

Islamic Philosophy and Occidental Phenomenology
in Dialogue 7

Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka
Nazif Muhtaroglu
Detlev Quintern *Editors*



Islamic Philosophy and Occidental Phenomenology in Dialogue

The Logos of Life
and Cultural Interlacing

 Springer

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VOLUME 7

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When Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka inspired the establishment of the book series Islamic Philosophy and Occidental Phenomenology in Dialogue in 2000, the dawn of the second millennium went hand in hand with a new spirit of cross-cultural philosophy, widening the philosophical horizon towards a seminal and very productive dialogue. The so far seven volumes of the book series published by Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka broke fresh ground for the sprouts of a New Enlightenment. The primeval logos as it differentiates itself with

the origin and unfurling of life, we may – wrote Anna Teresa Tymieniecka – retrieve these common roots that all philosophies share. As the soul plays the role of the microcosm for both Islamic thought and phenomenology of life, and as the soul does not know boundaries in space and time, we will – as she used to say – continue our dialogue, thereby gratefully commemorating Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka as our teacher.

Acknowledgements

We present here a collected volume of essays read at the World Phenomenology Institute's symposium, "Islamic Philosophy and Occidental Phenomenology in Dialogue", on the topic: "The Question of Divinity in the New Enlightenment?" This symposium took place at the American Philosophical Association's Eastern Division Conference Meeting, in Boston, December 27–30, 2010. I first of all owe thanks to the authors who offered us their essays for this beautiful collection. My Co-editor, Detlev Quintern was an invaluable help in organizing the volume. The members of the Editorial Board, Nader El-Bizri and Olga Louchakova-Schwartz also deserve thanks for their assistance. As usual, we thank Louis Tymieniecka Houthakker and Jeffrey Hurlburt for their help in organizing the symposium and this volume.

Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka

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Introduction

Detlev Quintern

The Logos of Life and Cultural Interlacing, the seventh volume of the series *Islamic Philosophy and Occidental Phenomenology in Dialogue* (IPOP) is the most recent addition to an initiative that seeks to promote cross-cultural understanding and a cross-cultural dialogue in an increasingly divided world at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Such a division caused by epistemological and cultural constructions of difference, for example the polarity of the Western and the Islamic world, can only intensify the ongoing segregation of the world and is therefore debatable.

In addition to the manifold historical testimonies of long-standing Islamic influences on Western philosophy, sciences and culture, Islamic communities, including scholars established not only in Europe and North America as a result of the ongoing global migration processes, continue to enrich contemporary intellectual debates. But, while the world becomes denser, the nurturing of mutual understanding has not followed suit. It is therefore one of the main objectives of the IPOP initiative and the CENTER FOR THE PROMOTION OF CROSS-CULTURAL UNDERSTANDING, founded 2009, not only to bring together philosophers and scientists from various backgrounds, but also to instigate a continuous and hopefully flourishing dialogue.

The (old) Enlightenment with its starting point in eighteenth-century Europe was advancing in splitting the unity of human beingness and furthermore the unity of life. Besides the fragmentation of humanity into hierarchically ordered races, from the nineteenth century onwards an understanding of sciences had broken ground according to which nature has to be forced into isolated objects of research. Life, including human beings, became an object of experimental-empirical verification in the laboratories of modernity. The laboratory, in which mathematical modeling resulted in the replacing of life by formulas, ascended undoubtedly to a producer of

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scientific evidence, whereby validity depended on the conditions of the experiment. But these conditions were constructed by the explorer himself. Likewise, it was the mathematization of life that was transferred to certain theories and methods of social sciences, economics, psychology etc. while in the meantime metaphysical search for wisdom became increasingly marginalized. By doing so, truth had to be verified by the deflection of a pointer as in the case of natural sciences or a statistic as a result of empirical evaluation in social sciences. As it is arguably impossible to construct a laboratory, simulating the communication and interplay of life's oneness, the vision of truth beyond the touchable or the visible, so to say beyond the measurable became unscientific.

The positivistic-empirical and apparently non-ideological theory of sciences on the one hand and the ideologization of philosophy and the history of mankind on the other hand, which according to Marx and Marxist approaches, was bound on certain inescapable laws of nature, hidden in the pathway of societies, had much more accordance than discordance.

As the most radical version of the old Enlightenment, following in the footprints of the ideas of the French Revolution, according to Marxist thought, existing orders, values and traditions had to be overthrown fundamentally. The creativity of human beingness was then chained in a teleological determinism, which traced back to Hegelian ideas, including the stigmatization of Religion as opium for the people (*Opium für das Volk* – Marx). The branding of faith, metaphysics and spirituality as unscientific so became the common ground for seemingly contradicting schools. Here, the empiricist-positivistic and the materialistic tendencies founded their concord. When both of these ways of thinking ended in a crisis towards the outgoing twentieth century, the unknowability of the real broke fresh ground, deepening the crisis into a labyrinth of disorientation. Finally, a kind of post-modernist, post-structuralist and post-Marxist rebellion against the positivistic-empiricist-teleological certainties ended in hopelessness and pessimism.

While understandably throwing overboard all supposed certainties, postmodernities in the meantime remained trapped inside their self-chosen anti-spiritual emptiness and loneliness. A New Enlightenment is hence called upon in order to regain the human dimension in the *unity-of-everything-there-is-alive* (Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka). To coincide with the onto-poietic self-individualization of beingness, an isolated focus on specific cutouts of human beings' multifarious capabilities, be it the limitation to the cognitive-rational, the sensitive-emotional, the spiritual, the unconscious or the bodily-medical will not do justice to the symphony of life in which we are enmeshed. Human beings are using all their "tools" to communicate universally: sensitive, emotive, cognitive, rational and aesthetical at the same time. This constitutes a boundless treasury pointing to the driving force of the creative logos and beyond to the sacral quest, in what Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka called the human condition in the web of life.

Still, a recalcitrant non-awareness of being woven inseparably into this fine and vulnerable web of life, as it is the case with the anthropocentric boastfulness that still characterizes the empiricist euphoria in the aseptic laboratories of modernity, runs the risk of destroying mankind's condition fatally. For that reason, sciences

and their application need to be reintegrated into this harmonious web – a self-evidence which kept scientific approaches pillared over hundreds of years, a period on which the old Enlightenment looked down with disdain.

All of the above indicate why it has become such an urgent necessity to initiate a new critique of reason, that among others things, queries the notion of progress, which in itself, as a concept, has led to various ecological-human catastrophes. This includes a thorough critique of biologicistic neo-Darwinian theories. Placed in this context, the insights of the philosopher, astronomer and physicist Ibn al-Haitham (d. ca. 1049), who was nearly a millennium ago famed for his experimental optics appear almost prophetic for he states that “*however variable its aspects may be, the whole universe obeys a permanent law, and its elements, however variegated they may be, are governed by harmony*”.¹

In contrast to later “modern” approaches which succeeded in modeling a pseudo-reality mathematically, mathematics served in the flourishing period of Arabic-Islamic sciences for the deciphering of the harmonic and therefore symmetric structure in life, which found its most beautiful expression in Islamic art. And yet, the mathematics of the microscopic crystal structure which is characterized by groups of ions, atoms or molecules arranged in terms of periodic repetition models (periodicity) had only in the second half of the twentieth century been identified with certain old geometrical patterns that are to be found in Islamic ornamentation, as for example in the repetitive exquisiteness of Islamic tiles. Harmony, also strongly emphasized in music, which can be composed mathematically, is here to be understood as a key principle in the orchestration of life.

As the advancements of scientific progress with its aim to deepen knowledge, from the smallest nuclei of life, the self-replicability of the cell “*as a sort of prototype of the individual*”,² to the surface of the most distant planets, is beyond any doubt, the New Enlightenment will have to bring into accord the current state of research with ways of deciphering the ontopoietic process, the beingness’ creative networks of communication which are driven forth by the logos of life, a concept further developed by Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka since the book series *Logos of Life* took its debut in 1988. Here, the potentials of an emerging pre-ontology or proto-phenomenology look ahead towards an area of post-metaphysics as outlined in the contribution by Daniela Verducci.

Moving on the question arises whether it is indeed possible to identify essentially certain geographical or cultural spaces with specific ways of thinking and philosophizing? In both, Western and in Eastern philosophies, e.g. in Islamic Philosophy, or in Confucian traditions and in Nietzsche’s body of work, one can find evidence of a radical reevaluation (*Umwertung*). In this context it seems not

¹ Ibn al-Haitham in Fuat Sezgin, *The Istanbul Museum for the History of Sciences and Technology in Islam (An Overview)*, (Frankfurt: Institut für die Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften, 2010), p. 20.

² Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, *The Fullness of the Logos in the Key of Life*, Book 1, *The Case of God in the New Enlightenment*, Analecta Husserliana, The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research, Volume C (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009), p. 93.

absurd to retrace Nietzsche's challenge whether we are not wandering as throughout an infinite nothingness, as the catharsis described by *al-Ghazali* (*al-Ghazzali/Algazeli*) (1058–1111) in his *Rescuer from Error* (*al-munqidh min ad-dalal*) realizes. Reaching the existential point of nothingness may advance epistemic paths to pure knowledge, or, to communicate closer with “*the reason of reason*” (Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka).

There is only one space, the jointly shared and cosmically embedded earth or globe, across which humans are communicating and exchanging cultural practices and ideas, not at least philosophical thoughts. If this, a thousand years ago, took a longer time, as manuscripts traveled sometimes for years from one continent to another, today these processes of communication are accelerated by the digitization of words, sounds and images which can be shared electronically with the world in seconds. Regardless of its place of origin, the slower pace of communication, failed to diminish the human desire for knowledge throughout the history of mankind. If we look at the reception and discussion of Aristotle or pseudo-Aristotelian (Plotinus) writings in the upcoming Islamic philosophy, which held both Aristotle and Plotinus in high regard coupled with a reference of Aristotle being the first teacher (*mu' alim al-awal*), it seems that there had always been a network of human communication. In this sense, cross-cultural philosophy is nothing groundbreaking new. Revisiting the later scholastic period, from its earliest beginnings to the dawn of the Renaissance and further on, we might come to the conclusion that philosophical cross-cultural disputes had been far more intense than it was the case in the upcoming twenty-first century. Many sources in the writings of Thomas Aquinas (1224/25–1274), Raimundus Lullus (1232–1316) or Meister Eckhart (1260–1328), just to name some Western thinkers, are verifying this. Among these sources we find references to Ibn Rushd (Averroes, 1126–1198), Ibn Sina (Avicenna, 980–1037) or *al-Ghazali*.

In other words, the relations between Islamic and Western, here scholastic philosophy had been close, not only around the Mediterranean, but also far into the middle of Europe. But, against the background of a divided world, a deep and continuous dialogue was not always easy to achieve. More often than not it turned into a one-way reception and a monologic self-assurance. And still the scholastic dispute with Islamic philosophy, however indisputably painstaking, was flourishing as the discussion on *unitas intellectus* by Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart, just one example of the profound reflections on Islamic philosophy, in this case the philosophy of Ibn Rushd (Averroes) confirms.

Ibn Rushd (Averroes) advocated, as outlined by Angèle Kremer Marietti, an epistemic comprehensive approach, embedded in dialogical inter-subjectivity, based on tolerance and open-mindedness. Olga Louchakova-Schwartz follows this tradition while comparing the phenomenology of life with Islamic metaphysics, mainly in the writings of Ibn al-Arabi (1165–1240). Abdul Latif Samian's contribution works out consonances for the question of divinity in Newton's and al-Biruni's philosophy of mathematics, showing whilst taking on a comparative perspective that distances in time and space are not hindering the “encounter” of philosophies even against the background of different traditions of religion.

Regrettably we cannot mention every single contribution at this point but are very grateful and would like to thank all the authors.

Unlike the ways of communication and disputation in the thirteenth century, the contemporary world provides us with innumerable opportunities to exchange ideas, to discuss and to dispute more or less instantaneous through electronic media. However, in order to fully utilize all senses at our disposal and since humans are not primarily interested in the mere exchange of data, a physical encounter in form of actual meetings in one place can hardly be dismissed. *The Logos of Life and Cultural Interlacing* as a publication invites learned communities around the world to join into and to foster our dialogue towards a New Enlightenment.

Part I
Phenomenology of Life and Metaphysics

A Metamorphic Logos for Post-metaphysics. From the Phenomenology of Life

Daniela Verducci

Abstract The deconstructive work that marked the twentieth century benefited thought. Jacques Derrida's attempt to translate linguistically and semantically the Heideggerian invitation to the *Destruktion* of the concepts of metaphysics produced the essential result of pointing out the discards, voids, fractures, discontinuities, aporias, the ideological and "actantial" structures of the texts of the metaphysical tradition, passing beyond their intrinsically manifest and wanted unity. In fact, the deconstructionist strategy works to deprive authority of the function of system that absorbs everything by reduction to identification with itself, in order to assert otherness and difference, previously "unthinkable" in the Western philosophical tradition.

Primum de-construere

The deconstructive work that marked the twentieth century benefited thought. Jacques Derrida's attempt to translate linguistically and semantically the Heideggerian invitation to the *Destruktion* of the concepts of metaphysics produced the essential result of pointing out the discards, voids, fractures, discontinuities, aporias, the ideological and "actantial"¹ structures of the texts of the metaphysical tradition, passing beyond their intrinsically manifest and wanted unity. In fact, the deconstructionist strategy works to deprive authority of the function of system that

¹ Cf. A. Greimas and J. Courtés, *Sémiotique. Dictionnaire raisonné de la théorie du langage*, (Paris: Hachette, 1979).

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absorbs everything by reduction to identification with itself, in order to assert otherness and difference, previously “unthinkable” in the Western philosophical tradition.

The same Martin Heidegger, despite the threatening project of the “destroying of the history of ontology,”² actually achieved positive liberation of some principal philosophical concepts, first of all that of “being,” from the centuries-long objectification imposed by metaphysics: he did so precisely inasmuch as he conducted an acute and penetrating linguistic exploration/deconstruction, scandalous for classical and ordinary philosophy, in the name of a phenomenological ontology capable of “letting the phenomenon be seen as it shows itself.”³

However, Deconstructionism, which, according to Derrida, disseminates meaning, and does not seek to remove the foundation of concepts, but only to exhibit the modalities of their development and functioning,⁴ is not concerned with satisfying the undying philosophical desire to “save the phenomena,” a desire expressed as early as Plato,⁵ taken up by Leibniz and then by Hegel in his *Phenomenology of the Spirit*,⁶ seen again in the Husserlian search for a *mathesis universalis*⁷ and still today felt in the burning problems related to communication.⁸

² Cf. M. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, tr. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1962), p. 41.

³ P. A. Rovatti – *La posta in gioco/Heidegger, Husserl, il soggetto* [The Stakes/Heidegger, Husserl, the Subject] – (Milano: Bompiani, 1987).

⁴ J. Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, tr. G. Chakravorty Spivak, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976).

⁵ Simplicius attributes to Plato the merit of having first indicated the need to “save” the astronomical “phenomena”, exhorting astronomers to explain the complex irregular trajectories of the planets through combinations of circular, simple, uniform, and ordered movements. Cf. Simplicius, *In Aristotelis De caelo commentaria*, ed. J. L. Heiberg, (Berlin: Reimer, 1894), pp. 492–493, 4. To his mind, Eudoxis has the merit of being the first to give an adequate solution to the question of planetary movements through the apparatus of the homocentric spheres. In addition, two contemporary works have taken for their title the expression “save the phenomena”: that of P. Duhem, *Sozein ta phainomena: essai sur la notion de theorie physique de Platon a Galilee* (1908), Paris: Vrin, 2003; and the article by G. Bontadini, *Sozein ta phainomena*, “Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica” [Journal of Neoscholastic Philosophy], V (1964), pp. 439–469, in which the author responds to the invitation of E. Severino to *Ritornare a Parmenide* [Return to Parmenides], “Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica”, II (1964), pp. 137–165.

⁶ In the Preface to the *Phenomenology of the Spirit*, G.F.W. Hegel specifies with conviction that the moment has come to “grasping and expressing the True, not only as Substance, but equally as Subject” tr. A. V. Miller, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), § 17, p. 10.

⁷ Cf. E. Husserl, *Erste Philosophie (1923–24). I. Kritische Ideengeschichte*, in *Husserliana*, ed. R. Boehm, VII, 1956, where the author declares the intent to do a reform of all of philosophy (p. 28). In addition, cf. Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy*, tr. D. Carr, (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 45.

⁸ Cf. A.-T. Tymieniecka, *The case of God in the New Enlightenment*, in *Analecta Husserliana*, C (2009), “The Fullness of the Logos in the Key of Life”-Book 1, p. xxv.

In fact, the deconstructive practice succeeds in setting into motion the entire mechanism that leads to a certain place where the totalization is interrupted because no series of semantic values can close upon itself or gather itself any longer⁹; it succeeds as well in achieving the goal of breaking through the pall of necessity and absoluteness that envelops modern metaphysics of the subject, spreading here and there its fragments of meaning; but Deconstructionism remains absorbed in the commitment to dissolve the ghost¹⁰ of dead metaphysics and does not seem particularly interested in detecting the new “logico”¹¹ germination that, precisely thanks to deconstruction, can begin to emerge from beneath the ruins of the metaphysical monolith.

An analogous logico infecundity is found in the later analyses of L. Althusser, dedicated to investigate the genesis of the complexity of economic “structure,” in the light of the formulation of an “aleatory materialism” or “materialism of intersection,”¹² that understands all reality as *Faktum* of a plurality in dissemination.¹³

Thus both authors understand the deconstruction they do as a phase of a journey of research directed to identifying a mere “transcendental contingency,”¹⁴ that certainly assures the definitive dissolution of traditional metaphysics but at the same time intends aprioristically to exclude that it can yield a *logos* capable of linking anew being and appearance.

Difficile est restituere/The Difficult Rebuilding

In some ways the deconstructionists seem subject to the merely compulsive psychological dynamic identified by Nietzsche, which dictates that extreme positions be ousted by equally extreme opposite positions: now, after centuries of metaphysical passion and belief in God and in an essentially moral order of the world, it is precisely this psychological compulsivity that renders “the belief in the absolute immorality of nature, in the lack of purpose and of meaning [. . .] the psychologically necessary passion” and produces the rise of the strenuously a-logico thought of “existence, just as it is, without meaning and purpose,” at a rank of the “most

⁹ Cf.: J. Derrida, *Positions*, tr. A. Bass, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981).

¹⁰ As well known, Derrida addresses the theme of the ghost in his work on K. Marx, *Spectres de Marx*, (Paris: Galilée, 1993).

¹¹ Cf. A.-T. Tymieniecka, *The Great Metamorphosis of the Logos of Life in Ontopoietic Timing*, in: A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), *Timing and Temporality in Islamic Philosophy and Phenomenology of Life*, Islamic Philosophy and Occidental Phenomenology in Dialogue, vol. 3, (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), p. 20.

¹² Cf. L. Althusser, *Sur la philosophie* [On Philosophy], Paris, Éditions Gallimard, 1994.

¹³ In V. Morfino e L. Pinzolo, *Introduzione* to L. Althusser, *Sul materialismo aleatorio* [On Aleatory Materialism], edited by V. Morfino and L. Pinzolo, Milano, Mimesis, 2007.

¹⁴ Althusser, *Sur la philosophie*, op. cit., p. 48.

scientific of all hypotheses possible,” in obedience to the positive consideration that “if existence had a [purpose], it would already have been reached.”¹⁵ But in this, according to Nietzsche, it only reveals the indolence of thought of the nihilist, who, having ceased long ago to reflect, has lost the capacity to realize the elementary fact that “one interpretation has waned; but since it was in force as *the* interpretation, it seems that existence has no meaning, that everything is in vain (*umsonst*).”¹⁶

Therefore, it is a defective and deformed exercise of the anthropological function of transcendence that prevents men of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries from grasping in the advent of nihilism the opening of a new possibility of life in the immanence to life: in fact, now that the dichotomy between true world and apparent world has been debunked,¹⁷ the human going-beyond no longer achieves the effect of impoverishing existence to the advantage of the otherworld, because, on the contrary, transcendence empowers existence. This does not escape Nietzsche, “the first perfect nihilist of Europe,”¹⁸ who, in fact, affirms: “Indeed, in hearing the news that the ‘old God is dead’, we philosophers and ‘free spirits’ feel illuminated by a new dawn”: “our ships may set out again [. . .], the sea, our sea lies open again.”¹⁹

In this way Nietzsche sees delineated the post-metaphysical metamorphosis of the anthropological being-directed-toward-a-meaning: after the announcement of the death of God, this species-specific anthropological function no longer happens as a-going-toward-a-supernatural-beyond, but takes place in a withdrawal-within-the-human-being-itself, in an unheard of “immanent transcendence,” in terms of which the fact that this “meaning” consists in something suprasensible is only one content among others.²⁰

However, this achievement of lucidity of reflective gaze did not suffice for Nietzsche when the explosion of his psychiatric pathology forced him to existentially face the inertial tendency to passive nihilism. Nietzsche was unable to bless his illness and for ten long years endured it in silence, leaving unfinished the post-nihilistic regenerating metamorphosis of his spirit augured in *Zarathustra*, from camel to lion, from lion to child. In fact, his spirit was able to make him a patient

¹⁵ F. Nietzsche, *Der europäische Nihilismus*, in: *Nietzsches Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, ed. Colli and Montinari, W. de Gruyter, Berlin-New York, VIII₁, 1974, § 6.

¹⁶ Nietzsche, *Der europäische Nihilismus*, cit., § 4.

¹⁷ F. Nietzsche, *How the “True World” Finally Became a Fable. The History of an Error*, in: *The Twilight of the Idols or How to Philosophize with a Hammer*, tr. by W. Kaufmann, in: *The Portable Nietzsche*, Penguin Books, London 1976, p. 479: “6. The true world – we have abolished. What world has remained? The apparent one perhaps? But no! With the true world we have also abolished the apparent one. (Noon; moment of the briefest shadow; end of the longest error; high point of humanity; INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA)”.

¹⁸ F. Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, op. cit., Preface.

¹⁹ F. Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, tr. B. Williams and J. Nauckhoff, Cambridge University Press, 2001, § 343.

²⁰ Cf. E. Tugendhat, *Nietzsche e l’antropologia filosofica: il problema della trascendenza immanente* [Nietzsche and Philosophical Anthropology: the Problem of Immanent Transcendence], in: “Discipline filosofiche” XII, I, 2002, pp. 91–92.

camel: he took on his shoulders “the heavy and the heaviest,” the full ethical burden resulting from the application of the centuries-old Judeo-Platonic-Christian paradigm. In the solitude of the wilderness which his spirit walked into, he then transformed himself into lion, because “such a spirit of preying” and such a “work of a beast of prey” is needed for the “capture” of freedom, for vanquishing the dragon of “Thou shalt” with his own “I will,” “to assume the right to new values”, “to create himself freedom for new creating”.

But Nietzsche was unable to achieve the final metamorphosis, the one from lion to child: in the face of his pathology, he did not proffer “a holy Yea,” did not express that “his own will,” which is the fruit of childlike innocence and forgetfulness, which creates new values and is able of “a new beginning, a game, a self-rolling wheel, a first movement”.²¹

After all, not even Zarathustra, the godless, was able to bear the “abysmal thought” of eternal return and when it suddenly emerged from the depths of his soul, he collapsed heavily to the ground. For seven days he remained as if dead because of his “great disgust at man” and all of existence: he was “weary” of them, instead they would eternally return²² to be transcended ever anew, in a game of overcoming that in the incipient phase of his twilight Zarathustra felt as excruciating.

The “innocent” becoming of life, without cause or end, or in other words as a constant “autopoietic” flow, according to the apt denomination conferred upon it by H. Maturana and F. Varela in the 1970s,²³ thus shows itself in Nietzsche to be inadequate for inducing the passage of “immanent transcendence” that pertains to the living human when, facing the challenge of becoming/willing that which he is, he finds himself equipped with only his personal power of self-determination for “a Revaluation of All Values”,²⁴ reinterpreting his own existential condition.

It was M. Scheler who revealed the reason for Nietzsche’s failed transformation/metamorphosis from lion to child: Nietzsche who, because of the profundity of his lived experience, matured in the most silent hours, in *Genealogy of Morals* was able to denounce Darwin’s and Spencer’s removal of “activity” from the concept of life, was then incapable of proceeding positively to substitute what was right for what was mistaken.²⁵ For this reason, to his own detriment, he underestimated the

²¹ F. Nietzsche, *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, tr. T. Common, Part I, “The three metamorphoses”, in: http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1998/1998-h/1998-h.htm#link2H_4_0006

²² Ibid., “The Convalescent”.

²³ H. R. Maturana and F. J. Varela, *Autopoiesis and Cognition. The Realization of the Living*, Dordrecht, Reidel Publishing Company, 1980. Maturana and Varela, *The Tree of Knowledge*, Boston, New Science Library/Shambhala, 1992.

²⁴ Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, op.cit., Preface.

²⁵ Cf. M. Scheler, *Versuche einer Philosophie des Lebens. Nietzsche, Dilthey, Bergson*, in: *Gesammelte Werke*, ed. M. Scheler and M. Frings, Vol. 3, Bern: Francke, 1955, pp. 311–341.

“ontological cost”²⁶ of the passage from the onto-poietic condition of living being in general to the onto-poietic one of man who freely/creatively works his transcendence-of-being. Nietzsche acknowledged with W. James²⁷ that the causal dynamics proper to biological evolution do not suffice for generating that individual human spontaneity and subjective teleology that, going well beyond mere conservation of self and one’s species, open to a world of entirely personal objectives and values.²⁸ However, while auguring for the advent of the superman a “cultural genetics” capable of unlinking the individual from the deterministic dynamics of psycho-physical evolution and of instead consigning him to the exercise of will,²⁹ Nietzsche maintained the conviction that it was necessary to “work, influencing directly upon the organism” in order to cause it to form “another corporality, which from itself will create another soul and other customs.”³⁰ In fact, according to Nietzsche, it is the adaptive movement proper to the living species that makes all their energies flow together in a *continuum* streamlined to typological fixing that guarantees the least expenditure and the greatest capitalization of them: the superman would benefit from this original accumulation of vital power in the human species, using it to break the evolutive continuity and “invent his superior form of being.”³¹ Instead, precisely this automatic development of empowerment proved ineffective in the final phase of Nietzsche’s existence, when his free will was unable to “feel/have a sensation” (*empfinden*) as his own that “instant of the general existence” (*Augenblick des allgemeine Daseins*) that was his to live, and therefore not even to “approve it triumphantly” (*triumphierend [. . .] gutzuheissen*).

Nietzsche, therefore, was acutely aware of the “philosophical” sense of life. He was able to grasp life in its ontological pregnancy of “energy that flows in the immense and, raising itself incessantly in waves full of values, forms with its appearance beings that its decline rigidifies into laws”, as Scheler said. He broadened the very meaning itself of the word “life”, which he extended to the point of embracing both those realities between which it was accustomed to insert it, God and the inanimate world, and to unleash them from himself as the respective forms

²⁶ Cf. F. Totaro, *Nietzsche e la verità in prospettiva* [Nietzsche and the Truth in Perspective], in: F. Totaro (ed.), *Verità e prospettiva in Nietzsche* [Truth and Perspective in Nietzsche], Carocci, Roma 2007, pp. 166–167.

²⁷ Cf. S. Franzese, *L'uomo indeterminato. Saggio su William James* [The Indeterminate Man. Essay on William James], Roma, D'Anselmi, 2000, pp. 19–63. Perhaps Nietzsche read the essay by W. James, *Great Men and Their Environment* (“Atlantic Monthly”, XLVI, pp. 441–59), in the French translation in “Critique philosophique” Jan.-Feb. 1881. Thus in: G. Campioni, *Les lectures françaises de Nietzsche*, Paris, P.U.F., 2001, p. 32, note 2.

²⁸ Nietzsche, *Nachgelassene Fragmente*, 9 [7], Autumn 1887, in NWKG VII₂, p. 6.

²⁹ Nietzsche, *Nachgelassene Fragmente*, 9 [7], 9 [84], Autumn 1887, in NWKG VII₂, pp. 6, 42.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 7 [97], Spring-Summer 1883,

³¹ *Ibid.*, 9[17] e 10 [17]. In this regard, cf. G. Camioni, *Scienza e filosofia della forza in Nietzsche* [Science and Philosophy of Power in Nietzsche], in: G. Campioni, *Sulla strada di Nietzsche* [On the Road of Nietzsche], Pisa: ETS 1993, pp. 161–196; C. Richter, *Nietzsche et la biologie*, Paris: P.U.F. 2001; G. Moore, *Nietzsche, Spencer and the Ethics of Evolution*, in: “Journal of Nietzsche Studies”, XXIII, 2002, pp. 1–20.

of a rising and ebbing process, just as Schelling had intuited. But in conclusion, we must acknowledge with M. Scheler that, while he was among the first to speak directly to 'life', Nietzsche did not reach full possession of the philosophy of life,³² being unable to resolve the crucial logico passage that leads from the spontaneity of constructivism of natural life to the free and creative onto-poiesis of human life.

The Metamorphic Logos of Life

Husserl set himself in continuity with the legacy of this Nietzschean concern and identified in living experience (*Erlebnis*) itself the new resource of transcendence with which to draw upon the logos that constitutes the world. In effect, as Habermas notes: "phenomenologists have not yet arrived at their own 'post-ism'", unlike the post-analytics, the post-structuralists, or the post-Marxists.³³ Furthermore, we must note that phenomenology has been in no way reduced to the mere "history of its effects" (*Wirkungsgeschichte*) but rather continues to be "permeated with existential topicality".³⁴ In fact, on one hand, as Habermas observes, "an ontologically oriented phenomenology [. . .] robs reason of its classical attributes" and discovers that "transcendental consciousness concretizes itself in the practices of the life-world and takes on flesh and blood in historical embodiments"; on the other hand "an anthropologically oriented phenomenology locates further media of embodiment in action, language, and the body", having already acquired "additional evidence for the rootedness of our cognitive accomplishments in pre-scientific practice and in our intercourse with things and persons".³⁵

This Habermasian configuration of a solidarity between spirit and life in phenomenology nonetheless remains in the dimension of the factual, just like the Husserlian observation in § 53 of *The Crisis of European Sciences* regarding "the paradox of human subjectivity: being a subject for the world and at the same time an object in the world."³⁶ Here, as there, one perceives the reflective deadlock imposed by the re-actualizing dualism that since Descartes has split the one being of ontology into two principal antitheses, *res cogitans/res extensa*, phenomenon/noumenon, mind/world. The line of the philosophy of praxis and sociology also acknowledges as insurmountable this import of modernity, that resounds there under the titles work/capital, individual/society, alienation/

³² Scheler, *Versuche einer Philosophie des Lebens*, op. cit., p. 314.

³³ J. Habermas, *Nachmetaphysisches Denken. Philosophische Aufsätze*, (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1988). Engl. transl. by W. M. Hohengarten, *Postmetaphysical Thinking. Philosophical Essays*, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), p. 3.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

³⁶ Cf. E. Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, op. cit., p. 178.

reification.³⁷ In the following § 54, Husserl proposes going beyond the paradox represented by subjectivity, in the openness to intersubjectivity, but the result reached with this does not resolve the problem because once again there emerges the difficulty of the relationship between transcendental subjectivity and that of the world.

Thus Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka is convincing when she observes that neither classical phenomenological inquiry nor that following the Second World War managed to find the common root of the eidetic and vital dimensions, or to draw upon “the sphere at which both reality, which is in question and consciousness, which emerges in correlation with it, become intuitively present in their emergence together.”³⁸

Vice versa, it is precisely the sense of “concretion” (= growth-together) that dominates the phenomenology of life of A.-T. Tymieniecka, as well as in the reflections on human phylogenesis recently conducted by M. Tomasello.³⁹ In the volumes of the *Logos and Life* series, the problem of philosophically explaining “various spheres of life”, that is, according to a united logos, is faced using the artistic logic that inspired the composition of the medieval *retables*, where the simultaneous presence of different pictures develops the synergy that highlights and transmits a plurality of meanings.

In the *retables* we have “a plastic visual reconstruction of a segment of life’s fullness” which, limited to a one-dimensional presentation of its topic may, within one of the panels, “bring to life” merely one phase of the development of the objective sense of the work, as well as only one “sphere” of “its inner workings”, the revelation of the complete significance of which “necessitates and indicates its innermost links to an ulterior as well as preceding phase (either in temporal genesis or in spatial extension, or lastly, in thematic expansion)”. Their unity is not that of “a continuing argument”, like according to the pattern of the temporal succession in which the reading-cognizing process of our human mind works, but that of “numerous significant threads which, being subjacent to the direct themes of presentations, maintain interconnections among various issues, various analytic complexes, and various dimensions which are projected by the great themes in question”.⁴⁰ Man participates in this latent and virtual inter-connectedness of life through the workings of his creative condition, as poets and artists documented much earlier than the philosophers.⁴¹

³⁷ Cf. P. Berger, Th. Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality. A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*. (London: Penguin, 1966). Cit. in: J. Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. Twelve Lectures*. tr. F. G. Lawrence, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987).

³⁸ A.-T. Tymieniecka, *A note on Edmund Husserl's late breakthrough*, in *Phenomenology world-wide. Foundations, expanding dynamics, life-engagements. A guide for research and study*, ed. A.-T. Tymieniecka, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), p. 686.

³⁹ Cf.: M. Tomasello, *The cultural origins of human cognition*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2000).

⁴⁰ A.-T. Tymieniecka, *Creative Experience and the Critique of Reason*, “Logos and Life”-Book I, “Analecta Husserliana”, XXIV (1988), p. 8.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

Analogously, applying to the explanation of her system of thought the structure of a “triptych”,⁴² A.-T. Tymieniecka intends both to offer the maximum prominence to what reality itself, showing itself, affords, and to safeguard it from the “forced connectedness” or “dubious speculative nets of unity”,⁴³ that to date have entangled the phenomenological vision itself. Therefore, instead of following the “traditionally established pattern of exposition of ideas that are assumed to be attuned to a strictly rational, cogent, intelligibly graspable unity of the universe”, Tymieniecka realizes that she has to proceed according to “the pattern that the originating reality, in acquiring its sense, projects”.⁴⁴

The phenomenology of life of A.-T. Tymieniecka thus is articulated in three panels: in the first, “The eros and logos of life within the creative inwardness”, open out all the strings from the knots which analysis of poetic creativity reveals. The central panel, about “The origin of sense” or in other words “The creative orchestration of the modalities of beingness within the human condition”, gathers these strings and “follows them in their intricacies through analytic evidence, allusive surmising, conjectural inference and evocative correspondence in order to investigate the crucial complex of the origin of meaning.” Emerging here in the foreground is the human creative experience in which “all the forces which carry the meaningfulness of natural life play upon the strings of the passionate soul and are gathered and transmuted, filtered and untied and tied again into new networks, bringing new, unprecedented, and unique specifically human significance to life”.⁴⁵ The creative process that characterizes the human level that life has reached induces in the logos of life a crucial metamorphosis and the natural human faculties are articulated in a new way, because the supreme role passes from the intellect to the *Imaginatio Creatrix* and the sensory perception yields to the primacy of the will.⁴⁶ Thus the theme of the third panel, “*The three movements of the soul*”, is the soul as the “soil” of life’s forces and the transmitter of life’s constructive progress from the primeval logos of life to its annihilation in the anti-logos of man’s “transnatural telos”.⁴⁷

The result of this kind of explanation in the form of triptych is surprising and phenomenologically fitting in its capacity to “bring to manifestation” (*zur Erschauung bringen*), claimed by Max Scheler⁴⁸: our theoretical attention has the occasion to abandon the tortuous and disrupted path of discovery which our mind follows so that we may come to grips with some elements of reality-in-becoming,

⁴² Ibid., p. 8.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 9.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 9.

⁴⁵ Tymieniecka, *Creative Experience and the Critique of Reason*, p. 10.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 11.

⁴⁷ A.-T. Tymieniecka, *The Three Movements of the Soul*, “Logos and Life” – Book 2, “Analecta Husserliana”, XXV, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988), p. 3.

⁴⁸ Cf.: M. Scheler, *Phänomenologie und Erkenntnistheorie*, in: *Gesammelte Werke*, ed. by M. Scheler and M. Frings, vol. 10, “Schriften aus dem Nachlass I”, (Bern: Francke, 1957), p. 380.

but taking in complete obscurity so many by-ways of our entire human functioning.⁴⁹ In fact, the graphic presencing of meaning is “a forceful mode of language” that causes “its eluding bodily signs to reverberate throughout our experiential system, seeking for an appropriate chord to resound”.⁵⁰

Thus we are captured by a new intuitive evidence, that of the unity of reason within life’s constructive spread!⁵¹ We see that what we call the “reality of life” is certainly fluid, infinitely expansive, and as such, ungraspable in its fullness, but we see also that it progresses in an harmonious-disharmonious unfolding which is just the opposite of the chaotic ways of our discovering process: “reality in becoming indicates a harmony, the networks of which are woven on so many looms, with such infinitely varied types of warps and woofs, in so infinite changeable a variety of patterns that no direct passage from one segment of its weaving to another [. . .] can be established by analyzing it through a certain selected number of modalities”.⁵²

But then what anthropological expertise responds to the appeal for harmony that is unleashed from the being-in-concretion, represented in the simultaneous presence of three different pictures?

Tymieniecka let us observe that in the intuition of concretion according to harmony-disharmony of the reality of life there comes to light “what within the turmoil of experience of every instant seeks to surface into the limelight of attention as fully significant”. They are “innumerable” instances of experience, of feeling, affect, thought, sense, etc. which assert their significance fully, which “succeeds for an instant in making their message “known”, in imprinting it on the canvas of our self-interpretative script, [which] is in the next carried away while the turmoil proceeds”. But such “innumerable” instances of experience are carried at their crucial level of surfacing with a clear signal, sign or meaning “by the experiential elemental striving, bends, passions, whims, willings which do not surface with a clear determined signal”. These essential factors play “*en sourdine*” their decisive role and we may evoke them allusively, not by direct association of experience, but “artfully assembling against each other entire segments of meaningful data from the different phases in which the life symphony constructs itself”. As Tymieniecka says:

From the fragments of their juxtaposed designs, from their plastic symmetries/asymmetries, anticipatory emptiness in one phase versus plenitude in another corresponding phase, develops the constructively progressing design, in a view of its presumed coherence which projects itself; and there appear corresponding experiential evocations, bringing what has been mute and absent from the limelight into its proper structural places and significant roles.⁵³

The reality of life represented in its “concretion” (= growth-together) in the triptych panels thus solicits our most hidden but also most humanly specific

⁴⁹ Tymieniecka, *Creative Experience and the Critique of Reason*, op. cit., p. 9.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 11.

⁵¹ Tymieniecka, *The Three Movements of the Soul*, op. cit., p. 195.

⁵² Tymieniecka, *Creative Experience and the Critique of Reason*, op. cit., p. 10.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 12.

expertise: that of the creative consciousness and of the human creative act, that in being can both grasp the virtualities, the not-yet, and bring them about, increasing life and documenting that the constructivism of life is coinciding with our own constructivism,⁵⁴ even if “this givenness of man within his world is not only of a process-like nature but, moreover, indicates a specific type of constructivism”.⁵⁵ When life attains the level of the human creative condition, it no longer stops at reproducing itself, but in the acts of the life of man it always interprets itself creatively in existence, giving rise to forms of life that are not only new and previously unimaginable, but also congruent and adequate to the becoming being of life, of which he alone possesses the cipher.⁵⁶

The full vicissitudes of life are now shown as the great game in which “life is being converted from a mute, neutral, one-voiced play of Nature into a uniquely human polyphonic symphony”⁵⁷ and the passage of transcendence from the naturalness of animal life to the free will for power of human life, in other words, “to the freshness and spontaneity of childhood” that Nietzsche had believed obstructed, instead is open,⁵⁸ because the logic metamorphosis of life has become manifest. Now it has become evident that life as autopoietic power of differentiation and individualization, when mature in the human condition, is transformed in its naturalistic configuration and acquires access to the dimension of freedom, a **fact** neglected by deconstructionist dissemination. In fact, the natural poiesis, or autopoiesis according to U. Maturana and F. Varela, gains voice when life reaches the level of the human condition; only and exclusively at this level can it also mature its flowering in the ontopoiesis of life, operated by the living “enaction” of the human subjectivity that “expands life into possible world of life”,⁵⁹ beyond the limits of natural determinism. Tymieniecka comments:

Thus, man’s elementary condition – the same one which Husserl and Ingarden have attempted in vain to break through to, by stretching the expanse of his intentional bonds as well as by having recourse to prereduced scientific data – appears to be one of blind nature’s elements, and yet at the same time, this element shows itself to have virtualities for individualization at the vital level and, what is more, for a specifically human individualization. These latter virtualities we could label *the subliminal spontaneity*.⁶⁰

In the representation of the phenomenology of life as a triptych, this is also shown to our theoretical gaze, granted that we work a suitable *epochè* of our

⁵⁴ A.-T. Tymieniecka, *Impetus and Equipoise in the Life-Strategies of Reason*, “Logos and Life”, vol. 4, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000), p. 5.

⁵⁵ Tymieniecka, *Creative Experience and the Critique of Reason*, op. cit., p. 4.

⁵⁶ A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), *Phenomenology of Life and the Human Creative Condition*, “Analecta Husserliana”, LII (1998).

⁵⁷ Tymieniecka, *Creative Experience and the Critique of Reason*, op. cit., p. 11.

⁵⁸ Cf.: Tymieniecka, *The Three Movements of the Soul*, op. cit., pp. 117–121.

⁵⁹ A.-T. Tymieniecka, *Creative Experience and the Critique of Reason, Logos and Life*, Book 1, Analecta Husserliana, XXIV, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988), “Analecta Husserliana”, XXIV (1988), p. 6.

⁶⁰ Tymieniecka, *The Great Metamorphosis of the Logos of Life*, op. cit., p. 28.

modern-rationalistic prejudices and let ourselves realize that there has been an “intuitive resowing”⁶¹: therefore instead of the field of life-world assumed as the ultimate ground and seen as the expansion of the constitutive, objectifying consciousness which is being restricted to the intellectual surface of life, we gain within the “creative context”, “a full-fledged field of philosophical inquiry into Nature, life, its specifically human meaningfulness and the sense of the human orbit”.⁶² Indeed, A.-T. Tymieniecka has attained the pre-ontological position of being, that in which being generates itself and regenerates. From this point of view, she has been able to untangle the logos, which presides over the evolution of the life of being, indicating it, with a term of her own coinage, as “ontopoiesis”, that is, “production/creation of being.”

But at this point a metaphysical problem arises and Tymieniecka asks herself: “Does this logos stop with the timing of life?”⁶³ Will “the driving force of the logos” that unfolds life in its complete self-individualizing dynamic, be able to conduct it from “the incipient instance of originating life in its self-individualizing process” all the way to “the subsequent striving toward the abyss of the spirit”?

The logos that is intrinsic to life has manifested itself as “a primogenital force striving without end, surging in its impetus and seeking equipoise”: it promotes “the constructive prompting” that determines “the progress of life” and “it prepares its own means/organs for its own advance”. This advance means the fulfillment of constructive steps toward transformations, that is: “step by step unfolding projects of progressive conversion of constructive forces into new knots of sense.” Therefore, “the crucial factum of life” has not appeared without reason, “brought [. . .] out of ‘nowhere’”; on the contrary, the “logoc force of life has its purpose”, just like Schelling’s living nature, that embodies the “scheme of freedom,”⁶⁴ and that purpose reveals itself as ontopoietic inasmuch as it expresses itself “in preparing scrupulously in a long progression the constructive route of individualizing life so that *Imaginatio Creatrix* emerges as an autonomous modality of force with its own motor, the human will”. Crowning its development, “the force of the logos of life”, with the will as new modality of force, finds itself able to advance “from the vital/ontopoietic round of significance into two new dominions of sense”: that of the creative/spiritual and that of the sacred. In the terms of traditional ontology, this means that “‘substances’ undergo a ‘transubstantial’ change” and also that “the inner modality of the logoc force undergoes an essential transmutation”. Therefore, “Life, [. . .] as a manifestation of the ontopoietic process” “is far from a wild Heraclitean flux, for it articulates itself”. In addition, and first of all, “[life]

⁶¹ Cf. D. Verducci, *The development of the living seed of intentionality from E. Husserl and E. Fink to A.-T. Tymieniecka’s ontopoiesis of life*, in “*Analecta Husserliana*”, CV (2010), p. 33.

⁶² Tymieniecka, *Creative Experience and the Critique of Reason*, op. cit., p. 10.

⁶³ Tymieniecka, *The Great Metamorphosis of the Logos of Life*, op. cit., p. 21.

⁶⁴ Cf. F. W. J. Schelling, *Aphorismen über die Naturphilosophie*, in: *Sämtliche Werke*, ed. K. F. A. Schelling, (Stuttgart: Cotta), 1856–1861, vol. VII, p. 236.

‘times’ itself⁶⁵ because time reveals itself as “the main artery through which life’s pulsating propensities flow, articulating themselves, intergenerating”.⁶⁶

In the metamorphic capacity that intrinsically qualifies the onto-poietic logos of life, there is the possibility for “the new metaphysical panorama”⁶⁷ that delineates itself to transcend “the timeless pattern of surrender to nature” and going beyond “the equipoise established through millennia of life between nature and human beings and between the gifts of nature and their use by living beings”⁶⁸ also establishing new nexuses between time as *chronos* and *kairos*.⁶⁹ The fulcrum of this metamorphosis is that “unique phase of evolutive transmutation” in which the “mature” phase of the platform of life manifests an extraordinary character and gives rise to the Human-Condition within the unity-of-everything-there-is-alive.

Paradoxically the human being appears to be integrally part and parcel of nature yet reaches levels “beyond nature”, levels of life that endow the human being with special unique significance that is no longer simply vital but is also spiritual.⁷⁰ The appearance of the living human being sets off in natural life “a watershed event, essentially a transformation of the significance of life”: the “enigmatic” surging of *Imaginatio Creatrix* in the middle of onto-poietic sequence, surging freely as it floats above the inner working of nature. Here we reach – observes Tymieniecka – the most surprising turn of logos of life, because this great shift was being prepared by the logos’ constructive steps, starting at the very beginning of self-individualizing of life, but it produces a “countervailing move”, that “brings about a complete conversion of its hold on life’s individualization and opens the entire horizon of freedom”.⁷¹ *Imaginatio Creatrix*, rooted within the functioning of Nature-life and yet an autonomous sense giver, introduces three new sense-giving factors: the intellectual sense, the aesthetic sense, and the moral sense. With them life is endowed with meaning beyond what is geared to and strictly limited to survival; there comes about an inner transformation of the vitally oriented and single-minded functional system of reference into the *novum* of specifically human creativity. Within the creative modus of human functioning in its specifically creative orchestration there occurs a metamorphosis of the vital system of onto-poiesis.

The moral sense lies at the core of the metamorphosis of the life situation from vital existence into the advent of Human Condition⁷²: here we have the entrance

⁶⁵ Tymieniecka, *The Great Metamorphosis of the Logos of Life*, op. cit., p. 20.

⁶⁶ A.-T. Tymieniecka, *Life’s primogenital timing. Time projected by the dynamic articulation of the ontogenesis*, in: “*Analecta Husserliana*”, L (1997), p. 4.

⁶⁷ Tymieniecka, *The Case of God*, op. cit., p. xxv.

⁶⁸ Tymieniecka, *Impetus and Equipoise*, op. cit, p. 99.

⁶⁹ Tymieniecka, *Life’s primogenital timing*, op. cit., p. 4.

⁷⁰ Tymieniecka, *The Great Metamorphosis of the Logos of Life*, op. cit., p. 31.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 33.

into the game of life of a specific thread of logos of life, that involves human communion and also the sacral quest.⁷³ The quest prompted by the moral sense is a mode of becoming but of an absolutely “spontaneous” becoming, one that does not follow a preprogrammed sequence to be accomplished but is “freely” projected becoming building on the accomplishments of each actor. While the human creative condition and moral sense both develop in onto-poietic time, the quest for ultimate understanding goes in a direction reverse to that of the onto-poietic unfolding of life and work to undo its own accomplishments of the progressive transmutation of the soul.

Indeed – Tymieniecka exclaims – through the moral and entirely freely chosen work of the conscience, the self-enclosed onto-poietic course may be undone and remolded in a free redeeming course!

The logos of life has led us to a borderline place between the onto-poietic logos of life and logos’ sacral turn toward territory that is beyond the reach of the logos of the vital individualization of beingness.⁷⁴ It is here that the Great Metamorphosis takes place:

Onto-poiesis carries its own necessities and opens to the transformative advance of the Great Metamorphosis that completes life’s meaning in a transition from temporal life to a-temporality, or better, hyper-temporality.⁷⁵

In the new post-metaphysical horizon delineated, starting from the proto-phenomenological discovery of the onto-poietic logos of life by A.-T. Tymieniecka, we receive a fundamental acquisition. In fact, up until now eternal life was an ethical urge that arises powerfully in the human being but that is destined to remain ontologically unsatisfied, or as a “mystery of desire”,⁷⁶ which, however, makes us lean dangerously over the abyss opened by death; in this post-modernity, instead, thanks to the phenomenology of life of A.-T. Tymieniecka, we have been able to realize that the paradox of our Human-Condition within the unity-of-everything-there-is-alive gives us the conjectural cipher that manifests and activates the “scale/ladder”-of-being-in-becoming or onto-poietic sequence of life, upon which we can sustain ourselves in executing the urge for transcendence that pervades us and for all the time of our life makes us strain

toward an all-surpassing sphere of Fulfillment, in which we would find our inadequacies supplied and be in harmony with all creation.⁷⁷

⁷³ Ibid., p. 35.

⁷⁴ Ibid., pp. 59–60.

⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 67.

⁷⁶ Cf. G. Ferretti (ed.), *La Resurrezione mistero del desiderio. Un dialogo interdisciplinare* [The Resurrection Mystery of Desire. An Interdisciplinary Dialogue], (Macerata: EUM, 2006). In this regard, see also: M. Craven Nussbaum, *The Therapy of Desire. Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics*, Princeton University Press, 1996.

⁷⁷ Tymieniecka, *The Great Metamorphosis of the Logos of Life*, p. 69.

All told, concludes A.-T. Tymieniecka, engaging the vast problem of the “evolving God”,⁷⁸

what in the cognitive-intellective perspective of human mind appears [. . .] to be the greatest human “folly”, an absurdity and something impossible for sober reason to accept, is a revelation by the logos of life/sacral logos within our now completed human experience of nothing less than *the reason of all reasons*.⁷⁹

⁷⁸ The thesis of an “evolving God” sinks its roots in the mystics of Meister Eckhart, Angelus Silesius and Franz von Baader, opening the road to the Hegelian idea according to which God is not God without the history of the world, and in fact takes on consciousness of Himself through man. The debate winds through pantheism and Spinozism, to find expression in the later Schelling, arousing very violent polemics, both from official theology, which cries out atheism, and from agnostic and positivistic thought, which considers this hypothesis a dangerous fall into theosophistic irrationalism. F. Nietzsche uses the expression in § 238 of *Human, all too human*. *A book for free spirits*, tr. M. Faber, S. Lehmann, rev. A. Danto, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996). In *Evolution créatrice*, Bergson also affirms that “Dieu se fait”. M. Scheler consigns the exposition of the thesis of “evolving God” mostly to the posthumous fragments collected in volume XI of *Gesammelte Werke*.

⁷⁹ Tymieniecka, *The Great Metamorphosis of the Logos of Life*, cit., p. 70.

The Effect of Illumination on the Way Back from Aristotle to Plato

Salahaddin Khalilov

Abstract Aristotle brought Plato's theory of ideas from the heavens to the earth. However, the human being could at best see the form/copy and languished embodiment of the idea in the things. The thousands of years of scientific development was not enough for the human being, whose starting point was the sensory experience, to reach the ultimate truth. Though the discovery of the structure and form of things, and expressing them in mathematical patterns had demonstrated the great potential and possibility of logical thinking, it was impossible to prove that the reached conclusion was adequate to the truth. On the contrary, it became obvious that whenever a human stepped aside from logic, due to his/her inner illumination the truth was revealed more clearly. In this context, the term "Illumination (*Ishraq*)" as used in medieval Eastern philosophy, in particular in Ishragism Doctrine, expresses a shorter way that the cognition can lead to the truth. The ideas existing in things as a form/copy are thus discovered by a human being, as a *living idea* in his/her own "I" and hence, the truth is revealed within himself/herself. The living idea is not merely information, but also a source of excitement and life and in order to understand it, there is a need to refer to the concept of Ontopoiesis.

Though both Plato and Aristotle have been regarded as the representatives of rationalism, in fact, Aristotle was not so consistent in his attitude; he also attached great importance to the sensory experiment and to the role of the knowledge gained in this very way.

Aristotle's statements against Plato, which give the impression of struggle, in fact, caused the two teachings to become clearer and to come 'cleared out' until

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today. As mentioned by the famous researcher of the Ancient philosophy V. Asmus, the criticism of Plato's theory of forms constitutes the main line of Aristotle's book *Metaphysics*.¹ Namely, for Plato idea (form) and notion are not merely our opinions about existence, but existence itself. Aristotle, in turn, considers that if there is not anything cognized then the knowledge about it does not exist too. (Otherwise, it would be knowledge about nothing.)

For having the idea about the correct and comprehensive view of reality, it is not sufficient to divide it into the indefinite and conditional notions like thinking and substance. Then the place that he occupies and the role that he plays could not be clearly conceived. For us, the optimum model is to define the ultimate idea on the one hand and the ultimate matter on the other; and the peculiarities of the world and the human being that are placed between the two poles as well as the relationships between them could be elucidated only after this.

After understanding God as the only Ultimate Being, which includes in him the poles of the ultimate idea and matter, we are going to elucidate the status of the ultimate idea and the ultimate matter which are completely separated from each other. Some researchers identify the ultimate idea with God. Matter in this case is left aside and two alternatives remain to explain it; either matter was derived from idea, or by not depending on God, it has existed from the very outset. None of these explanations could lead to the efficient conclusion for understanding the world.

The first approach reminds us of the teaching of Plato. That is, the only true being is the world of forms (ideas). The material world as well as the things and events in it, are supposedly the copies of ideas, and so they are deprived of the real existence. The temporality and conditionality of things and events in the world leads to the denial of their real existence in general. Nevertheless, the path of the human being to God, in fact, goes through the material world. The absolutization of the soul and the denial of the body, in one sense, could not play the role of the optimal methodological basis for learning the gist and mechanism of the events that happen in real life.

By being, in fact, a dualist standpoint, the second approach considers matter and God at the same status. This standpoint could be considered as an equivalent to the conceptualization of the duality of light and darkness, good and evil, idea and substance, fire and earth (in Empedocles) – which goes back to Zoroastrianism – in the form of idea and matter.

By having the body, the human being himself is a part of the middle world. Other things consist of the unity of idea and materiality, or more precisely, they are made of matter-material on the basis of a certain idea; likewise, the human being is also the carrier of the idea of the body. To tell the truth, unlike all other creatures, the human being is also the carrier of another idea – the idea of the universe, namely he is microcosm, he is as well the idea which could become active in certain times, that is, he is an idea which is transformed into consciousness. In other words,

¹ В.Асмус, “Метафизика Аристотеля”, in *Аристотель. Метафизика. Сочинения*, том 1 (Moscow: Nauka, 1976), p. 5.

though, the human being gets the opportunity to approach the ultimate idea and travel to the world of ideas (and to be absorbed in himself, to head towards his inner and spiritual world), due to having the soul, he could appear as the same organized side with things and events if he is in this world. That is to say, he has to obey the laws of this world and adjust himself to its harmony.

The human being, who includes the world in himself as a passive idea, 'learns' it in parts at the time when he is in the concrete contact with it. That is to say, by depending on the contact points with this world, the inner world of the human being is illuminated and opened. However, by not being dependent on the external world, the human being could also travel to his inner cosmic world if he would like to turn back and find or create in this world what he saw there. This very point stands on the basis of the creative process.

If the human being wants to reveal (in himself) the idea that is conveyed by either other things and events or his own body, then it will be clear that not only one idea but many ideas are included in these things. Then which idea appears at the first approach and what do the things, which do not appear, mean for us? The whole question is that the human being accepts the sign, peculiarity, form, structure and regularity, in a word, the idea that he could discover in objects and events, as idea, and the rest, which are obscure and unknown, he accepts them as matter and material. For the reason that the material substance has a complex structure, the higher levels, which are revealed in the hierarchy of ideas that it includes, are accepted as idea and the lower levels, which are obscure, as matter. By the idea of 'table', for example, the macrostructure and form, which provide its function, are meant. What it was made of, as well as the structure of its 'material', and the lower structural layers of this structure (molecules, atoms etc.) silently belonged to content and matter. When the human being looks at the object not with the naked eye, but with the microscope, what he observes are cells, molecules etc. In this case he will not be able to observe the microstructure.

Indeed, the illuminated side is accepted as idea and the obscure one as matter, exactly like that of Illuminationism (*Ishraqiyya*).

Analogically, the illuminated side in the brain-microcosm corresponds to consciousness (the idea, which is brought to a focus – intentionality) and the passive side to unconsciousness and unrevealed-consciousness (in the obscure part of the brain). Therefore, the main question is to which structural level the human being gives his attention. The material object and event are maybe the carriers of many things. However, what we know is its part that coincides with his cognitive view. The obscure part has been called differently by different philosophers. In fact, it corresponds to Kant's notion of 'the thing-in-itself (*das Ding an sich*)'.

Aristotle also tried to determine the mutual relationship and correlation between form and matter. He brilliantly noticed that there was a problem here. By reason of the fact that it was difficult to fully clarify the problem, he used another notion – the notion of substratum. For Aristotle, everything refers to substratum but it does not refer to anything. "And in one sense matter is said to be of the nature of substratum, in another shape, and in a third, the compound of these. (By the matter I mean, for instance, the bronze, by the shape the pattern of its form, and by the compound of

these the statue, the concrete whole.) Therefore if the form is prior to the matter and more real, it will be prior also to the compound of both, for the same reason".²

In this search Aristotle came to the idea of 'thing in itself', which, considering the knowledge level of his time, was a brilliant notion: "because each thing is inseparable from itself, and its being one just meant this".³

The human being sees, hears (gets information with his sense organs) when he is in contact with this world, and each time a certain life table appears in front of him. It gives the human being the impression that truth is outside and the aim is 'to reflect' this outsider with senses and thus to get knowledge about the world in this way.

