Analecta Husserliana

The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research

Volume CXIII

Phenomenology and the Human Positioning in the Cosmos

The Life-world, Nature, Earth: Book One

Edited by

Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka

Springer

PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE HUMAN POSITIONING IN THE COSMOS

ANALECTA HUSSERLIANA

THE YEARBOOK OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

VOLUME CXIII

Founder and Editor-in-Chief:

ANNA-TERESA TYMIENIECKA

The World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning
Hanover, New Hampshire, USA

For further volumes:
http://www.springer.com/series/5621

PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE HUMAN POSITIONING IN THE COSMOS

THE LIFE-WORLD, NATURE, EARTH: BOOK ONE

Edited by

ANNA-TERESA TYMIENIECKA

World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning,
Hanover, New Hampshire, USA

Published under the auspices of
The World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning
A-T. Tymieniecka, President

Springer

Editor
Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, President
World Institute for Advanced
Phenomenological Research and Learning
Ivy Pointe Way 1
Hanover, NH, USA

ISBN 978-94-007-4800-2 ISBN 978-94-007-4801-9 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-4801-9
Springer Dordrecht Heidelberg New York London

Library of Congress Control Number: 2012949999

Printed on acid-free paper

Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)

Acknowledgements

It is with great pride that I present these two volumes to the public under the titles: *Phenomenology and the Human Positioning in the Cosmos – The Life-World, Nature, Earth*, Book One and Book Two.

The papers collected here were read at the 61st International Congress of Phenomenology, *Phenomenology and the Human Positioning in the Cosmos – The Life-World, Nature, Earth,* which was held at Istanbul Kultur University in the summer of 2011. First of all, we owe thanks to all the Congress participants and authors of this volume.

We also sincerely thank Prof. Dr. Dursun Kocer, the Rector of Istanbul Kultur University, for the wonderful hospitality that all involved in the Congress received. The Local Organization Committee of the Congress, chaired by Prof. Erkut Sezgin, assisted by Mert Cadlar, Omur Ceylan and Emre Ibyk, has been wonderfully dedicated to our event and its friendly atmosphere.

I thank Profs. Carmen Cozma, Maija Kule and Halil Turan who assisted me with running the program of the Congress.

Louis Tymieniecki Houthakker and Jeffrey Hurlburt deserve our usual appreciation for their work in preparing these volumes for publication.

Anna-TeresaTymieniecka

Contents

Cosmo-Transcendental Positioning of the Living Being in the Universe in Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka's New Enlightenment 1
Jadwiga S. Smith

Part I

Cosmos, the Meaningful Construct 9
Halil Turan

Competing Concepts of the Cosmos in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries 21
Oliver W. Holmes

***Cosmos* and Scientific Practices in Ancient Greek and Ancient Chinese Thought: A Comparative Interpretation** 67
Sinan Kadir Çelik

Part II

Apel's Project of Cognitive Anthropology for Non-Western World and a Supplement of Muslim Proposal 83
Abdul Rahim Afaki

El Horizonte Rítmico Del Lenguaje (Trasfondo Fenomenológico En Las *Coplas* De Jorge Manrique) 97
Antonio Dominguez Rey

Kinds of Guise Bundles 135
Semiha Akıncı

Enmeshed Experience in Architecture: Understanding the Affordances of the Old Galata Bridge in Istanbul 141
Semra Aydinli

Part III

Plato on Return to the Nature 155
Olena Shkubulyani

Nature's Value and Nature's Future 173
Leszek Pyra

(Mis)Triangulated Human Positioning in the Cosmos: (Un)Covering the (Meta)Physical Identity of Agents of Good and Evil in Head and Silko 187
Imafedia Okhamafe

Beyond the Human-Nature Dualism: Towards a Concept of Nature as Part of the Life-World 205
Karen François

Metaphysics and the Concept of World in Rudolph Carnap and Moritz Schlick 217
Giuseppina Sgueglia

Part IV

Nature: Sealing the Humanness. Applying Phenomenology of Life to a Romanian Artistic Work 235
Carmen Cozma

The Path of Truth: From Absolute to Reality, from Point to Circle 245
Konul Bunyadzade

Newton's Phenomena and Malay Cosmology: A Comparative Perspective 259
A.L. Samian

Peering Through the Keyhole (The Phenomenology and Ontology of Cyberspace in Contemporary Societies) 269
J.C. Couceiro-Bueno

Part V

Reason and Sense as the Frames and Partitions of the Temple of Life 279
Salahaddin Khalilov

Direct Intuition: Strategies of Knowledge in the Phenomenology of Life, with Reference to the Philosophy of Illumination 291
Olga Louchakova-Schwartz

What the Lake Said. Amiel's New Phenomenology and Nature 317
Daria Iwona Gosek

How Can Sisyphus Be Happy with His Fate? 327
Sibel Oktar

Introducing Letter from Daniela Verducci Upon Her Inauguration as Vice-President of the World Phenomenology Institute 339

The World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning 341

Index 349

Cosmo-Transcendental Positioning of the Living Being in the Universe in Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka's New Enlightenment

Jadwiga S. Smith

Abstract The latest focus of Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka on the phenomenological investigation of transcendentalism is placed in the context of modern science, taking into account the fact that the compartmentalization of science, so beloved by positivist thinkers of the nineteenth century, has not yielded the expected answers to the questions of the nature of human consciousness, and that neither has the Husserlian transcendental reduction since it does not resolve the problem of the dichotomy of matter and mind. Tymieniecka's inclusion of cosmos is the most important component of her search for rationality as tied to the evolutionary progress of nature and the emergence of human creativity as the stimulus to the development of human culture with its aesthetic, moral, and intellective senses. These intellective senses and their corresponding passions have been the subject of numerous volumes of the *Analecta Husserliana* series. According to Tymieniecka's philosophy, Imaginatio Creatrix liberates the human spirit from one-sided dependence on nature and opens it to the acts of interpretation of organic processes. The creative act is an act of self-individualization. Moreover, the evolution of the universe is to be seen as fundamentally connected to the process of self-individualization.

Already in 1962 in her *Phenomenology and Science in Contemporary European Thought*, Tymieniecka's interest in science so crucial to her developing philosophy was based on the notion of meaning. Thus, only meaning allows ontological continuity because only conscious acts bring out crystallized themes among multiple heterogeneous objects and events. Even in the absence of consciousness—Tymieniecka stresses the relationship between the mental and physical; she sees no usual emphasis on dualism. Rather, her view of reality encompasses three ontological categories: the physical, the vital, and the meaningful; though

J.S. Smith (✉)
Department of English, Bridgewater State University, Bridgewater, MA, USA
e-mail: j5smith@bridgew.edu

A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), *Phenomenology and the Human Positioning in the Cosmos: The Life-world, Nature, Earth: Book One*, Analecta Husserliana 113,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-4801-9_1,

conceptually they are distinguished, even when not experienced, they are always present. On the one hand, the individual transcends the natural processes of nature in acts of creation in relations with other human beings and their existing social horizons, and, on the other hand, in relation to the entire cosmos. As mentioned, the process of self-individualization underlies the evolution of the universe. Thus, all sciences are to be treated as having a common base, without the standard classification.

These grounding ideas of Tymieniecka's philosophical work, already espoused in 1962, are further elaborated in her 1964 study of Kant, published in *Kantstudien*, in which she investigates two questions essential to her study of consciousness: What is the "constructive emergence of the world for human consciousness" and what is its involvement in "the universe of cognition"? In her study she criticizes the typical twentieth-century phenomenological mantra that objects are only accessible within consciousness. She observes that, as a result of this mantra, there is no way to account for continuity of perception, and there is no explanation of how the multiplicity of perceptual aspects can lead to a unified mental construct. She criticizes Gurwitsch and Merleau-Ponty for their embrace of passive synthesis, that is, for their interpreting of perceptual object's internal condition as being purely formal, dependent on the noemata's internal features. She points out the major problem with the unifying of the various phases of the perception of an object when adopting a passive procedure in the construction of a perceptual object. However, Tymieniecka stresses the need to recognize the active function of consciousness in perception, the function of interpretation, and also interpretation and correction. This originary constitutive variation of any idea is based on the Husserlian concept of eidetic variation, though she adjusts it to her own line of thought. This originary constitutive variation is responsible for an organization of perceptual chaotic multiplicity into "significant fields" (374). This is an important step in Tymieniecka's philosophical development because it establishes a crucial link with her present investigation of the flux and stasis problem. In other words, it is in the 1964 study that Tymieniecka establishes her distance from the Kantian and Husserlian approaches to the notion of transcendentalism. In contrast to Kant's transcendental idealism, she underscores the autonomous status of the object of perceptual content as guaranteed by the noetic laws of consciousness. Thus, there is no meaning without the sensory manifold being assumed into consciousness. And, in contrast to Husserl, in her 1965 "Existence Vindicated or 'A Hundred Real Dollars'," she re-established trust in the world as the system of connections and interconnectiveness of the individual within the world.

What Tymieniecka will add to this vision of the world and the individual is ultimately the cosmic dimension, introduced in her 1964 work *Leibniz' Cosmological Synthesis* and the 1966 book *Why Is There Something Rather Than Nothing*. In the Leibniz study she is now firmly committed to elaborating a theory which will deal with the issue of continuity in development and spontaneity in the constitution of individual reality, as well as the presence of patterns of stasis in flux and chaos. Her stress on universal interconnectedness in her first work is reinforced as the "intrinsic

[and] constant functional system of beings…seen as *integral elements of the framework of actual existence"* (4) in the latter. She now fully explores the "life course" of the individual, an entire process of individual development that involves a principle of creativity, allowing for both—a particular intrinsic design and individual spontaneity. Tymieniecka states that the individual lacks "*both sufficient reason* and *final end"* (71). As a result, the individual's sufficiency can be justified only by the "world totality" (76). Thus, humankind has a constitutive function, but this function is restricted by the larger constitutive system of the universe/cosmos. Tymieniecka, at this point, is ready to explore both—the principle of human individualization through the creative experience, on the one hand, and the cosmic dimension of existence in the world in its entirety.

Tymieniecka's four-volume *Logos and Life* makes a point to treat phenomenology as a philosophy dealing with the whole experience, refusing to view the relationship of cognition and reality as being antithetical. Thus, human creativity allows going beyond the limits of objectivity. It is a process in which the natural world is transcended, thanks to pre-intentional forces. As a result, creativity allows the individual to go beyond the transcendental horizon framed by intentionality and the horizon of survival values provided by nature. It also allows one to transcend the pre-established intentional system and, finally, it provides means to thematize a pre-intentional analysis of human life. Thus, Tymieniecka's critique of knowledge refutes the notion of pure consciousness as the ultimate foundation of true knowledge. Instead, she stresses that knowing and being are inseparable in constitutive consciousness.

The fourth volume of *Logos and Life* (2000) is an expanded treatment of this conviction. In other words, Logos and Life are inseparable. She further elaborates on the architectonic structure of the Logos along with its dynamism. The two sides co-exist because without each other's co-presence there would be either stasis or chaos. Instead, there is stability in the midst of change.

In the eyes of postmodern critics the investigation of the Logos may be an act of ultimate transgression, but Tymieniecka shrugs off the postmodern antagonism toward logocentricism; she points out the critics' blindness to the very basic connection between logos and the nature of reality. Again, the critics' relativism does not probe life adequately because there would be "no world, no life, no human beingness, and [even] no possibility of them without the universally…relevant systems of the Logos to which the process of the world of life refer" (98).

At the same time, and this would certainly please postmodern critics, Tymieniecka believes that subjectivity is fundamental to all human knowledge and creative acts. She points out, though, that knowledge and creativity exist analogically across the living universe. Life in all its richness and variety stores information to which human cognition is one of many possible modes of access. Knowledge, latent in nature, has no meaning unless it is approached by consciousness. Nevertheless, it is essential to the logos and its involvement in cosmic transmutation.

In her latest work, an essay titled, "Transcendentalism Overturned," in a volume titled *Transcendentalism: Overturned* (2011), the cosmic dimension of logos is

further explored. She elaborates on the essential connection between the nature of earth and the forces of the cosmos:

> The living being draws from the earth's essential nutrients sustenance for its existence in union with the celestial forces of the cosmos. Life has its celestial complement in the cosmic conditions, its earthly complement in the resources of the earth. Its very foundations are in the forces and laws of the cosmos, which in life become sustaining and transformatory (light and motion, atmospheric and climatic forces, etc.). (ibid, p.7)

The above statement proves Tymieniecka's continuous interest in the consciousness of the human being as rooted in the totality of life, including its cosmic dimension. "The passions of the soul"—crystallizations of the human significance of nature's vital forces—are the cornerstone of Tymieniecka's philosophical thought, and her latest treatment of the "passions of the soul" in the context of "cosmic architectonics" is now a crucial element in her discussion of transcendentalism and what she calls the New Enlightenment or the cosmo-transcendental positioning of the living being in the universe.

In her philosophical investigation of the passions in her essay "The Passions of the Skies," in the volume *Astronomy and Civilization in the New Enlightenment* (20) she stresses all along their role in crystallizing the Human Condition within the unity-of-everything-there-is-alive, but her latest revisionist work on transcendentalism is a culmination of her study of the transcendental conditions of knowledge as grounded in the "progressive development of life in its various stages of organization…culminating in the creative achievements of human life. As there is unity-of-everything-there-is-alive, the transcendental reference of cognition consists in the principles of that unity" (xiii). Such a statement is contrary to Kant's and Husserl's treating the transcendental as a prerogative of human consciousness. Again, she re-affirms that the geo-cosmic principles are not independent objects of knowledge, but that they play a role "within the transcendental agency of life" (xiii). In other words, her investigation is not just focused on the mind "unfold [ing] against the horizons of life and of the cosmos" (xiii). Again, she points out the originary genesis of beingness and life's geocentric-cosmic orientation resulting in "an individualizing human being, not confined to any static ontological framework but sustained within the stream of the ontopoetic unfolding of the Logos of Life" (xiii).

Under the name of the New Enlightenment, Tymieniecka proposes a way out of the proliferation of various scientific directions by suggesting that astronomy can provide an order among the various sciences and the universe, thus linking science and philosophy. According to her, the present-day natural sciences acknowledge unpredictability, chance, and blurred demarcation between determinism and freedom. She acknowledges such modern thinkers as Poincare, Mandelbrot, Thom, Kojeve, and their investigation of subjectivity in science. She connects here her own work on the creative human condition with their investigation of the subject in scientific inquiry. As a result, she submits that "only the creative mind of the human being can fulfill all the conditions set by Kojeve" (5). She is aware of the key problem: finding how the creative act of the human being can reach the depths of nature's workings, rules, laws. She proposes that the scientific investigator should not be

neutral but "an immersed conscious subject, immersed in the lifeworld, within the human-condition-in-the-unity-of-everything-there-is-alive" (6). She stresses again that the transcendental realm of logos is not to be identified only with human consciousness but also with the entire manifestation of the forces of earth and cosmos. Thus, Tymieniecka makes a statement that cognition, soul, mind, experience can be elucidated by their existence in the architecture of the universe.

In other words, she wants to explore the "correlation between the subject and object, between the life of the human mind and the ultimate cosmic horizon" (8). In Tymieniecka's philosophy, therefore the ontopoietic perspective and life and consciousness are ultimately on even terms: The living individual, as a receiver of life signals from outside processes and then inside processes, provides an objective dimension of "existential conditions" (11) throughout the entire life process of that individual, gradually developing into a self-consciousness, a center of formulation of sense amidst the ever-changing experience in progress. Thus, there gradually emerges a universally objective logos, only initially connected to subjective experience, a logos that is not autonomous, detached, universalized. Still, this is not an emergence of pure consciousness (as is the case with Husserl's thought) unconditioned by empirical data but, instead, consciousness in an existential bond with "the vital-empirical genetic net of the logos of life" (13). As a result, the objective content, ever dependent on the vicissitudes of life, its ever-changing horizons, is never fully accomplished. At this point, Tymieniecka proposes the overturning of the transcendental supremacy of mind over life:

> the human mind or pure consciousness—or the living agent—is not a self-instituted independent entity. Being an integral functional processor of life, it is modeled by the logos, it having attained this level of constructivism upon the basis of the rules, the prerequisites of the logos, the furthest architectonic of life. This so powerful mind, the center of our world, is but *transcendentally positioned* within this dynamic network of life preordained by the forces, laws, and flow of the logos… The world of life that man projects around himself is indeed transcendental but not in its fundamental origins in constitutive consciousness/mind—with its specific centrality—but rather with respect to its *positioning within the dynamic of the geo-cosmic architectonics of life.* It is *life-transcendental.* (17)

The New Enlightenment, proposed by Tymieniecka, has to deal then with the fluid nature of reality, its linear apprehension by the human mind in the process of gathering experience throughout one's entire life. She is inspired by the teaching of Heraclitus of Ephesus in her investigation of flux and stasis in relation to the nature of reality. She points out that it is Heraclitus who stresses the power of the logos because it "sustains the order of change and repose," and thus, essentially the human soul. The individual searching for the sense of identity has to deal with the identity of the universe, ultimately the very foundation of cosmos. Thus, "Logos is the transmitter of the interchangeable communication of nature, man, and the cosmos" (qtd. from proof). It conveys the continuity of life.

Tymieniecka paraphrases Descartes' "cogito ergo sum" and Ortega y Gasset's "I live, therefore, I think," and proposes her own "I live, therefore, I am" (paraphrased from proof). She stresses, then, that "*life's individualization, accomplished through the intrinsic ordering of all that is and by the processing*

of sense that carries on the relative stabilizing of spheres into becoming from the anonymous flux" (qtd. from proof).

The logoic foundation of the human condition underlies the existential perspective of reality as well as all the realms of vital cycles of the psychic, social co-existence essential to the intellective and spiritual ascent of a human being. Thus, the human soul is able to reflect the universal ordering of the universe in the passions of the earth, the skies and, ultimately, the cosmos.

Part I

Cosmos, the Meaningful Construct

Halil Turan

Abstract According to the modern conception, nature is essentially a mechanism devoid of will. However, the distinction between the scientific and the artistic modes of describing nature appears to be a result of the evolution of human thought. The ancients did not draw a distinction between cosmic and psychic phenomena. According to the Platonic view, the physical existence embodies value and meaning: it is the product of a will. The Epicureans, in contrast, viewed nature as a mechanism without value, but they too introduced will as a power capable of changing the deterministic causal order. Epicurus, like Plato, saw human life as having an aim; he too introduced value by recognizing free will as a constitutive power of the cosmos. Although modern natural sciences avoid teleology in their descriptions of the structure of nature, the modern conception of the human being as capable of understanding the mathematical language of the cosmos seems to bear a teleological element in the will to understand this language. Conceiving cosmos as a part of the world in which science is a practice among others, I argue that attribution of value to it is not only possible, but fruitful, provided that naïve and wicked views are avoided.

Questions concerning the structure and the meaning of nature or cosmos appear to have been considered as equipollent in the history of early philosophy. Nature has always been the concern in any activity one may think of: elements and mechanisms underlying change of any recognizable and useful kind constitute a realm in which people were inclined to seek a meaning; history of culture abounds in examples which suggest that what now appears to be accidental has been taken as embodying signs for the future, or directions for right conduct. The relative positions

H. Turan (✉)
Felsefe Bolumu, Orta Dogu Teknik Universitesi, Ankara 6531, Turkey
e-mail: hturan@metu.edu.tr

A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), *Phenomenology and the Human Positioning in the Cosmos: The Life-world, Nature, Earth: Book One*, Analecta Husserliana 113,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-4801-9_2, © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

of the heavenly objects, rare appearances like eclipses, flights of birds, shapes, textures and colors on the surfaces of certain objects have been carefully inspected as if they were statements of an intelligent and powerful being whose language can be deciphered. The modern conception of nature as displaying regularities, but no design, or as yielding useful products in the frames designed by us is essentially a machine devoid of will. Of course, we may still encounter accounts in which nature is conceived as embodying various meanings, as in aesthetical contemplation the legitimate domain of which is clearly distinguished from that of science, or in esoteric mystical interpretations which still survive though are not permitted to be openly publicized through education and the media. The established view makes it clear to everyone that there are no moral significations in natural events, no signs of a will or a design in them. Facts are facts as they are, that is, they are devoid of value, unless they are made to serve for a purpose, for some exploitation such as drawing matter or power to a place or for using them in communicating with the others.

No doubt, one can still claim to have access to meaning in nature, and to be able to convey it to others, or simply to express one's emotions by means of descriptions of natural phenomena. Art has always depicted facts by endowing them with value. However, the distinction between the two modes of describing, namely the scientific and the artistic, was not as obvious as it appears today, as a look at the history of representations of nature will clearly show. The modern attitude of debarring value from the scientific description of the natural may be conceived as an evolutionary process, but the idea that this evolution had to rule out the idea of *telos* appears to be contingent through the same perspective. Art seems to remain unchanged in this matter since it departed with science: it depicts not for use or production but for reproduction of pleasure and pain, thus it may still legitimately ask questions involving "why?" Hence, the order of nature assumes meaning in art, or in its aesthetical contemplation.

