A Philosophy of Schooling

Care and Curiosity in Community

Julian Stern

A Philosophy of Schooling

"A beautifully argued case for more humane schools—schools that will support stronger communities, greater intellectual curiosity, and more fully human adults."

—Nel Noddings, *Emerita Professor of Education, Stanford University, USA*

'Refreshingly, the 'philosophy' of this book is neither a dry exercise in working out what words really mean, nor is it a tortuous exercise which baffles the reader with esoteric terminology. Instead, it does what it says it is going to do: it asks what the purposes of schooling should be. And refreshingly again, it is both prescriptive and personal: it argues for a particular view on schooling, based upon the key concepts of care, dialogue, curiosity, learning, community and personhood, whilst at the same time allowing the reader to understand why the writer holds the positions he does. He writes in an elegant, highly informed, and gently humorous manner, but with a clear concern for the need to reflect upon the roads that schooling is currently travelling down, and whether these are good for individual, the educational endeavour, or the society within which these are located. This book entertains, informs, and challenges, and it argues a position backed by wide-ranging evidence and impeccable logic. In an age where the role of the educator is increasingly seen as that of implementation, a book which asks fundamental questions about the purposes of schooling, and provides challenging answers, can only be good in helping educators interrogate their own purposes and practice.'

—Mike Bottery, *Emeritus Professor of Leadership, Policy and Values, University of Hull, UK*

'Julian Stern offers an optimistic manifesto for schools as learning communities devoted to the cultivation of caring and curious persons committed to taking responsibility for others. Accomplished in an integrated curriculum that sustains spiritual, ethical, and political traditions across the generations, Stern builds his vision out of compelling interpretations of philosophers such as John Macmurray, Nel Noddings, Martin Buber, Michael Oakeshott, and Jonathan Sacks, from the vantage point of a leading scholar and practitioner of religious education. Concise, clear, and jargon free, and illustrated with delightful personal anecdotes, the text should be of interest to laity and professionals alike, from parents and policy-makers to teachers, clergy, principals, and scholars.'

—Hanan Alexander, *Professor of Philosophy of Education and Dean of the Faculty of Education, University of Haifa, Israel*

Julian Stern

A Philosophy of Schooling

Care and Curiosity in Community

palgrave
macmillan

Julian Stern
York St John University
York, UK

ISBN 978-3-319-71570-4 ISBN 978-3-319-71571-1 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71571-1

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017963069

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature
The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface

Philosophy is not merely a 'technique', a way of arguing. Philosophers can—I think should—be prepared to 'put forward a philosophy', and this book is a proposal, a *philosophy of schooling*. It is 'a' philosophy of schooling, not 'the' philosophy of schooling, a distinction well-made by Matthews (1994, p 9) in presenting his philosophy of childhood. I have written this book for those interested in and/or involved in schooling, and who want to know more about the deeper questions related to schooling, and some of the deeper answers too. More than a hundred philosophers are quoted in the book (and many other scholars too), but—challenging as the ideas are at times—I do not assume that readers would have studied philosophy. Philosophy is just where you get to when you keep digging deeper and deeper.

When I was a student, I used to hitchhike. The drivers who would pick me up often asked what I studied. When I said 'philosophy', they would often say 'so, what's your philosophy, then?' At the time, I thought this the wrong question to ask, and—being reasonably polite—usually said something about philosophy being a method of studying, of analysing concepts and arguments. It has taken a few decades for me to come around to the idea that having 'a philosophy' is indeed a good idea. The 'analytic' tradition popular in English-language philosophy throughout the twentieth century was dominated by analysis, the attempt—as Wittgenstein elegantly described it—to 'shew the fly out of the fly-bottle'

(Wittgenstein 1958, p 87e). Part of my own change of mind was the result of my encounter with traditions that were outside the analytic tradition, including existentialist, Hegelian, Marxist, phenomenological, and personalist philosophies. I encountered them whilst studying and teaching philosophy; I encountered them even more whilst studying and teaching about religion. Religions, especially those originating in India, show scant regard for the division between religion and philosophy, although philosophers are generally rather keener to keep the barriers up. Smart's wonderful book on 'world philosophies' (Smart 1999) was the first I had read that made European philosophy (whether 'analytical' or 'Continental') look like a small if interesting subsection of a sweep of philosophies most of which have been described as religious or as religion itself. It is a stereotype of philosophy and religion that philosophy has plenty of good questions (but few clear answers) whilst religions have plenty of good answers (but do not like too many questions). A stereotype, but not without its insight. So now, after more than three decades of teaching (and educating teachers of) philosophy, history, social sciences, religious education, and more, I come back to, well, what is my philosophy? As far as schools go, it is that schools are means of realising personhood in caring, curious, dialogic learning communities. And my 'philosophy of schooling' is, in the end, the clearest philosophy I have.

Anyway, I no longer hitchhike but still get asked about what I do. 'I teach', I say to people. When they ask what I teach, expecting 'history' or 'science', I reply 'teachers'. I have not given up my 'teacher' identity, although I have been working full-time in universities for more than 20 years. But that identity as 'teacher' is complemented by my lifelong identity as 'learner' or—in the term most recognised by universities—as 'researcher'. (An anagram of my name is *just learnin*'—although an anagram is hardly a secure basis for an identity.) Having completed an undergraduate degree, a one-year teacher education qualification, and a two-year postgraduate degree, I gave up the opportunity to convert the postgraduate qualification into a doctorate. I was fed up learning without teaching. Ten years into a school teaching career, I started doing some part-time teacher education and at the same time began a doctorate—fed up, I guess, teaching without systematically learning. My own identity as both 'teacher' and 'learner' is not a comfortably settled identity: it has

been fought out over many years. By now, though, I am much more settled in the single identity as teacher-learner, or activist philosopher, or action researcher, or … well, perhaps I am not that settled. I teach, I learn.

This book is in part my own way of finding out about schooling, and a cluster of explanatory concepts will be returned to repeatedly. They are care, dialogue, curiosity, learning, community, and personhood. These are the core concepts underpinning all I write here. Oddly—and I find it odd myself, as I write—one obvious concept is missing: teaching. Many would say that whereas learning can take place anywhere, what distinguishes schooling is that involves systematic *teaching*. This is true. And I intend this book for teachers as much as anyone else: teachers will, I hope, find themselves in every page. I am a 'self-confessed' teacher. (In an overly confessional world, this is just about the only thing to which I confess.) But teaching, for me, is a job that is only understood in terms of learning—along with care, dialogue, curiosity, community, and personhood. It does not carry enough philosophical weight to add much to those core concepts. Lawrence-Lightfoot defines teachers as 'society's professional adults' (Lawrence-Lightfoot 2003, p xxi), even if she later attributes this to Waller as a 'tongue-in-cheek' remark (Lawrence-Lightfoot 2003, p 30). I very much like that definition. So 'teaching' misses the cut, and the six core concepts remain, all interconnected and all together creating my model of schooling. The introductory Chap. 1, *Why Care About Schools?*, mentions all six, with an underpinning theme of care. Chapter 2, *Schools as Communities*, centres on community, Chap. 3, *Learning in Dialogue*, on dialogue, and Chap. 4, *Personhood and Personalism in School*, on personhood. Pedagogy—the 'science' of teaching and learning—is the theme of Chap. 5, *Pedagogy, Research, and Being a Curious Teacher*, but the core concepts are curiosity and learning. Similarly, although *School Leadership* is the title of Chap. 6, the dominant core concept is care. Chapter 7 on *The Sustainability of Schooling and Its Alternatives* explores the future of learning whilst Chap. 8, *A Curriculum for One: Overcoming Dualism*, is centred on curiosity and dialogue in the curriculum. *The Politics of Schooling*, in Chap. 9, focuses on community. Finally, the *Afterword* is a manifesto for schools, bringing together all six core concepts in a personalist programme for those in, and those who care for,

schools. If you want to know what I think about schooling, go straight to the *Afterword*; if you want to know why I think it, you will need to work through all the chapters—each of which starts with an epigraph taken from the manifesto. For a brief accompanying reading list, I would suggest these four volumes from the bibliography: Fielding (2015) for an overview of Macmurray's educational work, including a chapter by Macmurray himself; Buber (2002a) for the clearest accounts of creative dialogic education; Noddings (2016) for a clear account of the whole range of educational philosophy; and Aristotle (1976) for a clear account of all of philosophy.

None of this would have been possible without companions. I suppose I hitch a lift, as an academic, with other academics. For this book, the writers I have made most use of get their credits throughout the text. For those looking out for particular philosophers (or wanting to pigeonhole my philosophy), those most influential are (in alphabetical order) Aristotle, Martin Buber, René Descartes, Michael Fielding, Thomas Hobbes, John Macmurray, Emmanuel Mounier, Arne Naess, Nel Noddings, Plato, and Baruch Spinoza—that is two from the ancient world, three from the seventeenth century, and six from the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Macmurray's is the strongest voice of all: this is a book that builds on, even if it challenges and goes beyond, Macmurray's educational philosophy. The people who helped more directly and personally include Mike Bottery, Mario D'Souza, Alex Sinclair, Chris Sink, Marie Stern, and (a while back) Phillida Salmon. As a book of philosophy, I would also like to thank those who taught me philosophy, particularly L Jonathan Cohen, Brian McGuinness, and Charles Taylor, and those who, more recently, helped revitalise my interest in philosophy, particularly Hanan Alexander, Matthew Clarke, Gordon Ferguson, Michael Fielding, Alan Ford, Amanda Fulford, Morwenna Griffiths, Helen Lees, Nel Noddings, Anne Pirrie, Simon Smith, Richard Thompson, and Jeanne Warren. I am grateful to them and to everyone else who has helped through their comments, suggestions, criticisms, and interest. They are responsible for many good things in the book; I remain responsible for all the errors.

I have attempted to use inclusive language throughout, but I have quoted others accurately and therefore, at times, have quoted their non-inclusive language.

York, UK Julian Stern

Contents

1

Introduction: Why Care About Schools?

I will care for people and care about learning.

Introduction

I care about schools, and they need defending. People take schools for granted and assume they need no justification. This is wrong. Schools are important, I think, but *not* necessary. Most learning—even with mass schooling—takes place before, after, and beyond schooling, with most of all happening in the first few years of life prior to any form of schooling. It is therefore more helpful to consider what schools might *add* to the education of children and young people, rather than assuming schools are the only source of education. As Mounier said, '[t]he educational question cannot be reduced to the problems of the school: the school is only one educational instrument among others; and even to make it the principal instrument is a dangerous error' (Mounier 1952, p 117). This book is my explanation—my philosophy—of schooling, my reason for valuing schools even if they are not necessary.

Julian Stern, *A Philosophy of Schooling*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71571-1_1

Why do I care about schools? There are all too many unpleasant aspects of schools, just as there are of families and of every other social group. But a number of philosophers not only care about schools, but write of care *in* schools not as an additional extra, or a normative ideal, but as schools' core activity. I would like to build on this understanding of schooling in a chapter that is an account of care in the educational philosophy of Macmurray and Noddings. My purpose is in part to contribute to academic debates on schooling, but I am writing for those involved in schooling, and I am therefore also concerned about contributing to school-based debates on schooling. Teachers and others employed in schools, pupils, families, governors, and politicians can all benefit from seeing schools as caring institutions—better or worse at it, of course, but caring, nonetheless. This will in turn help them understand why we might care *about* schools. That is why the first sentence of my 'manifesto' (the *Afterword* of this book) says that 'the school I would like will have people in it who will care for me and care about learning, and will give me opportunities to care for other people'. Care is one of six key concepts—care, dialogue, curiosity, learning, community, and personhood—used throughout the book.

Macmurray and Noddings on Care and Ethics

Why care about care? Care is one of a trio of words—care, love, and friendship—that are central to any consideration of relationships, and therefore ethics, and yet which present challenges. All three terms can be sentimentalised, romanticised, sexualised: all are somewhat dangerous words to use. In some ways, 'care' is the least challenging of the three terms, but this certainly does not mean it is straightforward. Being 'caring' and 'careful' have very different meanings, and 'care' can mean a worry or grief just as much as it can mean protection and support (OED 2005). And the danger of associating care with schooling is that schools' educational function could be ignored in favour of seeing them as little more than babysitting facilities. Into this minefield, I therefore step with some care. (If you are feeling particularly carefree at the moment, you may want to move straight on to Chap. 2, and come back to care later.)

The philosopher Macmurray writes distinctively of care, love, and friendship. Long before 'care ethics' was presented as an explicit alternative to the rationalist duty-based ethics of Kant (1964), and the consequentialist utilitarian ethics of Mill (1910), Macmurray's moral philosophy was centred on care, love, and freedom. Being motivated by duty or by utility is a kind of 'Stoic solution – … to suppress the emotional elements in human relationship and to depend upon pure reason' (Macmurray 1946c, p 8). Love or care is a more proper moral motivation.

> Love, as the positive ground-motive of personal activity, can best be defined as the capacity for self-transcendence, or the capacity to care for the other. Love is for the other: fear is for the self. In actual experience, of course, both motives are operative together; and either may dominate the other. (Macmurray 1993, p 57)

It is important to note that '[m]y care for you is only moral if it includes the intention to preserve your freedom as an agent, which is your independence of me', and '[e]ven if you wish to be dependent on me, it is my business, for your sake, to prevent it' (Macmurray 1991b, p 190). The danger, that is, is of care creating a dependency and therefore being a potentially oppressive form of care. Care links Macmurray's work to the philosophy of Noddings. She, like Macmurray, distinguishes different types of care, only one of which is appropriate to a care-based ethic. Noddings contrasts 'caring' and 'care-giving':

> Care-giving can be done without care. We have Nurse Ratched from *One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest* … as an example. While caring is certainly associated with care-giving, and we hope that it will be paramount there, it isn't always, and so they are different. … I … want to emphasise the relational character of caring. So if I meet with a stranger, it is equally likely that I will be carer and he cared for, or the other way round. Both contribute to the caring relation. I'd emphasise that. (Noddings, in Stern 2016, p 33)

Caring is mutual, and it is not simply up to the carer to decide what is needed. That would be, in Macmurray's terms, too oppressive or too

liable to create a dependency. Nurses or teachers have professional caring responsibilities, but that does not necessarily make it a one-way (non-ethical) form of caring.

> [I]f you're looking at caring and teaching, it's usually the teacher who's the carer, and the student who's the cared-for. But that doesn't mean that the cared-for doesn't contribute anything to the relation. As you know I'm very interested in what the cared-for does contribute to the relation. So that is the kind of openness, reciprocity, that I want to try to sustain. It isn't this powerful group of carers, care-givers, who decide what the other folks need and then they're generously going to give it to them – instead of meeting together and realising that both contribute to the relationship. (Noddings, in Stern 2016, p 33–34)

Care is certainly needs based, but this requires that the carer is 'attentive – I listen to whatever needs are expressed – and, if possible, I try to respond positively' (Noddings 2005a, p 147). If a teacher decides what is needed, without listening, then this might be an example of 'virtue caring'. 'Some day you'll thank me for this!' is how they are remembered, and 'they do not establish caring relations or engage in "caring-for" as described in care ethics' (Noddings 2012, p 773).

> Care ethics emphasises the difference between assumed needs and expressed needs. From this perspective, it is important not to confuse what the cared-for wants with that which we think he should want. We must listen, not just 'tell', assuming that we know what the other needs. So Martin Buber, also, in his positing of relation as ontologically basic and of dialogue as the basis of the relation in teaching claims that 'The relation in education is one of pure dialogue'. (Noddings 2012, p 773, quoting Buber 2002a, p 116)

It is not easy to describe exactly what counts as 'care' in all circumstances, but this is because care theory is a 'non-ideal' theory, dealing with the complexities of real situations.

> Here are the way things are: we look at a situation, and we say, this is not good. On what grounds do we decide that? We talk about that. Do we have

> any good examples? Yes, there are good examples. We're looking at some problems in teaching, we compare them with families. There are some wonderful families that do wonderful things: here is an example in the real world. We don't have to copy it, but we can learn from it: we can try this and that from it. That's the whole idea of these so called non-ideal theories, of which care theory is one. (Noddings, in Stern 2016, p 31–32)

Although Macmurray could make sweeping generalisations on many topics, I think he would be attracted to this description of 'non-ideal' theorising in philosophy. He shares with Noddings a sense that what goes on in schools, too, is not something that is easily 'boxed' into a systematic rational theory. Rosenzweig similarly writes of the 'old philosophy' that deals in 'philosophical astonishment', which he tries to replace with the 'new thinking' that is at one with 'healthy human understanding' in seeking wisdom through 'understanding at the right time' (Rosenzweig 2000, p 123). Noddings retains thinking in time, in practice, and says,

> *The living other is more important than any theory*. This is a central idea in an ethic of care. It is pre-theoretical, rooted in natural caring. It is, however, often very hard for teachers to accept, because teacher education and educational research inculcate certain theories and modes of practice as the scientifically approved ways of doing things. … "Constructivism says …" and so the child is sacrificed to the theory. This happens repeatedly with fashionable ideas in education. (Noddings 2005b, p xix)

Care that intends to preserve the other's freedom, in Macmurray's sense, or that is attentive and mutual, in Noddings' sense, is therefore relational. 'There are two things about personal relations which make them quite different from all other relations', Macmurray says: '[t]hey are always mutual and they are always intentional' (Macmurray 1945, p 27). Care cannot be described of a single person, but only of a relationship. For this reason, Noddings prefers to talk of the care ethic as distinct from the idea of a 'virtue', which she takes to be a quality of an individual person. 'A caring relation … involves two parties, a carer and a cared-for; the carer attends to the expressed needs of the cared-for, is moved affectively by what he or she detects in the other's situation, and is prepared to respond in some appropriate way; the cared-for completes the relation by

recognizing – showing in some way – that the attempt to care has been received' (Noddings 2015, p 120–121). This position is in contrast to the more ideal (if not idealist) ethical theories of ethical autonomy—exemplified by the Enlightenment philosophies of Kant (1964) or Locke, for whom '[c]hildren have as much a mind to shew that they are free, that their own good actions come from themselves, that they are absolute and independent, as any of the proudest of you grown men, think of them as you please' (Locke 1998):

> The ethic of care rejects the notion of a truly autonomous moral agent and accepts the reality of moral interdependence. Our goodness and our growth are inextricably bound to that of others we encounter. As teachers, we are as dependent on our students as they are on us. (Noddings 2016, p 237)

This in turn means that 'moral rules' are not sufficient in themselves to guide morality. Something else needs to happen:

> Carol Gilligan and Nel Noddings were influenced by Buber in arguing that moral rules and principles are not reliable guides to moral behavior. They argued that moral growth is more affective than cognitive – better conceived as grounded in feelings of care than in justifiable moral rules and principles. Rules are grounded in object-object or instrumental relationships. Buber called them I-It relations. Caring, on the other hand, requires the meeting of two subjects in a moment when the other "fills the firmament," to cite Noddings's reference to Buber. He called those moments of meeting I-Thou relations. (Alexander 2015, p 166)

It has taken a long time for other ethicists to address the challenge of care ethics. According to Alexander, Kohlberg, late in his career, accepted that '[o]nly in communal contexts … can real, as opposed to hypothetical, moral dilemmas arise that will precipitate moral growth' (Alexander 2015, p 166). But Noddings is drawn more to Buber and dialogic ethics than to the more communal approach of Macmurray, as '[o]ne-on-one relationships, rather than community or tradition, are a more reliable ground for ethics and moral education' (Alexander 2015, p 167). Alexander notes that Noddings emphasises one-on-one relationships in contrast to communities. However, it may be possible to transfer care ethics into community

contexts if communities are characterised—as Macmurray says—by a network of (dialogic) relationships amongst people, rather than having their own powerful identities as purposeful communities. Communities sharing a common *purpose* are not Macmurrian communities. He says that such organisations are 'societies', not communities—in the same way that care that denies another's freedom or fails to be mutual is not really care.

Care ethics is shared, therefore, by Macmurray and Noddings, notwithstanding some different emphases and concerns. And both share a belief that care is central to schooling. What I wish to go on to say, is that care ethics goes far beyond ethics. In Levinas' phrase, 'ethics' can be 'first philosophy' (Levinas 1989, p 75). He sees the Other as central to ethics and from this builds a philosophy.

Macmurray on Care, Epistemology, and Ontology

How could care ethics be 'first philosophy'? Whereas Descartes created his epistemology from a sceptical position that almost overwhelmed him until all he could affirm with certainty was *cogito ergo sum*—I think therefore I am—Macmurray says that knowledge starts with the Other, the other who is *personal* and who, therefore, *cares*:

> The first knowledge … is knowledge of the personal Other – the Other with whom I am in communication, who responds to my cry and cares for me. This is the starting-point of all knowledge and is presupposed at every stage of its subsequent development. (Macmurray 1991b, p 76)

Macmurray does not value Descartes' thought experiment that ends with the cogito:

> [T]here is no problem about our knowledge of other persons. On the contrary, any philosophy which finds itself required by its own logic to ask the question 'How do we know that there are other persons?' has refuted itself by a *reductio ad absurdum*, and should at once revise its original assumptions. (Macmurray 1991b, p 76–77)

Therefore, 'any assertion – not to speak of any effort of proof – presupposes this knowledge by the mere fact that it is a communication' (Macmurray 1991b, p 77):

> If we did not know that there are other persons we could know literally nothing, not even that we ourselves existed. To be a person is to be in communication with the Other. The knowledge of the Other is the absolute presupposition of all knowledge, and as such is necessarily indemonstrable. (Macmurray 1991b, p 77)

Only with a caring Other can knowledge come. Descartes is often described as a 'rationalist' philosopher, and Macmurray rejected Descartes' epistemology. He did not reject reason, though:

> The rationality of thought is its objectivity, and the motive which sustains this objectivity in our thinking is our interest in the object for its own sake, which alone can shape our ideas to the nature of the object instead of to the nature of our own desires. To seek the truth is, in fact, to care for the nature of the object, within the limits of our intention to know it. (Macmurray 1993, p 58–9)

As I understand it, that means reason itself is motivated by care. We should note his description of rationality as caring for an object 'for its own sake'. In a community, in contrast to other social groups, people treat each other as ends in themselves, and not as means to other ends. In the quotation above, Macmurray is extending the 'for its own sake' principle to all objects of our knowledge. He seems therefore to be making reason a moral activity, at least if my care for the object of study 'includes the intention to preserve [its] freedom as an agent, which is [its] independence of me' (Macmurray 1991b, p 190, quoted earlier). Does this make sense? For Macmurray, I think, agency is attributed only to human beings. Perhaps—for me, though not for Macmurray—there is a 'thinner' morality at work with non-human objects of thought, based on accepting that the objects (whether or not they have agency) have a degree of 'independence' of the thinker. If this is accepted, then epistemology does indeed follow ethics, and ethics remains as 'first philosophy'.

What about ontology, the very nature of *being*? Macmurray generalises care ethics and the form of care in reason to all of our existence. 'The truth is', for Macmurray, 'that we need others in order to be ourselves' (Macmurray 2004, p 171):

> All things seek the fulfilment of their own nature; and it is the nature of man to live beyond himself; to find the centre of his interest in the world outside; to care for what is other than himself. In thought and knowledge we call this self-transcendence 'objectivity'; but this is only one aspect of it. At its fullest it is the self-transcendence in which we care for another person with our whole being, and find our freedom and our fulfilment in him. … Yet how rarely it happens; and perhaps this is the greatest paradox of human life. When any two human beings meet it is natural that they should enter into personal relation and care for one another as friends. It is, I say, the most natural thing in the world; yet it hardly ever occurs. … Why does it happen so rarely? Because we are afraid. We are full of deep-seated, half-conscious fears that will not allow us to trust one another, or to give ourselves away. We have learnt the arts of self-defence; to keep ourselves to ourselves, to give others no handle against us. (Macmurray 2004, p 171–172)

Amongst the many paradoxes inherent in this philosophy is that of independence. The motivation of all personal relations and, I think, all thought about objects, must be to retain the independence of others. Yet no one, and nothing, is truly independent. The 'reciprocity between child and adult' makes up 'the ground plan of his own personality' so that '*the personal is inherently mutual*' and '[h]uman life is a *common* life' (Macmurray 1946b, p 7, original emphasis). A child grows from 'dependence … not to independence, but to an inter-dependence in which he can give as well as receive' (Macmurray 2012, p 662). Mutuality includes, but is not limited to, 'functional' needs—needs to collaborate in order to eat or maintain our health. 'We need one another functionally, because there are so many things that we cannot do for ourselves or get for ourselves without the help of other people', but we also 'need one another personally; because it is our nature to love and be loved' and therefore 'need to care for others, even to spend ourselves for their sakes' (Macmurray 2004, p 171). Macmurray is referencing the Biblical instruction to 'spend'

your life in order to 'save' it (Matthew 16: 25, and as in St. Paul's statement that 'I will very gladly spend and be spent for you', 2 Corinthians 12:15), and extends this to a quasi-Marxist view of people as 'by nature' workers:

> The worker *spends* his life in creation by realizing his intentions in the world. This spending of our life *is* our life. We have no other. If then we refuse to be workers; if, instead, we insist on *saving* our lives, on being worked for – whether by others or by God – we negate our own nature and lose our own lives. (Macmurray 1939b, p 99)

Yet this work is not a Marxist manufacturing work, but the work of (mutual) care:

> This, in fact, is the most fundamental and the most characteristic of all human needs; as its satisfaction is the fullest and most absolute of all satisfactions. We talk and we behave as if this were not so. We try, for some obscure reason, to evade the issue. We pretend, even to ourselves, that we are above such childishness. We set ourselves to seek fulfilment and satisfaction in functional achievements, and let our personal lives atrophy and drop away. Why this should be so I cannot tell. A poet has called the fear of love our last cowardice; and in our lack of courage we pretend to ourselves that we can do without affection. Yet we cannot wholly succeed in our self-deception; and the complete egocentric – the man who really cares for nobody but himself – is either a monster or a maniac. (Macmurray 2004, p 171)

The ego does not exist apart from others, and the best we can do is to move from (primarily) being cared for, as a new-born baby (and even this involves some mutuality), to interdependence. Macmurray calls this process *learning to be human*, and he says it is a lifelong task. Long before 'lifelong learning' was a popular phrase in educational circles, Macmurray saw education as lifelong and as being a process of becoming 'real'. Hence, '[t]o be educated today means to have learned to be human – not Scottish, not British, not even West-European – but human' (Macmurray 2012, p 663), and '[w]e are all more or less unreal' such that '[o]ur business is to make ourselves a little more real than we are' (Macmurray 1992, p 143).

The mutuality of human existence is itself the central characteristic of human existence and how we live (and learn) in time. I have said elsewhere (Stern 2018) that Macmurray's relational, communal, philosophy in which 'no one [cares] for himself' (Macmurray 1991b, p 211) seems to reflect a somewhat limited appreciation of solitude and might have contributed to the 'depth of loneliness' attributed to Macmurray by his wife (Costello 2002a, p 28). This is well illustrated by his dismissal of Buddhism because it encourages 'withdrawal' (Macmurray 1993, p 67) and is essentially 'idealist' (Macmurray 1995, p 39). It also fits with the following account, in which Macmurray might be described as existentialist in the style of Sartre (2003). Sennett says that '[l]oneliness … hurts, but … all humans need to experience its pain; loneliness of the sort Sartre, in *Being and Nothingness*, called "epistemic loneliness" makes us aware of our limited place in the world' (Sennett 2012, p 183):

> We need one another to be ourselves. This complete and unlimited dependence of each of us upon the others is the central and crucial fact of personal existence. Individual independence is an illusion; and the independent individual, the isolated self, is a nonentity. In ourselves we are nothing; and when we turn our eyes inward in search of ourselves we find a vacuum. Being nothing in ourselves, we have no value in ourselves, and are of no importance whatever, wholly without meaning or significance. It is only in relation to others that we exist as persons; we are invested with significance by others who have need of us; and borrow our reality from those who care for us. We live and move and have our being not in ourselves but in one another; and what rights or powers or freedom we possess are ours by the grace and favour of our fellows. Here is the basic fact of our human condition; which all of us can know if we stop pretending, and do know in moments when the veil of self-deception is stripped from us and we are forced to look upon our own nakedness. (Macmurray 1991b, p 211)

This account not only edges towards a surprisingly empty existentialism, it also—equally surprisingly—seems to echo some of Spinoza's philosophy. The idea that we are never wholly independent and therefore never wholly free, but through understanding more of the world may become more independent, more free, complements Spinoza's philosophy of limited freedom, limited by our very finite existence: 'those who

believe, that they speak or keep silence or act in any way from the free decision of their mind, do but dream with their eyes open' (Spinoza 1955, p 135). And like Spinoza, who gave 'ethics' as the title of his mature philosophy, Macmurray has ethics as his first philosophy.

Macmurray and Noddings on Caring Schools

For Macmurray, 'society' is not simply the term for a large-scale body like a nation state. It can be applied equally appropriately to any non-personal group of people. The macropolitics of the state, and of international organisations, always interested Macmurray. But he was equally at home in micropolitics. One of his favourite micropolitical analyses was of schools. Schools were, he said, necessarily *communities*. He did not write of schools as potentially or actually 'democratic' in the political sense of an equal distribution of power, as the personal relationships that make schools into communities are not of that kind. He did, however, write of a form of mutuality that is appropriate to call egalitarianism (Stern 2002):

> The master-servant relation must disappear. This is quite compatible with an organised difference of functions in which one person has to make decisions and another to carry them out. Indeed it is the key to smooth and harmonious functioning of the system of co-operation. (Macmurray 1946c, p 6)

To achieve this in school requires 'the elimination of fear or anxiety from the personal relations of all members of the staff, and so of aggressiveness and submissiveness which are expressions of anxiety' (Macmurray 1946c, p 6). This is not an argument 'on general principles' but one 'precisely from the standpoint of educational efficiency' (Macmurray 1946c, p 7).

Macmurray sees all personal relationships in terms of care. His educational philosophy derives from that, as does his political philosophy. This is expressed in his summary of all his philosophy: '[a]ll meaningful knowledge is for the sake of action, and all meaningful action for the sake of friendship' (Macmurray 1991a, p 15). But I would like to return to the paradoxical character of this philosophy—that personal independence

(or 'self-realisation', becoming more 'real') must always be intended but can never be wholly achieved. With respect to politics in general, and the micropolitics of the school, Macmurray's paradox is that schools are filled with unequal relationships that nevertheless must have an intention of equality. And, once again, Noddings has a similar—though not the same—position. She recognises inequality at the same time as she recognises the necessary mutuality of real care: '[t]he centrality of relations of care and trust should be recognized in both planning and practice' (Noddings 2015, p 7). The intentional equality described by Macmurray, with the aim being friendship, is a stronger account of the paradox of schools being hierarchical yet egalitarian. Noddings emphasises mutuality *notwithstanding* inequality, in contrast to Macmurray who sees mutuality and inequality coexisting, with the former overcoming the worst, most fearful, aspects of the latter. Incidentally – and I suspect not to Macmurray's liking—Macmurray's position is similar to that of Aristotle, for whom 'the result [of friendship between unequals] is a kind of equality' (Aristotle 1976, p 270).

Care goes both ways. In a political situation, a communal or friendly environment where equality is intended, there may still be substantive political inequalities, but politics, like care, will 'go both ways'. This is what Macmurray means by freedom: freedom allows for mutuality, care, friendship. In the micropolitical context of schools, this will mean that teachers and other staff and pupils will all contribute to the communal nature of the school. Even if the staff are the 'professional carers', all—including pupils—will care. Amongst many implications of this is the discouragement of a common consequence of what Noddings calls 'caregiving': teachers seeing themselves as martyrs. Macmurray notes that '[t]he tendency to sacrifice the adults to the children is as disastrous as it is widespread' (Macmurray 1946c, p 6). Encouraging mutuality is not common in education discourse, any more than in political discourse. People are expected to be 'nonneedy', and 'the nanny state' is criticised for admitting to mutual dependency. Sennett describes how in liberal political theory such as that of Locke, 'dependence demeans', and says this comes from a stark division between fully dependent childhood and fully independent adulthood: it 'make[s] childhood and adulthood, immaturity and maturity, into political categories; the phenomenon of

dependency divides them' (Sennett 2003, p 103, although Locke himself, quoted above, seems to make independence characteristic of the expectations of children and adults alike). Macmurray has no such simple division, and acknowledges throughout his philosophy the mutuality in relationships amongst all, from infancy to adulthood, noting along the way that '[i]ndividual independence is an illusion' (Macmurray 1991b, p 211, also quoted above), as 'growing up is an educational process which hinges upon dependence upon other people [and …] runs from an utter dependence in which we can do nothing for ourselves, in which our survival depends upon other people thinking for us and planning for us and caring for us in every way, to a maturity in which, if our education has been successful, *as it never is completely*, we find ourselves members of an inter-dependence of equals' (Macmurray 1964, p 21, emphasis added). Sennett illustrates it in this way:

> Imagine a lover who declares, "Don't worry about me, I can take care of myself, I will never become a burden to you." We should show such a lover to the door; this nonneedy creature could never take our own needs seriously. In private life, dependence ties people together. … In the public realm, however, dependence appears shameful. … At a Labour Party conference recently [1997] the British prime minister declared that "the new welfare state must encourage work not dependency," in arguing for "compassion with a hard edge." (Sennett 2003, p 101)

Although Macmurray insists on care including the intention to preserve the other's independence (Macmurray 1991b, p 190, quoted above), he, like Sennett, thinks of this as impossible—as we are never wholly independent. Care is mutual, and schools are distinctively caring communities. This is what I mean by 'caring schools'.

Why Should We Care About Learning?

Schools are learning communities although they do not have a monopoly of learning. Schools are places *specialising* in learning, that is their whole being, whilst other communities (families, friendship groups, religious

groups) may also be doing other non-learning-centred things. Schools are specialist in that sense, and in the sense of having a curriculum of specialist subjects. And yet the activity of the school is much more simple:

> We may act as though we were teaching arithmetic or history. In fact we are teaching people. The arithmetic or the history is merely a medium through which a personal intercourse is established and maintained. (Macmurray 1946a, p 1)

Noddings concurs: '[i]t is a bad mistake … for a mathematics teacher to "think of her or himself as a mathematician" [as MacIntyre suggests]' (Noddings 2003, p 248) as the activity of schools is 'to produce better people' (Noddings, in Stern 2016, p 29). For Macmurray, this means that '[f]rom the teacher's point of view education is helping other people to learn to be human' (Macmurray 2012, p 9). A school governor himself, I assume Macmurray was involved in appointing teachers. He describes the qualifications necessary to be a teacher, and care is, once again, central. 'The qualification for [being a teacher] is that he should be himself an educated person', by which Macmurray means that '[h]e must have gone through the process of learning to be human with at least a fair measure of success' and 'must be able to enter into positive relations with each individual among his pupils' (Macmurray 2012, p 9). And in a characteristic 'care goes both ways' way, Macmurray makes similar demands of pupils as of teachers:

> The relation between the teacher and those who learn from him is one of the typical human relations and one which is fundamental. … It must be a relation in which two human beings meet, like one another, care for one another, help one another. That is the secret of teaching. (Macmurray 1964, p 17)

Noddings provides an account of the centrality of conversation in schools, and likens this to Buber's dialogue. Conversation is personal. 'Perhaps most significantly of all, in ordinary conversation, we are aware that our partners in conversation are more important than the topic' (Noddings 1994). And schools are more personal and dialogic than other situations in which care may be given.

> It matters to students whether or not they like and are liked by their teachers. The teacher as person is centrally important in teaching. A physician can concentrate entirely on treating her patients; so long as she exercises the virtues that reflect her expertise, her personal character and personality matter very little. But the teacher sets an example with her whole self – her intellect, her responsiveness, her humour, her curiosity … her care. … This … casts doubt on the contention that teaching is never more than a means. (Noddings 2003, p 244)

Schools are not primarily functional, then, even if they incidentally also fulfil various functions. In this, Noddings and Macmurray are as one. '[S]choolteachers accept some responsibility for the development of students as whole persons', and '[t]eaching is thoroughly relational' so that teachers and students experience an 'awakening sense (for both) that teaching and life are never-ending moral quests' (Noddings 2003, p 249).

Care is central, then. For Noddings, care and 'subjects' are both important; for Macmurray, subjects are there for the purpose of helping with the general intention of helping pupils become more human. Here is Noddings' account:

> Not only must a teacher acquire and continually extend her store of broad cultural knowledge, she must also be committed to establishing and maintaining relations of care and trust. This is necessary if teachers are to meet responsibility for the development of their students as whole persons. Relations of care and trust also form a foundation for the effective transmission of both general and specialised knowledge. But relations of care and trust are ends in themselves, not simply means to achieve various learnings. (Noddings 2003, p 250)

Both Noddings and Macmurray seem interested in care for people and the curiosity that is, roughly, care for the objects of study. 'Curiosity' has 'care' at its root—from 'cure', meaning 'full of care or pains, careful, assiduous, inquisitive' (OED 2005). This is made explicit in Macmurray's account of reason (given above) and is supported by Noddings' reference to 'producing better people' having priority over functioning to the benefit of mathematics or any other subject. For me, Macmurray's combina-

tion of care for people and for the object of study is a particularly effective, holistic, appreciation of the value of schooling.

Conclusion: Why Care About Schools?

My concern in this chapter is to use Macmurray and Noddings to argue for care as a 'first philosophy' for understanding schooling. This is not easy. An interesting analysis of a now-defunct policy explains how an apparent emphasis on care can be subverted by apparently rather innocuous performative requirements. *Every Child Matters* (DfES 2004) was a UK policy that stretched across schooling, social services, policing, and health. It seemed to have care at its heart:

> On the one hand, ECM seeks to prioritize the whole child and in this respect its raison d'être can be said to position learning as a process of mutually interdependent exploration between pupil and pupil, pupil and teacher. … In these ways it might be argued that a desire to both publicly extol care in the virtue sense ('care about') and promote an ethic of caring for in the day-to-day relationships of the school lies central to ECM.
>
> However, the detail in ECM suggests tensions. In its use of specific, reductionist targets and indicators ECM sits squarely with a performativity discourse, a discourse that favours not the emotional connection of the humanist project, but rather distance, rigour, performance and accountability. Not only is interdependency lost, but children are redefined: no longer are they seen as whole people, now they are judged solely in terms of that which school can affect and address, albeit in relation to a broader set of parameters and service provision than hitherto considered. (Adams 2007, p 234)

The move from caring about people to caring about 'performances' (the meeting of targets, measures, audits, league tables, and so on), is one that the sociologist Ball describes in terms of 'the teacher's soul and the terrors of performativity' (Ball 2003b). He says that 'while we may not be expected to care about each other we are expected to 'care' *about* performances [and …] are expected to be passionate about excellence' (Ball 2003b, p 224). This is as much of a risk for health professionals and social

workers as it is for teachers. But in this chapter, I have stuck to the school system. In schools, mutual care is central to all the work of the school. That is why we should care about schools. But this is an incomplete argument. The peculiarity of schools is not sufficiently followed through: there is an argument about learning here but not enough about *schools*, I think. The following chapter (Chap. 2) adds another element that is distinctive of schools: community.

2

Schools as Communities

I will treat other people as ends in themselves, not as means to other ends.

Introduction

Schools are learning communities, and understanding this means understanding the nature of learning and community. *Developing Schools as Learning Communities* was the title of my first major educational research project (Stern 2001a), and since writing that, I have developed my views in various ways. But I can happily say that 'developing schools as learning communities' was then, and remains now, the central purpose of my educational work. Most of the arguments in Chap. 1 were concerned with the relationships between teachers and learners. They would apply to other non-school-based teaching–learning relationships, including those of home-visiting or online private tutors, sports coaches, personal trainers, voice coaches and musical instrument tutors, driving instructors, senior work colleagues, or educators based in youth clubs, religious organisations, and prisons. Relatively formal education happens in many

Julian Stern, *A Philosophy of Schooling*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71571-1_2

places, and care is relevant to them all. Schools are more than just organisations involved in education. They are *communities*, learning communities—with the word 'community' having a specific meaning. Although my claim is normative (it is about what schools *should* be), it is a claim that also—I believe—makes most sense of what 'school' and 'community' mean. And although my claim is broadly philosophical and not conventionally empirical (it is not based on evidence about how schools work), there is empirical evidence that supports the claim, some of which is described here.

The terms 'school' and 'community' are often associated with each other. There is a long-standing literature on the relationships of schools to local communities (e.g. Dyson and Robson 1999) and a related literature on schools as communities (e.g. Macmurray 2012, Wehlage et al. 1989). There is also an extensive literature on non-school learning communities (e.g. Lave and Wenger 1991). However, Macmurray's is the most influential voice for this chapter. Overall, I am composing a portrait of schools as communities that will build on the care ethics of the previous chapter, and that will look forward to the following chapter on the details of dialogue—itself more influenced by the philosophy of Buber. The aim of the chapter is explained in my 'manifesto' (the *Afterword* of this book), where I say that 'the school I would like will be a friendly place which will have people in it who will treat each other as ends in themselves, not as means to other ends, and who will work together to support learning'.

Community Theories

Studying community is a complex matter, as there is such variation in understandings of what makes a community. Human communities are generally thought to be relatively small (in contrast to societies) and to have something in common (the etymological source of the word 'community'). There are some uses of the term that indicate very large numbers of people, such as the 'global Christian community' (Lambeth Council 2006), 'the LGBT community' (Martin 2017), or the '[w]orldwide community of Muslims' or 'Ummah' (SCAA 1994, p 25). These

uses often attempt to create a sense of unity notwithstanding (and perhaps precisely because) there are substantial divisions within such a large 'community', as in Lambeth Council (2006) which describes different Christian denominations (within a nominal single community) and makes no attempt to describe global *communality*. Large-scale communities may also be defined by outsiders in an attempt to unite in opposition. That strategy can be found in some 'clash of civilisations' (Huntington 1996) or radical atheist (Dawkins 2006) or fundamentalist religious (Armstrong 2000) theories that attempt to describe a single (opposed) community in order to describe or promote opposition to that community. Examples of massive communities are also at times modelled on smaller communities, and in that sense, the 'normality' of communities being small still remains. Macmurray, for example, argues for the possibility of a large community, but it is only a genuine community if it is built '[o]n the pattern of the small community', in which 'the relationships are all direct; the persons involved meet one another face to face in the routine of a common life' (Macmurray 1946c, p 7–8). Such a community is difficult to create, as Macmurray acknowledges—and he gives no example of such a community existing. (He describes a 'European tradition' of creating a large community by depending on 'pure reason', and an alternative Christian solution based on the 'generalisation of love', Macmurray 1946c, p 7–8, but he does not indicate that either has been achieved.)

So communities are, at least generally or normally, small and have something in common. Most of the disagreement—the more interesting disagreement—about the term 'community' is over what, exactly, might be 'common' to members of a community. One cluster of understandings suggests that what is held in common is a set of views, norms, or beliefs; another says that what is held in common is a set of activities or relationships. This, like so many philosophical disagreements, is well represented in the work of Plato and Aristotle, both of whom wrote of states as communities. It should be pointed out that Ancient Greek city-states were small, and therefore more able to be characterised as communities in the most common sense of (potential) face to face meeting: 'one cannot have a city with ten people and with 100,000 it would no longer be a city' (Aristotle 1976, p 307). In his description of community, Plato

characterised community in terms of a single set of views, norms or belief, or *agreement*. For Plato, 'harmony … is consonance, and consonance is a species of agreement', so the aim is to 'create … agreement by producing concord and love between … various opposites' (Plato 1997, p 471, from *Symposium*). Plato is writing here of music and love, but the political implications are clear. In the *Republic*, he describes the common ownership of property, and the common life, of guardians (Plato 1997, p 1052), and he insists on the city being 'naturally one not many' (Plato 1997, p 1056), with music (but not 'new songs') and poetry as its 'bulwark', because children 'absorb lawfulness from music and poetry' (Plato 1997, p 1056–1057). Agreement is central to Plato's model republic, a model related to and supported by (musical) harmony and consonance.

In contrast to Plato's views, Aristotle described community in terms of the activities or work of, rather than agreement within, a community. In *The Politics*, he specifically rejects the 'unity' of agreement in Plato's accounts. The 'dictum of Socrates' that 'it is best that the state should be as much of a unity as possible' is simply 'not true' (Aristotle 1962, p 56). He criticised Plato's musical model: creating unity would be 'as if one were to reduce harmony to unison or rhythm to a single beat' (Aristotle 1962, p 65). There 'must be some unity in a state, as in a household, but not an absolutely total unity' as '[t]here comes a point when the effect of unification is that the state, if it does not cease to be a state altogether, will certainly be a very much worse one' (Aristotle 1962, p 65). A city, as a community, 'must be a plurality' (Aristotle 1962, p 65). Aristotle is not often portrayed as a pluralist, but—at least in contrast to Plato—he is tending to that position. And the use of music to explain how too much agreement makes for a poorer community has been taken up more recently by a number of activist-musicians: building community in Northern Ireland by working with Protestant and Catholic Christians (Odena 2010), or in Germany making use of German Christian and Muslim Turkish musical traditions back to the eighteenth century (Concerto Köln and Sarband 2004, 2005), or bringing together musical and religious communities in Jerusalem (Savall 2008). Each of these illustrates the ability of music to express plurality and to reconcile some religious conflict, without denying diversity. As Illman comments on Savall's work, '[m]usic can bring a spiritual element into dialogue, … [which]

means to move from aesthetical to ethical, from superficial to profound, from rational to emotional' (Illman 2010, p 182).

Perhaps the best—or most fully articulated—example of musical plurality as a model of community is that of Barenboim and Said (2002). Together they founded the West-Eastern Divan project 'as a way to bring together musicians from Israel, Palestine and the other Arab countries to make music together, and ultimately—when we realised how much interest there was for the idea—to form an orchestra' (Barenboim 2008, p 63–64). They took their name from a collection of Goethe's poems inspired by the poetry of Hafiz (Goethe 2016). As Barenboim says, although an orchestra is 'unable to bring about peace', it can 'create the conditions for understanding without which it is impossible even to speak of peace' and 'has the potential to awaken the curiosity of each individual to listen to the narrative of the other and to inspire the courage necessary to hear what one would prefer not to' (Barenboim 2008, p 73). This goes beyond mere 'tolerance', as '[t]rue acceptance … means to acknowledge the difference and dignity of the other … [which] is represented perfectly by counterpoint or polyphony' (Barenboim 2008, p 74). Both Plato and Aristotle described community as like a musical performance. There is more 'unity'—perhaps to the point of unison—in Plato's model, more 'diversity' in Aristotle's model. Barenboim is a classical conductor and describes the (musical) problem with Plato's approach in terms of power:

> There is nothing worse than the attitude of an orchestral musician who comes and is extremely well prepared, able to play the notes perfectly but totally without any kind of character, so that the music is, as it were, then made by the conductor. And he is, in fact, saying. 'I play the notes, and you make the music'. And there's nothing further from the possibility of good music than that. That's where you get, of course, again, into the definition of power. And this is a very interesting point, because the conductor is always taken as a symbol of power. (Barenboim, in Barenboim and Said 2002, p 69–70)

A community determined by unity tends to unison which is bad as a community and bad as a musical performance, and tends to leave the leader with all the power. A community that, by contrast, is working

together even whilst it has opposing elements is one that is better as a community and better as a musical performance:

> In music, … joy and sorrow exist simultaneously and therefore allow us to feel a sense of harmony. Music is always contrapuntal in the philosophical sense of the word. Even when it is linear, there are always opposing elements coexisting, occasionally even in conflict with each other. Music accepts comments from one voice to the other at all times and tolerates subversive accompaniments as a necessary antipode to leading voices. Conflict, denial and commitment coexist at all times in music. (Barenboim 2008, p 20)

Aristotle is not, of course, recommending that a community is *simply* diverse. As in a musical performance, there remains a common activity and a kind of harmony that incorporates individual disharmonies. He gives to education the task of enabling the common activity, saying that a state (or community) would be 'depending on education for its common unity' (Aristotle 1962, p 65). Education in this sense has a similar role in Aristotle's community as it does in Dewey's society. Dewey described how education enabled democracy, with democracy styled as 'primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience' (Dewey 1916, p 87). A much 'smaller' form of community is the family, in which unity and diversity, harmony and disharmony coexist and are facilitated by working and learning together. This is a community in which, as everyone who has lived in a family will recognise, 'the child discovers himself as an individual by contrasting himself, and indeed by wilfully opposing himself to the family *to which he belongs*' (Macmurray 1991b, p 91).

The contrast between community determined by agreement and community determined by activity notwithstanding disagreement, as represented by Plato and Aristotle, is also well represented in models of community in later centuries. In the twentieth century, a contrast could be made between social contract theorists such as Rawls (1972), who looks for the possibility of agreement, whilst feminist writers and care ethicists such as Hawkesworth (in Alperson 2002) or Noddings (1984) write of communities as acting together and caring for each other even as they contain disagreements. Within education, Sergiovanni promotes 'shared values and ideals' (Sergiovanni 1994, p xiii), whereas Macmurray (1946a) and Noddings (1994, 2005b) promote the idea of schools as

communities being determined by the nature of the relationships between members of the school/community. Others who are in the 'acting together' group of theorists include Sacks (2007) on plural communities and societies as 'the home we build together'. Sacks writes of religious diversity, but extends the principles to all forms of diversity. 'Often', he says, 'when religious leaders meet and talk, the emphasis is on similarities and commonalities, as if the differences between faiths were superficial and trivial', but '[w]e need … not only a theology of commonality—of the universals of mankind—but also a theology of difference' (Sacks 2003, p 21). But '[t]he dignity of difference is more than a religious idea', as '[t]he world is not a single machine … in which diversity—biological, personal, cultural and religious—is of the essence' (Sacks 2003, p 21–22).