When philosophers approached the problem more deeply, they started to be sceptical about the degree of adequacy of the information, which was gained through senses, to the truth. The idea of reaching the ultimate truth by means of the purposeful thought or intuition or revelation was diversely expressed in Indian and Chinese philosophies as well as in Ancient Greek philosophy. This idea was leading in medieval Islamic philosophical thought. Shahab al-Din al-Suhrawardi also mentions that the knowledge gained through the outside senses misled the human being and alienated him from the ultimate truth. In the New Age philosophy Descartes took the same approach and claimed that the truth is not gained due to the sensory experiment but to the purposeful thought.

However, the notions, which claimed that the ready ideas in the human mind existed without being dependent on material realities, have also been met with resistance. The discussion of this problem was clarified in the teaching of John Locke at its best. Kant, in turn, by accepting either the results of the sensory experiment or pure reason, claimed that the real panorama of the world arose from the synthesis of these two truths. Thus, throughout the whole history of philosophical thought, the seeking of truth has realized by being based sometimes on the sensory experiment and sometimes on the purposeful rational thought.

At the same time, there were the cases in which accepting the human being as an independent being and comparing him with the material world as an independent substance and even regarding idea as the only being were subjected to a humiliating attitude; this attitude was also taken towards the material world and the human body. Plato, for instance, accepted the material world as a shadow of ideas (forms) and only ideas were considered by him as real. However, Plato's ideas were able to stand not only above things and events but also above human consciousness. Whereas what is clear to the human being is his inner world as well as it is the only reality for man. This world, in turn, does not always become clear and illuminated for the human being. Only certain points of this world become clear and illuminated when the human being is in contact with external objects and events, as well as when he focuses his thought on his inner world. What we saw yesterday and our past experiences are no longer alive, they have moved towards

² Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, trans. W. D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon, 1924), p. 76.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 95–96, 98.

the archive and towards the stock section (memory) as well as towards the dark and passive section, and have lost their reality. What are real for me are only the sensations, ideas and experiences – phenomena that I now experience. My own reality, in fact, consists of these very phenomena.

The problem of the place of sensation and idea in the structure of experience is also very important. Edmund Husserl, who, throughout his whole philosophical activity, was against **psychologism** and took the standpoint of avoiding its influence and expressing scientific teachings with mathematical exactness, attached great importance to clear ideas in the structure of human consciousness and suggested the experiences, which are out of all kind of sensational influences and at a level of idea, as real. Due to directing and intending consciousness, every object or event that is known to us from the sensory world is fixed by different models and phenomena.

Then what is of concern here? What is of concern here is the acceptance of a certain image, which has been formed in our consciousness, as reality; that is to say, not a material thing or object, which stands behind the image, but the image itself is accepted as reality. On the other hand, a question arises here: What is the difference between the image, which appears in the sensory experiment, and this intellectual image? The difference is that this image, in fact, is not an image of the single-of any object, which is taken in isolation, but an image of the whole.

Everything was clear in the pre-Kantian philosophical teachings, because the problem of the preference of either idea or matter, either God's will or human's sensory experiment, as well as the problem of giving priority either to senses or reasoning in the cognitive process, were unambiguously solved there. Although there were different standpoints and sometimes they contradicted each other, there was no need for controversies, because there was a clearness in every teaching about what should have been taken as substance as well as what should have been accepted as initial or derivative. Even Aristotle, who moved away from the teaching of Plato and took neither a systematic idealistic nor a systematic materialistic position, took a clearer epistemological and ontological position than Kant. It is unquestionable that Aristotle accepted the objective existence of the sensory world. In his teaching, idea is not taken as an independent substance; furthermore by identifying it with 'form' it is even presented as a way of the existence of the things and events of the material world. The things and events, which are cognized through the sense organs, as well as the logical principles, which have been generalized later and which are the bases of intellectual activity, are in fact chosen from material real processes. In Kant, in turn, 'the thing in itself', whose independent existence is not denied, does not play in the cognitive process a main role but a supporting one. Cognition takes its sources not only from the material world but also from the intellectual world itself. Furthermore, this dualism is not simply a dualism, that is, this teaching gives no ground for accepting both the material and ideal beginning as the same formed dual substances.

The teaching of Kant has synthetic character. On the one hand this teaching shows an initiative towards preserving the rationalist tradition, which by corresponding to those of R. Descartes B. Spinoza and G.W. Leibniz assumes

intellectual thinking as a basis; and on the other hand is seen here the obvious and nonobvious impacts of the English empiricism, which were developed by F. Bacon and J. Locke, and even the influences of Berkeley's sensualism, which is the idealist variant of this tradition. The reason why Kant's successors gave different and sometimes incompatible explanations to his teachings is related to the standpoint from which philosophical tradition they approached the problem. The efforts towards explaining Kant's teaching on the basis of rationalism, empiricism, agnosticism or even subjective idealism are the main reasons that condition the motley nature of Neo-Kantism. In fact, the philosophy of Kant cannot find its explanation in the context of all these traditional teachings, because this philosophy has a new essence.

This is, in fact, a newness for Western philosophy. For six centuries before Kant, in the East, in medieval Islamic philosophy, the bases for the syncretic philosophical teaching were founded, and the great Azerbaijani philosopher Shahab al-Din Suhrawardi was the first who took the first step in this direction.

The transition from the moral and material polarization as well as from the polarization of thought and nature towards the system of the internal relationship between the trinity of God, nature and man, was the main reason that conditioned this syncretism. Indeed, the world is seen from the prism of the relations between poles, when man goes out and observes the world from outside. When man enters himself into these relations he has either to be absorbed by one of these poles or he has to give a new explanation of the world. The movements that accept man as a part of nature, as a living and physical being, and even the most vulgar materialism lead in the last instance to the very bipolar explanation of the world that was created by God. On the other hand, the absorption of the human nature into the divine idea and taking him only as an ideal-spiritual being, as an 'ego' or an emotional-spiritual world and as an arena of sensual experiences, make it necessary, willingly or unwillingly, to take into consideration another pole in the form of the shadow of ideas or in the form of virtual world and 'non-ego'.

However, if the one foot of man is taken in this world and another foot in the other, that is, if he is taken on the one hand as a physical being and on the other hand as ideal-spiritual being, as a unity of contradictions and as a complex syncretic system, then the necessity of going out of traditional ontology appears. In other words, by dividing man into two parts and then adding one of them (the body) to the material world and another one (reason, morality) to the world of ideas, it is possible however to get one more variant of the traditional polarization. Nevertheless, if we do not divide man into these two parts and in case we take him as one independent being, then the world becomes not bipolar but tripolar. This is, in turn, absurd from the standpoint of geometrical logical tradition or more precisely it is absurd for the one-dimensional space. Namely one line may have not three, but two poles and two edges. The multipoleness is normal in two and three-dimensional space. It means that the transition to syncretic teachings in philosophy, in one sense reminds us of the transition from one-dimensional space to multidimensional space.

Accepting man as a substance by abandoning traditional beings, and beside simple movements, like solipsism, the duty of finding the new combinations of the trinity of God, nature and man are the central problems of a number of modern philosophical movements.

Although the material being, the world of things is not the main source of human cognition in Kant's teaching, or more precisely, though the information that we get from this world does not express the real truth, however its independent existence and its participation in the cognitive process are accepted. On the other hand, the human being enters the information that he gets into his unique thinking system as well as he regulates and packs them. It is supposed that the categories of time, space and causality play this very role. However it is questionable where and how man gets this inborn ability? Another question arises that if the things, which are drawn to the cognitive process and which are the partners of the sensory experiment, as well as their nature still remain unknown for us, then what kind of thing is the object that we cognize? Whose reflections are the knowledge gained from nature? Where has the place been left for the idea of God; has it been left in the nature of a priori knowledge or in the nature or essence of 'the things in themselves'?

Some researches of Kant blamed him for subordinating the object to the subject. N. Hartmann emphasized that the subject in Kant's teaching was not only the individual subject, but subject in general. Namely the empirical subject and empirical object stand vis-à-vis and both of them enter space and time at the same time. The thought of the subject includes the empirical object through 'the transcendental ideality'.⁴ Hartmann, however, unfortunately continues this point of view and hurries to abandon the scheme of Kant in this problem: It is not possible to cognize the appearance outside the 'thing in itself': either both of them are cognizable, or none of them.⁵ However Hartmann forgets that what is of concern here is not essence and manifestation, but is 'the thing in itself' and manifestation. The thing in itself, in turn, is single and every single does not include any ordinary essence, but the hierarchy of essences. It is, of course, possible that any essence may appear from this complex system and hierarchy and it could be cognized as a sensory image and then as an empirical idea. However, the reason why the cognized idea does not correspond to 'the thing in itself' is that the thing still keeps in itself many uncognized essences (generals, forms, eide) and there could be an infinite number of these last-named essences. There is an indefiniteness here and its adequate cognition, of course, is impossible.

Is the subject of science really the dehumanized objective world, or the world of meaning as it has been accepted by the community of scientists, or the general scientific panorama of the world, or a model, which has become a paradigm and the mode of thought that corresponds to this model? To what extent does what a neutral person sees and feels in the sensorial course of the event correspond to what a

⁴ See: *Философия Канта и современный идеализм*. (Moscow: Nauka, 1987), pp. 28–29.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

scientist, who has researched that event for years, sees and feels? For what accounts does the difference appear?

The thing is inexhaustible, infinite and indefinite. Then what does man cognize adequately? He does not cognize the thing itself, but its model; as well as he cognizes a concrete form and concrete structure, which have been foregrounded by being simplified and taken out from the hierarchy of infinite essences, forms an eidoses.

What are cognized here are the structure and wholeness. Is the thing entire then? Each thing is different under different angles, scales, perspectives and under different structural levels. That is to say, it includes a large number of wholenesses.

Matter, in turn, is unattainable for cognition. It is not possible to see absolute darkness. However, it is also impossible to see absolute light. Al-Suhrawardi writes: "The light of lights (*nur al-anwar*) is invisible because of the severity of his clarity".⁶ What we see are those who are between two invisibles.

The human being is at the crossroads of idea and matter. He is in twilight, lights up now and again and then is extinguished once again. He shines and then sets like twinkling stars.

The coordination of the term of 'light' with intellect and the term of 'darkness' with 'the thing in itself' and matter in al-Suhrawardi, makes it possible to draw certain parallels between these two epistemological systems. In the philosophical teaching of al-Suhrawardi, the cognitive problems were solved differently and uniquely from the Platonic, Neo-Platonic and Aristotelian views which had existed until that time. Though at first glance, the epithets of light and darkness corresponds here to the world of forms and the world of things, in fact, what is of concern here is the unity of these two worlds personified by the human consciousness (the thinking soul). That is to say, unlike Plato, he does not see the truth in comprehending forms, namely in merely being united with light. In fact, what is of concern here is the illumination of the physical being and its becoming clear to the human being. Only at the level of illumination and unveiling (*kashf*), the true essence of the thing and event is unfolded and the forthcoming duty is to purify this essence from the knowledge that we get them via our sense organs and cognize it purely.

The views about not taking knowledge from the world of events and their appearance as products of thought had existed in the pre-Kantian period. However, as a general rule, in the previous philosophies one of the two extreme views was chosen. By taking the material world- the objective reality as initial, materialists regarded all knowledge as derivative, as well as idealists, who by completely abandoning the material word and matter as a form of existence, sought the truth only in the world of ideas, which exists outside of man, or in the feeling world of man himself. Kant was the first who accepted the participation of both bases in the cognitive process and divided knowledge into two parts- one comes from experiment (a posteriori) and another is the product of pure reason (a priori).

⁶ Ş. Suhreverdi, "İşiq heykəlləri (The shape of light)" in *Şerq Felsefesi*, ed. Z.C.Memmedov (Baku: 1999), p. 221.

Unlike the claims of materialists Kant does not accept experiment as a reflection of the material world. ‘The thing in itself’ is unattainable for cognition. That is to say, what is cognized is not matter. What is cognizable then? For Kant, it is the form, which is manifested and explained in the relation of ‘the thing in itself’ with us (in experiment). In other words, what we cognize is not matter and ‘the thing in itself’, but the certain manifested signs of it. But how are the manifested and hidden signs determined.

“A deaf person understands what is in his heart” as it is said in an Azerbaijani proverb. Namely, during the contact of man with object, man cannot recognize the sign, which he has not possessed before, that is, which has been never programmed in his world of genetic or genetic-social-intellectual knowledge. In other words, what is clear for us is only the sign of a thing and event when we can see its form and hear its voice as well as we (our brain, nervous system and mentality) are the carriers of it (of its idea and basic forms). In the spectrum of electromagnetic waves, for instance, we can see only the waves in the interval of 4–8 Å. The ultra-violet rays, whose wavelength is less than 10, as well as the infra-red rays, whose wavelength is larger than ultra-violet rays, go out of our view. At the same time, we cannot hear what bats hear. Our possibility to receive sound waves has been determined in advance. It means that the human being takes the information from the event that he encounters only within the scope of his natural abilities. This opinion could also be considered valid for the form. If any form, which has been known and ‘native’ to us in advance, is not observed in object, then we consider it as amorphous. Continuing these views we could conclude that if we went beyond the human egoism and did not claim the mutual interaction of man and object, the resonance points in this process (recognition, cognition) are the same with object and object consisting of these points. Then we would not discuss the material being, but we would discuss its process of contact with object as well as its known aspects to our cognition.

What we should talk about is not the transition of ‘the thing in itself’ to ‘the thing for us’, but taking ‘the thing for us’ from ‘the thing in itself’. Each ‘thing in itself’ has infinite signs as well as it is inexhaustible and eternal, or more precisely, it is infinite inasmuch as indefinite. All the indefiniteness is equal to one another (just because we are deprived of the possibility of evaluating them).

Thus experiment, in fact, is the point of mutual relationship of man (ego) with matter, or more precisely it is the point of their sameness; the point of sameness between the ideal world of man and the material world. This point is finite that has been chosen from infinity. Especially the knowledge that is expressed by language is now a knowledge which is finite, definite, and capable of being made mathematical as well as which is established under logical forms, in a word, which is formal knowledge-information. Living knowledge, in turn, has not yet been deprived of its relationship with existence as well as it has not been broken off, separated, put into language frames and ‘preserved’. The idea, which by the influence of ‘the thing in itself’ has been transformed from the passive existence in the world of ideas into the form of active existence and which returns to life and is refreshed, is the very empirical cognition. (And then it is put into the Procrustean frame of formal logic

and utilized for preserving and then preserved – with material ways out of burning cognition).

Theoretical cognition, in turn, is the product of the thought which is directed to the inner man and to his ideal world, not to the material world and to ‘the thing in itself’.

These epistemological problems are expressed in Eastern (Islamic) philosophy with the term of ‘illumination’ (*ishraq*).

The attempts towards the explanation of epistemological problems by means of the notion of ‘illumination’ were also known in ancient Greek philosophy. Referring to an unknown philosopher, Aristotle said in a passage of *Rhetoric*: “God kindled our reason to be a lamp within our soul”.⁷ His comparison of reason with the light within the human soul shows that relating light to the divine source of human thought and entering *wajd* (the state of ecstasy in Sufism) and revelation to epistemology do not belong only to medieval Islamic philosophy. However what is of concern in Aristotle’s teaching is the phenomenon of intellect as a whole; the relationship between object and the knowledge about it are not a subject of discussion within this context. Al-Suhrawardi took a step further in this problem and tried to reveal the mechanism of the cognitive process. What is important here is to determine the initial carrier of information. Namely, to what extent the thing-object is initial, compared to our knowledge, and to what extent it is the carrier of truth; or, truth is a phenomenon, which was given to man by nature and revealed in the light of the divine contact and, in fact, is an independent phenomenon compared to the thing-object. If so, then the adequacy between the information that the thing carries and our knowledge is not only the result of the sensory experiment, but the result of deriving both of them from the same divine beginning and the transformation of the same idea from the same beginning into the human ego and things (in the shape of form).

One of the main differences of the modern philosophy with ancient Greek philosophy and medieval philosophy is that not only did it remove the indifference to the sensory experiment but it also tried to base scientific knowledge on observation and experiment. Unlike the rationalism of Descartes, F. Bacon and Spinoza, the development of **Naturphilosophie** (philosophy of nature) by Galileo and Newton as well as the attempts of F. Bacon and J. Locke towards establishing new science on the basis of the methodology based on sensory cognition divided philosophy into two diametrically opposite lines. These two lines were in fact the extension and struggle of the lines of Aristotle and Plato, which were founded in ancient time, in modern time.

One of the main problems that philosophical thought faced in eighteenth century was the problem of passing from empirical knowledge to theoretical knowledge. In this very period, it seems as if I. Kant showed an initiative to combine these two lines and to establish the entire conception of cognition, and tried to found the entire

⁷ Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, trans. W. Rhys Roberts, (<http://www2.hn.psu.edu/faculty/jmanis/aristotl/Aristotle-Rhetoric.pdf>, 2010–2013), p. 175.

unit system that included the relations between sensory and rational cognitions. In this sense, Kant's teaching could also be accepted even as a bridge between materialism and idealism. Kant does not regard matter as derivative from idea and as a form when he speaks of the relation between the sensual image and the sensory object. "It has been sufficiently demonstrated by the critique of pure reason that there can be absolutely no theoretical knowledge beyond the objects of the senses, nor any theoretico-dogmatic knowledge, since in that case everything would have to be known *a priori* through concepts; and this for the simple reason, that all concepts must be capable of resting upon an intuition of some sort, to provide them with objective reality; but all our intuition is sensuous."⁸

By looking at the later development line of philosophical thought we can see that these peace efforts were not so successful as well as the initiative towards establishing theoretical knowledge and scientific theories on empirical material and basing them on the philosophical plane did not justify itself. The analysis of the development way of scientific knowledge shows that theory is possible only due to generalizing idea. Such ideas, in turn, are not taken from experiment and they become possible only as a product of rational thinking. Especially the development of mathematics, and the possibility of the relative-independent formation of abstract theoretical constructions without being dependent on experiment, reinforced the necessity of the return to the line of Plato once again. That is to say, gaining the truth and founding perfect theoretical teachings demonstrated the necessity of the abstraction from the sensory world as well as the necessity of seeking for the connection with the world of forms. Indeed, the above-mentioned examples from al-Suhrawardi show that the ideas about the two independent sources of cognition were put forward still in the Middle Ages. Namely, it was claimed in these teachings that the basic way to reach the truth was not based on the sensory experiment but on the divine illumination (*ishraq*), ecstasy and unveiling (*wajd* and *kashf*). The analogical approaches in nineteenth and twentieth centuries continued in the different branches of intuitivism and irrationalism and this process, in turn, demonstrates the appearance of the necessity of the return from the Aristotelian line, which has been methodological basis in science for a long time, to the line of Plato.

⁸ Kant, *Theoretical Philosophy after 1781* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 385.

The ‘High Point’ of Thought: On the Future Thrust of all Transcendence

Simon Farid Oliai

Abstract In the aftermath of the “*deconstruction*” of the famous Platonic dichotomy between the sensuous “*real*” and the eternally self-identical world of “*ideal*” essences anticipated by Nietzsche, a new and universal era in philosophical thought shall have begun. An era in which the conceptual as well as the broader cultural resources of both modern phenomenology and classical illuminationist Islamic thought could be effectively drawn upon in attaining a new “*high point of thought*”. A “*high point*” whose endless attainment shall be underpinned by the pursuit of the project of a “*New Enlightenment*”. A “*New Enlightenment*” which views both the essence of man and that of the divine as “*no-thing*” other than the negative freedom to transcend all manner of given sensory which purports to restrict man’s radically free and finite “*be-coming*” in history.

Wherein does the experience of freedom consist? It is the experience of dissatisfaction with the given and the sensory, intensified by the growing awareness that the given and the sensory is neither all there is nor definitive. For that reason too, “*negative*” experiences are decisive for the experience of freedom, showing as they do that the content of passive experience is trivial, transient. . . . The experience of freedom was the basis of metaphysics in its historical genesis and development. Socrates articulated this experience, using the idea of a *docta ignorantia*: he did not enter upon metaphysics itself. Only Plato did that. . . . Plato explained freedom as transcending the sensible and reaching the transcendent Being, a transcendence from the “*apparent*” to the “*real*”. . . . Thus, the Idea is the pure supra-objective call of transcendence. From the perspective of objectivity, of form, of finite content, it cannot but appear as pure nothingness, as *flatus vocis*.¹

¹ Jan Patočka, “Negative Platonism” in *Philosophy and Selected Writings*, ed. Erazim Kohák, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), pp. 175–206.

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This task will concern our young philosopher colleagues, *on the one hand those who will have maintained contact with Heidegger's later work, a contact which I have inevitably lost over my many years spent in the East, and on the other hand my younger colleagues, my own students and others, who for their part I have encouraged to study Arabic and Persian in order that they may work, as philosophers, to tear Islamic philosophy and theosophy out of the ghetto of what has come to be called "Orientalism".*²

Could the “*inversion of Platonism*”, as Nietzsche once predicted, result in more than the mere abandonment or, at most, the redefinition of the oft misunderstood Platonic notion of the eternally true essence (“*eidōs*”)? A redefinition which would presuppose prior reflection on the cognitive significance of certain formative social practices. Practices which, as the celebrated Wittgensteinian interpretation of the “*duck-rabbit*” contrast would have it, are invariably underpinned by constantly evolving “*language games*”. “*Games*” whose examination could not only serve to better elucidate the manner in which language (understood as a network of historically evolving signifiers) functions but, more radically, the very nature of language as a historically contingent “*game*”. Only a distant future shall perhaps answer such a question. Yet, one could still ask what more, if “*any-thing*” at all, such an “*inversion*” may possibly result in?

Answering this last question presupposes, obviously enough, that the general sense of this intriguing idea of Nietzsche's be defined with sufficient clarity within our contemporary intellectual context. In the famous passage from the *Twilight of the Idols* entitled “*How the 'True World' Finally Became a Fable: The History of an Error*”, Nietzsche starts by writing:

The true world—attainable for the sage, the pious, the virtuous man; he lives in it, he is it (The oldest form of the idea, relatively sensible, simple, persuasive. A circumlocution for the sentence “*I, Plato, am the truth*”).³

After having outlined how the Platonic notion of the unchangingly “*true essence*” seems to have become a “*superfluous, useless and refuted idea*” that should be ultimately “*abolished*”, Nietzsche hints at what the aftermath of such an abolishment could portend and lead to:

The True World—We have abolished. What world has remained? The apparent one perhaps? But no !*With the true world we have also abolished the apparent one.* (Noon; moment of the briefest shadow; *end of the longest error; high point of humanity; INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA.*⁴

To which error, one may ask, does Nietzsche refer? What could he have possibly meant by “*high point of humanity*”? It is not possible to embark on a detailed analysis of Nietzsche's complex and playful use of “*metaphors*” here. Needless to say that such undeniably influential interpreters of Nietzsche's thought as Heidegger and Deleuze or such penetrating readers of his equally significant and

²“From Heidegger to Suhrawardi: An Interview with Philipp Nemo” in *Henry Corbin: Cahier de l'Herne* ed. Christian Jambet, (Paris: Herne, 1981).

³*Twilight of the Idols*, tr. Judith Norman, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 171.

⁴*Ibid.*

multilayered “text” as Derrida, Vattimo or Sallis have addressed the paradoxes as well as the perils of Nietzsche’s “conventional” and “systematic” opposition to “White Mythology”.⁵ One may thus refer to their crucial writings on this subject. In this respect, I should also mention that Heidegger’s complex, indispensable and yet contestable reading of the fundamental ambiguity of the notion of “inversion” (“Umkehrung”) in Nietzsche’s thought is one that a conceptually more detailed examination must reckon with and I can only make a few brief references to it herein. Rather than focusing on Nietzsche’s use of “metaphors”, I believe it would be more useful to reflect, albeit briefly, on what the term “high point” and the underlying notion of “height” could, to borrow a favorite notion of Jacques Derrida’s, “promise” for our future. An uncertain future whose “be-coming” shall have been no less than “global” in character even if it has proved itself far from unifying in its faltering construction of a common “world”.⁶ A future in which mere “belonging” to a questionably delimited historical or cultural tradition shall not dispense the serious thinker from thinking the “global be-coming” of all serious philosophy. A future in which, the notion of “height”, that is to say, the “beyond” of the merely “sensuous” shall have been thought, as Nietzsche anticipated, in a radically different manner than the one instituted by the Platonic dynamics of “hyperbolon”. That is to say, a metaphysical dynamics of “ascension” beyond the “sensuous” which clearly underpins the characteristic transcendence of the Platonic “eidos”.

It is indisputable that the “error” of which Nietzsche speaks in the above-mentioned fragment bears on the Platonic manner of setting up a discredited and fictive world, one in which it is no longer possible to believe in the aftermath of its becoming “elusive, pale, Nordic, Königsbergian” through the Kantian attempt at its “rescue”. If the Platonic notion of “eidos” has become questionable today to the point that Nietzsche could speak of its inevitable “abolition”, it is no doubt because it can no longer serve to explain, that is to say, reduce and regulate the erstwhile “object” of its mastery as such. The Platonic “idea” is therefore no longer an effective means of subduing that which it was meant to subdue, namely, “Be-coming” in the metaphysical and subordinate sense of the term. Hence, that which was once “higher”, superior and, ultimately, transcendent can no longer serve to dominate or, to echo Nietzsche, “imprison” that which was previously considered “lower”, inferior and immanent.

Its transcendence can thus no longer be conceived as a narrowly idealized limit imposed on the horizon of the “possibilities” of that which it had regulated for more than 2,000 years. The despised “becoming” of the “sensuous” can at last, as Nietzsche famously stated, be “affirmed” and the “error” of subjugating it to

⁵ The term refers to the title of the celebrated article of Jacques Derrida (in *Margins of Philosophy*) in which the inherently “metaphysical value” of the notion of “metaphor” is analyzed.

⁶ As Derrida correctly observed, “globalization” in English does not exactly render the French concept of “mondialisation” or the lesser known but philosophically crucial notion of “Weltisierung” elaborated by Heidegger in *Sein und Zeit*.

some fictively transcendent “*ideal*” (“*the longest error*”) shall be viewed as a thing of the past. In Nietzsche’s vision of the future, the “*sensuous*” real shall no longer be viewed as the “*matter*” of the merely “*apparent*” world since the entire regime of its ontological subjection to the Platonic ideal shall have been “*abolished*”. That is to say, in the language of post-Heideggerian European thought, “*deconstructed*”. Thus, the question with which I have started can be reformulated as follows: In the aftermath of the “*deconstruction*” of the Platonic notion of the immutable and true essence, how shall the “*affirmation*” of the “*becoming*” of the “*sensuous*” be conceived? In what sort of world shall we live what Nietzsche presciently calls this “*high point*” of humanity? A “*high point*” whose uncompromising assumption presupposes the sort of psychological makeup whose progressive construction Nietzsche describes as:

... becoming, step by step, *increasingly vaster in one’s horizons, more supranational, European, supra-European, oriental and, finally, Greek—remembering that Greece was the first link, the first synthesis of all the East and thus represents the beginning of the European soul, the discovery of our “New World”—who knows what may befall those who live in function of such imperatives? Perhaps nothing short of a new dawn.*⁷

Equally indisputable here is that, in Nietzsche’s view, such a new “*dawn*” shall not have been of a world whose becoming would somehow be restricted by some fictive ideal that constitutes a “*unique angle*”. An exclusionary “*angle*” whose “*fabrication*”, as Nietzsche would say in his later and avowedly polemical writings, reflects the characteristic vindictiveness of the “*nihilistic priest*”.

The world of this “*new dawn*” and the “*high point*” it announces is one which

has become infinite to us: in so far as we cannot reject the possibility that it includes infinite interpretations. Once again, the great shudder seizes us—but who would again want immediately to deify in the old manner this monster of an unknown world? And to worship from this time on the unknown (‘das Unbekannte’) as ‘the Unknown One’ (‘den Unbekannten’).⁸

What Nietzsche terms “*deification in the old manner*”, that is to say, the restrictive fabrication of the idealizing “*One*” which could limit future access to the irreducibly complex character of the “*sensuous*” is precisely what must be renounced. For the precondition to “*becoming vaster in one’s horizons*”, “*European*”, “*supra-European*”, “*Oriental and finally Greek*” is “*no-thing*” short of the irreversible renunciation of the “*One*” as a restrictive conceptual grid in thinking an unknown future “*beyond*” Platonism.

Hence, the “*Beyond of Platonism*” must be conceived “*beyond*” the Platonic “*One*”. The question is then how could that “*be*”? More simply and straightforwardly stated, how can “*Being*” as such be liberated from its erstwhile subjugation

⁷ Fragment 1051, August–September 1885 in *Friedrich Nietzsche: Philosophical Writings*, edited by Reinhold Grimm and Caroline Molina y Vedia, (New York: The Continuum Publishing Company, 1995), pp. 243–244.

⁸ *The Gay Science*, ed. Bernard Williams, trans. Josefine Nauckhoff and Adrian Del Caro, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), section 374, pp. 239–240.

to the restrictively metaphysical “*oneness*” of the Platonic “*One*”? It goes without saying that it would be impossible here to address the question of the precise metaphysical function of the “*One*” as the ultimate format of all “*Being*”. A format that is “*begot*” by the profoundly irreducible “*workings*” of the famous Platonic “*Khôra*”⁹ whose elusive “*spacing*” of the “*space-time*” of all idealized becoming is indeed the subject of the famous study of some of the implications of the Platonic dialogue “*Timaeus*” by Jacques Derrida in an eponymous work.¹⁰ “*Spacing*” (“*espacement*”) whose metaphysical grounding of the idealized and idealizing “*One*”, as Derrida rightly underscores, possesses a fundamentally ambivalent character in as much as it is both the ultimate ground as well as the non-ground of “*Being*”.

Rather, what I should like to underscore here is the fact that the fascinating reception and the profoundly “*formative*” interpretation of Plato’s thought in pre-Islamic as well as Islamic East constitute the pillars of a uniquely significant bridge between modern phenomenology and the rich tradition of metaphysico-theosophical speculation in the Eastern-Islamic world. A tradition of which the sophisticated “*illuminationism*” of the sort represented by the great Iranian Platonic thinker Suhrawardi is indeed a prominent example. Yet, my reference to the common Platonic lineage of modern phenomenology and the long-neglected (in the ‘*West*’) tradition of “*illuminationist*” theosophical speculation in the East, as crucially indispensable as it is in thinking all possible future dialogue between Islamic philosophy and phenomenology, is not meant to convey the false impression that one of these traditions would have to undergo some sort of conceptual reduction to the other. An unavoidably “*culturalist*” reduction, moreover, whose putative “*rationale*” would be either the supposedly underappreciated historical “*originality*” of one or the ignorantly and arrogantly proclaimed conceptual “*superiority*” of the other as a major “*school*” of modern thought. For both traditions will have to assume an irreversible and critical “*revision*” of their long-held and historically characteristic “*metaphysical*” tenets in order to engage in any sort of serious dialogue in the future. The “*revision*” in question here shall concern their different and yet unmistakably Platonic pretensions to the “*formatting*” of “*Being*” by subjecting its fundamentally free nature to the erstwhile restrictions imposed by the oneness of the “*One*”.

More specifically, this means that all serious modern phenomenology will have to admit that its noetic “*subject-principle*” does not have a trans-historically “*self-identical*” metaphysical “*essence*” and its future shall not have been bound by a culturally restrictive self-definition as a mere “*Western European*” construct. All serious future Islamic philosophy, on the other hand, will have to recognize the historical contingency of its metaphysically obsolete conception of the ultimate ground of “*Being*” since it can no longer be conceived as the ideally “*objective*” foundation of the “*sensuous*”.

⁹ The term “*χωρα*” is the Greek word for place or land.

¹⁰ *Khôra*, Jacques Derrida, (Paris: Galilée, 1993).

In short, in the aftermath of the “*deconstruction*” of the Platonic dichotomy between the “*sensuous real*” and an eternally self-identical world of “*ideal*” essences, the dawn of a new and universal era in philosophical thought shall have begun. One in which attaining a new “*height*” of intellectual honesty and psychological courage presupposes that the “*superstitious*” belief in the existence of a fictive, unique ground of “*Being*”, whether “*objective*” or “*subjective*”, be abandoned. Yet, to go “*beyond*” this old and discredited Platonic fiction, one must conceive all “*going beyond*” the “*sensuous*” as such in a different manner. In so doing, the conceptual as well as the broader cultural resources of both Islamic philosophy and phenomenology could indeed be fruitfully drawn upon in conceiving a “*beyond*” which shall no longer embody, to borrow Jan Patočka’s vocabulary, the mere “*sublatory*” (“*Aufgehobene*”)¹¹ negation of the “*sensuous*”.

That is to say, a fictive ideal whose construction would presuppose the “*haughty*” devaluation of the “*sensuous*”, as Nietzsche memorably put it, with a “*gravedigger’s mimicry*”. Rather, it would mean that, without ever denying the formative relevance of the “*sensuous*”, all future philosophy shall recognize that the essence of all thought consists in its liberating “*negative*” transcendence “*beyond*” the absurd restrictions and the contingent strictures of the “*sensuous*”. That which shall have perhaps come to symbolize a “*new high point of humanity*” would then be the unprecedented realization (and not just by future philosophy) that the “*highest point*” of “*humanity*” is “*no-thing*” more or less than its irreducibly finite, fragile and mysterious “*stretching of Being beyond*” the unsatisfactory and incomplete “*sensory*”, to use Patočka’s terminology.

Indeed, it is the endless underscoring of the equivalence between such a negatively assumed “*distance*” with the unacceptable, contingent “*given*” and man’s freedom which best resumes the project of a “*New Enlightenment*”. That is to say, an endlessly “*enlightening*” and universally necessary effort at underscoring the distantly protective nature of the “*Divine*”. An effort which shall have revealed the latter’s essence to be “*nothing*” other than man’s assumption of his/her radically divine freedom. Freedom whose uncompromising assumption presupposes the refusal of his/her subjection to the ideal restrictions of an ontological straightjacket of “*Being*”. In short, if there is glory to be found in future thinking, it shall be found in man’s unhindered espousing of the liberating thrust of a transcendence that would lead him to the “*beyond*” of the unsatisfactory and sensory “*given*”. A “*beyond*” that Suhrawardi famously termed “*Nakojabad*”. That is to say, in ancient Persian, a “*place*” which, as Corbin aptly pointed out, is “*no-thing*” other than

a place outside of ‘place’, a “place” that is not contained in a ‘place’, in a ‘topos’ that would permit a response, with a gesture of the hand, to the question “where?”¹²

¹¹ The expression is derived from the famous Hegelian term oft used in the *Logic* as well as *The Phenomenology of the Spirit*.

¹² “*Mundus Imaginalis*”, in *Cahiers Internationaux de Symbolisme*, 6 Brussels, 1964, pp. 3–26. The English translation by Ruth Horine appeared in *Spring*, Zurich, 1972.

The Sources of Truth in the History of Philosophy

Konul Bunyadzade

Abstract By studying the history of philosophy since ancient times one could come to the conclusion that the whole universe is the manifestation of an idea, a divine wisdom. The gist of this idea, which illuminates and directs thoughts, remains unchangeable and constant, though its form, style, method, language and religion, which find their expressions in different worldviews, could occasionally differ from each other. This ideational tradition, which has been passed from generation to generation in a certain sense, is defined by Seyyid Hossein Nasr as ‘truths or principles of a divine origin revealed or unveiled to mankind’ (*Что такое традиция*). According to the medieval Islamic thinker Ibn Miskawayh, this eternal philosophy that is known as *al-hikma al-khalida* (*Javidan Khirad* in Persian) in Islamic philosophy and *perennial philosophy* in the West as well as *sanatana dharma* in Hinduism, is ‘an eternal intelligence and wisdom’. It is an eternal wisdom which is a super-historical truth that does not change from time to time or from one nation to another and it has revealed itself in different cultures for ages (*Al-hikma al-khalida*).

Introduction

By studying the history of philosophy since ancient times one could come to the conclusion that the whole universe is the manifestation of an idea, a divine wisdom. The gist of this idea, which illuminates and directs thoughts, remains unchangeable and constant, though its form, style, method, language and religion, which find their expressions in different worldviews, could occasionally differ from each

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other. This ideational tradition, which has been passed from generation to generation in a certain sense, is defined by Seyyid Hossein Nasr as ‘truths or principles of a divine origin revealed or unveiled to mankind’ (*Что такое традиция*).¹ According to the medieval Islamic thinker Ibn Miskawayh, this eternal philosophy that is known as *al-hikma al-khalida* (*Javidan Khirad* in Persian) in Islamic philosophy and *perennial philosophy* in the West as well as *sanatana dharma* in Hinduism, is ‘an eternal intelligence and wisdom’. It is an eternal wisdom which is a super-historical truth that does not change from time to time or from one nation to another and it has revealed itself in different cultures for ages (*Al-hikma al-khalida*).²

Of the Two Regularities of Idea

There are two regularities of the unit-idea, which are superior to space and time, and assume the same importance for the past and present of the history of philosophy. The first is to accept that it is the basis and essence of the whole existence and to choose the correct sources and means that guide to it. As for Plato people see the shadows of the creatures of “he who is able to make not only vessels of every kind, but plants and animals, himself and all other things – the earth and heaven, and the things which are in heaven or under the earth (in Hades); he makes the gods also” and thus they suppose them to be real.³

So the way to truth lies not through these copies, but through the discovery of original ideas. Namely, as numerous manifestations of the only Creator both material and non-material things are the means that guide back to the source.

It is also an undeniable fact that not every opinion or idea expressed is the reflection of the truth of the source and sometimes it can even have an opposite meaning. The Sufi thinker Hallaj (tenth century) said “Faith and unbelief are different only in name, as in reality there is no difference between them.”⁴ That is to say, the same words that are based on the same source or the same idea could get a new ‘truth’ in the tongue of those who have brought them into being. And those who understand that the mistake is not in the source, but in the expression, apply not to the form but to its essence for learning the truth. Another Sufi thinker Abu Yazid Bistami (ninth century) says: “The colour of the water is the colour of its vessel. If the water is in the white vessel then it becomes white and if it is in black, yellow or red vessels then it becomes black, yellow or red and etc...” It means that the

¹ Сейид Хусейн Наср, (*Что такое традиция*), (<http://www.newatropatena.narod.ru/p22.htm>).

² Ibn Miskawayh, *Al-hikma al-khalida*, (Beirut: 1983), pp. 375–376. See also: İlhan Kutluer, *İslamın klasik çağında felsefe tasavvuru*, (İstanbul: İz yayıncılık, 2001), p. 29.

³ Plato, *The Republic*, trans. Benjamin Jowett, (New York: Dover Publications, 2000), p. 284.

⁴ أخبار احلاج. نشر وتصحيح ل. ماسينيون وب. كراوس. باريس. مكتبة لاروز. مطبعة القلم. 1936, ص 53.

essence of beings or events, which is studied considering the source, is closer to the truth.⁵

The second regularity is the eternity and continuity of this unit-idea. Prof. Salahaddin Khalilov writes: “One of the most important conditions of civilization is continuous history. Namely, if an achievement obtained in the development of society is not maintained later, it could not enter the historical process in the long time interval.”⁶ If we accept these words of the philosopher in larger scale and ascribe it not only to the history of a nation, but also to the eternal circulation of The Ultimate Idea and the one truth, we will bear witnesses to a simple and at the same time always protected regularity: Every historical idea and philosophical system should be the continuation of the former one and the former should be a permanent basis for the next one. Every idea that goes beyond this principle is doomed to go out of the spotlight.

In order to confirm the information that he has got and to cognize the gist and truth of what he has learnt, the human being tries to go deeper to its source by different means and the deeper layers of truth become revealed to him when he becomes closer to it. And the complete discovery of the source signifies the cognition of the Ultimate Reality. No wonder there have been teachings and analyses which have overshadowed it and moved it away from its essence and perverted it as well as the information abundance, which made it unseen, was created. However, there have also been people at all times who have seen its essence and contributed to its success and thus provided the conditions for the protection of the ultimate reality on Earth. For the sake of the protection of this idea and wisdom, which is “the same truth in essence no matter how its appearances differ in variety of existence and existential forms” and “the same knowledge no matter in which cultural forms it takes shape,”⁷ God has bestowed and is bestowing his revelation and inspiration upon prophets, philosophers and scholars whom he has chosen. One of the doors of such a people is open to people—to the area of appearance and another to the Creator who is the Master of this wisdom.

The different worldviews of philosophers and thinkers as well as the religious, philosophical and mystic movements and teachings, which were formed throughout history and developed at a certain period of time and then either fell into decay or, have continued their existence till the present time, and numerous sciences that include different fields, are signs of the abundance of the sources of the same idea as well as the variety of the ways that go to these sources. It is clear that the discovery of small sources could lead to the discovery of larger ones. In respect to this, it is possible to call the ideas of Globalisation or the approaching and synthesizing

⁵ السراج. حقيقته وقدم له وخرج أحاديثه عبد الحليم محمود وطه عبد الباقي سرور دار الكتب الحديثة بمصر. مكتبة المثنى ببغداد، 1960، ص. 57. الطوسي أبو نصر

⁶ Salahaddin Khalilov, “Kəsilməz tarix və dövlətçilik ənənələri” (*The traditions of the continuity of history and statehood*), *Ipek yolu* (N 1, 2001), p. 24.

⁷ İlhan Kutluer, *İslamın klasik çağında felsefe tasavvuru*, p. 29.

circumstances between scientific fields as the transition from small sizes to larger fields.

Even the classification of the characteristics, and types of the appearances of the unit-idea as well as their level of significance gives the opportunity to come to the conclusion that its essence, namely the cognition of the Ultimate Reality has three sources: *the divine book (divine revelation)*, *nature* and *the human being*. Every source demands a specific means of cognition as well as the object corresponding to the means is elucidated. The methods of approaching these sources and the commentaries on one or all of them have caused the certain philosophical movements and schools to be founded. Certainly throughout the history of philosophy, these sources were actual and the basis of the dominant ideology, sometimes one, sometimes the other, or sometimes alone and sometimes as a synthesis.

The Ancient Period

Still, in ancient time those who accepted nature as the one and only source of Truth, sought different means to learn it. For example, the people (magi, shamans, etc.) who possessed the divine gift, by means of different forces, rituals and prayers, tried to be aware of the secrets of nature and intervene in natural events and even to make them obedient to themselves. According to ancient myths and legends, beside the secrets of nature, human beings sought the secret of nature in nature itself. The legend of Gilgamesh, which is the ancient Sumerian monument, exemplifies this situation. Gods hide the secret of eternity in a mysterious flower. Though it was found by Gilgamesh (the human being), the snake, which ate that flower, became the possessor of it. The secret, which had been hidden in nature, remained in nature.⁸ The same situation and fact could be witnessed in ancient Greek philosophy, which sought the only source of all beings either in air or fire and water.

However, there were also the philosophers who did not see nature as a sufficient source and wanted to complete it with other sources. For example, Pythagoras (sixth century BC), whose philosophy was based on the knowledge about the comprehensible world and gods,⁹ and who accepted the Creator and nature as same and immanent with each other, considered that He is “the creator of all powers and creatures, the initial beginning of everything as well as the source of the light. At the same time he is the common father and the mind and the spirit of all things and the motive beginning of all surroundings.”¹⁰ By the means of numbers he not only tries to explain and cognize existence, but also to be harmonious with the cosmos, and because “it is difficult to cognize and express the initial form and

⁸ See *Bilqamis dastanı*, tr. İ.Vəliyev, Bakı: Gənclik, 1985.

⁹ Пифагор, *Золотой канон* (Pythagoras, *The golden verses*), *Фигуры Эзотерики*, (Moscow: ЭКСМО-Пресс, 2001), p. 256.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 268.

beginning and to verbalize them clearly, he applies to numbers for making them clear.”¹¹ He is of opinion that “the true being is not material, but the only eternal and effective.” Everything must share the same name with what really exists, and at the same time they are material, physical and are capable of birth and death; they do not truly exist¹² and “their existence is dependent on their imitation of numbers.” For this reason, Pythagoras accepts it as the major and only condition to be in harmony with it and to yearn for the main essence to reach the truth and cognize it.

Unlike Pythagoras, Plato takes a further step, and following the way of his teacher he transformed the human being into the object of thinking and considered him as “a part of the divine wealth.”¹³ However, the human being is not only a divine wealth, but he also includes everything in his mind. For Socrates things are two: “What is that which always is and has no becoming; and what is that which is always becoming and never is? That which is apprehended by intelligence and reason is always in the same state; but that which is conceived by opinion with the help of sensation and without reason, is always in a process of becoming and perishing and never really is.”¹⁴

I want to point out that the human being who is the subject of the philosophy of Socrates, is one who is capable of rising above the materiality, because “the philosopher can observe himself only by liberating his soul from the body.”¹⁵ So by moving away from materiality, the human being could get an opportunity to be united with the divine world that he is part of, and thus he becomes enabled to cognize everything: “In thought, then, if at all, something of the realities becomes clear to it?”¹⁶ As is seen, Plato gathers the secrets of the real existent not somewhere there in nature or divine power, but in the soul of the human being. He puts the human being in a central position. The philosopher says: “And when the whole soul follows the philosophical principle, and there is no division, the several parts are just, and do each of them their own business, and enjoy severally the best and truest pleasures of which they are capable.”¹⁷

During ancient time, philosophy had included a large number of different sciences and arts and then from time to time, each of those sciences and arts chose its own specific way by gaining independence. It showed itself in approaching sources, especially in the philosophy of Plato. Namely, though the sources are closely linked to each other and complement one another, all three have been based on the same source. Aristotle was the first in whose works these sources

¹¹ Ibid., p. 428.

¹² Ibid., p. 254.

¹³ Платон. *Федон* (Plato, *Phaedo*), Платон, *Диалоги* книга первая, Т.1. (Moscow: ООО Изд-во ЭКСМО, 2008), p. 639. (62 b).

¹⁴ Platon, *Timaeus*, trans. B. Jowett, (28 a), <http://www.ellopos.net/elpenor/physis/plato-timaeus/genesis.asp>

¹⁵ Платон. *Федон*, p. 642 (65 a).

¹⁶ Платон. *Федон*, p. 643. (65 c).

¹⁷ Plato, *The Republic*, p. 276.

started to be separated from each other and thus each of them gradually gained the partial independence. It is not a coincidence that in the Middle Ages the central point of the philosophical movements, which enabled sources to overshadow each other, was the very teaching of Aristotle. The philosophical schools, which were founded in Christian and Muslim worlds, are examples of this situation. In addition, it could be said that at the result of the independence of different schools, religion and science were at cross-purposes with each other and the contradictions and irreconcilability between them have increased.

The Middle Ages and the Modern Times

The emergence of the Abrahamic religions in the Middle Ages and their becoming the dominant ideology not only made the holy book important, but also made the human 'books' the parts of it. On the one hand it was connected with the growth of the influence of that book, but on the other hand with providing the opportunity to view the human being and nature from a new perspective. The philosophers who have orthodox views are examples of this.

Nevertheless, corresponding to the principle of the continuity of idea, the development line that had started in ancient time also continued in the Middle Ages. There was only a single difference: the divine revelation was the major basis and the main criterion that determined the angle of approach. For example, the ninth-century philosopher Johannes Scotus Eriugena (c. 815–c. 877) who based his ideas on Neo-Platonism and Christianity believed that “the development of the world is a circular movement that began from God and will ultimately return to Him. In this development that began with God’s creation, the divine spirit, which is not creature, but the creative nature, flows in stages . . . Thus there are three parts in nature: **God, ideas and other different things.**”¹⁸ Although he defines God as inconceivable, the philosopher accepts the Son and the Holy Spirit as the symbols lead into His cognition. At the same time, nature and all beings are accepted by him as the appearance of the Ultimate Spirit. It means that the human nature could return to God by cognizing the divine secrets that exist within him.

Nonetheless, the German philosopher Nicholas of Cusa (1401–1464) does not accept the dualism between God and the World and points out that the World is immanent in God and He encompasses the whole universe. For the philosopher “the universe was created in accordance with Him”¹⁹ and “in its universal oneness this maximum encompasses all things, so that all the things which derive from the Absolute [Maximum] are in this maximum and this maximum is in all [these]

¹⁸ Gökberk M., *Felsefe tarihi*, (İstanbul: Remzi kitabevi, 1999), pp. 141–142.

¹⁹ Nicholas of Cusa, *De docta ignorantia*, Book III, trans. Jasper Hopkins, (Minnesota: A. J. Banning Press, 2001), p. 120.

things.”²⁰ The line is the unveiling of the point,²¹ likewise for Nicholas of Cusa, like the Word and Son of God, the human being is a microcosm, which encompasses intellectual and sensible nature folded within himself.²² However, if we pay attention to the fact that the philosopher accepts that God is inconceivable to the human mind as a unit point and conceivable only as a line (plurality, nature), then it could be said that the source in Cusanus’ views is God-nature. Thus the philosopher emphasizes the inseparability of the two notions and considers it necessary that in order to understand a thing, the human being should apply to nature— ‘the book’ through which the Ultimate Reality is thoroughly revealed.

As we mentioned above, besides nature, the human being himself is a means which leads to the divine world. Namely, according to Christianity, which was the leading ideology in the Middle Ages in Western philosophy, the human being is the lowest being among creatures, and throughout his life he must purify himself from his sins. The approaches of philosophers are significantly different from those of clergymen and theologians who defended this idea. Namely, the Christ-the Son of the Father who is one of the three forms of the Trinity, besides being the Holy Word, he is also a human being. In this regard, the two lines could be seen in the views of Christian philosophers: either by being like the Christ and following Him, the human being must rescue his soul (it is rather the characteristics of theologians), or through the Christ he must discover the Christ-The Word of God within himself (it is characteristic of irrationalist philosophers). According to some of them, only the Christ possesses divine secrets, but to some others, this blessing was given to every person and it need to be cognized. For instance, according to Meister Eckhart (c. 1260–c. 1327) “God is within everything, but most people do not know it and only he who cognizes it, is capable of knowing Him. Therefore, the human being is more glorious than anything else in creation.”²³ The thinker thinks that “if I cognize him directly then I become Him and He becomes me.”²⁴ By the way, as a continuation of this idea, Hegel (nineteenth century) also thought that God and the human being are means to each other in understanding themselves: “God is God only insofar as he knows himself; his self-knowledge of himself is moreover his self-consciousness in man.”²⁵

As is seen, according to Christian philosophers not only Jesus Christ, but also the human being in general is a part of the Holy Trinity and only in the relationship with God could he become the source of true knowledge. However, the two main aspects should be emphasized here. Firstly, from the New Age onward, this centre of

²⁰ Ibid., Book I, p. 7.

²¹ Кузанский Н., *Сочинения: В 2-х т. т. 1*, (Moscow: Мысль, 1979), p. 241.

²² Ibid., p. 150.

²³ Экхарт М., *Духовные проповеди и рассуждения*, Перев. с нем. М.В. Сабашникова, (Sankt-Peterburg: Азбука, 2000), pp. 62–63.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 155.

²⁵ Гегель Г.В.Ф., *Философия духа/Энциклопедия философских наук: В 3-х т. Т. 3*, (Moscow: Мысль, 1977), p. 389.

gravity passed to nature and the priority was given to studying the human being only as a part of it (nature), that is, as a material being. Secondly, both in the Middle Ages and afterwards the divine revelation was studied and accepted as 'melted' either in the human being- Jesus Christ or in nature.

Accordingly, a branch of the unit-idea was developing in the Islamic East on the grounds of different religions and principles. The sources here sometimes acted as the parts which completed each other and sometimes as the parts which negated each other. According to the founder of Hurufism Fażlullāh Naimi (1340–1394), for instance, "all names are 32," or "all things derived from 32 letters." He also thought that 'the letter and the word are not separated from the Perfect Man (*al-Insan al-kamil*)' as well as "the soul and the letter are the same."²⁶ It means that the human being who includes in himself the secrets of material and divine worlds is the microcosm and the source of irrational knowledge. For the thinker "the human being is immortal as a reasoning soul and as a being who has a divine attribute. All the attributes of God are immortal. . .The human being also possesses them, but because of his ignorance he is not aware of this fact."²⁷ Therefore, by being liberating from his ignorance, the human could not only understand the secrets of the universe, but also he is even able to become divine.

Or in Ismailism (ninth and eleventh century), which is another Islamic sect, the human being is accepted as a possessor of divine attributes and characteristics as well as a conveyer of divine secrets. For this sect, which accepts the theory of immortal and divine imamate, "the secret mystic knowledge as a basis of religious knowledge belongs only to the imam."²⁸ The cause of the existence of the imam is accepted as "the ultimate cause of all things and thus of the existence on Earth." In one respect, he is a mediator between God and man and a guider who informs him (the human) about every type of knowledge: "The way to knowledge in this world is always open, because the faithful teacher (imam) has been sent to the world."²⁹ In addition, it could be said that it includes every type of knowledge and science. "The knowledge of Imams is natural and at the same time supernatural. They could give humans the religious knowledge which they consider necessary. The ordinary mortals (humans) could not reach the effective religious knowledge without Imam."³⁰

It is interesting that in spite of the ruling position of the religion in the Islamic East, the philosophical movements, which accepted nature as the only source, like *barahima* (brahmans), *mulhids* (atheists), *tabiiyyun* (naturalists),

²⁶ Кулизаде З.А., *Хуруфизм и его представители в Азербайджане*, (Баку: Элм, 1970), pp. 126–127.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 118–119.

²⁸ Агаев И.А. Исмаилийя., *Историко-философские очерки становления основных концепций*, (Баку: Еко, 1996), p. 35.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ Роузентал Ф., *Торжество знания. Концепция знания в средневековом Исламе*, перев. с англ. С.А. Хомутова, (Moscow: Наука, 1978), p. 150.

hissiyyun (sensualists), *zanadiqa* (clandestine apostates), *dahriyyun* (materialists), were also founded there as reverberations of proper ideas of the ancient time. For example, the two famous naturalist philosophers of the tenth century, Abu al-Husain Ahmad al-Rawandi (827–911) and Abu Bakr Muhammad Ibn Zakariya al-Razi (865–925 or 935), who claimed that “the universe was created not by a creator, but by itself,” tried to deny religion and the idea of God as a result of the meditation of prophet and thus they accepted nature as the one and only source of truth and knowledge.

The similar approach in Eastern philosophy could be encountered in the movement of *Noqtawiyya* founded by Mahmud Pasikhani Jilani (d. 1427) in the fifteenth century. They thought that “everything is in unity and the unity is the point as well as the point is the soil.”³¹ Nature, that is, is the beginning of the cognition and its ultimate point. Nevertheless, though the *noqtawits* is considered as an Islamic movement and although they accepted some principles of the religion and supported the conception of the perfection of the human being with mystical knowledge, in fact, they considered nature as the main source which guides to Truth. However, for the reason that they lost touch with the dominant ideology of the time, these teachings could not be long-lived and soon collapsed.

Sufism is one of the movements that is distinguished among those which were founded in the Islamic East by its special worldview. As there is an unseen world, which is the place of power and in which, on the one hand all material and non-material things exist potentially and without any form; who can enter there he could directly learn these truths and on the other hand it is a macrocosm that encompasses the human-the microcosm. According to *Wahdat al Wujud* (the Unity of being), which is its main principle, God is the only true being and His creatures, for the reason that they were created from nothing and will return to nothingness and are dependent on the outside will in their creation as well as they get their essence and existence from another being, are the beings which are relative, possible and like a reflection in the mirror they do not possess any essence (*Zat*) and reality. The Muslim philosopher ‘Ayn-al Quzat Hamadani (1098–1131), for example, thinks that “God is the cause of the creation of every creature so no being apart from Him has essence and existence in reality.”³² However, God is not a component of the chain of cause and effect, but is the creator of it and He is the *Necessary Being* who gave existence to possible beings as well as He is the substance which formed their essence: My friend, God is the origin and root of everything as the true substance. He acts with will and love.³³ And for Ibn al-Arabi “God (the Ultimate Reality) is the source (ayn) and essence (zat) of every single

³¹ Кулизаде З.А., *Хуруфизм и его представители в Азербайджане*, (Баку: Элм, 1970), p. 254.

³² الهمداني ابو المعالي عبد الله بن محمد بن علي بن الحسين بن علي الملقب بعين القضاة. زبدة الحقائق. تقديم و تحقيق ع. عسيران ن چاپخانه دانشگاه. 1341 هـ. صد. طهران. 44. الميانجي

³³ ابو المعالي عبد الله بن محمد بن علي بن الحسين بن علي الملقب بعين القضاة. تمهيدات. تقديم و تحقيق ع. عسيران طهران. 1373 هـ. صد. گلشان. 181. الميانجي الهمداني

creature that the eye sees.”³⁴ Therefore, all creatures are the manifestation of ‘the Existence’—the Ultimate Reality and the existence and development of the whole universe happens within this ‘Existence’.

According to Sufism, that is, God is the creator of the only Truth as well as knowledge and idea. And the way which guides to Him is firstly the human being himself and the environment with which he is in contact.

It becomes clear from the general analysis of either different philosophers or movements and generally from the development line of idea in the Middle Ages that the process of separation of the sources from each other, which started from ancient times, was not so sharp and the distance between them did not yet grow to an impassable level. For this reason, not depending on geographical location and the basis on which it is grounded, the existence of similar aspects between the manifestations of the same idea could be considered not only as a coincidence, but also as a necessity. Therefore, the directions, which spread from the same source like the rays of sunshine, were separated further and with the New Age this sharp confrontation already showed itself.