Cosmos, a Design with Meaning: Plato

Plato makes Socrates say the following in the *Phaedo*:

> I discovered that [Anaxagoras] made no use of mind and assigned to it no causality for the order of the world, but adduced causes like air and æther and water and many absurdities. It seemed to me that it was just about as inconsistent as if someone were to say, The cause of everything that Socrates does is mind – and then, in trying to account for my several actions, said first that the reason why I am lying here now is that my body is composed of bones and sinews, and that the bones are rigid and separated at the joints, but the sinews are capable of contraction and relaxation, and form an envelope for the bones with the help of the flesh and the skin, the latter holding all together, and since the bones move freely in their joints the sinews by relaxing and contracting enable me somehow to bend my limbs, and that is the cause of my sitting here with a bent position. Or again, if he tried to account in the same way for my conversing with you, adducing causes such as sound and air and hearing and a thousand others, and never

> troubled to mention the real reasons, which are that since Athens has thought it better to condemn me, therefore I for my part have thought it better to sit here, and more right to stay and submit to whatever penalty she orders.[1]

Sarcastically enough, Socrates draws a distinction between the philosophical perspective through which Anaxagoras takes the physical explanation of the nature as his primary task and his own that one has first to understand why things are as they are. Socrates wants to understand "the real reasons" of the unjust case against him, and "why" he has to abide by the laws of Athens. It is clear that these questions are cannot be answered in terms proper to a philosophy of nature like Anaxagoras'. Anaxagoras' active element *nous*, or mind, conceived as the element or the power governing all alterations in nature cannot explain the meaning of the facts concerning one's relation and communication with one's citizens. The description of nature as a mechanical system is totally insensitive to moral or political facts in one's life, that is, in one's life with the others where one has to consider and speak of responsibility, duty, happiness or misfortune. Hence, a discourse employing elements and powers to explain how the unchanging mechanism of nature runs cannot account for why one has to suffer as one does, why one has to seek virtue, and why one has to have concern for the others whether they are one's rivals or friends. Socrates complains of Anaxagoras' neglect of meaning and value in the cosmos, he says that he expected answers to questions concerning why natural order is as it is: "It never entered my mind that a man who asserted that an ordering of things is due to mind would offer any other explanation for them than that *it is best for them* to be as they are. I thought that by assigning a cause to each phenomenon separately and to the universe as a whole he would make perfectly clear what is best for each and what is the universal good."[2] It is a general historical interpretation that with Socrates and Plato a chasm opens between the traditional representation of the cosmos as a non-human mechanism, and the one according to which a will creates and governs the universe. Socrates in the *Phaedo* manifests that the task of the philosopher is to explain the order common to *all* phenomena, the cosmic and the psychic. Socrates asserts that his existence has a meaning, and seems to suggest that there must be clues to it in the structure and order of nature. Shapes, dimensions, descriptions and measures of alterations of matter should not be devoid of value; virtue or duty, must be capable of being accounted for in terms of the properties of matter and the unchanging measures of its alterations; the order of nature must show one the way to be followed in one's conduct. The Platonic ideal consists in the hope for the unity of mathematics and ethics (and aesthetics), and for such an explanation which can comprise all phenomena.

That will is a constituent part of the universe, of the order of the Earth and the heavens can today be a meaningful conception in poetic discourse, but not in science. However, there seems to be a natural impulse in the human being to seek

---

[1] *Phaedo*, 98b–e; in *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*, ed. E. Hamilton, H. Cairns, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989; p. 80; trans. H. Tredennick.

[2] Ibid. 98a–b; trans. H. Tredennick; my italics.

meaning in the sensible qualities of natural objects; it is conceivable that one asks lifeless objects or animals, or that one points out to a setting as signifying the meaning of life.[3] An object of sensation may easily assume a meaning, and may appear to reveal the meaning one is seeking. It must not be inconceivable that natural appearances assume meanings concerning value and continue to bear them throughout one's life; experiences of value consist in perceptual memories, or at least they must be coupled with such perceptions. Thus, memories of certain natural settings formed by the peculiar combinations of shapes and colors, the intensity of light, the relative positions and the motions of the objects in the surroundings, the heat, the sounds, in short everything capable of being measured and represented in mathematical terms may come to be associated with what one points at as the experience of a certain aesthetical (and/or ethical) value. Creativity in arts and even in sciences seems to be related to this now scorned tendency of attaching meaning to natural phenomena. It appears that such representation of value must have an affinity with the ancient belief that natural events can be construed as signs, that the course of events indicates what will happen in the future. Today it has almost become a stereotype that the objective of prediction in modern natural science has its roots in prophecy.

Plato has an extreme Pythagorean confidence that the structure of matter can be consummately accounted for in terms of mathematics.[4] Plato's cosmology is essentially speculative like the Pythagorean, and in general like the Pre-Socratic philosophy of nature. His account for the geometrical structure of minute parts of matter[5] and the shape of the universe,[6] for example, makes it clear that for Plato properties of matter are signs of the language of a creator who informs the humans about the best life. Nature is unavoidably subject to change, but the mathematical must be unchanging. The cosmos is a work of a mind, it is designed, and further it conveys a message to one who attends to its wonderful structure. There is an order in the heavens; the planets, the Sun, the Moon and the constellations have long been

[3] Wittgenstein, for example, tried to refute the view that happiness can be described in terms of facts. See his "A Lecture on Ethics", *the Philosophical Review* 74(1), 1965 pp. 3–12. Whether he was justified or not is an open issue. For many powerful expressions of art which are intended as descriptions or representations of various mental states are descriptions of phenomena or objects intended to describe a state of mind. Should we take it for granted that there must be distinction between two? How could a state of mind, an emotion be represented or communicated without the mediation of signs which also can be made to denote facts in terms of perceptual qualities in an objective description of nature?

[4] The Pythagoreans thought that mathematical principles underlie not only the structure of matter, but of every conceivable entity. They held that even conceptions like justice and opportunity are expressible in numbers: "Since of these principles numbers are by nature the first, and in numbers they seemed to see many resemblances to the things that exist and come into being – more than in fire and earth and water (such and such a modification of numbers being justice, another being soul and reason, another being opportunity – and similarly almost all other things being numerically expressible)"; Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 985b 26; trans. W. D. Ross.

[5] *Timaeus*, 55d ff.

[6] Ibid., 33b–c.

observed with the assumption that there must be an unchanging order, and this hypothesis seems to have justified itself in discoveries of further periodical phenomena. Although Plato seems merely to have assumed that the problems concerning the irregularities are solved or can be solved in a Pythagorean spirit, he has no doubt that the regularity embodies signs by the creator god, the artisan who models the universe, the demiurge:

> And the motions which are naturally akin to the divine principle within us are the thoughts and revolutions of the universe. These each man should follow, and by learning the harmonies and revolutions of the universe, should correct the courses of the head which were corrupted at our birth, and should assimilate the thinking being to the thought, renewing his original nature, so that having assimilated them he may attain to that best life which the gods have set before mankind, both for the present and the future.[7]

The Platonic view that the physical has value and meaning, that it teaches one how to live, how to reason and act, is exemplary in history. Hence all phenomena are related in such a way that the stars indicate what the right order in society and in private life is; men and women should, for their expectations, desires, deliberations and acts consider nature's order as a guide for living in a community. Hence the account concerning cosmology, astronomy and mathematics becomes a political, that is, an ethical issue. The regular change in the physical world, change in place and time embodies decipherable inscriptions for the meaning and value in life. In the *Phaedo*, Socrates says the following concerning Anaxagoras:

> I assumed that he would begin by informing us whether the earth is flat or round, and would then proceed to explain in detail the reason and logical necessity for this by stating how and why it was better that it should be so. I thought that if he asserted that the earth was in the center, he would explain in detail that it was better for it to be there… I was prepared … to receive information about the sun and the moon and the other heavenly bodies, about their relative velocities and their orbits and all the other phenomena connected with them – in what way it is better for each one of them to act and to be acted upon as it is.[8]

Questions concerning the reasons why things are as they are tragic questions, they are poetically penetrating and suggest one that their appearance in a context where Socrates was about to drink the poison is not accidental. Socrates asks why the sun, the moon and all other things are as they are; he seems to say that his tragedy must have some explanation in the order of the heavens, just as the position and place of the earth must have an explanation in terms of intentions of a divine will. Therefore, Socrates appears to pray, and to ask the heavens what gods indicate for justice, for the good, just as Homer's heroes asked birds to learn what is good and what is destined for them.

The belief or the tendency to seek meaning in the way things are, that is in the non-human world seems to be universal. I have argued that everything that bears a value must come to be recorded in memory as a meaningful whole of experience as

---

[7] Ibid, 90d; in *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*, ed. E. Hamilton, H. Cairns, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989; p. 1209; trans. B. Jowett.

[8] *Phaedo*, 97d–98; trans. H. Tredennick.

associated with a set of measurable phenomena. Considering the distinguishable memories in the past, one remembers one's perception of objects like the sun, the moon, trees, stones, water, winds, birds and the like have constituted the setting of the prominent event to which one attaches a meaning and value. This record which has a unity must doubtless be related to one's perceptions of oneself as a human being among others, to one's expectations from the others whether they belong to an actual or an imagined community. It goes without saying that one's interests are primarily in the community, not in the non-human nature unless one is not alone in some wilderness. The will to be recognized as a part of the community, to have a satisfactory share in the numerous necessities of life which multiply as the community one has in view expands seem to be one's primary concern in life. Thus, the will to prove one's competence in a science, for example, may be seen as an interest to be part of the common understanding or intelligence, as the will to be a recognized by others in the same profession. Objects lose their charm if the others are not concerned with them.

Nature is meaningful and assumes values at every instant of life. Could a view, a sound, or a touch be without an aesthetical value, however ordinary it is? Any perceptual experience in contemplating nature or a work of art, or in observing the setup of an experiment appears to be already in the realm of values, since what is perceived is an object of interest for one; for, if it were not, it would not even be perceived. Needless to say, natural objects, for example those observed with the expectation that they will reveal an order or those which are made signs are all objects of interest. It is clear that if the object or phenomenon under consideration is not a primitive means of survival for one who lives alone in the wilderness (which seems to be an almost improbable experience), one is always affected by it because it is an object of interest for a community, and hence it is important for one who deems it so for her/himself.

As it is clear that there can be no phenomenon or object devoid of value, could Socrates' or Plato's words in the *Phaedo* be considered as referring to a trivial matter? No doubt the historical interpretation that Plato (or Socrates) changes the course of philosophy and make philosophy of nature subservient to ethics and politics cannot be objected. Thereafter, physics came to be subservient to ethics until the modern separation of the two.

Will, a Natural Power: Epicurus

The same attitude is dominant in the two most influential traditions of philosophy, namely in stoicism and Epicureanism. Epicureanism, in its approach to the physical has exemplified a unique stance. The Epicureans viewed nature as without value, and made this their starting point in their doctrine of ethics. Epicurus' conception of the physical world as the product of chance collisions of atoms is generally considered to stand in contrast to Plato's teleological cosmology; therefore, these two accounts can serve us as models in terms of their dissimilarity.

The Epicureans held that the cosmos is the product of collisions and coalescences of atoms without any divine interaction; they conceived the cosmos including the human existence as the outcome of interactions of matter in void, accounted for change in terms of dissolution, and not excluding the soul from their accounts, they conceived death as the dispersing of the soul atoms. They recognized no design and no divine interaction in the universe, and depicted the gods of the tradition as leading a happy eternal life with no interest in the human affairs; thus, by almost caricaturizing them, they (at least in their closed circle of friends) abolished the mythological belief of interference of divine powers in the course of events and the underlying conception of hylozoism which is remnant of mythological accounts in cosmology. However, the historical turn marked by Socrates' words to which we referred above is discoverable in the Epicurean philosophy too. Philosophy of nature is subservient to the Epicureans' main interest, namely ethics. On the other hand, they felt themselves responsible to discover the best way of living in a world in which there are no divine signs or directions for it. Thus, the Epicureans had to cope with the determinism of atomism, according to which there can be no signs of a superior mind, a design or a will in the cosmos. The existence of the human race should therefore be a chance event as rain or sunshine is, an occurrence determined merely by the structure, position and velocity of atoms. If all phenomena are the effects of collisions which one may account causally in a satisfactory manner, how could one explain the will to avoid pain, and how could one account for that philosophical interest in the question how to live? If it is conceded that pain and pleasure are perceptions of one's own state of mind and body, could contentment with one's state of mind, for example, be explained in terms of a succession of causes in which one has no part? Is the feeling of pleasure or painlessness the effect of causes one can only observe (or speculate), and not due to one's own conceptions about virtue, good life and death? It appears that Epicurus sensed a serious problem for the possibility of a philosophy of life in Democritus' deterministic atomism,[9] and hence left room for freedom in a blind causal order by recognizing volition as a power capable of changing the natural course of atomic motions in the universe, as in effecting changes in one's thoughts about one's state. Although it is difficult to understand how atoms at a particular place could 'swerve' by volition,

[9] Diogenes of Oinoanda, the second century Epicurean whose wall inscription at Oinoanda (Fethiye, Turkey) supplies additional material for Epicureanism, makes Epicurus' argument against the strict determinism of Democritus clear: "If anyone adopts Democritus' theory and asserts that because of their collisions with one another the atoms have no free movement, and that consequently it appears that all motions are determined by necessity, we shall say to him: 'do you [not] know, whoever you are, that there is actually a free movement in the atoms, which Democritus failed to discover, but Epicurus brought to light, a swerving movement, as he proves from phenomena?' The most important consideration is this: if fate is believed in, all admonition and censure are nullified, and not even the wicked [can be justly punished, since they are not responsible for their sins.] Martin Ferguson Smith, *Diogenes of Oinoanda*, *The Epicurean Inscription*, Naples: Bibliopolis, 1992; p.394; Martin Ferguson Smith's translation.

the intention to attribute a substantial power to the will is clear in Epicurean texts. Lucretius writes the following:

> [W]hen the atoms are being drawn downward through the void by their property of weight, at absolutely unpredictable times and places they deflect slightly from their straight course, to a degree that could be described as no more than a shift of movement. If they were not apt to swerve, all would fall downward through the unfathomable void like drops of rain; no collision between primary elements would occur, and no blows would be effected, with the result that nature would never have created anything (2. 217–224)…
>
> Moreover, if all movements are all invariably interlinked, if new movement arises from the old in unalterable succession, if there is no atomic swerve to initiate movement that can annul the decrees of destiny and prevent the existence of an endless chain of causation, what is the source of this free will possessed by living creatures all over the earth? What, I ask, is the source of this power of will wrested from destiny, which enables each of us to advance where pleasure leads us, and to alter our movements not at a fixed time or place, but at the direction of our own minds? For undoubtedly in each case it is the individual will that gives the initial impulse to such actions and channels the movements through the limbs (2. 251–262).[10]

Lucretius explains freedom from natural necessity through volition in terms of an assumption concerning the formation of compounds, and seems to recognize the effect of will in the creation of things through a "swerve" of atoms. That will is a natural power is evident, he says, as its effects are visible in all living beings which seek pleasure and avoid pain. Interestingly enough, he seems to argue for the role of will in the creation of the cosmos by relying on its evidence in animals. Further, he appears to argue that one is free to think the best for oneself and act accordingly:

> [T]he initial movement is produced by the mind: it originates from the act of mental will, and is then diffused through every part of the body (2. 269–271)…
>
> But the factor that saves the mind itself from being governed in all its actions by an internal necessity, and from being constrained to submit passively to its domination, is the minute swerve of the atoms at unpredictable places and times (2. 289–293).[11]

It seems that the Epicureans recognized will as a complementary power in the material mechanism, as a power already inherent in it from the beginning of the formation of the cosmic order. Hence, the human (or animal) will becomes a causal power capable of changing the course of material flow which appears as various perceptions in the mind. Thus it is possible to choose and avoid; this freedom "enables each of us to advance where pleasure leads us". Epicurus argued that we are responsible for what we do and what we are: "that which we develop – characteristics of this and that kind – is at first absolutely up to us; and the things which of necessity flow in through our passages from that which surrounds us are at one stage up to us and dependent on beliefs of our own making."[12] Thus, if perception is understood in terms of the motion produced in the soul by the impacts of the continually flowing particles on the sense organs, it is possible for one to shape

[10] Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura*, trans. M. F. Smith. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2001; pp. 40–41.

[11] Ibid. p. 42.

[12] Epicurus, *On Nature*; 34.26 ff., in *the Hellenistic Philosophers*, ed., trans. A. A. Long, D. N. Sedley, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, vol. 1, pp. 102–103.

one's perceptual field and hence one's affections. Further, how to interpret those perceptions is dependent on the beliefs one has the power to form concerning their import. As in theorizing upon the structure of nature in terms of atomism in order to show that the fear of supernatural beings and that of an afterlife is nonsense, Epicurus argues to the same end that one is free in choosing one's way of life, in believing that one has the power to avoid certain perceptions and passions that ensue them and seek certain others. And, if thoughts are formed after perceptions, it follows that one has the power to think the thoughts which can lead him or her to an unperturbed state of mind. One's judgments are one's own making he says, exemplifies this freedom in his philosophy, and advises the others to follow his arguments to attain *ataraxia*.

Strangely enough, it seems that there is an affinity between Plato and Epicurus with respect to their accounts of cosmology. Plato puts forward a teleology which rests on the conception of a creator god in the *Timaeus*. In this matter the Epicurean argument stands in contrast to the Platonic. However, it appears that both philosophers have seen will as a power to break the chains of submission and ignorance – though from different perspectives and with different intentions. Plato thought that the wise can and must study the signs he believed to be embodied in the cosmos: the unchanging mathematical order discernible in the revolutions of the heavenly bodies as exemplified in the shapes and functions in the organisms, in the (imaginary) structure of minute parts of matter suggests him that the cosmos is the work of a mind. He thought that it must be the responsibility of the wise to decipher those signs which must be read as indicating value through order. Mathematics, ethics and aesthetics are thus merged in the Platonic cosmology. The naïve conviction that nature speaks to humans, which must certainly predate Plato and even Pythagoras, suggests that the principal motives for rational inquiry are essentially aesthetical and ethical. The Epicurean philosophy of nature displays the same belief most visibly: Epicurus seems to have followed Plato in making philosophy of nature subservient to ethics. Further, there must be an aesthetical pleasure in conceiving the cosmos as the product of collisions of atoms, and still more in assigning will a power to break the chain of causes to make life endurable. Epicurus, like Plato, must have seen himself responsible to render the cosmos and human life intelligible; accordingly, he must have acted with ethical, and, provided that he thought it possible to attain this ideal, with aesthetical motives.

Meaning and Value in Modern Science

The idea that will is a constituent of the cosmos does not at first sight seem to be a recurrent theme in modern philosophy. However, the question concerning the existence of an "external world" which appears to have no reference to its possible meaning seems to invite a new conception of will in the practice of science. It will be sufficient to note that the modern skeptical arguments have led to various conceptions of idealism which represent God as the architect of the cosmos.

Moreover, God was conceived as the warrant of the apparent freedom of human beings capable of investigating this order and utilizing the ensuing knowledge. Consider the physiological speculations on passions, for example; the knowledge of the bodily mechanism is never seen as an end in itself, the aim is to discover the best means for a happy life, which is considered possible through understanding the causes of psychic phenomena through an analysis of their causes both in material and psychological terms. The modern mathematical representation of nature is acknowledged to be devoid of meaning, but meaning seems to be revived in the activity of investigation, that is, in the scientist's will to search into the secrets of nature. Although modern natural sciences avoid teleology in their purely descriptive mathematical structure, the modern conception of the human being as capable of understanding the mathematical language of the cosmos seems to a hide a teleological element in it, as exemplified in the belief that there must be an order which can yield itself to the human mind, which the early moderns openly took to be akin to the divine. This attitude is reminiscent of Plato's argument now overtly considered to defective: Plato thought that the cosmos must be the work of a mind, since, he argued, its unchanging order is clear to the human mind, at least to the wise. Perhaps the same belief could be discovered in the modern conceptions of the scientist as endowed with a distinguished power of understanding, and, of course, with a will to dedicate a life to learning. In this dedication the scientist appears to act as if out of piety in her or his quest for understanding how nature works, though perhaps not in the naïve Platonic sense that mathematical inquiry is conducive to ethical truths, but simply to "truth", a conception which can hardly ever be thought not to embody a positive value. Further, the modern dualistic arguments concerning mind and body, or will and understanding seem to have supplied a demand for meaning and value in a world where nature is rendered a mechanism meaningless in itself. Thus, the human being has been assumed to be a free agent acting and enacting autonomously, and *above* natural necessity essentially in an Epicurean sense.

It seems to be difficult to conceive the physical universe in purely value-free terms. Considering the contemporary scientist's outlook, the cosmos does not seem to be something other than the so-called scientific phenomena assuming the form of readings on the devices of an experimental setup, reports of measurements, and theoretical studies giving them a definite shape. However, social relations in the community of scientists, emotions and passions of these persons in their professional and daily lives too must be phenomena constituting what they call nature. The universe is nothing other than the totality of phenomena of various kinds, not excluding those which have been treated separately as concerning will and value. Hence, although the representation of the cosmos is such that it is essentially an entity without a will and not designed by a will, it is a part of the world in which those who so conceive it live with a will to take part in its investigation.

It must be implausible to discover value in the cosmos already conceived as an entity devoid of value. However, if it is recognized that representations can hardly be without meaning for one who makes them objects of thought, or that considerations even of their mathematical order are intermingled with matters concerning value, it becomes problematical to conceive of an entity devoid of all meanings and

values. The ideas of order or chaos are makings of the mind, and they must occasion pleasure and pain as one can or cannot render what one refers to by these words a source of pleasure. An alternative mode of conceiving the cosmos as one and the same thing with its representation will make attribution of value to it possible. Once the cosmos is considered as one's own making, it can legitimately be said to embody value, though not in the naïve sense that one can discover what one assumes to be in it, and not in the wicked sense that one can make use of it to govern others by perplexing them, but in the aesthetic sense that it is an object of contemplation on the nature of order, disorder, meaning, meaninglessness, and the value of life.

Competing Concepts of the Cosmos in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries

Oliver W. Holmes

Insight into the spiritual universe of the millennial Jewish mystical tradition may be obtained by a phenomenological explication of two fundamental yet contrasting attitudes found throughout the course of its development, which can be called the moderate and the intensive modes of mystical concern or experience…occasionally the two did link up with one another…in the late medieval and early modern periods.

(Moshe Idel, **Mysticism**)*

Abstract The recovery and revival of ancient philosophy in the Renaissance gave rise to both an acceptance and rejection of the authority of ancient thought, responses that sparked the famous "Quarrel between the Ancients and the Moderns." The Philosophy of the seventh century has often been viewed as a gradual change from the religious, mystical worldview to a modern world characterized by rationalism and empiricism. The driving force ushering forward this transformation usually has been identified with the scientific revolution. This essay will attempt to demonstrate the degree to which the hermetic, organic and mechanical traditions interpenetrated each other during the intellectual transformation of the seventeenth century, a trend which carried forward into the eighteenth century. The works of Francis Bacon, Descartes, Anne Conway and Fontenelle will constitute the framework by which to analyze the issues surrounding those who supported ancient wisdom over the "new philosophy," as well as the contrary. Their respective works will be discussed within the context of the influence of writings of the Paracelsians and the Kabbalah.

