduce the number of programs and administrative tools for engaging Moroccans, rather they expanded with a softened objective.

The primary organizations and ministries directed at this type of engagement are the Council of the Moroccan Community Abroad and Ministry for Moroccans Residing Abroad, both of which promote involvement in economic, social, and political activities among Moroccans living abroad and organizing events and activities in geographic areas hosting large numbers of Moroccan citizens; Mohamed V Foundation for Solidarity and the Hassan II Foundation, which facilitate return of migrants through legal and logistic expertise on migration between receiving nations and Morocco; and the Council of Ulemas for Europe, a government department established to promote dialogue between religious groups and promote tolerance of Islam in the receiving communities. It also seeks to develop a shared religious identity for Moroccans living abroad and educate citizens abroad against extremism. In addition, Morocco has continued to send religious and academic educators abroad to teach Arabic, Islam, and other matters of cultural importance to ensure that children of the diaspora maintain an understanding of their cultural history and heritage.

The aforementioned programs promote connections within the diaspora community in the particular region they have settled and, through involvement with each other, connection with the homeland that underlies the bonds formed therein. It provides opportunities to

meet and engage with Moroccan cultural norms. By facilitating returns, both temporary and permanent, Moroccan citizens abroad are able to maintain familial and friendly relations with those within the country and to re-immerse themselves in the culture completely in those times. The religious outreach programs seek to create a safe, comfortable, and beneficial environment for Moroccans to maintain their religious heritage abroad. Moreover, one aim is to maintain the tradition of tolerant, progressive Islam that is prominent in Morocco while living abroad.

Extending Rights to the Diaspora

While recent developments in the role of the diaspora have led to more rights being extended to them, however imbalances continue to exist and the law in the books is not carried out to that degree in practice. Most recently, the national legal framework has extended the right to political representation, however, in reality, diaspora citizens are still disenfranchised and their political rights and democratic representativeness remain a key area for elaboration. In the wake of the Arab Spring, Morocco has adopted a revised constitution that tackles the rights of the Moroccan diaspora (i.e. Articles 16-17-18-30) and grants them political rights, stipulated in Article 17 of the Constitution, which states that "Moroccans living overseas shall enjoy the rights of full citizenship, including the right to vote and be voted for. They may run for office in elections on lists and in voting districts at local, regional and national level,"[16] and Article 18 which stipulates that "authorities shall work to achieve the highest possible level of participation of Moroccans living overseas in advisory and good governance institutions created by the Constitution or by law."[17] However, their implementation is still pending.

More than four years after its passage, it is important not to be content with the words inscribed in the Constitution, but, more importantly, their realization. As the King himself observed in his July 30, 2015 Throne Day Speech, "I take a keen interest in the situation of Moroccan citizens living abroad, trying to strengthen their commitment to their identity and to get them involved in the nation's development process."[18] The 2011 Constitution marked an unprecedented change by declaring the country's adherence to human rights as recognized universally as well as recognizing the preeminence of international law over national legislation. Accordingly, Morocco's obligations to extend rights to the diaspora

include those under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as other international treaties relevant to the diaspora. The decision to ratify the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was welcomed by Moroccan diaspora organizations who consider the protocol to be an essential instrument. However, despite these steps, blatant shortcomings in improving the situation of the diaspora's access to political rights in Morocco still prevail. Under Morocco's international human rights law commitments, the country must comply with the tripartite framework: obligation to respect, obligation to protect, obligation to fulfill. As millions of Moroccans reside abroad, the need to integrate Moroccan nationals living overseas into governance institutions and to allow them exercise their political rights is pressing. Any tangible steps made in the ongoing development of Morocco cannot be successful without the healthy marriage of good governance and the active participation of its citizens not only inside Morocco but also *outside* the country. This is an ongoing debate as the 2016 Parliamentary elections are around the corner.

Specific Rights Extended to Women

The recent legislative changes in the Moroccan government particularly affect the rights of women and accordingly, the women of the diaspora face the additional challenge of enforcement of these changes through consulate actors. In 2004 the *Moudawana*, personal status code was reformed to promote women's equality with men in the context of family law, including greater power to initiate divorce proceedings, inherit property equally with their male counterparts, and eliminate distinctions in capacity and age to enter marriage. Women residing outside the country struggle with inaccessibility issues. This is alarming since more than 40 percent of Moroccan emigrants are women and the need to bring them under the legal protection of the *Moudawana* is a constitutional right.

Cook and Cusack define State obligations to address discrimination against women based on a tripartite framework (obligation to respect, obligation to protect, obligation to fulfill).[19] Morocco has taken unprecedented steps in the country's history to help eradicate discrimination against women and to improve gender equality. In 2008, the decision to lift formally the reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) was an important part of Morocco's efforts to improve and strengthen

women's rights. By ratifying notable international human rights law instruments, Morocco has committed to the obligation not to discriminate and to provide equal protection of the law for the purpose of achieving women's equality with men in the enjoyment of their human rights. For instance, Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights features a poignant equality clause pertaining to women. Also, Article 1 of CEDAW has an express definition of discrimination against women. Despite the fact that Article 2(f) of the Convention obligates State Parties "to take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women," this obligation has not been fulfilled in the case of Morocco as blatant shortcomings in improving the situation of women's access to justice still prevail. These shortcomings are both de jure and de facto.

In the current context, the real challenge for Moroccan women residing abroad is to ensure that legal procedures in the *Moudawana* are reinforced through the Consulates to maintain the notions of justice, equity, and objectivity and at the same time the quick flow of justice.

Extracting Obligations from the Diaspora

In response to the recognition that the diaspora contained key economic opportunities as innovators, philanthropists, human and investment capital, and, of course, through remittance the Moroccan government established several initiatives to ensure that this opportunity would be harnessed for the benefit of Morocco. These were established during 2007's reform policies under the Ministry of Moroccans Residing Abroad, which worked to maintain continuous contact with Moroccans living outside the country to ensure a feeling of reciprocity and connection to their homeland.

Within Morocco these initiatives revolved around directing the diaspora's contributions towards economic, social, and human development to ensure their full participation in home-country development. For example, the Moroccan Ministry of Moroccans Residing Abroad mobilized support from other Moroccan Ministries to facilitate diaspora economic investments in Morocco, such as MDM Invest, the purpose of which is to encourage Moroccans living abroad to invest in Morocco and to strengthen their economic and financial ties with their country of origin. For this purpose, the convention allows, through the MDM fund, granting subsidies for new

investment projects or expansion projects. The fund's management MDM has a budget of 100 million dirham. Knowledge transfer programs, such as MAGHRIBCOM program, have been established to mobilize Moroccan competencies abroad to contribute to national development of Morocco, namely through the prism of social, legal, economic, and new technologies sectors.

Key Lessons

The key lessons stemming from the development and implementation of national diaspora engagement policies in the country can be divided into general lessons, followed by more specific lessons as they affect civil, political, economic, social, and cultural life.

As a general premise it must be understood that with the increasing number of Moroccans living abroad, the need to bring them under the protection of the constitution becomes essential. This can be achieved through boosting civic engagement through capacity building and technical assistance for Moroccan civil society groups active abroad that can contribute to preserving a Moroccan identity through development, linguistic, religious, and cultural dimensions. There is a need to enhance participatory governance and diaspora engagement and democratic representativeness beyond mere law on the books. More diaspora members should be present in consultative processes that are initiated by the Moroccan government: Participatory governance and the diaspora's engagement and democratic representativeness remain an issue despite efforts by the 2011 revised constitution to tackle diaspora issues.

In addition to addressing the individual needs and participatory opportunities of diaspora members, Morocco also needs to address the role of organizations working with the nonresident Moroccan population. The government must increase public awareness of civil society organizations representing Moroccans Residing Abroad in the area of public participation and to enable them to submit petitions to Moroccan public authorities, in accordance with Articles 14 and 15 of Morocco's Constitution. The civil society organizations and the diaspora members that rely on them would further benefit from training of trainers, which would enhance the organizations understanding of constitutional roles attributed to civil society organizations under the framework of Morocco's 2011 Constitution.

The diaspora and its representative organizations also present an opportunity for parallel diplomacy in their resident countries. Accordingly, there

is an urgent need to provide technical and financial support to Moroccan diaspora groups that advance Morocco's image abroad. Any tangible steps made in the ongoing development of Morocco cannot be successful without the healthy marriage of good governance and the active participation of its citizens not only inside Morocco but also *outside* the country. Empowering Moroccans, in their home country, and abroad, to participate in policy-making, through mechanisms of public consultations and dialogue has the potential to inspire concerted actions and meaningful progress in ushering in a new era of participatory rule of law in Morocco.

There is increasing discontent at the exclusion of civil society organizations of Moroccans Residing Abroad in engaging in Morocco's public policy-making agenda (i.e., through advocacy and capacity building among the Moroccan community abroad). There was a general consensus that existing mechanisms of public consultations and dialogue put in place in Morocco are insufficient to advance an inclusive legal framework for positive engagement of civil society organizations of Moroccans Residing Abroad.

Institutional Arrangements with regards to the engagement of the Moroccan diaspora need to be better centralized through an enabling legislative framework rooted in inclusion, of civil society organizations of Moroccan Residing Abroad, in the *conception, implementation, and evaluation* of Morocco's public development policies. This is essential to enable civil society organizations of Moroccans Residing Abroad to submit petitions to Moroccan public authorities, in accordance with Article 15 of Morocco's Constitution, within the formal public-participation framework; and export their expertise and resources for the betterment of their homeland—Morocco

Opening up public participation to the diaspora, especially the diaspora groups that are located in areas that are further from Morocco than the traditional European receiving countries is quintessential in ushering an open dialogue with the Moroccan government through a consultative framework to map the current status of diaspora engagement in Morocco as well as lessons learned. This will help the Moroccan government focus on priority areas.

As the number of Moroccans living abroad increases, the need to bring them under the protection of the constitution becomes essential. This includes promoting the development of an enabling environment for diaspora engagement, including organic law development, virtual participation/contributions and investment in economic development.

Turning to the specific findings concerning the socio-economic front, civic engagement is a prime area in which diaspora engagement

policies can contribute to preserving a Moroccan identity. Capacity building and technical assistance for Moroccan civil society groups active in the residence country are crucial to the protection of linguistic, religious, and cultural dimensions of the Moroccan identity. Programs such as Arabic language programs for the youth and religious education to help Moroccan youth counter extremism and help them grasp and assimilate the purposes of Islam, while raising awareness about the values of tolerance, moderation, and peace advocated by Islam fall within this sector. This could also include the initiation of volunteer and civic activities in the wider community through the Embassy structure. Education offers another avenue for creating bonds between the diaspora and the home country. Increasing the educational exchange of diaspora-born students of Moroccan descent through well-designed cultural tours to Morocco and summer educational programs can develop this connection.

One of the main benefits to domestic Moroccans and the Moroccan government of the diaspora is their potential for investment and financial improvement. Thus, improving policies to boost diaspora-led investment must be a priority. This should include removing current legal constraints in order to facilitate investments in Morocco and increase understanding of the regulatory framework in the country and its investment infrastructure.

The economic ties must also extend to the counties of residence. This can be achieved through creating a one-stop shop for investment information, enhancing statistical figures relevant to the diaspora for a better mobilization of their skills and development, providing access to networks, organizing business events, and matching local entrepreneurs, business owners, and government leaders with their diaspora counterparts.

The first issue to address on the political front is restoring the trust of Moroccans residing abroad in the Moroccan government, and defending their interests by promoting their legal and social situation. To this end, one of the key roles of the Ministry of Moroccans Residing Abroad which still requires attention is the coordination— which is currently lacking—between key Moroccan organizations and Ministries working on Moroccan diaspora issues such as: Hassan II Foundation, Directorate of Consular and Social Affairs (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation), Mohammed V. Foundation for Solidarity, and Diwan Al Madhalim.

Institutional arrangements with regards to the engagement of the Moroccan diaspora need to be better centralized through the Ministry

of Moroccans Residing Abroad as there is an overlap between the responsibilities of various organizations. In its current state, diaspora engagement is still managed in a dispersed way by organizations and Ministries other than the Ministry of Moroccans Residing Abroad. As such, diaspora-specific issues are still handled by existing institutions that are not always well-equipped to resolve such issues. So, a centralized vision ought to be developed so that the Ministry could become the main interlocutor between Morocco and the diaspora. Particularly, Moroccan government representatives in the USA (i.e., Embassy, Consulate) should enhance their channels of communication with the Moroccan-American community to answer their queries.

Finally on the legal front, the government and diaspora must liaise relationships and bilateral conventions between the home country and the country of residence to ensure the rights of the diaspora are sustained including pension and other retirement benefits which, in the long run, would guarantee foreign transfers from resident countries to the beneficiaries who choose to return to Morocco for retirement. Capacity building for members of the community that do not have recourse to Moroccan legal advisers to help them with their legal inquiries must be addressed. In the USA, unlike in Europe, the consulates do not have the option to offer legal services to the community; and the *Moudawana* provisions, among other legal reforms, have been poorly communicated to the Moroccan diaspora, which amounts to inadequate knowledge of their rights and responsibilities in cases of litigation.

Particularly, capacity building to the staff of the Ministry of Moroccans Residing Abroad is essential to ensure they are well-informed on the wide-ranging aspects of diaspora engagement in areas such as legal empowerment for Moroccans living abroad. It is crucial to implement capacity building for diaspora groups to be able to provide legal aid services through their associations and add legal aides appointed by the consulates to offer awareness and assistance in settling many legal disputes such as family issues.

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Leila Hanafi is a Moroccan-American international development lawyer with the World Bank Group in Washington, DC, and most recently legal adviser for the United Nations OPS in Washington D.C. office. She has served as the Diaspora Commissioner in the Moroccan Inter-Governmental Commission on Policy Dialogue and Constitutional Prerogatives. She is also the Diaspora editor for *Morocco World News* and spearheads several Diaspora advocacy groups for the rights of the Moroccan Diaspora. Her research and teaching specializations include Rule of Law, International Law, Human Rights Law, and International Organizations and her academic degrees are in international law from Georgetown University, George Washington University, and American University. She holds a PhD in Law from the University of Kent Law School. Her publications include *Morocco's 2004 Family Code: Improving Access to Justice for Women* (co-authored with Christine Pratt; *Women and Knowledge in the Mediterranean* Routledge: New York 2013) and *Transnational Family Law & Women's Rights– Comparative Case Studies of Denmark and Morocco* (The Danish Center for Research and Information on Gender, Equality and Diversity KVINFO and Copenhagen University, 2014).

Danielle Hites is a research assistant at the Alliance for the Rule of Law and Alternative Dispute Resolution and a law fellow at the International Justice Resource Center in San Francisco. Her primary advocacy focus areas include gender rights in the Middle East and North Africa, refugee law, and rule of law. She earned her *juris doctor* from Boston University School of Law and a bachelor of arts in psychology from Suffolk University. Her publications include *Prospects of Ratification of the Rome Statute in Morocco* (co-authored with Leila Hanafi, International Center for Criminal Law Souissi Rabat: 2014), *Note on Family Law and Moroccan Women Residing in the US* (co-authored with Leila Hanafi, The American Moroccan Legal Empowerment Network: 2014), and *Protecting Syrian Refugees: Laws, Policies, and Global Responsibility Sharing* (co-authored with Akram, Bidinger, Lang, Kuzmova, and Noureddine, Boston University, 2014).

Engaging with Its Diaspora: The Case of Senegal

Sorana Toma

INTRODUCTION

Senegal has a long history of intra- and inter-continental emigration flows as well as a highly active and engaged diaspora. The Senegalese living abroad have long been involved in the development of their home communities, both through private transfers to their families and through collective investments in the community infrastructure. Yet, incorporation of migration issues in the political agenda by the Senegalese state, and the acknowledgment of the role played by the diaspora in the country's development are much more recent.

From 2000 onwards, the government has been actively trying to engage with the diaspora. Adopting the recent discourse linking migration and development, it views Senegalese migrants as one of the main agents of Senegal's development. Among the state measures implemented, we can identify all three types described by Alan Gamlen,[1] albeit to different degrees depending on the location of the diaspora. The measures aimed at the African-based diaspora concern mostly the extension of rights and

S. Toma (✉)
Center for Economics, Sociology and Statistics (CREST), Université Paris-Saclay, Paris, France

their legal and welfare protection. In contrast, the programs targeting European-based Senegalese migrants are mostly intent on extracting their financial and human capital resources.[2] The latter focus on three main objectives: promoting private economic investments of Senegalese living abroad in Senegal, supporting migrant associations in their collective development projects in home communities, and third, drawing on the resources and expertise of the highly skilled diaspora for the benefit of Senegal. Furthermore, Senegal developed a series of state institutions responsible with engaging with its diaspora, such as the Ministry for the Senegalese living abroad.

The chapter is organized as follows: the first section maps out the country's diaspora and its history of migration flows, the second section presents a snapshot of the historical and present nature of state–diaspora relations. Senegalese migrant associations and their engagement in the home country are discussed in the third section. The fourth section introduces the political and social debate surrounding diaspora engagement policies (DEPs) in Senegal whereas a fifth section details their legal and institutional mechanisms. Some key lessons stemming from the development and the implementation of DEPs in Senegal are outlined in a final section.

MAPPING THE COUNTRY'S DIASPORA

Persistent Economic Crisis Since the 1970s

Senegal, a French colony until 1960, is considered to be a success story in terms of democracy in Africa[3] and, compared to other countries in the region, has enjoyed relative political stability since its independence. The picture is less optimistic in terms of economic prospects. The first two decades following independence were a period of economic growth fuelled mostly by Senegal's groundnut and other agricultural production (coffee and cocoa). But a combination of a persistent cycle of droughts and the oil shocks of the 1970s, together with the fall of market prices for agricultural products and the devaluation of the national currency in 1994 have marked several profound economic crises.[4] These intensified in the 1990s, and between 1990 and 1999 the gross domestic product per head sank by 28 percent.[5] In 2008 the country's Human Development Index was at 0.499 placing it 156th out of 177, signifying for the most part stagnation in human development despite moderate economic growth.

Growth rates over the last decade hovered at around 5 percent, but were largely cancelled out by high population growth—Senegal's population has quadrupled since 1960, leading to limited effects in poverty reduction.[6] Unemployment has been growing, and is especially affecting the young, whose numbers are increasing as the population is getting younger.[7] Following a series of structural adjustment programs, employment in the civil service has gone down substantially, while the private sector is too weak to sustain the labor market. This led to the informal sector being the most important provider of jobs and the first source of revenue of the Senegalese population: more than one Senegalese out of two has an informal activity, with the sector especially attracting women and children.[8] As a result of these economic and demographic transformations since the 1980s, an ever-larger number of young people with poor professional prospects enter the labor market each year[9] and view international migration as the only way to get ahead.

History of Migration Flows

These economic transformations have shaped the nature of migration flows to and from Senegal. Up to the 1970s, Senegal was mostly a country of immigration, its groundnut production attracting workers from neighboring countries.[10] Also, to begin with, migration to and from Senegal[11] has mostly been in connection with other African countries.[12] It is mostly from the 1980s onwards that Senegal increasingly became a country of emigration and that flows towards Western destinations took off.

The first wave of migration to Europe can be traced back to World War I, when many Senegalese served in France as marines and infantrymen (*tirailleurs sénégalais*) and often settled there after the war.[13] But the flows became more important after Independence, oriented towards a couple of African countries experiencing an economic boom in various sectors, such as the Ivory Coast and Ghana, where the cocoa, coffee, and wood cultures were peaking, Gabon, where the building sector was expanding, or the two Congos, for the diamond industry. On the other hand, the flows towards France also picked up, responding to the needs of the expanding automobile industry, which was actively recruiting workers to fill the domestic labor shortage.[14] Both regions adopted policies of freedom of circulation of persons.[15]

From the 1980s onwards, two major tendencies stand out: the diversification of destinations and the intensification of Senegalese migration

flows, especially towards Western destinations.[16] The end of the *Trente Glorieuses* sees France closing its borders to labor migration in 1975[17]; at the same time, the classical African destinations—the Ivory Coast and Gabon—started experiencing economic downturns and begin promoting the "national preference" (*ivoirité, gabonization*), making it harder and harder for foreigners to reside legally, and exert economic activities, on their territory.[18]

This led the Senegalese to progressively turn towards new destinations in the North without any colonial or linguistic links to Senegal, such as Italy, Spain, and the USA.[19] The former two became particularly attractive due to their expanding agricultural, construction, and tourist sectors and their flexible entry legislations and frequent regularization campaigns. Several data sources illustrate the decreasing share of intra-continental migrations: between 1988 and 1992, 58 percent of international migrations targeted other African countries, whereas only 43 percent did so between 1997 and 2001.[20] The economic crisis seems to have put a stop to this trend, at least temporarily, as intra-continental migrations went back up to 46 percent of all international moves between 2008 and 2013.[21]

A third trend that can be observed over the last two decades is the generalization of migration across different fragments of the Senegalese society, in terms of region of origin, social class, ethnic and religious background and, to some extent, gender. Up to the 1980s, most of the international migrants came from the drought-hit Senegalese River Valley. They were mostly men belonging to the Soninke or Haal Pulaar ethnic groups and migrated alone, their families remaining in the villages of origin.[22] The crisis of the Groundnut basin and the rise of urban unemployment since the 1970s led to a diversification of departure points. The Dakar area became the first origin of emigrants and the groundnut basin regions are increasingly sending migrants abroad. With more regions in Senegal increasingly engaged in international migration, the ethnic and religious make-up of Senegalese flows diversified. In particular, researchers have noted an increasing participation of the Wolof ethnic group and of the Murid Sufi brotherhood members in inter-continental flows.

The data published by the World Bank in the "Bilateral Migration matrix 2013"[23] indicate that over 540,000 Senegalese lived abroad in 2013, down from over 636,000 in 2010. Both figures are still much higher then the estimate for 2000, which put the Senegalese migrant stock worldwide at approximately 336,000.[24] The five main

destinations in terms of stocks are, in 2013, France, The Gambia, Italy, Spain, and Mauritania. These are also the main destinations[25] in terms of the most recent flows, those leaving between 2008 and 2013.[26] According to the World Bank 2010 estimates, 91,000 Senegalese were living in France, whereas the national statistical agency in France puts this number at 75,000 in 2008. In both cases however, this number is likely to be higher as it doesn't include those who have the double nationality, the descendants of immigrants nor irregular migrants.

Although qualitative work and some studies argue that international migration flows from Senegal are increasingly feminized, there is only limited evidence in the data in support of such a phenomenon.[27] At the national level, according to the 2013 census, barely a 2 percent increase in the share of women migrants can be documented.[28] However, the share of women among the stock of Senegalese migrants varies greatly by destination. For example, according to OECD data,[29] whereas around half of Senegalese migrants in Mali, and around 45 percent in France and the Gambia were female, women represented only 12 and 16 percent of migrants in Italy and Spain respectively.

A Snapshot of the Historical and Present Nature of State–Diaspora Relations

Despite the long history and the scale of migration flows, Senegal does not have a detailed migration policy framework.[30] There is no coherent and efficient strategy of managing and controlling migration, or of engaging with the diaspora, but rather an approach based on urgency and on a case-by-case basis.[31]

The discourse of the Senegalese government on the topic of migration and its policies and initiatives gradually shifted from the reintegration of return migrants to stimulating the diaspora's contribution to the development of the country. The 1970s and the 1980s were very much marked by the first issue, at the initiative of France, which was closing its borders to immigration. Senegal signed several agreements with France on the issue of the return of Senegalese workers in France. France's State Secretary of Immigration, Lionel Storélu, introduced in 1977 a *prime de retour* (return bonus), which was expanded in 1984. At the same time, following these agreements, Senegal created new

structures in charge of facilitating the social and economic reintegration of Senegalese migrants wishing to return to Senegal.

The State's discourse and policies relating to migration shifted focus in the 1990s, and more so from 2000 onwards. The emphasis was placed on the (mostly economic) role of the diaspora in the development of Senegal. With European funding, the government implemented a series of large-scale projects aimed at capitalizing on the financial and human capital of the Senegalese diaspora in Europe, under the label of "co-development."[32] More specifically, their objectives were to stimulate migrants' business investments in Senegal, the transfer of skills and the collective investments of migrants' associations in their communities of origin. Senegal also created several other institutions in charge of establishing a dialogue with the diaspora—such as the Superior Council of Senegalese living abroad, created in 1995—and, in 1998, allocated three seats in the Senate to ensure the political representation of the Senegalese living abroad. It has also been making efforts to put in place a good system for monitoring its citizens living abroad, through a census project aiming to create a database of the Senegalese diaspora.

Since 2000, and in parallel with the implementation of the co-development programs and initiatives mentioned earlier, Senegal signed several bilateral agreements with France, Spain, and Italy. The agreements are aimed at a better "management" of migration flows, and included measures to curb illegal migration, readmit nationals in irregular situations and organize channels of legal migration (through quotas, labor migration, and student mobility). Co-development, relabeled solidary development is another component of these agreements, and includes public aid for infrastructure and technical assistance.[33]

On the other hand, the relationship between Senegal and its African-based diaspora, as well as the main countries of destination within Africa (mostly West-African states) differs significantly. First, agreements with West African countries going back to 1979, stipulate the freedom of circulation, residence, and settlement of people within the ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States). Second, whereas programs targeted at the European-based Senegalese diaspora aimed mainly to stimulate their financial investments in Senegal and the return of some of its members, programs targeted at the African-based diaspora focus on the enforcement of rights associated with the freedom of circulation within ECOWAS and the social protection of the migrants.

DIASPORA'S ORGANIZATIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT

Senegalese migrants stand out for their strong transnational ties and sense of belonging to the home country. In Europe, they are one of the leading immigrant groups in terms of "density" of associations[34]: in Italy, they were the first in 2005 with around one association for every 682 immigrants, according to Caritas Roma.[35] Overall, the Senegalese living abroad keep strong links with their family and community back home, visit Senegal frequently and entertain the hope of a permanent return.[36] They also practice multiple and intense types of economic transnational engagement, such as sending remittances or transnational commercial activities,[37] while also being politically engaged in their home country.[38] This shared sense of identity, active networks and associations, as well as tight links with their home communities make the Senegalese living abroad a "diaspora."[39]

Existing research emphasized the intense associational life of Senegalese migrants in France,[40] Italy,[41] and Spain,[42] the main European destinations, but also in newer destinations such as Switzerland.[43] In contrast, we know much less about the Senegalese migrant associations in their main African destinations. In Europe, Senegalese associations cover a diversity of missions (socio-economic integration at destination, development of origin areas, cultural preservation) and have multiple membership criteria (gender, area of origin, area of destination, religious or ethnic belonging). The associational dynamism of the Senegalese diaspora partly reflects cultural practices and institutions characteristic of Senegalese society, where most individuals are members of several different associations, based on their age groups, neighborhood or village, gender, and religious affiliation.[44]

Researchers of the Senegalese diaspora have documented several types of migrant associations. The oldest associations were in France, due to the long history of migration flows to the previous homeland, and took the form of village insurance funds (*caisse villageoise*). Migrants from the same village, neighborhood or area of region contributed monthly to a common fund, which helped the members in case of unpredicted events, such as work accidents, repatriation, or funerals.[45] From the 1980s onwards, these collective funds become increasingly institutionalized and used in the development of their origin communities.

These *associations des ressortissants* (hometown associations or HTAs) fund collective projects aimed at improving the infrastructure and

institutions in the origin community, such as building, renovating, or supplying schools, medical centers, mosques and improving the water, road, or electricity infrastructure. They developed in Paris and the surrounding suburbs, where they are still most widespread, and were mostly established by migrants from villages in the Valley of the Senegalese River (northern Senegal). As Senegalese migration flows diversified both in terms of origin and destination, hometown associations spread to Italy, Spain, the USA, Africa and were also set up by migrants originating in other parts of Senegal, both rural and urban. In practice, a HTA in the diaspora works in collaboration with an association in the community of origin, which is in charge of implementing the projects. It frequently works with a Dakar-based association coordinated by internal migrants, which manages administrative contacts. HTAs are also generally part of a transnational network of "sister associations" in the other destinations of the migrants from the same community.[46] Irrespective of their location, members who hold a job should contribute to a collective fund, which can be shared between the various associations. This pooling of resources allows them to realize larger-scale projects, such as water towers, high schools, and hospitals. It also allows them to apply for co-development programs funded by the European countries of settlement in collaboration with Senegal (see section titled "Extending Rights to the Daispora").

The choice of development projects is generally taken in consultation with the head of the village and other local key persons, on the basis of consensus. But this is not always the case, and tensions often exist between the village-based association and the diaspora associations. The former accuse the latter of making unilateral decisions without being completely informed of the village situation. Tensions may also appear within the diaspora-based associations, between the younger, more educated generation and the older migrants, who have different ideas of what development should be and which projects should be funded. Younger generation members also tend to be more oriented towards the settlement context and push forward projects aimed at promoting the Senegalese culture or the socio-economic integration of migrants in their destination country.[47]

Other types of Senegalese migrant associations are more explicitly oriented towards the destination context. In Italy, several associations were created in the 1980s and 1990s with the objective of promoting Senegalese migrant workers' rights, offering also legal protection and advice. Membership is usually based on the city or region of residence at destination (e.g., the Association of Senegalese workers of Turin). More

recent associations focus on promoting Senegalese culture, both among the diaspora and among the native population. As hometown association are run by men, reflecting the fact that "the village belongs to men,"[48] migrant women developed their own associations. Female associations are frequently multi-ethnic and multi-national and direct their interest primarily towards issues concerning integration in the destination country. By anchoring their associations[49] in the local context of destination, and not in the village or neighborhood of origin as men do, women attempt to renegotiate the power relations they are traditionally subjected to.[50]

Yet other types of associations are based on ethnic or religious principles of belonging. Among the former, one of the biggest associations in Italy is the Association of Fulbé of Italy (AFI) with about 1,400 members and 12 sections[51]; its main objective is to preserve and promote the fulbé culture and language. *Dahiraa* is the most studied type of religious association: it groups disciples of the Murid brotherhood based on either their allegiance to a *marabout* or on the place where they are located.[52] Dahiras are especially widespread in Italy, where the Murids are overrepresented, and play a key role in the socio-economic integration of their members at destination. Finally, the Senegalese diaspora in Italy and France are also involved in mixed associations, which brings together both Senegalese migrants and natives of the destination country (i.e., French or Italian).

Senegalese migrant associations could traditionally be divided into those mostly oriented towards development initiatives in their home communities in Senegal and those focused on the destination context and the economic, social, and legal integration of migrants. However, researchers document an increasing trend among associations of engaging in both types of missions.[53] On the one hand, the more restrictive political and economic context in Europe, but also the rise in family reunification, led HTAs to also deal with integration issues. On the other hand, the new funding opportunities offered under the "co-development" framework and the efforts of the Senegalese government to engage the diaspora in the development of the country, led associations mainly oriented towards the destination context to take part in development projects in Senegal. Moreover, Senegalese migrants are often members of more than one association, further blurring the distinction between these two objectives.

Besides their collective engagement in development projects in home communities, many Senegalese migrants frequently send back remittances and may sometimes establish transnational businesses. According to World

Bank estimates, monetary remittances sent to Senegal from abroad have increased six fold since 2000, from US\$ 233 million to US\$ 1,476 million in 2008, as illustrated in Fig. 4.1. This sharp rise can be related to the increase in migration flows, particularly in flows towards European and North American destinations. But it is also, in a large part, due to the proliferation, since 2000, of new money transfer operators (e.g., Western Union, Money Gram) throughout Senegal, offering migrants safer, faster, and more reliable channels.[54] In 2006, Senegal disposed of more than 500 points for quick transfers (banks, decentralized financial societies, and the postal bank), representing 90 percent of the financial transfer market in Senegal.[55] According to the Migration and Remittances Household Survey carried out by the World Bank,[56] 87 percent of international remittances into Senegal go through official channels (74 percent through Western Union only), a much higher percentage than for other Sub-Saharan countries surveyed, such as Burkina Faso, Ghana, Nigeria and Kenya.

With the onset of the global economic crisis, flows declined to US\$ 1,350 million in 2009, a modest decline compared to the 71 percent decline in FDI during the same period.[57] Remittance flows recovered in the subsequent years, with a sharp increase in 2015 at around US\$ 1,910


Fig. 4.1   Annual migrant remittance inflows in Senegal

Source: World Bank Annual Remittances Data (Updated as of April 2017)

millions. They represent on average 10 percent of the country's GDP since 2006 (12 percent according to the IMF), contributing four times more than FDI flows and around as much as half of exports of goods and services. Senegal is fourth in Sub-Saharan Africa in terms of total remittances (behind just the much more populous Nigeria, Sudan, and Kenya) and fifth in remittances as percentage of GDP (behind the small states of Lesotho, Togo, Cape Verde, and Guinea-Bissau).[58] The European Union is by far the first origin of monetary remittances, accounting for 51 percent of transfers in 2007, according to data from the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO).[59] According to the same source, the USA accounts for 7 percent of the total remittances, while West African countries account for 8 percent (down from 12 percent in 2006).

Quantitative and qualitative studies emphasized the important role played by these monetary flows in securing family livelihoods and reducing national poverty. In Senegal, around half of the households have a migrant abroad.[60] Recipient households mainly use remittances for current consumption and rent (around two-thirds of the households), for health and education expenses, and very rarely for real estate or for business investments. However, according to a nationally representative household survey, the Africa Migration Project, this share varies greatly depending on the origin of the remittances: whether coming from outside or from within Africa. A larger share of remittances sent from outside Africa are used for real estate projects, such as construction of rebuilding of a house and purchase of land (14 percent compared to 2 percent of African-originating remittances) while a lower share is used for food (53 percent compared to 73 percent). In contrast, a larger share of African-originating remittances is used for the development of a business (5.7 percent compared to 1.3 percent).

Senegalese migrants are also engaged in other types of transnational activities beyond sending remittances. A comparative study of transnational practices of Senegalese, Ghanaian, and Congolese migrants show that the former are more likely to make short visits to their home country but also to return on a more long-term basis. Their families are also more likely to be transnational, as family reunification in Europe is less frequent among Senegalese migrants.[61] Senegalese migrants are also highly involved in the political life in Senegal, voting in national elections and influencing their relatives back home,[62] although their political transnationalism has been the object of much fewer studies.

THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL DEBATE SURROUNDING THE DEPs IN SENEGAL

International migration has become a central feature of Senegalese identity and the standard model of social advancement. Whether in a village of the Senegal River Valley or in Dakar, the international migrant has emerged as the new figure of economic and social success[63] replacing the state functionary as a symbol of individual achievement. The *modou-modou*,[64] as they are referred to in colloquial terms, are celebrated in Senegalese pop songs as modern heroes, leading Riccio (2005) to conclude that a reversal of traditional hierarchies has taken place in Senegal. "It is the unskilled and sometimes illiterate who is traveling globally without losing touch with the beloved homeland [who is celebrated], whereas the white collar or the graduate seems bogged down in what seems a failed path of social mobility."[65] Accordingly, young people's "career planning" is increasingly directed towards the international labor market.[66]

As discussed in the previous section, the Senegalese migrants' associations are highly active and have long been involved in the development of their home communities, both through private transfers to their families and through collective investments in the community infrastructure. In contrast, the incorporation of migration issues in the political agenda and the acknowledgment of the role played by the diaspora in their home communities by the Senegalese state are relatively recent.[67] A large symposium was organized in 2001 on the topic of "A new partnership with the Senegalese living abroad," marking a shift in the political and public debate and renewing State–diaspora relations. From this point onwards, Senegalese living abroad are seen as one of the main agents of development of the country. Organized by the Senegalese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the symposium brought together different state departments, the Superior Council of the Senegalese living abroad as well as several NGOs and migrant associations around two questions: "What can Senegal do for the Senegalese abroad" and "What can the Senegalese abroad do for Senegal."[68] The main priorities were drafted into an action plan, which was developed in 2006 into the strategic document known as *Lettre de Politique Sectorielle des Sénégalais de l'Exterieur* (LPS).

Furthermore, from the mid-2000s onwards, Senegalese institutions gradually adopted a discourse stemming from the "migration management"

approach advocated by the European Union in its Global Approach to Migration, adopted in 2006. According to Kabbanji (2013), this approach draws a strong link between migration and development, in at least two ways. First, by stressing the positive influence that migrants and migration in general play in the development of their countries of origin and second, by putting forward the idea that increasing development in countries of origin is the best way to curb the out-migration of unwanted migrants. What underlies both these dimensions is, according to Kabbanji (2013): "a common understanding that the essential condition for international migration having a positive impact would be "proper" management—management that consists of promoting (more) legal migration by matching the labor needs of destination countries with the labor supply from source countries.[69]

The State's public discourse thus reflects the now dominant, highly utilitarian perspective,[70] according to which developing the country of origin and providing opportunities for the young to work there is necessary in order to curb unauthorized mobility. State officials are increasingly adopting a discourse that stresses the "unprecedented scale of illegal migration flows" from Senegalese shores (Senegalese Government and French Government pact, 2006, p. 2), conveying images of Senegal in particular—and of Africa in general—being "deserted by its unemployed young people." An active campaign against clandestine migration, which emphasizes its dangers, is undertaken by most actors dealing with migration issues (public or private) and may serve to legitimize an increasingly interventionist approach.

The economic development of Senegal is seen as a solution for reducing migration, in particular in its illegal form. Migrants and their organizations are considered as key actors of development in their countries: they are expected to share the interests of their communities of origin and to bear a moral responsibility towards them,[71] to the extent that they shift that responsibility away from the state itself.[72] This moral obligation is reflected in the following interview of a Senegalese official:

> The migrant has to be preoccupied and to be responsible for the economic and social environment in the home country and community. Migrants are thus invited to invest in their future and in that of their children through projects. We offer them assistance such as information, training, financial support, etc.[73]

The Legal and Institutional Mechanisms of the DEPs

The Senegalese state has been increasingly engaging with its diaspora since the 1980s and particularly so since the 2000s. Among the state measures implemented, we can identify all three types described by Alan Gamlen,[74] albeit to different degrees depending on the location of the diaspora. The measures aimed at the African-based diaspora concern mostly the extension of rights and their legal and welfare protection. In contrast, the programs targeting European-based Senegalese migrants are mostly intent on extracting their financial and human-capital resources.[75]

Building Capacity

Starting in the 1980s, Senegal developed a series of state institutions responsible for engaging with its diaspora. Initially, these institutions focused on facilitating the reintegration of migrants. In 1983, following agreements with France on the return of Senegalese workers, the position of Minister in charge of Senegalese living abroad, delegated to the President of the Republic was created. The Minister was in charge of helping, orienting, and coordinating the State's actions in order to facilitate the social and economic reintegration of Senegalese migrants wishing to return to Senegal.[76] In 1987, with French assistance, Senegal created the *Bureau d'Accueil, d'Orientation et de Suivi* or BAOS (the Office for Reception, Orientation, and Monitoring) within the Ministry delegated to the President. The BAOS is in charge of giving migrants all relevant information with respect to the conditions of their return and reinsertion, facilitating their reintegration in a different production sector, implementing the policy for the promotion and transfer of migrants' savings, and facilitating the technical and financial implementation of migrants' individual and collective projects.[77] The BAOS is not however functional, according to the IOM office in Senegal.

The delegated ministry in charge of Senegalese abroad was dismantled and, following a ministerial reorganization on June 2, 1993, the authority of the Ministry for External Affairs was broadened; the Ministry became the Ministry for External Affairs and Senegalese Living Abroad until 2003. Since 2003, reflecting the increasing importance of the State–diaspora relations, a specific Ministry has been dedicated to migrants: the Ministry of Senegalese Living Abroad. In 2012, following national elections, the two missions were again joined in the same ministry. The

objectives of the Ministry for External Affairs and Senegalese Living abroad include: implementing an efficient system for managing and monitoring the Senegalese population living abroad, promoting the economic, social, and cultural reintegration of Senegalese abroad upon their return, facilitating their access to housing and developing a policy of engaging the diaspora in its development efforts.[78] With respect to the first objective, the Ministry implemented a census project, which aims to create a database of Senegalese nationals living abroad. The methodology consists of collecting information following three approaches: voluntary registration on a web site, the use of consular registries, and the listing of Senegalese migrants belonging to Senegalese diaspora associations (a database of 741 Senegalese associations around the world is available).

The Ministry of External Affairs and Senegalese Living Abroad is structured into the following sub-divisions: Directorate for the Promotion of Housing for Senegalese abroad (DIPHASE)—in charge of purchasing plots in Senegal and developing them for the Senegalese abroad with the support of property developers, the Directorate of Support to Investments and Projects (DAIP)—in charge of assessing projects designed by expatriates, the Directorate of Social Affairs (DAS)—in charge of social welfare issues for the diaspora, and the Directorate of General Administration and Equipment (DAGE)—in charge of staff management.

An advisory body to the Ministry—the *Conseil Supérieur des Sénégalais de l'Extérieur* (Superior Council of the Senegalese Abroad)—was created in 1995 through Decree No. 95–154 of 9 February with the mission of establishing a dialogue with the diaspora, but remained mostly inactive. In 2010 the Council was revitalized (Decree No. 2010–241) and charged with the mission to represent migrant associations around the world and "manage, protect and foster the Senegalese abroad."[79] It is currently composed of 75 members among whom the President designates 45 while 30 are elected by the diaspora. The institution and the election of the representatives were however criticized by the diaspora.[80]

The Ministry for Senegalese Abroad and its bodies are not, however, the only state institutions engaging with the diaspora. Several other Ministries are also involved with different aspects of migration policies but rarely coordinate their efforts, leading to a fragmented approach to migration. The Ministry of Economy and Finance is also interested in the diaspora and in particular in its participation in the development of the country through monetary remittances. The Ministry of Decentralization with Local Authorities is the entry point at the local level for national and international

actors, in particular for organizations and associations of the diaspora that wish to invest in Senegal. The Ministry for External Affairs is another important pillar of migration management. It is in charge of dealing with conventions and partnerships with other countries and was involved in the negotiation of several agreements with important destination countries for Senegalese migrants. The Ministry of Internal Affairs has been the governmental structure charged with signing bilateral agreements with countries such as France or Spain. The General Management for National Security is the operational arm of the Ministry, which is responsible for the implementation of the strategy for migration management in Senegal. The Ministry for Youth and Youth Employment is in charge of monitoring the global labor demand among youth (who are considered potential migrants).

Extracting Obligations from the Diaspora

Reflecting the recent political discourse linking migration and development, the government has been actively trying to engage Senegalese living abroad in the economic development of Senegal and of their origin communities. The initiatives implemented so far mostly target Senegalese living in Europe and are guided by three main objectives: first, promote the private economic investments of Senegalese living abroad in Senegal and support them in their business projects; second, support migrant associations in their collective development projects in home communities; and third, draw on the resources and expertise of the highly skilled diaspora for the benefit of Senegal. Furthermore, initiatives promoting the voluntary return of some categories of migrants, such as the unskilled or the irregular migrants, have also been linked to the development potential of migration. Most of the above-mentioned initiatives are funded by European countries (mostly France, Italy, and Spain) and often run by international organizations (e.g., IOM, ILO, UNDP). Senegalese institutions are usually involved as managing partners and may contribute a small part of the total costs of the projects.[81]

The majority of the programs is guided by the first objective and aims to support migrants in the creation of small and medium enterprises in their countries of origin. According to the promoters of such programs, the businesses started by migrants should galvanize the private sector in Senegal, create new jobs and contribute to decrease poverty. Migrants are thus seen as potential investors, despite the low share of migrant entrepreneurship and the small percentage of remittances

dedicated to productive investment, as discussed in the previous section. Several international and national programs are entirely dedicated to this objective or commit major components to it, among which: the Investment Support Fund for Senegalese Abroad (*Fonds d'appui à l'Investissement des Sénégalais de l'Exterieur*—FAISE), initiated and coordinated by the Ministry of Senegalese Living Abroad since 2008; the "Co-Development Initiatives" Fund based on the 2005 agreement with France, replaced in 2009 by the "Program to Support Solidarity Initiatives for Development" (*Programme d'Appui aux Initiatives de Solidarité pour le Developpement*—PAISD) funded by France; the Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) and its successor, Migrant Women for Development in Africa (WMIDA); the Support Platform for the Private Sector and the Promotion of the Senegalese Diaspora in Italy (*Plateforme d'appui au secteur privé et à la valorization de la diaspora sénégalaise en Italie* (PLASEPRI) funded by the Italian Cooperation, and the "Remittances and Local Development of Senegal" (REDEL) project funded by the Catalan Fund for Development Cooperation (see Kabbanji[82] for details on the funding of each project). Eligible candidates are legally residing migrants, usually in the country that funds the program, and who have some resources and business experience. Given that the funding of the programs supported by European countries is much higher, these initiatives disproportionally benefit Senegalese migrants residing in Europe.[83] The programs generally offer financial support (bank loans or, in a few cases such as FAISE and PAISD, grants), technical assistance in the set-up of the business, professional training in management skills, an extension of bank services and reduced currency transfers cost (particularly REDEL). Certain sectors are particularly targeted, such as the agriculture sector.

Ever since the 1970s, Senegalese migrants actively contributed to the development of their home communities, and continue to do so in high numbers, through collective investments in infrastructure projects. Political interest in this issue is however much more recent, and these investments are still not among the main objectives of above-mentioned programs. The Italian-funded MIDA and particularly the French-funded PAISD program supported most local development projects, mainly in the sectors of water towers, wells, irrigation systems, healthcare and education. The beneficiaries and project promoters are the migrant associations, and programs offer grants,[84] technical assistance as well as capacity building.

A third objective of these initiatives has been the mobilization and transfer of skills of the highly educated members of the diaspora. The adopted programs reflect a shift in perspective from a pessimist focus on "brain drain" to the more positive approach of "brain gain." According to the underlying discourse, the expertise and skills of the diaspora can be used in order to increase Senegal's institutional capacities and thus have an important impact on development.[85] A large-scale program dedicated to this objective is the Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN). Coordinated by the UNDP and carried out in several countries, the program is implemented in Senegal through the Ministry of External Affairs and Senegalese Living abroad since 2003. The project seeks to (1) identify highly-skilled Senegalese living abroad and create a database, (2) match the identified expertise with the reported needs of the private and public sector, (3) organize short assignments (virtual or physical mobility) of the experts in Senegal. Until 2007, 76 experts have supported, on a voluntary basis, institutions in Senegal, mainly universities (84 percent of the missions), and other public institutions in Senegal (only 4 percent in the private sector).[86] Among these, eight experts were permanently recruited in Senegal. The French-funded PAISD and the Italian-funded MIDA program sponsored similar activities, but restricted to the Senegalese experts living in the respective funding countries.

Furthermore, the agreement signed between Senegal and France in 2006 (and its amendment in 2008) mobilize the Senegalese diaspora more intensely, for example by inviting high-level academics to return to Senegal by offering them shared Chairs between a French and a Senegalese university or by creating a visa enabling the circulation of beneficiaries of co-development programs.[87]

The Senegalese government, in collaboration with the main destination countries, also implemented several programs promoting the return and reintegration of the diaspora. Such interventions were initiated by France, in the 1970s and 1980s: for example, the circular number 6 of January 17, 1977 signed with France promotes an operation called "Training Senegalese workers who have emigrated to France in view of their return" (*Journal Officiel*, 1978–10–30, no. 4668, p. 1365). The bilateral agreements signed with France, Italy, and Spain in the mid-2000s all stipulate the readmission of Senegalese citizens in irregular situation by the Senegalese state. Some interventions, funded by European countries, propose financial and technical support for "voluntary" returns. They draw a link between return and development by accompanying returnee

migrants in their economic projects.[88] The government has also invested in programs encouraging migrants' reinsertion in the agricultural sector. For example, the financial compensation of 20 million euros received from Spain following the 2006–2007 agreements was in principle allocated to the Voluntary Return to Agriculture (REVA) plan. The plan, which was criticized by many, aims to create jobs in agriculture and favors returned migrants.[89] A similar program—the *Grande offensive agricole pour la nourriture et l'abondance*—GOANA (Big Agricultural Offensive for Food and Abundance)—offers land and agricultural machines to return migrants and prospective emigrants who wish to invest in agriculture.

Extending Rights to the Diaspora

There are relatively fewer state measures aimed at extending the rights of the Senegalese migrants living abroad, compared to those aimed at extracting obligations from them.

First, the Senegalese diaspora enjoys several types of financial incentives, aimed at stimulating their remittances and investments in Senegal. The Investment Code[90] adopted in 2004 includes several initiatives inciting foreign investors and Senegalese citizens living abroad to invest in Senegal, including fiscal advantages during the first years following the start of the project and alleviation or exemption of certain state taxes. National banks are also offering incentives, such as the Diaspora Package offered by the *Banque de l'Habitat du Sénégal*, which enables Senegalese living abroad to open a savings account with special interest rates and has a specific insurance. The *Caisse Nationale de Crédit Agricol du Sénégal* (CNCAS) aims to stimulate investments in the primary sector (agriculture, animal husbandry, and fishery sector) by offering certain financial advantages to migrants.[91] These fiscal advantages are part and parcel of a numerous set of initiatives that aim to extract funds from the diaspora, particularly from its European-based part.

In terms of political rights, Senegalese citizens living abroad can vote in Senegalese elections, and they tend to have an important weight in determining the outcome both through their votes and through their influence on their relatives in the homeland.[92] Recently, the government stipulated that a Member of Parliament elected by the diaspora is to be appointed as third deputy president of the National Assembly, that five Senegalese abroad should be nominated in the Senate and that the Economic and Social Council should include diaspora representatives. On the other

hand, Senegalese lose their citizenship if they acquire a foreign nationality, as stipulated in Article 18[93] of the *Code de la nationalité sénégalaise* (Senegalese Citizenship Code). However, and despite the fact that the Code has not changed, dual citizenship seems to be accepted *de facto* by Senegalese officials.[94] The problems arise when the second state—for example, Germany—does not tolerate dual citizenship of non-EU nationals.

Legislation concerning the social protection of Senegalese citizens abroad mostly concerns the African-based diaspora. Besides an early agreement that was signed with France in 1974—the Convention on social security issues, renegotiated in 1975—protecting the rights of Senegalese migrant workers in France, few other such initiatives were taken with other European countries. In contrast, social security agreements were signed with Mali (1965), Mauritania (1987), Gabon and Cameroon (signed by Senegal, not ratified by the two countries) and inter cash payment agreements with Togo, Ivory Coast, Benin, and Burkina Faso.

Furthermore, six protocols were signed by State members of the ECOWAS, including Senegal, between 1979 and 1990, stipulating the right of free circulation, residence, and settlement of persons within ECOWAS. Provisions are made in order to protect the rights of migrant workers within the Community, including protecting their investments and their landed properties as well as controls on employers to fight illegal labor. However, according to Kabbanji,[95] the focus of the ECOWAS initiatives changed after 2000, under the influence of European actors who enter the negotiations: "measures aiming for a liberalization of intra-regional migration are replaced by restrictive measures."[96] The right of free circulation is henceforth restricted to a few categories, such as liberal professions, tertiary-level students, young professionals, and female entrepreneurs, and numerous actions aim to tackle illegal migration (within and beyond West Africa). In 1990, Senegal also ratified the UN Convention on the "Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families."

However, the provisions of the various bilateral agreements and conventions ratified by Senegal on the social protection of Senegalese migrants are rarely enforced, partly due to the absence of administrative arrangements.[97] Since the 2000s, international organizations stepped in by coordinating several large-scale programs aimed explicitly at improving the conditions of migration and the rights of migrants within the ECOWAS space. The project "Support and advice to African public

authorities responsible for migration and development initiatives along the migratory route to West Africa" (MeDAO Project[98]) carried out capacity building activities in the social protection of migrants. In Senegal, it supported the Ministry of Senegalese Living Abroad and other state officials to develop a work plan for promoting the ratification and the operational implementation of bilateral and multilateral social security agreements. The AMEDIP project, "Strengthening African and Middle Eastern Diaspora Policy through South-South Exchange," carried out by IOM and ICMPD (International Center for Migration Policy Development) between 2011 and 2014 had similar objectives.

THE KEY LESSONS STEMMING FROM THE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NATIONAL DEPS IN THE COUNTRY

Senegalese international migration flows have a long history and touch an important share of the population. Consequently, the Senegalese diaspora is highly diverse, both in terms of destinations and in terms of ethnic, religious, class, and regional make-up. Furthermore, it stands out relative to other immigrant groups through its large number of associations, most of which carry out development projects in the home communities of their members. Besides this exceptional collective engagement, Senegalese migrants also maintain strong private transnational ties with their origin communities, visit and return often, and frequently send money back home.

Despite the scale and history of migration flows and the longtime transnational engagement of Senegalese migrants, the Senegalese state has only recently started a dialogue with its diaspora. A large symposium in 2001 inaugurated this new partnership and a series of institutions charged with dealing with the diaspora were created, including the Ministry for Senegalese living abroad. Several initiatives aimed at stimulating migrants' investments in Senegal but also their voluntary return were implemented, mostly with European funding. The general discourse supporting these initiatives is that migrants can and should contribute to the development of their origin country. In turn, development is seen as a main strategy for curbing further migration.

Several studies point to a mismatch between the implemented programs and migrants' practices.[99] A very small minority of European-based migrants set up businesses in Senegal, yet stimulating and supporting these migrants' private investments is the main objective of

most initiatives. In contrast, collective investments by migrant associations, a prominent practice within the Senegalese diaspora, are the subject of fewer programs and receive comparatively less financial and technical support. Furthermore, the "development potential" of the African-based Senegalese diaspora is much less tapped, despite a higher share of intra-continental migrants setting up businesses in Senegal. Overall, they are much less targeted by the co-development programs implemented by Senegalese institutions than their European-based peers.

Besides these initiatives aimed primarily at extracting funds from its diaspora, the Senegalese state implemented few measures in order to protect the rights of its citizens living abroad. Senegal signed international and bilateral conventions with several African countries on social security and legal rights for Senegalese migrants, but did not give itself the financial and administrative means to implement and enforce those conventions. Furthermore, besides longtime agreements with France, the social and legal protection of Senegalese migrants did not feature prominently in the conventions it signed with Italy or Spain, two main destinations for migrants.