Certainly, the decisive step here is the complete formation of the approach to the ruling source – the divine revelation of the time. Muhammad Iqbal emphasises here, first of all, the missions of al-Ghazali and Kant which possess a prophetic wisdom: “Kant, consistently with his principles, could not affirm the possibility of a knowledge of God. Ghazali’s, finding no hope in analytic thought, moved to mystic experience, and there found an independent content for religion. In this way he succeeded in securing for religion the right to exist independently of science and metaphysics.”³⁵ It becomes clear that unlike Kant, Ghazali left the door of religious-mystical experience open to the limited frame of mind; to wit, both Kant and Ghazali drew the line between rational thinking and religion. In the Islamic East, the way shown by Ghazali on the one hand provided the development in this direction and extended the possibilities of the human being as a spiritual being, but on the other hand, for the reason that rational thinking has limited possibilities, this way caused it ‘to be locked’ in general. At the same time, by preserving the limits of each side, the West opted to develop in depth and learn nature. It should also be highlighted that exactly this approach to the books – sources determined the development of philosophical thought in the New Age.

As from the New Age, till the present time, the West paid its main attention to learning the book of nature as well as science and technology developed independently and separate from religion, and obtained in its way new achievements one after another.

On the contrary, the Islamic East attached importance to the Holy revelation. If we compare them, it is possible to come to the conclusion that both the East and the

³⁴ ابن عربي محي الدين. فصوص الحمر. التعليقات عليه بقلم ابو العلا عفيفي. دار احياء النب العربية. 1946. ص 107.

³⁵ Muhammad Iqbal, “Knowledge and Religious Experience”, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, <http://www.allamaiqbal.com/works/prose/english/reconstruction/01.htm>

West have run almost to the same extremes in ‘the books’ that they read, merely in different directions.

Modern Times

At first glance the main tendency that attracts attention in modern times is that the traditions of the New Age have deepened. The West has become specialized in the book of nature and the East in the Divine book. The important question here is that, besides the one-sided and imperfect approach, the human factor itself has also been valued from this point of view.

The idea is unit and the one-sided study of it causes the last result to be imperfect. It is not a coincidence that the West, which has obtained the last achievements of science and technology, nowadays, has mostly intellectual and spiritual crisis. The works, written by the distinguished Western thinkers, on ‘the Fall of Europe’, ‘the Death of Humanity’, ‘the Decline of Humanity’ and similar subjects and ideas, is the manifestation of the very unknown darkness that the West has fallen into. Accordingly, the Islamic East has fallen into economic and political decay, though it has fascinated the world with its spiritual richness and high aesthetic-artistic pearls. It is not a coincidence that being based on the Koran Taha Jabir al-Alwani writes: “the two readings [the divine book and nature] must be combined, for if they are not allowed to complement one another, the result will be an unbalanced understanding of reality.”³⁶

Certainly both sides are aware of the essence of their problems and try to solve them. Dialogues have been set in this subject and books have been written as well as conferences have been held. As a result, the East, which is weaker materially, is being assimilated within the West, which is more powerful and stable. Actually, it is only the annihilation of one side by the other, and ‘putting a patch on the idea’ without adopting it. So the idea is cognized imperfectly once again. Considering the principle of the continuity of idea, it could be said that besides preserving their specificities, the way of the salvation of both the East and the West from the crises that they have fallen into, lies in the formation of the correct approach to the sources of the essences of idea as well as truth and existence.

Muhammad Iqbal is one of the thinkers, who approached the question from this perspective. Being based on the philosophy of Sufism, he considers it necessary to read the spiritual world of the human being and considers the two others (history and nature) as its ‘further materials’: “Devotional Sufism alone tried to understand the meaning of the unity of inner experience which the Qur’an declares to be one of

³⁶ Taha Jabir al-Alwani. *Issues in Contemporary Islamic Thought*. (London: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2005), pp. 32–33.

the three sources of knowledge, the other two being History and Nature³⁷ and “it is in tapping these sources of knowledge that the spirit of Islam is seen at its best.”³⁸ It becomes clear that by ‘the human spirit’ and ‘inner experience’, the philosopher means the divine revelation, or more precisely, using the philosophy of Sufism as a base, we can say that the human being approaches to himself in the context of the divine book.

Salahaddin Khalilov is another philosopher after him who takes a comparatively different approach to this question. He writes: “Though it is acceptable within the Islamic worldview, the reading of the third book, to wit, to learn and realize the use possibilities of the spiritual world of the human being from the cosmic mind, has been met with contradictive approaches. Basically, this line that was developed under the name of Sufism is sometimes accepted as an extrinsic value to Islam. However, for us, the major superiority of Islam over other religions appears in this very direction.”³⁹ As is seen, S. Khalilov approaches the question from a larger context and he is the first one who puts forward the idea of ‘the three books’: the divine book, the book of nature and the universal intellect.⁴⁰ Namely he takes into consideration not only the material and divine aspects of the human being, but also his world of idea. It is worth, here, recalling that for Plato: “reason herself attains by the power of dialectic, using the hypotheses not as first principles, but only as hypotheses – that is to say, as steps and points of departure into a world which is above hypotheses, in order that she may soar beyond them to the first principle of the whole; and clinging to this and then to that which depends on this, by successive steps she descends again without the aid of any sensible object, from ideas, through ideas, and in ideas she ends.”⁴¹ So S. Khalilov’s idea of the three books in fact is Plato’s theory of ideas (forms). Plato merely considers the others as a secondary event– as a shadow of the third. In addition, it is possible here to draw an analogy with the notions of ‘the world unseen’ (*al-’ālam al-ghayb*) and ‘fixed essences’ (*al-’ayān al-thābita*) in Sufism. However, for the reason that it is the subject of a larger and deeper study, we leave it to another study. To tell the truth, Prof. Khalilov limits his service to ‘uniting the teaching of the two books’, which is firmly established in Islamic philosophy, with the Platonic teaching of ‘the one book’, which is different from the previous one, and “to taking into consideration the equivalence of these three books.”⁴² However, one more truth emerges in the context of our interpretation.

³⁷ Muhammad Iqbal, “The Human Ego – His Freedom and Immortality”, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, <http://www.allamaiqbal.com/works/prose/english/reconstruction/index.htm>

³⁸ Muhammad Iqbal, “The Spirit of Muslim Culture”, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, <http://www.allamaiqbal.com/works/prose/english/reconstruction/index.htm>

³⁹ S. Xəlilov. “İslam fəlsəfəsi nə vaxtdan başlayır”, *Fəlsəfə və sosial-siyasi elmlər*, pp. 24–25.

⁴⁰ See: “Əbu Turxanın “Üç kitab” və “İki işiq” təlimi”, *Fəlsəfə və sosial-siyasi elmlər*. № 3–4, 2006, p. 121.

⁴¹ Plato, *The Republic*, p. 196.

⁴² S. Xəlilov. “İslam fəlsəfəsi nə vaxtdan başlayır”, *Fəlsəfə və sosial-siyasi elmlər*, p. 25.

As we mentioned above the peak point of these sciences is also philosophy. Prof. Khalilov says: "Plato took the absolute ideas as the only truth, that is, he took the world of ideas (forms) as the only true book. Plato simply accepted the truths which exist in the material world and nature only as the opinions which is known to the human being; however he did not accept that the absolute truths, to which the human successively comes nearer and which are the purpose of studies and cognition, also exist in nature."⁴³ That is to say, by denying the first two books Plato confirmed the last book.

At first glance it seems to be the third extreme approach. Plato's book however was not limited and as a philosophy of its time it included the two others in a certain meaning. By force of time and circumstance, 'the books' were also separated corresponding to the sciences that were separated from philosophy and this process started with Plato's student Aristotle, who emphasized the importance of 'the book of nature'. Determining the equivalence of each of 'the three books', Salahaddin Khalilov succeeds in abolishing the distinction between different teachings and including them within a more perfect teaching. At the same time, he tries to combine them once again in the same point. In other words, *the Eternal Wisdom and that started from the same point and then divided into different parts, units in the same point once again.*

Conclusion

Each idea that belongs to the world of ideas includes in itself a certain type of truth, which is intended for the material world and whose manifestation is necessary; it also includes motive and guiding power that we can call it creative energy. It is possible to call this truth the mission of that idea. Idea looks for the optimum form of its manifestation unless truth is realized and energy leads to the proper result and becomes completely consumed. Surely, time and socio-political situation sometimes can generally cause that idea to be forgotten and perverted. Nevertheless, it is also an undeniable fact that no material cause and barrier could prevent the divine power and will. Idea only awaits a proper condition and means as well as a person who will realize it.

⁴³ Ibid., pp. 25–26.

Necessity and Chance: The Metaphysical Dilemma

Chris Osegenwune

Abstract This paper critically examines the old metaphysical problem of chance and necessity as they relate to change. Have you ever sat down and thought about chance and necessity as contending forces in human lives? If you have been bothered by such a thought, then, you would have probably known that these forces hit us from every side. This paper argues that we live in a world that is more vulnerable to the vicissitudes of the contending forces of necessity and chance. The consequences of chance and necessity in human affairs manifest in an endless variety of forms. Some darken, frustrate and complicate our existence, confound our plans and prevent us from actualizing our cherished ambitions. Others illuminate our lives and instill in us the expectation of hope, confidence, a bright future and happiness. The basic question now is: What is chance and what is necessity? Necessity in general implies what is bound to occur and occurs in nature or society under specific conditions. Necessity is always expressed in the objective laws of nature and society. On the other hand, chance is taken to mean that which might or might not happen. This position makes chance stand on a causal dependence. The metaphysical world where we live is ruled by possibilities and probabilities thereby making chance and necessity inevitable. It is on this ground that the paper submits that there is nothing that necessarily must occur and nothing that might not occur. Anything, or any event, however incredible may occur or may not occur. From this viewpoint, nothing is impossible, everything appears to be dependent on chance thereby giving little room to necessity.

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Some Conceptions of Necessity and Chance

Necessity and chance are two contending metaphysical forces which directly or indirectly affect the activities and actions of men. Through the lenses of metaphysics, some schools of thought have argued that human actions are propelled by necessity rather than by chance. Chance has been regarded as a terror which tends to dominate human accomplishments. This paper attempts to explore the metaphysical imports imposed by necessity and chance as they affect human activities. What then is necessity?

A seminal discourse on necessity is traceable to the metaphysical speculation of Leucippus in fifth century B.C. Before Leucippus, Philolaus of Thebes had earlier stated that “all things take place by necessity and by harmony”. This opinion prepared the ground for the atomic theory in Greek metaphysical tradition. Leucippus consolidated this position thus: “Nothing happens without a reason, but all things occur for a reason, and of necessity” (Durant 1966: 352).

The elaboration of this view by Leucippus appears to be a response to the view earlier put in place by Zeno and Parmenides on the void or empty space. Through this view, Leucippus hopes to clarify the concept of motion theoretically possible as well as sensibly actual. The universe according to him is composed of atoms and space and nothing else. These atoms in his view tumble about in a vortex fall by necessity into the first forms of all things, like attaching itself to like, in this way arose the planets and the stars. All things, even the human soul are composed of atoms (*ibid.*).

Democritus of Abdera 460–360 BC, a distinguished disciple of Leucippus developed the atomistic metaphysics into a rounded system of materialism. He begins like Parmenides with a critique of the senses. For the purposes of demonstration, we may rely on them, but the moment we begin to analyze their evidence we may run into difficulties. For Democritus, the only thing that exists is atom and the void. He put it this way;

Nothing comes about perchance,
But all through reason and by necessity
Nothing can be created out of nothing, nor
Can it be destroyed and returned to nothing.
There is no end to the universe, since it was
Not created by any outside power (Santillana 1961: 144).

Arising from this position is the view that an atom cannot be created nor destroyed showing its indivisibility. This view, however, could not stand the test of time as the atom was divided into protons, electrons and neutrons through advancement in scientific research and development. Democritus, also, deplored the senses as they obscure knowledge or opinion; genuine knowledge comes through investigation and thought. In his words, “Verily, we know nothing. Truth is buried deep. . . . We know nothing for certain, but only the changes produced in our body by the forces that impinge on it” (Durant 1966: 353).

He also observed that the atoms that constitute the world differ in size, figure and weight. No nous or intelligence guide them but by necessity. It is from this viewpoint that Konstantinov (1982: 134) sees necessity as the stable, essential connection of things, phenomena, processes and objects of reality conditioned by the whole preceding course of their development. The necessary according to him stems from the essence of things and, given certain conditions is bound to occur. Since necessity is something that must happen, how does it relate to inevitability? The point must be made that not everything that is necessary is inevitable. Necessity becomes inevitable when other possibilities have been ruled out and there is only one left. In a nutshell, necessity implies what is bound to occur and occurs in nature or society under specific conditions. Necessity therefore is expressed in the objective laws of nature and society (Zakharov 1985: 113). In a similar vein, necessity is understood as that which must occur and cannot but occur. Necessity from the dimension of this analysis is metaphysical determinism. In this regard, the Stoics unarguably were the first to present a coherent system of determinism. The term determinism depicts the view that everything that happens has a cause or causes, and could not have happened differently unless something in the cause or causes had also been altered. For the Stoics, “The world itself, like man, is at once completely material and inherently divine. Everything that the senses report to us is material, and only material things can cause or receive action. Qualities as well as quantities, virtues as well as passions, soul as well as body, God as well as the stars, are material forms or processes, differing in degrees of fineness, but essentially one” (Durant 1966: 652–653). The Stoics further state that, “all matter is dynamic, full of tension and powers, perpetually engaged in diffusion and concentration and animated by an eternal energy, heat or fire”. On the universe, the Stoics assert that it “lives through innumerable cycles of expansion and contraction, development and dissolution; periodically it is consumed in a grand conflagration, and slowly it takes form again; then it passes through all its previous history, even in minutest detail; for the chain of causes and effects is an unbreakable circle, an endless repetition” (ibid., 653). The conclusion of the Stoics is that all events and all acts of will are determined; it is as impossible for anything to happen otherwise than it does as it is for something to come out of nothing; any break in the chain would disrupt the world.

The Stoics were so much engrossed in hard metaphysical determinism believing that everything under the sun is predetermined. In this view, then, necessity or causality depicts a situation where something must occur whether we like it or not.

In their interpretation of the Stoics, Solomon and Higgins (1996: 71) maintain that the Stoics’ doctrine of determinism is characterized by an almost fanatic faith in reason. In particular, they intensify the old antagonism between reason and emotion. For the Stoics, reason must be separated from emotion because emotions are forms of irrational judgment, the sort that makes us frustrated and unhappy. The Stoics looked and observed that they were in a world that had gone haywire, a social world in which vanity, cruelty and foolishness reigned supreme. In spite of this assertion, the Stoics believed in the rational universe even though this contradicts their earlier assumption which sees the universe as irrational and absurd. The Stoics

consolidated their notion of determinism by uncompromisingly accepting the power of human reason, a “spark of the divine”, to enable us to see through the cruel and petty foolishness of human concerns. The purpose of this is to appreciate that larger rationality. To achieve this target, the Stoics advised that we should live “in conformity with nature”. Living in conformity with nature is desired but this does not acquit man from the vicissitudes of nature (Honderich 1995).

Types of Necessity

Various forms of necessity have been identified as follows:

- (a) Epistemic necessity: In an effort to communicate knowledge, sometimes the modal auxiliaries ‘must and may’ appear to be used in an epistemic sense to express, respectively, what is entailed by and what is consistent with what a thinker knows. Thus, someone who knows that a train is due but has not yet arrived may assert, ‘it must be late,’ and one who knows that it is due but does not know whether it has yet arrived may assert, ‘it may be late’. Epistemic necessity is accompanied with a high degree of certainty.
- (b) Logical necessity: A proposition is described as a logical necessity when it is deduced from the law of logic alone. For example, either it will rain or it will not rain expresses a logically necessary truth because it is an instance of the law of excluded middle. Again, if all men are mortal and Socrates is a man, then, Socrates is mortal, expresses a logically necessary truth. A logical truth is necessarily true because the contrary will amount to a contradiction. A logical necessity may be characterized as a proposition which is true in every possible world without exception.
- (c) Metaphysical necessity: Kripke (1980) has maintained that there is an objective necessity which is at once stronger than physical necessity and yet not simply identifiable with logical necessity. Logically necessary truths are knowable a priori from a rational point of view, but Kripke argues that metaphysical necessity is typically, only discoverable a posteriori that is, on the basis of empirical evidence. For example, Kripke holds that if an identity statement such as ‘water is H₂O’ is true, then, it is necessarily true – in the sense that it is true in every possible world where water exists. In this case, we can prove that water is H₂O on empirical ground through scientific investigation which is prone to error.
- (d) Nomic necessity: The word nomic means law-like which implies that the world is governed by laws. These laws seem to be regular if human experience is anything to go by. For example, water boils at a certain degree, cigarette smoking leads to cancer and lung cancer can kill. Although these laws provide a guide through experience, different results can occur depending on the individual. There are people who have smoked all their lives but have not been infected with cancer, there are those afflicted with lung cancer but have

not died. The shortcoming with nomic necessity is that there is no regularity in nature. Things could go wrong any time.

Chance

Just like any metaphysical concept, the word “chance” is not easy to define in a single phrase or construct. Chance is commonly taken to mean that which might occur or might not occur, or might occur in any way. A basic question raised by metaphysicians is: What is the interrelation of necessity and chance in the world around us? In an attempt to answer this question, Boguslavsky (1978: 198) states that there is nothing that necessarily must occur and nothing that might not occur. Anything, any event, however incredible may occur, and it may occur one way or the other. From this position, it means that nothing is impossible. There is no such thing as necessity. Everything in the world is the outcome of chance.

Konstantinov (1982: 134) restated this opinion when he maintained that chance is what under certain conditions may occur or may not occur, may happen in a certain way or may happen otherwise. The problem with this position is that chance events seem to be based on certain principles. Chance events seem to be open-ended. If chance is open ended, it means that it is unpredictable. This view is further elaborated by Rastrigin (1973: 18) as follows; “chance is first and foremost, the unpredictability that is due to our ignorance: to our being badly informed, to the absence of necessary data, and to our lack of essential knowledge.” What we can deduce from here is that, chance is essentially a measure of ignorance: the less the information we possess about an object or issue the more chancy is its behaviour. Conversely, the more we know of an object or issue the less is its behaviour a matter of chance, and the more definite we can be in predicting its future behaviour. Now, if chance is based on ignorance, and we happen to have knowledge of something, does this eliminate chance? We have to be careful on the response we are positing to this question. In the view of Rastrigin, three defenders of chance have emerged. They are as follows:

First, there is an infinite complexity of the world. It is impossible for us to exhaust the endless variety of the world. The more this is pursued the more we are confronted with more complex challenges. To put it simply, there is a natural ban on completely exhausting the world of its mysteries. In other words, “it is impossible to fathom the unfathomable.”

The second point why chance cannot be eliminated is that it is found in our limited accuracy of measurement. Although development in science and technology has helped us to improve the measuring of various items it is not yet perfect. In other words, there is nothing like an absolute accuracy. This state of affairs limits the possibility of prediction and as a result makes the survival of chance possible.

The third point is that chance comes into play as a result of the indeterminacy principle or uncertainty formulated by a German physicist Werner Heisenberg (1901–1976). The uncertainty principle states that every event the outcome of

which is determined by the interaction of individual atoms is of its nature a chance affair. Chance seems to have a strong linkage with probability. An action is said to be probable when its result cannot be predicted. Trying to clarify chance as having linkage with probability, Honderich (1995: 129) maintains that chance is used interchangeably with probability. According to him, among experts, however, there are more distinctions, or attempted distinctions between chance, probability, degree of belief, relative frequency, propensity, likelihood and some others. He gave some illustrations; For a given coin-tossing device, we may think of:

- (i) the actual frequency of heads in a given series of tosses,
- (ii) the betting rate a person would offer on heads for a prospective toss,
- (iii) what the frequency would be for some prospective “long run”
- (iv) the dispositional condition of the device to produce heads, and other related things.

The problem with this outline is whether we are identifying something definite and whether to call it chance. This view reminds us of the traditional problem in philosophy concerning the view that nothing ever really happens merely by chance. On this view, even though the probability or chance of heads for a single toss may be explained in various theories as being half, it will nonetheless be true that the outcome of the toss was causally determined in advance. The implication in essence is that the result of tossing of a coin is not predetermined, the coin is capable of falling either way. The prediction of where the coin will fall is a matter of chance.

That chance dominates human activities is attested by Monod (1971) when he maintains that life on earth arose by “freak chemical accident and was unlikely to be duplicated even in the vast universe.” In his words, “man at last knows he is alone in the unfeeling immensity of the universe, out of which he has emerged only by chance”. Monod believes that man is a merely chemical extract in a majestic but impersonal cosmic drama – an irrelevant, unintended side show. Some scholars have raised strong objections on this view as it seems to be anchored on the evolutionary theory. One of the criticisms is that Monod used this bleak assessment as a springboard to argue for atheism, the absurdity and the pointlessness of existence. For this school of thought chance is a fiction invented to disguise our ignorance. Activities of men on earth seem to be motivated by chance, especially those actions or decisions we are unable to control. If our actions are based on the rigid laws of the universe, we would not be making mistakes and this provides enough room for chance to operate. This aspect of the analysis will throw more light on chance in human affairs.

Chance and Necessity in Human Affairs

The brute experience of human existence demonstrates to a large extent the interaction between necessity and chance. When we are confronted with life challenges, we might not know where the pendulum will swing. Sometimes, when we succeed in solving some protracted problems, we begin to ask whether we are the one that solved the problem or somebody else. Sometimes, we ask whether the problem was solved by chance or through a defined device.

Some scholars have shown examples on how necessity and chance dominate human affairs. Sodipo (1973) in offering a unique sense of African philosophy distinguishes what he calls the “Yoruba concept of cause” and the western or the “scientific” concept of cause. The Yoruba concept of cause according to him is ruled by some supernatural or god and satisfies aesthetic and religious emotions. Causes of events are explained purely in terms of personal entities. Sodipo extended this view to competitions. When for example a person wins in a competition, the cause of his victory must be that the gods were in his favour, that is, that the gods wanted him to win. When he is defeated, it is because the gods do not favour him or do not want him to win. There is no scientific or general law of chance which determines such a victory or defeat. He further states as follows;

Even if a general law says that only one person out of a hundred passengers in a lorry involved in an accident would be saved the Yoruba believe that the gods, not chance, decide who that lucky one shall be and it is certainly worth trying to make oneself the lucky one. . . through the necessary sacrifices to some god or gods (ibid.,19).

In a similar vein, Ohaeri (1988) agreed with Sodipo’s submission when he states that the Yorubas traditionally conceive of illness as being caused by an admixture of three factors, namely: natural, preternatural and supernatural. Mild problems, such as common cold and diarrhoea, especially when brief in duration are attributed to natural causes (for example bad odour, filthy or unsanitary conditions). But when a disease is severe or becomes chronic or is unexpected, then primitive supernatural beliefs prevail. Preternatural causes (such as witchcraft and human curse) and supernatural causes (such as offences against the gods or ancestors) are sought in such instances.

Superstition Ohaeri believes still waxes strong in African traditional societies irrespective of one’s level of education as far as causation is concerned. Events, especially unfavourable ones, do not just happen by chance, but are caused by supernatural forces. A man’s sickness or his involvement in an accident may be attributable to the influence of another person who for some reason harbours ill will toward the unfortunate victim.

There are strong objections against anchoring necessity and chance on religious or supernatural grounds. Oruka (1975: 48–49) argues that if we take Sodipo’s position and other schools of thought seriously, it may imply that Yoruba traditional thought or philosophy is grounded on religion. If cause is explained in terms of chance set-ups and if the occurrence of an event is brought about by the probability of its chance to occur, in accordance with certain objective and impersonal laws of

science, it becomes clear that the cause of any event must be based on chance. But if Oruka's view is pushed to a logical conclusion, it will amount to subjecting every event to the whims and caprices of chance. In this case, therefore, anything can happen.

Makinde (2007: 90–91) reduced the whole argument on cause and chance as presented in African philosophy as obsolete. In his view, the traditional concepts of cause and chance in Yoruba traditional thought is presented from purely a religious angle. He compared this view to that of Mbiti who conceived the universe in a religious term. In Mbiti's account according to Makinde, God is read into objects and phenomena, while in Sodipo, things and events are caused by God or gods. Makinde did not condemn traditional thought which is not peculiar to Africans but cuts across Europe, however, he is of the view that the idea of conceiving the universe, cause and chance on purely a religious dimension does not promote the critical attitude expected in the development of philosophy and science. As an obsolete philosophy, this conception of cause and chance is not only unscientific but will make scientific investigation impossible. One will agree with Makinde's position because if at this age of critical philosophy and sophisticated scientific advancement we still fall back on traditional modes of explanation of events and phenomena, we are likely to be left behind with the train of progress.

This author is of a strong conviction that chance plays a dominant role in human affairs. Some examples that will illustrate our case better are as follows: If professor x emerges as a vice chancellor from a group of competent professors, this does not mean that the others are not qualified but is as a result of chance. That a baby boy or girl is born into a family is not dependent on the man or woman but the forces of the x and y chromosomes. Some families have witnessed instability as a result of blaming a woman for having more female children than male ones. That one is appointed a minister or a special adviser does not mean that he is better than any other person who is also qualified. Everything is dependent on chance.

Human Freedom

One of the ways in which necessity and chance play a dominant role in human affairs is through the exercise of human freedom. Freedom consists in rational judgment pulling a man to the right while irrational impulses pull him to the left. The metaphysical notion of freedom appears to have come from Hegel in his analysis between freedom and necessity. For Hegel, freedom is the appreciation of necessity. "Necessity is blind only in so far as it is not understood." Freedom does not consist in any dream – of independence from natural laws, but in the knowledge of these laws, and in the possibility this gives to systematically making them work towards definite ends (Engels 1978: 140–141).

In the realization of this definite end, freedom of the will therefore means nothing but the capacity to make decisions with knowledge of the subject. To this end, the freer a man's judgment is in relation to a definite question, the greater is the

necessity with which the content of this judgment will be determined; while the uncertainty, founded on ignorance, which seems to make an arbitrary choice among many different and conflicting possible decisions, shows precisely by this that is not free, that is controlled by the very object it should itself control. Freedom, therefore, consists in the control over ourselves and over external nature, a control founded on knowledge of natural necessity which is necessarily a product of historical development (ibid.). Hegel's position seems to rule out chance in the exercise of human freedom. The nature of man when he is faced with competing interests is unpredictable. This position is giving credence by Davies (1983: 137) who used the quantum factor to dismiss necessity. According to him the basic principle of the quantum theory is that nature is unpredictable. Davies linked this view to the uncertainty principle developed by Heisenberg which maintains that there is always an irreducible indeterminism in the operation of subatomic systems. In the micro world, events occur that have no well-defined cause. This runs contrary to the view of the proponents of free will who assert that the activities of a person are determined by his character, inclinations and personality. Most scholars who support indeterminism do so, on a critical scrutiny of human actions. Reacting to this, Ian Hacking, (<http://www.cambridge.org.catalogue>), argues that "by the late nineteenth century, it became possible to think of statistical patterns as explanatory in themselves, and to regard the world as not necessarily deterministic in character. In the same period, the idea of human nature was displaced by a model of normal people with laws of dispersion. These two parallel transformations fed into each other, so that chance made the world seem less capricious: it was legitimized because it brought order out of chaos." Hacking further argues that "these developments have led to a new style of scientific reasoning gaining its hold upon us." His conclusion is that "the greater the level of indeterminism in our conception of the world and of people, the more we expect control and intervention in our lives, and the less we expect freedom." The implication of this position is that determinism or necessity is an obstacle to human freedom and an obstruction to man's effort to transform the world.

It is against this background that Eiseley (1961: 350) argues that the mind of man, by indetermination, by the power of choice and cultural communication, by the great powers of thought, is on the verge of escape by the blind control of that deterministic world with which the Darwinists had unconsciously shackled man. The inborn characteristics led upon him by the biological extremists have crumbled. Man is many things – he is protean, elusive, capable of good and appalling evil. He is what he is – a reservoir of indeterminism. He represents the genuine triumph of volition, life's near evasion of forces that have molded it.

The analysis of human freedom is one of the difficult metaphysical problems. In one breath, man is said to be free, and in another, he is said not to be free. The discussion and the proffering of a solution to this metaphysical problem is the metaphysical dilemma to which we shall now turn.

The Metaphysical Dilemma in Necessity and Chance

The rift between necessity and chance can be traced to the thesis of Democritus on the nature of the atom. This thesis is anchored on the view that, “the atoms that constitute the world differ in figure, size, and weight; all have a tendency downward; in the resultant rotatory motion; like atoms combine with like and produce the planets and the stars. No *nous*, or intelligence, guides the atoms, no Empedoclean ‘love’ or ‘hate’ assorts them, but necessity – the natural operation of inherent causes – rules over all. There is no chance; chance is a fiction invented to disguise our ignorance” (Durant 1966: 353).

From the view of Democritus, everything in the universe is governed by necessity thereby making chance a fiction. The indivisibility of the atom which formed the basis of Democritus, view was set aside when the atom was broken down into protons, electrons and neutrons. This, I think, was actualized because of chance through a breakthrough in science. The view of Democritus on necessity and chance was further compounded by philosophers after him who threw more light on the nagging issue of necessity or determinism on one hand, and chance or indeterminism on the other. Determinism maintains that all events must have causes; that is, whatever events occur may be connected by general laws to other events (Abel 1976: 10). The interpretation of this position, is that, what does actually happen, must happen, and whatever does not actually happen cannot happen; there is no middle ground of possibility or contingency. This position is likely to rule out chance or probability which is an objective and inherent aspect of the world. The dilemma of determinism and indeterminism are so glaring when we are confronted with human actions. This dilemma can be stated thus: “(1) if determinism is true, we can never do other than we do; hence, we are never responsible for what we do. (2) If indeterminism is true, then some events – namely, human actions – are random, hence not free; hence, we are never responsible for what we do. (3) Either determinism is true or else indeterminism is true. (4) Therefore, we are never responsible for what we do” (Feinberg and Shafer-Landau 2002: 458). A thorough examination of these options presented above points out an undeniable position. This position is that both determinism and indeterminism are possible metaphysical orientations. For example, we can say that passing an examination depends on how hard a candidate works. This is contrary to winning a lottery or getting a job. In the former, hard work is a necessary condition for passing an examination while in the latter chance takes predominance. It is also not out of place if a candidate passes examination without working hard. There could be bribery or corruption where a hard-working candidate can be oppressed. The conclusion one can draw here is that anything is possible in human affairs as no rigid laws are sacrosanct. Even when we apply and observe all laws pertaining to an event or phenomenon, we can not guarantee absolute certainty but a provision for our limitations must be recognized.

Conclusion

The dilemma of chance and necessity has attracted a protracted metaphysical debate starting from the classical period in philosophical development. This debate appears to be compounded by the traditional metaphysical stance that reality is grounded on necessity. The examples that we have given in this paper show that no matter how strictly we adhere to the tenets of determinism, indeterminism unarguably affects our actions. The indeterminacy principle made popular by the German physicist Werner Heisenberg shows clearly that our measurement precision is always limited giving room for chance. Also, the history of man and his struggle with nature demonstrates the reality of chance. It is on this ground that this paper concludes that necessity and chance are two contending metaphysical forces that dominate human affairs.

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Part II
Comparative and Cross-Cultural
Approaches

The Seal of Philosophy: Tymieniecka's Phenomenology of Life Versus Islamic Metaphysics

Olga Louchakova-Schwartz

Abstract Tymieniecka's philosophy developed amidst the same twentieth-century cultural changes that have precipitated broad interest of non-Muslim philosophers in Islam. This paper argues that Islamic metaphysical vision finds its Western philosophical counterpart in the Phenomenology of Life. Tymieniecka revivifies the notion of the sacred in Western philosophy by introducing the concept of sentience, intelligence (logos) and unity of life. However, comparative analysis of the main categories and methods of knowledge in both systems demonstrates that despite the obvious similarities, there are significant distinctions between these two systems. Tymieniecka's philosophy begins with epoché on the preceding philosophical knowledge, while Islamic philosophy begins with revelation; Tymieniecka uses presuppositionless phenomenological direct intuition combined with reflective analysis, while Sufi metaphysics combines logic, intuition and reliance on the experience attained in the states of mystical perception. Unification of Reality and realization of truth in the Phenomenology of Life is attained via the intuition of life at large, and in Islam—via certainty attained in religious experiences of mystical unveiling. Due to refocusing from the static and objectification-based ontological categories of traditional metaphysics on the process of life's development (ontopoiesis), Tymieniecka's ontology serves as a possible solution to the problems of static metaphysical vision of Reality in Sufism.

The metaphysical vision of Islam is rooted in the notion of the unity of existence and knowledge, available through knowledge by presence; Syed Muhammad al Naquib al-Attas calls this the "Intuition of Existence."¹ Crystallized over centuries

¹ Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas, *The Intuition of Existence* (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization, 1990).

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of Islamic practice, this vision connects the common human quest for truth with the dimensions of the sacred in inner religious experience. This paper argues that vision finds a Western philosophical counterpart in the still-evolving ontological phenomenology of Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka. Though enriched by the attainments of modern science and Western philosophical tradition, her ontology does not divide reality into spiritual, physical or other compartments, and is inspired by the same primary data of life that animated the philosophy of the ancient Greeks, which is at the roots of Islamic metaphysics.²

Tymieniecka's philosophy developed amidst the same twentieth-century cultural changes that have precipitated broad interest of non-Muslim philosophers in Islam.³ Undermined by postmodern deconstruction, metaphysics faced a need to reaffirm its traditional essentialist, universalist, and monotheistic agendas against the "crimson dawn" of the many gods of relativism.⁴ At the same time, perennial tensions within metaphysics itself were also being exacerbated. The juxtaposition of the 'non-dual' Indian religious philosophies with Western individualism led to the growth of simplified philosophical approaches to existence, and compromised the subtle insights of apophatic theologies. Traditionalist Islamic philosophers such as Reza Davari Ardakani (Iran) and al-Attas (Malaysia) responded to this crisis by reprimanding the West for what they describe as the loss of metaphysics to the positivistic and scientific worldview.⁵ On the other hand, liberal Islamic philosophers such as Abdolkarim Soroush in Iran have welcomed the new epistemologies as a positive development that enriches humanity's knowledge of itself.⁶ As a result

² For a general introduction to the history of Islamic metaphysics, including the influence of Greek philosophers, see Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Oliver Leaman (eds.), *History of Islamic Philosophy*, 2 vols. (London: Routledge, 1996).

³ For more on the history of the dialogue between Islamic and Western philosophy, see John Inglis, "Towards a Balanced Historiography of Medieval Philosophy", Introduction to *Medieval Philosophy and the Classical Tradition in Islam, Judaism and Christianity*, ed. John Inglis (New York: Routledge, 2002), pp. 1–17.

⁴ For more on postmodern relativism, including a discussion of its many gods, see Richard Shweder, *Thinking through Cultures: Expeditions in Cultural Psychology*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991).

For more specifically on the relativity of religious knowledge, see Abdolkarim Sorosh, "Text in Context", Lecture delivered at McGill University, Institute of Islamic Studies, April 13, 1995, published in *Liberal Islam: a Sourcebook*, Charles Kurzman (ed.), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 244–251.

The metaphor of "crimson dawn" was first used with regard to polytheism by Henry Corbin in "Le paradoxe du monothéisme," *Eranos Jahrbuch* 45, 1976, pp. 69–133.

⁵ For more on Davari's perspective, see Mehrzad Boroujerdi, "Three Philosophical Debates in Post-Revolutionary Iran", in *Iranian Intellectuals and the West: The Tormented Triumph of Nativism* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1996).

For more on al-Attas's perspective, see Syed Muhammad al Naquib al-Attas, *Islam and Secularism* (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization, 1993).

⁶ For more on Soroush's perspective, see Boroujerdi, op. cit., 1996. For a review of Soroush's life and work, see <http://www.dr.soroush.com/>

of these changes, there has emerged a need for an innovative gnoseology that will be able not only to reposition metaphysics within these new and challenging cultural contexts, but also to resolve millennia-old internal contradictions of ontology.

To develop her original process-oriented metaphysics, Tymieniecka had to analytically penetrate the centuries of congealed philosophical tradition. Her monumental epoché on the assumptions of Western ontology, phenomenology, and philosophies of reason opened up a clearing (*Lichtung*, German) where the Logos of Life can be seen and articulated. The focus on the Logos, which is life's innermost sentience, measure, creativity and self-ordering, revives the sacredness in the practice of living. The specific timing of Tymieniecka's analytical summation of the philosophical heritage, the resulting synthesis and epoché, and this new metaphysics led me to view Tymieniecka as a 'Seal' of Western/Occidental philosophy.

The concept of the 'Seal' has its origins in Islamic thought.⁷ Just as a design of a real seal sums up the contents of the treasure chest, a thinker who is "the Seal" completes and expresses the essences of preceding knowledge. New knowledge emerges out of this creative synthesis. For example, Ibn 'Arabi, the great "Revivifier of Religion", not only summarized and reinterpreted the monotheistic message of Islam, but developed the new doctrine of monotheistic unification which received a name *wahdad al-wujud* (unicity of being, Arabic). By discovering the sentient, ordering Logos of Life, Tymieniecka not only re-sacralizes Western philosophical discourse, but enriches it with the understanding of the ontological status of the Divine imagination. In the analysis of Tymieniecka's gnoseology, it becomes clear that her novel metaphysics depends on the original strategy of knowledge, such as engagement of the direct intuition with the developing horizon of life, and attention to the inherent logistics of the process of knowledge as the logic self-articulation of life.⁸

By comparison, in Islamic metaphysics, the two main sources of knowledge are scriptural revelation and the personal intuition of the sacred.⁹ These sources of

⁷ The oral tradition of Sufism, such as Beshara Foundation, interprets the prophetic stations in Ibn 'Arabi's *Fusus al-Hikam* as a succession of stations in the emergent self-disclosure of the Real through the different Divine Names. A Divine Name is represented by a prophet who is the 'setting' (bezel) for the jewel, that is, the specific revelation. The setting is the place of reception which is formed according to the imprint of the jewel. Each prophet/Name appears in historical time and brings a wisdom/mode of being/mode of witnessing that expresses a new possibility for the era and is a response to the new possibility coming from the interiority of the people of that era which also represents that new possibility (Nick Yiangou, Beshara Foundation/Ibn-Arabi Society, personal communication, 2/4/11).

⁸ For an in-depth analysis of the epistemological strategy in Tymieniecka's work, see Olga Louchakova-Schwartz, Direct intuition: Strategies of knowledge in the Phenomenology of Life, with reference to the Philosophy of Illumination. In A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), *Phenomenology and the Human Positioning in the Cosmos*, Book 1. Analecta Husserliana, CXIII, 291–315 (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013).

For the term "horizon" with regard to phenomenology, see Enrique Lima, "Of Horizons and Epistemology: Problems in the Visuality of Knowledge", *Diacritics*, 33, 3/4 (2003), pp. 19–35.

⁹ Seyyed Hossein Nasr, "Mystical Philosophy in Islam", in *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward Craig, Vol. 6 (London: Routledge, 1998).

knowledge are related; the tradition maintains that intuition, or “knowledge by presence”, had been a medium of original revelation recorded in the Qur’an. However, as I will discuss in depth, psychological and phenomenological analysis uncovers a tension between these two sources of knowledge: in spite of the inspiring nature of Qur’anic revelation, the personal intuition of the sacred will be circumscribed by one’s commitment to a set of recorded ideas, as frequently happens in Islamic religious and philosophical practice.¹⁰

Close parallels can be established between Islamic knowledge by presence and direct intuition of phenomenological tradition, including the work of Tymieniecka.¹¹ Thus, in addition to the apparent similarity of their basic categories and their shared Greek heritage, Islamic metaphysics and the Phenomenology of Life also share an emphasis on direct intuition in the practice of knowledge. However, the presence of scriptural revelation in Islam creates considerable differences between the two systems, which are especially noticeable with regard to the process of enquiry itself.

Islamic metaphysics first posits a self-subsistent unified source of all particular conditioned existences, and then proceeds to examination of the structures of existence, while the Phenomenology of Life first acknowledges the actual *presence* of life and then follows its designs until they reveal their own intrinsic unity, intelligence, and implicit self-subsistence. Next, while there is some shared commonality in the systematic mental operations underlying the search for the real in both systems, Islamic metaphysics does not have a distinct process orientation. In fact, the process-orientation has never even been discussed with regard to metaphysics in Islam. As I show later, the process orientation, especially in Sufism, is a matter of internal practice, not a matter of metaphysics. In the latter, the traces of process orientation are to be found only in the Neoplatonic influences on Islamic philosophy, for instance in Proclus.¹² In contrast, Tymieniecka’s philosophy takes process orientation to its conceivable limit.¹³ This difference has consequences; in

¹⁰ For more on the inspiring influence of revelation, see Muhammad Asad (trans.), *The Message of the Qur’an* (Pakistan, Lahore: Maktaba Jawahar ul uloom, beginning of the fifteenth century of the Hijrah/beginning of the twenty first century).

¹¹ For knowledge by presence in Islam, see Mehdi Ha’iri Yazdi, *The Principles of Epistemology in Islamic Philosophy* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992); Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “Mystical Philosophy in Islam”, (Routledge, 1998). Available from <http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/ip/rep/H004>; For direct intuition in Tymieniecka’s work, see Olga Louchakova-Schwartz, op. cit., 2013.

¹² For more on Neoplatonic influences in Islamic mystical philosophy, see:

Ian Richard Netton, “Neoplatonism in Islamic Philosophy”, in *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward Craig, Vol. 6 (London: Routledge, 1998).

Corbin, op. cit., 1976.

¹³ For process orientation in Tymieniecka’s approach, see Olga Louchakova-Schwartz, op. cit., 2013.

Islam, the concept of the Unity of Existence is conditioned on positing a transcendental entity; in Tymieniecka, a process orientation obviates this logical necessity (see the discussion in the next section). Another substantive difference in orientation is that religious experiences, as the instances of God's self-disclosure, play a major role in the formation of Islamic metaphysics, while in Tymieniecka's approach, religious experience is only one instantiation of the logico self-articulation, while the main field of it is life at large.

Tymieniecka's critical analysis of the philosophical approaches to reason, enhanced by her novel use of direct intuition, leads to understanding of Logos as a unified reason inclusive of all modalities of intelligence. This essential understanding distinguishes Tymieniecka's thought from contemporary western philosophies; at the same time, it connects her with Islamic thought. Shared by the great thinkers of Ismaili, Ishraqi, and Andalusian schools, and Tymieniecka, this understanding of reason is important not only as a metaphysical insight in and of itself, but as a foundation for the applied aspects of metaphysics. There, it has the potential to rejuvenate both Western philosophy and postmodern Islamic philosophy, as well as the potential to influence scientific enquiry and cultural healing systems.¹⁴ Interestingly, this understanding of cosmic, unified intelligence in Tymieniecka grows out of a different route of enquiry than the one found in Islam. One of the goals of this paper is to show how, in *Phenomenology of Life*, the direct, supposition-free apperception of the intelligence embedded in life's logico networks liberates one's reflection to build a new, internally congruent and scientifically informed metaphysics.

A Problem of a Static Metaphysical Unity

It is hard to imagine a philosopher raising metaphysical questions without having some personal relationship with the question of the Real. A question may be asked, then, whether it will be better to begin philosophical analysis with the notion of the Real, or with the engagement with the Real per se, as opposed to the reflection of the Real in the notion of the Real. Tymieniecka's Logos of Life is not rooted in a mere rational motive; she appercepts the Logos directly, and re-affirms her discovery through the application of her phenomenological method. The sentience and the logistics of the unfolding of life are the main horizons of Tymieniecka's intuition. These horizons are much broader than the horizon of spiritual and religious experiences, as the Logos encompasses immensely more than a particular instance

¹⁴ Olga Louchakova-Schwartz, "A Paradox of the New Enlightenment: The 'Endangered' Self in the Path(s) of Individualizing Life", *Selected Papers from the IV International Conference of Phenomenology, "Phenomenological Paths in Post-Modernity: A Comparison with the Phenomenology of Life of A.-T. Tymieniecka"*, Pontificia, University, Rome, January 13–14, 2011, (to appear in *ARACNE Sentieri Fenomenologici Bozze*, pp. 205–220).

of spiritual understanding.¹⁵ Direct intuition has access to the overall field of Logos; with regard to religious experience, direct intuition grasps only one aspect of this field.

In Islamic metaphysics, by contrast, the enquiry begins with the notion that “everything is God”, and that God is the Real. Islam maintains that its textual tradition, i.e. Qur’an and hadith, spring forth from the above insight being the content of religious experience(s) of the founder of the tradition, the Prophet Muhammad.¹⁶

In post facto interpretations of a religious experience, immediacy loses itself to memory, turning into a notion. Such memories are mental replicas of experience; they can inspire faith, but paradoxically, they can also block access to individual pre-reflective experience of God.¹⁷ Because preconceived mental formations inhibit the direct intuition of the Real, the practice-oriented Sufi tradition neutralizes this effect by a mental training that brackets out higher-order reflective thought, logical reasoning or imagination in the process of refining one’s perception of the Divine.¹⁸ However, even with this kind of training, experiential mystical perception remains conditioned by the original revelation as its ideas are passed down through the generations. A conceptual replica of the original revelation can inhibit direct intuition and intimate knowledge of God.¹⁹ In other words, a record of revelation can become abstracted from its living roots and turned into a set of beliefs, thus defeating a part of its own purpose, which would be to inspire religious experiences in the followers.²⁰ Further, the ideas of scriptural revelation themselves may become an object of worship. To me, this contributes to the problem stated by Corbin:

¹⁵ Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, *The Case of God in the New Enlightenment*, The Fullness of the Logos in the Key of Life 1, Analecta Husserliana 100:70 (2009).

¹⁶ For an example of Qu’rānic statement that God is the reality of everything, see Sura Fussilat, Muhammad Asad (trans.), op. cit., XLI: 53.

Al-Haqq (‘the truth’, ‘the Reality’, ‘the truly existing’, Arabic) is one of the names of God. For more on the name *al-Haqq*, see Ibn Ata’ Allah al-Iskandari, *The Key to Salvation: A Sufi Manual of Invocation*, trans. M. Kourry-Danner, (United Kingdom: The Islamic Texts Society, 1996);

For Ibn ‘Arabi’s use of *al-Haqq*, see Muhyi-d-Din Ibn ‘Arabi, *The Wisdom of the Prophets*, trans. Angela Culme-Seymour (Roxburgh, Scotland: Beshara Publications, 1975), translated from *La Sagesse des Prophètes*, trans. Titus Burckhardt from *Fusus al-Hikam*, p. 8.

¹⁷ For more on roots of revelation in the direct experience, see William Alston, *Perceiving God* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991).

Christopher J. Eberle, “The Autonomy and Explanation of Mystical Perception,” *Religious Studies*, 34 (1998), pp. 299–316.

¹⁸ Sheikh Yasin Toussulis of the Malamatia Sufi Order and Sheikh Mehmet Selim Ozich, personal communication (1997).

¹⁹ For more on the relationship between conceptual and intuitive knowledge of God, see the argument between Pharaoh and Moses in Muhyi-d-Din Ibn ‘Arabi, op. cit., 1975, pp. 109–115.

²⁰ For more on the relationship between conceptual and intuitive knowledge of God, see the argument between Pharaoh and Moses in Muhyi-d-Din Ibn ‘Arabi, op. cit. *The Wisdom of the Prophets (Fusus al-Hikam)* translated from Arabic to French by Titus Burckhardt, from French to English by Angela Culme-Seymour (Gloucestershire: Beshara Publications, 1975), pp. 109–115.

In its exoteric form, namely the profession of faith that declares *La Ilaha illah [Lā Ilāha ilāʾ Llāh]* monotheism perishes in its triumphant moment, unknowingly obliterating itself by becoming *volens nolens* metaphysical idolatry.²¹

Corbin refers to the conflict between the idea of the multiplicity of divine manifestations (existences) and the idea of unity of the self-subsistent Essence (being) in exoteric forms of religion. Unless there is a direct perception of unification in being, as opposed to a logically derived possibility of unification in being, there is idolatry, that is, the worship of a thought-form. In Corbin's view, Ibn 'Arabi effectively resolved this contradiction by positing the experiential availability of indivisible transcendent being:

Monotheism attains salvation and obtains its truth only by attaining its esoteric form whose symbol of faith is expressed thus: *Laysa fi'l-wojud siwa Allah*—'in being, there is only God'.

In other words, God is in being, where "being" transcends qualified existence(s). However, the question remains as to how this completely unqualified God can be known by presence. If this is possible, this knowledge must be devoid of subject-object dichotomies. The religious thinking in the psychologically early developmental stages of faith creates many such dichotomies, including multiplicity versus unity, or the human subject of faith versus the divine object of her worship.²² Regardless of whether the mental conception of God is singular or plural, dichotomizing will always lead to a form of idolatry where, instead of the living God, an *Imago Dei* is worshiped. The advanced direct intuition necessary to get beyond this frame of mind is distinct from the intuition that sustains faith in its psychologically early form.

By comparison, in the *Phenomenology of Life*, the refinement of intuition takes religious insight outside of its dichotomizing forms, liberating it from the preconceived, theory-laden notions of the Divine. The unifying intuition involved in the *Phenomenology of Life* is distinct not only in the degree of its advancement, (as opposed to the psychologically early forms of intuition), and not just in the unification of subject and object, but in its re-focusing on developmental moments and developmental horizon of life as opposed to the static snapshots of existences and the objectified being.

In the following sections, I will further elaborate the comparisons between these different conceptions of ontological singularity, by way of discussing the epistemological pathways leading to these differences. As I mentioned briefly earlier, the natures of this singularity are also different, in spite of the intuited unicity of *what is* in both systems. In Islam, Reality pertains to the one and only self-subsistent being who is beyond appearances of existence, i.e. distinct in its transcendentality. In contrast, Tymieniecka posits *Logos Omnia*, as sentience, measure, proportion, and unfolding which is inseparable from all life.²³ As life is a singular unity, *Logos*

²¹ Corbin, op. cit., 1976.

²² For a description of the different stages of faith, see James W. Fowler, *Stages of Faith* (New York: Harper Collins, 1981).

²³ Tymieniecka, op. cit., 2009.

Omnia too is one, not many, in the same and the only order of beingness that life is in; and the instances of life are the instances of logoc self-particularization, immanent and transcendent at the same time.

Presuppositionlessness Versus the “Islamization of the Intellect”

As I noted in the introductory section, some contemporary Islamic metaphysicians are skeptical of Western metaphysics across the board. To al-Attas, . . .any attempt to resurrect a science of metaphysics in the West leads only towards metaphysics’ final dissolution.²⁴ William C. Chittick indicates that, to anybody who is sensitive to Islamic revelation, Tymieniecka’s philosophy may appear “deafening”.²⁵ I believe that such criticism overlooks the contribution of Tymieniecka’s direct intuition to phenomenological ontology. In its orientation towards life per se, presuppositionless direct intuition serves as a powerful antidote to what al-Attas calls a corroding influence of secularization.²⁶

In phenomenology in general, the suspension of suppositions and the analysis of the natural attitude convert ontology into a methodologically rigorous and epistemologically certain enterprise. This early agenda of Husserl’s phenomenology remains valid in Tymieniecka’s metaphysics. Orientation of Tymieniecka’s direct intuition towards the Logos of Life enables both the certainty of ontological conclusions and fidelity to the Real. Her focus is on ontopoietic, developmental moments. This enables her to articulate the unity-of-everything-there-is-alive, the unity of essence and manifestation, the harmony of measure and order, ontological-epistemological unity, ontopoiesis, the *Imaginatio Creatrix*, and other aspects of the fully fleshed-out ontological insight of her metaphysics.

Despite some individual variations, the basic thesis of presuppositionless necessary for successful explication of the structures of consciousness pervades all modalities of Western phenomenology. The presuppositionlessness is achieved via *epoché* and *phenomenological reduction* whereby one suspends ontological judgment in order to access the pre-reflective givenness of the phenomena.²⁷

²⁴ Al-Attas, op. cit., 1993, p. 37.

²⁵ William C. Chittick, “The Circle of Life in Islamic Thought,” in *Islamic Philosophy and Occidental Phenomenology on the Perennial Issue of Microcosm and Macrocosm*, ed. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, Islamic Philosophy and Occidental Phenomenology in Dialogue2 (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006), pp. 205–213.

²⁶ Al-Attas, op. cit., 1995.

²⁷ Amedeo Giorgi, *The Descriptive Phenomenological Method in Psychology: A Modified Husserlian Approach*, (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 2009), p. 91.

Experience happens for the experiencing subject in an immediate way and as part of this immediacy, it is implicitly marked as *my* experience. For the phenomenologists, this immediate and first-personal givenness of experiential phenomena must be accounted for in terms of a pre-reflective self-consciousness.²⁸

Bracketing, which is a systematic peeling-away of interpretive and symbolic layers of reflection provides for the “unpacking” of phenomena themselves.²⁹ Although the Husserlian epoché has been interpreted and used in various different ways, and although the procedure of bracketing per se structures pre-reflective experience, epoché has nonetheless been continuously useful in phenomenological work.³⁰ The need to free the mind from suppositions in order to obtain direct knowledge of what is has always been well-known in the practice of esotericism. In spiritual systems, examination of one's beliefs, control over the random production of thoughts and subconscious projections, and developing a conscious awareness of thought are major aspects of inner practice. Meditation styles that are concerned with the contents of the deep layers of the mind, such as Dhyana in Yoga or Nididhyasana in Advaita Vedanta, identify and discard the layers of meaning connected with individual identity it attaining the consciousness beyond the ego. Discarding the precepts and perceptions in search of unqualified essence of God is also central to the practice of negative theology.³¹ In that regard, phenomenological approach is faithful to a tradition of esoteric knowledge verified by centuries of practice.

Early on in her writings Tymieniecka fully embraced the phenomenological premise of bracketing out suppositions to access the pre-reflectively given patterns and designs implicit in the experience of life.³² In contrast, with the exception of

²⁸ Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi, “Phenomenological Approaches to Self-Consciousness”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2010 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta available at <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/self-consciousness-phenomenological/>

²⁹ Presuppositionlessness and a return to prereflective experience cannot ever be fully achieved, as one cannot completely strip phenomena of their constitutive influences. However, it is possible to attain a degree of bracketing out of value judgments and symbolic and interpretive meanings pertaining to the phenomena in question. For more on the relationship between prereflective and reflective meaning, see Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, “The Creative Self and the Other in Man's Self-Interpretation”, Tymieniecka (ed.), *Analecta Husserliana* 6, pp. 151–186.

³⁰ For example, Maurice Merleau-Ponty used epoché to explicate the true structures of perception from underneath the philosophical assumptions of intellectualism and empiricism; for his description of the process, see Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962).

³¹ For more on negative theology, see Henry Corbin, “Aphatic Theology as Antidote to Nihilism”, in *Le Paradoxe du Monothéisme*, Ed. de l'Herne, 1981. Paper presented in Tehran, 20 October 1977 during a conference organized by the Iranian Centre for the Study of Civilizations, *Does the Impact of Western Thought Allow for the Possibility of Real Dialogue between Civilizations?*

³² Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, “The Creative Self and the Other in Man's Self-Interpretation”, *Analecta Husserliana* 4 (1977), pp. 151–186.

some forms of Sufism,³³ this kind of philosophical attitude is alien to Islamic metaphysics of knowledge by presence. Behind Islamic metaphysical philosophy, there are many centuries of what Seyyed Hossein Nasr calls the “islamization of the intellect”. Such Islamicised intellect contains mental networks of categories constituted by principles of Islam.³⁴ Categorization is necessary for information processing, and cultural influences have been shown to structure this processing.³⁵ Due to these inherent properties of information processing, any analysis or experience in Islamic cultural milieu is embedded in Islam’s categorical framework. Within the Islamic cultural milieu, Qur’anic revelation and prophetic authority are not optional; they are constitutive.³⁶ It follows that the direct intuition, or knowledge by presence, at the core of Islamic philosophy must have been Islamized with regard to its horizons.

Reliance on the direct intuition in the matters of God-knowledge is a staple of Islam.³⁷ Unaffected by the Cartesian influences that led to empiricism and intellectualism, thinkers such as Suhrawardi, Ibn ‘Arabi, and Mulla Sadra avoided

³³ The Neoplatonic treatise on negative theology, *Theologia Mystica*, attributed to Dionysius the Areopagite, influenced both the mystical theology of Hesychasm in Christianity and the doctrines of Sufism. For more, see *The Mystical Theology*, in *Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works*, trans. Colm Lubheid (New York: Paulist Press, 1987), pp. 133–142.

For more on Hesychastic mystical theology, see Vladimir Lossky, *The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church* (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1992).

For more on the influence of Dionysius the Areopagite on Dhu ‘l-Nun, the teacher of Bestami, who is the leading proponent of negative theology in Sufism, see Reynold Alleyne Nicholson, *The Mystics of Islam* (London, G. Bell and Sons, 1914), p. 9.

³⁴ Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “The Qur’ān and Hadīth as Source and Inspiration of Islamic Philosophy”, in Nasr Leaman, op. cit., 1996, Vol. 1, pp. 27–39.

³⁵ For more on cultural structuring of cognitive schemas, see:

Richard Shweder, *Thinking through Cultures. Expeditions in Cultural Psychology* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991).

Michael Cole, *Cultural Psychology: A Once and Future Discipline* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1996).

For more on cultural formations of the self, see Cushman, op. cit., 1995.

For more on categorization with regard to the study of religion, see Abdolkarim Souroush, Lecture Delivered at McGill University, Institute of Islamic Studies, 13 April 1995 and published in *Liberal Islam, a sourcebook*, ed. Charles Kurzman, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 244–251 (1). Souroush says: “The science of nature is a human endeavor to understand the nature, and the science of religion is a human endeavor to understand religion. All understanding assumes suppositions and entails ‘categorization,’ that is subsuming the particular under universal categories and concepts. Understanding religion is no exception. It is preceded by certain assumptions and principles which are necessary conditions for its intelligibility and interpretation.”

³⁶ For more on Islamic elements as part of Muslim philosophers’ psychological constitution, see Marc H. Applebaum, “A Phenomenological Psychological Study of the Muslim Leaders’ Attitudes Toward Connection with the Prophet Muhammad” (PhD dissertation, Saybrook Graduate School, 2009).

³⁷ Al-Attas, op. cit., 1990.