O.W. Holmes (✉)
Department of History, Wesleyan University, 238 Church Street,
Middletown 06459-0002, CT, USA
e-mail: oholmes@wesleyan.edu

A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), *Phenomenology and the Human Positioning in the Cosmos: The Life-world, Nature, Earth: Book One*, Analecta Husserliana 113,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-4801-9_3,

During the course of the eighteenth century the secularized concept of the "new age" identifies the epochal threshold as having its beginning around 1500. The idea that a great revival or "rebirth" of literature, thought and arts occurred after a thousand years of cultural stagnation, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries originated with the Italian writers of the Renaissance. In this historical rediscovery and restoration of writings and artifacts from antiquity preceded and then accompanied the experience of absorbing knowledge of a "New World." The discovery of the new world, and the beginning of a close acquaintance with tropical territories, released a plethora of new data and a mass of descriptive literature which itself was to have stimulating effects. Geographical exploration and territorial expansion had been dramatic and transformative forceful manifestations of a Europe engaged in traversing preexisting boundaries. Through this proactive mode of expanding consciousness, perspective and knowledge, one discerns a parallel to the discovery (in space) of unknown worlds and their additional transformation of European culture and the concept of the individual. Thus, the Italian Renaissance appeared for the first time as a distinct epoch in cultural history, and became not only a revival or rebirth of human intellect and personality but the beginning of the modern world.

The historical line of cultural and intellectual trends in the period from 500 to 1500 has been punctuated by three so-called "Renaissance." Each of these movements—in the Carolingian era (eighth and ninth centuries), during the twelfth century, and in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries—occurred in a society that was consolidating itself after a period of acute disorder. Each was characterized by a return to Antiquity for materials and exemplars in the task of consolidation. However, each movement had its own distinctive scope, content and objective and each followed a singular trajectory. The differences are marked that certain scholars argue that the term "Renaissance" becomes meaningless when applied to all three.[1]

The term "Renaissance," here, incorporates some dominant characteristics of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries' movement, to discern certain intellectual tensions within European philosophy that it both expressed and exacerbated. This movement brought to light a vast amount of forgotten classical literature—a great deal of which had been transcribed in centuries immediately following the "barbarian" invasion of the German tribes and the Huns—for example, in Greek Archimedes, Galen, Ptolemy, Plato, Latin Celsius and Lucretius. The revival of Greek language, virtually forgotten in non-Arabic sectors of Western Europe, provided scholars a sense of immediate and vivid contact with the most philosophical and ancient societies. Renaissance philosophies differed not at all from their medieval predecessors in thinking that the "modern" individual ought to ground himself and herself firmly on the teachings of antiquity, but the individual was expected to achieve this directly, ignoring all that had been written in between, and more broadly in scope. Interestingly, Plato became the hero of the Renaissance, for some, rather than Aristotle, especially in the Tuscan region; analogously, but later, others preferred the atomism of Epicurus and Lucretius to Aristotle's qualitative theory. The Presocratic philosophies were read and quoted widely, as were the Pythagoreans. Copernicus found in Plutarch, another Renaissance discovery, and quoted in Greek the information that Philolaus the Pythagorean had suggested that the earth moved,

as did Heraclites and Ecphantus. Copernicus also refers to Aristarchus of Samos, to Anaxagoras, Empedocles and Leucippus, displaying knowledge of a great tradition which the medieval period had hardly considered. New horizons brought new varieties of thought, new problems to unravel and, for some innovative thinkers, a "new philosophy."[2]

Where the late fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth centuries turned toward classical antiquity for intellectual guidance, intellectuals in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries spurned imitating the classical model. The detachment from ancient models was set in full motion by the famous "Quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns" in the late seventeenth century. Within the context of these debates, and in this historical and cultural experience, two mental patterns which have relevance for the geographical discoveries of the new world and a heightened sense of individual consciousness, become discernible. First, the mental attitude which generally accompanied criticism of traditional philosophy was the spirit of adventure, of experiencing what lies beyond the closed boundaries of knowledge, of widening the limits of acquired truths, combined with the optimism that such expansion was possible. Another attitude stressed the need of an unbiased and critical mind, and of freedom of thought and discussion. If servility to the authority of the ancients precluded examination of traditional beliefs, no hope could be offered for increased knowledge, and if assent were too easily granted without clear proofs and demonstrations, no certainty would reside in learning. Both within and outside the debates "new philosophies" emerged, "new" in the sense of "non-Aristotelian," which proposed alternative paths to knowledge and truth. The exponents of this "new philosophy" were conscious of their respective contributions to intellectual history, a process which began in the Renaissance and extended throughout the seventeenth century.

Upon proposing alternative intellectual categories to the Neoaristotelianism of their contemporaries, the "new" philosophers refused to reject antiquity completely in that they continued to seek inspiration in varying ancient philosophical systems. Furthermore, while seeking to perpetuate ancient philosophical traditions, these philosophers identified with the newness of their approach to distinguish themselves from "old" school Aristotelian philosophy. They drew inspiration from neglected philosophies and texts of antiquity, in proposing comprehensive alternatives to Neoaristotelianism, and formulated their systems outside the philosophy faculties of the universities. Through their challenges to the current academic curriculum, this group of philosophers proposed new natural philosophy or logos, new theories of physics, new cosmologies and, among others, new philosophies of languages, all of which contained theological implications and challenges for Christian orthodoxy.[3]

The alternative visions of the cosmos, proposed by these exponents of this "new philosophy," initiated after the geographical exploration of, and encounter with, the new world and the disclosure of the new Copernican universe in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The distinction between the imperfect unchanging heavens and the imperfect earth was obliterated. Traditional scientific assumptions and Christian cosmology were also undermined by Copernican theory and territorial expansion beyond European boundaries. Thus, the triumph of Copernican cosmology, the success of mechanical philosophy, and the rejection of ancient authority by a

cluster of influential new philosophers were important transitions to the "modern" thought of the seventeenth. Upon examining this transition, I intend to study the philosophical issues raised on both sides of the divide, with the objective of analyzing the process by which competing concepts of the cosmos helped spawn the "new philosophy" of early modern thought. A new philosophy that contained as much continuity as change with respect to the past, evidenced in the works of Francis Bacon, Descartes, Anne Conway and Fontenelle.

Humanists, Classical Revival and the Hermetic Tradition

Prior to the Renaissance, there were two great textual transfusions into Latinate Europe, one in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, which brought medieval science to the forefront, the second in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, which was considerably more sophisticated in scholarship. The revival of learning, towards the middle of the twelfth century, was the period during which ancient Greek and more recent Arabic and Jewish thought became available to Western Europe in increasing quantities. Though the search for "lost" Greek scientific and philosophic writings was clearly not unprecedented, one discerns the process by which a tremendous amount of science was apprehended from the second classical revival, which provided Europe virtually all Galen, the "pure" Ptolemy, Archimedes and other Greek mathematicians, the pre-Socratics and above all Plato. The medieval period had accepted Aristotle's spurning his teacher Plato (and all of his predecessors) at its face value and, indeed, had sought out nothing of Plato's writings beyond the ***Timaeus*** which had made little impression. Among Plato's writings, up to the middle of the twelfth century, learned scholars in Western Europe knew only the ***Timaeus,*** and therefore Plato, to them, was primarily the author of the ***Timeus***. Furthermore, the ***Timaeus*** had been one of the first books to attract the attention of commentators, from early Greek commentaries to those in Arabic, Hebrew and Latin. The study of the other Platonic works, such as the ***Republic***, would pursue similar paths.

> The medieval tradition of Plato (in Greek, Arabic, Latin and Hebrew) was quite complex in that each version introduced a few innovations and new names. Plato's reputation had grown tremendously, first during the Byzantine renaissance of the ninth and tenth centuries, then under the patronage of the School of Chartres, finally under that of the Plato Academy of Florence, established by Cosimo de' Medici. In the fifteenth century, most markedly with the Florentine Neoplatonists, all this changed, for no obvious reason except that Plato was new and intellectually exciting. The importance of this Platonic revival in the second half of the fifteenth century for the development of modern science has been recognized by scholars throughout the history of ideas: "magic, astrology, and alchemy—all the outgrowth of Neoplatonism—gave the first effectual stimulus the observation of nature, and consequently to natural science." The scholars emphasize Platonism and Neoplatonism as mental operations which encouraged empiricism in opposition to the "rationalistic dogmatism" of the scholastic schools. Yet the various threads in the skein of ideas are mingled confusedly, and appear to lead from uncertain origins to very different ends. This Platonic influence encouraged thinking individuals toward mathematics, for it was considered shameful to be

> ignorant of geometry. Upon emphasizing mathematics, Plato put forward the notion of "pure" mathematics which provides us a vision of eternal truth and affords the best means of raising one's soul to the Idea of Good and to God. He conveys this perspective in the statement that "God is always geometrizing" (God is primarily a mathematician). The point of view is further illustrated by the traditional inscription over the door of the Academy: "Nobody should enter who is not a mathematician."[4]

The philosophers and mathematicians were primarily interested in the theory of numbers, to which Pythagoreans and the Platonists had provided cosmological significance. The mathematical mysticism of the Pythagoreans contributed to regularities in the celestial motions and to discern planetary laws. According to Plato, "as the eyes are fixed upon astronomy [and the stars], so are the ears fixed upon [and hear] the movement of harmony, and that these sciences are closely akin, as the Pythagoreans say and we agree with them."[5] This perception exemplifies the Pythagorean concept of the unity of mathematics, music, and astronomy, which influenced astronomic thinking through Copernicus to Johannes Kepler.

The rediscovery of ancient pure and applied mathematics pushed in the identical direction. Mathematics proper, along with its close relation astronomy, was to flourish rapidly during this period as never before. Algebra on the one side, trigonometry on the other, made tremendous strides while mathematics was applauded everywhere as the key to navigation and exploration, military science, geography (effectively shedding its legacy of travelers yarns) and even aesthetics. Leonardo da Vinci demonstrated this profound interest in geometry and algebra, in his notebooks and, in carrying out his own research in mathematics, would frequently pursue mechanical solutions to geometric and algebraic problems. Undoubtedly, during this period, he began to appreciate both the aesthetics of mathematics and the mathematics of aesthetics, and continued to seek mathematical demonstration of the laws of nature.

However, of greatest general interest, was the idea that mathematics offers a unique key for understanding nature and the cosmos; yet this was not a *single* idea since it had two chief and distinct branches: firstly, the conviction that nature is inherently mathematical, because God eternally geometrizes, or as Leonardo da Vinci observed: "Proportion is not only found in numbers and measurements but also in sounds, weights, times, positions, and in whatsoever power there may." The observation suggests that not only may we expect nature to be rationally ordered in some way for , if it were not, our seeking an understanding of it would be futile and because (as Descartes emphasized) if it were not the case God would be impossibly, deceiving individuals, but we may also expect this rationality to be realized mathematically. And secondly there is the purely logical conviction that mathematical reasoning remains the most certain that we may command; to quote da Vinci again: "There is no certainty where one can neither apply any of the mathematical sciences nor any of those which are based upon the mathematical sciences."[6]

The most truly Platonic thread, stemming from the ***Timeus***, held that God the architect of nature is, like the human architect, a geometer. This strand may lead to the patterns of crystallography or the patterns of the periodic table in chemistry, or it may lead to certain elements in Freemasonry, where the neophyte is (or was) addressed in terms beginning thusly: "Adam, our first parent, created after the

image of God, the great Architect of the Universe, must have had Liberal Sciences, particularly Geometry, written on his Heart."[7]

Galileo, among many others, proclaimed that the Book of Nature had been written in the language of geometry. He argued that natural philosophy should be expressed in the language of mathematics because nature was mathematical in its structure. Galileo perceived nature as revealing itself in mathematics, emphasized both these characteristics, and also maintained that the mathematical proof of propositions is, in logic, the best we can possess.[8] Neither of these positions was entertained in antiquity, not that the force of, for example, a geometrical demonstration was regarded as any more doubtful in antiquity than in modern times, but rather the ancients had supposed that the mathematical sort of reasoning was inappropriate outside strictly mathematical contexts. To rival the authority of the Aristotelian-dominated universities, mathematically inclined philosophers turned to Plato and Pythagoras to establish the mathematical nature of the natural world.

Other threads connected through the Neoplatonist school of philosophers, written many centuries after Plato's death in the third and fourth centuries AD, CE, to numerology, magic, and other esoteric arts thoroughly foreign to the mind of Plato himself, while others again produced a transcendental mysticism which was a little later absorbed by Christianity. When Constantinople, the capital of the Byzantine Empire fell to the Ottoman Turks, in 1453, Byzantine scholars emigrated to the West. This shift in political power prompted them to depart with their valuable manuscripts from antiquity and their knowledge of ancient Greek, to Italy and other intellectual centers. In Western Europe these scholars were embraced by the humanists. The second half of the fifteenth century returns the center of humanism to Florence where the "Platonic Academy," founded in 1459 by Cosimo de Medici, attracted some of the greatest scholars of the time: Marsilio Ficino, Pico della Mirandola, and Poliaiano. The spirit of Plato and the Neoplatonists dominated the group. The atmosphere of the "Academy" definitely was more Christian and philosophical and less critical of the prominent scholastics than had been most of the earlier humanists. Ficino derived his metaphysical terminology, the logical method of his argument, and many of his general ideas from the earlier Scholastics, particularly Aquinas. Where Aquinas' scholastic synthesis reconciled reason and faith, Ficino attempted to reconcile Moses and Pythagoras, Plato and Aristotle, Jesus and Plotinus. Ficino perceived the Neoplatonic and Hermetic texts, he studied, as derived from the venerable Greco-Egyptian sage, Hermes Trismegistus (thrice-greatest), who was thought to have been the author of over a dozen treatises (The Hermetic Writings), which purported to expound the wisdom of the Egyptians during the period of Moses.[9]

Trismegistus had been viewed as the world's first and foremost authority on the philosophy of nature and the magical command over nature. Ficino's mystical interests were reflected in his translation of the Trismegistus's ***Corpus hermeticum***, and in his rhapsody to the sun (from the *De Sole*), in which he pursued the paths set forth by earlier Hermetic texts. The treatises first became available to the West after the fall of Constantinople and were translated from the Greek by Ficino for the benefit of Cosimo de Medici, who wished this task to be performed prior to the

translation of Plato. The ***Corpus hermeticum***, purportedly at least coeval with Moses, was brought to Florence in 1460, in response to this urgent request. Actually, the writings were composed by Greeks of the Neoplatonic period, as the classical scholar, Isaac Casaubon, first demonstrated in the early seventeenth century. Casaubon found that the Hermetic writings were not produced in early Egyptian antiquity, but rather originated among a set of ancient esoteric texts in the second century AD,CE, and were associated with the mysticism of the Neoplatonic movement founded by Plotinus and continued by Porphyry.[10] Although Plato's works contained no overt magical element, he did consider the material world as "unreal" whereas "true reality" lay in the unchanging world of forms. Plotinus drew upon this approach as the starting point of a philosophy in which the material world was the last and lowest form of being. Influenced by Eastern mysticism, Plotinus claimed that the source of being was "the One" from which derived a trend of emanation, life, mind and soul, and finally, matter. For the Neoplatonist, the human soul embodied a spirit encased in matter whereas, for Neoaristotelians, spirit provided "form" to "matter."

The Hermetic writings provided the groundwork for a view of the cosmos which had broader implications for science and scientific method. It was a view of the world replete with magical powers, the secrets of which were open only to the select few who were willing to explore beyond surface phenomena. The explorer of nature was an ascetic, studying the occult, within the confines of an esoteric community. The operative words of this approach were mysticism, mystery and secrecy. This approach to phenomena, thus, resulted in a sharp contrast between the Hermetic and Aristotelian traditions.

In Trismegistus, the Christian scholars had uncovered a source of wisdom which was traced back beyond Plato to the original Mosaic revelation. Trismegistus was thought to have been the recipient of divine revelation about the physical world, as Moses had been about the moral world. Through this perspective, the Egyptians were perceived as the custodians of secular wisdom, as the Jew were of sacred wisdom. Previously, the Greeks, in the persons of Pythagoras and Plato, (and to a certain extent, Herodotus), had been considered the only sources of access to Egyptian lore, and the West had only come to know it via translations. At this point in time, towards the end of the fifteenth century, the Egyptian treatises became available in what appeared to be their original form. The translation of the ***Corpus hermeticum*** by Ficino in 1463 produced one more factor that was to affect the study of chemistry in the fifteenth century. Promoting occult learning of all varieties, alchemy was eventually brought to the attention of all learned scholars as an area of study that had received improper attention in the past. Joining this trend, Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa von Nettesheim and John Baptista Porta were to point to alchemy as fundamental science for comprehending nature. Hence Plato, together with the Neoplatonists, could be interpreted as contributing indirectly to the magical practices of Renaissance scholars, even though their respective works contain no overt magical elements.

To this synthesis Pico, della Mirandola combined Arabic thought, Zoroastrianism, and Hebrew Kabbalah. As in science, so in philosophy, Islamic and Jewish philosophers provided the intellectual bridge between the ancient world and the "Renaissance

of the Twelfth Century." Pico undertook one of the most ambitious projects in translating Kabbalistic works in the Renaissance. To this end, he solicited the services of Flavius Mithridates, a converted Sicilian Jew, to translate the Kabbalah for him.[11] After the twelfth century, in Talmudic Hebrew "Kabbalah," connoting "receiving" or "that which is received," referred to the post-Mosaic tradition, that is, traditional rabbinic and biblical laws and doctrines contained in the Five Books of Moses (Pentateuch) also known as the "Written Law." Furthermore, the word connoted "tradition," or "that which is received," in that it was understood to represent the esoteric and written aspects of divine revelation given to Moses on Mount Sinai, while the Five Books of Moses represented the exoteric, written component of this very revelation. As an esoteric tradition, the term was understood as a teaching intended only for a small group possessed with exceptional intellectual acumen and moral character and, thereby implied an intellectual endeavor inherently difficult to comprehend and master. Exoteric teaching, on the other hand, signified a teaching that was intended for a broader audience. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, commentators of the Kabbalah engaged in homiletical, philosophical, or mystical lines of thinking. The Kabbalah, in pursuing these paths, sought to reveal the hidden secrets of the five Books of Moses by use of the *sefirot* ("ciphers" or numbers). Among these enciphered forms, or "secrets," was the disclosure of the Neoplatonic doctrine of the world's creation by means of emanations from the Divine Being. The individual letters of the alphabet each controls various aspects of the creation, in the cosmos, in time, and in the body.[12] Within this worldview, Pythagoras assumed a new significance as the model of a mathematician who sought and encountered mystical combinations of numbers. Mathematics, in this new worldview, possessed the key to a world of unchanging realities, close to, if not identical with, the Divine Mind. The first part of these mystical writings demonstrated the degree to which Jewish thought had been profoundly influenced by Philo of Alexandria and by Neoplatonism long before it was affected by the philosophy of Islam.[13]

In the thirteenth century, the term came to dignify the new mystical doctrines and systems, often referred to as "ancient theology," that had been developing in northern Spain and southern France, particularly in Provence, since the twelfth century which reached their literary height in The Book of the ***Zohar***. This work, composed of several literary units, has been recognized by the Kabbalists since the late thirteenth century as the most important work of mystical teaching, and the book achieved in certain circles a sanctity only slightly less than that of the Bible. The ***Zohar*** has been characterized by commentators as a combination of theosophical theology, mystical psychology, anthropology, myth, and poetry. Old Gnostic doctrines, mystical traditions, theurgic speculations, popular superstitions, and mythological motifs coexisted alongside Neoplatonic and Aristotelian philosophic theories concerning the nature of the cosmos and about the relationship between a transcendent God and a finite world. The work develops the notion of the *sefiro*t or divine emanations into a comprehensive presentation of the nature of God and creation, and their interrelationship. The mysterious Godhead, *Ein Sof* ("no end," the infinite unknowable divine being) manifests itself through the ten *sefirot*, the realms of the divine universe. The central doctrine of the ***Zohar***

comprises the concept that the harmonious unity of the Divine Life is brought about as disturbed by human action. For the ***Zohar,*** the Torah possesses the essential key to unlock the mysteries of the Divine processes. According to the Kabbalists, the Torah consists of an actual manifestation of the Divine and thereby becomes a sort of symbolic *corpus*. Through this perspective, the ***Zohar*** becomes less interested in the literal meaning of historical events narrated in the Bible, than in the theosophical mysteries that provide their "inner" and therefore truly "real" meaning. The basic premise, upon which ***Zohar*** proceeds, entails the notion that there exists a complete correspondence between the "lower" and "upper" worlds. Thus, the individual's deeds and prayers possess cosmic significance. The *Gematria*, as a method of exegesis, was adopted by some of the Kabbalists to discern this "inner" meaning of the Bible. The hermeneutical rules guiding the method involved the calculation of the numerical value of Hebrew words, and the search for other words or phrases of equal value. Under the influence of letter-mysticism, which portrayed an important role in the esoteric tradition, *gematria* became a major characteristic of kabbalistic expositions as of magical practices.[14]

From the point of view of the renewed interest in mathematics, Neoplatonists promoted the development of a mathematical approach to nature and the internal development of geometry and algebra. The revival in this interest also resulted in a variety of occultist investigations connected to number mysticism. Fifteenth century kabbalistic studies encouraged a mystical numerological investigation of the Bible with the aspiration of deriving far reaching truths. Similarly, mystical numbers promised to provide insight into nature and the Divine world. Clearly, in the classical period, this tendency was embodied in the Pythagorean tradition before Plato. The Pythagoreans were the first to designate the world as "cosmos," a designation which implied a well-ordered and harmonious system, and to claim the earth was spherical. These cosmological claims implied further: the universe is a well-ordered system; the most perfect shape is the sphere and earth is round; the planets are not "errant" bodies but have regular motion; and those motions are uniform. Plato derived from Pythagoras' unitary perception of the "cosmos," the mathematical doctrine that the essential reality of things was to be found in numbers. These themes, through the revival of the texts of late antiquity in the fifteenth century, combined with the abiding relevance of Plato's numerical speculation in the ***Timaeus***, continued to have an effect on the world of learning. The themes ranged from the view that the planets and stars represent the most sublime manifestations of the Ideas to the proposition that astronomy constitutes the basic knowledge for wisdom, health, and happiness. These viewpoints were connected to the conception that divine mathematics, represented by the movements of the stars, also can be traced in music and in the theory of numbers. When individuals die, their souls return to their native stars. The dualism between mind and matter was further marked by the distinction between the greater world *(macrocosmos*) and the smaller one *(microcosmos).*[15]

Implicit in this late Hellenistic Neoplatonic philosophy, as in Graeco-Roman Stoicism, was the conception of the unity of nature, a unity that conveyed further, the notion that real correspondences exist between the individual and the "upper"

realm. Drawing upon this tradition, Pico grafted further magical ideas which he took from these traditions, ideas about talismans and the marvelously significance of letter-number transcriptions, which the adept could employ to control the flow of events. "The profound significance of Pico della Mirandola in the history of humanity," writes Yates, "can hardly be overestimated. He it was who first boldly formulated a new position for European man, man as Magus using both Magic and Cabala to act upon the world, to command his destiny by science."[16]

The argument put forward by Frances Yates's, in her classic and controversial study of ***Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition***, reflecting the previous quote, was that Neoplatonism not only induced certain Renaissance thinkers to examine nature, but that it induced individuals to examine nature with the intent of mastering it. These very intentions were to serve the methodical purposes of both Bacon and Descartes, in expounding the limits of Aristotle's philosophy. Her point, which for some scholars remains persuasive, was that the Greek philosophers had neither possessed nor sought the power to operate on nature: to understand and ratiocinate had been the limit of their ambition. Whenever they ventured far out in this direction, as in the case of Aristotle's comprehensive and consistent philosophy their intellectual ambition weakened and they proceeded no further. Renaissance Neoplatonism provided a new ambition, a new objective for knowledge: mastering nature. Through this perspective, the central issues inherent in the notorious quarrel between the "Ancients and the Moderns" in the seventeenth century were discernible already in the period of the Renaissance. However, at this earlier period, several perceived the advantage to weigh heavily on the side of the "Ancients," such that the central issue became the degree to which the "Moderns" were to continue with their Classical legacy. Machiavelli, representing the latter perspective, maintained that the Romans ought to be imitated in every detail of their accomplishments to the point of disparaging the use of gunpowder since the Romans made great military strides without it. By contrast, Guicciardini insisted that a more flexible policy of imitation was essential to allow for changing conditions in the world. Increasingly, the controversy turned on the issue of adopting the more fluid and elastic policies in the face of changing experiences.