Overall, Senegal was criticized for not having a coherent migration policy framework and an efficient strategy for managing migrating.[100] Furthermore, the various institutions involved in governing migration in Senegal have been criticized for their lack of coordination. The managing of migration is done by different governmental departments and ministries together with other development actors. Ad-hoc committees are established in order to deal with one-off problems. According to a recent report on Senegal's migration policies, "targeted policy areas suffer from a lack of focus and institutional actors' competencies are overlapping or lack follow-up."[101] At the national level, the absence of a clear policy for managing migration creates real confusion in the area of intervention by the different actors.[102]

NOTES

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5. Felix Gerdes, "Focus Migration. Country Profile: Senegal" (Hamburg: HWWI, 2007).

6. Fall, "Sénégal Migration, Marché Du Travail et Développement."

7. Momar-Coumba Diop, "Le Sénégal des migrations: mobilités, identités et sociétés," KARTHALA Editions (ONU Habitat and CREPOS, 2008); Gerdes, "Focus Migration. Country Profile: Senegal."

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10. The migration of French and Lebanese settlers to Senegal during colonization should also be mentioned.

11. Senegal has also a rich and complex history of internal migration flows—such as the "navétanes" of the groundnut basin or the sailors, for which there is no space here.

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13. Diop, *Le Sénégal des migrations.*

14. Hamidou Dia, "Espaces Domestiques, Espaces Villageois, Espaces Urbains Multi-Situés : Cinquante Ans de Migrations À Partir de La Moyenne Vallée Du Fleuve Sénégal (1960–2010)" (Paris 5, 2009), http://www.theses.fr/2009PA05H050.

15. The Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, the Right of Residence and Establishment was signed in 1979 by the members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Senegalese citizens could enter France without visas until 1985.

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17. The bill of July 5, 1974 announced the end of immigration and the closing of borders. It however reformed its policies on family migration, which became the main channel of immigration.

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23. http://econ.worldbank.org/
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46. Ibid.; Kane, "Diaspora villageoise et développement local en Afrique"; Maggi et al., "Migrations Transnationales Sénégalaises, Intégration et Développement Le Rôle Des Associations de La Diaspora À Milan, Paris et Genève."

47. Dia, "Les villages 'multi-situés' sénégalais face à la nouvelle configuration migratoire mondiale."

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Sorana Toma is an Assistant Professor of Sociology in the Center for Economics, Sociology and Statistics (CREST) at the ENSAE—Université Paris-Saclay in France. Her research interests include International Migration, Immigrant Assimilation, and Residential Segregation, with a geographical focus on Africa. Sorana obtained her MSc and PhD degrees in Sociology from the University of Oxford in Great Britain. Her recent publications appeared in the *International Migration Review, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Population Space and Place.* She is a member of the editorial board of Oxford Development Studies and a reviewer for development, migration, and sociology academic journals. Her professional memberships include the Population Association of America (PAA) and the European Association for Population Studies (EAPS).

Nigeria: Diaspora Engagement Policies in National Context

Olukoya Ogen

Introduction

The chapter explores and examines the historical and social dynamics of the Nigerian diaspora. It focuses on state–diaspora relations as well as diaspora–homelands relations. It will further investigate the major issues that have dominated debates in this diaspora development mantra. Similarly, it will assess the pattern of Nigeria's diaspora engagement policies and the key lessons learnt that have been observed from these policies over the years. The chapter is divided into seven sections. The first section will introduce the chapter while the second section will focus on the history of the Nigerian diaspora. The third section will examine state–diaspora relations in the Nigerian context. In the same vein, the fourth section will examine diaspora–homeland relations. The fifth section analyses the issues in state–diaspora relations in Nigeria while the sixth section assesses Nigeria's diaspora engagement policies based on Gamlen's typology. The seventh section concludes the chapter.

O. Ogen (✉)
Osun State University, Osogbo, Nigeria

113

THE NIGERIAN DIASPORA: DEFINITION, EVOLUTION, FEATURES, AND ORGANIZATION

Nigerians living in the diaspora are often considered as people who have migrated out of the country since the colonial period. In defining their identity, Charles Soludo, a former Governor of Nigeria's Central Bank observed that Nigerians in diaspora are "Nigerians who have 'settled' or live abroad (outside of Nigeria) for whatever reason. We exclude descendants of those who left as slaves-Africa's first and authentic Diaspora."[1] Soludo's definition appears to be the thinking of the Nigerian government. However, it is important to consider the fact that many of the descendants of former slaves from Nigeria have identified with the development of the country, especially in the areas of culture and tourism, especially when they attend cultural festivals like Osun Osogbo and Olojo, Ifa initiation ceremonies, and the like in Yorubaland.[2] Therefore, by considering this diaspora group, the Nigerian diaspora could be referred to as those Nigerians living outside the shores of the country who not only trace their origins to Nigeria but also identify with and support the development of the homeland. This fits into Plaza and Ratha's definition of diaspora "as people who have migrated and their descendants who maintain a connection to their homeland."[3]

There are no accurate data on the number of Nigerians living in diaspora. This is partly due to poor documentation by the Nigerian immigration authorities, and the inability of host countries to consider the naturalized and second generation Nigerians in their statistics. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has put the statistics of Nigerians living in the diaspora at about 20 million.[4] This figure could be contrasted with the population of Nigerian migrants living in the USA and the UK which are the major destination countries outside Africa. In the RAD-MPI report, the number of Nigerians in the USA is estimated to about 380,000 including children.[5] Another report shows that this figure is higher and could be up to 3.4 million.[6] 1n 2013, the Mayor of Brent, London, Mr. Michael Adeyeye confirmed that the number of Nigerians in London was over one million people.[7] Irrespective of these conflicting figures, it could be argued that Nigeria has a considerable number of nationals living in the diaspora and whose population reflects the large amount of money and investment they remit to the country.

The movement of these Nigerians abroad was greatly facilitated by the early transnational movement of different groups in the pre-colonial

period. Although the entity called Nigeria was not in existence in this period, many people who now identify with Nigeria outside the country are descendants of pre-colonial migrant groups in the region. Perhaps, the earliest recorded transnational movement involved the Hausa and Kanuri groups who plied their trade across the Sahara between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries. This was also the period when they made pilgrimages to Mecca and Medina. The movement of these groups facilitated their settlement in regions that are connected to their economic and religious routes. Another corridor was opened for transnational movement in southern Nigeria when the Atlantic slave trade began. This saw the forced movement of thousands of Nigerians who mostly worked on the plantations established in the Americas. Upon their freedom, they became citizens. Few descendants of these Nigerian migrants now identify with developments in the homeland, especially in the area of traditional religion. The forces of colonialism were also responsible for the exodus of Nigerians to the diaspora. In this period, many Nigerians migrated to other African countries such as Cameroon, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Benin Republic, and Ghana to work either as public servants in plantations or mine workers.[8] The glamour of western education during this period equally encouraged hundreds of Nigerians to seek higher education in the UK and the USA. Although they all set out with the intention to return to the country and take up jobs left by the departing colonialists, many remained abroad to work in their host lands.[9] This trend continued in the post-colonial period.

The economic recession of the late 1970s and 1980s compelled another wave of migration of Nigerians. The country's economic crisis led to an increase in job loss and poverty while those with jobs found it difficult to meet their needs due to the devaluation of the naira. The economic crisis was met by political repression of the military government mostly against pro-democracy activists, academics, and journalists who led the opposition movements. All of these forced many of them to seek asylum and better economic opportunities in different countries across the world.[10] With some going to seek permanent residency, they migrated to countries outside the UK and USA. The new destination countries include Germany, China, Malaysia, France, Belgium, Italy, Netherlands, the Gulf States, South Africa, and Botswana. While the majority of Nigerians from the Southern region of the country preferred Europe and the Americas, those from the Northern region gravitated to the Gulf and Muslim-dominated states. At the same time, quite a number of Nigerians found African

countries as viable alternatives to Europe, North America, and the Gulf States. It has been discovered that about 50 percent of all Nigerian migrants are living in Africa.[11]

A considerable number of Nigerians who emigrated are youths. It is estimated that nearly one million Nigerian youths seek admission abroad every year.[12] Their target countries are mostly the UK, the USA, Ghana, Malaysia, South Africa, and Canada.[13] The migration of young people could be linked to the country's socio-economic crisis, which threatened their chances of getting good education and employment opportunities. Nigeria's economic crisis resulted in the decay of major sectors of the economy such as education, power, and industry. This compelled many youths to seek higher education in universities abroad. A number of foreign universities' "consultants" who help to facilitate the admission of these youths also promised to help them seek employments after their education.[14] This has encouraged many of them to stay behind and live as residents. Apart from these youths, many Nigerians were also encouraged to migrate abroad through opportunities provided by the US and Canadian diversity visa lottery programs.

Although socio-economic and political crises may have encouraged Nigerians to seek better living conditions abroad, these factors do not fully explain the fundamental reasons why they take such decision. It is interesting that the factors of economic and political crises are consistent with the popular perception that migration is one of the fallouts of the problem of uneven development and income distribution, which induce peoples from developing countries to search for better opportunities in the developed countries.[15] As a matter of fact, it is assumed that since international migration is a key element of globalization, the phenomenon of global demographic mobility has been facilitated by the negative consequences of globalization as exemplified in glaring inequalities in economic and political power between immigration and emigration countries.[16] However, in spite of the relevance of this argument, it does not consider the fact that many migrants are not the poorest in their societies.[17] Traveling abroad usually involves a huge sum of capital which could only be afforded by those in the middle and upper class. As shown in the case of Nigerian migrants, many of them usually come from well-to-do families who see some members of their families living abroad as symbol of their wealth and prestige at home. Many Nigerians in this category have also migrated abroad because they want a change of environment.

As in the homeland, Nigerians in diaspora are widely different in their socio-economic status and living condition. These differences are often defined by occupation. Among them are members of the Black middle class such as medical doctors, nurses, barristers, academics, entrepreneurs, sportsmen and women, musicians, and those at the lower rung of the ladder which include taxi/bus drivers and care-givers. Some of the wealthiest among them include business moguls such as the late Chief Antonio Oladehinde Fernandez and Chief Harry Akande who lived in the USA. There are also Nigerians who have excelled in their professions and are at the top positions in their work places. They include world renowned academics such as Toyin Falola, a Professor of African History at the University of Texas, Austin, USA, Prof. Peter Nwangwu, a clinical pharmacologist who ranked among the top ten in his profession across the world, Philip Emeagwali, referred to as the "Father of the Internet" and voted Africa's greatest scientist by *New African* for his work on supercomputer development, and Chimamanda Adichie, an international award winning novelist. Similarly, there are technocrats such as Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, former Vice President, World Bank who headed the Ministry of Finance during Olusegun Obasanjo and Goodluck Jonathan adminis-trations and Mr. Olusegun Aganga, former Director at Goldman Sachs, London who was in charge of the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Investment in the Jonathan administration in Nigeria. It is also important to cite the cases of peoples of Nigerian origin who head public institutions abroad such as Collins Nweke, who was elected twice as Councilor at Ostend City Council of Belgium in 2013, Ms. Olufemi Obe, who was appointed a Commander of the New York Police Department (NYPD) in 2014, Mr. Michael Adeyeye, appointed the Mayor of Brent, London in 2012 and Prof. Ilesanmi Adesida, a nanotechnologist who became the first black Vice-Chancellor of Academic Affairs of University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign, USA in 2012.[18] Sportsmen such as Hakeem Olajuwon, a former MVP basketball player for Houston Rockets, USA and Hollywood artists such as Chiwetel Ejiofor are other symbols of excel-lence Nigerians living in the diaspora. On the other hand, however, there are many Nigerian nationals whose lives and activities have caused some dent to the image of the country abroad. Among these are young ladies involved in prostitution, especially in Italy, Spain, and the Gulf States. Many Nigerian youths have also acquired reputation

for fraud-related offences and drug trafficking. Indeed, the activities of these criminals have been responsible for the negative stereotyping of Nigerians abroad.

A major feature of Nigerians living in the diaspora is their organization into ethnic and sub-ethnic groups. As reflected in the homeland, they formed such groups as the Egbe Omo Yoruba, World Igbo Congress, Ikale World Congress, and the Zumunta Association, Anambra State Progressive Union in Germany, and the Odoziobodo Club of Ogwashi-Uku, to mention but a few.[19] These associations play crucial role in the integration of new migrants into the Nigerian diaspora network. They also assist new migrants to search for jobs and provide all forms of support to each other during ceremonies such as naming of new born babies and marriage. Faith-based associations; especially those with links to the homeland have also become important agents of integration and support to Nigerians in diaspora. These include the Cherubim and Seraphim Church, Christ Apostolic Church, Africa Independent Church Movement, The Redeemed Christian Church of God (RCCG), and Nasrullahi Fathi Society of Nigeria (NASFAT) with branches spread across European and American communities occupied by Nigerian nationals. The relevance of these associations to the Nigerian communities is their tendency to bring together people of similar world views and religious orientations. In particular, they support migrants who are insecure and disadvantaged in the society. This view is supported by studies which revealed that these indigenous faith groups have over the years met certain needs of migrants in terms of their spiritual, socio-cultural, and material needs.[20]

Nigerians in diaspora also belong to various civil society groups and associations which they use to air their opinions on socio-political issues at home and abroad. Studies by scholars show that these associations play a crucial role as source of information to prospective migrants, especially those relating to entry requirements, transportation arrangement, deportation policies, and social-welfare benefits. They also try to mobilize resources needed by migrants to reach their destination country. Similarly, they could organize the movement of migrants in a clandestine manner when it becomes necessary. This is often done to assist people in need of asylum. This form of arrangement was common at the peak of military oppression of the Sanni Abacha administration between 1993 and 1998 in Nigeria where many frontline members of civil society groups and pro-democracy activists were secretly moved out of the country. In this period, several pro-democracy groups emerged among Nigerian

communities abroad. Notable among them were the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) and United Democratic Front of Nigeria (UDF) with bases in the USA. Prof Wole Soyinka chaired the latter group and was also responsible for establishing a shortwave radio station, Radio Kudirat, which unleashed invective on the Abacha administration.[21]

Nigerians living in the diaspora also formed developmental associations and professional bodies which they used to support each other and foster closer interaction among themselves. They also tried to extend their support towards community development projects in the homeland. For instance, the Central Association of Nigerians in the UK (CANUK) has been trying to protect, unify, and empower Nigerians in the UK towards contributing to the growth and development of both the host country and the homeland. There is also the Nigerian-Canadian Professionals Network which seeks to network individual and group support for members through exchange of appropriate sector-specific information. Other similar groups are the Association of British-Nigerian Law Enforcement Officers (ABLE) in the UK, and the Diaspora Nigerians Network (DNN) in the USA.[22] After the transition to democratic governance in 1999, many other groups emerged abroad as branches of leading political parties in the homeland. In the 2015 elections, supporters of these parties campaigned abroad for their candidates, even though they were not allowed to cast their own vote for these candidates.[23] A major instance of their involvement happened in London some few weeks to the 2015 general elections in Nigeria when the opposition's All Progressive Congress Party (APC) presidential candidate, Gen Muhammadu Buhari, was scheduled to deliver a speech at the Chatham House. Before and during his presentation, supporters of the Presidential candidate of the Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP) clashed with those of the APC in a show of solidarity for each of their candidates.

Nigerians in diaspora have also tried to create a sense of shared identity abroad through different information and telecommunications services. They have been able to create an internet-based discussion forum called *Naijanet*. This forum connects Nigerian migrants in Europe, the USA, Asia-Pacific, and other regions where they discuss issues relating to development at home and in their host countries. They also have other ethnic *Listservs* such as Igbo-Net, Yoruba-Net, and THT.[24] There is also Ben TV and Channels TV which provide satellite and cable broadcast to Nigerians living in the UK. For the most part, the two television stations are dedicated to broadcasting issues and programs that are Nigerian. There

is also *Nigerianwebradio*, an internet-based station that broadcasts news and events concerning Nigeria. All of these platforms help Nigerians in diaspora connect with events at home and in their host lands and also enormously affect their everyday lives.

UNDERSTANDING NIGERIA'S DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT POLICIES

The engagement of the Nigerian diaspora towards the development of the country emerged as a major policy thrust of the Nigerian government following the return to democratic governance in 1999. The significance of this engagement is underscored by the new optimistic perspective on the role of diaspora groups in the migration–development nexus.[25] The value of remittances of the Nigerian diaspora is one major signpost for this optimism. Nigerian nationals across the world have contributed to the development of the country through remittances made to their respective families, business investment, and community development projects. In 2011, the World Bank reported that the official remittances of Nigerians living in the diaspora amounted to US\$ 19 billion,[26] while the 2013 report puts the value at US\$ 21 billion.[27] Curiously, this report also showed that Nigeria is the only African country in the top five recipients of global diaspora remittances, while the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) confirmed that diaspora remittances have been surpassing Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) to the country since 2002.[28] The significance of diaspora remittances was further underscored in 2014 when the Nigerian government issued a statement that it would focus on exploiting diaspora remittances to meet a significant part of its budget expenditures, especially in the areas of infrastructural development, due to the fall in oil prices.[29] Apart from their remittances, many Nigerians living in the diaspora represent some of the highly skilled and innovative human-capital resource in their respective host lands, particularly in the USA and the UK.[30] Among them are members of academia, scientists, medical professionals, entrepreneurs, and technocrats who not only occupy top level positions in their work places, but also make considerable impacts towards the development of their host lands.

A state–diaspora engagement began under the Olusegun Obasanjo administration. A major aspect of this engagement was to extract obligations from the Nigerian diaspora towards the development of the homeland. The Nigerian government encouraged them to increase their remittances by way of investment in any sector of the nation's economy.[31]

Over the years, this policy has facilitated the inflow of foreign direct investments and development assistance into the country. The most notable impact of this engagement has been felt on investment in community development projects, health care services, academic exchange programs with tertiary institutions and the development of science and technology among young graduates. The expertise of Nigerian migrants is also sought in an attempt to transform the critical sectors of the economy. This has encouraged the employment of technocrats such as Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, former Vice President, World Bank who headed the Ministry of Finance during Obasanjo and Jonathan administrations and Mr. Olusegun Aganga, former Director at Goldman Sachs, London who was in charge of the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Investment in the Jonathan administration.

In return for the obligations expected from Nigerians living in the diaspora, the Nigerian government tried to foster state loyalty and national identity with them through some privileges and rights that are accorded them. This is being facilitated through such policies as citizen-diplomacy to promote the individual interest of Nigerian nationals at home and abroad. The government has also declared a national diaspora day, which is being used to forge closer ties with the diaspora through a range of activities planned to mark the day. There is also an attempt to extend voting rights to Nigerian nationals abroad. For instance, the country's electoral commission made a case for their inclusion in the last general elections, however, institutional and technical problems meant that this was unable to happen in the 2015 general elections.[32]

Curiously, the extension of the right to vote is one of the major issues that has dominated debates in Nigeria's state–diaspora relations.[33] The Nigerian diaspora strongly canvassed for this right between 2012 and 2015. Owing to this, Nigerian diaspora organizations had to rally their members to support their right to vote through a register opened at Nigerian embassies across the world.[34] They also lobbied members of the National Assembly to pass the bill that will give constitutional backing to this laudable aspiration. However, their inability to cast their votes in the 2015 elections encouraged them to think that government has not done enough to identify with their interest.[35]

Issues revolving around the protection of rights of Nigerians in their host lands have also featured in the state–diaspora debate in Nigeria. In spite of its public pronouncement to pursue citizen-diplomacy, most Nigerians at home and abroad believe that this has not impacted on the

protection of their interests. This problem has particularly been observed when they expect government to intercede on behalf of Nigerians involved in criminal activities abroad.[36]

The non-implementation of a Public Diaspora Engagement Policy (PDEP) is another controversial issue in the state–diaspora debate. Indeed, in spite of its engagement, the Nigerian government does not have a formally codified or clearly defined diaspora engagement policy (DEP) that properly defines those who constitute Nigerian nationals in diaspora and other provisions that explain the obligations, rights, and rules of engagement between them and the homeland.[37] Consequently, it may be observed that Nigeria's diaspora engagement has been carried out on an ad-hoc basis.[38] Although a bill seeking to establish a Nigeria Diaspora Commission (NIDCOM), which is expected to cater for the engagement of Nigerians in diaspora on policies, projects, and participation towards national development, has been passed by the House of Assembly in 2015, it remains to be seen how this Commission will actualize the Nigeria's state–diaspora relations in the administration of President Muhammadu Buhari.

Before Buhari, state–diaspora relations relied on a range of symbolic activities and agencies that were coordinated by the Office of the Presidency. These include the Presidential Dialogue which the Nigerian President used to interact with diaspora communities abroad. An agency called the Nigerian National Volunteer Service (NNVS) is also involved in the mobilization of Nigerian professionals living abroad to promote capacity building at home. There is also the Nigerians in Diaspora Organization (NIDO), which represents all Nigerian professionals groups in the diaspora and coordinates their developmental projects meant for the homeland. Other agencies involved in state–diaspora relations are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Office of the Special Adviser to the President on Diaspora Matters, and the House Committee on Diaspora Affairs in the legislative assembly.

With no formal DEP, the pattern of Nigeria's state–diaspora relations could fit into Gamlen's open-ended definition of DEPs, which, according to him, refers to "state institutions and practices that apply to members of that state's society who reside outside its borders."[39] In the same way, it is possible to identify the three-way typology of Gamlen's DEPs in Nigeria's state–diaspora relations.[40] As elaborated in this typology, state–diaspora relations in Nigeria have focused on building capacity through a range of symbolic and institutional

approaches. It also seeks to extend rights to the Nigerian diaspora, as well as extracting obligations from them. One of the key lessons learnt from these diaspora relations is the attempt by the Nigerian government to reconstitute a state–citizen relation outside its borders. This policy is being explored in return for diaspora investment in the country. However, while progress is being made in this direction, the pattern of interaction and other related challenges in the homeland are holding back a range of advantages that ought to have accrued to the homeland and the diaspora group.

Generally, Alan Gamlen's definition and typology of DEPs provide useful understanding to the Nigerian diaspora polices and institutional mechanisms. Gamlen opines that DEPs "should not necessarily be seen as part of a unitary, coordinated state strategy. Rather, they form a constellation of institutional and legislative arrangements and programs that come into being at different times, for different reasons, and operate across different time scales at different levels within home-states."[41] This conception of DEPs illustrates the experience of Nigeria in diaspora relations. A notable observation from Gamlen's conception of DEPs is the diversified nature of these policies which he therefore categorized into three types according to the objectives pursued by immigrant home states in their diaspora relation. These three typologies show policies which are focus on *capacity building, extension of rights,* and *extraction of obligations* from the diaspora, all of which could be observed in Nigeria's DEPs.

THE NIGERIAN DIASPORA AND THE QUEST FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT

It is understood that a substantial amount of diaspora remittances to Nigeria go into consumption without savings and investment.[42] With little impact on infrastructural development, this pattern of diaspora remittance has often questioned the impact of diaspora remittances on development in the receivers' states.[43] While this argument does not suggest that diaspora remittances have not been properly invested by some people in the country, the Nigeria government has equally been exploring measures to encourage diaspora investment in long-term development projects. In 2013, the government initiated the first Diaspora National Development Strategy at a dinner hosted by the German chapter of (NIDO) in Berlin and attended by Nigerian businessmen in diaspora, the Nigerian Embassy

in Germany, and German businessmen. Part of the strategy was to issue the sale of a US\$ 100 million diaspora bond to activate diaspora investment in the country's infrastructural development, particularly in the power and oil industries. The bond is tax-free and it is expected to provide an alternative investment to equities, real estate, and bank deposits. It can also be used as collateral for borrowing from banks and discount houses.[44] Global financial services, Goldman Sachs and Stanbic IBTC, were appointed to oversee the sale of this bond.[45] Apart from this, the government has also launched a diaspora export program with the objective of facilitating international trade through small and medium enterprises (SMEs) owned by local and foreign-based Nigerians.[46] In the same vein, the CBN observed that Nigerian youths receive over 15 percent of diaspora remittances for educational purposes, while 12 percent is meant for investment. Therefore, the bank established Entrepreneurial Development Centers across the country to train and mentor young people on how to develop their business plans and invest the resources they have.[47]

The Nigerian Diaspora and Knowledge Transfer

Nigeria's policy in this regard is to ensure transfer of knowledge towards the development of science, technology, tertiary academic programs, and human capacity. The strategy is to promote linkages with academics and professionals abroad, notably of Nigerian origin, to persuade them to relocate to Nigeria on a short-term basis in order to contribute to national development through engagement in teaching, research, and community services in the Nigerian university system. The National Universities Commission (NUC) and NNVS are responsible for facilitating this knowledge exchange program in Nigerian universities. The NUC has developed a Nigeria's Linkages with Experts and Academics in the Diasporas (LEAD) program which it uses to connect diaspora scholars with Nigerian universities annually. The LEAD is also used to call for applications from volunteer diaspora scholars to take up short-term teaching appointment in the country.[48] An academic exchange program is supported by the UN under its Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Network (TOKTEN) program and is expected to address the global knowledge gap, which has for long been skewed in favor of the North.[49]

Apart from the NUC, academic exchange programs are also facilitated by Nigerian universities alumni abroad. The intervention of these alumni is to enhance manpower training, library development, and access to

research grants, among others. For instance, between 2003 and 2007, the alumni of the Faculty of Arts of Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife who are based in South Africa, the UK and the USA donated books and cash to the faculty. Many junior academics in the Faculty also benefitted from research and training abroad through the links provided by alumni academics in various institutions in Europe and the Americas.[50]

It is estimated that Africa has less "than 83 scientists and engineers per million compared to 423 in North Africa, 514 in other developing countries across the world, 783 in Asia (excluding Japan), and 1102 in advanced economies."[51] Therefore, the Nigerian government has been promoting the development of science and technology through a World Bank assisted Nelson Mandela Institution, known as the African University of Science and Technology (AUST) established in Abuja in 2007. The AUST's intervention is through graduate education programs with special focus on the most important needs of African countries, particularly in the areas of petroleum engineering, theoretical physics, materials science and engineering, pure and applied mathematics, and computer science and engineering.[52] At inception, the Board of the University was chaired by Nigeria's Dr. Ngozi Okonjo Iweala, while Wole Sobeyejo, a Professor of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering at Princeton University, was President and Provost. The University has other Nigerian and African diaspora visiting scholars. It partners with both local and international institutions dedicated to science and technology research such as the University of Ibadan, African Institute of Science and Mathematical Sciences, South Africa, IIT Bombay, University of Aizu, Japan, Kennesaw State University, USA and the Science Initiative Group (SIGA) in the USA.[53]

The Nigerian Diaspora and the Protection of Nigeria's Image and Interest

The need to protect the interest of Nigeria and its image abroad is another major obligation that the Nigerian government expects from its diaspora group. This obligation came against the backdrop of the image of Nigeria which has suffered due to many issues such as fraud, corruption, drug trafficking, maladministration, and inefficiency in public establishments. These challenges led to criticism from the international community as well as Nigerians at home and in the diaspora. Upon his emergence as

President, Obasanjo believed that the government must do everything possible to address the negative image that Nigerians suffer abroad. One of his strategies was to encourage the Nigerian diaspora to be the vanguards of Nigeria's image abroad. Because the international community is often misled by the media, he encouraged them to keep themselves abreast of issues at home before commenting on them.[54] Indeed, the Nigerian diaspora responded well to this call as some of them began to respond to the negative image of Nigerians abroad. A particular case in point was when the Cable Network News (CNN) carried out a documentary on the theme "How to Rob a Bank in Nigeria" which portrayed Nigerians as criminals in 2006. Dr. Ola Kasim, who was NIDO president in the USA, responded swiftly by issuing a rebuttal and condemning CNN for the negative stereotype against Nigerians.[55] Apart from this, many Nigerian diaspora associations, including ethnic and religious groups, have also been responsible for protecting the interests of fellow Nigerian diaspora involved in criminal activities or abuse of rights.

State–Diaspora Relations

From the 1970s, the Nigerian government linked with the Nigerian diaspora as part of other African Diaspora populations with the objective of promoting its foreign policy in the fight against colonialism, racism, and discrimination against peoples of Black origin.[56] Nigeria also engaged the African diaspora through the promotion of African cultures in this period. This led to the organization of the Lagos Festival of Black African Arts and Culture (FESTAC) in 1977. By 1985, Nigeria's foreign policy under the Ibrahim Babangida administration encouraged the enrolment of skilled Nigerians, mostly medical personnel, to assist other developing countries in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific through the Technical Aids Corps (TAC) scheme. Many of these professionals stayed back or moved on to other countries where conditions of service were better. The rationale behind this policy has been questioned given the fact that TAC encouraged the migration of skilled Nigerians abroad that ought to have been employed at home.[57]

The non-recognition of the Nigerian diaspora before 1999 as development partners could also be linked to the scholars' conflicting perceptions of the instrumentality of diaspora populations.[58] Indeed, between the 1950s and 1980s, the debate on the link between migration and development fluctuated between hopes and despair, with topics like "brain drain"

shifting to "brain gain" and "brain circulation."[59] The effects of homeland remittances have however encouraged the argument in favor of an optimistic future in the migration–development nexus. Similarly, the negative attitudes of diaspora Nigerians and the international community towards military rule in Nigeria have affected state–diaspora relations. In particular, the Abacha administration between 1993 and 1998 became very corrupt and could not guarantee the protection of freedom and rights of citizens. The tyranny associated with this regime was not assuaged by the problems of poverty and unemployment that continued to force the migration of many Nigerian citizens abroad. Although Nigerians in diaspora continued to remit money to their various homeland communities in this period, the system of administration in the country did not encourage any form of developmental partnership from them with the government. As a matter of fact, many of them led by pro-democracy activists became critics and opponents of the military government from their bases abroad.[60] The Abacha government responded by calling them "a bunch of Cab Drivers that have nothing to offer Nigeria" and people selling Ice Cream with their Master's degree.[61] However, respite was brought to this sour relationship following the return to democratic rule and the election of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo as President in 1999.

On the return to democratic governance, one of the challenges that confronted the new government was how to rebuild the ailing Nigerian economy in a way that would encourage foreign direct investment and alleviate the problems of poverty and unemployment, among other socioeconomic issues. With this objective, the Obasanjo government developed several strategies. A part of these strategies was to attract international development partners and foreign direct investment to the country. These include opening the door to members of the Nigerian diaspora community who have become major players in the development of their host lands and experts in their professional practices.[62] The Obasanjo administration showed its commitment to this objective in 2000 when it convened a meeting of Nigerians in Diaspora in Atlanta, USA for those in the Americas and London for those in Europe. The meeting witnessed an impressive turnout with about 3,700 Nigerian delegates in the Atlanta meeting, while about 500 delegates attended the London meeting. Obasanjo used the occasion to encourage them to create a platform that would be used to mobilize and involve them in the development of the homeland.[63] This led to the formation of NIDO in 2001 as an umbrella body for all Nigerian diaspora associations and groups across the world.

NIDO is responsible for facilitating development projects of Nigeria diaspora organizations in the homeland in collaboration with Nigerian residents abroad. The government later established a NIDO office at its Ministry of Foreign Affairs with branches in all Nigerian embassies abroad. All Nigerians in diaspora were encouraged to link up with this office in Nigerian embassies where they reside. Expectedly, NIDO developed regional branches in different parts of the world such as NIDO-Europe (NIDOE) and NIDO-Americas (NIDOA). There are also two branches of NIDO in Asia specifically in Singapore and Malaysia, and Australia and in some African countries such as South Africa, Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Côte d'Ivoire.

Following the establishment of NIDO, the Obasanjo government initiated a "Presidential Dialogue with Nigerians Abroad" in 2002 to inaugurate formally Nigeria's state–diaspora engagement policies. The dialogue was aimed at incorporating the Nigerian diaspora in national development. He also established an Office of the Special Adviser to the President on Diaspora Matters, which coordinates the activities of the Diaspora in the Presidency. Furthermore, he initiated the creation of the NNVS as an institutional framework to engage constructively with the Nigerian diaspora in national development through volunteering.[64] The NNVS operates from the Office of the Secretary to the Federal Government of Nigeria, and it aims to engage with the Nigerian diaspora to create a reverse brain drain (brain gain) of their skills and knowledge.

Nigeria's commitment to engage the Nigerian Diaspora is further shown in the declaration of July 25 of every year to mark the Nigerian Diaspora Day. The declaration was made to recognize the Nigerian diaspora as an important stakeholder in the Nigerian project. The first Nigerian Diaspora Day was celebrated in 2006 with the second Science and Technology Conference. Former President Umaru Musa Yar'adua declared open the second Nigerian Diaspora Day during the third Science and Technology Conference held in July 2008.[65] Building on the federal government's initiatives, diaspora engagement was initiated by many of the country's states' governors. Similarly, the Nigerian legislative assembly established a House Committee on Diaspora Affairs as part of measures to mainstream the Nigerian diaspora matters into the country's legal framework.

Another initiative taken to facilitate Nigeria's relations with her diaspora population was to map the number and demographic features of Nigerians living in the diaspora. In 2001, the Obasanjo government urged

the Nigerian diaspora to create a databank for all Nigerians in diaspora which will assist government to know their conditions and identify those with skills that would be of benefit to the homeland. Subsequently, NIDOE set up a committee headed by Mr. Sebastian Udeajah, a senior software developer and consultant in Germany, which developed the Global Database of Nigerians in Diaspora (GDND). The database was officially launched in 2009 in a gala night in London. The GDND has been opened at Nigerian embassies and High Commissions across the world with a request for all Nigerians, particularly the professionals to register their membership.[66] In addition to the effort of NIDOE, Nigeria partnered with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in 2014 to map out Nigerian health and education professionals working in major destination countries such as the USA, the UK, and South Africa, who are willing to contribute to the development of the health and education sectors in Nigeria. The partnership is part of the European Union funded project "Promoting Better Management of Migration in Nigeria" within the framework of the tenth European Development Fund (EDF). To carry out this survey, IOM appoints Human Security Group (HSG), a consulting firm which specializes in US–Africa related research dealing with diaspora engagement, strategic advocacy and communications, including diaspora mapping.[67]

DIASPORA–HOMELAND RELATIONS

It is generally observed that all diaspora groups have an emotional attachment to their countries of origin which usually stimulates their desire to contribute to the development of the homeland. In particular, emotional attachment of the Nigerian diaspora to the homeland has been fostered by the familial and communal ties that connect them together. These ties promoted an active diaspora–homeland relationship before the Nigerian government officially recognized the importance of such engagement. Indeed, before this time, the Nigerian diaspora had been remitting several billions of dollars both in monetary and material terms. The bulk of these remittances go into payment of school fees and health care of sender's relatives, construction of houses, community projects, and investment in businesses.[68] This Nigerian diaspora attitude is promoted by their traditional culture of communalism and social responsibility, which requires that the more fortunate family members provide for the needs of the less fortunate. Most Nigerian parents also believe that they have the

responsibility to invest in their children, who will in turn take care of them in their old age. Proponents of the social-responsibility-of-professionals theory have always thought that highly skilled individuals have a wider social function beyond their call to duty to commit and contribute to public policy and welfare.[69] While it could be argued that Nigerian academics and medical personnel in diaspora consider their contributions to the development of the homeland as part of their social responsibility to the homeland, it is also important to underscore the sense of citizenship and nationalism that often motivate their interest in taking such decisions.

The remittances of Nigerians living in the diaspora are a major signpost of their relationship and contributions to the development of the homeland. Diaspora remittances was about US$ 1.3 billion in 1999.[70] The CBN reported that remittances through the banking system stood at US$ 2.26 billion in 2004, while figures for 2005 and 2006 were US$ 3.3 billion and US$ 7.7 billion, respectively. About US$ 10.6 billion was reported for 2006 while US$ 8.0 billion was reported in 2007.[71] However, in 2013, Nigeria's share of the global south's remittances of about US$ 404 billion reached US$ 21 billion. In world ranking, the Nigerian diaspora remittances occupied the fifth spot after four countries: India (US$ 70 billion), China (US$ 60 billion), the Philippines (US$ 25 billion), and Mexico (US$ 22 billion).[72] Indeed, the volume of remittances to Nigeria as well as other countries are more than these official figures. This is because of the fact that a considerable amount of transfers to the homeland are also done through informal mechanisms such as sending money or material things through friends and families. There can be no doubt that this has impacted positively on the lives of family members at home and on the development of various communities in the country.

Plaza and Ratha have pointed out that the potential contributions of the diaspora to Africa's development usually go beyond personal remittances.[73] Diaspora could also assist in many areas such as facilitating knowledge exchange programs, providing access to capital markets, facilitating trade links, as well as in philanthropic activities for community development. African diaspora also save up to US$ 53 billion annually, most of which are invested outside Africa, which could be mobilized for the development of Africa through such instruments as diaspora bonds.[74] Given their potentials, therefore, it is realized that the pattern of diaspora engagement in Nigeria and flow of remittances have been expanded and institutionalized since 2000. While remittances continued to flow into

families, personal investment, and community projects, government began to influence the Nigerian diaspora to contribute to the development of other critical national sectors of the economy.

One major sector that has benefitted from this diaspora engagement is health. This is an area where Nigerian diaspora medical associations have impacted on the control of health and environmental crises in the country, as well as other African communities. Notable associations that are dedicated to this cause are the Medical Associations of Nigerians Across Great Britain (MASAG) and the Association of Nigerian Physicians in the Americas (ANPA). Through their collaboration with the Nigerian Medical Association (NMA) at home, they bring medical missions to Nigeria where they provide direct clinical care for thousands of people who are medically indigent. Frequently, they raise money to support the control of diseases. For instance, ANPA raised nearly US$ 40,000 and donated nearly US$ 100,000 worth of personal protection equipment to help fight the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreak in 2014.[75] These medical associations also offer research and training programs on various medical issues and management. The ANPA provided a boost to this objective when it signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Federal Ministry of Health and the National Primary Healthcare Development Agency (NPHCDA) in 2010 to provide the necessary content to train primary health workers in rural areas. Similarly, MASAG has signed an agreement with its Nigerian partner, Stroke Action Nigeria, in its effort to provide comprehensive "approaches to preventative care, rehabilitation, self-management and social support for stroke survivors and their families in Nigeria."[76]

Nigerian diaspora organizations have also been involved in providing information on investment opportunities, as well as the appropriate channels that could be used to facilitate foreign direct investment into the country. For instance, NIDO-America organized a USA–Nigeria Trade and Investment summit in 2013 where the significance of diaspora investment to Nigeria's economic development was discussed.[77] NIDO-Europe was also responsible for organizing the 2011 summit where the first Nigeria Diaspora Development Strategy was initiated in Germany. The summit was used to emphasize the commitment and capacity of the Nigeria diaspora towards the promotion of trade and investment for Nigerians in the country and those living abroad. Many government agencies have equally proposed some schemes that could be used to effectively mobilize diaspora remittances into the mainstream of

Nigeria's economy. Among them is the Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria, which came up with a mortgage scheme proposal for Nigerians in the Diaspora to own houses of their choice in the country.[78] The Nigerian Diaspora bond represents another initiative to mobilize capital for the development of Nigeria's economy. Indeed, it is also observed that the Nigerian diaspora professionals have been actively involved in nation-building in other ways. Most importantly, they have contributed to the introduction of such schemes as health insurance for all Nigerians, registered pension for workers and the reformation of the credit purchase system in industrial establishments.[79] All of these diaspora activities have been so important in forging closer ties between governments of both host lands and the homeland.

OTHER SALIENT ISSUES IN STATE–DIASPORA RELATIONS

Several contending issues could be observed in the relationship between government and the Nigerian diaspora. One of these major issues is the implementation of a Diaspora Public Policy. As noted earlier, Nigeria has no official diaspora policy that defines and recognizes the Nigerian diaspora, the objectives and method of diaspora engagement, diaspora institutional apparatus, among other issues of state–diaspora relations.[80] Owing to this, state–diaspora relations have relied on ad-hoc institutional apparatus such as NIDO and NNVS in harnessing the human and capital resources of Nigerian nationals abroad.[81] It has even been argued that Nigeria's diaspora relations is a project of former President Obasanjo which other administrations have not taken seriously.[82] Owing to this, Nigerians in diaspora have been protesting against the lack of an official policy to engage them in the development of the country. One such protest took place at the Diaspora Nigerians Town Hall Meeting of 2011 held with Nigeria's former Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Prof. (Mrs) Viola Onwuliri in Washington, USA. The Chairman of the Diaspora Nigerians Network (DNN), Prof. Oparaoji who spoke on behalf of other Nigerian diaspora groups, criticized the administration system of the Nigerian government and its lackluster attitude to tap the wealth of resources of the Nigerian diaspora. He also told the Minister that most Diaspora Nigerians have been discouraged from assisting the country due to the inability of government to come up with an official Diaspora Public Policy.[83]

It is interesting to note that the Nigerian diaspora groups have submitted proposals to assist government in the formulation of this policy, but according to Collins Nweke, government "has not followed through in an equally consistent manner in developing institutional structures or framework to drive its commitment to the cause."[84] Although the Nigerian government has taken the step of establishing the Nigerian Diaspora Commission (NIDCOM) in response to the protest, bureaucratic and political strictures have delayed its emergence. A notable argument that has been used to stall the passage of the bill at the legislative assembly is the view that Nigerians in diaspora do not deserve such a platform because of the harm they have caused the country in terms of crimes and fraud.[85] Consequently, the lack of a Diaspora Public Policy encouraged the Nigerian diaspora to think that the Nigerian government is not doing enough to accord them the respect they deserve as citizens nor recognized their stake in the development of the country. The former opinion is also shared by Nigerians at home who usually protest against government's inability to protect Nigerian nationals abroad from cases of human rights abuses and crimes.[86] Indeed, many Nigerian nationals are notorious for various offences abroad, particularly fraud and drug trafficking which have landed many of them in prison and on row.[87] Many other Nigerians abroad have been subjected to human rights violation and racial abuse such as the xenophobic attacks in South Africa. The government's inability to take strong measures in dealing with these cases added to the Nigerian diaspora's belief that the Nigerian government does not recognize them as citizens. In the address by Prof. Oparaoji, the Nigerian diaspora pointed out that if the Nigerian government recognized them as citizens and is willing to fight for them, then it must be willing to invest at least 1 percent of the country's total budget to take care of their interests.[88] According to him, such investment "is key to maintaining Nigeria's leadership of its citizens in Diaspora," as well as promoting a state–diaspora partnership for Nigeria's development.[89]

The lack of an official Diaspora Public Policy also encouraged some doubts about the sincerity of the Nigerian government in its effort to promote diaspora investment. This doubt is promoted by the problem of corruption that has become notorious in government establishments and among its officials at home and abroad. For many Nigerians in diaspora,

the implementation of an official Diaspora Public Policy is not only needed to map out government policies, strategies, and specific areas in need of investment, it is also required to demonstrate the sincerity and extent to which government is committed to diaspora engagement for the development of the country. Prof. Oparaoji particularly made this clear when he said that Nigerians in diaspora who are interested in the development of the country have remained skeptical due to such problems as corruption, lack of fairness in policy implementation, and disrespect by officialdom.[90] The problem of corruption, impunity, and mismanagement of public office that were witnessed during the Jonathan administration has also been identified as one major reason why the diaspora bond which was expected to inject capital worth billions of dollars into the non-performing critical infrastructures in the country may not have proved successful. This is because diaspora bonds have failed to achieve their desired results in countries characterized by corruption, lack of transparency, and political instability.[91] As a result, Mrs. Henrietta Abraham who is the chairperson of NIDO-UK, pointed out that many Nigerians in diaspora were unsure of buying the diaspora bond that was proposed under the Jonathan administration.[92]

Diaspora voting has been another major issue that has dominated state–diaspora relations in Nigeria. Nigerians in diaspora believe that their contribution to the development of Nigeria should not be limited to the economy. They also want to be part of the major actors involved in governance and administration of the country. This has prompted many of them to agitate for the rights of diaspora voting during national elections.[93] A few of them have been successful in winning elections in Nigeria, such as Hon Femi Gbajabiamila, who has been returned for the fourth time to the Federal House of Representatives, while people like Chief Harry Akande and Prof. Isa Odidi who both contested the office of the presidency lost their bid. But, the participation of these Nigerian nationals did not go without a challenge from Nigerians at home who believe that the dual citizenship status of Nigerians in diaspora barred them from contesting election in Nigeria. Many Nigerians at home have also argued that Nigerians in diaspora do not understand the political environment of the country and the basic needs of the people since they do not live among them. They also argue that Nigerians in diaspora usually come up with policies that worked abroad but which are inconsistent with local conditions.[94] This question was put to rest at the Supreme Court when it upheld the rights of Nigerians in diaspora to

contest elections in Nigeria. This was followed by another ruling in the Court of Appeal which upheld the rights of Nigerians in diaspora to vote in national elections.[95]

However, in spite of these verdicts, Nigerians in diaspora were not allowed to vote in the 2015 national elections. While the country's electoral body and former President, Goodluck Jonathan gave their support to this initiative, the federal constitution was not amended to approve it.[96] As a matter of fact, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) sent a proposal to the legislative assembly to amend the Electoral Act to allow diaspora voting.[97] Similarly, the Nigerian diaspora lobbied the legislative house to ensure that the constitution is amended to enable them to cast their vote during elections. All of these were not successful because of the various bureaucratic processes involved in constitutional amendments. At the same time, the country's electoral body complained of a lack of accurate data of Nigerians in diaspora as well as its inability to approve the option of e-voting.[98] These issues showed the major ways in which state–diaspora relations have been threatened in the Nigerian context.

Another important issue that has threatened this relationship is the question of wages for Nigerian nationals abroad who wish to offer their service for the country. During the Obasanjo administration, a social critic, Chief Gani Fawehinmi, went to court to challenge the decision of government to remunerate in US dollars Nigerian expatriates such as Dr. Ngozi Okonjo Iweala who held the Ministry of Finance and Ambassador Olu Adeniji who was in charge of Foreign Affairs. Fawehinmi's argument was that the wage being to each of the ministers was far above the national wage and those of other ministers.[99] Many Nigerians at home and abroad also supported Fawehinmi's argument, moreover, they expect that Nigerian expatriates would accept their service as a voluntary effort to assist nation-building. However, Nigerians in diaspora believe they have not been treated fairly on this matter. They argued that while it is true that many of them received wages that are above those working in Nigeria in their countries of residence, it is also important for Nigerians at home to understand that they have to make up for the loss of that lucrative job abroad and the infrastructural deficiencies in Nigeria which they will have to provide for themselves.[100] Therefore, for the Nigerian government, the question has always been how to bring these needed experts by providing them the necessary assistance and financial back-up without creating double standards.

Conclusion

Nigeria has launched an official DEP for more than a decade and it has been evolving under different administrations with neither a coherent nor codified single document that could serve as a reference point. While efforts have been made to establish the Nigerian Diaspora Commission (NIDCOM) that would facilitate the implementation of this policy, the country's DEP continued to be promoted through a variety of institutions and initiatives. This pattern of interaction has been criticized by the Nigerian diaspora. Yet, it has stimulated diaspora development in the country, especially in the expansion of access to health facilities and knowledge transfer. However, this is not to suggest that this pattern of interaction and other related challenges in the homeland such as corruption and insecurity have not held back a range of advantages that ought to have accrued to the homeland and the diaspora group. This DEP shows an attempt to produce state–citizen relations. The Nigerian government also thinks that these policies will help to leverage its economic link to international markets and wealth. Furthermore, it assumed that diaspora remittances, which surpassed ODAs to the country, could be mobilized towards the development of critical infrastructures such as transportation, power, and energy.

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Olukoya Ogen is Professor of History at Osun State University as well as Visiting Senior Research Fellow at DASA, University of Birmingham, 2012–2017. He was a Leventis Scholar at SOAS, University of London in 2008, a British Academy Visiting Fellow at the University of Birmingham in 2009, a CWAS Visiting Fellow in 2010, and an American Council of Learned Societies (AHP) Postdoctoral Fellow in 2011. Prof. Ogen is currently the Country Director of a 5-year European Research Council Grant on "Everyday Religious Encounters and Social Identities in Southwest Nigeria." His most recent publications include *History, Politics and Ethnicity: A Critique of the Existing Canons of Yoruba Historiography*, Adekunle Ajasin University Monograph Series, 2015, pp. i–32 and "Variations régionales et impact localisé: analyse comparative des dynamiques du commerce transatlantique des esclaves de l'est du pays Yoruba, 1807–1850." In Guy Saupin (ed.) *Africains et Européens dans le monde atlantique (XVe–XIXe siècle)*. Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2014, pp. 177–195.

Evolution and Nature of Diaspora Engagement Policies in Ghana

*Joseph Kofi Teye, Osman Alhassan
and Mary Boatemaa Setrana*

INTRODUCTION

Although migration can create a number of problems, such as shortage of labor, brain drain, and declining productivity in areas of origin,[1] there is enough evidence to suggest that, if properly managed, international migration can positively contribute to economic development in both sending and receiving countries.[2] Migrants' remittances, for instance, have been recognized as very important tools for promoting socio-economic development and reducing poverty in developing countries.[3]

J.K. Teye (✉)
Department of Geography and Resource Development, University of Ghana, Accra, Ghana

O. Alhassan
Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana, Accra, Ghana

M.B. Setrana
Centre for Migration Studies, University of Ghana, Accra, Ghana

While the migration management programs of many countries have historically focused on immigration,[4] recent realization that the diaspora can play a significant role in nation building has led to the development of programs that deal with emigration issues and interests of people in the diaspora.[5] Many African governments now view the increasing numbers of Africans abroad as a resource that can be drawn upon to enhance development at home.[6] As in other African countries, the contribution of the diaspora to Ghana's development is increasingly recognized.[7] Apart from making huge financial transfers to Ghana,[8] the Ghanaian diaspora also contributes to socio-economic development in Ghana through investments, knowledge transfers, and promotion of tourism.[9] In recognition of the role of the diaspora in national development, the government of Ghana has developed a number of programs and legislative instruments to enhance the country's relationship with the Ghanaian diaspora.[10] The nature of Ghana's relationship with its diaspora is, however, not adequately explored. This chapter, therefore, examines the nature of past and present governments' engagement with the diaspora, within the framework of Alan Gamlen's typology of diaspora engagement policies. The analysis focuses on three categories of state–diaspora programs.[11] The first category entails programs that seek to build capacity by producing state-centric diaspora communities and designing corresponding state institutions to deal with those communities. The second category is made up of strategies which aim to extend rights to the people in the diaspora. These include strategies that deal with dual nationality, voting rights, welfare protection, investment and import privileges. The third group of programs seeks to extract obligations from the Diaspora. These include measures intended to encourage people in the diaspora to transfer their skills and remittances back home.[12]

The data used to write the chapter were gathered from secondary sources, such as the migration database of the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS), books, and administrative reports from state agencies. Primary data were collected through oral communication with officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration and the Ministry of Interior. Phone interviews were conducted with three leading members of Ghanaian-Diaspora Associations in The Netherlands, the UK, and the USA. The chapter also benefited from research work and publications of the authors.[13]

MAPPING OF GHANA'S DIASPORA

International migration is an age-old phenomenon in Ghana.[14] Even before colonialism, many Ghanaians, like other Africans, moved to other locations for trading and in search of security and fertile lands for farming.[15] During the colonial era in the mid-nineteenth century, Ghana was a net receiver of migrants as people moved from other West African countries in the Sahel region to work on the cocoa plantations and mines.[16] Worsening economic conditions and political instability in the 1970s led to the massive out-migration of Ghanaians to Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, and destinations outside Africa.[17]

The political and economic instability that characterized Ghana in the 1980s led to further migration of Ghanaians to Europe (especially the UK, Italy, France, and Germany) and North America[18] mainly in search for greener pastures.[19] Consistent with the predictions of Migration Networks Theory,[20] many Ghanaians continue to migrate to these earlier destinations where they rely on kinship and friendship networks to find accommodation and jobs.[21] In the Netherlands, for instance, Ghanaians are mostly found in Amsterdam, Bijlmer Arena.[22] As a result of restrictive immigration policies adopted by North American and European countries, the Gulf Region has recently emerged as an important destination for labor migrants.