For more on direct intuition in Islamic epistemology, see Yazdi, op. cit., 1992.

the false dichotomy between reason and intuition, as well as what amounts to a divide between ontology and epistemology in Western thinking.³⁸ The validity of intuition as a means to knowledge was established by Qur'anic revelation long before Western phenomenology acknowledged its cognitive value. Reliance on knowledge by presence in the formation of ontological insight, therefore, is both typical for Islam, and is informed by concepts of Islamic revelation.

However, the Qur'an is believed to be a sealed book, in that the deepest understanding of the recorded revelation remains hidden. The levels of understanding that are available are premised on the idea of a primordial covenant between God and the human soul. The soul's existence is conditioned on her acknowledgement of relationship of lordship and servanthood, wherein the self-subsistent God commands the soul to be. Faith in this revelation rests on inner vision (*imān* in Arabic), and resolves into a direct, unmediated knowledge of God.³⁹ However, from the phenomenological perspective, consciousness maintaining such a notion of covenant is limited in its possibility to intuit a totally unqualified Real (cf. the Kantian thesis of transcendence). This intuitive knowledge is contingent on a presupposition that can never be discarded as long as that consciousness continues to be. Therefore, the functioning of the direct intuition is constrained with regard to any possibility of broader ontological insight.

By contrast, the constitutive influences of Western culture open the possibility of transcendental in many ways, and either theistic or non-theistic philosophizing. There is a spectrum of possibilities between the two, and the starting platforms do not define the theistic or non-theistic nature of conclusions. Especially in phenomenology, because of its pre-predicative focus and fidelity to human experience, the initial rational motives of a philosopher's individual faith have to be bracketed out. In the search for truth, "... a knowing that does not know any revelation or that does not recognize it as an already given fact (even to transform it later in a cognitive manner) is a-theistic. ... [I]f such knowledge should lead to God, this way would be an atheistic way [of coming to God]".⁴⁰ The process remains inspired by an open-ended faith, as opposed to a creed. This inspiration opens horizons of pre-reflective experience, whereby the non-theistic philosophizing discovers the implicit, constitutive religious presence:

Consciousness is immediately aware of the fact that there is a transcendent, absolute being; this is inscribed in consciousness itself. Consciousness knows this and this particular

³⁸ Ingles, op. cit., 2002.

³⁹ For more on faith in Islam, see James Hastings and John Selbie, *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, vol.10 (Whitefish, MT: Kessinger Publishing, 2003) 700. Original work published in 1908.

For more on knowledge of God in Islam, see:

Reza Shah-Kazemi, "The Notion and Significance of Ma'rifa in Sufism," *Journal of Islamic Studies*; 13:2 (May 2002), p. 155.

William C. Chittick, *The Sufi Path of Knowledge: Ibn al-'Arabi's Metaphysics of Imagination* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1989).

⁴⁰ Angela Ales Bello, *The Divine in Husserl and Other Explorations*, *Analecta Husserliana* 98 (2009), p. 14.

consciousness is religious insofar as the awareness is an awareness of the presence of God, which is simultaneously not reducible to consciousness itself.⁴¹

These “intuitional manifestations” make a foundation for the subsequent theoretical thought. Tymieniecka refers to this level of insight as one’s own logocentric manifestation from which one draws certainty regarding the sentience of Logos in all manifestations of life, which in turn nourishes a consecutive formulation of the process-oriented phenomenological ontology.⁴² Without this gestalt, being and existences would remain as two separate ontological principles, and there would be a need to posit an ideal metaphysical ground that must be more real than the allegedly semi-real manifestation. Therefore, the difference in gnoseological method, specifically, the presence or absence of epoché, is a cornerstone of the distinctions between the two systems.

Tymieniecka accomplishes with regard to being what Merleau-Ponty accomplishes with regard to knowing: a complete epoché of the preceding theory-laden approaches.⁴³ Even though the analytic styles of the two philosophers are very different, examination and suspension of theory-laden reflective thought, especially the targeted examination of one’s ontological assumptions, create a clearing where the philosophers can carry on their investigations. In the *Phenomenology of Life*, both the creative activity of life and the deep structures of its Logos are available for direct apperception as a result of this epoché. In other words, presuppositionlessness creates a space for the self-disclosure of the Real.

In comparing Tymieniecka’s ontology with Islamic metaphysics, this section has described two situations, one in which the flow of consciousness induces pre-reflective intuitions that become the foundation for metaphysical thought, and another in which ontological consciousness is guided by a previously fixed agenda.⁴⁴ The following sections will examine in more detail the phenomenological

⁴¹ Ales Bello, op. cit., 2009, p. 66.

⁴² For a further discussion of one’s own logocentric manifestation, see Olga Louchakova-Schwartz, op. cit., 2013.

⁴³ For Merleau-Ponty’s critique of empiricism and intellectualist assumptions regarding perception, see Merleau-Ponty, op. cit., 1962.;

For more on the suspension of presuppositions in Merleau-Ponty’s ontology, see Martin C. Dillon, *Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology*, (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1988).

For one criticism of preceding philosophical ontologies, see Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, “Inaugural lecture: Ontopoietic ciphering and existential vision of reality”, *Does the world exist: Plurisignificant ciphering of reality*, ed. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, *Analecta Husserliana* 100:79 (2004), pp. xiii-xxx. However, discussions of preceding ontologies occur throughout Tymieniecka’s writings. For summary, see Nancy Madras, “Creative Imagination—The Primogenital Force of Human Life: Following Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka’s Thread from the Elemental Stirrings to Human Fulfillment”, in *Imaginatio Creatrix: The Pivotal Force of the Genesis/Ontopoiesis of Human Life and Reality*, Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (ed.), *Analecta Husserliana* 100:83 (2004), pp. xxi-xli.

⁴⁴ For a discussion of Husserl’s analysis of these two types of situations, see Ales Bello, op. cit., 2004, pp. 65–79.

structure of metaphysical insight in Sufi metaphysics and in the Phenomenology of Life.

Ontological Intuition and Sentience

It has been said that Tymieniecka begins her analysis with the world. William Chittick has contrasted this with the primary moment of Islamic philosophy, revelation.⁴⁵ However, structural analysis of the two systems shows that place of the world in Tymieniecka's philosophy, and the place of revelation in Islamic metaphysics are not the same, therefore, they can not be compared with regard to their function in the overall system. Tymieniecka does not, in fact, begin with the world; she only uses the world as a phenomenological field of life in which she situates her intuition at the beginning of the cycles of interrogation.⁴⁶ The interrogation itself, as is the case with Tymieniecka's great counterparts in phenomenological ontology, Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, begins with the epoché. The understanding of limitations in preceding philosophy leads her to reformulate the whole philosophical apparatus with the central move of putting life in the center of interrogation. The world is a display of life, whence, Tymieniecka analyses the world. Therefore, in Tymieniecka's philosophy, it is the position of the philosophical-phenomenological epoché, and not the analysis of the world, that corresponds structurally to the role of revelation in Islam.

In order to attain her focus on the world, Tymieniecka uses the clearing created by epoché to establish a link between her intuition and the Logos of Life.⁴⁷ The philosopher's soul functions as a lens through which the logico structures of the world are seen according to the principle "as within, so without."⁴⁸ As the sentience of the Logos is also discovered to be a part of this inner logico manifestation, interrogation connects to the sentience of the Logos as its guiding thread. In the clearing created by phenomenological epoché, the mind of the philosopher and the Logos of Life are dialogically connected, and the sequences of interrogation both are *initiated* by the self-articulating impulse of the Logos, and *are* the Logos. Thus, the impetus of interrogation is not so different from the intention of the original covenant between the soul and God in Islam; each is a logico imperative. However, since this imperative is not ontologically presupposed in the Phenomenology of

⁴⁵ Chittick, op. cit., 2006.

⁴⁶ For the comparison of the self and the world as the primary ground of phenomenological interrogation, see Olga Louchakova-Schwartz, "Self and World: Vedanta, Sufism, and Presocratics in Phenomenological View" to appear in *Analecta Husserliana (a)*.

⁴⁷ For more detailed analysis, see Olga Louchakova-Schwartz, op. cit., 2013.

⁴⁸ For more on the structures of the world inside the self, see Olga Louchakova-Schwartz, op. cit., to appear (*a*).

Life, but is expressed in the *de facto* relationship in interrogation, it places no limitations on the enquiry.

Freeing the mind from the preceding philosophical perspectives in order to regain access to pre-reflective facts of life in Tymieniecka's philosophizing is comparable to the process of internal purification of the spiritual heart in Islamic gnosis. As Ibn 'Arabi describes in *Fusus al-Hikam*, God created the world in order to see his own essence reflected in it. However, initially, the world was like an unpolished mirror. Adam, the *anthropos*, became the "light itself of the mirror and the spirit of this form [of the world]."⁴⁹ The spiritual heart (the phenomenological core of one's consciousness) is the junction between the human and divine self-awareness, where the light of knowledge illumines the form of the world. The heart also contains its own reflection of the world as *alam al khayal* (the 'Imaginal World', Arabic). Polishing of the mirror of the heart through the process of internal practice and correct ethical choices is necessary in order for God to see His own essence (or essences). These essences are grasped by the awareness which al-Attas calls the Intuition of Existence.⁵⁰

The corresponding aspect of direct intuition in Tymieniecka's approach can be referred to as "ontological intuition".⁵¹ As an aspect of overall phenomenological direct intuition, this kind of intuition is directed at the "*immediate, direct evidence* which lies at the roots of all human experience: direct evidence accompanying states of affairs, objective formation by the mind, emotional complexes, intentional acts. . .".⁵² The ontological intuition is specific with regard to the spectrum of the direct evidence that it selects out of all possibilities of consciousness. It chooses the horizon in which it operates, beingness, because the goal of this intuition is to support the "reflection that underlies . . . all the major phenomenological attempts at grasping the great conundrum of beingness".⁵³ The direct evidence corresponding to ontological intuition involves both modes that correspond to physical realities and "modes in which transcendencies are made known other than the constituting of physical realities as unities of harmonious appearances. . .".⁵⁴ In other words,

⁴⁹ For more on the metaphysics of the mirror of the heart, see Muhyiddin Ibn 'Arabi, "Of the Divine Wisdom in the Word of Adam" in *Fusus al-Hikam*, chapter 1, Ibn 'Arabi, op. cit., 1975, pp. 1–7.

⁵⁰ Al-Attas, op. cit., 1990.

⁵¹ The term was introduced, and the spontaneously rising ontological intuition was first reported with regard to the experience of people with spiritual emergence. For more, see Olga Louchakova, "Ontopoiesis and Spiritual Emergence: Bridging Tymieniecka's Phenomenology of Life and Transpersonal Psychology", in *Phenomenology of Life—From the Animal Soul to the Human Mind*, Book II of *The Human Soul in the Creative Transformation of the Mind*, Analecta Husserliana 100:94 (2007), pp. 43–68.

⁵² Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, "The Theme," in *Phenomenology of Life and the Human Creative Condition*, Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana C100:52 (1998): 52, p. xii.

⁵³ Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, op. cit., 2004, p. xiv.

⁵⁴ Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy*, Book 1, trans. Fred Kersten, (Dordrecht: Kluwer 1976), p. 117.

ontological intuition takes into its horizon both the realities of the world, and intra-subjective clusters of phenomena united by a particular mode of transcendence in self-awareness.

Sentience is grasped by intuition in this pre-reflective evidence. Tymieniecka's account of sentience is very laconic, possibly, due to lack of terms for the description of the modes of transcendence which defy the usual subject-object dichotomizing.⁵⁵ I will attempt to replenish her evidence of sentience by the data of my own psychological phenomenological study. Sentience can be described as an essence of the perceived-perceiving field. Along with qualities of awareness and/or aliveness, it also has a quality of sacredness.⁵⁶ One experiences sentience as pre-reflective and pre-suppositionless, as it has a paradoxical nature of appearing simultaneously as the subjective, as belonging to the phenomenal field, and as uniting the two fields. Sentience is not divisible per se; it only appears divided into aspects such as pure awareness, knowing, the known, existence, or fullness/sacredness by the superimposition of language and discursive thinking.⁵⁷ There are two features in the direct apperception of sentience which make it difficult to explicate it: firstly, sentience is both the substance and the source of all apperception; secondly, the gestalt of sentience is nearly instantly veiled by reflective higher-order thoughts. However, some people, especially Buddhist practitioners, can experience the gestalt of pure sentience for prolonged periods of time, in spirituality-related experiences. In the oral tradition of Buddhism, sentience is referred to as the "intrinsic radiance of all phenomena".⁵⁸ Tymieniecka describes the horizon of sentience as an "All-Surpassing sphere of fullness . . . where we seek a divine instance as our own measure, as it is circumscribed by the logos of life."⁵⁹ This sphere of fullness is, at the same time, a pre-reflective ground which is not optional, but constitutive for a religious/spiritual experience.⁶⁰

Sentience is also a dynamic principle, and a birthing ground for all kinds of transcendencies. As a pre-reflective ground, it is invisible in the natural attitude untouched by epoché. However, its direct self-apperception is available in the

⁵⁵ For more on the use of language in description of the realities of the sacred, see Michael Sells, *Mystical Languages of Unsaying*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

⁵⁶ Louchakova, op. cit., 2007.

⁵⁷ There is a detailed analysis of how sentience-awareness appears divided in the Indian philosophy of Advaita Vedanta; see the Mandukya Upanishad, Swami Gambhirananda (trans.), Vedanta Press; Advaita Makaranda, Ann Berliner (translation and commentary) (Bombay, India: Asia Publishing House, 1990).

In Western philosophy, Merleau-Ponty performed a similar analysis of the fragmentation of a unified percept into aspects due to the superimposition of theory-laden thinking; see Merleau-Ponty, op. cit., 1962.

⁵⁸ Sylvia Gretchen, Dean of Tibetan Nyingma Institute, Berkeley, personal communication at the Buddhist Nyingma retreat (November, 2010).

⁵⁹ Tymieniecka, op. cit., 2009, p. 253.

⁶⁰ Ales Bello, op. cit., 2004.

human condition, and appears as a part of the onto-poietic design of the Logos highlighted in cognitive activities of the soul. The moments of sentience emerge out of anonymity due to inwardly directed-awareness.⁶¹ Besides touching on the sacred, the intuition of those moments touches also on reality, truth, the origin of things, the emergence and development of life's manifestations, as well as contributing to the formation of one's understanding of principle of autonomy and self-subsistency, and to one's conceptualization of God.⁶² This complex field of sentience is at the core of Tymieniecka's philosophizing; the fullness of spirit associated with religious experiences in the human condition is, in fact, the same phenomenological reality. By highlighting the notion of sentience as a defining feature of the Logos of Life, and as a guiding principle for her phenomenological system, Tymieniecka reintegrates sacredness into Western philosophy.⁶³

Ontological intuition, emerging through reading Tymieniecka's philosophy, leads one to understand how pervasive sentience is in life; one can follow sentience as a guiding thread throughout Tymieniecka's discovery of the Logos of Life. However, Tymieniecka does not always invite the reader to witness the process of her realizations, but offers mainly a concluding gestalt.⁶⁴ This is the case with the category of sentience, which Tymieniecka does not completely spell out in her writings; this has led to much discussion. To clarify the notion further, I will make a connection that is not immediately evident, between the gestalt of sentience in Tymieniecka's thought and the category of sentience in experience-based metaphysical religious philosophies. Tymieniecka maintains that sentience is the main feature of life and the essence of the Logos of Life. In this, her view resonates with the metaphysical perspectives of many spiritual philosophies. For example, in Vedanta, the nature of Ultimate Reality is defined as *sat-cit-ānanda*, 'truth/being-awareness/sentience-fullness' (Sanskrit).⁶⁵ In Buddhism, the absolute *Bodhicitta* is both enlightened compassion and enlightened pure awareness, i.e., aspects of sentience. The name of God *al-Haqq* in Sufism is 'Truth', 'Reality' (Arabic), but at the same time it points out to a principle related to knowing, that is an aspect of

⁶¹ Olga Louchakova, "Ontopoiesis and Union in the Prayer of the Heart: Contributions to Psychotherapy and Learning", *Logos of Phenomenology and Phenomenology of the Logos*, Book 4 of *The Logos of Scientific Interrogation. Participating in Nature—Life- Sharing in Life*, Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (ed.), *Analecta Husserliana* 100:91 (2006), pp. 289–311.

⁶² For more on the potentialities of ontological intuition in spiritual emergence, see Louchakova, *op. cit.*, 2007.

⁶³ Corbin refers to the loss of the sacred as one of the main problems of Western philosophy; see Corbin, *op. cit.*, 1981.

⁶⁴ For more on Tymieniecka's presentation of her methodology, see Louchakova-Schwartz, *op. cit.*, 2013.

⁶⁵ The exact translation of Sanskrit *ananda* is 'bliss'. However, oral tradition always refers to *ananta ananda*, which is limitless bliss or fullness. I use it this term the translation of definition as it is closer to a phenomenological referent implied in this definition than bliss.

sentience.⁶⁶ All of these terms point out to a certain perceptual field. As of both the above analysis of people's reports, and of the analysis of texts, sentience is not divisible *per se*; it is only divided into aspects such as pure awareness, knowing, the known, existence, or fullness/sacredness by the superimposition of language and discursive thinking.⁶⁷

In Tymienieckian contexts the notion of sentience appears to be similar to the one in the present analysis. Again, she only points to it.⁶⁸ In the *Phenomenology of Life*, a detailed egological analysis isolated from the larger field of life would be of a limited cognitive value; it is only in the context of observations of the whole field of life that the egological gestalt acquires its true meaning. Sentience is to life what wetness is to water: the former can not be separated from the latter. Sentience always *is*, and thus, Tymieniecka can maintain that life is its own metaphysical ground; there is no ideal essence, or substance of any kind that can be posited as separate from life. As the essence of perception, sentience is the phenomenological core of reason, intelligence and all knowing. Therefore, it is also the essence of the Logos of Life. As a logocic principle, it is not a thing, but a process: its existence is in relationship, and in the unfolding of the onto-poietic schema of the Logos. In short, sentience, which always contains a possibility to know or posit something, *IS* the dynamic of the Logos.

Tymieniecka's *Logos* is grammatically a noun, but its phenomenology is that of a process. The Logos signifies the logistics of unfolding of life, and aspects such as measure and proportion, sequencing and direction of becoming. As a signifier for a process, *logos* is semiotically a verb. Refocusing from things to processes is an important feature of Tymieniecka's approach, in which she breaks through the habitual tendencies of the mind which lead to a *cul-de-sac* of objectification in metaphysics. Tymieniecka observes that the mind tends not only to focus on what is static, but also to create an impression that things actually are static:

Given the spontaneous tendency of the speculative mind to seek a point of vantage from which the all-embracing intuition could be obtained, the cognitive mode of the mind is led to focus on the static, stationary circuits of the artifacts of the lifeworld that the human mind itself establishes.⁶⁹

⁶⁶ For instance, it is described so by Ibn 'Arabi: "God [*al-Haqq*] wanted to see the essence [*al-a'yan*] of His most perfect Names [*al-asmā al-husnā*]. . .", Ibn 'Arabi, op. cit., 1975, p. 8.

⁶⁷ There is a detailed analysis of how sentience-awareness appears divided in the Indian philosophy of Advaita Vedanta; see the *Mandukya Upanishad*, Swami Gambhirananda (trans.), Vedanta Press; Advaita Makaranda, Ann Berliner (translation and commentary) (Bombay, India: Asia Publishing House, 1990).

In Western philosophy, Merleau-Ponty performed a similar analysis of the fragmentation of a unified percept into aspects due to the superimposition of theory-laden thinking; see Merleau-Ponty, op. cit., 1962.

⁶⁸ This is a part of her method. For more on Tymieniecka's method, see Louchakova-Schwartz, op. cit., 2013.

⁶⁹ Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, Book 4 of the *Impetus and Equipoise in the Life-Strategies of Reason. Logos and Life, Analecta Husserliana C:70* (2000), p. 22.

When this cognitive mode is bracketed out, Life and Logos appear not as static principles, but as processes. Therefore, Tymieniecka avoids objectification in her language; for example, she does not say being, but introduces the term beingness. Epoché and the resulting presuppositionlessness enable her to bracket out the static interpretive framework of philosophical terminology and to focus on the dynamisms of life. Thus, the sentience of the Logos of Life refers to a moment that is in itself dynamic, paradoxically combining the qualities of being an object of perception. It is a process, like the flow of a river, or a combination of a process and an object, like an electron being both a particle and a wave.

Tymieniecka's insight into the dynamic singularity of the Logos of Life, and her focus on transformation, development and emergence, are rooted in the specific positioning of her direct intuition towards the phenomenological referents of transformation, development, emergence, and the like. She sees the Real not through a series of snapshots but through the awareness of continuous transformations (like bread being baked). This repositioning of the direct intuition leads Tymieniecka to many phenomenological discoveries, including her view of onto-poietic time as a self-articulation of the Logos.⁷⁰ Tymieniecka's analysis shows that the sequences of insights and the focus of attention in interrogation is governed by the internal, implicit logistics of the process. This is not a logic of the reason, but a logistics of measure, proportion, and flow of logoic onto-poietic manifestations. In other words, interrogation means following this flow, in dialogue with the Logos itself. Along the lines of this understanding, the notions of consciousness and beingness are the ciphers of one unified phenomenon of life. Life's sentience radiates as a number of rationalities such as intelligence, apperception, or awareness, which function in relation to other virtualities and rationalities and to one another. The sentience is embedded both in the subject and in the object, and is on both ends and at the core of any intentional consciousness, including the apperception of the real. Tymieniecka says:

... [S]entience is the conductor of the unfolding of the sacred thread of the logos in its progressive revelation. Sentience leads the constructive forces of life ... culminating in human experience—in beauty, love of the other, sacrality. It reacts to the experience in the ex-stasis of life in the Divine Fullness.⁷¹

Let us again reengage this analysis with the Islamic discourse. It is obvious that the same pre-reflective substratum of sentience can be tracked in the Sufi intuition of existence, which happens through the mediacy of *shuhūd* ('spiritual witnessing', Arabic), or *dhawq* ('tasting through the heart' Arabic), or both.⁷² As a pre-reflective intuitional manifestation, this intuition feeds theoretical thought. Thought objectifies

⁷⁰ Kathleen Haney, "The Ontopoietic Timing of Life versus the Kairic Unfolding of the Trans-Natural Destiny (A.-T. Tymieniecka)", in *Timing and Temporality in Islamic Philosophy and Phenomenology of Life*, Islamic Philosophy and Occidental Phenomenology in Dialogue, V. 3, Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (ed.) (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), pp. 285–294.

⁷¹ Tymieniecka, op. cit., 2009, p. 99.

⁷² Al-Attas, op. cit., 1990, p. 29.

its pre-reflective referent, and can be abstracted from the actuality of the intuitional, embodied meaning of the spiritual moment. When thought acquires a life of its own, it draws attention away from the actual experience. Then the subtle individuations of sentience again sink into anonymity and become invisible in experience. New intuitions do not occur because attention does not deepen, and the introspection—the inward turn of awareness—does not take place. If thinking has been crystallized as a religious dogma, it becomes detrimental to the moments of transcendence; rigid presuppositions, superimposed on the direct intuition and sentience, silence their gentle whisper.

Intuition-based phenomenological tracking of the unfolding manifestations of sentience is an opposite of the mental position of objectification. Sentience, tracked as a dynamic reality, unfolds into different aspects, such as beingness and/or intelligence. When the reflexive thought captures the virtualities growing out of sentience in its aspect of beingness, and the rationalities emerging out of its aspect of intelligence, it formulates the notion of dynamic evolving unity, the ontopoietic logos. This tracking of sentience in life leads Tymieniecka's philosophical reflection to formulate an original understanding of truth. The overall certainty of truth is formed not through any single experience of God but through systematically and persistently following the life of the logoic sentience, that is, through the totality of the perceptual possibilities and ontological intuitions available in the human condition. As opposed to *faith-based* certainty in Islamic metaphysics, intuiting the dynamic sentient multiplicity of phenomena feeds the ongoing *direct perception* of the certainty of truth.⁷³ This canvas of life in Tymieniecka's thought unfolds against the background of the intuited unity of life. The numerous virtualities of life and rationalities of Logos bask in this indivisible dynamic unity, where every step is conceived within the preceding steps, and is connected by myriad potentialities with the sentient whole.

The ontological intuition grasps the ongoing ontopoietic emergence of sentience, both at the core of one's religious perception, and in the larger field of life. The dynamic nature of the sentience, uncovered in its preconceptual givenness, serves as a foundation for Tymieniecka's integral process ontology.⁷⁴ If one focuses on the process of emergence, rather than on static sequential moments, the arguments about the nature of the Ultimate Reality do not arise; life's sacredness is the perennial metaphysical reality. On the contrary, an incorrectly positioned perception, or objectifying thinking, construct the static categories of metaphysics which never fully work. The beingness does not have any isolated phenomenological

⁷³ For more on the notion of certainty in Islam, see Abu Bakr Siraj ad-Din, *The Book of Certainty: The Sufi Doctrine of Faith, Vision and Gnosis*, trans. Martin Lings, (Cambridge, UK: Islamic Texts Society, 1996);

For a description of this particular type of intuition coming from extinction in God, see Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas, *Prolegomena to the Metaphysics of Islām* (Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization, 1995), pp. 177–216.

⁷⁴ I suggest the term *integral process ontology* to differentiate Tymieniecka's process-oriented ontology from Whitehead's process theism.

referent that can be captured by a static focus, as opposed to the pure being which appears to be simply constructed by the above-mentioned objectification. When Ultimate Reality is derived from erroneously intuited, artificially static pre-reflective data, and is then treated by objectifying thinking, it turns into an epiphenomenal construction, and the whole process of theological or ontological enquiry devolves into a thought chasing its own tail. From the process-oriented perspective, the metaphysical oppositions between materialism and idealism, between essence and existence, arise from such erroneous perceptions; they are perpetuated by analysis that focuses on static categories and objectifies the fleeting moments of life.

In contrast, Tymieniecka's intuition captures the process of the constant unfolding of the field of life, its poiesis and its flow. In process-oriented phenomenology, she has developed a proper philosophical procedure capable of resolving gnoseological conflicts. In this procedure, one focuses on the dynamisms and interrelatedness of virtual moments of beingness that shape the whole of life.⁷⁵ In order to capture the inherent unity of life, one must stay in the horizon of developing sentience; that unfolding sentience is life's growth cone and onto-poietic front. This is the clearing in which newly born virtualities and rationalities are visible.⁷⁶ Because Tymieniecka's ontology is oriented towards processes; it is an integral ontology that manages to capture the whole field of *what is*, liberating ontology from internal contradictions.

Static Versus Ontopoietic Oneness

Through the focus on poiesis and flow, Tymieniecka's metaphysic posits a complete unity of life, its identity with what is real, and the full availability of this unity to the process-oriented ontological intuition. This situation, where apperception of unity is fully available as soon as the process-orientation of intuition is understood, is different from the understanding of unity in the Sufi doctrine. In the latter, the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic influences, which became amalgamated with the original Qur'anic message, create a logical gap between the creation and the transcendent God:

The Qur'anic God was linked to his creation by the sheer power of creativity, the Aristotelian God was linked—much less feelingly—with that which moved, while the Neoplatonic God bridged, or attempted to bridge, the huge gulf between transcendence and corporeal reality by the device of emanation.⁷⁷

⁷⁵ For more on the interrelatedness of instances of individualizing life with all life, see Tymieniecka, op. cit., 2009.

⁷⁶ For an experience-based description of the process of this deployment as seen by people in the process of spiritual emergence, see Olga Louchakova, op. cit., 2007.

⁷⁷ Netton, op. cit., 1998.

In Sufism, metaphysical vision must be supported by the direct intuition in actual practice. As al-Attas puts it:

Metaphysics as we understand it is a science of Being involving not only contemplation and intellectual reflection, but it is based on knowledge gained through practical devotion to that Being Whom we contemplate and sincerely serve in true submission according to a clearly defined system of Revealed Law.⁷⁸

Through states of expanded awareness (states, *hal*, Arabic) and stable changes in Sufi personality (stations, *makam*, Arabic), practice brings a Sufi to the gestalt of the Ultimate Reality. The concept of the stations can be traced back to the Neoplatonic concept of emanations. This integration of the experience of the Ultimate, transcendent Reality with the actual experience of living has been of major importance in the development of Sufi thought. In the doctrine of *wahdat al-wujud* ('Unicity of Being', Arabic) of Ibn 'Arabi, the concept of God is radically monotheistic, however, it is not the linear logic, but the paradoxes and hermeneutics of understanding and perception that link the idea of transcendent unity with the impressions gained through internal practice.⁷⁹ Affirming this doctrine, practice unity has become especially important in the relativity-infused cultural climate of postmodernism, where Ibn 'Arabi's teachings enjoy growing popularity among modern Sufis. As described by Corbin, Ibn 'Arabi reconciles the multiplicity of existences with the oneness of being through paradoxes:

One ... needs to consider the relationship between *being* and *existent being*. We shall advance two hypotheses: does the One absolutely One transcend being itself? Or is it concomitant with Being, of the "Act-to be" that transcends existent beings? ... The word One does not name what it is but is the symbol of the absolutely Ineffable. The one is not One. It does not possess the attribute One. It is essentially unificent [*unifique*], unifying, constitutive of all the Ones, of all the beings that can only be existents by being each time an existent, i.e. unified [made one], constituted in unities precisely by the unifying One. ... In Ibn Arabi's school of thought, harmony is achieved by the confrontation between monotheism of the naïve or dogmatic consciousness and theomonism of the esoteric consciousness; in short the acceptance of the exoteric or theological *tawhid* (*tawhid wujudî*). This is precisely the form that the paradox of the One and the Many takes in Islamic theosophy.⁸⁰

Interestingly, in this description there is a hint towards the process-orientated unification, (as in "Act to be" which transcends the existent beings), however, this never receives its full doctrinal development. In fact, the doctrine always contains the paradox of one and many, there is no final unification outside of this paradox. The personal understanding of unity along these lines is necessarily connected with the state of non-ordinary perception known as the final unveiling.⁸¹ As al-Attas describes it:

⁷⁸ Al-Attas, op. cit., 1990, p. 26.

⁷⁹ For an example of such a hermeneutics, see Ibn 'Arabi, *The Tarjumán al-Ashwâq*, trans. Reynold Nicholson (London: Theosophical Publishing House, reprint of 1911 edition, 1978).

⁸⁰ Corbin, op. cit., 1976.

⁸¹ Al-Attas, op. cit., 1990.

In the final 'unveiling', he 'witnesses' the single, unified Reality again taking the myriad forms of the phenomenal world without Itself becoming multiple. He sees with a spiritual vision the Unity individuating Itself into Multiplicity without impairing Its original Unity, and yet 'connecting' or 'relating' the Multiplicity with Itself in such wise that, although the Unity takes on the forms of Multiplicity, It still distinguishes itself from the latter and remains always in Its original nature. In other words, he sees the inner articulations of the Unity, in which Unity is neither joined to nor separate from the Multiplicity, and which goes on in continuous operation. This continuous operation of Unity articulating itself into Multiplicity and back again into Unity as witnessed by the spiritual adept is called the 'gathering of gathering' (*jam' al-jam'*)...⁸²

Taken in themselves, in isolation from ordinary perception, these experiences are in contrast with the rest of human life. Therefore, the concept of God, who is the only self-subsistent Reality and the principle of principles which logically can not change, creates an opposition to the experience of God which is fluctuating. To maintain fidelity to the uncompromising monotheism of Qur'anic revelation, the states of unveiling have to be conceptually unified with the states where God is veiled. The doctrine must bridge gaps in experience until experience catches up with doctrine. Therefore, the notion of a static metaphysical unity has to have as its correlate a notion of the nonreality, or degrees of reality of the empirical world. Although the Neoplatonic concept of emanations is absent from the Qur'an,⁸³ Islamic mysticism has some semblance of it in the idea of the scale of perceptions, or stations (as above), that bring a Sufi gnostic closer and closer to God.⁸⁴ Therefore, the states of unveiling are glimpses of more real levels of reality that shine through ruptures in the less real levels of reality. However, the individual perception can never be fully trusted in terms of being an instrument of knowledge, because the current station of the gnostic may not be that of the full unveiling of the Reality of God.

Ibn 'Arabi resolves the tension between the transcendent oneness of being and experiential multiplicity of existences through the dialectics of opposites on the spectrum of consciousness. In this spectrum, one polarity is human identity, and the other is God's identity, and a man must be 'removed from himself' by Divine will to know the Real.⁸⁵ In this extinction of illusory separateness, and the extinction of the illusory act of extinction, the self-subsistent Absolute/God is the only one remaining. This relationship or self-subsistency of God, and conditioned nature of manifestation are contained by the ethics of lordship/servanthood between the Absolute and its derivative, the human soul with no being of its own. The absolute unity of God is established in the dynamic dialogical cycles between the two. These

⁸² Al-Attas, op. cit., 1995.

⁸³ Corbin, op. cit., 1976.

⁸⁴ James Morris, "The Sage and the Young Disciple. Revisiting religious Shi'ism and Early Sufism: the fourth/Tenth Century Dialogue of 'the Sage and the Young Disciple'. Reason and Inspiration in Islam," ed. Todd Lawson, (London: Tauris and Co, 2005), p. 110.

⁸⁵ For an example of hermeneutics emerging out of the fluctuating states of perception, see Ibn 'Arabi, *The Tarjumán al-Ashwáq*, trans. Reynold Nicholson, (London: Theosophical Publishing House, reprint of 1911 edition, 1978).

cycles of gnosis engage the two polarities, the soul that is gradually acquiring direct knowledge of God that confirms and transcends its original conceptual knowledge, and God (Reality), who manifests knowledge of Itself through Its activities of self-disclosure within the human soul. Eventually, the gnostic:

... knows what he has 'witnessed' was a 'fragment', so to speak, of the continuous series of self-determinations and particularizations of the absolute Unity. His remembrance, reflection and contemplation of that vision at this stage constitute that Knowledge in him whose reality and truth is established by the certainty of direct experience (*haqq al-yaqin*). ... "[W]itnessing' of it is temporary, but the subsequent knowledge of it is permanent ... for he now *knows* that the myriad forms that constitute the Multiplicity are in reality so many different aspects of 'the Truth' (*al-haqq*) Who 'clothes' Himself in their guises. ..."⁸⁶

In this process of maturing intuition, the prescribed exoteric forms of faith, *islam* and *iman*, progress towards an inner, esoteric form, *ihsan*, which is faith in God as if one sees Him.⁸⁷ Faith eventually advances to *ma'rifa* ('gnosis', Arabic), which transcends egoic ownership of knowledge and eventually becomes the condition of God's self-knowledge.

The final end and ultimate return of the gnostics ... is that the Real is identical with them, while they do not exist. ...⁸⁸

In other words, the states of experience are ontologically integrated only in the context of an overall developmental progression that includes various modes of cognition. When this is accomplished, "Man ... sees God everywhere in his spiritual vision, so that for him is realized the full meaning of the text: 'wheresoever you turn *there is an aspect of God*.'"⁸⁹

Throughout the history of Islam, great minds and outstanding mystics have tried to reconcile the tensions between the experientially recognized dynamic Unity within multiplicity and the static conceptual framework in a recorded monotheistic revelation. On the one hand, original revelation declares the ontological Unity, on the other hand, there is a framework based on static categories and objectifications, which has to be reconciled with experience. Even though Ibn 'Arabi's work diminished the prominence of this conceptual problem, Sufi God remains to be an Absolute Being, a sort of a global subject/substance. From my perspective, there remains a contradiction between the static concept of God and the dialectic of the perceptual process by which God is known. The ultimate unification of existences in being can not be attained in a theory of relative levels of reality, or experimentally, unless the metaphysics refocuses, as in the Phenomenology of Life, on the process.

⁸⁶ Al-Attas, op. cit., 1995, pp. 192–193.

⁸⁷ Hassan El-Najjar, "Three Levels of Faith: Islam, Iman, and Ihsan", Al-Jazeera, 2007. Available at <http://www.aljazeera.info/Islamic%20Editorials/2007/May/Three%20Levels%20of%20Faith%20Islam,%20Iman,%20and%20Ihsan%20By%20Hassan%20El-Najjar.htm>

⁸⁸ Reza Shah-Kazemi, op. cit., 2002, p. 63.

⁸⁹ Al-Attas, op. cit., 1995, p. 200. Quoted text is from Qur'an, al-Baqarah (2):115.

I believe that the static metaphysical categories can not convincingly support a monotheistic vision of reality. This discrepancy between life as given, and the metaphysical vision, and not the nearly proverbial conflict of civilizations, is what appears to propel young Muslim intellectuals to seek solutions in Western philosophies of reason.⁹⁰ But the solutions of traditional Western philosophy are yet another cul-de-sac; reason-based approaches cannot solve problems of a metaphysical nature, nor can empiricist perspectives. Western philosophy itself has long recognized this; the crises of reason precipitated the search for solutions in phenomenology. Tymieniecka's phenomenological orientation towards life, and the focus of her intuition on the dynamic and temporal moments, naturally solve the problems that emerged in the preceding enquiry.

Unified Intelligence, Reality and God

Albeit with controversies, Islam provided a vision of unified existence, which was a healthy alternative to postmodern trauma and fragmentation of the self. Perhaps, Tymieniecka's philosophy was inspired by the same sensibilities, and its solution for the problem of fragmented existence is a more consistent one.⁹¹ Before the Phenomenology of Life, Western philosophy not only separated one aspect of knowledge from the other, but viewed them as having different statuses in the hierarchy of approaches to truth. Rooted in Aristotelian categorizing, Western philosophy distinguished between the different mental categories, such as reason, emotional intelligence, intuition, logic etc. Human reason was differentiated from the divine reason, and the nature was devoid of intelligence altogether. As viewed by the seventeenth-century European Enlightenment, intelligence and reason are the discriminating faculties. In this intellectual climate, an idea of a unifying intelligence would be an oxymoron. Reflecting on the emergence of the new quality of knowledge in the current period that she calls the New Enlightenment, Tymieniecka developed a concept of unifying reason-Logos.

Logos in the New Enlightenment manifests in the increase of knowledge, especially scientific knowledge. Scientific knowledge changes humanity's knowledge of life and of itself. Scientific knowledge is not only reason-based; it incorporates many forms of intelligence. In the framework of the Phenomenology of Life, scientific knowledge is a manifestation of universal, unified intelligence,⁹²

⁹⁰ For more on the popularity of philosophies of reason among Muslim intellectuals, see Ali Paya and Mohammed Amin Ghaneirad, (2006). The Philosopher and the Revolutionary State: How Karl Popper's Ideas Shaped the Views of Iranian Intellectuals. *International Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, 20:2, pp. 185–213.

⁹¹ For more on Tymieniecka's thought in post-modernism, see Louchakova-Schwartz, op. cit., to appear in *ARACNE Sentieri Fenomenologici Bozze*, pp. 205–220.

⁹² For an example of the scientific study of multiple intelligences, see Swami V., Furnham A, Zilkha S. Estimates of self, parental, and partner multiple intelligence and their relationship with

which is the Logos of Life. Through science, Logos provides the new data regarding the structures and processes of life. With regard to being a source of a new kind of knowledge, one can compare the practice of science with the internal mystical practice in Sufism: both provide the new knowledge relevant to what is true and real. If a philosopher accepts this new testimony as a ground for her philosophizing, this causes re-visioning the concepts of the real and God.

While Islamic philosophy also incorporated the Peripatetic heritage, it developed its own alternative to Western analysis of mind in a notion of a unified faculty of heart-intellect.⁹³ The teachings of Suhrawardi, Mulla Sadra, Ibn 'Arabi, and their successors establish the inherent identity between the trans-egoic intelligence available to advanced gnostics, and God's, or Reality's, knowledge of Itself.⁹⁴ As I described in the preceding section, this intelligence is attained through the dialectic cycles of inner spiritual practice and understanding. Basing her conclusions on her own phenomenological analysis, Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka goes beyond the limits of these dialectics. First, she uncovers the unifying intelligence that is available experientially in a non-mystical state of mind. Second, she discovers that this intelligence is not of a human origin, but has a universal character; it is inherent not only to human consciousness, but to life at large. When, in the course of ontopoiesis of life, the human condition of life emerges, it brings this intelligence into focus, and serves as a locus of its self-articulation. The gestalt of this unifying intelligence is within the natural possibilities of human knowledge, and the awareness of such intelligence depends on the direct intuition, not on mystical perception. Finally, because this intelligence is expressing itself poetically, as life's measure, proportion, and ordering, it inherent at all life.

In the concept of unicity of being and the corresponding concept of the unicity of awareness, Islamic metaphysics point out to the cosmic unifying intelligence identical with Absolute Existence/Being. As opposed to logically conceived realities, this intelligence is discovered via a combined action of reason and intuition, which is the heart-intellect. However, the differences between the exoteric and esoteric understanding, and the problems in esotericism per se that I described in the previous section, lead to possibility of misinterpretations of such a unity. As Corbin indicates:

[J]ust as the exoteric level is constantly subject to the menace of metaphysical idolatry, so too the esoteric level is threatened by the danger that arises from a mistaken interpretation of the word being.⁹⁵

personality, values, and demographic variables: a study in Britain and France. *Spanish Journal of Psychology* 2009 Nov; 12(2):528–39.

⁹³ In Ismailism or in Ibn 'Arabi's hermeneutics, however, this unified reason is only available in potentiality, and is activated only in the upper stages of the gnostic's ascent, where the seeker's own identity is erased, and the Real, i.e., God-Intellect, is self-manifesting through the heart of the gnostic.

⁹⁴ Shah-Kazemi, op. cit., 2002.

⁹⁵ Corbin, op. cit., 1976.

Tymieniecka does not have to introduce an esoteric dimension to her philosophy because the contradictions between the reason and the intuition and the tensions between the stating being and dynamic beingness are resolved in her concept of onto-poietic Logos. Since the earlier thought could not possibly incorporate the data of modern sciences, and Tymieniecka can, this helps her to develop a full picture of this intelligence. The ‘unveiling’ of the Real takes place in the analysis of onto-poiesis with the inclusion of the data of sciences.

This fullness of understanding will also be connected with the Tymienieckian view of transcendence as a process which takes place in the course of life’s onto-poiesis, and remains within the logocic unity of life. The logical necessity of there being a transcendent source of everything finite is a cornerstone of most metaphysics.⁹⁶ However, this logical move is conditioned by its dependence on the presence of things to be transcended, that is, by the inherent dichotomy between the infinite and the finite. Like other religious philosophies, Islam tried to deal with this problem by introducing the notion of the degrees of reality. Tymieniecka avoids this fatal for metaphysics situation because her world does not consist of finite objectified existences; it consists of the onto-poietic virtualities of life and the rationalities of the unfolding Logos. Therefore, the logical necessity for a meta-physical principle beyond manifestation is obviated by Tymieniecka’s process orientation. It is only in the eternal unfolding of life that the notion of the real finds its real positioning in *beingness* and its consequent freedom from the logic-based fallacy. Life-intelligence is, *de facto*, a principle that extends beyond all particular instances of individuation, such as particular concepts of God. Tymieniecka differentiates this principle from the sacred in religious experience, and calls it *Logos*.

What is the givenness of the *Logos* for us, in the human condition of life? On one hand, Tymieniecka’s interrogation is both non-theistic, and phenomenologically the direct intuition-based; on the other hand, as Ales Bello demonstrates, any phenomenological direct intuition of an absolute being is inspired by faith.⁹⁷ The question arises, then, as to whether faith, and as to what kind of faith, is at the core of this apperception of the Logos. Psychologically, faith develops in conjunction with an idea of God, from formalized and objectified symbolic representations towards progressively more formless and immediate intuitions.⁹⁸ In the advanced forms of faith, the pre-reflective substratum of religious thinking is fully brought out of anonymity; acts of faith are open-ended, and are based not on a mere idea of God, but rather on a lived experience of God with connotations of certainty, reality and truth. This can be called either faith, or knowledge, or both in one.⁹⁹

It appears that it is due to this kind of mental environment created by the advanced open-ended faith, that Tymieniecka’s intuition acquires the qualities

⁹⁶ Netton, *op. cit.*, 1998.

⁹⁷ Alles Bello, *op. cit.*, 2009.

⁹⁸ Fowler, *op. cit.*, 1981.

⁹⁹ Shah-Kazemi, *op. cit.*, 2002.

essential for the act of discovery of the unifying Logos. It is because of this intuition that Tymieniecka's Logos-God does not have to be posited as an a priori principle; it is discovered early on in Tymieniecka's philosophizing, but as an a posteriori. In Tymieniecka's philosophy, this act is not postponed until perception catches up with metaphysically expressed recorded revelation, but begins from the very beginning with the intuition of Logos in Life, and remains pervasive throughout her whole discourse.

As distinct from the term "Logos", Tymieniecka uses the term "God" predominantly to address experiences which have the dimension of the sacred. Tymieniecka leaves unspecified whether these experiences support a polytheistic or a monotheistic understanding. This specification would be unnecessary because the intuition of the unifying intelligence in Tymieniecka's philosophy is not rooted in the experiences of polytheistic or monotheistic nature. The recognition of the unifying *Logos* happens, as I mentioned above, at the very beginning of Tymieniecka's interrogation, and the main body of her philosophy is dedicated to description and analysis of the process-structures of the already discovered principle of the Logos of Life. In separately standing experience, what is can appear fixed in its static givenness by the objectification of the noetic-noematic constitution of one's perception. In Tymieniecka's metaphysics the true knowledge of life is found outside of these perceptual boundaries. In order to obtain a full picture of reality:

[W]e have then to recognize not only the horizons of our cognitive performances . . . but also the horizons of the whole experience of living beingness and of all its vital functions.¹⁰⁰

God of religious experiences is only a part of life. What is embedded in and discovered through the intuition of the myriad of connections and interrelatednesses that shape life. Both Islamic metaphysics and Tymieniecka's metaphysics incorporate the data of religious experience, and the data of life larger than one single experience. However, for the Islamic metaphysics, life outside of religious experience is a life of veiled Reality, or the life of separation from reality. Unification of reality happens in the transcendence of life. For Tymieniecka, on the contrary, the intuited unification of life is what presupposes the possibility of metaphysical analysis. In Islam, the unity of awareness and being is given via religious experience, coming in increments.¹⁰¹ In Tymieniecka, the unity of knowledge and life are given both via religious experience, and life as a whole, in all cognitive modalities which pertain to life. This is especially evident when one considers life in its self-creative aspect. As Tymieniecka states, "In the ontopoietic perspective, life and consciousness are interchangeable."¹⁰²

Ontopoiesis is Tymieniecka's term for what she observes as a self-creative activity of life. This activity, by which life sustains itself, is logocentric (sentient and

¹⁰⁰ Tymieniecka, op. cit., 2009, p. 134.

¹⁰¹ Incremental revelation is reflected in Qur'an.

¹⁰² Tymieniecka, op. cit., 2009, p. 131.

orderly). It is also mediated by the work of *Imaginatio Creatrix*, a logoic force which ‘invents’ the new forms and contents of life. In ontopoiesis, life deploys the tandem of entelechial energies and the operative generational force.¹⁰³ The entelechial energies formulate future purposes and organize the field of life; the operative generational force fills in the actual contents.¹⁰⁴ Thus, the unification takes place at every moment of life, it is both a *modus vivendi* and a *modus operandi*. The human condition of life emerges in the sequence of ontopoietic stages as a novum, which is a radical shift in qualities of life, and in logoic imagination. The human soul is the center of unification, a cognitive condenser that distills ontological insights out of the matrix of life. The soul:

... works on and with all virtualities as a lens of life, offering the ground for their encounter and opening the space where it can intervene in those virtualities and transform them in particular ways.¹⁰⁵

The soul has an inward dimension, the center where, as Tymieniecka puts it, there is “the specific cognitive face of the process in which the objective content of the logos is formed.”¹⁰⁶ The religious experiences and/or experiences of self-knowledge in this center serve as a clearing in which one sees overt expressions of the tendencies of life, a sort of ontological blueprint of the universe.

In the human condition, the logoic aspect of *Imaginatio Creatrix* reveals its agency and expresses consciously its creative potentialities. This initiates the soul’s transcendence of the vital order of life and the development of spiritual and philosophical reflections. In the Logos-human dialectics of Tymieniecka’s philosophy, the human condition is both necessary in and subordinated to the logoic scheme of things. It is the apex of logoic individuation and the state where Logos accomplishes its reflective self-articulation.

In Tymieniecka, Logos is never veiled. In its complete identity with life, the Logos is totally available to the philosophical direct intuition. However, one needs to know how to position one’s phenomenological intuition in order to discern the logoic networks. In Tymieniecka’s analysis, none of her predecessors in the Phenomenology of Life dissociated eidetic intuition from the intuition of life.¹⁰⁷ The intuition of life, as opposed to intuition of abstracted essences, enables one to focus on the self-subsistence and logoic development of life, i.e., ontopoiesis. In Tymieniecka’s view,

¹⁰³ Tymieniecka, op. cit., 2009, pp. 36–37, 44.

¹⁰⁴ In Islamic perspective, there is a corresponding principle: God preparing the place to receive the spirit, and then informing it with spirit. One of the aspects of God which emerges out of this view is God as a builder of measures and proportions. Therefore, Islam articulates its *adab* (‘etiquette’, Arabic) as consideration and respect for the order of things in Divine economy.

¹⁰⁵ Tymieniecka, op. cit., 2009, p. 224.

¹⁰⁶ Tymieniecka, op. cit., 2009, p. 131.

¹⁰⁷ Tymieniecka, op. cit., 2009, p. 73.

Table 1 Comparisons between the concepts and categories of Tymieniecka's phenomenology of life and Islamic metaphysics

Concept or category	The Phenomenology of life	Islamic metaphysics
Instantly recognized similarities		
Central concept	Life	Existence/being
Central feature of the method	Direct intuition	Knowledge by presence
Reality	Life with its logos	God
Cosmic intellect	Logos of life	God
Unification	Life is a unity, and one with its Logos, which is intelligence in all its forms, sentience, measure and proportion of all things	Unification in being
Status of the human being	Established in the context of ontopoiesis, as a locus where life's logos reflectively articulates itself	Similar concepts of anthropos as a light of awareness in the world, with the latter serving as God's mirror in God's self-knowledge
Nuances and distinctions		
Structural foundation of philosophy	Life per se, as observed and given in experience	Scriptural revelation regarding the nature of one's existence
Conceptual foundation of philosophy	Critical analysis of the preceding philosophical systems, phenomenology, early Greek philosophy; personal insight	Scriptural understanding of Reality combined with Aristotelian and Neoplatonic influences
Method	Phenomenological interrogation, which is the direct intuition of life and its structures combined with reflective analysis. Main features of the method: (a) phenomenological presuppositionlessness at the level of grasping of the structures of life, pre-reflective with regard to self-experience; (b) orientation of intuition towards the process, as opposed to objectification of noematic contents of experience	Logic subordinated to the creed, and faith-inspired hermeneutical cycles of the direct intuition in spiritual states. Focus on static categorizing, not presuppositionlessness, no concept of pre-reflective horizon, but reliance on the intuitive apperception of mental realities as a valid epistemology
Central category	Life, as unitive, sentient, intelligent (logoic), self-creating and self-ordering principle	God, as unity of existence (being) and witnessing
Being and knowledge	Identical as life and its logos	Identical both in the nature of the real, and its cognitive hierarchies
Reality	Discovered phenomenologically, and formulated a posteriori. Identical with sentient and logoic life	Posited a priori, and then affirmed experientially. Transcendent to the ordinary life experience
Unification of reality	Attained via phenomenological method	Posited a priori

(continued)

Table 1 (continued)

Concept or category	The Phenomenology of life	Islamic metaphysics
Concepts qualifying the central category	The logos of life; sentience; ontopoiesis of life; Imaginatio Creatrix	Truth, reality, and other names of God
Unity of being and awareness	Established in the context of ontopoiesis	Established via the direct intuition of mental realities in introspective experience ^a
Metaphysical unification of the real	Attained in the context of ontopoiesis, as unity of particularization and unification of life	Posited a priori
The concept of intelligence	Intelligence as logocic sentience, measure, proportion, ordering and purposefulness inherent to life; intelligence is a cosmic feature of all life. A concept of unifying intelligence, incorporating all modalities of reason, awareness, intuition and thinking	Unifying reason is connected with the notion of Supreme Being, or God, which is the transcendental reality. It is available in direct experience of human heart-intellect
Process orientation	Taken to its maximum, pervasive and foundational to the whole system	Present in the cycles of hermeneutics in Sufi practice, but does not occupy a central place in metaphysics

^aFor unity of being and awareness, see Suhrawardi (1183–1191) *Oeuvres philosophiques et mystiques*, vols I and II, ed. H. Corbin, Tehran and Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1976; vol. III, ed. S.H. Nasr, Tehran and Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1977

[A] statement of fact or state of affairs never remains completely enclosed within itself, [but it] refers always with necessity to some factor or factors needed for further completion . . . and . . . to its ‘possible’ but not definitely indicated continuation. . . ¹⁰⁸

The place Tymieniecka assigns to the human soul in the cosmic schemata of Logos reminds one of Ibn ‘Arabi’s description of the meaning of the prophetic station of Adam ¹⁰⁹; the idea of logocic self-articulation will resonate with the idea of the self-disclosure of God in Sufi hermeneutics. ¹¹⁰ These and other evident similarities between the Phenomenology of Life and Sufi metaphysics are accompanied by many significant differences. In many instances, the deeper contextual comparative analysis reverses the initial impression of similarity. In conclusion, I attempt to systematize this complex situation in a schematic summary of comparisons between the categories in these two completed systems of knowledge (Table 1).

¹⁰⁸ Tymieniecka, op. cit., 2009, p. 12.

¹⁰⁹ Ibn ‘Arabi, op. cit., 1975, pp. 1–7.

¹¹⁰ W. C. Chittick, op. cit., 1998.

Concluding Remarks

Replacing the traditional ontological analysis of static essences and structures with interrogation focused on the life's process, Tymieniecka avoids the infinite regress of logic and the consequent necessity to posit a separate from empirical existence metaphysical substratum as the causal principle of reality. Since her ontological premise is life, which is a process, and is *sui generis* and sentient, her unity-of-everything-there-is alive is in *Logos Omnia*; i.e., it is a process-based category. "The *sui generis* life is understood . . . to be at the center and also to be the ultimate point of reference."¹¹¹ Therefore, her discourse does not suffer from the internal contradictions that are inevitable in Islamic monotheism due to its objectification of the metaphysical ground as a static, eternal principle. Taking her enquiry beyond the contradictions between being and existence(s) into beingness, and beyond the inconsistencies of monotheistic theory and praxis into the onto-poietic and sentient unity-of-everything-there-is-alive, Tymieniecka achieves a new kind of unity-based metaphysics. Whether or not Tymieniecka's thought was influenced by Islamic metaphysics, remains an open question. In her extensive analysis of the preceding philosophies, she does not mention Islamic metaphysics. However, the commonalities between the basic categories of Ishraqi, Ismaili or Akbarian philosophies, and the Phenomenology of life are hard to deny. The distinctions are also evident: Tymieniecka offers new solutions to the problems at the core of ontological cul-de-sacs of Sufism, thus extending her function as The Seal of philosophy towards Islamic metaphysics itself.

¹¹¹ Tymieniecka, op. cit., 2009, p. 74.

Confrontation et réconciliation entre l’Islam et l’Occident

Angèle Kremer-Marietti

Abstract Je me présente comme une philosophe que je suis, une élève de Gaston Bachelard, qui était autant épistémologue, et donc amateur de sciences, que lecteur et amateur de poésie. Je ne suis personnellement ni une théologienne, ni même une religieuse. Parmi mes maîtres éminents, je retiens la leçon d’attitude morale de Bachelard : recherche de la vérité du monde et de la vérité de soi. Une pensée évoquant l’héritage philosophique clair et distinct de Descartes ou l’héritage légué par Bachelard qui pensait qu’il n’y a pas de progrès sans quelque erreur de départ, mais surtout qu’il n’y a pas de « vérité première » qui puisse se confirmer comme étant juste, une telle pensée tolérerait tout esprit religieux, quel qu’il puisse être (qu’il soit chrétien ou musulman), à condition qu’il ne soit pas dévastateur de la recherche et du questionnement, comme les religions le furent souvent par le passé. Car, pour Bachelard, la raison n’est pas immobile mais en mouvement : et si elle instruit l’expérience, on peut dire aussi que l’expérience instruit la raison.

Et je ne connaissais pas l’Islam avant de m’y intéresser directement sur la demande de l’un de mes anciens étudiants. Et, comme je m’en doutais, j’ai découvert un objet d’études le plus complexe qui soit au monde ! Parler de l’Islam est-ce parler de religion ? Pas simplement, car les visées dans l’ordre moral et dans l’ordre politique interfèrent dans ce concept, et, très curieusement, les dernières sont certainement en plus grand nombre que les premières. Oui, il existe des valeurs morales musulmanes, très respectables, qui sont susceptibles de s’imposer à une conscience quelle qu’elle soit. Mais les injonctions coraniques dépassent amplement les visées morales ou intérieures, et semblent concerner pour beaucoup la vie politique. Et, même s’il est permis de distinguer religion et civilisation, avec l’Islam, on doit reconnaître que la confusion n’est pas accidentelle : elle s’impose. Et, si on oppose au concept de l’Islam le concept de l’Occident, nous sommes en face de deux civilisations imprégnées de religion, ce qui est totalement vrai pour l’Islam, et, à l’Occident, on assiste davantage à ce que Chateaubriand

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appelait le « génie du christianisme », c'est-à-dire, les conséquences logiques et historiques du christianisme plutôt que sa lettre pure et simple.

Avant de commencer, je voudrais rendre hommage à un grand islamologue algérien, professeur à la Sorbonne, qui nous a quittés cette année, Mohamed Arkoun, auteur de nombreux ouvrages de dialogue entre les religions et qui affirmait que la foi est une construction qui change à travers l'histoire.

L'islam, religion ou civilisation ?