Plato's influence throughout the history of Western thought was demonstrated by spatial and temporal measures. Only the ***Timaeus,*** considered by some scholars to be the most obscure of his dialogues, was available in Latin translation during the medieval period. However, through his influence on Cicero and on Augustine, the system of Plato dominated the whole theology of the Catholic Church from the first century through the twelfth, when the influence of Aristotle accompanied that of Plato. Though modified, the philosophy of Plato remained unaffected by the developing influence of Aristotle. In Plato's universe, one world of Forms sharply set off from one world of matter exists, wherein he provided inadequate explanation of the interrelation of the two worlds. In Aristotle's world, an interlocking hierarchy of matter and form exists, proceeding from lowest to highest. The Aristotelian idea of a "great chain of being," in which everything had its allotted place and was intricately related to everything else, dominated Western thought since the revival and translation of his works, in the thirteenth century, until the seventeenth century. This

notion became extremely important for his followers, in the study of theology, philosophy and science. Christian and humanist thinkers, who refuted Aristotle's ideas, following Cicero and Augustine, praised Plato above all other classical philosophers despite the fact that they had limited direct knowledge of Plato's writings and virtually no contact with Platonism as a living philosophical tradition. However, after the fall of Constantinople in 1453, all of this changed. For Platonism, as a living tradition, was familiar to Byzantine thinkers since the eleventh century and, when the religious and political upheavals of the fifteenth century brought Byzantine Platonism westward, the West was exposed for the first time to a systematic philosophy as serious as Neoaristotelianism in its scientific aspirations, yet shared the religious concerns of the Christian critics of Aristotle. The specific criticism arising from Jewish, Christian and Islamic thinkers pertained to issues underlying revealed religion. These Neoplatonic theologians were concerned over the fact that Aristotle's system denied the ideas of Divine providence and the possibility of sudden intervention on the part of Providence in an ordered universe; that miracles were impossible for Aristotle's undeterred Prime Mover. Moreover, Aristotle rejected the belief in a special creation of the universe as described in ***Genesis***, in that he proclaimed matter as being eternal; and finally, Aristotle denied personal immortality. Though religious criticisms were meted out by Jewish, Christian and Islamic Platonists, concerning revealed religion, the emphasis here will be on those Christian thinkers who were concerned with determining and understanding the epistemological boundaries of natural philosophy.

These boundaries were examined with a seriousness of purpose, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, during which time the ancient Greek doctrine of atomism became increasingly popular. This occurred when the invention of the microscope provided additional plausibility to the theory in that individuals were able to observe tiny microscopic entities for the first time. The microscope offered the observation that still smaller entities, or atoms, existed from which everything had been composed. Although the content of the variegated sciences in these elements was diversified, the "new philosophy" provided a common form of analysis shared widely enough to characterize what many perceived to be a scientific movement. The distinctive new direction made in scientific research was to search for the intelligibility of nature increasingly in an underlying mathematics and mechanical structure than in immediate observation, and to seek systematic and quantitative analysis and experimental observation. The tremendous advances made in mathematics and the science of dynamics during this period appeared to confirm the view that every action and reaction in the physical world may be explained solely in terms of matter in motion. This view became the premise upon which "mechanical philosophy" was based.[17]

In the pre-Copernican, Aristotelian universe, within the organic tradition, scientific observers explained natural phenomena in terms of analogies drawn from living organisms. For Aristotle, the horizon of science was coextensive with nature. A theory of nature derived from living organisms as well as social structures provided Aristotle with a logical foundation upon which to construct a broadly conceived science. Nature, thus, consists of a system of capacities or forces of growth directed by their

inherent constitution toward characteristic purposes. The Greek word for "nature," *physis*, derives from the verb *phou,* which connotes "to grow' or "to develop." "Nature," he posits, or "development," implies "the genesis of growing things [literally: which participate in the phenomenon of growth]." The term also signifies "that immanent part of a growing thing from which its growth first proceeds…. Nature in the primary and strict sense is the essence of which have in themselves, as such, a source of movement…and processes of becoming and growing are called nature because they are movements proceeding from this."[18] The language employed originated in observation of growth and decay, with the analogy of the acorn growing into an oak tree readily available. This observation perceived more constant change in nature than regularity and uniformity. Through this view, every being possess a *physis* of its own, in the sense of its own principle of "development." Clearly, from this perspective, "nature" assigns to each bring a "final" state, which corresponds to its perfect form."[19] Such an observation led to the view that a potentiality or purpose inherent in all of natural phenomena, consisted of a "final cause," which dominated vital development. This view of the world, as movement directed towards an end, persisted even when the investigator interacted with inanimate nature, for he/she tended to attribute life to it or to employ language and terminology derived from his or her primary interest in life and growth.

However, this view also implies the extent to which growth may be limited. For Aristotle, that which has no term or limit is by definition incomplete and imperfect, and "coming-to-be and passing-away must occur within the field of 'that which can be-and-not-be.'"[20] Through these observations, Aristotle remained faithful to the theory of cycles: that which is born and grows up will also fade and die, in a perpetual series of new beginnings. This perception provides his solution to the basic question concerning persistence in change and the concept of eternal return. The authority of Aristotle's views permeated the whole of the Hellenistic and Roman world, up to the Renaissance, also a time in which the writings of Lucretius were rediscovered. Lucretius and his version of Epicureanism became important to the period in all of its philosophical manifestations and implications for growth and decay. When Lucretius wrote his ***De Rerum Natura***, he conceived of "nature" as the principle of growth, the word itself derived from the verb, *nasci*, "to be born." Moreover, if the world remained in its youth, he contended, that deny the fact that, one day, it will have to confront its decay. For,

> For all the things that you see so gaily growing and step by step climbing to the full-formed life, take to themselves more atoms than they lose…until they reach the highest peak of growth. Then little by little time breaks their full-blown strength and powers, as life grows weaker and melts away….So, too, the walls round this great world of ours, once taken, will crumble to ruin and decay.[21]

Aristotelians perceived this process repeated throughout nature, not solely in livings things but in the movement of inanimate objects and in "chemical" change. The terms "natural" and "unnatural" were applied, within the organic tradition, to problems of motion. According to Aristotle, a falling stone was behaving "naturally," a projectile hurled upwards was moving "unnaturally". In his ***Physics***, Aristotle categorized sublunary movements under two headings: if they occurred as part of the

order of things, that is, "according to their nature," they were "natural," if contrary to that order, and failing to conform to their "development" (for instance, as when a weight is lifted upwards), "violent." He considered both types of movements to be resisted by the medium, (normally air or water) through which the moving body has to pass, as when a leaf flutters down from a tree. Continuation of movement therefore required a cause or a force to produce it, that is, only living things. Nature's tendency towards order constitutes the cause of natural motion in terrestrial objects, while muscular effort or some unusual violence in nature itself (for example, a gale of wind) produces violent motion.

Aristotelian theories of physics and chemical change were inextricably connected to Aristotelian cosmology. Accordingly, the earth was at the center of the universe and the planets and the sun revolved around it, each in their respective sphere. There was an absolute up and down, in spatial terms, and there was also a complete division between the lunar (perfect) world and the sub-lunar (imperfect) world, each of which had its planets move in circular orbits and their composition consisted of an incorruptible element. Within the essential duality of the world, and in the sub-lunar world, change was a constant feature, motion was rectilinear and matter composed of four elements: earth, air, fire, and water. The earth embodied the sub-lunar realm of change and decay. Death and decay, according to Paracelsus, "brings about the birth and rebirth of forms a thousand times improved." For Boehme, the resolution of contraries was the death of their conflict and the necessary prerequisite for a higher form of development and being, a kind of transformative rebirth.[22]

Bacon, the Paracelsans and the Organic Tradition

However, in the new Copernican universe, the distinction between the perfect, unchanging heavens and the imperfect earth was obliterated with its Christian cosmology. Traditional scientific assumptions were also undermined by the Copernican theory, in that Aristotle's notion of the four elements, each with its allotted "natural" place, seemed incomprehensible, if not counter intuitive. More specifically, the Copernican universe undermined the relationships and correspondences that assisted in organizing human experience and in providing human beings some semblance of security in an inherently insecure world. The idea of antiquity, in which the individual was perceived as a microcosm reflecting the larger world, or macrocosm, became meaningless in an infinite universe of inert, passive matter. Even more, in the sixteenth century, several observers realized that the mariners compass, the printing of books, and the military employment of artillery represented achievements as momentous as anything produced in the world of antiquity. Although the influence of the Far East was unacknowledged, those who praised the prowess of the West did so to highlight the accomplishments of the Moderns. For the opening of new worlds through geographical "discovery" and the multitude of published books to disseminate learning were calculated to become a heavy counterweight to the highly vaunted superiority of the Ancients. Francis Bacon, one of the prominent proponents

of this view, pointed to the invention of gunpowder, printing, and the magnetic compass, as did others before him, as examples of human technological progress, indicating an advance upon the achievement of antiquity. He perceived Europeans as innovative inventors through whom the combination of common sense, manual craftiness and natural knowledge brought wealth and power. Through the perspective of this practical inventiveness, Bacon understood knowledge as an active process, as a *venatio,* a quest, an exploration of unknown lands, a discovery of the unknown instead of contemplation or recognition. Where Neoaristotelian scholastic philosophy espoused contemplation and had been a passive reconciliation of the individual and nature, Bacon's new philosophy taught the principle that the individual ought to explore nature actively and, having uncovered its secrets, to exploit them for human purposes. Indeed, the foundations of nature may be transformed. He demonstrated this philosophical principle in the First Aphorism of his ***Novum Organum***: "Man, is Nature's agent and interpreter; he does and understands only as much as he has observed of the order of nature in fact or by inference; he does not know and cannot do more."[23]

Before long, those who extolled the accomplishments of the Moderns came to realize that certain forms of scientific knowledge gained a great deal by the accumulation of observed facts, or by the continual revision of the results and the improvements in actual method. Near the end of the sixteenth century Giordano Bruno pointed out that even in the ancient world Ptolemy had built on the observation of his predecessors who, in turn, possessed the advantage of starting from the achievements of others from an earlier period. Meanwhile, Copernicus, collecting all that his predecessors had accomplished concerning the conception of the spherical shape of the earth, was in a more favorable position than any of them to know the position of objects in the universe. Indeed, Bruno wrote, it was the Moderns who were the Ancients, and who enjoyed the benefits of the accumulated experience of humanity, and the age of classical Greece belongs instead to the childhood of the world. Within the context of the controversy of the Ancients and the Moderns, the contention that we were the more ancient appeared on several occasions in the seventeenth century. However, the comparison of the whole of human history with the life of an individual was capable of being used to the opposite purpose, and it is plausible that Francis Bacon gave an erroneous impression when he demonstrated that the Moderns were really the elders. In his ***Wisdom of the Ancients***, published in 1609, Bacon drew allegorically upon the emblematic literature of the sixteenth and early seventeen centuries, interpreting particular Greek deities from the pantheon as symbolic representation of his own viewpoint: namely, he presented enigmatically modern wisdom as though it were ancient learning. For Bacon oscillated in his writings between portraying the world as passing through cycles of improvement and decline, and, at other moments, regarding his own period as that of the world's old age or maturity.[24] At the end of the seventeenth century, the equation of modernity with maturity became essential to explain the extremer version of the doctrine of decadence—namely, the view that the period was the old age of the world and that nature was unable to exert the same energy or power as before—a notion which conveyed more a perception that nature itself was suffering from a long process of

exhaustion, than a static view of the total process of transformation in time. The controversy over the relative merits of the ancients and moderns, and by extension, the advantages and disadvantages of the revival of antiquity for learning turned on this notion of the decay of nature.

The notion of the decay of nature gave rise to broader concepts concerning truth and the "birth" or "end of time," youth and old age, fathers and sons (and occasionally the daughter), as well as ancient (or "old") and modern (or "new") approaches to knowledge. Throughout this spectrum, two fundamental issues involved in the quarrel concerned the question of scientific innovation and the question of learning; that is, which age possessed greater intellectual prowess and which displayed greater knowledge. The notion of nature's decay pertained directly to conceptions which either weakened or strengthened reliance on classical authority for intellectual guidance. Joining contemporary thinkers who defended the superiority of the modern period to earlier historical periods, Bacon indicated that the adage "truth is the daughter of time" signified that maturity of the modern age, compared to antiquity, enabled it to attain far greater achievements than was possible in antiquity. In the ***Advancement of Learning***, Bacon pointed out the misconceptions that have led individuals to believe otherwise. The inventory of human thought provided by Bacon, in this work, revealed deficiencies in knowledge grounded in the belief that there was nothing new to be discovered, that we have already inherited all there was to know from the ancient Greeks and Romans. Among others, cases in point include Alexander's expedition into Asia and Columbus's navigation westward. A related error occurs in the conviction that the best observation or opinions have already taken place, a belief that suppresses the attempts of new suggestions. Bacon repudiated this tendency in belief in promoting the viewpoint that "the truth is, that time seemeth to be the nature of a river or stream, which carrieth down to us that which is light and blown up, and sinketh and drowneth that which is weighty and solid."[25]

The intellectual currents flowing throughout Bacon's works signal a call for a radical reform in approaches to knowledge which was substantiated by a conviction of the radical changes which were occurring in Europe, Asia, and the Americas, and by the belief that a new historical epoch was close to being born. These changes were spawned by a series of material innovations which have altered human life significantly more than the so-called "truths" derived from philosophical sects or schools. These innovative changes that altered the course of human history were mechanical inventions, transoceanic voyages and geographical encounters. These encounters in the "new world" required a "new" philosophy. For, "it would be disgraceful if, while the regions of the material globe,—that is , of the earth, of the sea, and the stars,—have been in our times laid widely open and revealed, the intellectual globe should remain shut up within the narrow limits of old discoveries."[26] In concert with his observation of these epoch-making material factors, Bacon preferred his own work as a "masculine child of time," (***Temporis partus masculus)*** instead of the mind of a genius. On several occasions, Bacon employed the peculiar phrase, "birth of time," to characterize his proposed new natural philosophy. In his ***The Masculine Birth of Time***, he characterized this birth as "masculine" which reflected the emblematic literature of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. For, in Renaissance

mythological studies and emblem books, "time" was portrayed as having, yet not giving birth to, a child. The child of "Time" is "Truth," often depicted as a nude female being delivered from error: hence the motif *Veritas temporis filia*, "Truth the Daughter of Tyme, and there is nothing so secrete, but the date of manie days will reveale it."[27] The motif was familiar among the contemporaries of Bacon's intellectual milieu as demonstrated by Thomas North's remarks: "Time (that is… the father of Veritie) cannot suffer hir to be hidden by any coloured fraud or deceit."[28]

This emblematic theme of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries represented the purport of Bacon's new method of epistemological inquiry to render truth, and his purposeful appropriation of the expression, "birth of time," with the emphasis on parturition, was unsuccessful in finding an analogue in contemporary versions of the *Veritas temporis filia* motif. Bacon's use of the "masculine birth of time," in *Temporis partus masculus*, attempts to establish a new beginning in philosophy in the form of inveighing against earlier prominent thinkers. The structure of this early polemical, unfinished work, was presented in the form of a lesson by a "master" to someone he addresses as "my son," and the didactic purpose conveys the theme of the legitimacy of knowledge and the process by which knowledge was transmitted. The birth of time becomes "masculine" because its father (implying God, the Father) is known, and therefore legitimate. The cumulative development of knowledge, over time, marks its legitimacy with respect to truth. "My intention" the master-teacher explains further,

> "is to impart to you, not the figments of my own brain, nor the shadows thrown by words, nor an adulterated form of religion, nor a few commonplace observations or notorious experiments tricked out to make a composition as fanciful as a stage-play. No: I am come in very truth leading to you Nature with all her children to bind her to your service and make her your slave. Does it seem to you then that I bear in my hands a subject of instruction which I can risk defiling by any fault in my handling of it, whether springing from pretence or incompetence? So may it go with me, my son; so may I succeed in my only earthly wish, namely to stretch the deplorably narrow limits of man's dominion over the universe to their promised bounds; as I shall hand on to you, with the most loyal faith, out of the profounder care for the future of which I am capable, after prolonged examination both of the state of Nature and of the state of the human mind, by the most legitimate method, the instruction I have to convey."[29]

In his ***Novuum Organum***, Bacon indicated later that "truth is rightly called the daughter of time, not the daughter of authority."[30] In formulating this adage, he postulates further that knowledge accumulates gradually and, as such, cannot be grasped by a single philosopher, no matter how great a mind, in isolation from the cooperative efforts of other thinkers and researchers. Hence the collective, cumulative efforts that arrive at finding truths, occurs as long as the process has begun in a legitimate manner, where legitimate, for Bacon, connotes that which becomes methodical and lawful.

In repudiating the authority of the ancient philosophers, Bacon criticized the "fine meditations, speculations and endless discussions" that hitherto had passed for natural philosophy as "unsound…useless for the discovery of [practical] works," and the logic on which it was based as "useless for the discovery of the sciences."[31] He joins the Renaissance humanists in maintaining that Neoaristotelian philosophy

had corrupted Christianity and that the solutions it offers pertain solely to disputatious issues than to practical challenges. To achieve anything new and useful in the world required philosophers to rely less on ancient methods of inquiry, and to apply new methods, practices and policies of investigation. To substantiate this claim, he compares the progress of the mechanical arts, enterprises on which philosophy and authority had no effect, with the corruption of ancient philosophy: the former develops and improves with time; the latter degenerates.[32] At issue, for him, was the perception that ancient thinkers relied more upon reason than upon direct observation of nature. In criticizing Neoaristotelianism, he viewed himself as correcting the excessive degree to which it relied on rationalism. "Research into final causes," he argued, "like a virgin dedicated to God is barren and produces nothing."[33] The "new method" he proposed would not only create a new language of science and, thereby, establish the important criteria by which to provide an adequate scientific explanation of nature, but would also make fresh demands for the practical application of nature's "hidden" powers. He summoned experimenters to dispense with "mistress Antiquity," and "to sell their books and to build furnaces; quitting and forsaking Minerva and the Muses as barren virgins and relying upon Vulcan."[34] Bacon's views on the practical purpose of science, and the major effort he directed to the reformation of our knowledge of nature, revealed that the operative of his inductive method had been influenced by the tradition of natural magic as well as that of the mechanical arts.

The alchemists and magicians, despite the faults Bacon found in them, retained the belief in the reality of the natural world and in the capacity of the individual to achieve profound changes in nature by natural means. Their methods of inquiry included observation and experiment to obtain quantifiable results. For this reason, Bacon regarded the importance of this tradition as an important forerunner of the research reforms he sought. Nonetheless, he proceeded to point out, there remain important differences. The strong revival of interest in the Platonic, Neoplatonic, and Hermetic writings, by Pico della Mirandola and other humanists, appears to have affected Bacon as well through his broad reading of natural magic and alchemy. However, the revival in this interest, first in mathematics and then in the widespread interest in natural magic, had its limits. Demonstrating his familiarity with the literature, Bacon impugned the traditional secrecy of those subjects, which claimed to have access to the "hidden and secret properties of things," and contended that a true "magician" would make a public disclosure of his or her discoveries. Magic was regarded as a search for these "hidden, occult" qualities of natural objects and phenomena, and appeared to some natural philosophers at least to offer a promising procedure in investigating nature. Alchemists, for example, prepared substances by various methods, such as distillation, with the aspiration of tapping a source of miraculous power. However, if a miraculous discovery were made, the likelihood of passing it on to succeeding generations of nature explorers would have been diminished by their emphasis on secrecy and dissembling their successes.