Estimates of the number of Ghanaians in various countries, however, vary widely due to paucity of data. According to the Ghana Statistical Services (GSS), there were 250,624 Ghanaians living outside the country as at the 2010 National Population and Housing Census.[23] This figure grossly underestimates the number of Ghanaians outside the country because data on emigrants were obtained from household members left behind. In some cases, respondents did not provide accurate information on migrants.[24] Data provided by receiving countries and Ghanaian missions abroad are more reliable. In 2005, Twum-Baah reported that 1.5 million Ghanaians were living outside the country.[25] It has also been estimated that about 71 percent of the Ghanaian emigrant population live in ECOWAS countries.[26] This means that while many diaspora discussions focus on Europe and North America, there is a large number of Ghanaians within the ECOWAS sub-region. A more recent estimate by Awumbila and her colleagues, which is based on data from major receiving countries in the ECOWAS sub-region, indicates that there

Table 6.1 Number of Ghanaian emigrants in ECOWAS countries

Destination country	Number of Ghanaian emigrants	Percentage
Benin	6,472	1.86
Burkina Faso	2,579	0.74
Cape Verde	67	0.02
Côte d' Ivoire	111,001	31.94
Gambia	–	–
Guinea	1,314	0.38
Guinea Bissau	–	–
Liberia	6,744	1.94
Mali	–	–
Niger	2,599	0.75
Nigeria	186,015	53.53
Senegal	–	–
Sierra Leone	1,280	0.37
Togo	29,416	8.47
Total emigrants in these countries	**347,487**	100

Source: Awumbila et al. (2014)

were about 347,487 Ghanaian emigrants in the major receiving ECOWAS countries alone.[27] As shown in Table 6.1, within the ECOWAS sub-region, Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire are the major destinations for Ghanaian emigrants. About 186,015 Ghanaians, representing 54 percent of the Ghanaian population in the ECOWAS sub-region, were in Nigeria while another 111,001, representing 32 percent of the emigrant population in ECOWAs, were in Côte d'Ivoire. Relatively favorable economic conditions in Nigeria, colonial legacy, and common official language with Ghana may explain why migrants from Ghana are more likely to move to Nigeria.[28] The high number of Ghanaians in Côte d'Ivoire is also not surprising given its proximity to Ghana and the fact that its economy has historically been strong as a result of cocoa production. Outside Africa, the USA and the UK were the host countries for the majority of Ghanaian emigrants (see Table 6.2). There were 149,596 Ghanaians in the USA and another 81,917 in the UK. Common language, favorable economic policies, similar educational systems, social networks, and colonial ties may explain the large number of Ghanaians in these countries.[29]

Despite the long history of emigration from Ghana, the term 'diaspora' gained its roots in the mid-1980s, when Ghanaian emigrants in North

Table 6.2 Ghanaians residing in non-African countries (2013)

Country	Total number of Ghanaians
Australia	4,572
Austria	2,211
Belgium	3,226
Canada	22,211
Denmark	1,844
France	6,710
Finland	1,139
Germany	23,719
Italy	52,914
Ireland	1,265
Japan	1,891
Norway	2,035
Netherlands	14,175
Spain	15,533
Sweden	2,318
Switzerland	2,733
UK	81,917
USA	149596

Source: Agyemang and Setrana (2014)

America (USA and Canada) and European countries, notably the UK, Germany, and the Netherlands, started forming associations based on ethnic and religious affiliations.[30] The initial goals of these associations were to protect individual migrants and also to mobilize resources for the development of their hometowns. With time, Ghanaians in other countries also formed various associations to support one another and also to help promote development back home.

HISTORICAL AND PRESENT STATE–DIASPORA RELATIONS

As in many African countries, there was no comprehensive migration policy in Ghana until 2015 when a draft migration policy received cabinet approval. Despite the absence of a diaspora engagement framework, state–diaspora relations have been of great concern since Ghana gained independence in 1957.[31] The first president of Ghana, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, sought to achieve this engagement through his vision of uniting Africa. In

view of this, he organized the Independent African States and the All-African People's Conferences in 1958.[32] After the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah in 1966, successive governments in Ghana did not actively implement any diaspora engagement programs.[33]

Since the 1990s, and especially after 2001, when President John Agyekum Kuffour took over as the president of Ghana, there has been renewed interest in engaging with the diaspora for national development. A number of diaspora engagement programs have been implemented by the state, while non-state actors have also organized some programs to facilitate dialogue between Ghana and the diaspora.[34] The programs organized by the state to enhance its relationship with the Diaspora include the *Emancipation Day, PANAFEST, Home Coming Summit, Joseph Project,* and *Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) Initiative*. The *Representation of People Act* (ACT 699) was also passed in line with broader diaspora engagement policy.[35] More details of these programs are provided in the following sections.

The Emancipation Day and Pan African Festival: The Emancipation Day which has been held in Ghana since 1998 and Pan African Festival of Arts and Culture (PANAFEST) were organized by the government under the Ministry of Tourism to promote tourism and government engagement with both African and Ghanaian diaspora.[36] In addition, these programs also sought to readdress the contribution of the African diaspora towards socio-economic development in Africa and in particular Ghana.

Right of Abode Law and Home Coming Summit: In 2000, Ghana passed the "Right of Abode" law, which allows a person of African descent to apply and be granted the right to stay in Ghana indefinitely.[37] The *Home Coming Summit*, which was based on the theme "Harnessing the Global Ghanaian Resource Potential for Accelerated National Development," was organized by the Ghana government in Accra in 2001 to encourage the diaspora to transfer their skills and resources to Ghana for national development.[38] The Summit brought together more than 1,000 Ghanaian emigrants and non-migrants. The participants came out with various action plans for effective state–diaspora collaboration, mobilization of resources, and the creation of a diaspora dataset. The government of Ghana demonstrated its commitment to implement the suggestions of the summit by establishing a Non-Resident Ghanaian Secretariat in 2003 to supervise these recommendations. However, this secretariat has faced several challenges, including lack of data and limited resources to maintain an effective relationship with the diaspora.

The Joseph Project: As a follow-up of the earlier programs, the *Joseph Project* was introduced in 2007 during Ghana's fiftieth Independence Anniversary. People of Ghanaian decent and other Africans gathered to mobilize resources for the development of Ghana. The project has encouraged return visits of African diaspora to Ghana for both tourism and investment. The project has also promoted the learning of Ghanaian culture by the diaspora through cultural performances and education.

The Dual Citizenship Act of 2002: The Dual Citizenship Act was passed to extend dual citizenship to naturalized Ghanaians living in other countries.[39] It is now possible for Ghanaians to become citizens of a host country without losing Ghanaian citizenship. Within seven years of its implementation, about 5,903 Ghanaian emigrants had signed on to this Act.[40] The 2010 census figures show that 2.9 percent of Ghana's population has dual citizenship.[41]

The Representation of People's Act (Act 699): This legislation was first introduced in parliament in June 2005 amid intense controversy, not on its principle, but on how it can be implemented in a transparent manner.[42] Consequently, the Committee on Constitutional, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs had a public hearing in Ghana, some West Africa countries, and Europe to discuss these matters.[43] Based on a favourable report from the Committee, the Bill, which recognizes the right of Ghanaians in the diaspora to vote, was passed in 2007. However, since its passage, the Electoral Commission has not had enough resources to implement this bill.

Establishment of Diaspora Affairs Bureau (DAB): In order to strengthen Ghana's engagement with the Diaspora, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration (MFARI) in collaboration with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) Ghana, the German Technical Cooperation (GIT), and the Centre for Migration Studies (CMS) at the University of Ghana created the Diaspora Support Unit in 2012. As part of activities to launch this unit, MFARI in collaboration with IOM organized a colloquium on the theme "Linking the Ghanaian Diaspora to the Development of Ghana" in August 2012. The colloquium brought together the various Ghanaian associations and individuals in the diaspora (e.g., Ghanaian emigrants from Italy, the Netherlands, Germany, and the USA) as well as stakeholders in the country. It was at this conference that the Diaspora Support Unit and a website for Ghanaian diaspora were launched.[44] The Diaspora Support Unit was later upgraded into the

Diaspora Affairs Bureau (DAB) with the mandate to serve as a national platform for effective engagement with the Ghanaian diaspora.[45]

Workshop on Diaspora Capital and Development of Diaspora Engagement Policy: The MFARI in collaboration with the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) organized the first ever workshop on "Diaspora Capital" in Accra from August 18 to 22, 2014. The workshop was sponsored by the EU and implemented by the ICPMD through the EU's Migration EU eXpertise (MIEUX) initiative. The workshop concentrated on the development of the Ghanaian Diaspora Engagement Policy and was attended by members of the Stakeholder Committee for National Diaspora Engagement. This committee has representatives from relevant ministries, such as the MFARI, Interior, Justice and Attorney General, Finance, Agriculture, and Health. It also has representatives from some state agencies (e.g., the National Development Planning Commission, Bank of Ghana, Ghana Investment Promotion Centre, Centre for Migration Studies) and some international organizations (e.g., IOM and GIZ). The workshop was the first of its kind in a planned series to collate inputs from these stakeholders for the development of a National Diaspora Engagement policy.[46] The Centre for Migration Studies is the lead organization charged with the development of the Diaspora Engagement Policy.

Diaspora Knowledge Networks: In addition to the above programs, which were undertaken by the state to enhance its engagement with the diaspora, some public agencies have also implemented programs aimed at facilitating knowledge transfer from diaspora experts to their Ghanaian counterparts. For instance, the Ministry of Health and the IOM have organized the Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) program to address the effects of brain drain and facilitate knowledge transfer in the health sector.[47] As will be discussed later, the public universities in Ghana are also benefiting from knowledge transfer programs.

Informal Institutional Initiatives and Interactions: Apart from the formal interactions described above, the Ghanaian disapora also interacts with the homeland through less formal programs, such as those organized by political parties, churches, and traditional authorities (i.e., festivals). Since the introduction of the 1992 constitution, external political party branches have been established in many host countries to engage people in the diaspora. The major political parties in the country, especially the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP), have external branches across the globe. Through the activities

and decision-making processes of these external party branches, the Diaspora contributes skills and resources to the country's political development.[48]

Many of the Ghanaian churches have also established branches in other countries to engage the diaspora. For instance, Apostolic Church of Ghana, Church of Pentecost, Lighthouse Church, and Assemblies of God Church, have branches in the USA, UK, Netherlands, and Canada among others. Religious ministers of these churches frequently visit their foreign branches while some Ghanaians also visit home to attend church conferences and conventions. Traditional festivals, which are usually organized annually by traditional authorities and ethnic groups, also provide informal platforms for Ghanaians abroad to visit and interact with the homeland. During major festivals in Ghana, such as Aboakyir of Winneba, Fetu Afahye of the Ogua traditional area, Homowo of the Gas, Odwira of Akropong traditional area, Hogbetsotso of Anlo traditional area, members of foreign based Hometown Associations (HTAs) visit Ghana to take part in the celebrations. During these celebrations the foreign-based HTAs also mobilize resources for development projects in their communities.

DIASPORA SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO HOMELAND DEVELOPMENT

Ghanaians in the diaspora tend to form informal associations based on ethnic ties, religious affiliations, and professional networks. Origin-based groups (HTAs) are common in all the countries where there are many Ghanaian migrants.[49] These associations tend to meet regularly and interact in the local languages, as the members are mainly from the same ethnic group in Ghana. Examples of these associations include the Ga-Adagme Union, Krobo Youth, Brong-Ahafo Union, and Fanti Union found in several European countries and the USA. In some large European cities, such as London and Hamburg where there are many Ghanaian emigrants, there are Ghanaian migrant chiefs. Many Ghanaians in the diaspora join these informal associations in order to receive assistance and maintain their cultural identity in the context of social conditions of marginalization and discrimination.[50] Interviews with some leaders of some of the diaspora associations indicate that HTAs also provide support to members in need of jobs and accommodation. Members of HTAs also receive financial and

psychological support in times of sickness and bereavement. These associations also protect their members against any anti-migration policies of host countries. The associations also mobilize financial resources for supporting socio-economic development in their home towns and villages.[51] Some HTAs have contributed towards development projects such as the construction of schools, libraries, hospitals, and provision of water in their communities in Ghana.[52] In undertaking these projects, ethnic-based associations sometimes link up with local actors (e.g., chiefs, assemblymen, local HTAs) in Ghana. According to Alhassan, maintaining links with local HTAs and other individuals in Ghana provides the Ghanaian diaspora with the opportunity to access useful information that they can rely on for their personal investment activities.[53]

Apart from the ethnic/origin-based associations, some Ghanaians in the diaspora also belong to informal professional networks. For instance, there are Ghanaian doctors' and nurses' associations in a number of countries, including the USA and the UK. There are also Ghanaian Students Associations in some European countries. These professional-based associations are not highly organized but members sometimes meet to discuss issues of common interest. Professional associations have some interactions with their counterparts in Ghana, but such networks are weak.

Religious-based diaspora organizations also exist in some countries. As explained already, many of the major Ghanaian churches have branches in European countries and North America. There are over 50 Ghanaian churches in Hamburg alone.[54] Apart from providing social and psychological support in the everyday life of their members,[55] the churches also provide central points of contact for community life.[56] Diaspora churches also contribute money to support parent churches in Ghana. In return, the churches in Ghana support their foreign-based branches by sending them religious ministers. As explained already, foreign branches of Ghanaian political parties are also important diaspora organizations that engage with the homeland. Members of political parties abroad sometimes contribute money to support their parties during elections in Ghana. Some members also sometimes come home to compete for positions in parliament.[57]

In addition to the ethnic-based diaspora organizations that are regionally oriented, there are associations which are nationally oriented or Pan-African. These associations are composed of migrants from various backgrounds[58] and tend to promote socio-economic development in the homeland. Examples of these associations are the German-Ghanaian Development

Aid Association, African-American Association, Caribbean-Ghana Association, the Diaspora-African Forum, Sankofa in the Netherlands, and the Society for the Promotion of Rural Development in Africa.

Transnational Networks and Contributions to Homeland

Ghanaians in the diaspora usually maintain networks with friends and relatives back home through communication and sending remittances to support household consumption and finance community development projects.[59] According to Tonah, Ghanaians in the diaspora maintain ties with relatives and friends back home in order to obtain recognition independent of their precarious social status in the destination countries.[60] Some emigrants also support families and friends back home because they see it as a responsibility to help poor members of their families or communities.[61]

As hinted already, Ghana receives a significant amount of remittances from the Diaspora each year. Although estimates of financial transfers to Ghana vary widely, figures from the Bank of Ghana indicate that migrant remittances increased from about US$ 449 million in 1999 to US$ 1.5 billion in 2005 then US$ 1.8 billion in 2008 and finally to US$ 2.4 billion in 2011.[62] The World Bank's estimates are lower but also show that remittance flows to Ghana increased from US$ 6.1 million in 2000 to US$ 99 million in 2005 and then US$ 152 million in 2013.[63] Table 6.3 shows the remittances sent from the topmost 10 countries. It is clear that

Table 6.3   Major countries of origin of remittance to Ghana

Country of origin	Remittance (million US$)
United States	33
United Kingdom	25
Nigeria	21
Italy	12
Côte d'Ivoire	12
Germany	9
Canada	6
Burkina Faso	5
Spain	4
Togo	4

Source: World Bank (2014)

the USA is the most important source of remittances to Ghana. The figures indicate that while many diaspora engagement programs target emigrants in Europe and North America, Ghanaians from some African countries, such as Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire, also send a significant amount of remittances. The total remittance that Ghana receives annually is higher than Foreign Direct Investment and Overseas Development Aid.[64]

Apart from financial transfers to households, Ghanaians in the diaspora contribute to socio-economic development by undertaking non-profit activities in selected communities. Members of diaspora associations reported that they have carried out non-profit activities in Ghana over the years. For instance, the Sankofa Foundation, which has been in existence for the past 10 years in the Netherlands, has been funding a Poultry Project for women in deprived communities in Ghana. Since 2005, more than 700 women from various communities, including Asutuare, Dawhenya, Afienya, Dodowa, and Tamale were trained in poultry management and were also provided with poultry houses, feed for two months, Day old chicks, bed, and other inputs. Some diaspora associations also raise funds to support development projects (e.g., schools, hospitals) in their home towns.

The diaspora also contributes Ghana's development through business investments. The literature identifies three types of transnational business activities. The first category entails *transfer businesses*, which transfers goods or money between the migrant sending areas and the host country. The second category is made up of *cultural and ethnic* businesses. Examples of these businesses include retail stores or restaurants that import cultural products and other goods from the countries of origin to be sold to the migrant community. The third category is made up of *businesses established in the origin* country through the capital brought by returned migrants or people in the diaspora.[65] All these types of transnational businesses are important in Ghana. With regards to the first category (transfer businesses), some Ghanaian emigrants in various countries, including USA, UK, China, Saudi Arabia, and Germany buy and transfer goods, such as mobile phones, used cars, clothing, and household appliances, to Ghana for trading. A number of Ghanaian emigrants are also involved in transnational cultural and ethnic businesses, which link them to Ghana. For instance, some Ghanaian emigrants import locally produced goods such as kente cloth, beads, and alcoholic drinks for sale in African shops in Europe. The sale of goods abroad promotes development in

Ghana through the multiplier effects. Regarding the third category of businesses, our interviews show that some Ghanaians in the diaspora have brought capital to invest in small- and medium-scale businesses in various sectors, including real estate, hospitality, and agriculture.

The diaspora also contribute to development in Ghana through the promotion of tourism. As noted already, the diaspora also contributes to development by way of knowledge transfer when some professionals (e.g., medical doctors) visit home to work on a short-term basis or when they return permanently to work in Ghana.

CORE ISSUES AND CHALLENGES OF DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT PROGRAMS IN GHANA

Ghana has been part of the global community concerning gains to be derived from its diaspora which has proven to have the human, technical, and financial resources for supporting the development process in the country. The diaspora engagement policy is primarily based on the anticipated mutual benefits that Ghana and its Diaspora will get from such a partnership. One core issue that has driven the diaspora engagement policy since 2001 is how to provide the enabling framework to enhance transfer of money from the diaspora to Ghana. It is estimated that less than 50 percent of remittances to Ghana are sent through formal channels.[66] Consequently, the government has been engaging the diaspora on how to increase inflow of remittances through financial institutions.

Another important issue that the government of Ghana wants to address through its diaspora engagement policy is harnessing the critical skills that the Diaspora can bring into the country. An assessment by Baah-Boateng and Ewusi in Ghana showed a labor supply-demand gap of critical skills involving professionals, technicians, and associated professionals.[67] There are huge skills deficits in some sectors, such as the oil and gas, energy, manufacturing, and financial services.[68] The need to tackle the skills gap has therefore been identified by both the government and the private sector as one key area where the Ghanaian and African diaspora could contribute to the nation's development effort. It has been argued that if the right consultation and planning is made during the proposed consultations for engagement, these skills can be transferred to Ghanaians through flexible arrangements where the diaspora spend some time in Ghana transferring this expertise to Ghanaians.

The need to provide the diaspora with the opportunity to take part in governance of the country is another issue that has emerged since 2001. It has been argued that people in the diaspora will be more committed to supporting the development of the country, if they are allowed to vote. As noted already, there have been efforts to allow Ghanaians living abroad to vote, but this has often generated some debates around how to effectively monitor such external voting processes without compromising the integrity of the elections.

While many people in Ghana support the need to engage the diaspora to promote development, a few Ghanaians have called Ghana's diaspora engagements a misplaced priority. Critics argue that efforts to engage the diaspora are all about the ill-planning which is the normal routine in Ghana. They argued further that the government has failed to create the right environment for investments, but it is expecting people in the diaspora to bring their hard-earned resources into the country. It has been argued that some people who really have some resources to invest will consider many other pertinent issues such as land acquisition procedures and the time taken to formalize investment documents. Some people have also suggested that the Ghanaian government needs to engage more, not only in the rhetoric that there are investment opportunities for the diaspora, but also demonstrate practically at home that basic services/necessities are being provided or fixed. These are the necessary supportive infrastructure which, when put in place, will facilitate diaspora settlement and investment in Ghana.

There are a number of challenges that need to be resolved for a successful implementation of the diaspora engagement policy. To begin with, there is a general lack of accurate data on Ghanaians in the diaspora and this affects planning. It is widely acknowledged that there is the need to establish a comprehensive database of Ghanaians abroad. The reality though is that the Ghanaian missions abroad have staff and logistic shortages and are unable to perform their schedules on time. As part of the drive to map out the Ghanaian and African diaspora, the DAB has started some discussions and training of "front line" officers of the Ghana missions in UK, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Germany. The DAB, however, does not have adequate resources for this training program.

Another challenge is the mistrust between the emigrants and officials of Ghanaian missions abroad. Some members of the diaspora complain that they are not given due respect when they visit the Ghanaian missions abroad. Some of the emigrants also think that the missions are not willing

to intercede on matters bordering on visas, residence, and work permits. Perhaps it should be clear during the consultations and the engagement with the diaspora that issues of visas, residence, and work permits are most often handled following laid-down procedures in host countries and that diaspora engagement does not necessarily commit the Ghana missions abroad to interfere with other processes. Indeed, there are concerns about how the Ghanaian and African diaspora often misunderstand engagement to mean an avenue for all kinds of benefits to be derived.[69]

How to actively involve second generation emigrants in diaspora engagement programs is also an issue that has engaged the attention of public officials. On many of such engagements, public officials only deal with first-generation migrants. Young Ghanaians in the diaspora are hardly given any platform to suggest ways in which these arrangements can work for them. There is, therefore, a call for effective mobilization and consultation with the second-generation youth who do not only have a right to be part of the discussions, but equally possess the necessary skills which in no doubt will be an essential contribution to Ghana's development.

Another issue that needs to be addressed is the wrong assumption by some emigrants who are now citizens of other countries that they will automatically be entitled to dual citizenship, if they invest in Ghana. As not all countries accept dual citizenship, it needs to be emphasized that diaspora investments do not automatically grant any person dual citizenship.

The diaspora engagement policies and programs are quite difficult to administer effectively because they are implemented by multiple agencies. Currently, the ministries and agencies responsible for tourism, security, foreign affairs, and investments are working together on the diaspora engagement policy. Spreading the functions over many agencies with different legislative arrangements and execution at different times does not make it cohesive. Also, the policies require administrating in countries other than Ghana. This makes implementation difficult since it is not within the jurisdiction of the country implementing the engagement policy.[70]

An Analysis of the Legal and Institutional Mechanisms of Engaging the Ghanaian Diaspora

In this section, we analyze the nature of the legal and institutional mechanisms of Ghana's diaspora engagement policy, within the Gamlen

framework typology of diaspora engagement policies.[71] Based on this framework, the diaspora engagement mechanisms in Ghana are discussed under three broad categories, namely measures to build capacity, programs to extend rights to the Ghanaians in the diaspora, and policies to extract obligations from the diaspora.

Measures to Build Capacity

As discussed in the introductory section, diaspora engagement programs that seek to build capacity can be further categorized into two sub-groups. The first category seeks to promote *symbolic nation building*, by adopting measures which entail inclusive rhetoric and symbols, conferences, and cultural programs to enhance emigrants' relationship to their homeland. The second set of programs, which aimed at *institution building*, includes establishing consular and consultative bodies; transnational networks, and ministerial level agency.[72]

With regards to the symbolic nation-building policies, the literature suggests that some governments may make rhetorical gestures aimed at (re)including the diaspora within national population that the states seek to govern. A number of programs, in Ghana, have been adopted over the years to enhance Ghanaian emigrants' sense of belonging to the transnational community. The Ghanaian government has also, especially since the year 2001, made rhetorical gestures aimed at (re)including the diaspora within national population. Similar to the case of Morocco,[73] these recent rhetorical gestures have departed from the government's pronouncements in the 1980s which portrayed Ghanaian high skilled emigrants, especially doctors and nurses, as unpatriotic people that have deserted the country for greener pastures elsewhere.[74]

In recent years, the government has also attempted to shape media messages aimed at mobilizing Ghanaian emigrants for homeland development. Some of these media messages aim at encouraging people in the diaspora to come back home, to send more money home, or to invest in Ghana. The Ghanaian missions abroad sometimes rely on Ghanaian radio stations in host countries and websites managed by the HTAs to persuade people in the diaspora to support homeland development. This approach resonates with the "analytics of government" school of thought, which posits that governing is not only about controlling subjects, and that it also includes the use of persuasive tactics.[75] There is also now a website for Ghanaian diaspora which is managed by the Diaspora Affairs Bureau (DAB).

Ghana has also attempted to reinforce claims of shared national identity with the diaspora by organizing conferences and cultural events for diaspora communities. The Emancipation Day which has been held in Ghana since 1998 and Pan African Festival of Arts and Culture (PANAFEST) are actually programs that seek to reinforce claims of shared national identity with the diaspora. Apart from promoting tourism, these programs seek to enhance the contribution of the African diaspora towards socio-economic development in Ghana and Africa as a whole. The *Home Coming Summit* in 2001 is another large convention that seeks to promote communal mentality among Ghanaians in the diaspora and encourage them to invest in Ghana. The over 1,000 Ghanaian emigrants and non-migrants that attended this summit discussed ways of solving the developmental challenges of Ghana and came out with various action plans for effective state–diaspora collaboration to promote development in the country. *The Joseph Project* which was organized in 2007 also sought to enhance Ghanaian emigrants' sense of belonging to the transnational community and encourage emigrants to contribute to nation building. As noted earlier, apart from encouraging return visits of African diaspora to Ghana for both tourism and investment, this project has promoted the learning of Ghanaian culture by the diaspora through cultural performances and education.[76]

Ghana also implemented measures aimed at *institution-building*. One of the most important initiatives in this direction is the establishment of a Diaspora Unit in 2012, which was subsequently upgraded to Diaspora Affairs Bureau. DAB now operates as part of the Legal and Consular Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration. Among other things, DAB seeks to mobilize and encourage dialogue and sustained engagement between the diaspora and the government for Ghana's development. It also aims to develop a database on all Ghanaians in the diaspora while also promoting dialogue between Ghanaian migrants and relevant stakeholders in Ghana.[77] As part of the drive to map out the Ghanaian and African diaspora, the DAB has started some discussions and training of "front line" officers of the Ghana Missions in the UK, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Germany. This is to enable these officers to engage effectively and professionally with the Ghanaian diaspora. This new line of doing things by the DAB is good because some mistrust exists between some of the diaspora and the MFARI or indeed other state institutions engaging with them on behalf of the government. The setting up of this Bureau has been of tremendous help to Ghanaian diaspora by

engaging them through video conferencing to respond to queries and enquiries. The Bureau also educates and provides information through a radio program that encourages phone-in calls by the diaspora. Again, the Bureau has been recently charged by the Ghana government to engage consultants to develop a Diaspora Engagement Policy for Ghana. In connection with this, the DAB has set up a core team of relevant stakeholders working with the diaspora. These, among others, include government agencies, ministries, researchers from academia, and Civil Society Organizations.[78]

Additionally, DAB works closely with already existing HTAs to reach the diaspora. Attempts have also been made to create national-level diaspora associations to help promote development in Ghana. In many cases, officials of the Ghanaian foreign missions abroad have worked with prominent emigrants to form these associations. While working with many state organizations and informal associations have been good, there have been tensions between and among some of these organizations over who should control the program. These tensions have effects on policy implementation. For instance, there were initial tensions between and among ministries of tourism, interior, and foreign affairs over where the diaspora unit should be located. The establishment of external political party branches in many host countries and the opening of Ghanaian church branches in host countries can also been seen as informal ways of building institutions and networks to engage the diaspora.

Mechanisms That Extend Rights to the Diaspora

It is generally acknowledged that in order to extract benefits from the diaspora, home states may extend certain rights to the emigrants so as to appease them or produce goodwill relationships which can help to ensure steady flows of remittances and investments.[79] According to Gamlen, the measures that states tend to adopt to extend rights to emigrants in host countries include *political incorporation, provision of civil and social services, as well as protecting rights of emigrants.*[80] The government of Ghana has implemented some programs in each of these areas.

The "Right of Abode" law, which allows persons of African descent to apply and be granted the right to stay in Ghana indefinitely, is an important right extended to all Africans in the diaspora. Indeed, after passing this law Ghana became the first in Africa to open its doors, not just to

Ghanaians living in the diaspora, but also to people of African descent to settle in the country. While this law has enabled many African-Americans to come back to Ghana, the process of obtaining a permanent resident status is frustrating.[81]

The Dual Citizenship Act passed in 2002 to extend dual citizenship to naturalized Ghanaians living in other countries[82] is also an attempt to extend rights to people in the diaspora. It is now possible for Ghanaians to become citizens of the host country without losing Ghanaian citizenship. The 2010 census figures show that 2.9 percent of Ghana's population has dual citizenship.[83] However, Ghanaian emigrants who desire any political position would have to renounce the non-Ghanaian citizenship.[84]

The Representation of People's Act (Act 699) which was passed in 2007 also seeks to politically incorporate the Ghanaian diaspora into Ghana's political system by extending voting rights to them. It is believed that by extending voting rights to emigrants, they would be encouraged to support Ghana, as investing in places where one has no political decision-making power is not desirable.[85] As noted already, since its passage, the Electoral Commission (EC) has not had enough resources to implement this bill. Apart from resource constraints, this bill has not been implemented because political parties fear that it may undermine the credibility of the electoral system, since it will be difficult for them to monitor electoral process outside Ghana.

The government of Ghana has not done much as far as the *provision of civil and social services* to Ghanaians in the diaspora are concerned. In contrast with the situation in the Philippines whereby the state manages the recruitment and protection of overseas workers,[86] the government of Ghana does not have any labor export policy. There are also no special service centers for emigrants coming back home for holidays. Again, although portability of social security benefits is important to emigrants who wish to return to Ghana, the government has not made any serious attempt to discuss this issue with governments of host nations.

While some officials of the foreign ministry reported that the protection *of the rights* of Ghanaians abroad is one of the core functions that they have been performing, members of the diaspora associations investigated have the impression that the government of Ghana is not doing enough. The emigrants complained that the government of Ghana does not engage governments of host countries to change unfriendly visa procedures. On the other hand, some of the government officials explained that they are unwilling to interfere in the domestic matters of sovereign host-states. As a

result, officials of the Ghana missions reported that they only use diplomacy to encourage host countries to protect the rights of Ghanaians abroad.

Policies for Extracting Obligations from the Diaspora

Given that the main aim of governments designing diaspora engagement policies is to engage the emigrants in such a way that they could help promote development in the homeland,[87] many governments around the world have designed policies aimed at extracting obligations from the diaspora. Some developed countries such as the USA and Switzerland have mandatory payment systems in place to levy taxes on emigrants, while other countries such as the Philippines extract mandatory payments through less formal channels, such as fees collected from emigrant workers recruited through state recruitment programs.[88] In Ghana, there are no systems in place to levy taxes on emigrants. The government of Ghana has, however, developed a number of programs aimed at extracting obligations from the diaspora. As unemployment is a major development challenge in the country, a number of programs have been implemented to encourage the diaspora to come and invest in Ghana. The Ghana Investment Promotion Centre has organized a number of programs to educate the diaspora on investment opportunities. During presidential visits to other countries, meetings are held with the iaspora to engage them on investment opportunities. As noted already, the MFARI in collaboration with the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) organized the first ever workshop on "Diaspora Capital" in Accra, Ghana from August 18 to 22, 2014. Among other things, participants at this workshop discussed how to encourage Ghanaians in the diaspora to come and invest in the country.

As stated already, one issue that has driven the diaspora engagement policy since 2001 is how to provide the enabling framework to enhance transfer of money by the people in the diaspora. Remittances are perceived to be an important anti-poverty tool and an item that gauges economic growth and development. It has been recognized that the diaspora's contribution in terms of financial transfers far exceeds Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) in Ghana, and there was an urgent need to harness this potential for accelerated development. As a way of enhancing financial transfers and promoting investments, the government of Ghana has implemented policies that allow Ghanaian emigrants to operate foreign

accounts in Ghanaian banks. Ghanaian emigrants are also able to obtain housing loans from banks in Ghana for the purchase of their houses. The government of Ghana has also been issuing foreign-currency-denominated bonds to emigrants. This has also provided investment avenues for Ghanaians in the diaspora.

Some government agencies have also implemented programs aimed at facilitating *knowledge transfer* from diaspora experts to their Ghanaian counterparts. As noted already, the Ministry of Health and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) have organized the Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) program to address the effects of brain drain and facilitate knowledge transfer in the health sector.[89] The project facilitates short-term working visits to Ghana by Ghanaian medical doctors and other health workers in the diaspora. During these visits, the health professionals provide services in various areas of health, including surgery, dentistry, and urology, in various hospitals across the country. The project also gives opportunity to health professionals in Ghana to travel to European and American Healthcare institutions for short-term internships and placements.[90]

Universities in Ghana are also benefiting from knowledge transfer programs. For instance, the University of Ghana, under a Carnegie Next Generation of Academics in Africa Project, has been running a Diaspora Linkage Program (UG-DLP) on a pilot base since 2011. The program aims at collaborating with universities abroad through transfer of expertise of Ghanaian professors in the diaspora to promote the University of Ghana's academic teaching, research, and learning. Since the inception of this program, post-graduate education at the University of Ghana, in particular, has benefitted from the endowed experiences shared by these Ghanaian researchers living outside the country.

Lessons Learned and Conclusions

This chapter has examined the nature of diaspora engagement policies in Ghana. The measures adopted by the government of Ghana to engage with its diaspora are largely consistent with Gamlen's typology of diaspora engagement policies, namely initiatives aimed at building capacity/institutions, extending rights to the diaspora, and extracting obligations from the diaspora.[91] Measures adopted by Ghana to build capacity/institutions include organizing cultural events and conferences to reinforce claims of

shared national identity with the diaspora, attempts to shape media messages for the purpose of mobilizing Ghanaian emigrants for homeland development, and establishing the Diaspora Affairs Bureau (DAB).

The major rights extended to the Ghanaian diaspora include dual citizenship to naturalized Ghanaians and the right to vote. However, since its passage the bill on right to vote has not been implemented outside Ghana, as a result of resource constraints. The fact that the government has passed this bill even when it knows it cannot implement it resonates with the assertion of Rees that some policies can be "interpreted as a token gesture, designed to diffuse political conflict, without making any real change in the status quo."[92] With regards to efforts to extract obligations from the diaspora, a few programs have been adopted to encourage people in the diaspora to send remittances through formal channels and invest in Ghana. Some state agencies have also implemented programs aimed at facilitating *knowledge transfer* from diaspora experts to their Ghanaian counterparts. The analysis shows that Ghana has made some modest gains as far as diaspora engagement policies are concerned, but it still faces a number of challenges in its attempt to engage the diaspora for development.

Some lessons can be learned from the Ghanaian experience. To begin with, cultural events and conferences, such as the PANAFEST, Joseph Project, and Home Coming Summit, have been very useful in enhancing Ghanaian emigrants' sense of belonging to the transnational community. The Ghanaian case shows that one of the best ways to initiate engagement with people in the diaspora is to develop tourism programs to attract them to their natal states. Once they are "home" other business programs can be discussed with them. The extension of dual citizenship right to people in the diaspora has also proved to be a good policy, as it has encouraged more emigrants to visit Ghana.

The creation of the Diaspora Affairs Bureau (DAB) has also been useful for the implementation of the diaspora engagement policy. Before its creation, the Ministry of Tourism was largely responsible for organizing diaspora engagement programs in Ghana. The ministry of Tourism, however, could not respond to suggestions to shift its diaspora engagement programs from tourist-focused activities to routinely planned events.[93] The creation of DAB has contributed significantly to the formulation of development-focused diaspora engagement policies and institutionalization of relationships between the state and diaspora associations.

The effective collaboration between DAB and other ministries (e.g., ministries of health, education, employment, and finance) is also an

important lesson. Although such inter-ministerial collaboration presents challenges, it has been very useful in the formulation and implementation of diaspora engagement policies. For instance, the collaboration with the Ministry of Health has helped in the successful implementation of programs that enable Ghanaian medical doctors in the diaspora to provide voluntary medical services in various hospitals in Ghana. Collaboration with the Centre for Migration Studies at the University of Ghana has also been useful for generating useful data for policy formulation.

The establishment of relationship with diaspora organizations has also been useful. Besides the formal national agenda to engage with the Ghanaian diaspora, there are other informal networks and associations that have decade's long connections with specific diaspora groups.[94] Ghana already had HTAs, most of which have been quite active in community and national development. Since 2001, the state has established some productive linkages with these diaspora associations. DAB usually rely on these associations to engage with the Diaspora. An effective national diaspora engagement program will involve identifying diaspora associations which already relate to the state and having discussions with them in order to arrive at common concerns and ways of addressing them.[95]

In view of these findings, it is recommended that the Disapora Affairs Bureau must continue to collaborate with both state and societal actors to implement the diaspora engagement policies. There is also the need to deal with mistrust between diaspora associations and Ghana missions abroad. The expectations of the diaspora that engagement with the state will automatically grant emigrants more rights in Ghana and flexible immigration regimes in host countries must be managed. As Gamlen noted, symbolic nation-building programs entail complex negotiations, through which various actors attempt to introduce their own priorities into public debate.[96] Therefore, the government must explain to the people in the diaspora that while it will continue to diplomatically engage host countries to protect Ghanaians under international law, Ghana cannot interfere with visa and work permit granting procedures of other countries.

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Joseph Kofi Teye holds a PhD in Geography from the University of Leeds. He is a Senior lecturer at the Department of Geography and Resource Development, University of Ghana and the Course Coordinator at the Centre for Migration Studies, University of Ghana. His current research interests include environmental change and migration; migration and development; the role of the diaspora in nation building; and natural resource policy analysis. Dr. Teye has published a number of his works in international journals.

Osman Alhassan holds a PhD in Human Geography from the University of Ghana, Legon and is currently a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana. Dr. Alhassan is also a faculty of the Centre for Migration Studies (CMS) with research and teaching expertise on transnational migration and the diaspora. Dr. Alhassan has published widely on disaster risk monitoring and humanitarian action in Ghana, and the role of hometown associations in Ghana's development efforts. His latest migration research focuses on the role of the Ghanaian diaspora in natural resource management in Ghana.

Mary Boatemaa Setrana holds a PhD in Migration Studies from the University of Ghana. She is Lecturer at the Centre for Migration Studies, University of Ghana, Legon-Accra, Ghana. Her research interest includes transnational migration and diaspora; migration, social change and development; migration and gender; and return migration and reintegration of international migrants into sub-Saharan Africa. Dr. Mary Boatemaa Setrana has published widely on gendered dynamics of migration; migration and development; and return migration and reintegration.

Reaching out to the Diaspora: The Liberian State's Formulation of a Diaspora Engagement Policy

Janet E. Reilly

INTRODUCTION

Nearly 700 people filled every seat and all available standing room in the Staten Island high school auditorium as they waited eagerly to hear Liberia's Iron Lady speak on November 9, 2010. It was the first time that Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, the first democratically elected female head of state in Africa, would be addressing the Liberian community in Staten Island as president of Liberia. Sirleaf was no stranger to the US-based diaspora; after fleeing Liberia in 1980, Sirleaf herself lived for many years in the USA before returning to Liberia and winning the presidency in 2005. She had even campaigned in Staten Island in the densely Liberian-populated neighborhood of Park Hill, known as "Little Liberia," in the summer of 2005. But her visit to Staten Island in late 2010 was her first as Liberia's president, and, as such, it marked an important turning point in the Liberian state's efforts to formally engage the diaspora.

J.E. Reilly (✉)
Sarah Lawrence College, Bronxville, NY, USA

After being elected in 2005, in Liberia's first elections following the 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement that brought 14 years of civil conflict to an end, Sirleaf had focused on reconstruction, rebuilding Liberia's infrastructure and mapping out a strategy for the country's economic growth and development. Informally, the Liberian government had always identified the diaspora as a potential key contributor to Liberia's recovery, encouraging Liberian emigrants to invest in their homeland and recruiting individuals from the diaspora to work in government. Only since 2008, though, had the state taken formal steps to enlist the diaspora. In so doing, it was attempting not only to harness the vast resources of the diaspora but also to expand its realm of governance outside its traditional territorial borders.

Historically, states have focused on managing immigration rather than emigration. Beginning in the final decades of the twentieth century, however, emigrant states have increasingly turned their attention toward engaging their "citizens abroad." This chapter reviews how Liberia fits into this pattern of an emerging trend among states to reach out to and "incorporate" their diasporas. It traces Liberia's policies toward the diaspora, including its attempts over the past few years to formulate an official diaspora engagement strategy.

Over the past three decades, Liberia has experienced numerous power and policy shifts that have impacted Liberians living in the USA. After 2005, the democratically elected government in Liberia began actively encouraging the involvement of the diaspora in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission process and as financiers of the rebuilding effort. Even as the 2014 Ebola epidemic crippled the nation, Liberia pursued significant initiatives aimed at engaging the diaspora. This chapter examines migration and diaspora engagement policy from the Liberian side, detailing the Liberian state's role in creating a transnational space and a transnational citizen identity for Liberians in the diaspora.

THE LIBERIAN DIASPORA

There are no official figures on the numbers of Liberians living in the diaspora. As a result of the two civil wars that engulfed the country from 1989 to 2003, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that the numbers of Liberians who fled across an international border peaked at more than 780,000 in 1996.[1] The majority of those fled to neighboring countries—Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, and Sierra

Leone—and to other countries in West Africa, notably Guinea and Nigeria.

The greatest number of Liberians outside of West Africa reside in the USA. A figure of 450,000 Liberians in the USA and Canada is often attributed to the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). This, however, is a figure that was mentioned by Jacques Paul Klein, the UN Special Representative in Liberia in 2004, during an interview and is not based on official data.[2] Liberian community organizations and leaders estimate that there are as many as 300,000 Liberians in the USA, with the largest populations in Minnesota, New York, Pennsylvania, Georgia, New Jersey, and Rhode Island. According to American Community Survey (ACS) 2012 data, 73,131 persons (+/–6,896 margin of error) living in the USA were born in Liberia. The greatest number of these—11,464 persons—resided in Minnesota. After Minnesota, the greatest number of persons born in Liberia lived in Pennsylvania (8,532), followed by Maryland (6,072), New Jersey (5,323), and New York (4,403).[3] Of course, some persons born in Liberia were probably not Liberian, but rather from other West African countries—namely, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, and Sierra Leone—with significant refugee populations in Liberia. By comparison, according to ACS 2012 data, 56,219 (+/–7,480 margin of error) persons identified themselves as having Liberian ancestry. The ranking of the top six states with the largest numbers of persons reporting Liberian ancestry was the same as that of states with persons born in Liberia, though there was variation after the sixth slot.[4] Both datasets, however, underestimate the number of Liberians in the United States. In Minnesota alone, there are at least 25,000 Liberians, according to various news reports and social service organizations' estimates. The ACS data are useful, therefore, to show the regions in the USA where the largest numbers of Liberians reside and to demonstrate the growth of the population over time. ACS data also confirm the fact that the vast majority of Minnesota's Liberians live in the Twin Cities. While Minnesota undoubtedly hosts the largest number of Liberians in the USA, the most densely concentrated population likely resides on Staten Island, in New York City. Estimates range from 5,000 to 10,000 Liberians living on Staten Island, largely concentrated in the Clifton and Stapleton neighborhoods of Staten Island's North Shore.

The Union of Liberian Associations in the Americas (ULAA) serves as an umbrella organization for Liberian organizations in the USA, yet coordination is loose at best and the Liberian diaspora in the USA remains

fractured—due in large part to the role that ethnic divisions played in the conflicts in Liberia from 1989 to 2003. Each geographic region (typically a metro area) with a significant Liberian population in the USA hosts at least one, and usually multiple (often competing), Liberian community organizations. The Liberian community in Minnesota—perhaps more than any other region—has a reputation throughout the USA and in Liberia for being politically powerful. The Organization of Liberians in Minnesota (OLM) frequently hosts Liberian officials and dignitaries who visit Minnesota to rally support for the Liberian government's policies and to campaign during election cycles.[5]

A number of European countries also host Liberian communities. The European Federation of Liberian Associations (EFLA)—a Belgium-based umbrella organization of Liberian organizations in Europe—states that it has member organizations in 13 European countries—The Netherlands, France, Luxemburg, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, Norway, The UK, The Kingdom of Belgium, Italy, The Republic of Ireland, and Denmark.[6] While numbers of Liberians in Europe mentioned on various websites, Liberian media sites, and blogposts, range widely—from 50,000 to 250,000—none are supported by official data. The actual number is likely closer to the more conservative estimates.

DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT POLICIES: AN EMERGING TREND

States' interest in formalizing links with their diasporas has increased in response to a number of factors: large waves of migration from the global South to the global North following decolonization and, later, civil wars, such as those that occurred in Liberia from 1989 to 2003; advances in global technology and communication, most notably the Internet, that have increased the speed and ease of travel and allowed people to maintain contact across the globe; and the identification of the "brain drain" phenomenon—the large-scale emigration of skilled labor—as a significant economic cost to emigrant states. By extending certain privileges and rights to diaspora members, emigrant states can lay claim to diaspora wealth and extract obligations from diaspora members.

Alan Gamlen's analysis of 70 states' diaspora engagement policies documents the widespread adoption of diaspora policies by emigrant states.[7] Through "instituted processes,"[8] states extend "thin membership,"[9] to emigrants, drawing diasporas into a "web of rights and obligations."[10] Whether coordinated or not, Gamlen argues, diaspora engagement

policies serve to "transnationalize governmentality."[11] In other words, they "(re)produce citizen-sovereign relationships"[12] between states and diaspora members. Aihwa Ong argues that globalization has resulted in "graduated sovereignty," which she describes as a "series of zones that are subjected to different kinds of governmentality and that vary in terms of the mix of disciplinary and civilizing regimes."[13] Graduated sovereignty "subjects different segments of the population to different mixes of disciplinary, caring and punitive technologies."[14]

This transnationalization of states problematizes the Westphalian concept of sovereignty, signaling a shift in what Francesco Ragazzi labels the "art of government."[15] While the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States codified the core elements of state sovereignty as 1) a permanent population, 2) a defined territory, and 3) a functioning government, states' increasing attempts to engage their diasporas shift the focus from territory to community.[16] Luis Eduardo Guarnizo, in his study of Dominicans and Colombians in New York and Salvadorans in Los Angeles, illustrates this process of "transnationalism from above" (directed by a sending state in an attempt to create a "deterritorialized state").[17]

Importantly, however, Gamlen argues that diaspora engagement policies are not part of a "unitary, coordinated state strategy," but rather form a "constellation of institutional and legislative arrangements and programmes that come into being at different times, for different reasons, and operate across different timescales at different levels within home-states."[18] States, seeking remittances and investment from emigrants, have actively encouraged their participation in homeland politics, extended citizenship rights to emigrants, and cast emigrants as "heroic citizens."[19] Linda Basch *et al.* examine the activities of emigrant states in de-territorializing the state, extending rights and privileges to emigrants, and seeking to maintain economic ties with their diasporas.[20] New terms, such as "external citizenship," have been used to describe not only the legal status of dual citizenship (which states are increasingly granting to emigrants), but also the "lived experiences of participation in national life."[21]

Similarly, David Fitzgerald argues that emigrant states' interests alone are an inadequate lens through which to examine migration policies. Instead, the formulation of diaspora policies can only be understood through a "neopluralist approach disaggregating 'the state' into a multilevel organization of distinct component units in which state incumbents and other political actors compete for their interests."[22] Alexandra

Delano's richly detailed description of Mexico's relationship with its diaspora in the USA demonstrates the usefulness of this type of multi-level approach.[23] Gamlen, in his analysis of diaspora engagement policies, however, emphasizes the need for more comparative case studies, which this study of the Liberian diaspora addresses.

In Gamlen's comparative analysis of 70 countries, he develops a typology of "diaspora engagement policies." The policies, loosely defined, are grouped into three "higher-level types of diaspora engagement policies":

- capacity building policies, aimed at discursively producing a state-centric "transnational national society," and developing a set of corresponding state institutions;
- extending rights to the diaspora, thus playing a role that befits a legitimate sovereign; and
- extracting obligations from the diaspora, based on the premise that emigrants owe loyalty to this legitimate sovereign.[24]

The Liberian government has in recent years taken significant initiatives aimed at engaging the diaspora, most of which represent attempts at "symbolic nation-building" that fall under Gamlen's first category of "capacity building." Yet the Liberian state has also made inroads into engaging the diaspora in other ways, including through attempts (sometimes unsuccessful) to extend rights to and extract obligations from Liberian emigrants.[25] These will be explored in detail later in the chapter. First, however, we begin with an examination of the historical relationship between Liberia and its diaspora.

HISTORICAL LIBERIAN STATE POLICY TOWARD THE DIASPORA

Migration between Liberia and the USA has always played an important role in defining Liberian identity. The first wave of migration between present-day Liberia and the USA was the forced transfer of Africans as slaves from the continent to North America, beginning in 1619 with the arrival of African slaves in Jamestown, Virginia, and ending in the summer of 1860 when the last recorded group of Africans was brought to Alabama on the slave ship *Clotilda*. The second wave, overlapping with the first, was the "return" of black Americans to Africa, resulting in the creation of Liberia as a political entity in 1822 and continuing into the twentieth century.

The vast majority of those in the diaspora who today identify as "Liberian" are recent migrants. Some are Liberian students (or their descendants) who traveled to the USA and other countries in the 1950s to 1970s on government and private scholarships to attend various universities and trade schools. Most, however, fled Liberia due to either the 1980 coup or the two Liberian civil wars that engulfed the country from 1989 to 2003. This section traces the historical development of Liberian state–diaspora policy since Liberia's founding, in order to understand more fully the Liberian state's recent efforts to incorporate the diaspora into its sphere of governance.

Liberian Policy Pre-1980

From 1847 to the 1950s, migration between Liberia and the USA was largely immigration from the USA to Liberia. Until 1904, citizenship in Liberia was reserved exclusively for Americo-Liberians—the descendents of the original American settlers—and afterwards, a system of social and legal segregation persisted that denied full citizenship rights to indigenous Liberians. As late as 1944, Liberian President William Tubman, in his inaugural address, declared,

> What is termed the "Americo-Liberian population" is diminishing. It needs vigorous new blood of our own race from without to assist in the Herculean task set before them as the bearers of the torch of Christianity and civilization to their uncivilized brethren. I am therefore wholly inclined to the view that we should use every legitimate means at our disposal to encourage the immigration of our kith and kin to Liberia from the United States.[26]

During Liberia's first century, the ruling Americo-Liberians had faced numerous revolts among the indigenous population and spent heavily on military operations to secure the hinterland.[27] The Ports of Entry Act, in effect since January 1, 1865, had also contributed to the state's financial and security problems, restricting the government's ability to raise revenue through foreign trade and angering Liberia's indigenous peoples. The act specified that foreigners could only land their vessels and conduct trade with Liberians at certain ports of entry on the Liberian coast, thus prohibiting inland tribes from trading with foreigners.

By 1944, Liberia's economy was struggling, the country remained underdeveloped and in need of basic infrastructure, and the state faced

continued internal security challenges. It was against this backdrop that Tubman came to power and immediately and aggressively pursued both a National Unification Policy and an Open Door Policy, which would eventually create opportunities for young Liberian elites to study in the USA, thus leading to a new wave of migration between Liberia and the USA.

Liberia's Open Door Policy

Tubman pursued the Open Door Policy, hoping to emulate the US policy with China, to increase foreign investment in Liberia. In his 1944 inaugural address, he stated,

> We shall encourage the investment of foreign capital in the development of the resources of the country, preferably on a partnership basis, and we shall accord to investors the necessary protection and fairness of treatment.[28]

The policy was not an entirely new one. Liberian President Arthur Barclay (1904–1912) had taken strides to attract foreign investment and increase the number of concessions to foreign firms, and it was President Edwin Barclay (1930–1944), Tubman's predecessor, who had repealed the unpopular Ports of Entry Act as one of his first official acts as president.

In 1926, the Liberian government had signed the country's first foreign concession agreement with the Firestone Plantations Company. When Tubman entered office in 1944, Firestone was the only foreign company operating in Liberia. As a result of the Open Door Policy, however, by the early 1960s, 25 major foreign companies were operating and investing in Liberia.

Early mining concession agreements between foreign (mostly US) companies and the Liberian government included "Liberianization" clauses, but they were extremely limited in scope. Essentially the companies were not allowed to import unskilled labor without the Liberian government's approval and were required to obtain the Liberian secretary of the treasury's approval to hire more than 150 white employees.[29] The notable exception to this was Firestone, which was permitted—in its 1926 planting agreement with the government of Liberia—to hire up to 1,500 white employees. Due to the lack of technical training available in Liberia, virtually all the companies' managerial and technical positions went to foreigners, with Liberian workers filling tens of thousands of low-level

positions. A 1958 law imposed penalties on companies found guilty of discrimination against Liberians in hiring practices, but it did little to change the balance of power due to the lack of qualified Liberian candidates.

In 1953, the mining concession agreement between the Liberian-American-Swedish Minerals Company (LAMCO) and the Liberian government stipulated, for the first time, an obligation on the part of LAMCO to train Liberians in the company's operations. LAMCO's 1960 mining concession agreement also included this requirement, and a 1974 agreement, supplemental to the 1960 agreement, went further, stating an obligation "to provide on-the-job training, to operate vocational training centers, and to provide scholarships" for Liberians.[30]

Such training requirements became standard practice after William Tolbert became president in 1971. Tolbert's administration passed a series of laws in the early 1970s, beginning with the Investment Incentive Act of 1973 (expanded in 1983), which collectively became known as the Liberianization Policy. Embodied by the General Business Law of 1975 (amended in 1998), the Liberianization Policy restricted foreigners from participating in 26 types of "small" business reserved solely for Liberian investors and, importantly, required foreign investors to "employ and train Liberians at all levels and increase their numbers in case of expansion," in order to be eligible for incentives.[31]

Concession agreements for gold and diamond mining in the 1970s also included "Liberianization" clauses requiring companies to take measures such as the following: employing Liberians as a certain percentage of staff personnel; allocating a certain percentage of voting shares to Liberians; giving preference to Liberian goods and services; allowing the Liberian government to purchase the concessionaire's output; and training Liberians "for staff positions and for skilled labour" in order "to realize Liberianisation of staff personnel."[32] Still, Firestone managed to maintain its privileged position in Liberia. During a 1974 renegotiation of Firestone's 1926 planting agreement, the Liberian government proposed requiring Firestone to add an "affirmative program of training, and constant upgrading of qualified Liberian staff," to which Firestone responded by saying the request was neither "appropriate" nor "necessary."[33]

Liberian Students Arrive in the USA

As a result of the numerous concessions agreements between US firms and the Liberian government and the subsequent Liberianization Policy,

Liberian students began traveling to the USA for technical training in the 1950s. In Minnesota, for example, Dunwoody Industrial Institute (renamed Dunwoody College of Technology in 2001) hosted a steady stream of Liberian students on scholarships funded by the Liberian government and also by private entities (notably LAMCO). Liberian students are first mentioned in the institute's newsletter *The Dunwoody News* in 1959, which states,

> There are three trainees from Liberia, two of whom are in the Machine Shop and one in the Automobile department. Two of these trainees are sponsored by the International Cooperation Administration of the United States; the other is studying under a Liberian Government scholarship.[34]

The next mention of Liberian students at Dunwoody is not until 1972 (one student), followed by 1974 (one student), and 1975 (two students). In 1977, however, *The Dunwoody News* profiled a Liberian woman, Serina Cooper-Klimpacher, who was at the institute for a special five-week assignment in personnel management. Described as a married mother of three children, Cooper-Klimpacher was referred to as a staff administrator in the personnel division of LAMCO, which "is presently emphasizing the replacement of many supervisors and workers with Liberian employees. Dunwoody has aided this development by providing training for several supervisory employees as well as the training of mechanics and craftsmen."[35] From 1977 to 1979, an additional 19 Liberian students (all but two LAMCO employees) were profiled in *The Dunwoody News.* In 1980, however, the flow of Liberian students to Dunwoody ended abruptly due to the military coup in Liberia that ousted the True Whig Party and forced many of Liberia's former government officials to flee the country.