Je me présente comme une philosophe que je suis, une élève de Gaston Bachelard, qui était autant épistémologue, et donc amateur de sciences, que lecteur et amateur de poésie. Je ne suis personnellement ni une théologienne, ni même une religieuse. Parmi mes maîtres éminents, je retiens la leçon d'attitude morale de Bachelard : recherche de la vérité du monde et de la vérité de soi. Une pensée évoquant l'héritage philosophique clair et distinct de Descartes ou l'héritage légué par Bachelard qui pensait qu'il n'y a pas de progrès sans quelque erreur de départ, mais surtout qu'il n'y a pas de « vérité première » qui puisse se confirmer comme étant juste, une telle pensée tolérerait tout esprit religieux, quel qu'il puisse être (qu'il soit chrétien ou musulman), à condition qu'il ne soit pas dévastateur de la recherche et du questionnement, comme les religions le furent souvent par le passé. Car, pour Bachelard, la raison n'est pas immobile mais en mouvement : et si elle instruit l'expérience, on peut dire aussi que l'expérience instruit la raison.

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L'Islam dans l'histoire occidentale

Comme on l'a dit avant moi : « de l'Iran aux Philippines, du Maroc au Sénégal, il existe de multiples manières de vivre sa religion, de comprendre le monde moderne, d'interpréter la loi musulmane. »¹ Rien n'empêche, en effet, un Musulman de répondre aux défis du monde moderne, et même dans un sens que l'on pourrait reconnaître pour occidental. La question se pose aujourd'hui, et j'en suis personnellement très heureuse. On peut l'exprimer de cette façon : « Islam et Occident : confrontation ou coexistence pacifique » ? Ou bien, mieux : « Les musulmans et l'Occident sont-ils voués à la confrontation ? », question à laquelle a clairement répondu le Professeur Ja'far Shaykh Idris² (de l'Institut des sciences islamiques et arabes de Washington) à l'appui d'une coexistence pacifique. Il demande : « Est-il possible pour les habitants de notre village planétaire de vivre ensemble en paix et de recueillir les fruits de la science et de la technologie en constante progression ? Ou est-ce que les différences religieuses, culturelles et civilisationnelles sont vouées à créer conflits et guerres ? » (fin de citation). Dans cette perspective positive, il faut garder à l'esprit le fait que l'Islam est la religion de la paix. À cela nous devons ajouter que les salutations quotidiennes entre les hommes ne sont autres que « paix », et l'adjectif « muslim » (musulman) signifie « pacifique ». Car la paix est le but de l'Islam. Tout être humain peut jouir de la paix de l'Islam. Et, si les non-musulmans entretiennent une attitude pacifique avec les musulmans, ou même s'ils sont indifférents envers l'Islam, du point de vue de l'Islam il n'existe aucun motif à l'Islam pour leur déclarer la guerre.

Il faut rappeler ici quelques grandes séquences historiques depuis la fondation de l'Islam, et qui se sont écoulées durant plus de 1000 ans,³ dès 714 dans ce qui était la France à l'époque où les musulmans se sont emparés de Narbonne, qui est devenue leur base pour les 40 années suivantes. Les musulmans occupèrent également, de 714 à 725, le Languedoc et la rive droite du Rhône jusqu'à Sens. Toulouse subit en 721 le siège d'une armée musulmane de 100.000 soldats et fut défendue par Eudes, le duc d'Aquitaine, secondé par Charles Martel qui envoya des troupes pour l'aider. Après avoir subi six mois de siège, Eudes fit une sortie et l'armée musulmane se replia sur l'Espagne. Les musulmans contournèrent les Pyrénées par l'Est, en passant à l'Ouest des Pyrénées. Bordeaux fut assaillie et détruite par 15.000 cavaliers musulmans, qui passèrent dans les Pays de la Loire, jusqu'à Poitiers, et ils furent finalement arrêtés par Charles Martel et Eudes à vingt kilomètres au nord de Poitiers, en 732. Les musulmans ne furent éliminés de l'Aquitaine qu'en 808 par Charlemagne. En 990, grâce à Guillaume II, comte de Provence, les derniers envahisseurs furent refoulés. La pression musulmane s'exerça pendant les

¹ *Le Monde diplomatique*, juillet-août 2002.

² Dr. Ja'far Shaykh Idris dans la revue *Islamic Future*, au mois de Safar 1414 (juillet 1996) : « Les Musulmans et l'Occident sont-ils voués à s'affronter ? ».

³ Cf. Cercle Frédéric Bastiat – Les dîners-débats, « *Comprendre l'Islam* », Compte rendu du dîner-débat du 16 février 2008 avec Jean-Jacques Walter, in *Lumières Landaises* n° 67.

250 années suivantes par des razzias effectuées à partir de la mer. Les hommes capturés étaient emmenés dans des camps de castration en Corse et déportés dans les bagnes du Dâr al islam, comme les femmes d'âge nubile dans les harems. Les « pirates barbaresques » avaient leurs repères en Corse, en Sardaigne, en Sicile, sur les côtes d'Espagne et celles de l'Afrique du Nord. Toulon fut détruite en 1178 et 1197, et les populations massacrées ou déportées. En 1830, la décision d'aller conquérir l'Algérie fut en partie motivée par le désir de détruire les dernières bases des corsaires algérois. Cela pour la France. En Espagne, rappelons la guerre soutenue par les Espagnols chez eux, et qui dura aussi plus de mille ans.

La question du seul Dieu

La question peut se poser : est-ce uniquement l'Islam en tant que religion qui motiva cette succession de guerres en France et en Espagne ? Certainement pas, c'est simultanément la société et l'État. D'ailleurs, une référence religieuse et politique de l'Islam, Khomeiny disait que 90 % des règles islamiques concernent la société civile et que dans une bibliothèque islamique, 90 % des livres concernent la société et l'État et 10 % seulement la morale privée et les rapports à Dieu. Une conclusion, que je dirai occidentale, affirme donc que ce qui fait problème dans l'Islam pour l'Occident, ce n'est pas la religion, c'est la conjugaison de la religion et de l'État.

En ce qui concerne la religion, en tant que monothéisme, l'Islam ne présente guère de problèmes. En effet, pour les monothéismes (qu'il s'agisse du [judaïsme](#), du [christianisme](#), ou de l'[islam](#)), Dieu représente l'Être suprême, transcendant, unique et créateur du monde. Ses principaux attributs sont également reconnus : ce sont l'infinité, l'omniprésence, l'omnipotence, l'omniscience, l'immutabilité, l'immatérialité, la perfection, l'universalité, la sagesse, la justice, et la bonté... Dieu a établi les lois générales qui gouvernent le monde, mais peut intervenir en y dérogeant par des miracles. Quant au judaïsme et à l'islam, ces religions ne tolèrent aucune représentation de Dieu, appelé respectivement [Yahvé](#) et [Allah](#).

Si je me tourne du côté des philosophes occidentaux, Dieu est un principe abstrait que la raison, sous la forme du discours philosophique, tente de comprendre. Chaque philosophe insiste sur tel ou tel des attributs de Dieu, en fonction de la thèse qu'il entend défendre.

Le Dieu des philosophes représente en général la cause première de l'univers et la perfection. Il ne détient son existence d'aucune autre source que de lui-même : il est *causa sui*, cause de lui-même, comme l'a exprimé Spinoza. Il n'est donc la résultante d'aucune révélation ni d'aucun acte de foi. Tandis que dans la religion l'idée de Dieu est une intuition, donnée à l'homme par Dieu lui-même, ou encore une révélation, de nombreux philosophes ont essayé d'apporter des preuves logiques de son existence. Par rapport aux religions, le Dieu des philosophes n'inspire ni la crainte ni la vénération : le Dieu des philosophes est essentiellement un concept absolu, à la fois impersonnel et théorique.

À côté de l'inspiration, on peut constater que la rationalité fait partie intégrante de la religion islamique, et cette rationalité comprend un principe primordial : le jugement des actions par leurs conséquences. C'est une rationalité guidée par d'autres valeurs islamiques. Ainsi privilégiera-t-on toujours l'acte dont découlera le plus grand bien ou le moindre mal. La principale catégorie de bienfaits recherchés en Islam est celle qui est acceptable, de manière globale, par le plus grand nombre. Il s'agit du bien-être spirituel, du bien-être mental de la vie humaine, de la santé et de l'honneur de l'être humain. À la lumière de ces critères rationnels et de ces valeurs, dans des circonstances normales, la coexistence et la coopération pacifique sont largement préférées aux guerres et aux conflits.

De certaines erreurs occidentales

Dans une recherche propre à élucider une confrontation entre l'islam et l'Occident, avec une possibilité de réconciliation concrète, on peut, certes, commencer par chercher les principales erreurs de la compréhension occidentale de la culture islamique. On dénoncerait tout d'abord, une erreur historique de l'Occident : une erreur qui a duré plus de cinq siècles, une rupture fondée sur l'amnésie et qui peut nourrir haine et xénophobie. En effet, de part et d'autre, on a oublié l'histoire commune réunissant tout ensemble Orient et Occident, c'est-à-dire judaïsme, christianisme, et islam, qui en fait, à l'origine, appartenaient au même monde. Cette erreur, fondamentalement très ancienne et liée aux orientations des trois grandes religions du monothéisme, a précédé, accompagné et suivi la rupture déterminée par la reconquête de l'Espagne et, en particulier, par la chute de Grenade, en 1492. Car cette victoire espagnole n'a pas été conçue comme purement politique, elle a été comprise comme étant religieuse et culturelle. On peut concevoir que la rupture qui s'ensuivit est née d'une amnésie quant à la réalité d'un même monde, lieu commun des trois monothéismes, et qu'elle a pu nourrir une certaine xénophobie.

Une erreur a consisté à identifier État islamique et Islam. Même s'ils ne représentent pas toutes les communautés islamiques, il existe des États islamiques qui sanctionnent violemment les musulmans ou non musulmans n'obéissant pas à la loi. Je fais allusion, par exemple, à la lapidation subie par les femmes, en cas d'adultère, qui est entrée dans la loi de certains États islamiques, ou bien encore à la centaine de coups de fouet qu'une journaliste, jugée « indécentement » habillée, a mérité de recevoir (alors qu'elle portait un pantalon). Ces pratiques sont-elles strictement religieuses ? Sont-elles inscrites dans le Coran ? On a souvent confondu, dans ce domaine, religion et droit coutumier, tel le mariage forcé. L'Occident, compris comme civilisation obéissant au christianisme a également connu l'usage de supplices atroces infligés à des criminels supputés. De nos jours, les mentalités ont changé ; des millions de musulmans sont durablement installés dans le nouveau comme dans l'ancien monde. Cette présence importante comporte une chance vers la création de ponts entre le Nord et le Sud. De plus, à l'intérieur de

la référence islamique, une évolution est possible vers une interprétation des textes fondateurs, permettant de prendre en compte, tout à la fois, les réalités du monde actuel, les aspirations à plus de démocratie, et la volonté des femmes de voir leurs droits humains respectés.

Le vêtement féminin

Justement, je prendrai directement un sujet banal de la vie citoyenne en France, impliquant les difficultés relatives au port du voile des jeunes filles à l'école⁴ comme à celui de la burqa des femmes dans l'espace public.⁵ Ces vêtements sont apparus dans l'espace républicain comme des signes qui ont objectivement été perçus par les Français comme un traitement restrictif de liberté et réservé au genre féminin, retenu aussi simultanément comme étant une pratique attribuée, sans doute à tort, à des obligations d'origine religieuse, mais, il faut le dire aussi, pour ses implications en droit civil, comme étant incompatibles, incompatibles avec les traditions, la culture, la Constitution et les lois de la France.

Les quelques femmes interrogées, qui s'étaient destinées à porter la burqa, ou même encore qui souhaiteraient la porter, invoquent avant tout l'obligation religieuse d'y adhérer. Or, du point de vue strictement religieux, le fait est qu'il n'y a guère dans le Coran d'indication explicite relative à de tels usages, si ce n'est qu'en effet, les femmes y sont invitées à des comportements de décence, par la recommandation, à l'occasion, de se dissimuler en tirant davantage sur elle le voile qu'elle ont traditionnellement porté, et c'est ce que souligne un musulman lettré, respectueux du texte, selon qui les sept versions du terme « voile » dans le Coran signifient « décence ». Pour Gamal Al-Banna,⁶ en effet, le hidjab (ou la burqa) était une manière de s'habiller qui s'est imposée à l'islam, alors que ce vêtement existait déjà dans les populations anciennes. Mais surtout, selon le titre de l'article signé par Amine Esseghir, « Le hidjab n'est pas obligatoire en islam », ⁷ et cela relativement au verset du Coran cité par Gamal Al-Banna ; en effet, on peut y lire :

Et dis aux croyantes de baisser leurs regards, de garder leur chasteté et de ne montrer de leurs atours que ce qui en paraît et qu'elles rabattent leur voile sur leurs poitrines ; et qu'elles ne montrent leurs atours qu'à leurs maris, ou à leurs pères, ou aux pères de leurs maris, ou à leurs fils, ou aux fils de leurs maris, ou à leurs frères, ou aux fils de leurs frères, ou aux fils de leurs sœurs, ou aux femmes musulmanes, ou aux esclaves qu'elles possèdent,

⁴ Rapport Stasi, 2003 : <http://lesrapports.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/BRP/034000725/0000.pdf>

⁵ Loi votée le 13 juillet 2010. « Nul ne peut, dans l'espace public, porter une tenue destinée à dissimuler son visage ». Tel est le premier article du projet de loi instaurant une interdiction générale du voile intégral. Porter la burqa coûterait 150 € d'amende.

⁶ Un grand nombre d'articles de Gamal Al-Banna sont disponibles en arabe sur <http://www.mettransparent.com/autheurs/arabic/banna.html>

⁷ Amine Esseghir, « Le hidjab n'est pas obligatoire en islam. Gamal Al-Bana, le trouble-culte » dans Les Débats : <http://www.lesdebats.com/editionsdebats/140207/Actualite.htm>

ou aux domestiques mâles impuissants, ou aux garçons impubères qui ignorent tout des parties cachées des femmes. Et qu'elles ne frappent pas avec leurs pieds de façon que l'on sache ce qu'elles cachent de leurs parures. Et repentez-vous tous devant Allah, ô croyants, afin que vous récoltiez le succès.⁸

Généralement, à cette époque, « les femmes portaient le voile, comme elles le faisaient depuis des siècles, que ce soit en Mésopotamie ou en Grèce, et les hommes des turbans pour se protéger du soleil ou de la poussière ». ⁹ D'ailleurs, il n'existe qu'un unique verset évoquant le hidjab ; on y lit :

Ô Prophète ! Dis à tes épouses, à tes filles, et aux femmes des croyants, de ramener sur elles leurs grands voiles : elles en seront plus vite reconnues et éviteront d'être offensées. Allah est Pardonneur et Miséricordieux.¹⁰

En fait, il ne s'agirait que d'une simple allégorie se rapportant à un accessoire vestimentaire qui cachait du regard des autres les femmes du Prophète. Il ne s'agit pas d'une tenue permanente, puisque Gamal Al-Banna indique qu'un hadith authentifié fait la narration d'ablutions pratiquées en commun par les hommes et les femmes : or, les femmes accomplissant ce rite ne pouvaient rester couvertes pour l'accomplir. De plus, Gamal Al-Banna rapporte que l'histoire de l'islam fait état d'un incident mettant en scène le khalife Omar sermonnant une servante, esclave musulmane, pour s'être couverte d'un voile, alors que le voile était alors un signe de distinction des femmes libres (qui le portaient) à l'opposé des esclaves (qui ne le portaient pas). En fait, ce sont essentiellement des mouvements salafistes ou chiites qui imposent actuellement le port du voile et surtout de la burqa comme signe du fondamentalisme musulman. D'ailleurs, les critiques dirigées contre Gamal Al-Banna proviennent de conservateurs musulmans, salafistes ou autres. Quant à lui, Gamal Al-Banna, il pense que la lecture même du Coran doit évoluer et que « les musulmans doivent revoir les interprétations du Coran à la lumière des connaissances modernes, de la pensée universelle et de la révolution que le Coran a apportée au moment de sa révélation ». ¹¹

Si erreur il y a eu sur le voile et sur la burqa, elle ne peut provenir que d'une illusion qui s'est imposée dans notre société, et venant de la part d'extrémistes, mais nullement du fait de la majorité des musulmans, en général opposés, chez nous, surtout au port de la burqa, même s'ils se sont sentis indirectement manipulés dans les discussions qui ont souvent amplifié la signification de cette dissimulation du corps féminin. C'est, d'ailleurs, une dissimulation qui transcende la féminité proprement dite, puisqu'elle cache ainsi toute particularisation et personification du corps humain, au point de le dérober à toute intelligence communicative, qui aujourd'hui a lieu de se propager non seulement par la parole, mais encore par l'expression entière du visage. Avant même qu'elle ne soit nommée, la personne voit son identité comme étant vue et reconnue par la présentation de son visage, qui

⁸ Sourate Annour (la lumière), 31.

⁹ Amine, op. cit.

¹⁰ Sourate *Al Ahzab* (les coalisés), 59.

¹¹ Amine, op. cit.

signifie autant par l'entremise de son expression volontaire qu'involontaire. Une telle phénoménologie actuelle de l'échange est aujourd'hui acceptée comme républicaine et nécessaire à la volonté commune du « vivre ensemble ». Il ne peut y avoir de liberté, d'égalité ni de fraternité dans une cécité de l'apparition humaine. Une éthique de la transparence s'impose à la réalisation manifeste de l'équilibre collectif de la république.

L'Islam et l'Occident en opposition

On a vu¹² que Al-Fârâbî¹³ présentait la philosophie, « la science suprême », ainsi que « la science la plus ancienne », comme provenant des Chaldéens, retransmise aux Egyptiens, aux Grecs, aux Syriques, et enfin à la culture arabo-musulmane. Toutefois, ce qu'on appelle « falsafa » est-ce ce que les Grecs appelaient « philosophie » ? Et y a-t-il eu effectivement passage du savoir à partir de l'Islam vers l'Occident ? Enfin, le poids de la thèse de Samuel Huntington¹⁴ sur le choc des civilisations domine-t-il encore le champ des études sur l'Islam et l'Occident ? Et le « progrès », identifié à l'Occident, n'est-il pas abusivement idéologique ? Ce sont là probablement autant de causes d'erreurs occidentales en prise sur l'Islam. Sans compter, en un mot, ce que représente l'islamophobie, véritable synthèse de l'erreur occidentale, qu'a tenté de définir le Runnymede Trust, une ONG britannique : « L'islamophobie consisterait à concevoir l'islam comme un bloc monolithique, imperméable à tout changement, coupé des autres cultures, inférieur par ses idées barbares, irrationnelles, primitives et sexistes, et en outre violent, agressif, menaçant. Lorsqu'on s'inscrit dans cette logique, l'Islam est assimilé à une idéologie politique dominatrice qui cherche à prendre l'avantage par la force. . . »¹⁵

Les millions de musulmans durablement installés dans les pays de l'Occident représentent une chance d'étendre universellement le principe des droits de l'homme, puisque « le dialogue occupe une place de choix dans le discours

¹² Je renvoie au Colloque organisé à Lyon, « L'Islam et l'Occident à l'époque médiévale. Transmission et diffusion des savoirs » (11, 12, 13 mars 2009) – laboratoires [Triangle](#) : Action, discours, pensée politique et économique (UMR 5206), [Cerphi](#) : Centre d'Etudes en Rhétorique, Philosophie et Histoire des Idées, [Ciham](#) : Centre Interuniversitaire d'Histoire et d'Archéologie Médiévales, à l'[Ecole normale supérieure Lettres et sciences humaines](#) – qui a été un colloque international conçu comme un moment de débat scientifique et d'échanges sur les enjeux sociaux de l'écriture de l'histoire, dès lors que l'on traite du monde arabo-musulman, de ses rapports avec les sociétés occidentales et, plus particulièrement, de la transmission des savoirs entre les deux mondes au Moyen Âge.

¹³ Al-Fârâbî (872–950), auteur de : *De Platonis Philosophia, De l'obtention du bonheur, Traité sur les sciences, Traité sur l'entendement, Encyclopédie.*

¹⁴ Samuel Huntington *The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order*, traduction française chez Odile Jacob en 1997.

¹⁵ *Le Courrier International*, 848, 1^{er} février 2007.

coranique, lequel est destiné autant à l'individu qu'à la collectivité ». ¹⁶ Effectivement, le dialogue religieux a commencé à prendre forme depuis quatre décennies : le Vatican a appelé au dialogue islamo-chrétien en 1962 ; de son côté, Al Azhar a constitué une commission de dialogue présidé par son représentant. En matière de relations politiques et économiques, le dialogue euro-méditerranéen fut initié après la guerre d'octobre 1973. L'une des entraves à ce dialogue consiste dans la vision que nous donne un orientaliste de l'université de Princeton, Bernard Lewis, ¹⁷ selon qui le monde est divisé en deux parties pour les musulmans : le Dar Al Islam, partie du monde régie par la loi islamique (shari'a) dans le cadre d'une nation unique gouvernée par une seule personne et où les gens adorent un Dieu Seul et Unique ; et le Dar Al Harb, partie du monde située en dehors de la nation musulmane et, de ce fait, menacée par le Jihad ou guerre sainte.

À la recherche d'une épistémologie de la compréhension

Devant une telle virtualité de conflit, rien n'interdit de rechercher une épistémologie à la hauteur de la difficulté. Certains auteurs contemporains, tel Mohammed Abed al-Jabbri, ¹⁸ sont plus ouvertement orientés vers une solution non seulement pacifique mais encore respectueuse des différentes civilisations. Il faudrait, en effet, une épistémologie de compréhension mutuelle telle que cet auteur l'envisage, et dont il voit le père-fondateur dans le grand philosophe andalou Ibn Roshd (Averroès 1126–1198). On oublie souvent que l'averroïsme latin a été à la source de la civilisation occidentale. Aussi Mohammed Abed al-Jabbri énonce-t-il les principales règles du dialogue rochdien. Comme l'écrit al-Jabbri, ces règles sont conçues sur la base d'une idée hégélienne avant Hegel, la « négation de la négation », c'est-à-dire la mise en avant d'arguments apparemment antagonistes, mais seulement différents.

Le **premier principe** d'Ibn Roshd consiste à comprendre l'autre dans son système de référence. Le **second** n'étant que le droit à la différence, permettant la concordance, et concordance ne signifie pas équivalence : témoigner en faveur d'une chose ne veut pas dire s'identifier avec elle. Le droit à la différence doit être respecté. D'où, le **troisième principe** de l'épistémologie rochdienne : la compréhension, c'est-à-dire la tolérance et l'indulgence. Au lieu de mettre en doute les thèses des adversaires, Ibn Roshd cherchait la vérité. Pour lui, être juste, c'était

¹⁶ Voir la N° 19-1423H/2002 : « Les Civilisations, Dialogue ou Conflit ? Une approche islamique du Dr Ahmed Arafat Al Kadi ».

¹⁷ Bernard Lewis, *Islam et Occident*, Princeton University Press, 1992.

¹⁸ Voir l'article de Mohammed Abed al-Jabbri, « L'Islam et l'Occident ' Choc des civilisations ' ? – Avenir des relations ? », in *Revue L'Islam aujourd'hui*, : http://www.aljabriabed.net/t1_islam_occident.pdf

« chercher des arguments en faveur de son adversaire comme on le fait pour soi-même. »

Le propos de Ibn Roschd était d'apaiser l'antagonisme dans le rapport d'altérité, c'est-à-dire dans le rapport du moi à son autre. C'est sur ce modèle de dialogue que Mohammed Abed al-Jabbri veut que s'élabore « un processus d'interculturalité basé sur le respect mutuel et le droit à la différence ». Il s'agit, en fait, d'une épistémologie de compréhension mutuelle, à l'image de celle proposée par Averroès. Sans doute, faut-il voir, dans cette attitude de sagesse, une réaction au livre de Samuel Huntington sur le choc des civilisations,¹⁹ qui pèse encore lourdement dans le champ des études sur l'Islam et l'Occident.

¹⁹ Il faut retrouver le pendant temporisateur de cette attitude, dans l'œuvre de Fernand Braudel (1902–1985), *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II*, dont la 1^{ère} édition parut en 1949, et que Braudel n'a cessé de réécrire et de développer jusqu'à la 5^{ème} édition de 1982.

The Question of Divinity in Newton's and al-Biruni's Philosophies of Mathematics: A Comparative Perspective

A.L. Samian

Abstract Al-Biruni and Newton were mathematicians of different religious traditions. Not only were they devotees of different religions, they were also thinkers of different epochs. They grew up in societies having different norms and ideals. Al-Biruni spent his life totally under Muslim governments which by and large follow the Shari'ah. On the other hand, Newton lived in a country in which Christianity was the dominant religion. These differences in cultural and historical background notwithstanding, there are many similarities in their philosophies of mathematics. In what follows, we will examine these similarities as well as pointing out the significance of the commonalities.

Introduction

Both al-Biruni and Newton believe that mathematics is a primary link that connects nature, science and religion. Guided by their belief that everything is rooted in the Divine, mathematicians' contemplation of nature are facilitated by mathematics through which they can know and internalize the levels of reality and the qualitative aspects of God in the world of quantities.

Above everything else, both of them construed mathematics as a way of knowing about this world to the end that man can know more about God and himself. It is both a theoretical and practical activity of solving problems by using symbols and manipulating them according to certain rules.

They look at mathematics as a very powerful tool of studying nature. However to say that they were instrumentalists as the word is understood today would not do

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justice to their philosophies of mathematics. Instrumentalists believe that in the case of mathematics, the latter is nothing more than a tool in our quest of knowledge. Yet al-Biruni and to a lesser extent, Newton, believe that mathematics has an important role in man's understanding of the relationship between nature, science and religion. Nature can be scientifically analyzed through mathematics, and religion plays a critical role in some of the processes. In more specific terms, mathematics as practiced by al-Biruni and Newton must be viewed from the perspective of contemplation wherein the mathematician is immersed in deciphering nature with the consequence of knowing more about his mode of existence and as a matter of fact, about Existence Itself. Mathematics is never merely an instrument void of metamathematical significance.

The relationship between nature, science and religion is grounded in mathematics. Nature is deciphered in several ways depending upon the field of study; sometimes by means of observation and experiments and also by way of witnesses and transmitters (as in the case of history). In both instances, al-Biruni and Newton maintain that mathematics has an integral role to play. In observations and experiments, the least that mathematics could offer is to validate their accuracy, and in the case whereby so much depends on the reliability of transmitters, mathematics is used to check the accuracy of reports especially with regards to dates and locations (mathematical geography).

In the view of al-Biruni and Newton, the usefulness and significance of mathematics is not confined to problem solving. Both of them believe that mathematics can sharpen man's intuitive capability at least insofar as precision and exactness is concerned. As an important consequence, mathematics helps mathematicians to study the abstractness of his object of study. The ability to contemplate the abstractness of things bears also another significant consequence; mathematics increases the mathematicians' knowledge of one important plane of reality, the abstract world which circumscribes the material world. Thus mathematics functions as a nexus and an invaluable bridge between the material world and the angelic world and ultimately to the Divine who is the Most Abstract of all.

With regard to their mathematical conception of nature, they have come to affirm that nature is not only simple but there is also harmony and order. Simplicity, however, should not be understood in a vulgar sense. That the world is simple means that man is endowed with the faculty to know the world. And the fact that the world is created in six days as revealed in the Holy Qur'an and Bible alludes to the orderliness of nature; that from the very beginning there is order in creation.

There is another similarity in al-Biruni and Newton's view on the nature and role of mathematics. In the case of al-Biruni, his mathematical quest begins by focusing on nature as the object of study. The external world which is the world of multiplicity appears in all variety of forms. Yet through mathematics he could find the common factors underlying the multiplicity. There is an underlying theme connecting the world of brute facts. It is not the case that all that exists are accidents which are devoid of any higher purposes. Rather, subjecting them to mathematical scrutiny will reveal that their existence points to an important aspect; that they are manifestations of the eternal and the actually infinite.

If al-Biruni was to begin his mathematical study of nature by observing and experimenting with the sensibles in relation to problems, Newton begins his by contemplating on the phenomena. Mathematics to Newton is likewise an essential tool in deciphering nature and in solving problems as manifested in the phenomena. That mathematics is more than a tool is clear when we examine Newton's work closely, for example the *Principia*. Man can unravel the abstract aspect of the phenomena and thereafter knows more about himself, nature and God by way of mathematics. More than anything else, mathematics according to Newton provides a valuable linkage between the study of phenomena of nature, religion and God.

Although his *Principia* was written with this relationship in mind, the message was not received by some of his contemporaries like Hobbes and the other so-called atheists so much so that he has to explicitly state this underlying theme later in the "Scholium" of the *Principia*. And the *Principia*, which to us was an apologia for theology considering his over-emphasis on the mechanical and the quantitative aspects, was and still is his most well-known mathematical work that earns him a respectable place in the history of science, not with-standing the history of the world.

Mathematics and God

Central to both al-Biruni and Newton's philosophies of mathematics is their conception of God. Both mathematicians view the sensibles and mathematical objects as related to God in a manner corresponding to their mode of existence. God is the center for all mathematical objects there is.

In point of fact, it is their notion of God which dominates their conception of mathematics. According to both of them, by doing mathematics one should in the end know more about God. Newton argues that true steps in natural philosophy will lead the philosopher to Pure Being, whereas for al-Biruni, the total worthiness of mathematics corresponds to the extent that mathematics can bring the mathematician closer to God, to the degrees that it can improve his piety.

By this time, we may ask whether the 'Godhead' referred to by both of them in their mathematical treatises is indeed the same God. Newton's descriptions of God's Qualities given in the *Principia* and *Opticks* are not exactly the same with the descriptions stated by al-Biruni throughout his writings. Al-Biruni's God creates and destroys unceasingly, whereas that is not the case with Newton's. Both however would agree very much that to know the essence of God is beyond human capability. In like manner, they would share the same belief that God is both the 'most' and the 'more'. For example, they would agree to the statement that God is both 'greater' and 'the greatest'. He is the greatest of all and yet He is definitely greater than whatever list of Divine Qualities they can think of.

Mode of Mathematization

The first major similarity that comes to mind in their concept of the mathematization of nature is the function of the rational soul. In spite of the importance of the external senses, it is the rational soul that can find meanings associated with the results of mathematical interpolation.

Interpolation of mathematical objects are carried out chiefly by the internal senses. Prior to arriving at a particular mathematical model, mathematical images are conveyed to the internal senses by the various sense organs. Once processed, mathematical meanings are abstracted by the rational soul.

Since both mathematicians realize the significance of the rational soul, it is not surprising that both stress the need to purify the rational soul. Newton's so-called 'moral philosophy' and al-Biruni's ethics sought to purify the rational soul of the mathematician. They believe that since it is God that imparts mathematical meanings to the soul and since God is the Most Pure, consequently having a 'pure soul' will facilitate the process.

Not all people have the same power of abstraction because of the discrepancy in the 'power' of the rational soul. Different people have different degrees of innate mathematical faculties and capacities. Thus with regard to the peoples' attitude in acquiring mathematical knowledge, both uphold the view that there are two 'classes' of people; those who have the 'knack' of mathematics (using Newton's terminology) and those who 'scream' at the sight of calculations and geometrical figures (paraphrasing al-Biruni).

There is yet another striking parallelism between both al-Biruni's and Newton's mode of mathematization. There is a hierarchy of reality, so to speak. In the case of al-Biruni, material objects and the infinite divisions of its constituents, the nature of light as represented in his *Treatise on Shadows*, the belief in the existence of Angels, the frequent mentions of God's Divine Qualities and the stated humility of not-knowing the Divine Essence correspond respectively to the levels of reality consisting of the material, subtle and angelic world circumscribed by the world of Divine Qualities and Divine Essence. In similar vein, Newton likewise espouses the same belief with respect to the existence of the hierarchy, although their view on how the levels operate are not exactly same.

As a consequence of their belief in the existence of various planes of reality, we can chart a one-to-one mapping between the faculties involved in the process of mathematization and the levels of reality. The external senses map into the world of brute facts, which is the terrestrial world. The mind and other internal senses are mapped into the so-called intermediate world or the subtle world. Finally the soul who attains the mathematical meanings and ultimately the spirit, each corresponds to the celestial world and the world of infinity, which is none other than the world which includes Divine Qualities and the Divine Essence.

As a corollary to the one-to-one relationship between man (the microcosm) and the cosmos (macrocosm) manifested in both al-Biruni and to a lesser extent in Newton's mode of mathematization (Newton believes that God's instrument such

as gravity has its own innate power) we can explain the reason mathematics functions as a bridge connecting the world of sensibles to the world of intelligibles; simply because by mathematizing, we facilitate our comprehension of the abstract world. We brought ourselves yet closer to the world of the infinite and ultimately to the world of Divine Qualities and Divine Essence.

Mathematical Knowledge

Both al-Biruni and Newton believe that mathematical knowledge bears various degrees of certainty. In other words, mathematical knowledge in the form of mathematical models (solution to mathematical problems) at the level of sense experience are not indubitable because they can either always be improved or corrected. At the level of sense experience, mathematical models are approximations. The improvements or corrections are subjected to the acuteness of the mathematicians external and internal senses, the accuracy of instruments (measurements), the inability to perform complete induction and the insolubility or other problems connected to the problem which the mathematician is solving. Both also believe that mathematical objects exist objectively in the realm of imagination.

Underlying both al-Biruni and Newton's conception of mathematical knowledge is their belief in the existence of the levels of reality and corresponding levels of truth. Whatever mathematical knowledge that they have acquired at the level of sense experience are approximations of truth. At a higher level, mathematical truths are truths *simpliciter*. All of these mathematical truths can be discovered.

Essential to al-Biruni's 'sophisticated conjectures' and Newton's so-called 'mathematical reasoning' or 'mathematical demonstration' is the belief that these are improvements on other mathematical models. They are the 'better solutions' to problems and mathematician's cannot say with absolute certainty that these solutions are the best.

At the meta-mathematical level, implicit in their view of mathematical knowledge is that mathematics is open ended in the sense that it can never be final. It is the nature of mathematics pertaining to the world of sensibles to remain incomplete.

Both also maintain that mathematical knowledge is acquired by man in the sense that it issues forth from God, although at the level of gross matter, mathematical truth (or falsity) are relative.

The significance of God in both al-Biruni and Newton's philosophies of mathematics must be treated in a proper perspective. Modern interpretation of their philosophies of mathematics does not amply demonstrate this important aspect.

Let us first consider some analysis of al-Biruni's mathematical works.¹ Al-Biruni's mathematics are presented as merely quantitative interpolations

¹Example of studies that have overlooked this aspect are M. Anas, "Al-Biruni's Mathematics and Astronomy", *Afghanistan*, 26 (1973), pp. 76-85, M.S. Khan, "Aryabhata I and al-Biruni", *Indian*

where signs are processed according to certain formal rules. Never is there any treatment on the qualitative aspects of mathematics although al-Biruni's conception of numbers, for example, are imbued by them. As we have shown, his definition of the number 1 is clearly a manifestation of his understanding of Divine Unity.²

The same analysis applies to Newton. Few understand the *Principia* to include the qualitative aspects of his mathematics,³ regardless of how much it might have. Most modern interpreters of the *Principia* uphold the position as if there is no qualitative aspects at all in Newton's mathematics. As a corollary, this position bears the consequence that God is not central to his philosophy of mathematics. Just to cite an example, D.T. Whiteside's *Mathematical Principles Underlying Newton's Principia Mathematica*⁴ consists chiefly of formal manipulation of symbols which is hardly the mathematical principles of the world as understood by Newton wherein the premises such as God as the source of mathematical knowledge and that by doing mathematics one can know more about God are clearly manifested in his mathematics. According to Whiteside; "... Newton's 'Propositions', 'Theorems', 'problems', 'Lemmas' and 'Scholia' are mere expository frameworks inherited from his enforced study, ... and they are manifestly retained in his own subsequent mathematical writings purely as a literary convenience".⁵ Although Whiteside shares Truesdell's claim that Newton's *Principia* is 'a book dense with the theory and application of the infinitesimal calculus',⁶ the intricate connection between Newton's conception of the infinite and his conception of God as explained in the Scholium of the *Principia* is not considered at all.

Relevance to Contemporary Philosophies of Mathematics

Current investigations in the foundation of mathematics, in particular with regard to mathematics and cognition, are based on the assumption that learning mathematics has its own mode of reasoning which is defined by several variables. They hold the view that experience, intuition, emotion and motivation are the important variables.

Journal of History of Science, 12 (1977), pp. 237–244, A.K. Bag "Al-Biruni of Indian Arithmetic", *Indian Journal of History of Science*, 10(2) (1975), pp. 174–184. I. Booklaky, "The Mathematical Geography of Al-Biruni", *Hamdard Islamicus*, 7(2) (1984), pp. 63–76.

² B.B. Lawrence has argued that there is a connection between al-Biruni and 'mysticism' but the manner in which it is related to mathematics is not examined. See B.B. Lawrence, "Al-Biruni and Islamic Mysticism", *Hamdard Islamicus*, 1(1) (1978), pp. 53–70.

³ For example, see B. Stewart and P.G. Tait, *The Unseen Universe of Physical Speculations on a Future State*, (London: Macmillan, 1881).

⁴ See D.T. Whiteside, *The Mathematical Principles Underlying Newton's Principia Mathematica*, (Glasgow: Glasgow University Publications, 1970).

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

There are those who even believe that intuition is scientifically analyzable.⁷ There are also those who subscribe to the view that as far as mathematization is concerned, a person's cognition about cognition is important. The assumption of this approach is that a person cognizes about cognition itself apart from cognizing objects and events. They form conceptions of the manner in which the mind works, "about their own mental states and processes".⁸ Yet, in none of these analyses is the role of the internal senses, the purification and the involvement of the soul (not to mention Divine Transcendence and Divine Unity) as subscribed to by al-Biruni and to a lesser extent, Newton, considered.

The concept of levels of reality has not received much attention in contemporary popular research in the foundation and philosophy of mathematics.⁹ Currently, one of the major assumptions is that mathematization is an internal process concerning an external world which is void of any extra-mental realities.¹⁰ The Divine Essence and the Divine Qualities bear almost no influence on the process. In short, although the flowering of mathematics began as early as the first man on earth and the concept of the existence of levels of reality, which is subscribed to by mathematicians of various cultures and from different religious traditions (as demonstrated in the case of both al-Biruni and Newton), has brought forth tremendous developments of mathematics, popular modern analysis on its foundation has either overlooked or denied this fundamental aspect. They have either failed or missed the sacred mathematical connection between the heaven and the earth and the fact that Divine Immanence and Divine Transcendence are everywhere, i.e., to paraphrase Tymieniecka, "in the guise of a fulfilled metaphysics".¹¹

Formalistic conception (for example that propounded by David Hilbert) in the modern study of the foundation of mathematics requires that mathematics be expressed formally since they believe that the ultimate goal of mathematics is to reduce mathematical truth to a formal and coherent, symbolic system. Our study of Newton's and al-Biruni's conception of mathematical knowledge shows that such a program envisaged by them is impossible to be carried out chiefly because at the level of sense experience, mathematical truth changes over a period of cognitive development through a variety of problems situation and that particularly in the case of Newton, axiomatized knowledge is evidently *only* the last developed state of the mathematicians' knowledge.

⁷ For example, see E. Fischbein. *Intuition in science and mathematics: An educational approach*. (Dordrecht: Springer, 1987).

⁸ See H. Wellman, "The Origins of Metacognition", in D.L. Forrest-Pressley, G.E. MacKinnon, & T.G. Waller (eds.), *Metacognition, Cognition, and Human Performance* (London: Academic Press, 1985).

⁹ For a representative discussion of the various philosophies of mathematics, see R.L. Wilder. *Introduction to the Foundations of Mathematics* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965).

¹⁰ For their other assumptions and a critical analysis of them, the reader can consult Shaharir Mohamed Zain, "Beberapa Kritikan Awal Terhadap Premis Ilmu Sains Tabii", in *Kesturi, Jurnal Akademi Sains Islam Malaysia*, (1) (1) (1991), pp. 81–93.

¹¹ See A.-T. Tymieniecka, (ed.). *Phenomenological Inquiry-The New Enlightenment* (New Hampshire: The World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning, 2008).

For that matter, one should never lose sight of the fact that the axiomatized presentation (as in the *Principia*) is only the 'external part' of his mathematical knowledge and that it can never be viewed as his mathematical knowledge per se. For al-Biruni and to a lesser extent, Newton, mathematics is *much more* than stated definitions and propositions. Both 'internal' and 'external' aspects of mathematics are important.

Another aspect on which we wish to comment is the ontological status of geometrical entities as part of the ingredients of mathematical knowledge. Basically there are three common positions upheld by current modern advocates of philosophies of mathematics. The formalists maintain that mathematics is derived from axioms and thus no mathematical reality is assumed (geometrical objects have no objective existence); the realists argue that geometrical entities are abstract objects existing in the abstract world; and the constructivists subscribe to the view that geometrical entities are construct formed in the human mind. In this case, it is clear that neither the formalists' nor the constructivists' position fit with both al-Biruni and Newton. Both of them believe that geometrical entities exist objectively in the realm of imagination. Therefore the realists' position is the closest to that held by both al-Biruni and Newton.

Unlike differences between the intuitionists, formalists, and constructivists, in contemporary secular philosophies of mathematics, it is worth re-emphasizing that there are interesting similarities between Newton's and al-Biruni's philosophies of mathematics. There is an explanation for this uniformity. In our opinion, their differences are shaped by their basic religious beliefs and yet there are so many similarities in it. For example, in *principle* they share the belief in the *existence* of God, Prophets, angels and the Hereafter. However, the intuitionists, formalists and constructivists alike never consider these universal religious tenets as having any relevance at all to the foundation and philosophy of mathematics. Each group bases their philosophies on assumptions divorced from these basic religious tenets. In the absence of these tenets, there are no unifying themes underlying their philosophies. Consequently, there are marked contrasts between their philosophies of mathematics, notwithstanding their variegated and secular philosophies.

Bereft of these universal tenets, it is understandable that the philosophies of mathematics propounded by the intuitionists, formalists and constructivists do not bear mathematical experience that helps mathematics in their spiritual ascent to the intelligibles and ultimately to the Divine.

More importantly, in accord with these metamathematical tenets espoused by al-Biruni and to a lesser extent, Newton, is the belief that man is a microcosm. He is a reflection of the macrocosm. It is the incognizance of this 'forgotten truth' (using Huston Smith's terminology), that man is the microcosm, that the heaven and the earth are ontologically related and that God is the Lord of both; become the principle cause of the secularization of mathematical experience. The mathematical experience of the mathematicians is no longer part of that illuminative experience with Divine Unity and Aspects of Existence. Instead, the mathematical experience they undergo is only the fruit of their descent to the dry and morbid world of sophisticated quantification.

A Shared Philosophy of Mathematics

From our study of al-Biruni's philosophy of mathematics and after comparing its essentials with those of Newton's, we discover that there are basic underlying agreements between them. Accordingly, there is actually a 'shared' philosophy of mathematics espoused by them which demonstrates that contrary to modern philosophies of mathematics, philosophical and foundational problems in mathematics must be solved metamathematically.

Mathematics as understood and practiced by al-Biruni and Newton can be regarded as a huge and comprehensive research program imbedded with various levels of operation. We claim that basically these hierarchies of operation can be subsumed under three distinguishable worlds (for lack of a better term). The three worlds can be presented geometrically as three concentric circles wherein the most important world which functions as the kernel of the research program lies not in the innermost but at the outermost layer. We will name the outermost layer 'World 1'.

World 1 is the world of metamathematics. It contains the metaphysical principles determining the nature of the mathematics produced. These metaphysical principles are *not* assumptions or axioms or conventionalists' claims. They function as the foundations of mathematics and its overall guiding principle. From our findings of al-Biruni and Newton, there is a taxonomy of metamathematical principles situated in this so-called World 1. The first principle is the concept of Divine Unity (al-Biruni's *tawhid* and Newton's oneness of God), followed by the concept of levels of reality and levels of truth. Their philosophical positions, especially with regard to mathematization and the status of mathematical knowledge, are overshadowed chiefly by these metamathematical principles.

Circumscribed *and* underdetermined by World 1, which is the outermost circle, is World 2. It consists of assumptions, premises and axioms.¹² Inherent in Newton's and al-Biruni's conception of mathematics is the position that there are two classes of assumptions; those that deal with the material world and those that deal with the subtle world. For example, al-Biruni's and Newton's assumption that there is harmony in nature clearly deals more with the material world whereas the Euclidean postulates, that deal with mathematical objects residing in the realm of imagination, are more concerned with the subtle world. Likewise with the assumption of entities such as ether and gravity. These assumptions (except gravity which is not yet formulated as such in the time of al-Biruni), for both scholars are unlike the principles situated in World 1. They definitely are not infallible. For example, implicit in their belief in the plurality of worlds is the position that Euclidean geometry is not the only geometry possible.

World 3 is the world of mathematical models. It is a world overshadowed by both World 1 and World 2. The contents of World 3, as al-Biruni's 'sophisticated

¹²These assumptions are to be understood in the sense of the Euclidean postulates (which are subscribed to by both al-Biruni and Newton).

conjecture' or Newton's 'structured models', are more readily subject to change than the contents of World 2. These mathematical models result from the application of various methods. Inasmuch as mathematical models in World 3 are derivable from World 1 and World 2, they can be competitors or complementers. For example, geocentric and heliocentric models are competing mathematical models. The epicycles, however, are complementers. They are constructed as improvements to the geocentric model. (In view of these examples, note that although the construction of these mathematical models are influenced by World 1 and World 2, their end results are not necessarily compatible).

When we say that the contents of World 3 are derivable from World 2 serves as the heuristic factor for World 3.

In all events, World 1 provides the overriding *regulative principles* for the other Worlds. For instance, the discovery of anomalies with regard to a mathematical model shows not only that there are inconsistencies in World 3 but also reinforces their belief in the incompleteness and uncertainty of mathematics in the level of sense experience and eventually, the 'external' part of mathematical knowledge.

We can see in this case that both al-Biruni and Newton, in addition to the practitioners of 'modern philosophies of mathematics', share the view that there is no 'complete knowledge'. Although they do arrive at the same conclusion, the main reasoning underlying the conclusion is totally different. The chief reason for Newton and al-Biruni is the overriding belief in the Divine as the only One who has complete knowledge, whereas this aspect is not considered at all by the advocates of modern philosophies of mathematics in arriving at that conclusion. The same analysis applies to their concept of mathematical truth and mathematical certainty.¹³

Conclusion

The three worlds operating as the scheme of mathematical research imbedded in al-Biruni's and Newton's philosophies of mathematics point to an interesting aspect. Mathematics is claimed to function as a handmaiden of theology (*mathematica ancilla theologiae*). Our findings as reflected by the structure of the outline of their 'shared' philosophy also show that it is theology that provides the foundation of their mathematics, even though it is less evident in Newton's compared to al-Biruni's.

At least from the aspect of Divine Unity, theology is central in both al-Biruni's and Newton's overall conceptions of mathematics and thus it functions as the dominating factor in World 1 and consequently in the other two worlds. All there is has its roots in the Divine. Metaphysical principles residing in the

¹³ See for example, M. Kline, *Mathematics: The Loss of Certainty*, (New York; Oxford University Press, 1980).

meta-mathematical world are part of religious belief which is strongly entrenched in their hearts even before their lifelong engagement with mathematics. The doctrine of the existence of the levels of reality, the belief in hierarchy of truths, at least with the fundamental knowledge that Absolute Truth is the prerogative of God whose other names is The Truth, the uncertainty of mathematical knowledge at the level of sense experience and so forth is, in the first place, *not* a result of having mathematical knowledge alone. More important than that, it is a consequence of the deep-rooted belief *and* knowledge in the ever encompassing, ever knowing God; the Absolute Phenomenon.

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Algorithms in the Twentieth Century

Semiha Akinci

Abstract While very few intellectual achievements cannot be traced back to important predecessors, many come to be implanted in the historical public consciousness through the efforts of one man, who is then acclaimed as the person responsible for that achievement. So it was in the case of Al-Khwarazmi, who is credited with having introduced algorithms into arithmetic and algebra, although full-fledged algorithms, for example, for prime factorization, are given by Euclid, who wrote eleven centuries before Al-Khwarazmi.

While very few intellectual achievements cannot be traced back to important predecessors, many come to be implanted in the historical public consciousness through the efforts of one man, who is then acclaimed as the person responsible for that achievement. So it was in the case of Al-Khwarazmi, who is credited with having introduced algorithms into arithmetic and algebra,¹ although full-fledged algorithms, for example, for prime factorization, are given by Euclid, who wrote eleven centuries before Al-Khwarazmi.

The salient features of the algorithmic approach are highlighted in comparing Khwarazmi's way of formulating solutions for quadratic equations with the approach it supplanted, at least in Western mathematics. This earlier approach was that of Diophantus, and consisted of giving a list of solutions to a more or

¹ C. B. Boyer, (1968) *A History of Mathematics*, (New York: Wiley), p. 251, and D. I. Struik (1948), *A Concise History of Mathematics*, (New York: Dover), pp. 89–90.

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less interrelated collection of problems involving simultaneous equation²; these equations were solved in terms of specific numerical examples, and in most cases only those which were deemed practically relevant were given, no mention being made of negative roots, for example. The intention, apparently, was that the student who would think out these specific solutions would then gain the experience and mastery to solve similar problems in terms of different numerical constraints on his own, but even the need to go on to such generality was not explicitly stated. Khwarazmi's method, however, was to classify quadratic equations into several types, according to the distribution of the quadratic, linear and numerical terms, and to give general rules, expressed in terms of operations on those polynomials, for finding all positive roots. Since they were expressed in terms of the constitutive polynomials of the quadratics under discussion, rather than in terms of the numerical values which happened to be involved in the specific examples to be solved, such rules could be applied to any equation in the algebraic form for which the rules were given, and simple decision procedures had been provided for determining when one or both roots would be positive. Thus Khwarazmi explicitly stated general rules for solving all equations of a given form, regardless of what the specific numerical coefficients were in each special case.

Whatever the historical developments were, this peculiarity of Khwarazmi's exposition of algebra can be adduced as a rational reason for giving his name to such kinds of computational procedure, which can be applied to obtain a full solution of any of an unlimited number of special cases of a certain kind of problem, yielding the conclusion as a result of a finite sequence of easily performed operations. In his own work Khwarazmi had taken care to provide intuitively satisfactory geometrical demonstrations of his algorithms, but in the more practically oriented West this aspect of his exposition was neglected in favor of the analyticity and generality of the algorithmic approach. The method Descartes delineates in his renowned *Discourse* is more properly characterized as the algorithmic rather than the merely mathematical method, since the synthetic axiomatic method epitomized in Euclidean geometry has quite as much claim to the distinction of being a mathematical method.

Nevertheless the principal difference between pre- and post-Renaissance Western mathematics was that the pre-eminence of the synthetic axiomatic method in the former was replaced by the pre-eminence of the analytic algorithmic method in the latter. What the acclaimed infinitesimal calculus offered over and above Archimedes' conceptual framework was a widely applicable algorithmic method for solving any of a wide range of problems, each of which would have called for specific, particular solutions if taken up by the original Archimedean method. Unlike the case for algorithms yielding solutions of quadratic equations, however, devising logically rigorous arguments explaining why the algorithms provided by the calculus gave acceptable results proved to be quite a difficult task, supposedly surmounted in the last decades of the nineteenth century, meanwhile occasioning

² C.B. Boyer (1968), *A History of Mathematics*, (New York: Wiley), pp. 202–203.

much of the theoretical work produced in mathematics. Efforts for producing more and more general algorithms for solving equations of arbitrary degree and algebraic form culminated in Galois Theory, which in turn made possible the demonstration of an important negative result, namely that general algorithms could not be given for the solution of equations of degrees exceeding four.

With the advent of matrix algebra, algebra became thoroughly algorithmic by the beginning of the twentieth century, but at about the same time aroused interest in the foundations of mathematics led many mathematicians to adopt the study of axiomatic systems, and through such studies the synthetic proof came once more to a place of prominence as a mathematical method, although the deductive apparatus employed in formulating such synthetic proofs was the new mathematical logic, which had been influenced by the algorithmic approach. Thus the first decades of the twentieth century saw the synthetic-axiomatic and the analytic-algorithmic approaches co-operating as had seldom been the case in the past.

The difference between twentieth-century mathematical logic and the syllogistic it succeeded is quite like the difference between Diophantine algebra and algorithmic algebra. Both the Diophantine approach and syllogistic theory consist of a number of paradigmatic solutions, in which appropriate substitutions for the terms actually used have to be made for these to be applicable to the cases at hand. In either case no justification is offered for these solutions, no guidelines are provided for finding solutions to unmentioned cases, and no explicit mention of the constraints on the choice of acceptable specific terms for substitution is made. In contradistinction, twentieth-century mathematical logic proffers a small number of general rules of deduction, each applicable to any of a well-defined class of operands, such that by the successive application of these deduction rules any truth-functionally valid argument can be shown to be valid. Thoroughgoing justification is given for the dependability of each rule of deduction, and hence of any proof which consists of a finite sequence of applications of such rules; the operand upon which these rules may operate are scrupulously specified, and extending such rules to non-truth-functional contexts, such as model logics, was seen to be an elementary matter. In each of these respects the deduction rules of mathematical logic show a close analogy to Khwarazmi's algebraic algorithms.

Several deductive systems have been devised since the beginning of the twentieth century, and while some of them are fully algorithmic, in the sense that the sequence of deduction rules appropriate to a specific argument is uniquely determined by the structure of the argument involved, in some other systems, in which rules reflecting those actually used in mathematical inferences are chosen as basic, a number of different sequences of deduction rules may be applied to the same premises to yield different proofs of the same inference. It is only in this respect of rather minor condition that the more usual deductive systems of mathematical logic fall short of being fully algorithmic.

While the algorithmic approach has profoundly influenced both theoretical and practical mathematics from the Islamic Renaissance to the present, the influence it has exerted upon the daily lives of the multitudes through that channel is negligible when compared with the influence it has deployed through the increasingly more

common use of automatic processors. Such processors function by performing algorithms, which are called programs. The main idea behind writing a program is to devise an algorithm for performing any instance of a well-defined class of tasks, and to express that algorithm in terms of a sequence of operations the processing device for which the program is intended can perform. Most contemporary processors have programs for receiving algorithms expressed in languages very similar to ordinary English and producing the requisite sequence of operations that processor can perform, so the only task left for the ordinary user is to devise the required algorithm in terms of an acceptable programming language.

Efforts directed towards getting automatic processors to perform immensely complicated tasks, such as running the postal services of entire countries, are said to involve the systems analysis of those tasks. Systems analysis result typically in the production of a very large number of relatively simple algorithmic procedures interrelated by means of still other coordinating algorithms, these systems of algorithms themselves figuring as sub-components of more comprehensive algorithms, on through a fairly large number of levels of complexity. To the extent that the prediction that increasingly larger numbers of practical chores will be turned over to automatic processors is reliable, one can foresee that in the fairly close future almost everybody will have developed a familiarity with algorithms, either through somehow assisting in the production of programs, or at least through hating them for having rendered their merely human services dispensable.

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Ontologization of Ethics or Ethicization of Ontology – A Comparative Approach on Plotinus and al-Ghazali

Ilona Kock

Abstract This article intends to show how ethics depend logically on ontology and how ontology reaches deep into the sphere of ethics. Plotinus and al-Ghazali are here interpreted as examples of philosophers who developed a perspective for the substantial rooting of justice as the yardstick of action oriented at unity as the measure of theory. Emphasizing reason to be the bracket between ontology and ethics man has a crucial role to play in the harmonization of being. Getting back to the ultimate source by the heart's drive to understand the human finds itself united with all being, a fellow creature. Knowledge of God is no escapism but at the same time self-knowledge and deep insight into the web of life that culminates in gentle devotion to all being.

Prologue

Developing a concept of ethics that allows to be binding or consequential is a task that by its complexity asks for a stable ground. In times where change is constant as much as is doubt the way to go is neither a smooth one nor easy to find. This article argues that ethics unfold from an ontological basis, practice grounds on theory which is developed along a rough overview and short glimpses on the philosophical system – if we want to call it this – of Plotinus and al-Ghazali.¹ They show how

¹This article delivers a brief and rough overview of Plotinus' and al-Ghazali's thoughts on this particular aspect of substantiating ethics ontologically or interpreting ontology ethically. It can thus only offer short glimpses into their respective complex work. The topic has been treated in more detail and depth in: Ilona Kock, *Ontologische Begründung von Ethik durch*

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cosmology is a unity of ontology and ethics as ethics develop “logically” from an ontological theory that connects all being essentially in one simple and transcendent source. Substantiating being in unity leads to an orientation of ethics at justice. The linking bracket between ontology and ethics is reason – and thus the human being that is essentially defined through reason. Plotinus and al-Ghazali here offer the possibility to expand the concept of reason beyond the rationalistic confines it experiences so often. Being the core of a purified heart, reason is perfectly unfolded in the absolute experience of unity which reflects the point of simultaneous self-knowledge and knowledge of the ultimate source. Reason, bearing additionally a spiritual aspect, thus answers a demand of cross-cultural philosophy. It shows how “mysticism”² is not anti-rational but develops a particular system and accordingly logic. Incorporating doubt fundamentally in the search for absolute truth, Plotinus’ and al-Ghazali’s philosophy can still serve as a horizon or perspective for us today.

Ontology

The One and God, Emanation and Creation

The absolute source and substantiation of all being is the One in Plotinus’ thought, in al-Ghazali’s God, whose essence is unrecognizably concealed in absolute transcendence but who can still be positively described by his attributes and implied through his works, the phenomenal being.³ Whereas al-Ghazali establishes ontology theologically, thus starts from an onto-theology,⁴ we can not directly speak of a concept of God with Plotinus. The term “God” does indeed occur occasionally here

Einheitserfahrung im Denken Plotins und Ghazalis. (Nordhausen: Traugott Bautz, 2011), [hereafter *Ontologische Begründung* (2011)]. This examination is mainly based on Plotinus’ Ennead VI9 (9) and al-Ghazali’s *Miškāt al-anwar*. Other sources and literature can be found in the aforementioned publication.

²The term is in quotation marks as is commonly understood as something at least latently irrational. This article intends to show how different philosophies or systems of thought follow their own logics, thence develop a respective concept of reason. So does “mysticism”. Above that, Plotinus and al-Ghazali emphasize the absolute role of reason which is perfect in its most exceeded abstraction or transcendence. The term “mysticism” would thus have to be treated cautiously and one would have to add “intellectual” or “rational”. The quotation marks intend to refer to this seemingly paradoxical idea of a rational and spiritual philosophy that is thought by the heart.