There are so many complications in defining or describing community, many of which are represented by the philosophers quoted here, that it would be inappropriate to settle all arguments and determine the essence of community. Nevertheless, my own argument is that expecting complete agreement in a community is implausible (and, politically, tyrannical), and so what might be in common is more properly some kind of activity. Although not all communities are small, the sense of acting *together*, with people directly facing each other, seems, similarly, the most plausible differentiation between a community and any other active grouping of people. That is, community seems most plausibly to be of one of the forms consonant with the arguments of Aristotle, Barenboim, Dewey, Hawkesworth, Noddings, Macmurray, and Sacks. Of all those diverse authors, it is Macmurray whom I think the strongest in linking the idea of community in general with the idea of schooling in particular, whilst allowing for diversity even within the smallest of communities—such as the disagreeable family. His account of schools as communities is therefore explored in more detail.

Macmurray on Schools

Macmurray makes an important contribution to educational debates by insisting that learning in school is most importantly learning how to live in community. A school is a community, amongst many other

communities (families, friendship groups, etc.), but it is distinct from other communities in also being 'about' community. His is a philosophy of schooling, therefore, although he does not call it this. It is a theory that is distinctive and that has implications for all aspects of schooling. At the same time, it reads at times as rather 'ordinary': Macmurray was himself concerned that, '[u]nfortunately, I have a capacity of writing so clearly that people are often inclined to think they understand it when they don't' (Macmurray 1991a, p ix). So I will have a go at describing his theory, and at making it seem as unusual and, I think, as powerful as any in the field.

In a number of ways, Macmurray is a traditionalist. He is content that schooling is completed through subjects as then (and now) understood: he does not promote the idea of a radically revised curriculum. And, notwithstanding his contemporaries like A S Neill (1985) promoting the radical overhaul of authority relations in schools, Macmurray envisaged schools with conventional power relations between teachers and pupils. Michael Fielding, a radical educationalist who is influenced by Macmurray (Fielding 2007), writes of democratic schooling but—sadly—is able to give only a very limited number of examples of democratic schools (Fielding and Moss 2011). Macmurray, somewhat in contrast, writes of what all schools are and can be, without being radically transformed. And he is a traditionalist in being an enthusiast for discipline in schools. But, even including these factors, Macmurray was also a radical educationalist. The subjects on the curriculum were conventional, but their purpose was distinctive: it was *not* to learn about the subjects or the disciplinary communities in their own right, or to learn for the sake of some external purpose such as employment or good citizenship or the improvement of the economy, but instead to learn how to live in community. His was not a democratic model of schooling in the style of Neill or Fielding, but he understood the personal relations in school could—would inevitably—overcome de facto inequalities of power in the school. And although discipline was essential in schools, discipline without fear was entirely compatible with freedom.

Macmurray was not a schoolteacher himself, though he was a university teacher and—by all accounts—a disciplined and supportive and communal Dean of the Faculty of Arts at the University of Edinburgh

(Costello 2002b, p 347; Somerville 1999). His biggest direct involvement with schools was as chair of governors at Wennington School. This was a Quaker foundation, a private residential ('boarding') school 'which favoured communion and holistic personal development over intellectual excellence', which provides 'evidence attesting to the seriousness with which he regarded these matters' (McIntosh 2011, p 43). He wrote extensively about schooling and talked to those training to teach in Edinburgh, but later in life he felt his views on education were of little interest to others, due to '[t]he almost complete victories of technology and capitalism in the West and the reduction of education from learning as full personal formation in cultural life to the mere acquisition of discrete "skills" and "tools"' (Costello 2002a, p 24). A proposed book on education was rejected by Faber, which had already published nine of his books, and this was 'for him, indisputable evidence that his views on education were no longer relevant' (Costello 2002b, p 320). Perhaps his combination of tradition and radicalism failed to appeal to either group at that time. But Macmurray's reputation as a philosopher was revived in the 1990s by the high-profile endorsement of Tony Blair, both before and after he became UK prime minister. Blair wrote a foreword to a collection of Macmurray's writings, commending philosophy's potential to 'increase an understanding of the world or our ability to change it', suggesting that Macmurray's philosophy 'can do both' (Macmurray 1996b, p 10). Later, Blair is quoted as saying 'if you really want to understand what I'm all about, you have to take a look at a guy called John Macmurray', as '[i]t's all there' (Kirkpatrick 2005, p 157). The nature of community and, to a lesser extent, the role of religion in society are the two themes that Blair seems to have attributed to his reading of Macmurray (see McIntosh's chapter on Macmurray and New Labour, in Kim and Kollontai 2007, p 69–87). Communitarianism was a significant aspect of Blair's first government:

> At the heart of my beliefs … is the idea of community. I don't just mean the local villages, towns and cities in which we live. I mean that our fulfilment as individuals lies in a decent society of others. My argument … is that the renewal of community is the answer to the challenges of a changing world. (Blair, quoted in Prideaux 2005, p 58, ellipses in original)

Academic interest in Macmurray grew, with the publication of Fergusson and Dower (2002) (derived from conference proceedings), Costello (2002b) and McIntosh (2011) (biographies), two collections of Macmurray's writings (Macmurray 1996b, 2004), and the application of his philosophy to disciplines such as counselling and theology (McIntosh et al. 2016, Sink 2006). On education, Macmurray's reputation has been revived by a number of people, myself included (Stern 2001b, 2012), and most particularly Michael Fielding (Fielding 2007, 2012a, b, 2015) and the various other contributors to Fielding 2015, Peter Cunningham, Keri Facer, Raimond Gaita, Nel Noddings, and Richard Pring.

At the centre of Macmurray's theory of schooling is his theory of community. The 'first principle' of the school 'is that it must be a real community', and this is '[n]ot because community is a good thing—I would underline this—but because this is the condition of success in its educational function', as 'it has to mediate between the family and the larger world of adult life' (Macmurray 1946c, p 5). This can be broken down into three sets of interrelated claims, one about community, one about education, and one about the relation of school to family and to the 'larger world'. For Macmurray community, like any social group, 'acts together', but, unlike other social groups, a community's 'members are in communion with one another; they constitute a fellowship' (Macmurray 1996b, p 166):

> A society whose members act together without forming a fellowship can only be constituted by a common purpose. They co-operate to achieve a purpose which each of them, in his own interest, desires to achieve, and which can only be achieved by co-operation. The relations of its members are functional; each plays his allotted part in the achievement of the common end. The society then has an organic form: it is an organization of functions; and each member is a function of the group. A community, however, is a unity of persons as persons. (Macmurray 1996b, p 166)

So if activities can bring people together in a school and in, say, a political party, the difference between them is not that they are 'doing something', but whether the purpose of the group is the only—the primary—driver of how people regard each other, or do people come together as *persons*.

The common purpose pursued by a political party may be noble and worthwhile, and the people involved may be well-motivated, good people, but if people are not there to treat each other as ends in themselves, but as means to further ends, then it is a 'society' not a 'community'. Macmurray uses the example of his tailor:

> My tailor is related functionally to the people who wove the cloth that he makes up for me; but it is unlikely that he knows them. He may be a friend of mine, but he need not be. Our relations may remain impersonal; and though I must meet him, we may confine our relations to the necessities of the service for which I pay him. (Macmurray 2004, p 170)

Expecting members of a political party, or people from whom we buy or to whom we sell things, to be treated as members of the same community is unnecessary for them to fulfil their function. Examples of more 'obvious' communities, where people treat each other as ends in themselves, include families. We do not treat our parents, siblings, spouses, or children in terms of what common purpose we can achieve. Or, if we do, we tend to think this is misunderstanding what a family is: hence parents complaining that their children treat them as taxi drivers, or treating the family home as a hotel; hence children complaining that their parents are acting like employers if they insist on chores being completed before giving them pocket money. This is not an insult to taxi driving, to running a hotel, or to employing people. It is just that communities, in Macmurray's sense, are characterised by relationships in which people treat each other as ends in themselves, not (or not primarily) as means to make money or any other external purpose. Dewey makes a similar point describing 'The Great Society created by steam and electricity', which 'may be a society, but it is no community' as it is 'relatively impersonal and mechanical' (Dewey 1954, p 94).

Friendship groups are, like families, amongst Macmurray's examples of social groups that are necessarily communities. By 'necessarily', I mean that a family in which members did, primarily, treat each other as means to further ends would be regarded as not really a family, or at best as a dysfunctional family. Likewise with friends. Although Macmurray does not acknowledge this in his writings, his views on friendship seem

remarkably similar to those of Aristotle. Aristotle distinguishes three kinds of friendship: 'those who love each other on the ground of utility … those who love one another on the ground of pleasure … [and] perfect [friendship of] people … [who] desire the good of their friends for the friends' sake' (Aristotle 1976, p 263). Typically, Aristotle says, younger people may be tempted to friendship for the sake of pleasure, whilst older people may be tempted to friendship for 'utility', but anyone may be a 'perfect' friend, treating the other for the sake of the other. Even if friends are unequal in power, as with older and younger people, friendship equalises: 'unequals' can be friends, 'the result is a kind of equality' (Aristotle 1976, p 270). A real friendship, like a real community—for both Aristotle and Macmurray—is of this form, that each treats others as ends in themselves. Friendship and community are not just analogous: for Aristotle, 'in every community there is supposed to be some kind of justice and also some friendly feeling … [and they are] exhibited in the same sphere of conduct and between the same persons' (Aristotle 1976, p 273); for Macmurray, '[t]o create community is to make friendship the form of all personal relations' (Macmurray 1991b, pp 198).

But why is a school necessarily a community as a 'condition of success in its educational function' (Macmurray 1946c, p 5)? This brings us to the second set of claims Macmurray makes: that of the specific educational purpose of schooling. Schools are there to teach 'people' or 'personhood':

> [W]hen we teach we must deal with living human beings. We, the teachers, are persons. Those whom we would teach are persons. We must meet them face to face, in a personal intercourse. This is the primary fact about education. It is one of the forms of personal relationship. It is a continuing personal exchange between two generations. To assert this is by no means to define an ideal but to state a fact. It declares not what education ought to be, but what it is, and is inescapably. We may ignore this fact; we may imagine that our task is of a different order, but this will make no difference to what is actually taking place. We may act as though we were teaching arithmetic or history. In fact we are teaching people. The arithmetic or the history is merely a medium through which a personal intercourse is established and maintained. (Macmurray 1946a, p 1, partly quoted in Chap. 1)

The purpose of schools (and universities) 'is not primarily to produce scientists, or historians, or philosophers, but through the sciences and the humanities, through discussion in their societies or through games in their athletic clubs, to educate men and women', so 'education, from the standpoint of its victims, is learning to be human' (Macmurray 2012, p 661). In other words, if schools were primarily training people for particular occupations, or for any other external purpose, they would not need to be communities. There are many good, worthwhile, educational courses that achieve precisely that: effective vocational and skills training. Such training can also take place in schools, but this is referring to organisations whose main purpose is such training. They are 'societies', in Macmurray's terms, not (or not necessarily) 'communities'. This approach is not appropriate if the purpose of schooling is 'learning to be human', or becoming 'persons', as that comprehensive end can only plausibly be achieved through treating people as persons. Personhood is achieved in community, and we learn community only through living in community, through being treated as a person and treating others as persons. The subject disciplines, vital to Macmurray's model of schooling, are not vital as ends in themselves, but precisely because they can be used to help the young become persons in community. History, for example, 'can be taught as an exercise in intellectual technique which extends the range of knowledge and understanding', but 'it can also be used as an instrument of imaginative self-transcendence and of emotional expression' and thereby 'becomes a medium of cultural development' (Macmurray 1946c, p 10).

One of the complications of this theory is that we may treat someone as a 'person', but personhood is not something fully 'achieved' at some point. 'We are all more or less unreal', Macmurray says, and '[o]ur business is to make ourselves a little more real than we are' (Macmurray 1992, p 143, also quoted in Chap. 1, above). The wording would be clearer to modern ears if it promoted 'self-realisation' or 'personal realisation'. In another context, Macmurray combines becoming more 'real' with being more 'human':

> We are born human, and nothing can rob us of our human birthright. Nevertheless we have to learn to be human, and we can only learn by being

> taught. So hard is the lesson that very few of us learn more than a smattering of it; our own reality lies always beyond us, and we reach after it but never grasp it. (Macmurray 2012, p 662)

This position restricted personhood to human beings, of course, and that is not crucial to the argument about schooling, and is not crucial—I would suggest—to the argument about becoming more 'real' either. (There is a further discussion of this issue later in the book, notably in Chaps. 3, 4, and 7.) But the argument that we become real in community, because it is in community that people treat us primarily as persons, is a powerful one that justifies schools and schooling as amongst the ways in which people 'become'. The educational purpose of schooling is focused here, and the 'unity' of persons in a community 'is the self-realization of the personal' (Macmurray 1996b, p 167). In more conventional philosophical language, and talking of broad education and not just schooling, he says that '[t]o educate a child is to train it to live; and a good education is one which succeeds in training a child to live well, to live his whole life as life should be lived' (Macmurray 1968, p 111).

Schools are communities, and educationally the teachers and the curriculum are there to help pupils become more 'real'. Macmurray's theory of schooling also addresses how school relate to families, other communities, and the larger world. The school, he says,

> stands between family and the wider community and looks back to the first and forward to the second. For long periods it has to take the place of the family for its pupils: and also it has to mediate between the family and the larger world of adult life. It is able to do this, and to combine in miniature the conditions of each of these, because unlike either of them it has one concern to which everything else is directed—the education of young persons who are entrusted to it. (Macmurray 1946c, p 5)

He compares residential (boarding) and non-residential schools. The former fulfil more of the functions of a family, but 'can never be a substitute for the family' and are in danger of being 'too little related to the activities of normal life in society' (Macmurray 1946c, p 3). Non-residential schools rely more on the family, which 'is a good thing, provided family conditions are reasonably adequate and healthy' (Macmurray 1946c,

p 3). But in any school the broad aims are the same, those of helping the pupils to become more real. However, the educational role of schools is not universal, and we should not be 'trying to throw the whole business of education on the schools': '[t]he schools and the teachers have their part to play, and a very important part', but 'there must be a deliberate and proper collaboration in education between the school and the background; and for practical purposes the background means the home … [as t]he major part of education is done, badly or well, in the home' (Macmurray 1968, p 117).

> If the home training is bad, or if it is shirked, the school will be helpless. And if the school and the home are pulling all the time in different directions, they will only succeed in pulling the child in two, and probably destroy one another in the process. (Macmurray 1968, p 117)

Macmurray believed, later in his life, that schools are increasingly expected to do more, as '[n]either home nor church are performing their task universally or effectively' (Macmurray 1958, p 4), but the separation of 'education' from 'schooling', and the admission that schools are—at best—partners with others in the educational enterprise, are crucial to the argument for schools. It is not an argument based on schools being the only, or only possible, educators but based on their scale (bigger than families and so able to do more, but still able to work as communities in contrast to some larger social groups), and the specialism in the subjects of the curriculum. '[W]hat differentiates the small community—family or school—from the great communities is that in the former the relationships are all direct; the persons involved meet one another face to face in the routine of a common life; while in the latter most of the relationships are indirect' (Macmurray 1946c, p 7). And schools being larger and having more professional staff allows for more subject teaching. We should not think of the traditional subjects as peripheral: they are important, precisely because school subjects may help pupils become more 'real'. The comment that '[y]ou are not training children to be mathematicians or accountants or teachers or linguists; you are training them to be men and women, to live human lives properly' (Macmurray 1968, p 112) is not denigrating the subjects but showing how the subjects can contribute to the purpose of schooling.

When subjects are taught 'for their own sake' and this *dominates* the curriculum, they become a distraction:

> You have one person very anxious to make Tommy a good mathematician and another to make him a good historian and another all out to develop his knowledge of science or to teach him to speak French or read Latin. And who is now concerned to make him a good human being and to teach him to live? Somehow the all important thing has got squeezed out in the process of professionalizing education. ... The golden aim of education—to teach the children how to live, has vanished over the horizon—crowded out by a multiplicity of little aims. ... They are learning that life is a bundle of more or less unpleasant tasks which are a weariness to the flesh, to be performed because they have to be performed, and that to escape from them is a blessed relief. (Macmurray 1968, p 114)

Describing the curriculum as having a single overarching aim is what, for Macmurray, shows what schools can contribute distinctively (i.e. the subjects, which families are less likely to be able to teach), and why this does not make them the only educators—as learning to live is, clearly, also the task of families and others beyond the school.

Recognising School Communities

Philosophers are sometimes nervous of questions of the 'so what?' form: 'so what difference would it make if this were true?', 'so what should we do now?' Seeing schools as communities, broadly in the sense described by Macmurray, has a number of implications—it is a theory that makes a difference to how schools work, and to what people can and should do about it. 'Recognising' school communities itself has two meanings: we should recognise that schools are communities, and we should develop ways in which we can 'see' the community features of schools. The first, I suggest, may be achieved in part by invoking an analogy: schools as households. The second may in turn be achieved through exploring ways in which those in school do indeed treat each other as 'persons', and/or look beyond the school for their aims.

The household analogy (used in Stern 2012) helps see schools for what they are and for how they work. Although 'household' has been used in a number of different ways, I am referring here to the use of the term for living conditions that dominated prior to the modern nuclear family home and that still apply in some current, modern, living conditions. According to the accounts of Webb (2007) and Vernon (2005), there has been an emerging separation of private and public (or civic) worlds over several hundred years. The older formation, which has been retained for longer amongst less affluent social groups, regarded many activities that today are considered most 'private' as far from private in the more modern sense. Households were places where eating, toileting, and sleeping were somewhat 'public' activities, taking place amongst family, friends, staff, allies, and colleagues. Hence '[t]he physical intimacies of kissing and eating and sleeping together were symbolic of what we might call social capital' (Vernon 2005, p 109), and colleagues and friends might be literal 'bedfellows', in the sense of sleeping together. Later, 'the public institution of the household was replaced by the private institution of the family' (Vernon 2005, p 111). In the UK census up until 1901, the data 'did not distinguish between private families (subsequently called households since all members do not need to be related), and institutional or non-private households, so that it is not possible to say what proportion of the total population was living in private households' (Halsey 1988, p 358).

The term 'household' can therefore call up a variety of social forms, older and newer. It is relatively neutrally defined by sociologists as 'a single adult living alone or a group of people living together, having some or all meals together and benefiting from a common housekeeping' (Townsend 1979, p 179), and in that sense it could be applied easily to residential schools and, at least analogously to non-residential schools. Schools are like households; they are intimate places with close relationships—including intergenerational closeness—that make it inappropriate to call them modern 'public' places. However, they are also subject to public accountability and inspection, professional standards, and usually some form of public finance, and for these and other reasons they lack of some forms of secrecy and privacy common in homes. For Macmurray, schools are communities in which people therefore treat each other as

ends in themselves, as close and as potential friends, and yet they also reach out to, and are open to, the communities and society beyond schools. They are like households, personal yet not entirely private, an overcoming of private-public divisions.

Modern social groupings of the form of households include communes, military barracks, kibbutzim, hospitals, and prisons. All are larger scale and involve more 'public' responsibilities and activities than typical nuclear family homes, yet all retain shared personal responsibilities and activities—eating and toileting and a sense of people being treated at least in part as ends in themselves. Hospitals may be curing illnesses and mending physical damage, but they also have holistic responsibilities for patients as persons. Macmurray as Dean of Faculty at Edinburgh University (and medic in World War One) was responsible for the founding of the first university-based nurse education in the UK in 1956 (Costello 2002b, p 347), and insisted—alongside its first director, Elsie Stephenson—that it should be hosted in the Arts Faculty 'as it is primarily persons that nurses attend to, not diseases' (Costello, in Tilley 2005, p 35–36). In personal relationships—and, typically, in households, but not necessarily in larger-scale 'societies'—people are essentially *irreplaceable*. Clearly friends and family members come and go, not least as a result of moving away from each other or dying, but they are not *replaced*. What 'irreplaceability' expresses is a consequence of closeness and friendship in community—a consequence that makes schooling important throughout one's life, a contribution to lifelong learning. Irreplaceability is implied by the marketing phrase from 1997 'no-one forgets a good teacher' (Passmore and Lepkowska 1997), and being unforgettable is linked to households in a description of children's houses that 'become abodes for an unforgettable past' (Bachelard 1994, p xxxvi). As Macmurray described it, '[o]ur personal relations … are unique' as 'we are related as persons in our own right: and we are not replaceable', so '[i]f I lose a friend I lose part of my own life' (Macmurray 2004, p 169). This is not true of 'functional relations', Macmurray continues, such as his relationship with his tailor, quoted above, who 'may be a friend of mine, but … need not be' (Macmurray 2004, p 170).

However, as well as 'seeing' schools as communities, by recognising them as analogous to households, they may also be researched in these

terms too. I researched the closeness within schools with teachers and pupils in primary and secondary schools in the UK and in Hong Kong who were asked to describe, in diagrams and/or as responses to interview questions, the people who were closest to them in school. Intergenerational closeness was described, and described to a greater extent than is usually reflected in the literature, consistently across student age groups and staff groups. Of the 105 people who completed the diagrams of closeness (a set of concentric circles with 'me' in the middle), 82% named both adults and children in the 'closest' group, and all named both adults and children somewhere on the diagram. This finding (Stern 2012), amongst many others in the research project (Stern 2009a), suggested that schools are more like households, close communities open to friendship and not dominated by external targets, than the more pessimistic portrayal as largely or entirely externally directed.

Conclusion

Communities are groups of people acting together, and whatever common purpose they are acting on, the people treat each other as ends in themselves, and not as means to further ends. From this model of community, Macmurray draws a model of schooling—where the educational purpose of schools is to help people become 'more real'. Whereas in Chap. 1 earlier, schools were described as starting from care, in this chapter it is the communal dimension of schooling that makes schools distinct from other forms of care and of education, and care and community are therefore brought into dialogue. And it is dialogue that is the form of the personal interaction within schools. Hence dialogue is the subject of the next chapter.

3

Learning in Dialogue

I will speak and write to other people with sincerity and demonstrate an interest in the reply even if it is different to my view.

Introduction

Whereas Chap. 1 described the ethics of care as the 'first philosophy' of education, and Chap. 2 described the distinctive communal nature of learning in *school*, this chapter looks in more detail at how care and relationships are typically enacted in school: through 'dialogue' or 'conversation', spoken or written communication involving more than one communicator. There has been much writing on dialogue in education. It is central to the whole educational philosophies of Oakeshott (1989, 1991), Bakhtin (1981), Vygotsky (1962, 1978), Alexander (2004, 2006), Haynes (2002), and Wegerif (2007, 2008) and is vital in the articulation of the relationship of religions, education, and religious education (Avest et al 2009, Ipgrave 2003, 2009, Smart 1960). However, a range of meanings of 'dialogue' has been used. In the collection by Avest et al, for example, there are discussions about the relationship between dialogue

Julian Stern, *A Philosophy of Schooling*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71571-1_3

and conflict (which are sometimes seen as alternatives, sometimes as coexisting), whether dialogue in school should involve teachers and pupils being open about their own views or whether dialogue is helped by teachers/pupils being allowed or required to hide their views, the different forms of dialogue that might be appropriate in home and in public life (with school in an intermediate position, but closer to that of the home), and the contrast between dialogue as mere 'talk' and dialogue as of existential significance.

What I provide here is a broad framework to help understand the range of theories of dialogic schooling, and then a specific account of the complementary theories of Buber and Noddings. Picking up on Buber's use of 'surprise', my conclusion is a celebration of the unexpected and the uncertain. And in my 'manifesto' (the *Afterword* of this book), I say that 'the school I would like will be one where people speak and write to each other with sincerity and demonstrate an interest in what the other person will reply even if their views are very different'.

The Dynamics of Dialogue

Reading theories of dialogic schooling, it is fascinating to see how often dialogue has been 'discovered' over the centuries. From the educational uses of dialogue described by Plato (which are unlikely to be the earliest dialogic educational texts) through to Freire, whose 1968 book *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (Freire 1993) is described as 'initiating the theory of dialogic pedagogy' (Skidmore and Murakami, in Skidmore and Murakami 2016, p 1), there have been many 'inventors' of dialogic education. Perhaps there is always something of a tension between the authority of teachers as 'suppliers of knowledge' and their pupils' tendency to 'answer back' (or take over from) the teachers, just as there is an inevitable tension between parents and children as the children become more independent and take over from their parents. The one-way communication of some authority figures and the two-way dialogue involved when a new voice challenges those authorities: the former is a monologue, the latter, a dialogue. For the thirteenth-century poet Rumi, there is the contrast between 'acquired' and 'fresh' learning (Rumi 1995, p 178); for Lave and Wenger, there is the contrast between

'dyadic' and 'cyclical' learning (Lave and Wenger 1991, p 57). Perhaps the regular reinventions of dialogue in education are, therefore, examples of the regular attempts to 'answer back' to authority figures—teacher or parents. Whatever the reasons for the reinventions, dialogic forms of education are varied, and three overlapping dynamics of dialogue are described here, related to time, authority, and conclusions.

Many think of dialogue as taking place at one time, or in the terms of computer communication 'synchronous'. That is, a dialogue or conversation is a set of people talking roughly at the same time, with the give-and-take of a social encounter. This is the emphasis in accounts (such as Alexander 2004, 2006, Ipgrave 2003, 2009, and most of the contributors to Avest et al 2009) where educational dialogue is seen primarily in terms of the teacher-pupil (and pupil-pupil) talk in classrooms. Authors such as Alexander, Ipgrave, and Avest all recognise longer timescales in education, of course, but their emphasis on *dialogue* is on immediate classroom dialogue. However, dialogue may take place over a long period—'asynchronous' in computing terms—not only over the time it takes to read and respond to an email or letter, but over many years. Reading a literary text by a long-dead writer may be a dialogic encounter, as described by Bakhtin in his dialogic *heteroglossia* of the novel and his broader social heteroglossia (Bakhtin 1981, p 263), Rosenblatt (1994, 1995) in her transactional theory of literature involving 'reader response', or Pike (2003) in his account of a number of more or less dialogic types of reading. In a different tradition and writing about university education, Leavis (1948a, b) described a 'canon' of literature that speaks to us across the ages, a 'great tradition' that should be read as part of a dialogue across the ages. Those unable to read or appreciate such literature live in a 'vacuum of disinheritance' (Leavis and Leavis 1969, p 5). A fuller account of educational conversation across time, but one that also speaks of tradition and a conversation of 'civilisation', is Oakeshott. He writes of schools and universities, and has an emphasis on conversation that is both in the present and spread over the centuries:

> As civilized human beings, we are the inheritors, neither of an inquiry about ourselves and the world, nor of an accumulating body of information, but of a conversation begun in the primeval forests and extended and

> made more articulate in the course of centuries. It is a conversation which goes on both in public and within each of ourselves. (Oakeshott 1991, p 490–491, and see Bakhurst, in Bakhurst and Fairfield 2016)

There are those who think that reading great literature and other canonical texts is an entirely passive process, a 'banking' of established, authoritative, knowledge, a 'dance around dead things'—as the architect Fehn describes museums (Yvenes and Madshus 2008, p 29). Some celebrate that view, as in the Campaign for Real Education's claim that '[t]he curriculum should be subject-centred' with an 'emphasis … on *content* … *[and* b]ook *knowledge'* rather than 'child-centred and relevant' (http://www.cre.org.uk/philosophies.html). Writers such as Oakeshott are conservative in the sense of 'conserving' the elements they regard as marking 'civilisation', as well as in the political sense of limiting change and valuing hierarchy. But they still regard conversation as ongoing, and they see schools and universities as existing precisely to maintain and develop that conversation—as teachers in those institutions have not only specialist knowledge of, but specialist *involvement* in the conversation.

More radical educational philosophers such as Pring (2000) still acknowledge this conversation over time. Teachers and pupils are involved in a transaction, but the teacher also carries an ongoing transaction with the 'culture' represented in the subject matter taught:

> An educational practice … is a transaction between a teacher and a learner within a framework of agreed purposes and underlying procedural values. Such a transaction respects the learning needs of the learner, on the one hand, and, on the other, mediates the aspects of the culture which meet those needs. Such aspects include a tradition of literature and literary criticism, the narratives picked out by history, the understandings of the physical world embodied within the different sciences, the appreciation of the social worlds reflected in the arts. And, of course, such traditions, narratives, understandings and appreciations are by no means static. They are the product of deliberations, arguments, criticism with and 'between the generations of mankind'. Therefore, the transaction between teacher and learner, at its best, might be seen as an initiation into what Oakeshott … refers to as that conversation between the generations, in which the learner comes to understand and appreciate the voices of history, science, literature, etc. (Pring 2000, p 28)

Teachers will often, therefore, 'see themselves as participating in … a tradition' and 'believe that the understanding enshrined within that tradition, of which they are the custodians, is important to the young people as they seek a deeper appreciation and knowledge of their lives and of the challenges within them' (Pring 2000, p 28). As with Oakeshott, the pupils are not passive: the aim is 'to bring the young people on the "inside" of those traditions' (Pring 2000, p 28).

If conservative and radical philosophers can agree on the idea of educational dialogue being spread over time, there remains a difference in the radical philosophers' openness to change and willingness to go beyond a relatively narrow canon—especially one that separates more or less 'civilised' contributions to the conversation. The degree to which established authors are regarded as having authority, and the degree to which teachers in classrooms have authority, compared to the authority of a wider range of authors and the authority of pupils, distinguishes more conservative and more radical philosophers. As White describes it, Oakeshott's conversation is restricted to 'specific kinds of human activity – science, practical activity, history, the arts', and it 'evokes the wide-ranging, unfocused atmosphere of an upper class dinner party' (White 2007, p 25–26). White's model of conversation, in contrast, is one of 'citizens … communicating about the good life with civic aims in mind' (White 2007, p 26). Being open to change also gives a greater sense of a conversation that is projecting into the future, in more radical accounts. The sense of teachers not simply passing on a tradition, but helping create the next generation—enabling pupils to become the traditions of the future—is a future-oriented approach to conversation. As Lave and Wenger describe it, the 'old-timers' are creating 'replacements' for themselves, with those replacements inevitably changing and adding to the tradition, so 'communities of practice are engaged in the generative process of producing their own future' (Lave and Wenger 1991, p 149).

Along with the more tradition-focused and more future-focused dynamics of dialogue, it is worth noting the emphasis in a number of accounts on the 'presentness' of dialogue. Noddings describes an Oakeshott-like 'immortal conversation' which includes the passing on of (more or less dogmatic) religious traditions, some forms of 'traditional liberal arts' which are a 'privileged intellectual endeavour' (as described by Newman, for example), and a broader conversation across all subjects.

Although she recognises a value in the 'immortal conversation', and even notes that 'philosophy went too far in rejecting the eternal questions, and there are signs that philosophers may once again invite their students to join in the immortal conversation' (Noddings 2016, p xiii), a broader conversation is of more interest to her. Such a broad conversation might, in mathematics, include boundary-crossing issues such as 'Descartes' attempt to prove God's existence, Pascal's famous wager, Newton's expressed feeling that theology is more important than mathematics, the mysticism of the Pythagoreans, the contemporary fascination of mathematicians with the infinite, mathematical arguments for a pluralistic universe and possible forms of polytheism, the Platonic positioning of mathematical forms just beneath the supreme good' (Noddings 1994, p 113, and see Noddings 1993). She also describes a Habermasian 'discourse ethics' which is 'more like philosophical processes' and is a somewhat 'idealised' conversation—not least because 'agreement is rare in philosophy' (Noddings 1994, p 107–110). Her third form of conversation is a much more present-oriented one, a form of 'ordinary conversation' in which adults demonstrate their care for pupils, in which participants take what each other says seriously, and in which 'we are aware that our partners in conversation are more important than the topic':

> Participants are not trying to win a debate; they are not in a contest with an opponent. They are conversing because they like each other and want to be together. The moment is precious in itself. The content of the conversation, the topic, may or may not become important. Sometimes it does, and the conversation becomes overtly educative and memorable on that account. At other times, the only memory that lingers is one of warmth and laughter or sympathy and support. (Noddings 1994, p 14)

Being 'in the present' is important to Noddings not simply as a way of caring for each other, but also as a form of moral education. The dangers of being *only* in the present are, separately, both praised and critiqued by those exploring the influence of social media on forms of conversation. Rifkin writes of the breaking down of privacy for young people for whom social media sites have meant 'freedom is not bound up in self-contained

autonomy and exclusion, but rather, in enjoying access to others and inclusion in a global virtual public square' (Rifkin 2015, p 91):

> The authoritarian, top-down model of instruction is beginning to give way to a more collaborative learning experience. Teachers are shifting from lecturers to facilitators. Imparting knowledge is becoming less important than creating critical-learning skills. Students are encouraged to think more holistically. A premium is placed on inquiry over memorization. (Rifkin 2015, p 134)

Yet others describe the immediate conversation enabled by social media as 'no more than a ghostly half-life compared to the hugs, laughs and spontaneous communication of "face time", leaving us lonelier and emptier than ever', such that 'it would be better to choose either genuine companionship or genuine solitude' (Tennant 2011, p 176). Cordes and Miller (2000) describe the 'low-tech' needs of pupils, which are in danger of being ignored as a result of the increasing dominance of computer-mediated communication. Serious critical accounts of the relationship between social media and—for example—Habermas' concepts of conversation in public and civic spaces are readily available (Fuchs 2017, p 218), whilst the focus of much social media on entertainment and contemporary events such as sports (Fuchs 2017, p 233) suggests an immediacy to most of the social media conversations. Twitter has an 'image as an echo chamber of serendipitous chatter' (Van Dijck 2013, p 86), although the image is in conflict, perhaps, with the current 'exploitation and manipulation of tweets' (Van Dijck 2013, p 86). Boyd (2014) stresses the ways in which social media are to a degree peripheral to the real conversation between teenagers, who use smart phones more to take photos and to find each other but, once found, use the phones less than adults do. Concentrating simply on the quality of conversations on social media would therefore ignore the 'mixed economy' of young people's fuller conversations. (Boyd suggests that limitations on young people meeting in person are the main driver of conversation on social media: such conversations are always second-best.) More negatively, Turkle notes that '[t]he ties we form through the Internet are not, in the end, the ties that bind[:]… they are ties that preoccupy' (Turkle

2011, p 280). The use of social media in political protest and campaigning, from the early account of Rheingold (2002) to the broader accounts in Dencik and Leistert (2015), suggest a more forward-looking use of conversation on social media.

The dynamics of dialogue are time related (with the centre of gravity in the past, in the present-and-future, or in the immediate present), and authority related (with more or less weight given to authority figures in conversations). A third dynamic is related to the end or conclusion of the conversations. Wegerif highlights the important distinction between inconclusive and conclusive conversations, which he describes as 'dialogue' and 'dialectic' (Wegerif 2008). The dialectic of Hegel and Marx 'attempts to integrate real dialogues and struggles into a logical story of development, leading to unity either in the "Absolute Notion" of Hegel or the truly rational society under global communism of Marx' (Wegerif 2008, p 350). In contrast, dialogue 'refers to the inter-animation of real voices where there is no "overcoming" or "synthesis"' (Wegerif 2008, p 350). The educational value of dialogue, in which there is not a requirement for a resolution, is distinct from, and greater than, that of dialectic. Wegerif's view echoes that of Oakeshott, for whom conversation is not always directed to an end point. University can provide 'a break in the tyrannical course of irreparable events … in which to taste the mystery without the necessity of at once seeking a solution' (Oakeshott 1989, p 110):

> In a conversation the participants are not engaged in an inquiry or a debate; there is no 'truth' to be discovered, no proposition to be proved, no conclusion sought. They are not concerned to inform, to persuade, or to refute one another, and therefore the cogency of their utterances does not depend upon their all speaking in the same idiom; they may differ without disagreeing. (Oakeshott 1991, p 489)

Similarly, Noddings describes school conversations in which 'participants are not trying to win a debate; they are not in a contest with an opponent' (Noddings 1994, p 114), and Buber contrasts 'conversation' with 'that curious sport, aptly termed discussion, that is, "breaking apart", which is indulged in by men who are to some extent gifted with the ability

to think' (Buber 2002a, p 3). The sense of dialogue or conversation 'where talk is without a conclusion' (Oakeshott 1991, p 490) is as important as the sense of conversation taking place over time and the sense of conversation being more or less dominated by authoritative voices. All three dynamics of dialogue are represented in the accounts of Macmurray, Buber, and Noddings, but it is the specifics of Buber's account, in dialogue with Macmurray, that is the centrepiece of the following section.

Macmurray and Buber in Dialogue

Having made good use of Macmurray's philosophy in earlier chapters, it is interesting to see how he tackles the conversational or dialogic enaction of his theories of care and community. We must meet persons 'face to face' and this is 'the primary fact about education' (Macmurray 1946a, p 1, quoted in Chap. 2), but what is the face-to-face meeting like? He does not write a great deal about this topic. One extended account is given as part of a description of the difference between a more and less 'real' person. A 'very real' person 'can't be overlooked', and 'seems to have a flame in him'. The 'unreal person', in contrast, 'is apt to be overlooked in company, as if he wasn't there':

> Often, because of this, he tends to chatter a lot and thrust himself forward, exhibiting great energy; but you feel that the energy is somehow worked up and galvanized into action, it isn't the spontaneous flowing out of a fund of life in the man. For all his activity he doesn't seem to get anywhere, and all his talking only makes him a bore. He is in fact inwardly rather dead and lives on other people, reacting to them, stimulated into self-assertion by them. (Macmurray 1992, p 106)

This 'out of touch' person may be 'respectable', but only has conventional and 'orthodox' opinions and feelings: 'there is a staleness and dullness about them, as if the spirit of the man wasn't in them' (Macmurray 1992, p 106). When such a person 'comes into a company where a jolly interchange of real conversation and real feeling has been going on, it dries up at once and the conversation becomes trivial and commonplace',

as 'in his presence everything seems to go flat and lose its substance' (Macmurray 1992, p 106). The contrast seems to be between 'lively' conversation which is spontaneous and meaningful, and 'dead' conversation which is unoriginal and unconnected to the people present and 'concrete experience'. Macmurray also distinguishes between the personal conversation that a teacher and pupil may have, and an impersonal conversation between the same people:

> Let us suppose that a teacher of psychology is visited by a pupil who wishes to consult him about the progress of his work. The interview begins as a simple personal conversation between them, and the teacher's attitude to the pupil is a normal personal attitude. (Macmurray 1991b, p 29)

Later, the psychologist realises the pupils is in an 'abnormal state of mind': his attitude changes and he 'becomes a professional psychologist':

> From his side the relation has changed from a personal to an impersonal one; he adopts an objective attitude, and the pupil takes on the character of an object to be studied, with the purpose of determining the causation of his behaviour. (Macmurray 1991b, p 29)

Although there may be no outward sign of a change, there is a different intention, and the conversation is changed from a personal to an impersonal one. Macmurray is here 'contrasting the scientific attitude towards human beings with our normal attitude to one another in personal intercourse', or an employer interviewing a candidate, or an academic conducting a doctoral viva/defence (Macmurray 1991b, p 30). Conversation may be personal or impersonal and may swap between the two 'modes' during a single meeting. As McIntosh says, 'the fullest form of the personal is experienced when two friends engage in conversation, since they not only share information but also enjoy fellowship' whilst '[i]f two people converse out of mutual interest in a particular topic without any concern for the other person or that person's views on the subject, the mutuality that characterizes a fully personal relationship is lacking' (McIntosh 2011, p 165). However, accounts of the details of conversation or dialogue are rare in Macmurray. He found himself 'much closer to the

prophetic insight of one of the very greatest of modern thinkers, Martin Buber' than he did to Kierkegaard (Macmurray 1995, p 24), and some have found 'Macmurray's emphasis on the personal … [as] irrefutably akin to Buber's stress on dialogue, while Friedman attests to the notable parallels between Buber's perception of the "I-Thou" relation and Macmurray's understanding of you-I communication' (McIntosh 2011, p 75). Yet the processes of dialogue are much more fully worked out in Buber, and it is to his philosophy that I now turn.

Buber's dialogue is more than an activity in which people take part. It is what makes us people. As with Macmurray, the personal is relational. Buber rejected the label 'existentialist', a label often given to his philosophy, in large part because existentialism is more about self-consciousness than dialogue. True dialogue 'is not a monologue of the solitary thinker with himself, it is a dialogue between *I* and *Thou*' (Feuerbach, quoted in Buber 2002a, p 31). As Scott says, the self-consciousness of a philosopher like Sartre is 'one of the main barriers to spontaneous meetings', as it is '[o]nly when the other is accorded reality' that we are accountable to that person and '[o]nly when we accord ourselves a genuine existence' that we are 'held accountable to ourselves' (Scott 2010). Imagining the reality (*Realphantasie*) of the other person is required of dialogue. Distance (which is why it takes imagination) and relation (the imaginative leap) together in dialogue. Although dialogue is central to Buber's early work, *I and Thou* (Buber 1958), it is described more fully in later works. *I and Thou* is something of a celebration:

> [H]ow lovely and how fitting the sound of the lively and impressive *I* of Socrates! It is the *I* of endless dialogue, and the air of dialogue is wafted around it in all its journeys, before the judges and in the last hour in prison. (Buber 1958, p 89)

I and Thou divides all attempted relationships into two kinds: treating the other as 'thou' and treating the other as 'it'. Treating others as objects (as 'it', or 'objectively') is common but, as Friedman says, the I-thou relationship is 'not … a *dimension* of the self but … the existential and ontological reality in which the self comes into being and through which it fulfils and authenticates itself' (Friedman, in Buber 2002a, p xv).

Dialogue, by which this is achieved, is 'real' dialogue, but there are other kinds of communication that may be called dialogue: 'technical' dialogue and 'monologue disguised as dialogue'. The detailed description of these three forms is this:

> There is genuine dialogue – no matter whether spoken or silent – where each of the participants really has in mind the other or others in their present and particular being and turns to them with the intention of establishing a living mutual relation between himself and them. There is technical dialogue, which is prompted solely by the need of objective understanding. And there is monologue disguised as dialogue, in which two or more men, meeting in space, speak each with himself in strangely tortuous and circuitous ways and yet imagine they have escaped the torment of being thrown back on their own resources. (Buber 2002a, p 22)

Note that the description of 'technical dialogue' is not trivialising the value of exchanging information. For schools, exchanging technical information is of course vital: there is material to be learned, 'objective' evidence presented and understood. Buber's friend and colleague Rosenzweig claims that Buber, '[i]n setting up the I-IT, … give[s] the I-Thou a cripple for an opponent', treating all of (objective) 'creation' merely a 'chaos' that is 'just good enough to provide construction material … for the new building' (quoted in Zank and Braiterman 2014). Is technical information—information about objects—merely a material with which to create the personal 'thou'? I have no record of a direct response by Buber to this criticism, but for those who might want to describe Buber as an anti-realist, I think it is important to note that Buber may ignore but does not *deny* the value of technical dialogue. His concern was with the inadequacy of technical dialogue *alone* to create or maintain a fuller personal relationship, and thereby to create a person. Although Zank and Braiterman suggest that it is 'widely assumed by his critics in Jewish philosophy that in his critique of Jewish law and the *I-It* form of relationship Buber rejected the world of object-forms *in toto*' (Zank and Braiterman 2014), this does not seem compatible with the positive description of 'technical dialogue' and its contrast with not only 'real' dialogue, but also with 'monologue disguised as dialogue'.

Buber's particular concern seems to be with the *decreasing* role of real dialogue in modern society, unbalancing the proper presence of real and technical dialogue:

> The first kind [i.e. real dialogue], as I have said, has become rare; where it arises, in no matter how "unspiritual" a form, witness is borne on behalf of the continuance of the organic substance of the human spirit. The second [i.e. technical dialogue] belongs to the inalienable sterling quality of "modern existence". (Buber 2002a, p 22)

Real dialogue is too often hidden in modern society, although it unexpectedly 'breaks surface' even 'in the tone of a railway guard's voice, in the glance of an old newspaper vendor, in the smile of the chimney-sweeper' (Buber 2002a, p 22). One assumes that there is still a value in the 'object forms' related to those three people: a value in the railway guard helping you on to the correct train, the newspaper vendor selling you the paper you want, and the chimney sweeper managing to sweep your chimney without burning the house down.

But what of 'real' dialogue? It 'can only take place in a living partnership, that is, when I stand in a common situation with the other and expose myself vitally to his share in the situation as really his share' (Buber 1998, p 71) and so must recognise the difference and separation between two people, in order to bring the people into relation. This is exemplified, according to Friedman, by a marriage in which two people are together notwithstanding their differences, in which 'we touch on the real otherness of the other and learn to understand his truth and untruth, his justice and injustice' (Friedman, in Buber 2002a, p xvi). In Schaeder's biography, she describes Buber's favoured form of dialogue as 'conversation', as '[h]e needed confrontation with the Thou for his own spontaneity to kindle, for the spark to leap out of the unpredictability of dialogue', but this was not, typically, 'brilliant debate, crossing swords with the advocate of a different viewpoint' but a conversation about 'common concerns' (Schaeder, in Glatzer and Mendes-Flohr 1991, p 1). She continues, that '[h]e enjoyed conversations in which people brought him "a burning problem"', and to the shy '[h]e would ask them to tell him what went on in their minds when they woke at dawn and could not fall asleep

again' (Schaeder, in Glatzer and Mendes-Flohr 1991, p 61). Such real, everyday, conversations are of a different kind to the grand conversation of the immortals, or the philosophers' ideal conversations of the public sphere. In this, Buber sides with Noddings on conversation being particularly important when it is not 'grand'. In a letter of 1962, he disagrees that Heidegger was involved in a kind of 'permanent dialogue' with 'the great philosophers'. 'Dialogue in my sense implies of necessity the unforeseen, and its basic element is surprise, the surprising mutuality' (Buber, in Glatzer and Mendes-Flohr 1991, p 647, quoted above). Ordinary (real) dialogue is 'not an affair of spiritual luxury', he says, 'it is a matter of creation, of the creature, and he is that, the man of whom I speak, he is a creature, trivial and irreplaceable' (Buber 2002a, p 41).

Buber most often describes real dialogue as between human beings, but it is important to note that dialogue stretches beyond humanity. So, 'a worker can experience even his relation to the machine as one of dialogue, when, for instance, a compositor tells that he has understood the machine's humming as "a merry and grateful smile at me for helping it to set aside the difficulties and obstructions which disturbed and bruised and pained it, so that now it could run free"' (Buber 2002a, p 43). More personally, he describes his own experience as a child when he would visit a horse and stroke it:

> But once … it struck me about the stroking, what fun it gave me, and suddenly I became conscious of my hand. The game went on as before, but something had changed, it was no longer the same thing. And the next day, after giving him a rich feed, when I stroked my friend's head he did not raise his head. A few years later, when I thought back to the incident, I no longer supposed that the animal had noticed my defection. But at the time I considered myself judged. (Buber 2002a, p 27)

A person's relationship with a horse that becomes one of pleasure for the person alone is a failed dialogue whereas it could have been a somewhat real dialogue—only 'somewhat' real because the horse was not fully part of the dialogue and did not really judge him. The sense of dialogue, if incomplete dialogue, with the non-human is also described of a tree, in Buber's description of a walk he took:

> Not needing a support and yet willing to afford my lingering a fixed point, I pressed my walking stick against a trunk of an oak tree. Then I felt in twofold fashion my contact with being: here, where I held the stick, and there, where it touched the bark. Apparently only where I was, I nonetheless found myself there too where I found the tree. (Buber 2002b, p 49)

Hence, 'the tree is now no longer *It*': 'I encounter no soul or dryad of the tree, but the tree itself' (Buber 1958, p 19–20). This was the moment when 'dialogue appeared to me', he says, '[f]or the speech of man is like that stick wherever it is genuine speech, and that means: truly directed address', as I am '[h]ere … [b]ut also there, where he is' (Buber 2002b, p 49–50).

As well as reaching towards a dialogue with trees, horses, and other non-human natural beings, Buber also describes a similarly elusive form of dialogue with God. This dialogue, according to Friedman, 'is not met by turning away from the world or by making God into an object of contemplation, a "being" whose existence can be proved and whose attributes can be demonstrated', but is instead 'met only as Thou', in a 'dialogue that goes on moment by moment in each new situation, the dialogue that makes my ethical "ought" a matter of real response with no preparation other than my readiness to respond with my whole being to the unforeseen and the unique' (Friedman, in Buber 2002a, p xvi). One of many complications in interpretations of Buber is his use of 'God' and 'spirit' at times as synonyms and at times as distinct. What is clear is that the dialogue with God is at least in part achieved in or through dialogue with people. He uses an analogy of reading a single poem, but only getting to know the poet through reading a number of poems:

> When we really understand a poem, all we know of the poet is what we learn of him in the poem – no biographical wisdom is of value for the pure understanding of what is to be understood: the *I* which approaches us is the subject of this single poem. But when we read other poems by the poet in the same true way their subjects combine in all their multiplicity, completing and confirming one another, to form the one polyphony of the person's existence.