Among other defects, Bacon noted, are the concentration on particular arts, to the exclusion of, what he designates, *philosophia prima*,—first philosophy. Bacon regarded his *philosophia prima* as a collection of axioms, which may prove useful

to more than one (though not necessarily all) *scientia*. The sharing of these axioms by all the individual branches of science reveals the intimate connection of theoretical and practical parts in his conception of *scientia* and thereby confirmed his general idea of science as an operative endeavor. The main thrust of Bacon's criticism was directed at the esotericism and charlatanry, which dominated the practice of magic in secret circles, and he implored "the practical part of natural science" rather to emulate the mechanical arts, which expand progressively their knowledge though collaborative efforts. Yet, to this criticism, he added the observation that natural magic was useful in that it contributed to scientific empiricism. Cornelius Agrippa, Paracelsus and others professed that magic demonstrated a profound belief in nature. "The operations of magic," Agrippa maintained on behalf of this belief, "proceed from nature and are done in accordance with nature."[35] Indeed, natural magic entails that "science which applies the knowledge of hidden forms to the production of wonderful operations; and by uniting (as they say) activities with passive displays the wonderful works of nature."[36] Above all else, the quality of scientific results was determined by the integrity of its method. Although Bacon also criticized the unguided empirical enthusiasm of Paracelsus and alchemists, in general, he joined the Paracelsans in their distrust of mathematics. Thus, in placing less emphasis on mathematics, Bacon's idea of a "new science" and scientific method became essentially experimental, qualitative, and inductive in approach. He was convinced that "unto the deep, fruitful and operative study of many sciences, specially natural philosophy and physics, books be not only the instrumental…. In general, there will be hardly any main proficience in the disclosing of nature, except for expenses about experiments."[37] Bacon propounded the view that the individual should explore nature actively and, having discovered its secrets, exploit them for his or her own purposes. Upon engaging in direct observation and experimentation, in gathering new observations and extracting new results, the new scientist will improve continually his or her mastery of nature and thereby the felicity of human life. Through the active engagement of direct observation and experimentation, the "new science" would also disclose "nature's secrets."[38]

Indeed, the writings of Paracelsus and his followers, known as "iatrochemists," or "spagyrists unfinished," were suffused with magic. That is, replete not solely with a high-level, esoteric, metaphysical sort of magic often associated with Neoplatonism, but a robust, operative magic already associated with Agrippa. The science of iatrochemistry, in which chemistry was studied for use in medicine, was initiated though this approach. The followers were medical chemists and chemical physicians who, while accepting the ideas of chemical medicine, rejected some of the extremes of medical mysticism demanded by their teacher. Paracelsus adopted the Neoplatonic principle, which posited the corresponding realms of macrocosm and microcosm, and applied it to the world of medicine. He viewed the organs of the human body as the equivalent of the stars; the human body itself as a microcosm of all that existed in the world—animal, vegetable and mineral and spirit. Through this perspective, Paracelsus maintained that the individual and the cosmos were analogues which were inextricably intertwined. Paracelsus' categorization of "astronomy" always found a central place in the narrative of his chemical medical system. In proclaiming that the

foundations of medicine lay in philosophy, astronomy and alchemy, Paracelsus' position was consistent with an entrenched position established by medieval Arabic and Jewish medical authorities, and was reflected in the prevailing proclivities of medical education in the seventeenth century. Natural philosophy and mathematics were taught as an appendage of medical education; astrology was a standard component of medical studies; alchemy occupied a small space in the study of pharmacology. He shared the traditional concerns, yet his conception of philosophy, astronomy and alchemy was sharply differentiated from the medical principles practiced by the Arabs or in the schools, and Paracelsus thereby sought to refute most of what was ordinarily taught as the foundation for medical theory. The function of the physician, for him, entailed procuring remedies from the macrocosm to cure the disease of the microcosm. For example, in the earlier Paracelsan period, inevitably the stars act as magically upon individuals as chemical medicaments: "A healthy man must submit to heaven and every day he must remain in abeyance to receive what it sends him." To be sure, Paracelsus made use of the new world of chemical process and phenomena to enlarge the realm of magic. According to Lynn Thorndike:

> …for Paracelsus there is no such thing as natural law and consequently no such thing as natural science. Even the force of the stars may be side-tracked, thwarted or qualified by the interference of a demon. Even the most hopeless disease may yield to a timely incantation or magic rite. Everywhere there is mystery, animism, invisible forces.[39]

Walter Pagel, the foremost modern student of Paracelsus, agrees that the latter rejects rational thinking, is indeed "inspired by a deep distrust of the power of human reasoning," and believes, accordingly, that the great truths of nature were learned "in dream and trance fortified by a strong will and imagination." This understanding was based upon the notion that nature would be apprehended best by the "astral body" of an individual which is itself (as the microcosm) directly a part of nature and thereby apprehends these "truths" intuitively, directly, than by the brain which *examines* nature as something external. For knowledge, according to Paracelsus, resides within things, seemingly as their essence or virtue and, therefore, the individual who possesses this knowledge of all things (the powers of the stars as well as the medical virtues of plants) is the Magus: "…if a man go to no other school than that which is made of bricks and mortar and seek no schoolmaster other than him who reaches from behind the stove, he will come to nothing except superficially."[40] Through this sense of understanding, Paracelsus resembled the religious mystics and several alchemists, in viewing the truth that proceeds from enlightenment as transcendental and unattainable through the ordinary literary processes of study.

The Paracelsan world was eternal in character and part of the Divine in nature. The universe was a magical cosmos in which God was the Magus. It was a live universe in which all things had a spiritual directing force (an *Archeus*) which guided their development, for "God has created all things." Paracelsus called the life principle of this directing force, *archeus,* understood in the Greek sense as a beginning, origin or first cause. The birth of a vital world order emanating from an initial state of things (a "beginning," *arche*). According to this understanding, complex organisms, such as animals or humans, possess several *archei*, which control various

organs and limbs. In describing the function of this process Paracelsus invoked the analogy of soldiers under the leadership of a general whereby the organs and limbs are controlled by a supreme *Archeus.* For, Paracelsus continues, "He has created something out of nothing. This something is a seed, in which the purpose of its use and function is inherent from the beginning."[41] In this manner, the development of each entity was shaped by an immanent pattern and a power contained within its seed. The growth of all beings was autonomous, free from the influence of external forces, for "never can anything develop from what is not in itself."[42] The growth-prompting power inherent within each seed was a vital or spiritual force, initiated by the *Archeus*:

> What would be body without spirit? Absolutely nothing. The spirit then and not the body contains concealed in itself the virtue and power … [it] conserves the living body and when this perished the spirit escapes and leaves the dead body and returns to the place whence it came, into the chaos, the air below and above the firmament …know that spirit is the true life and balsam of all corporate things.[43]

For Paracelsus and the iatrochemists of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as indicated, inert matter was nonexistent. All substances, even minerals and chemical compounds, were "alive," as they were permeated by a vital force which caused growth and determined forms which, in turn, the growth assumed. Each natural object, therefore, was an autonomous entity, as it derives its growth and movement from its internal vital force, instead of from external sources of energy. The natural philosophy of the Iatrochemical School which, after Paracelsus, included John Baptist van Helmont and Jakob Boehme became particularly strong in Germany and exerted an influence that extended as far as Brussels to the Cambridge Platonists.

Paracelsus' cosmos was full of hidden secrets (the occult) from which the physician derived intuitive knowledge that allowed "overhearing" its essential nature. The manner in which the physician discerned the "signatures" or essential nature of the universe was through experience and experiment both within ourselves and in the external world. "He who wishes to explore nature," Paracelsus maintained, "must tread her books with his feet."[44] Paracelsus' principle of signatures revisited the classical concept of nature as a "book," written by God, in which each existent entity became a word or letter disposed to be read. As such, the principle was a variant of Neoplatonism and the Kabbalah. The theory of signatures proclaimed that each and every natural object contains the imprint of some sign pertaining its utility and capacity to relive human ills.[45] The signature of an entity assumed its idea, form, and/or essence in that it disclosed the celestial influence possessed by the object. Each created object possessed an inner form or "signature" which expresses its essence**.** Hence, Paracelsus' world repudiated mechanical or material explanations of nature and, thereby, as a cosmos dominated by spirit instead of matter, completely differentiated itself from the mechanistic world of Descartes and Hobbes. However, this view of the world was not remote from the universes of Copernicus and Kepler, or of Bruno and Fludd. Paracelsus differed from Copernicus and Kepler in his attitude toward mathematics, in that he rejected the notion of the universe as having been written in mathematical characters. This difference becomes marginal when one considers the fact that all of these Neoplatonists (including the Hermeticists and

the Kabbalists) believed in a similar kind of universe, and were all searching for a code which would reveal its secrets. Paracelsus differed from Copernicus in turning to the laboratories of the earth, in particular, the mines, instead of the celestial laboratory. Superficially, Copernicus and Paracelsus have little in common, apart from their respective uses of Platonism. However, in bringing these figures together, the strength and impulse of the "magical tradition" in shaping the development of science in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries becomes discernible.

Paracelsus views epitomized the complexity inherent in any characterization of seventeenth-century science in terms of the ascendancy of the "modern" over the "ancients." Paracelsus and his followers may be characterized as "moderns" to the extent that they opposed the authority of Aristotelian scholasticism in theology and science, yet "ancients" by the manner in which they adopted a source of wisdom considered more venerable than scholasticism. Their quest for knowledge and truth became rooted in the search for means of restoring "*prisca*," the ancient wisdom, possessed by the Prophets, Moses, or Adam prior to the Fall.

Although the works of Paracelsus and the Paracelsans proffered important alternatives to Aristotelian matter theory, Bacon proposed a natural philosophy that reached beyond physical, astronomical and cosmological questions to embrace the domain of earthly living entities. Through the application of the "new" scientific method, Bacon strove to combine the theoretical interpretation and technical control of natural phenomena. This methodological approach to science emphasized the dominance of humanity and the passivity of the natural world. The rise of science, from the seventeenth century, has been connected to human aspirations that increased knowledge of the world would allow for a more effective use of natural resources. The world was perceived as a passive source of raw materials to be exploited by humanity for its own benefit. Where the mechanists, such as Descartes and Hobbes, applied a single mechanistic method to natural phenomena, Bacon advocated observations over a broad range of phenomena. Bacon's scientific approach draws upon a human analogy, instead of a mechanical one, to describe a natural phenomenon which carries his assumptions within the organic tradition.

In this connection, some feminist historians of science have suggested that the emergence of scientific knowledge, and the "Scientific Revolution," became in theory and practice, a predominately male and consequently, anti-female enterprise. Carolyn Merchant, for instance, maintained that this emergence in scientific knowledge overturned traditional ideas concerning living in harmony with nature in favor of ecological exploitation that simultaneously sanctioned the subjugation of women. In overturning the classical association of women and nature, she argued, the Scientific Revolution was responsible for bringing about a new mechanistic worldview that was directly related to the exploitation of both women and nature. Nature, for traditional philosophies, had been viewed as essentially feminine.[46] In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Neoplatonism portrayed the image of the macrocosm as having been enlivened by the female soul. In his ***Timaeus***, Plato characterized the fullness and beauty of the universe as constituting a female soul. The early Greek goddess, "Gaia," known as Earth or Mother Earth was considered a nurturing mother who provided for the needs and desires of humanity.

This conception of the earth as mother was accompanied by the notion of stringent ethical constraints against the exploitation of natural resources. For humanity to pillage these resources would be tantamount to children turning on its mother.[47] From this perspective, classical philosophies of nature promoted living in harmony with nature instead of striving to exploit it. The Romans were knowledgeable ancient writers on agriculture and Pliny the Elder, one of the contributors, invoked the Mother Earth metaphor explicitly to warn against excessive mining and deforestation. He ventured so far as to suggest that earthquakes were signs of earth's displeasure at such pillaging of her treasures. The influence and tradition of Pliny remained fertile in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The earth and the sky continued to represent mother and father, and every individual thereby, according to Giordano Bruno, was "a citizen and servant of the world, a child of father Sun and Mother Earth."[48]

In defense of the charge that Bacon's allegorical images were constructed to characterize science, domination and masculinity to oppose nature and femininity, Sarah Hutton challenged the underlying assumptions of Keller, Merchant and other feminist scholars. Upon targeting the masculinity of the image of domination, she demonstrated how these critics obscured the paradox inherent in the concept of "masculine birth" and the "topos of power" once removed from the historical context and the broader framework of his writings. Clearly, "the topos of power," she maintained, "occurs frequently in Bacon's writings." However, this very "topos of power" must be differentiated between Bacon's first, and "only," metaphorical use in connection with the female subjugation image in his ***Temporis partus masculus***, and his use of the topos to distinguish between "mere brute force and power as rule or *imperium*."[49] The emblematic representation of the *imperium* of science appears in the title pages of ***Instauratio Magna*** (1620) and ***Sylva sylvarum***(1627) and, Hutton pointed out, alluded to an emblem of the Holy Roman Emperor, Charles V (also Charles I of Spain). Hutton promoted the notion that the emblem depicts the Pillars of Hercules, which purports to delineate the divide between the Old and New Worlds, the known and the unknown. Bacon viewed himself as sailing through these pillars to an intellectual new world. By appropriating the emblem to construct an image of scientific discovery beyond the Pillars of Hercules, Bacon incorporated "the heroic and imperial import of Charles V's *impressa*."[50]

In other works, Bacon's attack on "mistress Antiquity" placed him on the side of the "moderns." In addition, his emphasis on the mechanical arts, and call for human dominion over nature helped replace the classical metaphor of the universe as a female being with the image of the universe as a machine. The mechanical arts demonstrated the degree to which Bacon advocated his method as providing humans with power over nature through manual manipulation, technology, and experiment. The scientific understanding, for him, and the technical control of nature went hand and hand, in that both were produced by the application of scientific method.

From the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, a reaction set in against the magical, occult philosophic tradition by an intellectual outlook that rested upon a view of nature in which the dominant analogy was the machine. The new science advocated by Bacon taught the individual to explore nature actively and, having uncovered its secrets, to exploit them for his or her own purposes. In particular,

Bacon was concerned more with applying the scientific method to the arts and crafts, than to commerce and navigation, and with the construction of a new natural philosophy. This approach to the practical results of knowledge eventually became associated with the increase use of the mechanical analogies to which Galileo, Mersenne, Descartes and Hobbes turned. Mechanical analogies were available to natural philosophers much earlier than the end of the sixteenth century, in that the most obvious characteristic machines such as the windmill, the sailing ship and the wind pump used a source of power which already had been familiar to the West. The revival of Archimedean science during the course of the sixteenth century, in reaction to both Neoplatonic and Neoaristotelian traditions, may have accounted the reason for which Galileo and his successors seized upon a mechanical frame of references as particularly appropriate. Archimedes, the renowned Greek mathematician was allured by mechanical analogies such as, for example, his analysis of the lever, though the machines he conceived were designed more for ornament and interest, than for practical utility. For a group of sixteenth-century explorers of nature, the works of Archimedes provided information about a certain aspect of Greek science which was neither Aristotelian nor Platonic. These scientists perceived an immense gap between the approach taken by mystical Neoplatonism and the detached intellectual curiosity of Archimedes. The Archimedean tradition, thereby, became that of the mechanical engineer. The latter approach was not esoteric, refused to become preoccupied with the occult, and avoided searching for mathematical harmonies which contained religious significance. Although the works of Archimedes were known in manuscripts to a few medieval scholars in Latin translations, the appearance of a printed edition in the mid-sixteenth century, proved to be the true turning point in his familiarity to interested thinkers. The Archimedean revival, beginning with Niccolo Tartaglia, who published the first Latin edition of Archimedes in 1543, to Galileo and beyond, revealed Archimedean geometry to the Renaissance mathematicians and laid the foundation for a mathematical approach in which the world was open to measurement and analysis. Within this orientation, numbers did not possess the mystical appeal that they did for the Platonists and Neoplatonists.

Descartes and the Mechanical Tradition

Inasmuch as mechanism was a reaction against the occult tradition, it was equally a reaction against the organic tradition. The mechanical tradition found it impossible to view the universe as a machine and to allow the prevalent Aristotelian assumptions concerning authorship of the universe, the nature of God, Christian revelation, miracles and the place of purpose in the world to remain intact. Mechanical philosophy proceeded from the assumption that the universe operated on the basis of mechanical forces and, as Mersenne maintained, God became the Great Engineer. Hence, the task of the natural philosopher was to explore the interrelation of the various component parts of the universe, on the premise that they would interpenetrate like those of a machine.

As indicated earlier, the mechanistic interpretation of natural phenomena was revived in Renaissance Italy. The machines of Leonardo, the mechanical interests of Niccolo Tartaglia and the revival of Archimedes appear pertinent to the complex of ideas, particularly those which emphasized the predictable interpenetration of mechanical forces in nature. During this period, however, the mechanist approach was confined to a small group of investigators. The idea expanded in the seventeenth century initially with Galileo, continuing further with Mersenne, Descartes and Hobbes. For during the seventeenth century, the centers of science shifted from the late medieval locations of commercial prosperity and Renaissance culture, German and northern Italy, to the regions near the Atlantic which had profited from the great geographical encounters: France, the Netherlands and southern England. The change in geographical locations of the centers of science during the seventeenth century was accompanied by a change in the type of individual who engaged in scientific investigation. This new type of scientist was fundamentally more an amateur than an academic professional: philosophically minded landed or mercantile aristocrats, doctors and lawyers, than monastic and university scholars. Descartes, Hobbes and Locke were such amateurs who joined Bacon in the attempt to provide a general analysis of the scientific method to the intellectual community of the first half of the seventeenth century.

For Descartes, the task of the natural philosopher was not that of the biologist or the empirical observer, rather simply to explain the operation of mechanical principles on which the Divine Engineer of Nature had created the world. In natural philosophy, Descartes set out to achieve two objectives. Firstly, to examine and generalize the mathematical method, which had been developing in the science of mechanics. Secondly, to construct by means of this method a general mechanical image of the operations of nature. The efflorescence of mathematics held an overwhelming appeal for most of the original minds, throughout the seventeenth century, in that it appeared to provide the keys to comprehend the Universe. Those who were allured by the symbolic language, who explored its potential and who encouraged its adoption were drawn primarily from the ranks of the mechanists. As one of the most influential mechanists, and as the intellectual atmosphere in France proved to be unwelcoming of such ideas, Descartes moved to the Netherlands where, in 1637, he published his ***Discourse on Method***. The purport of the work entailed two objectives: the first, an analysis of the mathematical-deductive method, and the second, an outline of his conception of the physical world. The second part was expanded later in his ***Principles of Philosophy***, published in 1644, and it was this part which proved to be the most influential during the seventeenth century.

In the history of philosophy, Descartes has his place as the first "modern" critical thinker of the "new philosophy." In the history of science, his significance lies in the fact that he was the first to construct a scientific system, which conflicted at almost every point with Aristotelian principles. The content of this system pointed Descartes' natural philosophy away from the traditional world view, grounded in the principles of Aristotle, and expounded upon by Neoaristotelian Renaissance thinkers and their medieval predecessors. Within the system, all material beings were machines ruled by the same mechanical laws, the human body no less than

animals, plants and inorganic nature. From this point of departure, he dispensed with the traditional conception that nature was hierarchically ordered, the idea that the beings which composed the world formed a vast "chain" of creatures stretching down from the most perfect of all beings, the Divine Being, in the heavens to the various individuals, animals, plants, an minerals on earth. For Descartes, the physical and organic world was a homogeneous mechanical system composed of qualitatively similar entities; each following the quantitative mechanical laws disclosed by the analysis of the mathematical method. The world was not, as the scholastic Neoaristotelian philosophers had believed, a heterogeneous but ordered diversity of entities, each finding its rank in the cosmic order through the purely qualitative analysis of a classification in terms of the kind of soul it possessed, be it vegetable, mineral, animal or rational. Apart from the mechanical world, Descartes presupposed that there was also a spiritual world in which the individual alone of the material beings participated by virtue of his or her soul. Thus, as Cartesian philosophy became widely accepted, the traditional view, namely, the view that the world was composed of a vertical scale of creatures, gradually disappeared and was supplanted by the conception of a universe composed of parallel planes, the one mechanical and the other spiritual, and the individual alone sharing in both. From the seventeenth century, Descartes' formulated dualism became fundamental to European thought and remained a central issue within the debates between the Ancients and the Moderns.

Prior to the revival in ancient learning, individuals who shared the traditional view of the universe often drew an analogy between God, the king, the sun, a lion, and gold in that each represented the highest degree of perfection in their respective categories. The projection of these conceptual categories onto the physical world of material beings demonstrated the lack of correspondence between logical disputations concerning the world and the actual existence of physical entities. The world is, for Descartes, as explained earlier, a machine, composed of inert bodies, moved by physical necessity, indifferent to existence of thinking beings. The familiar everyday world of sensory experience often proves to be illusory, especially when the occultist orientation of Neoplatonist had been relied upon to explain the opaque qualities of nature. This reliance on the special uncovering of nature's "mysteries," instead of the recognition of reason's powers of transparency, combined with the breakdown of any "true" correspondences to reality brought about frustration, disbelief, if not the perception of decay and disorder in the world. John Donne portrays this image well:

> So did the world from first hours decay,
> That evening was beginning of the day…
> And new Philosophy calls all in doubt,
> The Element of fire is quite put out;
> The Sun is lost, and th'earth, and no mans wit
> Can direct well direct him where to looke for it.
> And freely men confesse that this world's spent,
> When in the Planets, and the Firmament
> They seeke so many new; then see that this
> Is crumbled out againe to his Atomies.

> 'Tis all in peeces, all cohaerence gone;
> All just supply, and all Relation:
> Prince, Subject, Father, Sonne, are things forgot,
> For every man alone thinks he hast got
> To be a Phoenix, and that then can bee
> None of that kinde, of which he is, but hee.
> This is the worlds conditioned now….[51]

Descartes' writings reacted against this new, vision of a chaotic world, expressed by John Donne, and put forward philosophical solutions to the skeptical crisis of the age. These writings were poignant responses to the skeptical crisis that plagued serious intellectuals during the Renaissance and Reformation period. Renaissance humanism held up classical cultures as particularly laudatory. In particular, many humanist writers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries followed Cicero through their interests in skepticism from antiquity. Cicero revealed an attraction to Stoic ethical values and to the skeptical position in physics and logic. The Stoic ethics became valuable in presenting the ideal of the wise man, but the physics and logic upon which it was founded offered less attraction. The humanist skeptics embraced Cicero's rhetorical strategies as an intellectual weapon directed against the claims made by doctrinaire philosophy, especially scholastic Neoaristotelian philosophy, to teach wisdom.

Descartes challenged the humanists' sources of knowledge reminiscent of the "academies," those ancient skeptics who were heirs to Plato's Academy and whose arguments, during this period, had gained prominence in France through the ***Essays*** of Michel de Montaigne in the latter part of the sixteenth century.[52] The seamless cloak of Christendom became rent by the protests of the Reformation. As religious reformers proliferated throughout the Christian communities and new scientific discoveries and theories undermined the traditional Aristotelian worldview, several thoughtful individuals perceived themselves adrift, philosophically, in a world that proved incapable of providing certainty to longstanding assumptions. In the post-Reformation universe of Copernican theory, the heavens, for some, appeared to be as blemished and mutable as the earth. In his ***Discourse on Method***, as with his subsequent works, Descartes made explicit the mechanistic assumptions that were merely implicit in Galileo and Mersenne, assumptions which consisted of religious as well as philosophical objectives. In an effort to refute the nascent skepticism of the period, Descartes formulated four points of philosophical method to clear the ground upon which a more substantial structure than the Aristotelian world view could sustain. In the process of this search for philosophical certainty he experienced his own personal crisis that prompted him to proclaim the basis for an indubitable "clear and distinct" philosophy. Descartes' search for "clear and distinct" ideas finally carried him to his famous statement, "*cogito ergo sum*" ("I think therefore I am"), which became both the cornerstone of his philosophy and a religious affirmation of his existence. The *cogito* became the foundation of a new system of knowledge. From this new foundation of certainty, he conceptualized the existence of God, and then to the existence of the physical world. Indeed, Divine Being was known to him through the mind, for the veracity of God's existence derived in this

manner was far more evident than anything perceived through the senses. From this foundation Descartes was prepared to deduce the entire universe and its laws. According to this self-evident principle, each step in this mathematically demonstrated method would be as certain as the proofs of Euclidean geometry. For he would refuse to accept this indisputably certain truth unless he thought from the outset he had encountered an infallible argument demonstrating the existence of a perfect God; that is, only the existence of such a God could ensure that his conclusion was correct. Thought thereby became the activity of the soul. Hence, it was a spiritual activity in a mechanical universe and provided an answer to those skeptics who refused to accept the existence of the soul.