Those young Liberians who migrated to the USA and, in fewer numbers, to other countries before 1980, however, formed student organizations that would later develop into today's Liberian diaspora organizations. Many of the Liberian community organizations in the USA, including the Union of Liberian Associations in America (ULAA)—the umbrella organization for Liberian community organizations in the USA—were originally student organizations from which young Liberians launched political careers in Liberia. While those within ULAA emphasize its role as a catalyst for democratic change in Liberia, most Liberians in the USA do not view the organization in such a positive light. Instead, they decry its role as an instrument that elite Liberians

historically used for personal gain at the expense of the diaspora community the organization was created to serve. In recent years, ULAA's leadership has made concerted efforts to rehabilitate the organization's image and to de-politicize the organization, but in-fighting and tribal divisions among members continue to hamstring progress.

Liberian Policy 1980 to 2005

The period from 1980 to 2005 is most notable, in terms of migration policy, for the mass exodus of Liberians[36] that occurred as a result of a coup d'état and two civil wars. From its founding until 1980, Liberia had been ruled by the Americo-Liberian elite as a one-party state. On April 12, 1980, Samuel Doe, an ethnic Krahn—one of Liberia's 16 indigenous groups—led a military coup that toppled William Tolbert's administration and killed President Tolbert. Ten days later, 13 cabinet members and high-ranking officials in the former Tolbert government were publicly executed. Hundreds of government officials—those with money, connections, and valid visas—including Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, fled to the USA. After a 1985 coup attempt by Thomas Qwiwonkpa (an ethnic Gio) failed to unseat Doe, he grew increasingly paranoid, launching bloody reprisals on real and perceived opponents, including ethnic Gios and Manos, whom he blamed for the attempted coup. These reprisals led to a sharp increase in the level of emigration.

Mass Emigration from Liberia

Prior to 1980, Liberian net migration—the number of immigrants minus the number of emigrants—had been quite small but always positive, with immigration higher than emigration. From 1980 to 1985, net migration was zero. After the 1985 coup, however, emigration from Liberia increased dramatically and continued in massive numbers—as shown in Table 7.1—following Charles Taylor's invasion of Liberia in 1989 and throughout both the First Liberian Civil War, from 1989 to 1996, and the Second Liberian Civil War, from 1999 to 2003.

High Emigration Among the Tertiary-Educated Population

Although the net migration rate went from negative to positive in the period from 1995 to 2000, it was largely due to the repatriation of Liberians from refugee camps in bordering countries—those who had had the fewest resources and had only been able to flee on foot—in the

Table 7.1 Liberian net migration, 1950–2010

	1950–1955	1955–1960	1960–1965	1965–1970	1970–1975	1975–1980	1980–1985	1985–1990	1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2005	2005–2010
Net migration (thousands)	–0	8	8	11	11	12	0	–368	–284	453	–73	300

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, *World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision*, CD-ROM Edition, April 2011, http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Excel-Data/migration.htm

Table 7.2 Medical brain drain: Physicians emigrating: 1991–2004 (expressed as percentage of physicians trained in Liberia)

1991	46.096	1998	47.768
1992	48.789	1999	49.579
1993	49.387	2000	49.756
1994	48.626	2001	49.351
1995	48.685	2002	49.840
1996	47.908	2003	50.255
1997	47.870	2004	51.219

Source: "Revised panel dataset on physician emigration," description in Bhargava, Alok, Frédéric Docquier, and Yasser Moullan, "Modeling the Effects of Physician Emigration on Human Development," (February 12, 2010), *Economics and Human Biology* 9 (2011): 172–183. Dataset available at "International Migration Data Sets," Frédéric Docquier website, http://perso.uclouvain.be/frederic.docquier/oxlight.htm

period from 1996 to 1999, between the Liberian civil wars. Significantly, the outflow of Liberian elites—those with the highest level of education and the greatest access to resources—that had begun already in the early 1980s, continued unabated throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s.

Skilled emigration remained a constant concern for Liberia. In 2000, for example, the emigration rate of Liberia's tertiary-educated population was 45 percent (i.e., 45 percent of those who earned tertiary degrees in Liberia emigrated).[37] This was an increase from the 32 percent skilled emigration rate recorded in 1990.[38] As late as 2004, the most recent year for which data are available, 51 percent of physicians trained in Liberia emigrated (see Table 7.2).

The Liberian government's desire to reverse this "brain drain"—to turn it into a "brain gain"—has driven Liberian policy toward the diaspora in recent years.

Liberian Policy Post-2005

Following Liberia's first democratic elections in 2005, which brought President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf into power, the Sirleaf administration immediately reached out to individuals in the diaspora—largely former government officials—beckoning them "home" to fill government positions. In one of the more widely publicized cases, Sirleaf appointed Beatrice Munah Sieh, a woman who had previously served as deputy chief of police in Liberia, to be Liberia's new chief of police in 2006. At the time, Sieh had been working for ten years as a special education

teacher in Trenton, New Jersey, after having survived an assassination attempt and fleeing Liberia in 1996.

Beyond the identification of key individuals in the diaspora who could assume positions of power in the new government, however, the Sirleaf administration was slow to recognize the diaspora's huge financial and political potential. It was not until the end of Sirleaf's first five-year term neared that the administration began taking official steps to engage the diaspora more broadly—to entice them to reinvest in Liberia and, at the same time, to incorporate them into its realm of governance. Following a review of the Liberian diaspora's political importance, the remainder of this chapter details the actions by the Liberian state since 2005 to engage the diaspora and explains how these actions contributed to the creation of a transnational space in which diaspora individuals are increasingly choosing to operate.

THE LIBERIAN DIASPORA'S POLITICAL IMPORTANCE

Among Liberians, the diaspora is often referred to as Liberia's sixteenth county (Liberia has 15 counties), reflecting the important (though not always positive) role that the diaspora is acknowledged to play in Liberian politics. On the November night that Sirleaf spoke in Staten Island, tickets were free but hard to come by due to the fact that Staten Island's North Shore neighborhoods boast the highest concentrated population of Liberians outside Africa. Those without tickets had come dressed for the occasion anyway, mingling among those in the crowded line outside the school before the event in the hopes of receiving extra tickets from a friend or stranger. The Staten Island Liberian Community Association (SILCA) had lobbied for years, since Sirleaf's election in 2005, to host the Liberian president, but it was only in late 2010, in the run-up to the October 2011 presidential election, that Sirleaf made her first presidential visit to Staten Island.

Ellen Johnson Sirleaf's 2010 visit to Staten Island that night was undoubtedly in part stumping for the presidential election in October 2011. Although few Liberians residing in the USA travel back to Liberia to cast ballots in elections, the diaspora is able to influence Liberian elections in a number of important ways.

In September 2010, the Organization for the Promotion of Development in Liberia (OPODL)[39]—a diaspora political pressure group registered in Minnesota and created to support the 2011

presidential re-election campaign of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf—dispatched one of its members, Alonso S. Ngumbu, to Liberia for a three-week "assessment and engagement visit," which included setting up a local OPODL office in Liberia and meeting with the leadership of Liberia's Unity Party.[40] Speaking to *The Liberian Journal* prior to his trip, Ngumbu stated, "We need to put some boots on the ground, to positively impact the course of political events in Liberia, because the 2011 elections are right before us." The following month, OPODL sent another member of its public relations team to Liberia. Speaking about the purpose of the trip and OPODL's specific objectives, Abraham Kamara said,

> OPODL hopes to achieve several things. First, the trip is meant to send a loud and clear message to the Liberian people that we cannot afford to turn back the clock. President Sirleaf has placed Liberia on an irreversible path to success, and OPODL doesn't want any turn in the wrong direction. We also intend to conduct a press conference, laying out a more detailed case to Liberians and the world about our support for President Sirleaf's candidacy. The press conference will also provide an opportunity to address any questions about our organization and our efforts. As part of a broader strategy, we will finalize plans to put strong and heavy boots on the ground, a local office in Liberia. There seems to be a huge interest in OPODL in Liberia, and our emergence has certainly inspired so much interest in the uniqueness of our aggressive approach. This is perhaps why our growth as an organization seems unprecedented, especially given our relatively short history. Lastly, we hope to meet and engage several senior level government officials and Unity Party bosses, including the Iron Lady, to build a more sustained working relationship across many fronts.[41]

Liberians in the USA also raise money for fellow Liberians traveling back to Liberia to campaign for candidates during elections. Those who cannot afford to travel to Liberia themselves to participate in the elections provide support for others who make the journey. As one Liberian living in Minnesota explained,

> There are people who will go back [to Liberia] to canvass to vote and to do the ground work. I don't know whether I would be able to go. But at the same time, because we live in United States, we have influence over our people. For example, my family, I send them money every month. I send money to my mom every month and my dad every month to buy a bag of

rice and for her up-keep. I send her money every single month, so if I told her, if I sit and have a conversation with her and say, "Look, yeah I think this person would do it for us," she would listen to me. I mean, maybe not 100 percent of everybody would do that, but a lot people know that you have a son or daughter in the United States and when you tell them something like that, they would listen to you. So, again we have a way of influencing elections, so many ways in Liberia. There are some of us who are American citizens, but we can still go home and we can canvass. I'm not an American citizen yet, so I'm free to go home, and I can canvass, but [I don't] because I believe there is still a fear for my own life. So, I would probably not do that, but I can coordinate what they do there. We can do some fundraisers to help in small ways those people who want to go back, help them to pay their plane tickets, help them to be able to survive while they're on the ground, because in Liberia nobody would give them money to sustain themselves. So, for those who would be going, we raise money to help them go back home and cover and help. [MN12, 50-year-old male living in Minnesota, entered the USA in 2000, asylee, Interview with author, October 6, 2010]

As the individual above notes, the diaspora also plays a key role in influencing how family members back home, and others to whom they send remittances in Liberia, vote. As one Liberian in Minnesota put it, "The people here are so integral in elections in Liberia because they tell people whom to vote for. Even, you had candidates come here to do speeches that were running there because they know…They did it during the election of Ellen" [MN1, 34-year-old female living in Minnesota, entered the USA in 1985, lawful permanent residence (LPR) through marriage, Interview with author, October 14, 2010].

In April 2011, in fact, during an induction ceremony for officers of the Unity Party (Ellen Johnson Sirleaf's political party) Minnesota Chapter, Varney Sherman—the chairman of the Unity Party in Liberia—encouraged those in attendance to use their connections and money to influence voters and the political process back in Liberia:

A telephone call to those who receive the barrel [referring to shipments of goods] from you regularly; a telephone call to those who receive the [money transfer] control number from you regularly can make a tremendous difference.[42]

Another Liberian residing in Minnesota explained the Liberian state's practice of sending government ministers and officials to Minnesota in order to raise awareness of and "sell" the government's agenda in this way:

> And they come here and I tell you what, Liberians in the United States, in the diaspora, we're huge, we're part of the economy. We fuel the economy in Liberia. And that's not going to stop even if we have a [World] Bank president[43] because we're sending some monies to our families. But they come here because they feel that when we send monies to our families, we control our families back home. We can say, you know, "Vote for this person," or "Do not vote for that person," because we're sending you money, we're supporting you, and if this is the person that we want, you better vote for that person, because otherwise you're not going to get money from us. But they also come here because they figure out they can sell that agenda. And once they sell it to us we can all call our people and say, "Well, you know, the Liberian government is doing great things lately, you know; we heard it's doing this," and the people are like, "uh-huh." [MN11, 36-year-old male living in Minnesota, entered the USA in 1995, naturalized US citizen through marriage (formerly refugee in Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire), Interview with author, October 7, 2010]

Liberians have also returned to Liberia in large numbers to take up positions in government. One interviewee describes the large percentage of Minnesotans in the Liberian government[44]:

> There are a lot of people from Minnesota who are part of the present government. I'm told they have a giant share of the government in Monrovia, people [from Minnesota] who participate as compared to other states...Yeah, I know a lot of friends right here who work for government. But the remittances are still there, on a monthly basis. Nearly every friend I know is building a house in Liberia. Either they have finished [a house] or they are trying to build one or they are building a second one. I know that for a fact. I also do know that on a daily basis people leave from Minnesota to [go to] Liberia either for a visit or for vacation—for many different reasons. I do know people who move to Liberia from Minnesota on a daily basis. So what I'm trying to say is in Minnesota we play a major role both in the economic and political situation in Liberia today. This is why you see that most of the [Liberian] government officials come to Minnesota. A lot of the Liberian people live [here]; they used to be in Rhode Island and Philadelphia but now Minnesota is the highest number of concentration of people and so a lot of the programs center around [here]. ULAA is having

the meeting right in this same hall in September. So everything is centered around Minnesota most of the time. So Minnesota is very important in some of the economic and political decisions that are made in Liberia. [MN3, 45-year-old male living in Minnesota, entered the USA in 1998, asylee, Interview with author, July 26, 2010]

As noted by the interviewees, the Liberian diaspora is an enormous source of capital for Liberia. According to the World Bank, Liberia received US\$ 383 million in remittances in 2013.[45] The figure (see Table 7.3) represents nearly 20 percent of the country's gross domestic product (GDP), which was the tenth highest percentage worldwide.[46]

Even more important in terms of political influence than individual remittances, however, is the potential investment power of the diaspora. According to the World Bank, in 2012, Liberians in the diaspora (estimated population, 400,000) earned an estimated US\$ 3.8 billion in income and had an estimated US\$ 800 million in savings, which equaled 44 percent of Liberia's gross domestic product (GDP).[47] In 2009, the percentage had been even higher. In that year, the World Bank estimated that the 400,000 Liberians in the diaspora had a potential US\$ 600 million in savings, which equaled 66.8 percent of Liberia's GDP.[48] This is significant, especially when considered in light of the fact that of both the 20 African countries included in the 2009 study and the 13 African countries included in the 2012 study, the Liberian diaspora's estimated savings relative to the country's GDP was the highest of any country. In fact, the country with the second highest amount in 2009 was Zimbabwe, where emigrants' potential savings represented only 34.4 percent of the country's GDP. Morocco and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) tied for third place with 10.5 percent. In 2012, Haiti (65.4 percent) and Jamaica (45.7 percent) outranked Liberia, with El Salvador (29.3 percent) and Eritrea (27.2 percent) in fourth and fifth place, respectively. According to the study of 2009 data,

estimates are based on the assumptions that members of the African diaspora with a college degree earn the average income of their host countries, the migrants without tertiary education earn a third of the average household incomes of the host countries, and both skilled and unskilled migrants have the same personal savings rates as in their home countries. Understandably, savings are higher for the countries that have more migrants in the high-income OECD countries.[49]

Table 7.3 Annual remittances to Liberia, 2004–2014 (updated as of April 2015)

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014e	Remittances as a share of GDP in 2013 (%)
Remitt-ances (US$ millions)	58	32	79	62	58	25	31	360	516	383	528	19.7

Source: World Bank staff calculation based on data from International Monetary Fund Balance of Payments Statistics database and data releases from central banks, national statistical agencies, and World Bank country desks. See Migration and Development Brief 12 for the methodology for the forecasts (World Bank, "Migration and Remittances Data")

Early Efforts to Engage the Diaspora

While investment potential from the diaspora represents an enormous opportunity for Liberia, the Liberian government, by its own estimation, has been slow to recognize and exploit its potential. In the words of Amara Konneh, then Liberia's minister of planning and economic affairs, in May 2010,

> No post-conflict country has ever successfully recovered without tapping into the potential of its Diaspora community. True, we recognized that probably a little too late. But, I think it's never too late for a country like Liberia to reach out to all of its citizens no matter where they are, particularly those who have the capacity to help with the recovery process.[50]

While the Liberian government's formulation of a diaspora policy is still in its nascent stages, the Liberian government has in recent years undertaken significant initiatives aimed at engaging the diaspora.

The Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission Diaspora Project

In 2007, the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), in an effort to construct a durable peace after 14 years of conflict, became the first TRC (of more than 30 worldwide) to take statements from individuals—victims, witnesses, and perpetrators—in the diaspora. Partnering with Advocates for Human Rights, a non-governmental organization headquartered in Minnesota, the TRC and an army of volunteers gathered 1,631 statements from Liberians in Ghana, the USA, and the UK. More than 80 percent of these, however, were taken in Ghana, and only 237 were recorded in the USA.[51]

The reasons for the low participation rate in the USA are many. Due to the fact that the Liberian TRC was not empowered to give amnesty to those who testified, Liberians—both in Liberia and in the diaspora—were reluctant to do so. Liberians in the USA, however, also blamed a lack of knowledge of the commission's work for their decision not to testify. As one person put it,

> Well, I wasn't interested in that...I had lots of stuff running through my brain at the time. I mean I could have given a statement of course because I experienced my own share of persecution and all kinds of stuff, but I thought

they had enough people. And the day that they came to Minnesota, that weekend or that time, I think [it was the] second [time] they came, then they said the people who they had were people whom they had already scheduled a long time ago. So, I think I missed some kind of information, technical thing, so that's why I couldn't give a statement. But, I mean, I could have given one. [MN12, 50-year-old male living in Minnesota, entered the USA in 2000, asylee, Interview with author, October 6, 2010]

The same person also mentioned another important reason that many Liberians in the USA chose not to participate in the TRC—namely, fear that their statements could be used against them should they someday return to Liberia.

Well some people that did not talk thought ... [] about going back home someday, and they didn't feel that it was too safe for them to give state-ments, because you have people here who were active combatants in the war. And if you are identified, you know, they felt they could get in trouble, things like that. I mean, I was thinking about [that] too, but I think my not giving a statement was just mainly technical. [MN12, 50-year-old male living in Minnesota, entered the USA in 2000, asylee, Interview with author, October 6, 2010]

Other Liberians stated that they feared their testimony could put relatives in Liberia at risk:

I was contacted by the Advocates for Human Rights [and asked] if I could explain my story. I told my lawyer, and my lawyer said, "Well at this time, we haven't been granted asylum yet, so I'll advise you not to talk anything about it until we hear from the judge," because ... [] we were thinking the judge could deny me asylum ... [] So that was the reason why I did not go, but definitely I would have. There are other reasons, too. If it wasn't for my asylum case that was pending, probably the only reason I wouldn't have done that [was] because my mom lives in Liberia. My daughter lives there [too], and exposing her through what I was going to explain would not be too good for her. [MN16, 32-year-old male living in Minnesota, entered the USA in 2006, asylee (formerly refugee in Ghana), Interview with author, July 23, 2010]

Tribal divisions also played a role in suppressing participation. In conver-sations (both interviews and informal conversations) with Liberians, when asked why they thought so few people participated in the TRC process,

many Liberians mentioned viewing the process (especially in Minnesota) as dominated by indigenous Liberians, notably ethnic Krahns.[52] An Americo-Liberian who said he did not testify because he wasn't invited to explains that he thinks the TRC process was driven by indigenous Liberians:

> I would have [given a statement]. I don't know why they didn't ask me, but I'll tell you what [I think] the reason is why they didn't ask me. [It's] because I would have quite a different perspective being an Americo-Liberian [in terms of] how I saw it [the conflict], you know. Maybe they didn't want me, those indigenous [Liberians] who work with the Advocates for Human Rights, they didn't want to get my perspective, because I would have been honest and what not, and say it like it is. [MN4, 51-year-old male living in Minnesota, entered the USA in 2000, asylee, Interview with author, October 4, 2010]

Most interestingly, many Liberians in the USA stated that they had not given a statement to the Liberian TRC because they were not asked to do so; or conversely, when asked why they had given a statement, said they had done so because they were asked personally. One Liberian, when asked why he had not testified, replied, "Well, one, I was never called; and two, I'm not one of the most aggrieved party in the conflict, I did not play any role at all [leading up] to the conflict. I was neither on any side of the conflict" [MN3, 45-year-old male living in Minnesota, entered the USA in 1998, asylee, Interview with author, July 26, 2010]. One religious leader who helped to raise awareness of the TRC's activities when asked if he gave a statement, said, "No, I did not give a statement, because they didn't ask me. I went through the war and I have my own story, but they didn't ask me" [MN8, 47-year-old male living in Minnesota, entered the USA in 2004, LPR, Interview with author, October 14, 2010].

Individual Efforts to Engage the Diaspora

Besides the work of the TRC, early efforts by the Sirleaf administration to engage the diaspora were primarily undertaken on the initiative of individuals, rather than as part of coordinated government action. Arguably the most significant individual efforts were those of Milton Nathaniel Barnes, the former minister of finance in Charles Taylor's government from 1999

to 2002, who was appointed by Sirleaf as Liberia's ambassador and permanent representative to the United Nations in 2006. He served in that position for two years, and then as Liberia's ambassador to the USA from 2008 to 2010. In November 2007, Barnes presented an overview of the Liberian government's strategies to promote diaspora participation in Liberia to a panel at one of the events that constituted the United Nations Institute for Training and Research's (UNITAR) Migration and Development Series. The presentation focused on the types of opportunities that increased diaspora participation would afford, namely economic (remittances and investment), technological, capacity building (including better work ethic and time management skills), intellectual property, and political lobbying in the USA.[53] Individual strategies to engage the diaspora and encourage return to Liberia were also outlined.

Ambassador Barnes and his wife, Dawn Cooper-Barnes, a former professor of arts and dance instructor, also founded the Liberian Renaissance Foundation (LRF) in spring 2007. A nonprofit organization, the LRF's mission was "to bring the Liberian diaspora together in celebration of the Liberian people, culture and arts" and to act as "an agent for positive change in Liberia by improving the image of Liberia in our global community and by providing opportunities for empowerment of the Liberian people rather than through mere charity."[54]

In a December 31, 2008 address posted on the *Liberian Journal* website, designed to appeal to the diaspora's feelings of goodwill and obligation towards family, friends, and countrymen during the Christmas and New Year's holiday season, Barnes announced his intention to form a Liberian Diaspora Advisory Board to liaise with the Liberian embassy in Washington, DC.[55] The Embassy of Liberia officially launched the Liberian Diaspora Advisory Board in February 2009.[56] The original original members convened for two days (February 20–21, 2009) at Ambassador Barnes's residence, and Barnes continued to promote his vision for the Board in public appearances throughout 2009. Speaking to the Liberian community in Indiana in November 2009, for example, Barnes noted a "paradigm shift" in the diaspora's attitude toward Liberia from one of criticism to one of active involvement, and spoke of the diaspora's obligation—as Liberians—to effect positive change in Liberia. He asserted:

> let me state emphatically that the Liberians here in Indiana are just as vital to the revitalization of Liberia as the people living in Liberia. We all must do

our part, and the leadership and initiatives that you all have shown, is exactly what Liberia needs as we embark on the path to rebuild our battered nation ... you, as Liberians living abroad, with more resources and educational opportunities, are an integral part of the formula for success ... Trust me when I say that not only your community in America, but your country of Liberia desperately needs your help. No matter how much, or how little you can render, your expertise, advice and support is greatly needed. Remember that no matter how much support we receive from our international partners, only Liberians can deliver lasting and sustainable development for Liberia.[57]

In 2010, however, President Sirleaf recalled Ambassador Barnes,[58] and without him at its helm, the Liberian Diaspora Advisory Board and its work fizzled out quickly, never resulting in any concrete action.[59]

LIBERIA'S DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY

By the time Ellen Johnson Sirleaf took the stage in Staten Island a year later in November 2010, however, something significant had shifted in the Liberian government's approach to dealing with the diaspora, which the president's official appearance embodied. On the one hand, her appearance seemed to be just business as usual—a Liberian candidate stumping in Staten Island. As mentioned earlier, it was not the first time that Sirleaf had campaigned in Staten Island; every major Liberian candidate made appearances in Staten Island whenever elections were held in Liberia. Financial support from the diaspora was a critical component of Liberian politics, helping to fund political campaigns and fueling 14 years of civil war, from 1989 to 2003. But, on the other hand, there was something undeniably novel and electrifying about Sirleaf's visit.

What was different about that November night was that it was the Liberian state that was there to address the community, to summon diaspora Liberians back to Liberia, and Liberians had come from far and wide to attend the event. Some, including members of the group Campaign to Re-elect Ellen (CARE) who had traveled from Philadelphia to be there, wore t-shirts, held signs, and distributed pamphlets and pens supporting Sirleaf's re-election campaign for the presidency in 2011. There were numerous green—the color of the president's Unity Party—handkerchiefs and bandannas being waived in solidarity with Sirleaf.

But also in attendance were those who were critical of the president and her decision to run for a second term. These critics were skeptical of her candidacy for two reasons: She had previously made a formal declaration that she would not seek another term after winning the presidency the first time in 2005; and the Liberian TRC had included Sirleaf on a list of 49 persons[60] it recommended in its 2009 final report should be banned from political office in Liberia for 30 years.[61] Still, even those critical of Sirleaf had descended upon Curtis High School that night—many in their finest traditional African and Western attire—to take pride in their leader and their homeland. They had gathered to hear Sirleaf recount Liberia's successes over the previous five years and to witness her receive awards and recognition, including a proclamation by the New York City Council that Staten Island had been home to 10,000 Liberians for the past 30 years.

For the night was not only a celebration of the woman who had become a "rock star" in the West and the "darling of the international community,"[62] credited with leading post-conflict Liberia into a period of relative stability and democracy. It was also recognition by the Liberian state and New York City government of the Liberian diaspora and an affirmation of its political, cultural, and economic importance in New York and Liberia. In her address to the diaspora that night, Sirleaf asked Liberians to "come back home,"[63] saying Liberia needed "to infuse the system with people like yourselves." She stressed the importance of remittances to the country's economy and stated that her government's greatest success was that "today, you can be proud to be a Liberian."

Beyond the rhetoric, however, the president had concrete developments to discuss and incentives to offer. She highlighted the government's creation of the Senior Executive Service (SES), officially launched in December 2008 and funded by the World Bank, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the governments of the USA, Greece, and Germany, as well as Humanity United.[64] The program was designed to recruit a cadre of public servants to transform the civil service, making it more accountable, professional, and effective. It had already, she reported, pulled in over 100 Liberians from abroad. Sirleaf also mentioned her administration's efforts to create a diaspora database to match individuals' skills to job openings in Liberia. She noted that dual citizenship was "just around the corner," and might be approved as early as January 2011 when the Liberian legislature returned from its holiday recess, though not in time for those in the diaspora to vote in the 2011 elections.

Most of these goals, however, remain (in 2015) aspirational. While Liberia's executive branch has clearly made engagement with the diaspora a stated priority, others in government and in the country at large are less eager to formalize diaspora–state relations. Despite repeated requests by President Sirleaf to pass dual citizenship—the most recent during the president's annual address to the national legislature in January 2015—the legislature has refused to take up debate on the bill. The bulk of Liberia's diaspora engagement policy, therefore, according to Gamlen's typology, is most appropriately categorized as "capacity-building," and specifically, "symbolic nation-building."[65] The example of Liberia's first (and so far, only) Diaspora Homecoming in 2010 illustrates this approach.

"Diaspora Homecoming"

Shortly following President Sirleaf's November 2010 visit to Staten Island, the Liberian government hosted its first-ever Diaspora Homecoming in December 2010. The week-long series of events was scheduled to take advantage of the large numbers of Liberians who had returned to Liberia for the holidays and was modeled on the "best practices" of other African countries' engagement with their diasporas through "large scale, Government facilitated, once-a-year Homecomings to reorient the Diaspora, and provide them with a birds' eye view of development initiatives, opportunities for employment and investment, and cultural reconnection."[66] A government press release stated,

> Having recognized that the Liberian Diaspora represents vast wealth potential through private sector development, middle-class entrenchment, and public sector capacity building, the Government of Liberia seeks to formalize its relationship with the Diaspora, recognizing that they are partners in development. To that end, the Government has begun collecting data, through a strategic questionnaire, in order to devise a Liberian Diaspora profile that will allow it to continue to create an enabling environment for Diaspora return, institutional engagement, and/or investments in education, health, agriculture, and infrastructure. It is also on the cusp of benefitting from a US$ 0.5 million grant from the World Bank to formally incubate a Diaspora Unit within the Ministry of State for Presidential Affairs to handle matters related to Diaspora engagement and policy formulation.[67]

The homecoming, which was attended by over 100 Liberians from abroad, included the following: a meet-and-greet cocktail with

President Sirleaf in the foreign ministry; one day of site visits to development projects; a day-long Liberian diaspora forum on the theme "How to Effectively Navigate the Investment and Job Market" with a concurrent job/ideas fair of employment and investment opportunities; and, a half-day consultation for Liberia Rising 2030—the government's growth and development strategy to make Liberia a middle-income country by 2030.

The homecoming drew inspiration from the "best practices" of other African countries, such as Ghana, South Africa, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone, which had all organized their own "homecoming" events. In December 2006, Sierra Leone had organized its first diaspora homecoming. In the same year, dual citizenship (a recognized priority for the diaspora) was granted to Sierra Leoneans who had acquired citizenship in another country, which (like in Liberia) had not been allowed previously.[68] And in 2007, Sierra Leone created an Office for Diaspora Affairs, located within the Office of the Presidency. Other countries had also begun to formally engage their diasporas. Nigeria, under President Obasanjo, established a special presidential advisor for diaspora affairs, and Ghana, Mali, and Senegal all had ministers whose jobs included diaspora affairs.[69] According to Robtel Pailey, the Liberian special assistant to the minister of state for presidential affairs at the time, however, Sierra Leone was the only country to which Pailey traveled for a week-long study tour while in charge of formulating a policy on diaspora engagement for the Liberian government.[70]

The Sirleaf administration has also embarked on a campaign to meet with diaspora groups to encourage individuals' participation in development initiatives in Liberia. As early as August 2008, at a Diaspora Engagement Stakeholders' Consultative Forum held in Monrovia, President Johnson Sirleaf urged emigrant professionals to volunteer their services in Liberia and endorsed a number of initiatives, including the compilation of a Liberian Diaspora Professional Directory, designed to strengthen diaspora involvement in rebuilding Liberia.[71] More recently, President Sirleaf, whenever traveling abroad, has made a point of speaking with diaspora leaders and organizations in cities across the USA, as well as in West Africa and Europe. The Liberian government still refers to persons who left Liberia decades ago as Liberians and as Robtel Paily notes,

> It is particularly worth noting that many of the custodians of political, economic and social reconstruction have been members of Liberia's diasporas: Antoinette Sayeh, former Finance Minister, led the country's

preparation for HIPC [Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative] status and the first Poverty Reduction Strategy; Olubanke King-Akerele and Toga Gayewea McIntosh, formerly of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, continued to court multi-lateral and bilateral economic and political arrangements that would transform Liberia's international standing as a "pariah nation"; and Justice Ministers Philip Banks and Christiana Tah led the judicial reform agenda.[72]

Progress on institution-building has been extremely slow, however, and attempts to extend rights to the diaspora have been met with resistance in Liberia, as discussed later. It is also worth mentioning that while the efforts described above on the part of the Sirleaf administration are what Gamlen refers to as "symbolic nation-building," the Liberian government has come under criticism for what many people in Liberia regard as preferential treatment toward Liberian emigrants (particularly in terms of the appointment of emigrants to government positions) and what Pailey refers to as an emphasis on state-building rather than nation-building.[73] She argues that the Liberian state in its attempt to attract external donors and appease foreign stakeholders, such as the USA, World Bank, African Development Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the diaspora, has neglected to build consensus and national unity among Liberians at home and abroad. Nowhere is this more evident than in the debate over dual citizenship in Liberia. As Pailey notes,

> Informal 'contracts' entered into between local elites and international actors actually lead to the enforcement of weak states because their interests in creating a facade of change often leave existing state-society relations unchanged (Barnett and Zurcher, 2010: 23–52). This is an argument that is particularly prolific amongst local populations in Liberia about the role of diasporas, as they argue that granting dual citizenship to this already privileged group might reinforce pre-war fissures in social relations. I would argue that in order to subvert claims about the propensity for dual citizenship to re-inscribe historical inequities, Liberia should undergo nation-wide public deliberations on the proposed legislation, leading to a national referendum on the issue.[74]

In a 2013 visit to the Twin Cities to raise support for the government's development agenda, Liberia's Minister of Finance Amara Konneh also

warned Liberians in Minnesota that their participation in transnational activities may be viewed negatively in Liberia:

> We've all heard the words "Congo" or "Country," used in less than affectionate ways, or used those words ourselves, in private conversations. You'll be interested to know that, in as much as your community here [in the USA] has its tensions—which are normal—it will be a whole different ball game when you get back to Liberia. Because, as a Krahn man or woman, for example, your American accent, nice clothes, respectable car and personal affluence will out of a sudden earn you the label of "Congo." Because the term is no longer used only to describe African American settlers; it is now used as a blanket label for all those who have risen to a certain income bracket. It is especially used, now, on those of us who have lived abroad for a certain length of time.[75]

In terms of diaspora engagement policies, President Sirleaf's proposal to extend rights to the diaspora, by allowing Liberians to hold dual citizenship, has been the most divisive issue by far.

DUAL CITIZENSHIP

At the forefront of the Sirleaf administration's strategy to engage formally the diaspora is a push to legalize dual citizenship in Liberia. Since its founding, Liberia has not allowed citizens to hold any other citizenship, and acquiring citizenship of a foreign country results in loss of Liberian citizenship. It is important to note, however, that while this is technically the case, in practice many Liberian elites, including those in public office, hold foreign citizenships.

In 2008, four Liberian senators—Cletus Segbe Wotorson of Grand Kru County, Sumo G. Kupee of Lofa County, Jewel Howard-Taylor of Bong County, and Abel Massalay, of Grand Cape Mount County—proposed the Act to Establish Dual Citizenship for Liberians by Birth to the second session of the fifty-second Liberian national legislature. Despite having the support of the Sirleaf administration, the act has remained (as of August 2015) stuck in committee for years and the subject of intense political debate both in Liberia and among those in the diaspora.

Although the bill has widespread support among the diaspora, it is unpopular in Liberia. Robtel Pailey sums up the two sides of the issue as follows:

> Those in favor of dual citizenship argue that Liberians by birth should not be punished for fleeing the civil war and seeking greener pastures abroad. Those opposed to dual citizenship argue that Liberians who naturalized in other countries are traitors who only want dual citizenship now because Liberia is stable and ripe for exploitation.[76]

Beyond the ideological debate, however, there are a number of specific problems with the proposed legislation. Pailey points out that the proposed bill, "does not include important provisions about the statutory rights and responsibilities of would-be dual citizens, such as voting in national elections, holding high political office, paying taxes, or serving in the military."[77] Other problems include the fact that there are no reliable data on the number of diaspora Liberians who might take advantage of dual citizenship, and the allegation that those pushing for passage of the legislation within Liberia's government are the very individuals who have obtained foreign citizenships themselves, creating an obvious conflict of interest. While Liberians in the diaspora argue that they contribute to the country's development through remittances, Pailey notes,

> The challenge herein is proving whether or not diaspora remittances have had significant national development outcomes beyond household consumption, such as the construction of essential infrastructure, the provision of basic social services, or the establishment of viable businesses. While some invoke remittances, others cry foul about the presumed high rate of capital flight. They claim that money leaving Liberia to support transnational lives—mortgages, school fees, student loans, and taxes paid to foreign governments—could very well be equivalent to remittances sent to Liberia, thereby canceling out remittances altogether.[78]

In 2010, OPODL launched a petition drive to gather 10,000 signatures in support of dual citizenship. Abraham Kamara, OPODL's public relations officer, explained the reasoning behind the push for dual

citizenship and addressed Liberians' fears that those returning from the diaspora would be competing for jobs in Liberia:

> We support dual citizenship because we believe it is in the economic interest of Liberia. It's also in the national security interest of Liberia to have dual citizenship. We believe (for) a country emerging from 14 years of civil war, it is important to introduce dual citizenship because it will give Liberians, almost 500,000 who are in the United States and other parts of the world, and who have gained United States citizenship to go back home and contribute to the development of Liberia...We believe this issue of dual citizenship should not come down to jobs because Liberians in the United States who want to go back home are not going back home to take jobs. There are not enough jobs in Liberia to absorb everyone. The majority of Liberians want to go back home to establish businesses. So, our message to our fellow Liberians is that this issue is not about jobs; it's about the development of our country.[79]

Despite the fact that many Liberians do hold dual citizenship, and this is often overlooked by the Liberian government, many Liberians in the USA who are eligible to naturalize have chosen not to, fearing it might prevent them from holding office in Liberia in the future. When asked if he had naturalized, one religious leader in the USA replied,

> No, not yet. I have some political ambitions, perhaps in the near future, and naturalization will inhibit that because the Liberian constitution does not allow dual citizenship, not as yet. The American Constitution does, but you would be doing yourself a disadvantage because today you can't hide that; everybody will know. So most political situation or individuals who are interested in politics are affected by that. [MN8, 47-year-old male living in Minnesota, entered the USA in 2004, LPR, Interview with author, October 15, 2010]

Another interviewee emphasized the benefits of naturalization, yet still had not naturalized:

> It's important to be a US citizen, especially when you have children who need to go to school, and you have children who are born here. So there are a lot of reasons people make a decision. I am a resident; I qualify to be a

citizen if I want to apply. I have not done that. It's a choice that I have to make. If I want to do so, it would be my choice to do it or not to do it . . .

Well, I have not made up my mind to. I don't know whether I'm going to seek office [in Liberia] one day. If I've made a decision and I'll seek office one day, then I have to think whether I can be a citizen of the United States. [MN3, 45-year-old male living in Minnesota, entered the USA in 1998, asylee, Interview with author, July 26, 2010]

Those supporting dual citizenship have pointed to a double-standard among Liberia's leaders, alleging that many of those in Liberian government have already naturalized in the USA and Europe. In 2012, Frederick A.B. Jayweh, a Liberian lawyer residing in Denver, Colorado, argued that,

Absolutely, Liberian Citizens should no longer remain sitting around, barred from dual citizenship while many of their leaders, in the Executive, Legislative, Judiciary, and other sectors of Liberia hide and fly by-night to become United States and European Citizens. This Campaign is about naming and exposing those Government officials from top to bottom of the Sirleaf's Government, publishing their names and dates of denaturalization, members of their families already naturalized as United States Citizens, and forcefully encourage the National Legislature of Liberia to proceed, amend, and reform Liberia's Aliens and Nationality Law of 1956.[80]

Even though an estimated third of Liberia's population fled to other states during the civil wars, Liberia does not face a population shortage. Many of those who fled to refugee camps in neighboring countries eventually returned, and although Liberia is a small country, with an estimated population in 2015 of 4.5 million,[81] its population growth rate is 2.58 percent.[82] At this rate, the UN estimates that Liberia's population will rise to 6.4 million by 2030 and will more than double (9.4 million) by 2050.[83] Liberia also has an extremely young population, with a median age of only 18.6 years.[84]

The issue for the Liberian government moving forward, however, is not necessarily how to encourage Liberians in the diaspora to return to Liberia, but rather how to extend the Liberian state's influence and governance power outside its territorial borders, to include the diaspora. A formalization of dual citizenship would be a means to that end. The final section of this chapter examines another of Gamlen's categories of diaspora engagement policies, namely the Liberian state's efforts to build capacity through institution-building.

Diaspora as Partner in Liberia's Poverty Reduction Strategy and "Liberia Rising 2030"

In 2010, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf's government launched a formal initiative to engage the diaspora in the government's "Lift Liberia" Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS)—the three-year framework for national development begun in April 2008 and aimed at reducing poverty and achieving the Millennium Development Goals.[85] Covering the final three years of Sirleaf's first term, the PRS served both as an aspirational roadmap for the administration's reconstruction efforts and as a rallying point for private sector investors, both in Liberia and the diaspora. Recognizing that the diaspora was a significant player in Liberian politics, the Sirleaf administration sought to engage and partner with diaspora members, thus neutralizing potential opposition forces by giving them a financial and political stake in the administration's development plan.

By January 2010, the Sirleaf government, looking beyond the PRS's end date of June 2011 to the October 2011 presidential elections and the possibility of a second presidential term, had initiated "Liberia Rising 2030." In January 2010, at her annual address to the national legislature, Sirleaf announced her intention to run for a second term in the October 2011 presidential elections. In the same speech, she called on the legislature to legalize dual citizenship for Liberians in the diaspora.[86]

In 2010, the administration also sent a team of government officials to rally support for the PRS at town hall meetings with Liberians in five US cities: Staten Island, NY; Philadelphia, PA; Providence, RI; Minneapolis, MN; and, Atlanta, GA. The ministers emphasized the role diaspora members could and should play in reducing poverty and combating corruption through private sector wealth creation and economic growth. As explained by Amara Konneh, then Liberia's minister of planning and economic affairs, in 2010,

> The private sector is going to be the key in terms of employment because employment is the only way that we can create wealth for our people. And to employ, you need massive foreign direct investment; you also need to make doing business easier for Liberian-owned businesses because those informal businesses are the ones that are actually employing relatives and providing critical support to Liberians inside Liberia.
>
> The new frontier is going to be about how do we address the issue of human capital to reverse the brain drain situation in Liberia into a brain gain;

how do we encourage Diaspora Liberians, who are the middle class of Liberia but not in the country, to return home to tap into the private sector potential; how do we work together to address the issue of corruption?[87]

In October 2010, just a month before Sirleaf's visit to Staten Island, Liberia had submitted an application to the World Bank for an Institutional Development Fund (IDF) grant in the amount of US$ 500,000 to create an Office of Diaspora Affairs.[88] The grant application, titled "Liberia Will Rise Again Diaspora Engagement Program," sought support to "enhance the capacity of the Government of Liberia's Diaspora Engagement program, through a Diaspora Unit within the Ministry of State" and to "assist in the formulation of a National Liberian Diaspora Policy devised to buttress the implementation of the third year of the Lift Liberia Poverty Reduction Strategy and the forthcoming Liberia Rising 2030 development agenda."[89] In 2012, Liberia's proposal was funded in the amount of US$ 443,000, effective January 2013. The target completion date for the project was January 2016.[90]

As of 2014, however, little progress had been made toward the stated objectives with regards to diaspora engagement. A World Bank progress review of the project in June 2014 noted that "Implementation progress is still very slow. After several months of delay, the implementing agency is finally concluding interviews of candidates for various positions that are critical for the project. The implementing agency has committed to improve the pace of implementation once all project personnel are on board." The report further noted that, in terms of results, none of the three indicators (listed below) were present, as indicated by "no":

- To gather diaspora inputs and information on global engagement practices through consultations and outreach (No)
- National Diaspora Policy Developed (No)
- Strengthened Diaspora Unit in the Ministry of State Without Portfolio (No)[91]

Despite the devastating impact of the Ebola crisis in 2014, however, which required the government's full attention and resources, some of the government's initiatives to engage the diaspora appeared to be gaining steam in 2015. Liberia's newly created Office of Diaspora Affairs held its First Annual Professional Liberian Summit in February 2015 in Washington, DC. Liberian officials also continued their outreach to the diaspora through

participation at events such as the All Liberian Diaspora Conference in Washington, DC. in April 2015. The event, organized by Liberian diaspora organizations, was attended by the Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs/ Focal Point for Diaspora Engagement, Hon. Abratha P. Doe, whose office has also pursued the establishment of the diaspora database that President Sirleaf had promised so many times in past years. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs created a registration form (available on its website) that it encouraged individuals to fill out and return for inclusion in the database.

Concluding Remarks

The Liberian state's recent steps to formalize its relationship with the diaspora—in particular, its attempts to formulate a diaspora engagement strategy—mark a turning point for the Liberian state. It remains to be seen to what extent recent events represent a true shift in the "art of government" or are merely an economic strategy aimed at harnessing the vast resources of the diaspora. At the very least, as demonstrated in this chapter, engagement efforts have been driven as much by individual actors' interests as by concerted state policy. Still, there is solid evidence to suggest that, collectively, the Liberian state's actions constitute part of a larger developing trend among emigrant states to extend their realm of governance outside their traditional territorial borders.

The bulk of Liberia's diaspora engagement policies to date fall under the category of "capacity-building" in Gamlen's typology. Institutions, such as the Office of Diaspora Affairs, have been created, with the assistance of funds from the World Bank, but most diaspora engagement efforts to date are best classified as "symbolic nation-building" through individual outreach by government officials to diaspora leaders and organizations. The executive branch's attempt to extend rights to the diaspora, through the introduction of a bill to allow dual citizenship, has been met with opposition in the national legislature and has ignited a broader debate both at home and abroad about Liberian national identity and the capacity of the diaspora to contribute to the process of peacebuilding. While diaspora engagement is certainly motivated by a desire to extract obligations from the diaspora, scant progress has been made in instituting formal mechanisms for achieving this goal.

Still, as the Liberian state reaches out to the diaspora, it is "creating diaspora," redefining what it means to be Liberian and what it means to be a member of the Liberian diaspora by creating opportunities for civic

engagement. As individuals participate in civic activities aimed at the homeland, they are reformulating their own identity and assuming a "transnational citizen" identity.

NOTES

1. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *2005 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook: Liberia*, 2007, 400–401, http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/STATISTICS/4641be64d.pdf. Total number of Liberian refugees in 2007 is 784,008.
2. Jacques Paul Klein, quoted in *World Chronicle,* no. 924, January 14, 2004, http://www.un.org/webcast/worldchron/trans924.pdf
3. Based on ACS three-year estimates, 2010–2012. I used ACS three-year estimates, because it is more recent than five-year estimates and more accurate than the one-year estimates. The top 10 states were Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Georgia, Texas, Massachusetts, California, and North Carolina.
4. Based on ACS three-year estimates, 2010–2012. I used ACS three-year estimates, because it is more recent than five-year estimates and more accurate than the one-year estimates. The top 10 states were Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Georgia, Rhode Island, North Carolina, Virginia, and Massachusetts.
5. A visit by Liberian Finance Minister Amara Konneh in July 2013 to Brooklyn Park was criticized by Liberian Minnesotans who complained of corruption by the finance ministry [Regan, Sheila, "Minnesota Liberian Community Split Over Liberian Finance Minister's Visit," July 24, 2013, *Twin Cities Daily Planet,* http://www.tcdailyplanet.net/news/2013/07/24/protest-planned-over-liberian-finance-ministers-visit]
6. See the European Federation of Liberian Associations' website at http://old.liberiansineurope.eu/lank2_under1.asp
7. Gamlen, Alan, "Diaspora Engagement Policies: What are They and What Kinds of States Use Them?" Centre on Migration, Policy, and Society, Working Paper No. 32, University of Oxford, 2006, http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/publications/working-papers/wp-06-32/
8. Smith, Robert C., "Migrant Membership as an Instituted Process: Migration, the State and the Extra-Territorial Conduct of Mexican Politics," *International Migration Review* 37, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 297–343.
9. Smith, "Migrant Membership as an Instituted Process."
10. Bhagwati, Jagdish N., "Borders Beyond Control," *Foreign Affairs* 82, no. 1 (2003): 98–104, http://www.cfr.org/world/borders-beyond-control/p5356

11. Gamlen uses the term "governmentality" as developed by Michel Foucault to describe the means and practices by which subjects are governed.
12. Gamlen, "Diaspora Engagement Policies," 4–5.
13. Ong, Aihwa, *Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999), 7.
14. Ong, *Flexible Citizenship,* 22.
15. Ragazzi, Francesco, "Governing Diasporas," *International Political Sociology* 3, no. 4 (2009): 378–397.
16. Ragazzi, "Governing Diaspora."
17. Guarnizo, Luis, "On the Political Participation of Transnational Migrants: Old Practices and New Trends," in Gary Gerstle and John Mollenkopf, eds., *E Pluribus Unum? Contemporary and Historical Perspectives on Immigrant Political Incorporation* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001), 213–263.
18. Gamlen, "Diaspora Engagement Policies," 4.
19. Barry, Kim, "Home and Away: The Construction of Citizenship in an Emigration Context," *New York University Law Review* 81, no. 1 (2006): 34.
20. Basch, Linda, Schiller, Nina Glick, and Szanton Blanc, Cristina, *Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation-States* (Langhorne, PA: Gordon and Breach, 1994).
21. Barry, "Home and Away," 11.
22. Fitzgerald, David, "Inside the Sending State: The Politics of Mexican Emigration Control," *International Migration Review* 40, no. 2 (2006): 259–293, 260.
23. Delano, Alexandra, *Mexico and Its Diaspora in the United States: Policies of Emigration Since 1848* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
24. Gamlen, "Diaspora Engagement Policies," 5–6.
25. Gamlen, "Diaspora Engagement Policies."
26. "First Inaugural Address of President William Vacanarat Shadrach Tubman, January 3, 1944," in *The Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents of Liberia: From Joseph Jenkins Roberts to William Richard Tolbert, Jr., 1848 to 1976,* Joseph Saye Guannu, ed. (Hicksville, NY: Exposition Press, 1980), 319.
27. The distinction between the coastal region, where the Americo-Liberians settled and established the original counties, and the interior region, inhabited by indigenous peoples, has played an important role in Liberian history. At the time of Liberian independence in 1847, the republic consisted of three coastal counties—Grand Bassa, Montserrado, and Sinoe—that had been established on land purchased by the colonization societies from African tribal leaders and that extended only 40 miles inland from the coast. The area beyond the 40-mile demarcation zone was referred to simply as the "hinterland," and although the

new republic had trading interests and posts in the region, it had no jurisdiction or sovereignty. Competition from European powers to gain control over the resource-rich interior in the second half of the nineteenth century led the Liberian government to expand its jurisdiction over the hinterland, establishing the department of the interior by an act of the Liberian legislature in 1869, and instituting a system of indirect rule over the hinterland in 1904 under President Arthur Barclay.

28. First Inaugural Address of President William Vacanarat Shadrach Tubman in Guannu 1980, 321.

29. For example, these requirements were part of both the 1945 Liberian Mining Concession agreement and the 1958 National Iron Ore, Ltd. Agreement. See, Annex 12, van der Kraaij, Fred P. M., "The Open Door Policy of Liberia: An Economic History of Modern Liberia," 2 vols., 703 pp., PhD Thesis, Tilburg University, The Netherlands (1983), 579–594, http://www.liberiapastandpresent.org/PDF/The_Open_Door_deel2.pdf

30. The three agreements are as follows:

1. Concession Agreement made and entered into between the Government of Liberia, Represented by the Honorable William E. Dennis, Secretary of the Treasury, R. L., and the United African Corporation, Represented by its President L. E. Detwiler, September 9, 1953.2. Mining Concession Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Liberia and the Liberian American-Swedish Minerals Company and Bethlehem Steel Corporation, April 28, 1960.3. Supplemental Agreement Among the Government of the Republic of Liberia and the Liberian American-Swedish Minerals Company and Liberia Bethlehem Iron Mines Company, Successor To and Assign of Bethlehem Steel Corporation, February 26, 1974, including Appendix I and Exhibit A.

The full text of all three agreements are included as Annex 14, van der Kraaij, "The Open Door Policy of Liberia: An Economic History of Modern Liberia," 587–594.

31. The Republic of Liberia's National Investment Commission, The Investor's Guide to Liberia (Monrovia: National Investment Commission, 2007), 30.

32. The four agreements are as follows:

1. Gold Concession Agreement Between The Government of Liberia and Lawrence L. Trumbull, May 7, 1970, Monrovia, Liberia.
2. Diamond Mining Concession Agreement Between The Government of The Republic of Liberia and Globex Minerals, Inc. of California, U.S.A., December 23, 1957.

3. Gold Mining Concession Agreement Between the Government of The Republic of Liberia and African Mining Partners, August 1, 1973.

4. An Act Approving The Mining Concession Agreement Entered Into By And Between The Government of The Republic of Liberia And Liberian Gold And Mining.

The full text of all four agreements are included as Annex 9 [van der Kraaij, "The Open Door Policy of Liberia: An Economic History of Modern Liberia," 567–570].

33. See, "Summary Table of Renegotiation of the 1926 Planting Agreement with Firestone 1974–1975–1976," Annex 8, van der Kraaij, "The Open Door Policy of Liberia: An Economic History of Modern Liberia," 557.

34. "International Student Body at Dunwoody," *The Dunwoody News,* Vol. XXXVIII, No. 5, Minneapolis, October 30, 1959, 1.

35. "LAMCO Employee Attends Special Courses," *The Dunwoody News,* Vol. LVI, No. 8, Minneapolis, December 16, 1977, 3.

36. According to the final report of the Republic of Liberia Truth and Reconciliation Commission, an estimated 250,000 people died during the two conflicts; another one million were displaced internally and hundreds of thousands became refugees (collectively, nearly half Liberia's population) [The Republic of Liberia Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Final Report (Ghana: Twidan Grafix, June 30, 2009), 44, http://trcofliberia.org/reports/final-report]

37. Ratha, Dilip, Sanket Mohapatra, and Ani Silwal, "Liberia," Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011, World Bank Development Prospects Group (The World Bank Group, 2011), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1199807908806/Liberia.pdf

38. Docquier, Frédéric and Abdeslam Marfouk, "International Migration by Educational Attainment (1990–2000)—Release 1.1," in *International Migration, Remittances and Development,* Caglar Ozden and Maurice Schiff, eds. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); dataset available at "International Migration Data Sets," Frédéric Docquier website, http://perso.uclouvain.be/frederic.docquier/oxlight.htm

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40. Kiatamba, Abdullah, "Pro Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf OPODL Dispatches Team to Liberia," *The Liberian Journal,* September 16, 2010, http://www.theliberianjournal.com/index.php?st=news&sbst=details&rid=1697

41. Abraham Kamara, quoted in Kiatamba, "Pro Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf OPODL Dispatches Team to Liberia."