> In such a way, out of the givers of the signs, the speakers of the words in lived life, out of the moment Gods there arises for us with a single identity the Lord of the voice, the One. (Buber 2002a, p 17–18)

Just as there are variations of real dialogue, there are variations of *failed* dialogue. Failure of dialogue is not the same as silence. Buber says that 'the most eager speaking at one another does not make a conversation … [as] shown in that curious sport, aptly termed discussion, that is, "breaking apart", which is indulged in by men who are to some extent gifted with the ability to think', whilst 'for a conversation no sound is necessary, not even a gesture … [as s]peech can renounce all the media of sense, and it is still speech' (Buber 2002a, p 3). A discussion is likely to be a failed dialogue because it treats the event as a competitive sport, so the 'other' is not truly present, is not included. '[B]eing, lived in monologue, will not, even in the tenderest intimacy, grope out over the outlines of the self' (Buber 2002a, p 24), and so it is not the lack of closeness or intimacy that makes for failed dialogue. The monologist 'is not turning away' but is exhibiting 'reflexion' (Buber 2002a, p 26) in which 'the self "curves back on itself"' (translator's note by Ronald Gregor Smith, in Buber 2002a, p 246). Dialogue fails, for Buber, when distance and relation are imbalanced, according to Scott. So 'mysticism (absorption in the all)' is a failure to recognise the 'other' and 'turns into narcissism (a retreat into myself)' whilst 'collectivism (absorption in the crowd) turns into lack of engagement with individuals (a retreat into individualism)' (Scott 2010). And in his conversation with the therapist Carl Rogers, Buber describes both paranoia and schizophrenia in terms of failed dialogue. Unlike the monologue of (many) philosophers, who 'have fallen, with the totality of their thought world, into a monologizing hubris' (Buber 1998, p 103), the person suffering from paranoia, he says, 'does not shut himself', instead, '[h]e *is* shut', 'there is something else being done to him that shuts him' (Buber 1998, p 165).

It is helpful to summarise what it is about the dialogue of Buber and Macmurray that is most important to schooling. Buber himself described 'the significance of the dialogical principle in the sphere of education' as twofold: 'for its groundwork' and 'for its most important task' (Buber 2002a, p x). That is, the purpose of education—by which Buber included

schools and other classes, adult education and universities—is to bring people into dialogue, and dialogue is the main task of that education. Education is an *inclusive* process, although—in schools, especially—the inclusion is never quite complete, as the mutuality is one-sided (Buber 2002a, p 116–117). In school, the teacher 'experiences the pupil's being educated, but the pupil cannot experience the educating of the educator', as if that happened, 'the educative relation would be burst asunder, or change into friendship' (Buber 2002a, p 119). He says the same of the therapist-client relation, and the pastor's relationship with members of the congregation: '[h]ealing, like educating, is only possible to the one who lives over against the other, and yet is detached' (Buber 1958, p 166). At this point, Buber seems to hold a distinct position from that of Macmurray and Noddings. For all three philosophers, professionals clearly have a specific professional responsibility for their pupils, clients, or congregation. But for Macmurray, quite explicitly, schools and religious groups are communities which, as communities, not only allow for, but 'end in' (i.e. are ultimately aiming for) friendship. Macmurray and Buber agree about therapists as this is not a communal relationship, but in communities there must be the possibility of full mutuality. Noddings also describes a clear mutuality in the relations between teachers and pupils: teachers may be 'professional' carers, but they must also be open to being cared for by pupils.

Whatever the degree of mutuality in these different philosophies, it is Buber's distinctive contribution to debates on schooling to describe the centrality of dialogue. And the 'symptom' of dialogue that, in turn, is vital to Buber's philosophy and helps explain a great deal of all the dialogic approaches to schooling, is *surprise*. 'Dialogue in my sense', he says in a letter criticising the so-called permanent dialogue that philosophers such as Heidegger claim with earlier philosophers, 'implies of necessity the unforeseen, and its basic element is surprise, the surprising mutuality' (Buber, in Glatzer and Mendes-Flohr 1991, p 647, quoted above). Buber illustrates this with an account of an outwardly rather conventional geography lesson in which a young teacher faces a class for the first time and asks a question about the Dead Sea: 'What did you talk about last in geography? The Dead Sea? Well, what about the Dead Sea?' (Buber 2002a, p 134). The question is focused on a particular pupil whom the teacher has seen as

curious, and the boy 'begins to *tell a story*', describing his visit to the Dead Sea. The boy finishes his account, 'And everything looked to me as if it had been created a day before the rest of creation' (Buber 2002a, p 134, emphasis in the original). This 'surprise' suggests to Buber that the teacher had correctly understood the curiosity of the pupil and in so doing had given him the opportunity to surprise. The class falls silent and listens. Hence, 'a real lesson' is 'neither a routine repetition nor a lesson whose findings the teacher knows before he starts, but one which develops in mutual surprises' (Buber 2002a, p 241). Distance and relation, in balance, make for surprise. Monologue does not surprise, and losing oneself in another does not surprise. Surprise comes with 'real conversation', 'a real lesson', 'a real embrace', and 'a real duel', as 'in all these what is essential does not take place in each of the participants or in a neutral world which includes the two and all other things; but it takes place between them in the most precise sense, as it were in a dimension which is accessible only to them both' (Buber 2002a, p 241–242).

The inclusion of 'a real duel' in Buber's list of situations in which there is both distance and relation, and the kind of meeting expected in dialogue, is a reminder that dialogue is not necessarily enjoyable. Real dialogue can hurt, and the experience of a person hurt in dialogue may be that much worse precisely because the connection is made. An insult coming from someone who does not really know you is likely to be less painful than an insult from someone who knows and even loves you. Buber's dialogue is, therefore, not a form of 'spiritual luxuriousness' (Buber 2002a, p 41) but a real meeting, a creative, imaginative act that may—like art of any kind—disturb and trouble as much as it brings pleasure or enlightenment. And it will inevitably surprise. This has many implications for schooling, not least of which is a requirement for what Durka calls the 'learned uncertainty of teachers' (Durka 2002, p 1), echoing the 'learned ignorance' of the fifteenth-century German mystic Nicholas of Cusa, about whom Buber wrote a dissertation in 1904 (Scott 2010). It can also be linked to Rancière's idea of the value of not knowing (the value of the 'ignorant schoolmaster', Rancière 1991) and Suissa's interpretation of 'thinkers like Kropotkin and Bakunin', who wanted to create 'the conditions of power in which it was possible for a person in authority to be made fallible' (Suissa 2006, p 59, quoting Sennett).

Conclusion: Surprise, Surprise

There are many who explore the idea of learning in dialogue as important to school. This dialogue may be spread across time and space, it may be a 'civilised' conversation, and it may be the dialogue of friends on trivial matters. The authors dominating this chapter—such as Oakeshott, Macmurray, Noddings, and Buber—all commend a mixed economy of dialogue in school, a range of dialogue with established traditions and dialogue with current companions, a range of 'technical' dialogue and 'real' dialogue. As described by Buber, especially, dialogue is the central purpose and activity of all forms of education, and central to dialogue is the role of surprise. For schools, this matters. In various ways, schools try to avoid surprise. Syllabuses are drawn up and lessons are planned, perhaps years in advance, and the coordination of learning across schools can be vital to the efficiency and effectiveness of school systems. All of this planning is valuable, and, I suggest, it is all compatible with the surprise of dialogue. Surprise is not a comprehensive alternative to planning and order in schools: they are in tension, but both surprise and planning must be allowed. Surprise, in particular, is that which must be allowed to occur in any dialogic encounter. Observation of hundreds of lessons suggests to me that within well-crafted syllabuses and finely tuned lesson plans, real, surprising, dialogue can take place in any—in every—lesson. In the absence of any planning, a chaos of random or spontaneous activity, there is no reason to believe dialogue will flourish. Attributed to Picasso is the quotation 'learn the rules like a pro, so you can break them like an artist' (quoted in Sykes 2014, p 68). Schooling that is creative and filled with hope—that is, an openness to creating a wished-for future—will also be surprising; schooling that is wholly predetermined, certain, and perfect (at least in its own eyes), will be unsurprising—and also uneducational. Surprise overcomes the potential of schools to be soulless institutions. It is promoted here as the decisive characteristic of truly educational dialogue in schools.

Policy-makers, and more generally those with power, are often reluctant to acknowledge the importance of surprise. There is much that is reasonable about planning what and how children will learn in school, and about setting explicit learning objectives. In such ways, children can

have an appropriate equality of access to elements of the curriculum. Planning and predictability are helpful in giving shape to the child's year, and in allowing siblings, friends, and families to support the child's learning. Children moving between schools will have less chance of ending up repeating learning or being lost in unfamiliar learning. For these and many other reasons, careful planning is helpful. The passing on of information will always be vital to education, and this, along with other planned items, can properly be referred to as Buber's 'technical' dialogue, aiming for 'objective understanding' (Buber 2002a, p 22). Repetitive practice and rote learning, too, may have a role in such schooling. There has been a revival in understanding the value of characteristic 'craft' learning, with Sennett's exploration noting the 10,000 hours of repetitive, and often solitary, practice needed for expertise in a number of fields, such as musical performance, sport, or writing (Sennett 2008, p 172). Yet if technical dialogue were all that schools were for, they would be entirely impersonal institutions and would not provide an education of the whole child—an education in character, a personal, social, and spiritual education. Buber describes the typical twentieth-century problem of treating people as 'it', and this is matched by an equally problematic approach to an exclusively private home life of feelings. In modern society, he said, all too often,

> Institutions are 'outside,' where all sorts of aims are pursued, where a man works, negotiates, bears influence, undertakes, concurs, organises, conducts business, officiates, preaches. They are the tolerably well-ordered and to some extent harmonious structure, in which, with the manifold help of men's brains and hands, the process of affairs is fulfilled.
>
> Feelings are 'within,' where life is lived and man recovers from institutions. Here the spectrum of the emotions dances before the interested glance. Here a man's liking and hate and pleasure are indulged and his pain if it is not too severe. Here he is at home and stretches himself out in his rocking-chair. (Buber 1958, p 62–63)

This, however, is inadequate, and 'the separated *It* of institutions is an animated clod without soul [a translation of the word "golem"] and the separated *I* of feelings an uneasily-fluttering soul-bird' (Buber 1958,

p 63). In such circumstances, institutions would 'know only the specimen' whilst 'feelings only the "object"'; 'neither knows the person, or mutual life' (Buber 1958, p 63). Schools that are golems are soulless machines. They may be efficient machines and, as Buber explains that machines are useful: 'without *It* man cannot live' (Buber 1958, p 52). However, golem schools lack real dialogue and are inhuman: 'he who lives with *It* alone is not a man' (Buber 1958, p 52).

The absence of surprise might bring an appearance of greater certainty. But however comforting certainty is, constant certainty would be a problem for education, just as it would be a problem for political freedom. A social psychologist writing in post-war Germany wrote of the problem of 'certainty' in Nazi Germany, and the need to overcome the desire for universal certainty in order to enable the nation to recover from 1945. 'Dogmatic certainty', he said, 'is the end of education … [and t]he educated philistine is as uneducated as the ignoramus' (Mitscherlich 1993, p 14). So a surprising school would be an *un*certain school: complete certainty would be lost. A surprising school would also allow for hope (which lives in uncertainty), so hopelessness would be lost. The completely regulated school, running like clockwork, may have some attractions, but the situation is not only unrealistic but is an enemy of hope. Perfection in adults is damaging to children, as described by Rousseau's contemporary d'Épinay, who 'challenges Rousseau's ideal of the exemplary model-parent … [as s]he believes that adults need to accept being "good enough" parents rather than "perfect parents"' (Sennett 2008, p 102). d'Épinay was followed in this view by the psychologist Winnicott (1986), who stressed the harm done to children by perfect parents—giving children no room to develop their autonomy. The same can be said of teachers who, if they know everything (or act as if they know everything) can make education seem closed, uncreative, and dull. Of course, knowing a lot is valuable in teachers: it is real or pretended perfection that would be damaging to pupils in developing their autonomy. Perfection, then, would be lost in a school admitting surprise. This is my surprising conclusion.

4

Personhood and Personalism in School

I will treat other people as whole people with ideas, knowledge, wishes, emotions, bodies, sexualities, histories, futures, and connections with the rest of the world.

Introduction

A lot goes on in classrooms. When the richness and complexity of classrooms are reduced to results or effects or functions or the implementation of policies, there is almost nothing left. Yet the lived reality of classrooms is not only worth studying in its own right, it is of huge personal, social, and political significance. Personhood is not influenced by schooling so much as schooling develops personhood; society does not influence schooling so much as schooling creates society; politics does not determine schooling so much as schools enact politics. This book started with care—mutual care—as a first philosophy for schooling. What we care about matters (do we care most about the people, the subject matter being taught, external performance measures, the

Julian Stern, *A Philosophy of Schooling*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71571-1_4

economy, or what?), and how we care matters too. Schools are educational organisations, and what makes them distinctive is that they are communities in which people treat each other as ends in themselves. They do this in large measure through dialogue. And what they are doing—why they care, what the community does, to what purpose dialogue is enabled—is to teach *people*, to help young people be *a little more real* as people. All these arguments raise another question: what is the 'personhood' that becomes 'more real'? And a person becoming more real is—or certainly would be expected to be—more individuated, more distinct, so the issue of individuality in school is also important to an understanding of how classrooms work. Yet the task of teaching people, of helping the young become more real, can never completely succeed, as mortality proves everyone finite.

If 'the intrusion of death into our lives', as the poet Larkin describes it (quoted in Bradford 2005, p 259), is unusual—even impolite—in a discussion of schools, then I am sorry. Many years ago, I taught religious education lessons on death: Christians believe in heaven (and perhaps hell), Hindus have reincarnation, atheists rot, and so on. For all my sensitivity, as I had thought, in tackling the subject with young people aged 11 and upwards, I had missed the point. A questionnaire was carried out in 1997 (referenced in Fageant and Blaylock 1998; Blaylock 2001a, b; Weston 2003, and http://old.natre.org.uk/db/). It asked pupils aged 7–18 many things including what they thought happened to them when they die. Their responses transformed my ideas on teaching. What I had missed in my own days of teaching was that the pupils had their own views on what happens when they die, and these views were expressed more powerfully than the textbook versions I had been giving them. Here are four example responses from 11-year-olds:

> I think that death is just a place you have to go back to. Everyone is going to go there weather they like it or not.

> I dont think there is such thing as an afterlife and when we die we are dead and that is the end of us but if we are murdered we turn into spirits.

> You go to a church to have a cermoney and people cry. You get beried and get eaton by maggots or over animals. You get to sleep and be peaceful.
>
> I afraid of death but part of me want's to die.

What surprised me was not that these views were 'correct' or 'incorrect' (according to the pupils' own reported religious or non-religious allegiances), or that they were sophisticated or philosophically interesting responses (even if many of them were). The surprise for me was that the pupils seemed to have such strong, deeply felt, personal views, views that I had painstakingly avoided asking about—avoided thinking about—in all my years of teaching the topic. Pupils are 'persons' and could perhaps be treated as such. It was easy to ignore that in a school where technical dialogue, the passing on of information, dominated lessons. I realised that even when schools teach about death, death itself had not been allowed to make an appearance. The real views of pupils (and teachers) on the topic were suppressed. I had been suffering from what Rosenzweig strikingly referred to as 'acute *apoplexia philosophica*' (Rosenzweig 1999, p 59). This is the tendency of philosophy, and of reason more generally, to 'attempt to elude death' by avoiding real life (Rosenzweig 1999, p 102). The cure for 'reason's illness' is to 'teach … him to live again', and in doing this, 'we have taught him to move towards death' (Rosenzweig 1999, p 102). Pupils know about death, but they also know that schools will often ignore or actively suppress such 'reality'.

I had been complicit in this ignorance or suppression, and was, therefore, less of a teacher. Maybe it was in part the effect of my philosophy studies in my teens and twenties—which were at times somewhat technical and impersonal. It was the hints at 'reality' whilst I was a teacher that led, much later, to my interest in personalist philosophy. This chapter addresses personhood through personalist philosophy and personalist psychology. In doing this, I also explore the somewhat fuzzy boundaries of personhood, reality, and individuality, as well as the implications of these for relationships in and beyond schools. My 'manifesto' (the *Afterword* of this book) explains this by saying that 'the school I would like will be one in which everyone is there as a "whole person", with ideas,

knowledge, wishes and hopes, emotions, bodies, sexualities, histories, futures, and connections with the rest of the world'.

Personalism in Philosophy and Psychology

Philosophers love making simple things complicated and complicated things utterly obscure. Asking what a 'person' is can seem to be one of those exasperating philosophical questions. But debates on what a person is, and the boundaries of personhood, have never been more lively in 'the real world' as well as in the heads of philosophers. There are arguments about the start of life (at what point does a group of cells become a person) and the end of life (at what point does a group of cells no longer count as a person), arguments about the relationship of people to technology (from cyber enhancements all the way through to the uploading of the contents of a person's brain to a computer), arguments about the moral or political boundaries between human beings and other animals, and many more. The terms 'person' and 'human' are sometimes used interchangeably, and debates on humanism, post-humanism, and the transhuman are all relevant to personhood. As I understand it, personhood is not simply *relevant* to schooling; it is absolutely *central* to the very meaning of schooling. I have become something of a personalist. Philosophers can be grouped in many ways. There are plenty of isms (idealism, realism, pragmatism, materialism, empiricism, existentialism, and many more), along with the groups named for individual philosophers (the Platonists, Spinozists, and Hegelians). Personalism is a term used for a relatively small but diverse and loose-knit (or unknit) philosophical grouping that puts personhood at the centre of its philosophies. Personalism is barely a movement and is presented here as a way of highlighting the significance of persons to a philosophy of schooling.

Two philosophers identified by others (if not themselves) as personalist, and much quoted throughout this book, are Macmurray and Buber. They, along with other personalist philosophers such as Mounier (1952) or Polanyi (1962), set personhood not only at the centre of their ethics (what should be done?), but also at the centre of their epistemologies (what can be known?), ontologies (what is there?), and politics (how is

power wielded?). Personalists do not all agree on what a 'person' is, however, and they have varied views on education. The breadth is well represented in Beauregard and Smith (2016), where the editors note that '[t]he ties that bind these disparate intellectual cultures may appear very loose indeed', but their 'aspirations are shaped by the desire to respond, and respond vigorously, to the impersonal and depersonalising forces perceived to be at work in philosophy and theology, and most recently, the natural and political sciences' (Beauregard and Smith 2016, p 9–10). And '[t]heir common aim is to place persons at the heart of these discourses, to defend the idea that persons are the metaphysical, epistemological, and moral "bottom line;" in the words of Thomas Buford, "the supreme value and the key to the measuring of reality"' (Beauregard and Smith 2016, p 10). To that extent, I am happy to see myself as a personalist.

One of the characteristic features of personalist philosophy is a sense of personhood being developed in relation. A second characteristic feature of personalism is a concern with individuality that avoids many forms of individualism—addressed later in this chapter. What about persons in relation? An account of the southern African concept of *Ubuntu* captures some of the issues:

> Bishop Desmond Tutu wrote of *ubuntu*: '*Ubuntu* is very difficult to render into a Western language. It speaks of the very essence of being human. When we want to give high praise to someone we say *Yu u nobuntu*: Hey, he or she has *Ubuntu*. This means they are generous, hospitable, friendly, caring, compassionate. They share what they have. It also means my humanity is caught up, is inextricably bound up, in theirs. We belong in a bundle of life. We say, "a person is a person through people". It is not "I think therefore I am." It says rather, "I am human because I belong." … A person with *Ubuntu* is open and available to others, affirming of others, does not feel threatened that others are able and good; for he or she has a proper self-assurance that comes from knowing that he or she belongs in a greater whole and is diminished when others are humiliated or diminished, when others are tortured or oppressed, or treated as if they were less than they are.' (Hoppers and Richards 2012, p 58)

For Macmurray, relations make for personhood, and this separates persons from being 'mere' animals. (I agree with the first half of the claim

and disagree with the second half: more of that, later.) Macmurray's is a distinctly Christian narrative and reflects the religious tradition of people (human beings) being made 'in God's image'. Buford's account says that within Christianity, 'the word "person" came into use when speaking of the three persons of the Trinity', and '[s]oon it was used when speaking of individual humans created by God and, bearing God's image, acquiring a dignity not possessed by any other creature' (Buford, in Beauregard and Smith 2016, p 1). Anglican Christians like Bishop Desmond Tutu, Protestant Christians such as Martin Luther King Jr. (and Macmurray earlier in his life), and Catholic Christians Mounier and Karol Wojtyła (later Pope John Paul II), were joined together in their Christian, relational, personalism (Beauregard and Smith, in Beauregard and Smith 2016, p 9).

Mounier is the most vociferous advocate of personalist philosophy. Yet he is described by Rauch, in his foreword to Mounier's own book, as 'not a great philosopher' in the sense of a system builder (in Mounier 1952, p viii) and as providing a less profound account of personalism than those of Nédoncelle or Ricoeur. However, Rauch continues, 'Mounier's personalism was "a pedagogy"' and one which 'introduces uneasiness … which opens the door to commotion' (in Mounier 1952, p viii–ix), a reaction against 'conservative, defensive, sulky' Christianity that was 'afraid of the future' (in Mounier 1952, p xii). His limitations as a systematic philosopher were intentional as Mounier did not want personalism to be 'either a system or a political machine', but 'a certain outlook' with a purpose 'to accentuate certain demands which do not always receive sufficient consideration in … our present crises' (in Mounier 1952, p xii). Mounier himself says that personalism's 'central affirmation' is 'the existence of free and creative persons' which 'introduces into the heart of its constructions a principle of unpredictability which excludes any desire for a definitive system' (Mounier 1952, p xvi). He does not attempt an objective definition of a 'person', as only objects can be defined. A person is more than a collection of characteristics, or a 'type', however distinctive: '[h]ere is my neighbour … he is *a* Frenchman, *a* bourgeois, *a* socialist, *a* catholic … [b]ut he is not *a* Bernard Chartier, he is Bernard Chartier' (Mounier 1952, p xvi–xvii).

> It is a mistake to believe that personalism only means that, instead of treating men according to type, we take their shades of difference into account. Huxley's 'Brave New World' … is … the opposite of a personal universe, for everything in it is contrived, nothing is created and no one engages in the adventure of responsible liberty. (Mounier 1952, p xvii)

The crude individualism of Huxley's nightmare isolates every individual, leaving them 'unattached to any natural community' and 'turning towards others with a primary mistrust', so that 'the person' is opposed to 'the individual' (Mounier 1952, p 18–19). Becoming a person is not about becoming different: 'the cult of originality appears always as a secondary product, not to say by-product, of the personal life' (Mounier 1952, p 46). The growth of the person is not about becoming exceptional: 'the person is, from the beginning, a movement towards others' (Mounier 1952, p 33).

Personhood as movement towards others is characteristic of all personalists, even if some, like Mounier, also recognise the value of solitude. Relationship to others is certainly central to the philosophy of Buber, who was Jewish and, like Macmurray and Mounier, might be called a religious philosopher—although not a traditional philosopher of religion. He wrote extensively on mutuality in *I and Thou* (Buber 1958). There is no 'prior' I in the world, the I of Descartes' *cogito ergo sum*, I think therefore I am (Descartes 1912, p 27, from the *Discourse on Method*), the starting point of modern philosophy. Buber says '[t]here is no *I* taken in itself, but only the *I* of the primary word *I-Thou* and the *I* of the primary word *I-It*'; hence, '[w]hen a man says *I* he refers to one or other of these' (Buber 1958, p 16). The *thou* of another person is related to the divine as the universal other: 'In every sphere in its own way, through each process of becoming that is present to us we look out toward the fringe of the eternal *Thou*; in each we are aware of a breath from the eternal *Thou*; in each *Thou* we address the eternal *Thou*' (Buber 1958, p 19).

Buber and Macmurray were both influential in psychology as well as philosophy. Macmurray argued that, to the extent that psychology is a science, it is a science of 'human behaviour', not of the 'mind' (Macmurray

1939a, p 115). To the extent that psychology is about persons, it is not a science. That is why his book on the philosophy of psychology is titled *The Boundaries of Science* (Macmurray 1939a). The growth through the twentieth century of what is called 'humanistic' psychology takes the second—in Macmurray's sense, non-scientific—route. Amongst this group of psychologists are Maslow (1971, 2014) and Rogers (1951, 1961). Buber had a fascinating recorded conversation with Rogers (in Anderson and Cissna 1997; Buber 1998), and in this he distinguishes his view of personhood from that of individuality, terms often used interchangeably by psychologists. Individuality is important, but personhood is more than just individuality:

> You speak about persons, and the concept 'persons' is seemingly very near to the concept 'individual'. I would think that it is advisable to distinguish between them. An individual is just a certain uniqueness of a human being. And it can develop just by developing with uniqueness. This is what Jung calls individuation. He may become more and more an individual without becoming more and more human. I know many examples of man having become very, very individual, very distinct from others, very developed in their such-and-suchness without being at all what I would like to call a man. The individual is just this uniqueness; being able to be developed thus and thus. But a person, I would say, is an individual living really with the world. And *with* the world, I don't mean *in* the world – just in *real contact*, in real reciprocity with the world in all the points in which the world can meet man. I don't say only with man, because sometimes we meet the world in other shapes than in that of man. But this is what I would call a person and if I may say expressly Yes and No to certain phenomena, I'm *against* individuals and *for* persons. (Buber, in Buber 1998, p 173–174)

Anderson and Cissna say that this is a misunderstanding by Buber of Rogers' views because Rogers is 'for' persons too (Anderson and Cissna 1997, p 103). This account therefore not only clarifies Buber's personalism, but argues that Rogers is similarly personalist.

Another strand of psychology that might join the loose-knit group of personalists is that of personal construct psychology. Developed by Kelly (1955), it was used by Salmon in her work on schools (Salmon

1988, 1995, 1998) as well as in her more broadly educational and clinical work (Salmon 1985, 2004). She presents an alternative to 'mechanistic psychology', giving 'central importance … to the idea that each of us creates our own reality, that we can know the whole world we live in only through the personal interpretations, or constructions, that we make of it' (Salmon 1988, p 11). For schools, this means overturning the idea that the 'personal' is peripheral: '[p]ersonal relationships with teachers and with fellow pupils are conventionally viewed as largely irrelevant to education', and '[o]nly when they prove impossibly problematic do they become the focus of attention' (Salmon 1998, p 12). Personhood is constructed, socially, from infancy onwards, and schools are necessarily personal:

> Reality is not to be pinned down forever in a standardized curriculum. The understanding which teachers offer is necessarily provisional – for the time being only. And for all that school knowledge has high social consensus and is grounded in the whole cultural heritage, it is also indelibly personal. It takes its significance from within the construct system of any particular teacher. Since each person inhabits a distinctive world of meaning, the curriculum of education is constructed afresh, and individually, by every teacher who offers it. (Salmon 1995, p 22)

Personal construct psychology is named for the continuing construction of personhood, with education being the systematic interface between personal construct networks of meaning. Salmon's view of 'living in time' (Salmon 1985) is that standard models of developmental psychology, and of schooling, see childhood as preparation for adulthood, adulthood as a 'plateau' of important achievements (such as sex, money, career), and old age as a decline from that plateau. Her alternative view is that we are always developing, always in the present. Seeing childhood as always pointing forwards to adulthood, and old age always pointing backwards to adulthood (or forwards to death), means that at least half of our lives are 'missed'. Instead, she says that schools are places where *all* (pupils, teachers and other staff alike) are living and are constructing themselves as persons. They are not places primarily 'for' other times, future achievements, or economic activities.

My own route into more personalist philosophy was influenced by Salmon very directly, as she was my doctoral supervisor. And despite the echoes that I can see between her views and those of Macmurray, she was not convinced. Attending Edinburgh University in the 1950s, Salmon went to Macmurray's introductory lectures on philosophy. Well, she told me that she went to the first lecture, in which Macmurray differentiated human beings as 'persons' from all other living things. She did not return as she rejected such a separation. The boundaries of the personal are contested amongst personalists, and these boundaries have implications for the ways of becoming more real. These two themes, therefore, need further explanation.

Becoming Real

Macmurray's views on becoming more real are described in Chap. 2 as a form of (exclusively human) self-realisation in community, never complete, while Buber's 'real' dialogue (in Chap. 3) is one that is creative, surprising, and more inclusive. How else is 'becoming' described by personalist philosophers and psychologists? Combining the issue of 'becoming' with the boundary issue of 'personhood', the deep ecologist Naess describes 'increased self-realization … through the fulfilment of potentials that each of us has, … a broadening and deepening of the self' (Naess 2008, p 83). He continues with an account of Spinoza's views on joy:

> Spinoza makes use of the following short, crisp, and paradoxical definition of joy (*laetitia*): "Joy is man's transition from lesser to greater perfection." Somewhat less categorically, he sometimes says that joy is the affect by which, or through which, we make the transition to greater perfection. Instead of "perfection," we may say "integrity" or "wholeness." (Naess 2008, p 128)

Spinoza's 'joy' is, he continues, 'linked intrinsically to an increase in many things: perfection, power and virtue, freedom and rationality, activeness, the degree to which we are the cause of our own actions, and the degree to which our actions are understandable by reference to ourselves' (Naess

2008, p 128). For Naess himself, 'self-realization' may be the 'supreme norm', but it 'is not an eternal or a permanent "self"' (Naess 2008, p 195–196). And, drawing on Spinoza to help create an ecological philosophy, the 'broadening and deepening of the self' goes well beyond humanity: 'with sufficient comprehensive maturity, we cannot help but identify ourselves with all living beings' (Naess 2008, p 82). Hence, our deepening self is one with our deepening understanding and at oneness with nature. Spinoza's 'universe', 'the eternal and infinite Being', is described as *Deus sive Natura*: 'God or Nature' (Spinoza 1955, p 188). Our understanding and at-oneness with nature are dynamic, developing, never complete. We are 'of' nature, not apart from nature, and '[t]he more we understand particular things, the more do we understand God' (Spinoza 1955, p 260). Each of us is finite, but to the extent that we understand, we partake of the eternal. 'Eternal' in Spinoza means 'outside time', not 'everlasting' (Spinoza 1955, p 264).

Although Spinoza could barely be called a personalist, his cooption by Naess does bring his philosophy and psychology closer than might be expected to those of personalists. An increasing understanding is not a detached intellectual state, but an active being-at-one with things. Macmurray recognises Spinoza's insight into the 'real' as a 'concrete wholeness':

> Philosophy … is the attempt to express the infinite in immediate experience through reflection. It would be equally correct to say that it is the attempt to express reality. For reality is essentially the concrete wholeness which characterizes immediate experience. Whatever is abstract, whatever is isolated and separated out from the infinite in which it has its being, becomes to that extent unreal. This, I think, is what Spinoza means when he talks of the unreality of the finite in so far as it is finite. To isolate anything from the whole in which it has its being is to destroy its reality by depriving it of the possibility of completeness. It becomes essentially incomplete and meaningless when torn from its setting. Reality, therefore, is bound up with the unity and completeness of the world in our immediate experience of it. (Macmurray 1996a, p 16–17)

'Reality' and 'understanding' are so intimately related, in Spinoza as much as in Naess or Macmurray, that this gives us the basis for an

educational philosophy. Self-realisation is the equivalent in Macmurray to joy (the transition to greater perfection) in Spinoza. Others use the term 'integrity' with a similar meaning, as 'being whole' (Best 1996, p 5), so education should 'begin with the notion of what it is to be *a whole person*', and we should see 'education as *the development of the person*' (Best 1996, p 6, emphasis in original). Other approaches are that of 'holistic' education, which 'attempts to nurture the development of the whole person' in a way that 'includes the intellectual, emotional, physical, social, aesthetic, and spiritual', noting that '[p]rogressive education and humanistic education dealt with the first five factors but generally ignored the spiritual dimension' (Miller, in Miller et al. 2005, p 2), and 'gestalt' theory (e.g. Denham 2006; Jones and Frederickson 1990), which was used by Polanyi (1962, p vii) as a starting point for his personalist philosophy.

To be more 'real', to have greater 'integrity' or to develop 'holistically', all echo each other. And limitations on these characteristics are all therefore limitations on personhood. The psychologist Salmon writes of schizophrenia, for example, as a limitation of personhood, in an account that also promotes what I would call her personalism. '[T]o understand the development of thought-disordered schizophrenia', she says, 'we have to look to relational rather than individualistic matters' (Salmon 2004, p 78). Referring to the work of Shotter, she stresses that 'in establishing a sense of personal identity, the pronoun You is prior to that of I' (Salmon 2004, p 78): 'The thou is older than the I in the sense that the capacity to be addressed as a "you" by others is a preliminary to being able to say "I" of oneself, of being able to understand the uniqueness of one's own "position" in relation to others, and to take responsibility for one's actions' (Shotter, in Salmon 2004, p 78). Schizophrenia is not an 'illness for which one could discover a cause of the form of a schizococcus', but a problem with relational personhood: 'this and other problems' should be regarded 'not as residing within people, but between them' (Salmon 2004, p 76). A more mainstream psychologist, Baron-Cohen (2011), writes of aspects of autism, of psychopathy, of anorexia, and of borderline personality disorder, as related to limitations in empathy. He acknowledges Buber as an inspiration for his approach to empathy (Baron-Cohen 2011, p 5), and defines empathy itself as 'our ability to identify what

someone else is thinking or feeling, and to respond to their thoughts and feelings with an appropriate emotion' (Baron-Cohen 2011, p 11). Salmon's view—and that of Baron-Cohen—is not one of limitation as 'barrier'. People with schizophrenia can be supported to regain relationships (for Salmon, who had worked as a clinical psychologist), and people on the autism spectrum can be supported to develop more empathy (for Baron-Cohen, who produces training materials). Others reject even more firmly any sense of autism, for example, as limitation. Bustion (2017) replaces the 'theory … that autistic persons lack a sense of self' in favour of the views of 'many autistic persons … that they experience autism as an essential and valuable feature of their very personhood' (Bustion 2017, p 10), and Biklen et al. (2005), similarly, rejects the 'myth' of the autism as the 'person alone'.

Infants, too, are seen by many as limited in their personhood yet—of course—open to education. Salmon dislikes the term 'limitation' and describes how 'even the youngest children' are seen in families 'in terms of potentiality rather than limitation':

> In their interaction with small babies, mothers talk as though their infants were already quite advanced. … She treats babble as meaningful, though unfinished, language, completing utterances on the baby's behalf. (Salmon 1998, p 100)

Salmon contrasts this approach to the approach in all too many schools, which are 'based on notions of human limits, of built-in incompetence' (Salmon 1998, p 101). Macmurray, similarly, notes the human babies are 'made to be cared for' and 'born into a love-relationship which is inherently personal' (Macmurray 1991b, p 48). In this sense, the human baby 'is less like an animal than the human adult' (Macmurray 1991b, p 45, referring to Suttie 1960, p 12). (More recently, Trevarthen has provided 'scientific' evidence of two-month-old babies exhibiting 'fellow-feeling' and 'reasonableness', supporting 'Macmurray's anticipation of "the intersubjective infant"' Trevarthen 2002, p 97.) A whole range of cases where aspects of personhood are limited (or where there is greater potential for further growth), such as infancy or schizophrenia as described by Salmon, might also include those with dementia and other illnesses and disabilities.

What Buber hints at, and Naess describes much more fully, is the 'permission' this might also give us to consider non-human personhood. A number of primates develop in their early years in very similar ways to human babies, a number of non-human animals are able to live in community (including in human communities) as fully as—or more fully than—a number of human beings. The debates go wider, to the 'expanding circle' of the morality of Singer (2011), which has controversial implications for the edges of human life, the political account of Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011), which frames human beings and domestic, 'liminal', and wild animals within a political rights discourse, and the ecological accounts of Naess or of Shepherd (2011), which refer to the 'living mountain' in personal terms. A simple 'scaling' of animals on a single moral continuum may overlook fundamental differences: '[a]nimals are not lesser humans; they are other worlds' (Haraway 2004, p 125, quoting Barbara Noske). But there are some commonalties across special boundaries, and human beings are already experienced at exploring the 'other worlds' of distant and unfamiliar human beings.

In recent years, the boundaries of personhood have been challenged by technological developments, too. As an academic who uses computers in almost every aspect of my work, I sometimes refer to a computer as my 'distributed brain'. Not a particularly funny joke but an increasingly relevant one for debates on personhood. Our memories, our identities, are ever more formed with and stored by electronic devices, our vision is already able to be 'augmented' by devices projected on to the glasses we wear, and the opportunity to have some kind of GPS system embedded in our brains—rather than just in our glasses—is no longer considered absurd. In more ordinary senses, how we present ourselves, the 'mask' we wear, is electronic. What we do, what we eat, what we think at a hundred points during the day, are shared electronically, and fashions in dentistry and cosmetic surgery are determined as much by the effect on online presentation as on 'real life' situations. 'Real life' is, therefore, only put in inverted commas to distinguish it from electronically mediated life: both are, really, 'real'. 'Virtual reality' is not almost real: it is a form of reality expressed in computer-mediated environments and is only 'virtual' in the sense of being 'not recognized formally' (OED 2005) as real. As Graham describes it, referencing Haraway's *A Cyborg Manifesto*,

> In a high-tech world … the only political and ethical vantage-point to make any sense is one in which we regard ourselves as 'cyborgs', fusions of flesh and machine, human and cybernetic. This means we cannot ground our ethics on the high ground of essential humanity, uncorrupted spirit or pristine body. … Instead, we need to learn to think ethically, politically, even theologically, from a position of complicity with the technologies. (Graham, in McKay 2004, p 158)

Human interaction with technology, creating the 'transhuman', is not new, of course, and each technical development—the development of printing presses, photography, radio, and television—has challenged or developed new forms of personhood. The very term 'person' comes from the Latin term for a mask worn by actors. Geiger's sensitive account of personae describes how teaching can encourage pupils to put forward insincere or inauthentic masks: the pupils may be 'faking it' (Geiger 2016, p 507). But a pupil's mask may *reveal* just as it may *hide*: '[a] paradox lies at the heart of having a *persona*: it both is and is not one's "ownmost" personhood' (Geiger 2016, p 508). Everyone plays social roles, but we may 'play those roles in such a way that the authentic personhood of the *persona* breaks through, shows forth, and communes with the other persons rather than mere *personae*' (Geiger 2016, p 510). Shakespeare's melancholy cynicism of Jacques in *As You Like It*, 'All the world's a stage, / And all the men and women merely players', is based on the idea that people are *merely* playing: there is nothing other than that. But playing and authenticity are not mutually exclusive. Just as a 'play' (by Shakespeare) is not 'merely' fiction but may tell truths, playing a social role is not 'merely' playing but may be an expression of personhood. Geiger retells a tale of Buber:

> Martin Buber's Hasidic tale illustrates the point: Rabbi Zusya, near death, imagined how God would speak to him when he crossed the threshold into the other world: "In the world to come I shall not be asked: 'Why were you not Moses?' I shall be asked: 'Why were you not Zusya?'" (Geiger 2016, p 513)

Every subject of the curriculum requires that pupils try on masks, ways of seeing and understanding the world. Geiger writes about religious education, although the same could be said of any discipline:

> Sometimes this means seeing from the perspective of someone from a very different religious tradition, at other times it means seeing from the perspective of someone else within one's own religious tradition. A mask can also be acquired by trying to see and understand reality from the perspective of ancient texts and holy books. But these masks are not the only ones that students wear. An underappreciated mask that is constantly worn by them is that of the "student." Being a student, the immediate lived context of RE in schools, is both an opportunity for self-manifestation and hiding. (Geiger 2016, p 514)

In all these accounts, becoming more real is a process of learning. Learning does not 'help' people become more real: it is itself the becoming. As Hanks says, 'learning is a way of being in the social world, not a way of coming to know about it' (in Lave and Wenger 1991, p 24). Schools, as learning communities, are participants in this process—though not the only participants. Macmurray sees schools as intermediate between families and wider society, whilst Naess, channelling Spinoza, sees learning as necessarily going far beyond school communities. Self-realisation, developing greater integrity, or holistic education, are all ways of describing becoming more real. And degrees of reality may be attributed not only to human beings, but potentially to other animals and objects. The boundaries of personhood are not only challenged by the non-human, but by human beings themselves—especially those who do not match the humanistic ideal of rational adulthood—and by the transhuman beings we may be becoming. Schools are places where everyone has assigned roles to play, as teachers, other staff, or pupils. Becoming more real does not necessarily mean denying or giving up those roles in an attempt at raw sincerity or authenticity. The roles themselves, the masks we wear, can be a way of achieving personhood.

Conclusion

Mounier's 'adventure of responsible liberty' (Mounier 1952, p xvii, quoted above) is determined by the combination of being (or being treated as) *distinct*, as an end in oneself and not as a means to further ends, with being (or being treated as) relatively whole or complete or *real*.

Adapted from elements of personalist philosophy, with significant contributions from Spinoza and others, this approach also complements a number of educators promoting *holistic* education (Miller et al. 2005). There are three aspects of personhood and personalism that I want to stress here. The first is that schooling is *personal*. It is 'I-Thou', in Buber's terms, more than it is 'I-It'. This means it is mutual and intentional, not impersonal and functional. There are perfectly legitimate impersonal organisations, or at least organisations that are not primarily personal. But schools are not amongst them. Macmurray says this explicitly of schools (Macmurray 2012), as does Buber. In an address to teachers, Buber notes that the 'development of the creative powers in the child' is important (Buber 2002a, p 98) and must be complemented by 'sharing in an undertaking' and 'entering into mutuality' (Buber 2002a, p 103). Although '[t]here was a time, there were times, where there neither was nor needed to be any specific calling of educator or teacher', there is, now, and '[w]e can as little return to the state of affairs that existed before there were schools as to that which existed before, say, technical science'; so in schools today 'we can and must enter into the completeness of its [the child's] growth to reality, into the perfect humanization of its reality' (Buber 2002a, p 106). (I might replace the word 'humanization' with 'personalisation' in that quotation.) Schooling that is personal has much in common with families; schools, like families, necessarily reach beyond themselves in the very processes of being communities.

The second of my three concluding points, derives from the first one: it is that learning in school is necessarily a process of self-realisation, or becoming real. Learning to be more real as a person, in this sense, is not primarily learning to be a good historian, a good scientist, a good citizen of the country, or a worker with a good income. Macmurray notes that '[u]niversities are educational institutions, as are schools' and '[t]heir business is not primarily to produce scientists, or historians, or philosophers, but through the sciences and the humanities, through discussion in their societies or through games in their athletic clubs, to educate men and women'. Hence 'education, from the standpoint of its victims, is learning to be human' (Macmurray 2012, p 661). Becoming real is not ever fully achieved: being a person carries with it a mortality, a finitude that must be acknowledged. And Macmurray's concern with human

beings, contrasted with other animals, brings me to the third of my conclusions. For personalists, especially but not exclusively those who allow for personhood to stretch beyond human beings, schooling is self-realisation in and with an ecology stretching around—and perhaps beyond—the world. This does not require some additional environmentalist argument: it derives from the very nature of personhood. Shepherd wrote of Cairngorm as the 'living mountain' (Shepherd 2011), but spent most of her life training teachers—delightfully seeing that role as the 'heaven-appointed task of trying to prevent a few of the students who pass through our Institution from conforming altogether to the approved pattern' (Shepherd 2011, p x). Bottery (2016) writes of the intimate relationship between schooling and sustainability. And Hay writes of spirituality in schooling and how 'many of our most pressing social and political problems … [including] carelessness about the ecology of our planet … have their origin in the ignoring of the aspect of our human nature adapted to deal with them, relational consciousness or spirituality' (Hay 2007, p 3).

These three implications of personhood for schooling are implications for all aspects of schooling including for relationships amongst the members of the school community, for the curriculum, and for the management of the school. However, one of the risks of having a personalist, or simply more personal, view of schooling is that it can be interpreted as being individualised to the extent that no system, no policy, and no conventional 'teaching' would make sense. There is, therefore, a need to consider what developing personal, individual, learning in a dialogic community might mean in terms of pedagogy, how we understand teaching and learning in classrooms.

5

Pedagogy, Research, and Being a Curious Teacher

I will be curious and will try to find out and share and discuss what I find out.

Introduction

Lave and Wenger do not talk much about schools in their influential book on learning. They 'make … a fundamental distinction between learning and intentional instruction' (Lave and Wenger 1991, p 40), and in schools, dominated by intentional instruction, too often 'school learning' is simply 'learning school' (Wenger 1998, p 267). Their points are well made. People learn all the time, and always have been learning, long before anyone thought about setting up schools of 'intentional instruction'. Young children learn more than anyone else, before schools have got their hands on them. They even manage to learn—at a very young age—how school works. Being coopted into a game of 'school' played by a three- or four-year-old, I am well aware that such children seem to know exactly what teachers do. 'Sit there', 'now, do what I tell you', 'be *quiet*',

Julian Stern, *A Philosophy of Schooling*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71571-1_5

'have you finished yet?', and 'that's not *right*'. The phrases somehow seep down to children. They know that teachers are bossy people who make pupils do some things, who stop pupils doing other things, and who judge pupils. Meanwhile, they are learning such a lot, without the help of teachers. Lave herself gives a good example of how intentional instruction is perfectly well understood by those who are *not* engaged in such instruction. She researched tailors and their apprentices in Monrovia, Liberia. There was 'abundant evidence that learning was going on', but she could not see it happening—there were no designated teachers, no tutorials. Lave asked some of the master tailors how they taught the apprentices:

> The masters were hospitable and kind. Obligingly they "gave lessons." In these sessions, a master stood over his small apprentice giving a monologue on the work to be learned and a running commentary on the apprentice's performance. The verbal detail was extraordinary. There was no doubt that the masters knew how to "teach." But it didn't feel right, even though it was what I thought I ought to see. I finally couldn't avoid facing up to the fact that I was pursuing the wrong issues when one master explained to his apprentice in a loud voice really intended for my ears that "the fly *always* goes on the *front* of the trousers." (I went home and wept.) (Lave 2011, p 48)

Weeping because she had been looking for 'teaching' not for 'learning', this is a revealing moment. Of course, the fly goes on the front of the trousers: a teacher tells people what they already know. Some of this is known to teachers, although the knowledge is a little embarrassing. Teachers spend a great deal of time telling pupils that they should not punch their classmates and that they should concentrate in lessons. Pupils already know this, and teachers know that pupils know. Pupils punch despite knowing they should not, and they daydream despite knowing they should concentrate. What is happening, when the young child plays 'teacher', when the tailor pretends to be a teacher by stating the obvious, and when a professional teacher tells a pupil what they should and should not do despite the pupil knowing this—and the teacher knowing that the pupil knows this? Partly, it is a power game, a way of demonstrating that you are the person who is in control. It is entertaining for a young child to be the 'boss' now and again, playing at being the teacher or the parent. Similarly entertaining, perhaps, for

Liberian tailors to humour a visiting anthropologist by showing how they could instruct their apprentices if they wanted to. A tired teacher knows that, when things go wrong in the classroom, they still have the power to tell pupils off. Even if what they say is unnecessary, the process of saying it reasserts the teacher's power. It is a performance.

Systematic intentional instruction is not necessary, in the sense that most learning happens in its absence. However, more is going on in teaching than merely a slightly absurd game. Power is being asserted: to teach is to have power over learners. There are other ways of having such power, including—for the tailors—the power wielded by being good at your job, such that apprentices will want to observe and copy what you do, in order to become proficient themselves. But teacher power is of a specific form, recognised even by those who are not currently engaged in it. I return to the sociologist Lawrence-Lightfoot's description of teachers as 'society's professional adults' (Lawrence-Lightfoot 2003, p xxi, quoted above in the Preface). Quoting Waller from the 1930s, she says that teachers 'are expected to be more "adult" than the rest of us, more responsible and constant, less impetuous and erratic' as '[w]e want them to model for our children the values and norms that we ordinary adults rarely enact consistently in our own lives' (Lawrence-Lightfoot 2003, p 30). Although this might be regarded as 'anachronistic', the 'vestiges' of Waller's view 'remain, and they influence the ways in which teachers and parents encounter one another' (Lawrence-Lightfoot 2003, p 30). If learning in school is learning to be 'more real' as a person, and if this is typically done through an ongoing conversation across the generations within a community (as argued in Chaps. 1, 2, 3, and 4, above), then being a 'professional adult' has a not-so-anachronistic character to it. Tailors and their apprentices are jointly engaged in tailoring, and so they are in less need of another role to play: tailoring is enough. But being an adult in a school community whose purpose is to learn community (a shorthand way of describing the first four chapters of this book), makes teachers into professional adults in particular ways. Teachers are indeed playing a role, acting a part, and that is not simply or primarily that of being a tailor—or a mathematician, a scientist, a linguist. It is being an adult and an adult who is 'professional'. Being a professional adult is, in this context, about systematically engaging in these things (caring about

community, dialogue, becoming more real) and doing them through (not for the sake of) the curriculum.