Descartes' concept of God emphasized truth and power instead of love and goodness. He assumed the Divine Being resembled an ingenious engineer, similar to the vision of Archimedes, an idea conveyed in his ***Principles of Philosophy:***

> Just as the same artisan can make two clocks, which though they both equally indicate the time, and are not different in outward appearance, have nevertheless nothing resembling in the composition of their wheels; so doubtless the Supreme Maker of things has an infinity of diverse means at his disposal, by each of which he could have made all the things of this world to appear as we see them, without it being possible for the human mind to know which of all these means he chose to employ.[53]

Descartes' employment of mechanical analogies, to describe what God has created, also implied the notion of a Divine Engineer. This becomes apparent when he proclaims that "the rules of mechanic…are the same with those of nature," and in discussing the proof of God's existence, draws upon the analogy of a machine maker:

> There is no difference between this and the case of a person who has the idea of a machine, in the construction of which great skill is displayed in which circumstances we have a right to inquire how he came by this idea, whether for example, he somewhere saw such a machine constructed by another, or whether he was so accurately taught the mechanical sciences, or is endowed with such force of genius that he was able of himself to invent it, without having elsewhere seen anything like it; for all the *ingenuity* which is contained in the idea objectively only, or as it were in a picture, must exist at least in its first and chief cause.[54]

For Descartes, mechanical considerations determined the form and motion of heavenly bodies, and indeed of all operations of nature. Mathematics he considered only as a methodological device, and he was unsympathetic to the attitude of the pure mathematician. "For really there is nothing more futile," he reasoned, "than to busy oneself with bare numbers and imaginary figures in such a way as to appear to rest content with such trifles…which are discovered more frequently by chance than by skill…more of the eyes and the imagination than of understanding."[55]This sort of an understanding prompted Descartes to conceive of motion as one of the central features of the universe. Although Descartes was only able to explain motion in terms of divine action, he proclaimed it as axiomatic: "He created matter along with motion and rest in the beginning; and, now, merely by his ordinary co-operation, he preserves just the quantity of motion and rest in the material world that he put there in the beginning."[56]

Descartes comprehensive and more speculative writings elevated mechanism to a universal truth, both in physics and in biology. Soul and material body have nothing in common save a single ambiguous point of contact (the "pineal gland"); nothing may be attributed to the soul save thought. Descartes' biological mechanisms became rather a universal transformation of systematic explanation, than a metaphysical shift in the principles of biology. For if, with Descartes we take the human body to be mechanical, but man not a machine, the reason for failing to extend similar reasoning to animals, which clearly possess the senses of pleasure and pain and perhaps some faculty of reason as do humans remains solipsistic. Descartes' dualism provided the reaction against Renaissance "naturalism" with its metaphysical justification. The philosophers of the Renaissance, in their reaction to their medieval predecessors and against the theological view of nature as the principle of "evil," proceeded to the other extreme, and obfuscated its features by spiritualizing it. In the clearly delineated dualism of Descartes, a sharp contrast to the hermetic tradition has been projected, all things infused, of the Renaissance thinkers, as do the Aristotelian physics of their respective schools of thought. For Descartes, two substances constitute all of reality. The substance of an extended thing, or "*res extensa*," essentially differs from the mind that thinks and knows itself to exist, though, and corporeal beings are those that natural science investigates. The notion, spirit, consists of a substance characterized by the act of thinking; the material realm he classifies as a substance, the essence of which consists in extension: *res cogitans,* and *res extensa.* Defined accordingly, one was unable to attribute any property characteristic of matter to thinking. (Neither extension, neither place nor motion). Thinking, which incorporates the various modes of mental activity, assumes, and thinking alone, is its property. Through the perspective of natural science, the more significant consequence of the distinction lay in the rigid exclusion of any and all psychic characteristics from material nature. Descartes' usage of the passive participle, *extensa*, in contrast to the active participle, *cogitans*, which he chose to characterize the realm of spirit, served to underscore the inertness of physical nature; a status of its own source of activity.[57]

Through the concept of extension and motion Descartes thought it possible to deduce with his method the main outlines of the operation of the universe. "Give me motion and extension," he wrote, "and I will construct the world." Proceeding from the premise that there are in nature neither magical powers nor such occult forces as gravity and magnetism were supposed by some to be, and assuming that the universe was continuous and completely imbibed with particular matter in motion, Descartes developed a mechanical model to represent all its actions. His ideas of mechanism, of the corpuscular structure of matter, of the importance of "natural laws," became important for the progression of seventeenth-century science. He put forward the view that the laws of nature were such as to develop any possible arrangement of the primordial chaos of matter into the kind of world familiar to most of us. Irrespective of its form at the beginning, the universe of necessity assumed its current configuration, and so too would any other possible world composed of matter and motion. As Descartes identified matter with motion, he denied the possibility of a vacuum, an empty hole in space, and that matter was composed

of atoms with empty spaces between them. He conceived of the universe as a plenum, that is, full of matter. Matter permeated the whole of space, and from the outset, therefore, the primordial matter could undergo only a rotatory motion. That is, every moving particle in a plenum must participate in a closed circuit of moving matter; hence every motion must be circular. Since the universe was full of matter, if one part of it moved, then other parts of it were required to move as well. Movement in a circle became the most basic way by which to actualize this process, thereby the curricular motion of the planets around the sun. Therefore, for Descartes, the universe was composed of an indefinite number of vortices, each swirling around a sun of a star and carrying the planets around with them. Upon explaining the movement of planets in terms of swirling movement of elliptical vortices of matter, Descartes rebuffed Aristotle's assumption concerning the primacy of circular motion and the quintessential nature of planetary substance. The planets were held in stable orbits by the constant pressure of subtle matter continually swirling outward from the central sun. Descartes could even use his theory of vortices to explain the motion of the tides—one of the most intractable problems confronting seventeenth-century practical mathematics.

As with other mechanical philosophers Descartes' theories accounted for more than large-scale phenomena such as the motions of the planets and the movement of the tides. For instance, he attempted to account for the phenomenon of magnetism on mechanical, corpuscular principles. Magnetism was one of natural magicians' favorite examples of evidence for the existence of occult qualities in the universe. The influence of this tradition was evident in William Gilbert's work, ***De magnete***, published in 1600, the first comprehensive account of magnetism, where he compared the actions of the magnet to those of the soul. For Descartes, there were no magnetic phenomena which could not be explained in mechanical terms. Magnetism, he posited, was the result of a stream of corpuscles (or particles) flowing out from the magnetic body. Descartes' mechanical philosophy extended to animal and people. His renowned description characterized all animals as no more than complex machines. He viewed human bodies similarly, save that humans were considered as possessing an animating soul that controlled their bodies through the medium of the "pineal gland." According to Descartes, the individual was a union of a soul with a machine like animal body, and he found little difficulty in comparing the workings of the human body to the works of hydraulic engineering so frequently in evidence in the gardens of the wealthy in early seventeenth century:

> One may very well liken the nerves of the animal machine I have described to the pipes of the machines of those fountains; its muscles nadirs tendons to the other different engines and springs that serve to move them; and its animal spirits, of which the heart is the source and the ventricles of the brain the reservoirs, to the water that moves these engines. Moreover, respiration and other similar functions which are usual and natural in the animal machine and which depend on the flow of the spirits are like the movements of a clock or of a mill, which the ordinary flow of water can make continuous.[58]

Thus, the body was perceived as a piece of machinery, its reflexes controlled by a vast tubular network in which valves opened and closed, allowing fluids to move in different directions and for different purposes. Though animals, for

Descartes, possess internal mechanisms by which to regulate their behavior, they lack consciousness and are considered a machines, mere "automata," and as a consequence, are incapable of sharing the acquired experiences of humans.

Descartes' mechanical conception substituted a theory of particles for the Aristotelian theory of the four elements. The theory postulated a constant quantity of motion in the universe, whereby he explained chemical change in terms of a mechanical adjustment of particles. Inherent in the explanation was the principle of particles of three sizes, which corresponded to the ancient elements of earth, air and fire and implied refuting the Aristotelian emphasis on qualities and the persistence of substantial forms. The first, the largest, accounted for the chemical and physical properties of matter. The second, somewhat smaller and rapid in their motion, were to be located between the atoms of earth. Lastly, the particles of fire, possessing a violent motion, were to be found in whatever openings that might remain. In this manner, all space was to be filled, a notion which allowed Descartes to reject, along with Aristotle, the vacuum and the possibility of action at a distance. Local aggregations configured the planets and the sun, and similar processes occurred around the distant stars. This notion became an attempt to explain all phenomena in terms of vortices, whirlpools, of matter, and resulted in a vast system of vortices that accounted for all the matter in the universe. The mechanical philosophy of Descartes, in which he asserted that the phenomena of nature were produced by particles of matter in motion, and with its emphasis on physical causation, existed in tension with the Pythagorean tradition that nature may be accounted for in exact mathematical terms. Resolution of this tension had to wait for the observations and findings of Isaac Newton. Meanwhile, Descartes' natural philosophy proclaimed that physical reality did not correspond to the appearances of physical sensation.

Henry More, Anne Conway and Kabbalah

This emphasis on the lack of correspondence between physical reality and our perception of that reality, the premise of Descartes' philosophy of nature, prompted thinkers from different circles to challenge this proposition. The persuasiveness of this explanation rested upon the acceptance of his sharply defined assumptions concerning the duality of nature. As one of the dominant intellects of the period, a few of Descartes' contemporaries advanced criticisms of his philosophy about the workings of nature. Descartes engaged certain of the issues inherent in his theories with a few of these critics, particularly in England, through correspondences which enhanced both the philosophical reputations of those involved and the acrimonious tone of the exchange. Henry More, one of the prominent members of the Cambridge Platonists, was among these critics despite having been one of the earliest and most enthusiastic proponents of Descartes' philosophy in England. As the implications of Descartes' philosophical views became clear, More drew back his enthusiasm. The issues of concern were Cartesian mechanism and the dualism of body and soul. According to William Inge, the Cambridge Platonists became the seventeenth century

counterpart of the Neoplatonists of the second century A.D., C.E. with reverse intellectual roles: The Alexandrian scholars were concerned with the issue of grafting Christianity on to a recognized Classical philosophy; in the case of the Neoplatonists, it was an issue of grafting philosophy on to Christianity. In appealing to "Reason," he observed, the Cambridge Platonists "deliberately challenged the one conclusion in which the leading schools of the day were agreed." For Bacon and Hobbes, according to this view, Puritans and Prelates, all agreed in treating philosophy and religion as categories wholly different in kind. For the Cambridge Platonists there was never any question of separating reason and faith, religion and philosophy. Among the seventeenth-century "moralists," the precepts of the Cambridge Platonists had pointed most clearly towards an exaltation of the natural moral sense of the individual: to act in a correct manner, they taught, we need only to direct our eyes within, and read natural law written upon the heart. Accordingly, as a committed Christian, More was keenly aware of the threat to religious belief inherent in Descartes' concept of dualism and in the general postulate that all physical interaction was explicable solely in mechanical terms as matter in motion. Where Descartes' posited mind and body, or spirit and matter, were purely distinct entities with body considered as only extension, More feared that Descartes inadvertently left the path clear for the double dangers of materialism and atheism. Similar charges were made against Hobbes. For, when these distinctions were made, More asked, what would happen to mind or, for that matter, soul? These questions, among others, were central in the correspondences between More and Descartes, and More and his intellectual protégé, Lady Anne Conway.

In the ***Principles***, Descartes maintained that what he calls "*translatio*," ("transfer" in Latin;"*transpor*t" in the French version), that is, motion in the sense of change of location, must be considered as constituting, like shape, a mode of the body moved, and as in no way signifying the action by which it is so moved. For, he explains: "Motion, as ordinarily understood, is no other than the action [*actio*] by which a body passes from one location to another."[59] Upon invoking the Latin term, "transfer," Descartes makes explicit his intention to employ the term to imply "local" motion; that is, local in the sense of change from one position to another, as opposed to force or action that is required to account for such movement. He adds: "And I [therefore] say that motion is the being moved, not the force or action that does the moving; and I do so in order that I may show how motion is always in the moved, not in the mover; for we are not wont to distinguish these two things with sufficient accuracy."[60] To elaborate this point, Descartes asserts further,

> Further, I *understand that it is a mode [modum] of the moving thing, not a Subsisting thing [rem subsistentem*], just as shape is a mode of the thing shaped….But since we are here concerned not with the action which is in that which moves or which arrests the movement, and consider only the *translatio*, or its absence, rest, it is evident that this *translatio* cannot exist outside the body moved, and that it is merely that this body is otherwise disposed [*alio modo se habere]* when in motion than when at rest, so that motion and rest are nothing else than two diverse modes.[61]

In a letter to Descartes, 23 July, 1649, More pointed out the paradoxical implications inherent in these statements. For, if motion consists of a mode of matter in the

degree and understanding as shape, and consequently, similar to shape, wholly dependent on the particular body to which it belongs, then how can it, any more than shape, be conceived as passing over into other bodies?

> I am utterly at a loss which I [attempt to] think how so trivial and common a thing as motion, separable as it is from its subject and allowing of migration into other subjects, and at the same time of so feeble and evanescent a nature that it would at once perish, Were it not sustained by its subject, how this motion should yet so powerfully take possession of its subject, driving it so forcibly hither and thither.[62]

In his reply to More, dated 30 August, 1649, Descartes acknowledged More's objection that motion, if no less truly a mode than shape, may not be conceived as migrating form one body to another. "You judge correctly," he replies, "that motion, in so far as it is a mode of body, cannot pass from one body to another. But I have never asserted it to be so transmissible, None the less I hold that motion, in so far as it is such a mode, is constantly being changed."[63]

Descartes subsequently drew particular attention to his concept of Design to account for the origin of the universe and motion, proclaiming the Divine being to be the Prime Mover:

> The *translatio*, which I entitle *motus*, is [similar to shape]… a mode in body. But the moving force [*vis movens*] can be that of God Himself, as conserving in mater the same amount of translation as he has set into it in the first moment of creation….Now this force exists in created substance [*in substantia creata*] as its mode [and therefore strictly speaking not as *vis,* but only as *translatio*]; but that is not how it exists in God. I was unwilling, however, to treat of this in my writings, as it could not be made generally understandable, and I might seem to be supporting the opinion of those who regard God as *anima mundi*, [and as such] united to the matter of the world.[64]

Therefore, as a physical occurrence, motion comprises a mode like shape in that no inherent agency may be attributed to it. In body there can be no such thing as impetus, force or energy, but only difference of location. Just as extension may have no existence apart from the extended, so time may have no existence in and by itself, apart from the enduring. Descartes' theory of motion both as a factor distinct from extension and responsible for the whole articulation of nature, and his notion that mind and matter (or extended substance) were wholly distinct and incompatible, constituted the main thrust of Anne Conway's argument against the explanatory weaknesses of his mechanical system. Lady Conway, pupil, intellectual correspondent and collaborator, and lifelong friend of Henry More, joined him in repudiating materialistic mechanism as providing the process by which we comprehend the natural world. Conway was introduced to the new philosophy of Descartes thorough her earliest correspondences with More, from whom she received her philosophical training. These extant letters revealed the philosophical education she absorbed, through the epistolary tutorials of her brother's university tutor, and the context within which her eclectic intellectual interests developed. Furthermore, these epistolary philosophic exchanges were not exhibiting academic "research" so much as entering a "republic of letters" that was inhabited by academics and non-academics alike.

However, insofar as Lady Conway made a contribution to the intellectual community her legacy as a philosopher rests upon the posthumous publication of, ***Principia***

philosophiae antiquissimae et recentissimae, which were her philosophical papers discovered among her remaining effects after her death in 1679. Her treatise, originally written in English, were published anonymously in Latin in 1690, in Amsterdam, and retranslated into English and published subsequently 2 years later. These essays embodied a work of metaphysics, devoted mostly to issues surrounding the nature of substance, which were central to philosophical debates during the second half of the seventeenth century. Accordingly, her philosophical language traversed the intellectual terrain from Cambridge Platonism, vitalism (biological and chemical), and alchemy, to kabblah (Christian and Jewish) and Origenist doctrines. The eclectic combination of categories seems to contradict the "modern" principles which she purports to demonstrate in her treatise. Indeed, her work demonstrates the degree to which the seventeenth century encompassed all of these intellectual categories, concepts that, depending on the context, either complemented or competed against the categories of reason and empirical observation so characteristic of the period. While the broad spectrum of thinkers and philosophers were taking the "modern" turn towards Descartes, Hobbes, and Locke, Henry More and Conway turned more pointedly towards Neoplatonism, mysticism, and various strands of the so-called occult.

Anne Conway wrote ***The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy*** during the last decade of her life, a period during which the emanationist precepts of Lurianic kabbalah influenced the shaping of this work. Lurianism was one of the confluent streams of thought, indentified earlier, from which she formulated her philosophical system. Conway's first direct experience with Jewish kabbalah sources began in 1670, when she and More encountered Francis Mercury van Helmont who in turn, introduced, them to the German kabbalist scholar, Christian Knorr von Rosenroth. Francis van Helmont's first encounter with Anne Conway was as a physician. Van Helmont's father, Jan Baptist van Helmont, derived his own distinctive natural philosophy from the iatrochemistry of Paracelsus and, along with Jacob Boehme, became one of the leading Paracelsians combating Galenic medicine. After Conway's initial and subsequent encounters with the younger van Helmont, the confluence of Neoplatonism, Hermeticism, Kaballah and Quakerism began to take distinctive shape in the articulation of her philosophy. At the time of their meeting, Knorr von Rosenroth was engaged with a translation of a collection of texts associated with the Zohar that were eventually published as ***Kabbala denuda*** in 1677–1678; a second volume appeared in 1684. The Kabbalah permeated Christian circles since the period of the Renaissance, through such figures as Pico, Reuchlin, Agrippa, Postel, Paracelsus and Boehme. Although Conway was aware of the Christian interpretation of kabbalah, after Henry More published his ***Conjectura cabbalistica***, in 1653, direct knowledge of Jewish mystical writings among non-Jews, prior to Knorr's translation, was rare.[65]

In her philosophical essays, Conway also engaged metaphysical issues and challenged the philosophical assumptions of Descartes, Hobbes, and Spinoza as well as her mentor, Henry More. Specifically, Conway criticized the dualism of Descartes and the materialism of Hobbes and Spinoza from the perspective that each thinker provided an inaccurate view of the natural world and the Divine

attributes of the cosmos. Soul and body, mind, or spirit and matter, did not constitute different or separate entities. Indeed, she offered, matter is itself a form of spirit. "Spirit and Body," she contends, "are originally in their first Substance but one and the same thing."[66]

From the perspective of mechanical philosophy, we are reminded, all phenomena in the natural world are explicable in terms of matter in motion, matter being merely extension, differentiated by shape, size and position. Both More and Conway extolled the philosophical contributions made by the "master of mechanicks." For, "it cannot be denied," Conway affirmed, "that Descartes taught many remarkable and ingenious things concerning the mechanical aspects of natural processed and how all motions proceed according to regular mechanical laws…." This affirmation was followed by an assertion that would eventually distinguish her philosophy of monistic vitalism from Descartes' natural philosophy. "For truly in nature," she continued, "there are many operations that are far more than merely mechanical. Nature is not simply an organic body like a clock, which has no vital principle of motion in it; but it is a living body which has life and perception, which are much more exalted that a mere mechanism or a mechanical motion. "[67] In the context of seventeenth-century discussions of "corporeal motion," Descartes offered the explanation that "motion is the *translation* [transfer, or transport, in French] of one piece of matter, or one body, from the vicinity of the other bodies which are in the immediate contact with it, and which are regarded as being at rest, to the vicinity of other bodies."[68] However, Conway considered this explanation controversial and offered her own response:

> But it is s matter of great debate how motion can be transmitted from one body to another since it is certainly neither a substance nor a body. If it is only a mode of the body, how can this motion be transmitted from one body to another since the essence being of a mode consists in this, namely that it inheres or exists in its own body?[69]

Conway rejected the adequacy of this account of the physical world for action and life. "Motion and figure," she asserted, "contribute nothing to the receiving of life."[70] Rather, she posits that body is not "dull and stupid matter," but a substance imbued with life, each particle of which has the capacity of self-motion:

> …every body is a certain life or spirit in nature, and has the principle of perception, having sense and thought, having love, desire, joy, and grief insofar as it is affected one way or another, and consequently that every body has activity and motion in itself so that it can move itself wherever it wants to be…[71]

Conway proposed a monistic concept of created substance, a philosophy of spiritual monism, a system of thought consistent with the Lurianic account of the nature of God and created substances, and of the relation of God to His creation. In accordance with this account, all things consisted of spirit in the sense that created things were composed of a substance similar to the Divine Creator:

> For seeing … there is no creature which doth not receive something of [God's] goodness, and that very largely: And seeing the goodness of God is a living goodness, which hath life, power, love and knowledge in it, which He communicates to His creatures. How can it be, that any dead Thing should proceed from Him, or be created by Him, such as is mere Body or Matter.[72]