³Al-Ghazali for religious purposes rejects a purely negative approach to God. Cf.: Mehmed S. Aydin, *Ghazali on Metaphorical Interpretation*. Working Paper in preparation for the L.A.U.D. (Linguistic Agency University of Duisburg) Symposium. (Duisburg, 1997), no page. Cf. also: Ilona Kock, *Ontologische Begründung* (2011), pp. 101–107. The attributes, al-Ghazali warns, can not be understood anthropomorphically. Cf. Al-Ghazali, *The Incoherence of the Philosophers*. A parallel English-Arabic text translated, introduced and annotated by Michael E. Marmura. (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 1997), p. 17.

⁴Cf. Ilona Kock, *Ontologische Begründung* (2011), p. 100.

as well but in a context that can certainly not be interpreted monotheistically. Plotinus had a sceptical attitude towards the cults; his thinking still develops from a polytheistic (“pagan”) background. Against this the soul or its functioning, as for example its striving, can be called a god as it indeed happens with the Eros. When Plotinus does not speak of “a god” but “the God” it is not always clear if he means the Nous as the thinking of thinking⁵ or the One itself that defies every describability. The emphasis on the One’s absolute hyper-beingness transfers this beyond the frame of the designatable and lets it so appear completely abstract and transcendent.⁶ Plotinus’ notion of the One becomes comparable with al-Ghazali’s conception of God through the immersion of the transcendence of God’s essence. As the *Miškāt* (“The Niche of Lights”) describes, the true God is not the mover of being and not even the one who enables this to move but a principle hidden behind this to whom all being is owed but that itself lies absolutely beyond all recognisability.⁷ This underlined and deepened abstractness of the first and original principle can be interpreted as a similarity with Plotinus’ One. In a Godhead beyond the intelligible notion of God theology is in a way overcome to a hyper- or pre-theology.

The substantiation of the emergence of being also shows differences between Plotinus and al-Ghazali. Whereas al-Ghazali advocates creation Plotinus’ system is based on emanation.⁸ Of the overabundance of the One the entire being flows out mediated by the stages of the Nous and the soul.⁹ Voluntary creation is not even mentioned here rather the conscious will of the One is negated as it is beyond any definition as much as beyond consciousness or will. It is herein that al-Ghazali finds a problem; against emanation he emphasizes God’s freedom. God can through his free will determine creation directly; being does not flow out necessarily and

⁵ This is how God was characterized later in the peripatetic tradition of Arabic philosophy e.g. by Ibn Sina or Ibn Rushd.

⁶ For the notion of the One cf. Ilona Kock, *Ontologische Begründung* (2011), pp. 38–43. On pp. 34–38 the difficulty to define the One is reflected.

⁷ See: Abu Hamid Muhammad Al-Ghazali, *Die Nische der Lichter. Miškāt al-anwar*. Aus dem Arabischen übersetzt, mit einer Einleitung, mit Anmerkungen und Indices herausgegeben von ‘Abd-Elamad ‘Abd-Elhamid Elschazli. (Hamburg: Felix meiner Verlag, 1987), p. 63. For al-Ghazali’s notion of God: Ilona Kock, *Ontologische Begründung* (2011), pp. 107–113.

⁸ Cf. Ilona Kock, *Ontologische Begründung* (2011), pp. 15–20, 113–119.

⁹ It is not absolutely clear if Plotinus understands the basis of phenomenal, sensual being, matter, as being independent and eternally existent or lets this as well flow out of the One. Does he advocate a world without beginning or the world’s advent in time? We should hereby keep in mind that both Plotinus and al-Ghazali conceive time as the image of eternity. Time is the mode of that which exists and becomes comprehensible only by this. Thus the world cannot emerge in a certain initial moment as a beginning or initiation can only be in time and thence with the world. Following this, would the effluxion of being or creation not have to happen in eternity? And would creation in the sense of a beginning not be in being only assumably so that it would have to create itself as it is the only temporal existence above which the One, God is exalted?

uncontrollably by God. But Plotinus as well underlines the One's freedom.¹⁰ Just because the One is superior to any determination it is the yardstick for everything, for goodness, truth, actuality or authenticity and also for freedom. The One's overabundance does not explain a compulsion for the causation of being but on the contrary the freedom to give perpetually. However, al-Ghazali's rejection of emanation is not absolute. In his idea of the flowing of being ("Herfließen des Seins"; *fluxus entis*) he distances himself from the sensuality of the image of flowing just as Plotinus does.¹¹ The flowing out is not to be understood like the flowing of water out of a vessel where the water really dwindles from the vessel and connects for example with the surface of a hand. Being rather emerges in the way sunlight reflects on a wall or the image of a person in a mirror. The source or origin does not lose anything; it remains entirely itself but at the same time causes the light or the mirrored image. The frequent characterization of God as true light¹² or sun in the *Miškāt* suggests that God is here understood like the One with Plotinus (who also compares it with the sun),¹³ as a source above being whose overabundance does not dwindle or change in flowing out but remains the same eternally. Also al-Ghazali's theory creation being mediated along a row of intellects¹⁴ as an alternative to direct immediate creation by God can be compared with emanation. As therein the Nous and the soul mediate material being here stages of angels, that represent intelligible principles,¹⁵ translate God's command into being.

¹⁰ The debate on the free will of the One can be read in chapter VI8 (39) "Der freie Wille und das Wollen des Einen" in: Richard Harder, *Plotins Schriften*. Band IV: die Schriften 39–45 der chronologischen Reihenfolge: a) *Text und Übersetzung*. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1967), S. 2–61.

¹¹ Cf.: Dominic J. O'Meara, *Plotinus: an introduction to the Enneads*. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 60–61. For al-Ghazali see: Muhammed Yasin El-Taḥer Uraibi, *Al-Ghazalis Aporien. Im Zusammenhang mit dem Kausalproblem*. Vorgelegt an der Philosophischen Fakultät der Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität. (Bonn, 1972), p. 303.

¹² See: Abu Hamid Muhammad Al-Ghazali, *Die Nische der Lichten- Miškāt al-anwar*. Aus dem Arabischen übersetzt, mit einer Einleitung, mit Anmerkungen und Indices herausgegeben von 'Abd-Elsamad 'Abd-Elhamid Elschazli. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1987), p. 27.

¹³ VI, 6, 34 in: Richard Harder, *Plotins Schriften. Band I: die Schriften 1–21 der chronologischen Reihenfolge*. (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1930), p. 118.

¹⁴ See al-Ghazali's simile of the waterclock e.g. in: Muhammed Yasin El-Taḥer Uraibi, *Al-Ghazalis Aporien. Im Zusammenhang mit dem Kausalproblem*. Vorgelegt an der Philosophischen Fakultät der Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität. (Bonn, Univ., Diss., 1972), pp. 106 following.

¹⁵ For the association of angels with intellects cf. Al-Ghazali, *The Incoherence of the Philosophers*. A parallel English-Arabic text translated, introduced and annotated by Michael E. Marmura. (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 1997), p. 65.

Reason and Being, Hierarchical Organization of the Worlds and the Role of Man

Plotinus and al-Ghazali explain being to be divided into two worlds, the sensual-material or phenomenal one and the intelligible one.¹⁶ These worlds parallel each other and their relation is like that of model (intelligible or spiritual world) and image (sensual world) whereby the spiritual world is again the image of the absolute model, the One or God. Being is organized hierarchically in these spheres. The highest stage, the One or God, as the perfect model and source of all being is the yardstick against which the truthfulness and actuality of being is measured.¹⁷ Whereas the One or God is the only truly real and actual, being grades according to its proximity to this original principle. The highest stage of the intelligible world is closer to it than for example the soul that mediates between the worlds. Matter finally, which is the farthest from the hyper-being source and the most scattered into multitude and vagueness, is at the lowest rung of the ladder of being. Measured against the yardstick of unity multitude is, the more it progresses, to be judged as privation. The lesser the unity is the lower is the form of being. The rank of being is measured against the proximity to the perfect unity of the One or God. The more a being approaches this the higher its value is to be judged and the more actual it can be denoted as being at all. Thus the intelligible world is more veritably being than the sensual phenomenal one that turns out to be a mere metaphor of the spiritual world. As any being arises from one source it is always essentially a symbol, sign and reference. Not that inauthenticity bestows it with its value but the role as a sign of the ultimate ground distinguishes it as valuable and truly being. Its function as a reference also substantiates the possibility of knowledge and approximation of the source of all being, which can add to the value of being, its truthfulness. Understanding the phenomenal world in its being an image and a sign of the intelligible one, of which structure and form are depicted in the corporeal, one attains a more authentic notion of real being on the one hand and on the other hand one raises the value of the material world through the realization of its symbolic function. Also, looking at the intelligible, spiritual world as the image of the One or God, this as well appears to be a sign wherein its true character and thus its value is based and what at the same time enables the ascent along the yardstick of truth. The inauthenticity of being on the one hand means a privation of unity measured against absolute unity. On the other hand, if it is understood as a symbol, interpreted as a sign, it facilitates the attainment of unity through knowledge. Being is by this function linked with rational knowledge directly.

The correspondence of being and reason, organized along stages that rise up to the One or God and meet their perfection there can be found equally with Plotinus and al-Ghazali. As all being stems from one original source it is shaped uniformly.

¹⁶ Cf.: Ilona Kock, *Ontologische Begründung* (2011), pp. 20–24, 85–89.

¹⁷ See: Jens Halfwassen, *Plotin und der Neuplatonismus*. (München: C.H. Beck, 2004), p. 37.

The source being the highest principle of reason, real and true light, being is organized rationally through all its stages. Thereby it can only just really be regarded and work as a symbol, a reference to its source. Mirroring through its rational shape and organization the perfection of the absolute reason of the first and real principle, it can qualify to achieve knowledge of this. The rationality of the order of being substantiates the harmony of cosmos. Not just any principle could create and determine the “best of all worlds”; only reason itself in its absolutely free, unlimited and undifferentiated form (or pre-form) can guarantee the balance of being, letting its intelligibility flow into and fundamentally form it. The spiritual world that imprints the rational forms into the material world is therefore, with regard to rationality, also pre-eminent compared with the corporeal. Here the soul, that occupies a position between the worlds, plays a crucial part. If the soul is successful in overcoming the material for the spiritual and in realizing knowledge to be its real role and value, it unfolds its rational core and thus its being by which it further rises in the hierarchy of unity.

Unity through reason can only be really created and understood through the role of man in this system. Man being essentially endowed with reason represents a microcosm.¹⁸ Where macrocosm appears to be rationally organized being man is its smaller counterpart holding reason in his and her innermost heart. Thereby man is at the same time the mirror of the original source in being. This being characterized by the perfection of reason, the human being is its worldly representative as reason defines man essentially. This human reason is subject to the difficulties of earthly being. It is embroiled in the inauthentic multitude and has to learn through unfolding to look for the truth in the abstract or spiritual. For this the human being goes back to the structure of being surrounding it. Through scientific activity¹⁹ man unveils the perfect organization of being and infers the principles determining this thereby rising to the intelligible world. If man comprehends that these principles have flown out of one sole and simple source, the first and original principle of the most perfect reason, he or she transcends all worlds and attains the

¹⁸ Plotinus and al-Ghazali define the human being and its capacity essentially as being reason. Cf. Ilona Kock, *Ontologische Begründung* (2011), pp. 48–53, 119–122. Compare the idea of man as microcosm on pp. 95–98. Al-Ghazali himself calls man the “small world”. See Muhammed Yasin El-Taher Uraibi, *Al-Ghazalis Aporien. Im Zusammenhang mit dem Kausalproblem*. Vorgelegt an der Philosophischen Fakultät der Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität. (Bonn, 1972), p. 305 and Frank Griffel, *Al-Ghazali’s Philosophical Theology*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 269.

¹⁹ This is one of two ways al-Ghazali suggests to achieve truth. Cf. Ilona Kock, *Ontologische Begründung* (2011), pp. 167–172 and Abu Hamid Muhammad Al-Ghazali, *Die Nische der Lichten. Miškāt al-anwar*. Aus dem Arabischen übersetzt, mit einer Einleitung, mit Anmerkungen und Indices herausgegeben von ‘Abd-ElSAMAD ‘Abd-ElHAMID ElSCHAZLI. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1987), p. 24. The other way is that which al-Ghazali calls *dauq* (tasting). He explains this term in: Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazali, *Der Erretter aus dem Irrtum. Al-Munqid min ad-dalāl*. Aus dem Arabischen übersetzt, mit einer Einleitung, mit Anmerkungen und Indices herausgegeben von ‘Abd-ElSAMAD ‘Abd-ElHAMID ElSCHAZLI. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1988), p. 54.

aim of knowledge, the origin of being. The unfolding of human reason thus enables the realization of the unity of all being; it is the essential link to really let this unity come to light. If from this experience of unity the human being derives an ethics that is mirrored and realized in his or her conduct of life, the “mystical” ascent to the original absolute, hyper-conceptual knowledge is able to connect or unite being and morality, ontology and ethics. By assuming one source of being that appears to be the most perfect, hyper-rational principle of reason, Plotinus’ and al-Ghazali’s systems of thought facilitate, through the key position of man mirroring reason, the unity of beginning and end, of the substantiation of being and a just perspective of action.

Ethics

The Ascent²⁰ and the Difficulty of Its Comprehensibility

Man’s essential core, reason connects, following Plotinus and al-Ghazali, being with an ethics of unity and justice and creates a unity between the worlds. Being characterized as rational, man, in the harmonization of being towards unity, holds a crucial function in the cosmic system. He is challenged by a double ethics. The one side develops in an ascent and refers to the understanding progress of the human reason towards absolute simplicity and unity in the transcendent One or God. The following descent denotes the action in the world of being and against the fellow creatures.

To some extent the ascent follows an ethics of subjectivity; only every single person him- or herself can through individual efforts discover and unfold his or her innermost core of reason. Man is thereby embedded into the all of being along which knowledge is oriented and perfected. As absolute unity is the yardstick of all truth, reason as well unfolds towards this and is then regarded as real and authentic when it merges into the absolute, being beyond concepts, speech and differentiation. The path leading there is characterized by abstraction or purification from the sensual and from multitude.²¹ The basic insight at the beginning of each ascent is the doubt about the reality of being and the realization of it being an inauthentic

²⁰ The idea of ascent and descent stems from: Euree Song, *Aufstieg und Abstieg der Seele. Diesseitigkeit und Jenseitigkeit in Plotins Ethik der Sorge*. Hypomnemata. Untersuchungen zur Antike und zu ihrem Nachleben; Bd. 180. (Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009). The detailed treatment of this idea, formulated as an ontologization of ethics or ethical interpretation of ontology, and its association with Sufism can be found in: Ilona Kock, *Ontologische Begründung von Ethik durch Einheitserfahrung im Denken Plotins und Ghazalis*. (Nordhausen: Traugott Bautz, 2011).

²¹ Cf. Ilona Kock, *Ontologische Begründung* (2011), pp. 53–59, 172–185. As al-Ghazali has developed a profound theory of epistemology, based on stages of doubt, see also pp. 119 following.

sign of truth. This simplification is radical with Plotinus and al-Ghazali: not even the own self of the searcher for knowledge can endure before absolute unity.²² Only in the overcoming of the self, in complete transcendence of being or dying of the self is the aim really achieved; man is as he was before he was, immersed in the original source.²³ As here even consciousness is transcended, unity is less known but rather extensively experienced beyond the rational.²⁴ This experience of complete unity can take place inside the inner depths through the abstraction of everything external. Leaving the corporeal the searcher for knowledge transfers him- or herself ever deeper into his or her own, rational core. Paradoxically the transcendence of the self lets man find his true ground that reflects the original principle, pre- or hyper-reason. In the experience of unity man transfers the absolute transcendent origin into his innermost core. Self-knowledge and knowledge of God are one in this experience of unity.²⁵ They unite transcendence and immanence in the heart of man.²⁶ This experience is called a vision by Plotinus and al-Ghazali and they distinguish this from sight. Vision describes a different kind of seeing, an inner insight or tasting and happens only in the individual heart of the soul. Sight only perceives objects that can refer and lead to true vision.²⁷

The vision or the experience of unity bears difficulties concerning their communication and comprehensibility that Plotinus and al-Ghazali were aware of.²⁸ Vision happens momentarily, suddenly, uncontrollably and hyper-rationally. Thus it exceeds the limits of the expressible. Merely the way there, doubt, abstraction and the education of the individual reason can (roughly) be communicated or it can be motivated to pursue it. The absolute experience itself is an individual affair. Anybody can experience the vision only in his or her own depths and this is therefore incomparable with the experience of others. The One or God being the

²² See Ilona Kock, *Ontologische Begründung* (2011), pp. 65, 181. Cf. also: Werner Beierwaltes, *Denken des Einen: Studien zur neuplatonischen Philosophie und ihrer Wirkungsgeschichte*. (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1985), p. 123; and Reynold A. Nicholson, *The Mystics of Islam*. (London & Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), p. 59.

²³ Cf. Ilona Kock, *Ontologische Begründung* (2011), p. 148.

²⁴ Cf. Jens Halfwassen, *Plotin und der Neuplatonismus*. (München: C.H. Beck, 2004), p. 56 and Ilona Kock, *Ontologische Begründung* (2011), pp. 63–64, 181.

²⁵ See: Ilona Kock, *Ontologische Begründung* (2011), pp. 62, 72–73 and 146–150. Cf. also: Mahmoud Zakzouk, *Ghazali und Descartes. Ein philosophischer Vergleich*. Interkulturelle Bibliothek; Bd. 104. (Nordhausen: Traugott Bautz, 2005), p. 84 and Annemarie Schimmel, *Mystische Dimensionen des Islam*. (Aalen: Qalander Verlag, 1979), p. 211.

²⁶ As the absolute aim of the striving of man is achieved momentarily Plotinus' and al-Ghazali's philosophy does not have to be characterized as oriented towards the hereafter. In the moment of vision the hereafter is also transcended. Absolute "enlightenment" is experienced in life already and thus heightens man as living and rational.

²⁷ See Ilona Kock, *Ontologische Begründung* (2011), pp. 59–66, 137–146.

²⁸ Cf.: Ilona Kock, *Ontologische Begründung* (2011), pp. 34–38, 66–70, 151–156, 183. See also: Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazali, *Der Erreter aus dem Irrtum. Al-Munqid min ad-dalal*. Aus dem Arabischen übersetzt, mit einer Einleitung, mit Anmerkungen und Indices herausgegeben von 'Abd-Elsamad 'Abd-Elhamid Elschazli. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1988), p. 47.

yardstick of truth and authenticity, thereby at the same time being unspeakable and incomprehensible through its pre- and hyper-existence, generally questions the capability of speech to indicate the truth. Speech can not grasp perfect unity that exceeds it; at the same time it can thus not actually describe an existing being as this is always only a symbol, a sign or a reference to the real truth. Thus speech can finally only be understood as a metaphor. Every statement does not really indicate something but circumscribes its object roughly and therefore functions symbolically. Because in this way speech fundamentally fails as a means of communication of truth, it all the more misses the absolute experience of unity. This is thus approached in silence or in inauthentic speech, the awareness of the speechlessness of speech, which is communicated in a paradoxical technique of simultaneous negation and affirmation²⁹ or in symbolic allegories. In Plotinus' and al-Ghazali's "mysticism" the true God, the One is discovered just through the comprehension of the incomprehensibility; in the immersion into the suspecting ignorance the absolutely hidden is unconceptually, hyper-conceptually realized, tasted, experienced.

A further problem of the comprehensibility of the experience of unity is grounded in the fact that the inner self is one with the transcendent divine during the momentary vision. Complete purification lets the original reason be reflected in the rational core of the human soul. When the vision is over they part again. In this duality unity can not actually be grasped, it slips away from describability that only characterizes the multiple separation of being. Hereby the understanding of the unity of man and God or the One deserves fundamental scepticism: Plotinus and al-Ghazali both emphasize that the unity is not real, essential.³⁰ Man and the divine do not merge into actual unity; the first one does not truly immerse in the last one. This unity should rather be understood like a reflection whereby the picture flows onto the surface of a mirror so that both seem to be one. But in fact the model remains the model and the surface of the mirror the surface. For the moment of their being opposite each other, and only if the surface of the mirror is clear, just as the soul or heart of the person has to be pure, the picture of the model is reflected on the surface of the mirror; the mirror resembles the model in depicting this on itself, thence being its image. If the model disappears, the mirror's surface is imageless as well. Model and surface do not change essentially. They remain themselves and their mutual similarity is abolished after the moment of reflection. Just like this, the unity of man and the One or God is not essential but a simile that intends to circumscribe the radical nature of the approximation. Actually, in this so-to-speak-unity the real difference between transcendent source and human being

²⁹ Cf.: Werner Beierwaltes, *Das wahre Selbst: Studien zu Plotins Begriff des Geistes und des Einen*. (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2001), p. 145. A very insightful publication on the dynamics of paradoxical speech is: Michael A. Sells, *Mystical languages of unsaying*. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994).

³⁰ Cf.: Ilona Kock, *Ontologische Begründung* (2011), pp. 64–65, 182–183 and also Abu Hamid Muhammad Al-Ghazali, *Die Nische der Lichte. Miškāt al-anwar*. Aus dem Arabischen übersetzt, mit einer Einleitung, mit Anmerkungen und Indices herausgegeben von 'Abd-Elsamad 'Abd-Elhamid Elschazli. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1987), p. 25.

becomes obvious. Whereas the source is absolutely simple, hyper-worldly and pre-existent, man is living, being and embedded in a complex world in which he or she occupies an important role. In the experience of unity man does not only know God or the One, but as well discovers himself essentially. He comprehends his humanity that is substantiated in reason. If man realizes his rational unity with the absolute source, he at the same time understands himself as differentiated from this because of his being a mortal but rational human being. Herein the second side of ethics is grounded, the descent into the world that is the domain of man during his or her life. As a living being that is above that endowed with reason and thus capable of achieving knowledge of the absolute truth, man is responsible to harmonize cosmos, to perfect the unity of the universe through his wise behaviour acting according to justice.

Descent into the World, Ethics of Justice and of Pure Conscience

Whereas the ascent can be seen as ethical because it fulfils the responsibility of self-knowledge that leads towards the source which substantiates being, the descent (or ethics) is to be understood as its result.³¹ Insofar practical ethics have to be seen as a philosophical way of life as man's conduct is based on his extensive experience of truth. Ethics thus come forth from the most subjective, for man individually educates his soul towards simplicity and purifies it, and culminates in action in the world inspired by the attainment of unity. Reason is here the soul's master. It discovers absolute truth in the original source, the One or God, against whom the value of all being has to be measured. Every single being herein has a function that is oriented at its essence, it has been endowed by the ultimate source of being, which it unfolds to achieve perfection, its determination and destiny. Man is actually and really reason. Its perfect unfolding, wisdom, thus represents the achievement of bliss for the human being. True wisdom is the realization or rather experience of the unity of all being in the One or God. In this way every existent being appears to be actually equal in and through the ultimate source. Man's responsibility is to promote the unfolding of being and of man by emphasizing the relevance of reason and to act as an example in his own rational conduct of life. The yardstick of his action is thereby equality in unity, that is justice. Every human being, a sovereign as well,³² is under the obligation to its fellow creatures to act according to mildness, gentleness and goodness. Especially a person who has had a

³¹ For the connection of theory and action, ontology and ethics by reason or knowledge see: Ilona Kock, *Ontologische Begründung* (2011), pp. 70–77, 162–167, 185–197.

³² Dorothea Krawulsky, *Briefe und Reden des Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazzali*. Übersetzt und erläutert von Dorothea Krawulsky. Islamkundliche Untersuchungen Bd. 15. (Freiburg im Breisgau: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1971), pp. 69, 115, 133 beautifully underlines this.

vision, experienced unity has to and is only able to fulfil this commandment. She has become so pure and is so immersed into her heart that she bears the source inside herself and is thus similar to it. As Plotinus defines the One as the ultimate Good³³ and al-Ghazali as well emphasizes man's being the image of the Merciful,³⁴ it suggests itself to interpretation that this achievement of the highest knowledge (or "enlightenment") culminates in action according to similarity, that is in mercy or compassion and goodness, in an ethics of giving. Here the role of reason is crucial: knowledge achieved through the perfect unfolding of reason substantiates and grounds just conduct towards every fellow being. Insofar as Plotinus' and al-Ghazali' "mysticism" does not at all advocate escapism but an ethical conduct of life that is philosophical, the path of the wise.

Reason educates the soul towards knowledge and justice. Just as it facilitates the purification of the sensual it also enables the bareness of evil conduct. With this Plotinus and al-Ghazali emphasize, along with personal disposition, teaching and habituation to good deeds.³⁵ Thence, the education of reason is directly associated with the capability of moral conduct which is why reason (also in the descent) can be denoted a virtue. As reason is concealed in the innermost core of the human being, ethics have to be judged according to the state of the human inwardness.³⁶ Not every giving is good; mildness can be a deception when it is mere pretence. Plotinus and al-Ghazali demand a pure, honest conscience which can only just really characterize an action as good. The relativity of morality is harmonized in the rational attainment of the highest knowledge in the experience of unity through the purity in the deepest core of the heart that can only appear as just through its becoming similar to the ultimate Good. Thus reason is a virtue and the ethics of justice the peak of a philosophy that is oriented at unity. In the absolute immanence of the individual innermost core of the soul the key point of the actuality of being, of truth, of reason and certainty and of the purity of doing can be found. Plotinus and al-Ghazali, through the unity of immanence and transcendence in the rational core of the human being, link knowledge, ethics and happiness; insofar, we could here also speak of an earthly, rationally oriented Eschatology.

³³ Cf. Ilona Kock, *Ontologische Begründung* (2011), p. 40.

³⁴ See: Abu Hamid Muhammad Al-Ghazali, *Die Nische der Lichter. Miškat al-anwar*. Aus dem Arabischen übersetzt, mit einer Einleitung, mit Anmerkungen und Indices herausgegeben von 'Abd-Elsamad 'Abd-Elhamid Elschazli. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1987), p. 40.

³⁵ See Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazali, *Das Kriterium des Handelns. Mizan al-'amal*. Aus dem Arabischen übersetzt, mit einer Einleitung, mit Anmerkungen und Indices herausgegeben von 'Abd-Elsamad 'Abd-Elhamid Elschazli. (Darmstadt: WBG, 2006), p. 138. Also: Ebrahim Moosa, *Ghazali and the Poetics of Imagination*. (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2005), p. 230.

³⁶ Cf. Ilona Kock, *Ontologische Begründung* (2011), pp. 58–59, 194.

Epilogue

In spite of all contradictions and differences, Plotinus and al-Ghazali appear to be comparable in their emphasis on the absolute part of reason. The original source of all being, the One or God, is as true light the original principle of reason, organizing and forming thereby all being rationally. Man being essentially determined by reason, his responsibility being the reflection of divine light in his own individual innermost core, fulfils the unity of rationality through his comprehension of the One's, God's, actuality what only just renders the rationally ordered being understandable. The philosophies of Plotinus and al-Ghazali stress the relevance of reason and have the human being in their centres; finally they advocate a philosophy of man, for he, through the unfolding of reason, creates the unity of being and of being and ethics. The human being herein has the responsibility to harmonize cosmos through knowledge. Man translates the rational providence (for being emerges ordered along the absolute reason) of the first principle into the world of the living. For this his ascent in knowledge to absolute unity, the immanence of transcendence, is fundamentally relevant.

The exceeding of reason, the expansion of the concept of reason with the hyper-rational, the extensive experience of unity enables to base ethics on ontology. The hyper-rationality of "mysticism", *Henosis*³⁷ or the experience of unity is thus not so much an overcoming or dismissal of reason (and not of rationality as well) but rather its perfection. Through the absoluteness of this deep realization, the comprehension of being in its actuality culminates in action following the principle of justice. Insofar, the knower, the philosopher and "mystic" is an example for society as she can communicate her knowledge through teaching and her conduct of life.

The knowledge of the unity of being demands, if it is experienced in the truthful inner depths, the purest heart, no escapism but an ethics of justice. Thus the basic principle of reason with Plotinus and al-Ghazali shows the mutual dependence of ontology and ethics which are linked through knowledge or reason. Therefore the extension of the concept of reason with the hyper-rational, with "mysticism" as the absolute unfolding of reason towards unity, is absolutely relevant as it only just facilitates the substantiating explanation of ethics through (and on) ontology and the orientation at unity and justice instead of division and injustice.

The substantiation of being through a hyper-rational, reason itself principally substantiating source, the original principle of reason, lets it be rationally organized and thus be comprehensible and interpretable as a reference to its source. Because man is defined as being essentially rational he or she is able to attain perfect knowledge or experience of unity. Letting this become alive in the conduct of life through wisdom, mercy, goodness and justice, man himself only just creates the unity of all being.

³⁷ This term is very well explained by Werner Beierwaltes, *Denken des Einen: Studien zur neuplatonischen Philosophie und ihrer Wirkungsgeschichte*. (Frankfurt am Main: Votterio Klostermann, 1985), p. 123.

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Avicenna and Husserl: Comparative Aspects

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Abstract Philosophical continuity between medieval philosophy represented by Avicenna and analytic philosophy embodied by Husserl can be traced in a comparative way through a number of issues, already studied by many authors. This paper attempts to analyze some of the themes linking Avicenna and Husserl. The question of intention is at once the philosophical basis and the hinge that connects medieval philosophy to phenomenology through Brentano. Intention related to the issue of *phantasia* and perception also echoes to *tasawwur* and *tasdiq* in the medieval context. In this comparative analysis, the notion of hylè represents, in a differentiating way, the intelligibility of the data both by the materiality and by the original characteristic form. Hyle is the form of the intelligible data, their flesh and schematic appearance as well as the other side of the internal senses. A third theme which is relevant in a comparative context is logic, for the young Husserl sets out to demonstrate the inadequacy of classical or traditional logic to define a formal then transcendental or phenomenological logic, based on the concept of Logos, which can be compared with the prophetic intellect professed by Avicenna.

Husserl on rare occasions cites medieval philosophers like St. Augustine and Nicolas of Cusa, using the term “scholastic” to refer to those times, especially when he talks about the concept of intentionality or “traditional logic” (*traditionellen Logik*).¹ At the same time, phenomenological literature has focused on several points of the relationship between Husserl’s thought and medieval

¹ Cf. *Hua.*, VII, 1, *Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Erster Teil, Kritische Ideengeschichte* (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1956), p. 61, 329, 106. *Hua.*, XXX, *Logik und allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie: Vorlesungen 1917/18* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1996), p. 20. Husserl gives a number of detailed analyses of traditional logic, criticizing in particular conversion (*Konversion*) and consequence (*Schlusse*), cf. *Hua.*, Materialien, 6, *Alte und neue Logik: Vorlesung 1908–09*, ed. Elisabeth

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philosophy. Interest in these comparative studies has grown significantly over the past ten years. Researchers have attempted both to conduct comparative studies on the relationship between phenomenology and medieval philosophy and renew the interpretation of the latter by a phenomenological approach.

This article attempts to conduct a comparative study of Avicenna's philosophy and Husserl's phenomenology through some similar concepts and themes. Our goal is to understand in which way a number of philosophical questions are analyzed in Avicenna and Husserl and show the relevance of the connection that can be established by studying these questions.

We begin with a review of the literature and bibliographic data in which we find the first traces of studies on this subject. This section allows a better view of the stakes and the context in which the philosophical link between Avicenna and Husserl found a place in contemporary studies. We then take into consideration that intellectual relationship from various angles. Indeed, we will, first, tackle the question of intention on which a large part of the Avicennian corpus is based and which is also a founding element of Husserl's phenomenology. A second issue to be addressed will be the place of Phantasia in Avicenna and Husserl, especially in the context of the internal senses or intuitive data. Another fundamental issue is logic, that represents a major problem for both philosophers and especially for Husserl, whose critique of traditional logic significantly echoes Avicennian logic.

Between the philosophy of Antiquity and that of the modern period, medieval philosophy, or theology, was not the favorite subject of phenomenological studies and, for that matter, of Husserl's phenomenology. Husserl's philosophical genealogy seems flawed as it scarcely refers to scholastic schools. However, we know the paramount role that the Middle Ages have played in the transmission of philosophical and theological knowledge for the development of modern philosophy.

The Concept of Intention (ma'na) and Its Connection to Other Concepts

The concept of intention is at the heart of medieval philosophy, namely that of Avicenna, and also of the phenomenology of Husserl. It is in the sense of the continuity of the Platonic idea that we can understand the continuation of this concept and particularly the modality of the articulation of the intent beyond mere representation. The intentional purpose Husserl expresses by consciousness can be compared with the functioning of intentionality from the perspective of the estimative imagination as expressed by Avicenna. The two most important axes of Husserlian intentionality are expressed in the first place by an intuitive phenomenology consistent with the hyletic aspect and the problematic of perception and then

Schuhmann (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003), p. 253 ff. He appears vehement in his criticism of traditional logic, cf. *Erste Philosophie*, *ibid.*, p. 19 ff, tr. fr. 26.

by the phenomenology of the world of life. “Modern intentionality” looks into the study of phenomenology. This movement sometimes takes interest in classical or medieval philosophy but some of its representatives are actually only interested in modern philosophy.²

The concept of intention in Avicenna somehow highlights a paradox. On the one hand the search for meaning in the phenomenological sense matches the notion of *intentio*, for which Avicenna uses *ma'na* as equivalent, or sometimes other words, as we shall see; and on the other hand the idea that Avicenna seeks objective knowledge in the teleological horizon which appears to have remained unknown to researchers.

The word *intentio* is indeed used in the Latin translation of Avicenna to render the word *ma'na*, but it is also used to render other concepts such as *âra* and *gharaz*.³ There is a gap between the philological approach and the consistency of the philosophical concepts. Indeed, the notion of *intentio* refers to a continuum of bodily sensations in a temporal process and it is bound to the emergence of an external object in the brain being the center of the noetic perception in the context of the faculty of the soul performing its intelligible device. Avicenna, speaking of

² A philosophical tradition after phenomenology proposes modern philosophical readings of intentionality and of the set of mental acts. Connected to a scientific reading, by means of the cognitive sciences or of the modern psychology, this tradition forms on a philosophic basis to try to enlighten the dark points of the question of the intentionality in particular from the question of language. The historic chain comprises numerous characters but to cite only some of them, see John R. Searle, *Intentionality: an Essay in the Philosophy of Mind* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1983); John R. Searle, *L'Intentionnalité: essai de philosophie des états mentaux*, trans. Claude Pichevin, Propositions (Paris: Éd. de Minuit, 1985); Hintikka is particularly representative, see Jaakko Hintikka, *L'intentionnalité et les mondes possibles*, trans. and pres. Nadine Lavand, Opuscule 6 (Villeneuve-d'Ascq: Presses universitaires de Lille, 1989), transl. from: *The Intentions of Intentionality and Other New Models for Modalities*; in France, Jean-Luc Petit gave a pioneer lecture of this tradition, see Jean-Luc Petit, *L'action dans la philosophie analytique*, Philosophie d'aujourd'hui (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1991); Jocelyn Benoist represents philosophical opinion in the tradition of modern intentionality, particularly in the continuity of Americans, see Jocelyn Benoist, *Sens et sensibilité: l'intentionnalité en contexte*, Passages (Paris: les Éd. du Cerf, 2009); another current emphasizes the scientific and practical side of perception partly linked to the question of intentionality, see *Philosophies de la perception: phénoménologie, grammaire et sciences cognitives*, dir. Jacques Bouveresse and Jean-Jacques Rosat (Paris: O. Jacob, 2003); one must also cite the work of Thomas Metzinger who inscribes a new modality of consciousness as reference or self-reference and who promotes a philosophy of consciousness literally individualised, see Thomas Metzinger, *Being No One: the Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity* (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 2003).

³ *Ma'nâ* is the concept most often mentioned. In *Avicenna latinus*, vol. IV–V, 1968, *ma'nâ* is rendered by *intentio*, as are *maqsud*, *qasd* and *âra*. About translation and its difficulties, see *ibid.*, (introd.), p. 112 ff., where the word *intentio* is cited. Herbert Spiegelberg gives more detail about the different meanings and uses of the notion of intention, see Herbert Spiegelberg, *The Context of the Phenomenological Movement* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1981), p. 5. A short analysis of the occurrences of the notion of *ma'nâ* can be found in Jean Jolivet, “Le vocabulaire de l'Être et de la création dans la *philosophia prima* de l'Avicenna latinus”, in *L'élaboration du vocabulaire philosophique au Moyen Âge*, ed. Jacqueline Hamesse and Carlos G. Steel (Turnhout: Brepols, 2000), pp. 37–38.

the animal soul, divides the faculty of apprehension (*mudrakah, daryâftan*) into two kinds, external and internal. Here, the faculty of apprehension signifies a level previous to perception as such through the use of the Persian word *daryâft* which shows the receptivity of data. This receptivity is more comprehensible when it comes to internal faculties, as, in this case, Avicenna distinguishes between shape or image and sense which is equivalent to *intentio*.⁴

Similarly, we may consider that when speaking of apprehension (*Auffassung*) Husserl refers to the level of the reception of intentional data.⁵ Indeed, by adopting the concept of intention, Brentano sought to determine non-existent data. But according to Husserl, Brentano was unable to distinguish between intention and intentional mental process or the content of intentional experience. In other words, Brentano merely remained within the same limits of the definition of intention and its established functioning as the medieval philosophers. The intentional purpose in the example of the wolf and the sheep in Avicenna, is inscribed within the same limit of consciousness, that is to say, the basic form of intention which seeks to know the thing seen or meant and to ascribe it to the intelligibility of consciousness.

At this stage in the intelligible process the estimative imagination (*tawahhum*) appears as the core of knowledge and intelligible perception. Thus the appearing, for example, of the wolf to the sheep is not just the intention, but the instinctive sensation which results in the intelligible or noetic process, in this case intentional, which means that the intention becomes the result of the appearing itself resulting in the estimative imagination in the common sense Avicenna qualifies as *Phantasia (bantâsia)*.⁶

As for intention, what we may understand from Avicenna in the example of the wolf and the lamb is an instinctive bodily distinction in the sheep which “understands” the presence of the wolf as the actual enemy. Here we are facing common sense, that is to say the appearing of an animal before the sheep and the instinctive

⁴ Avicenna, *Resâleh-ye Nafs* [Treaty of the soul], ed. Mousâ ‘Amid (Hamadan: Anjuman-i âsâr-i farhangî va mafâkhir-i farhangî; dânishgâh Bou ‘Ali Sinâ, 1383/1994), p. 16 ff., here, p. 20; Avicenna, *Dânishnâmah ‘Ala’i, Tabi’iyat*, ed. Mohammad Meshkât (Hamadan: Anjuman-i âsâr-i farhangî va mafâkhir-i farhangî; dânishgâh Bou ‘Ali Sinâ, 2004), p. 96; receptivity has a passive and detached aspect in relation to the soul, *al-Ta’liqât*, p. 23. Let’s underline the existence of a second current which denies the proximity between the medieval notion of intention and what has been treated as intention in modern philosophy from Brentano then Husserl, see J.-F. Courtine. About the word *intentio* and its modern presence, one can note that Jean-François Courtine uses the word “*visé*” to translate the word *intentio*, Jean-François Courtine, *Suarez et le système métaphysique* (Paris: PUF, 1990), p. 22. Later on, he draws conclusions from the medieval notion of intention which doesn’t relate to “une problématique phénoménologique de l’intentionnalité au sens “*sich-richten-auf*””, Jean-François Courtine, *La cause de la phénoménologie* (Paris: PUF, 2007), p. 20.

⁵ Edmund Husserl, *Phantasia, conscience d’image, souvenir : de la phénoménologie des présentifications intuitives : textes posthumes, 1898–1925*, trans. Raymond Kassis and Jean-François Pestureau; rev. Jean-François Pestureau and Marc Richir (Grenoble: Millon, 2002), p. 62.

⁶ Avicenna, *Resâleh-ye Nafs*, p. 21.

consequence manifested thereafter.⁷ In other words, the appearing of the enemy is in the direction of the intentional process, considering that the *tawahhum* is the faculty, among the internal senses, of free imagination, which gives access to knowledge.⁸ If Avicenna is led to use this example, it is, in our opinion, because he looks for a natural attitude allowing to see the consistency between the man in his position of animal or natural attitude and the animal as a representative of Nature. The use of this natural attitude means that Avicenna must seek an original experience in a naïve state to show the foundations of a sense or sensation. Moreover, it is a way to explain the functioning of a faculty whose authenticity remains uncertain.⁹

Considering that the concepts of *wahm* (estimative imagination) and *tawahhum* (illusion in the sense of intuitive imagination) are among the intuitive data, we can say that these intuitive data exist in Husserl's theory. These can be found in perceptual consciousness and *phantasia* consciousness which can be treated in parallel with the emotional and kinesthetic sensations. In other words, in the context of the phenomenology of the world of life intentionality is based on the intersubjective and constituting foundation of the world in which the empirical intuition is born. This is a point of convergence between Husserl and Avicenna about the questioning of intention in the context of intuition. While Avicenna stops at the borders of intuition and intellect to determine the strength of *wahm* (estimative

⁷ About that aspect concerning common sense and distinction, see Max Horten, *Die philosophischen Systeme der Spekulative Theologen im Islam* (Bonn: F. Cohen, 1912), p. 183. For a more recent view, see Alain de Libera, *La querelle des universaux: de Platon à la fin du Moyen Âge* (2nd. ed., Paris: Seuil, 2009), p. 196.

⁸ Max Horten translates *al-tawahhum* by the fact of knowing the intention of an individual by means of estimative [imagination], like for example the sheep which recognizes in the wolf its natural enemy, Max Horten, *Die spekulative und positive theologie des Islam nach Razi* (Leipzig: Harrassowitz, 1912), p. 364. About the notion of *wahm*, see Robert E. Hall, "The "Wahm" in Ibn Sina's psychology", in *Intellect et imagination dans la philosophie médiévale*, ed. Maria Cândida Pacheco and José F. Meirinhos (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006), vol. I, pp. 533–549. About the medical aspect and the localisation of internal senses by Avicenna, p. 546 ff. According to the author, there is no localisation for *wahm* in Avicenna, even though he mentions it briefly, *ibid.*, p. 548. About the notion of *Wahm* in relation with intentionality and the elaboration of such notion, see Dag Nikolaus Hasse, *Avicenna's De Anima in the Latin West: the Formation of a Peripatetic Philosophy of the Soul, 1160–1300* (London: The Warburg Institute, 2000), p. 141 ff.; also Nader el-Bizri, "Avicenna's De Anima: between Aristotle and Husserl" in *The Passions of the Soul in the Metamorphosis of Becoming*, ed. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, Islamic Philosophy and Occidental Phenomenology in Dialogue 1 (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003), pp. 82–85. Recent studies have also focused on this localisation, Paul Mazliak, *Avicenne & Averroès: médecine et biologie dans la civilisation de l'Islam* (Paris: Vuibert, 2004), p. 90 ff.

⁹ Hence the critic of this attempt by Ibn Rushd: "Ibn Rushd reproche à Avicenne le fait qu'il pose dans l'animal une faculté autre que l'imagination, qu'il appelle "wahmyyah (en arabe)" à la place de la pensée en l'homme. Ibn Sînâ donne comme exemple: la faculté qu'a la brebis de reconnaître en le loup son ennemi. Ibn Rushd trouve qu'il est superflu de nommer une autre faculté ce qui ne relève que de l'imagination, puisque l'imagination elle aussi est une faculté cognitive . . ." cited after 'Abd al-Rahmān Badawī, "Avicenne en Espagne musulmane: pénétration et polémique" in *Milenario de Avicena* (Madrid: Instituto Hispano-Arabe de Cultura, 1981), p. 22.

imagination) and the perception of animosity by the sheep when confronted by the wolf, the major issue for Husserl is to strive to show the link between intention and intentional consciousness with the world of life and under the model of genetic phenomenology. The intentional and genetic relationship passes through the actual world in which we make our own individual and intersubjective experience. The intentional donation takes place in a constituted surrounding universe in which intentionality aims thoroughly while constituting itself. According to Husserl, the constitution of the world in the structure-of-horizon of systematic interpretation is the fact of interpreting intentionality or the fact of an intentional interpretation. This means that in the intentional consciousness we constitute the world by and from the intentional interpretation.¹⁰ Moreover, Husserl expresses this intentional link with the world through the expression of “intentional acquisition” (*intentionale Erwerbe*) in the total acquisition (*Totalerwerb*) of the world.¹¹ Another reading of Husserl focuses on the close relationship between the apperception of the active self in the intentional consciousness and the world. This apperception by the self is a concrete manifestation of his “soul” (*Seele*) which is accomplished through the absolute consciousness (*absolut Bewusstsein*) localized in his living body which, in turn, is localized in the world.¹²

The process of appearing is the synonym of the figurative imagination (*tasawwur*) where the noematic possibility of the object is formed. The potentiality in this context is related in some way to logic in the sense of the formation of judgment when the enemy’s (the wolf’s) proposal is formed. Hence the use of the word “concept” by the translators of Averroes to render *tasawwur*. Here is where we note the absence of the hyletic aspect, in the formation of the concept of *tasawwur*. This aspect constitutes, in Husserl, with the noetic aspect, the formation of the intuitive data in the context of the phenomenology of intuition. It is through *tasdiq* that the process of appearing, in a sense, is accomplished and constitutes itself inasmuch as intuitive knowledge, according to Avicenna, reaches its peak. We can say that the formation of the intuitive data meets the horizon of the acquisition of science, which shows in a certain way the teleological aim in Avicenna.¹³

¹⁰ *Hua.*, 39, p. 129.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 605.

¹² See *Hua.*, XV, *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität: Texte aus dem Nachlass. Dritter Teil, 1929–1935*, ed. Iso Kern (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), p. 542–543.

¹³ Amélie-Marie Goichon explains the concept of *maqsud*, but she stresses the fact that this word does not represent anything particular in the Avicennian vocabulary, Amélie-Marie Goichon, *Lexique de la langue philosophique d’Ibn Siná*, (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1938), p. 304, Herbert Alan Davidson’s article, “Averroes on the material intellect”, *Viator* 17 (1986), analyses the aspect of the intellect, specifically the material and potential intellect, pp. 91–137; the question of the relation between *tasawwur* and *tasdiq* can also be found there, *ibid.*, p. 8 ff. and the material intellect is considered according to Averroes’ *Epitome* as a disposition and not a substance. One must also emphasize the question of the translation of notions, as, according to the author, Averroes understands *tasawwur* (concepts) as an equivalent of *tasdiq* (propositions), *ibid.*, hence the author questions the statute of language in Averroes’ phrasing. This aspect has been analysed

Therefore, by analogy, Avicenna uses the face-to-face between the sheep and the wolf. This means that the intention manifested in the sighting and apprehension of the wolf by the sheep is not merely the intelligibility formed in the apprehension of the received image, but that it is an instinctive apprehension. Hence the fact that Avicenna in his *Dānishnāmah*, says that the sheep “sees the face of the wolf by the external sense and understands the animosity from the internal sense called estimative imagination (*wahm*) which is equivalent to the intellect for the animals.”¹⁴

In *al-Shifa* and *al-Najat*, we have, in a slightly different form, first the apprehension of the wolf by the external sense of the sheep referring to the soul, which is equivalent to the faculty of imagination, and secondly the intention (*ma'na*) which includes the internally designed meaning in its noetic scale.¹⁵ Avicenna expresses the same nuance speaking of the fact that man has an understanding of himself, whereas in the animal that understanding passes either by the sensation (*hiss*) or the estimative imagination (*wahm*).¹⁶ This allows us to consider that ultimately Avicenna believes an internal faculty of intellection or intelligibility funded on a noetic basis able to ignore a perceived datum. Speaking of *wahm* and of the internal sense and considering the former as an element belonging to the animal, Avicenna “corrects” the words of Farabi. On the one hand, in the example of the sheep, by the fact of considering that there is a return from the external sense to the internal sense and vice versa and also by distinguishing between *wahm* as the seizing that is proper to the animal and sensation that is the perception of external data. Farabi fails to distinguish between sense and *wahm* nor the process between internal and external senses.¹⁷

by Harry Austryn Wolfson who explains that it originates in Averroes' commentary about conception and judgement in Aristotle, see Harry Austryn Wolfson, “The Terms *Tasawwur* and *Tasdiq* in Arabic Philosophy and Their Greek, Latin and Hebrew Equivalents”, in *Studies in the History and Philosophy of Religion*, ed. Isadore Twersky and George H. Williams (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977–1979), pp. 119–123, here pp. 119–120. See also the rhetoric reading of Renate Würsch, *Avicennas Bearbeitungen der aristotelischen rhetorik: ein Beitrag zum Fortleben antiken Bildungsgutes in der Islamischen Welt* (Berlin: Schwarz, 1991) who sees the use of the words *tasawwur* and *tasdiq* in the *persanophone* Avicenna as equivalents respectively of *Begriff* and *Urteil*., pp. 22–23.

¹⁴ *Dānishnāmah 'Ala'i, Tabi'iyat.*, op. cit., p. 96.

¹⁵ Avicenne, *Al-Shifā, al-Tabi'iyat, 6, al-Nafs* (Cairo: al-hay'at al-mesriya al-'amma li al-kitab, 1395/1975), p. 35, the characteristic of an abstraction is here in the comprehension (*idrak*) without act (*al-idrāk lā ma'a al-fi'l*). Avicenna, *Al-Najat: min al-ghargh fi bahr al-zalalat*, ed. Mohammad Taqi Danishpazhuh (Tehran: intisharat-e danishgah-e Tihran, 1374/1985), pp. 327–328: “ce qui est compris du loup d'abord par le sens et ensuite par la faculté interne, là, c'est une imagination, et [en revanche] ce qui est compris par la faculté interne sans sens aucun, là, c'est l'intention” (*fa al-lazi yudraku min al-z'eb awwulan bi al-hiss summa al-quww al-batinah fahuwa al-sura(t), wa al-lazi turakuhu al-quww al-batinah dun al-hiss, fahuwa al-ma'ni*).

¹⁶ Avicenna, *Al-Mubāhisât* (Qom: Intishārāt Bidār, 1371/1992), question 519, p. 179. About the notion of *wahm* and its difference with *zann* (opinion, belief), see Fazlur Rahman, *Avicenna's Psychology* (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), pp. 79–80.

¹⁷ See Al-Fārābī, *Risāla al-Fusus*, ed. Max Horten, “Das Buch der Ringsteine Fārābis. Mit Auszügen aus dem Kommentare des Emīr Ismā'il el Hoseini el Fārāni” in *Abū Nasr Muhammad*

A concept which plays a significant part in the context of intuitive data is the *hads* (noematic intuition). The concept of *hads* can be translated as sightedness, which renders the noetic-noematic activity and in which we find again the kernel of the prophetic intellect. Avicenna in *al-Shifa*. puts the *hads* behind the faculty of the mind that is acquiring the definitions and opinions (*zihni*) and behind understanding (*fahm*) and considers it a faculty of understanding looking for half of what it encounters.¹⁸ This concept can be equated with apperception and considered equivalent to the intuition given its character deriving from spatiotemporal data.¹⁹ Avicenna is less explicit in the passage quoted to locate the *hads* among intuitive data, he is more explicit in contrast in the *Dānishnāmah* where the explanation of *hads* meets the prophetic spirit and thus the *hads* find a purely intuitive or innate meaning in the range of moods.²⁰

Intuitive Data and Phantasia According to Avicenna and Husserl in the Context of Perception

The concept of intention which occupies a prominent place in Husserl's phenomenology seems to encompass all intuitive data. However, we note that there may be a gap between intention, intentional consciousness and search for meaning, a gap that can occur at the noetic-hyletic act and the question of the absence of object during the intentional aiming. As we have seen, the notion of intention prevails in the comparative studies between Avicenna, as figure *par excellence* of the medieval non-Christian philosophy, and Husserl's phenomenology. Indeed, the internal senses return as one of the main similarities between the two medieval philosophies (Muslim and Jewish) and the phenomenology of intuition. Not only in his writings

ibn Muhammad al-Fārābī: texts and studies, II, coll. and reprint. by Fuat Sezgin, Islamic philosophy 8 (Frankfurt am Main: Institute for the History of Arabic-Islamic Science, 1999), pp. 26–27.

¹⁸ Avicenna, *Al-Shifā, al-Mantiq, 5 al-Burhān* (Cairo: Nashr wizara al-tarbiya wa al-ta'lim, 1375/1956), vol. 3, p. 259, also, in Avicenna, *Al-mabda' va al-ma'ād*, ed. Abdullah Nūrānī (Tehran: McGill University; Tehran University, 1984), pp. 115–116. For the definition of the notion of *Hads*, see Amélie-Marie Goichon, *Lexique.*, op. cit., p. 65. About the *Hads* as key to the prophetic intellect, see Herbert A. Davidson, "Alfarabi and Avicenna on the Active Intellect" *Viator* 3 (1972), pp. 109–178, here, pp. 167, 176 ff. About prophecy as intellectual and noetic modality, see Abdelali Elamrani-Jamal "Multiplicité des modes de la prophétie" in *Études sur Avicenne*, ed. Jean Jolivet and Roshdi Rashed (Paris: Les Belles-Lettres, 1984) pp. 125–142.

¹⁹ A recent study highlights this notion in Avicenna's philosophy and its difference with the notion of thought, see Dimitri Gutas "Intuition and Thinking: the Evolving Structure of Avicenna's Epistemology", in *Aspects of Avicenna*, ed. Robert Wisnovsky (Princeton: Markus Wiener, 2001), pp. 1–38. In this article, *Hads* is equivalent to intuition.

²⁰ *Dānishnāmah 'Ala' i, Tabi'iyat.*, op. cit., p. 142 ff. Avicenna is even more determined to define the *hads* as a divine emanation (*fayz ilāhi*) and an intelligible connection without any acquisition, *Al-Mubāhisāt.*, op. cit., Q 237, p. 107.

published during his lifetime (*Ideas I*) but also throughout his intellectual career, Husserl has given capital importance to intuitive data to make them into a phenomenology of intuition that goes along with eidetic phenomenology. In this context, intentional transcendental phenomenology is also recognized by its noetic-noematic aspect, especially as it was to couple with the hyletic aspect. In other words, Husserl founded through a deliberate and intuitive phenomenology, a method of descriptive analysis addressing the medieval issues addressed and discussed by philosophers such as Avicenna.²¹

The operation of kinesthesia gives way to an operation of the carnal unity that reverses the medieval method, namely the overthrow of the cosmic body in the real ground and the world of life. The phenomenological “alchemy” consists of a diversity and variety that constitutes as one in its transcendental sphere. This approach has enabled phenomenology to provide some fundamental elements which have been the foundation of a number of modern sciences like cognitive science and neurology. The biology of consciousness is not far from being linked to such a phenomenological view, which means that medieval philosophy as it was practiced by Avicenna, in turn reflects this vision that puts the body forward as a kinesthetic landmark as far as the knowledge of the world by the individual is concerned.²²

In *Ideen*, Husserl emphasizes that phenomenology “In its purely eidetic attitude “excluding” every sort of transcendence, on its own peculiar basis of pure consciousness (...) necessarily arrives at this entire complex of transcendental problems.”²³ It is within this context that “the pure hyletic is subordinated to the

²¹ The phenomenological analysis of perception leads Husserl towards analyzing the issue of *phantasia*, see *Phantasia, conscience d' image, souvenir*, p. 49. These are writings from the years 1904–1905 and according to the editor, they are posterior to *Logical Investigations*, *ibid.*, p. XXXI. One takes into account that these lessons are Husserl’s teaching about “[...] phenomenology and the theory of knowledge in which for the small circle of the more advanced students I begin [to teach] a phenomenological system of intuition [...]”, Edmund Husserl, *Briefwechsel*, in collab. Elisabeth Schumann, ed. Karl Schumann (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994), vol. I, p. 25 (*Der Phänomenologie und theorie der Erkenntnis, in welcher ich für einen kleineren Kreis fortgeschrittener Schüler Anfänge einer systematischen Phänomenologie der Intuition*). About method, see Bernhard Rang, *Husserls Phänomenologie der materiellen Natur* (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1990), p. 223, in which the author points out that the triad *Hyle-noesis-Noema* corresponds to *Empfindung-Auffassung-Auffassungssinn* in Husserl’s *Logical Investigations*. About the complexity of the noetic and hyletic relation in Husserl’s phenomenology, see Michel Henry, *Phénoménologie matérielle* (Paris: PUF, 1990), pp. 24–29; another author underlines this relation in *Ideen*, see Alfons Süssbauer, *Intentionalität, Sachverhalt, Noema: Eine Studie zu Edmund Husserl* (München: Alber, 1995), pp. 102–106.

²² Husserl, meanwhile, in *Ideen.3* analyses a kinaesthesia from the animated body, French tr. Paris, 1993, p. 140 ff.; *Ideen 2* makes a conclusion about a consciousness constituting objects in its totality, Fr. tr. Paris, 1996, p. 53. The noetic act can be considered as pure abstraction. A certain aspect which distinguishes the noetic act of sense has been approached by Dagfinn Føllesdal, “Noema and Meaning in Husserl”, in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 50, supplement (1990), pp. 263–271.

²³ Edmund Husserl, *Collected Works, Volume II, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*, trans. F. Kersten (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1983), §86, p. 209.

phenomenology of transcendental consciousness.”²⁴ However, Husserl later returns to this difficult question, mentioning, for example, the overlapping between the noetic and the hyletic moment.²⁵

While Avicenna, as a physician, discusses the philosophical aspects with a physical approach, as a philosopher Husserl emphasizes the transcendental subjectivity from the living body in all its manifestations and all its features. Returning to the body in the context of transcendental unity appears as a common determinant of the unity of the body and shows that the Middle Ages had an almost immediate consciousness of the unity of the body and that of man as the centric pole of the cosmos.²⁶ We know of the important role of medicine in the formation of philosophical thought and in this case that of Avicenna. He sees philosophy and the “conceptualization” of data through medicine.