This chapter explores the oddity that is 'teaching', and does that despite the strange games teachers play—the games merrily imitated by preschool children and Liberian tailors. When I was a child myself, an adult told me that when you were on holiday, you could always tell who the teachers were: they would be the ones organising the games on the beach. There is something true about that, but I am convinced there is more to teaching and teacherliness than just this. The reflective practice beloved of teacher educators since Dewey's time (Schön 1983, 1987; Jones 1994; Furlong and Maynard 1995) is *especially* reflecting on this 'professional adult' role. McLaughlin writes of the 'popularity and appeal' of being a 'reflective practitioner' but avoids the somewhat limited techniques of models such as those of Schön and stresses what must be reflected upon rather than reflection for its own sake (McLaughlin 2008, p 60–78). He suggests we should go 'beyond' the 'reflective practitioner' approach to teaching, not because there is anything wrong with reflection (or practice), but because the important questions are the *next* questions. McLaughlin's own suggestion is that reflection and practice are embedded in more or less established and accepted social practices, and without the ability to view and criticise those wider practices, teachers will be limited to the role of conservators of current or past social forms, rather than educators for the future. I wish to move further, towards an idea of research as the kind of systematic learning process appropriate to teachers and pupils alike, and I offer research, therefore, as the centre piece of my understanding of 'professional adulthood' and of pedagogy. Teaching is a curious life, after all. In my 'manifesto' (the *Afterword* of this book), I express it in this form: 'the school I would like will be one in which everyone is curious, wanting to find out, wanting to help other people find out, and wanting to share and discuss what is found out'.

Pedagogy and Teacherliness

An 'innocent' definition of pedagogy is 'the art or science of teaching' (OED 2005), but, as Bruner said, '[p]edagogy is never innocent' (Bruner 1996, p 63). Saying that pedagogy may be an 'art' or a 'science' is perhaps

a clue in the more innocent definition of the difficult decisions being made when pedagogy is developed or practiced. Tickle describes how new teachers are constantly 'reflective', but most hope for a time when they know and can implement 'what works': they are looking for 'a repertoire of technical and clinical competences', which will allow them to 'escape' from further reflection (Tickle, in Elliott 1993, p 123). But achieving an 'effective' pedagogy is an illusion, or worse. Ball, in his description of performativity, says that effectiveness is one of the mechanisms used by policy-makers to 'terrorise' teachers. 'Truthfulness is not the point', he says, 'the point is … effectiveness, both in the market or for Inspection or appraisal' (Ball 2003b, p 224). And as the introduction to this chapter has said, even the assumption that there is a *need* for pedagogy, because there is a need for teachers, can be disputed: intentional instruction has always been in a minority when it comes to how learning happens. Lave describes her doubts about 'the tight links assumed in conventional theory to bind learning to teaching' (Lave 2011, p 88):

> These doubts focused on the apprenticeship process as a whole, taking seriously the apprentices' views that learning was their bailiwick, not their masters'. It felt like good sense to assume that learning – not teaching – was the phenomenon to follow in order to open up questions about learning. In apprenticeship, the master knowers/doers did not adopt identities as teachers, though they certainly knew how to produce a sharp teacher caricature. (Lave 2011, p 88)

For this reason, Lave 'argued that "teaching" (as defined in conventional cognitivist terms) was not required to produce learning' (Lave 2011, p 88). By 'uncoupling learning from teaching', there remained—in the master-apprentice relationships studied—a great deal of activity 'that looked as if it belonged in the instructional ballpark, although more often as a response to learning (and other) activity than as its cause' (Lave 2011, p 88). In consequence, she coins the term 'situated instruction' (Lave 2011, p 88) to match the 'situated learning' of her earlier publication (Lave and Wenger 1991). As I see it, this differentiates what might be termed the *teacher* from the *Teacher*. A *teacher* might help someone learn and might in certain appropriate situations (determined by the progress

of the learning that is happening) provide instruction. A *Teacher*, meantime, is someone whose role is dominated by intentional instruction whatever the situation—as it were, whether or not the learner wants or needs it at that time.

Professional teachers reading this description may be saying that what they do is what I describe of a *teacher*, not a *Teacher*. 'Do you not realise', they may say, 'that in a school day, at most 10 or 15 minutes in each hour will ever be spent *Teaching*, and 45 to 50 minutes in each hour we are wandering around the room supporting individual pupils?' That may be true, but it is not well-enough known. The image of schools is of *Teaching*. New teachers, researched by Tickle, had an image of a technically efficient and effective pedagogy, the ideal end point 'as they trod the road of status passage from student to novice and towards what they call "Capital T Teaching"' (Tickle, in Elliott 1993, p 113–114). There are differences between Tickle's Capital T Teaching and my Lave-inspired *Teaching*, not least because his is the image held by new teachers (in his research) whereas mine is the stereotype that is common in the general public, preschool children, tailors, and early-career anthropologists. What they both have in common is that they are incorrect, distorted views of how schools work. Such distorted views have a number of consequences. Tickle's teachers were—he thought—'diverted … from the uncertainty involved in examining their own beliefs, personal philosophies and emotional selves', escaping from a 'holistic appreciation' of teaching (Tickle, in Elliott 1993, p 123). Those—in or out of schools—who think that schools are full of *Teachers*, in the sense of people who are actively 'instructing' pupils (with formalistic and often redundant displays of control and knowledge) will not notice the learning that goes on in other ways and will not appreciate the possibility of more engaging and collaborative classroom practices.

Pressure to conform to an impossible pedagogic ideal—the technically proficient and 'certain' ideal of Tickle's teachers or the 'bossy instructor' ideal of Lave—has consequences. Any professional teacher who internalises either of these ideals is likely to suffer guilt as they will not achieve the ideal or, if they do, they will be sorely disappointed. Guilt is an emotion rarely studied in schools, but whenever I ask a group of teachers to indicate if they suffer from a powerful and constant sense of guilt

(as teachers), I have yet to hear anyone dissent. This is as true of successful and skilled teachers as of those having difficulties sustaining the role. The expectation of 'reflective practice' may, for some, increase feelings of guilt as it is an approach that assumes the possibility of constant improvement—and therefore implies a constant sense of being less good than one might have been. But that would be true for all who try to learn, as the wish to learn implies a current ignorance, so reflective practice cannot be the dominant cause of teacher guilt. Hargreaves (Hargreaves and Tucker 1991; Hargreaves 1994) says teachers are 'overloaded', 'their work intensifies, and they are remorselessly pressed for time', and hence 'they experience intolerable guilt' (Hargreaves 1994, p x). This may be both a 'persecutory' guilt at having failed to meet others' expectations (as in Easthope and Easthope 2000), or a 'depressive' guilt at having 'ignored, betrayed or failed to protect the people or values that symbolize their good internal object'. The former may result from external pressures whilst the latter may be more internally generated—the result of teachers' 'commitment to goals of care and nurturance' and the 'open-ended nature of the job' (Hargreaves 1994, p 145–147). Parents and carers of children may, incidentally, suffer from a complementary sense of guilt when engaging with schools. Lawrence-Lightfoot, herself a sociology teacher (in a university), describes her unexpected 'terror' when going to see her daughter's teachers, and the 'uncertainty and awkwardness, … the … inadequacy and guilt I felt afterward' (Lawrence-Lightfoot 2003, p xviii).

Given high levels of guilt, there are several possible responses. Hargreaves suggests that '[e]asing the accountability and intensification demands of teaching' would help reduce 'persecutory' guilt (Hargreaves 1994, p 156). For depressive guilt, he suggests '[r]educing the dependence on personal care and nurturance as the prime motive of elementary teaching in particular', and by '[r]elieving the uncertainty and open-endedness in teaching' (Hargreaves 1994, p 156). I am acutely aware that I am a writer who promotes—in this book—a *greater* emphasis on care and the necessity of admitting and even *celebrating* the uncertainty and, therefore, open-endedness of teaching. 'A pedagogy of air', described by Barnett, 'opens up spaces and calls for a will to learn on the part of the student; to learn even amid uncertainty' (Barnett 2007, p 1), and '[d]ogmatic certainty is the end of education', as the psychologist-psychiatrist

Mitscherlich said, dogmatically (Mitscherlich 1993, p 14, quoted above in Chap. 3). The contrast between my view and that of Hargreaves is not so great, though, as he suggests 'extending the definition of care to embrace a moral and social dimension as well as a personal one', albeit also by 'balancing the purposes of care with other educational purposes of equivalent purposes' (Hargreaves 1994, p 156). And his 'cure' for uncertainty is 'creating communities of colleagues … who work collaboratively to set their own professional standards and limits, whilst still remaining committed to continuous improvement' (Hargreaves 1994, p 156). Seeking solutions through community is a good Macmurrian response, but I am less comfortable with balancing care and other aims. Rather, I would want to extend the definition of care even further, to include care for learning and for the object of learning—that is, to include curiosity.

Seeing curiosity as a form of care is vital to my whole argument, a central feature of teacherliness. Hargreaves hints at what is a widespread concern of teachers: how to balance care and 'other aims' of schooling, with those other aims often represented by the curriculum or academic achievement. Pugh provides a stark example, writing as acting head of a residential school for pupils with what at the time were referred to as 'emotional and behavioural difficulties' (Pugh, in Stoll and Myers 1998). He described being sent to the school after it was 'failed' by the Ofsted inspection system and finding what was seen by staff as a 'conflict between care and the curriculum'. The '*raison d'être* of the school' was not seen as delivering the subjects of the National Curriculum, 'but the less defined and more urgent task of remedying the emotional damage that society and so many other educational establishments had inflicted upon its pupils' (Pugh, in Stoll and Myers 1998, p 108). Many teachers 'felt that it was only possible to educate academically after a rigorous programme of social education had soothed the savage beast, raised self-esteem and demonstrated the value of relationships based on respect and cooperation' (Pugh, in Stoll and Myers 1998, p 111). Pugh himself felt that denying or deferring the subjects of the curriculum was failing the pupils. As the pupils had been rejected by other schools, he saw the failure as a double one: failing the failures. Before he arrived (and during the failed inspection), there was an emphasis on behaviour modification, including giving out 'rewards such as sweets or chocolate … [or] McDonald's meals'

(Pugh, in Stoll and Myers 1998, p 112). This had a limited effect on the pupils and was replaced by rewards related to the pupils' education, such as pencil cases and geometry sets, and '[t]he most significant reward … was that each child was achieving his own target at his own level' (Pugh, in Stoll and Myers 1998, p 112). The move towards the curriculum can be seen as a move towards pupil 'behaviour' being seen as intimately *related to* their learning, rather than to be improved *prior to* their engagement in learning:

> The conflict is not about caring or not caring, or educating or not educating … The object of caring has become the need to ensure that every individual is able to take advantage of the education offered. In this sense, the school has defined itself firmly within an educational context rather than as an auxiliary branch of social services of the Health Authority. (Pugh, in Stoll and Myers 1998, p 115)

There are many troubling aspects of the situation described by Pugh, not least the pressure to emphasise the curriculum in order to do what inspectors would like to see. But seeing care as *inclusive* of learning the subjects of the curriculum, rather than as an *alternative* to it, is important. The narrower sense of care—which excluded learning subjects—left caring as 'an object in itself' and denied the 'purpose of the school' which was 'to educate' (Pugh, in Stoll and Myers 1998, p 115–116). There are many ways of defining and determining the curriculum, in terms of subjects, skills, themes, character, or values. (To misquote Bruner, 'the curriculum is never innocent'.) Seeing curiosity as a form of care, though, allows for a concern with curricular matters as part of a philosophy of care. The word 'curiosity' is closely related to 'care', deriving as it does from 'cure', meaning 'full of care or pains, careful, assiduous, inquisitive' (OED 2005), and the connection is not merely a trick of etymology. A curious learner is one who wants to find out; an incurious learner may still learn but has other more important motivations—perhaps to please someone else, or to gain a qualification, or to win a McDonald's meal or a geometry set. We all have mixed motivations, but a focus on curiosity in learning, on the intrinsic value of what is learned, puts learning at the heart of schooling.

The school that states on its website that 'Our number one priority … is to help our students gain essential skills to master all Standardized Assessment tests' (a US middle school handbook, 2017) seems to be missing the point. I do not name the school, as 'missing the point' may be a little unfair: the school principal has taken on board the pressure exerted by a results-dominated education policy. Fighting or subverting education policy is hard work for a school principal or headteacher, and a school handbook that honestly states what is, in policy terms, expected of the school should not be criticised too harshly. (Perhaps the school was actually curiosity driven, and its test-driven slogan was merely for 'outsiders' to read.) What teachers and school leaders can do, though, is to promote care: care for people and care for the objects of study (i.e. curiosity). This is not two cares but one: in school, an educational community, it would not be caring for people if we were to ignore or trivialise or instrumentalise the objects of study, and it would not be caring for the objects of study if we were to see those as entirely separate from the people of the school. Learning is not an activity completed after the care has been done: it is one of the cares (with 'care' also meaning 'burden' or 'worry') of all in school. Noddings, in her application of care ethics to schooling, relates care and curiosity, saying that 'the teacher sets an example with her whole self – her intellect, her responsiveness, her humour, her curiosity … her care' (Noddings 2003, p 244).

A pedagogy centred on curiosity, set within schooling centred on care, makes sense of teachers being society's professional adults. Characterising adulthood as reasonable and reasoning, as open to further development, as caring and (within that) as curious: such 'adult' features are proposed as relatively non-controversial—if still contestable—features. The sense of 'adult' is that described by Berne (1964) in his account of transactional analysis and applied to schools by a range of writers such as Newell and Jeffery (2002), Johnston (1999), and more loosely used by Newton and Tarrant (1992) and Östman (2010). Berne's contribution distinguishes 'adult-adult' transactions from 'parent-child' and 'child-child' transactions. The stereotypical *Teacher* role is one of 'parent' in a 'parent-child' relationship. Teachers acting as 'adults' are not—primarily—acting as 'parents', notwithstanding the responsibility of teachers often being described in parenting terms, such as the UK legal principle of *in loco*

parentis (University of Bristol 1998, p 11). It means—within transactional analysis—being balanced or objective. Such 'adult' behaviour can be exhibited by adults and children alike, just as 'parent' behaviour may be exhibited by children (as in the preschool child playing *Teacher*) and the 'child' behaviour may be exhibited by adults. For Berne, a good parent will act as 'adult', and not 'parent', much if not all of the time. There is something healthy and honest in teachers occasionally acting like children—in an end-of-year cabaret, perhaps, or on a camping trip—and occasionally acting in strongly authoritative parent roles—for example when pupils are in danger. The former might be described in terms of carnival as a necessary—occasional—social release (Bakhtin 1984), the latter in terms of a recognition of the *de facto* power differential between teachers and pupils (described in Chap. 6). But the adult-adult relationship can still be the one most central to schools.

This section started with Bruner's comment on pedagogy never being innocent. His was not a criticism of pedagogy, but an attempt to understand it, and he presented four types of (non-innocent) pedagogy. Each is based on a 'model … of learners' minds' (Bruner 1996, p 53):

1. *Seeing children as imitative learners: The acquisition of "know-how."* … Such modelling is the basis of apprenticeship, leading the novice into the skilled ways of the expert. …
2. *Seeing children as learning from didactic exposure: The acquisition of propositional knowledge* …
3. *Seeing children as thinkers: The development of intersubjective interchange* …
4. *Children as knowledgeable: The management of "objective" knowledge.* (Bruner 1996, p 53–60)

The first of these appears to be a simplified version of the 'situated learning' of Lave and Wenger (1991) and the second a version of the stereotypical *Teacher* approach, along with Buber's 'technical' dialogue (Buber 2002a, p 22). Bruner's third model is mutualistic, as in Buber's 'real' dialogue (Buber 2002a, p 22) or the dialogic approach of Wegerif (2008), whilst the fourth is more like the ongoing conversation described by Oakeshott (1991)—described eloquently by Bruner in terms of there

being 'something special about "talking" to authors, now dead but still alive in their ancient texts – so long as the objective of the encounter is not worship but discourse and interpretation, "going meta" on thoughts about the past' (Bruner 1996, p 62). Recognising that schools will typically use all of these pedagogies at certain times, Bruner describes this in terms of the various activities in schools 'designed to cultivate skills and abilities, to impart a knowledge of facts and theories, and to cultivate understanding of the beliefs and intentions of those nearby and far away' (Bruner 1996, p 63). Allowing an 'apprenticeship' approach to include becoming more real as a person, then all four pedagogies could be covered by Buber on dialogue and Noddings or Macmurray on conversations (into the past and into the future), so this is not so much four pedagogies as four approaches to teaching that could be used within one pedagogy, and this too is to an extent recognised by Bruner who says that his four pedagogies 'are best thought of as parts of a broader continent' (Bruner 1996, p 65). My own 'continental' approach to pedagogy is built on a generalisation of the curiosity exhibited by teachers as one aspect of their 'caring', as 'professional adults'. Teaching is understood in terms of learning—not just the learning of pupils, but of teachers, too.

Where resources and traditions allow, teachers can have very reduced 'intentional instruction' roles whilst still being responsible for the learning of their pupils. This is not a new discovery. In further and higher education, moving from being 'the sage on the stage' to being 'the guide on the side' (King 1993) has become a cliché. And schools promoting pupils as learning by discovery, in the company of teachers, goes back at least to the nineteenth century. Dewey wrote eloquently of the need to introduce any subject in school in as 'unscholastic' a way as possible (Dewey 1916, p 154), to avoid the pupil simply trying to be a good pupil and 'finding out what the teacher wants, what will satisfy the teacher in recitation and examination and outward deportment', rather than seeing learning in terms of solving 'real problems' (Dewey 1916, p 156). What makes for teacherliness is, but is not limited to, the intentional instruction of the *Teacher* (which itself may influence pupils in their own homes, through homework) and is also the ability to support pupils whilst they are learning, helping pupils apply school learning beyond the school (through homework), and drawing on the lives of the pupils (for example

through homework) in order to make learning personal and engaging. Such teacherliness does not isolate the school from the rest of society but connects it to pupils' families and communities and to wider society. Dewey describes an unconnected school as akin to a monastery, cut off from the rest of the world. Instead, he says, 'learning in school should be continuous with that out of school': 'as a rule, the absence of a social environment in connection with which learning is a need and a reward is the chief reason for the isolation of the school; and this isolation renders school knowledge inapplicable to life and so infertile in character' (Dewey 1916, p 358–359).

Teacherliness, therefore, includes skills in instruction (which parents need not have) and in connection between the school and the rest of society (which, according to Dewey, monks need not have). Care for other members of the school community is vital and will be complemented by a care for the objects of study—expressed in terms of curiosity. As Macmurray describes it, a teacher 'must have gone through the process of learning to be human with at least a fair measure of success' (quoted in Chap. 1):

> He must be able to enter into positive relations with each individual among his pupils. He must not be afraid of them, and he must be able to inspire their trust and admiration. No person who doesn't really care for children should ever teach. But also he must be qualified on the artistic side – I mean he must not be bookish or merely intellectual. He must be alive and creative; his imagination must be active and disciplined. (Macmurray 2012, p 670)

This is 'a lot to demand' of a teacher, but given this, 'the rest will take care of itself', and '[n]o technical training in educational methods can ever be a substitute for this, however unexceptionable the methods may be in themselves' (Macmurray 2012, p 670). A teacher's pedagogy—the understanding of the process of teaching and learning—is more of an 'existential stance' (Chater and Erricker 2013, p 107) than a technical understanding. Curiosity embedded in a broader stance of care is described here as a way of understanding schools as learning communities. This recognises the odd nature of schools as separate from the

communities of practice common in other forms of learning (in families and in workplaces) whilst also having the characteristic of 'apprenticeship' learning, albeit with the learning being—in the end—learning to be more 'real' as a person.

Teachers may be society's professional adults, but they are not—in any of the accounts provided here—regarded as perfect or complete in their learning. This would be absurd in any case, as no finite person could be wholly realised—as argued in Chap. 4, above. People are learners, and 'learning is a way of being in the social world, not a way of coming to know about it' (Hanks, in Lave and Wenger 1991, p 24, quoted in Chap. 4). Having approached teaching from the perspective of *teaching* (and *Teaching*), it is now time to explore teaching in terms of *learning*.

Learning and Research

People become schoolteachers for many different reasons, some because they are drawn to the act of teaching, some because they love a particular subject and want to teach it, some because they want to work with young people, some, no doubt, because they have difficulty thinking of another career. I became a schoolteacher primarily because I enjoyed learning—and wanted to do it with and for other people. (Later, I became a university lecturer for much the same reason.) I soon found that I enjoyed the act of teaching, too, and enjoyed working with young people, and I felt that I was a better person when involved in teaching than I had been as a student. I mention my own motivations in order to set them aside, or at least to provide a certain amount of 'stake inoculation' (Potter, in Silverman 2001, p 183–184), as I do not want to present my own situation as a universal truth. There is no 'one good reason' to become a teacher, and decades of working with teacher education students has confirmed the need to acknowledge a wide range of motivations. Amongst the reasons are various mixes of teaching and learning and relationships. For hooks, a wonderful writer about teaching, it was writing not teaching that motivated her. Her sister said 'You never wanted to be a teacher … all you ever wanted to do was write' (hooks 1994, p 1–2).

> From childhood, I believed that I would teach *and* write. Writing would be the serious work, teaching would be the not-so-serious-I-need-to-make-a-living "job." Writing, I believed then, was all about private longing and personal glory, but teaching was about service, giving back to one's community. (hooks 1994, p 2)

Although hooks' views changed as she became more involved in teaching (especially in higher education), the sense of teaching as a way of making a living is hardly unusual. In describing here the idea that teaching can best be understood in terms of learning, and in particular in terms of researching, I am not, therefore, special pleading for my own life story as a model for all teachers, and I am not ignoring the many other motivations and experiences of teaching. What I am presenting is an argument for *research* as the best way of understanding the presence of teaching (the peculiar act of *teaching*) in schools as caring learning communities of the kind described in the previous chapters of this book.

Research is a strange justification for the presence of teaching, not least because in universities—including the one in which I currently work—there is often thought to be a conflict between the demands of teaching and the demands of research. Research and teaching are all too often seen as in opposition to each other and certainly compete for the attention and time of academic staff in universities—even if university rhetoric often praises 'research-led' teaching (Healey, in Barnett 2005, p 69). Hughes goes as far as identifying various 'myths' related to research and teaching in universities, such as the myths 'of the mutually beneficial relationship between research and teaching' and of the 'superiority of the lecturer as researcher' (Hughes, in Barnett 2005, p 16). He goes on to say, however, that the link is not between research and teaching, but research and *learning*: '[i]f we think of research as a learning process on the one hand and the process of student learning on the other hand, then they do share a common context in discovery' (Hughes, in Barnett 2005, p 17). I agree, but I wish to extend the argument in a way that will, in the end, bring us back to a connection between research and *teaching*. This is because teaching includes but is not—should not be—dominated by intentional instruction (*Teaching*), but should include that alongside a range of other activities. All of teaching (including *Teaching*) can be

understood as not only analogous to but as a form of research, able to be justified and judged in ways that research is justified and judged.

Two definitions of research will be used here, and they will be applied to the work of teachers and pupils in schools. The best-established definition of research in current UK policy, applied to research audits for the last decade, is that of 'a process of investigation leading to new insights, effectively shared' (Hefce 2011, p 48; UUK 2012, p 22), a definition that is helpfully clear and simple. The internationally recognised *Frascati Manual* (OECD 2015) is also helpful. It covers much the same ground as does Hefce, although it refers to 'knowledge' rather than 'insights', which seems to me to be a more limiting approach. Research is 'creative and systematic work undertaken in order to increase the stock of knowledge – including knowledge of humankind, culture and society – and to devise new applications of available knowledge' (OECD 2015, p 44), and to be regarded as research, the work must be 'novel', 'creative', 'uncertain', 'systematic', and 'transferable and/or reproducible' (OECD 2015, p 45). Research—using either definition—can be regarded as quite ordinary. 'A process of investigation' might be carried out in a range of more or less rigorous ways, and the 'new insights' gained might be new to a relatively restricted group of people, perhaps a single person. And 'effective sharing' of these new insights is completed in a number of ways. Every school will expect its pupils—from the youngest age—to be carrying out investigations for at least some of the school day. Teachers will expect pupils to come up with new insights, even if these 'lightbulb moments' are original only to a single pupil or to a small group of pupils. And sharing insights is integral to schooling, whether sharing insights with the rest of the class, contributing to displays, taking part in show-and-tell activities, or writing test papers to be shared with the teacher or exam boards. Teachers, too, are expected to research in the very ordinary sense that they are required to carry out systematic investigation (not least into the performance and attitudes and well-being of their pupils), leading to new insights (including insights into how specific pupils, or pupils in general, learn what is on the curriculum) effectively shared (sharing with other teachers and other school staff, with specialist professionals, and with parents and carers).

How could the everyday activities of pupils and teachers not be described as research? Much of the work of pupils and teachers is routine and repetitive and is sometimes—to be honest—rather dull and uninspiring. However, much the same can be said of the working lives of professional researchers: a day full of 'new insights' is rare, and slogging through data or methodically checking transcriptions tends to fill more of the time. As Buber says of a dialogic life, in a typically poetic description that might—I suggest—be included in the autobiography of every researcher:

> I am not concerned with the pure; I am concerned with the turbid, the repressed, the pedestrian, with toil and dull contraryness – and with the break-through. With the break-through and not with perfection. (Buber 2002a, p 41)

What would put the work of pupils and teachers beyond the reach of research, instead, would be if everything were routine and if no new insights were gained. Such a school would be 'perfect', in the sense that it would be entirely predictable and perfectly planned. Such an ideal is sometimes wished for by teachers and by policy-makers, but it is a dream, an illusion. Uncertainty and unexpected breakthrough is characteristic of every real school—and of every real research project, too. I am delighted that the OECD definition of research requires at least *some* 'uncertainty', as so many people think that research is precisely the movement from uncertainty to certainty, from ignorance to knowledge. Well, that might be the direction in which research goes, but it can never reach a point of complete certainty, of perfection. ('I am still confused, but at a higher level', as honest learners often tell themselves.) Make a list of the greatest researchers in history, and it will be a list of people whose insights, theories, and findings have been challenged and, eventually, overturned or overtaken. (If that has not happened yet, it will likely happen in the future.) Macmurray describes 'the glory of science': 'that it can never accept the point it has reached as the final certainty' and '[i]ts business is to strive to surpass it' (Macmurray, in Wren 1975, p 8). Schooling, like research, is uncertain and full of surprise: a 'real lesson' is 'one which develops in mutual surprises' (Buber 2002a, p 241, quoted above in

Chap. 3). D'Agnese describes the 'inescapable uncertainty at the core of human thinking' (D'Agnese 2017, p 73) and attributes this to Dewey in his work on education, so the idea of 'good' uncertainty has significant academic support. Although the investigations carried out by pupils and teachers may not be as systematic as those of professional researchers, their insights might not be as world-changing, and their sharing might be a little parochial, it is—I suggest—still describable as research. (A number of people, incidentally, will also claim that the insights that teachers gain of their pupils' motivations and behaviour are just as important as the insights of much professional research, and that the insights generated by pupils in school are shared more widely than those published in an obscure academic journal.)

The Frascati Manual describes three types of research, 'basic' and 'applied' research and 'experimental development'. Basic research 'is experimental or theoretical work undertaken primarily to acquire new knowledge of the underlying foundations of phenomena and observable facts, without any particular application or use in view'; applied research 'is original investigation undertaken in order to acquire new knowledge … [that] is … directed primarily towards a specific, practical aim or objective'; experimental development 'is systematic work, drawing on knowledge gained from research and practical experience and producing additional knowledge, which is directed to producing new products or processes or to improving existing products or processes' (OECD 2015, p 50–51). All three—at appropriate levels—take place in schools, and all at different times will be carried out by pupils and teachers. And if I can be excused referring to pupils as 'products' of schooling, then the definition of experimental development might appropriately be used to describe the profession of school teaching. This is an age when technologies allow for the rapid spread of uninvestigated ideas, and when research-active, research-informed, 'experts' are declared superfluous by leaders as distinguished as the UK prime minister Callaghan criticising education 'experts' in 1976 (Chitty 1989), the UK justice secretary (and recently education secretary) Gove saying that 'people in this country have had enough of experts' (Deacon 2016), and the (at the time) US presidential hopeful Trump declaring 'the experts are terrible' (Gass 2016). Seeing schools as characterised by research, research by pupils and research by

teachers, makes a role for schooling in society that is politically as well as personally significant. In Dewey's terms, this can be schooling's contribution to 'democracy', the democracy that 'is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience' (Dewey 1916, p 87).

In these ways, I am describing research *as* pedagogy (Stern 2010). This is valuable not only because of the uncertainty and potentially conflicting demands that characterise schooling, but also because the subjects of the curriculum (whether they have 'academic' titles such as 'biology', or skills-focused titles such as 'personal and social education') are beset by fundamental uncertainties. Religious education—a school subject I have researched as well as taught—negotiates its way through premodern, modernist, and post-modern academic discourses, and politically charged debates on the role of religion in school and in society in general. It is riven by disagreement, not least between those of different religious positions. There are many 'pedagogies' of religious education (Grimmitt 2000), but these can be combined together as 'methods' (as described in Stern 2006, p 73–79, later adopted by Freathy et al. 2015, 2017). What research as pedagogy clarifies is that any and all such methods can be evaluated, using the Hefce definition, according to how systematic are the processes of investigation, how valuable or applicable are the insights generated, and how effectively the insights are shared. Using the Frascati definition, the evaluation might be on the grounds of how novel, creative, uncertain, systematic, and transferable/reproducible are the insights or knowledge generated. (Both definitions have far more detail than this about judging research: here, just the 'headline' features are mentioned.)

Some would see this approach as recommending a form of action research, linking to Dewey's 'authentic pedagogy' and more directly to Stenhouse's promotion of teachers as researchers (Baumfield, in Barnes 2012, p 209). Although I agree with Baumfield's own position (e.g. Baumfield et al. 2012), my own position is distinct from that of Stenhouse, for whom '[t]he school is a distributor of knowledge rather than a manufacturer' (Stenhouse 1975, p 10). That more passive view of teachers as 'self-monitoring' (Stenhouse 1975, p 165) and as drawing on research, more than as real researchers themselves, underplays the significance of

research as pedagogy. Pupils, similarly, can be seen as relatively passive or can be seen as really researching. Flutter and Rudduck describe different levels of possible pupil participation in schooling, from 'listening to pupils', through 'pupils as active participants', to 'pupils as researchers' and 'pupils as fully active participants and co-researchers' (Flutter and Rudduck 2004, p 16). My own experience of using hermeneutic techniques to understand loneliness and solitude (Stern 2014, p 69–75, p 125–128) also involved engaging pupils and adults in completing their own hermeneutic work (represented especially in Stern 2014, Chaps. 2 and 11). I am confident that the pupils' insights were as valuable and original as those of participating adults (and adults with whom I discussed the responses have all—so far—agreed with this judgement), and as valuable and original as many of the insights of psychologists, philosophers, and poets writing on loneliness and solitude.

As my own academic background is in philosophy (along with a range of social sciences), I described my approach to research for that project as a form of 'action philosophy' (Stern 2014, Chap. 5, 2015; see also, Stern 2007, p 1–4, p 120, p 175). Action philosophy is cyclical, as hermeneutic philosophy is cyclical, and it becomes action philosophy 'when it "activates" new philosophical work, extending the conversation in current practice settings to which the philosophy refers' (Stern 2015, p 113). A 'philosophy of schooling', then, is action philosophy 'when there is an "activism" within schools, which forms part of the philosophical work', leading to philosophers changing the world *in doing philosophy*, and not 'as a result of' doing philosophy (Stern 2015, p 113). In the loneliness and solitude project, the pupils were 'writing as part of a regular and well-established activity: they are "in action" as learners, as philosophers' (Stern 2015, p 112). They completed their hermeneutic work, then, as part of their 'action' as pupils and were expected to 'do' philosophy, not simply to write 'about' philosophy. As author of the book of the project, I was also 'activating' philosophy amongst pupils and teachers, as part of my own professional practice as educationalist-researcher. Action philosophy of this kind involves at least two people in the same practice setting coming to understand an issue through taking part in a hermeneutic cycle—a hermeneutic tandem, perhaps.

The work described here on loneliness and solitude is presented as an example of 'serious' research being completed by pupils (in that project, aged 7–8 and 12–13) and teachers (as in Stern et al. 2015), but there are many illustrations from 'ordinary' lessons in schools all around the world. It certainly does not require the label of systematic action research, or action philosophy, to be an example of a process of investigation leading to insights, effectively shared. That is the value of using research as pedagogy: it is how ordinary schools often work, and it provides the means by which to evaluate that work. Cochran-Smith and Lytle describe 'Inquiry as Pedagogy, Pedagogy as Inquiry' in their account of practitioner research in schools and universities (Cochran-Smith and Lytle 2009, p 108), and they include teachers, community activists, and parents in their account (Cochran-Smith and Lytle 2009, p ix). By adding pupils into the mix, I am hoping to provide a more inclusive account of schooling, understanding teaching through understanding the distinctive form of learning known as 'research'. In concluding this section, I should say that although research is used, in this account, to understand how teaching and learning (of teachers) and learning (of pupils) work, I do not want to give the impression that no other forms of learning take place in school. Inevitably, there is a place for routine activities that do not involve investigations leading to insights. Memorising texts (to be recited or performed), practising sporting or musical or craft or scientific techniques, learning an irregular verb in a foreign language, and repeatedly applying a single mathematical formula to a set of data: all of these are valid activities for schools, and none of them on their own would count as 'research'. However, if a school were filled with such activities and had no investigative, insightful, shared activities, then it could not count as truly educational. And, as has already been said, the highest level of research will inevitably incorporate a range of routine or repetitive activities—which do not deny its overall character as research. So 'research as pedagogy' is a description of schooling that allows for all types of learning, but that *requires* particular types of 'research' learning—and learning (and teaching) is appropriately judged in terms of the overall criteria for evaluating research.

Conclusion

Schools are curious places, and so they should be. Learning happens throughout life and independent of the 'intentional instruction' that is expected from teachers. Not only that, but teaching (the profession) itself happens much of the time without 'intentional instruction' of the kind mimicked by Lave's tailors. The role of schoolteacher can be described not as *Teacher*, one of the stereotypes of certainty leading only to guilt at failure to meet an impossible standard, but as society's professional adult. Teachers are professional adults because they are teaching mature personhood and using school subjects (and the rest of the 'hidden' curriculum) to help pupils become more real as persons, more adult (in the sense of mature, not simply 'grown up'). To understand how teachers work (their pedagogy), being a 'reflective practitioner' is helpful but incomplete. Instead, research is presented as the pedagogy underpinning teaching in schools that are caring communities, caring for people and caring for the objects of study. Research, itself a demonstration of curiosity (or care for the object of study), is more interesting and more uncertain than it is sometimes portrayed even by professional researchers. Schools are curious places for pupils, too, as their roles can also be described as researchers, investigating, gaining and sharing insights, amongst the more routine activities taking place in and beyond their schools.

Finishing with an account of the experience of a more curious and a less curious school, here is hooks on her first school:

> Attending school then was sheer joy. I loved being a student. I loved learning. School was the place of ecstasy – pleasure and danger. To be changed by ideas was pure pleasure. But to learn ideas that ran counter to values and beliefs learned at home was to place oneself at risk, to enter the danger zone. Home was the place where I was forced to conform to someone else's image of who and what I should be. School was the place where I could forget that self and, through ideas, reinvent myself. (hooks 1994, p 3)

Later, as a result of integration policies, she went to a new school and—for all the significance of integration to US society—the result for her schooling was negative:

> School changed utterly with racial integration. Gone was the messianic zeal to transform our minds and beings that had characterized teachers and their pedagogical practices in our all-black schools. Knowledge was suddenly about information only. It had no relation to how one lived, behaved. It was no longer connected to antiracist struggle. Bussed to White schools, we soon learned that obedience, and not a zealous will to learn, was what was expected of us. Too much eagerness to learn could easily be seen as a threat to white authority. (hooks 1994, p 3)

The change 'taught me the difference between education as the practice of freedom and education that merely strives to reinforce domination' (hooks 1994, p 4). It also—for me—illustrates the range of experiences that I am both describing and evaluating in this chapter (and the rest of this book), a range of more or less surprising, more or less personal, more or less curious, more or less caring schooling. This is not about marking schools out of ten. My own experience of schooling (as pupil, teacher, and researcher) suggests that some of the pupils in hooks' first school may have found that school to be unpleasant and discouraging, and some of the pupils in hooks' second school might have found it exciting and liberating. Pupils' and teachers' experiences vary hugely within each school: 'the range of variation by department *within* schools is probably three to four times greater than the average variation *between* schools', so 'it is likely that the typical ineffective secondary school will have some departments which have relatively good practice *when compared with all schools of all levels of effectiveness*' (Stoll and Myers 1998, p 167). Instead, I am describing some of the experiences that any teacher and any pupil might have in any school—even if I think that there are some schools where this is far more likely and others where it is less likely. Teachers and other adults are the 'professionals' in school and so have most responsibility for these variations. But everyone in and connected to the school community, including pupils, have contributions to make. This can be challenged by pressures from outside the school, and the following chapters, therefore, explore accountability in and of schooling: who is most responsible, and to whom are they responsible, for schooling. Is schooling itself sustainable, given schools' changing social contexts?

6

School Leadership: Caute in the Middle

I will take responsibility for using opportunities to lead (in ethical ways),
I will take responsibility for accepting other people's (ethical) leadership,
and I will engage dialogically with leaders and led.

Introduction

Each school is a learning community, not dominated by external purposes but by people acting together, developing the personhood of all members of the community, treating each other as ends in themselves. It is easy to portray this view as hopeless idealism, ignoring those in powerful positions beyond the school—local or central government bodies, inspection services, pressure groups, media, and all the rest of the world. School staff and particularly school leaders are accountable to others, to governors, to government, to policy-makers and policy-implementers, to everyone in the world who thinks they know, better than those working in schools, how schools should be run. Levels of external accountability vary: some schools may be more 'independent' than others (with 'independent' the term used in the UK for private, fee-paying, schools), some

Julian Stern, *A Philosophy of Schooling*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71571-1_6

governments have tighter control over schools than others, some inspection services are more supportive than others. But, always, there is a level of accountability beyond the school that makes it important to avoid naïve views of schools as worlds in and of themselves, untethered to what is sometimes called 'real life' beyond the school. And schooling as a whole may be described in terms of accountability. What is the value of schooling to wider communities and societies, and to whom or what is schooling accountable?

Schools should be seen as caring, curious, learning communities, with community characterised as a group of people treating each other as ends in themselves rather than as means to other ends. However, others have a legitimate interest in schooling, and schools do not exist in the absence of families, industries, local and central governments and public services, and international organisations. The previous chapter ended with an account by hooks of how wonderful it was to forget the self she was told to be at home and to reinvent herself (hooks 1994, p 3). I celebrate that reinvention and how hooks built—and continues to build—on that school-based inspiration. Some in her family might have been similarly delighted by the reinvention; others might have been frustrated or annoyed. What right did the school have to allow or encourage her to challenge the dominant culture in her family and become a different person? Many teachers and parents will be familiar with arguments over such issues, and they are not straightforwardly resolved. The rights of both groups are significant but not absolute. There are many others who have or who feel they have a stake in schools. This chapter is an account of leadership, including the relationship between school leaders (the micropolitical leaders within the school) and the wider world (the mesopolitical interaction managed by school leaders). Macropolitical issues are touched on, but these and more general politics of schooling are addressed more fully in later chapters. School leaders are, I argue, caring and need to be careful: they are 'caute' in the middle. *Caute* was the motto of the philosopher Spinoza: it is Latin for 'take care' or 'be careful'. Spinoza had good reason to be careful, coming from a family of Jews living in Amsterdam having been forced to convert to Catholicism in Portugal, and with Spinoza himself being driven out of the Jewish community for his early publications. Even in this dangerous situation, he continued

publishing controversial political and religious texts. He took care and was careful, not as a cowed and placid obedient person, but as a courageous and committed writer on politics and religion. Being 'caute' in such a style is not a bad ambition for school leaders today.

I am referring to 'school leaders' here, whereas in the previous chapters, I have referred to 'principals' and 'headteachers'. That is because there is some debate over who leads a school, whether it is a single person within the school (such as the headteacher), a group of people within the school (the senior team, or perhaps all staff), or someone somewhat outside the school (a chair of a governing body or the whole governing body, a superintendent, an 'executive' headteacher of a group of schools). The ambiguity itself points to one of the oddities of leadership: it has as many meanings as there are people who talk about it. And many, many people talk about it. Leadership is so generously theorised and so diversely defined, it can be difficult finding a way through the field. My own approach to school leadership is an extension of the philosophy of schooling already presented, in terms of care, community, dialogue, and curiosity. School leaders are those with (caring) responsibilities within their schools, but also responsibility for negotiating the boundaries of the school—the relationships of the school to the rest of the world. Where those beyond the school have formal power over the school, school leaders are described as 'accountable' to them. In traditional models of hierarchy, leadership is exercised 'downwards' (to those lower in the hierarchy) whilst accountability is owed 'upwards' (to those higher in the hierarchy). In this sense, school leaders—like all leaders—are Janus-like or, if you prefer, two-faced. Looking in two directions at once, looking outwards (to those to whom you are accountable) and looking inwards (to those for whom you have a responsibility), is potentially stressful and is certainly hazardous. They are caught in the middle, hence the need for caution. Who do they care for, and what do they care about?

In this chapter, three themes are used in order to explore leadership. Power is one theme: real power and myths of power, how it is gained and wielded, and what it means to leaders. The second theme is a proposed relational theory of both leadership and *followership*—an alternative term for accountability. A third theme is that of performance or performativity: how school leaders perform in various ways (within and beyond the

school) and how they are particularly susceptible to the performativity that is able, in some circumstance, to drain school leadership of any real meaning or value. In my 'manifesto' (the *Afterword* of this book), I summarise this by saying that 'the school I would like will be one in which everyone is given a chance to lead (supporting people or supporting learning, in ethical ways) and takes responsibility for that leadership, everyone is given a chance to accept other people's (ethical) leadership and takes responsibility for accepting that leadership, and everyone engages dialogically with leaders and led'.

Power

Power is given to school leaders and cannot be ignored. For all the talk of collegiality and democracy, of common purpose and service to the community, leadership comes with power. Power—though not unlimited power—to appoint staff, to control and discipline staff, to bring pupils in to the school, to control and discipline pupils, to organise the teaching and learning in the school, and to create or influence the school's ethos. In different countries and school systems, school leaders may have more or less power over such matters, with laws and policies and government organisations limiting or increasing the powers of school leaders. But there is power in leadership—and if there were no such power, then putative leaders would simply not be leaders. There are several ways in which this association between power and leadership is avoided or disguised—not only in professional conversations, but also in the research literature. One oddity is the scarcity of a literature on followership. Those who mention followership usually see it as puzzling. Blase and Anderson mention the possibility that '[p]ower is exercised *with* followers' (Blase and Anderson 1995, p xiv), and conclude that '[t]eacher empowerment … can only be achieved when the line between leadership and followership becomes blurred' (Blase and Anderson 1995, p 46). Bottery, writing on the ethics of leadership, also mentions followership (Bottery 1992, p 181), but it is not a major theme. The problem is, no one really wants to talk about followers and followership. '[T]he word *follower* is considered something of an insult', as Kellerman says, and has 'connotations of

… too much passivity and dependence', so 'it has been shunned by those in the leadership field' (Kellerman 2008, p 6).

Chaleff, who, along with Kellerman, is one of the few enthusiastic writers on followership, writes of the 'deepest discomfort with the term *follower*', as '[i]t conjures up images of docility, conformity, weakness, and failure to excel' (Chaleff 2009, p 3). In a humorous column for the UK higher education trade paper, Taylor describes this well. There is an urgent need for more qualified followers, he says, and so a three-week course has been set up which 'will provide attendees with a range of basic followership skills including unquestioning obedience, general subservience, all-round docility and thoroughgoing conformity'. Applications should be marked 'Humble' (Taylor 2008, p 88). Because of this negative image, euphemisms are used, such as 'constituent', 'associate', 'member', or—though it is barely euphemistic—'subordinate' (Kellerman 2008, p 6). I remember working in a school where the head and other senior managers used the word 'colleague' to refer to other staff, and it was used with such a patronising tone that any use of the word 'colleague' as a term of address makes me shiver. Chaleff sees followership as in need of reframing as a powerful position: 'the sooner we … get comfortable with the idea of *powerful* followers supporting *powerful* leaders, the sooner we can fully develop and test models for dynamic, self-responsible, synergistic relationships in our organizations' (Chaleff 2009, p 3). Putting a stress on the power of followers is valuable, although seeing their power as primarily exerted to support their *leaders*, rather than supporting their own work, might be misleading. Chaleff recognises, at least, the need for 'intelligent disobedience' (Chaleff 2015), with the idea coming to him from a training of guide dogs for visually impaired people. The dogs are first taught to be obedient and are then taught the 'advanced' class of 'intelligent disobedience': that is, when to disobey an instruction when in a dangerous situation unrecognised by the handler (Chaleff 2015, p iii). Are intelligent guide dogs good models for followership? Collinson notes the difficulty of being a 'courageous' follower, saying that 'Chaleff tends to underestimate the costs and overestimate the possibilities of both voice and exit for employed followers', adding that '[t]he ramifications of risking dissent may be much more severe than Chaleff acknowledges' (Collinson 2006, p 184).

The advantage of having a theory of followership is that it keeps in mind the asymmetry in power between leaders and followers. No amount of euphemism can miss the unequal distribution of power. For all the talk of 'empowerment' and 'teamwork' and 'participation', implying a somewhat 'level playing field', this is 'by and large … false' as 'most organizations still have systems and structures in which superiors control their subordinates' (Kellerman 2008, p 6). Kellerman suggests this is an intentional deception, 'intended to keep subordinates in line by deluding them into thinking that in some fundamental way their relationship to their superiors has changed' (Kellerman 2008, p 8). A certain degree of such cynicism is needed in leadership research, given the number of oddities about the field, such as the attempt to ignore followership. A wholehearted cynic such as Pfeffer (2015) attempts to strip away leadership's self-delusions. His work—based mostly on American businesses, not schools—wears its cynicism on its sleeve and goes as far as promoting the idea that lying, selfish, and bullying leadership may work (to the benefit of profits), saying that it is a romantic illusion to assume otherwise. Leaders have more power, and yet '[t]he topic of power remains … the organization's last dirty secret—something that nice people don't talk about, let alone teach to executives' (Pfeffer 2015, p 33). I am less cynical, as I think an ethical justification is possible for an unequal distribution of power—that is, for leaders and followers to coexist ethically. But to do that, there is another difficulty to overcome in Chaleff's approach to followership and leadership. He says that (powerful) followers support (powerful) leaders (Chaleff 2009, p 3, quoted above). A pathological version of this is provided by Pfeffer, who warns that leaders typically 'maximize their own survival chances by acting selfishly to acquire, at all costs, the resources necessary for their survival', whilst avoiding thinking about '[g]roup survival' which typically 'depends on individuals sacrificing their own well-being for that of the group' (Pfeffer 2015, p 20–21). Supporting leaders or supporting the 'common purpose' of the organisation (as—typically—determined by leaders) are the most popular descriptions of followership, but there are alternative versions that are worth exploring.

In Northouse's extensive writings, he notes the hundreds of definitions of leadership and comes up with his own definition that he says

tries to encompass as many as possible of those examples. 'Leadership', he says, 'is a process whereby an individual influences a group of individuals to achieve a common goal' (Northouse 2016, p 6). And '[b]y *common*, we mean that the leaders and followers have a mutual purpose' as '[a]ttention to common goals gives leadership an ethical overtone because it stresses the need for leaders to work with followers to achieve selected goals' (Northouse 2016, p 6). Stressing mutuality 'lessens the possibility that leaders might act toward followers in ways that are forced or unethical' (Northouse 2016, p 6). Well, yes it would, but it ignores Pfeffer's point that those with power may work for themselves and those that do might simply try to convince their followers that the interest of the leaders is really a common interest of leaders and followers. What is strange is that Northouse does not say he is defining 'good' or 'ethical' leadership but leadership itself. Yet he adds an 'ethical overtone' to reduce the risk of unethical leadership. Unethical leadership is in this way not simply disapproved of: it is edited out of the account of leadership altogether. Why would anyone—let alone a writer of textbooks—do such a thing? According to Pfeffer, it is because leaders and leadership consultants would prefer to tell each other nice stories than to tell each other the truth. As I say, I am less cynical than Pfeffer is (although I still value his cynicism), and think that there is a positive value in the idea of common purpose. After all, schools—in common with other organisations—are expected these days to have a vision statement, a mission statement, a set of values, and a strategy document all of which paint a picture of an organisation with a clearly stated common purpose. Sharing a purpose does, as Northouse says, provide an ethical underpinning to a system in which some get paid more than others (and some—the pupils and their families—get paid nothing), and in which some have significantly more power than others. And working to a common purpose does—where it happens—bring people together. The question remains, is there a different way of describing the work of followers *as* followers (rather than just as workers supported by their leaders), a way of describing their followership other than aiming at supporting leaders or supporting a (not always) 'common purpose'?