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43. Referring to the fact that Ellen Johnson Sirleaf previously worked as a senior loan officer at the World Bank.

44. Liberians in Minnesota repeatedly mentioned the fact that a large number of individuals had returned to Liberia to take up positions in government. Attempts to verify this information, however, were unsuccessful as it was difficult to confirm whether or not government officials had resided in Minnesota.

45. World Bank, "Prospects—Migration and Remittances Data," http://go.worldbank.org/092X1CHHD0

46. The countries that ranked above Liberia were as follows: Tajikistan, Kyrgyz Republic, Nepal, Moldova, Tonga, Haiti, Armenia, The Gambia, and Lesotho. Samoa ties Liberia at 19.7 percent.

47. De, Supriyo, Ratha, Dilip, and Yousefi, Seyed Reza, "A Note on International Migrants' Savings and Incomes," Migration and Remittances Unit, Development Prospects Group, World Bank, September 24, 2014, 6, http://blogs.worldbank.org/peoplemove/files/Note%20on%20Diaspora%20Savings%20Sep%2023%202014%20Final.pdf

48. Plaza, Sonia and Dilip Ratha, "Overview," in *Diaspora for Development in Africa,* ed. Sonia Plaza and Dilip Ratha (World Bank Publications, April 26, 2011), 15, http://www.diaspora-centre.org/DOCS/DfD_overview.pdf

49. Plaza and Ratha, "Overview," 14.

50. Amara Konneh, quoted in Butty, James, "Liberian Diaspora Critical for Poverty Reduction," *VoiceofAmericaNews.com*, May 11, 2010, http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/Butty-Liberia-Poverty-Reduction-Konneh-11may10-93373634.html

51. The regions in the USA where the greatest number of statements were collected were as follows: the Twin Cities (70 statements); Staten Island (61 statements); and Philadelphia (30 statements).

52. During the Liberian wars, Minnesota was known as a fundraising site for the rebel group Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) whose members were largely Krahn and Mandingo. See, for example, Schmitz, Rob, "Accusations of Rebel Ties Divide Minnesota's Liberian Community," Minnesota Public Radio, August 7, 2003, http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/2003/08/07_schmitzr_liberianfunds/

53. Barnes, H. E. Mr. Milton Nathaniel, Permanent Representative of Liberia to the United Nations, Mission of the Republic of Liberia to the United

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55. "Ambassador Nathaniel Barnes to Form Liberian Diaspora Advisory Board (Special New Year's Message)," *Liberian Journal*, December 31, 2008, http://www.theliberianjournal.com/index.php?st=news&sbst=details&rid=746

56. "Liberian Embassy In Washington Launches Liberian Diaspora Advisory Board," press release posted on the website of the Government of the Republic of Liberia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 25, 2009, http://www.mofa.gov.lr/press.php?news_id=154; "Diaspora Advisory Board Established to Help 'Lift Liberia,'" *Liberian Journal,* February 25, 2009, http://www.theliberianjournal.com/index.php?st=news&sbst=details&rid=892

57. Barnes, Nathaniel, "Remarks to the Liberian Association of Indiana," *People to People: Liberian Online News* website, November 21, 2009, http://www.peopletopeople.info/id393.html

58. In 2010, President Sirleaf recalled him amid rumors that he had intentions to challenge Sirleaf in Liberia's 2011 presidential election. Barnes—a graduate of Rider College in New Jersey (BS Finance 1978) and Pace University in New York (MBA 1979) who fled Liberia in 1980 and then returned in 1996 to work in the Ministry of Finance, eventually becoming the Minister of Finance—had lost to Sirleaf in the 2005 presidential elections, in which he ran on the Liberia Destiny Party ticket. In December 2010, after being recalled, he stated that he would again run in 2011, but later, in July 2011, announced that the Liberia Destiny Party would not field a presidential candidate in the elections.

59. Author's interview with Robtel Pailey, former Liberian special assistant to the minister of state for presidential affairs and a member of the Liberian Diaspora Advisory Board, November 8, 2011.

60. The "List of Persons Subject to/Recommended for Public Sanctions" includes 49 persons whom the Liberian TRC recommended be "barred from holding public office, elected or appointed, for a period of thirty (30) years as of July 1, 2009." In addition, the TRC recommended both prosecuting and barring from office another 182 persons, which included 124 persons responsible for "gross human rights violations" and 58 persons who committed "egregious violations" ["List of Persons Subject to/Recommended for Public Sanctions," in Republic of Liberia Truth and

Reconciliation Commission, *Volume II: Consolidated Final Report* (Ghana: Twidan Grafix, June 30, 2009), 361, available online at http://trcofliberia. org/reports/final-report].

61. The TRC had added Sirleaf's name to the list due to her onetime support of Charles Taylor. In testimony to the Liberian TRC in 2009, Sirleaf admitted that she originally sympathized with Taylor during his invasion of Liberia in 1989. Many Liberian elites who fled Liberia when Samuel Doe took over in 1980 viewed Taylor as someone capable of restoring Americo-Liberian rule to the country. Sirleaf stated that she was a founding member of the Association for Constitutional Democracy in Liberia (ACDL), then operating in Washington, DC, which raised US$ 10,000 in support of Taylor and that she visited Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) rebel headquarters in Nimba County during the conflict. She has not, however, stated how much money she individually contributed and emphasizes that her support of Taylor ended sometime in mid-1990 when the atrocities he was committing became known.

62. The author's Google search for the phrase "Ellen Liberia darling of international community" on August 24, 2015 pulled up thousands of media mentions of the phrase.

63. Quotes from the president's November 9, 2010 visit were taken by the author while attending the event.

64. For more information on the SES, see: "More Efforts to Build Liberian Capacity: Senior Executive Service (SES) Launched," Government of the Republic of Liberia Executive Mansion website, December 18, 2008, http://www.emansion.gov.lr/press.php?news_id=993; "Senior Executive Service," the Republic of Liberia's Civil Service Agency website, http://csa. gov.lr/content.php?sub=SES%20Overview&related=Departments&sidebar= Departments

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67. "President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf Addresses Diaspora Liberians Visiting Home for the Holidays."

68. Parliament amended the Sierra Leone Citizenship Act of 1973 in 2006 to allow dual citizenship.

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Janet Reilly is a guest faculty member in politics at Sarah Lawrence College. She received a PhD and MA in political science from the City University of New York (CUNY) Graduate Center, a MSt in forced migration from the University of Oxford, and a BA from Duke University. She previously taught at Queens College (CUNY) and has worked for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Turkey, Save the Children Foundation in Ethiopia, and Lutheran Family Services' Refugee Resettlement Program in the USA. Publications include articles in *Refugee Survey Quarterly* and *Refuge*. Research interests include refugee protection and asylum, migration, human rights, citizenship, transnationalism, humanitarian relief, and international law.

Engaging the Ethiopian Diaspora: Policies, Practices and Performance

Elizabeth Chacko and Peter H. Gebre

Introduction

The Ethiopian diaspora is of recent vintage, as the exodus of migrants from Ethiopia only began in the mid-late 1970s. Political, environmental, and economic push factors were instrumental in the formation of substantial Ethiopian immigrant populations in North America, Europe, neighboring African countries and the Middle East by the mid-1980s. In 2013, the worldwide stock of migrants from Ethiopia was estimated to be approximately 586,000, and the top destinations of these migrants in the More Developed Countries (MDCs) were the USA, Israel, Canada, Germany, Italy, and Sweden. Significant destinations in the developing world include Sudan, Djibouti, Kenya, and Saudi Arabia.[1] However, other sources estimate the diaspora to number well over one million persons.[2]

Globalization and the concomitant rise of newer, quicker, and less expensive modes of transportation and communication have allowed for

E. Chacko (✉)
George Washington University, Washington, DC, USA

P.H. Gebre
All American Small Business Exporters Association, Washington, DC, USA

larger outflows of migrants as well as created opportunities for the dispersed population to maintain and build linkages with the country and communities left behind. Diasporas the world over have been increasingly involved with their countries of origin, creating avenues for greater connection and organizations that facilitate deeper cultural, economic, and political engagement. While some of these ties are symbolic in nature, country governments in the developing world have in turn sought to capitalize on the role the diaspora could play in assisting with economic and social development in the sending country. Governments have therefore devised diaspora engagement policies to make émigrés feel that they are still a vital part of the national enterprise and to channel the involvement of the diaspora in key areas.

This chapter will use the case of the Ethiopian diaspora to examine the numerous ways in which this population maintains connections with its culture and country of origin, as well as the effectiveness of Ethiopian government policies in creating a sense of inclusion and connectedness among the diaspora and in using the diaspora as a tool to spur development. The chapter draws on data from the World Bank, United Nations publications, the US Census, the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as print and online media publications and materials published by entities such as Ethiopian Embassies and diaspora groups.

The Formation of the Ethiopian Diaspora

The out-migration of Ethiopian nationals was set in motion by the 1974 Marxist revolution that overthrew the monarchy under Emperor Haile Selassie and replaced it with the military and communist regime of the Derg. Known as the "Red Terror," the Derg conducted a brutal campaign to wipe out factions that it considered "counter-revolutionaries," a group that included students, intellectuals, urban professionals, and the elite. At least 10,000 people were reportedly killed in Addis Ababa alone by the Derg and an equivalent number in other urban areas.[3]

The Derg ruled Ethiopia from 1974 to 1987, during which period the country was wracked by civil war and many fled to escape persecution, forced conscription, resettlement, natural disasters, and poor job and livelihood opportunities. Ethiopians who were already living abroad as students or professionals found it expedient to stay on in their host countries as their lives were at risk if they returned to their country of birth. In the USA alone, an estimated 5,000 Ethiopian students, diplomats, tourists, and businessmen

decided not to return to Ethiopia when the Marxist revolution took place.[4] The instability caused by political strife was compounded by major droughts during 1977–1978, 1987–1988 and catastrophic famine during 1984–1985, the last estimated to have killed over a million people.[5] Out-migration from Ethiopia picked up in the 1980s as people left in increasing numbers as refugees and asylum seekers.

In 1987, Mengistu Haile Mariam, the leader of the Derg, formally dissolved it and established the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. But in 1991, Mengistu and his government were overthrown by a coalition of guerrilla forces and the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) came to power. But people continued to flee the country and the decade of the 1990s saw some of the highest numbers of Ethiopian refugees and asylum seekers, reaching a peak of over 393,000 in 1995.[6]

Some émigrés took advantage of family reunification, refugee, and other policies in Western countries that permitted their entry as potential settlers, or after entering these countries, overstayed their tourist and student visa terms. After the collapse of the Derg, Ethiopia turned to ethnic federalism and the country was divided into ethnicity-based regions. The hardening of divisions based on ethnicity and the increasing balkanization of Ethiopian politics. as well as continued repression, violence, and limited economic prospects have also hastened the exodus from the country as well as growing internal migration and displacement. The USA, Israel, and Sudan are among the top destinations for Ethiopian immigrants. The characteristics of migrants in each of these countries and their migration trajectories vary considerably; these will now be described in greater detail.

USA: The USA is the top destination of settlement for Ethiopian emigrants. According to the 2011–2013 American Community Survey of the US Census Bureau, there are 226,660 persons of Ethiopian ethnicity residing in the USA, up from the 2010 estimated population of the group of 139,693 persons.[7]

Several acts and immigration policies were critical in increasing the flows of Ethiopians to the USA. The Refugee Act of 1980 established a uniform policy in the USA for the resettlement and integration of refugees and raised the limit of refugees admitted annually from 17,400 to 50,000. Some 48,600 persons from Ethiopia entered the USA between 1980 and 2013 as refugees and asylum seekers.[8] Through the Diversity Program, known colloquially as the green card lottery, up to 55,000 permanent resident visas were given annually to persons from countries that had low rates of migration to the USA. Between 2003 and 2013, over 36,000

Ethiopians obtained green cards through the diversity program and 26 percent of all Ethiopians admitted to the USA as legal permanent residents during this period came through the program.[9]

Foreign-born Ethiopians account for 73 percent of the entire ethnic Ethiopian population in the USA and almost half (47 percent) of these foreign-born arrived between 2000 and 2009. A fairly well-educated group, 18 percent of Ethiopians over the age of 25 years in the USA have Bachelor's degrees and 10 percent have graduate or professional degrees.[10] The largest concentrations of Ethiopians are found in the Washington, DC and Los Angeles metropolitan areas. Atlanta, Minnesota and Seattle also have large populations of this group.

Israel: Ethiopian immigrants to Israel, another important settlement destination, are primarily Ethiopian Jews who are also known as Beta Israel. This group began migrating to Israel in small numbers in the 1950s, taking advantage of the Law of Return that sought to reunite a scattered Jewish population in an Israeli homeland. However, in 1974 the Derg made emigration illegal and sealed Ethiopia's borders. Religious communities such as the Beta Israel were prohibited from practicing their faith and were also subjected to discrimination. During the 1970s and early 1980s, thousands of Ethiopian Jews undertook the perilous journey to Israel via Sudan and Kenya and as many as 4,000 of these migrants are believed to have perished on the way.[11]

Migration to Israel increased in the late 1980s and early 1990s, with the largest flows taking place on May 24 and 25, 1991, when over 14,000 Ethiopian Jews were airlifted from Ethiopia to Israel through Operation Solomon with the help of the Israeli military.[12] Emigration from Ethiopia to Israel has continued to take place, although at a slower pace. Over 82,000 persons of Ethiopian origin live in Israel today.[13] Although bound to Israel by ties of faith and a heightened sense of Jewish identity, Ethiopian Jews are culturally disparate from the Ashkenazi Jews that dominate Israeli culture and politics and are still poorly integrated into the society of the country.

Sudan: The top destination within Africa for Ethiopian migrants, Sudan shares a border that is more than 800 miles in length with Ethiopia. The two countries also have some linguistic, religious, and ethnic commonalities as well as historic linkages especially in the frontier areas. Sudan began receiving Ethiopian refugees in 1978 as conflicts between the Mengistu regime and insurgents escalated and the flows continued well into the mid-1980s as civil war, drought, and famine

forced hundreds of thousands of Ethiopians to leave their country as refugees. Many have since returned to the home country and during 2001 alone, more than 10,000 Ethiopian refugees who had left the country prior to 1999 were repatriated from Sudan.[14]

The discovery of petroleum in Sudan and the growth of the oil industry since 2000 has created jobs for both high- and low-skilled workers, attracting low-skilled labor migrants from nearby countries such as Ethiopia, which suffers from under- and unemployment. The stream of labor migrants from Ethiopia includes legal and undocumented migrants, children below the age of 18 and increasing numbers of unskilled women migrants.[15]

DIASPORA ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR INTERACTIONS WITH ETHIOPIA

The earliest Ethiopian immigrant organizations were religious and secular ones that focused on helping newly arrived immigrants and refugees adjust to an unfamiliar place, and on keeping Ethiopian cultures and traditions alive. Self-help groups with a mission to build professional, social, and other networks to improve the economic prospects of the diasporic community and its inclusion in the receiving country were also established during the early phases of Ethiopian immigrant settlement.

Among these organizations were religious ones such as the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Religion Church that provided familiar rites and rituals as well as a place for the community to gather and interact with one another. Secular organizations were established by members of the community to provide social, financial, and integration services to Ethiopian refugees and immigrants who increased in numbers since the 1980s. Ethiopian immigrants also organized events to preserve heritage and cultural traditions not only for first-generation immigrants but also for succeeding generations who were born in the receiving country.[16]

Organizations that focused on the needs of the immigrants and refugees were complemented by others that the diaspora established to assist different groups and regions in the country of origin. While the earliest Ethiopian immigrants in the countries of the MDCs wished to return to their homelands, immigrants are more transnational nowadays in their practices, and often maintain connections to both origin and destination country societies. The emotional and

affective engagement of first-generation Ethiopian immigrants with the country of origin may be seen at various spatial scales, not merely at the expected ones of the individual and family. The home, the community, the village, town or city, state, and country all carry significant emotional significance for Ethiopian émigrés whose attachments are underlain by bonds of kinship and ethnicity. Development and other kinds of assistance were channeled by the diaspora through associations and organizations that facilitated the transfer of goods, materials, and skilled personnel, and facilitated partnerships between migrant groups and multilateral agencies and receiving country governments.

Among such organizations were migrant hometown associations (HTAs). Typically, HTAs facilitate the transfer of money and resources to home communities. Through them, the diaspora financed infrastructural, educational, and health-related projects that provided tangible benefits to hometown residents and aimed to improve their quality of life. Hometown associations are known to collaborate with local communities, international organizations, foundations, and country governments to improve the effectiveness of their development initiatives.[17] Ethiopian immigrants are active participants in HTAs. A 2008 survey of 11 migrant groups in the USA showed that involvement in HTAs among these groups varied from 6 percent to 58 percent, with Ethiopian immigrants having the highest involvement in HTAs.[18]

Migrant professional organizations also partner with multilateral agencies and receiving country governments to help in Ethiopia's development, as may be seen in the case of organizations composed of Ethiopian-origin health professionals. The loss of medical doctors has long been a significant part of brain drain from Ethiopia to the developed world. Getahun[19] noted that there were at least 1,200 Ethiopian doctors living and practicing medicine in the USA, while according to El-Khawas[20] there are more Ethiopian doctors in North America and Europe than in Ethiopia. While few Ethiopian doctors have returned to their homeland permanently, many are eager to assist in improving health care and the health status of the population and have returned periodically to help and provide pro bono services.

The Ethiopian North American Health Professionals Association launched a HIV/AIDS anti-retroviral treatment center in 2003 and is estimated to have provided treatment to some 10,000 patients from the poorest areas of Addis Ababa.[21] Some Ethiopian diaspora organizations

partner with agencies like the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to further their mission. For example, Ethiopian health professionals living in the USA partnered with IOM-MIDA (Migration for Development in Africa) to form the MIDEth Health Project, donating medical equipment worth almost US$ 2 million, and training staff in Ethiopian hospitals.[22]

Still others work in collaboration with the development agencies of their countries of settlement. The Ethiopian Diaspora Health and Education Professionals Mobilization Project is funded by the Italian Government, building on a pilot program to enable qualified diasporans to help build the capacity of Addis Ababa University through virtual volunteering. Diaspora organizations such as the Association of Ethiopian Health Professionals in Sweden (AEHPS) have collaborated with the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) to provide medical care in resource-poor settings in Ethiopia since 1993. Funded by the Italian Government, the information website "Ethiopian diaspora.info" seeks to provide timely and accurate information to the Ethiopian community overseas. It also has the purpose of creating a national database of Ethiopians living abroad along with their individual skill sets and qualifications so as to assess the availability of resources in the diaspora for development efforts in Ethiopia.[23]

Devesh Kapur[24] has noted that migrant remittances can be of a political nature, financing continued outflow of citizens, giving a political voice to once-marginalized groups, providing financing for terrorist, right-wing, and other groups, and influencing country and subnational politics. Indeed, not all diaspora organizations wish to collaborate with governments of their countries of origin as differences in political and other ideologies can pit government and diaspora against each other.

Diaspora groups also try to influence the manner in which the governments of their countries of settlement view and interact with the country of origin. An example of an Ethiopian diaspora organization that is not working in concert with the Ethiopian government is the Ethiopian American Council (EAC). The EAC was established by Ethiopian immigrants in the 1990s to create greater awareness about Ethiopia in the USA and to lobby the US House of Representatives (Congress) to provide assistance and aid to their country of origin. Since then, the EAC has grown and has chapters in several US states.

The organization now seeks to instigate changes in Ethiopia by influencing US policies towards that country. The EAC has worked with elected

representatives in the US Congress and the Congressional Task Force on Ethiopia to promote democratic practices and condemn laws and policies of the Ethiopian government that have led to human rights violations. Human rights groups and the EAC contend that the government's anti-terrorism law has been used to suppress freedom of speech and peaceful dissent, and has led to the wrongful imprisonment of thousands of citizens. The group even wrote to President Obama prior to his 2015 visit to Ethiopia urging him to visit Kalite prison where over a thousand political prisoners are allegedly being held in abysmal conditions.[25]

ETHIOPIA'S DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT POLICIES: FORMATION, ISSUES, AND CHALLENGES

Country governments formulate and implement diaspora engagement policies to fulfill economic, political, and socio-cultural goals. Through policies they formalize and strengthen linkages between scattered emigrants and diaspora associations and their country of origin. Solidarity with the country of origin is often fostered through long-distance nationalism, and the nation offered as a "transnational social field" [26] rather than a geographically bounded entity. By cultivating a sense of national identity, belonging, and pride, governments pave the way for greater involvement of the diaspora in development activities in the "home" country. Whether considered more likely and valuable than aid [27] or a means of connecting with the diaspora and tapping into its resources,[28] the diaspora–development nexus has important policy implications for many country governments.

In light of a dearth of published materials on the genesis of diaspora policies in Ethiopia, the stated goals of extant policies will be examined within the context of the country's history and current political, social, and economic realities According to Lyons[29] diaspora groups created through conflict and sustained by memories of the trauma that surrounded their exodus are less likely to engage in compromise and partnerships with the goverments of origin countries. The first wave of emigrants from Ethiopia were royalists who fled the Derg's Marxist regime in the 1970s and who may have endured a loss of economic and social status as a consequence. Many in the subsequent waves of migrants from Ethiopia, which may also be characterized as conflict-generated diasporas, were also not in alignment with the ideology of the government in power. Therefore, it is not

surprising that there is a strong anti-government faction within the Ethiopian diaspora.

Emerging from decades of civil war and famine, in the early years following the EPRDF's coming to power in 1991, the priority of the new government was on building the political and economic institutions of the country, and it did not devise policies on how to engage the diaspora in the economic and political future of the country. However, starting in 2002, the government of Ethiopia pursued deliberate strategies and used policy instruments to boost flows of financial resources, skills, and technology from its diaspora. Among the early documents that recognized the positive role of the diaspora was the country's Foreign Affairs and National Security Strategy of 2002, where the government of Ethiopia envisaged that:

> Ethiopians in the diaspora could also play an important role in carrying out research and investing at home...they could win friends for Ethiopia and try to influence their country of residence to cooperate with our country. They could act as a bridge between Ethiopian companies and firms in their land of residence, thereby promoting investment and trade ties while seeking markets for Ethiopian products...especially in the economic sector, the government should take the initiative in creating the most conducive environment for them to play a constructive role.[30]

The need for the government to create an environment attractive for diaspora engagement was echoed in the government's development plans, which identified the diaspora as a source of financing to fill the country's external resource gaps. In its 2002–2003 "Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program" (SDPRP) document, for instance, the government proposed to expand the private sector in the economy through policy measures that included investments by Ethiopians in the diaspora. In subsequent years as well, the government set ambitious goals to end poverty and for sustained development in which the diaspora was consistently viewed as a source of financing. The 2005/2006–2009/2010 Plan for *Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty* also recognized the potential positive impact of involving the diaspora, "which is increasingly engaging in, or returning to Ethiopia, and providing a cross-fertilization of ideas, skills, and injections of capital and remittances that can help accelerate development."[31]

The government's more recent 2010–2015 *Growth and Transformation Plan* (GTP), also reaffirmed the possible contributions of the diaspora. Members of the diaspora were called upon by Prime Minister Meles Zenawi to become involved in the country's development when he stated that,"Ethiopians in the diaspora need to further consolidate their efforts and do their part for the efficient implementation of the GTP, a plan which aims at extricating the country out of poverty."[32]

Concrete actions were taken to mobilize the diaspora's resources to finance public projects, particularly in the energy sector. Among the first steps the government took was proclamation 270/2002,[33] which lifted some of the legal restrictions that had been imposed on diasporans and set the framework for the diaspora to engage in trade, investment, and volunteer activities in Ethiopia. For example, proclamation 270/2002 grants diasporan Ethiopians the right to enter and live in their country of origin without restriction, the right to be employed without a work permit, the right to be considered domestic investors and the right to own fixed property. Subsequent regulations were aimed at operationalizing these rights, but provided no room for political political participation by the diaspora. Some of the key policy instruments introduced to encourage diaspora involvement are listed in Table 8.1.

The thrust of these policies rests upon the government's position that the Ethiopian diaspora (particularly in North America and Europe), could play an important role in the development of the country through knowledge and technology transfer, investment, and remittances. Additionally, the involvement of the diaspora in increasing trade and tourism, in building the country's image abroad, and being advocates for the important missions of the country are stated in the government's 2013 diaspora policy. This document also highlights the government's desire to preserve the rights and interests of the diaspora, and this is the first of eight stated goals.[34]

For its part, the government of Ethiopia has been actively working to gain the support and trust of the diaspora by organizing forums through its embassies and with the help of its supporters. Government officials regularly travel to the USA, Europe, and other parts of the world where there are sizable diaspora populations to discuss economic opportunities and to encourage direct diaspora engagement through investment or through skills and technology transfer. In 2011, more than 15,000 members of the Ethiopian diaspora allegedly took part in such discussions organized by Ethiopian embassies in 22 cities all over the world.[35]

Table 8.1 Diaspora engagement policies of the FDRE

I. Diaspora Engagement Policies Governing Law

Proclamation No. 270/2002: A proclamation to Provide Foreign Nationals of Ethiopian Origin with Certain Rights

Rights/Privileges accorded:
• No entry visa requirement
• No residency permit requirement to live in Ethiopia.
• No work permit requirement
• The right to be treated as domestic investor
• The right to use economic, social, and administrative services
• The right to own fixed assets and properties
• The right for coverage of pension scheme.

Restrictions:
• No right to vote or to be elected for office at any level of government.
• No right to be employed in the national defense, security, foreign affairs, and other similar political establishments.

Current Status: A new guideline issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (No.19/2007) has expanded the conditions under which ID Card may be denied or revoked:
• If it is presumed that the person would not contribute to the nation's development
• If it is believed that granting [a Yellow Card] could harm the country's development, peace, and democracy.

II. Regulations

Councils of Minsters Regulation No 88/2003. The revised regulation on the importation of goods on Franco-Valuta basis. It provided Ethiopians in Diaspora the right to import duty free:
• Personal and household effects as well as goods and equipment necessary for their livelihood.
• Goods imported for investment activities including capital goods and raw material adequate up to commissioning stage and for their personal use.

Current Status: This was a very attractive incentive for many in the diaspora until it was suspended in July 2006.

Directive No. FXD/31/2006. Establishment and Operation of Foreign

Currency Account: Allows Ethiopians in Diaspora to maintain a foreign currency account:
• The minimum initial deposit to open a fixed deposit account is US$ 5,000
• The maximum amount to be deposited in a current account is US$ 50,000
• The deposit account can be a collateral to get credit from domestic banks
• Interest income on foreign currency fixed deposit account is tax free.

National Bank of Ethiopia Directive No. FXD/30/2006: Provisions for International

Remittance Services: The goal is to improve the operations of the formal remittance transfer by reducing remittance costs and increasing access to cost effective, reliable, fast, and safe services

Eligible financial and non-financial organizations:

Table 8.1   (continued)

II. Regulations

• International money transfer operators in association with banks
• Commercial banks
• Non-financial organizations
Investment Incentives and Investment Areas Reserved for Domestic Investors
Council of Ministers Regulation, Regulation No. 270/2012
It redefines investment areas allowed for Ethiopian in diaspora and the following areas of investment are exclusively reserved for Ethiopian nationals:
• Banking, insurance, and micro-credit and saving services;
• Packaging, forwarding and shipping agency services;
• Broadcasting services;
• Mass media services;
• Attorney and legal consultancy services;
• Preparation of indigenous traditional medicines;
• Advertisement, promotion and translation work; and
• Air transport services with a seating capacity up to 50 passengers

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Source: Compiled by Authors

Beyond such discussions, Ethiopian embassies in countries with significant diaspora populations have been organizing committees to support their efforts. The Grand Renaissance Dam Diaspora Participation and Coordination Councils were formed in key US and European cities to boost mobilization efforts and contributions toward the successful completion of the gigantic dam.[36] Matters of interest to the diaspora are also regularly posted on Ethiopian embassy websites.

The reactions of the diaspora to these goals and initiatives have been mixed for several reasons. Ethiopia is a country with more than 80 ethnic groups, the largest ones being the Oromo, Amhara, Somali, and Tigray, comprising 34.5 percent, 26.9 percent, 6.2 percent, and 6.1 percent respectively of the total population.[37] Persons from these groups are also well represented in the diaspora. Although viewed by the national government in its policies as a homogeneous entity, the Ethiopian diaspora is diverse in critical areas such as ethnic, political and religious affiliation, and socio-economic status; and some of the existing fissures within the diaspora have been further deepened due to government policies.

Until the Marxist revolution, the ethnic group that wielded the greatest economic and political power historically were the Amharas. During the regime of the Derg different ethnically defined resistance groups such as

the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) were part of the armed insurrection against the Marxist government, eventually banding together to form the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Party (EPRDF) that seized power from the Derg in 1991. However, many in the diaspora, although unified in their opposition to the Derg, were also highly critical of the Tigray-dominated EPRDF's plan to rebuild Ethiopia on the basis of ethnically defined regions. Moreover, many in the first wave of the diaspora to the MDCs who were educated, professional, and urban Amharas, viewed the Tigrayan leaders of the EPRDF to be lacking in experience and insufficiently educated and skilled to lead the country.[38]

Such oppositions and schisms were further reinforced when the Ethiopian Orthodox Church split and the Holy Synod in exile headed by Abuna Merkorios was established in 1992. This church in exile is opposed to the current government of Ethiopia and has expanded its membership among the diaspora, further complicating diaspora–origin country relationships. Diaspora members in opposition to the government use the Ethiopian Orthodox Church as a rallying institution and partner. The Holy Synod in exile has taken on the mantle of defender of freedoms and condemned the government of Ethiopia for repression and human rights violations. The Synod has publicly resolved "to take a stand and become an advocate for those whose freedom and liberties are being crushed in Ethiopia."[39]

Historically, the Ethiopian Orthodox Church's influence in society, its role as a custodian of Ethiopian heritage and through this position to Ethiopian nationalism, has been strong. Many of the popular national holidays such as *Enqutatash* (Ethiopian New Year), *Meskel Demera* (celebration of the finding of the true cross), and *Timket* (Epiphany) are all religious holidays that are closely linked with Ethiopian culture and identity. Given such strong connections between religion and culture, it is not surprising that the predominantly Christian Ethiopian immigrants living in the West turned to the church as a place of worship as well as a locale where cultural ties to the mother country and cultural integrity could be maintained. Currently there are close to 60 churches in the USA and around the world with 13 bishops that are considered affiliates of the Holy Synod in exile.[40]

The social networks forged in such religious communities and other social groups can be used to mobilize the diaspora against political parties and agendas in the country of origin., as has been the case with the

Ethiopian diaspora.[41] Political, civic, and religious diaspora organizations have been critical of the government even in areas that are not directly related to politics, such as the buying of diaspora bonds. Members have also disrupted fund-raising events organized by the Ethiopian government in North America and in Europe. In 2011, when members of the diaspora were encouraged to assist in the building of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) through the purchase of government bonds, some in the diaspora saw this as a political move rather than a strategy to assist in economic growth and poverty reduction:

> Zenawi [the late Prime Minister] is cunningly using the project to perpetually milk the hard earned money of the Ethiopian people, including those in the diaspora, for the foreseeable life of the project. The project not only will ensure kickbacks to Zenawi and his cronies from the no-bid contract awarded to Salini Costruttori, it is also conceived to generate a stream of revenue for TPLF through coercion to buy bond and lucrative contracts to the vast TPLF-held business conglomerate.[42]

In summary, the debate surrounding the development of diaspora engagement policies can be characterized as the Ethiopian government's effort to make the diaspora an integral part of its development efforts, in the face of a politically active and often confrontational diaspora.

BUILDING CAPACITY, EXTENDING RIGHTS, AND EXTRACTING OBLIGATIONS: THE EFFICACY OF ETHIOPIA'S DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT POLICIES

Alan Gamlen[43] developed a typology of diaspora engagement policies centered on the concept of transnationalization of governmentality, which is useful to analyze the nature of government policies, their strategies, and the goals they aim to achieve. Gamlen identified three overarching kinds of policies that are employed to build closer relationships between the diaspora and the state and extend the sovereignty and power of the sending country over the diaspora. These are: (1) policies that seek to build capacity through both symbolic nation-building and institution building, (2) those that extend the rights of the diaspora by transnationalizing citizenship and incorporating the diaspora by providing it with civil and social services as well as certain political rights and (3) those that seek to extract obligations from the diaspora by facilitating the inflow of remittances, foreign direct

investments, and the involvement of the diaspora in the co-development of the country, usually in partnership with the government. Gamlen's tripartite division will now be used to examine the Ethiopian government's diaspora engagement policies and their effectiveness.

Building Capacity

Over the past two decades Ethiopia has proactively engaged with its diaspora to buttress its political and economic goals. Through proclamations and laws that provide foreign nationals of Ethiopian origin with certain rights and privileges and by consistent messaging that identifies members of its far flung diaspora as important and integral members of the nation writ large, the Ethiopian government has tried to create a more inclusive and interactive space for its diaspora.

The Ethiopian government has developed symbolic and institutional measures to reinforce the idea of shared national identity within the diaspora, aiming to foster a sense of loyalty, pride, and belonging to the homeland. As part of this effort the government has also tried to produce diasporic communities that are better aligned with and supportive of the state and its policies. In 2002 the Ethiopian government embarked on a strategy to involve the diaspora in the country's socio-economic development by creating a General Directorate in charge of Ethiopian Expatriate Affairs under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA).

The Directorate was charged to: (1) Serve as a liaison between different federal Ministries, regional Diaspora coordinating offices and Ethiopians in Diaspora; (2) Encourage the active involvement of the Ethiopians in Diaspora in socio-economic activities of the country; and (3) Mobilize the Ethiopian community abroad for a sustained and organized image building. An Ethiopian Expatriate Support and Coordination Office was also created as part of the country's capacity-building efforts.

Through its diplomatic missions and in partnership with the business and civic organizations of the diaspora, the MOFA has organized various programs and activities to mobilize the Ethiopian diaspora. Examples of MOFA-driven capacity-building activities are organizing, supporting, and sponsoring conferences, meetings, and forums for the diaspora at home and abroad, supporting civic organizations to hold Ethiopian New Year and other national celebrations abroad, and celebrating the contributions of the Ethiopian diaspora to the home country.

Supporting and Sponsoring Constituency Building Programs Abroad

The Ethiopian Diaspora Association (EDA), a civic organization founded in 2012, was supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its formation was announced on the Ministry's official website. The Association's stated objectives include making relevant government policies known to the diaspora, facilitating the engagement of its members in development activities in their country of origin, and serving as a bridge between the diaspora and the Ethiopian government. According to the chairman of the association, the Ethiopian Diaspora Association is also likely to play a key role in knowledge and technology transfer.[44]

Events intended to network the diaspora for business and philanthropic purposes are also organized or supported by the Ethiopian government, probably due to their potential for simultaneously creating state-centric transnational communities. The Ethiopian Diaspora Business Forum, an annual event since 2007 and People to People (P2P), which works to mobilize the global Ethiopian community and diaspora partners to support health care services and access to education in Ethiopia are some of the diaspora initiatives that take place in close collaboration with the government.

The MOFA has also led the government's efforts to organize the diaspora through a housing development program. Currently, diaspora members can apply to register at their nearest diplomatic mission to buy townhouses in Ethiopia through this housing development initiative. Through its dedicated web portal, the Ethiopian Diaspora Portal, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also regularly disseminates information regarding the latest rules, regulations, initiatives, and developments concerning the diaspora.

Celebrating the Contributions of the Diaspora

The Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has recently tried to strengthen the diaspora's ties to the country of origin by designating a Diaspora Day, the first of which was celebrated on August 12–16, 2015. Held in the capital of Addis Ababa and Benishangu regional state (where the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam is being constructed), between 5,000 and 10,000 Ethiopian diasporans were

expected to attend. As part of Diaspora Day activities, organizers offered site visits to new infrastructure and other projects, showcasing to the diaspora the impacts of their investments in these schemes and building national pride. Diaspora days have also been celebrated in the countries with large Ethiopian immigrant populations, usually in partnership with the Ethiopian embassy there.

Reversing Brain Drain and Encouraging Brain Circulation

Professionals and the highly skilled in sectors such as health, research and development, tertiary education, and Informational Technology (IT) are among the most highly desired return migrants. The Ethiopian government has been working with multilateral agencies and diaspora organizations to encourage the temporary or permanent return of its much-needed highly qualified professionals. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) initiated the Return and Reintegration of Qualified African Nationals (RQAN) Program in Ethiopia in 1995 with a mission of encouraging and facilitating the return of skilled and professional members of the diaspora. Funded by the European Union, RQAN covered relocation expenses and provided returnees a monthly stipend of US$ 800 for 12 months. However, between 1995 and 1999 when the program was terminated, there were only 66 Ethiopian participants.[45]

On January 29, 2015, IOM signed a new cooperation agreement with the Ethiopian government to work on migration issues with a view to promoting economic and social development. Among the proposed strategies under this agreement is for the Ethiopian government to work collaboratively with IOM-MIDA to facilitate the temporary and permanent return to Ethiopia of members of the diaspora with skill sets that are valued and needed.[46]

EXTENDING THE RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES OF THE DIASPORA

Through measures such as guaranteeing welfare protection, extending dual citizenship or dual nationality, voting rights, lifetime or long-term visas, as well as investment and import privileges, governments today offer privileges to the diaspora that are were once only available to citizens.

Welfare Protection

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs directly and through its diplomatic missions works to protect the welfare of its diaspora. A recent case is when Ethiopian migrant workers in Saudi Arabia were expelled in 2013–2014 and the Ethiopian government organized a repatriation program, bringing more than 100,000 Ethiopian workers back to the home country. In response to the deaths of Ethiopian migrants while transported by human traffickers and the reported abysmal conditions under which some migrants work overseas, in August 2015, the Ethiopian government proposed legislation to protect the rights, safety, and dignity of Ethiopian nationals working abroad as migrant labor. The new bill would allow the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs in particular to monitor and regulate overseas employment and exchange services, and proposes stringent punishments for persons or agencies found to be in violation of the law.

Dual Nationality and Visas

In 2002, the Ethiopian government sought to include members of the diaspora in the national enterprise by enacting a law that allowed a "Person of Ethiopian Origin" (EO) identification for emigrants who had become citizens of other countries. The designation of person of Ethiopian Origin was expected to bind the diaspora more closely to Ethiopia culturally, legally, and economically, allowing even foreign-born of Ethiopian ethnicity to identify with the Ethiopian nation and facilitate the movements of human, cultural, and financial capital from the diaspora to the homeland. Indeed, among the stated objectives of issuing EO identity cards is, "To create a legal framework whereby persons of Ethiopian Origin could make their contribution to the development and prosperity of their country of origin."[47]

Although Ethiopia does not offer dual citizenship, those with EO identification cards (colloquially known as Yellow Cards) have many of the privileges of Ethiopian citizens, including entry into the country without a visa, the ability to own residential real estate, and the right to live and work in Ethiopia without additional permits. Inside Ethiopia, the Yellow Card allows members of the diaspora to avail of various services provided by the government and state-owned companies (hotels, airlines, etc.) to Ethiopian nationals at a discounted price.

Table 8.2   Ethiopian diaspora yellow card holders by region and country, 2011

Region/Country	Yellow card holders	Percentage of total
North America	**6,226**	57
USA	4,882	45
Canada	1,344	12
Europe	**3,378**	**31**
Italy	783	7
UK	760	7
Germany	434	4
Sweden	380	4
Netherlands	276	3
Others	745	7
Middle East	**703**	**6**
Yemen	520	5
Israel	136	1
Others	47	0.5
Australia and New Zealand	**507**	**5**
Australia	422	4
New Zealand	85	0.8
Others (Africa and Asia)	**176**	**2**

Source of data: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ethiopia

The rights and privileges extended to Yellow Card holders focus on economic and social services and benefits. They do not have the same political rights as citizens and may not vote, stand for political office, or be employed in institutions and agencies that are involved in matters of national security, diplomacy, and the country's defense.[48] Ethiopians living in the MDCs are more likely to obtain yellow cards and avail of the benefits they offer. Of a total of 10,990 Yellow Card holders in 2011, the overwhelming majority were settled in North America and Europe, which together accounted for nearly 90 percent of all such card holders (see Table 8.2).

Starting in 2004, Ethiopians nationals living abroad and yellow card holders were allowed to have domestic accounts in hard foreign currency such as US dollars, pounds sterling, and euros with balances of between US$ 100 and US$ 5,000 as per directive No. FXD/25/2004.[49] In 2006, this limit was raised tenfold to US$ 50,000 for current accounts. Expatriates and those with Ethiopian Origin identity cards were also allowed to open non-repatriable accounts in Birr, Ethiopia's currency, with interest rates that were twice the minimum rate set by the National Bank of Ethiopia.

EXTRACTING OBLIGATIONS FROM THE DIASPORA

Since the mid-1990s, the Ethiopian government has devised policies and provided various incentives to involve its diaspora (particularly émigrés settled in the West) in the country's development through financial remittances, direct investment, and the transfer of skills. State governments within Ethiopia are also actively encouraging investment by diasporan entrepreneurs to promote business development, innovation, and the creation of jobs and transnational business networks.

Remittances

Financial remittances are an important and growing source of external finance in developing countries like Ethiopia, providing money for household consumption, education, purchases of land and housing, capital for establishing small businesses, and critical social insurance.[50] Remittances to Ethiopia rose dramatically after 2003, when they were valued at 0.5 percent of the country's GDP. By 2010, remittances to Ethiopia had reached US$ 345 million and their share of the country's GDP had almost doubled to 0.9 percent. While remittances to Ethiopia have been on general upward trajectory, there have been fluctuations in flows (see Fig. 8.1). In 2014, formal remittances were valued at US$ 646 million and the contributions of Ethiopia's Western-based diaspora to the country's coffers accounte for the bulk of all such remittances.[51] There is, however, a marked difference between remittance figures from the World Bank and Ethiopia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition to formal remittance flows, the latter (as seen in balance of payments statistics) include "private current transfers" that could capture non-reported remittances, temporary worker incomes, as well as donations through NGOs and charitable organizations. In 2012–2013, the total private transfers reported by the Ethiopian government at US$ 3,889 million were six times larger than formal remittances reported by the World Bank. Even private individual transfers, which amounted to US$ 2,491 during 2012–2013 are considerably larger than formal remittance flows.[52]

Scholars have found that remittances and elections cycles are connected, with migrants remitting more money during a national election year [53] and three to four months prior to sub-national elections[54] forming "political remittance cycles." However, this does not appear to be case for Ethiopia as a strong uptick in financial remittances was not seen in either

Fig. 8.1 Monetary remittance inflows to Ethiopia in US$ millions (1977–2014)

Source of data: The World Bank Prospects, Migration & Remittance Data: Bilateral Remittance Matrix (2015)

1995 or 2005, when national elections were held. This could be on account of active measures taken by the government to restrict diaspora involvement in elections, knowing that there was a strong opposition contingent in the diaspora.[55] The most dramatic surges in remittances occurred between 2006 and 2007, the year of the Ethiopian Millennium, when the Ethiopian government pushed for greater diaspora involvement in the home country and in 2011–2012, the year following the unveiling of the five year (2010–2015) Growth and Transformation Plan and the 2010 elections.

There appears to be a close relationship between Ethiopian migrant stock and financial remittances to the country of origin (see Fig. 8.2). The USA, which has the largest Ethiopian diaspora population is also the top source of remittances (US$ 181 million) to Ethiopia. Israel and Sudan, which are also important Ethiopian migrant destinations, are the second and third largest sources of remittances. Although approximately half of Ethiopian immigrants residing in Israel live in poverty, in 2012 the group was responsible for remitting US$ 83 million to the country of origin, while Ethiopians in Sudan, who are largely migrant workers, remitted US$ 59 million in the same year. Other important sources of remittances, each

Fig. 8.2 Ethiopian migrant stock and remittances to Ethiopia (selected countries)

Sources of data: World Bank Prospects—Migration and Remittance data (2012); United Nations, Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Table 10: Total Migrant stock at mid-year by major area, region, country or area of destination, 2013

accounting annually for between 24 million and 59 million dollars include Canada, Saudi Arabia, and Germany[56].

Diaspora Bonds

Instruments that are used to raise money particularly during times of financial crisis, diaspora bonds are usually offered at a lower interest rate than the rate required by foreign investors. To market diaspora bonds, country governments tap into the diaspora's patriotic feelings and desire to give back to the country they left behind but are still attached to in numerous ways. In 2008, a diaspora bond known as the Millennium Bond was issued by the Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation (EEPCO), a state-owned utility company, underwritten by the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia. However, the government was not very successful in mobilizing funds, probably on account of poor marketing strategies and inadequate publicity as well as a lack of trust in the government as guarantor.[57]

In 2011, the Ethiopian government announced the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Built on the Blue Nile near Ethiopia's border with Sudan and with a price tag of US$ 4.8 billion, the

GERD is projected to be the largest hydroelectricity generating dam in Africa and expected to be funded largely by government bonds. According to the National Council for the Coordination of Public Participation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, the Ethiopian diaspora has contributed some US$ 30 million to the massive project through the sale of bonds, and the government is hoping for continued and greater diaspora involvement and investment. But the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has acknowledged that there is a gap between expected contributions and funds raised so far, stating that "taking the economic power of the diaspora, the purchase of bonds could have been far better had it not been due to the weakness of the coordinating institutions, shortage of manpower and laws of some countries." [58]

Investments

Migrants and diasporas contribute to home-country development through direct and portfolio investment and by establishing venture capital funds to purchase equity in local businesses.[59] They also use their financial capital to set up new ventures ranging from those in horticulture and manufacturing to health, education, retail, hospitality, and transportation services. The Ethiopian government provides investment incentives and privileges by allowing diaspora investment and investors to be treated as domestic investors with a few exceptions. Among the privileges that Yellow Card holding Ethiopian diasporans receive is being allowed to engage in investment ventures of less than US$ 100,000, a threshold that is lower than the minimum capital investment required of other foreigners. All foreign investors (including Yellow Card holders) are exempt from paying income tax for two to seven years, enjoy 100 percent duty exemption on machinery and equipment imported for investment projects; and 100 percent customs exemption on spare parts whose value does not exceed 15 percent of total value of capital goods imported.[60]

After 2001, when the main financial incentives were put in place by the Ethiopian government, foreign investments in Ethiopia grew but have continued to fluctuate. Diaspora investors initiated small business enterprises in the home country, setting up manufacturing units and service operations. They have also invested in agriculture and forestry. Of the projects established by Ethiopian diasporans in the sending country through the national government between 1994 and 2013, 36 percent were in manufacturing, followed by education (9 percent), real estate and

machinery and equipment rental (9 percent), health and social work (8 percent) and transportation and communication, including tour operations, also at 8 percent. Ethiopian-origin entrepreneurs living in the USA and Canada were responsible for almost half of all enterprises set up by diasporans in Ethiopia during this period. But overall, the share of the diaspora in investments in Ethiopia at just 3 percent, is low.[61]

Although diaspora investments rose after 2001, likely on account of financial incentives offered by the government, they have also fluctuated. Immediately after the controversial 2005 elections, investments fell by 50 percent, possibly a reflection of the diaspora's sensitivity to perceived political instability. But this was followed by a striking rise during 2006–2007, the year of the Ethiopian Millennium, when the Ethiopian government made a concerted effort to involve the diaspora in Millennium celebrations and subsequently by an equally dramatic fall the following year.[62] Investments dropped after 2008 in response to the economic downturn in the USA and Europe, where most of the diasporan investors lived, but could also be viewed as a reaction to the Ethiopian government's 2009 "anti-NGO" law that attempted to repress civil society organizations and also gives it the right to shut them down.[63]

Fluctuations in investments may also be traced to changing policies. Under Regulation No. 270/2012 of the Council of Ministers (which specifies the activities and populations that are eligible for various trade and investment policy incentives), areas of investment that were once reserved for only Ethiopian citizens were expanded. But the regulation does not provide exemptions or special treatment that specifically target diaspora investors. Income tax exemptions and duty free privileges are accorded to selected sectors and investment locations regardless of the investor's origin or citizenship. Hence, it appears that the government has scaled down the type of special exemptions and privileges that were bestowed on the diaspora in the past, although it is still attentive to ways of increasing diaspora investments.

Lessons Learned from Ethiopia's Diaspora Engagement Policies

Since the 2000s, Ethiopia's national government has created and implemented policies aimed at increasing contributions of the diaspora in the country's development by incentivizing diaspora investment and widening

the scope of diaspora engagement particularly in economic and social areas. The reaction of the diaspora to these goals and initiatives have been mixed on account of stark divisions created by political, social, and economic differences within the Ethiopian diaspora. Although the Ethiopian government encourages broad diaspora involvement through its use of an overarching national identity, this strategy is undermined by the government's own policy of employing ethnic identifiers as the primary means of categorizing the Ethiopia population. Such identities are also strongly tied to geographic divisions through ethnicity-based subnational divisions that were created by the government. Several politically active and vocal diaspora groups have been very critical of EPRDF's plan to rebuild Ethiopia on the basis of ethnically defined regions and parties. Many are still actively resisting these divisions, which have repercussions for the economic and social improvement of discrete regions and the well-being of the people living in them. Diasporans in opposition to the government may, therefore, be inclined to direct assistance and investment through channels other than the ones created and promoted by the national government despite being offered privileges and benefits to do so.

If a state is perceived as mercurial or ineffective in implementing its diaspora investment policies or parochial in its channeling of diaspora investments and philanthropy, the diaspora may be wary of partnering with the national government. Rather, it may prefer to work with multilateral agencies, foundations, and NGOs or even stakeholders and subnational governments in their states, cities, and regions of origin. In the case of Ethiopia, due to ideological and political rifts in the diaspora, those Ethiopians who seek to help the state build capacity are more likely to be politically aligned with the government in power, but even these groups may be concerned about transparency, accountability, and political stability.

Another issue that might lead to concerns on the part of diasporan investors is that the Ethiopian government's policies with regard to special incentives for the diaspora have not been consistent and have varied over time. Preferential treatment in the form of tax and customs advantages and subsidies were once provided to Ethiopian-origin yellow card holders, but many of these privileges have been diluted as they became available to all investors in key sectors. Others, such as the priority given to diasporans to obtain long-term low-cost leases for land and build residences on them have been suspended altogether. This narrowing of policy options may also act as a disincentive for investors. Thus, despite the fact that Ethiopia has a burgeoning economy with double-digit growth figures, increasing

exports and high returns on investment in key sectors, pragmatic concerns such as the security of their investments and ideological clashes with the government in power are likely to prevent widespread diaspora engagement at all levels.

NOTES

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Elizabeth Chacko is a Professor of Geography and International Affairs at the George Washington University, where she is also the Associate Dean for Undergraduate Studies in the Columbian College of Arts and Sciences. Elizabeth is engaged in research on immigration and its impacts on economic, cultural, and social geographies. In particular, she focuses on Ethiopian immigrants in the USA and their integration in receiving cities and neighborhoods; racial, national, and ethnic identity formation and change among Ethiopian immigrants and its socio-spatial implications; spatial clustering and the creation of ethnic spaces by immigrant communities, as well as the linkages between diasporas and development. She has written several journal articles as well as book chapters on Ethiopian immigration, and is a co-author of three books. Elizabeth's academic degrees are from the University of Calcutta, India (BSc), Miami University (MA) and UCLA (PhD). During 2013–2014, she was a Fulbright scholar. Elizabeth is on the editorial board of the *Journal of Cultural Geography.*

Peter H. Gebre is an economist in international trade and Vice President of the All American Small Business Exporters Association's (AASBEA), where he conducts policy analysis, market research, and provides business development expertise. Prior to joining the private sector, Mr. Gebre was the Director of Macroeconomic Planning and Policy Analysis for the Government of Ethiopia at the former Ministry of Economic Development and Cooperation, where he led policy reform studies in the areas of tariff reform, customs valuation, debt management, private sector development, and regional economic integration. His current research and practice areas are focused on international business, immigrant entrepreneurship, business development, and leveraging the African diaspora. Mr. Gebre is actively involved in Ethiopian diaspora organizations and previously served as a member of the US Small Business Administration's Advisory Committee and as the Chairman of the African Subcommittee of the DC Chamber of Commerce. His publications include *Conversations with Successful Ethiopian-American Entrepreneurs* (2004); and "Leveraging the diaspora for development: lessons from Ethiopia" (co-authored, in *GeoJournal*, 2012).

A Provisional Analysis of Diaspora Engagement Policies in Kenya

Bethuel Kinyanjui Kinuthia, Fred Jonyo and Godwin Siundu

INTRODUCTION: CONTEXTUALIZING THE DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT POLICIES DEBATE IN KENYA

Diasporic populations have for long played important economic roles in their home and host countries, roles that have been studied variously under the rubric of postcolonial discourse. In the social and human sciences generally, studies in postcolonial discourse have opened up new or alternative understanding of how people relate in economic, political, and cultural terms across the major divides of the global north and the global south, all with corresponding assumptions revolving around social, cultural, economic, and political differences and similarities. These

B.K. Kinuthia (✉)
School of Economics, University of Nairobi, Nairobi, Kenya

F. Jonyo
Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Nairobi, Nairobi, Kenya

G. Siundu
Department of Literature, University of Nairobi, Nairobi, Kenya

assumptions, for example, those that paint the global north and southern Africa as more promising than other parts of the world in terms of opportunities for self-advancement or security, coupled with advances in the technologies of travel and communication, have led to a surging culture of cosmopolitanism that sees greater numbers of people traveling to countries other than those of their birth. At the same time, cultural, family, political, economic, and even sentimental reasons have led to a situation where those who emigrate from their countries of origin are unwilling to sever links with their home countries, even as they endeavor to entrench themselves further and deeper into their host countries. This phenomenon has led to increasing specter of dual citizenship, first as a product of the magnanimity of leaders and, later on, as a provision in the constitutions, at least in the Kenyan case. At the same time, scholarship on various aspects of this phenomenon has broadened and deepened with time, from earlier chronicling in social scientific description to their narra-tivization via literature, to the current theorization across the disciplines. Yet, such scholarship has not taken root across in many countries, and even where it has, there is still a glaring need for further studies to validate the tentative findings and attendant assumptions that naturally inform many foundational studies. This need is more urgent for the Kenyan case that, despite having a relatively high number of emigrants scattered all over the world, has little scholarly archive on the trends and distribution of emigrants. Nor does it have a meaningful government-emigrants engagement tradition or policies that scholars and other interested players may draw on to formulate important theories.