Another element which may appear in this context of comparison between two philosophies is the fact that Husserl establishes a proper phenomenological logic in which reason finds a new ontological foundation. We think here of Logos which refers to both significance and meaning under the trilogy thinking, reflection and speech. Hence we can establish a relationship between intention and data for intentional consciousness seeks to grasp the meaning of data in order to be able to constitute it under the eidetic background. What we can highlight is the responsibility of the prophetic intellect in Avicenna which works deeply and resembles the noetic activity of Logos. However, the question is whether Husserl’s phenomenology always looks for the meaning or whether it is an apperception wider than the meaning and the language application. In other words, the constitution of meaning attempts to do without language to reach the transparent world, the conscious and

²⁴ Ibid. p. 210.

²⁵ *Hua., III/1, Beilag 51*, p. 606.

²⁶ The question of the body and the continuity of bodily sensations has been discussed, see Max Horten who stresses this dimension, *Die philosophischen Systeme*, op. cit., p. 177 ff. For Descartes, the reception of common senses follows the union between the soul and the brain. See Étienne Gilson, *Index scolastico-cartésien* (Paris: Vrin, 1979), p. 263, and postface, p. 366. The self is posed as an entity, an Ego and « le centre spirituel de la personne humaine », in *Avicenna latinus, De Anima*, vol., IV–V, (Introd.), pp. 37–38. It must be noted that Ján Bakos translates *Badan* by the word “corps (vivant)” in the sense of the unity of the self which understands in anticipation its kinaesthetic members rather than the intelligible and rational knowledge, Ján Bakos, *Psychologie d’Ibn Sinâ d’après son œuvre As-šifa’* (Prague: Académie tchécoslovaque des sciences, 1956), vol. 2, p. 182 (original text., vol. I, p. 253). About the unity of the self via the kinaestheses and the kinaesthetic sensation, *ibid.*, vol. II, p. 181, (vol. I of the original text., p. 252), Avicenna the philosopher may have had a more detailed knowledge of the body by the means of the medicine available to him through the Greek tradition, in particular Galen (*Jálinous*) along with others, as Eudemos of Rhodes (*Ozimous*). Manfred Ullmann stresses the importance of Avicenna’s *Qānoun*, see Manfred Ullmann, *Die Medizin in Islam* (Leiden: Brill, 1970), p. 172 ff., about Eudemos, see Dimitri Gutas “Eudemos in the Arabic Tradition”, in *Eudemos of Rhodes*, ed. Istvan Bodnar, *Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities* 11 (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2002), pp. 1–23. Marina Paola Banchetti-Robino, “Ibn Sinâ and Husserl on Intention and Intentionality”, *Philosophy East and West* 54:1 (2004), p. 74 ff. mentions that Avicenna cites « physicians » in a context of criticism of the views of Aristotle’s predecessors about sight and perception, *Dānishnāmah ‘Ala’i, Tabi’iyat*, op. cit., p. 87.

awake world. If Avicenna achieves a kind of individual mystique to escape from God, we can also consider that Husserl inclines towards a metaphysics of Logos in the process of accomplishing the meaning of the world.²⁷ Husserl attempts to modernize traditional logic by excluding on the one hand the apophantic rationale which doesn't know of grammatical fluidity and on the other hand the consequential conclusion of this logic.

The Comparative Approach Through the Critique of Traditional Logic by Husserl

Young Husserl at the turn of the century is very interested in traditional logic which he analyses and to which he applies a thorough and severe critique. By traditional logic, one must understand pure logic as opposed to transcendental logic or formal logic. Upon publication of *Logische Untersuchungen*, Husserl's endeavors go in the direction of a confrontation with traditional logic. For Husserl, the attachment to Kantian philosophy and logic is a historical landmark, and he says that Kant has not seen "fully in all clarity the essence of the aimed discipline."²⁸ This approach towards traditional logic is a common theme in his late writings.

Traditional logic comprises at first Aristotelian logic soon joined by Stoic logic. The basis of this logic, according to Husserl, is that it was not a true "logic of truth but merely a logic of non-contradiction, a logic of matching".²⁹ Consequently, the

²⁷ Husserl defines logic from *Logos* as synonym of reason (*Vernunft*) in one of his writings, *Hua.*, XVII, *Formale und transzendente Logik: Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft*, ed. Paul Janssen (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), p. 22 ff. Étienne Gilson, *Pourquoi saint Thomas a critiqué saint Augustin* (Paris: Vrin, 1981), discusses Avicenna's doctrine about logic (cited from *Avicenna, Logica*, p. III; f; 9 r b., he compares with Duns Scot p. 171: "Il (Avicenne) distingue en effet alors le genre logique du genre naturel. Est genre naturel l'essence même de la chose, celle que l'on assigne pour répondre à la question: qu'est-ce que c'est ? c'est le cas de l'animalité par exemple. Est genre logique ce qui s'ajoute au genre naturel pour lui conférer l'universalité").

²⁸ Edmund Husserl, *Recherches logiques: Prolégomènes à la logique pure*; trans. Hubert Elie, Arion L. Kelkel and René Scherer (3rd ed., Paris: PUF, 1994), vol 1., p. 239. Far from traditional logic, Husserl only mentions it to criticize it vehemently: "Personne ne voudra se familiariser avec l'idée de réduire la science à ce qu'elle était du temps de la logique aristotélico-Scholastique. Surtout quand il paraît en outre en résulter que, comme l'enseigne Kant lui-même, la logique a depuis Aristote, le caractère d'une science achevée"). The absence of certain names as Boetius or Porphyry is to be noted in Husserl's criticism of traditional logic. New readings mention the Porphyry's *Isagoge* in Husserl's logic, see George Heffernan, *Isagoge in die Phänomenologische Apophantik: eine Einführung in die phänomenologische Urteilslogik durch die Auslegung des Textes der "Formalen und transzendentalen Logik" von Edmund Husserl* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989). About the continuity of this tradition of logic in western thought, see Porphyre, *Isagoge*, trans. Alain de Libera and Alain-Philippe Segonds; introd. and notes Alain de Libera (Paris: Vrin, 1998), p. CVII.

²⁹ *Philosophie première, 1923–24. 1, Histoire critique des idées*, trans. Arion L. Kelkel (3rd ed., Paris: PUF, 2002), pp. 25–26, my Eng. trans. On aristotelian logic, see Richard Cobb-Stevens "Being and Categorical Intuition", *The Review of Metaphysics*, 44:1 (1990), pp. 43–66.

characteristic of traditional logic is that it is a complete science which wants an absolute match and an integrity of formation from the statement of the premises until the conclusive consequence. In this context, any contradiction has proved false in logical analysis under the form of syllogism.³⁰ Husserl's criticism against traditional logic is based on the fact that this logic fails to understand the relationship between the statement of the judgment and the real goal. In other words, the traditional formal logic is contained to an initially intelligible reasoning without realizing the existing correlation between predicative truth and objectivity.³¹

Husserl's criticism of traditional logic may also be applied to Avicenna's logic to the extent that such logic was inspired directly from Aristotelian logic and contains all the elements criticized by Husserl.³² Logic is an important part of the Avicennian corpus and its ultimate utility is to serve intelligence in order to know the imagination (*tasawwur*) and the veridical perception (*tasdiq*).³³ Logic is also the means by which we shall find out something unknown by something known.³⁴ Avicenna, in turn, and although he is aware of the correlation, considers logic in its fundus of purely intelligible and rational activity that begins with the statement in the language and the language data.³⁵

However, it should be noted that the logical review through the statements happens in the context of the acquisition of meaning and with an intentional objective. In other words, the beginning of the intelligible activity of logic by the statement is a search for the general or universal sense (*al-ma'ni al-kulli*) which reflects the substance of things in external reality.³⁶ This general sense is a

³⁰ *Philosophie première*, p. 32.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 37. Husserl also discusses traditional logic in the context of apophantic logic which will appear in further analyses.

³² The Arabic translation of Aristotle's *Organon* has introduced at once a science that has been developed by Arab philosophers. The question of conversion is part of analogy and appears as one of the modalities of syllogism. Aristotle, *Mantiq Arastū*, ed. 'Abd al-Rahmān Badawī, *Dirāsāt Islāmiyyat* 7 (Beirut: Dār al-qalam, 1980), 3 vols; vol. 1, p. 137 ff. An analysis of Avicenna's logic and its relation, through induction, to Aristotelian logic is found in Jon McGinnis, "Scientific Methodologies in Medieval Islam", *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 41:3 (2003), pp. 307–327.

³³ *al-Shifā, al-Mantiq, 1, al-Madkhal* (Cairo: Nashr wizara al-tarbiya wa al-ta'lim, 1371/1952), pp. 17–18.

³⁴ *Danishnāmah, Risālehy-e Mantiq*, ed. Muhammad Mu'in and Muhammad Mishkāt (Hamadan: Anjuman-i āsar-i farhangī va mafākhir-i farhangī; Dānishgāh Bou 'Ali Sīnā, 1383/1994), p. 9; Fr. trans.: *Le Livre de science*; trans. Mohammad Achena and Henri Massé (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1955), p. 24. In spite of the considerable efforts of learned translators, a new reading of this translation is necessary, particularly as far as some notions, like intention, are concerned. This text and its translation are criticized in Jules Janssens, "Le Dānesh-Nāme d'Ibn Sīnā: un texte à revoir?" *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale*, 28 (1986), pp. 163–177.

³⁵ *al-Shifā*, op.cit., p. 23 ff.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 34. Avicenna in his advice at the end of his logical treatise *Danishnāmah*, underlines the fact that one must believe in sense (*Ma'ni*) and not name, *Danishnamah 'Alā'i: Mantiq*, op. cit., p. 160, tr. fr. *ibid.*, p. 86.

translation formed on the Platonic idea that morphs as the modality of understanding things in logic. The general meaning of which Avicenna speaks is the state of judgment of pure intellect (*zihn-e al-mutlaq*).³⁷ The correlative link which is determined by the pure intellect and the modality of internal perception of real things, is a unilateral link always aiming at the external object by an intelligible statement. Consequently, we can say that the general sense is an idea, which loses its Platonic origin due to the change of mode of perception. In other words, the general sense is not conceived by Avicenna as an absolute but as an intention, that is to say, the act of aiming or the mode of inner perception. This aspect is beyond the analysis of Husserl who only sees in traditional logic efforts of the intelligible action locked in its reasoning. Husserl can not admit either that traditional logic and medieval philosophy, and in this case that of Avicenna, manages to change the direction of the Idea into a new modality that attempts to determine the relationship between thinking subject and being thought of.

Husserl's criticism against traditional logic is echoed in his lectures of 1908–1909 which contain a detailed analysis in particular from the theory of consequence.³⁸ Husserl focuses on the question of consequence but we can see that his analysis does not embrace all the theoretical and analytical courses of traditional logic and its various arguments. Thus, considering the scope of Avicenna's logic, and in particular the importance of the issue of consequence in his corpus, we can see that Husserl did not take into account all the aspects of this logic. Husserl's attack is somehow directed towards the basis of logic, the functional purpose of the syllogistic approach to achieve the "truth".

One of the conclusions Husserl draws from his analysis of traditional logic is that the consequence is true only if the premises are too, as is the case for judgment which laws are true.³⁹ This consequence, according to Husserl, cannot be defined in the sphere of logical consequence (*Sphäre der rein logischen Schlüsse*) as a

³⁷ *al-Shifā*, op. cit., p. 36.

³⁸ Edmund Husserl, *Alte und neue Logik: Vorlesung 1908–1909*, ed. Elisabeth Schuhmann (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003), Vol. 6, p. 253 ff. It is a set of writings by Husserl about logic and the theory of judgement, being part of the F group of manuscripts, see *Logik und allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie: Vorlesungen 1917/18 mit ergänzenden Texten aus der ersten Fassung von 1910/11*, ed. Ursula Panzer (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1996), Vol. 30, pp. 236–249. A certain trend wants modern logic to inscribe itself in a continuity from Frege to Russell and Wittgenstein. To mention only one typical example, see Rudolf Carnap, *Scheinprobleme in der Philosophie und andere metaphysikkritische Schriften*, ed. Thomas Mormann, Philosophische Bibliothek 560 (Hamburg: F. Meiner, 2004), p. 63 ff., here, pp. 65–66. This tradition is very narrowly linked to mathematics whereas modern logic in Husserl's view has a phenomenological basis destined by *Mathesis universalis*, see Edmund Husserl, *Idées directrices pour une phénoménologie et une philosophie phénoménologique pures. 3, la phénoménologie et les fondements des sciences; Postface à mes idées directrices pour une phénoménologie pure*; trans. Dorian Tiffeneau and Arion L. Kelkel (Paris: PUF, 1993), p. 69. *Mathesis universalis* reaches a formal ontology in the view of some authors, see Jean-François Courtine "L'objet de la logique" in *Husserl*, dir. Jocelyn Benoist (Paris: Éd. du Cerf, 2008), p. 83.

³⁹ *Alte und neue Logik*, op. cit., p. 262 (... *der Schluss ist nur wahr, wenn die Prämissen eben wahr, wie sie urteilmässig als Wahrheiten gesetzt sind*).

categorical consequence (*kategorialen Schlüsse*). To explain this idea, Husserl gives the example of mathematical quantity (*Menge*), speaking of the number (*Anzahl*) or the ordinal number (*Ordinalzahl*), etc. in the context of relational consequence (*Relationsschlüsse*).⁴⁰ For example a is in b, b is in c, resulting in a is c and so on. Relational terms are here as the essence (*Wesen*) of the categorial concept of quantity and as a consequence the very number funds itself as categorial.⁴¹ According to Husserl, such consequence takes another character (*Charakter*) as is the case in traditional logic, for example in this statement, on an apophantic background that “if every A is a B, then there is no A which is not B, [and] if some A is B, then we do not need that each A be a B” and so on.⁴²

Avicenna, meanwhile, confirms that the relationship is essential to the premise in order for it to be a premise. However, the definition (*al-hadd*) of the deleted relationship is in the deletion of the premise and not in the removal of the relationship itself. In other words, the relationship does not have to be invalidated as long as the premise itself is not deleted. As for the condition, it is the letters and their properties as well as the prepositions on which the relationship depends which are eliminated while the premise and consequence remain.⁴³

This presentation leads Husserl to emphasize the apophantic character of the consequence (*apophantischen Schluss*) to characterize the variants by a “nominal representation” (*nominale Vorstellung*).⁴⁴

Another criticism of traditional logic by Husserl focuses on the difference between direct (*unmittelbaren*) and indirect (*mittelbaren*) consequence in modern logic.⁴⁵ The example of direct consequence is in a certain judgment that we make while saying that “the ABC triangle is an equilateral triangle and each equilateral triangle is an equiangular triangle and so this triangle is an equiangular triangle”. As

⁴⁰ The link between logic and mathematics has been studied by various authors, e.g. Barry Smith, David Murray, “Logic, Form and Matter” *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes*, 55, (1981), pp. 47–63, 65–74; see also Richard Tieszen, “Phenomenology and Mathematical Knowledge” *Synthese*, 75:3 (1988), pp. 373–403.

⁴¹ *Alte und neue Logik.*, op. cit., p. 263, (*Die hier auftretenden Relations termini sind als im Wesen der kategorialen Begriffe Menge, Anzahl gründende selbst kategorial*).

⁴² *Alte und neue Logik.*, op. cit., p. 263. See Richard Cobb-Stevens, “Being and Categorial Intuition”, op. cit., p. 63.

⁴³ Avicenna, *al-Shifâ 2, al-Mantiq 4, al-Qiâs*, (Cairo: Nashr wizara al-tarbiya wa al-ta’lim, 1383/1964), p. 54 (*wa amma a-râbita fa zâtiya li al-muqaddma hattâ yakoun muqaddama, va lâkinnahâ tabtal ‘ind al-inhilâl, va lâ yakoun mâ tanhal ‘ilay al-muqaddam mâ yabtal ‘inda al-inhilâl, falâ yakoun haddan li almanhal, fa inna al-hadd huwa mâ tanhal ‘ilaih al-muqaddam. wa fi al-shartiyât, izâ asqatat hurouf al-shart wa al-ajzâ wa hurouf al-inâd allati bihâ al-irtibât, baqiy al-muqaddam wa al-tâli*).

⁴⁴ *Alte und neue Logik*, op. cit., pp. 263–264. For the analysis of some grammatical terms see Käte Hamburger, “Zur Theorie der Aussage”, *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung*, 20:1 (1966), pp. 23–56, here pp. 24–30. Other remarks have been made about the grammatical logic and its articulation in Husserl, see a review by Ignacio Anglèlli, “The Logic of the Articles in Traditional Philosophy” *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 16:2 (1978), pp. 250–252, here p. 251.

⁴⁵ *Alte und neue Logik*, op. cit., p. 267.

for the indirect consequence, we want such a judgment as “property of equilaterality comes from the ABC triangle. There, each equilateral triangle is an equiangular triangle, so this triangle is also equiangular”. The consequence in each of these two cases is quite similar. But according to Husserl we have a premise which is replaced by an equivalent relational premise and this changing of premise is cause that now the consequential proposal does not remain in the direct premise.⁴⁶ The syllogistic argument exposed through the triangle is also found in Avicenna who takes it from the Book of Euclid. Avicenna considers this argument in his analysis about “compound syllogisms”. What is at stake in this syllogism is that the resulting conclusion from two premises becomes itself, in turn, a premise for another syllogism.⁴⁷

This argument allows Husserl to get rid of direct consequence to the extent that the perfect and irreducible proof (*Beweis*) must be a perfect and irreducible judgment in the example he proposes “since A is, A’ is, since A’ and B are, B’ is, and from this we can draw that “since A and B are, B’ is.” This also applies to the further proof “since B’ and C [are], C is” and we can extract from that that “since A and B and C are, C’ is”, and so on.⁴⁸ The search for a consequence that is articulated in modern logic and flows in the sense of things leads Husserl to describe such a consequence as the eliminatory consequence because in a true proposition, the direct consequence is no longer used to associate the links of the terms with each other.⁴⁹

Based on this argument, Husserl returns to evaluate traditional logic, saying that “traditional logic only separates here as a rule consequences from a premise as a bare “conclusion” and consequences from several premises”.⁵⁰ We can say that Husserl seeks a new rationale in logic through a critique of the foundations of traditional logic. This rationale does not keep at all costs the consequence and to implement inadequate premises but to see the object of the logic and the judgment as the foundations of a transcendental logical reasoning.

Husserl’s criticism against traditional logic postulates that this logic is at once a completed science. Husserl’s attempt to establish a new rigorous science collides with this traditional logic as a science, that is to say that it would not have contributed to modern philosophy. However, on closer inspection, traditional logic does not totally lack any philosophical consideration. It seems that traditional logic succeeds in taking into account the intelligible possibilities outside completed logic, those possibilities that are part of an individual approach. Avicenna, at the

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 267 (*Aber die eine Prämisse haben wir durch eine äquivalente Relationsprämisse ersetzt, und diese Prämissenänderung macht es, dass nun der Schlusssatz nicht unmittelbar in den Prämissen liegt*).

⁴⁷ *Dānishnāmāh, Mantiq.*, op. cit., p. 83 ff., Fr. tr., op. cit., p. 57 ff.

⁴⁸ *Alte und neue Logik.*, op. cit., p. 269.

⁴⁹ *Alte und neue Logik.*, op. cit., p. 272, (*Das “Neue” das sie lehren, besteht in einem wahren Satz, der unmittelbar noch nicht verknüpfte Termini zur Verknüpfung bringt*).

⁵⁰ *Alte und neue Logik.*, op. cit., p. 272 (*Die traditionelle Logik scheidet hier in der Regel nur Schlüsse aus einer Prämisse als blosse “Folgerung” und Schlüsse aus mehreren Prämissen*).

end of the Treaty of logic of the *Danishnâmah*, proposes a kind of “Ten commandments” in the form of ten advice (*vasiyat*). This is a treatment always logical but still qualified by individual efforts. This advice shows that Avicenna does not remain within the limits of the logical laws, but that he is aware of what’s at stake in human activity. This advice, called “Advice that will give security against sophism”, also has a logical foundation but in a philosophical twist, that is to say, which involves the individual in its rational efforts.⁵¹

Conclusion

Both the issues about intuitive data and the methodical and philosophical perspective towards an objective knowledge tend to show that more extensive research can be undertaken to investigate the continuity and the comparative links between medieval philosophy and Husserl’s phenomenology. This was actually attempted but has not led to tangible results. The formation of a number of cognitive researches in relation to medieval philosophy shows this same continuity in another context. A major problem with two dimensions is at work when considering the relationship between medieval thinking and modern philosophical thinking. On the one hand, there is the philological challenge that different authors have tried to take into account, without achieving satisfactory results. Wolfson has identified the different translations of the concepts of *tasawwur* and *tasdiq* in different languages and over time; we, in turn, would like to suggest to translate *tasawwur* by hyletic or hyle-morphic imagination (or figurative imagination) and *tasdiq* by noetic perception or noematic apprehension. Indeed, what allowed a number of translators to render *tasawwur* by conception was the idea of materialization of form and image in the brain (the alchemy of the intellect) but the notion of hyle is lacking in this translation. Similarly, translating *tasdiq* by doxical judgment or perception lacks the idea of noetic activity and the very intellection of the brain. That is why phenomenological insights can start a new attempt to reformulate the translations of *tasawwur* and *tasdiq* since it is the perceptual and cognitive unit of understanding and intentional consciousness.⁵²

⁵¹ *Danishnamah*, *Mantiq*., op. cit., pp. 156–165, Fr. tr., op. cit., pp. 85–88.

⁵² A certain philosophical school is still under the influence of this current which sees perception as comprehension or intelligible apprehension (*idrak*). According to this current, perception refers to *aesthesia* which must match noetic perception (*tasdiq*) and in that context we are always surrounded by perception as intuitive data where noesis comes to us in a direct way. Perception in the sense of *idrak* corresponds to *Wahrnehmung* which covers at once all of the corporal sensations. Obviously, perception is opposed to *phantasia* and in general to imagination which, in turn, represents a different intelligible and noético-morphique dimension and, both by formation and function, of perception. There is also the idea that phantasm becomes like the flesh of consciousness, which means that there exists a carnal dimension in *phantasia* in the process of acts. See Arno Anzenbacher, *Die Intentionalität bei Thomas von Aquin und Edmund Husserl* (Vienna: Oldenburg, 1972), p. 115.

On the other hand, due to the hidden conflict between the Middle Ages and the modern era, we are always confronted by indecision in the philosophical discourse regarding the patent relation between those two types of thinking in two different eras.

Interpreting the Divine Word and Appropriating a Text: The Farāhī-Ricoeur Thematic Affinity

Abdul Rahim Afaki

Abstract This paper is an attempt to concretize the possibility of drawing parallels between Hamīd al-Dīn Farāhī's Qur'ānic hermeneutics, specifically his notion of *Nazm al-Qur'ān*, and Paul Ricoeur's conception of appropriating a text. Farāhī is of the view that the whole structure of the Qur'ān is thematically coherent. This coherence appears at both microscopic and macroscopic levels, which is to say, all of the verses of a *sūrah* of the Qur'ān are integrally related to each other to give rise to the major theme of the *sūrah* and again all of the *sūrahs* are interconnected with each other to constitute the major theme(s) of the Qur'ān as an organic whole. This notion of *Nazm* gives rise to the theme of autonomy of Qur'ānic text which can be comparable with the meanings of textual autonomy coming out of Ricoeur's project of appropriating a text. Ricoeur's objectivist hermeneutics regarding text as something autonomous finds a blurred area where it seems to be fused with Farāhī's Qur'ānic hermeneutics. Textual autonomy defines this blurred area owing to two traits. First, it releases the interpreter from the obligation of incorporating the socio-historical-cultural aspects of the author's life in the interpretation of text. Second, it enlightens the way for the interpreter to transform his life through the dictates of the hermeneutical appropriation of text.

Focusing the notion of autonomy of text, this paper draws parallels between Hamīd al-Dīn Farāhī's Qur'ānic hermeneutics and Ricoeur's scheme of appropriating a text. The whole argument is divided into two parts. Part I deals with Farāhī's hermeneutical approach to the divine word as an autonomous text. The major thrust of discussion is the notion of *Nazm al-Qur'ān* (coherence of the Qur'ān). Part II is concerned with finding certain thematic affinities between Farāhī's Qur'ānic hermeneutics and Ricoeur's methodology of appropriating a text. In this regard, the notion of autonomy of text is to become the blurred area where the horizons of two distinct theoretical spheres are found fused.

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Farāhī's Notion of Autonomy of the Qur'ānic Text

Farāhī was born in a small village, Pharīhah near the city of A'zamgarh in the province of Uttar Pradesh, India six years after the Hindu-Muslim uprising against the British Imperialism in 1857. After the unsuccessful uprising, there arose two distinct currents of Muslim intellectualism in South Asia. The first was characterized by a conservative approach to the accumulation of traditional Islamic sciences including *tafsīr*, *hadīth*, *fiqh* and *tārīkh* etc. It excluded everything from the academic curriculum exterior to the fold of Muslim tradition of intellectualism except certain small traces of Aristotelian logic and Euclidian geometry. The second was the so-called Islamic modernism. It was an attempt of reconsideration of Islamic tradition under the yoke of Western modernism. The Seminary of Deoband and Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College of 'Alīgarh were to represent at that time the two intellectual currents respectively. Farāhī's academic life reflects both of these currents as his educational curricula. In the first phase of his educational life, he as a beginner memorized the Qur'ān and learned both Persian and Arabic languages. Then as a grownup student he went through the advanced-level Persian as well as Arabic with especial emphasis on *al-adab al-jāhili* (the pre-Islamic literature) along with '*ilm al-hadīth* and *fiqh*. In the second phase, he learned English and took admission in Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College, 'Alīgarh in order to pursue modern Western sciences including philosophy.¹

As regards his day's currents of Muslim intellectualism namely the Deoband conservatism and the 'Aligarh modernism, Farāhī was to transcend both. This transcendence was not a reduction which might lead his *self* to the depth of its subjectivity instead a revitalization which made his self find the way to attain the objectivity of meaning of the Word of God. As far as his position as a Qur'ān exegete is concerned, he identifies himself as an exponent of the old tradition of *tafsīr bi' l-rā'y* (exegesis by personal opinion) with the brand of *Nazm al-Qur'ān*. Throughout the history, the fundamental source of Qur'ān exegesis has been the *āthār* (sing. *athar* meaning exegetical remnant or tradition) of the Prophet and his companions handed down to an exegete through certain *isnād* (sing. *sanad* meaning chain of one-to-one reporting of *āthār* cited chronologically in reverse direction starting from the given reporter and ending at the Prophet). But in view of certain shortcomings of Qur'ānic hermeneutics based upon the *āthār* many exegetes turned toward the language which is an a priori condition of all acts of interpretation in a society. The turning from the *āthār* to the language was in fact a divergence from *tafsīr bi' l-mā' thūr* (traditionist exegesis) toward *tafsīr bi' l-rā'y*. Differing from the traditional misconception of *tafsīr bi' l-rā'y*, Farāhī explores his own conception of interpretation (*tā'wīl*). According to him, the Qur'ān "itself inspires its addressees with reflection (*tadabbur*) on it and unfolds (*tabayyan*) the obscure cognitions

¹ Sharaf al-Dīn Islāhī, *Dhikr-e-Farāhī (Reminiscing Farāhī)* (Lahore: Dār al-Tazkīr, 2002), pp. 109–172.

(*ma'ārif ghāmidah*) to the wise people (*ashāb al-'uqūl*).² Moreover, the reflection on the Qur'ān, which the Qur'ān itself invites to, gives rise to the plausibility of interpretation of the Qur'ānic verses: "Do they not reflect on the Qur'ān or are their hearts locked up by them." (*Muhammad* 47:24)³

The Prophet not only led his life through this inspiration but he also made his companions lead their life the same way. This hermeneutic aspect of their life was the most significant characteristic of the early Islamic society. In that hermeneutic culture each individual was free to interpret the divine word by his own, as it is common place to find the differences in their interpretations of the same text. Had they, according to Farāhī, derived their interpretations solely and wholly from the Prophet, they would not have had differences in their interpretations. However, the freedom of interpreting the Qur'ān did not lead one to deriving the subjectivist meaning of the verse concerned. For, the freedom of interpretation was coupled with the responsibility of following certain hermeneutical principles "based upon the Book, the *Sunnah* and Arabic language (*lisān al-'Arab*)" which made the interpretation objectivist. Thereby Farāhī construes a general principle that if one's interpretation of the divine word turns out to be unmatched with the three authorities mentioned above, then one's opinion so formed will be objectionable (*madhmūm*).⁴

It implies that Farāhī does not favor every form of *tafsīr bi 'l-rā'y* rather he is more cautious of what form of it is acceptable and what is not. The acceptability of *tafsīr bi 'l-rā'y* depends upon the nature of *rā'y* which one owns through one's interpretation of the divine word. In this regard, Farāhī seems to distinguish the acceptable opinion from the objectionable opinion (*al-rā'y al-madhmūm*). He does obviously neither totally reject the plausibility of interpreting the Qur'ān by the help of exegetical remnants handed down to one by one's predecessor nor he favours such interpretations that are entirely grounded upon one's mere opinion (*al-rā'y al-mahd*) and subjective prejudice (*hawā' l-nafs*). Drawing upon the divine imperative of reflecting on the Qur'ān (*Muhammad* 47:24) and the culture of the Prophetic hermeneutics, Farāhī nevertheless necessitates the formation of opinion through the process of interpretation. An opinion concerning the meaning of divine text cannot be acceptable or objectionable simply due to its traditional givenness or extratraditional novelty respectively. If one attempts to understand the Qur'ān through exegetical remnants it will be essential for one, according to Farāhī, to interpret "with certain criticism (*al-tanqīd*) in order to hold the opinion which is true (*sahh*) and authentic (*thābit*).⁵ Such an opinion should not be obtained by 'overlooking the guidance of the Qur'ān (*dalālat al-Qur'ān*) and the integration of a verse with its analogues (*nazā'ir*).⁶ Moreover, it should not merely be based upon

² Hamīd al-Dīn Farāhī, *Rasā'il al-Imām al-Farāhī fī 'Ulūm al-Qur'ān* (3rd Reprint, A'zamgarh: Al-Dā'irat al-Hamīdiyyah, 2005/1426), p. 215.

³ There are several other verses wherein one can find this invitation from the Qur'ān to the reflection on it. For instance, *al-Nisā'* 4:82; *al-Mū'minūn* 23:68; *Sā'd* 38:24 etc.

⁴ *Rasā'il*, p. 216.

the plain tradition (*al-manqūl al-mahd*) without differentiating between what is valid (*sahih*) and what is invalid (*saqīm*). For, the major part of the exegetical remnants comprises of ‘the inauthentic *ahādīth*, which are not only contradictory (*mutanāqid*) to each other but also to the apparent meaning of the Qur’ān (*zāhir al-Qur’ān*).’ So it is inevitable for one to see whether the given remnant is contradictory to or compatible with the divine word by interpreting it to the extent that one ultimately gets satisfied regarding its acceptability or objectionability. Thereby the Qur’ān exegetes, according to Farāhī, believe that “the best Qur’ān exegesis is one which is by the Qur’ān itself (*ahsan al-tafsīr mā kān bi ’l-Qur’ān*).”⁵ It reflects that Farāhī’s idea of *tafsīr bi ’l-rā’y* necessitates to arriving at an objectivist opinion as regards the meaning of the Qur’ān by rejecting every possibility of subjectivist attempt of interpreting the divine word whether traditionally or extratraditionally. The objectivist opinion cannot in any way be objectionable, and the only way to make the opinion devoid of being subjectivist is the way of interpretation. That is to say, the process of interpretation provides one with the ground to construe the Qur’ānic text as an autonomous meaning bearer, which is understandable from *within* being unexposed to the imposition of meanings from *without*. This hints at a fundamental canon of interpreting the Qur’ān as an autonomous text namely “the canon of interpreting the Qur’ān by the Qur’ān (*tā’wīl al-Qur’ān bi ’l-Qur’ān*).” According to the canon, a part of the Qur’ān is to be interpreted with respect to some other part(s) of the Qur’ān without referring to anything beyond the parameters of Qur’ānic text. There are a lot of places where the Qur’ān leaves the statement “abridged (*mujmal*) which is elaborated at some other place”, which is to say, a statement of the Qur’ān appears to be an interpreted version of some other statement appearing at some other place. He gives examples of the verses 72 and 73 of *Sūrat al-Anfāl*. The former says:

Those who believed and emigrated and fought with their assets and their selves in the way of Allāh. . . (*Anfāl* 8:72)

The latter says:

Those who believed and emigrated and fought in the way of Allāh. . . (*Anfāl* 8:73)

In the latter, the phrase, with their assets and their selves (*bi amwālihim wa anfusihim*) is not mentioned, though, according to Farāhī, its sense is there. Moreover, verse 75 of the same *sūrah* says:

And those who believed subsequently and emigrated and fought (being) with you. . . (*Anfāl* 8:75)

Here there is no mention either of *fī sabīl Allāh* (in the way of Allah) or of *bi amwālihim wa anfusihim*, but both the senses are there as shown by the addition of *ma’akum* (with you).⁶

⁵ *Rasā’il*, p. 217.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 263.

The idea of *tā'wīl al-Qur'ān bi'l-Qur'ān* (interpreting one part of the Qur'ān with reference to another part of it) is to presuppose that the Qur'ān is to have some thematic structure and coherence (*Nazm*). As regards Farāhī's Qur'ānic hermeneutics it remains not only a presupposition, rather it becomes the major thrust of his hermeneutical thought, as the latter is identified by the former and vice versa. He firmly believes that 'the Qur'ānic discourse cannot engage meaning in variance with its *Nazm*.' According to the notion of *Nazm al-Qur'ān*, the whole structure of the Qur'ān is thematic and that thematic structure is absolutely coherent. That is to say, all of the verses of a *sūrah* of the Qur'ān are integrally related to each other to give rise to the major theme of the *sūrah* and again all of the *sūrahs* are interconnected with each other to constitute the major theme(s) of the Qur'ān. This view is entirely different from the older conception of the *Munāsabah* (proportionality) of immediate verses or *sūrahs* of the Qur'ān as expounded by Rāzī and Suyūṭī etc.⁷ "Proportionality (*Munāsabah*) is a part of *Nazm* or *Nizām*" in the sense that the former is to relate one verse or *sūrah* to the preceding and following verse (s) or *sūrah*(s) while the latter makes the whole *sūrah* 'a perfect unity' (*kāmil^{an} wāhid^{an}*). Moreover, the part-whole relationship between *Munāsabah* and *Nazm* is to establish the Qur'ān as a unit-word (*Kalām^{an} Wāhid^{an}*).⁸ The thematic coherence of *sūrah* depends upon its specific major theme which Farāhī calls 'Amūd (pillar). The 'Amūd of *sūrah* is its purport (*mahsūl*) and purpose (*maqṣūd*) that dynamically effects the entirety of the *sūrah*. That is to say, one can never find the 'Amūd of *sūrah* in the elementary order of the verses, rather it is a living spirit (*rūh*) of *sūrah* that manifests intrinsically in the *kalām* as an explanation (*sharh*) and detail (*tafsīl*) and as an output (*intāj*) and justification (*ta'līl*) of *sūrah* as a whole. And the only way to decipher the 'Amūd is to reflect (*Tadabbur*) deeply on the *sūrah* in its totality.⁹ As the verses are integrally related to one another to give rise

⁷ Suyūṭī, while discussing the issue of *Munāsabāt al-Āyāt wa 'l-Suwar* (Proportionality between the Verses and the *Sūrahs*) mentions names of Abū Ja'far ibn al-Zubayr and Burhān al-Dīn al-Biqā'ī, along with himself, who wrote full-fledged exegeses on the ground of the notion of *Munāsabah* and *Nazm*. See Jalāl ad-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, *Al-Itqān fī 'Ulūm al-Qur'ān* (Tehran: Dārul Dhavīl-Qurbā, 2001/1422), pp. 211–223.

⁸ After explaining the difference and relationship between *Munāsabah* and *Nizām*, Farāhī says: "...and upon this basis you can see or understand the whole Qur'ān as a unit-word." Also see Mustansir Mīr, *Thematic and Structural Coherence in the Qur'ān: A Study of Islāhī's Conception of Nazm*. This is Mīr's dissertation which he submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Near Eastern Studies) from the University of Michigan in 1983, pp. 51–56. The dissertation was later published in book form, Mustansir Mīr, *Coherence in the Qur'ān: A Study of Islāhī's Concept of Nazm in Tadabbur-e-Qur'ān*, Indianapolis, American Trust Publication, 1986. Also see Mustansir Mīr, "The *Sūrah* as a Unity: A Twentieth-Century Development in Qur'ān Exegesis," in G. R. Hawting and 'Abdul-Kāder A. Shareef (Eds.), *Approaches to the Qur'ān* (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 211–224.

⁹ *Rasā'il*, p. 85.

to the 'Amūd of *sūrah* all of the *sūrahs* are interconnected to constitute the coherent structure of the Qur'ān as an organic whole.¹⁰

This whole scheme of the thematic- and structural-coherence of the Qur'ān as established by Farāhī is, on the one hand, to make Qur'ānic text autonomous seemingly comparable with Ricoeur's concept of autonomy of text, and on the other, it reflects the notion of hermeneutical circle that seems to be very close to that of the classical Western hermeneuticians, particularly Friedrich Ast and Schleiermacher.¹¹ The thematic- and structural-coherence of the Qur'ān is established by the revealed parts it is comprised of, and the meaning of every verse, as Farāhī opines, is determined by the major theme of the *sūrah* the verse is a part of, as the 'Amūd, as we have shown above, is to effect the whole thematic structure of the *sūrah* dynamically. Thus, for Farāhī interpretation of the Qur'ān is always circular. But this is not a vicious circle of logic, rather a hermeneutical circle that has always been a principle of understanding and interpretation of a text throughout the Western tradition of hermeneutics. In Part II of the paper we shall also see along with Ricoeur's conception of autonomy of text the hermeneutical circularity of the notion of *Nazm*.

¹⁰ Farāhī's student Islāhī, who drawing upon Farāhī's theories later wrote a complete exegesis of the Qur'ān titled *Tadabbur-e-Qur'an*, further elaborates the idea of Qur'ānic coherence. He claims that the whole of the Qur'ānic text comprising 114 *sūrahs* is structurally divided into seven groups each of which starts with one or more *Makkī sūrah(s)* (*sūrahs* revealed at Mecca) and ends with one or more *Madanī sūrah(s)* (*sūrahs* revealed at *Madīnah*). The whole scheme of Islāhī's in this regard is as follows:

1st Group:	From <i>Sūrat al-Fātihah</i> (1) to <i>Sūrat al-Mā'idah</i> (5): The first is <i>Makkī</i> and the remaining <i>Madanī</i>
2nd Group:	From <i>Sūrat al-An'ām</i> (6) to <i>Sūrat al-Tawbah</i> (9): The first two are <i>Makkī</i> and the remaining two are <i>Madanī</i>
3rd Group:	Form <i>Sūrah Yūnus</i> (10) to <i>Sūrat al-Nūr</i> (24): All are <i>Makkī</i> except the last one
4th Group:	From <i>Sūrat al-Furqān</i> (25) to <i>Sūrat al-Ahzāb</i> (33): Only <i>al-Ahzāb</i> is <i>Madanī</i>
5th Group:	From <i>Sūrah Sabā</i> (34) to <i>Sūrah Hujurāt</i> (49): The last three are <i>Madanī</i>
6th Group:	From <i>Sūrah Qāf</i> (50) to <i>Sūrat al-Tahrīm</i> (66): The last ten are <i>Madanī</i>
7th Group:	From <i>Sūrat al-Mulk</i> (67) to <i>Sūrat al-Nās</i> (114): The first forty-two are <i>Makkī</i> and the last five <i>Madanī</i> . See Amīn Ahsan Islāhī, <i>Tadabbur-e-Qur'ān (Reflection on the Qur'ān)</i> , Vol. 1 (7th Reprint, Lahore: Fārān, 1997/1417), p. 25

¹¹ Abdul Rahim Afaki, "Farāhī's Objectivist-Canonical Qur'ānic Hermeneutics and its Thematic Relevance with Classical Western Hermeneutics," *Transcendent Philosophy Journal*, Vol. 10 (December 2009), pp. 231–266.

***Nazm al-Qur'ān* and Autonomy of Text: The Farāhī-Ricoeur Thematic Affinity**

The notion of *Nazm* along with the canon of *tafsīr al-Qur'ān bi'l-Qur'ān* leads one to interpreting the Qur'ān as an autonomous text. The concept of *Nazm* is a unique version of the notion of the hermeneutical circle,¹² that different parts of the Qur'ān are integrally-thematically related to each other to constitute it as an organic-thematic whole and vice versa. Drawing upon the notion of *Nazm*, Farāhī expounds the doctrine of *tafsīr al-Qur'ān bi'l-Qur'ān* that “one part of the Qur'ān interprets the other (*al-Qur'ān yufassir ba'dah ba'd^{an}*)” by the way of context, as the Qur'ān defines itself as “*kitāb^{an} mutashābih^{an}*”, which is to say, “its one part has got a connotative similarity with the other.”¹³ This twofold interplay of the thematic coherence and the hermeneutical circle within the Qur'ān guarantees that the Qur'ānic text is an autonomous structure. The autonomy of divine text makes it free from all of the complementary hermeneutical relationships with anything exterior. That is, it guarantees that “the Qur'ān is the key to interpret itself requiring nothing from outside in order to specify its meaning, to expound its objectives (*maqāsid*) and themes (*matālib*), and to interpret its realities.”¹⁴ Farāhī's notion of the autonomy of divine discourse reminds one about views concerning the autonomy of text as expounded both by Emilio Betti and Paul Ricoeur. Regarding the issue of textual autonomy the latter seems to be closer to Farāhī than the former, as in the case of the former the text is conceived as “meaning-full form” being “suitable for preserving the character of the mind that created it or that is embodied in it”¹⁵ while the latter is characterized by an objectivist ‘appropriation’ of a text

¹² The notion of the hermeneutical circle that the overall meaning of a text is determined by the integral relationship between the meanings of its parts and vice versa has been a living thrust throughout the history of Western hermeneutics. This notion has been so significant that one can write a whole history of hermeneutics in terms of the development of this notion through the ages. As far as the earliest shaping of the concept of hermeneutical circle is concerned, one may trace its roots back to the Renaissance in the West. The initial form of the notion of the hermeneutical circle was the argument which the Protestant reformers developed questioning the Church authority as a sole interpreter of the divine Scriptures. Rejecting the subjective imposition of meaning by the Church on the Scriptures, they argued that there was no need to impose external meaning on the Scripture, rather it ‘contained an internal coherence and continuity’, which is to say, ‘an individual passage [of a Scripture] must be interpreted in terms of the aim and composition of the whole work.’ See Wilhelm Dilthey, *Wilhelm Dilthey: Selected Writings*, ed., trans. & Intr. H.P. Rickman (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 254 and Kurt M-Vollmer, *The Hermeneutics Reader: Texts of the German Tradition from the Enlightenment to the Present* (New York: Continuum, 1985), p. 2.

¹³ *Rasā'il*, p. 263–267.

¹⁴ Amīn Ahsan Islāhī, *Mubādī-e-Tadabbur-e-Qur'ān* (Lahore: Fārān, 1991/1412), p. 60.

¹⁵ Emilio Betti, “Allgemeine Auslegunglehre als methodik der Geisteswissenschaften,” (trans. Josef Bleicher), Josef Bleicher, *Contemporary Hermeneutics: Hermeneutics as Method, Philosophy and Critique* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), p. 54.

‘bracketing’ all subjectivity which may involve at the moment of interpretation of the text as an ‘utterance or set of utterances fixed by writing’.

The divine spirit of Qur’ānic discourse makes it absolutely closed in terms of the creation of its meaning which does not suit Betti who conceives text as the meaning-full form always represents itself as an objective manifestation of some mental (rather than the divine) reality. The mental reality may be expressed in some form with or without intent. If it is contained in the form implicitly, that is to say, if it is manifested in the form unconsciously or without any intent, it becomes the object of interpretation. So interpretation “does not presuppose that the thought-content has been expressed with an intent towards conscious representation or towards communicating something about social life.”¹⁶ Rather interpretation is concerned with certain spontaneously created expressions in which the meaning is implicitly contained. And this unconscious and unintentional meaning contained in the form invites an interpreter to decipher it. In this regard the representational function of the meaning-full form plays a vital role in its interpretation. The internal meaning of the form may be unconscious but ‘symptomatic’ in its nature. For instance, every practical activity being a meaning-full form contains internal meaning that being viewed as a symptom “could be used for arriving at a person’s fundamental conceptions and his characteristic way of perceiving and judging things around him.”¹⁷

Since this internal meaning is created by a mind spontaneously, that is, the representational function is devoid of any conscious intent, therefore, “it provides the most genuine and reliable indication of the attitude of [its] author by allowing safe inferences as to the underlying mentality.”¹⁸ That is how interpretation becomes an ‘objective activity’ based upon the unconscious and unintentional representational function of meaning-full form, which is to say, it is a cognitive contact whereby the interpreter cognizes a subject whose creative thought is objectivated in the meaning-full forms. Thus the process of interpretation can be viewed as an inversion of the process of creation of the meaning-full forms wherein “the interpreter retraces the steps from the opposite direction by re-thinking them in his inner self.”¹⁹ In this inversion, the interpreter has to understand the meaning-full forms being as close as possible to the original meaning expounded by the other mind objectivated in them, which makes the text autonomous and the interpretation objectivist. That is why the first and fundamental canon of Betti’s hermeneutical theory is called the canon of the hermeneutical autonomy of the text or of the immanence of the standards of hermeneutics. According to the canon, one should interpret the meaning-full form as an autonomous text that has its own ‘logic of development’, its own ‘intended connections’, its own ‘necessity, coherence and conclusiveness’. This canon is also known as the canon of the immanence of the

¹⁶ Bleicher, *Contemporary Hermeneutics*, p. 54.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

standards of hermeneutics, as according to it, the meaning-full forms “should be judged in relation to the standards immanent in the original intention [rather than] in terms of their suitability for any other external purpose that may seem relevant to the interpreter.”²⁰ In the face of all immanence and autonomy of text, it does not remain completely closed, as from the end of its creation the author is always found to have put meaning in it. But in case of the divine scripture like the Qur’ān, the structure of text remains absolutely closed owing to the divine and transcendental source of meaning rather than a mundane reality. In this regard, Ricoeur’s concept of text seems to be more autonomy oriented in the sense that it severs the text from everything exterior even the author.

Ricoeur takes text to be a ‘discourse’ which one speaks but which is fixed in meaning when “one writes precisely because one does not speak” that time.²¹ ‘The birth of a text’ is guaranteed by the objectification of discourse in the form of writing. It is meaning intended by the utterance (not only the words), which is fixed in writing. The text is a fixation of meaning in writing calls for a reading. Ricoeur demarcates ‘reading’ from ‘dialogue’. Dialogue, for him, “is an exchange of questions and answers.” Since there is no questioning-answering relation found in the act of reading therefore it cannot be considered as a dialogical process. Ricoeur does not focus on the author-reader relation, rather he lays emphasis on the text-reader relation, as the text, being a fixed meaning bearer of the utterance of the author, can be taken as a ‘substitute’ of the dialogue and as something which ‘intercepts’ it. That is to say, the text is autonomous in itself, as on the one hand, it “preserves discourse [by the transcription of oral language into graphic signs] and makes of it archives available for individual and collective memory.”²² On the other hand, “the linearization of symbols allows for an analytic and distinctive translation of all the successive and discrete traits of language and thus increases its efficiency” and autonomy.²³ The conception of the autonomy of text leads Ricoeur to discard it from all of its ‘outer references’ including the world in which it was fixed as well as the author who himself fixed it. This “suspension of the referential relation to the world and the reference to the author” enables the reader to “stay within the ‘place of the text’ and within the ‘enclosure’ of this place.”²⁴ In Ricoeur’s view, the process of reading has two different attitudes namely ‘explanation’ and ‘interpretation.’ In the explanatory attitude, the text is considered as a structure of linguistic signs closed within itself being disconnected from its outer references, while in the interpretational attitude, the reading of the text makes it ‘open’ to something exterior. That is, the autonomous structure of the text remains

²⁰ Bleicher, *Contemporary Hermeneutics*, p. 58.

²¹ Paul Ricoeur, “What is a Text? Explanation and Interpretation,” (trans. David M. Rasmussen), David M. Rasmussen, *Mythic-Symbolic Language and Philosophical Anthropology: A Constructive Interpretation of the Thought of Paul Ricoeur* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), p. 136.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 137.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 139.

close in relation to the author while open in relation to the interpreter. Interpretation as the reading of a text is characterized by the interlinking of some external discourse to the discourse fixed by writing in the text. In this regard, interpretation can be grasped as ‘appropriation’ which has several dimensions.²⁵

Firstly, when an interpreter reads a text, he not only understands the context, rather he understands himself as well. That is to say, the reading of a text is a “concrete reflection”, as “the interpretation of a text ends up in the self-interpretation of a subject that henceforth understands himself better.”²⁶ But this hermeneutical reflection which guarantees the simultaneity of “the constitution of *self* and that of meaning” remains incomplete until and unless it is incorporated with the explanatory attitude of the self. The understanding of a text provides an alternate route to the reader to understand himself by his mediation to his own life through the appropriation of cultural signs and symbols already fixed in the text. So the explanatory attitude of a reader becomes complementary to his hermeneutical reflection.

The second dimension of interpretation as appropriation is concerned with the aim of hermeneutics “to fight against cultural distance.” By cultural distance Ricoeur not only means “the temporal distance but the kind of estrangement in regard to the system of values to which the cultural background of the text belongs.” When one interprets a text, one appropriately brings all of those textual elements together which first seem to be foreign to render them properly one’s own.²⁷

The third dimension of interpretation as appropriation which Ricoeur considers as the most significant one is concerned with the link of discourse fixed in a text by the process of writing to the ‘actual discourse’ belongs to the process of interpretation. Drawing an analogy between the reading of a text and “the performance of a musical score” he expounds that when one reads a text one actualizes “the semantic virtualities” of it.²⁸ It means that the reading of a text is an event of discourse corresponding to the actualization of the textual meaning with reference to the interpreter’s real life, i.e. “to interpret is to appropriate *hic et nunc* for ourselves the intention of the text.”²⁹ In this regard this third dimension of interpretation becomes a condition for the other two, as one first realizes or actualizes the semantic possibilities of a text only then one overcomes the cultural distance as well as understands oneself in relation to the understanding of the text.

Ricoeur’s notion of the three-dimensional appropriation of text as an autonomous structure is coherently adjustable with the Farāhīan view of the autonomy of divine discourse as a perfect model of human life-praxis. Putting the foundation stone of his canonical Qur’ānic hermeneutics, Farāhī expresses his serious reservations against the absolute lacuna of hermeneutical reflection in drawing from the

²⁵ Rasmussen, *Mythic-Symbolic Language*, p. 145.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 148.

²⁹ Ibid.

Qur'ān regarding *'ilm al-akhlāq* (ethics) and *'ilm al-kalām* (theological dialectic). His reservations are justifiable owing to the ethical spirit of Islamic civilization as based upon the divine discourse. The purpose behind the revelation of the Qur'ān is mainly to make the mortals understand its verses as well as to purify their souls as the Qur'ān says:

Our Lord! Send in them as apostle from amongst themselves who (can) recite Thy signs to them and teach them the Book and the Wisdom, and purify them. Indeed, Thou art the Exalted in Might (and) the Wise.³⁰

Conclusion

The defining aspect of Farāhī's hermeneutical approach to the divine word is the notion of *Nazm*. The mutual effect of all of the two canons discussed above leads one to the idea of autonomy of divine text. Farāhī's conception of autonomy of the Qur'ān seems, apart from all the differences, to be related to the notion of the autonomy of text as expounded by Betti and Ricoeur who are well-known as objectivist hermeneuticists. Farāhī's belief that the Qur'ān is thematically coherent requires that one should not refer to anything exterior in order to interpret any part of the Qur'ān; rather, the thematic integrality between the various parts of the Qur'ān and their further thematic relationship to the major theme(s) of the Qur'ān are enough to construe the meaning of the Qur'ānic text. That is to say, one part of the Qur'ān interprets the other by virtue of the thematic relationship between them. This is what we call *tafsīr al-Qur'ān bi 'l-Qur'ān*. In contemporary Western hermeneutics, Betti and Ricoeur both are of the view that in order to be interpreted appropriately the text should be taken as autonomous. But their approaches to the view of the autonomy of text are different from each other. The former thinks that at the level of creation the text or the meaning-full form comes into being through the author's unconscious attempt of putting meaning into the text, while at the level of interpretation the interpreter is to minimize the imposition of his subjective views on the meaning-full form through the process of self-effacement. That is to say, the meaning-full form's coming into being owes entirely to the author's life-experiences in his cultural world, and the interpreter is to reciprocally reconstruct those meanings as objectively as possible. As compared to Betti's, Ricoeur's conception of the autonomy of text seems closer to that of Farāhī. Ricoeur's hermeneutical approach to text is far more objectivist than that of Betti's, as the former discards the text from both the author's and the interpreter's life-world as a source of meanings. He rejects the author-text relationship as something intervening in the process of interpretation, for it may stir the interpreter's focus from the objective givenness of the text to the life-world of the author. He also rejects the possibility of the subjective impositions of meanings by the interpreter on the text.

³⁰ *Baqarah* 2:129.

On the contrary, he believes in the hermeneutical appropriation of the text through the interpreter's explanatory and interpretational attitudes towards it. In the process of hermeneutical appropriation, it is the text that may affect the interpreter's life not vice versa. Ricoeur's hermeneutical approach toward the text as something autonomous is highly useful for the objectivist Qur'ān exegetes like Farāhī in two ways. First, it releases the interpreter from the obligation of incorporating the socio-historical-cultural aspects of the author's life in the interpretation of the text, which suits the divine word as a text to be interpreted, as at the level of creation it is rooted into the transcendental divine world rather than the socio-historical-cultural world. Second, it enlightens the way for the interpreter to transform his life through the dictates of the hermeneutical appropriation of the text, which is a golden rule for the objectivist Qur'ān exegetes like Farāhī to ascend their life through the divine path of righteousness derived from the Word of God.

Dieu et son mirage : L'exégèse druze de Coran 24:39

Jad Hatem

Abstract Quoique le Coran ne soit pas le Livre sacré des druzes, il demeure un ouvrage de référence majeur. Les fondateurs de la religion, Hamza Ibn 'Alî et Isma'îl al-Tamîmî en font un usage constant, mais en le soumettant à une interprétation qui en bouleverse le sens. L'auteur s'attache à en donner un exemple à travers l'exégèse qui est faite du verset 39 de la sourate de la Lumière. Dans le contexte coranique, ce verset signifie que les bonnes actions n'assurent pas le salut si leurs agents sont des infidèles. Pour Tamîmî, il concerne le Dieu qui a revêtu une forme humaine et comment le reconnaître sous son incognito.

Je me propose d'examiner l'exégèse d'un verset du Coran que nous lisons sous la plume d'Isma'îl al-Tamîmî, auteur d'une partie des *Épîtres de la sagesse*, (ci-après *Épîtres* entre parenthèses), livre qui contient l'essence et l'élixir de la religion druze.¹ Il importe de noter qu'il fut un des partenaires de Hamza ibn 'Alî dans la fondation de la nouvelle religion et est considéré, à l'égal de son maître, comme l'un des cinq *hudûds*, c'est-à-dire une entité supracosmique (en l'occurrence l'Ame

¹ La religion druze est née au Caire sous le règne (386–411 h) du calife fatimide al-Hâkim bi-Amr Allâh. Le nom de la secte provient d'un de ses du'ât, Darazi, qui la répandit en Syrie où elle prit souche après qu'elle fut éradiquée en Egypte après la mort du souverain (ou sa disparition, selon les druzes, qui doit être suivie d'un retour triomphant). Le véritable fondateur de la religion est un persan du nom de Hamza ibn 'Alî qui, avec Isma'îl al-Tamîmî et Bahâ'uddîne Muqtanâ rédigea les *Rasâ'il al-hikmat* qui constituent le livre sacré. Influencée par la théologie et la philosophie ismaéliennes, la doctrine druze hérite leur théorie des *hûduds*. Toutefois, elle s'en écarte par deux traits essentiels : (1) ces *hûduds* sont incarnés, et leurs âmes transmigrent (*tataqammas*), comme d'ailleurs celles de tous les humains. (2) l'Un prend figure humaine afin d'instruire les hommes. On lui connaît dix apparitions dans l'histoire, la dernière étant al-Hâkim.

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universelle). Créé avant le monde, il s'incarne et survient d'âge en âge afin de propager la vraie foi (et, ajouterons-nous la vraie philosophie puisque Platon est tenu pour l'une de ses réincarnations), et particulièrement lorsque le Créateur prend figure dans le monde, ce qui advint du temps de l'individu qui répondit au nom de Tamîmî en la personne du Calife fatimide al-Hakim bi-amr Allâh. Pour ces raisons, l'auteur est considéré par les druzes comme nativement versé dans la connaissance des réalités surnaturelles et invisibles. Sa science, pour ne pas dire son omniscience, est propre à apposer sur ses écrits le sceau de la parfaite véracité. Nul besoin d'ajouter que ses écrits jouissent, comme ceux de Hamza et de Bahâ'uddîne Muqtanâ, le cinquième dignitaire (ou *hadd*), de la plus grande autorité, infiniment supérieure à celle qu'aurait par exemple un prophète, y compris quant à l'interprétation du livre sacré qu'il a communiqué aux hommes, car quelle que soit la sincérité de l'homme, il ne possède pas l'intelligence du texte. Qu'on se souvienne que Suhrawardî proclamera dans les *Temples de la lumière* que l'interprétation du Coran n'a pas été confiée au prophète de l'Islam, mais au Paraclet qui lui succédera et qui sera oint de la lumière (entendre : de la substance divine). Ce que Suhrawardî se proposera d'être par rapport au Coran, les *hudûds* le furent avant lui. Il y eut et il y aura d'autres herméneutes du Livre, mais rares sont ceux qui prétendent connaître mieux les choses le concernant que son transmetteur.² Cela tient, dans le cas des *hudûds*, au fait qu'ils sont les vrais auteurs des Livres. Aux côtés du Prophète de l'Islam se trouve le premier *hadd*, le dénommé Salmân, qui a statut de dispensateur (*mumidd*) gabrielique, celui qui transmet le texte (cf. *Epîtres*, p. 99). Par exemple, le verset coranique : « Nous t'avons fait descendre le Livre en toute vérité » (39:2) est expliqué de la façon suivante : le Livre, c'est 'Alî, la Parole à Mahomet, la Vérité est le Qâ'im (*Epîtres*,³ p. 280), à savoir Hamza. Pour ce qui est des Evangiles, la situation est plus claire puisqu'on les tient pour directement composés et signés par les *hudûds*, Jean ayant été celui qui sera Tamîmî.