Relational Leadership and Followership

Followership, like leadership, is best described in relational terms, and to understand followership, I need to return to the relational, transactional, work of Chap. 5, and the communal and dialogic theories of the earlier chapters. Before that, there is more to explore in how 'common purposes' work in schools. Within a school, a great deal of effort is often made by school leaders to convince other staff, and pupils and their families, of the common purpose of the school—whatever that purpose is—and this is perfectly reasonable. Many schools may indeed have a genuine common purpose, but the effort to convince is just as great—perhaps greater—in those schools *without* a common purpose than it is in those schools *with* one. Schools without a common purpose often have leaders looking 'outwards', especially in those contexts where external accountability is intense and has a high public profile. Public league tables of exam results and the 'ranking' of schools, and high-stakes inspection and audit, typically draw leaders into focusing on those external indicators to the exclusion of internal matters. That pressure is probably the origin of the US school principal quoted in Chap. 5, who described the school's 'number one priority' as helping pupils gain the skills needed to succeed in standardised assessment tests. Meanwhile, staff and pupils may be more interested in more immediate educational activities (developing an interest in the subjects being studied) and in the quality of relationships within the school.

I was told recently of a UK teacher talking to the headteacher of the need to improve relationships in the school. The teacher who told me this said that the headteacher's reply was 'we don't need relationships: we've got *systems*'. School leaders may be aiming in one direction, and the staff and students in another. In those circumstances, the idea of a 'common purpose' can be used to disguise disagreement and reduce open conflict within the school. The effort at persuasion may eventually work, of course: in time, all in the school may agree to a common purpose that was originally simply the 'vision' of the leader. This is as true of political leaders as school leaders: some start with views that are very much minority views, but eventually persuade whole populations to change their minds. How else would radical change—whether 'progressive' (the

abolition of slavery or the universal franchise) or 'regressive' (the imposition of a dictatorship, the dismantling of a welfare system)—be achieved? The idea of a common purpose is often used in such conditions: it starts with 'we all agree on this'—with 'even if we don't yet realise it' left unsaid.

Where the idea of a common purpose is well established and is genuinely 'common', it is possible to swap between leaders supporting followers and followers supporting leaders. But this is all too rare and cannot be relied upon. My own first realisation of the importance of recognising the 'direction of support' in a system where the leader was convinced of a common purpose was, also, the original stimulus for my research on 'developing schools as learning communities' (Stern 2001a). I had a brief encounter with a leader—the head of the school in which I worked, who used to visit every class to introduce himself and see if the pupils had any questions. A good approach. He came into my tutor group after I had been working there for a couple of years and said 'Mr Stern has been working for me for two years, and …'. Until that moment, I had thought he, as headteacher, had been working for me, but he clearly thought that I was working for him. He seemed to see the hierarchy—as Chaleff and many other writers see it—as a triangle thus: Δ, in which those 'lower' in the triangle (the teachers and, right at the bottom I would imagine, the pupils) worked for and thereby supported those 'higher' in the triangle. I saw the hierarchy as a triangle thus: ∇, in which the leaders were those 'lower' in the triangle, who supported those higher in the triangle, with teachers in the middle and pupils at the top. It was only on that day that I became conscious that my own way of thinking about leadership was quite different to that of the headteacher. My own failure to notice the difference between leaders supporting followers and followers supporting leaders was—I now think—made possible by the idea—perhaps the myth—of a common purpose. That is, if all in the school think that they are aiming for the same purpose, then all are supporting that purpose, and the direction of support (of leaders for followers or vice versa) is of less significance. My belief at the time was that the headteacher genuinely thought we shared a common purpose; my surprise and discomfort at being described as working *for* the headteacher suggests that I didn't believe this was true.

The idea of a common purpose avoids the need to work out whether the triangle is pointing upwards or downwards. Yet the direction of support, with or without a common purpose, is an idea that has a profound ethical impact, one that Aristotle would certainly recognise. In his account of leadership, Aristotle does not promote one structure of leadership over another, or one distribution of power over another. Rule may be by a single person (monarchy, or in its deviant form, tyranny), by a group of people (aristocracy, or in its deviant form, oligarchy), or by all the people (polity, or in its deviant form democracy) (Aristotle 1962, p 116). He has more good things to say about monarchy than about polity, though he also has good things to say of limited, constitutional, rule-bound, polity—which today we might call constitutional democracy. (What Aristotle refers to as 'democracy', we might now better term 'mob rule'.) However, structure is not central to his account of the ethics of leadership. The difference between the 'good' and the 'deviant' forms of any leadership structure is whether or not the leader is working for the led: it is the intentions of the leader that matter. Good leaders *intend* the benefit of the led, they 'work for the people'; deviant leaders work for their own benefit or (though this is rather left to the imagination) for some external benefit or for no benefit at all. Aristotle's way of describing this uses familial terms. 'The association of a father with his sons has the form of monarchy, because he is concerned for the welfare of his children' (Aristotle 1976, p 276), whereas 'in a tyranny there is little or no friendship … [f]or where there is nothing in common between ruler and ruled there is no friendship either, just as there is no justice[: t]heir relation is like that … of master to slave' (Aristotle 1976, p 278). The role of the person higher in the hierarchy must include helping those lower in the hierarchy, in any 'good' system, and without this, no system is good.

The incident that led to my first research on leadership—the realisation that leaders and the led might have different views of who was the supporter, who the supported—was followed up in surveys of pupils, teachers, and teacher education students (Stern 2001a). The students described what they thought of the schools they had been working in, and how those schools might be more 'ideal'. One of the statements they had to play with was 'most managers in the school act as if they are superior to people below them in the hierarchy'. One respondent in one of the

groups identified the statement as true of an 'ideal' version of that person's school, and they also identified as true the other, more obviously positively coded, statements about managers. Were they really saying that 'acting superior' was a good quality for managers to have in a school, and one that would be present even in an ideal version of that same school? This small empirical puzzle was to prove a rich source of further analysis and critique (Stern 2002). The eventual explanation turned on the possibility of a leader having the quality of 'magnanimity' (as defined by Aristotle 1976, p 153), if and only if that leader also had all the other virtues associated with a good leader. Such magnanimity is an uncommon virtue. Aristotle is very clear about those who act superior but lack other positive leadership qualities, and about those who refuse to act superior when they do indeed have the other leadership qualities: the former exhibit 'vanity', the latter undue humility or 'pusillanimity' (Aristotle 1976, p 105).

The concept of magnanimity, therefore, provided a useful description of the intentions that characterise a good leader. This is in contrast to the description of magnanimity as a method of affirming high status (Boone 1998) or as a way of reducing hostility in times of conflict (Schumann et al. 2014), and, far from being a 'very upper-class' virtue (Thomson and Tredennick, in Aristotle 1976, p 153), it is closer to Thoreau's idea of generous magnanimity that he said was exhibited by the poor as much as—or more than—the rich (Woodson 1970). Aristotle's focus on intentions, implied by magnanimity, is critical to leadership debates, and his focus on leaders having a responsibility for the led, rather than for external agencies or visions, is critical to understanding leadership within a community. 'Inward-looking' leadership, within a community, can still meet external aims, but cannot be dominated by such aims: it must be leadership as part of a community. Even the warrior-led people of Britain a thousand years after Aristotle lived saw the wisdom and the moral weight of a leader who aimed for the benefit of the led. The highest compliment offered Beowulf is that 'he worked for the people' (Heaney 1999). For Aristotle, and many writers since, the key performance indicators of effective political systems were the (effectively enacted) intentions of the leaders, the relationships between leaders and the led, and the framework of justice or equity that made this all possible (as in Stern

2002). The idea of a common purpose, lacking a 'direction of support' (leaders for led, or led for leaders), hides this fundamental ethical issue in leadership. Notwithstanding the genuine value of having a common purpose, the idea of all organisations having an agreed common purpose appropriate to all members distracts from or, in worse circumstances, disguises the possibility of 'bad' (tyrannical, oligarchical, mob rule) leadership in schools.

If the ethics of leadership followed Aristotle's lead, and was determined by whether or not the leader was working for the led (the followers), what would the ethics of followership be based on? As Chaleff says, followers themselves have power—even if their power is more limited than the power of leaders. (Chaleff notes that one of the powers of an employee who is a follower is that of leaving the job: this implies that the only followers with absolutely no power would be slaves or other forms of tied or bonded labourers.) Within a school, all staff—not just teachers—are likely to have power of some kind over pupils, and many will have some power over other staff. All are likely to have other powers—decision-making powers over how a task should best be completed, for example. This may be taken to mean that 'everyone is a leader', the ideal of fully distributed leadership—a popular model of leadership that is much used in educational research (Gronn 2016) to the extent that it 'has acquired taken-for-granted status' (Lumby 2016, p 161). Gronn believes that there is now too much confusion in the meaning of distributed leadership for it to be useful in analysing school leadership and followership. Instead, he suggests that it is more helpful to think of 'leadership practice' as 'arranged or patterned to comprise a configuration' (Gronn 2016, p 169). This means looking at which people have what particular powers or limitations on their powers. That is vital, I think, to see how schools work.

A teacher in the classroom has significant power within that classroom, power over the pupils and, often, some power also over a teaching assistant. It makes sense to say the teacher is a 'leader' within the classroom, and a teaching assistant may be a 'leader' with a subgroup of pupils whose learning the teaching assistant supports. One consequence of this is that it would not be ethical for professional teachers to ignore the power in their roles—either by 'blaming' others in the system for everything they do, or by refusing to acknowledge any power over pupil learning. This

model does not ignore the greater power held by a headteacher or senior management team of the school, or the school's governing body. Those people may be able to be described as 'school leaders', whereas a teacher in the classroom could better be described as a 'classroom leader'. Saying that this is an example of 'distributed leadership' does not help much—as Gronn says—as the powers may be unequally distributed and the distribution of power (its 'configuration') needs to be specifically justified. My own approach—implied in this description—would be to apply Aristotle's model. We can justify the power of a teacher insofar as the teacher is really helping the learning of the pupils taught, justify the power of a headteacher insofar as the headteacher is really supporting the work of all the staff and pupils in the school. (These are presented as necessary but not sufficient justifications: the power of teachers in a school for murderers is not wholly justified simply because those teachers are really helping the pupils learn how to kill.)

To the headteacher or senior leadership team of a school, a junior teacher is a follower (supported by the headteacher or leadership team); to the pupils in the teacher's class, the teacher is a leader. Pupils are 'leaders' too, in the sense that they have some—limited—power over their own learning. As Chaleff notes of employees, one of the powers of pupils is to 'leave', whether this means avoiding attending school or avoiding completing the work set at school. It is no surprise to teachers to hear that pupils have significant power over their own progress in school. Since the 1960s, educational sociologists have been noting the ways in which pupils gained status or power with other pupils through misbehaving and otherwise disrupting the work of teachers (Hargreaves 1967; Ball 1981). This is a real power—albeit one that could have negative consequences later in life—and the power of pupils can also be used to succeed academically in school. But saying that followership is characterised simply by a more limited exercise of power is hardly an explanation of followership at all. It is, instead, a description of the configuration of power. Is there anything more to an ethic of followership? The additional ingredient is, I believe, related to mutuality. Followers are 'good' followers not only in appropriately exercising their own, limited, leadership powers. They can also be understood as 'accepting' the support of their leaders—if the leader does intend to support their followers. Misbehaving pupils

are not accepting the educational support of their teachers. According to Hargreaves and Ball, this is in part because the pupils correctly understand that their teachers are not always really intending to support them. For Hargreaves, misbehaving pupils often believe (correctly) that their teachers are not treating them with dignity, so the only source of dignity available to them is that gained from peers—through misbehaving. For Ball, misbehaving pupils often believe (correctly) that a limited degree of misbehaviour is helpful preparation for the kinds of working class jobs that they are likely to take when leaving school.

These and the many other theories of pupil misbehaviour are presented as examples of 'bad' followership being the result of a more or less conscious awareness of 'bad' leadership—teachers treating pupils in undignified ways or teachers training pupils for particular positions in the class system. The obverse of this would be followers being prepared to accept the support of their teachers, assuming that support is intended for the benefit of the pupils. And, more than merely accepting support, good followers will enter into a mutual relationship with leaders, such that both are engaging in genuine dialogue or conversation. In terms of transactional analysis (Berne 1964), good followers will be in adult-adult relationships with good leaders; in Buber's terms, they will be in real dialogue with each other; in Noddings' terms, in conversation. And this is a kind of equality. Aristotle noted how friendship of those who 'desire the good of their friends for the friends' sake' (Aristotle 1976, p 263, quoted in Chap. 2) would equalise otherwise unequal people. '[T]he affection of father for son (and generally of the older for the younger) … and of every person in authority for his subordinates', Aristotle says, in each it is friendship that equalises: 'the result is a kind of equality' (Aristotle 1976, p 269–270). Similarly, Macmurray describes how in a community there is 'a positive unity of persons [which] is the self-realization of the personal' because 'they are … related *as equals*'. 'This does not mean that they have, as a matter of fact, equal abilities, equal rights, equal functions or any other kind of *de facto* equality', he continues, as '[t]he equality is intentional: it is an aspect of the mutuality of the relation' (Macmurray 1991b, p 158). A good follower, *as* follower, is therefore someone who accepts the support of their leader(s) and who has a personal (in Macmurray's sense), dialogic (in Buber's sense), friendly (in Aristotle's

sense), relationship with their leader(s). Noddings, too, writes of care as necessarily mutual. Teachers may have a professional responsibility to care for their pupils, and leaders for the people they lead, but 'that doesn't mean that the cared-for doesn't contribute anything to the relation', so there is—there must be—a 'kind of openness, reciprocity' in the relationship (Noddings, in Stern 2016, p 33–34, quoted above in Chap. 1).

So far, three elements have been identified for an ethical model of followership: being powerful in one's own field (i.e. not acting as if one had no power at all), accepting support from those who are leaders, and being mutual (personal, dialogic, friendly) in one's relationships with (appropriately ethical) leaders. The last of these elements has an equalising effect on the relationship—it makes for 'adult-adult' transaction (Berne 1964)—even if the relationship is at that time, in fact, unequal. The combination of inequality and equality is well described by Noddings, for whom adults in school 'must be reasonably good people' and 'must care for the children and enjoy their company' such that '[w]hen children engage in real talk with adults who like and respect them, they are likely to emulate those adults' (Noddings 1994, p 115). What is a 'must' for teachers is likely to be emulated by pupils; pupils are not under the same obligation to act in this way. Hence, leadership and followership are described as mutual without being fixed: the mutuality in the relationship hints at the possibility of de facto as well as relational equality. Madera describes this as like the game 'follow the leader' in which children copy the movements of a 'leader' child, and each eventually becomes the leader and either copies the previous leader's movements or changes them.

> The younger the child, the more apt she seemed to be influenced by previous leaders. It was as if each child at first was not quite ready to introduce new movements or truly to take on the role. Each needed time to analyze the actions of previous, more experienced leaders. (Madera 2000, p 51)

She concludes that '[f]ollowing was obviously not a passive act, but one that required thought, observation, and planning on the part of the participants', and that therefore '[w]e can take pride in our followership, remembering that it too is an honourable and essential role … [and that

f]rom good followers emerge good leaders' (Madera 2000, p 51–53). The alternative to followers being able to 'play' at and potentially become leaders, is followers being stuck in a dependency that is damaging to followers and leaders alike. Barth, at the time head of Harvard's Principals' Center, wrote of this in terms of infantilism:

> The biggest problem besetting schools is the primitive quality of human relationships among children, parents, teachers, and administrators. Many schools perpetuate infantilism. … This leads to children and adults who frequently behave like infants, complying with authority from fear or dependence. (Barth 1990, p 36)

Leadership and followership are, therefore, at best in an unstable equilibrium, with relationships tending towards equalising, and followership having the potential to become leadership, and both leaders and followers having power within their own fields. There is no fundamental division between people who are leaders and people who are followers as all people who are leaders are also followers. Classroom leaders (typically, teachers) are followers of school leaders, school leaders may be government education policy followers, government policy-makers may be followers of international policy-makers. It might be said that the leader of the world would be the only person without any following to do, but few could identify any world leader—at any point in history—who had such power. Leaders are, therefore, by definition caught in the middle, having to practice both leadership and followership; they are leaders within their fields and are 'accountable' as followers beyond their fields. And the ethic of leadership and followership I am proposing here is that leaders, *as* leaders, have a responsibility for those they lead, whilst followers, *as* followers, have a responsibility to allow themselves to be supported by leaders, but they are not working *for* the leaders. All are 'caute' in the middle, able to care for each other, but the responsibilities are asymmetrical. Leadership implies a responsibility for the led, not the other way around. And followers are not under a responsibility to follow those leaders who are not working to support the led. Aristotle sees leaders as choosing between working for the led and working for themselves. School leaders who are primarily working for those outside the school—to meet government

policies, to gain league-table positions, to serve the economy, or some other external aim—are not ethically leading their own schools. What is more, they are unlikely to be ethically following those outside the school, as policy-makers who construct league tables and business organisations who want appropriately trained workers are not intending the benefit of schools. If those in school are working for an external purpose, rather than treating each other as ends in themselves, then this takes away from the community character of the school, as Macmurray describes it (in Chap. 2).

Being distracted from a focus on caring within the school by being forced into 'performing' for an external target is also described in the leadership literature as 'performativity'. That is the subject of the next section.

Performance and Performativity

Early in his research career, Ball (1981) wrote of children behaving—misbehaving—in response to their schools and teachers who were perhaps inadvertently preparing the pupils for particular positions in a class-based society. Ball later broadened his research to investigate the micro politics of the whole school (Ball 1987) and later the macropolitical issues in education (Ball 2003a, 2007). What brings all these dimensions of schooling together is the problematising of people in school acting 'for' those above them in the hierarchy, and this aspect of Ball's work is summarised in his account of performativity (Ball 2003b). I share Ball's concern with teachers and school leaders working for external organisations rather than working for the 'led'. However, I believe that much work on performativity has distorted views of performance in leadership and want to distinguish maleficent from beneficent versions of the concept. Performativity has been used in academic discourse—especially by critical theorists—as a 'boo-word', describing a mode of regulation that destroys the soul (Ball 2003b), an inhumane chase for external targets (Adams 2007), a loss of autonomy due to chasing 'customer satisfaction' (Cain and Harris 2013), hyper-accountability (Drummond and Yarker 2013), an impersonal

market-oriented service delivery model (Fielding and Moss 2011), or a performance management system inimical to welfare (Thrupp and Willmott 2003). These negative constructions of performativity are often founded on the work of Lyotard, who stresses the artificiality and 'falseness' in performativity, including a version of the Marxist 'false consciousness' (Lyotard, in Benjamin 1989, p 356). In most of these accounts, performativity is an important feature of neoliberal public life, making insincere and alienated soulless creatures out of people—especially leaders. What is needed is the rejection of performativity and its replacement with sincerity or its more recent cousin 'authenticity' (Sennett 1978, p 29). It has become difficult to talk of performativity in other than maleficent forms, and the 'performance' qualities of school leaders are hidden or ignored, distorting accounts of school leadership (and leadership in general), and it can—somewhat ironically—disenchant or discourage school leaders. Without rejecting the negative uses of the term in the academic literature cited above, I would like to provide another narrative of performativity, in order to engage critically with performativity's maleficent form.

The term 'performativity' in its modern usage derives from the work of the philosopher Austin. He used the term to refer to utterances like making a bet that 'do' something, rather than simply being true or false (Austin 1975, p 8). He recognised the possibility of performative utterances being 'insincere', as in saying 'I congratulate you' when you do not feel pleased (Austin 1975, p 40), but his emphasis was on the 'doing' nature of performativity. This was extended by Butler, who used the term to describe the politics of performativity, in uses such as name-calling—the 'injurious' speech that can damage people (Butler 1997, p 1–2). Sticks and stones may break my bones, and words can … well, in Butler's words, 'some speech not only communicates hate, but constitutes an injurious act', so language 'acts *upon* its addressee in an injurious way' (Butler 1997, p 16). Butler discusses the negative aspects of performativity, yet she still recognises the possibility of its positive use, or what she calls the 'felicitous performative' which is a speech act that, in itself, has a positive effect (Butler 1997, p 17). Insults are good examples of 'injurious' performativity, compliments are good examples of positive, 'felicitous', performativity.

Negative performativity is now dominant in the literature. An alternative view is presented by Barnett, writing about higher education. He notes that '[t]he idea of performance has come in for a battering of late: "performativity" has become a term of abuse, in its implication that educational activities might be structured by considerations of impact and return (especially in the economic sphere)' (Barnett, in Barnett 2005, p 106). But '"performance" and even "performative" and "performing" can have more positive connotations: such ideas can point to and urge practices that invite involvement, commitment and energy on the part of the student' (Barnett, in Barnett 2005, p 106). Indeed, '[t]he most powerful performances … are not just alive; they are life itself in its fullness, at once creative, engaging and significant' (Barnett 2007, p 79). He continues, drawing on Austin's work on performative utterances, and notes that there 'are two powerful ideas of performance that are worth hanging onto: on the one hand, the idea of performance-as-theatre, of performance as creative and as reaching out to an audience; on the other hand, the idea of language-as-performance, itself being creative, of speech as action' (Barnett 2007, p 79). He continues that 'this set of ideas of performance inhabits a quite different set of spaces from that of "performativity" in Lyotard's philosophy … [as] Lyotard's idea of performativity has a weak or even negative meaning, whereas both language-as-performance and theatre-as-performance are shot through with positive meaning' (Barnett 2007, p 79–80). A similar positioning of performativity as positive and creative is provided by hooks. Her account of schooling is powerful but all too rarely acknowledged by mainstream writers on schooling:

> Teaching is a performative act. And it is that aspect of our work that offers the space for change, invention, spontaneous shifts, that can serve as a catalyst drawing out the unique elements in each classroom. To embrace the performative aspect of teaching we are compelled to engage "audiences," to consider issues of reciprocity. Teachers are not performers in the traditional sense of the word in that our work is not meant to be a spectacle. Yet it is meant to serve as a catalyst that calls everyone to become more and more engaged, to become active participants in learning. (hooks 1994, p 11)

For educational settings, then, positive performativity can refer to the educational processes of teaching and learning, but it also has enormous importance for leadership. Teachers (*as* teachers) are necessarily leaders as well as performers in the classroom, but school leaders are performers, too, in many different ways. Leadership is typically a 'border' role, with responsibilities inside and outside the organisation led—a semipermeable membrane between those 'led' and those 'beyond', a border guard letting some through and blocking others. The performances expected of leaders are therefore internal and external. Internally, there may be staff meetings, memos, interviews, or notices. Externally, there may be meetings with governors or external bodies, auditors and inspectors, mission statements, websites, and public pronouncements. All will require different styles, and all may present and disguise different elements. That does not mean that leaders must be two faced in the negative sense, just that they must be able to act appropriately for different audiences. There are many ways in which school leaders might be said to be set impossible challenges and to be pressured to 'perform' to inappropriate external agendas. Responses to those pressures are often framed in terms of honesty or authenticity. However, a return to performativity in the positive versions (of Austin, Butler, and particularly Barnett), suggests an alternative approach. Leaders can—in distinct ways—embrace performativity and remain ethical. Rather than making an artificial choice between 'performance' and 'sincerity', school leaders can take some control back by making choices over what sort of performativity might be appropriate.

What distinguishes beneficent from maleficent performativity is the same as that which distinguishes ethical and unethical leadership. Who is driving the performance: for whom are leaders performing? Performing for the sake of a league table means a leader is being redirected away from their responsibility for the people they lead. Ball is absolutely correct to say that performativity can terrorise teachers and school leaders and can promote 'inauthenticity and meaninglessness' by convincing them that 'it is output that counts' (Ball 2003b, p 223). In these ways, teachers and school leaders 'may not be expected to care about each other': instead they 'are expected to "care" *about* performances … [and] to be passionate about excellence' (Ball 2003b, p 224). All this, I agree with: it is an important and powerful critique of much that is happening in schools

today in a neoliberal culture and policy context. What it misses is the idea that performances can be—and are recognised by many in schools as—beneficent and entirely appropriate. It is the purpose or 'direction' of the performance that determines whether it is appropriate. A teacher putting on a 'performance' for pupils, telling a story or demonstrating a chemical reaction as a bit of a 'show', is entirely appropriate. In the same way, a headteacher putting on a performance at a speech day, inspiring the audience with a well-crafted presentation on the value of education, can be a beneficent performance. It is when teachers are performing for the sake of the performance alone (merely showing off their performance skills and not using performance to help support pupil learning), or when headteachers preach the value of a holistic education whilst at the same time only praising those teachers who meet exam result targets, it is such misdirected or hypocritical performances that are worthy of critique, and that, as Ball describes it, endanger the teachers' 'souls'.

For me, the best illustration of leaders' misdirected performativity is the way that leaders are, currently, expected to have a 'vision'. There is a tantalising myth presented by policy-makers and some leadership academics that leaders are quite different people to followers. There is a separation of 'leaders' from 'led' and also of 'leaders' from mere 'managers', and one of the most interesting distinguishing marks of 'true leaders' is that of 'vision'. It has not always been so. An American school principal says '[i]f I had said twenty years ago that I had a vision, I would have been put in an institution', but '[n]ow I can't get a job without one!' (quoted in Hoyle and Wallace 2005, p 10–11). There are many reasons for the increasing use of the term 'vision', but its ubiquity is well represented by the UK inspection system (Ofsted, the Office for Standards in Education), which sets out the requirements for vision in its inspection framework. They require information on 'any strategic planning that sets out the longer term vision for the school' (Ofsted 2016, p 15), and in judging the effectiveness of leadership, they 'will consider … the leaders' and governors' vision and ambition for the school and how these are communicated to staff, parents and pupils' (Ofsted 2016, p 37). But vision was originally used in religious contexts, and it implies access to ideas from God rather than from other people. Having vision is a 'special' quality, therefore, in religious traditions, and its conversion into a leadership

characteristic retains some of that quality. Asking for visionary leadership means enacting the visions of those *outside* the school, and especially those of the (god-like?) central government policy-makers. If having 'vision' matters, in the sense of having pseudo-mystical insight into (rather than dialogically generated understanding of) what is needed, then school leaders are both 'separate' and are looking outwards for inspiration.

In such ways, being expected to practice 'visionary' leadership is precisely to ignore the people you lead, and taking 'inspiration' from outside that group. Vision is one of the ways of directing performativity outside the school, and is dangerous for precisely that reason.

Conclusion

I have presented and critiqued a view of school leaders as caught in the middle, expected to care for those within the school whilst also being expected to care about external targets. They need to take care, Spinoza's *caute*, and especially take care to understand the ethical, educational, character of leadership, and to differentiate that from the stereotypes and myths of leadership promoted by many policy-makers and leadership scholars. All leaders by definition have power, and there is an important sense in which all in school have power, and therefore all are leaders. But all are also therefore followers, and it is in the articulation of leadership and followership that an ethic of hierarchical schooling emerges. Leaders must care for the led, and such leaders will encourage the people they lead to act in a mutualising and, therefore, somewhat equalising way towards the leaders. But followership also requires a focus on appropriate use of such power (such leadership) as *followers* possess. This tension between hierarchy and egalitarianism is similar to the tension described in earlier chapters between community and individuality, dialogue and separation, and accurately learning what is taught and being original. Leadership cannot exist without followership, but leaders and followers are not different people—leaders are not special and visionary—as leadership and followership dissolve in mutuality, and over time and in different circumstances, followers become leaders, leaders followers.

If the ethics and politics and psychology of leadership and followership are to be understood, we must explore power, the possibility or absence of common purpose, and the positive as well as negative uses of performance. New theories of leadership, or reinvigorated old theories, need to be developed. Towards the end of his account of the challenges of educational leadership, Bottery (2004) does something of this kind, presenting models of school leadership that are ecologically and politically aware, focused on the public good, embracing epistemological provisionality, and reflectively interrogating their practice within wider contexts (Bottery 2004, p 198). He follows this up with an account of leadership and sustainability (Bottery 2016). In this chapter, having critiqued a range of views on leadership, followership, common purpose, and performativity, I have also described some of the most helpful models. I am not avoiding the terrors of performativity (Ball 2003b), the absurdity of assuming that school leaders are the only people who make schools work (Lakomski et al. 2016), or the disguised violence often wielded by those in power in schools (Harber 2002, 2004; Allen 2014). What I am doing is clarifying the direction of support—the legitimate use of power—within schools. This also, therefore, has implications for those beyond the school. Those outside school have an interest in what happens within school, but schools are not 'for' parents, or 'for' industry, or 'for' local or central government. As communities, schools are groups of people treating each other as ends in themselves. As educational organisations, schools are employing society's professional adults to teach personhood through working together in community. Classroom leaders should be working for the pupils and the learning within the class, school leaders should be working for all the people and the learning within the school, and leaders beyond the school—'stakeholders' in the school—should be working for the benefit of the school.

The use of power for one's own sake is a form of tyranny, described as such at least since Aristotle's time. It is worth returning to the example given at the start of this chapter, hooks' celebration of her first school in helping her reinvent herself—in contrast to her criticism of her second school for teaching only obedience. The family of hooks had a legitimate interest in her education in both schools, but if the first school was supporting hooks' 'reinvention' for her—hooks'—sake rather than for the

sake of some kind of social engineering, and if the obedience taught at the second school was for the sake of social conformity and not for the benefit of hooks' herself, then her family had no legitimate claim to prevent the first school acting in the way it acted. They did, however, have a claim to prevent the second school if it was—as hooks suggested—enforcing obedience for an 'external' purpose. School leaders are, after all, followers too. They should be open to the leadership of those beyond the school, even though—just like pupils in their school—they will be ethically obliged to follow only those leaders who, in turn, are working for the benefit of the led.

The asymmetry in leadership and followership, like the asymmetry in teaching and learning and in caring and being cared for, is not fixed and absolute. It is breached by the mutuality of dialogue, the equalising tendency of friendliness, and the changeability of roles over time. Shelley's poem *Ozymandias* (https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/46565/ozymandias) tells of the 'great leader' whose statue announces the hubristic 'Look on my works, ye Mighty, and despair!', but whose kingdom, like most of the statue, has disappeared with time, wrecked and decayed. A reminder to all leaders that leadership is a temporary, cyclical activity—replaced in time, and, later, often enough, forgotten. Is there anything in schooling that is sustainable? That is the subject of the next chapter (Chap. 7).

7

The Sustainability of Schooling and Its Alternatives

I will be prepared to draw on the past, to live in the present, and to prepare for the long-term future, acknowledging uncertainty and connectedness.

Introduction

Mass schooling is a recent phenomenon: most of history has done without it. And schooling is unnecessary, both in the sense that there are many people who are successfully home educated (or otherwise educated) within systems of mass schooling, and in the sense that even with mass schooling, most learning goes on outside schools. These are ideas underlying every chapter of this book. If schooling is of value—and I think it is indeed of value—then this needs to be demonstrated, it cannot be taken for granted. Schooling needs justifying, and alternatives to schooling need justifying too, if they are of value. Questions over the sustainability of schools—or the sustainability of particular aspects of schools—are being asked, as might be expected in an age when the sustainability of the world has become a critical issue. What I argue in this chapter is that the topic of sustainability puts to the test core concepts

Julian Stern, *A Philosophy of Schooling*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71571-1_7

already explored in earlier chapters—notably care, community, dialogue, personhood—and is both illuminated by and illuminates those concepts. Whereas Chap. 6 on leadership took on micro- and mesopolitical issues raised by the core concepts, this chapter expands the circle further and addresses mesopolitical and global macropolitical issues. Although schooling will not save the world, it may yet be central to greater—if not absolute—sustainability. And if schooling has such a role, then this may justify sustaining schools, even if they *are* unnecessary.

What is sustainability? Like most of the most interesting words, it sounds simple but is enormously complex. In terms of political debate, one of the most influential definitions was given in a 1987 report—known as the Brundtland Report—developed by the United Nations. The report defined sustainable development as 'development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs' (WCED 1987, p 43). Something is 'sustainable', therefore, if it achieves its current purpose without preventing future generations from achieving their purposes. For example, I am not *sustainably* meeting my current need for energy if I use up all the energy sources that future generations would need to meet their needs for energy. Such a definition raises many questions. How is it possible to know what future generations will need and how their needs might be met? We may use up all the non-renewable fossil fuels available to us, but future generations may be able to rely exclusively on renewable sources of energy, or extensive as yet unexploited sources of non-renewable fuels. These are—I believe—terrible arguments in the short term, as non-renewable fuels seem to be running out much quicker than alternatives sources are being developed. But there is still a problem of uncertainty with any definition of sustainability—with any definition that looks into the future, as the future is always somewhat uncertain. A second question raised by the Brundtland definition is how many generations are to be considered? The phrase 'future generations' implies at least two—this generation's children and grandchildren—and many people are most concerned with these two subsequent generations. But future generations might include 4, 40, or 4000 generations, and there would be wildly different implications for each timescale. In a policy context where the cycle of governments is four or five years (i.e. a government will try to act in

such a way that it gets re-elected in the next four or five years), and in an economic context where businesses are focused on quarterly results whilst shares and currencies change price by the second, it is hard enough to take account of even one or two generations. But the longer-term view is no less important, even if it is all too often ignored. That was why Brundtland and subsequent reports—such as the United Nations reports on climate change (https://www.ipcc.ch/)—still have the power to shock us. Several contributors to Kim and Draper (2011) note that ancient biblical texts took a longer perspective on the environment than many current governments. (For example, a 'jubilee' is a 50-year cycle of 'rest' years, to restore the land, just as the 'sabbath' is a restorative day each week.)

As well as raising issues of uncertainty, and of time-scale, definitions of sustainability also raise questions of who might be included in 'future generations'. Brundtland clearly refers to human beings (currently alive or yet to be born), but the idea that global sustainability refers only to human beings, with no other animals or plants having any value in their own right, is increasingly implausible. The science fiction film *The Day the Earth Stood Still* (Derrickson et al. 2008, loosely based on Bates 2012) has the alien Klaatu visit earth to save it. 'So you've come here to help us', the human character Benson says. 'No', Klaatu replies, 'I came to save the earth'. Benson realises that saving the earth means saving it *from* human beings, not *for* human beings. The planet can only be sustainable for future generations of (all but one) species as a result of the extermination of the one species that threatens this sustainability. A little extreme, perhaps, but entirely understandable. The greatest dangers to the environment, if human beings were wiped out, would probably be the technologies—such as the weapons of mass destruction—that we would leave behind, and even these technologies are more likely to be a global threat with the help of, rather than in the absence of, human beings.

This chapter avoids the temptation to map out a certain future for schooling (or for humanity) but explores some possible futures—futures with and without schools. What might a deschooled society look like? If schools are retained, how might they work and be sustainable? The argument presented—or at least started—here is that schools can be central to sustainability, because they are, for better or for worse, intergenerational

exchanges from the past to the present and on to the future. Ethical and political implications of sustainability, such as balancing the demands of different generations, can be met in various ways by schooling. Putting intergenerational justice at the heart of schooling gives schools a role in society that extends previous arguments in this book about personal relationships, and that extends previous arguments by authors such as Dewey about schooling and democracy. In my 'manifesto' (the *Afterword* of this book), I describe it in this way: 'the school I would like will be one that draws on the past, lives in the present, and prepares for the long-term future by creating the next generations, acknowledging the uncertainty of the future and the ways in which people are connected to each other and to the rest of the world—past, present and future'.

What Does Deschooling Look Like?

If we are to understand the value of schools and whether schooling is sustainable, it is important to consider alternatives without schools. There have been many suggested alternatives to schools, and these are presented here in four groups: tutor-based learning, home-based learning, nature-based learning, and work-based learning. The first of these—the use of peer-tutors and specialist tutors—was promoted by Illich (1971, 1974), and his approach is considered in this section. As Noddings suggests, '[p]eople have expressed ambivalence about education and schools for a long time', but this ambivalence is not a simple rejection. Even Illich, known for recommending comprehensive deschooling, 'recognised the central importance of teaching' (Noddings, in Lees and Noddings 2016, p 1–2). What she goes on to say is that Illich's vision of deschooling is 'easier said than done', and that in the 'search for promising alternative forms of education … we should put great emphasis on the teacher-student relationship, within or outside formal schools, and how it can be developed and maintained' (Noddings, in Lees and Noddings 2016, p 1–2). Noddings writes this in a handbook of alternative education. Along with reference to Illich's comprehensive deschooling, based on a free market in tutoring voluntarily engaged with by learners, there are accounts in the handbook of home-based and nature-based alternatives to schooling, as

well as alternative forms of schooling. In addition to those three groups of alternatives to schooling, I will add work-based learning as a distinct alternative—although in some accounts, this might be categorised as a form of, rather than alternative to, schooling.

The categories 'school' and 'not school' are difficult to define. The so-called dame schools of the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, for young children whose families had little or no money for other types of schools, were usually run in the home of the 'dame' (Higginson 1974; Grigg 2005). These were 'schools' that were much like 'home-based education'. The libertarian schooling of Summerhill developed by Neill (1985) might be described as either an alternative *form* of schooling or as an alternative *to* schooling. What about systematic online instruction completed in the pupil's home? For the purposes of this chapter, three broad, fuzzy, criteria are used in combination to differentiate the *alternatives to* schooling in this section from the *alternative forms of* schooling:

- One clearly subjective criterion is that of recognisability. Accounts of dame schools look familiar as schools more than as home-based learning, and Summerhill looks like a school. Learning whilst living in an all-age commune, without separated rooms or times for lessons, and young apprentices engaging in productive economic activity and given very limited time for separate 'lessons', do not look like schooling.
- A second criterion is the boundedness of the situation. Someone at home using a whole range of books and internet sites to learn material might be being home educated whereas someone who joins an organisation that recommends or supplies a set of books and member-only internet sites that support learning, with other members of the organisation assessing the learning, might be being schooled using a bounded distance learning approach. An example from higher education of the latter mode of learning is the UK's *Open University* (http://www.open.ac.uk), which is clearly a university (even though students do not attend a campus). An example for children is the confusingly named *Notschool* (http://www.inclusiontrust.org/notschool/), which provides tutoring and other forms of learning support for vulnerable children including those with behavioural, emotional, and social difficulties (including not being able to attend a 'traditional' school).

- The third criterion is that of the purpose of the organisation: schools are primarily educational. Many organisations are educational—such as apprenticeships—but their *primary* purpose is other than educational (it may be tailoring, as in Lave 2011, or butchery or midwifery or any other occupation, as in Lave and Wenger 1991).

It is easy to write of alternatives to schooling 'in theory', but, despite the absence of mass schooling through most of human history, it is difficult envisaging in detail what comprehensive deschooling might entail. It is much easier to imagine turning the clock back to a time before mass schooling, but that is hardly a plan for a future without schools. In 1926, Buber wrote of the time 'where there neither was nor needed to be any specific calling of educator or teacher', as '[t]here was a master, a philosopher or a coppersmith, whose journeymen and apprentices lived with him and learned, by being allowed to share in it, what he had to teach them of his handwork or brainwork' (Buber 2002a, p 106). He continues, however, that '[w]e can as little return to the state of affairs that existed before there were schools as to that which existed before, say, technical science' (Buber 2002a, p 106, quoted in Chap. 4). What I will attempt, however, is to consider various states of affairs other than schooling. This section cannot provide a guide to all non-school alternatives, of course, but provides one fuller example—that of Illich—in this section, followed by a number of briefer accounts of other alternatives.

It was Illich who popularised the process of comprehensive deschooling, and his model of a deschooled society has—surprisingly—echoed through much more recent computer-mediated alternatives to schooling. Illich was a critic of schooling, but this was part of a much larger critique of institutions. Schools were the first example he gave in his writings of institutions that did more harm than good: 'for most men the right to learn is curtailed by the obligation to attend school' (Illich 1971, p 7). Whereas Dewey criticised the narrowness of schooling, its focus on learning unconnected to the 'real lives' of pupils, Illich criticised 'the attempt to expand the pedagogue's responsibility until it engulfs his pupils' lifetimes' (Illich 1971, p 7). He said that school 'tends to make a total claim on the time and energies of its participants … [which] makes the teacher into custodian, preacher and therapist' (Illich 1971, p 37).

> The *teacher-as-moralist* substitutes for parents, God or the state. He indoctrinates the pupil about what is right or wrong, not only in school but also in society at large. He stands *in loco parentis* for each one and thus ensures that all feel themselves children of the same state. (Illich 1971, p 37)

The caring and personal schooling that I am promoting in this book is the type of schooling Illich attacks as an 'institutionalisation of values' that 'leads inevitably to physical pollution, social polarization, and psychological impotence: three dimensions in a process of global degradation and modernized misery' (Illich 1971, p 9). His alternative forms of learning include some 'reference services' guiding people to formal learning or to 'educators-at-large' (freelance tutors) as and when they might be needed, and 'skill exchanges' and 'peer matching' allowing people to exchange skills with each other or find appropriate peer-tutors (i.e. non-professional peers with a skill) (Illich 1971, p 81). Families will retain a prime role in children's learning, although '[p]arents need guidance in directing their children on the road that leads to responsible educational independence' (Illich 1971, p 99). There is a need, he says, for 'experienced leadership' in the fields of pedagogy and in specific fields of knowledge: '[b]oth kinds of experience are indispensable for effective educational endeavour' (Illich 1971, p 99).

Illich's critique starts from a similar position to that of Lave (2011; Lave and Wenger 1991, described in Chap. 5), saying that a 'major illusion on which the school system rests is that most learning is the result of teaching', whilst 'most people acquire most of their knowledge outside school' (Illich 1971, p 20). 'Most learning', he continues, 'happens casually, and even most intentional learning is not the result of programmed instruction[: n]ormal children [*sic*] learn their first language casually' (Illich 1971, p 20). Although I would express it a little differently, I agree with this—as I agree with most of what Lave says. And, like Lave, Illich notes that '[t]eaching, it is true, may contribute to certain kinds of learning under certain circumstances' (Illich 1971, p 20). Illich's critique of these aspects of schooling has been influential and is helpful in avoiding the idea that schools—in contrast to families, communities, workplaces—are the only sources of learning, or the only sources of morality. What Illich adds, though, is the idea that schools are 'eminently suited to

be the World Church of our decaying culture', the best means by which to 'veil from its participants the deep discrepancy between social principles and social reality in today's world' (Illich 1971, p 48). Schooling is '[s]ecular, scientific and death-denying' and '[i]ts classical, critical veneer makes it appear pluralist if not anti-religious' (Illich 1971, p 48). Trained as a Roman Catholic priest, Illich—with his many references to religion—seems to see schooling as the successor to an authoritative church in its 'veiling' of inequality and injustice. Deschooling was for him part of a larger deinstitutionalising of society, and the model for an iniquitous institution seems to have been originally the church, and later the school as 'secular church'.

The liberation theology of Latin American theologians and educational campaigners such as Paulo Freire (1993) were hugely influential on (and influenced by) Illich. In *Deschooling Society*, Illich commends Freire for having 'discovered that any adult can begin to read in a matter of forty hours if the first words he deciphers are charged with political meaning' such as 'the access to a well or the compound interest on the debts owed to the *patron*' (Illich 1971, p 25). More than half a century earlier, Dewey was commending teaching that recognised the 'relevance' of what was learned to the pupils' lived experience. But it is not, mainly, that schooling is inefficient that makes Illich (more than Freire) an opponent of all schooling. It is that schools are institutions, and institutions should not be personal and moral and therapeutic and concerned to influence the whole lives of people. Those things should only—he implies—be carried out in non-institutional settings, one assumes including families, friendship groups, local communities, and so on. Institutions may be appropriate for a limited number of tasks (a little teaching of some matters appropriate to formal instruction for example), but should have a very restricted range of influence. Illich's is a libertarian anarchist position, as in his promotion of the idea of Jesus as 'an anarchist savior' (Illich 1988, p 1). Schools and such educational 'systems' 'are the embodiment of the enemy, of power', and '[t]he rejection of power, in Greek the an-archy, of Jesus troubles the world of power, because he totally submits to it without ever being part of it' (Illich 1988, p 8). The idea that one should '[r]ender unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's' (KJV Mk 12) is an example—Illich says—of the

requirement to 'love one's enemies': 'submission to authorities is the supreme form of the "love of enemies" through which Jesus became our Savior' (Illich 1988, p 8).

There are other forms of anarchism—including Kropotkin's communitarian anarchism described in Chap. 9. Illich, as a (progressive) libertarian anarchist, sees institutions as needing to be replaced by individuals freely choosing how and when to learn what they need to learn. His polemic seems extreme at times, suggesting schools 'insist' on the 'insidious enterprise of multiplying dropouts and cripples' (Illich 1988, p 1), and that schooling is 'held up as sacred' yet 'creates and legitimates a world where the great majority is stigmatized as a dropout while only the minority graduate … which certify them as belonging to a superrace which has the duty to govern' (Illich 1988, p 1). But his critique is far more substantial than simply arguing that schools can damage pupils. Likewise, his critique of hospitals includes, but is more than, an account of the harm that hospitals do—the 'iatrogenic' effects of hospitals (Illich 1995)—as they also oppress and subjugate people. In Illich's writings, learning happens primarily in families, friendship groups, and workplaces, supplemented by voluntary tutoring as needed. The tutoring is facilitated by matching 'partners' for educational purposes, perhaps via a computer. (Computers were not developed for such purposes in the 1970s, but Illich's description is a good pre-emption of such technologies.) Tutors would only teach that requested by their tutees, and would not expect any overarching influence. His is not a wish for improved schools, and is not simply a wish for more flexible or technologically enhanced teaching.

> Neither new attitudes of teachers toward their pupils nor the proliferation of educational hardware or software (in classroom or bedroom), nor finally the attempt to expand the pedagogue's responsibility until it engulfs his pupils' lifetimes will deliver universal education. (Illich 1971, p 7)

Instead, the 'search for new educational *funnels* must be reversed into the search for their institutional inverse: educational *webs* which heighten the opportunity for each one to transform each moment of his living into one of learning, sharing and caring' (Illich 1971, p 7).

Oddly, I find it hard to argue against much of what Illich says, and yet I disagree wholeheartedly with his conclusion. I think that schools *can* and often *do* heighten the opportunity for each person to transform each moment of living into one of learning, sharing and caring. Many of the specific elements of schooling disliked by Illich—the intentional creation of failures, the tendency to see schools as the only sources of learning—are my own dislikes. However, I have more confidence in the possibility of schools having a broadly positive influence, and I have considerably less confidence in the ability of liberating learning happening in a deinstitutionalised society. For all the dangers in schooling, most are replicated in families, friendship groups, local communities, and workplaces. Schools do not have a monopoly on learning: Illich is right. But neither do they have a monopoly on bullying, abuse, exploitation, cruelty, violence, or racism. Families, friends, local communities, and workplaces are all pretty good at these oppressive practices, too. Deinstitutionalising learning does not—I suggest—necessarily liberate learning. (Many go to school for a *relief* from oppression and exploitation at home.) So I concur with many of Illich's suggestions of improving learning, but not his requirement that this can only be done through, and will necessarily be achieved through, deschooling. His voluntary tutoring and peer support are excellent ways of teaching many things—and computing has made such learning all the more viable. But the very heart of Illich's criticism of schools—their tendency to see themselves as having a responsibility for more than mere technical training, their tendency to see themselves as moral and political institutions that stand between (and somewhat independent of) families, communities, and workplaces—this is where I see the positive value of schools.

Home-Based, Nature-Based, and Work-Based Learning

Schools that address the holistic needs of all learners (Miller et al. 2005) may be described in some ways like *households* (Stern 2012, further explored in Chap. 2), but learning in homes and households predates schooling and has never gone away. In recent decades, home-based

education (sometimes referred to as 'home-schooling') has become increasingly prominent as an alternative to schooling (Meighan 1995). In many countries, home-based education is legal and is supported—to an extent—by government agencies. In the UK, this is based on the requirement established in 1944 that '[i]t shall be the duty of the parent of every child of compulsory school age to cause him to receive efficient full-time education suitable to his age, ability, and aptitude, either by regular attendance at school or otherwise' (section 36 of the Education Act 1944, p 29). The word 'otherwise' has been picked up by the major UK support group for home-based education, *Education Otherwise* (https://educationotherwise.org/) whose slogan is 'education is compulsory – school is optional'. In the USA, home-based education is supported by groups such as *Alternatives to School* (http://alternativestoschool.com/articles/home-based-learning/) and the related *Alliance for Self-Directed Education* (https://www.self-directed.org/).