Hence in this chapter, we seek to offer a provisional analysis of diaspora engagement policies in Kenya. We argue that while Kenya has a sizeable emigrant population spread all over the world and quite capable of shaping the country's economic dynamics, the nascent and weak diaspora engagement policies have made it difficult to harness this potential for the good of the country. Most of what has been presented as diaspora engagement "policies" in Kenya are mere knee-jerk responses to the country's need for international legitimation and poli-tical posturing meant to give the illusion of action. Overall, the idea that successive governments have been audible in their rhetoric on engaging emigrants in nation-building and dead silent on exactly how this can be done, suggests that there is official ambivalence to diasporic commu-nities from Kenya. For instance, while the government has for long acknowledged and encouraged Kenyans in the diaspora to continue

remitting foreign currency to Kenya, the same government lacks any clear strategy of how to tap the same and channel it towards "development." At the same time, the government seems to have adopted an equally ambivalent attitude towards remittances, especially after the recent specter of terrorist acts targeting certain locations in the country. The Kenya government's strategy in fighting terror has included closing money transfer outlets that play a central role in facilitating remittances,[1] accusing some of these outlets of complicity in money laundering that supports terrorists and distorts property value and the corresponding market prices. We arrive at these conclusions by drawing on the limited literature available, including policy documents like the Constitution of Kenya (2010), the Kenya Diaspora Policy (2014) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Strategic Plan (2013/14—2017/18), findings of previous related studies in the region and beyond, in order to formulate a comparative framework that we then analyze by deploying Alan Gamlen's "typology of diaspora engagement policies."[2] We have organized our chapter along three key planks; first, a mapping of the country's diaspora around the world and the historical context of the same. Then, we analyze some of the policies in terms of their efficacy in achieving their stated objectives and, finally, we conclude by theorizing the policies in order to demonstrate our arguments.

Kenya's Diasporic Profile: Distribution and Causes

This section begins by presenting a picture of the distribution of Kenyan emigrants in other parts of the world. Notably, there has been an upward trend in international migration patterns in the country, starting out at 303,648 in 1960, and ending up at 466,713 by 2013. According to figures, most Kenyan emigrants are located within Sub-Saharan Africa. A sizeable number of Kenyan emigrants are also in Europe and Asia, with about 150,000 legally resident in the UK alone. Table 9.1 summarizes the distribution of the Kenyans in the diaspora.

The Kenyan diasporic populations have been driven out by a number of reasons, most of which are not unlike those which cause emigration of citizens of other countries. Factors for migration are divisible into four general groups. First are predisposing factors that create a scenario in which there is a raised likelihood of migration; things like structural disparities including living, environmental, and political standards, between the origins and destinations of migrants. The second group,

Table 9.1   Distribution of Kenyans in the diaspora, 1960–2013

Region	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010	2013	Total
East Asia and Pacific	725	2,565	4,360	5,895	9,540	15,556	18,999	57,640
Europe and Asia	14,343	76,212	10,6742	12,9283	151340	177501	178490	83,3911
Latin America and Caribbean	57	134	144	509	385	276	490	1,995
Middle East and North Africa	194	369	746	1,111	1,604	0	521	4,545
North America	1,348	4,570	14,807	30,060	64,220	111,287	139,338	365,630
South Asia	3,341	4,690	9,345	8,652	7,457	2,477	2,425	38,387
Sub-Saharan Africa	283,640	301,293	182,723	129,254	139,685	133,634	126,450	1,296,679
Total	303,648	389,833	318,867	304,764	374,231	440,731	466,713	**2,598,787**

Source: Global Bilateral Migration Database (2014)

proximate factors, affects the decision to migrate directly and hinge on the working out of the predisposing factors. This may manifest in a downturn in the economic factors or environmental degradation in the country of origin. A third group, precipitating factors, are those that trigger the decision of individuals to migrate. Simply put, these are the consequences of proximate factors, for example, higher taxation and joblessness. The final group consists of mediating factors that accelerate and consolidate migration. Factors such as the availability or lack of infrastructure, education, and development could either facilitate or constrain the migration process.[3] This section discusses the proximate and precipitating factors because they are the most applicable to Kenya, and have attracted less academic scrutiny so far.

According to a World Bank Report, two major factors have driven emigration from Kenya to other countries: proximity and income differentials.[4] As Table 9.1 shows, Kenyans have tended to emigrate to neighboring countries in search of higher incomes. The involved financial, cultural, and social costs of relocation are relatively low when the destination country is nearby. Migrants from developing countries in many instances lack the proper documentation to facilitate migration to countries that are far off. In addition, migrating over short distances ensures that migrants are able to maintain religious and family ties across borders.[5] Notably, there were more migrants from Kenya to other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa over the period covered.

Better income prospects tend to push Kenyans beyond their immediate regional proximity. For instance, in a related research conducted earlier, some respondents indicated that they had gone to greater eastern Africa, southern Africa, and Europe not only because of better employment prospects but also the jobs were better remunerated.[6] One respondent stated thus: "Kenya needs to create more job opportunities. There are millions of Kenyans like me who are experts in different fields but you find us selling our skills to other nations where we can get paid other than sitting back home" (Respondent 31 in Burundi June 26, 2012).[7]

The respondent's view corresponds to what has become a truism in the scholarship on diaspora populations. For example, South Africa, one of the few African countries known for relatively high pay, attracts labourers from Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Mozambique. Even so, it has been documented that, at times, migrants travel to countries in which incomes are slightly lower than incomes in their origins. This is especially so where proximity was a motivating factor for migration to a different country, and migrants

choose to stay within the same region (ibid). Migrating to a different region involves higher relocation costs, which is offset by the higher incomes.

Migration from Kenya also has links to the pursuit of higher education. The skills and experiences garnered from this factor are attributed to "nation building." Because of this, political rhetoric has often included calls for those studying abroad to return to the country in order to participate in nation building. Scholarships to developed countries have made it easy for Kenyans to acquire education from abroad. An example is the Kennedy Student Airlifts of the 1960s, whose beneficiaries went to the USA for higher education. Since then, there have been a myriad opportunities for students to travel to many countries with opportunities for education, for example Germany, Russia, the UK[8] and, in the recent years, South Africa. For the latter, there is an argument gaining traction for its suggestion that the trajectory of scholarship taken in particular disciplines like cultural studies has only been possible because a huge number of Kenyans earned their doctoral degrees from leading universities in South Africa.[9]

The economic hopelessness in the 1980s and 1990s led to a massive exodus of various professional and social groups from the country. As one respondent in Ghana stated,

> I migrated from Kenya during the Moi era when the economy was in the throes of collapse. I went to the US to pursue further education, where I later worked. I have also worked in South Africa and now I am currently working in Ghana. (Respondent No. 34 Ghana June 22, 2012)[10]

Skilled professionals such as doctors, lecturers, and lawyers exited Kenya to other countries within the region and outside. Further, during periods of civil, political, and economic strife, other Kenyans have migrated in large numbers from the country to other regions, for example, during the 1992 and 1997 general elections. For a long time, Kenyans of Asian descent were the most known for taking off in times of national crises.[11]

Recent years have witnessed the emergence of opportunities in low-skilled positions like domestic helps, and security guards in countries such as Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. While such openings have been alluring, tales of anguish from those who get there have somewhat dampened the spirits of low-skilled Kenyans who would have wished to emigrate to such countries. A somewhat related trend in emigration has been notable among successful athletes, most of whom have taken to emigrating to the United Arab Emirates, where they change their religious affiliations,

acquire new names and other identities, before embarking on more lucrative careers as professional athletes.[12] All these trends, together with unfolding political dynamics, have cumulatively propelled the Kenya government into a more defined engagement with the diasporic Kenyans, a subject that we now turn to.

HISTORICIZING STATE–DIASPORA RELATIONS IN KENYA

In Kenya and many other parts of the world, diaspora populations have historically been excluded from participation in national discursive practices, with their opinions on key national issues being politely ignored because of the presumption that they, the emigrants, by leaving the home countries, escaped the responsibilities of helping in nation building. This notion was rather common during the cold war era, when such emigrants became victims of state surveillance, and being labeled as dissidents, then a euphemism for unpatriotic, even subversive elements and enemies of the state. Indeed, part of the conceptual problem that we are confronted with at this point is the fluid nature of the word "diasporic" as a descriptor of the people we are discussing. The fluidity of the word is further enhanced when examined in the context of its overlaps and variants, where "emigrant" could also be "exile" or "fugitive"; words that, although laden with quite specific valence in their theoretical contexts, tend to be quite conflated when mouthed by either the state agents or even by the emigrants themselves, as circumstances dictate. But back to the historical contexts, we note that with the collapse of the Soviet Union and, with it, the global espionage culture, emigrants' home states have shifted in their perception of emigrants from threats to the states in the cold war era to potential partners in development of the countries and the forging of stronger senses of patriotism. In this light, recent years have seen an increased interest in nurturing the relationship between sending-states (states from which migrates originate) and their respective diasporas through initiatives that are prominently, if vaguely as well, known as Diaspora Engagement Policies (DEPs). These "policies" are formulated to address various aspects of the diaspora populations, inclusive of matters to do with citizenship, diplomacy, and economic development involving their home countries.[13] Partly because of the nascent nature of such initiatives and the logistical dynamics involved in the conception, formulation, and implementation of the same, what we refer to as DEPs are vague statements that defy any neat, firm definitions. Indeed Alan Gamlen, easily one of the most

notable scholars on the broader subject of diaspora engagement policies, acknowledges the amorphous nature of these policies when he avers that:

> Diaspora engagement policies cannot be seen as singular, discrete, or historically sui generis. Rather, they form a constellation of institutional and legislative arrangements and programmes that come into being at different times, for different reasons, and operate across different timescales at different levels within the state.[14]

The sporadic nature of DEPs, therefore, only allows for provisional description rather than definition of what it is that we are referencing when we talk of policies. For our purpose, we consider DEPs as state institutions and practices that apply to the members of that state's sociality who reside outside its borders; they have something to do with residence elsewhere as measured against autochthonic antecedents back in Kenya. Realizing that diasporic populations may be involved in the practice and rhetoric of development, the government has recently attempted to engage them by extending some rights that were hitherto denied to them just because they were away from Kenya. Top among policy provisions are voting rights for those in the diaspora and bilateral agreements on the social and economic rights of expatriates.[15] Yet, these rights appear to be founded on the generosity of spirit of the regime in place because the Constitution of Kenya only allows expatriate the right to dual citizenship (Cap 3 Article 16) but are silent on all other rights. Hence, for Kenyans in the diaspora even the right to vote is not expressly provided for, leading to situations where government officials spend much time talking about it, only for late cancellation of the decision to open voting stations in the diaspora due to logistical reasons, as happened around the 2013 General Elections. All this happens because of the inability or failure of government to thoroughly think through its diaspora engagement policies with a view to implementing them, and instead encouraging fragmented initiatives by various arms of government that end up only paying lip service to this important idea. This has been going on for close to 17 years now, if we take 2001 as the time that the government started paying attention to its diaspora populations by committing to continental ideas. Table 9.2 summarizes the key milestones in these initiatives to show that the government has complied with regional expectations without matching them with tangible initiatives at home.

Table 9.2   Developments in the evolution of Kenya's diaspora policy

Year	Main development	Remarks
2001	Kenya appointed the signatory to the African Unions Constitutive Act (2001), which is aimed at promoting the participation of African professionals in the continent and in the Diaspora.	This can be considered the earliest documented moment of Kenya's recognition of the role of its diaspora
2004	The formation of the National Diaspora Council of Kenya.	The council remains inactive, thereby defeating the purpose of its original formation
2002–2007	The Government of Kenya (GoK) consults with members of the diaspora on the best way to promote their involvement in developing the nation.	
2007	The GoK creates a Diaspora Technical Team, The Kenya Private Sector Alliances (KEPSA) and diaspora representatives. The team prepares a report on "Maximizing the Potential and Input of the Kenyan Diaspora in the Political Process, Wealth Creation, Employment Generation and Poverty" ahead of the Kenya Diaspora Bill 2007.	Up to now, only the Kenya Private Sector Alliance has retained any presence in Kenya'spublic imaginaries. The role of the diaspora representatives on the team is unclear
2009	In response to the Presidential Circular No.1 of 2008, the Diaspora Committee is moved to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the Ministry of Planning	The Ministry of Foreign Affairs did, in 2014, come up with a Strategic Plan that mentions Kenya's diasporic communities
2009	Diaspora Diplomacy made into a pillar of Kenyan Foreign Policy	Captured in (Article 46, 47, 48)
2010	Non-resident rights such as voting rights, dual citizenship, and automatic citizenship for child born to Kenyan parents embedded in the new constitution	The right to vote for diasporic Kenyans is only enjoyed to the extent that Kenyans in the diaspora do not, now, lose their Kenyan citizenship by acquiring any other. But, as happened in 2013, neither the government nor the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission has

Table 9.2   (continued)

Year	Main development	Remarks
		labored enough to ensure that Kenyans in the diaspora can actually register and vote from their host countries. In essence, the right to vote is an ideal and not a practice.
2010	Investment forums are organized in the USA and the UK, for example The Kenya Diaspora Investment EXPO 2010	The outcomes of these are not clear because there is no evidence of follow-up initiatives or mechanisms of quantifying the impact of such forums.
2011	Draft Diaspora Policy released by Ministry of Foreign Affairs	At this stage, little could be done in the name of this policy
2011	Diaspora Bond issued in support of infrastructure projects	
2012	Kenya ratifies the Amendment to the African Union (AU) Constitutive Act Article 3(q), which welcomes the full participation of the African Diaspora in building the African Union.	This, again, may be an indication of Kenya's willingness to conform to international protocols.
2012	Study visit by the Ministry of Labour, Social Security and Services, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and the Department of Immigration and registration of persons to India and Morocco to create a better understanding of diaspora engagement strategies.	Relevant insights from the study visit informed the formulation and implementation of the 2014 Kenya Diaspora Policy.
2013	The Executive Council of the Africa Union accepts Kenya's offer to host the African Institute for Remittances (AIR)	The African Institute for remittances (AIR) was on November 28 launched at the Kenya School of Monetary Studies (KSMS), where it is hosted.
2014	Kenyan Diaspora Policy is published	Since 2001, this marks the beginning of singular direction on government engagement with its diasporic populations. The government's commitment to this is seen in the Kenyan Diaspora

Table 9.2   (continued)

Year	Main development	Remarks
		Policy, officially known by the same name.
2015	Kenya Foreign Policy, thus called, is published	Approved by President Uhuru Kenyatta
2015	Launch of the Kenyan Diaspora Policy by Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta on January 20 at the Kenyatta International Convention Centre	Also in attendance were the cabinet Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Principal Secretary, Ministry of Labour, Social Security and Services, the CEO Kenya Commercial Bank, among other key players in diaspora matters. Diaspora engagement, according to the President and other stakeholders will be based on the five pillars of Foreign Policy— economic diplomacy, peace diplomacy, environmental diplomacy, cultural diplomacy and Diaspora diplomacy. The Diaspora Policy acts a guide to "harnessing the wealth and expertise of Kenyans in the diaspora to our development efforts"
Forthcoming	Plans to establish a National Diaspora Council of Kenya (NADICOK) outlined in the Kenyan Diaspora Policy, to oversee the implementation of the Kenyan Diaspora Policy.	The Council will operate under the Ministry of Foreign Affair and International Trade and is expected to advise the government on issues of Kenyans in the diaspora.

From Table 9.2, we deduce that the Kenya government is not only a late starter in efforts aimed at engaging its diasporic population, but that it has also embarked on this initiative in a lukewarm and haphazard manner partly because, as we see the role of the Africa Union in jolting Kenya into action, the push has come from without the country, and so one may rightly conclude the government's initiatives of engaging with the

diaspora are driven by the necessity to comply with international protocols and not necessarily to enhance a mutually beneficial relationship between Kenya and its diasporic populations.

We argue that this attitude can be explained by examining the country's political history, especially during the Daniel Moi regime, which was characterized by a deep sense of paranoia against its citizens abroad.[16,17] During the one party days that coincided with the peak of the cold war, the national political debates were dominated by a rabid hatred for "foreign masters" who were said to bankroll anyone who spoke out against the government's ills. Naturally, most of those who could dare do this were Kenyans then living in the diaspora.

Indeed, the increased tone and tenor of discussing the role of Kenyans in the diaspora coincided with the post-Moi regimes, when the discourse of expanded democratic space made the country a lot more attractive to diasporic Kenyans who nursed ideas of returning to the country, but also when the regimes themselves desperately needed to win over the support of Kenyans in the diaspora. Two points need to be made here; one, the 2002 General Elections from which Moi was constitutionally barred from running marked the first real chance for change, and many people, including Kenyans in the diaspora, were expectedly excited about the outcome. The diasporic population weighed in heavily with sentiments that whipped patriotic feelings together, and for the first time dialogic networks linking Kenyans at home and those abroad were activated through the internet. It became impossible for the Kenyan leadership to ignore the ideological influence that Kenyans in the diaspora had over their stay-at-home counterparts. The second point relates to the 2007 General Elections, whose presidential tally was steeped in such controversy that the country imploded in what is now known as the post-election violence.[18] While a basic truce was reached through the formation of a coalition government, Mwai Kibaki was in a precarious position internationally, and the stigma of deploying a smash and grab strategy to win his second term blotted his image abroad, and so his regime saw in diasporic Kenyans a chance to colour Kenya's image abroad differently. That may be the unvoiced explanation for the more vigorous engagement with Kenyans in the diaspora, who were now seen as key cogs in legitimizing a regime tottering on the brink of moral bankruptcy, and at the same time helping to clean up the image of Kenya that had been soiled by the 2007–2008 violence. On his part, Raila Odinga, as the ever aggrieved member of the coalition government, saw in diasporic Kenyans some of his most ardent supporters to

whom he repeatedly paid homage in his numerous trips abroad. Both Kibaki and Raila, in playing out their rivalry, enhanced the political culture of addressing Kenyans abroad in the many countries that their duties took them to. Uhuru Kenyatta, himself weighed down by the stigma of involvement in the 2007–2008 violence for being among those who bore the greatest responsibility, was a lonely figure isolated from the international community of leaders and, before the ICC withdrew its charges against him in mid 2015, only found true warmth of welcome among the Kenyans he met in the countries that he visited as head of state. In a sentence, the Kenya government's increasing focus on Kenyans in the diaspora was and is firstly a political decision and only secondarily, if at all, an ideological or economic one. The three post-Moi leaders—Mwai Kibaki, Raila Odinga, and Uhuru Kenyatta—all found need to consort with Kenyans in the diaspora to legitimize their own positions, something that shows the nuanced complications of state/government/leader engagement with diasporic populations. In the absence of clear DEPs, as is the case with Kenya, such conflations are bound to occur. It is important, therefore, to have a clearer understanding of what DEPs are, and in what forms they may come. This is the task we undertake in the next section of our chapter, in which we draw on Alan Gamlen's ideas on DEPs to show that gap between best practices elsewhere and Kenya's attempts at formulating coherent engagement policies that may guide the government–diaspora relationships.

GAMLEN'S DEP TYPOLOGY AND ITS RELEVANCE TO KENYA

There are three major types of DEPs.[19] The first type is refers to those that are directed towards capacity building. These go towards encouraging a national and transnational approach to the development of the state and its institutions of governance. One of the provisions of this type of policy is the presentation of awards and accolades to some of the emigrants considered to be national heroes. This is a notable shift from previous stances in government, where emigrants were labeled as deserters in countries like Morocco[20] and Mexico, marked by the use of derogatory terms for emigrants.[21] In addition, capacity building entails the establishment of support programmes under which expatriates can learn and preserve their national languages and other significant aspects of their history. Recent times have brought about a scenario in which diasporic populations are considered integral parts of the national population. Governments are in

recent times taking keener interest in diaspora activities—including the dedication of memorials to and organization of conferences on diaspora populations. There are also efforts to keep all nationals, inclusive of those living abroad, abreast of the activities of government. This is, for example, applicable in the case of Turkey and Hungary, where there are state-run websites, information centers, and television channels deployed to inform their populations living in the diaspora of the activities of government.[22]

The second type of DEPs is aimed at protecting the rights of expatriates.[23] Here, emigrants are granted civil and social services, like the implementation of policies that regulate labour export, healthcare, and advocacy in taxation. Socially and legally, the ties between sending-states and their respective emigrants have been reinforced, a manifestation of the restructuring taking place in institutions that are responsible for governing these relationships. While still limited, there has been an increase in the implementation of policies aimed at the preservation and promotion of access to citizenship for citizens living abroad.[24] This is true for Kenya, whose constitution (2010) provides for dual citizenship for emigrants. Where this is lacking, for example in India and Croatia, governments with a large population of persons living abroad have introduced the use of ethnic origin cards, which allow diaspora nationals to access the services similar to those of other nationals.[25] In addition, the introduction of political rights allows for the political inclusion of citizens abroad. There are steps towards redesigning the electoral systems and structures of representation. More governments are in the process of extending certain rights such as voting and contesting for election. Where there are no arrangements to allow citizens abroad to vote, bodies that can represent emigrant populations are formed to facilitate the receipt of social rights for these groups.[26] In the Philippines, for example, there are comprehensive welfare protection programs in place for emigrants,[27] something lacking in Kenya.

The third type of DEPs is directed towards the extraction of obligations from emigrants; on the principle that emigrants have a duty and loyalty to their sending-states.[28] Governments recognize the advantages of having a large and permanent diaspora population in relation to development ventures.[29] This is a shift from the past ideology, where economic development was thought to be pegged on reduction of the emigration of labour, and having productive forces return to the country from abroad.[30] Today, it is considered economically valuable for populations to be permanently resident in countries to which they migrate. An example of this is

the formulation of co-development strategies to aid in the pursuit of development ventures.[31]

Engaging the diaspora, while necessary, requires techniques that have remained underdeveloped.[32] There is a tendency to underestimate issues around diaspora policy, resulting in deficient planning and oversight mechanisms where diaspora policy is concerned. For improved policies, it is mandatory to improve the systems that govern operations and oversight in this field.[33] The implications for this are twofold: first, with proper policies in place, the sending-state is presented with policy imperatives that are important for furthering national interests. Second, sending-states are obliged to ensure fair treatment for their diasporas, eliminating preferential, arbitrary, and exploitative tendencies.

African states like Ghana, South Africa, and Kenya continue to make efforts towards the incorporation of diaspora communities in development activities by launching initiatives to facilitate this. Examples include the creation of pertinent ministries that handle diaspora bodies and extending the functions of foreign affairs ministries, with particular interest in diasporas formed outside of Africa.

Four principles have been identified as being key to the process of attempting to engage African Diasporas in development projects.[34] The first principle is ensuring that policies are as inclusive as possible, considering the diverse nature of the diaspora, its relationship with the home country, and levels of trust in the government. The second principle is that the state should make efforts to understand the diaspora for effective engagement. The third principle has to do with the promotion of development outcomes and result orientation. This especially has to do with improving outcomes in health, education, job creation, and infrastructure and enterprise development. Lastly, the policy should be centered on addressing the needs of emigrants, their priorities and strengths while refraining from worsening their capacity constraints.

KENYA DIASPORA POLICY

For a long time Kenya, like many other states, tended to ignore its Diaspora population, making little effort to engage them. However, following a push from the diaspora for recognition, there have been progressive efforts towards including these diasporic populations. Some of the factors that contributed the diasporic clamor for recognition include the

fact that some of the emigrants, depending on their reasons for travelling abroad, would like keep abreast of events back at home. Second, in their interaction with immigrants from other countries, such as India and Philippines, Kenyan diasporic communities learnt of other countries' successful efforts towards ensuring the integration of their respective diasporas. This prompted Kenyans in the diaspora to ask the government to establish similar structures. On the other hand, the Kenyan Government was forced to take interest in the activities of its diaspora. Following the 2007 post-election violence, the Kenyan currency took a dive in the market. Remittances from abroad gained prominence as one of the lifelines of the Kenyan Shilling.

Following piqued interest in the country's diaspora, in 2008, deliberations resulted in the amendment of Articles 16 and 82 of the Constitution to incorporate Kenyans in the diaspora as citizens of Kenya and, further, give them rights to participate in the political process of the country. In addition, these talks would nudge policy-makers towards the creation of the Kenya Diaspora Policy of 2014. About two years later, the Diaspora and Consular Affairs Department within the Ministry of Foreign Affair was established and mandated with coordinating diaspora issues and offering consular services to distressed Kenyans living abroad.

Generally, in parliament, there was consensus on the importance of the diaspora. There was and still is recognition of the fact that some of the Kenyans living abroad are in distress. For example, there have been documented cases of abuse of Kenyan National working in Middle Eastern countries. This created a sense of urgency among politicians, who were often approached by relatives of persons in distress in the diaspora to come up with ways to address these concerns. Further, with the 2010 Constitution provision on the voting rights of diasporic communities, strengthening ties with the diaspora became a political strategy.

Given the robust nature of issues that needed to be incorporated within the Policy document, deliberations incorporated several interest groups. Some of these include the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the Immigration Department in Kenya, Non-Governmental Organizations of interest, diaspora associations such as the Kenya Diaspora Association, and the Kenya Community Abroad. Further, there were benchmarking visits by the Kenyan Government to countries that had successfully formulated policies geared towards protecting the rights of their diasporic populations, for example India and the Philippines. Studies were also conducted on how the Algerian Government manages

its diaspora. All this went into the development, validation, and publishing of the document. It was then presented in Parliament and finally launched in 2014.

The Kenya Diaspora Policy (2014) resulted from the need to incorporate the country's diaspora in the process of national development.[35] According to the policy document, some of the challenges encountered in efforts towards engaging the diaspora effectively include inadequate mechanisms of protecting Kenyans in the diaspora, the high cost of remitting money, untapped skills and expertise, weak structures to inform Kenyans in the diaspora of investment opportunities, lack of an integrated database on Kenyans abroad, and inadequate capacity to offer consular services.

The major strategies outlined for involving the diaspora in development include reducing the high cost of money remittance, tapping into diaspora skills, knowledge, and expertise, encouraging participation of Kenyan citizens abroad in the democratic processes, developing an incentive framework for promoting diaspora participation in national development, and enhancing capacity to offer consular services. In addition, there is a need to develop strategies that can facilitate the engagement of Kenyans abroad in the development process, to develop a means to protect Kenyans living abroad, mobilize Kenyans to form umbrella associations with a national outlook and promote channels for partnerships with Kenyans at home. Finally, is the need to develop an institutional framework for coordinating and dealing with the issues affecting Kenyans living abroad.

The Kenya Diaspora Policy is based on seven key principles:

1. Recognize the role of Kenyans in the diaspora in socio-economic development in Kenya.
2. Coordinate efforts of all concerned parties in matters of the diaspora.
3. Accord all concerned parties, inclusive of Kenyans in the diaspora, a chance to participate in the formulation of policies and be involved in dialogue on the issues that affect them directly.
4. Kenyans in the diaspora will also be engaged in the monitoring, evaluation, and the implementation of policy and have an opportunity to provide feedback where needed.
5. Empower emigrants to send remittances and invest in the country with ease, while engaging in the transfer of technology and the deepening of knowledge.

6. To coordinate the activities of Kenyans abroad to eliminate the duplication of efforts. Specific expectations of the Kenyan diaspora will be taken into account, particularly across different genders and the youth.

7. Finally, to harness the potential of Kenyans abroad, a decentralization of efforts seeing to the coordination of efforts between the county and national governments for beneficial engagement with Kenyans in the diaspora.

While the Kenya Diaspora Policy (2014) comprehensively covers diaspora inclusion, there are teething problems with which would-be implementers have to contend. One of the key challenges is on keeping up-to-date records on Kenyans in the diaspora. According to the Director, Diaspora and Consular Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is difficult keep track of how many Kenyans exactly are living abroad. He attributes to the dynamism of the diaspora. For example, often there are unclear channels via which to keep track of those that travel in and out of the country for a short duration of time, like those going abroad to study for a year. In addition, there is distrust on the part of Kenyans living abroad towards calls by the Kenyan government for them to get registered. Undocumented Kenyans in foreign countries work to maintain a low profile and prefer to remain anonymous for fear of the impending repercussions of getting found out. Benson Kakui, talking to the Voice of America, says, "When you are giving the government your information, you don't know what this can be used for. That's a fear. Some of the reason why people did not register, frankly, was because of that. They are fearful that 'Hey, the government is keeping track of me, they know where I am, and why do they want to know?'"[36]

It has also been a challenge formulating mechanisms to pick diaspora representatives, as required by the Kenya Diaspora Policy. There is a lack of consensus as to whether these regional representatives should be appointed directly or elected by Kenyans living in these regions. Further, the existence of numerous diasporic organizations poses a challenge to implementers. The Cooperative Act provides for representation of Kenyans living in the same region by one Savings and Credit Cooperative Organization (SACCO). On the other hand, the Kenyan Constitution makes provisions for the freedom of association, which means that a Kenyan cannot be forced to belong to one association. As a result, there are multiple associations in a given diasporic region. This

leaves policy implementers at a loss for which organization they should treat as the primary in a given region.

KENYA'S DIASPORA GROUPS AND THEIR ENGAGEMENTS

Members of the diaspora generally can be divided into three categories, depending on their level of participation in the homeland: silent members, core members, and passive members.[37,38] These categories apply to the Kenyan situation, and they collectively make contributions in the social, economic, and political aspects of the country's engagements. Core members are those that are actively involved in the activities of the diaspora and are often at the helm of lobbying for a larger degree of participation in national activities by their members. Passive members are involved in these diaspora activities, but only when called upon by the active members. Silent members often are largely uninvolved in diaspora activities. This section looks into the activities of the active and passive members and their collective role as contributors to the socio-economic and political well-being of Kenya. Some of these important organizations include Maisha and RetoPamoja in Germany and the Kenya Diaspora Alliance, Kwarula Society for Kenyan Education, The Kenya Christian Fellowship, and the Association of International Kenya Medical Professionals in the USA.

Diasporas as Development Agents

The diaspora engagement process as an agent for development entails setting deliberate engagement goals, followed by fostering a trust-based relationship between the Kenyan diaspora and governments of both the home and host countries, geared towards diaspora mobilization for sustainable development. Protecting Kenyan citizens in the diaspora is the fastest way to garner dividends from emigrants,[39] and has been deemed an area that should be of priority to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.[40] One of the diaspora engagement goals as laid out by the 2015 Chair Kenya Community in the Diaspora, Paris is to mobilize and link Kenyan professional globally to stimulate brain gain. Other key goals include harnessing resources from the Kenyan diaspora for investment in important sectors of the economy, keeping up-to-date records on human resource needs of the country and diasporic technical and professional

resources, inviting philanthropic contributions from the diaspora through engaging organizations and individuals, and pooling funds from donor communities in the diaspora. In addition to these, there should also be efforts towards promoting smooth collaboration between Kenyan professionals in the diaspora and those that are within the country. This should improve the efficiency of institutions, promoting institutional capacity-building

At the core of missions of diaspora organizations is a socio-cultural sense, in which the organizations seek to consolidate Kenyans in the diaspora and integrate new arrivals into life in respective Diasporas. In addition, they seek to promote a cultural interaction between the host country and Kenyans. Some of these diaspora organizations are open to Kenyans from all tribes, ages, genders, and socio-economic backgrounds. Organizations such as Reto Pamoja arose from the need of migrants to be recognized as part of a community while in the diaspora.[41] Advocacy was the primary goal of the some of the groups. For example, one of Maisha's primary objectives was to alter certain practices in schools within the host country, which sought to discriminate against African students.

Further objectives of organizations in the diaspora are based on supporting economic development initiatives back at home. There are efforts by these organizations to encourage entities, whether Kenyans in Germany or non-Kenyans in Germany, to invest back home. Many of these networks contribute to charities and organizations devoted to long-term development ventures that are based in Kenya, especially in their communities of origin.[42] There is an emphasis on supporting organizations that are centered on the provision of education in Kenya, given that there are important spillover effects from education in developing economies. Some of the broad development objectives held by organizations abroad include ensuring that children from specific communities have access to proper kindergarten, primary, and secondary school education, encouraging self-reliance in the community by opening access to certain economic activities within rural areas, and improving the conditions under which street children in Kenya live. These organizations and their objectives are borne out of the attachments that migrants have to the people they leave in their sending-countries and the obligations towards persons such as their friends and relatives. These obligations are fulfilled mainly through remittances, which we discuss in a later section.

The Political Agency of the Kenyan Diaspora

For a while, the Kenyan diaspora clamoured for recognition by the government. This yielded four main documents, which were set to act as bases for further recognition. The first is the Kenyan Diaspora Bill, 2007, which recognizes the tremendous potential held by diaspora to jumpstart the Kenyan economy. Second, the Vision 2030, also explains the Diapsora's role in efforts towards economic growth through creating business networks and social capital, remittances, foreign direct investment, political involvement, product promotion for Kenyan products abroad, promoting Kenyan culture and tourism, transfer of science and technology, and through transfer of knowledge and philanthropy. The third is the Constitution, which provides diasporic communities with the right to vote and a right to dual citizenship.[43] The final document was the Kenya Diaspora Policy of 2014, which has been discussed at length in a preceding section. Article 38 of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 makes provisions for political rights, inclusive of the right to vote. According to Article 38(3) of the Kenyan Constitution, every adult citizen has the right to be registered as a voter, vote by secret ballot in any election or referendum, to be a candidate for a public office or office within a political party where the citizen is a member, and to hold office if elected. These political rights are further enhanced in Article 82(1)(e), which gives Parliament the mandate to enact legislation that provides for progressive registration of citizen living outside the country to progressively realize their right to vote. The term "citizen" is inclusive of the Kenyan diaspora, validated by the provision for dual citizenship under article 16 of the new Constitution.[44]

In the run up to the 2013 general elections, the Kenyan diaspora looked to consolidate their numbers to see to a change in political regimes. Under the banner "Kenyans in Diaspora for Change," there were efforts towards uniting diaspora organizations. Some of the diaspora groups that expressed interest in uniting towards this cause included Kenya Global Unity, the Kenya Community Abroad, New Vision Kenya, the Kenya for Change, and the Diaspora Movement of Kenya. These groups looked into setting up a fund, from which all parties interested in contesting would benefit.

According to Mr. Kimuyu, an official in the movement, there were plans in place to field candidates for senators, governorship, among other civic positions in their respective regions.[45] For purposes of upholding democracy, they intended to form a political outfit but also make

provisions for candidates to be affiliated with parties of their choice. This was inclusive of independent candidates. For diasporic communities, political inclusion was long overdue, given that many of them have built up business networks within their host countries that could be instrumental to reviving the economy of Kenya. Some of the issues that have spurred the diasporic community to action are corruption, tribalism, and the subsequent disunity of Kenyans especially after the 2007 post-election violence. According to Kimuyu, the potential for development is high, if the right leadership ascends to power, which is one of the goals they hoped to achieve by fielding their own candidates.

While there was a great degree of enthusiasm on the part of diasporic communities in the period leading up to the March 2013 elections, the only Kenyans living outside the country that received facilitation to vote were those living within the East African region. In the year 2015, following a petition by New Vision Kenya, the Supreme Court ordered the progressive registration of Kenyans in the diaspora to facilitate their participation in local elections. Currently, there are plans by the electoral agency to incorporate more Kenyans in the diaspora in the 2017 General Election.[46] The criterion laid out is that there have to be at least 3,000 Kenyan citizens residing in a particular country for a polling station to be set up in the host country. There is progress towards mapping countries to find out which ones meet the threshold. Kenyans abroad will only be able to vote for the president and take part in referendums. They however cannot vote for members of parliament, county representatives, governors, senators, and women representatives. Given the amount of resources required to make diasporic elections possible however, there are concerns that there will be new debates around the feasibility of diasporic electoral involvement.

Remittances

Historically, Kenya has not been among the countries that send or receive large remittance volumes. However, with the recent rise in the volume of remittances received by the country, remittances now make up a significant share of the GDP. According to the World Bank World Development indicators, remittances now make up to 3 percent of the country's GDP. Fig. 9.1 illustrates the rise in remittances to Kenya.

In 2014, the World Bank reported that the highest source of remittances to Kenya was the UK, sending US$ 494 million. The second

Fig. 9.1 Remittance inflows to Kenya 1970–2014

Source: Global Bilateral Migration Database (2015)

highest was the USA, at US$ 460 million. There were also significant remittances from Germany, Australia, Canada, Tanzania, Uganda, and South Africa.

Despite the potential that remittances have to contribute to the development of the nation, the country lacks clear guidelines on the receipt and use of these inflows.[47] Remittances to Kenya have overtaken some of the traditional capital inflows. As such, there have been efforts by the government of Kenya to consider means of engaging Kenyans in the diaspora to raise their contribution to the development of the nation by sending more remittances. Towards this, the government has established structures that could be useful. Some of them include launching the diaspora policy, which is aimed at engaging the diaspora further and in a structured manner, and incorporating the diaspora in the Constitution of Kenya (2010) and the Vision 2030 document.[48]

The African Remittances Institute

With the purpose of harnessing international remittances from African diasporic communities, the Africa Union (AU), with funding from the European Commission, in 2014 launched the African Remittances Institute (AIR) in Nairobi. This, against the backdrop of hefty transaction costs incurred in the course of sending money from abroad to the African continent. Other key stakeholders in the establishment of the AIR include the World Bank,

responsible for implementing and executing the project, the InternationalOrganization for Immigration, and the Africa Development Bank.The amount lost in transaction costs is approximated at US$ 15 million out of about US$ 60 billion remitted to Africa annually.[49] These figures are however believed to be significantly underestimated, given the large number of unofficial transactions across Africa, believed to be higher than official transactions. At the center of the African Remittances Institute's goals is reflecting the positive side of migration, allowing or formal channels of remitting money.[50] The Institute aims to track the destination of remitted cash order to reduce the incidence of migrants being conned by their relatives into sending money home for particular projects, many of which do not come to fruition. This is a key step towards leveraging the untapped developmental potential of remittance inflows into AU member countries given that rising remittance inflows to Africa have been rising.

Diaspora Engagement: Lessons Learnt

It is becoming evident that there is need to look beyond what the diaspora can do for their countries of origin and think on what their countries of origin can do for them. While diaspora engagement for developing countries has got largely to do with wanting to achieve the country's development goals, is a two-way affair. From what has been covered, one thing is apparent; there has been very little communication with those in the diaspora. This manifests in certain ways. First, records on Kenyans living abroad are scanty and disjointed. While many of these persons are registered, there is no mechanism put in place to consolidate records in those leaving, those returning, and those that are undocumented in their host countries. A second sign is in the lack of information on the investment or developmental ventures undertaken with the funds these peoples disburse to their country of origin. As we will point out, this has negative connotations for investment.

Creating a reliable diaspora profile is a major challenge to implementers of the Kenya Diaspora Policy. While there are records on Kenyans living abroad, these records are uncoordinated with each other. The dynamism of the diaspora, fear of divulging emigrant information are some of the reasons behind this. Even so, it remains that it is important for implementers to have a clear picture of the diaspora profile, if any steps are to be made towards including the forty-eighth county, as the President of the Republic refers to the diaspora. There is, therefore, need to employ multiple data collection techniques for a diaspora profile, one that outlines the major

characteristics of the diaspora along with existing associations that address the interest of these peoples. Efficiency can be ensured through a strong cooperation between entities in charge of collecting data on the diaspora, for example Kenyan missions to other countries, host country governments, and the statistics office in Kenya. Publicity around data/information collection drives should also be enhanced in order to reach populations abroad that may be oblivious of the government's efforts to establish a link with its citizens. This is important since Kenyan Diaspora Engagement policies ought to be based on reliable evidence if we hope to meet the objectives outlined in existing policy documents.

The African Remittances Institute (AIR) is an important link to the development efforts of not only Kenya, but also the African continent as a whole. One of the concerns raised by Kenyans living abroad is that there is very little information on how remittances work once they have been disbursed to Kenya. Further, there are fears that while they remit money back home solely for development purposes, these funds are rarely assigned to their intended purpose. With the mandate of minimizing the incidence of this, the AIR and similar organizations could be instrumental in encouraging diasporic communities to take part in investment activities back home. One of the ways to achieve this would be to communicate the returns on remittances/investments to diasporic communities, along with tangible evidence of the same. It is expected that boosting investment across the disporic Kenya community will act as a platform for the creation of an enabling environment for foreign direct investment by other non-Kenyan parties too.

How effective the Kenya Diaspora Policy will be is contingent on the ability of policy makers to coordinate with other parties of interest to see to the fruition of the document's goals. Some of these other parties include Kenyan government agencies that directly or indirectly hold a stake in diaspora engagement, host country governments, and diaspora associations. Building cooperation is guaranteed to reinforce the mandates of the policy in the long-term. For effective implementation, it is imperative that Kenyan missions abroad act as a strong link between the Kenyan government back home and associations representing the interests of Kenyans living in other countries. Further, operating in a vacuum is hardly an option; there is a need to base actions pertinent to diaspora engagement on the proven policies and implementation initiatives of other governments that have been successful in the same. While it is true of the Kenya Diaspora Policy that it borrowed heavily from those of other successful countries, further resources should be

devoted to enhance engagement between the country and its benchmark partners for higher efficiency.

Diaspora generates benefits that accrue to their home countries and cascade to the villages through currency inflows and human capital formation. A strong network of the Kenyan government, the diaspora, and pertinent associations is required for the diaspora to grow into its role as a development actor. Empowering the diaspora relies heavily on having the engagement policy address the resource requirements created by efforts towards mobilizing the diaspora. This is needed to support both those that have been successful within their host countries and the vulnerable. One of the ways to achieve this is by strengthening diaspora networks to encourage a flow of exchange of experiences between those residing abroad.[51] Programs designed to strengthen diaspora capacities ought to consider the specific needs of different diaspora groups and the various host countries.

Finally, there should be forums that promote interaction between the Kenyan Government and the diaspora, to enhance engagement. Further, these forums should go beyond periodical interactions but rather open channels for easy exchange of information between the parties involved. While the Kenyan Government has expressed interest in engaging with its diaspora, one of the challenges to be dealt with is the adoption of outreach concepts. This is a challenge for many governments. Even so, it is important that Kenyan embassies and consulates be made accessible to Kenyans living abroad as one such mechanism of promoting interaction. In addition, the Kenyan government can take advantage of social media platforms to interact with and leave an impact on diasporic institutions, all the while ensuring that interaction between those selected to represent either side remains transparent for the sake of minimizing mistrust between the diaspora and government.

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Bethuel Kinyajui Kinuthia is a Lecturer, School of Economics at the University of Nairobi, and the Director Institute of Research on Economic Development (IRED), Nairobi, Kenya. He holds a PhD in Economics from Leiden University, and an MA in Economics from the University of Nairobi. He has researched widely in the area of economic policies in Kenya.

Fred Jonyo is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration at the University of Nairobi, Kenya. He holds a PhD in Political Science and Public Administration from Makerere University, Uganda, and an MA in International Politics from the International University of Japan. He has researched widely and published in refereed journals including *African Renaissance* and *Africa Management Review*.

Godwin Siundu is a Senior Lecturer, Department of Literature, University of Nairobi, Research Associate, English Department, Stellenbosch University and Editor, *Eastern African Literary and Cultural Studies*. He holds a PhD in African Literature from the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, and an MPhil in Literature from Moi University, Kenya. He has researched extensively in diasporic and migrant experiences, and has published in reputable journals including *Research in African Literatures, Africa Insight, African Identities*. His book, *Imagining Home and Community in East African Asian Writings*, is published by VDM Verlag.

The State of Leadership and Diaspora Engagement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

Jean-Pierre K. Bongila

INTRODUCTION

At a time when various governments of the Global South and their expatriates in the West have begun constructive dialogues regarding the socio-economic development of their countries, it appears fitting to investigate the level of collaboration—if any—between the leadership of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and its diaspora. This chapter examines the contexts of the Congolese diaspora in the Global North countries, and the expectations that both the Congolese leadership and their emigrants have implicitly or explicitly set for each other, addressing the nature of the current alliance between the two entities. For example, the US Institute for Peace (USIP) reports on several Congolese workshops discussing perspectives and recommendations to improve economic and political policies in the DRC.[1] However, questions remain as to how both the Congolese leadership

J.-P.K. Bongila (✉)
Department of Leadership, College of Education, Leadership and Counseling, University of St. Thomas, Minneapolis, MN, USA

and its diaspora collaborate in the application and implementation of policies and actions pertaining to capacity building, extending rights to and extracting obligations from the diaspora. Using a leadership ethics framework dubbed "African Baobab Tree," a form of African "public sphere" (Habermas), this chapter advocates for the establishment of a two-way communication between the DRC government and its diaspora in order to bring about the implementation of courses of action, if any.[2]

Migration4Development has it that:

> Migrants who despite their "scattering" (Greek: Diaspora) all over the world have never lost their ties to their country of origin, and today implement their ideas in concrete projects or use their remittances collectively, can be interesting partners for development cooperation. The actors from the realms of development, cooperation, politics and society are only very slowly becoming aware of this notion.[3]

Obviously, this chapter fits the migration–development nexus in that it concerns the Congolese people that have been voluntarily or involuntarily moved outside of their country, and still hold affinity ties with their homeland. Palmer in his article "African Diaspora" denounces what he perceives to be a confusion between diaspora and migration.[4] For him, migration refers to a movement of a people within and/or outside its polity "whereas Diaspora suggests several migratory streams of a people to many destinations."[5]

> African Diaspora, as I understand it, encompasses both the descendants of Africans that were made slaves and forced to move to Europe and the Americas via the Atlantic slave trade, the largest population having been brought to Brazil…However, modern African Diaspora has to apply in particular to Africans who have emigrated from their home countries for such reasons as education, employment, and living security for themselves and their offspring.[6]

According to the Migration Policy Institute (MPI), from 1980 to 2013, the sub-Saharan African diaspora population in the USA grew from 130,000 to 1.5 million.[7] This chapter concerns modern Congolese diaspora whose number is estimated at three to six million according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM).[8]

Congolese Diaspora and Emigration

In the DRC the notion of "diaspora" refers to Congolese emigrants who have been residing abroad for the longest time; most of them are first-generation while some are second-generation that have resided overseas for years. Congolese fondly refer to them as "*mikiliste*" in Lingala language or more "*hommes de quatre seasons*" (French for "people of four seasons"). However, officially those emigrants are referred to as "*Congolais de l'étranger*" (Congolese abroad). There are several categories of Congolese nationals who sought emigration in other countries, particularly those of the OECD. First there are refugees or asylum seekers whose number reached a peak of 461,042 in 2004, and decreased to 32,742 in 2008.[9] This fluctuation in the numbers of Congolese refugees may be explained by the long period of internal conflicts—heavily sponsored by its neighbors—which the DRC underwent. Second, there are members of the Congolese diaspora who have sought migration as permanent and temporary workers in OECD countries whose number has been estimated at 190,000 in 2011.[10] In the USA, of the 124 immigrants from the DRC reported in the year 2004, 80 percent did not have a job or did not report having a job. Of those that held a profession, 40 percent had a professional or technical specialty, 35 percent specialized in business administration and 35 percent in various services. [11] Table 10.1 shows an estimate of the DRC born people who have immigrated to the Organization and Economic Co-operation Development (OECD) countries. Second to only to Nigeria in size among African countries, the DRC diaspora numbers below exclude members residing illegally in those countries as

Table 10.1   DRC diaspora destinations in OECD countries in 2010–2011

Rank	Country	DRC born population (Thousands)
1	France	116.3
2	Belgium	78.4
3	Canada	17.6
4	UK	17.5
5	USA	11.2
6	Switzerland	5.7
7	Netherlands	3.1
8	Italy	3.5

well as their descendants.[12] As discussed in the next section, several political and socio-economic reasons account for the emigration of the DRC citizens towards OECD countries.

PROFILE OF CONGOLESE DIASPORA IN OECD COUNTRIES

In 2015, OECD reported that the DRC ranked 76 out of 144 countries in emigration rate of highly educated citizens, most of those residing in the OECD countries listed in Table 10.1.[13] In 2011 alone, 265,500 DRC emigrants joined its diaspora in the Global North countries, an increase of 35.3 percent of highly educated and 27.5 percent of low-educated members. Of the DRC's immigrants to OECD countries, 41% of men and 24% of women are highly educated. Overall, the DRC emigration to the most developed countries places it among the lowest in the world, standing 166 out of 203 countries according to OECD's statistics.[14] Although poverty accounts for one of the main motivations for migration to richer countries, potential emigrants still need the financial basics required for immigration processes. About 38 percent of Congolese would move permanently to OECD countries if they had the opportunity to do so.[15] Employment rate of the DRC citizens who have joined its diaspora in OECD is estimated at 54 percent while unemployment stands at 23 percent. A distribution of the Diaspora by occupations reveals that 32.6 percent of its members hold highly skilled positions of which 17.5 percent are health professionals, 7.7 percent teaching professionals, and 48.5 percent have medium-skilled occupations. This DRC diaspora formally remits less than US\$ 20 million per year with the exception of 2010–2012 when remittances to the DRC went as high as US\$ 120 million.[16] The DRC diaspora's various contributions to the presidential elections of 2011 may explain this rather unusual increase in remittances. The next section looks at rationales behind the emigration of Congolese towards the Global North in general and OECD countries in particular.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXTS OF EMIGRATION IN DRC

Located in Central Africa, the DRC (formerly Zaire), covers a land surface of 2,345.000 km^2. In 2012 the DRC population was estimated at 72 million, with the majority population concentrated in the inner country or villages.[17] Dorina Bekoe and Michelle Swearingen report that from its independence from Belgium in 1960 up until the 1980s, the Congolese diaspora was constituted of people who migrated for academic, business,

and leisure purposes.[18] It might be inferred that the first era of Mobutu regime (1965–1980), which can be characterized by a relative socio-economic stability, had much to do with the quality of the DRC diaspora in OECD countries. However, the second period of Mobutu's rule (1980–1997) is rightfully or wrongfully dubbed *kleptocratic* (from Greek *kleptēs*, "thief" and—*kratos*, "power").[19] Mobutu's rule by theft engaged in formal and informal looting and vandalism of the national treasures, making enemies of those who resisted the system. As a consequence of a regime turned autocratic and oppressive, numerous Congolese (then Zairians) had to flee for their lives, adding to a growing diaspora, which by then included political refugees and asylum seekers.[20]

As the political and economic conditions of the DRC worsened, the dynamics and patterns of migrations to the West shifted. A great number of asylum seekers and labor migrants added to the number of temporary diaspora composed mostly of students. Since the 1990s, the ongoing armed conflicts in the Great Lakes region in general and in the DRC in particular, have increased the Congolese diaspora around the world. Violence perpetuated against civilians, particularly in the eastern provinces of the DRC has caused more Congolese to scatter throughout the world in search of greener pasture. According to the US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI), one million Congolese fled their homes in 2001 alone, of whom about 8,000 filed for asylum in the West.

The UNDP Human Development Report of 2007 ranked the DRC 176th out of 182 countries in the UNDP Human Development Index.[21] The same report indicated that 59.2 percent of the DRC population lived on less than US$ 1.25 per day. It stands as an obvious implication that the DRC has not met the Millennium Development Goals, particularly those that target the majority of its population, including: alleviation of poverty, provision of education, attaining gender equality, and decreasing the rate of HIV/AIDS and malaria.[22] The worsening economic outlook of the DRC paired with bad governance has been seen as the overall factor behind the migratory tendencies that have taken place since the 2000s.[23] Traditionally, Congolese migrated to familiar territories in France and Belgium. However, in recent decades they have spread to various new destinations, with South Africa and countries located between the DRC and Europe as the number one destination. The US Institute of Peace revealed that in 2009, most Congolese people migrated to such countries as Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia, Belgium, France, Germany, Central African Republic, Canada, and the UK.[24]

The largest group of DRC immigrants is made up of refugees and asylum-seekers who left the country as a consequence of armed conflicts within the DRC borders. *The Human Development Report 2009* estimates that about 68 percent of emigrants from the DRC were living in other African countries and only about 32 percent live in Western countries.[25]

The same document reported that in 2009 about 100,700 persons from the DRC immigrated into the OECD countries of whom 35.5 percent possessed a university-level education, while 25 percent had not completed secondary education, and 32.5 percent possessed some sort of secondary or post-secondary education.[26] It is estimated that only 11 percent of the whole Congolese group that has emigrated since the 2000s hold a higher education level, implying that emigration from the DR Congo has created a diaspora of a relatively lower level of education.[27] Such a number, if verified, would upwardly or downwardly influence the contribution of the DRC diaspora to the economy of their motherland, given particularly that unemployment rate in the DRC diaspora was estimated at 21.8 percent in 2007 according to UNESCO.[28]

There are discrepancies as to the real number of the Congolese emigrants. According to some DRC's estimates based upon a 10-year census (1995–2005), there were about 821,057 emigrants, the majority of whom settled in other African countries. On the contrary, the Committee for Congolese Federation Abroad (CFE) estimated the DRC diaspora is made up of three million members.[29] Additionally, the DRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs proclaimed there are about six million Congolese living abroad. The IOM notes that the discrepancies in the real numbers of the Congolese diaspora in Western countries are due mostly to the lack of trustworthy official data. In 2008, an OCED report indicated that 59 percent of Congolese emigrants have been in their country of residence for over 10 years.[30]

In addition to the civil wars and political instabilities in the country, other causes of Congolese emigration can include a high and fast population growth: 13.5 million in 1958; 30.7 million 1984 in 1984; 68 million in 2010; 79 million in 2013.[31] While life expectancy is estimated at 57 years from birth, the DRC population has grown by 2.45 percent, and the migration rate is estimated at -0.27 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2015 est.) placing the country 130th out of 222 states in the world.[32] The same CIA *Factbook* estimated the DRC urban population at 42.5 percent of the total population (in 2015) representing a significant increase from 30 percent in 2010 (as reported by the

IOM). Particularly noteworthy was the global financial crisis of 2008 that severely affected the economy of the DRC which relies heavily on the mining sector, and exports of raw materials. Exacerbating the already precarious economic landscapes of the DRC are systematic corruption and lingering armed conflicts, which have deteriorated national output and government revenue, and caused the external debt to skyrocket.[33] If, by their nature, authentic diasporas are emotionally attached to their homeland, then to what extent do DRC expats concern themselves with capacity building in their home country?