On lit dans la plus importante de ses épîtres, intitulée *Tafsîr al-'ulum wa-ithbât al-haqq wa-kashf al-maknûn* :

Il s'est rapproché de nous par nous (*bi-nâ*), Il s'est rendu familier à nos intellects moyennant nos formes et s'est manifesté à nous moyennant toutes nos œuvres afin que le comprissent nos facultés. Nous ne disons pas que cette forme visible (*sûrat mar'iyat*) est Lui (*hiya huwa*) de sorte que nous l'enfermions et le limitions (*mahsûran mahdûdan*) ; Il surpasse tout cela par sa majesté et sa gloire ! Nous disons plutôt : Il est elle (*huwa hiya*) par dissimulation (*istitâran*), pour la proximation (*taqarruban*) et la familiarisation (*ta'nîsan*), et cela sans limite, ni ressemblance (*tashabbuhan*), ni pareillement (*mithl*). Ainsi que le clame le *Coran* : "...comme un mirage dans une plaine (*bi-qî'at*) que l'assoiffé prend pour de l'eau, si bien qu'y parvenant, il s'aperçoit qu'il n'est rien, et il trouve là (*'indahu*) Allâh". Cette forme est pareille à un mirage qui te paraît eau mais que tu trouveras n'être pas de l'eau dès que tu l'inspecteras. De même cette forme, la considères-tu avec les yeux charnels (littéralement : de la nature), tu la prends pour une forme comme la tienne ; t'en

² Jésus fut sans doute dans ce cas (Lc 24:27). On notera que les *Epîtres de la Sagesse* présentent Tamîmî comme une réincarnation d'Hermès trismégiste (E, pp. 240, 282), l'herméneute par excellence et par étymologie.

³ Hamza ibn 'Alî, Ismâ'îl al-Tamîmî, Bahâ'uddîne al-Samûqî, *Rasâ'il al-Hikmat*, Paris, 1980.

approches-tu avec les yeux de la science, tu ne la trouveras pas une forme, mais tu trouveras Allâh en son lieu (**indaha*). De la même façon, la divinité (*Lâhût*) de Notre-Seigneur est le pré- et le post-éternel (*al-azalî al-abadî*) qui ne peut être limité ou qualifié. Et il en va de toi, observant cette forme visible, comme de celui qui, regardant dans la substance du miroir, voit l'équivalent de sa forme, sans pouvoir la toucher, comprendre son mode d'être et définir sa quiddité. Si tu veux la toucher, tu touches ta forme. Et si tu changes quelque chose en ta forme, elle aussi change à tes yeux. Tout ceci, à condition que tes yeux soient exempts de chassie et de saleté.

Si au contraire ta vision est troublée par quelque taie, tu ne vois pas ta forme exactement comme elle est. De même, celui qui regarde cette forme visible la voit selon son degré de science et de vérification (*Epîtres*, pp. 258–259).

La citation coranique reproduit partiellement le verset 39 de la sourate *La lumière*. Après avoir évoqué aux versets précédents la vigilance et la pratique des fidèles qui leur valent une récompense divine, le texte énonce : « Quant à ceux qui ont mécré, leurs actions sont comme un mirage dans une plaine⁴ que l'assoiffé prend pour de l'eau si bien qu'y parvenant, il s'aperçoit qu'il n'est rien (*lam yajidhu shay'an*), et il trouve là Allâh qui lui règle son compte en entier, Allâh est prompt à faire rendre compte ». De la théonomie de la primauté de la foi résulte que ce sont les bonnes actions des mécréants qui équivalent à un mirage. On lit dans le commentaire de Fakhrudîne al-Râzî (*ad loc.*) que l'illusion consiste précisément à avoir pensé que leurs actes de justice étaient de nature à leur assurer le salut. Celui qui commet le mal ne s'attend à rien de tel. Nul mirage dans son cas !⁵ Il est sous-entendu, chez Râzî, que l'erreur ne vient pas ce que l'on croit que telles actions sont méritoires alors qu'elles ne le sont pas. Elles le sont en elles-mêmes sans être le moins du monde efficaces. Tabarî précise que ceux qui n'ont pas ajouté foi au Coran et au Prophète s'imaginent que leurs actions les prémunissent de l'enfer (dont l'idée est déjà génératrice de soif). Ils seront surpris de découvrir un Dieu qui les condamnera.

Il est hautement significatif que par les deux coupures pratiquées aux deux bouts du verset et son insertion dans un propos sur l'appréhension ambivalente de Dieu, Tamîmî change le comparé. D'une part, ce ne sont plus les bonnes actions des mécréants qui équivalent à un mirage, c'est la forme visible de Dieu, ce qui évidemment est bien autre chose ; d'autre part, alors que la rencontre de Dieu n'a rien de réjouissant en ce cas précis dans le Coran, elle est, selon l'épître de la Sagesse, accession à la cime de la gnose. Pour traquer et trouver le sens caché, une extrême violence est infligée au texte. Certes toute interprétation ésotérique, mystique ou sectaire, recourt au coup de force. Mais l'audacieuse licence qu'on s'accorde va jusqu'à la transvaluation lorsqu'on fait dire au texte le contraire de ce qu'il clame. Or c'est exactement ce à quoi s'emploie notre passage, sinon dans le

⁴ *Qî'at*, pluriel de *qâ'* : une étendue de terre. En l'occurrence, un désert.

⁵ Cette lecture n'est pas unanimement admise. Muhammad al-Shîrâzî (en son *Taqrîb al-Qur'ân min al-adhhân*) tient que les actions sont elles-mêmes mauvaises (*sayyi'at*). Dans le domaine chrétien, cette dernière position correspond en général à la conviction de l'Église catholique, notamment contre Wyclif soutenant que quoi que l'homme fasse en état de péché mortel, il pèche mortellement, ce dont hérite Calvin (cf. *Institution de la religion chrétienne*, III, XV, 6 ; IV, XIII, 2).

traitement du verset précité, du moins pour ce qui regarde l'ensemble du Coran. En effet, Tamîm s'appuie sur le verset coranique au dessein d'établir le mode de reconnaissance de Dieu qui vient avec un visage humain à la rencontre de l'homme sur la scène et dans la dramaturgie du monde, ce qui ne manque pas de heurter de front l'explicite du Coran. Les *Epîtres de la Sagesse* où figure celle de Tamîm (sous le numéro 36) justifient leur procédé en se faisant passer pour un redoublement de l'ésotérique. En effet, Hamza observe qu'après l'exotérique (*al-zâhir*) à savoir la phase de Mahomet (qualifié de *Nâtiq*) — entendre le sunnisme — est venu l'ésotérique (*al-bâtin*), à savoir la phase de 'Alî (désigné comme *Asâs*), — entendre l'ismaélisme. Mais à cet ésotérique succède une nouvelle phase qui en est l'ésotérique (*bâtin al-bâtin*) et qui fera de lui un exotérique (*Epîtres*, p. 198).⁶ Ceci implique, d'une part, que sont abolies « les deux Lois » (*Epîtres*, pp. 56, 65) et, d'autre part, que l'interprétation du Coran doit s'élever à un nouveau palier. L'ésotérique s'était chargé, usant du commentaire identifiant, de dépister dans tout le Coran des allusions à 'Alî et aux Imâms issus de lui et de Fâtima. C'est ainsi que les infidèles dont les actions sont comme un mirage sont, d'après al-Qummî, les opposants aux Imâms.⁷ Dorénavant, on s'appliquera à y découvrir des allusions à Hâkim. A titre d'exemple, alors que l'ésotérique du pèlerinage à la Mecque appelle à une reconnaissance de la science de Mahomet et de 'Alî, l'ésotérique de cet ésotérique découvre, dit Hamza, que la *Ka'ba* (*al-Bayt*) signifie l'unification de Hâkim, c'est-à-dire l'admission qu'il est Dieu (*Epîtres*, p. 60). On voit que ce n'est pas à une simple substitution d'hommes qu'on assiste, car après tout, pour les fatimides, le calife al-Hâkim bi-amr Allah est de la semence de 'Alî, et on pourra même dire qu'il est pour ainsi dire 'Alî, tous deux étant des expressions de l'Intellect universel et tous deux participant de la divinité sans être Dieu, ce pour quoi Hamza s'acharne à nier leur identification l'un à

⁶ Il est intéressant de noter que la formule *bâtin al-bâtin* se rencontre chez les ismaéliens (cf. Ja'far Abû Mansûr al-Yaman, *Kitâb al-'âlim wa-l-ghulâm*, in *Arba' kutub haqqâniyyat*, Beyrouth, Majd, 1983, pp. 30–31) et que les druzes en usent pour disqualifier leur doctrine. La différence est la suivante : pour Hamza, le passage au *bâtin al-bâtin* signifie l'entrée dans une nouvelle religion, alors que pour les ismaéliens, il consiste dans la mise en évidence d'une nouvelle couche de sens dans la même tradition. En règle générale, ils n'éprouvent pas le besoin de recourir à l'argument de l'altération du Coran (c'est le cas de Kulaynî, chez les imâmites). Il leur suffit d'affirmer que c'est le sens qui a été dévoyé. La formule chez Hamza permet de rejeter l'ésotérique avec l'exotérique puisque transformé en exotérique.

⁷ *Tafsîr*, ad 24:36. De même Hâshim al-Bahrânî dans son *Tafsîr al-Burhân* et Sultân Muhammad al-Janâbidhî dans son *Tafsîr bayân al-sa'âdat fî maqâmât al-'ibâdat*. Certains commentateurs (comme Muhammad Ridâ al-Mashhadî, auteur du *Kanz al-daqâ'iq*) nomment carrément les Omayyades. Une exégèse imamite non-bâtinite comme celle de Tabatabâ'î (dans *Al-Mîzân fî tafsîr al-Qur'ân*) préfère identifier les actions des mécréants aux offrandes des idolâtres qui, comme tout le monde, aspirent au bonheur et croient le trouver moyennant leurs rites. Ce n'est que dans un deuxième moment qu'il étend l'attribution à ceux qui nient le Créateur (sans qu'il dise comment). Muhammad Hussayn Fadlullâh (*Min wahyi al-Qurân*) précise qu'ils ne croient pas dans la vie future et le jugement divin, en sorte qu'ici la surprise est de rencontrer Dieu et non plus de découvrir que leurs actions n'ont servi à rien. Il est à noter que plusieurs commentateurs shî'ites ne s'avancent pas plus loin que les sunnites.

l'autre, et ceci contre les ismaéliens (*Epîtres*, p. 61) et même contre les nusayris (*Epîtres*, p. 172) pour la raison qu'il ne veut pas voir en 'Alî autre chose qu'un homme. Or voici la différence fondamentale avec l'ismaélisme : les druzes font subir au calife⁸ un saut qualitatif qui lui fait perdre (au profit de Hamza) le titre d'Imâm et modifie son nom qui devient al-Hâkim bi-amrihi, c'est-à-dire celui qui gouverne (ou juge) de par son impératif à lui. Ce n'est pas que l'ancien nom se trouve contredit ; il est disqualifié parce tout simplement éliminé par l'équation : al-Hâkim est Allâh. De quoi justifier le passage à une puissance supérieure. Autre chose de repérer des allusions et de fonder une médiation (l'imâmique), autre chose de mettre au jour une présence qui abolit toute médiation. On n'allégorise plus en conservant le sens obvie (nécessaire à la pratique religieuse), on allégorise en éliminant le sens obvie (afin de donner son congé à la *sharî'a*⁹). De fait, comme Hamza lui-même l'affirme, dès lors que l'ésotérique devient l'exotérique d'un nouvel ésotérique, le premier exotérique se dissout (*yadmahill*) (*Epîtres*, p. 198). Au lieu donc d'avoir à se cacher sous le règne de la Loi coranique et d'en appliquer les prescriptions tout en les sachant inutiles, on se contente désormais de faire mine de suivre les directives¹⁰ et les exégèses de l'ismaélisme (on ne renverse pas l'Etat fatimide gouverné d'ailleurs par Hâkim) jusqu'au moment où sera pleinement proclamée la vérité, moment de l'exotérisation définitive, ce qui ne saurait s'accomplir avec le Coran, mais que réalisent les *Epîtres de la Sagesse*. Coran 20:55 est interprété ainsi par Tamîmî : « "C'est d'elle que Nous vous avons créés" signifie l'exotérique. "Et en elle Nous vous retournerons" signifie l'ésotérique. "Et d'elle Nous vous ferons sortir une fois encore" signifie sortir les unitaires de l'exotérique et de l'ésotérique vers la troisième voie, qui est la voie de l'unitarisme (*tawhîd*) » (*Epîtres*, p. 279). Pour ce qui est du terme de *tawhîd*, j'ai montré ailleurs¹¹ qu'il désigne primordialement la profession de la divinité de Hâkim (non l'attestation de l'unicité de Dieu qui va de soi). Quant aux *Epîtres de la Sagesse*, il ne convient pas de les interpréter ésotériquement. C'est pourquoi je soutiens que le druzisme n'est pas en soi une religion ésotérique en dépit de la discipline de l'arcane qu'il s'impose. C'est qu'il appelle une lecture ésotérique des autres livres sacrés, non de celui qui est par excellence le sien (où il n'est pas parlé en figures). Quant à la nuance de dissimulation ou de circonspection qui est parfois accolée au bâtinisme, il vaut mieux la rendre par le terme de *taqiyya*, afin de

⁸ Du *Calife-Dieu* le syntagme propose une coïncidence des opposés plus aiguë encore que celle de l'Homme-Dieu, car calife signifie proprement celui qui succède à quelqu'un, ou lui tient lieu. Adam comme calife de Dieu ne fut pas plus Dieu que les califes de Mahomet Mahomet ou Dieu.

⁹ Par exemple, sous la plume de Tamîmî : est menteur celui qui se dit unitaire (*muwahhid*) tout en étant attaché à quelque chose du *shar'* (*Epîtres*, p. 280). Il est à noter que l'anomisme qui se fait jour ici est de nature doctrinale (contre les prescriptions religieuses de l'exotérique) et non morale. Hamza précise que la connaissance du sens ésotérique de la pureté n'implique pas que l'on soit autorisé à se livrer à la débauche (*Epîtres*, p. 167).

¹⁰ Pour Hamza, l'ismaélisme possède également une *sharî'at* dont il faudra également se défaire (*Epîtres*, pp. 74, 76).

¹¹ *Dieu en guise d'homme dans le druzisme*, Paris, Librairie de l'Orient, 2006, ch. I, § 10.

distinguer ce qui relève du doctrinal et du substantiel (là où l'on veut éviter l'injure que l'on fait aux indignes de leur divulguer ce qu'ils ignorent), d'une part, et ce qui est commandé par le circonstanciel ou l'accidentel, d'autre part. Si l'ismaélisme demeure à ses propres yeux un ésotérisme, c'est dans la mesure où il ne produit pas un nouveau Livre sacré, préférant innover par rapport à l'Islam en manipulant le Coran à sa guise sans que cela aille au complet retournement du sens.

Dans le passage cité, la forme visible désigne l'aspect humain dont le Dieu se revêt. Pour ce qui concerne la théophanie, le druzisme tient indissolublement à deux thèses : La première stipule que la révélation figurale de Dieu ne peut être qu'humaine puisque son dessein est de s'adresser aux hommes et de se lier à eux : la théophanie est strictement anthropomorphe. Dieu est maître du Quand et du Où, mais pas du Comment.¹² La deuxième exige un strict docétisme : la forme humaine par quoi Dieu se montre à nous et même habite parmi nous ne jouit pas d'une humanité véritable. Mais ce n'est pas seulement l'âme qui lui fait défaut, comme dans l'apollinarisme, c'est tout aussi bien le corps effectif, si bien qu'il est spécifié que le personnage n'a pas réellement de parents ni d'enfants, qu'il n'urine ni ne copule. L'apparition est médiée par l'apparence, on pourrait même dire la fiction.¹³ Hamza pourrait dire avec André Breton : « J'ai connu un homme qui avait pour chair un miroir » (*Poisson soluble*). A tout le moins, le druzisme échappe à toute imputation d'incarnation au sens chrétien (*hominificatio verbi*). Je parlerai plutôt de subcarnation, c'est-à-dire d'une advenue de Dieu *sous* la forme humaine sans qu'il devienne homme. Le Dieu druze ne peut être touché. Il est également impossible d'enfermer dans un trait la chose labile et nébuleuse en sorte qu'une vénération iconique n'est pas de mise. Mais si le *tajassud* est franchement répudié, qu'en est-il du *ta'annus* ? Il est également rejeté dans sa tonalité chrétienne : le Dieu ne devient pas homme, ou si l'on préfère, il n'assume pas la nature humaine en sorte qu'au final il se trouverait doté d'une nature mixte (suivant les monophysites) ou d'une double nature (selon les chalcédoniens). Toutefois *ta'annus* prend une valeur spécifique dans le druzisme (et les religions qui lui sont connaturelles) dès lors qu'il désigne la familiarité (le *uns*) et par là le commerce humain. D'où chez Hamza la préposition : « *ta'annasa ilayhim* » (p. 229) et non « *ta'annasa* » purement et simplement. Certes le *uns* requiert la prise d'une forme humaine, mais elle n'exige pas que cette forme soit un homme en bonne et due forme. Manière de sauvegarder la transcendance divine et de préserver l'essentiel de l'apophatisme ismaélien qui interdit l'abîme de l'essence divine à nos sondes (d'où la récusation du *tashbîh* dans le passage de Tamîmî) sans toutefois reléguer ici Dieu dans un inaccessible au-delà (ou un invisible absolu, *ghayb*) qui ne

¹² Voir sur ce point l'Épître LXVII (intitulée *Min dîn qâ'im al-zamân wa-l-hâdî ilâ tâ'at al-Rahmân*), due à Bahâ'uddine. Dieu ne se manifeste pas moyennant des phénomènes naturels (montagne, buisson ardent, orages).

¹³ C'est le terme qu'aurait utilisé en cette occurrence Thomas d'Aquin, lui qui écrit : « Il ne convenait pas que le Fils de Dieu qui est la Vérité du Père, eût recours à quelque fiction (*fictione*) ; pour cela ce n'est pas un corps imaginaire (*phantasticum*), mais véritable qu'il prit » (*Somme théologique*, III.39.7.c).

concerne pas les hommes et ne leur parle pas. Ces caractérisations pourraient s'appliquer à l'imamisme n'était que le *ta'annus* divin est immédiat. J'entends par là qu'il n'emprunte pas la voie de la proximation médiate, réfléchie en un homme, fût-il d'essence supérieure. C'est Dieu en personne qui se rend présent aux hommes dans la guise humaine, c'est-à-dire selon le mode de révélation qui leur convient.

Deux difficultés surgissent alors (que Tamîmî ne distingue pas) : la première a trait au rapport de Dieu et de la forme, la seconde au statut phénoménologique de cette dernière. « Nous ne disons pas que cette forme visible est Lui (*hiya huwa*) de sorte que nous l'enfermions et le limitions (*mahsûran mahdûdan*) ; Il surpasse tout cela par sa majesté et sa gloire ! Nous disons plutôt : Il est elle par dissimulation, pour la proximation et la familiarisation, et cela sans limite, ni ressemblance, ni pareillement ». Il est affirmé que la forme humaine ne peut prétendre au rang de divinité. Il n'y a pas place ici pour une quelconque communication des idiomes et quand bien même la forme humaine aurait eu un cœur, supposition impossible, un culte au cœur divinisé aurait été privé de fondement. Un gant ne saurait être Dieu, d'autant qu'il peut être changé, ce qui advient d'ailleurs aux vêtements d'emprunt taillés sur mesure et dont on compte au cours des siècles au moins dix. Pas plus qu'il ne professe l'union hypostatique, le druzisme ne reconnaît l'unicité pérenne (*hapax*) de la figure humaine produite en vue de la théophanie. Que signifie alors la formule inverse : *Il est elle* ? Dieu l'ayant produite pour être son expression, leur rapport est d'immédiateté en sorte que ce n'est pas quelqu'un d'autre qui parle par sa bouche : Nulle possession, nulle inhabitation (au sens strict de *hulûl*). La citation coranique intervient ici pour souligner la transcendance absolue. Elle est en effet bientôt suivie de la phrase : « De la même façon, la divinité de Notre-Seigneur est le pré- et le post-éternel qui ne peut être limité ou qualifié ».

Passons maintenant au statut phénoménologique de la forme. Il est mixte. D'un côté, la forme possède la consistance d'un exoplasme, c'est-à-dire (1) qu'elle procède de Dieu sans qu'il y ait prélèvement de chair auprès des hommes (rôle dévolu à Marie dans le christianisme), (2) que sa production est une plasmation : elle aboutit à une figure visible, (3) que cette figure est un phantasme. À lui seul le premier point n'oblige pas à déduire le troisième car le Créateur peut fort bien répéter l'opération d'Adam en sorte qu'il advienne lui-même sous la figure d'un homme intégral. Il est donc nécessaire que l'on pense la chose dans la solidarité de ces trois moments et qu'ils se soutiennent de la métaphore du mirage servant négativement à souligner le caractère fantasmatique de la forme humaine. Lorsque Tamîmî exclut la ressemblance, il se range, sans contradiction, du côté de ceux qui condamnent les anthropomorphistes (*mushabbiha*) au sens où ils se figurent Dieu ayant des attributs humains, notamment la corpulence (cas particulier des *mujassima*), ce qui est propre à lui conférer une limitation. Le soubassement apophatique de la théophanie anthropomorphe veut précisément couper court à cet anthropomorphisme de mauvais aloi. La divinité (le *Lâhût*) est incircriscrivable. La théorie de l'exoplasme, absente de la conception anthropomorphiste, explique l'expérience du mirage. En contrepartie, le mirage donne l'image de la chose même (la forme humaine), et non un terme de comparaison, une simple

similitude picturale (*comme* un homme représenté). De surcroît, et c'est l'essentiel : il y a apparition, mais non vide, puisqu'on trouve Dieu là, dans ce lieu, et qu'il est bien évident qu'on le chercherait en vain ailleurs si l'on désirait le rencontrer en personne et lester chaque moment d'une infinie qualité de présence.

Mais tout ceci n'exprime encore qu'un seul côté. Il y en a un second en raison du mode d'être ambigu de la forme qui est à la fois réelle et irréelle, qui n'est pas ce dont elle est forme lors même qu'il est elle. Que voit-on finalement, et à quelles conditions est-il donné de reconnaître le Dieu sous l'apparence de l'homme ? Il y a une ambiguïté, selon le christianisme, quant à la nature de Jésus, car il était difficile, pour ne pas dire impossible, de soupçonner le Verbe éternel en l'homme de Nazareth ; il reste toutefois qu'il a été perçu, qu'il possédait tout le caractère de la réalité, non seulement pour ceux qui l'ont approché, mais en soi : « la chair et le sang (...) sont vraiment là », déclare Luther.¹⁴ Ce n'est pas la même difficulté qui travaille le druzisme concernant Hâkim. Par cela que la forme de la représentation (l'humain) n'est pas conforme à sa matière (le divin), il a fallu un mécanisme spécial de reconnaissance, basé précisément sur le retournement du semblant. De là vient que Tamîmî emprunte au Coran la métaphore du mirage.

Quant au retournement du semblant, qui est proprement perspicacité, Tamîmî en rapporte le mécanisme à la science (*al-'ilm*). De quelle nature cette science ? Serait-ce du type de l'entendement qui fournit de la chose une meilleure idée que celle que produit la sensibilité ? De quels moyens dispose alors l'entendement pour redresser ou contredire la donnée sensible ? La métaphore du miroir permet d'approcher la solution. Relisons le passage de Tamîmî :

« Et il en va de toi, observant cette forme visible, comme de celui qui, regardant dans la substance du miroir, voit l'équivalent de sa forme, sans pouvoir le toucher, comprendre son mode d'être et définir sa quiddité. Si tu veux la toucher, tu touches ta forme. Et si tu changes quelque chose en ta forme, elle aussi change à tes yeux. Tout ceci, à condition que tes yeux soient exempts de chassie et de saleté. Si au contraire ta vision est troublée par quelque taie, tu ne vois pas ta forme exactement comme elle est. De même, celui qui regarde cette forme visible la voit selon son degré de science et de vérification ».

C'est dire que tout de même que la variation dans la vision d'une image dans le miroir dépend de l'état de l'organe, la perception correcte du mirage exige la science. Ce n'est pas le mirage ou la forme humaine qui sont ici comparés à l'image spéculaire. Mais ils en sont susceptibles dès lors que placés dans la perspective ouverte par les propos suivants de Hamza : « Il a affirmé sa puissance dans le monde qu'il a créé, et tout un chacun qui le voit à mesure de sa pureté est pareil à qui voit son visage dans le miroir » (*Epîtres*, p. 229), « Il ne se personnifie pas en un corps, mais chaque homme le voit de son point de vue (*min hayth huwa*) » (*Epîtres*, p. 203). Il n'est pas niable que la juste considération de la forme humaine dépend d'un facteur subjectif qui n'est autre que la foi. Seul celui qui croit en la divinité de Hâkim aperçoit autre chose que le mirage. Mais si Dieu est invisible que s'offre-t-il donc à sa perception ? D'une part, le verset coranique dit qu'on trouve

¹⁴ *Wochenpredigten über Johannes*, in *Werke*, Weimar, Böhlhaus, 1909, t. 26, p. 184.

Dieu, et, d'autre part, Hamza et Tamîmî tiennent qu'on le voit. Il est légitime de conclure qu'on appréhende toujours du circonscriptible et partant toujours et encore une forme humaine. Comment expliquer alors la sentence de Tamîmî qui clame que si on s'approche de la forme avec les yeux de la science, on ne trouvera pas une forme, mais Dieu en son lieu ? Elle veut dire, à mon sentiment, qu'on ne trouvera pas une forme comme la nôtre si bien qu'on ne pourra plus penser que ce qu'on voit est un homme. Trouver est dissocié de voir dans une subcarnation puisqu'on trouve *sous* ce qu'on voit et non la chose qu'on voit. Par là se justifie que le texte ajoute qu'on trouve Dieu dans le lieu de la forme (la préposition '*ind*' peut être rendue par *auprès* à condition de marquer la coïncidence, non la juxtaposition). Il y a donc toujours forme. Il n'y a pas intérêt, selon les *Epîtres de la sagesse*, de passer de la présence visible à une présence invisible,¹⁵ car celle-ci est privée de parole. Or la parole divine n'est physiquement audible qu'émise par une forme humaine.¹⁶

Il est ici possible de juger de l'audace interprétative de l'ésotérique de l'ésotérique comparée à celle d'un soufi comme Ibn Atâ' pour qui avoir découvert que le mirage n'était que du rien signifie que la créature n'a trouvé que de la créature, ce qui n'a rien d'étonnant car cette dernière ne saurait servir de médiation pour atteindre Dieu, lequel ne peut être connu et attesté que par lui-même.¹⁷ Dans les deux cas, le perçu a le contour du fini, mais pour le druze c'est Dieu en personne qu'on aborde. C'est que mirage est miroir pour le soufi emprisonné dans le cercle de ses représentations, non pour le druze qui appréhende le divin à travers le mirage et grâce à lui, ce qui lui permet d'attester sinon le divin en lui-même du moins la divinité de Hâkim. Le mirage n'est pas à proprement parler un leurre, mais le mode adéquat de la présence. Il n'est même pas une épreuve comme pour discriminer les gens car Dieu se déclare à tous. L'épreuve a précisément lieu à l'occasion de l'occultation, c'est-à-dire lorsque Dieu délaisse la défroque de la forme humaine, ainsi qu'on l'apprend dans la belle épître de Bahâ'uddîne intitulée *Min dûn qâ'im al-zamân wa-l-hâdî ilâ tâ'at al-Rahmân*, la soixante-septième des *Epîtres de la sagesse*. Pour le dire autrement, l'épreuve ne commence pas avec le mirage, mais bien avec sa disparition ! Du mirage approché avec l'œil de la science on pourrait donc dire : « Tous les miroirs sont clairs / Tel un lac après une grande pluie » (Hilde Domin).

Le tout maintenant est de savoir ce qui précisément se donne à contempler lorsqu'on sait que Dieu est sous le mirage ou pour qu'on le sache ! Selon l'explication fournie par l'éminent exégète druze al-Tanûkhî (qui fut, dit-on, le compilateur des *Epîtres*), le croyant ne voit pas un corps en tous points comme le nôtre, ce qui serait source d'illusion, mais une image comme dans un miroir,

¹⁵ Comme dans le christianisme où étant fixé définitivement à la chair, le Verbe éternel ne peut répandre partout l'Esprit-Saint à moins de disparaître physiquement de la scène du monde (Jn 16:7).

¹⁶ J'exclus donc de mon propos toute parole (et toute vision) advenant dans le cœur du fidèle. Le retrait de Dieu ne paraît propice qu'au disciple qui ne rencontre pas (dans cette vie-ci) le Dieu subcarné et souffre de son infiguration actuelle en raison de ce qu'il endure ou parce qu'il estime que quelque chose de décisif devrait se produire.

¹⁷ Cité in Sulamî, *Haqâ'iq al-tafsîr*, ad. loc.

entendre que le croyant voit sa propre image reflétée dans la forme humaine du Dieu. Tanûkhi estime donc que l'image spéculaire dont parlait Tamîmî équivalait à la forme humaine. Il ajoute à cela deux précieuses considérations : 1/ le vieillard se voit vieillard dans la forme-miroir et la femme femme.¹⁸ Ceci est de nature à écarter toute mécompréhension de l'explication proposée : ce qui est observé c'est le reflet exact et non l'image de l'humanité en général. 2/ Cette vision n'était pas possible avant le *kashf*.¹⁹ C'est dire qu'avant la date du 30 mai 1017 qui inaugure le cycle du dévoilement, même le croyant ne pouvait voir que le mirage tout en sachant que c'en était un. L'expérience de la vision de soi (comme reflet) dans la forme humaine du Dieu ne lui était pas accordée.

J'en déduis que le statut phénoménologique de ladite forme ne s'explique pas uniquement par le regard, fût-il celui de la science portée par la foi. Quelque chose se passe qui rend possible l'expérience. Il y a donc également un facteur objectif qui invite à reconnaître qu'une modification dans la forme humaine a été observée. De quoi j'ai proposé dans mon livre *Dieu en guise d'homme dans le druzisme*²⁰ une explication sous forme de reconstitution. Que si l'acte intentionnel ne consiste pas à saisir quelque chose dans sa nudité, mais quelque chose en tant que substance associée à une qualité, une quantité ou quelque autre accident, il s'ensuit que la perception ne saisit pas des objets simples, mais complexes. Or voici qu'au premier acte intentionnel qui appréhendait l'objet complexe reconnu comme Calife fatimide succède un autre qui saisit un autre objet, le Dieu, également doté de forme (sans quoi il ne serait pas perçu), non moins objet complexe, quoique différent du premier. Le nouveau est affecté d'un double indice, insubstance et variabilité en fonction des observateurs. Cette métamorphose permet à la fois de reconnaître que l'on n'a pas affaire à un être humain et de confirmer l'auto-attestation de celui qui clame sa divinité. Qu'est-ce qui empêche que ce soit le fait d'un démon ou d'un mauvais génie trompeur ? Bien que la question n'ait pas été posée par les druzes, elle peut recevoir une réponse de leur cosmologie et leur anthropologie : tous les esprits, à l'exception de Dieu, sont incarnés et sont soumis aux lois du monde sensible, à la mort et à la réincarnation, y compris les cinq hudûds, y compris l'Adversaire (*didd*). Il n'y a rien de tel qu'un démon flottant dans les airs et changeant de forme à son gré.

En conclusion, j'aimerais élargir mon propos par une rapide allusion à l'usage qui est fait du verset 24:36 du Coran dans les théories subcarnationistes issues de l'Islam. On sait que la thèse du réalisme de l'Incarnation est âprement défendue par le christianisme selon qui, pour reprendre à Luther son puissant dire, celui qui touche la chair du Christ touche Dieu.²¹ Or le druzisme partage avec le nusayrisme la conception docète. Il n'est donc pas très surprenant de découvrir sous la plume de Jillî la même citation tronquée exactement de la même façon pour lui faire dire la

¹⁸ *Mîthâq ya'nî hujjat wa-ribât 'alâ al-khalq*, Ms, Paris arabe 1436, f° 40a.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 42a.

²⁰ Paris, Librairie de l'Orient, 2006, ch. I, § 5.

²¹ *Wochenpredigten über Johannes*, p. 194.

même chose. Il y est question du Christ (à savoir le Nom, la deuxième hypostase de la triade nusayrie) qui a fait montre de ses qualités dans la corporéité bien que lui-même incorporel, étant lumière, et cela au dessein de la familiarité avec les hommes et la miséricorde à leur endroit. La forme est limitée, l'Esprit-Saint non. Et de citer le verset, puis de commenter : « L'Esprit-Saint est présent (*mawjûd*) dans le lieu (*'ind*)²² de la manifestation de la forme, illimité et échappant à l'appréhension sensible et au toucher. Les gens l'ont vu selon leurs apparences (*ashkâl*), comme se voit celui qui se regarde dans le miroir ». ²³ Le verset coranique figure également en bonne place et *dans un contexte identique* dans le *Traité christologique* d'al-Mu'izz, comme je l'ai montré dans un article.²⁴ Reste à se demander si le hasard a présidé à la rencontre, si d'un texte à l'autre une influence est à déceler ou s'il s'agit même de démarquage. Si l'attribution à Jillî (mort à Alep en 399 h, douze ans avant la disparition de Tamîmî) est correcte, la *Risâlat masîhiyyat* fournit le document le plus ancien. Il est résumé dans la *Maqâlat* mise sous le nom du Calife fatimide qui se trouve être le grand-père de Hâkim. Le certain est qu'une même problématique inspire la même stratégie interprétative quelles que soient par ailleurs les divergences doctrinales, rituelles ou identificatoires, par exemple la question de savoir quel est le nom du subcarné, 'Alî ou Hâkim.

²² On pourrait dire : *dans le là de l'apparition*. La préposition reprend évidemment le terme du verset coranique.

²³ *Al-Risâlat al-Masîhiyyat*, Introduction. Je me suis basé sur un manuscrit, l'édition disponible (*Rasâ'il al-hikmat al-'alawiyyat*, II, Diyâr 'Aql, 2006) étant trop fautive.

²⁴ *Nouvelle hypothèse concernant le traité christologique attribué au Calife Al-Mu'izz*, in *L'Orient des dieux* n° 2, 2002, p. 51–68.

‘Aql al-Kullî Meets the Logos of Life: A Cross-Cultural Path Towards a New Enlightenment

Detlev Quintern

Abstract The current crisis, which not least is a crisis of reason, requires to be traced back historically to the dualistic-epistemic concept of Enlightenment. By following the here delineated revision of the “Old Enlightenment”, often called “Modernity”, the study will emphasize the vital necessity to pave the way for new approaches towards an Enlightenment which will have to be based on cross-culturality. Above all, regaining an understanding of *Oneness* is a challenge for a new vision, which likewise unifies spiritual wisdom with precise knowledge. Regarding especially the process of the individuation of the Divine, I will focus on the universal (‘Aql al-Kullî) reason in the structure of knowledge in the opus of *Ikhwan as-Safa* and the *Logos of Life* in the philosophy of Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka. It shall be argued that with *Ikhwan as-Safa* the individuation of the principle of life found its earliest encyclopedic expression. The *Logos of Life* philosophy brings the current level of sciences into harmony with the moral sensitivity directing the communicative web of *everything-there-is-alive*.

Enlightenment in the Abbasside Caliphate

The college of the *Ikhwan as-Safa* lived and worked around the second half of the tenth century in the Abbasside caliphate (752–1258). Proceeding from an absolute universal reason (‘Aql al-Kullî), the brothers of sincerity developed a philosophically, scientifically and ethically established system of theories, which they employed on different systematically deduced disciplines, beginning from mathematics, natural sciences and anthropology to social sciences and theology. Science

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served for the deciphering of the immeasurable shaping of the divine creative power to bring this optimally into the service of society's well-being.

During the Abbasside caliphate the unfolding of reason and the progress in science in no way collided with metaphysical certainty. Also metaphysics and the concept of God did not conflict with humanism, having the human being as its centre. On the contrary, an understanding of reason, a divine quality that only befits the human being, motivates the quest for truth in the living nature that moves the world. The knowledge or realization of the self as human being in its microcosmological mode of being constitutes the initial point for the disclosure of laws in nature.

Precisely because the human being is a small world (microcosm) man, nature and the universe interact. In other words, a harmonic and communicative orchestration of being, which, instructed by human responsibility and constructiveness, unfolds its creative potentials.

Insights achieved from empiricism, experiment and abstraction were implemented in science and as a consequence benefitted society. The science historian George Sarton, who already in the 1960s initiated a discussion about a new humanism, saw in the experimental orientation of Arabic-Islamic science a breakthrough to modern science, to which the Greek contributed little:

Perhaps the main, as well as the least obvious, achievement of the Middle Ages, was the creation of the experimental spirit, or more exactly its slow incubation. This was primarily due to Muslims down to the end of the twelfth century, then to Christians. Thus in this essential respect, East and West cooperated like brothers. However much one may admire Greek science, one must recognize that it was sadly deficient with regard to this (the experimental) point of view which turned out to be the fundamental point of view of modern science.¹

The sciences had their foundation in ethics, wherein the elevation of reason and knowledge constituted the quintessence of being human, approaching cosmos, nature and human being theoretically and methodically in a multiperspectivity, which offers itself as an alternative to the current lapse, one-dimensionality and mere functionality of science. Enlightenment, therefore, has its starting point during the Abbasside caliphate; it is inspired with a specific concept of reason.

The scholars *Ikhwan as-Safa* differentiated this structure of reason and knowledge, initiating a wave of awareness, which continued to have a strong influence until scholasticism and the Renaissance. In consequence of the aberration of reason and the destructive turn and shift away from the once spiritually and humanistically oriented Enlightenment that occurred at the end of the European eighteenth century, this chapter will debate cross-culturally the current new paths toward a "New Enlightenment", which present themselves with the philosophy of the "*Logos of Life*" in the corpus of Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka.

¹George Sarton, *The History of Science and the New Humanism*, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1962), pp. 99–100.

°Aql al-Kullî – Universal Reason

°Aql al-Kullî discloses itself to Ikhwan as-Safa as an initial and starting point of a process of living becoming, whereby the scholars follow the concept of Plotinus (205–270), developing it into a system of thought and teaching. The differentiated theory of Plotinus about the emanation of *nous* out of the free will of the One is also found in a number of contemporaneous works such as the Gnostic *Tractatus Tripartitus*. Out of the emanation and out of the father’s free will coming into being arises: “[. . .] for the free will which was begotten with the totalities was a cause for this one, such to make him what he desired, with no one to restrain him.”² The fall of the logos/nous shows the way to eternal salvation through the returning in the spheres of the immortal divinity. In the works of Plotinus as well as for Ikhwan as-Safa the coming down of the noetic soul out of the *One Multiplicity* or °Aql al-Kullî into the temporal and matter-bounded and the aspired yearning to re-becoming *One* is a continuous interplay of the universal soul (unity) and the partial or individuated souls (multiplicity) in the web of life.

The self-reflecting reason, emanating out of the *One* actualizes itself in the soul, which, endowed with wise sensitivity, uses *hylic* matter before becoming a specific being in life’s shaping (*physis*). Regarding the centrality of the sensitive and intellectual soul we do find a number of similarities between the thinking of Plotinus and that of Ikhwan as-Safa.³ Plotinus describes the soul as self-reflecting/reasoning and sensitive. For *Ikhwan as-Safa* life is the substance of the soul which emanates continuously out of it like the light out of the sun: “In the same way life emanates out of the soul on the bodies in as much as the life is substantial for the soul. It is then the form which constitutes its being.”⁴

We find the coming into being soul for the understanding of the plants in Plotinus as in Ikhwan as-Safa: “And so it holds true for the soul of plants that indeed they seem to be as lively as all souls are living. They had been sent out from one origin.”⁵ But what makes man a human being, who is distinguished from all the

² Nag Hammadi Deutsch (NHC) I, 5 75.28-29; *The Nag Hammadi Library in English (NHL)*, p. 72.

³ Friedrich Dieterici hat auf die Rezeption Plotinscher Konzepte durch Ihwan as-Safa aufmerksam gemacht; bei der sogenannten Theologie des Aristoteles – eine pseudo-aristotelische Schrift, die im Werk der laueren Geschwister erwähnt wird – handelt es sich um Übersetzungen in das Arabische aus den Enneaden. Vgl. Friedrich Dieterici, *Die sogenannte Theologie des Aristoteles aus dem Arabischen übersetzt und mit Anmerkungen versehen*, (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1883). “When the Latin translation of this Arabic reworking created the Liber de Causis, a genuine Plotinian view – moreover, one challenged in various ways by several post-Plotinian Platonists – also reached the Western Middle Ages.” Cristina D’Ancona, “Porphyry, Universal Soul and the Arabic Plotinus,” in *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy*, vol. 9, 1999, pp. 47–88, p. 88.

⁴ Diwald, Susanne, *Arabische Philosophie und Wissenschaft in der Enzyklopädie. Kitab Ihwan as-Safa (III). Die Lehre von Seele und Intellekt*, (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1975), p. 439. [quote translated by the author of this essay]

⁵ Friedrich Dieterici, *Die Philosophie der Araber im 10. Jahrhundert n. Chr.*, (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1876), p. 7. [quote translated by the author of this essay]

life, and yet at the same time woven into the inseparably meshed life. Here Plotinus underlines the dianoetic capacity of the human soul as the specific and essential characteristic of human beings.

The soul is as well endowed with reason as wishing sensitively to strive after the archetype on one side and its own expression on the other side. Originating out of the *nous*, the soul carries in itself a reasoning capacity which links it to the noetic and enables it to know the spiritual forms. This dianoetic capacity manifolds the reasoning unity of the *nous* into scientific and differentiated thinking.⁶

The emanating, endowed with reason and then descending soul wishes for shaping and perfection. It remains so long in the specific body as a partial soul until the desire to re-becoming-oneness with the universal soul urges for a departure from its *hylic* material shape. This process of self-individuation, originating from *‘Aql al-Kullî* is not haphazard or accidental. Nevertheless a process of continuous becoming and passing away the first and initial reason never acts destructive but improves the web of life progressively. It is only man who enables him-/herself to intervene destructively in life as it can be seen currently in the obviously man made catastrophes.

Following Plotinus we find in the opus of *Ikhwan as-Safa* the out of God emanating primary and original first reason, which orientates the soul. The *hylic* matter, as created nature, is – Plotinus characterizes it simply as “the silhouette and appearance of the intelligible world” – (Enn. VI. 3, 8) delineated by *Ikhwan as-Safa* as the last mold in a descending ladder as follows:

Reason is the light and the first emanation of the sublime creator. The soul is the light and emanation of the reason, which the Creator – he is great and noble – emanated out of Him. Again, the first hyle/matter is the shadow and the silhouette of the soul. The absolute shapes are the images, colors and forms which the soul transacts in the hyle/matter, with the allowance of the sublime creator, supporting the soul with reason at the same time.⁷

Man, striving after knowledge – in the sense to open up the field of science – is competent to develop reason and soul, and in doing so qualifies him-/herself as a human being. In this way s/he comes nearer to his/her origin and therefore nearer to God.

The above process of knowledge is ontologically legitimated by the fact that the individual souls are considered as faculties of the Universal Soul. If knowledge marks the passage from potentiality to actuality, such a passage depends on the ever existing Celestial Universal Soul, which is knowledgeable in actuality. The more each individual soul

⁶ Ilona Kock, *Ontologische Begründung von Ethik durch Einheitserfahrung im Denken Plotins und Ghazalis*, (Nordhausen: Bautz, 2011), p. 17. [quote translated by the author of this essay]

⁷ Diwald, Susanne, *Arabische Philosophie und Wissenschaft in der Enzyklopädie. Kitab Ihwan as-Safa (III). Die Lehre von Seele und Intellekt*, (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1975), p. 470. [quote translated by the author of this essay]

increases its knowledge, the more it is close to the universal Soul. Consequently, epistemology finds itself strictly linked to ontology as the Ikhwan seem to ground science in the fourth “Neo-Platonizing” hypostasis of their cosmology.⁸

Ikhwan as-Safa developed out of the dianoetic process of life an evolutionary teaching, starting with degrees of mathematic abstraction – understanding *One* as a none-number and yet a precondition to all numbers – arriving at the differentiated multiplicity of being by natural sciences. After the world has been created in its most perfect form, taking the shape of a globe, life moves up from simple mineral and botanic to more complex shapes in zoological life before reaching its anthropological culmination. It is reason which makes human beings superior to animals, even if the latter are often physically stronger than man. Ikhwan as-Safa identify the human being, endowed with the talent of self-knowledge, as the crown of being. By striving to deepen knowledge, by enlarging upon scientific insights human beings approach their bright origin, and are being woven into the universe of life (macrocosm) as a microcosm. Sciences enable man to decipher the mesh of being.

However, since Darwin’s underlining of natural selection as a crucial motor of evolution this for centuries saved metaphysical ontology fell under suspicion. The knowledge of the communicative interplay of everything-there-is-alive was progressively replaced by an unforgiving rivalry in an endless struggle for existence. In addition, the trace of life’s reasoning sensitivity which is cultivated to moral sense in human beings was marginalized scientifically. Against this background it seems advisable to overcome the various reductionist approaches that are more urgent than ever, including a misleading understanding of natural selection. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka suggests:

Natural selection cannot move organisms as genetic networks form the generic states of the morphogenetic sequence. Seen correctly, a morphogenetic sequence is, in my view, open on to two sides: on one side, toward the conditions of the landscape, and on the other, toward the seminal genetic material of its field as it is energized and dynamized.⁹

Far away from a reductionist, deterministic and in a final step closed or teleological design of development, the sprouting New Enlightenment follows the auto-creative spiral direction of evolutive progress:

It is the self-prompting ontopoietic, entelechial fact that, through its spiral direction, brings forth new forms (new morphogenetic sequences), that is, new types of life. This is true along the scale of life’s development: organic, vegetative individualization; the rational modes of instinct and sensing valuation; instinctive selection; conscious deliberation with a limited choice; and, finally, the presentational, inventive rationalities of the human creative orchestration of faculties that prompt life.¹⁰

⁸ Carmela Baffioni (1998): “From Sense Perception to the Vision of God: A Path towards Knowledge according to Ikhwan as-Safa,” in: *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy*, Vol. 8, pp. 213–231, p. 216.

⁹ Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, *The Fullness of the Logos in the Key of Life, Book I., The Case of God in the New Enlightenment*, Analecta Husserliana, The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research, Vol. C, (Dordrecht: Springer 2009), p. 59.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

We find the spiral as a universal symbol, already in cave paintings millennia ago all over the world. Had there been awareness on the spiral direction of evolutive progress in the early history of humanity? Today knowledge deepens even beyond the nucleus of life, the cell, “a sort of prototype of the individual”.¹¹ Even if more than a 1,000 years ago Ikhwan as-Safa did not yet reach these deepest insights for example into the cell’s capacity of replication, they had been aware of life’s creativity directed by an inventive reason. By long-term observations they came to the result that life can even grow out of vegetation loss and mortifying substances. Life’s creativity is not reducible to narrow chains of scientific disciplinarity. The universal intellect pervades All-Being constructively. This has to be reflected not only inter-but transdisciplinary.

Encyclopedic Sciences and Enlightenment

The Opus of Ikhwan as-Safa can only deficiently be circumscribed as an encyclopedia for it is arranged towards an as-close-as-possible approach to unity in multiplicity, thereby transcending the borders of scientific disciplines. At the same time, the Ikhwan advanced in deepening specific knowledge of particular scientific fields while applying and combining several methods like experiments, logical or empirical ones. This mode of aspiring after truth is described by Sarton:

The unity of nature, the unity of knowledge, and the unity of mankind are but three aspects of a single reality. Each aspect helps to justify the others. That trinity is but the dispersion of a fundamental unity, which is beyond our material grasp, but within our loving hearts.¹²

Friedrich Dieterici elaborated the considerable contribution of Ikhwan as-Safa regarding the emergence of the genre “encyclopedia” from the middle of the eighteenth century onwards:

The encyclopedists like Diderot, D’Alembert, Maupertius, Grimm, Holbach, all of them were great in striving towards the origin of knowledge while seeking for unity. The particular or detail in science came to life interlinked with universality. Their vast opus might be forgotten but never its tremendous effect inspiring new brain work.¹³

Maybe it is that wish for an almost absolute compilation, systematization and classification of being which characterizes most precisely the relatively late European Enlightenment. If we consider Linnaeus’ (1707–1778) botanical systematization or Cuvier’s (1769–1832) comparative anthropology which had been strongly influenced by his *disaster theory*, it becomes obvious that the efforts to penetrate

¹¹ Ibid., p. 93.

¹² Dorothy Stimson (ed.), *Sarton on the History of Science*, Essays by George Sarton, (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1962), p. 15.

¹³ Dieterici, Friedrich, *Der Darwinismus im zehnten und neunzehnten Jahrhundert*, (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1878), p. 6 [quote translated by the author of this essay]

reality scientifically came along with a dualistic split of humanity. Humanity, hitherto understood as a unity, now had been hierarchically ordered. The Arabic term *ra'as* used for the classification in natural sciences was, after reinterpretation, now introduced to classify the human species. Kant introduced the term *race* into the German language thereby constructing a racist concept of mankind and history. On par with the here outlined developments in the history of ideas, life-reason in its scientific and spiritual dimension was scrapped in the nineteenth Century. Henceforth any understanding of development marked a novel departure which tended to overthrow traditions, which in turn were viewed as backwardness. First Hegel then Marx established the model of teleological progress which became a long-lasting myth in European history. Not only had the unity of human being been condemned but the unity of space and time was eliminated in favor of an inescapable progress that paved the way for the violence-based imperial power, saturating the earth with blood.¹⁴ Nature came to be revolutionized into a reservoir, which had to serve for destructive purposes.

In other words, the dualistic splitting of *Beingness* is an essential feature of nineteenth-century Europe, which dominated philosophy and thinking in general. Following an often disharmonic dialectic of polarization, *beingness* had been split into matter, idea, object, subject, being, consciousness etc. Then formerly all the life creatively woven in unity turned into a still ongoing work of destruction. In consequence of the waning away of assumed teleological certainties in “late modernity”, “post-modernity” became a kind of escapism, now refusing any path towards knowledge of the truth.

Logos of Life

The *Logos of Life* as being differentiated to an understanding of Fullness by Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka unveils to human knowledge the “*reason of reason*” as vital animated Logos. Already in earlier writings, thereby following Leibniz, Tymieniecka drew attention to “*the multispherical constitutive pattern of the universe*”.¹⁵ According to Leibniz, strictly rejecting any anthropomorphism, God is essentially reason. Leibniz set himself the following task:

The challenge is now, to find *the cause of the existence of the world*, as the integration of all *accidental* things, and this in the substance, that bears the reason for its existence in itself and that is therefore necessary and eternal. This principle must be endowed with reason. [...] Moreover, this intellectually talented cause has to be infinite in every respect, its

¹⁴ A study by Karam Khella interlinks understandably the interplay between epistemic-dualistic and historic violence, see: Karam Khella, *Der umzingelte Geist, Vorlesungen über Erkenntnistheorie, Hermeneutik und Kritik der Wissenschaften*, (Hamburg: Theorie und Praxis, 2000).

¹⁵ Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, *Leibniz' Cosmological Synthesis*, (Assen: Royal Van Gorcum, 1964), p. 5.

power, wisdom and benevolence must be absolutely perfect; for it embraces every possibility.¹⁶

Nevertheless, with Tymieniecka any authoritative force is not attributed to divine wisdom – it is rather characterized by inexhaustible constructiveness and communicative creative power. The *Logos of Life* is now brought to light as vital animated (logo-theic, intellective triadic-noetic, feeling-sharing and inventive).

When the Ikhwan were able to define and work out the '*Aql al-Kullî*' in its creative constructiveness in the becoming of minerals, plants, animals and finally the human being, they also pointed out the finest transitions from minerals to plants thus transcending the insights of the classical age (Aristotle) by far – for example by exposing the ambisexuality of the date palm, that was therefore classified as the highest form of botanic life – so the knowledge of the all-life-inspiring *sentient Logos of Life* is further developed in the *Ontopoeisis of Life*. Staying with the example of the plants, they become “metaphysical” in the *spatiotemporal schema of life* as it is also confirmed by the latest findings of natural sciences, for example, the cell as a kind of prototype of the individual:

The plant has a soul: it receives signals of light, humidity, pressure and possesses an intrinsic apparatus for responding to them. The plant assimilates some forces as propitiously bettering its existential condition. It responds to the attacks of predators, it bends before the wind, it may repair some degree of injury suffered by it, regenerating a damaged part, a capacity which seems crucial among the prerogatives of living beings.¹⁷

Soul (animus) is assigned to a harmonizing position in the self-individuation of life:

We may distinguish as many modes of the animus as there are kinds of living beings, from the simplest to the highest, from the vegetal through the simplest animalia, to the most complex of the human soul. The soul of the living being stands for reacting, sensitive, sentient, emotive factors of life's becoming. The animus, grounded in life's complexities, harmonizes them into a self-controlled, self-existent, living individual.¹⁸

A New Enlightenment will have to come into harmony with the balancing and auto-creative powers of reason. Reason-life flourishes in the richness of individual rationalities, reviving continuously horizons of this extraordinary thus sacral beauty. As communication will be the key to our new assessment of reason¹⁹ that interplays with the orchestration of life, not only the exploration of but to evolve

¹⁶ Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *Versuche in der Theodicee über die Güte Gottes, die Freiheit des Menschen und den Ursprung des Übels*, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1996), p. 96. [quote translated by the author of this essay]

¹⁷ Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, “Differentiation and Unity, The Self-Individualizing Life Process,” in *Life, Differentiation and Harmony . . . Vegetal, Animal, Human*, ed. Marlies Kronegger, Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998), p. 20.

¹⁸ Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, *The Fullness of the Logos in the Key of Life, Book I., The Case of God in the New Enlightenment*, *Analecta Husserliana*, The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research, Vol. C, (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009), p. 8.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. xxvi.

along cross-cultural paths will be crucial on the way towards a New Enlightenment. Against the attempts of splitting, separating and disentangling the web of life °Aql al-Kullî/Logos of Life are manifested in a unifying process. The sacral goodliness and beautiness is verified in the communicative sentience, sharing-in-life. In the New Enlightenment human reason will communicate with life-reason.

A comparative study and an encyclopedic review with the *Logos of Life* in its botanical, zoological and anthropological individuation in cooperation with professional colleagues from different disciplines would be a desideratum and challenge for further interdisciplinary research. Sciences should be re-harmonized with the constructiveness of °Aql al-Kullî/Logos of Life.

Towards a New Enlightenment

If man destroys the web of life at any place and time and with that, the harmonic as well as fragile texture of the cosmos, he will destroy himself. It is the ethical/moral sensitive embedding of knowledge which allows utilizing a substance for the good of human being or quite the contrary for destruction. Only a few degrees in variance can turn a remedy into a deadly poison.

With the beginning of the old enlightenment since the nineteenth century, the development of thinking and science has experienced a lapse which today finds expression in the oftentimes only successively apprehended crises. Even the term crisis sounds euphemistic. No branch of scientific research devours so many potentialities and resources as the military one, although “war” is scarcely perceived as a crisis in a society that is thoroughly characterized by a culture of violence. Meister Eckhart underlined that it is better to serve the poor than to cross the sea, an indicated critique of the crusades. The pathological doing violence is the peak of what can only roughly be described as crisis. The financial crisis is in most cases entirely decoupled from wars, the ecological or the climate crisis etc. But all these crises, that deeply gash society and natural habitats, are they not ultimately an expression of a crisis of human being or a move to the crisis of reason? Has reason turned destructive?

The philosophy of Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka allows us to reveal the fullness of the logos of life as a key to open the gates to a New Enlightenment, which have as yet been barred by scepticism, empirical reductionism and mathematic modelling, to a new vision of reason. In the encounter of °Aql al-Kullî with the *Logos of Life*, both of which are only notions of one inseparable divinity, a communicative determination toward a recurrence and to a cross-cultural New Enlightenment substantiates, that unfolds in keeping with the constructive potentialities in the web of life and hence reverts to the human destiny.

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Appendix

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Conference Meeting, Boston, December 27–30, 2010

SYMPOSIUM

Islamic Philosophy and Phenomenology in Dialogue

GVI-10. World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning
Tuesday, December 28, 2010. 7:30–10:30 p.m.

Topic: *The Question of Divinity in the New Enlightenment?*

Chair: Mohammad Azadpur (San Francisco State University)

Speakers:

Daniela Verducci (University of Macerata, Italy)

A Metamorphic Logos for Post-Metaphysics, from the Phenomenology of Life
(will be read in absentia)

Detlev Quintern (University of Bremen, Germany)

Al-'Aql al-Kulli meets the Logos of Life: A cross-cultural path towards a new Enlightenment

Olga Louchakova (Institute of Transpersonal Psychology)

The Seal of Philosophy: Tymieniecka's Phenomenology of Life in an Islamic Perspective

GX-10. World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning
Wednesday, December 29, 2010. 7:00–10:00 p.m.

Chair: Detlev Quintern (University of Bremen, Germany)

Speakers:

Mohammad Azadpur (San Francisco State University)

Foucault, Corbin, and Comparative Philosophy as Phenomenology

Abdul Latif Samian (National University of Malaysia)

*The Question of Divinity in Newton's and al-Biruni's Philosophies of Mathematics:
A Comparative Perspective*