As in Lurianic kabbalah, Anne Conway proposed a philosophical system constructed on monistic vitalism, in which all created things are similar to the Divine Being, composed of spirit instead of matter. The intellectual strands of Cambridge Platonism, Kabbalism, Descartes, Hobbes and Spinoza, as well as the appeal of Quaker principles, run parallel, intersect and become entangled within her work. Conway's syncretic approach to these strands of thought prompted some of her critical contemporaries to accuse her of expressing views similar to Hobbes and Spinoza. Conway recognized both the similarities and the differences between her system of syncretism and that of philosophical contemporaries. For implicit within the metaphysical hierarchy of being which she postulates is her explicit repudiation of the doctrines of materialism, atheism and pantheism. Such repudiation was deemed essential by virtue of the tendency of certain of her contemporaries who expressed concern that her system of monads was a variation of Descartes, Hobbes and/ or Spinoza. To address this concern, Conway signals: "Let no one object that this philosophy is nothing but Cartesianism or Hobbesianism in a new guise."[73] As with many of her contemporaries, Conway regarded with extreme repugnance any association with the materialistic and atheistic implications of Hobbes' philosophy. However, instead of rejecting Hobbes outright as an atheist-materialist, she acknowledges the parallel strands in both of their systems: Namely, that both postulate that all creatures constitute one substance and Hobbes's assertion that "all visible things can change into one another" such that "nothing is so lowly that it cannot reach the highest level." She continues,

> I concede that all creatures from the lowest to the highest were originally one substance and consequently could convert and change from one nature to another. And although Hobbes says the same thing, nevertheless this is not all prejudicial to the truth; nor are other parts of that philosophy necessarily Hobbesianism, where Hobbes says something true.[74]

Cognizant of the perception that the acceptance of a principle which identified Divine Being with the physical universe exposed her to the charge of affirming atheism, materialism and pantheism, Conway made certain to emphasize the differences between the position taken by Hobbes and Spinoza and her own concerning substance. "As for Hobbes," she contends,

> it is even more contrary to our philosophy than Cartesianism. For … Hobbes claims that God is material and corporeal, indeed that he is nothing but matter and body. Thus he confounds God and creatures in their essences and denies that there is an essential difference between them….Spinoza also confounds God and creatures together, and makes but one Being of both; all which are diametrically opposite to the Philosophy here delivered by us.[75]

Conway considered her philosophical system of monism, the principle of a single-substance, as the preferred position upon which to oppose Hobbes. Her study and incorporation of Lurianic kabbalah positioned her to formulate spiritual substance as the single constitutive element of phenomena. As with Hobbes, she acknowledged similarities between her view of substance and Spinoza's monism, and, yet, recognized differences. For, in identifying affinities with Spinoza, she rejects that, in her system, God and creatures constitute a single substance. Indeed, she contends that the hierarchy of species serves to prevent any confusion of God

with creation, in that the species of her system are differentiated radically one from another. One species never becomes another, although the lowest creatures within the third species may increase in perfection infinitely. The Neoplatonism becomes apparent here, particularly the Stoic variety. Though the Stoics differed on various interpretations of doctrine, they were of a single mind concerning their conception of divine Providence and a divinely established hierarchy. The scale of being extends from the inanimate to the animate, from the animate to the human and rational, and, finally, reaches from the human to the higher rationality of the Divine Being. This process of rationality provides the connection between what is divine within the individual human being and the divine fire without, which transforms our unique world into a unified Cosmos. She contends further that just as no polyhedron, by ever increasing the number of its sides, can become a circle, and no cube can become a sphere, so no creature can become God: "Thus a creature is capable of a further and more perfect degree of life, ever greater to infinity, but it can never attain equality with God. For his figure is always more perfect than a creature in its highest elevation, just as sphere is the most perfect of figures, which no other creature can approach."[76] Conway's concept of "Middle Nature" becomes crucial in her own understanding of the relationship of Divine Being to the world, a notion within which she was enabled both to explain the immanence of the divine all phenomena, and to preserve ontological distance between creation and the Creator of the cosmos. The influence of her study of Lurianic kabbalah becomes discernible in the formulation of this concept.

Conway's concept of the "Middle Nature," and the "celestial Adam," owed as much to Philo of Alexandria as it did to the Lurianic kabbalists of the Renaissance. Both she and Henry More thought Philo epitomized the conflation of ancient Hellenistic and Jewish learning. According to More, Philo's philosophy demonstrated the manner in which Platonists and Pythagoreans derived their doctrines "from the Divine traditions amongst the Jews."[77] Through this perspective, Philo joined contemporary Alexandrian scholars, in their attempt to reconcile religion and philosophy, by grafting Judaism on to a recognizable Classical philosophy. Thoroughly proficient in the philosophical Schools of Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and the Pythagoreans, Philo was one of the most important and prolific Jewish philosophers of the Hellenistic period. His legacy of writings includes theological essays, allegorical interpretations, explications of biblical laws, and questions and answers on the Books of ***Genesis*** and ***Exodus***. For Philo, true and meaningful philosophical life may be found in the divine law of Moses, which leads those, who adhere to its apodictic principles, to attain the ultimate objective of human life—the perception of God. Philo's exposition of Hebrew Scripture's truths was intended to demonstrate the uniqueness and epistemological integrity of the Jewish tradition over other intellectual and religious traditions.

Philo grafted on to Scriptures the very hermeneutical method that the Stoics employed to interpret Homer and Greek mythology. In accordance with this approach, the Hebrew Scriptures constitute the inspired word of God. Therefore, Moses' utterances were "absolutely and entirely signs of the divine excellence, conduct and particularly the nation of his worshippers, for whom he opens up the road

which leads to happiness,"[78] As the embodiment of *Logos*, Moses received "divine communication," which for Philo, implies "all that follows in the wake of God is within the good man's apprehension while he himself is beyond it." From this perspective, Philo designates Moses "the law-giving Word," by which humanity may be rescued from the bondage of matter. Moses thereby rescued humanity from the bondage of matter. For Philo**,** the Bible was compiled in a state comparable to that of the philosopher who had been inspired to recall intelligible ideas beyond the world of sense and matter. Accordingly, for Philo, the Torah was inspired, but Moses and not God was the author, a radical interpretation for later rabbinic Judaism. The same inspiration imbibed the Septuagint translators who preserved the true meaning of the mysteries conveyed by Moses. At Sinai Moses' unadulterated soul was engraved or inscribed by God. By virtue of this divine impression of knowledge, Moses embodied a "living law," prior to composing the written laws and, thereby, expressed his extraordinary knowledge through the act of writing (instead of speaking) when he composed the Torah, which contains laws of proper conduct and facts concerning the structure of the cosmos. Philo perceived the need to authorize Judaism to both Jews and non-Jews within the relatively new context of Hellenistic competition of cultures, a competition that was at the same time political, especially in view of the even newer Roman Empire's quest to authorize itself equally through the appropriation of the Greek philosophical and literary heritage. To be sure, for Philo, Mosaic Law contained universal significance in virtue of its special relations to natural law.[79]

This form of discourse resulted in anthropomorphic language that required allegorical interpretation. Philo's analysis of the Bible conveyed the message that only the Mosaic Law enables those who follow it to live by the Stoic mandate of life in accordance with nature. The pinnacle of the life in pursuit of this path consisted of an individual, ecstatic, unmediated experience of coming to know the transcendent and immaterial God. This well-lived life comprises a contemplative mystical, experience in which the "eye of the mind" or the soul arrives at the position "to see God." For, as the goal of human life, this mystical experience governs the direction of the contented life, organizing all human activities to attain it. As the revealed law of Moses constitutes the ideal law, for Philo, which God implanted in nature at creation, the universal goal of "seeing God" becomes attainable only for those who live by the law of Moses, as it alone guides humanity in accordance with nature. Thus, the experience of "seeing God" constitutes the community of "Israel" which, for Philo, connotes a non-ethnic intellectual, religious category understood as "those who see God," instead of an ethnic or national category. This perspective would enable More, Conway, Christian kabbalists to adapt Philo for their own purposes thereby identifying him as one of the intellectual foundations of Christianity. Indeed, Philo had been appropriated so thoroughly by some Christians that he was regarded, retrospectively, as a Christian. Eventually, centuries later, during the period of the Renaissance and Reformation, knowledgeable scholars recalled that Philo *Christianus* had in fact been Philo *Judaeus.* This recognition generated renewed interest in him by both Jewish and non-Jewish scholars, Neoplatonists, iatrochimists and kabbalists as well as More and Conway.

Conway's interest in Philo and the aforementioned traditions demonstrated her philosophical interest in identifying the Divine attributes of the cosmos, as well as her ecumenical interest in connecting disparate religious orientations. Although Conway omits the ten *sefirot* of the *Zohar* and the kabbalah of Isaac Luria, in structuring her ontological hierarchy, nonetheless, she formulates a hierarchy of species to describe the unfolding of Divine Being into the manifold of creation. For the kabbalists, this decade, *ten sefirot*, encompasses the world of Divine attributes. Furthermore, she conceives Divinity as an immense light, and her second species, also known as *Adam Kadmon*, the primordial or first man, serves the role of mediator. That is, mediator not in the Christian meaning of redeemer, but in a broadly ontological meaning as a median between absolute, unchanging perfection, on the one hand, and the contingent condition of created things, on the other. In Lurianic kabbalah, the son of God (or "celestial Adam") is also conceived as an emanation from the infinite God, referred to as *Ein Sof* ("no end," the infinite, unknowable divine being), manifests itself throughout the ten *sefirot* , the realms of the divine world. The ***Zoha***r develops the idea of the *sefirot* or divine emanations into a full-fledged presentation of the nature of God and creation, and the relationship between them. In Conway's ***Principles***, specific references to Lurianic doctrines become recognizable: firstly, the principle of *tikkun* (positive redemptive action), which entails a process of restoration or purification, where suffering has a regenerative function. The idea of redemptive action and restoration, however, was not exclusive to kabbalistic sources. As we have noted earlier, redemption through spiritual regeneration and metempsychosis was a doctrine found in Origenism as well as in Pythagoras.[80] In addition, the idea of substance as immaterial, a very important concept in Lurianism, invites comparison to Plotinus's concept of incorporeal matter. Secondly, the Lurianic precept that all created things are composed of spirit reverberates in her monistic concept of substance constituted entirely as spirit. Finally, in Lurianic kabbalah, as in Conway system, spiritual substances may, through the long, arduous process of restoration rise up the scale of being.[81] For Luria, despite the tediousness of the process, each material entity was allotted repeated reincarnations *(gilgul*).

Though Conway's system avoids the doctrine of the transmigration of souls inherent in Lurianism, her interpretation of the redemptive process entails the possibility of substance itself as undergoing periodic sequence of refinement. Closer affinities occur when she refers to souls as "sparks" of the divine, employing the kabbalistic language, *nizzuzuth.*[82] This idea derives from Lurianic kabblah, which maintained that all individuals possess a "divine spark" within the *inmost being* or heart of their person. The notion that a Divine spark resides in every human being was developed from the Biblical teaching that humanity was created in the image of God; that each human life is sacred, and of infinite worth. The very Divine "fire" that animates the world has cast a "spark" in the hearts and souls of individuals. In consequence, several of the Hebrew prophets drew upon the concept of creation to contend that all creatures suffer as a result of human wrongdoings. The suffering of God and of all creation was subsequently addressed by proper human action throughout rabbinic exegetical literature and, especially, in Lurianic kabbalistic

thought of the sixteenth century from which More and Conway derived their respective insights. Conway, by incorporating Lurianism into her philosophical system, by demonstrating its compatibility with kabbalist writings, was convinced she had an approach by which to embrace the Jews within the fold. For, if the kabbalah may serve as common ground between Christians and Jews, and if her philosophy could offer an application of it that becomes both compatible with Christianity and inoffensive to both Jewish and Islamic followers, her philosophy would hold the key to conversion. Indeed, if the role of the Adam *Kadmon* was understood correctly, and her concept of substance accepted, then "these matters … will contribute realty to the propagation of the true faith and Christian religion among Jews and Turks and other infidel nations."[83]

Thus, the extended ecumenical purport of Conway's philosophical system exhibits a rational account of God and the world, with which non-Christians may engage. An insight, undoubtedly, prompted by the continuous religious and cultural conflicts throughout the seventeenth century. The conviction in the unity of humankind becomes the natural corollary of the Unity of God, since the One God has to be the God of humanity. The first chapter of Genesis, which proclaims the One God as the Creator of the universe and all that is therein, makes it possible to delineate the descent of humankind to a common ancestry. The conception of monotheism also has been the basis of "modern" science, and of the worldview of the unity inherent in the cosmos since the sixteenth and seventeen centuries, in that belief in the Unity of God opened the eyes of curious observers to the unity of nature. To the belief that, as one scholar maintains, "there is a unity and harmony in the *structure* of things, because of the unity of their *Source*."[84]

The competing concepts of the cosmos, nature and human nature converge in Conway's philosophical system through her articulation of the unity of the universe and of humankind. Among the controversies surrounding the atheistic and materialistic implications in the philosophies of Descartes, Hobbes and Spinoza, Conway sought conciliatory relationships between disparate concepts of nature. The principles connecting theism to spiritualism and kabbalah, in her viatlist metaphysics, articulated organic sympathies which sustained the harmonies of the cosmos, a world of immaterial substances that function like souls and minds. The "lively" immaterial substances conveyed in Conway's system of monism demonstrated a concerted effort to indicate how rational scientific observations and mystical elements inherent in Lurianic Kabbalah were not antagonistic to each other, for the fundamental function of her "Middle Nature" was to assure the regeneration of "natural beings." The philosophical turn to the issues of growth, decay and regeneration recalls questions surrounding the significance of Classical authority, particularly regarding the continued reliance upon the supposedly superior wisdom of the Ancients. Whether in philosophy, grammar, rhetoric or astronomy, placing any concept forward that fell short of some association with the views of prominent predecessors became extremely difficult, if not impossible. Those who assumed this attitude shared the related notion that the irreversible decline of the world deemed it necessary to refer back the model of the Ancients, who had lived in happier times. The Renaissance humanists, who adopted this position, maintained that the rediscovery of Antiquity

became mainly an issue of copying unsurpassable models of Greek and Roman works. The quests for knowledge began with the legacy of the Greeks and Romans. This stance was discernible in the famous aphorism attributed to Bernard of Chartres: "We are dwarfs perched on the shoulders of giants." Where the expression implies the progress of knowledge is cumulative, it also suggests that such progress may be considered only by giving more than their due to the recognized authorities, and further, that it would be difficult for any acquired knowledge to proceed beyond them.

The idea that the historical process might become a record of improvement rather than of degeneration was conceived during the scientific advances of the seventeenth century. The humanist of the Renaissance, inspired by the writings of classical antiquity, accepted the notion that the age which produced Cicero and Seneca was an unassailable summit of civilization. Bacon, as mentioned earlier, proffered one of the first challenges to this conception when he suggested in his Novum Organum that the designation of "antiquity" was properly employed not of ancient Greece, when civilization was young, but of the "the time in which we live."[85] Bacon's interpretation of Bernard of Chartres aphorism pointed in a different direction than the Renaissance humanists who extolled the accomplishment of the past. For him, knowledge and experience belong to the present: we stand on the shoulders of the past and are able to see farther. The potential of advances in knowledge began to be debated in the early seventeenth century and thereby paved the way for the renowned quarrel between "Ancients and Moderns." At issue, extending beyond the excellence or perfectibility of literary models was the new role of reason and experience, considered at this time to behave in an autonomous and cumulative manner. Fontenelle, during the heated intensity of the acrimony, pushed the concept further. Single-handedly, he transformed successfully the literary "battle of the books" between the ancients and moderns from a sterile conflict of pedantries into a serious discussion of an intelligible question: Did historical evidence sustain a theory of "degeneration?" A tenacious defender of the Moderns, Fontenelle posed this issue in his ***Digression sur les anciens poetes et modernes***, in 1688. In this celebrated work, he changes completely the ancient manner comparing the history of humankind to individual human existence:

> The comparison we have just drawn between men of centuries and a single man may be extended to our whole question of the Ancients and the Moderns. A fine cultivated mind is, so to speak, composed of all the minds from preceding centuries; there is one and same mind which has been cultivated all that time. Thus, the man who has lived since the beginning of the world until the present day has had his infancy (when he busied himself only with the most pressing needs of life), and his youth (when he was quite successful in the things of the imagination, such as poetry or eloquence, and when he even began to reason, albeit with more fire than substance). Now he is the age of virility, when he reasons with more force and greater knowledge than before, but he would be much more advanced if the passion for war had not occupied him for so long and made him contemptuous of the sciences, to which he has at last returned. It is vexing that such a smoothly flowing comparison cannot be carried to the end, I have to admit that that man will not have an old age. He will always be equally capable of the things to which his youth was appropriate, and ever more capable of those befitting his manhood: that is, to leave the allegory, men will never degenerate, and the healthy views of all the fine minds to come will always be added to one another.[86]

This basic work of Fontenelle implemented a fundamental shift in perspective. As the humanists fostered a belief in individual potential and encouraged individual achievement, the eighteenth-century modernists perceived historical potential in collective individual contributions to knowledge. For, as Fontenelle maintained, knowledge has increased over the ages and, therefore, we might look forward to improvement. In this manner, Fontenelle contributed to the notion of progress the idea of an indefinite advance, resulting more from the accumulation of knowledge and experience than from a change in human nature. The world, he proclaimed, would never degenerate because the "best minds" would always contribute to each other's wisdom. Thus, from the end of the seventeenth to the eighteenth century, what previously had been considered inconceivable appeared quite reasonable: the intellectual horizon shifted suddenly as the idea of progress acquired a position of dominance within Western thought. The historical process of continuity and change reveals that reason's dominant position, and the idea of progress, will encounter new intellectual challenges from traditional conceptual categories in subsequent years. The issues surrounding the various debates between the "Ancients" and the "Moderns," during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, persist within, and without, academic circles in the twenty-first century.

Notes

* Moshe Idel, "Mysticism," in ***Contemporary Jewish Religious Thought: Original Essays on Critical Concepts***, ***Movements and Beliefs***, edited by Arthur A. Cohen and Paul Mendes-Flohr (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1987), p. 643.

1. Charles Homer Haskins, ***The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century*** (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 5–29. See also, Paul Oskar Kristeller, ***Renaissance Thought: The Classic, Scholastic, and Humanist Strains*** (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1961), pp. 3–69.
2. Kristeller, ***Renaissance Thought***, *passim*. For the rediscovery of Classical philosophical works, see James Hankins and Ada Palmer, ***The Recovery of Ancient Philosophy in the Renaissance: A Brief Guide***, **Quaderni** Di **Rinascimento**, number 44(2008). For "new philosophies" and "new" perceptions of the universe clamoring to reform philosophy in the Renaissance, see James Hankins, "Humanism, Scholasticism, and Renaissance Philosophy," and "The Significance of Renaissance Philosophy," and Miguel A. Granada, "New Visions of the Cosmos," in ***The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Philosophy***, edited by James Hankins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 30–49,338–345; 270–286. For the intellectual context of the seventeenth century, see, Richard Tuck, "The Institutional Setting," and Stephen Menn, "The Intellectual Setting," in ***The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy***, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) I: 9–86.
3. The Works of Aristotle provided the core of the curriculum in university arts and theology faculties and the *studia* (libraries) of religious orders. See Hankins, ***The Recovery of Ancient Philosophy***, pp. 20–23.
4. Frances A. Yates, ***Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition*** (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 448–452. See also, Frances A. Yates, "The Hermetic Tradition in Renaissance Science," in ***Art, Science, and History in the Renaissance***, edited by Charles S. Singleton (Baltimore: the Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), pp. 258–260. On Plato's astronomy and mathematics, see George Sarton, ***A History of Science,*** 3vols. (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1970), I: 287–288,449–451; III: 9.

5. ***Plato's Republic***, translated by G.M.A. Grube (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1974) Book VII: 530.
6. ***The Notebooks of Leonardo da Vinci,*** edited, translated, with an introduction by Edward MacCurdy, 2 vols. (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1938) I: 634, 636.
7. Frances A. Yates, ***The Rosicrucian Enlightenment*** (London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), p. 213.
8. Edwin Arthur Burtt, ***The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science*** (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1932), pp. 74–83.
9. For Ficino's reliance on Aquinas, and as "one of the earliest humanists to quote and write a commentary on [Lucretius'] ***De rerum natura***," see Alison Brown, ***The Return of Lucretius to Renaissance Florence*** (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2010), pp. 91–92. On the ***Hermetic Corpus***, Ibid., pp. 22,92, 95; Hankins and Palmer, ***The Recovery of Ancient Philosophy in the Renaissance***, pp. 68–69; George Sarton, ***A History of Science***, II: 113, 166–167; Yates, ***Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition***, pp. 12–43.
10. Mark Pattison, ***Isaac Casaubon, 1559–1614*** (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1892), pp. 334–341. Yates, ***Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition***, pp. 398–455. Anthony Grafton, "Protestant versus Prophet: Isaac Casaubon on Hermes Trismegistus," in ***Defenders of the Text: The Tradition of Scholarship in an Age of Science, 1450–1800,*** edited by Anthony Grafton (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 145–161.
11. Chaim Wirszubski, ***Pico della Mirandola's Encounter with Jewish Mysticism*** (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 69–76, 123–153. Also see, ***Pico della Mirandola: New Essays***, edited by M. V. Dougherty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
12. ***The Zohar***, vol. I., Pritzker Edition, edited, translated and commentary by Daniel C. Matt (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004). Gershom G. Scholem, ***Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism*** (London: Thames and Hudson, 1955), pp. 119–243. Moshe Idel, ***Kabbalah: New Perspectives*** (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), pp. 112–200.
13. Scholem, **Major Trends of Jewish Mysticism**, pp. 1–39.
14. Gershom Scholem, ***On the Kabbalah and its Symbolism***, translated by Ralph Manheim (New York: Schocken Books, 1969),pp. 12–37, 56–70, 104–173.
15. See Plato, ***Republic***, Book II, and ***Timaeus,*** 42b; and Aristotle, ***Politics***, chapter II.
16. Yates, ***The Rosicrucian Enlightenment***, p. 110.
17. On the interpretation of "new philosophy" as "the mechanical philosophy," see Stephen Menn, "The Intellectual Setting," in ***The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy***, I: 33–86. On the materialist influence of Lucretius, see Brown, ***The Return of Lucretius to Renaissance Florence***.
18. Aristotle, ***Metaphysics,*** in ***The Work of Aristotle, edited*** by W. D. Ross, 12vols (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966) 8: 1014b, 1015a.
19. "Final," for Aristotle, understood as that "which corresponds to the end" or "which is determined by the final cause" (signifying principle or entelechy). "For in all things, as we affirm, Nature [in the sense of development] always strives after 'the better.'" Aristotle, ***De Generatio et Corruptione,*** in ***The Works of Aristotle***, 9:336b.
20. bid., 9:335b.
21. Lucretius, ***On the Nature of the Universe***, translated by Frank O. Copley (New York-London, 1977), pp. 54–55, Book II, lines 1122–1145.
22. Stephen F. Mason, ***A History of the Sciences*** (New York, Macmillan, 1962), p. 353.
23. Francis Bacon, ***The New Organon***, edited by Lisa Jardine and Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 3.
24. ***The Works of Francis Bacon***, edited by James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath 15 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1900) IV: 82.
25. Ibid., III: 290–291.