In China, home-based education is not legally established but exists in major cities as well as rural areas. According to Sheng (2014), much of the city-based activity has a combination of religious and academic motivations and is typically supported by groups of mothers connected through a religious or related community. Sheng's research suggests that most Chinese home-based education in major cities is tightly tied to traditional schooling, often with the aim of getting children into the most oversubscribed schools, colleges, and universities—in China or overseas. Researchers in the UK and USA describe a wider range of possible education in homes, from carefully timetabled and test-oriented programmes that copy many features from schooling, to self-discovery approaches that copy, instead, many of the ways that preschool children learn. Mayberry describes four groups of motivations for home-based education: 'religion', 'concern about the quality of socialization found in schools', 'concern for academic success', and those 'committed to an alternative lifestyle' (Mayberry 1989, p 171). The research of Lees (2014) stresses the 'alternative' feature and the challenge provided by home-based education to policy on schooling. For Meighan, '[t]he evidence supports only two generalisations', these being 'that families display considerable diversity in motives, methods and aims' and 'that they are usually very successful in achieving their chosen aims' (Meighan 1995, p 275), including in exam

results. (Kunzman, in Lees and Noddings 2016, p 184, points out the 'irony in measures such as standardised test scores and grade levels playing such a prominent role in the arguments about the value of home education'.) Home-based education, he says,

> questions all the fundamental assumptions underpinning schooling, as well as pointing to ways of regenerating and reconstructing education systems in general and schools in particular, in the direction of more flexibility, suitable for the post-modernist scene. It gives us clues as to how we can de-school schools by developing the Invitational School to replace the Custodial School. (Meighan 1995, p 275)

Lees (2014) researched parents involved in home-based learning and explored the 'alternative' pedagogy more than—for example—the religious motivations that seem more influential in the USA and China. Her research also explored in detail the interface between home-based education and policy-making, and the tendency of policy conflation of 'education' and 'schooling'. The Badman Review into home-based education in the UK recommended the setting up of a 'compulsory national registration scheme, locally administered, for all children of statutory school age, who are, or become, electively home educated' (Badman 2009, p 38), but Lees and other commentators were concerned that the review—and the various recommendations made by the review—were based on a conflation of home-based education with safeguarding concerns about the potential for abuse within families. No one would want to downplay the risks to children and vulnerable adults in family/home settings (or school settings), but if home-based education is seen—in policy terms—primarily in terms of a *risk* to children, rather than an alternative form of education, then the policy and practice in both homes and schools will be distorted or misunderstood. What this issue raises is the sensitive political nature of home-based education. In the USA and China, political issues relate especially to religion, in the UK, to safeguarding.

Around the world, home-based education provides for a small minority of the population, about 4% of the school-age population in the USA, and probably lower numbers in the UK, Australia, and Canada, and pockets of provision in India, New Zealand, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, and

a number of European nations, with limited (discouraged or extra-legal) provision also in China, Israel, Japan, Germany and Sweden (Kunzman, in Lees and Noddings 2016, p 180). But in all jurisdictions, issues are raised. There are some who recommend extending home-based schooling with further support from schools or community groups. Mayberry refers to the way in which 'more cooperative attitudes and policies between home-based educators and school authorities are developing and the desire for a more flexible education provision in the future is in prospect' (Mayberry 1989, p 171), and support websites suggest '[c]onnecting with other families that practice home-based, self-directed learning', along with '[c]onferences … [which can] provide social confirmation, as well as peer groups and diversity for parents and children' (http://alternativestoschool.com/articles/home-based-learning/). As Kunzman says, '[t]he distinctiveness of home education lies not in its location, but in its locus of oversight', so 'the "home" in home education refers more accurately to who is shaping the education, not where the education is happening' (Kunzman, in Lees and Noddings 2016, p 179).

Just as home-based education ranges from 'school-in-a-home' provision (i.e. sometimes a temporary respite from the schooling system) to a full-scale alternative to schooling that might move towards something like Illich's vision of comprehensive deschooling, other alternatives have similar diversity. Nature-based education includes the outdoor education that many schools engage in, such as that described by Quibell et al., who researched 'wilderness schooling' and measured the positive impact it had on 'attainment in all three subjects [reading, writing, and mathematics] compared to controls' (Quibell et al. 2017). Forest schools, similarly, have become complementary to conventional schools. Developed in Nordic countries (out of the outdoor movement known as *Friluftsliv*) and Germany (the *Wandekinder* tradition) (Knight, in Lees and Noddings 2016, p 290), they have been taken up in a number of other countries. They are described as a 'model for learning holistically and outdoors', offering children 'regular opportunities to achieve and develop confidence and self-esteem through regular hands-on learning experiences in a woodland or natural environment with trees' (Knight, in Lees and Noddings 2016, p 289, and see also Knight 2016; Elliott 2015; Ryder-Richardson 2006). More radical opportunities—in many ways opposed to the other

forms of learning from nature—are described by Dinker and Pederson, in their work on 'critical animal pedagogies' (Dinker and Pederson, in Lees and Noddings 2016). Outdoors education, visits to zoos, and the animal-assisted therapies (Chandler 2017; Margalit 2010, p 256) are valuable, but these may represent '[a]symmetric power relations, through which students are implicitly or explicitly taught to utilise, dominate or control other species' (Dinker and Pederson, in Lees and Noddings 2016, p 415). They recommend the creation of 'an alternative education that frees ourselves and animals from the destruction we wreak on their world' which would involve 'a pedagogical practice of *unthinking the human*; unthinking our parasitic selves' (Dinker and Pederson, in Lees and Noddings 2016, p 416). This would not necessarily involve avoiding contact with non-human animals, of course, but would involve a comprehensive consideration of interspecific engagement throughout education—in or out of school.

There has been an interesting recent growth in philosophical interest in nature. Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century concerns with nature and with 'human nature' had gone into decline through the twentieth century, with challenges to biological determinism from feminist and anti-racist movements. Yet interspecies issues seem to have raised once more the possibility of species-specific ethical theories, such as those of Habermas (2003) or Nussbaum (in Sunstein and Nussbaum 2004, p 299–319). Gray writes of 'Mother Nature's Pedagogy: How Children Educate Themselves' (in Lees and Noddings 2016, p 49), based on a theory of the 'natural' optimisation of learning through '[u]nlimited freedom to play, explore, and pursue one's own interests', the '[o]pportunity to play with the tools of the culture', '[a]ccess to a variety of caring adults, who are helpers not judges', and '[f]ree age mixing among children and adolescents' (Gray, in Lees and Noddings 2016, p 57–60). Traditional schools, by avoiding these natural ways to learn, 'quash the educative instincts' (Gray, in Lees and Noddings 2016, p 61). This position, however, seems more like a critique of schooling that might—just might—provide an alternative approach within schooling. As with a number of alternatives described in this chapter, it is not always clear whether it would be possible to reorder schools to such an extent that nature, the outdoors, appropriate interspecies relationships, forests, and—noting

some of the motivations for home-based education—religion might be incorporated into schooling, or whether the changes would be so great as to undermine altogether what is currently thought of as schooling. Bottery is in favour of incorporation, with 'social, economic and environmental sustainability … based on what promotes the well-being of those living within such systems, both human and non-human' such that 'people are viewed less as *human resources*, and more as *resourceful humans*, to be viewed and treated more as ends rather than means, and where the quality of work comes from underpinning values of trust, empowerment and care, and therefore where their well-being is a fundamental concern', noting that we should 'invoke the same principle for other living creatures' (Bottery 2016, p 176).

The final group of alternatives to schooling is even closer to a school-like system than a non-school system. Three criteria for inclusion in this section were provided, these being recognisability, boundedness, and the purpose of the organisation. Work-based education may not look like the stereotype of traditional schooling (with pupils behind desks), but many schools make good use of workshops and other practice-based forms of learning. Most work-based education is institutionally bounded, too. It is more in its *purpose* that work-based education is distinct from traditional schooling. After the Russian Revolution, a politically and organisationally radical overhaul of the schooling system led to setting up 'polytechnic' schooling. Zajda described the USSR as 'one of the few countries where, to use Lenin's words, universal productive labour has been wedded to universal education' (Zajda 1980, p 56). That is, schools did not simply use workshops and related approaches to teaching and learning but saw the work completed in schools as itself 'productive'. Pupils contributed to making their own schools, their own furniture, their own meals, and so on. This was the not just Lenin's view but reflects Marx's view of communism as overcoming the division of labour: 'society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, herdsman or critic' (Marx and Engels 1970, p 54). Polytechnic schools were originally intended to be multiskilled and productive enterprises in that style, and

the learning somewhat resembled apprenticeship learning—albeit with pupils simultaneously carrying out apprenticeships in (for the sake of continuity) hunting, fishing, and criticising. Although the title 'polytechnic' was used into the 1980s, education in the USSR after the 1920s appeared more recognisable as 'schooling'.

Other attempts to develop work-based education include those of Freinet, who wrote of 'education through work' (Freinet 1993). His approach was 'more than mere education based on manual work' or 'a premature apprenticeship'; it was, instead, 'rooted in tradition but prudently suffused by modern science and technology, the point of departure of a culture of which work will be the center' (Freinet 1993, p 323). What this referred to was overcoming the intellectualisation of school learning, and the de-intellectualising of physical work. 'Real work is a whole', he said, and 'there can be just as much good sense, intelligence, and useful and philosophical speculation in the head of a person who's building a wall as in that of a scientist doing research in a laboratory' (Freinet 1993, p 323–324):

> It's precisely a question of reaching that integration of work, avoiding stultifying mechanization, exalting the spirituality that idealizes each act, restoring the general value as well as the individual and social importance of that act, re-establishing the inter-dependence of various functions and the fundamental similarity of their motives and their goals, so as to remove the arbitrary divide – which present civilization has taken to an extreme – between physical activity on the one hand, and individual life, thought and emotion on the other. (Freinet 1993, p 324)

Long before Lave and Wenger wrote of the divorce of schooling from the typical situations in which learning more commonly takes place, Freinet was describing work-based education as a way of overcoming that division between formal 'intellectual' learning and everyday life and work. He did, however, recommend setting up schools (rather than alternatives to schools) which would integrate work and intellectual activity.

Taking work-based learning one step further than either Marx and the polytechnics of the USSR, or Freinet and Freinet-inspired *Modern School Movement* (https://www.fimem-freinet.org/), *Tvind* schools were work-based organisations that were called schools but acted as social enterprises.

Optimistic accounts of Tvind schools, such as those in Castles and Wüstenberg (1979), are complemented by more critical accounts of Chamberlin and Chamberlin (1993) and Bengtsson and Hulgård (in Borzaga and Defourny 2004). Using public funds, the Tvind schools were residential, collectively owned private schools set up in Denmark from the early 1970s. The curriculum involved 'student travel, participation in curriculum decision making, and school management' (Chamberlin and Chamberlin 1993, p 115), and all took part in 'enterprise' activities, generating income for the movement notwithstanding being 'more or less Maoist' in ideology (Bengtsson and Hulgård, in Borzaga and Defourny 2004, p 77). Legal battles almost closed the schools in the late 1990s, but some continued into the 2000s. The 'productive labour' of polytechnic education, the overcoming of intellectual-physical divisions of Freinet schools, and the income-generating social enterprise of Tvind schools, all illustrate forms of work-related learning that push the boundaries of what might be called 'schools'. However, these descriptions lead us back to consider the possibilities of different forms of schooling, rather than—or as well as—alternatives to schooling.

Sustainable Schools: Just, in Time

What do these alternatives to schooling demonstrate? The deschooling of Illich provides a valuable critique of schools, but with an alternative that does not clearly overcome the problems of schools. It therefore stands as a critique needing a *response* from schooling rather than necessarily requiring the *abolition* of schooling. Home-based education is an interesting counterpoint to schooling, especially well-suited to those children, parents, or carers who have insufficient confidence in the available schools. Covering at most 4% of the population (in the USA), this is not put forward by most researchers as a comprehensive alternative to schooling, and it is difficult to see how homes, families, and communities could provide support for 100% home-based learning. Instead, home-based learning as an educational approach can complement schooling—as it does, for example, in 'homework' practices. As homes become more frequently used for 'homeworking' made possible by information technologies and

flexible working (Haraway 2004, p 25), school-set homework as well as home-based learning may grow in importance. The very existence of school-set homework implies learning-in-the-absence-of-the-teacher and at least a certain amount of *recognised* home-based learning. Perhaps the combination of comprehensive home-based learning and school-set homework provides an insight into possible school futures, in which school-based intentional instruction is complemented by out-of-school learning, with the balance between in-school and out-of-school learning able to change according to circumstances. Amongst universities, currently, there is a wide range of practice from intensive instruction-based on-campus programmes to distance learning programmes with occasional periods working directly with a tutor (e.g. in a Summer School). Schools might allow the same range, supporting largely home-based provision with carefully designed study support materials and occasional tutoring, and also supporting full-time attendance at the school—and, as at present, allowing for schools to be residential, too.

Nature-based and work-based learning are also—I suggest—able to provide insight into how schooling can work, but do not argue strongly for the comprehensive deschooling of society. The relationship of the people in school to other species and to the environment as a whole, just as to people beyond the school, is important to caring and curious schooling. Schools and their local, regional, national, and international communities should as appropriate incorporate relationships to non-human animals (as in the political theory of Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011). And the philosopher Naess goes further, describing an 'ecological approach to being in the world' (Naess 2008, p 81) that encompasses all living beings and non-living things. The relationship of schooling to nature, in all its guises, is a matter of much more than avoiding a few destructive activities (by recycling, or using more renewable energy). As Bottery says, 'if nothing is done, humanity is likely to face a very unpleasant future' (Bottery 2016, p ix). He remains optimistic, as I do, saying 'there is still time to turn things around', and 'educational institutions and their leaders can make a major contribution to this endeavour':

> In this scenario, … educational leaders cease to be assigned some form of perfunctory middle-management role in the delivery of short-term policies.

> Instead they become major contributors to societal and global long-term sustainability. Educational leadership thus exemplifies not only a significant case study in the generation of greater sustainability; it also represents a challenging but hugely rewarding role in contributing to global sustainability, which cannot afford to be passed up. (Bottery 2016, p ix, and see also O'Brien 2016; Sandell et al. 2005)

A minimal argument has been made, therefore, that alternatives to school do not solve all the problems of schooling, and the best elements of the alternatives can inform and be incorporated—at least to an extent—within schools. Even this minimal argument is stronger than that of Brighouse, for whom 'schooling is the only practical formal mechanism we have for guaranteeing (or trying to guarantee) that all children get reasonable access to education, regardless of how supportive their parents are of education' and '[m]ost children … will only learn higher forms of mathematics, foreign languages, and engagement with serious music and serious literature if they do so in a formal setting: school' (Brighouse 2006, p 7). In this section, however, I want to build on Bottery's optimism and make a stronger argument: schools provide quite specific qualities that contribute not only to their own but also to a broader sustainability. Schools may not only be sustained—may continue to exist—in the absence of comprehensive alternatives, they may add value to global sustainability precisely *as* schools. Returning to the definition of sustainability presented earlier in this chapter, something is sustainable if it achieves its current purpose without preventing future generations from achieving their purposes. Schools are learning communities, that is their purpose, and the learning is not just of the pupils. All in the school are committed to learning, and all care, even if it is only the adults in the school who have professional responsibilities. Teachers may be described as society's professional adults. Schools are 'intergenerational', too, and exhibit an intergenerational closeness, described in Chap. 2. In schools, there is 'a continuing personal exchange between two generations' (Macmurray 1946a, p 1, quoted in Chap. 2). In Chap. 3, the relationship was described as a conversation between generations (quoting Pring and Oakeshott), with the more future-oriented approach to conversations (of writers such as Pring and Noddings) implying teachers are not simply

passing on a tradition but helping create the next generation—enabling pupils to become the traditions of the future. Families and local communities also, of course, involve intergenerational exchange and conversation, and adults create future generations, but schools have a distinctive role in intergenerational exchange.

This argument is not new. Plato had the eccentric but interesting view that teaching and giving birth were the two main ways of gaining a kind of immortality. Diotima, in the *Symposium*, tells Socrates that 'mortal nature seeks so far as possible to live forever and be immortal … [which] is possible in one way only: by reproduction, because it always leaves behind a new young one in place of the old' (Plato 1997, p 490).

> ["W]hat we call *studying* exists because knowledge is leaving us, because forgetting is the departure of knowledge, while studying puts back a fresh memory in place of what went away, thereby preserving a piece of knowledge, so that it seems to be the same. And in that way everything mortal is preserved, not, like the divine, by always being the same in every way, but because what is departing and aging leaves behind something newer, something such as it had been. By this device, Socrates," she said, "what is mortal shares in immortality, whether it is a body or anything else, while the immortal has another way. So don't be surprised if everything naturally values its own offspring, because it is for the sake of immortality that everything shows this zeal, which is Love." (Plato 1997, p 490–491)

It is love ('Platonic' love) as a cross-generational relationship that enables a taste of immortality.

> Now, some are pregnant in body … while others are pregnant in soul – because there surely *are* those who are even more pregnant in their souls than in their bodies, and these are pregnant with what is fitting for a soul to bear and bring to birth. (Plato 1997, p 491)

Poets give birth to wisdom, and craftsmen give birth to the products of their crafts, Diotima continues, but 'by far the greatest and most beautiful part of wisdom deals with the proper ordering of cities and households, and that is called moderation and justice', so someone 'has been pregnant with these in his soul from early youth, … and, having arrived at the

proper age, desires to beget and give birth, he too will certainly go about seeking the beauty in which he would beget … and so he tries to educate him' (Plato 1997, p 491–492). Education, for Plato, helps people touch immortality through creating the next generation, and the greatest part of education is that of 'proper ordering', creating just societies.

There are many elements of Plato's theory, hinted at in these quotations, that would be regarded as entirely inappropriate today—not least the sexual exploitation of pupils by teachers. ('Platonic love' was not quite as sexless in its original form as in its later use.) However, the core idea of teaching and learning as an intergenerational encounter creating a future in which justice is maintained or enhanced—this is a remarkable anticipation of sustainability debates. It is not enough simply to contribute to the creation of a new generation: education as a process also involves the ethics and politics of the current and future society in which it takes places. The process is continuing. It is not an exchange between two generations alone but part of a continuing generational encounter: this is implied by Plato's reference to 'what is mortal shares in immortality' (Plato 1997, p 491). People may even give up their lives for that share in immortality. 'Do you really think that Alcestis would have died for Admetus', he writes, 'if they hadn't expected the memory of their virtue – which we still hold in honor – to be immortal?' (Plato 1997, p 491). As well as a connection to current sustainability debates, Plato is also anticipating elements of Macmurray's philosophy. One is the admission of human mortality. There is 'a devil's doctrine of immortality' (Macmurray 1991b, p 160), rejected by Macmurray as a result of his experience in the battle grounds of World War I. He learned, during the war, not to fear death and not to be persuaded by religious promises of eternal life. Religion, he said, 'is the effort of human consciousness to deal with the knowledge of death and to overcome the fear of it' (Macmurray 1935, p 37–38): to overcome the *fear* of death, not to overcome *death*. (This is addressed in more detail in Chap. 9.) A second connection between Plato and Macmurray is the connection between education, community, and love. Macmurray regarded Plato's philosophy as too 'organic', wrongly seeing society as a single organism and treating people as 'animals' (Macmurray 1991b, p 128). But Plato and Macmurray share a commitment to understanding how communities/societies work in which all

members know each other (Macmurray 1946c, p 7), and they share a sense of this 'knowing' as personal—in Plato, the connection is 'love', in Aristotle and in Macmurray, 'friendship', as 'all meaningful action [is] for the sake of friendship' (Macmurray 1991a, p 15, quoted in Chap. 1). Plato saw education in general as a loving intergenerational process that maintained or developed justice whereas Macmurray, writing specifically of schools, saw schooling as an intergenerational encounter teaching community, created through and for friendship.

Conclusion

Schools add to what families and local communities do in terms of intergenerational encounter. They are professional contributors to intergenerational exchange. In schools, as described by more conservative conversationalists such as Oakeshott (1991) or Leavis (1948b) and more radical conversationalists such as Pring (2000) or Noddings (1994), the conversation stretches back to long-dead generations and stretches around the world—curated, for example, by academic disciplines drawing on the long dead and the global. (School subjects are not the same as academic disciplines, but the disciplines—such as literature, history, religious studies, physics—are nevertheless drawn on by school subjects.) The professional conversations in schools also stretch into the future, with schools (e.g. in the UK) expected to 'contribute towards the spiritual, moral, mental, and physical development of the community' (section 7 of the Education Act 1944, p 4). Contributing to development is future oriented, and schooling policies around the world describe the responsibilities of schools to the future in many different ways—but all are future oriented, none merely trying to preserve the past. The professionalism of schooling, with teachers as society's professional adults, necessarily incorporates a clear sense of a long history prior to the moment of schooling, a global reach of what is studied in schools, and a sense of responsibility stretching long into the future. Schooling is sensitive to time and space in these ways, and this cannot be expected—to the same degree—of families or local communities on their own. (There are, inevitably, some families and local communities that have such a perspective on time and

place, but schools are places that have a systematic professional commitment to these dimensions.) Arguments are opened up by this position—arguments over how far back in time schools will explore, which global influences are to be acknowledged, how far into the future it may be viable for schools to prepare for, and many more. But professional schooling is distinctively committed to such perspective.

Professional schooling is committed to a sense of the ethics and politics of this responsibility—in Plato's description, a maintenance of justice, in Macmurray's description, the creation of community that in time might, ideally, lead to universal community: 'a universal community of persons in which each cares for all the others and no one for himself' (Macmurray 1991b, p 159). Schooling is not restricted to the support and development of democracy in Dewey's terms (Dewey 1916), as intergenerational justice is not entirely bounded by democracy—it is an issue for Plato's non-democratic polity as it is for more contemporary polities that might not be regarded as democratic. And schooling is in need of justification in all polities, not just those we choose to call democratic. Sustainability is a matter of intergenerational justice, justice over time. Sustainability: just, in time is, therefore, both the title and the conclusion of this chapter.

8

A Curriculum for One: Overcoming Dualism

I will be prepared to overcome divisions.

Introduction

The book's first three chapters explored the core concepts of care, community, and dialogue, whilst the next four chapters explored personhood, learning, leadership, and sustainability. With these principles, what actions are appropriate—what curriculum and (in the following chapter, Chap. 9) what political system best supports schooling? This chapter explores the curriculum through the lens of division or dualism—and the possible overcoming of dualism. A school is often organised by division: dividing pupils into groups, dividing the curriculum into subjects, and dividing one school from another. 'What I know about living a divided life', says Palmer, 'starts with my training as an academic' (Palmer, in Lantieri 2001, p 1). He 'was taught to keep things in airtight compartments: to keep my ideas apart from my feelings, because ideas were reliable but feelings were not; to keep my theories apart from my actions,

Julian Stern, *A Philosophy of Schooling*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71571-1_8

because the theory can be pure, but the action is always sullied' (Palmer, in Lantieri 2001, p 1). He hopes for teachers to 'live divided-no-more' (Palmer, in Lantieri 2001, p 1). The divisions described by Palmer can be seen as forms of dualism, the philosophical division of the universe into two fundamentally different and distinct types of substance.

In Descartes, there is a division between mind (or thought, or spirit) and body (or material existence, or extension). Dualism of the kind attributed to Descartes came to dominate modern philosophy. Descartes is not influential, I think, because he came up with an unassailable argument for mind-body dualism. I would go as far as to say that he was not even a thorough-going dualist. But since his time, philosophers have taken sides: idealists like Berkeley seeming to 'side' with mind, materialists and empiricists like Newton or Hume seeming to 'side' with body, and a third group, including Kant and Hegel, seeming to overcome dualism by banging their heads together, dialectically. (May I be forgiven for such a crude summary of hundreds of years of philosophy.) A smaller group of philosophers attacked Descartes head on, saying he was wrong. Amongst those are twentieth-century philosophers like Ryle, who saw dualism as an example of a category mistake (Ryle 1949, p 13–25), Macmurray, who sees only idealism and solipsism in Descartes' cogito (Macmurray 1991a, p 62–83), and Descartes' contemporary, Spinoza. Spinoza describes Descartes' dualist doctrine witheringly:

> Such is the doctrine of this illustrious philosopher (in so far as I gather it from his own words); it is one which, had it been less ingenious, I could hardly believe to have proceeded from so great a man. Indeed, I am lost in wonder, that a philosopher, who had stoutly asserted, that he would draw no conclusions which do not follow from self-evident premises, and would affirm nothing which he did not clearly and distinctly perceive, and who had so often taken to task the scholastics for wishing to explain obscurities through occult qualities, could maintain a hypothesis, beside which occult qualities are commonplace. (Spinoza 1955, p 246)

As an undergraduate philosophy student, I wondered why we studied philosophers who seemed so easy to argue against. It took a long time to realise that it might be valuable to study Descartes even if I still thought him 'wrong'. And the value of studying him is that, as I later came to

realise, he was not quite a dualist. The rich ambiguity in Descartes' account of dualism was what stimulated so much interesting philosophy. As Smith says, the 'two marks of supreme genius in a philosopher' are, one, 'to build a whole system' around a single idea, 'and two, to begin the enterprise of refuting it' (Smith, quoting Brown and de Sousa, in Beauregard and Smith 2016, p 82). Dualism is fascinating and powerful in its very imperfections, some of which were recognised by Descartes. The same can be said of its opposite, monism (the idea that there is only one 'substance', one type of 'stuff')—with idealists able to be described as mind-monists, materialists as body-monists, and so on. This chapter, therefore, uses as its guide the overcoming of different aspects of dualism. As a book presenting a philosophy of schooling, it is the dualisms represented in schools that I focus on, especially those relating to the curriculum. I do this not to promote monism (although certain forms of holism are recommended), but to promote the process of admitting-and-overcoming dualism. That process provides a dynamism to all of learning and to schooling in particular.

Dualism has a long history, predating Descartes. Ancient beliefs in the distinction between forms and bodies (e.g. in Plato's *Phaedo*), the fundamental conflict between good and evil (e.g. in Zoroastrian traditions), or the division of the world into the spiritual and the physical (e.g. in Manichaean and Bogomil traditions) (Bowker 1997) have been influential well beyond the religious communities in which the ideas developed. Christianity, for example, is not usually described as dualist in such ways, but Descartes was a dualist. Descartes' dualism seems to have more in common with the dualism of Bogomilism (deemed heretical by Christian churches) than with the Roman Catholic philosophy of Descartes' own professed church. As the Catholic philosopher Maritain says, 'Christianity forcefully emphasizes the unity of the human being, and any recurrence of Platonism – for instance the way in which Descartes … separated the soul … from the body … and lodged the mind in the pineal gland, like a waterworks engineer in the midst of his machines – is but a distortion of the Christian idea of man' (Maritain 1962, p 129). The complex history of dualism in philosophical and religious traditions is more convoluted than can be described here. Even the contrast—given above—between dualism and monism is missing the further possibility of pluralism, the existence of more than two fundamental substances.

In this chapter, the idea of overcoming dualism is used to tackle a number of divisions encountered in schooling, and the ways in which they may—at least to an extent—be overcome. The divisions include those between minds and bodies and between 'us' and 'them', and they bring into focus the appropriateness of the school curriculum. As Macmurray says, 'any philosophy which takes the "Cogito" as its starting point and centre of reference institutes a formal dualism of theory and practice; and … this dualism makes it formally impossible to give any account, and indeed to conceive the possibility of persons in relation, whether the relation be theoretical – as knowledge, or practical – as co-operation' (Macmurray 1991a, p 73). Dualism means that 'thought is essentially private' and is therefore 'the contrary of action' (Macmurray 1991a, p 73), making philosophy 'a bubble floating in an atmosphere of unreality' (Macmurray 1991a, p 78). Overcoming dualism, moving—in its simplest form—from two towards one, therefore implies a curriculum, as well as a pedagogy, that recognises the movement towards 'oneness'. In my 'manifesto' (the *Afterword* of this book), I describe the movement in this form: 'the school I would like will be one in which there is an attempt to overcome divisions, whether these are divisions between the intellectual and the physical, between the theoretical and the personal, between subjects of the curriculum, between groups of people, between people and nature, or between parts of what exists and all that exists'.

Minds, Bodies, and Schools

Within schools, there are many forms of dualism. Mind-body dualism is seen in schools—especially for those over the age of 11 or 12—in their stress on being intellectual places, where bodies are annoying inconveniences and only cognitive development matters. The contrast between those who describe schools as places where children learn authoritative truths, and those who describe schools as places where children learn holistically (covering, for example, 'the intellectual, emotional, physical, social, aesthetic, and spiritual', Miller et al. 2005, p 2, quoted in Chap. 4) is often—if not always—a contrast between dualists and monists. An

example of the former is the tradition running from Plato through Peters and on to many of what Carr calls 'traditionalists' (in Siegel 2009, p 284). Plato, he says, conceives of education involving 'an encounter with objective truth(s)', whilst later traditionalists in 'liberal' education added other elements—such as literature and the arts—in their approach to the 'transmission of culture' (Carr, in Siegel 2009, p 284). Although the traditionalism of Plato and liberal education clearly intended education—latterly schooling—to have an ethical, social, and political impact on pupils, they still saw it as an intellectual pursuit, and one in search of objective truth. Hand describes this as the 'academic curriculum' of Peters:

> According to this theory, the basic components of the school curriculum should be academic subjects or disciplines. The primary responsibility of schools is to initiate children and young people into forms of theoretical inquiry.
>
> Why? The classic and most fully articulated justification of this view is the one offered by R. S. Peters. … Peters' justification rests on two claims: (i) that initiating people into theoretical activities is just what the word 'education' means, and (ii) that theoretical activities are worthwhile. (Hand, in Bailey 2010, p 51)

The 'worth' of such education, according to Hand, lies in its search for truth. This focus on the 'theoretical inquiry' of 'academic subjects and disciplines' is reflected in an oft-repeated hierarchical approach to school subjects. Some school subjects, according to this approach, are more important than others, and their importance lies in their relationships to academic disciplines. Hence, 'disciplinary knowledge offers core foundations for education, from which the subjects of the curriculum are derived' whilst other subjects are of lower status: '[s]ome very worthwhile areas of learning apply such knowledge in particular ways or foreground particular areas of skill or competence – but have weaker epistemological roots' (DfE 2011, p 24). The 'proper' subjects of the school curriculum are those that are junior versions of the academic disciplines developed in universities. But there are several problematic distortions in such an account. It distorts the academic disciplines as there is no straightforward 'theoretical' division between disciplines. All academic disciplines have complex and porous identities; they grow and shrink and change into

other disciplines. Having myself worked for 25 years in universities as an education specialist (with a philosophy background), I have been categorised variously as part of 'education', 'professional studies', 'life sciences', 'social sciences', and 'psychological and social sciences', amongst others; I have worked with those in business schools, arts faculties, humanities departments, theology and religious studies departments, departments of linguistics, and more. What is my discipline, and what are my boundaries? I am not sure, and I am not sure that it matters. 'Education', incidentally, is rather looked down upon in most universities, as it is a 'discipline' (or perhaps 'field') only invented by Peters and colleagues in Hull in 1964 as a result of Peters describing the 'urgent necessity for conceptual clarity in the field of education':

> [T]he result of this intervention was the immediate convening by the government's Department of Education of a closed seminar held in Hull in March 1964, at which selected professors of education from England, led by Peters, hammered out the structure within which educational studies in England and Wales would expand and develop over the coming two decades.
>
> The new foundation disciplines, which the conference endorsed, were to include philosophy, psychology, sociology and history (rather than Peters' original proposal of economics). … [T]he study of pedagogy and curriculum were specifically excluded from the Hull conference. (Furlong 2013, p 28–29)

Education has in the last half century sometimes moved towards being a discipline more than a field, but phrases like 'education studies' and 'educational studies' are signs of low status in the academic world (likewise, 'media studies', 'gender studies', 'film studies', or 'sports studies'). The initial exclusion of pedagogy and curriculum from the field (although they were later allowed a small, low status, position) also points to a second distortion: that university disciplines (or subjects, or fields) that are professionally oriented are not 'proper' disciplines. This, despite universities having developed in the UK and across Europe initially to train people for professions—especially for the church, and later law and medicine.

Another set of distortions is based on the idea that school subjects exist primarily for the benefit of university academic disciplines. Beane (1995) describes the uncomfortable relationship between 'disciplines of knowledge' and 'school subjects'. 'Though school-based subject areas, like disciplines of knowledge, partition knowledge into differentiated categories, they are not the same thing as disciplines', he says:

> Some subjects, like history or mathematics, come close, but they are really institutionally based representations of disciplines, since they deal with a limited selection of what is already known within the field. That selection is based on what someone believes ought to be known (or is not worth knowing) about some discipline by people who do not work within it or are unfamiliar with its progress to date. Other subjects, like biology or algebra or home economics, are subsets of disciplines and are limited in even more specialized ways. And still other subjects, like career education or foreign languages, may lay far-reaching claims of connection to some discipline, but their presence in schools really has to do with economic, social, or academic aspirations. (Beane 1995, p 617)

A school subject and an academic discipline 'are not the same things, even though they may be concerned with similar bodies of knowledge' as '[t]hey serve quite different purposes, offer quite different experiences for those who encounter them, and have quite different notions about the fluidity of the boundaries that presumably set one area of inquiry off from others' (Beane 1995, p 617). Amongst other problems are those consequent on academic disciplines being 'territories carved out by academicians for their own interests and purposes':

> [T]he subject approach thus suggests that the "good life" consists of intellectual activity within narrowly defined areas. The notion that this is the only version of a "good life," or the best one, or even a widely desirable one demeans the lives of others outside the academy who have quite different views and aspirations. It is a remnant of the same "top-down" version of the curriculum that has historically served the people in schools so poorly. (Beane 1995, p 618)

Once school subjects are released from their thrall to academic disciplines (or ideal, incorrect, myths of academic disciplines), they can—if appropriate—gain a place in the school curriculum in their own right. Beane himself recommends curriculum integration, bringing down the barriers between school subjects, and there are many good reasons for this—not least, the lack of such barriers outside schools (other than in universities). Why should children's learning in school be separated into distinct packages, when their learning outside—both before and after—school is not divided in that way? Young children do not have a specified hour each day to 'learn language' and another hour a day to 'learn how to eat', to 'learn how to feed ducks', to 'learn how to recognise the danger of fires': all the learning is mixed up (in disciplinary terms) and based around their daily wants and needs and those of others in the household. An 'aims-based curriculum' (Reiss and White 2013) is similarly independent of subjects-for-their-own-sakes. I am agnostic on whether the curriculum should be centred on school subjects, the current interests of the children (the purest form of 'discovery learning'), aims (individual, communal or social aims), skills, or invented 'topics'. All approaches to the curriculum have value and have associated problems. A purely interest-driven curriculum is clearly good at motivating pupils, but pupils with narrow interests may not stretch themselves and would lose opportunities to see if other interests are, as it were, of interest. A topic-based curriculum will gain from applying a wide range of ideas or skills from different disciplines, but once topics become established, they act much like subjects or disciplines. (The 'topic' of literary fiction, previously studied within classics or history, became an academic 'discipline' called 'English', 'French', and so on.) Subjects have a clarity, a history, and a community (whether that is the school-subject-community or an academic-discipline-community) on which to draw, but—as Beane says—the very distinctions of subjects can distort learning and make it harder for children to learn in the muddled and multifaceted way typical of non-school life. What is more important is that the subjects, topics, interests, aims, or skills should not divide—not divide mind from body, individual pupils from each other, or communities (including subject/disciplinary communities) from each other.

The battle to gain a place on the curriculum reflects all of these issues. Moran writes of the conventional school curriculum (in the USA and the UK) in terms of 'doubt' and 'practice'. 'When we are doubtful that there is an academic subject and especially when we want a practical result', he says, 'the word "education" shows up in the curriculum subject itself', so 'we sometimes have such things as physical education, driver education, music education, moral education, sex education as the names of what is taught' (Moran 1989, p 101). To Moran's list of 'E' subjects might be added personal and social education and citizenship education. Appending the word 'education' acts like the word 'studies' in universities: it downgrades the value of the subject as a 'real' academic discipline, or as a valuable school subject based on an academic discipline. Religious education is an interesting example, as it is distanced by its name from theology (a well-established academic discipline), from religious studies (a more recently established academic discipline cursed by the word 'studies'), and from religious nurture in homes and religious communities, and yet it draws on all three traditions—differently in different schools and countries. Cush describes religious studies, religious education, and theology as related like 'big brother, little sister and the clerical uncle' (Cush 1999, p 137). Similar stories could be told of the relationship between citizenship education and politics, physical education and sports science and sports studies, and moral education and philosophy. What remains untenable, though, is the idea that school subjects are most valuable to the extent that they echo academic, theoretical disciplines. The intellectual purity of disciplines themselves is implausibly defended, and school subjects have all kinds of roles in the curriculum other than purely intellectual pursuits. Not only that, but school subjects themselves are not the only viable way of filling a school curriculum.

The issue is one of false dualism, the false dualism implied by the existence of 'pure' intellectual disciplines in contrast to the more applied or practical or professional activities carried out as subsidiary activities in universities or schools. Maritain describes this as a Cartesian dualism, saying that 'any education of the Cartesian … type, any education dealing with the child as with a pure mind or a disembodied intellect, despising or ignoring sense and sensation, punishing imagination as a mere power of deception, and disregarding both the unconscious of the instinct

and the unconscious of the spirit, is a distortion of the Christian idea of education' (Maritain 1962, p 129–130). He describes this as a distortion of the *Christian* idea of education, but I would generalise his comment to apply to *all* schooling. And he brings out the other side of such dualism: the downgrading of the physical. Subjects involving active physical engagement (physical education, design and technology subjects, art, dance, drama) are looked down upon and are put at risk whenever there are funding cuts or high pressure to meet external targets, which are usually themselves focused on high-status subjects such as English (in Anglophone countries) and mathematics. There may have been a 'corporeal turn in social theory' (Ivinson 2012a, p 489), but putting bodies into the analysis of schooling tends to involve challenges—and bodies are often there as 'disruptions' of schooling (Ivinson 2012b; Ivinson and Renold 2013a, b). In its purest form, physicality is seen as a denial of education itself, as in Barrow's description of physical education as 'only marginally related to education' (Barrow 1981, p 60): a valuable activity to have in schools but of no real *educational* value. Sennett blames Aristotle for the downgrading of physical engagement in education. Before Aristotle, '[t]he craftsman represents the special human condition of being *engaged*', with the old word for craftsman being *demioergos*, meaning 'public' and 'productive'; but 'Aristotle … uses instead *cheirotechnon*, which means simply handworker' (Sennett 2008, p 22–23).

Overcoming mind-body dualism in the school curriculum would allow for the 'purest' of intellectual pursuits alongside the most 'handy' of physically engaged pursuits. All are mixed, as Freinet (1993) describes 'work' (in Chap. 7), and this is a more comprehensive curriculum than one in which mind and body are artificially separated. This is a matter of schooling whole people. Best, writing of the importance of the integrity in education, notes that the philosophy of education, as it developed in the 1960s,

> began with (on the one hand) the notion of an educated person (with a somewhat narrowly academic conception of what it is to be educated) and (on the other) with the forms of knowledge into which one was to be initiated. It would have been better to begin with the notion of what it is to be *a whole person*, and of education as *the development of the person*. (Best 1996, p 6)

This suggests to Best the need for a 'person-centred curriculum, and not a subject-centred one' (Best 1996, p 24). This may exaggerate the contrast, though, as a person-centred curriculum might yet use subjects, and a subject-centred curriculum might yet engage with whole persons. Elliott says that we should go back to Dewey's idea of using child-centred teaching methods to enable children to gain access to subjects, and using subjects as 'resources for thinking about the questions, problems and issues that arise in the learners' experience' (Elliott 2011, p 18). Macmurray, too, notes how '[e]ducationalists are beginning to learn that it is of great importance that what children are taught should be real to them', as a focus on merely 'acquiring knowledge' merely 'furnishes their minds with such a mass of useless lumber that they are like those drawing-rooms we used to see in which there was no room to move about' (Macmurray 1992, p 93–94). Whichever way this works, a mind-body dualist curriculum will be a false division, misleading teachers and pupils alike. There is a book's worth of examples: within English, keeping all texts on the page and disavowing speech (spoken poetry, acted plays) (see Iversen, in Birketveit and Williams 2013), within science, ignoring experimentation (other than written accounts of 'experiments of famous scientists') or insisting that pupil experiments must come up with the correct answers (rather than working out why an experiment could produce non-standard results) (see Sinclair and Strachan 2016), within mathematics, seeing infinity as an exclusively intellectual concept (with no social, emotional, and practical implications), or in history, seeing historical sites as mere illustrations (rather than as the very stuff of history itself, the 'fields beneath', Tindall 1977).

Mind-body dualism is regarded by the philosopher Naess as related also to the divisions between people. Whereas Spinoza puts integration or wholeness at the centre of his philosophy, many philosophers are less mature, he says, and *divide*. Descartes' mind-body division also led to him separating human beings from other animals. Similarly, 'Schopenhauer was not very advanced in his relationship to his family … [and] Heidegger was amateurish – to say the least – in his political behavior' (Naess 2008, p 82). 'Our problem', he says, 'is not that we lack high levels of integration (that is, that we are immature and therefore joyless), but rather that we glorify immaturity', hence the low degrees of 'maturity and

integration' of 'Heidegger, Sartre, Kierkegaard, and Wittgenstein, but also Marx and Nietzsche' (Naess 2008, p 125). Naess goes on to note some 'lesser-known but perhaps more mature philosophers, like Jaspers and Whitehead' (Naess 2008, p 125). Such a beauty pageant of philosophers, graded according to their maturity, is rather distasteful, but it is presented here as a serious account of how the dualism of Descartes is linked to other dualisms, with 'us-them' dualism the topic of the next section.

Us and Them

One of the lessons taught most vigorously by schools is how to divide people. Dividing staff from pupils and dividing 'more important' from 'less important' staff; dividing pupils by age and often by achievement, gender, religion, educational needs; dividing the people of this school from other schools, this region or country from other regions or countries, this age from previous ages. These divisions are achieved organisationally, pedagogically, and directly through the material taught in classrooms. The first division is that between 'you' and 'me', in the individualism of Descartes. Taylor describes Descartes as the 'founder of modern individualism' because he 'throws the individual thinker back on his own responsibility, requires him to build an order of thought for himself, in the first person singular', even though he is to 'do so following universal criteria' (Taylor 1989, p 182). But there is another form of individualism, that of Montaigne, who, in contrast, 'is an originator of the search for each person's originality' (Taylor 1989, p 182). Both individualisms, the universal individualism of Descartes and the singular originality of Montaigne, are represented in schools: Descartes in the move to 'pure thinking', Montaigne in the move to 'pure originality'. Yet both individualisms are also seen in individualistic competitiveness and in the sense of individual responsibility. This is Foucault's 'technology of responsibilisation', as described by Peters of education as 'one of the distinctive means of neo-liberal governance of welfare and education' (Peters 2001, p 58), a process 'at once economic and moral' (Peters 2001, p 61). Here, some of the ways of dividing people are described—although many are, at heart, versions of this first form of dualism deriving from Descartes'

cogito. It is worth repeating, from Chap. 4, the warning offered by Buber that individuation is vital, but that the movement to separate should be complemented by a movement towards, hence 'I'm *against* individuals and *for* persons' (Buber, in Buber 1998, p 174). Separating and coming together: a simple dualism is as inappropriate as a simple monism. In school, people are brought together and separated in every subject. Here, I will illustrate from different school subjects the possibilities for 'us and them' dualism and for overcoming dualism.

Mathematics is sometimes seen as a rather solitary and intensely intellectual subject, not needing any applicability to justify itself. Yet the subject is also understandable as a hotbed of political and religious conflict: the number zero and the symbol for infinity were both resisted in Europe, with Fibonacci in the thirteenth century coming across Hindu-Arabic numerals, including zero (i.e. 0, 1, 2, 3 …), but failing to convince many others to adopt them instead of the cumbersome Roman numerals (i.e. I, II, III, IV …) which lacked a zero (Hoffman 1998, p 216). This was in part due to the opposition of church authorities, who objected both to the sense of emptiness in zero (which would allow in the devil) and to the democratisation of calculation if Hindu-Arabic numerals were introduced (Ifrah 1998, p 588–590). As late as the nineteenth century, religious queasiness was expressed by the Prussian Jewish mathematician Kronecker: 'God made the integers; all else is the work of Man' (Hoffman 1998, p 225). Noddings writes of mathematics—her own subject as a teacher—as social and religious in its very being, noting that '[m]ath class may seem an odd place to discuss the existence of God the meaning of life, or the possibility of immortality, but these subjects did not seem odd to [Martin] Gardner, Newton, Pascal, Descartes, Euler, or Leibniz (or to modem mathematicians and computer scientists like Rucker, Hofstadter or Knuth)' (Noddings 1993, p 742). Any pupil who leaves school thinking mathematics is pure, universal, and floating free of the 'real world', has missed out on the political and social embeddedness of mathematics, the ongoing and disputed history of numbers, and the philosophical and religious challenge of infinity and the 'transfinite'—a word for something bigger than infinity, it seems (Hoffman 1998, p 223–224), leaving Cantor, its inventor/discoverer, to accusations of pantheism.

If mathematics as a school subject benefits from understanding how mathematicians work and how the discipline is developing, it will recover the sense of 'learned uncertainty' (Durka 2002, p 1, quoted in Chap. 3). This is just as valuable in science, a subject also cursed with a reputation for intellectualism. Polanyi's ground-breaking personalist account of science, sets out to show that 'complete objectivity as usually attributed to the exact sciences is a delusion and is in fact a false ideal' (Polanyi 1962, p 18). Science is a social, collaborative process, kept alive in communities of scientists. Later, Kuhn was to describe scientific 'paradigms' (Kuhn 1970), but Kuhn's work, hugely influenced by that of Polanyi, was a thinner and less personal account of how science worked. Polanyi describes a scientific tradition as (and as like) an 'art' which 'cannot be specified in detail' and 'cannot be transmitted by prescription' but 'can be passed on only by example from master to apprentice' which 'restricts the range of diffusion to that of personal contacts, and we find accordingly that craftsmanship tends to survive in closely circumscribed local traditions' (Polanyi 1962, p 53):

> It follows that an art which has fallen into disuse for the period of a generation is altogether lost. … These losses are usually irretrievable. It is pathetic to watch the endless efforts – equipped with microscopy and chemistry, with mathematics and electronics – to reproduce a single violin of the kind the half-literate Stradivarius turned out as a matter of routine more than 200 years ago. (Polanyi 1962, p 53)

Becoming a scientist is to learn in community: '[t]o learn by example is to submit to authority', he says, and '[y]ou follow your master because you trust his manner of doing things even when you cannot analyse and account in detail for its effectiveness' (Polanyi 1962, p 53). Pupils who learn about science as though it were a neat progression towards greater and greater truth, believing they are learning simple (or complicated) truths, are missing out on the ways in which real scientists, and real science, work—within communities or (in Kuhn's terms) paradigms that do not make much sense from the outside.

There is a need to attempt a leap into the world of Aristotle, or Newton, or Darwin to understand what they were trying to do in their own worlds.

This movement towards unfamiliar scientific communities will be difficult and may not be fully achieved. But we need to attempt such a leap if science teaching is to give pupils a good sense of the curious, personal, communal worlds created by scientists. A great deal of school science is described as 'Newtonian', as it follows the mechanics of Newton's *Principia* (Newton 1999) rather than the more recent, more complex, relativity and quantum mechanics. Yet in his own day, Newton was accused of being 'occult' and very unscientific in this theory of gravity, a force working at a distance (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/newton/), so his was far from a simple and clear theory—and it has in any case been variously superseded. Again, uncertainty, leaps in the dark, a sense of truths being searched for but the Truth not (yet) being straightforwardly captured—all this gives pupils a good sense of their own place in a continuing conversation, rather than being merely recipients of neatly packaged truths. Recent work on 'big ideas in science' (Harlen 2010, 2015) refuses to describe science in terms of truth: '[s]cientific explanations, theories and models are those that best fit the evidence available at a particular time' (Harlen 2015, p 17). 'Best fit' is as close as these documents go to the truth, and no further.

The sense of science as a messy and personal business is just the start of overcoming dualism in school science. School science affects and is affected by the relationship of pupils and adults in school to the rest of the world. How are non-human animals to be treated? Dissection is rarer in school laboratories than it was, but if science is the subject in which killing and dissecting is practised, and is restricted to non-human animals, what does that say about pupils' sense of scientific insights? (I am not saying that dissection cannot be justified, just that its place in the curriculum teaches a particular lesson about life that goes beyond the understanding of how muscles work or how blood circulates.) The science of the environment, of intelligence, of evolution, of DNA sequencing—these and so many other topics are loaded with personal, social, religious, and political controversies. School science can choose to separate science off from controversy, by claiming it is a pure and rationalist discipline without any need for ethics, but that will simply separate out science and create a false dualism. As described by Haraway, '[t]he major ethical and epistemological issue for me, in trying to understand

what kinds of undertakings the biological and anthropological sciences are, is that knowledge is *always* an engaged material practice and *never* a disembodied set of ideas' (Haraway 2004, p 199–200). Scientific knowledge is 'embedded in projects; knowledge is always *for*, in many senses, some things and not others, and knowers are always formed by their projects, just as they shape what they can know[: s]uch shapings never occur in some unearthly realm; they are always about the material and meaningful interactions of located humans and nonhumans – machines, organisms, people, land, institutions, money, and many other things' (Haraway 2004, p 200).