Leadership and Economic Development

Dysfunctional Leadership

To promote participation of the Congolese diaspora in the development of the country, the Congolese government created a position of Deputy-minister in charge of emigrants in 2006, which is currently held by Honorable Antoine Muyamba Okombo.[34] However, "in addition, the Directorate for Congolese Nationals Abroad was established within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs whose objectives render the above-mentioned vice-ministerial position superfluous".[35]

On the other hand the DRC diaspora has organized itself under a transnational association called "Federation des *Congolais à l'étranger*: FCE" (Congolese Federation Abroad). Headquartered in France, FCE is led by a federal committee whose president resides in the USA. The organization holds several branches in European, African, Asian, and American countries. Although FCE holds yearly meetings, it can hardly estimate the exact number of its members. More importantly, there exist various associations of Congolese diaspora at the national and international level that are committed to social development activities, although to a limited extent.[36]

Despite the apparent organizational leadership of the Congolese government and its diaspora, concrete steps towards a systemic collaboration of both entities still remain nebulous. In all fairness, some initiatives on both sides have taken shape in order to enable the country to benefit from "the competences of its expatriate nationals." Needless to say that these two leaderships remain set apart, and therefore dysfunctional.

Unsettling Emigration Policies

Although the IOM indicates that the DRC did not have a clear immigration policy from its independence up to the 2005, there has been some legal framework on the issue. According to a 2005 IOM report in the DRC,

> There is not a single law on migration in DRC, but several decrees regulating various aspects of migration. The decrees in question are outdated and do not reflect the current structures of the government. Written documents are often confusing, complementing and revoking each other as new ordinances are promulgated. Officials in charge of enforcing those laws often find it hard to do their job.[37]

However, a decree (Decret-Loi No 002/2003 of January 11, 2003 created the Directorate General for Migration (DGM) with the following attributions: to enforce the government's migration policies and organize a police force for foreigners and borders. Additionally, the DGM was to take care of ordinary passports, expanding its responsibilities throughout DRC diplomatic missions and chancelleries. It is noteworthy that the DGM could not carry out its new responsibilities to issue ordinary passports for the simple reason that this role was the prerogative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[38]

First the government of the DRC has established the Directorate General for Migration (DGM) that oversees the migration and movement of the Congolese nationals and foreign population within its territory. Second, the government has charged the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs with the responsibility of supervising the movement of migrant workers. The DRC's document on Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (DSCRP) alludes to a plan to tap into and mobilize the diaspora's resources in an effort to fight poverty. As a member of several regional and sub-regional cooperation groups (including the SADC, ECCAS, ECCAS), that also promote the free movement policy of their nationals within particular regions, the DRC has sought to reach out to its population living outside its boundaries. IOM also indicates that the DRC has signed some cooperation agreements on migration with such countries as Switzerland and Belgium gearing toward the identification of its diaspora and its potential capacity building. However, the lack of political coordination on migration issues has presented a great challenge to the DRC leadership. As a result, its initiatives on the diaspora have yielded no satisfactory results.

The major challenge facing the leadership of the DRC in its immigration policy is the very lack of political coordination. On the surface, public administration appears to be centralized while in reality, national ministries and other institutions don't operate in synch with each other.

In 2006, the DRC referred to migration as one of the major strategies for mobilization of competencies and resources to combat poverty. The Congolese government decided to rely on the success of the experiment dubbed "Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA)" initiated by the IOM. Its purpose was to promote the transfer of intellectual and financial resources of the diaspora for their benefit of the country in general and that of their communities in particular. The DRC, then, decided to design a migration plan for social development.[39] IOM notes that the DRC government has taken similar courses of action, although timid, leading toward a social development rapprochement with its diaspora.

Government and Diaspora Courses of Action

Against the backdrop of the aforementioned resolutions, the DRC government organized a national dialogue followed by forums of Congolese living abroad in Kinshasa from July 30 to August 5, 2008. The above gathering provided an official cadre for "*launching the foundations of partnership between the Congolese State and the Congolese living abroad.*"[40] The forums centered around two major resolutions. One was the creation of a reconstruction fund whose initial amount was estimated at US$ 1 million. The other resolution requested the commitment of the DRC diaspora with expertise in healthcare to lend their support to the country's health sector. However, the effectiveness of the DRC diaspora's contributions rested upon two major conditions, namely the enactment of a dual-citizenship policy and the participation of the diaspora in national elections. These preconditions would entail a major change in the DRC constitution, which holds that Congolese nationality is unique and exclusive.

Besides such sporadic introductory initiatives on the part of the DRC government, mostly marked by political rhetoric without concrete follow-ups, there have been hardly any courses of action leading toward a collaboration for capacity building. However, through individual contributions and networking with international NGOs and other institutions, the diaspora manages to take some socio-development steps that could have made a larger impact had their government provided the infrastructure.

Return Home Operation

In 2009, the IOM reported about a move by certain members of the Congolese diaspora to return back to their country, although the conditions that took them abroad in the first place had not been eradicated. The Deputy-Minister for Congolese in the Diaspora is receiving an increased number of requests regarding opportunities of returning back to the Congo. In general terms, the DRC diaspora intends to return home either for capacity building or for an easy pass that would allow them to travel back and forth from their countries of residence to the DRC where they are eager to invest resources. A forum organized by the DRC's Office of the president in 2008 in Kinshasa came to the same conclusions. The future of Congolese immigration may be undergoing a shift in that many Congolese would move abroad not to settle permanently in their new countries of residence, but rather to acquire the necessary knowledge and resources that could contribute to the reconstruction of the DRC.

Worth mentioning is the important sectorial initiative promoted by the MIDA program whereby the DRC diaspora would briefly return home to teach in institutions of higher learning. Note that this MIDA program for the Great Lakes Region focuses on the diasporas of the three countries of DRC, Rwanda, and Burundi in Belgium. The IOM reports that the program targeting the reinforcement of learning transfer, as well as the transfer of expertise and other resources towards identified countries, embodied four phases.[41] Phase 1 began in 2001 with IOM's evaluation of the needs within the targeted countries as well as the diaspora's contribution to the identified needs. In Phase 2 (2005–2006), MIDA focused on reinforcing institutional capabilities of the targeted countries as far as mobilizing human and financial resources from the diaspora members living in the European Union (EU). In Phase 3, MIDA was intent on solidifying mechanisms of partnership in the public, private, and academic sectors while increasing a coordination autonomy of partners involved. Phase 4 (2008–2012) consisted of supporting the UNDP activities in the sectors of healthcare and good governance within DRC government ministries. With regards to the transfer of knowledge, IOM reports on the specific cases of 26 professors from the DRC diaspora who returned to teach at the University of Lubumbashi. MIDA's partnership with universities in the DRC has also been beneficial to the University of Kinshasa and that of Kisangani. This program has also supported various projects initiated by the DRC diaspora with the purpose of establishing a solid network between those emigrants and their homeland.

Business Investment and Entrepreneurship

Besides this academic partnership, some members of the DRC diaspora who return home for brief journeys, have invested in various businesses particularly hostelry and import/export commerce. Various websites promote the works of NGOs and other organizations that have established socio-economic partnerships with the DRC.[42]

For example, a project called "Professional Mobility between Belgium and the DRC" targeted the development of the DRC by upgrading the skills of the diaspora that could benefit their country of origin. The specific objectives of the project included: (1) promoting and facilitating temporary and circular migration by making visible professional opportunities in the DRC and by enhancing contact with businesses; (2) developing local capacities as far as managing international job markets, and networking with companies; (3) encouraging the diaspora's investment in the social-development of their country of origin; and (4) promoting reflection and political action on the nexus between employment, migration, and development.[43] This project included a more specific conference on "To live, work and do business in the DRC." It provided updated information on the realities and possibilities of living in the DRC, mainly in Kinshasa.

Undertaken in early 2008, following a feasibility study with the Congolese diaspora in Belgium, the project "Mobility between Belgium and the Democratic Republic of Congo" was a response to previously identified needs. It emerged from two factors: first, many members of the DRC diaspora showed a great interest in returning to work in their country of origin provided that they receive a decent work contract; second, many companies in the DRC are looking for dynamic, skilled, and qualified Congolese as human resources. In response to these two realities, and because of discrimination in employment in Belgium, the *Maison Africaine* and the CIRE (Co-ordination and Initiatives for Refugees and Foreigners) joined hands to make visible professional opportunities in the DRC, and facilitate contact between job seekers and companies. In order to respond to the professional expectations of Congolese expatriates living in Belgium, the initiators of this project decided to identify professional opportunities that exist in the DRC main cities of Kinshasa, Matadi, and Lubumbashi. A DRC event in this effect brought together some 250 Congolese from the diaspora. It counted 10 Congolese and Belgian companies established in the DRC. It offered 34 jobs; half of the offers coming from DRC did not respond to the standards of the public employment service in Belgium.[44]

Other entrepreneurial projects include "Support to the Health Center of Kabinda," which allows for foreign specialist physicians to visit the region and impart their experience. Another project "Agricultural recovery and food security for the fight against poverty in the territory of Lomela in Sankuru/Kasai Oriental/RD Congo" consisted of (1) training and equipping agricultural team players trained in the Lomami region; (2) providing farmers and the poorest with seeds of good quality for agricultural production; (3) enhancing the use of tools adapted to the local conditions of production; and (4) promoting cooperative dynamism and encouraging community and individual care support.[45]

Non-profit Sectors

The non-profit sector is also making some inroads as evidenced by Migration4Development initiatives. Take the example of *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit* GmbH (German Agency for Technical Cooperation) (GTZ), which in 2007 undertook a pilot program on behalf of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) promoting the engagement of several diasporas in Germany, including that the DRC, in non-profit sectors. From the onset, GTZ carried out some need-assessment study on the diasporas of each of the 10 countries involved in the program including the DRC. The major goal involved organizing diasporas in Germany to implement joint-projects with GTZ in their home-countries. This pilot study confirmed the extensive use of remittances in the last 10 years in such countries as the DRC, confirming quantitatively the impact of labor migration. The IOM study ascertained that the implementation of joint-projects between a given diaspora and such an institution as the German Development Cooperation can harmonize this sector of development, lending to the perception of the diaspora as partners of development cooperation particularly in the non-profit areas.[46]

Monetary and Material Remittances

Studies have also confirmed that transfer of money from either individuals or non-profits from the diaspora has greatly contributed to better the living conditions of people in home countries. The IOM 2005 document on "Remittances in Great lakes Region" put the remittance figure from the DRC diaspora at US$ 97 million for formal remittances alone.[47] It argues that a relatively small size of the DRC diaspora can explain this low remittance amount. Although the official figure may only show

remittances sent via official mechanisms, the amounts of informal remittances are likely to amount to a much higher figure.

The same study indicated that more money is transferred, particularly from Belgium, through Money Transfer Companies (MTOs), 22 of which are recognized by the DRC's Central Bank.[48] Besides, international outlets such as Western Union and MoneyGram count among the major transfer venues of money remittances the DRC's diaspora routinely utilizes. However, monetary remittances from the DRC diaspora to their homeland represented only one side of the development impact of the diaspora. Equally important is the involvement of Congolese expatriates in non-monetary and non-profit endeavors. This growing non-profit sector, although hardly quantifiable, has grown qualitatively in the last few years.

In sum, it appears that remittances to the DRC operate as a transfer of funds, but more and more as a transfer of materials. This influx of material goods contributes to the development of activities in the informal sector, which makes a greater proportion of the economic activities.[49] In addition to the transfer of cash used to cover the immediate needs of the beneficiaries, there is also an important transfer of direct goods such as cars, computers, medical equipment, and the like. The IOM notes that the lack of reliable statistics makes it difficult to estimate the real impact of remittance on the overall economy of the country.[50]

Surprisingly, the CIA *Factbook* reported that the economy of the DRC has slowly recovered since the big crisis of 2008. The informal sector represents a major part of the DRC economy as most families depend on this form of economy for their sustenance. It is noteworthy that this informal economy is in large majority fueled by Congolese living in the diaspora through the phenomenon of remittance. According to various sources, about 80 percent of families (particularly in the largest cities of the DRC (Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, and Kananga) depend on remittances from the diaspora for their sustenance, indicating that informal channels are mainly responsible for making the transfer of money.

The above courses of action underscore the dysfunctional nature of the collaboration between the Congolese government represented by the deputy-minister in charge of the diaspora and its expatriates. Most of the aforementioned development initiatives are one-sided from their inceptions: either individual members of the DRC diaspora promote them or international institutions would take them off the ground in conjunction

with DRC expatriates. Taking everything into account, the Congolese government appears to be laid back or absent, underscoring the dysfunctionality of its leadership.

Considering Shortcomings

Despite the seemingly positive impacts the diaspora makes in the social-development of the DRC, particularly in the areas of remittances and non-profit assistance, a study by de Bruyn et al. highlights two shortfalls worth mentioning.[51] First, remittances, in general, have a micro-economic impact as they respond directly to the needs of the beneficiary families. However, investment of money transfer faces many hurdles including insufficient funds, lack of information and of institutional protection, lack of experience, and under-development of the banking system. This study also reveals the increasing dependence of many DRC families on the diaspora's remittances. In fact, some households identify those money transfers as regular incomes; they do not strive to secure alternative funding sources for their basic needs.

Second, the authors identify brain-drain and illegal immigration as another huge challenge facing the DRC government. On the one hand the Congolese government faces the growing socio-economic instabilities seen as the main cause of illegal migration. On the other hand, the same government has negotiated with external partners, namely some EU countries to crackdown on want-to-be-illegal immigrants from the DRC, and supported the repatriation of scientific and technical members of the diaspora.[52] The study maintained that these two quagmires find their resolutions only in the course of public opinion because of the inadequacy of the DRC government to deal with them. Although the cost of brain-drain on the DRC has not been evaluated, migration affects mostly young Congolese between the age of two and 35 according to the same study. This phenomenon can modify the age pyramid in the country while depriving it of invaluable qualified workers particularly in the medical fields.

As opposed to the brain-drain viewpoint, some African leaders and scholars have put forward the concept of "Brain-bank." Expressing his enthusiasm at the massive participation of the South African diaspora in the general elections of 2009, the Government spokesperson Themba Maseko was quoted as saying, "that the eagerness of the South African expatriates who voted abroad in the general elections could be seen as a

brain-bank for the country."[53] By the same token Congolese living abroad are likely to improve the country's image overseas in addition to bringing investment, knowledge, and skills back into their motherland. This new perception of the brain-bank (as opposed to the brain-drain) has caused South Africa to put forth some organizations, such as the Homecoming Revolution, and the International Marketing Council's Global South Africans Network, to enhance connections between South African living abroad and their home country. The same can be said of the DRC, which has put forth a Vice-ministry for its brain-banking in foreign territories albeit with a lack of serious follow-up.[54]

Engaging Leadership and Diaspora

It is needless to state that little can be accomplished in terms of capacity building in the DRC in the current dysfunctional state of (lack of) collaboration between the leadership of the DRC and that of its diaspora. Rather than pointing the finger of blame exclusively to either the government or the leadership of the diaspora, how can we engage both sides to work for the common good, namely the socio-development of the motherland? One way recommended by leaders in critical/political theory and leadership ethics including Habermas and Greenleaf is the use of public sphere, which traditional Africans knew as "African Baobab Tree."[55] Concretely, this concept calls for a two-way communication between opposite sides of the village in order to agree on a middle-ground course of action and engage in new and progressive marching order that would benefit the whole polity. Therefore, there ought to be friendly meetings whereby both leaderships (representatives of DRC Ministry to Expatriates and those of the Federation of Congolese in the Diaspora—FCE) would sit at a negotiation table to discuss this matter of national importance.

For such a dialogue to happen in a fruitful manner, conveners should examine and commit to the basic principles of ethical leadership of respect to those holding opposite views, service to the people of the DRC, justice and fairness to the people of the DRC, honesty, and community building.[56] These ethical leadership prerequisites may come down to a self-examination of the common reproofs addressed to either side. However, the most constructive strategy to advance that two-way winning communication for the home-country ought to compel each side to bring their contributing strengths to the "Baobab Tree." Do the DRC leadership and its diaspora

worldwide have any collaborative efforts to show for as far as capacity building? What should the DRC learn from the nexus between governments and emigrants of other countries?

Mutual Contributions

Various DRC diasporas have attempted to tackle impasses of capacity building in their home country. Those contributions, including that of the DRC government are to be brought to the fore front of the Baobab Tree negotiations. For example, in their report on "What is next for the Democratic Republic of the Congo? Recommendations from a Trans-Atlantic Diaspora Dialogue," authors Dorina Bekoe and Michelle Sweringen provide a summary of a trans-Atlantic DRC diaspora dialogue organized by the US Institute of Peace (USIP) in October 2009.[57] The main purpose of the dialogue was to contribute to strengthening the DRC capacity building through an examination of the best strategies for (1) "delinking mining from the war economy", (2) strengthening the private sector, (3) building and enforcing a zero tolerance policy for corruption. Participants in this dialogue included various economic sectors such as non-profit organizations, entrepreneurs, professors in various fields, and other scholars who came up with specific and broader recommendations not only for the mining sectors but also for the overall capacity building for the DRC.

Conversely, the DRC could use its natural resources to leverage its role as an attraction center for researchers, traders, and business people.[58] The recent trend by the Congolese diaspora to return to their country is also due to the enforcement of the measures to control the migratory movement within Schengen territory, as well as the tracking on illegal migrants. As a consequence the DRC has organized various campaigns discouraging school students and the youth from illegal migration and warning them about its dangers. For example, some national NGOs and churches have organized what is called "operation *vanda na mkoka* (in Lingala: Stay in the country) discouraging illegal migration. The EU and many other diplomatic missions have supported the above initiatives by reducing the amount of visas issued to people from the DRC.[59]

Additionally, the diaspora would commit to representing a positive force for the social development of the DRC. This is contrary to the perceptions in the political arenas and popular media of a diaspora that is less of a civil society than an opposition force to the sitting government.

On the other hand, the government promises to reverse the perception that its leadership is an institutionalized corruption operative that has no people's interest in mind, by bringing to the Baobab Tree some samples of past, present, and future commitments and actions to bettering the living conditions of the people.

That the DRC has created a vice-ministry for Congolese living abroad represents a good step towards an overdue systemic collaboration with the diaspora. Current policies and immigration programs, although still not completely enforced, are meant to force positive effects of the diaspora on the socio-development of the country. Institutionally, the diaspora should bring to the table a blueprint of the coordination of its own leadership, activities, initiatives, and projects. The unfortunate reality reveals that the current state of DRC diaspora is uncoordinated and non-synergized within countries, states, provinces, and even cities.

The diaspora commits to increasing its remittances through investment by becoming more proactive in "seeking assistance to reduce cost and to institutionalize financial transfers turning these into a more meaningful tool for investment in the DRC."[60] The government accepts to provide more institutionalized structures and more efficiency in the transfer of money and other goods.

Both the diaspora and the government bring mechanisms to strengthen their bonds and channel their investment into the DRC. The government commits to getting rid of its perceived hostility toward the diaspora community by making it easy for the diaspora to involve in Congolese social development affairs. While the government presents its blueprint of investment in support of the diaspora, the latter promises to return the favor by adopting a positive and proactive attitude toward their homeland.

The diaspora comes with a blueprint to raise awareness about the benefit for the international community to invest in the DRC. One way of doing this is to "inform donor organizations and others of opportunities in DRC: Participate in/organize a symposium/practical workshop for interested donor organizations, and potential investors, to discuss investment opportunities in Congo and where to find the resources for that investment."[61]

Learning from Other Countries

In a report on "What we know about diasporas and economic development", The Migration Policy Institute (MPI) concluded that the impact of diasporas on economic development can be felt in three main areas:

trade, investments, and transfer of skills and knowledge.[62] Collaboration between countries and diasporas hastens the implementation of policies and strategies leading to the success of these economic areas. Examples abound of countries whose leadership and diasporas have worked together to provide noticeable boosts for the socio-development of their citizenries.

To facilitate the diaspora's investment into the country, "Senegal has established an investment fund for Senegalese abroad, which has financed 804 projects worth a total of 20 billion CFA francs ($40 million)."[63] Many other countries such as Liberia have considered a similar arrangement with and for their Diaspora.[64] India holds deposit accounts for Non-resident Indians (NRI), which in 2008 yielded over US$ 40 billion, the equivalent of "[between] one-sixth and one-third" of the country's external debt.[65]

Ghana took advantage of the IOM-managed project known as the Migration and Development in Africa (MIDA) to turn to its medical professionals in the diaspora in order to fill gaps in medical training and services.[66] More than 100 Ghanaian health professionals residing in Europe participated in training 21,000 health workers and students who took part in the training and education program.[67]

Chile has established a program called *ChileGlobal*, a talent network of highly skilled Chileans abroad. Through this joint-agency, the government of Chile promotes and facilitates the development of key economic clusters in Chile through the reinforcement of cooperation venues with expatriate Chileans who commit their time, experience, contacts, knowledge, and skills to help Chilean companies to globalize. *ChileGlobal* includes about 400 influential members of the diaspora dedicated to designing and financing innovation business projects in the production and services sectors. Additionally, *ChileGlobal* engages in boosting human capital to increase productivity and promote transfers of technology "to and from Chile." As a result, as of 2011, *ChileGlobal* succeeded in helping to create 76 companies with more than 50 Chilean and international partners including private corporations, institutions of higher learning, and technology companies.[68]

The experience of Korea also shows that its economy successfully improved as a consequence of an enabling environment combined with shared national vision between the government and the diaspora. South Korea came up with the slogan *we can live well, too* in the 1960s, which it built against the backdrop of a national vision of industrialization. It made its diaspora of *friendly troops* in Japan the partners or cornerstone of the technological complex it eventually established in Seoul.[69]

Steps of Leadership Engagement

Both the DRC leadership and its diaspora can set up some essentials for a win-win communication; they can examine their mutual contributions to the conversation and learn from the experience of other countries. In so doing, parties should be well endowed for a serious beginning. The question then remains as to which starting point would constitute a concrete and serious basis for a collaboration that leads toward the social development of the DRC Congo?

In its *Developing a Road Map for Engaging Diaspora in Development*, the IOM provides very insightful details worth adapting to the contexts of the DRC.[70] A reworked and adapted roadmap is paramount to a successful two-way communication under the African Baobab Tree, whose setting should be a neutral location easily accessible to both the representative of the diaspora and those of the government. Needless to underscore that both the DRC and the diaspora ought to bear a high level of open-mindedness with the sole goal of promoting the social development of their homeland. A commitment to this goal is likely to consider a leadership marching order including: identification of goals, building trust, fostering synergy, mobilizing stakeholders, and implementing effective engagement.[71] Figure 10.1 adapted from the *Road Map for Diaspora Engagement* proposed by the MPI sums up the major themes the leadership of the DRC and its diaspora can carry to the Baobab Tree.[72]

Identify Goals and Capacities

Once at the baobab tree, the first step for both the leadership of the DRC and that of its diaspora is to identify their own goals and define the tools to attain those goals. Some of the currently burning goals may consist of "making the business climate in the DRC fair and incentivizing" or facilitating members of the DRC diaspora's efforts to transfer skills to the homeland. The DRC leadership should see those goals as an integral part of development planning. DRC's diaspora effort is likely to succeed when the basic elements of good governance are integrated into development planning.[73] One way of achieving this goal may require the creation of a Consultative Institute of Expatriate Congolese Abroad (*Institut de Consultation des Congolais à l'étranger*) (ICCE). This DRC–diaspora-run institution would make recommendations to the DRC leadership about the expatriates' policies, and engage in various discussions with

Figure 1. Steps of Leadership
Engagement under Baobab Tree

DRC Government

DRC Diaspora

Goal and Capacity Identification

- Harmonize goals with diaspora resources
- Take leadership

- Provide inventory of Diaspora's projects at national, regional, and local level

Building Trust

- Improve business transparency, rule of law
- Combat bribe, corruption
- Create joint-diaspora decision making

- Communication with D.R.C Leadership
- Show unity of cells
- Ban questionable behaviors
- Engage in healthy competition

Create Cohesiveness

- Harmonize government services
- Ministry to diaspora
- Know diaspora
- Coordinate Census of diaspora by diaspora

- Coordination
- Unify diaspora's cells
- Empowering FCE
- Conduct Data Collection
- Conduct diaspora Census

Mobilize Stake Holders

- Create profile Events
- Work with FCE
- Transfer philanthropic funds
- Diaspora Day
- Recognize diaspora merits

- Participate in home-land event
- Work with D.R.C to select spokespersons
- Volunteer expertise and services
- Integrate development planning and policy implementation

Fig. 10.1   Steps of leadership engagement under Baobab Tree

regard to the diaspora and the institute. In addition to the courses of action discussed above, the diaspora ought to provide an inventory of the past, present, and foreseeable projects it has undertaken in the homeland.

Given the ultimate objective for both the DRC leadership and the diaspora to engage in capacity building, a blueprint should be in place on both sides in order to attain that vision. However, currently, the

government's rhetoric reflects a more political agenda whereas its divided diaspora scatters its efforts in addressing isolated economic avenues. For example, the current vice-minister for the DRC diaspora, Mr. Antoine Muyamba was quoted as urging the diaspora to back a bill that would allow expatriates to vote, and be elected for public offices. The caveat however is that the bill calls for a complete census of diaspora cells in order to determine the eligibility of their members. Such a census is likely to take years, allowing an undue extension of Kabila's term and, therefore, the likelihood for the deputy-minister to remain in power.

Regarding the legitimate question of the DRC rights to participate in the elections of their home country's leaders, Bongila's (2013) book on this topic is worth mentioning.[74] Here also, the author advocates for the "African Baobab Tree" as a suitable ethical leadership approach that calls for both the concerned government and its diaspora to set specific modalities had such elections to occur. The book also implies that granting election rights to the diaspora would both recognize the diaspora's investment in the DRC and allow the expats to have a say on the direction their capacity building would take. However, there is a danger for the DRC government to not deliver on its promise to dialogue with the diaspora if the latter maintains the rights to elections as a pre-condition to a serious involvement in capacity building. With or without rights to elections, the diaspora has had a proven record of its participation in the development of the DRC. As presented above, that participation has been met with a number of hurdles, which may be more easily negotiated with the government than the elections rights (see Fig. 10.1).

Building Trust

Leadership ethics requires trust building as a major prerequisite for a two-way communication. As the Congolese leadership and its diaspora meet under the Baobab Tree to build partnerships, the chances of success are high if the dialogue is built upon good communication and mutual trust. In an effort to build mutual trust, it is critically important for the conveners on both sides to reject two pre-conceived notions. One stems from the notion that the government representatives are all corrupt and engage the diaspora for political gains. The second notion to reject is that diaspora is made up of a bunch of trouble-makers "*combattants*" or "*collaborateurs*" (snitches) or are all opponents to the established government in the DRC.[75] In a move of good will, when asked about "the *combattants*," his honorable Antoine

Muyamba Okombo Makengo, Deputy-Minister to Congolese Emigrants, would not approve of the negative connotation attached to "combattants" as Congolese expatriate thugs. He rather referred to them as "our children who display a little too much energy." On the other hand the diaspora should show unity and good conduct by denouncing and reprimanding behaviors that made them "combatants" or trouble-makers in the first place. Instead, DRC members of the diaspora should shine through healthy competition—as opposed to dress fashions—and by the quantity and quality of their businesses and the amount of people they employ.

For the DRC government, building trust may involve the creation of a favorable environment for the members of the diaspora to engage in development endeavors. The DRC government should commit to improving the current domestic business climate by implementing greater transparency in regulations and licensing requirements, and by fostering the rule of law.

In order for any investment in the DRC to gain credibility and attractiveness, there remains one major lingering obstacle the government ought to tackle urgently, namely the collection of taxes in form of bribes at every street corner. Dorina Bekoe and Michelle Swearngen report that this endemic petty corruption stems from low wages, the lack of minimum wage, the need for survival, and a culture of impunity.[76]

To those petty corruptions, which should be dealt with as an urgent matter, participants in the 2009 Diaspora Dialogue rightly included "Grand corruption." This cancerous behavior is "fostered and even encouraged by the institutionalized system of political patronage along with a lack of transparency and impunity from prosecution."

While the creation of a vice-ministry position for the diaspora has brought confidence in building trust, the government should seriously invest in communication with its diaspora. The DRC may follow the example of Mexico which implemented a joint diaspora-government decision-making, using the FCE as one of the communication platforms.[77] To build partnership trust, the DRC can also consider offering to its diaspora such privileges as "duty-free imports of goods, tax-free repatriation of foreign-currency income, and ability to buy assets or hold jobs normally reserved for resident citizens."[78]

The DRC can sponsor cultural events, including Martyrs of Independence Day (January 4), "Independence Day (June 30) that would include the presence of its diaspora. In its effort to build trust with its diaspora, Ghana and several African countries passed laws

permitting dual citizenship. The DRC can follow suit by considering extending the suffrage rights to its expatriates and/or permitting dual citizenship. "Dual citizenship is one signal that a government can send that it trusts people who have multiple commitments to meet all the obligations of full citizenship"[79] (see Fig. 10.1).

Cohesiveness or Synergy

In spite of some positive messages on the part of the DRC government with regards to involving its diverse diaspora, a two-way communication is yet to be established to engage the powers of the latter. Up to this point, both entities have been working in isolation with the diaspora looking for ways to obtain policies and measures that would ease its investment in capacity building, and the government cautiously hesitant in pursuing a genuine dialogue with the diaspora. The odds of a meaningful and productive result are greater in the event of a continued synergetic collaboration between the DRC leadership and its diaspora.

Synergy has to occur at various levels: within the DRC's government units in charge of the diaspora, within the various cells of the numerous DRC diasporas, and between representatives of those diasporas and the DRC government. As mentioned above, besides the vice-ministry to the Congolese Abroad, the DRC government has also created within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs a Directorate for Congolese Nationals Abroad. The presence of these two overlapping entities within the government results in a lack of synergy and coordination. In practice, it appears that the Vice-Ministry to the Diaspora has taken precedence as far as meddling timidly with the diaspora affairs. On the other hand, there exist myriads of uncoordinated DRC diasporas spread throughout the world, each with its own agenda. An empowered Congolese Federation Abroad (FCE) would take on the responsibility to identify those small diaspora units, and reconstruct and restructure them in ways that channel leadership and information throughout.

Therefore, building cohesiveness between DRC diasporas calls for both the Vice-Ministry to the Diaspora and FCE to identify and get to know the diaspora. As suggested by IOM, this involves a laborious but delicate task of diaspora census including a comprehensive data collection, mapping the locations of small diaspora units, and compiling inventories of skills and experience.[80] Because a motion to uphold a diaspora census can be marred by political calculations (from the government) and suspicions on the

diaspora's side, if initiated by the DRC, this activity should be detached from any diaspora's policies and regulations of the moment. For example, a proposal for dual citizenship would not depend on whether a census of the diaspora has been completed; neither should presidential elections be delayed pending the completion of this activity.

Instead, the DRC leadership can learn from the Indian government, which in 2002 appointed a High-Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora to conduct a census of an estimated 20 million nonresident Indians and persons of Indian origin. This two-year exercise included the analysis of diaspora location, situation, and potential expertise, and yielded results that fostered synergetic efforts in capacity building in India.[81] To avoid overstretching its diaspora effort, the DRC leadership could work with FCE to complete a similar census. Additionally the DRC leadership could rely on embassies and consular officers of destination countries to collect data on the place of birth and ancestry of DRC expatriates who currently reside in their countries (see Fig. 10.1).

Mobilize Stakeholders

After establishing goals, building trust between the DRC and its diasporas, and building a basis for a synergic partnership, the next step in leadership engagement will consist of mobilizing stakeholders (government, diaspora, and civil society). What the diaspora is looking for in order to participate actively in capacity building of the DRC is summarized in this most single following point: "make the business climate in the DRC fair and incentivizing." The DRC is infamously recognized for its cumbersome taxes and complicated customs processes. The World Bank's 2015 Doing Business Report rated the DRC 184 out of 189 countries.[82] Participants in the USI Peace Briefing observed that "investment flows to the DRC are reportedly constrained by cumbersome regulations, excessive taxation and corruption. On average, a business owner will be required to make 32 different tax payments per year, costing them up to 322 percent of their profit."[83] This costly and convoluted process has led to a fragmentation of the private sector into many segments, including thriving illicit and informal markets.[84]

The DRC vice-ministry to the diaspora and the "Federation des *Congolais à l'étranger*: FCE" (Congolese Federation Abroad) should work hand-in-hand to implement mechanisms to stir expatriates' enthusiasm in belonging and investing in their homeland. This can translate in

the creation of an independent and accountable strategy for the transfer of philanthropic funds from the diaspora to the DRC. Israel leads the way with its American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee—governed exclusively by members of the diaspora—raising an estimate of US$ 1billion per year in philanthropic contribution.[85] The DRC can modestly start with hundreds of dollars yearly. According to the IOM, a philanthropic cooperation between the DRC and its diaspora could enjoy tax benefits or other incentives in host countries (see Fig. 10.1).

Other strategies to mobilize stakeholders may include high-profile events, such as DRC Diaspora Day honoring all expatriates, which will also see the participation in the DRC of delegates from different diasporas. There can be established as an annual celebratory gathering of the expatriates and descendants of DRC emigrants, recognizing members of diaspora that have made a significant contribution to the country or have exemplified outstanding professional distinctions. Still in the effort to mobilizing expatriates, the DRC leadership can appoint some members of the diaspora to be spokespersons on issues concerning the diaspora, sponsoring travels to the DRC for volunteer programs, opinion meetings, and youth empowerment.

Conclusion

This abbreviated overview of the level of collaboration between the DRC leadership and its diaspora regarding capacity building reveals a level of leadership dysfunctionality and unsettling immigration policies. However each side has engaged in some uncoordinated courses of action contributing to improving some sectors of the DRC socio-economic apparatus. For example, the various cells of the DRC diaspora have often undertaken development projects in conjunction with international institutions such as MIDA. In spite of the DRC's creation of a deputy-ministry for the diaspora, there appears to be a noticeable lack of synergy within the organs of the DRC leadership in charge of the diaspora, between that ministry and the diaspora, as well as within the various cells of the diaspora. To bring about a two-way communication between both sides of the DRC citizenry, this chapter proposes the use of African Baobab Tree as a platform to harmonize the dialogue between the DRC leadership and its expatriates. It draws from the leadership ethics tradition and holds that, like in traditional Africa when a village would unite under a baobab tree to settle critical issues of socio-political nature, both the DRC leadership and its diaspora would reflect on the critical importance of working together for the

development of their homeland. Both sides would come committed to the ethical leadership values of respect for others, service to others, justice and fairness, honesty, and above all community building as they walk through the steps of leadership and diaspora engagement this book chapter has suggested. A well-coordinated and synergized collaboration between the DRC leadership and its talented and multifaceted diaspora is likely to result in great dividends for the social and economic development of the homeland. Ultimately, the success of this endeavor depends on the effectiveness of the DRC leadership to put in place appropriate emigration measures and adequate means in order to create a favorable environment for a unified and coordinated diaspora to breed business and unleash entrepreneurship.

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Jean-Pierre K. Bongila is the founding director of the University of St. Thomas' (MN) International Leadership Program in the department of Leadership, Policy and Administration. He serves as a tenured member of the core doctoral faculty with expertise in international, educational, and ethical leadership. He pursues a quest for the development of "Global Positioning Leadership" as a critical exposure to global realities by seeking practical responses to emerging issues. He teaches doctoral courses including "Power, Freedom and Change" and "Ethical Dimensions of Leadership," and has led a yearly graduate course "Leadership in the International Contexts" of South Africa, Tanzania, Cuba, and Brazil. His publications include *Grounding Leadership Ethics in African Diaspora and Election Rights* (New York: Lexington Books, 2013), and *Chaos in Theatre, a Grand Guignol of Actors' & Directors' Worst Nightmares* (http://heartlandplays. com). He is a member of the International Leadership Association (ILA) and African Studies Association (ASA), and holds the University of St. Thomas' Global citizenship Award (2011).

Brain Drain or Brain Gain? Leveraging Zambia's Diaspora Dividend

Ndangwa Noyoo

INTRODUCTION

Zambia attained its independence on October 24, 1964. Previously, the country was a British colony that had been ruled directly by Britain from 1924 to 1964. Prior to this, it was under the rule of the British Empire's proxy, the British South Africa Company (BSAC), which was headed by the arch imperialist Cecil John Rhodes from 1911 to 1924. During the BSAC's rule there was not much development that took place in the two territories of North-Eastern and North-Western Rhodesia—which were amalgamated in 1924 to form Northern Rhodesia after direct British colonial rule was instituted—as the BSAC only focused on extracting raw materials and cheap labor from these territories. Even during direct British rule, not much was done in raising the quality of life of the local population. This, despite the fact that Northern Rhodesia was already by the early 1930s, a leading exporter of minerals such as tin, lead, and especially, copper. Copper was a highly sought after commodity in Europe at the time and thus earned the colony of Northern Rhodesia and Britain high export revenues. Although

N. Noyoo (✉)
Department of Social Development, University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa

Britain created substantial social infrastructure for the European settler population residing along the urban enclave, dotted along the only rail line in the country, the majority of the African population was not catered for by the colonial authorities and had existed in a state of mass and chronic poverty. Thus the task of educating and providing health-care to Africans was usually undertaken by several missionary Christian organizations in the colony. Furthermore, the British colonial authorities had not placed any premium on creating substantial education infrastructure in the country. That is why Zambia had about 109 university graduates at independence. Other human development indicators paint a less-encouraging picture. For instance, 73 percent of African males were illiterate—in the sense that they had never completed four years of primary schooling. For a population of 3.4 million at independence, there were 10,000 beds, less than 700 nurses and less than 400 doctors, meaning that there were fewer than three hospital beds per thousand of the population.[1]

However, this dreary situation dramatically changed when the first African government, which was led by the United National Independence Party (UNIP) and Zambia's founding president, Kenneth Kaunda, set into motion a process of rapid development, which achieved resounding successes in just half a decade. By 1966, the University of Zambia (UNZA) was completed and ready to receive the first batch of Zambian students. At the time, the UNIP government was very sensitive to the question of African liberation, black economic empowerment, and the general advancement of Zambians. This was before the former became obsessed with the notion of staying in power at the cost of the country's progress. Nevertheless, these were the UNIP government's clarion call during the fight for independence and the party would remain committed to these ideals until it was voted out of power in 1991 (although the ideals became more rhetorical at this stage). Fortuitously, at independence, Zambia inherited a prosperous mining-based, but mono-economy. At independence and previously, the wealth of the country was not in the hands of the indigenous people. Therefore, in order to attain positive development outcomes in both the social and economic sectors, the UNIP government fast-tracked an ambitious and fast-paced program that sought to develop the new independent country's economy, infrastructure, and the social development sphere. Through these measures, the government attempted to erase the inherited legacy of colonialism characterized by high levels of poverty, ignorance, disease, and hunger. Hence, the new government made efforts to abolish any remaining

vestiges of racial discrimination and segregation, the maintenance of individual liberties, and the achievement of African Democratic Socialism, by raising the standard of living, achieving a more equitable distribution of wealth, humanizing social security (in particular free health services and expanded educational facilities), and generally promoting trade, industry, and agriculture in the interest of the people.[2]

A policy known as Zambianization was also developed for the country immediately after independence. This policy was regarded as an avenue that could empower locals through formal employment (it was later extended to other sectors as well). According to the founding president of Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda, Zambianization sought to create the greater sharing of wealth, ending of exclusiveness and racial privilege, and the opening up of opportunities to Zambians, who had been denied all elements of good life—education, health, responsibility, and fair return for labor.[3] Furthermore, the UNIP government built many colleges and specialized institutions such as those for nurses and teachers, and also many secondary and primary schools across Zambia. Investments had also extended to agriculture because during colonial rule commercial agriculture was exclusively undertaken by the white settler population. All the above-mentioned positive strides were financed by copper revenues as copper prices had soared on the back of World War II demands and later, the Vietnam War, in the early 1960s. Therefore, the UNIP government had managed to expand the inherited colonial socio-economic infrastructure and transform Zambia's social conditions due to high copper prices. It looked like nothing could go wrong. However, the UNIP government had not been wise enough and had failed to diversify the economy as copper remained the sole major export of the country for a long time. Even to date copper continues to be Zambia's economic mainstay.

DETERIORATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS AND THE ONSET OF THE BRAIN DRAIN

Zambia's economic fortunes would drastically diminish when the world economic recession of 1973 set in. This global economic downturn was precipitated by the oil embargo which had been orchestrated by mostly Arab countries from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). This embargo was mainly targeted at the USA which was seen as giving Israel an undue advantage in the Arab-Israeli War of 1973. Other

Western nations that had supported Israel were also targeted. However, this situation took on global proportions as the days went by. Hence, the "oil crisis" led to a commodity price collapse and a reduction in export revenues. In the ensuing crisis, Zambia had to turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank for assistance due to bad economic management strategies. So began the long history of Bank and Fund interventions in the Zambian economy. In return for loans, Zambia was required to implement Bank and Fund endorsed economic policies over three decades. Unfortunately, this period is a sad story of increasing debt, economic stagnation or collapse, and social crisis. After the external economic shocks suffered in the early 1970s, Zambia's total external debt had doubled to US$ 6.916 million by the end of the 1980s.[4] The second world recession of 1979 only cemented Zambia's economic woes and weak economic standing. Export earnings plummeted and socio-economic conditions in the country also worsened, thus leaving many Zambians poor and vulnerable. This dire economic situation was also compounded by lack of savings by the UNIP government during periods of high copper prices. Instead of accumulating savings, the UNIP government had increased expenditure on social and physical infrastructure, imported luxury goods, and assisted parastatal and private companies' manufacturing profits. Furthermore, extensive state intervention gave rise to bureaucratization, corruption, and uncertainty. This discouraged productive private investment and foreign trade initiatives.[5] It can be said that the UNIP government's socio-economic programs' Achilles heel were the centralized welfare state, a one-sided industrialization strategy based on copper mining with declining commodity prices, and the neglect of the agricultural sector and infrastructure, such as transport, water, energy, and health, which in effect transformed Zambia into one of the poorest countries in Africa.[6]

The foregoing deteriorating socio-economic and human development conditions had a negative knock-on effect on the living standards of millions of Zambians. Many struggled to meet their daily needs. As the economy plummeted, many professionals had to eke out a living in very precarious and untenable situations. Many of them resorted to moonlighting in order to earn extra income so as to sustain their livelihoods. This is the environment in which the country's brain drain was initially sown. Before proceeding, it is important to define some of the theoretical and conceptual issues that underpin this discussion. This exercise is needed in order to proffer clarity in regard to the issues under examination in this chapter.

DEFINING THE BRAIN DRAIN

It must be borne in mind that the brain drain is not only a Zambian phenomenon but it is something that is also experienced by countries in the developing world in general and Africa in particular, in significant proportions. It is aptly referred to, in the context of the former locales, as the *brain drain* because these areas have very few skilled people to head key sectors of their countries' economies. When a significant number of trained people leave these places it almost results in the hemorrhaging of national economies. Suffice it to say, definitions of brain drain or skilled emigration are generally imprecise, both conceptually and in terms of data sources. The lack of reliable data is caused by the inability of countries of origin to keep records of their emigrants. It is surprising that the exact interpretation of brain drain by countries of origin in the underdeveloped South is unclear, which means that the concept denotes what the countries of destination in the developed North define it to be.[7]

It is also worth mentioning the fact that the brain drain has increased with the rise in globalization. The easy flow of communication and the ability by people to travel long distances due to improved modes of transportation has also helped to accelerate the brain drain. Therefore, the brain drain is part of international migration which is also part of an even larger social and economic process that has been helping to transform the world in recent decades, namely, globalization.[8] In addition the drivers of international mobility are not only economic but they are also cultural and political. For example, the strong diasporic networks that encourage people to view emigration as perfectly normal, and which provide a supportive environment for managing the complex processes of mobility are crucial in defining migration patterns. Important also are the pro-skills immigration policies that most developed countries have now put in place to attract those with skills in certain labor fields. Such policies do not only recruit skilled migrants directly through application of a range of preferential measures, but also indirectly through international education policies. Nevertheless, any adequate explanation of the phenomenon of brain drain, therefore, needs to consider both its objective and subjective dimensions.[9]

The migration of highly trained people out of Africa, often called the "brain drain" or "brain loss" leaves many nations short of skills to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century. This phenomenon is not new to

Africa. It began in the 1960s following independence and has continued ever since.[10] There are many reasons behind the brain drain, especially in Africa:

> The causes of brain drain are generally understood according to the push-pull theory. The push factors relate to unfavorable conditions in Africa that motivate people to leave. They include, among others, job security, low wages, crime, armed conflicts, political repressions, and poor educational systems. The pull factors describe the favorable conditions in the receiving countries that help Africans move abroad. They include, among others, higher salaries, greater mobility, less bureaucratic control, safety of environment, and a higher standard of living.[11]

It must be noted that the brain drain did not always result in Zambians leaving the country, but it also saw locally based professionals moving from the public sector to the private sector, or better paying parastatals. In the process, the public sector lost many skilled individuals and thus it had weak capacities to drive Zambia's development. Nevertheless, the "leaving for greener pastures" was the main form that the brain drain took in Zambia. For instance, UNZA, as with other institutions and sectors, suffered a brain drain because Zambia offered low university salaries, especially when compared to other countries in the sub-region where university faculty and teachers had better remunerations in Botswana, South Africa, and Namibia. These economic factors and the less-than-motivating working environment contributed considerably to the brain drain.[12] For those who had left the country to other countries in the Southern African region, pull factors of salaries and conditions of service seemed to have been the main reasons. In effect, the brain drain led to a serious skills deficit in the country. As, the brain drain unfolded, it was discovered that over 600 medical graduates trained between 1977 and 2000 in Lusaka, only 50 were still working in the Zambian public sector health service in 2000. Crucially, it was not just the economic downturn that was the push factor behind the brain drain. The deteriorating political situation in the country had also provided impetus to the brain drain. After being a multi-party democracy at independence in 1964, the UNIP government opted to change the independence constitution in December 1972. Henceforth, Zambia became a one-party state until 1991. This situation effectively closed the political space as all opposition parties were banned. The UNIP government and Kaunda became

extremely autocratic after this and harassed, detained, or blacklisted any person or social formation that had sought to challenge their tyrannical rule. All dissenting voices were silenced and Kaunda and his UNIP government became almost omnipotent. It is also important to highlight the fact that the educated class in Zambia was in the lead in fighting against the rising tide of dictatorship in the country.

Due to the foregoing, Kaunda and the UNIP government began targeting vociferous intellectuals or tertiary institutions that had become opposition hotbeds against dictatorship in Zambia such as UNZA. Also, in the same league were journalists and the clergy who fought for democracy and human dignity. In the process, the UNIP government went out of its way to muzzle the press. Due to the unhealthy political environment, many educated Zambians decided to leave the country for better opportunities as they were targeted by the one-party state regime. It is contended in this discussion that Zambia's notoriety as regards the maltreatment and non-appreciation of its professionals and technocrats is a relic of the one-party state which seems to have endured to even present times despite this system's demise in 1991. In the one-party state where capabilities were overlooked for sycophancy, professionals were constantly vilified and hounded by the political establishment. Infamous pronouncements by political leaders like: "You will die with your degree" or "Do not bite the hand that feeds you" were meant to reinforce the notion that intellectuals were a problem and not national assets. Independent thinkers, predominantly from the intellectual class, were anathema to the one-party state regime.[13] In addition, poor conditions of service and limited employment opportunities only accelerated the emigration of professionals to more developed economies.

When the late second president of Zambia, Frederick Chiluba, and the Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) came into power, the culture of undervaluing intellectuals was simply extended and concretized. There was just no respite for intellectuals and professionals during this period. For example, when medical doctors went on strike and demanded better salaries and working conditions, they were simply dismissed and even taunted by the then Minister of Health, Michael Sata, that they could go to neighboring countries if they so wished. This was not possible, nonetheless, as the doctors' passports were confiscated by the Zambian government.[14] It was only during the reign of the late president, Levy Mwanawasa that serious strides were made to engage with the question of the Zambian diaspora. In 2008,

the government of Zambia held a national consultative meeting, often referred to as the *Indaba*, on the then global economic crisis and its implications to Zambia. The *Indaba* was attended by delegates from the diaspora, various relevant government ministries, civil society organizations and key stakeholders like the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The national consultative forum recommended that appropriate government ministries should dialogue with the Zambian diaspora and establish methodologies for their engagement in national development. Several meetings were held between the IOM and the Ministries of Labor and Social Security, and Home Affairs. At these meetings, the IOM was requested to assist in the preparation and implementation of labor migration and migration for development programs in Zambia.[15]

After Mwanawasa passed away in 2008, the work on the Zambian diaspora seemed to have stalled a bit. The next president Rupiah Bwezani Banda and his short lived administration, from 2009–2011 could not build on Mwanawasa's hard-work and strategic outlook. Despite this and to his credit though, when opening the parliament in October 2009, Banda also highlighted the potential of the Zambian diaspora in contributing to national development and informed parliamentarians and other development partners present, of the high interest demonstrated by many Zambians in the diaspora in investing in various sectors of the economy. In response to these requests, Banda appointed a Diaspora Liaison Officer to facilitate interaction between the Zambian diaspora and appropriate national institutions. In the same month, Banda visited South America and encouraged Zambian nationals studying in South America and other parts of the world to consider returning home and participate in the development of their country.[16] After this, things not only deteriorated but took a bizarre turn during the presidency of Michael Chilufya Sata. Sata's antics involved chastising the Zambian diaspora whenever he travelled abroad. His interactions with Zambian professionals living outside Zambia resembled a situation where a Headmaster was admonishing truant pupils. In all such engagements, the Zambian diaspora would quietly take abuse from an erratic president. For example, while on a trip to Botswana in 2013, Sata addressed Zambian professionals residing in this country in this manner: "All of you who are here with fake questions I am very disappointed with you and embarrassed. Are you not even ashamed of yourselves? You ran away from Zambia and thought we could not find you and now today we have caught you. You are refugees in

Botswana being exploited by the Botswana Government. You left Zambia to come and work here for an extra K1?"[17] In Sata's tirade, K1 refers to the lowest paper denomination of Zambia's currency, the Kwacha.

Mapping the Zambian Diaspora

The brain drain scenario has in the present times been mainly couched in a diaspora discourse.

Nevertheless, for purposes of this chapter's arguments a theoretical perspective is required. For starters, the term "diaspora," a derivative of the Greek words *dia* (across) and *sperio* (to scatter) is traditionally used in relation to the historical dispersion and exile of the Jewish "nation." However, the traditional view of a diaspora such as this, sharing a distinctive ethnic, religious, or cultural identity that is carefully preserved within the adopted country is less appropriate today, given the diversity of diaspora experiences.[18] In this discussion, a diaspora refers to a particular kind of migration. Most scientists agree that at least a few of the following characteristics are crucial to describe a diaspora:

- Dispersal from an original homeland to two or more countries.
- There must be a collective—often idealized—memory/myth of the homeland.
- A myth of returning to one's homeland (be it now or in the future, temporary or permanent).
- There is a sense of empathy and solidarity with similar groups elsewhere in the world and/or with events and groups in the homeland.[19]

In this regard:

> Diaspora, then, is a contemporary term used to describe practically any population considered "reterritorialized" or "transitional", whose cultural origins are said to have arisen in a nation other than the one in which they currently reside, and whose social, economic, and political networks cross nation-state borders and, indeed, span the entire globe.[20]

The migration of highly skilled Zambians has increased during the past decade and the total number of migrants from Zambia, as a percentage of the total population is estimated at 1.4 percent. The emigration rate of the

tertiary educated population is 16.8 percent, while the total percentage of emigrating nurses is 9.2 percent or 1,100 people. The rate for medical doctors trained in the country who have migrated to other countries is 24.7 percent.[21] The Zambian diaspora seems to be concentrated in Australia, Canada, USA, UK, Botswana, and South Africa.[22] Furthermore, results from the Zambian Diaspora Survey which was conducted in 2011 reveal the following trends:

- 30 percent of the respondents were residing in the UK
- 18 percent were in the USA
- 14 percent were in South Africa
- 6 percent were in Botswana
- 4 percent were in Australia
- 3 percent were in Canada
- 26 percent gave varied responses.[23]

There are also other places where Zambians have emigrated but the aforementioned countries have far larger numbers of Zambians residing there. Furthermore, the Zambian diaspora encompasses students, professionals, and entrepreneurs to artists, engineers, journalists, bankers, economists, medical doctors, nurses, and lawyers. The Zambian diaspora is mostly highly educated and skilled. The earlier-cited survey shows that 37 percent of the respondents have reached Master's Degree level; 27 percent Bachelor's Degree level; 19 percent college level; and 9 percent PhD level. Seven percent reached various post-high school levels, while 2 percent have reached secondary level of education.[24]

A Missing Diaspora Dividend?