Pupils often develop subject-related worldviews that they 'wear' in the relevant lessons and discard as they leave the room: the big bang in science lessons, a creator god in religious education lessons; sex as an ordinary biological function in science lessons, sex as a precious personal activity raising issues of choice and morality in personal and social education lessons; wars as interesting objects of study in history lessons, and wars as tragic events recorded by poets in English lessons. Attempting to breach some of the divisions, bringing together poetry and experimentation, morality and history, the personal and the biological: in such ways, pupils will become more integrated as persons, less divided within themselves and able to be less divided from others. The imaginative leaps required to understand science from a different age are as much needed as the leaps needed to understand people from different ages in history, or to understand people of different religions or languages in religious education or foreign language lessons.

Cooling et al. (2014) describe research carried out in UK schools with a Christian foundation, asking how the 'Christian ethos' might be enacted in classrooms. They describe the project as a *What If?* project. What if we learned a foreign language because we wanted to get to know people, rather than merely for our own benefit? Less time might be spent learning how to buy food and travel to a tourist destination, more time might be spent asking about personal interests. Similarly, geography might have more concern for the environment, based on the religious principles of stewardship. Cooling's is a very specific example of asking 'what if?' in school, but the same question can be asked of any philosophy of schooling. What if school were to be understood in personal, community,

dialogic terms—as in this book? Each subject would be taught in distinctive ways, the school hierarchy would be based on a particular range of principles, and so on. That is the way in which this book is structured, taking care, community, dialogue, personhood, curiosity, and learning—along with associated concepts—and building a philosophy of schooling. When it comes to the curriculum, there are just as many implications of these core concepts as there are when Cooling considers the school's religious ethos. In that sense, the work of my book is similar to that of Cooling, even if our 'ifs' are different.

Raising an explicitly religious theory in a philosophical work will concern a number of philosophers who see religion as characterised by blind faith and philosophy as characterised by systematic doubt. Descartes has a lot to answer for. (That is his claim to philosophical greatness.) As Polanyi says, '[i]t has been taken for granted throughout the critical period of philosophy that the acceptance of unproven beliefs was the broad road to darkness, while truth was approached by the straight and narrow path of doubt' (Polanyi 1962, p 269):

> Descartes had declared that universal doubt should purge his mind of all opinions held merely on trust and open it to knowledge firmly grounded in reason. In its stricter formulations the principle of doubt forbids us altogether to indulge in any desire to believe and demands that we should keep our minds empty, rather than allow any but irrefutable beliefs to take possession of them. Kant said that in mathematics there was no room for mere opinion, but only for real knowledge, and that short of possessing a knowledge we must refrain here from all judgment.
>
> The method of doubt is a logical corollary of objectivism. It trusts that the uprooting of all voluntary components of belief will leave behind unassailed a residue of knowledge that is completely determined by the objective evidence. Critical thought trusted this method unconditionally for avoiding error and establishing truth. (Polanyi 1962, p 269)

Polanyi does not think that this method of doubt has ever been rigorously practised, but the belief in doubt (such an odd phrase, to believe in doubt) 'was sustained primarily – from Hume to Russell – by scepticism about religious dogma and the dislike of religious bigotry' (Polanyi 1962, p 281). Whereas such scepticism has value, when pressed, 'the programme

of comprehensive doubt collapses and reveals by its failure the fiduciary rootedness of all rationality' (Polanyi 1962, p 297). There is an act of trust or faith, that is, in all theorising, all knowledge claims. 'Since the sceptic does not consider it rational to doubt what he himself believes, the advocacy of "rational doubt" is merely the sceptic's way of advocating his own beliefs' (Polanyi 1962, p 297).

Conclusion: Towards One

Overcoming dualism is a valuable if not comprehensive tool in organising the school curriculum. The curious communal conversations that take place in schools should include conversations from the past—conversations, as it were, with the dead, those whose voices are carried by literature, history, science, and religion. The conversations need to cross the boundaries inevitably created by communities, whether these are the very local communities created by classes and age groupings in schools, or national communities, or disciplinary communities. This would allow conversations between mathematics and religion and literature, as much as between people living in the UK or Russia or Japan or Australia, or those living in the current century or past centuries. And the conversations should not stop with the teachers, leaving pupils merely as recipients, as listening. Conversations continue into the future. In these ways, divisions are breached. Buber describes his concern as being '[w]ith the break-through and not with perfection' (Buber 2002a, p 41, quoted in Chap. 5). In a similar way, Serres describes the need for breakthrough and the dangers of staying within one's own narrow world—a danger, especially, for academics, as 'reason never discovers, beneath its feet, anything but its own rule' (Serres 1997, p xiii). 'Do schoolmasters realize that they only fully taught those they thwarted, or rather, completed, those they forced to cross?', he asks; '[c]ertainly, I never learned anything unless I left, nor taught someone else without inviting him to leave his nest' (Serres 1997, p 7):

> No learning can avoid the voyage. Under the supervision of a guide, education pushes one to the outside. Depart: go forth. Leave the womb of your

> mother, the crib, the shadow cast by your father's house and the landscapes of your childhood. In the wind, in the rain: the outside has no shelters. Your initial ideas only repeat old phrases. (Serres 1997, p 8)

For Serres, '*[t]he goal of instruction is the end of instruction, that is to say invention*', and the rest is merely '[c]opying, cheating, reproduction, laziness, convention, battle, sleep' (Serres 1997, p 93, italics in the original). I would disagree with his description of 'the rest': copying and reproduction, at least, are vital to all kinds of learning. But the idea of copying and reproduction setting the *limits* to learning: that is, indeed, a dangerous idea. In Chap. 4, I suggested that personhood was achieved in community, but it can also be achieved in solitude—a mixture of going beyond oneself (a form of transcendence) and integrating oneself (an enstatic approach) (as argued in Stern 2014). In this chapter, the movement has been described as overcoming dualism, but the movement is the same, towards a oneness. Yet the oneness or individuality towards which both movements travel is not ever reached. As the poet Hölderlin says, in *The Root of All Evil*, 'Being at one is god-like and good, but human, too human, the mania / Which insists there is only the One, one country, one truth and one way' (Hölderlin 1990, p 139):

> Hyperion's evocation of a lost oneness suggests that we have been torn away from a vital, dynamic order of life coursing through nature, an order that was known to earlier experience but is now concealed by the detached stance of rational knowing and reflective awareness. By recalling the earlier state, *Hyperion* conveys the belief that life has depth, beauty, vibrancy and intensity when it is at its source, but is brittle and disjointed when it is uprooted from the source. (Guignon 2004, p 53)

Hölderlin was Buber's favourite poet (Glatzer and Mendes-Flohr 1991, p 11–12), and the sense of moving towards 'one', but never merging entirely into the one, takes us back to the introduction to this chapter. There is a need for separation as there is a need for overcoming separation. 'Overcoming dualism' is a vital process embedded within the school curriculum, but the idea that this would lead to no separation, no boundaries, no division would lead to the 'god-like' oneness that is for Hölderlin the root of all evil. So overcoming dualism can help us

construct a curriculum for—that is, moving towards—integrity, wholeness, and oneness. The 'one' will not be reached though, just as the movement towards self-realisation (described in Chap. 4) will never be fully achieved.

9

The Politics of Schooling

I will try to be broadly optimistic and will take responsibility for the power that I have, and collaborate with others in and beyond the school to support my own learning and the learning of other people.

Introduction

How can schools be seen as political organisations? Not political as an additional activity but political through-and-through. What is the political role of schooling? I would like to recover the 'ordinary' politics of schooling in order to give more encouragement to those studying and working in schools to believe that they (and not just politicians and policy-makers) are making a difference—and in order to encourage them to make a choice as to what difference they might make. This chapter is a philosophical exploration of the politics of schooling. It is an extension of all the previous arguments in the book, particularly Chaps. 1, 6, and 7 on care, leadership, and sustainability. Chapter 8 re-engaged with a number of previous arguments, exploring divisions between people and within

Julian Stern, *A Philosophy of Schooling*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71571-1_9

the curriculum. This chapter explores politics—how schools work at micro and macro levels. Politics reaches out of schools to local, national, and international governments, political organisations, and social movements, but the politics of schooling starts and—in my view—also in a sense ends in schools themselves.

The most common descriptions of politics refer to power, control, and authority. All too often politics is framed negatively—in terms of inappropriate forms of power, abuse of authority, and aggressive means of control. Politics should be kept out of sport, or religion, or education, so it is said. On topics such as politics, like sex and religion, a certain embarrassment is understandable. As Blase and Anderson say, 'few studies of the politics of schools have much to say about how to break the vicious cycle of destructive political behaviour or how to move beyond the mere management of conflict to seeing it as significant behaviour that can lead to needed changes' (Blase and Anderson 1995, p 12). In other words, politics is about all the bad things that happen, and those actively interested in politics are not to be trusted. This is partly a matter of fear—fear of those wielding power and fear of power itself. The chapter explores fear, then—as a general political issue and as it applies to schools. But I am something of an optimist myself, when it comes to schooling and when it comes to politics. The second half of the chapter, therefore, explores opportunities to contribute positively to schooling, leading, in my 'manifesto' (the *Afterword* of this book), to saying that 'the school I would like will be one in which people are broadly optimistic take responsibility for the power that they have, and collaborate within and beyond the school to support people's learning'.

Power and Fear

Schools can be scary places. The first day at a new school is very often feared. For some pupils, schools remain fearful throughout their time. The fear can be retained, with many parents describing their fear of going to their children's school. A Harvard professor describes her 'terror' at the prospect of meeting her child's teachers (Lawrence-Lightfoot 2003, p xviii). These seem like 'small' fears, and yet the political philosophy of

fear is of huge significance. Researching in schools over many years in several countries, I am confident that most teachers value holistic learning and relationships with pupils above all else. Interviewing 63 school staff—mostly teachers and headteachers—for one project (Stern 2009a), there was almost no mention of school inspection, audit, league tables, or any other external policies and controls when questioned about what was important to them in school. This made me more optimistic. And yet I still find teachers implementing policies they feel are inappropriate for their pupils, teaching a curriculum designed more for external bodies than for the pupils in the school, and using language like that of the principal quoted in Chap. 5—who said the school's 'number one priority' was 'to help our students gain essential skills to master all Standardized Assessment tests'. That is a puzzle—a political puzzle. According to Macmurray, the main reason teachers do not always do what they think is right, is *fear*. In Chap. 1, I quoted Macmurray on the role of fear in preventing us from caring. In a virtuoso rhetorical piece of writing from 1964 (originally a BBC radio broadcast), Macmurray uses fear to link the problem of our obsession with examination results to world poverty and war:

> The resources now in our hands, with the knowledge and techniques for their use, have greatly increased and go on increasing almost automatically. Already we are in a position to eliminate from the whole world in the space of a generation the threat of hunger and gross poverty, and most of the diseases that cripple and kill. The cost? Considerably less than is being spent today on preparations for war. And since this war must never happen, all *this* expense, is wasted. If all the national governments were to agree on a plan of co-operation, to eliminate war and turn the resources we should save to ending poverty and disease, the thing could be accomplished before our children had reached middle-age. There would be difficulties, undoubtedly, but none which, in principle, could not be overcome. So the world today has reached the borders of Utopia. (Macmurray 1979, p 13)

Having reached the borders of Utopia, why do we not cross the border?

> Even if you accept these facts, I expect that some of you will say, 'But, of course, it won't happen!'. That reminds me of a time when I was concerned

> about the effects of examinations in our schools and colleges. I took every opportunity to consult with teachers. 'Don't you find,' I would ask, 'that the examination system frustrates your efforts to educate your pupils?' Mostly I got an affirmative answer. Where upon I would go on: 'Then let's get rid of it.' Astonishingly often the reply was, 'Oh! but you can't do that!'
>
> Why not? If examinations frustrate education, why can't we stop them? And if we could produce a world of health and plenty by ending the military tradition, and uniting to eliminate poverty and disease, why can't we? The only answer that I can find is that we are afraid to. Fear has been, from the beginning, one of the major forces in human society. (Macmurray 1979, p 13)

Fear, Macmurray concludes, has 'dogged our steps', it has 'exiled the visionaries, killed the prophets and blocked the roads of advance', and now 'when opportunity is at a maximum, we have maximized fear and concentrated it, until unless we can overcome it we are likely to be driven to the final insanity of racial suicide' (Macmurray 1979, p 13). In the half century since Macmurray wrote this, the children he referred to have indeed reached middle age. Much has changed in the world, but the fears are just as great today, and they still seem to be blocking both the small-scale and the large-scale political developments he had hoped would have been achieved. Fear is still a powerful force (it is not alone, but it is a powerful force), and it links school issues to broader issues. Macmurray's is not the only political philosophy giving such a prominent place to fear. What is unusual in the account given of his views is the sense that fear could be defeated. Even in his old age, having lived through two world wars and much else besides, he had a reasonably optimistic attitude.

An interesting contrast can be made, though, with the philosopher Hobbes. Both philosophers put fear at the centre of their political philosophies, and both recognise the *personal* nature of fear, starting—for Hobbes—with his very birth. It is said that Hobbes, who lived through all the political and social upheavals of seventeenth-century England, was a fearful man: 'my mother gave birth to twins: myself and fear' (Hobbes, quoted in Gert 2010, p 1). His masterpiece, *Leviathan* (1968), was his way of dealing with fear. Fear and being afraid is mentioned 187 times in the book, and he describes a 'state of nature' of human beings, in which every person is right to fear every other person, and so 'the life of man' is

'solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short' (Hobbes 1968, p 186). Overcoming a fear of that kind of life, society needs a Leviathan, a giant—and also feared—autocrat who brings peace. 'The Passions that encline men to Peace, are Feare of Death; Desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a Hope by their Industry to obtain them' (Hobbes 1968, p 188). It is a 'Fundamental Law of Nature' that

> *every man, ought to endeavour Peace …; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of Warre … to defend our selves.* (Hobbes 1968, p 190, emphasis in original)

Macmurray, in contrast, rejects the 'naturalness' of such competitive brutality, and from a basis in communal care starting within the family, builds a political philosophy that is centred on freedom and democracy. Why, then, does fear seem to have almost as big a role in Macmurray's philosophy as it did in Hobbes' philosophy? In some ways, they are complementary philosophies: one dominated by unavoidable fear, the other dominated by the avoidance of fear; one careful, the other caring. Both philosophers link fear to the politics of small-scale communities as well as to nations, and they can therefore also be related to schooling.

Why did these two philosophers draw such different conclusions from their analyses of fear? They both agree that fear of all kinds can be traced back to a fear of death. Macmurray faced death with what seems like considerable courage. In World War I, he joined up as a medic and went to the Somme. He soon faced death.

> The first, and perhaps the most effective change which the experience of the battlefield worked in me, was the result of becoming familiar with death. In normal civilian life one hardly ever meets death, and when one does, it is heavily disguised. For the combatant soldier it is not an idea; it is a stark, ever-present, unavoidable fact. (Macmurray 1995, p 17)

Different people, he said, would be differently affected: '[w]ith me it resulted in a quick and complete acceptance of death, for myself as well as for my comrades[:] … it removed for ever the *fear* of death' (Macmurray 1995, p 18, emphasis in original). For Macmurray, '[t]he fear of death is

the symbol in us of all fear', and, even more importantly, 'fear is destructive of reality' (Macmurray 1995, p 18). Macmurray's experience in the trenches contrasted with his experience on home leave. There, he felt civilians acted 'as though an evil spirit had entered into them, a spirit of malice and hatred', and '[b]efore twenty-four hours had passed I wanted to get back to the trenches, where for all the misery and destruction, the spiritual atmosphere was relatively clean' (Macmurray 1995, p 20).

The lesson learned by Macmurray in the war was that overcoming the fear of death means overcoming all fear. This, he applied directly to schools as fear limits the 'reality' of those in schools, and should be overcome. Whereas Macmurray experienced war first hand, Hobbes, in contrast, avoided war. He left England for France in 1640, claiming with some pride that 'he was among the first to flee the civil war' (Gert 2010, p 1). This is not to say that Hobbes was cowardly. His writings were daring—daring today, and even more so in the seventeenth century. It was that Macmurray and Hobbes reacted to war and death in different ways. Hobbes believed that 'the primary goal of reason is to avoid death' (Gert 2010, p 1) whereas Macmurray, through his wartime experiences, believed that we should deal with our knowledge of death by 'overcom[ing] the fear of it' (Macmurray 1935, p 38). The constant fear of death is, in the end, the fear of the Other, which is in turn the fear of life:

> The fear of the Other is, at bottom, the fear of life; and this has two aspects, which are ultimately one – it is the fear of other people and the fear of Nature. Death is at once our defeat at the hand of the forces of nature and our final isolation from the community of the living. (Macmurray 1991b, p 165)

Those who are in constant fear of death, therefore, necessarily fear life. The idea of fearing life is well captured by the poet Larkin, who said '[l]ife is first boredom, then fear' (Larkin 1988, p 153). The psychologist Erikson presents the other side of this: 'healthy children will not fear life if their elders have integrity enough not to fear death' (Erikson from *Childhood and Society*, quoted in Arthur 1990, p 150). Gandhi says it even more poetically: '[t]hose who defy death are free from all fear' (Gandhi 1951, p 248). Passing on fear across the generations—or avoiding passing on

fear—this is a choice made within schools. So Hobbes feared death and used reason to avoid it as long as he could. Macmurray overcame his fear of death, and therefore—he believed—overcame his fear of life. Macmurray's account of overcoming fear by facing it is an important dimension of his philosophy, and it is in the application to school communities of Macmurray's approaches to fear that is, I believe, of considerable value. Macmurray said that fear haunts all forms of community—family, friends, religious communities, and schools:

> Fear freezes the spontaneity of life. The more fear there is in us, the less alive we are. Fear accomplishes this destruction of life by turning us in upon ourselves and so isolating us from the world outside us. That sense of individual isolation which is so common in the modern world, which is often called 'individualism', is one of the inevitable expressions of fear. (Macmurray 1992, p 32)

This form of 'individualism', expressed as 'egocentricity' and 'selfishness' leads to a 'life which is fear-determined', he says, and 'fundamentally on the defensive' (Macmurray 1992, p 33). Such a life 'is permeated by the feeling of being alone in a hostile world' (Macmurray 1992, p 33): this might be a description of Hobbes' 'state of nature', and it has a great deal in common with Macpherson's account of Hobbes' philosophy, centred on its 'possessive individualism' (Macpherson 1962). Macmurray and Hobbes, therefore, agree that fear leads to individualism which in turn leads to defensiveness and misery. Where they differ is in the possibility of 'escape' from fear. Hobbes understands the only way out of a nasty, brutish, short life is by the creation of a greater fear—that of government by the Leviathan. Life may remain somewhat nasty, but it will be longer, as people will no longer attempt to kill each other, as they will all fear punishment by the government. For Hobbes, this is not a mere theory: he described himself as living in fear, being born with fear as his inseparable twin. Macmurray, in contrast, found escape from the fear of death precisely in recognising that death was inevitable. The purpose of government was not to create enough fear to stop people from killing each other. It was to enable friendship in community to flourish.

Political systems at any scale can be founded, as Hobbes describes it, primarily on a (rational) fear or they can be founded, as Macmurray describes it, primarily on friendship—which does not 'depend upon pure reason' (Macmurray 1946c, p 8). Sitting alongside Hobbes are many other social contract theorists. Such theories are often driven by fear. Even Rawls (1972) bases his justice-oriented political theory on a social contract to be agreed by people sitting behind a 'veil of ignorance', assuming that the veil ensures they would fear the consequences of a system in which some are unfairly treated. It is not enough that the system should be fair: what is needed is ignorance of whether you are to benefit from or be harmed by the unfair system, to motivate you to agree to a fair system. Sitting alongside Macmurray are those who base politics on positive relationships. As described in Chap. 2, Macmurray and Aristotle, for example, both put friendship at the heart of their politics. Aristotle goes as far as to say that 'in a tyranny there is little or no friendship' (Aristotle 1976, p 278, quoted in Chap. 6).

Schools can be based on fear—fear of punishment, fear of failure, fear of bullying—just as much as nations can be based on fear. Few explicitly recommend fear as a motivator in school, but occasionally a fear-driven educational philosophy is revealed. The UK secretary of state for education, John Patten, complained of lessening expectation of eternal damnation amongst young people. He said that 'the loss of that fear has meant a critical motive has been lost to young people when they decide whether to try to be good citizens or criminals' (Macleod 1992). Although coverage of his comments clearly related them to his (Catholic) religious beliefs, Ball says that the principles of Patten and other 'new right' thinkers in the educational politics of the 1980s and 1990s 'could trace its philosophy back to Hobbes' (Ball 1994, p 29). Other education writers describe—in negative terms—the use of fear in schools, and the need to reduce its use. Harber (2002, 2004) writes of 'schooling as violence', including both physical and psychological violence, and describes how 'authoritarianism in schools and classrooms' creates an 'association of pain and fear with learning' (Harber 2002, p 11), whilst Chater writes of 'education as violence to the spirit' (in Ota and Chater 2007, Chap. 7). Failure in school is seen by Holt as generated by fear: fear of embarrassment, fear of failure, fear, perhaps, even of success (Holt 1964), and Barth

describes the 'biggest problem besetting schools' as the 'primitive quality of human relationships', which leads to 'children and adults … frequently behave[ing] like infants, complying with authority from fear or dependence' (Barth 1990, p 36). More positively, Ayers describes a 'good school' as 'fearless' (Ayers 2004, p 39), and Noddings, noting how 'schools have often induced fear, boredom, subjugation and feelings of inadequacy', describes how 'good education' will take place in caring institutions (Noddings, in Lees and Noddings 2016, p 1). And Fielding describes the headteacher Alex Bloom, working in London in the 1940s and 1950s, who believed that 'at the root of much bad education, in both its broad and narrow senses, is the utilisation of fear, either as a motivating device for good behaviour or as a deterrence for its opposite', noting that 'fear enslaves and inhibits … [and] destroys the personality', in contrast to Bloom's view of education—including his work as a headteacher—which 'implies growth … of the whole personality' (Fielding, quoting Bloom, in Burke and Jones 2014, p 89).

The role of fear in politics—incorporating the politics of schooling—is complex. It is the *dominance* of fear that is objected to by Noddings, Ayers, Bloom, or Harber, but there must be room for some risk or stress that might induce some fear. Gill (2007) writes of an increasingly 'risk-averse' society that attempts to make children wholly safe: as dangerous, he says, to try to avoid fear at all costs as it is to be dominated by fear. In fact, Gill suggests that adult fears—fears of litigation, of being sued—are the source of a risk-averse culture that tries to abolish all fear. Even friendship or love, the positive relationship that is central to the politics of both Macmurray and Aristotle, has an element of risk and fear. Facer writes of 'the self as democratic agent' in schools as implying 'the simultaneous fear and confidence engendered in the recognition of dependence upon others', with friendship described as 'that unique relation of fear and trust' (Facer, in Lees and Noddings 2016, p 74). It is the *misuse* of fear as the basis for all politics that is dangerous. Fear and love, according to Costello's biography of Macmurray, are 'the two founding motives in human beings', and fear can have 'value' but is 'misuse[d] and abuse[d] … in totalitarianism' (Costello 2002b, p 290). Macmurray's work has echoes in the social psychology of Mitscherlich. Living through Germany in the 1930s, and attending some of the Nuremburg trials in his professional

capacity as a psychologist (Mitscherlich and Mielke 1949), he used his understanding of totalitarianism to analyse post-war Germany. Authority had been so misused before and during the war that survivors were unable to mourn (Mitscherlich and Mitscherlich 1975) and became a 'fatherless society' (Mitscherlich 1993). It is not that Germans had 'got over' the experience of the years of totalitarianism. They had rejected mourning and rejected authority altogether as both were too uncomfortable. Fearing their own history, Germans were unable to rebel against authority, leading to what is described as a 'fraternal society' (Mitscherlich and Mitscherlich 1975, p 305, described by Bly as the 'sibling society', in Mitscherlich 1993, p xvii). Education was tightly controlled in totalitarian Germany, but this meant education failed. '[E]ducation can never be complete' as '[a]n educated man … [is] one who has retained his youthful receptiveness to the new and the unknown', he says, so '[d]ogmatic certainty is the end of education': '[t]he educated philistine is as uneducated as the ignoramus' (Mitscherlich 1993, p 13–14).

The politics of schooling reflects—and contributes to—wider politics. Fear-driven politics, like fear-driven schooling, typically divides people encouraging individualism and competitiveness and works against both friendship and self-realisation. 'The world cannot be saved by the exercise of power', Macmurray says, as '[t]o use power … is to appeal to fear: it is to make another afraid to refuse obedience to your command' (Macmurray 1995, p 77). He continues, saying that '[t]he State acts through fear to maintain the common life of a society' (Macmurray 1995, p 78) whereas it is left to communities—family, religion, schools—to 'act through love to maintain and to create a community' (Macmurray 1995, p 78). That is why Macmurray's approach to fear—his way of tackling Hobbes' twin—is so radical and so significant. It is also the basis of his qualified optimism.

Optimism and Anarchism

When asked about a political issue, I once, somewhat flippantly, described my position as that of an optimistic anarchist. The phrase 'optimistic anarchist' stuck with me, even if it is a long way from capturing my

political views. Optimism comes from a sense that it is possible to contribute positively—through schooling, and in other ways. Anarchism comes from a sense that this is possible precisely because there is more power at local level than people might expect. There is an alternative to succumbing to national or international policy-makers. Anarchism has many forms. There are individualist and social versions, and amongst the social versions there are mutualist, federalist, collectivist, anarcho-communist, and anarcho-syndicalist varieties (Suissa 2006, p 7–15), and there is even a looser form of 'post-anarchism' (Newman 2010). Broadly, I find most valuable those forms of anarchism that do for communities what personalism does for persons: the anarchism that sees relatively small-scale communities as the dominating features of politics. It is not that larger-scale political entities—such as nation-states—are necessarily malicious: they are, rather, somewhat redundant, unnecessary, superfluous, or, in Kropotkin's terms, 'impotent' (Kropotkin 1995, p 39). Such an approach is one of radical subsidiarity. Subsidiarity is 'the principle that a central authority should have a subsidiary function, performing only those tasks which cannot be performed effectively at a more immediate or local level', OED 2005). Taking decisions at the most local possible level is an anarchist approach, even if the principle of subsidiarity originated in the far-from-anarchist Roman Catholic Church. Pope Benedict XVI described subsidiarity as 'an expression of inalienable human freedom', to be 'closely linked to the principle of solidarity …, since the former without the latter gives way to social privatism, while the latter without the former gives way to paternalist social assistance that is demeaning to those in need' (quoted in Llach 2013, p 1). Llach explains this in terms of a balance of 'freedom or self-determination' that 'protect[s] the autonomy of every person … the family and the different communities of the civil society' and the 'necessities' obliging 'upper entities to subsidiarily assist those that can't satisfy their basic human needs by themselves' (Llach 2013, p 1–2). More radical subsidiarity, towards the anarchist end of the spectrum of views (as represented by Illich, for example, as described in Chap. 7), would see the local as even more important and the national and international as less important.

What makes me *optimistic* is that I do not think that nation-states or other powerful large-scale political entities (international organisations

such as the UN, European Union, or NATO, or multinational companies which tower over most nation states in terms of economic power at least) hold our future in their hands. They do not even hold the present in their hands. There is (more) power in the hands of small-scale local communities, including families, friendship groups, schools, and religious communities, and this power can dominate our lives—our political, lived-together, personally significant lives. Members of these communities may choose to do so in positive ways, promoting justice and inclusion in their response to larger-scale inequities and inequalities. I am not optimistic in the sense that everything will turn out wonderfully well. Care and curiosity in dialogue will not make crises—individual, communal, or global crises—disappear, but they will give us a chance to face the crises, and even if the world we know were destroyed, we could 'go beyond that abyss, in dialogue' (Stern 2009b, p 280). I am optimistic in the sense that people in schools make a difference, not just within the school, but well beyond—geographically and temporally. Bryk's analysis of Catholic high schools uses subsidiarity to describe what the best schools can do. He notes that 'subsidiarity means that the school rejects a purely bureaucratic conception of an organization', so 'instrumental considerations about work efficiency and specialization must be mediated by a concern for human dignity' (Bryk 1995, p 88). Subsidiarity involves the decentralisation of governance which 'is predicated on a view about how personal dignity and human respect are advanced when work is organized around small communities where dialogue and collegiality may flourish' (Bryk 1995, p 88). The 'full potential of persons is realized' through small groups like schools, and this combines the 'ideas of personalism and subsidiarity' (Bryk 1995, p 88).

'Personalist subsidiarity' is not quite as good a slogan as 'optimistic anarchism', but they are related. As with the previous chapter (Chap. 8), this one combines descriptive work on what schools are, inevitably, with what schools can be. But this ambition is not a distant Utopianism: it is about what pupils, teachers, and others in school can choose to do now. The personalist Mounier describes how politics 'enters into everything' (Mounier 1952, p 111), and linking the personal and the political has been popularised by feminists since the late 1960s. Many personalists and feminists would go further and say that it is the personal that is the

most important 'scale' of the political, and those who do are in that way linked to a range of anarchist philosophies. The personal being political also in most cases implies an ability—a responsibility—of persons to influence politics, the basis for my claim to optimism. There is a negative form of 'responsibilisation', Foucault's 'technology of responsibilisation' as described by Peters as 'one of the distinctive means of neo-liberal governance of welfare and education' (Peters 2001, p 58), a process 'at once economic and moral' (Peters 2001, p 61) (quoted in Chap. 8). However, that is a false responsibility, giving people the blame for their situation without giving them the power to change the situation. Derived from such negative responsibilisation is the cruel optimism described by Berlant: 'cruel optimism exists when something you desire is actually an obstacle to your flourishing' (Berlant 2011, p 1). Instead of such cruel optimism, I will argue for a politics of schooling that is genuinely optimistic, even if in a qualified way. This section starts with some explicitly anarchist educational accounts and moves on to discuss why optimism is a worthwhile attitude to schooling.

Individualist libertarian anarchism is perhaps the best-known form of anarchism, and the one most criticised, too, as combining the worst features of capitalism (egoistic individualism) with a lack of the economic organisations that make capitalism so productive. Marx and Engels criticise Stirner's individualist anarchism, referring sarcastically to the 'egoistic individual' who may 'inflate himself to the size of an atom, i.e., to an unrelated, self-sufficient, wantless, absolutely full, blessed being' (Marx and Engels, *The Holy Family*, in Selsam and Martel 1963, p 310–311). Such anarchism, they say, is atomistic and harmful. However, it is not individualist but *social* forms of anarchism that interest me here, as they are—in part at least—related to the personalism of Mounier or Macmurray. Kropotkin is a good place to start, as his theorising was a direct response to the philosophy of Hobbes. 'There always were writers who took a pessimistic view of mankind', he said, and who 'concluded that mankind is nothing but a loose aggregation of beings, always ready to fight with each other, and only prevented from so doing by the intervention of some authority' (Kropotkin 1987, p 74–75). This is Hobbes' position, he says, and that of the Social Darwinists such as TH Huxley: 'the Hobbesian philosophy has plenty of admirers still; and we have had

of late quite a school of writers who, taking possession of Darwin's terminology rather than of his leading ideas, made of it an argument in favour of Hobbes's views upon primitive man, and even succeeded in giving them a scientific appearance', and 'Huxley, as is known, took the lead of that school' (Kropotkin 1987, p 75). It is interesting to note Kropotkin's association of Hobbes and pessimism.

Although Kropotkin opposed Social Darwinism, he was an admirer of Darwin's work and recognised the mutuality in Darwin's description of nature, rather than the competitiveness in Huxley's account—or Tennyson's 'Nature, red in tooth and claw' (http://www.theotherpages.org/poems/books/tennyson/tennyson04.html). He gives many examples of mutual aid amongst (non-human) animals, amongst human beings throughout history and around the world, and 'amongst ourselves': an example of 'ourselves' being the activities of the Cyclists' Alliance Club (Kropotkin 1987, p 220). His argument is not strictly a biological one as he recognises the social and cultural influences on human behaviour. It is an argument that is historical and anthropological but supported by the possibility—described by Darwin and ignored by Huxley—of cooperative as well as competitive behaviours having evolved. 'What Kropotkin experienced among the Russian peasants, the Swiss watchmakers, and his own comrades in the revolutionary movement', says Shatz, 'was a moral community whose members instinctively recognized each other's fundamental human worth and dignity' (Shatz, introduction to Kropotkin 1995, p xix). His views on community are similar to—and influenced—those of Buber. Buber 'had considerable sympathy for the social philosophy of anarchist thinkers such as Kropotkin and Proudhon' (Suissa 2006, p 30) but differed on the role of the state. Kropotkin believed that the second half of the nineteenth century 'furnishes a living proof that representative government is impotent to discharge all the functions we have sought to assign to it'; hence, we have 'witnessed the failure of parliamentarianism' (Kropotkin 1995, p 39). It is this that separates Kropotkin from Buber, as Buber recognised the possibility of a national government with some moral and political value—albeit as a 'community of communities' (Suissa 2006, p 30). But both agree that it is smaller-scale communities that are the more important moral and political units.

Mutuality is well represented in Kropotkin's view of schooling. His concern with most methods of schooling was the damage caused by the division of labour. Just as in the workplace, where there were classes of, for example, theoretical scientists, applied engineers, and manual workers, so in schools there was a separation of 'brain work' and 'manual work'. Pupils typically study 'real things from mere graphical representations, instead of making those things themselves' (Kropotkin 1998, p 176). He advocated 'the *education intégrale*, or complete education, which means the disappearance of that pernicious distinction' (Kropotkin 1998, p 172). Such 'complete' education, similar to that recommended by Freinet (1993, described in Chap. 7), would mean that 'on leaving school at the age of 18 or 20, each boy and each girl should be endowed with a thorough knowledge of science – such a knowledge as might enable them to be useful workers in science – and, at the same time, to give them a general knowledge of what constitutes the bases of technical training, and such a skill in some special trade as would enable each of them to take his or her place in the grand world of the manual production of wealth' (Kropotkin 1998, p 172–173). Despite writing over a century ago, his views seem modern today and progressive but with little of the radicalism of Illich's deschooling (Illich 1971). It is important to recognise, though, the way in which he stressed 'independent thought', a 'sincere longing for truth', and pupils feeling their 'heart[s] at unison with the rest of humanity' in school, and attacked 'parrot-like repetition, slavishness and inertia of mind' (Kropotkin 1998, p 176–178), as central to a revolutionary political reform movement.

What will such schools be like? Schools can be places where self-realisation happens, I suggest, in a community as described by Macmurray, through dialogue as described by Buber. It is the very nature of the school as a community (not a 'society') that creates the space in which such relationships can flourish. Schools are connected to wider social organisations, which gives the schools their influence (and which makes them 'public', to an extent), but they are also communities in themselves, like families and friendship groups (which separates them from social organisations and makes them 'private', to an extent). I have argued that this means schools are like households (Stern 2012, described in Chap. 2). Brogan writes similarly of the 'exilic classroom' (Brogan 2017), in an

account of university classrooms that is—I think—equally applicable to school classrooms. These are 'spaces of relative autonomy created by socially and economically non-dominant groups to develop their own forms of relationships apart from the dominant expectations of wider society' (Brogan 2017, p 514). He calls them 'exilic' because they are places for people in 'exile from' the dominant structures or cultures, like de Certeau's description of the 'everyday' actions that 'subvert' the intentions of the governing or dominant group (Brogan 2017, p 516–517; de Certeau 1984). Brogan describes what happens in such classrooms as anarchist because 'anarchism is not an abstract concept of freedom, nor a means to a particular end, but an everyday practice of individuals', it is 'a matter of how one lives' (Brogan 2017, p 519, quoting Landauer). Teachers in such exilic classrooms experience a 'constant tension between fulfilling the expectations of the institution in order to keep her job, and attempting to create exilic classrooms' (Brogan 2017, p 521), but '[w]hat is interesting is the potential for what can occur when an exilic classroom can be formed, whether relationships form along anarchic lines or not' (Brogan 2017, p 521).

Kropotkin said he did not 'cherish the illusion' that all schools might change in the way he hoped 'as long as the civilised nations remain under the present narrowly egotistic system of production and consumption', but he did say that we could expect 'some microscopical attempts' at integrated or complete schooling (Kropotkin 1998, p 180). The British anarchist Ward wrote of one such example—St. George-in-the-East Secondary Modern School, in the East End of London, led by Alex Bloom—with Ward writing a eulogistic obituary for Bloom. Fielding describes the links between anarchist theory and Bloom's practice (Fielding, in Burke and Jones 2014, Chap. 7; Fielding 2005). The school is described as an example of 'democratic fellowship', an '[i]nterdependence of positive and negative freedom in and through the care and reciprocity of an inclusive, democratic community' (Fielding, in Burke and Jones 2014, p 88). Such 'democratic fellowship … unit[es] and legitimat[es] both positive and negative freedoms in and through a shared humanity' and '[t]ogether and interdependently they provide what the great Scottish philosopher, John Macmurray, called the "conditions of freedom"' (Fielding, in Burke and Jones 2014, p 88). Fielding recognises

the 'microscopical' nature of Bloom's school, as a relatively rare example of what Kropotkin would surely have described as an 'integrated' school. Some would say it is 'no more than a drop in the ocean', but Bloom—like Ward and Fielding—would say 'he hoped it would be more like a pebble in a pond – a sharp impact in a particular spot, sending out a series of ripples over a much wider area' (Fielding, in Burke and Jones 2014, p 97).

What Kropotkin's and Brogan's approaches to anarchism suggest is that, however radical is the anarchist claim of the impotence of government, a social—communal—anarchist theory applied to schooling can imply a school that is in many ways rather 'normal', one in which people are treated as whole people (whole-people-in-the-making), driven by a comprehensive curiosity and mutual care. As spaces in which such communities can exist, schools are politically significant in ways that central governments cannot destroy. This is the source of my own optimism and the optimism of school leaders such as Bloom and the optimism of many thousands of teachers in classrooms around the world—those in dialogic, caring, curious classrooms. Those who see the value of the school community as itself a political act, can be the basis for a genuine optimism. It is an optimism that builds on and encourages the current forms of communal mutuality, rather than reaching towards a Utopian 'ideal form' of political organisation. It is not optimistic in the sense of declaring all local communal, mutual organisations to be unproblematic and just. Instead, the optimism is of a current *opportunity* for good work in such organisations and a rejection of the 'false necessity' (Unger 2004) of nationally or internationally dominated policy and (supposed) control.

Macmurray sees children, even more than teachers and other staff, as his source of optimism:

> There is a great deal of bad education about; there always has been. … But there is no need to be despondent, I tell myself when I feel pessimistic; the redeeming feature in the situation is the quite enormous capacity for resistance which children possess. (Macmurray 2012, p 671)

Buber takes from anarchist writers an optimism that is based on the idea that '[e]ducation is … not seen as a means to creating a different political order, but as a space – and perhaps, … a relationship – in which we

experiment with visions of a new political order' (Suissa 2006, p 150–151). Ward's limited optimism is based on the idea that 'an anarchist society, a society which organises itself without authority, is always in existence, like a seed beneath the snow, buried under the weight of the state and its bureaucracy, capitalism and its waste, privilege and its injustices, nationalism and its suicidal loyalties, religious difference and their superstitious separatism' (Ward 1982, p 18). Adults and pupils in school can be fully present—they can engage in dialogue, and be part of a caring, curious, community—or they can withdraw from dialogue (even from dialogue with those beyond the school), they can withdraw from the community by treating others as merely means to ends, they can be careless and incurious. This is their choice. Pupils are not in school as professionals, so their choice to engage or withdraw is harder to challenge. But the adult professionals (professional adults) in the school are responsible for their choice. This was the view of Mitscherlich and Mielke (1949) in their account of the Nuremburg trials of the 'doctors of infamy' involved in medical experiments in Nazi Germany: they were held responsible for breaking their professional ethics, even though they were given political orders to do so. Professional adults in schools (in much less challenging circumstances) should similarly take professional responsibility to be fully present, and if they do this, it is likely that pupils will be present too. This is a positive responsibility, not a burden imposed by those beyond the school. Indeed, taking responsibility for being present in this way, adults can face the pressures from beyond the school with a greater understanding of how to subvert—if not resist—such pressures, by the very act of caring in a curious community.

Conclusion

Many describe politics as 'not for them'. I have sympathy for that view, as professional politicians and national and international political organisations and those who influence them do not always provide good examples of caring, principled humanity. But politics is for everyone, and central to this chapter has been the argument that—particularly for those in schools—politics is to a significant extent 'in our hands', with the 'our'

referring to all adults and pupils in the school. Political power—how politics works— can be illuminated by considering the issue of fear. It is fear that all too often thwarts better schooling just as it thwarts a better world. But taking heart from a range of philosophies—the personalism of Mounier or Macmurray, the care ethics of Noddings, the dialogue of Buber, or the anarchism of Kropotkin—it is possible to see a way of making schools the places that adults and pupils in schools already want.

Afterword: A Manifesto for Schools

Introduction

This book started with the question 'why care about schools?' Chapter 9 finished with a description of the political responsibility we all have for what happens in schools. Throughout the book, arguments are made for a form of schooling that is caring, curious, dialogic, and communal. It is a personalist account of integrated, sustainable schooling. Writing the book, I was conscious of the implications of what I said for those learning and working in schools. But in this afterword, I describe the implications of this philosophy of schooling in the form of answers to the 'so what?' questions that readers often ask of books—especially of the more philosophically- or theoretically-oriented books.

There are plenty of examples of such summaries, including in texts already referenced in this book. Haraway's *Manifest for Cyborgs* of 1985 is a summary of the implications of '[s]cience, [t]echnology, and [s]ocialist [f]eminism in the 1980s' (Haraway 2004, p 7), which has proved a 'milestone' in posthumanist philosophy (Guga 2012, p 100), and it, along with Buber's work, helped me understand the fuzzy, porous, boundaries of humanity and personhood. Barth writes of what is central to his conception of a good school, in a language that—cleverly—disguises the radical

Julian Stern, *A Philosophy of Schooling*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71571-1

nature of much of what he recommends: 'I would want to return to work in a school that could be described as a *community of learners*, … [a]nd I would readily work in a school that could be described as a *community of leaders*, where students, teachers, parents, and administrators share the opportunities and responsibilities for making decisions that affect all the occupants of the schoolhouse … [and] that accorded a special place to philosophers who constantly examine and question and frequently replace embedded practices by asking "why" questions' (Barth 1990, p 9–10). Kessler's 'seven gateways to the soul in education' (Kessler 2000, p 17) and Lantieri's account of 'schools of spirit' (Lantieri, in Lantieri 2001, p 8–9), both have a lot in common with my own description of 'the spirited school': 'an inclusive community with magnanimous leadership that enables friendship through dialogue in order to create and evaluate valuable or beautiful meanings, valuable or beautiful things, and good people' (Stern 2009a, p 161). There is also a history of pupil-generated manifesto for schools, including Blishen's influential *The School That I'd Like* (Blishen 1967) and later follow-ups by Burke and Grosvenor in which pupils describe their wish for 'a safe haven, not a prison' and ask for 'the school to be clever, so it may last forever' (Burke and Grosvenor 2015, p 7, p 25).

The manifesto presented here describes the wishes and commitments that different people interested in schooling might make, based on the various claims made throughout this book. In each section, there are positive statements sitting alongside statements of what this does *not* mean. It is written in the first person, to emphasise the sense of responsibility that those in schools, and those outside schools with an interest in schooling, have for what happens in schools. In the first significant piece of research I completed on what those in school wanted of their school, pupils and teachers were asked what should happen in classrooms, in order to develop a combined 'classroom code' (Stern 2001a). Many of the teachers thought that pupils would come up with trivial or inappropriate ideas, and that it would be the teachers' views that should dominate the final code. However, to their surprise (and somewhat to my surprise), the lists of ideas of the pupils and of the teachers were almost identical, and the agreed document reflected all the ideas. In many research projects before and since then—on topics such as home-

work, community, assessment, and solitude (Stern 1998, 1999, 2009a, 2014; Stern and Backhouse 2011)—the views of pupils and teachers have proven similarly astute and constructive, and have overlapped with each other. For this reason, I have written a manifesto made up of statements that can be used by all in school. Those outside of school—parents, carers, those in home-based education, and anyone interested in schooling—may also 'sign up' to the manifesto, although the grammar of the manifesto (what 'I' will do in school) would need to be changed.

A Manifesto

1. **Care**

The school I would like will have people in it who will care for me and care about learning, and will give me opportunities to care for other people.

I will care for people and care about learning.

Sometimes I will not show how much I care, perhaps because I am having to concentrate on myself just at the moment, or because I am not so good at showing that I care. But if others care they may—at some point—find out how much I care, too.

The school I would like will *not* care more about exam results and what inspectors or league tables say about the school than it cares about me.

I will *not* accept uncaring people without trying to work out why they are uncaring and, if possible, help them to care more.

2. **Community**

The school I would like will be a friendly place which will have people in it who will treat each other as ends in themselves, not as means to other ends, and who will work together to support learning.

I will treat other people as ends in themselves, not as means to other ends.

Sometimes relationships break down, and there may be people in school I dislike (and I may have good reason to dislike them), but people in the school will not ignore this and will help us to get on as best as we can.

The school I would like will *not* be unfriendly or allow enmity and bullying to go unchallenged—whether between or amongst adults or pupils.

I will *not* treat people only as means to other ends—such as treating people merely as paid helpers or as merely ways to help with my own academic or career success.

3. **Dialogue**

The school I would like will be one where people speak and write to each other with sincerity and demonstrate an interest in what the other person will reply even if their views are very different.

I will speak and write to other people with sincerity and demonstrate an interest in the reply even if it is different to my view.

Sometimes it is difficult listening to or reading the views of other people, especially if they are distant in time or different in their views, but I will not close down such dialogue and will be prepared to be surprised by what others say or write.

The school I would like will *not* be one where people say what they think but do not listen to what other people think or believe that others with differing views should simply be dismissed.

I will *not* ignore what other people say, simply because their views are different to mine, and I will *not* try to win every argument simply for the sake of winning.

4. **Personhood**

The school I would like will be one in which everyone is there as a 'whole person', with ideas, knowledge, wishes and hopes, emotions, bodies, sexualities, histories, futures, and connections with the rest of the world.

I will treat other people as whole people with ideas, knowledge, wishes, emotions, bodies, sexualities, histories, futures, and connections with the rest of the world.

Sometimes I have thoughts and feelings that I do not want to share, and I want to be allowed to keep them to myself, but I will still appreciate that there will be others in the school to whom I could open up about these things if at some point I want to.

The school I would like will *not* be one in which people treat others as merely (teaching or learning) brains, exchanging knowledge, and ignoring the rest of personhood.

I will *not* treat others as merely brains, exchanging knowledge, and ignoring the rest of their personhood.

5. **Curiosity**

The school I would like will be one in which everyone is curious, wanting to find out, wanting to help other people find out, and wanting to share and discuss what is found out.

I will be curious and will try to find out and share and discuss what I find out.

Sometimes I will find learning new things really difficult or really boring, whether I am a pupil or an adult in school, but I will be open to the opportunity for my curiosity and my ability to learn to be reignited by others in the school.

The school I would like will *not* be one in which people are left incurious, either because it is assumed that they cannot learn or that they already know everything with certainty.

I will *not* settle for being permanently incurious, either because I think I cannot learn or because I think I already know everything with certainty.

6. **Leadership**

The school I would like will be one in which everyone is given a chance to lead (supporting people or supporting learning, in ethical ways) and takes responsibility for that leadership, everyone is given a

chance to accept other people's (ethical) leadership and takes responsibility for accepting that leadership, and everyone engages dialogically with leaders and led.

I will take responsibility for using opportunities to lead (in ethical ways), I will take responsibility for accepting other people's (ethical) leadership, and I will engage dialogically with leaders and led.

Sometimes I will be expected to 'perform' for people inside or outside the school in ways that might distract me from my responsibility for leading people or learning, and in those circumstances I will aim to prioritise the leadership of people and learning for which I am responsible.

The school I would like will *not* be one in which leaders expect followers to work for them, or in which followership means working for leaders inside or outside the school.

I will *not* expect my followers to work for me and I will *not* expect to be working for my leaders.

7. **Sustainability**

The school I would like will be one that draws on the past, lives in the present, and prepares for the long-term future by creating the next generations, acknowledging the uncertainty of the future and the ways in which people are connected to each other and to the rest of the world—past, present, and future.

I will be prepared to draw on the past, to live in the present, and to prepare for the long-term future, acknowledging uncertainty and connectedness.

Sometimes people learn well at home and in other places that are not schools, and I will help schools learn from such alternatives and will help such alternatives learn from schools.

The school I would like will *not* merely be a repository of the past, it will *not* merely be a meeting of current needs, and it will *not* merely be a preparation for the future.

I will *not* merely maintain the past, I will *not* merely meet current needs, and I will *not* merely prepare for the future.

8. **Curriculum**

The school I would like will be one in which there is an attempt to overcome divisions, whether these are divisions between the intellectual and the physical, between the theoretical and the personal, between subjects of the curriculum, between groups of people, between people and nature, or between parts of what exists and all that exists.

I will be prepared to overcome divisions.