For five decades, successive Zambian governments have failed to leverage the financial and human resource capacities of Zambians living abroad, for the purpose of developing Zambia. It can be argued that such an approach was partly reinforced by the previous hostile attitude of the UNIP government towards the intellectual class as stated earlier. Nevertheless, it still remains a mystery as to why other political administrations could not derive tangible dividends from the diaspora in order to catalyze national development efforts. Although it must be said that this attitude by Zambia's politicians is slowly changing for the better. It is important for political leaders to appreciate the fact that having a

diaspora community is not a loss to the country *per se*. Recent empirical literature shows that high-skill emigration need not deplete a country's human capital stock and it can generate positive network externalities.[25] Furthermore, for many African families, remittances from international migrants are vital for survival, and a major source of income to pay rent, home construction, medical expenses, school fees, business investment, and a variety of other activities. For instance, in Africa in the 20-year period between 1990 and 2010, the income from remittances had more than quadrupled from US$ 9.1 billion to US$ 39.7 billion. This was the largest inflow from abroad after Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and in 2008 it exceeded official aid.[26] It is intimated here that the diaspora dividend is directly linked to the diaspora's attitudes, world view, experiences, and ways of approaching life situations which in most cases differ from those of their compatriots in their countries of birth. Due to this, returning migrants who have worked abroad are often positioned to derive the utmost economic and cultural benefit from migration. For these migrants then, international migration yields dividends, class advantages, or benefits that are assumable within local structures, notwithstanding the engendered inequalities.[27]

In the case of Zambia, the situation is the same as the one just described above as remittances from the diaspora are quite significant. For instance, in 2011 Zambia's remittances totaled approximately US$ 126 million though formal and informal means.[28] Empirical evidence from the 2011 Zambian Diaspora Survey indicates that the main recipients of remittances were spouses, children, parents, dependants, extended family members, friends, churches, community organizations and others. The study also notes that since many members of the diaspora are in the young and productive age group, it is not surprising that their parents are still alive and receive support from them. However, the support goes beyond parents to include extended family members. The study observes that this financial responsibility should be taken into account when devising remittance policies. A good number of respondents also indicated that they sent money either monthly or quarterly.[29]

Furthermore, the research study also observes that since a majority of the recipients are parents (67 percent) and members of extended families (62 percent), on the one hand, and that a large portion of the remittances are believed to be used for education, health-care provision, and child-care

purposes, on the other, is further evidence that remittances play an important role in poverty alleviation at the household level. However and more importantly, it also further implies that only a small fraction of these resources are directed towards capital investment.[30]

Plotting the Way Forward

It is noteworthy that recently there are positive developments that have taken place in the aforementioned area and probably this is due in part to a more receptive attitude from the political establishment. For instance, work around a new diaspora engagement policy, which is based on the work that has been undertaken by various government agencies, in conjunction with the IMO, is a good example of a proactive stance by the political leadership. Also, in collaboration with the IOM, the government started supporting the awarding of grants for professionals in the diaspora to relocate to Zambia.[31] In fact, as this chapter is being finalized, the Zambian government has noted that it will soon devise a diaspora policy. This is a welcome development and it is hoped that such assertions will not end up as mere rhetoric as on many previous occasions. Given the foregoing scenario, it is important to highlight some of the advantages of having a diaspora engagement policy. First, it would act as a springboard for economic growth and development as the diaspora can be a source of knowledge, skills, resources, and technology. Second, it would facilitate an increase in remittances and FDI because engaging with the diaspora could promote an enhanced investment environment which could increase the levels of remittances into Zambia. Third, the policy would also allow for the deepening of democracy as participation by diaspora communities in national affairs could result in inclusive social and economic development.[32]

The title of this chapter poses the question of whether Zambia is experiencing a brain drain or brain gain. In asking this question, the author assumed that the brain drain, with all its perceived shortfalls, can actually be turned into a brain gain by the Zambian government if it strategically approaches this issue. Nevertheless, the above-mentioned initiatives should not exist in a vacuum but must be augmented with a robust public-policy regime, which is also evidenced-based. Evidence-based policy-making or EBPM is a discourse that informs the policy process, rather than aiming to directly affect the eventual goals of the policy. It advocates a more *rational, rigorous* and *systematic* approach

(emphasis added). The pursuit of EBPM is based on the premise that policy decisions should be better informed by available evidence and should include rational analysis. This is because policy that is based on systematic evidence is seen to produce better outcomes. The approach has also come to incorporate evidence-based practices.[33] This discussion also contends that the government should not only be urging highly trained and skilled entrepreneurial Zambians to return home when there is nothing to return to. Hence, the proposed EBPM could pave the way for the government to develop sectoral plans that directly address the Zambian diaspora. These could have short-, medium-, and long-term goals. One way such proposed initiatives can be translated into outputs and outcomes can be via robust Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). PPPs are not initiatives that are out of the ordinary as other African countries are already reaping rewards from their diaspora dividend through PPPs. Zambia should emulate such countries. For instance, as early as 2010, the government of Ethiopia launched a new website for the Ethiopia Investment Agency—a "one stop shop" for investment opportunities in the country, including specific areas for investment by Ethiopian nationals and foreign investors—together with all the necessary information on taxation, eligibility, and procedural logistics that would be required for investment to be made from outside the country.[34]

Furthermore, PPPs can nudge the diaspora dividend in Zambia's favor through a myriad of socio-economic, cultural, and environmental endeavors:

> The title, Public-Private Policy partnerships, speaks to a division of labor between the government and the private sector across policy spheres as much as to any specific collaboration between the government and the private sector on particular policy projects. Concrete experience is accumulating in the policy fields of education (private sector, mostly non-profit schools), health care (Medical Savings Accounts, Medicaid managed care, Medicare managed care), energy policy (proposals for new institutional forms for nuclear power), criminal justice (for-profit incarceration facilities), transportation (roads, rail projects, public and commercial mobility infrastructures), environmental policy (market incentives to reduce pollution), welfare (private delivery of services to the poor), technology policy, and many more.[35]

The government and the Zambian diaspora could begin to build PPPs for Zambia's development via a wide array of initiatives. For instance, a

"clearing house" which is specifically established for the implementation of this thrust of PPPs could be managed by the Zambia Development Agency (ZDA). The ZDA was established in 2006 by an Act of Parliament and became operational in January 2007, after the amalgamation of five statutory bodies that hitherto operated independently in order to foster economic growth and development by promoting trade and investment through an efficient, effective, and coordinated private sector-led economic development strategy. These institutions were the Zambia Investment Centre (ZIC), Zambia Privatization Agency (ZPA), Export Board of Zambia (EBZ), Small Enterprise Development Board (SEDB) and Zambia Export Processing Zones Authority (ZEPZA). The Act gives powers to the ZDA in key areas of trade development, investment promotion, enterprise restructuring, development of green fields' projects, small enterprise development, trade and industry fund management, and contributing to skills-training development.[36]

CONCLUSION

This chapter discussed the brain drain phenomenon in Zambia and contended that it is actually the key contributor to what is now referred to as the Zambian diaspora. In addition, the chapter traced the origins of this trend and then examined the manner in which it unfolded in the last three decades. It also examined past and present state–diaspora relations. The discussion also examined the "diaspora dividend" which relates to *inter alia*, the expertise, skills, world-view, exposure, business and entrepreneurial talents, and other networks of Zambia's diaspora and how they could actually be harnessed for Zambia's development. The chapter's main contention was that Zambia's drain brain could actually be turned into a "brain gain" if there was a right political will from the country's political establishment. In this regard, it acknowledged some of the positive initiatives that are emerging in the country such as the development of the diaspora engagement policy. It cannot be stressed enough that there is need for continuity in regard to the encouraging work which is being undertaken by the Zambian government and other stakeholders. The winners of the August 2016 election should continue with the said initiatives and in fact consolidate them. For far too long a lack of political will and visionless politicians cost Zambia dearly as she was unable to tap into the "diaspora dividend" for decades.

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Ndangwa Noyoo is an Associate Professor in the Department of Social Development at the University of Cape Town, South Africa. He teaches Introduction to Social and Economic Development at the Fourth Year Level, and Comparative Social Policy in Africa at the Graduate Level. His research interests are Social Policy, Social Development, Public Policy, Indigenous Knowledge Systems and Comparative Social Policy in Africa. His publications include inter alia: *Public Policy-Making in the Mbeki Era* (Pretoria: Kwarts, 2015) and *Social Policy and Human Development in Zambia* (Pretoria: Kwarts, 2015).

Mutual Antagonisms: Why the South African Diaspora and the South African Government Do Not Engage

Jonathan Crush and Abel Chikanda

INTRODUCTION

The developmental role and potential of diasporas is now almost universally acknowledged, with some even going so far as to label them "heroes of development."[1] However, others have noted that diasporas are not homogeneous groups and do not necessarily respond with enthusiasm to the engagement overtures of governments of their countries of origin.[2] Not all emigrants wish to identify themselves as diaspora communities or have a desire to align themselves with where they came from.[3] The Tamil diaspora in Canada, for example, completely shuns working with the Sri Lankan government in post-war reconstruction, for to do so would lend legitimacy to what they see as an army of occupation.[4] Migration history, class, age, race, ethnicity, religion, socio-economic standing, political affiliation, and

J. Crush
Balsillie School of International Affairs, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada

A. Chikanda
Geography & Atmospheric Science, University of Kansas, Lawrence, USA

social status all have an important impact on the way in which diasporas view and interact with the governments of their countries of origin.[5] As a result, diaspora heterogeneity affects the way in which different factions of the diaspora engage, if they engage at all.

Even though South Africa is best known as a destination for migrants, it is also an important global migration source country, with over 750,000 South Africans living abroad. Studies of emigration from South Africa can be grouped into three main types. First, there are those that document the scale and reasons for the ongoing exodus from the country and project future trends.[6] Second, there is a substantial body of literature that specifically focuses on the nature and impact of the "brain drain" of health professionals to industrialized countries.[7] Third, some have sought to present a detailed profile of those who leave South Africa, describing their demographic characteristics such as age, race, gender, and educational attainment, as well as their settlement patterns in destination countries.[8]

Until recently, however, few scholars had tried to investigate the links that émigré South Africans maintain with their country of origin and the factors that might hinder or enable the broader socio-economic engagement that characterizes many African diasporas.[9] South African emigration was traditionally viewed through the lens of a Eurocentric model of "permanent immigration." When they immigrated to Australia, Canada or the USA, they supposedly did so for good. Titles such as "packing for Perth," "the new great trek," and "bye the beloved country" reinforced the idea of permanent departure.[10] Earlier application of the term "diaspora" to South Africans emigrants similarly assumed that they were classic immigrants who would cut their ties with the country.[11] Some attention was paid a few years ago to the potential of alumni networks and the now-defunct South African Network of Skills Abroad (SANSA).[12] But attempts to situate the South African diaspora within the broader context of the large and growing global literature on diaspora engagement and development are still comparatively rare. Recent exceptions to this characterization assume there is such a thing as a South African diaspora and seek to understand its character, practices, and attitudes, its fragmented nature, its linkages with South Africa, and its actual and potential return behavior.[13]

This chapter draws on this new literature as well as primary data from a Southern African Migration Program (SAMP) survey of 1,635 South Africans in Canada conducted in 2009–2010.[14] It first provides an analysis of the formation of the global South African diaspora and situates the relative absence of diaspora engagement within the context of the history

of South African emigration. The chapter then examines the specific case of the South African diaspora in Canada, one of five major destination countries, and argues that the majority are antagonistic towards the South African government and the very idea of being involved in diaspora activities that would promote development. The final section of the chapter examines the attitude of the South African government towards diaspora engagement and argues that although government is supportive of the general idea of engaging the African diaspora in development, it has done very little to court its own diaspora.

South Africa's Global Diaspora

Before 1990, emigration from South Africa was largely determined by the discriminatory policies pursued by the apartheid government. While white immigration and emigration occurred relatively freely, the emigration of black South Africans was constrained by factors such as the lack of educational opportunities and the denial of travel documents required for crossing international frontiers.[15] Thus, exploring the patterns of migration from South Africa during the apartheid era is, strictly speaking, an exercise in tracking white emigration from the country since only a few blacks were allowed to leave the country legally. Most of the black members of the diaspora were political exiles and many returned to South Africa after 1990.

Post-apartheid movements out of South Africa have been driven by a variety of factors including dissatisfaction with life in South Africa compared with overseas,[16] insecurity and fear of violent crime,[17] and dissatisfaction with life under a democratic government.[18] Destination trends can be established by analyzing data from the UN Global Migration Database which classifies migrants according to their country of birth using census data in the country of destination.[19] The data covers the period 1990–2013 and can be used to track the growth of South Africa's diaspora worldwide. Overall, the South African diaspora more than doubled from 335,594 in 1990 to 786,618 in 2013 (Table 12.1). Most of the growth was experienced in the Global North rather than the South. Thus, while 34 percent of South Africa's diaspora was found in the Global South in 1990, only 16 percent were there in 2013.

The only region which has seen a decline in its South African-born population between 1990 and 2013 is the rest of Africa. This is surprising given the fact that South Africa has aggressively expanded its economic interests on the rest of the continent since 1994. At the level of the

Table 12.1 Growth of the South African diaspora worldwide, 1990–2013

Destination region/Country	1990	2000	2010	2013
WORLD	*335,594*	*518,671*	*768,153*	*786,618*
Global North	222,329	402,662	649,240	659,524
Global South	113,265	116,009	118,913	127,094
AFRICA	*101,845*	*100,414*	*85,526*	*90,535*
Botswana	5,780	13,587	28,048	33,973
Zimbabwe	11,400	19,880	11,898	11,571
Swaziland	21,689	14,013	10,768	10,216
Mozambique	28,813	26,969	8,559	8,735
Malawi	1,310	6,750	8,214	7,849
Namibia	19,287	9,250	7,670	7,203
Angola	2,437	3,226	5,118	5,846
Lesotho	2,777	2,441	1,197	1,060
Zambia	6,260	1,519	991	875
Other Africa	2,092	2,779	3,063	3,207
ASIA	*10,241*	*14,042*	*18,955*	*21,156*
Israel	8,519	10,107	11,736	11,926
Cyprus	1,235	2,258	4,350	5,847
Republic of Korea	–	443	1,620	2,075
Philippines	193	865	786	818
Other Asia	294	369	463	490
EUROPE	*100,635*	*191,094*	*303,185*	*290,692*
UK	68,531	140,911	232,028	214,009
Netherlands	6,620	10,820	12,995	13,406
Portugal	6,464	10,850	10,886	11,392
Germany	4,059	5,060	8,157	8,250
Ireland	621	5,467	6,154	7,546
Switzerland	4,025	4,542	6,870	7,521
Italy	409	1,238	5,009	6,026
France	2,397	2,552	4,927	5,093
Greece	1,167	1,089	2,824	2,923
Spain	748	1,483	2,333	2,555
Austria	1,538	1,933	2,388	2,496
Sweden	798	1,016	2,023	2,249
Denmark	604	984	1,639	1,823
Norway	636	761	1,212	1,438
Other Europe	2,018	2,388	3,740	3,965
LATIN AMERICA and CARIBBEAN	*1,179*	*1,553*	*14,432*	*15,403*
Chile	134	244	11,286	12,167
Brazil	–	–	1,589	1,608
Other Latin America and the Caribbean	1,045	1,309	1,557	1,628

Table 12.1 (continued)

Destination region/Country	1990	2000	2010	2013
NORTH AMERICA	64,634	105,866	143,011	148,407
USA	39,944	68,494	98,393	101,959
Canada	24,657	37,282	44,360	46,187
Other North America	33	90	258	261
OCEANIA	57,060	105,702	203,044	220,425
Australia	51,445	80,141	154,499	166,731
New Zealand	5,615	25,561	48,545	53,694

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2013)

individual country, there is certainly considerable variation: the numbers in Botswana increased considerably while those in countries such as Mozambique and Namibia have declined. The numbers in non-Southern African countries have increased only marginally. Most countries in the Global North have experienced growth in their South African-born population, although five countries are the top destinations for emigrants: the UK, Australia, the USA, New Zealand, and Canada.

Collectively, these five countries accounted for 74 percent of the global South African diaspora in 2013, up from 57 percent in 1990. The UK is by far the most popular destination for South Africans, primarily because of strong historical links and the fact that the UK was the major source of migrants under white minority rule (Table 12.2). Between 1990 and 2000, the South African-born population in the UK increased by 106 percent and by 52 percent between 2000 and 2013. More recently, however, the South African-born population actually declined from 232,028 to 214,009 between 2010 and 2013, a drop of 8 percent. This suggests that the UK has become a less attractive destination for South African emigrants and that some of those already there have either returned to South Africa or are moving to destinations with fast-growing South African populations such as Australia and New Zealand.

Australia witnessed an impressive growth rate of 108 percent between 2000 and 2013, making it the second largest South African diaspora globally. The USA has also become a major destination for South Africans, with more than 100,000 South African-born people living there in 2013. New Zealand has registered the highest growth rates among the countries with a sizeable South African born population.

Table 12.2   Five major destination countries of South African emigrants

Destination Country	1990	2000	Percentage change (1990–2000)	2010	2013	Percentage change (2000–2013)
UK	68,531	140,911	106	232,028	214,009	52
Australia	51,445	80,141	56	154,499	166,731	108
USA	39,944	68,494	71	98,393	101,959	49
New Zealand	5,615	25,561	355	48,545	53,694	110
Canada	24,657	37,282	51	44,360	46,187	24
Total	190,192	352,389	85	577,825	582,580	65
Percentage of Global Total	57	68		75	74	

Between 1990 and 2013, the South African-born population grew from 5,615 to 53,694, an overall increase of 856 percent. In the case of Canada, the numbers of immigrants from South Africa was relatively small before apartheid began to unravel in the mid-1980s (Fig. 12.1). Thereafter, there

Fig. 12.1   South African Immigration to Canada, 1980–2009

Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada

was a massive increase in emigration to Canada, consistent with more general patterns of migration from the country.

PROFILE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN DIASPORA

South Africa does not collect data on emigration from the country. Knowledge on the profile of the South African diaspora comes instead from administrative records, including censuses, in destination countries as well as sample surveys by researchers. The available data shows that the overwhelming majority of the South African diaspora are white. According to the 2001 census in the UK, 90 percent of South Africans were white, 3 percent were black, 3 percent Indian/Asian, 2 percent mixed-race, and 2 percent other (Table 12.3).[20] There is also evidence of spatial concentration of some racial groups in certain parts of the country. For instance, while Jewish South Africans account for less than 2 percent of the South African population in the UK, they make up as much as 9 percent of South Africans in the London area, with a dense concentration in north and north-west London.[21] The dominance of whites is echoed in the profile of the South African population in the USA. In 2000 as many as 82 percent identified themselves as white, 6 percent black, 5 percent Asian and 4 percent mixed-race. Similarly, and more recently, white South Africans made up 88 percent of the diaspora in Canada, while only 2 percent were black, 5 percent were Asian and 3 percent were mixed-race.

Table 12.3   Racial composition of the South African diaspora

	UK 2001 Census (%)	US 2000 Census (%)	Canada 2010–2011 SAMP Survey (%)
White	90	82	88
Black	3	6	2
Asian	3	5	5
Mixed/ Colored	2	4	3
Other race	2	3	2
Total (N)	(140,911)	(63,560*)	(40,570**)

Source: Based on Sveinsson and Gumuschian (2008) and US Census Bureau (2000a)
* Total number of people who responded to the question on race
** Total South African-born population in 2006

Table 12.4 Educational level of South African born persons aged 15 and over

	Census year	Primary	Secondary	Higher	Number
Australia	2001	22.1	34.9	43.0	67,441
Canada	2000	20.4	17.6	62.1	54,501
USA	2001	17.2	42.1	40.8	90,759
New Zealand	2001	3.5	41.7	54.7	19,875
UK	2001	10.2	42.8	47.0	115,426

Source: Adapted from OECD (2003)

In some contexts, the racial composition of the diaspora would not be of great significance. In the case of the South African diaspora, the predominance of white South Africans is of crucial importance. The major division within the white South African diaspora concerns the language spoken at home and ethnic identification. Generally, the white South African population falls into two main groups, one English-speaking and of Anglo-Saxon origin and the Afrikaner group with a strong Dutch heritage. Prior to the end of apartheid, there was little emigration by Afrikaans-speaking whites who were the major supporters of and beneficiaries of that system. After 1994, Afrikaners began to emigrate in growing numbers. The 2011 Australian census found that 75 percent of the South African-born population spoke mainly English at home while 22 percent spoke mainly Afrikaans.[22] In the UK, the proportion of Afrikaans-speakers was estimated at around 25 percent in 2008.[23]

One of the reasons the South African-born population has been able to gain admission in a number of countries is their high level of education, itself a product of the racial privileges they enjoyed under apartheid. Their educational profile is generally much better than that of the native-born population (Table 12.4). At least 40 percent of South Africans living in the major destination countries in 2000–2001 had a post-secondary qualification. In Canada, at least 60 percent of South African-born persons had a post-secondary qualification, a figure close to the 58 percent documented by the SAMP survey of South Africans in Canada which included 27 percent with professional degrees.[24]

The high educational level of the South African diaspora translates into good employment outcomes in destination countries. In Australia, the

2011 Census showed that South Africans aged 15 years and over had a labor force participation rate of 76 percent, with an unemployment rate of just 5 percent.[25] The corresponding rates in the total Australian population were 65 percent and 6 percent respectively. Of the 92,511 South Africa-born who were employed, 63 percent were in skilled managerial, professional, or trade occupations. The corresponding rate in the total Australian population was 48 percent.[26]

The high rates of labor force participation mean, in turn, that the South African diaspora tends to earn higher salaries compared to the national average. In the USA, the South African diaspora had a total annual household income of US$ 69,229 in 1999, compared to US$ 41,994 for the entire US population.[27] Thirty four percent had annual household incomes of over US$ 100,000 compared to only 12 percent of the total population. In Australia, the median individual weekly income for South Africans in Australia was AU$ 882 in 2011, compared with AU$ 538 for all overseas-born and AU$ 597 for all Australia-born.[28] In Canada, nearly 40 percent of survey respondents earned over CA$ 100,000 per annum.[29]

Diaspora Disengagement in Canada

The World Bank argues that one of the primary development-related indicators of diaspora engagement with their country of origin is remittance flows which reached US$ 436 billion globally in 2014.[30] Data from the Word Bank shows that the remittances sent by South Africans residing abroad grew from just US$ 15 million in 1970 to an estimated US$ 1.1 billion in 2013 or 0.3 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Fig. 12.2). The considerable increase in remitting after 2000 might suggest that the diaspora is intensifying its financial links with South Africa.

Evidence from the SAMP survey of South Africans in Canada provides a richer perspective on diaspora remitting than that provided by aggregate World Bank figures.[31] Nearly 45 percent of those interviewed had never sent remittances to South Africa and only 12 percent could be considered regular remitters, sending money at least once per month. Most of the others were irregular remitters with 23 percent remitting a few times a year and 18 percent less than once a year. The amounts remitted varied considerably but were relatively low in comparison to the income profile of the diaspora: the average annual remittance for those

Fig. 12.2 Remittances trends to South Africa, 1970–2013

Source: World Bank (2015)

who remitted was CA\$ 6,062 and only 12 percent remitted more than CA\$ 5,000 in the year prior to the survey.

The bulk of the remittances (73 percent) went to family members in South Africa. Day-to-day household expenses, medical bills, food purchase, special events, clothing, school fees, and home renovation or construction were the major uses of remittances. Only 9 percent had used remittances for savings and investment, 4 percent to buy property and 3 percent to start or run a business. In other words, the primary motive for remitting among those who remit is to support family members who remain in South Africa with basic expenses. There is no indication that remitting is motivated by any desire to contribute to South Africa's general economic development. There is strong evidence to suggest that the propensity to remit varies by year of migration and tends to decline over time (Fig. 12.3). Thus, 46 percent of those who left South Africa between 1980 and 1989 send remittances to South Africa, compared to 55 percent who left between 1990 and 1999 and 60 percent who left after 2000. Hence, those with a shorter migration history are likely to engage more with South Africa than those who have been living outside the country for an extended period of time.

Fig. 12.3 Proportion sending remittances by year of migration

In the same way that remitting tends to decline with time away, so do other linkages with South Africa. For example, 35 percent of those who immigrated to Canada between 2005 and 2009 have a bank account in South Africa. This figure falls to 20 percent of those who immigrated between 1990 and 1994 and 10 percent of those who emigrated in the early 1980s. The overall proportion of diaspora members holding investments, owning property or a house, having savings, and owning a business in South Africa is much lower (less than 15 percent of recent immigrants). However, as with bank accounts, the longer a person has been in Canada the lower the chance that they will maintain these material links with the country (Table 12.5).

Table 12.5 Asset ownership in South Africa, by year of migration to Canada

	Period of immigration						
	Before 1980 (%)	1980– 1984 (%)	1985– 1989 (%)	1990– 1994 (%)	1995– 1999 (%)	2000– 2004 (%)	2005– 2009 (%)
Bank account	8.9	10.3	14.3	20.5	19.5	26.1	35.3
Business	2.5	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.6	1.6	2.0
House	5.1	0.0	3.8	7.1	6.4	9.2	13.0
Investments	3.8	3.4	9.8	17.3	12.8	17.3	15.3
Property	5.1	3.4	4.5	3.2	5.4	5.7	7.4
Savings	3.8	0.0	3.8	6.4	7.7	11.4	14.2

Table 12.6 Diaspora engagement activities (in the previous year)

	% No	*% Yes*
Made a donation to a Canadian NGO/charity operating in South Africa	88.9	10.1
Made a donation to an NGO/charity in South Africa	92.3	7.7
Made a donation to a religious organization in South Africa	92.8	7.2
Carried out research with people in South Africa	95.9	4.1
Bought a house or property in South Africa	98.1	1.9
Purchased goods from South Africa to sell in Canada	98.3	1.7
Invested in a business in South Africa	98.4	1.6
Exported goods to South Africa from Canada	98.6	1.4

N = 1,726

Table 12.7 Likely diaspora engagement activities (in the next two years)

	% No	*% Yes*
Make charitable donations that benefit South Africa	72.2	27.8
Volunteer work in Canada to benefit South Africa	83.0	17.0
Fundraise for projects in South Africa	84.8	15.2
Send money for development projects in South Africa	85.5	14.5
Participate in exchanges	88.9	11.1
Work in South Africa	91.0	9.0
Invest in business in South Africa	93.5	6.5

Interest in contributing to development in South Africa was extremely low, in sharp contrast with the attitude of other African diasporas in Canada towards their countries of origin.[32] Over 80 percent of the South Africans said that they did not see themselves playing any role in the development of South Africa. There were very low levels of interest in participating in typical diaspora activities such as direct investment, educational exchanges, volunteer work, philanthropy, skills transfer, and import and export (Table 12.6). More than 70 percent of the respondents did not see themselves ever participating in any of these activities (Table 12.7).

REASONS FOR DISENGAGEMENT

The lack of interest in contributing to the development of post-apartheid South Africa among the majority of South Africans in Canada has prompted the conclusion that this is a deeply disengaged diaspora.[33] In order to explain

the disinterest in engagement, it is necessary to explore the various antagonisms and hostilities that exist towards the country within the diaspora. As noted above, the majority of the diaspora in Canada are white and left South Africa after the end of apartheid. The perceived loss of the material and other benefits conferred by whiteness, and rejection of the idea of living under a black majority government, were certainly significant drivers of emigration after 1994. The upsurge in emigration of middle-class and professional Afrikaners, in particular, is related to such perceptions. In fact, whites in South Africa continue to enjoy a disproportionate share of the wealth, jobs, property, and privileges, two decades after the country's first democratic elections.[34]

The South African diaspora discourse of disengagement goes further, portraying whites in general and themselves in particular as victims of the post-apartheid order. One of the common themes is that whites in South Africa are being systematically targeted by extreme criminal violence simply because they are white. Some even refer to this as "apartheid in reverse." The argument that there is a government-supported genocidal campaign against whites is central to the two controversial and unsuccessful claims for refugee status by white South Africans in Canada that have been adjudicated by the Immigration and Refugee Board.[35] No-one denies that violent crime is a serious problem in South Africa but the reality is that the victims are disproportionately black.

Another common complaint is that whites (and therefore themselves and their children) are victims of affirmative action and that the future of white children in South Africa is threatened by the policies of the African National Congress (ANC) government:

"I was laid off at Telkom on management level, because I'm white. They had to 'correct' the numbers by having less white managers."[36]

"My business was forced to employ Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) staff who did not fit into my practice or could not contribute in the improvement of our service to clients. The government's policies forced our clients to discriminate against our firm and we could not afford the BEE changes forced upon us."[37]

"My children are white and I do not see any secure future for them in a changing South Africa where you get a job or get selected for a sports team based on skin color and not merit."[38]

"The government couldn't care less about the future of my children. The government couldn't care less about safety and security. As long as they achieve their political ambitions which consists of putting black women and

black men (and make your way up through the different lighter color schemes and sexes until you get to white men) into any job whether they have the ability to do it or not."[39]

None of the respondents showed any concern about either the future of black children or the fact that unemployment rates in South Africa are much higher among blacks than whites. Some, including this physician, not only railed against affirmative action but linked it to the supposed genocide against whites:

"As a family physician in South Africa, I was forced by the ANC government to take on a black previously disadvantaged partner as part of affirmative action . . . I was supposed to drop my standards to accommodate this candidate. This would have resulted in me doing the work as a physician and guarding my own patients against my under-qualified black partner. I refused to drop standards and saw emigration as the only option. My family members were murdered and the spineless South African Police Service failed them. It was and still is just a matter of time before the ongoing policy of genocide against my white South African countrymen and women will be completed."[40]

Views about the ANC and the South African government were almost universally negative, and not just over affirmative action. At best, there were those who were extremely skeptical about whether engagement would reach the people who needed it most:

"The money goes into a deep dark pit, and does not contribute to self-development. Any help sent there lands in the bottomless pit of corruption."[41]

"I do not believe the money actually gets to those who need it; rather, the money lines the pockets of 'higher-ups.' This has been evident for numerous years and is often reported in the South African media. I do not believe it is the role of expats to aid in South African development; the change needs to come from within."[42]

At the very worst, there were numerous racist diatribes against the supposed incompetence of black South Africans and the ANC government:

"Canada helped destroy the old South Africa through their naive meddling and support for the communist terrorists that took over. Canada therefore owes me a new, safe country and all the benefits that I can extract from it.

I hate Canada and will never feel any loyalty towards it, but I hate the new South Africa even more. I can't wait for the new South Africa to go the way of hell holes like Congo and Zimbabwe."[43]

"South Africa has become another 3rd World African country, full of graft and corruption and the crime is totally out of control. The ruling ANC party is there only to enrich themselves at the expense of the masses. They are stealing the coffers dry. South Africa is on the rapid path to becoming another Zimbabwe, in fact the 'Zimbabwification' has already started. It won't be long before the 'African begging bowl' syndrome starts (if it hasn't started all ready). The future does not look good for South Africa."[44]

"Every day we read about white people who get killed in their homes and are living in fear for their lives. Jobs are being taken away from the white population. Officials in power are dishonest and stealing money from the Government, driving the latest and expensive cars, whilst black and white are living in metal made homes. Thank God for the white brain power for many years whom the black people hate in South Africa. If it was not for them, South Africa would have been the same as East, West and North Africa."[45]

While these kinds of views are certainly not held by all members of the diaspora, a common thread in all accounts is disillusionment with the supposed failures of the ANC to implement the post-racial order promised by Mandela in 1994. These views, ranging from skepticism to disillusionment to outright hostility, explain why the South African government is held in such low regard and why any effort on the part of the government to engage its diaspora would be a major uphill battle. Senior officials in the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) recently described to one of the authors how DIRCO had met on several occasions with successful diaspora entrepreneurs in Canada and received a cordial but lukewarm response to suggestions that they invest in their home country.

While it is tempting to label all South Africans in Canada as "disengaged," as the vast majority are not involved in the range of activities typical of an engaged diaspora and do not see themselves playing any role in the future of South Africa, the SAMP survey did identify a small minority who were more positive about the country and its future. They were more favorably disposed to being or becoming involved in activities of a developmental nature.[46] An analysis of the differences between these individuals and the disengaged found that they were

disproportionately from lower income groups, that they remitted more frequently, that their reasons for coming to Canada were generally unrelated to concerns about crime and their children's future, that they visited the country far more often, and that they were much more likely to return to South Africa.

What was most striking about those individuals who were already involved in diaspora engagement activities, is that they tended to do so outside government structures with non-governmental organizations and civil society:

"I support two South African NGOs that focus on female empowerment and support, and I do a lot of fundraising and raising awareness for these issues. Last Christmas, I took a group of volunteers to KwaZulu-Natal and next year will be moving to Cape Town for the summer to work with the organizations I support. I think I have a crucial role to play in African development. I also work with an NGO that sets up education and support systems in Uganda and Kenya, because I am a South African who has been blessed with opportunities and it is up to me to use those to empower the people living there. I am passionate about volunteer work and international development, especially in Southern Africa."[47]

"I am still passionate about South Africa. Six years ago, I started a home-based travel agency. My core business is selling South Africa. Annually, I book many expats to South Africa for vacation and send Canadians on tours or safaris. For me, this is a unique way of contributing to South Africa and to focus on the positive. South Africa is an amazing country and has lots to offer to travelers."[48]

"We support an African school feeding program. This is an interest as my niece, who lives in the United Kingdom, is a director and fundraiser for the charity. For four years, I imported products from three self-help groups in South Africa to sell for them at fairs and through stores in Canada."[49]

Some prominent South African-Canadian philanthropists are involved in directly funding education programs in poorer South African communities, but again outside the aegis of government.[50] The closest that some come to government was through working with their alumni associations from publicly funded South African universities. The University of Cape Town, for example, has a particularly active alumni association in Canada and the Vice-Chancellor, Dr. Max Price, is a regular visitor to Canada to fundraise for the University.

South African Government Responses

The post-apartheid South African government was initially extremely negatively disposed towards its diaspora, particularly those who left the country after 1994, and this negativism still permeates much official thinking. They were viewed as people who could not tolerate living under a democratic dispensation and the country was better off without them. In a public outburst in 1998, no less a person than Nelson Mandela castigated those who were leaving as cowardly and unpatriotic and that the country was pleased to see the back of them.[51] In many ways, Mandela set the tone for the official view of emigration in the years that followed. By 2000, it had become evident that the ongoing exodus from the country was creating a chronic skills shortage in certain sectors of the economy and the health sector. The general attitude at this time was that emigration was having negative impacts on the country.[52]

The government responded in three ways, none of them involving any effort to engage the diaspora. First, it launched a campaign (largely unsuccessful) to shame countries in the North into stopping the recruitment and emigration of South Africans. The argument that other countries were "poaching" South Africans and that, at the very least, they should pay reparations was articulated often by politicians and ambassadors abroad between 2000 and 2005. Only when it became evident that this was a futile strategy, did government start to acknowledge that the only way to arrest the "brain drain" was to address the push factors that made them leave.[53] Second, it embarked on a strategy of bilateral intergovernmental agreements by which professionals from other countries would spend periods working in South Africa. The most prominent of these schemes was the import of physicians from Cuba and the reciprocal training in Cuba of South African doctors.[54] Third, and only after much prevarication and debate, the South African Parliament passed the Immigration Act of 2002 which acknowledged that a skills-based immigration policy was necessary. In practice, the barriers to immigrants were lowered only slightly and it still became extremely difficult to emigrate to South Africa.[55]

After the African Union (AU) designated the African diaspora outside the continent as the "sixth region" of Africa in 2003, South Africa became a leading advocate of the importance of Africa engaging with its diaspora. South African President Thabo Mbeki explicitly tied his personal vision of an African Renaissance to the diaspora, noting that "when we speak of an

African Renaissance, we speak of a rebirth that must encompass all Africans, both in Africa and the African Diaspora."[56] In March 2005, as part of South Africa's global efforts to celebrate the tenth anniversary of democracy, it co-sponsored (together with the AU and Jamaican Government) a diaspora conference in Kingston with the theme "Towards Unity and United Action by Africans and the African Diaspora in the Caribbean for a Better World: The Case of South Africa."[57] The conference itself was designed to strengthen economic, cultural, and political relations between Africa and its Caribbean diaspora, especially that created by slavery. As a result, the conference was long on Pan-Africanism, the historical connections between the peoples of Africa and the Caribbean, and the solidarity of the Caribbean in the anti-apartheid struggle against apartheid. Nothing was said by the speakers, including the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, about engaging South Africa's own diaspora.

In 2007, the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, gave the keynote address at the African Union-African Diaspora in Europe Regional Consultative Conference in Paris, criticizing the ways in which the African diaspora was treated in Europe and observing that "our gathering here today has much to do with our common future as Africans and people of African descent. Some would say that like a hen that gathers her chicks under her wings for protection from danger, Africa the motherland, seeks to reconnect with her scattered children, some of whom were forcibly and brutally taken away from her many years ago."[58] In 2012, South Africa hosted the Global African Diaspora Summit in Johannesburg. The Summit approved a far-reaching and concrete Plan of Action designed to connect and deepen relations between the African Union and the African diaspora.[59] It did not explain how these general AU objectives should be operationalized by individual African states. South Africa, as host, had privileged access to the Summit stage, its speakers including President Jacob Zuma, and the Director General and Minister of DIRCO (formerly the Department of Foreign Affairs). In his opening address Zuma asserted:

> The resolve of the African National Congress over many decades to represent the aspirations, hopes, and desires of the oppressed African majority, and to create and produce a free people, served as a unifying cause across the oceans. Like an umbilical cord, the struggle tied our continents together and gave us leaders (who) wanted to see the liberation of black people from all forms of bondage, humiliation, and degradation. They wanted to see black

people regardless of borders, being treated with respect and dignity. They wanted to see Africa taking its rightful place in global affairs, and Africa not being impoverished through the endless exploitation of its raw materials. They wanted to see dependency and underdevelopment ending, replaced by a new Africa that took control over its resources for the benefit of its peoples. To achieve such goals of an African renewal, Africa and its diaspora need to work together in more organized ways than before to advance the African agenda worldwide.[60]

The Director General of DIRCO noted that "we need participation of all people of African descent to accelerate Africa's development. The African diaspora must be seen as a torchbearer and pathfinder of our regeneration and therefore very pivotal in advancing the cause of Africa and everywhere." It is clear from the extracts cited above that when South African politicians speak of the diaspora they (like the AU and most other African countries) mean those of black African heritage and descent. Ironically, the number of diaspora members of black African descent is relatively insignificant in the case of the South African diaspora. The exceptionalism of South Africa as a settler-state with 350 years of European settlement, immigration, and emigration, would clearly require a different conceptualization of the diaspora and one that included, at the very least, all South African-born people outside the country irrespective of racial and ethnic identity.

The Declaration of the Johannesburg African Diaspora Summit laid out a systematic strategy for cooperation between Africa and its diaspora including: (1) promotion of sustainable linkages in trade and investment, science and technology, travel and tourism, communication and transport infrastructure, energy, information and communication technology, and cultural industries; (2) the growth and development of SMEs and the promotion of entrepreneurship; (3) using financial instruments focusing on investments to facilitate the mobilization of capital; (4) business partnerships; (5) science and technology cooperation; (6) knowledge transfer and skills mobilization including the development of a diaspora skills database; (7) increased collaboration between academic and research institutions; and (8) cultural exchange programs. All of these are fairly standard prescriptions for enhanced diaspora engagement which can best be operationalized at the national rather than continental level. Indeed, the Declaration does note that necessary steps should be taken "to promote and create effective synergies between national and continental Diaspora programs."

The question to be asked is what concrete steps the South African government has taken since it first expressed its commitment to the AU vision of diaspora engagement and, more recently, its support of the 2012 African Diaspora Summit Declaration. The answer is very little, either institutionally or programmatically. There are no dedicated units or focal points within any government Department to promote systematic engagement with the diaspora abroad. The South African Network of Skills Abroad (SANSA) withered and died after it had relocated from the University of Cape Town to a government department in the early 2000s. In 2005, at the invitation of the Department of Home Affairs, SAMP prepared a proposal for gathering knowledge about the South African diaspora and its engagement potential but this was never funded or implemented. More recently, the Minister of Home Affairs noted that South Africa had no plan for engaging the diaspora, despite acknowledging that South Africans abroad were an untapped resource with considerable influence and prestige on the world stage.[61]

CONCLUSION

A number of recent studies have examined the way in which whites in South Africa have, despite the loss of political power, continued to articulate ideas about white superiority and black inferiority, albeit in private rather than public spaces.[62] Such "backstage talk" is centered on discourses of black incompetence and whites under threat, of racial exclusivity, racist notions of inherent black inferiority, and out-group threat.[63] There is no reason why these discourses do not also emigrate and, indeed, SAMP research in Canada suggests that they have a powerful hold on attitudes towards South Africa within the diaspora. In overturning a decision of the Immigration and Refugee Board to award refugee status to a white South African claimant, the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal judgment suggested that discourses of black barbarity and white genocide were the preserve of the claimant's South African lawyer's family. However, the idea that post-apartheid South Africa is a racial dystopia in which whites are systematically discriminated against and persecuted has much broader purchase within the diaspora.[64]

The circulation and reproduction of negative views about contemporary South Africa within the diaspora provides a powerful disincentive

for engagement in any activity with developmental outcomes, and especially those that might involve interacting with the ANC government. As this chapter has demonstrated, the appetite for engagement by the South African diaspora in Canada is extremely limited and rests on a toxic foundation of misinformation, racial stereotyping, and real and imagined fear. In Ontario, highly successful members of the South African diaspora prefer to direct their philanthropic giving to Canadian causes and avoid South Africa altogether.[65] The minority of South Africans who have a more positive view of the country, and do see a role for themselves in poverty alleviation and development, tend to direct their philanthropic activities into non-governmental channels and programs.

The antagonism of the diaspora towards their country of origin is likely to lead to considerable suspicion and even outright rejection of any engagement overtures by the South African government. And certainly there is some anecdotal evidence that successful business persons in the South African diaspora in Canada are reluctant to invest in the country, to the puzzlement of government officials seeking to sell the investment opportunities in the South African economy. However, in general, such overtures are few and far between. This is largely because the post-apartheid South African government has traditionally written off its diaspora as development partners. The diaspora is perceived as largely white (which it is) and largely hostile to the ANC government (which it is). The possibility that there is a minority within the diaspora who are looking for opportunities to engage in positive ways and, in some cases is already doing so, is lost.

At the same time, it is not as if the South African government is hostile to the idea of engagement in principle. It has been a keen supporter of the African Union's Pan-Africanist vision of Africa's engagement with its historical and contemporary diaspora in North America, Europe and the Caribbean. However, rhetorical commitment to Africa's engagement with its "sixth region" has not translated into any systematic vision to engage with its own national diaspora. The AU's idea is that engagement can be pursued at a continental and national level and many African countries have put programs and policies in place to tap their own diaspora populations. Not so the South African government. The mutual antagonisms, rooted in racial politics and identities carried over from the apartheid period, are likely to ensure that South Africa remains a prime example of diaspora disengagement.

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Jonathan Crush is the CIGI Research Chair in Global Migration and Development at the Balsillie School of International Affairs, Waterloo, Canada and Honorary Professor at the University of Cape Town., South Africa. He is the Director of the Southern African Migration Program (SAMP) at the International Migration Research Centre (IMRC) and has published extensively on African migration issues including, most recently, *Mean Streets: Migration, Xenophobia and Informality in South Africa* (Ottawa: IDRC, 2015).

Abel Chikanda is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Geography and Atmospheric Science, and African and African-American Studies at the University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas, USA. His research interests include migration and development, food security, and the informal economy in Southern Africa. His publications include *Diasporas, Development and Governance* (New York: Springer, 2016) (with Jonathan Crush and Margaret Walton-Roberts).

Afterword

Diaspora Engagement Policies: It Takes Two to Tango

Contributions included in this volume have highlighted a number of important points and dynamics in the quest of African states and various organizations to engage with the global African diaspora.

First, both theoretically and empirically, the migration–development nexus has been solidly established. Members of the African diaspora and diaspora organizations are positively contributing, at the macro and household level, to countries of origin's development through financial and social remittances, investments, transfer of skills, and other processes. However, states have yet to fully tap into the diaspora's development potential and transformative power. The formulation of diaspora engagement policies (DEPs) is intended to remedy this situation. DEPs must be approached against the backdrop of the new discourse on development that conceptualizes the state within a dense web of transnational relations and networks in which their "citizens" abroad are increasingly claiming a stake in the homeland, transnational relations, and networks that are redefining the meaning of peoplehood as well as the reach of state sovereignty.

Second, the formulation of DEPs at the national level has been impacted by intense global consultations on migration and development that have taken place over the past decade as well as strategic policymaking on the part of the AU. Even though the annual Global Forum on Migration and Development remains an informal consultation

mechanism, it has become an important laboratory of ideas and a venue for exchanging best practices on diaspora engagement, many of which have found their way into national diaspora polices and strategies that have been formulated in Africa in recent years. These policies and strategies have also been impacted by AU's normative activity on the diaspora. Ever since its inception in 2002, the AU has sought to reframe the meaning of Pan-Africanism by incorporating the diaspora into Africa's development project and the building of the Union. The AU's normative efforts to engaging with the diaspora culminated in the adoption of an important Declaration at the Global African Diaspora Summit in 2012. The Declaration outlines the AU's broad diaspora agenda and unveils a program of action that calls for the full cooperation of member states in partnering with the diaspora for the development of the continent and the building of the Union.

Third, a comparative analysis of state–diaspora relations in the 10 case studies included in this collection reveals a number of key features and trends. Generally speaking, the formulation of DEPs seems to have been driven by an instrumental approach to state–diaspora relations. This approach views the diaspora mainly as a source for remittances and investments that the state intends to capitalize on to further its development agenda, which is understood in purely economic terms. As many of the contributors in the book have argued, such an approach can neither lead to a genuine involvement from the diaspora nor generate the type of economic outcomes that are expected. For states to fully tap into the diaspora's development potential, they have to pursue a holistic approach that welcomes the diaspora's contributions in all areas (economic, social, cultural, and political) impacting the country's development—here defined in terms of human development.

A holistic approach to state–diaspora relations underscores the importance of "social remittances" from the latter in addition to "financial remittances" that the former tend to focus on. The concept of social remittances speaks to the transformative power of ideas and experiences that the diaspora could bring to the fore. It is ultimately linked to democratic governance and human rights. A holistic approach entails a radical transformation of government–society relations. Simply put, it advocates against looking at the diaspora simply as a cash cow and calls for genuinely welcoming it as a partner in a development project whose center of gravity is the fulfillment of the needs of the people and the promise of individual and collective freedom. By all accounts, it seems that many African governments have reached out to the diaspora as a new Eldorado, a way of generating extra revenues and

investments. They have not fully embraced the spirit of diaspora engagement and the substantive transformations that it entails.

Fourth, state-diaspora relations in the ten case studies show great variations. For example, some states such as, Senegal, Ghana, Ethiopia, and Morocco, have historically maintained close ties with their diasporas and have developed comprehensive legal and institutional frameworks to facilitate those relations; others, such as, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Zambia, and Kenya have adopted instruments that appear rather rudimentary or still have relations that are not fully structured or even antagonistic toward the diaspora as in the case of South Africa.

Fifth, the case studies included in this book have emphasized the centrality and impact of emigration politics in the formulation (or lack thereof) and implementation of DEPs. Government–diaspora relations seem to be driven by dynamics of attraction or repulsion, trust or fear that mirror broader societal cleavages, especially those of ethnic or ideological resonance. Perception is key in understanding these complex relations. How do the government—and the society at large—perceive those who have left the country and now claim a stake in a different polity while seeking to impact political, economic, and social development in their country of origin? How do the diaspora perceive the government? As an ally or as an actor that stands in the way of its quest for greater influence in the homeland? Case studies in this volume have provided insights into what appears sometimes to be a delicate dance of *je t'aime . . . moi non plus* between African governments and the diaspora.

Three key determinants seem to account for the nature of state–diaspora relations. First, in countries that have historically favored emigration as a way of relieving pressure on the domestic labor market and ensuring a stream of remittance income, and whose diasporas have built extensive transnational networks (Senegal, Morocco), governments seem to be more focused in their attempts of extending rights to and enlisting the contribution of the diaspora. Conversely, in countries that have historically perceived emigration negatively (South Africa), governments have generally shown a lack of political and institutional focus in their attempt to engage with the diaspora. Second, countries that have made significant progress on the democratization front (Ghana, Kenya, Liberia) have also welcomed the diaspora into this new political space through a vibrant public debate on the role and contribution of their citizens abroad in national development and the legal and institutional reforms necessary to building better state–diaspora relations. Third, the development

strategy and performance of the government—accompanied by legal and institutional reforms—seems to be an important element in eliciting the diaspora's involvement and sustaining a level of constructive engagement with the government. The buying of government bonds for the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam by the Ethiopian diaspora represents a good illustration. The diaspora's involvement in this project and its engagement with the government was primarily motivated by the belief that the latter could deliver on this vital infrastructure project for the country's development.

Policy recommendations offered in the case studies have all emphasized a set of fundamental elements that must be part of any sustainable strategy for engaging with the diaspora. They stem from the core assumption—now backed by strong empirical evidence—that diasporas do make a positive contribution to their countries of origin's development and must, therefore, be an integral part of how national development projects are conceived of and executed. These elements echo the four stages road map of diaspora engagement that has emerged from global consultations on migration and development over the past decade. For African countries to fully tap into the diaspora's development potential and build mutually beneficial relations with their citizens abroad, the following steps are critical.

The first step calls for governments to identify their goals and capacities in relation to the diaspora. From the analyses provided in this volume, many governments seem not to have devoted enough attention in clearly outlining the strategic goal being pursued through their engagement with the diaspora. Is the government's strategic goal to reduce poverty or to improve the state's economic competitiveness? The former's policy focus is more on remittances, business investments and capital markets whereas the latter puts more emphasis on knowledge and skills transfer. As demonstrated throughout this volume, without clearly identifying its strategic goal, the government runs the risk of deploying a patchwork of policies and measures that lack clarity and consistency. The importance of consulting with the diaspora in setting the country's diaspora policy strategic goals cannot be overstated. Not all governments have engaged in this consultation process with the same deliberate purpose and intensity.

The second step centers on the imperative for the government to know the country's diasporas. Each diaspora presents a unique set of needs and capabilities rooted in its historical and present experience as well as realities in the country of destination. It is important that diaspora approaches and

strategies pursued by governments account for these trajectories and complexities. This crucial step is a function of capacity building on the part of the government which must undertake, *inter alia*, a comprehensive data collection of the diaspora, a mapping of its location, and an inventory of the skills, capacities, and experiences that reside within the diaspora. Like in the first step, this mapping and inventory exercise requires the government to maintain an open and sustained dialogue with the diaspora in order to assess its interests and agendas and ascertain what it is willing to contribute as well as its expectations from the government. Chapters in this book have underscored important weaknesses in terms of African governments' capabilities to know their diasporas. The lack of reliable data on diasporas has been identified as one of the major impediments in the development of effective diaspora engagement policies and programs.

The third crucial step of a road map for diaspora engagement focuses on building trust between the government and the diaspora. The importance of building trust stems from the scholarly and empirical insight that posits that a true partnership between the government and the diaspora is at the heart of any effective diaspora engagement policy and strategy. It is important for the two sides to derive value from this relationship. This is particularly true for the diaspora which has often felt instrumentalized in governments' attempts to engage with it simply as a mean of securing much needed remittances and other investment opportunities. Contributions in this volume have reiterated the cardinal importance of trust in the effectiveness of diaspora engagement policies and strategies. They have also discussed a host of measures and programs that can contribute to building trust. Such measures include, *inter alia*, creating a welcoming environment for diaspora engagement in development activities through measures that range from improving the business climate, bringing greater transparency in regulations and licensing requirements, to protecting property rights. Another set of equally important measures that governments could take to build trust are more political in nature. They deal with extension of political rights to the diaspora through overseas voting and other forms of political participation, including the question of dual citizenship. If many countries have extended voting rights and some form of political participation to their citizens abroad, many still remain entrenched in a conception of nationality that doesn't accommodate the idea of dual citizenship, which has been a key demand from the diaspora. Ghana, for example, acquiesced to this demand when it passed a law permitting dual citizenship in 2000, which was followed by another piece of legislation extending voting rights to Ghanaians abroad in 2006. The

essence of this third step in diaspora engagement is, ultimately, about democratic governance and the rule of law. A government committed to democratic governance and the rule of law through the types of economic and political reforms outlined above is more likely to build a trusted partnership with the diaspora than one that sees the latter simply as cash cows.

Once goals and capacities are clearly identified, the diaspora known, and a level of trust established, then the government is in a much stronger position to successfully mobilize the diaspora for development, which is the focus of the fourth and final stage of the road map for diaspora engagement. As discussed in the contributions included in this book, the African governments under consideration have deployed a variety of measures aimed at mobilizing the diaspora. Some are institutional by design such as the creation of diaspora ministries and other offices within the government; others are more diplomatic or political such as the integration of members of the diaspora into development planning and policy implementation, and high profile visits of government officials to diaspora communities. The third set of measures are more of a cultural nature such as the sponsoring of commemorative events in diaspora communities or travels of members of the diasporas, especially diaspora leaders and the youth, back home. However, as convincingly argued in this volume, those measures will not lead to a successful engagement with the diaspora if they are not accompanied by a sustained and focused effort on the part of the government to clearly outline the strategic goals it seeks to achieve by engaging with the diaspora, to identify its capacities in reaching these goals, to undertake a thorough mapping and comprehensive inventory of the diaspora's skills, capabilities, and experiences as well as an assessment of its interests, agenda, and expectations, and to seek to build trust with the diaspora on the basis of a genuine partnership for development.

In the final analysis, the key point to take away from this book is that diaspora engagement is a two-way street. Both the government and the diaspora must be willing and able to engage; they must both derive value from this partnership for the ultimate benefit of the people. As the old adage says, it takes two to tango.

Jack Mangala

Index