Sometimes divisions are comfortable and helpful, and sometimes overcoming divisions can lead to a unity that is alienating or impersonal, so even if the overall movement is towards overcoming divisions, this will never be complete and may involve the protection of divisions at some points in order to protect individuality and in order to be in a stronger position to overcome divisions in the future.

The school I would like will *not* accept divisions as permanent, and will *not* overcome divisions with such completeness as to create a unity that is damaging.

I will *not* accept divisions as permanent and will not attempt to overcome divisions to such a degree that I create a damaging unity.

9. **Politics**

The school I would like will be one in which people are broadly optimistic, take responsibility for the power that they have, and collaborate within and beyond the school to support people's learning.

I will try to be broadly optimistic and will take responsibility for the power that I have, and collaborate with others in and beyond the school to support my own learning and the learning of other people.

Sometimes there are good reasons to be fearful and pessimistic, and this will often lead to defensiveness, but people in school should be prepared to face those fearful situations rather than to ignore or

hide from them, in order to support people even though feared things may happen.

The school I would like will *not* accept individualist competitiveness to such an extent that the school is dominated by fear and will *not* deal with fear by allowing an authority figure (within or beyond the school) to make all the decisions and to maintain power by instilling a fear of disobedience.

I will *not* treat other people primarily as competitors to be beaten, and I will *not* let fear dominate all I do or make me give up taking some responsibility for what happens in school.

Conclusion

The manifesto for schools is based on what has been argued throughout this book. It is presented as a *conclusion* to the book but also as a *starting point* for further discussion and argument over what schools can and should be like.

Bibliography

Adams, P (2007) 'Learning and Caring in the Age of the Five Outcomes', *Education 3–13, 35:3*, pp 225–237.

Alexander, H A (2015) *Reimagining Liberal Education: Affiliation and Inquiry in Democratic Schooling*; New York: Bloomsbury.

Alexander, R J (2004) *Towards Dialogic Teaching: Rethinking Classroom Talk*; Thirsk: Dialogos.

Alexander, R J (2006) *Education as Dialogue: Moral and Pedagogical Choices for a Runaway World*; Thirsk: Hong Kong Institute of Education with Dialogos.

Allen, A (2014) *Benign Violence: Education in and Beyond the Age of Reason*; Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave.

Alperson, P (ed) (2002) *Diversity and Community: An Interdisciplinary Reader*; Oxford: Blackwell.

Anderson, R and Cissna, K N (1997) *The Martin Buber-Carl Rogers Dialogue: A New Transcript with Commentary*; Albany, NY: SUNY.

Aristotle (1962) *The Politics*; Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Aristotle (1976) *The Ethics of Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics*; London: Penguin.

Armstrong, K (2000) *The Battle for God: Fundamentalism in Judaism, Christianity and Islam*; London: Harper Perennial.

Arthur, C (1990) *Biting the Bullet: Some Personal Reflections on Religious Education*; Edinburgh: The Saint Andrew Press.

Julian Stern, *A Philosophy of Schooling*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71571-1

Austin, J L (1975) *How to Do Things with Words: Second Edition*; Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Avest, I ter, Jozsa, D-P, Knauth, T, Rosón, J and Skeie, G (eds) (2009) *Dialogue and Conflict on Religion: Studies of Classroom Interaction in European Countries*; Münster: Waxmann.

Ayers, W (2004) *Teaching the Personal and the Political: Essays on Hope and Justice*; New York: Teachers College Press.

Bachelard, G (1994) *The Poetics of Space*; Boston, Massachusetts: Beacon.

Badman, G M (2009) *Review of Elective Home Education in England [The Badman Review]*; London: Stationery Office.

Bailey, R (ed) (2010) *The Philosophy of Education: An Introduction*; London: Bloomsbury.

Bakhtin, M M (1981) *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays by M M Bakhtin*; Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press.

Bakhtin, M M (1984) *Rabelais and His World*; Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press.

Bakhurst, D and Fairfield, P (eds) (2016) *Education and Conversation: Exploring Oakeshott's Legacy*; London: Bloomsbury.

Ball, S J (1981) *Beachside Comprehensive: A Case Study of Secondary Schooling*; Cambridge: CUP.

Ball, S J (1987) *The Micro-Politics of the School: Towards a Theory of School Organization*; London: Routledge.

Ball, S J (1994) *Education Reform: A Critical and Post Structural Approach*; Buckingham: Open University Press.

Ball, S J (2003a) *Class Strategies and the Education Market: The Middle Classes and Social Advantage*; London: RoutledgeFalmer.

Ball, S J (2003b) 'The Teacher's Soul and the Terrors of Performativity', *Journal of Education Policy, 18:2*, pp 215–228.

Ball, S J (2007) *Education Plc: Understanding Private Sector Participation in Public Sector Education*; London: Routledge.

Barenboim, D (2008) *Everything Is Connected: The Power of Music*; London: Phoenix.

Barenboim, D and Said, E W (2002) *Parallels and Paradoxes: Explorations in Music and Society*; London: Bloomsbury.

Barnes, L P (ed) (2012) *Debates in Religious Education*; London: Routledge.

Barnett, R (ed) (2005) *Reshaping the University: New Relationships Between Research, Scholarship and Teaching*; Maidenhead, Berkshire: Open University Press.

Barnett, R (2007) *A Will to Learn: Being a Student in an Age of Uncertainty*; Maidenhead, Berkshire: Society for Research into Higher Education & Open University Press.

Baron-Cohen, S (2011) *Zero Degrees of Empathy: A New Theory of Human Cruelty*; London: Allen Lane.

Barrow, R (1981) *The Philosophy of Schooling*; Brighton: Wheatsheaf.

Barth, R S (1990) *Improving Schools from Within: Teachers, Parents, and Principals Can Make the Difference*; San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Bates, H (2012 [1940]) *Farewell to the Master*; Rio Rancho, New Mexico: Sterling.

Baumfield, V, Hall, E and Wall K (2012) *Action Research in Education: Second Edition*; London: SAGE.

Beane, J A (1995) 'Curriculum Integration and the Disciplines of Knowledge', *Phi Delta Kappan, 76:8*, pp 616–622.

Beauregard, J and Smith, S (eds) (2016) *In the Sphere of the Personal: New Perspectives in the Philosophy of Persons*; Wilmington, Delaware: Vernon Press.

Benjamin, A (ed) (1989) *The Lyotard Reader*; Oxford: Blackwell.

Berlant, L (2011) *Cruel Optimism*; Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press.

Berne, E (1964) *Games People Play: The Psychology of Human Relationships;* London: Penguin Books.

Best, R (1996) *Education and Integrity*; London: Roehampton Institute London.

Biklen, D, with Attfield, R, Bissonnette, L, Blackman, L, Burke, J, Frugone, A, Mukhopadhyay, T R and Rubin, S (2005) *Autism and the Myth of the Person Alone*; New York: New York University Press.

Birketveit, A and Williams, G (eds) (2013) *Literature for the English Classroom: Theory into Practice*; Bergen, Norway: Fagbokforlaget.

Blase, J and Anderson, G (1995) *The Micropolitics of Educational Leadership: From Control to Empowerment*; London: Cassell.

Blaylock, L (ed) (2001a) *Listening to Children in Primary Religious Education*; Birmingham: PCfRE.

Blaylock, L (ed) (2001b) *Listening to Young People in Secondary Education*; Birmingham: PCfRE.

Blishen, E (ed) (1967) *The School That I'd Like*; London: Penguin.

Boone, J L (1998) 'The Evolution of Magnanimity: When Is It Better to Give Than to Receive?', *Human Nature, 9:1*, pp 1–21.

Borzaga, C and Defourny, J (eds) (2004) *The Emergence of Social Enterprise*; London: Routledge.

Bottery, M (1992) *The Ethics of Educational Management: Personal, Social and Political Perspectives on School Organization*; London: Cassell.

Bottery, M (2004) *The Challenges of Educational Leadership*; London: Paul Chapman.

Bottery, M (2016) *Educational Leadership for a More Sustainable World*; London: Bloomsbury.

Bowker, J (ed) (1997) *The Oxford Dictionary of World Religions*; Oxford: OUP.

Boyd, D (2014) *It's Complicated: The Social Lives of Networked Teens*; New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.

Bradford, R (2005) *First Boredom, Then Fear: The Life of Philip Larkin*; London: Peter Owen.

Brighouse, H (2006) *On Education*; London: Routledge.

Brogan, A J (2017) 'The Exilic Classroom: Spaces of Subversion', *Journal of Philosophy of Education, 51:2*, pp 510–523.

Bruner, J S (1996) *The Culture of Education*; Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Bryk, A S (1995) 'Lessons from Catholic High Schools on Renewing Our Educational Institutions', in Hallinan M T (ed) (1995) *Restructuring Schools: Promising Practices and Policies*; Boston, Massachusetts: Springer, pp 81–98.

Buber, M (1958 [1923]) *I and Thou: Second Edition with a Postscript by the Author*; Edinburgh: T&T Clark.

Buber, M (1998 [1965]) *The Knowledge of Man: Selected Essays*; New York: Humanity Books.

Buber, M (2002a [1965]) *Between Man and Man*; London: Routledge.

Buber, M (2002b [1967]) *Meetings: Autobiographical Fragments: Third Edition*; London: Routledge.

Burke, C and Grosvenor, I (2015) *The School I'd Like: Revisited: Children and Young People's Reflections on an Education for the Future: Second Edition*; Abingdon, Oxfordshire: RoutledgeFalmer.

Burke, C and Jones, K (eds) (2014) *Education, Childhood and Anarchism: Talking Colin Ward*; Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge.

Bustion, O (2017) 'Autism and Christianity: An Ethnographic Intervention', *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, pp 1–29.

Butler, J (1997) *Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative*; New York: Routledge.

Cain, T and Harris, R (2013) 'Teachers' Action Research in a Culture of Performativity', *Educational Action Research, 21:3*, pp 343–358.

Castles, S and Wüstenberg, W (1979) *The Education of the Future: An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Socialist Education;* London: Pluto Press.

de Certeau, M (1984) *The Practice of Everyday Life*; Berkeley, California: University of California Press.

Chaleff, I (2009) *The Courageous Follower: Standing Up to and for Our Leaders: Third Edition*; San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler.

Chaleff, I (2015) *Intelligent Disobedience: Doing Right When What You're Told to Do Is Wrong*; Oakland, California: Berrett-Koehler.

Chamberlin, C and Chamberlin, L (1993) 'Alternative Schools as Critique of Traditional Schools: The Tvind Schools in Denmark', *Canadian Social Studies, 27:3*, pp 115–120.

Chandler, C K (2017) *Animal-Assisted Therapy in Counseling: Third Edition*; New York: Routledge.

Chater, M and Erricker, C (2013) *Does Religious Education Have a Future?: Pedagogical and Policy Prospects*; London: Routledge.

Chitty, C (1989) *Towards a New Education System: The Victory of the New Right?*; London: Falmer.

Cochran-Smith, M and Lytle, S L (2009) *Inquiry as Stance: Practitioner Research for the Next Generation*; New York: Teachers College Press.

Collinson, D (2006) 'Rethinking Followership: A Post-structuralist Analysis of Follower Identities', *The Leadership Quarterly, 17*, pp 179–189.

Concerto Köln and Sarband (2004) *Dream of the Orient*; Deutsche Grammophon B0001J04HE.

Concerto Köln and Sarband (2005) *The Walz: Ecstasy and Mysticism*; Archiv B0009AM5H2.

Cooling, T, Green, E and Revell, L (2014) *The Influence of Christian Ethos on Teaching and Learning in Church Secondary Schools: Final Report Summary*; Canterbury: Canterbury Christ Church University.

Cordes, C and Miller, E (eds) (2000) *Fool's Gold: A Critical Look at Computers in Childhood*; College Park, Maryland: Alliance for Childhood.

Costello, J [E] (2002a) 'The Life and Thought of John Macmurray', in Fergusson, D and Dower, N (eds) (2002) *John Macmurray: Critical Perspectives*; New York: Lang, pp 1–34.

Costello, J E (2002b) *John Macmurray: A Biography*; Edinburgh: Floris.

Cush, D (1999) 'The Relationships Between Religious Studies, Religious Education and Theology: Big Brother, Little Sister and the Clerical Uncle?', *British Journal of Religious Education, 21:3*, pp 137–146.

D'Agnese, V (2017) 'The Essential Uncertainty of Thinking: Education and Subject in John Dewey', *Journal of Philosophy of Education, 51:1*, pp 73–88.

Dawkins, R (2006) *The God Delusion*; London: Transworld.

Deacon, M (2016) 'EU Referendum: Who Needs Experts When We've Got Michael Gove?', *The Telegraph, 6 June 2016*, available online at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/06/eu-referendum-who-needs-experts-when-weve-got-michael-gove/ (accessed 27 June 2016).

Dencik, L and Leistert, O (eds) (2015) *Critical Perspectives on Social Media and Protest: Between Control and Emancipation*; London: Rowman & Littlefield International.

Denham, J (2006) 'The Trainer's Presence in Effective Gestalt Training', *British Gestalt Journal, 15:1*, pp 16–22.

Department for Education (DfE) (2011) *The Framework for the National Curriculum: A Report by the Expert Panel for the National Curriculum Review*; London: Department for Education.

Department for Education and Skills (DfES) (2004) *Every Child Matters: Change for Children*; Nottingham: DfES.

Derrickson, S (director), Scarpa, D and North, E H (writers) (2008) *The Day the Earth Stood Still*; Los Angeles, California: 20th Century Fox.

Descartes, R (1912 [1637–1644]) *A Discourse on Method, Meditations and Principles*; London, Toronto, New York: Dent Dutton.

Dewey, J (1916) *Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education*; New York: The Free Press.

Dewey, J (1954 [1927, 1946]) *The Public and Its Problems*; Athens, Ohio: Swallow Press.

Donaldson, S and Kymlicka, W (2011) *Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights*; Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Drummond, M J and Yarker, P (2013) 'The Enduring Problem of Fixed Ability: But Is a New Conversation Beginning?', *Forum, 55:1*, pp 3–7.

Durka, G (2002) *The Teacher's Calling: A Spirituality for Those Who Teach*; New York: Paulist Press.

Dyson, A and Robson, E (1999) *School, Family, Community: Mapping School Inclusion in the UK*; Leicester: National Youth Agency for the Joseph Rowntree Foundation.

Easthope, C and Easthope, G (2000) 'Intensification, Extension and Complexity of Teachers' Workload', *British Journal of Sociology of Education, 21:1*, pp 43–58.

Education Act 1944, available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Geo6/7-8/31/contents/enacted (accessed 1 August 2017).

Elliott, H (2015) 'Forest School in an Inner City? Making the Impossible Possible', *Education 3–13: International Journal of Primary, Elementary and Early Years Education, 43:6*, pp 722–730.

Elliott, J (ed) (1993) *Reconstructing Teacher Education: Teacher Development*; London: Falmer.

Elliott, J (2011) 'The Seesaw Curriculum: It's Time That Education Policy Matured', *Forum, 53:1*, pp 15–29.

Fageant, J and Blaylock, L (eds) (1998) *Faith in the Future: An Anthology of Pupils' Writing from the National RE Festival Questionnaire*; Birmingham: PCfRE

Fergusson, D and Dower, N (eds) (2002) *John Macmurray: Critical Perspectives*; New York: Lang.

Fielding, M (2005) 'Alex Bloom, Pioneer of Radical State Education', *Forum, 47:2&3*, 2005.

Fielding, M (2007) 'The Human Cost and Intellectual Poverty of High Performance Schooling: Radical Philosophy, John Macmurray and the Remaking of Person-Centred Education', *Journal of Education Policy, 22:4*, pp 383–409.

Fielding, M (2012a) 'Editorial: Learning to Be Human: The Educational Legacy of John Macmurray', *Oxford Review of Education, 38:6*, pp 653–659.

Fielding, M (2012b) 'Education as if People Matter: John Macmurray, Community and the Struggle for Democracy', *Oxford Review of Education, 38:6*, pp 675–692.

Fielding, M (ed) (2015) *Learning to Be Human: The Educational Legacy of John Macmurray*; London: Routledge.

Fielding, M and Moss, P (2011) *Radical Education and the Common School: A Democratic Approach*; London: Routledge.

Flutter, J and Rudduck, J (2004) *Consulting Pupils: What's in It for Schools?*; London: RoutledgeFalmer.

Freathy, R, Doney, J, Freathy, G, Walshe, K and Teece, G (2017) 'Pedagogical Bricoleurs and Bricolage Researchers: The Case of Religious Education', *British Journal of Religious Education*, pp 1–19.

Freathy, G, Freathy, R, Doney, J, Walshe, K and Teece, G (2015) *The RE-Searchers: A New Approach to Religious Education in Primary Schools*; Exeter: University of Exeter.

Freinet, C (1993 [1960]) *Education Through Work: A Model for Child-Centred Learning*; Lewiston, New York: Edwin Mellen Press.

Freire, P (1993 [1968]) *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*; Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Fuchs, C (2017) *Social Media: A Critical Introduction: Second Edition*; London: SAGE.

Furlong, J (2013) *Education – An Anatomy of the Discipline: Rescuing the University Project?*; Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge.

Furlong, J and Maynard, T (1995) *Mentoring Student Teachers: The Growth of Professional Knowledge*; London: Routledge.

Gandhi, M (1951) *Selected Writings of Mahatma Gandhi*; London: Faber and Faber.

Gass, N (2016) 'Trump: 'The experts Are terrible", *Politico, 4 April 2016*, available online at http://www.politico.com/blogs/2016-gop-primary-live-updates-and-results/2016/04/donald-trump-foreign-policy-experts-221528 (accessed 31 August 2017).

Geiger, M W (2016) 'Personae, Persons, and Intersubjectivity: A Relief for Understanding Roles, Deception, and Communion in Religious Education', *Religious Education, 111:5*, pp 504–520.

Gert, B (2010) *Hobbes: Prince of Peace*; Cambridge: Polity.

Gill, T (2007) *No Fear: Growing Up in a Risk Averse Society*; London: Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation.

Glatzer, N N and Mendes-Flohr, P (eds) (1991) *The Letters of Martin Buber: A Life of Dialogue*; Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press.

Goethe, J W (2016 [1819]) *The West-Eastern Divan of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe*; Adelaide, South Australia: Wakefield Press.

Grigg, G R (2005) "Nurseries of Ignorance'? Private Adventure and Dame Schools for the Working Classes in Nineteenth-Century Wales', *History of Education, 34:3*, pp 243–262.

Grimmitt, M (ed) (2000) *Pedagogies of Religious Education: Case Studies in the Development of Good Pedagogic Practice*; Great Wakering, Essex: McCrimmons.

Gronn, P (2016) 'Fit for Purpose No More?', *Management in Education, 30:4*, pp 168–172.

Guga, J (2012) 'From Science Fiction to Social Reality', in Romportl, J, Pavel Ircing, P, Zackova, E, Polak, M and Schuster, R (eds) (2012) *Beyond AI: Artificial Dreams: Proceedings of the International Conference*; Pilsen, Czech Republic, pp 98–111.

Guignon, C (2004) *On Being Authentic*; Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge.

Habermas, J (2003) *The Future of Human Nature*; Cambridge: Polity.

Halsey, A H (ed) (1988) *British Social Trends Since 1900: A Guide to the Changing Social Structure of Britain*; Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Haraway, D (2004) *The Haraway Reader*; New York: Routledge.

Harber, C (2002) 'Schooling as Violence: An Exploratory Overview', *Educational Review, 54:1*, pp 7–16.

Harber, C (2004) *Schooling as Violence: How Schools Harm Pupils and Societies*; Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge.

Hargreaves, A (1994) *Changing Teachers, Changing Times: Teachers' Work and Culture in the Postmodern Age*; London: Cassell.

Hargreaves, A and Tucker, E (1991) 'Teaching and Guilt: Exploring the Feelings of Teaching', *Teaching and Teacher Education, 7:5–6*, pp 491–505.

Hargreaves, D H (1967) *Social Relations in a Secondary School;* London: Routledge.
Harlen, W (ed) (2010) *Principles and Big Ideas of Science Education*; Hatfield, Hertfordshire: The Association of Science Education.
Harlen, W (ed) (2015) *Working with Big Ideas of Science Education*; Trieste, Italy: iap: the global network of science academies.
Hay, D (2007) *Why Spirituality Is Difficult for Westerners*; Exeter: Societas Essays in Political & Cultural Criticism.
Haynes, J (2002) *Children as Philosophers: Learning Through Inquiry and Dialogue in the Primary Classroom*; London: RoutledgeFalmer.
Heaney, S (trans) (1999) *Beowulf*; London: Faber.
Higginson, J H (1974) 'Dame Schools', *British Journal of Educational Studies, 22:2*, pp 166–181.
Higher Education Funding Council for England (Hefce), Scottish Funding Council, Higher Education Funding Council for Wales, Department for Employment and Learning (2011) *REF2014: Research Excellence Framework: Assessment Framework and Guidance on Submissions*; Bristol: Hefce.
Hobbes, T (1968 [1651]) *Leviathan*; Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Hoffman, P (1998) *The Man Who Loved Only Numbers: The Story of Paul Erdős and the Search for Mathematical Truth*; London: Fourth Estate.
Hölderlin, F (1990) *Hyperion and Selected Poems*; New York: Continuum.
Holt, J (1964) *How Children Fail*; Harmondsworth: Penguin.
hooks, b (1994) *Teaching to Transgress: Education as the Practice of Freedom*; New York: Routledge.
Hoppers, C O and Richards, H (2012) *Rethinking Thinking: Modernity's "Other" and the Transformation of the University*; Pretoria: University of South Africa.
Hoyle, E and Wallace, M (2005) *Educational Leadership: Ambiguity, Professionals & Managerialism*; London: SAGE.
Huntington, S P (1996) *The Clash of Civilizations: And the Remaking of World Order*; London: Simon & Schuster.
Ifrah, G (1998) *The Universal History of Numbers: From Prehistory to the Invention of the Computer*; London: Harvill.
Illich, I D (1971) *Deschooling Society*; Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin.
Illich, I D (1974) *After Deschooling, What?*; London: Writers' and Readers' Publishing Cooperative.
Illich, I [D] (1988) 'The Educational Enterprise in the Light of the Gospel', *Lecture, 13 November 1988, Chicago*, available online at http://www.davidtinapple.com/illich/1988_Educational.html (accessed 30 August 2017).
Illich, I [D] (1995) *Limits to Medicine: Medical Nemesis: The Expropriation of Health*; London: Marion Boyars.

Illman, R (2010) 'Plurality and Peace: Inter-Religious Dialogue in a Creative Perspective', *International Journal of Public Theology, 4:2*, pp 175–193.

Ipgrave, J (2003) *Building e-Bridges: Inter-Faith Dialogue by E-Mail*; Birmingham: RE Today Services.

Ipgrave, J (2009) 'The Language of Friendship and Identity: Children's Communication Choices in an Interfaith Exchange', *British Journal of Religious Education, 31:3*, pp 213–225.

Ivinson, G [M] (2012a) 'The Body and Pedagogy: Beyond Absent, Moving Bodies in Pedagogic Practice', *British Journal of Sociology of Education, 33:4*, pp 489–506.

Ivinson, G M (2012b) 'Skills in Motion: Boys' Trail Motorbiking Activities as Transitions into Working-Class Masculinity in a Post-Industrial Locale', *Sport, Education and Society, 19:5*, pp 605–620.

Ivinson, G [M] and Renold, E (2013a) 'Valleys' Girls: Re-theorising Bodies and Agency in a Semi-rural Post-Industrial Locale', *Gender and Education, 25:6*, pp 704–721.

Ivinson, G [M] and Renold, E (2013b) 'Subjectivity, Affect and Place: Thinking with Deleuze and Guattari's Body Without Organs to Explore a Young Girl's Becomings in a Post-Industrial Locale', *Subjectivity, 6:4*, pp 369–390.

Johnston, J (1999) *Improving Personal Effectiveness for Managers in Schools*; Stafford: Network.

Jones, J (1994) *Teacher as Reflective Professional*; London: Institute of Education, University of London, Occasional Papers in Teacher Education and Training.

Jones, N and Frederickson, N (eds) (1990) *Refocussing Educational Psychology*; London: Falmer.

Kant, I (1964 [1795]) *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*; New York: Harper.

Kellerman, B (2008) *Followership: How Followers Are Creating Change and Changing Leaders*; Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard Business Press.

Kelly, G A (1955) *The Psychology of Personal Constructs*; New York: Norton.

Kessler, R (2000) *The Soul of Education: Helping Students Find Connection, Compassion, and Character at School*; Alexandria, Virginia: ASCD.

Kim, S C H and Draper, J (eds) (2011) *Christianity and the Renewal of Nature: Creation, Climate Change and Human Responsibility*; London: SPCK.

Kim, S C H and Kollontai, P (eds) (2007) *Community Identity: Dynamics of Religion in Context*; London: T&T Clark.

King, A (1993) 'From Sage on the Stage to Guide on the Side', *College Teaching, 41:1*, pp 30–35.

Kirkpatrick, F G (2005) *John Macmurray: Community Beyond Political Philosophy*; Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.

Knight, S (2016) *Forest School in Practice: For All Ages*; Los Angeles: SAGE.
Kropotkin, P (1987 [1902]) *Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution*; London: Freedom Press.
Kropotkin, P (1995 [1892]) *The Conquest of Bread and Other Writings*; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kropotkin, P (1998 [1898]) *Fields, Factories and Workshops Tomorrow*; London: Freedom Press.
Kuhn, T (1970) *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions: Second Edition*; Chicago: University Chicago Press.
Lakomski, G, Eacott, S and Evers, C W (eds) (2016) *Questioning Leadership: New Directions for Educational Organisations*; Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge.
Lambeth Council (2006) *Lambeth Agreed Syllabus for Religious Education*; London: Lambeth Council.
Lantieri, L (ed) (2001) *Schools with Spirit: Nurturing the Inner Lives of Children and Teachers*; Boston, Mass: Beacon.
Larkin, P (1988) *Collected Poems*; London: The Marvell Press and Faber and Faber.
Lave, J (2011) *Apprenticeship in Critical Ethnographic Practice*; Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Lave, J and Wenger, E (1991) *Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral Participation*; Cambridge: CUP.
Lawrence-Lightfoot, S (2003) *The Essential Conversation: What Parents and Teachers Can Learn from Each Other*; New York: Ballantine.
Leavis, F R (1948a) *Education & the University: A Sketch for an 'English School'*; London: Chatto & Windus.
Leavis, F R (1948b) *The Great Tradition: George Eliot ● Henry James ● Joseph Conrad*; London: Chatto & Windus.
Leavis, F R and Leavis, Q D (1969) *Lectures in America*; London: Chatto & Windus.
Lees, H E (2014) *Education Without Schools: Discovering Alternatives*; Bristol: Policy Press.
Lees, H E and Noddings, N (eds) (2016) *The Palgrave International Handbook of Alternative Education*; Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Levinas, E (1989) *The Levinas Reader*; Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Llach, J J (2013) 'What Role for Subsidiarity in Emerging Schemes of Governance?', in *Governance in a Changing World: Meeting the Challenges of Liberty, Legitimacy, Solidarity, and Subsidiarity*; Vatican City: Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences, pp 1–15.
Locke, J (1998 [1692]) *Some Thoughts Concerning Education*; Modern History Sourcebook, http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1692locke-education.html.

Lumby, J (2016) 'Distributed Leadership as Fashion or Fad', *Management in Education, 30:4*, pp 161–172.
McIntosh, E (2011) *John Macmurray's Religious Philosophy: What It Means to Be a Person*; Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate.
McIntosh, E, MacDonald, D and Sink, C A (2016) 'Macmurray on Relationality: A Tool for Systems Theory?', *Philosophy and Theology, 28:1*, pp 207–224.
McKay, J R (ed) (2004) *Netting Citizens: Exploring Citizenship in the Internet Age*; Edinburgh: Saint Andrew Press.
McLaughlin, T H (2008) *Liberalism, Education and Schooling: Edited by David Carr, Mark Halstead and Richard Pring*; Exeter: Imprint.
Macleod, D (1992) 'Patten in Favour of Japanese Work Ethic', *Independent, 15 July 1992*, available online at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/patten-in-favour-of-japanese-work-ethic-1533594.html (accessed 30 August 2017).
Macmurray, J (1935) *Creative Society: A Study of the Relation of Christianity to Communism*; London: Student Christian Movement Press.
Macmurray, J (1939a) *The Boundaries of Science: A Study in the Philosophy of Psychology*; London: Faber and Faber.
Macmurray, J (1939b) *The Clue to History*; London: Harper & Brothers.
Macmurray, J (1945) *Search for a Faith*; London: BBC [pagination from the version of the John Macmurray Fellowship, Sheffield, 2016].
Macmurray, J (1946a) 'The Integrity of the Personal', *Joseph Payne Memorial Lectures, King's College, London, 1 November 1946*.
Macmurray, J (1946b) 'Culture and Function', *Joseph Payne Memorial Lectures, King's College, London, 15 November 1946*.
Macmurray, J (1946c) 'Freedom in Community', *Joseph Payne Memorial Lectures, King's College, London, 29 November 1946*.
Macmurray, J (1958) 'Learning to Be Human', *Moray House Annual Public Lecture, 5 May 1958*.
Macmurray, J (1964) 'Teachers and Pupils', *Educational Forum, XXIX:1*, pp 17–24.
Macmurray, J (1968) *Lectures/Papers on Education*; Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Library, Special Collections Gen 2162/2.
Macmurray, J (1979 [1943, 1964]) *Ye Are My Friends and to Save from Fear*; London: Quaker Home Service.
Macmurray, J (1991a [1957]) *The Self as Agent: Volume 1 of The Form of the Personal*; London: Faber.
Macmurray, J (1991b [1961]) *Persons in Relation: Volume 2 of The Form of the Personal*; London: Faber.

Macmurray, J (1992 [1932]) *Freedom in the Modern World*; New Jersey: Humanities Press.
Macmurray, J (1993 [1949]) *Conditions of Freedom*; New Jersey: Humanities Press.
Macmurray, J (1995 [1965]) *Search for Reality in Religion*; London & Toronto: Quaker Home Service & the John Macmurray Society.
Macmurray, J (1996a [1933]) *Interpreting the Universe*; New Jersey: Humanities Press.
Macmurray, J (1996b) *The Personal World: John Macmurray on Self and Society: Selected and Introduced by Philip Conford*; Edinburgh: Floris.
Macmurray, J (2004) *John Macmurray: Selected Philosophical Writings, Edited and Introduced by Esther McIntosh*; Exeter: Imprint Academic.
Macmurray, J (2012 [1958]) 'Learning to Be Human', *Oxford Review of Education, 38:6*, pp 661–674.
Macpherson, C B (1962) *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke*; Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Madera, P (2000) 'Following and Leading', *Re:View, 32:2*, pp 51–53.
Margalit, M (2010) *Lonely Children and Adolescents: Self-Perceptions, Social Exclusion, and Hope*; New York: Springer.
Maritain, J (1962) *The Education of Man: The Educational Philosophy of Jacques Maritain*; New York: Doubleday.
Martin, J (2017) *Building a Bridge: How the Catholic Church and the LGBT Community Can Enter into a Relationship of Respect, Compassion, and Sensitivity*; San Francisco, California: HarperOne.
Marx, K and Engels, F (1970 [1846]) *The German Ideology: Students Edition*; London: Lawrence & Wishart.
Maslow, A H (1971) *The Farther Reaches of Human Nature*; New York: Penguin.
Maslow, A H (2014 [1968]) *Toward a Psychology of Being*; Floyd, Virginia: Sublime Books.
Matthews, G B (1994) *The Philosophy of Childhood*; Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Mayberry, M (1989) 'Home-Based Education in the United States: Demographics, Motivations and Educational Implications', *Educational Review, 41:2*, pp 171–180.
Meighan, R (1995) 'Home-Based Education Effectiveness Research and Some of Its Implications', *Educational Review, 47:3*, pp 275–287.
Mill, J S (1910 [1859–1861]) *Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government*; London: Dent.

Miller, J P, Karsten, S, Denton, D, Orr, D and Kates, I C (eds) (2005) *Holistic Learning and Spirituality in Education: Breaking New Ground*; Albany, New York: SUNY Press.

Mitscherlich, A (1993 [1963]) *Society Without the Father: A Contribution to Social Psychology*; New York: Harper Perennial.

Mitscherlich, A and Mielke, F (1949) *Doctors of Infamy: The Story of the Nazi Medical Crimes*; New York: Henry Schuman.

Mitscherlich, A and Mitscherlich, M (1975) *The Inability to Mourn: Principles of Collective Behavior*; New York: Grove Press.

Moran, G (1989) *Religious Education as a Second Language*; Birmingham, Alabama: Religious Education Press.

Mounier, E (1952) *Personalism*; Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.

Naess, A (2008) *Ecology of Wisdom*; London: Penguin.

Neill, A S (1985 [1960]) *Summerhill: A Radical Approach to Child-Rearing*; Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Newell, S and Jeffery, D (2002) *Behaviour Management in the Classroom: A Transactional Analysis Approach*; London: Fulton.

Newman, S (2010) *The Politics of Postanarchism*; Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Newton, C, and Tarrant, T (1992) *Managing Change in Schools: A Practical Handbook*; London: Routledge.

Newton, I (1999 [1687]) *The Principia: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy*; Oakland, California: University of California Press.

Noddings, N (1984) *Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education*; Berkeley: University of California Press.

Noddings, N (1993) 'Excellence as a Guide to Educational Conversation', *Teachers College Record, 94:4*, pp 730–743.

Noddings, N (1994) 'Conversation as Moral Education', *Journal of Moral Education, 23:2*, pp 107–118.

Noddings, N (2003) 'Is Teaching a Practice?', *Journal of Philosophy of Education, 37:2*, pp 241–251.

Noddings, N (2005a) 'Identifying and Responding to Needs in Education', *Cambridge Journal of Education, 35:2*, pp 147–159.

Noddings, N (2005b) *The Challenge to Care in Schools: An Alternative Approach to Education: Second Edition*; New York: Teachers College Press.

Noddings, N (2012) 'The Caring Relation in Teaching', *Oxford Review of Education, 38:6*, pp 771–781.

Noddings, N (2015) *A Richer, Brighter Vision for American High Schools*; New York: Cambridge University Press.
Noddings, N (2016) *Philosophy of Education: Fourth Edition*; Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
Northouse, P G (2016) *Leadership: Theory & Practice: International Student Edition: Seventh Edition*; Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE.
Oakeshott, M (1989) *The Voice of Liberal Learning: Michael Oakeshott on Education*; New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.
Oakeshott, M (1991) *Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays*; Indianapolis, Indiana: Liberty Fund.
O'Brien, C (2016) *Education for Sustainable Happiness and Well-Being*; New York: Routledge.
Odena, O (2010) 'Practitioners' Views on Cross-Community Music Education Projects in Northern Ireland: Alienation, Socio-Economic Factors and Educational Potential', *British Educational Research Journal, 36:1*, pp 83–105.
Office for Standards in Education (Ofsted) (2016) *School Inspection Handbook: Handbook for Inspecting Schools in England Under Section 5 of the Education Act 2005*, Manchester: Ofsted.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2015) *Frascati Manual 2015: Guidelines for Collecting and Reporting Data on Research and Experimental Development: The Measurement of Scientific, Technological and Innovation Activities*; Paris: OECD Publishing.
Östman, L (2010) 'Education for Sustainable Development and Normativity: A Transactional Analysis of Moral Meaning-Making and Companion Meanings in Classroom Communication', *Environmental Education Research, 16:1*, pp 75–93.
Ota, C and Chater, M (eds) (2007) *Spiritual Education in a Divided World: Social, Environmental & Pedagogical Perspectives on the Spirituality of Children and Young People*; Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge.
Oxford English Dictionary (OED) (2005) *The Oxford English Dictionary: Third Edition*; Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Passmore, B and Lepkowska, D (1997) 'No One Forgets a Good Teacher …', *TES, 17 October 1997*, available online at http://www.tes.co.uk/article.aspx?storycode=155565 (accessed 11 January 2011).
Peters, M (2001) 'Education, Enterprise Culture and the Entrepreneurial Self: A Foucauldian Perspective', *Journal of Educational Enquiry, 2:2*, pp 58–71.
Pfeffer, J (2015) *Leadership BS: Fixing Workplaces and Careers One Truth at a Time*; New York: HarperCollins.

Pike, M A (2003) 'From Personal to Social Transaction: A Model of Aesthetic Reading in the Classroom', *Journal of Aesthetic Education, 37:2*, pp 61–72.
Plato (1997) *Complete Works*; Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett.
Polanyi, M (1962) *Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy*; London: Routledge.
Prideaux, S (2005) *Not so New Labour: A Sociological Critique of New Labour's Policy and Practice*; Bristol: Policy Press.
Pring, R (2000) *Philosophy of Educational Research*; London: Continuum.
Quibell, T, Charlton, J and Law, J (2017) 'Wilderness Schooling: A Controlled Trial of the Impact of an Outdoor Education Programme on Attainment Outcomes in Primary School Pupils', *British Educational Research Journal, 43:3*, pp 572–587.
Rancière, J (1991) *The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation*; Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
Rawls, J (1972) *A Theory of Justice*; Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Reiss, M J and White, J (2013) *An Aims-Based Curriculum: The Significance of Human Flourishing for Schools*; London: Institute of Education Press.
Rheingold, H (2002) *Smart Mobs: The Next Social Revolution: Transforming Cultures and Communities in the Age of Instant Access*; Cambridge, Massachusetts: Perseus.
Rifkin, J (2015) *The Zero Marginal Cost Society: The Internet of Things, the Collaborative Commons, and the Eclipse of Capitalism*; New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Rogers, C R (1951) *Client-Centered Therapy*; Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Rogers, C R (1961) *On Becoming a Person*; Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Rosenblatt, L M (1994) *The Reader the Text the Poem: The Transactional Theory of the Literary Work, with a New Preface and Epilogue*; Carbondale and Edwardsville, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press.
Rosenblatt, L M (1995) *Literature as Exploration: Fifth Edition*; New York: Modern Language Association of America.
Rosenzweig, F (2000) *Philosophical and Theological Writings*; Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett.
Rosenzweig, R (1999 [1921]) *Understanding the Sick and the Healthy: A View of World, Man, and God*; Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Rumi (1995) *The Essential Rumi*; Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Ryder-Richardson, G (2006) *Creating a Space to Grow: Developing Your Outdoor Learning Environment*; London: David Fulton.
Ryle, G (1949) *The Concept of Mind*; Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Sacks, J (2003) *The Dignity of Difference: How to Avoid the Clash of Civilizations: Second Edition*; London: Continuum.

Sacks, J (2007) *The Home We Build Together: Recreating Society*; London: Continuum.
Salmon, P (1985) *Living in Time: A New Look at Personal Development*; London: Dent.
Salmon, P (1988) *Psychology for Teachers: An Alternative Approach*; London: Hutchinson Education.
Salmon, P (1995) *Psychology in the Classroom: Reconstructing Teachers and Learners*; London: Cassell.
Salmon, P (1998) *Life at School: Education and Psychology*; London: Constable.
Salmon, P (2004) 'The Schizococcus: An Interpersonal Perspective', *Personal Construct Theory & Practice, 1*, pp 76–81.
Sandell, K, Öhman, J and Östman, L (2005) *Education for Sustainable Development: Nature, School and Democracy*; Lund: Studentlitteratur.
Sartre, J-P (2003 [1943]) *Being and Nothingness*; Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge.
Savall, J (conductor) (2008) *Hommage: À Jérusalem et Invocation À la Paix [A Homage to Jerusalem and an Invocation to Peace]*; Alia Vox AVSA 9863 A+B.
Schön, D A (1983) *The Reflective Practitioner*; New York: Basic Books.
Schön, D A (1987) *Educating the Reflective Practitioner: Toward a New Design for Teaching and Learning in the Professions*; San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
School Curriculum and Assessment Authority (SCAA) (1994) *Religious Education: Glossary of Terms*; London: SCAA.
Schumann, K, McGregor, I, Nash, K A and Ross, M (2014) 'Religious Magnanimity: Reminding People of Their Religious Belief System Reduces Hostility After Threat', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 107:3*, pp 432–453.
Scott, S (2010) 'Martin Buber (1878–1965)', *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy,* http://www.iep.utm.edu/buber/ (accessed 11 June 2017).
Selsam, H and Martel, H (eds) (1963) *Reader in Marxist Philosophy: From the Writings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin*; New York: International Publishers.
Sennett, R (1978) *The Fall of Public Man*; London: Penguin.
Sennett, R (2003) *Respect in a World of Inequality*; London: Norton.
Sennett, R (2008) *The Craftsman*; London: Allen Lane.
Sennett, R (2012) *Together: The Rituals, Pleasures and Politics of Cooperation*; London: Allen Lane.
Sergiovanni, T J (1994) *Building Community in Schools*; San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Serres, M (1997) *The Troubadour of Knowledge*; Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press.

Sheng, X (2014) *Learning with Mothers: A Study of Home Schooling in China*; Rotterdam: Sense Publishing.
Shepherd, N (2011 [1977]) *The Living Mountain*; Edinburgh: Canongate.
Siegel, H (ed) (2009) *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Education*; Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Silverman, D (2001) *Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for Analysing Talk, Text and Interaction: Second Edition*; London: SAGE.
Sinclair, A and Strachan, A (2016) 'The Messy Nature of Science: Famous Scientists Can Help Clear Up', *Primary Science, 145*, pp 21–23.
Singer, P (2011) *The Expanding Circle: Ethics, Evolution, and Moral Progress*; Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Sink, C A (2006) 'What John Macmurray's Philosophy Can Add to the Counseling and Values Community', *Counseling & Values, 50:3*, pp 162–165.
Skidmore, D and Murakami, K (eds) (2016) *Dialogic Pedagogy: The Importance of Dialogue in Teaching and Learning*; Bristol: Multilingual Matters.
Smart, N (1960) *A Dialogue of Religions*; London: SCM.
Smart, N (1999) *World Philosophies*; London: Routledge.
Somerville, C (1999) [Personal correspondence with Julian Stern, December 1999.]
Spinoza, B (1955 [1677]) *The Ethics*; New York: Dover.
Stenhouse, L (1975) *An Introduction to Curriculum Research and Development*; London: Heinemann.
Stern, L J (1998) *The OoSHA Review: Out of School Hours Activities in Lambeth: Report for Lambeth LEA, Spring 1998*; Isleworth: Brunel University.
Stern, L J (1999) *"It Ain't so Boring": Newham EAZ Homework Review: Analysis of Surveys and Monitoring*; Isleworth: Brunel University.
Stern, L J (2001a) *Developing Schools as Learning Communities: Towards a Way of Understanding School Organisation, School Development, and Learning*; London: London University Institute of Education: PhD Thesis.
Stern, L J (2001b) 'John Macmurray, Spirituality, Community and Real Schools', *International Journal of Children's Spirituality, 6:1,* pp 25–39.
Stern, L J (2002) 'EMU Leadership: An Egalitarian Magnanimous Undemocratic Way for Schools', *International Journal of Children's Spirituality, 7:2*, pp 143–158.
Stern, L J (2006) *Teaching Religious Education: Researchers in the Classroom*; London: Continuum.
Stern, L J (2007) *Schools and Religions: Imagining the Real*; London: Continuum.
Stern, L J (2009a) *The Spirit of the School*; London: Continuum.

Stern, L J (2009b) 'Monologue or Dialogue? Stepping Away from the Abyss in Higher Education', *London Review of Education, 7:3*, pp 271–281.

Stern, L J (2010) 'Research as Pedagogy: Building Learning Communities and Religious Understanding in RE', *British Journal of Religious Education, 32:2*, pp 133–146.

Stern, L J (2012) 'The Personal World of Schooling: John Macmurray and Schools as Households', *Oxford Review of Education, 38:6*, pp 727–745

Stern, L J (2014) *Loneliness and Solitude in Education: How to Value Individuality and Create an Enstatic School*; Oxford: Peter Lang.

Stern, L J (2015) 'Soul-searching and Re-searching: Action Philosophy Alone', *Educational Action Research, 23:1*, pp 104–115.

Stern, L J (2016) *Virtuous Educational Research: Conversations on Ethical Practice*; Oxford: Peter Lang.

Stern, L J (2018) 'Missing Solitude: Macmurray, Buber and the Edges of Personalism', in Castriota, A and Smith, S (eds) (2018) *Looking at the Sun: New Writings in Modern Personalism*; Wilmington, Delaware: Vernon Press, pp 157–167.

Stern, L J and Backhouse, A (2011) 'Dialogic Feedback for Children and Teachers: Evaluating the 'Spirit of Assessment", *International Journal of Children's Spirituality, 16:4*, pp 331–346.

Stern, L J, Grant, T and Ward, P (2015) 'How Solitude Will Bring Us All Together', *Professional Reflection: The Journal of NATRE, 33:1*, pp 54–57.

Stoll, L and Myers, K (eds) (1998) *No Quick Fixes: Perspectives on Schools in Difficulty*; London: Falmer.

Sunstein, C R and Nussbaum, M C (eds) (2004) *Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions*; Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Suissa, J (2006) *Anarchism and Education: A Philosophical Perspective*; Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge.

Suttie, I D (1960 [1935]) *The Origins of Love and Hate*; Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Sykes, M (2014) *Doing the Right Thing for Children: Eight Qualities of Leadership*; Saint Paul, Minnesota: Redleaf.

Taylor, C (1989) *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity*; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Taylor, L (2008) 'Followership Courses', *THE 1,852, 3–9 July 2008*, p 88.

Tennant, L (2011) 'A Whole Weekend Alone?', *Marie Claire*, June 2011, pp 175–176.

Thrupp, M and Willmott, R (2003) *Education Management in Managerialist Time: Beyond the Textual Apologists*; Maidenhead: Open University Press.

Tilley, S (ed) (2005) *Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing: The Field of Knowledge*; Oxford: Blackwell.

Tindall, G (1977) *The Fields Beneath: The History of One London Village*; London: Maurice Temple Smith.

Townsend, P (1979) *Poverty in the United Kingdom: A Survey of Household Resources and Standards of Living*; Harmondsworth: Viking.

Trevarthen, C (2002) 'Proof of Sympathy: Scientific Evidence on the Personality of the Infant and Macmurray's 'Mother and Child", in Fergusson, D and Dower, N (eds) (2002) *John Macmurray: Critical Perspectives*; New York: Lang, pp 77–117.

Turkle, S (2011) *Alone Together: Why We Expect More from Technology and Less from Each Other*; New York: Basic Books.

Unger, R M (2004) *False Necessity: Anti-Necessitarian Social Theory in the Service of Radical Democracy*; London: Verso.

Universities UK (UUK) (2012) *The Concordat to Support Research Integrity*; London: UUK.

University of Bristol Graduate School of Education Document Summary Service (University of Bristol) (1998) *Teachers' Legal Liabilities and Responsibilities (DfEE Circular 4/98: QTS Standards): The Bristol Guide*; Bristol: University of Bristol.

Van Dijck, J (2013) *The Culture of Connectivity: A Critical History of Social Media*; Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Vernon, M (2005) *The Philosophy of Friendship*; Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Vygotsky, L S (1962) *Thought and Language*; Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Vygotsky, L S (1978) *Mind in Society: The Development of Higher Psychological Processes*; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Ward, C (1982) *Anarchy in Action: Second Edition*; Freedom Press.

Webb, D (2007) *Privacy and Solitude in the Middle Ages*; London: Continuum.

Wegerif, R (2007) *Dialogic Education and Technology: Expanding the Space of Learning*; New York: Springer-Verlag.

Wegerif, R (2008) 'Dialogic or Dialectic? The Significance of Ontological Assumptions in Research on Educational Dialogue', *British Educational Research Journal, 34:3*, pp 347–361.

Wehlage, G G, Rutter, R A, Smith, G A, Lesko, N, and Fernandez, R R (1989) *Reducing the Risk: Schools as Communities of Support*; London: Falmer.

Wenger, E (1998) *Communities of Practice: Learning, Meaning, and Identity*; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Weston, D (2003) 'Children Talking Online', *RE Today, 21:1*, pp 30–31.

White, J (2007) 'Wellbeing and Education: Issues of Culture and Authority', *Journal of Philosophy of Education, 41:1*, pp 17–28.

Winnicott, D W (1986) *Home Is Where We Start from: Essays by a Psychoanalyst*; Harmondsworth: Pelican.

Wittgenstein, L (1958) *Philosophische Untersuchungen: Philosophical Investigations: Second Edition*; Oxford: Blackwell.

Woodson, T (1970) 'Thoreau on Poverty and Magnanimity', *PMLA, 85:1*, pp 21–34.

World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) (1987) *Our Common Future [The Brundtland Report]*; Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wren, T E (ed) (1975) *The Personal Universe: Essays in Honor of John Macmurray*; Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press.

Yvenes, M and Madshus, E (eds) (2008) *Architect Sverre Fehn: Intuition – Reflection – Construction*; Oslo: National Museum of Art, Architecture and Design.

Zajda, J I (1980) *Education in the USSR*; Oxford: Pergamon Press.

Zank, M and Braiterman, Z (2014) 'Martin Buber', *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/buber/ (accessed 30 August 2017).

Index

Julian Stern, *A Philosophy of Schooling*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71571-1