26. Ibid., IV: 81.
27. See, Frances Meres, ***Palladis Tamia*** (London: P. Short for Cuthbert Burbie, 1598).
28. Sir Thomas North, ***The Morall Philosophies of Doni,*** edited by J. Jacob (London: 1st edition 1570), p. 212. Thomas Peyton, ***The Glass of Time in the Two First Ages*** (London: 1620), p. 73. According to Hans Baron, the Humanists, in the late Renaissance, derived the motif from Aulus Gellius' ***Noctes Atticae***, XII, 11.7. Hence, "the phrase *veritas temporis filia,* was used by Leonardo, Machiavelli, Bruno, Galileo, and Bacon, as a catchword to express the notion of the progress of human knowledge." Hans Baron, ***From Petrarch to Leonardo Bruni: Studies in Humanistic and Political Literature*** (Chicago and London: Published for The Newberry Library, The University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 197, n.2. See also, Sarah Hutton, "The Riddle of the Sphinx: Francis Bacon and the Emblems of Science,"in ***Women, Science, and Medicine, 1500–1700: Mothers and Sisters of the Royal Society,*** edited by Lynette Hunter and Sarah Hutton (Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing, 1997), pp. 1–28.
29. Quoted in ***The Philosophy of Francis Bacon: An Essay on Its Development from 1602 to 1609***, with new translations of fundamental texts by Benjamin Farrington (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1964), p. 19.
30. Bacon, ***The New Organon***, p. 69.
31. Ibid., pp. 34–35.
32. Bacon, ***Works,*** II: 354; IV:14.
33. Ibid., IV: 90, 103.
34. Ibid.
35. Charles Webster, ***From Paracelsus to Newton: Magic and the Making of Modern Science*** (Mineola, New York: Dover Publications, 1982), pp. 58–59. On the intimate connection of the "ideal" aspirations of experimental science and the objectives of the Renaissance Magus, see Paolo Rossi, ***Francesco Bacone: Dalla Magia alla Scienza*** (IBari: Editori Laterza, 1957), pp. 49–113; Yates, ***Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition***, pp. 130–143.
36. Bacon, ***Works,*** III: 289.
37. Ibid., 352.
38. Ibid., 340.
39. Lynn Thorndike, ***A History of Magic and Experimental Science During the First Thirteen Centuries of Our Era***, 8vols. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1929), V: 628.
40. Walter Pagel, ***Paracelsus: An Introduction to Philosophical Medicine in the Era of the Renaissance*** (Basel-New York: S. Karger, 1958), pp. 50–51, 63.
41. Stephen Mason, ***A History of the Sciences***, p. 230.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid., pp. 106–107.
44. Ibid., p. 56.
45. Ibid., pp. 148–150.
46. Carolyn Merchant, ***The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology, and the Scientific Revolution*** (New York: Harpers & Row, Publishers, 1980), pp. 1–41. See also, ***Body/Politics: Women and the Discourses of Science***, edited by Mary Jacobus, Evelyn Fox Keller, Sally Shuttleworth (New York & London: Routledge. 1990).
47. An example in Classical tragedy occurs between Clytemnestra and Orestes, in Aeschylus's trilogy, ***Oresteia***. The symbolic idea of the "viper," which turns against its mother takes place in "*The Libation Bearers*," lines, 246–2439, 525–550.
48. Quoted in Merchant, ***The Death of Nature***, p. 25. Compare, ***The Natural History of Pliny***, 6 vols. translated with copious notes and illustrations by John Bostock and H.T. Riley(London: H.G. Bohn, 1855–1857), Book 33,Chap. 1, pp. 68–70, 204–206. Another Roman, Ovid, already observed in his ***Metamorphoses*** the violence and aggressive uprooting and pillaging of the

earth wrought by the Iron Age. In the poem, "The Four Ages," Ovid compares the peaceful Golden Age, when the earth supplied "all [human] needs from its natural resources" to the Iron Age, marked by "Grim War," during which time "the affluent earth" was "mined and dug out" for gold and iron. Ovid, ***Metamorphoses,*** translated by David Raeburn, with an introduction by Denis Feeney (London: Penguin Classics, 2004), Book I, lines 88–150. On the contrast of agriculture to mining, see Sarton, ***A History of Science, 2:376–378.*** See also, Oliver Davies, ***Roman Mines in Europe*** (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1935).

49. Hutton, "The Riddle of the Sphinx" in ***Women, Science and Medicine***, ***1500–1700***, p. 14. For her perceptive comments concerning "essentialist" approaches to female philosophers in the seventeenth century, see Hutton, ***Anne Conway***, pp. 238–243.
50. Ibid., p. 17.
51. ***The Complete Poetry and Selected Prose of John Donne***, edited by Charles M. Coffin, introduction by Denis Donoghue, notes by W. W. Chmielewski (New York: The Modern Library, 1978), pp. 198–199, lines 201–219.
52. See Montaigne's, "Apology for Raymomd Sebond," in ***Essays and Selected Writings***, a bilingual edition, translated and edited by Donald Frame (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963), pp. 199–255.
53. Renée Descartes, ***Philosophical Works***, translated by Elizabeth S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross, 2vols. (New York: Dover Publications, 1955) I: 226.
54. Ibid., p. 171.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid., p. 215.
57. Ibid., p. 123.
58. Ibid., p. 315.
59. ***Oeuvres de Descartes***, Charles Adam & Paul Tannery edition, 11 vols. (Paris: Leopold Cerf Publishers, 1897–1909) VIII: 53, ***Principles*** II, para. 24.
60. Ibid., IX: 76, pt. ii; ***Principles***, I para 65.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid., V: 382–383.
63. Ibid., V: 404–405.
64. Ibid., V: 403–404. See also, ***The Conway Letters: The Correspondence of Anne, Viscountess Conway, Henry More, and their Friends, 1642–1684,*** edited by Marjorie Hope Nicolson, revised edition with an introduction and New Material edited by Sarah Hutton (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 19920), pp. 484–494.
65. ***Kabbalah unveiled; containing the following books of the Zohar: the book of concealed mystery; the greater holy assembly; the lesser holy assembly*** translated into English of the Latin version of Knorr von Rosenroth and collated with the original Chald (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971). ***The Conway Letters,*** pp. 217–221,351–352, 527–531. Sarah Hutton, ***Anne Conway: A Woman Philosopher*** (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 156–157. Allison P. Coudert, ***The Impact of the Kabbalah in the Seventeenth Century*** (Leiden-Boston-Koln: Brill, 1999), pp. 80–151, 177–240. For Leibnitz's relationship with Knorr von Rosenroth and van Helmont, and his direct knowledge of the ***Kabbalah desnuda***, see Ibid., pp. 308–330; and, Alison P. Coudert, ***Leibnitz and the Kabbalah***, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994). ***Henry More (1614–1687) Tercentenary Studies***, edited by Sarah Hutton, with biography and bibliography by Robert Crocker (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990). ***Judaeo-Christian Intellectual Culture in the Seventeenth Century***, edited by Allison P. Coudert, Sarah Hutton, Richard H. Popkin, and Gordon M. Weiner (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999).
66. Anne Conway, ***The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy***, edited by Allison P. Coudert and Taylor Corse (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 63–64.

67. Ibid., p. 64.
68. Descartes, ***Principles*** II: 25.
69. Conway, ***The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy***, p. 69.
70. Ibid., p. 69.
71. Ibid., p. 41.
72. Ibid., p. 44.
73. Ibid., p. 64.On the "contemporary setting" in which Spinoza and Hobbes were perceived as "apostles of atheism," see Samuel I. Mintz, ***The Hunting of Leviathan*** (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 39–80.
74. Conway, ***The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy,*** pp. 64–65.
75. Ibid., p. 64.
76. Ibid., p. 66.
77. Hutton, ***Anne Conway***, pp. 156–176.
78. Scholem, ***Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism***, pp, 110–114; Scholem, ***Kabbalah***, pp. 44–77.
79. Scholem, **Kabbalah**, 49–50.
80. Scholem, ***Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism***, pp. 214–286.
81. Conway, ***The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy***, 42.
82. Ibid., p. 39.
83. Ibid., p. 31.
84. See Leon Roth, ***God and Man in the Old Testament*** (London: Allen & Unwin, 1955).
85. Bacon, ***New Organon,*** p. 4.
86. Bernard Le Bovier de Fontenelle, ***Poésie pastorale ave un Traité sur la natur de l'eglogue et une Digression sur les Anciens Poètes & Modernes*** (The Hague: Louis van Dole and Estienne Foulque, 1688), pp. 227–228.

Cosmos and Scientific Practices in Ancient Greek and Ancient Chinese Thought: A Comparative Interpretation

Sinan Kadir Çelik

Abstract The present study focuses on the differences between ancient Greek and ancient Chinese cosmologies and scientific practices in a comparative manner so as to scrutinize the interrelations between phenomenological conception of *life-world*, scientific practices and their representation of *cosmos*. It is argued that diverse economic, political, geographic and social factors are responsible for the constitution of varied *life-worlds*. The ancient Greek understanding of hidden causes and conflicting forces are compared with the Chinese comprehension of *ch'i* and *li*. Dichotomous modeling of the universe by the ancient Greek philosophers is then contrasted with grasping the nature as harmonious relations-in-processes within the tradition of ancient Chinese thought. As a result of this comparison, it is concluded that in a culture which brings the peaceful co-existence of all animate and inanimate beings to the fore, scientists or philosophers could be more prone to perceive *cosmos* as a continuous, holistic and dynamic harmony.

The concept of "science" has gained a remarkable privilege or even been exalted especially in European culture. It has often been sanctified as the most honorable, as the most supreme knowledge that human beings can attain. This is simply because of the daunting task assigned to the practice of natural sciences: revealing the hidden laws of nature in order to understand the past and present of our *cosmos,* meanwhile predicting its future. It is impossible to conceive a science – whether "natural" or "social" – if one does not attribute at least a significant explanatory or heuristic power to its theoretical approach. More properly, to be labeled as "scientific," a theory may not necessarily provide us with sophisticated empirical predictions, but for a theory, it would be enough to have an outstanding heuristic or representational power, which may give rise to theoretical progress in future.

S.K. Çelik (✉)
Faculty of Literature, Department of Philosophy, Atatürk University, Erzurum, Turkey
e-mail: sinankcelik@gmail.com

A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), *Phenomenology and the Human Positioning in the Cosmos: The Life-world, Nature, Earth: Book One*, Analecta Husserliana 113,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-4801-9_4,

Since mathematical or logical entities are not simply derived from or are abstract expressions of empirical reality, they do not simply represent anything empirical or natural. This is why mathematics can be regarded as a non-representational discipline. Nevertheless, all natural and social sciences are representational in the sense that they should at least in principle aim at properly (or "scientifically") representing something, e.g., an empirical object, a pattern of events or a mechanism supposed to be responsible for the existence of a continuum – even if they often make use of non-representational disciplines, such as mathematics. Further, putative existence of certain entities might be problematic; for instance, in the literature of physics, it seems that such questions has remained unanswered in the last century: How rival theories applied for explaining the behavior of sub-atomic particles, if they had really existed in the literal sense as claimed in theories, can consistently and coherently be combined?

Whatever the answer one might give to similar questions, it is evident that whether they exist or not, various conceptions of sub-atomic particles are employed for representing the putative existence of something. Achieving the most proper and comprehensive representation of empirical reality, nature or *cosmos* is thus characteristic task of modern scientific endeavor. This is simply the reason why the validity of scientific theories are generally approved or refuted by having recourse to the criterion of "correspondence with reality." Within this frame, the change of scientific theories has been considered as an inevitable part of "scientific progress" or as "approaching to the truth," but is it really so?

If Thomas Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* is reconsidered, it will become plain to eye that emergence of scientific theories or the variety of conceptual schemes used for explaining or properly representing the *cosmos* corresponds to a certain moment in history, a certain place in the world and a sociological pattern of diverse relations among human beings. They change throughout time not because of the internal logic of science or scientific progress; therefore, historically immutable, stable elements of *cosmos* might not exist and even if they existed, we have no guarantee that we will fully comprehend them in the future. Furthermore, alteration of theories in the history of science would not seem to be a continuous, cumulative, compulsory, coercive, rational, or a progressive transformation. This process has gaps, jumps, *gestalt switches* without having any algorithm or a rational, logical explanation behind it. Since the scientists have been dedicated to different paradigms, their representation of the same thing differs; simply because they live in different worlds. For instance, "when Aristotle and Galileo looked at swinging stones, the first saw constrained fall, the second a pendulum."[1] And if so, "what changes with a paradigm is only the scientist's interpretations that themselves are fixed once and for all by nature of the environment and of all the perpetual apparatus."[2]

This is the most basic tenet of Kuhn's challenge, which brought about a "social turn" in the philosophy and history of science: Science is not an isolated domain of knowledge, which can merely be explained by its own terms and its internal requirements, but rather a special human activity that takes place in a certain *life-world*: "[T]he life world was always there for mankind before science, then,

just as it continues its manner of being in the epoch of science."[3] *Life-world*, that is to say, is ontologically prior to scientific comprehension of reality. *Life-world*, in other words, precedes scientific representation of reality. Scientific theories emerge from pre-scientific form of life and are in fact expressions of a certain attitude or a practical activity, in Husserl's own words: "Science in the form of special science has become a sort of theoretical technique, which like technique in the usual sense depends on a practical experience, accruing from many-sided and often exercised practical activity."[4]

Formalization of sciences in the West, for Edmund Husserl, brought about separating the *life-world* from science while reducing it to a purely technical theoretical construction. This does not, however, entail to claim that science as a result of its progressive transformation created its own realm ontologically detached from the *life-world*. Even the most abstract representation of empirical reality, for instance quantum mechanics, is likely to be completed in and an expression of the *life-world*.[5] *Life-world*, thus, basically refers to subject-relative pre-theoretical natural attitude and no doubt ontologically prior to any scientific construct. Nevertheless, this conception of *life-world* needs to be more concretely described. At this point, it would not be an exaggeration to state that Kuhnian philosophy of science offers possibilities to be interpreted as a historical and empirical justification of Edmund Husserl's philosophical point of view regarding the relation between knowledge producing activity and the *life-world*. This point requires to be studied in detail; however, the aim of the present paper is rather to support the following claims by paying attention to two distinct traditions: Scientific practices have played their different roles in diverse societies at various periods in the history. In other words, the way how we live inevitably affects how the scientific activity is performed. Our discoveries or inventions regarding the *cosmos* might be constituents of the human commerce with the natural world in the course of human pursuit of technical interest.

This is the reason why, in the present study, I will try to illuminate peculiarities of different scientific representations of *cosmos* by focusing on two distinct traditions, namely the ancient Greek and the ancient Chinese thought. In this comparative evaluation, what should carefully be avoided is viewing Chinese "scientific practices"[6] as simply "a failed prototype of modern science."[7] An unprejudiced comparison would also allow us to scrutinize the interrelations between *life-world*, scientific practice and its representation of *cosmos*. Here, I would like to emphasize a few salient points.

Ch'i and *Li Versus* Conflicting Forces and Laws

In ancient China, *cosmos* was understood through the dynamic dichotomization of *Yin* and *Yang*, which are constantly changing, interacting and redefining each other. For Chinese scientists, such a change as primary reality "cannot be mastered and explicitly theorized but at best intuited and adapted to."[8] Nature was perceived as

non-periodic cyclical successions of events in an unpredictable, implicit way and its movement was described though an event-oriented language, without presupposing an "ultimate cause" or *will* external to itself, such as God. Additionally, Chinese discovery or invention of nature did not refer to abstract concepts like space and time or cause and effect. In the Chinese scientific understanding of nature, space and time were already embedded in what happens; and the emergence of an object was not grounded on its causes, but considered as an instantiation of the endless chain of relations. Within this frame, Chinese comprehension of the "essence" basically differs from its Greek counterpart in the following way: "Aristotle asks for what a thing essentially is; the Chinese ask for what is indispensable to being called X."[9]

Let us note that ancient Greek way of searching the ultimate causes, which are supposed to be responsible for the emergence, existence and disappearance of all things in the universe, diverges from Chinese understanding of *cosmos* as interrelations, mutual interactions, processes and transformations. For instance, considering the differences between ancient traditions of medicine, G.E.R. Lloyd states that "[w]here the Greeks generally focused on the study of structures and organisms, in China the emphasis was more often on processes, on interaction, on resonances."[10] In other words, in the Chinese scientific practices "the apprehension of special patterns present in a multiplicity of phenomena was reached by a process of 'relating' or 'threading together' (*kuan*) or 'inter-relating' (*kuan thung)*."[11] Ontologically speaking, if the universe is nothing different from assemble of interrelations and interactions in variety of processes, then, Chinese scientists' task seems rather to grasp their nature with a relational mode of thinking, which was radically different from the Western type of finding the relation between cause and effect or from the ancient Greek conception of *cosmos* as "explained within the framework of the great oppositions established by Greek religious thought between a whole series of polar terms: men-gods; the invisible-the visible; what is eternal-what is mortal; the permanent-the changing; the pure-the mixed; the certain-the uncertain."[12] That is to say, in the ancient Chinese scientific practices; constant accumulation of knowledge regarding the interrelations and interactions with careful observations seems to be sufficient for comprehending what nature is. In ancient Greek comprehension of nature, on the other hand, an invisible, eternal and permanent (in this sense godlike) laws, elements, mechanisms or causes were supposed to be responsible for appearances of natural phenomena, behind which there seems to be the invisible but cognizable hidden reality. Platonic world of forms is the typical example of postulating the existence of the highest intelligence (*theios logos*, *theios nous*), divine laws (*theios nomos*). Unchanging hidden principles, basic causes or mother of the entire universe (*arkhai kai aitiai, ton ouranon kai ton en autois kosmon*) in the nomenclature of early Greek physicists was a material like entity, for instance, limitless indefinite substance (*aperion*) for Anaximandros or *aer*, *pheuma*, *psykhe* for Anaximenes.

Further, in ancient Greece, observation of certain regularities in natural phenomena seems to make way for assuming a universal *will* beyond overpermissiveness of all Gods (*anangke*, *andras*, *teia*, *moria*), which also bestows an eternal justice (*dike,*

eimarmene); as exemplified in one of Heraclitus' fragments: "To god all things are fair and just, whereas humans have supposed that some things are unjust, other things just;" although in his another fragment, he proposes that "war (*polemos*) is the father of all, king of all."[13] The Greek view of universe as the sum of all antagonistic opposites continually in conflict with each other did not, however, result in assuming an ontological disorderliness of nature. The war of conflicting powers (*dunameis*) was conceived as responsible for orderliness: They are opposites, but equal in power (*isotes tes dunameos*) and this is why they are counterbalanced with each other.[14]

It is worthy of noting here that there is a striking parallel between how citizens live in a *polis* and their perception of nature. The desired equilibrium between conflicting interests of citizens in perfect or in a deviated form of democracy was tried to be resolved by appealing to the concepts of justice, law or nature. Their appropriations by different philosophical schools are diverse. Aristotelian, Platonic, Stoic, Cynic or Epicurean conceptions of nature and justice have no doubt remarkable differences. Nevertheless, all of them directly or indirectly made use of a model of *cosmos* in their ethical and political works. For instance, *physis*, for Callicles, gives power to strong men, however, *nomoi,* laws or the rules of majority (the weak) prevent them from taking political power and governing the weak majority. To put it differently, as long as the laws among men in a city are not written with reference to the laws of nature, the strongest men would not be capable of protecting their own natural rights.[15] In this analogy, Callicles clearly contrasts nature to the laws of city and depicts nature as an arena in which the strongest naturally takes the hierarchically highest position. From Callicles' point of view, political realm in a *polis* is then essentially founded on a deviation from "natural law" according to which the weak should not suppress the strong in the name of justice or so-called "equality." By observing nature, one must without hesitations confirm that animals are not equal in power and neither human beings among themselves should be. Nature is, then, as a matter of course an arena of inequality and hierarchical orderliness, not an expression of harmony or peaceful coexistence of all inanimate and living beings.

Even if there are variety of ethical or political appropriation and usages of a *cosmos* image in the aforementioned literature, it seems that like perceiving the universe as conflicting forces coming into equilibrium, Greek philosophers in variety of manners searched the proper way of living in a *polis* given that there are already unresolved conflicts and struggles among citizens. Similar to two fundamental forces of nature proposed by Empedocles, namely Love (*filia*, *filotes*, *storge*) and Disagreement/Separation/Strife (*neikos*, *eris*), citizens might also be inclined to be friends or enemies to each other. Philosophers like Plato, Aristotle and Epicurus praise the merits of being companions and supremacy of just laws to be followed in a city. However, they are all well aware of the fact that political factions, disagreements and antagonisms between the citizens seem to be inevitable. Laws in this frame are likely to be the mean between these opposing tendencies; in other words, their function is basically regulation of conflicting interests, antagonistic feelings and desires.

On the other hand, let us note further that the word *nomoi,* which had been used for regulation of social harmony and equality between citizens in Ancient Greek

city-states, came to be considered as a model of equilibrium and geometric harmony of nature. Jean Pierre Vernant's *Myth and Society in Ancient Greece* directs our attention to the point that how the physical thought of the Greeks of the sixth century was intimately related with their political thought, social practices and their web of beliefs. For example, physical elemental principles (*archai*) were contrasted with natural phenomena, and they resemble to Greeks' gods in the sense that "they are eternal and indestructible; not mortal and perishable; immutable, not changeable and ephemeral; pure, not mixed."[16] Besides, in their conception of nature, the physicists of Miletos made use of a conceptual terminology, which had been developed in social practices and political arrangements. Their interpretation of the physical universe or nature is in accordance with a politically ideal model of equilibrium between opposed powers in the social sphere, namely *isonomia*. This is the ideal of a balanced distribution between contrary powers so that no one can dominate the others. The same ideal, that is "opposed forces" reaching "equilibrium," was applied by Greek philosophers in constructing a geometrical image of the world and explanation of *cosmos* in spatial terms. Hence there is an evident reciprocal relation between microcosm of the city and macrocosm of the universe in ancient Greek thought.[17] It would not then be a surprise that existence of conflicting interests of citizens in the political realm of ancient Greek cities brought about representing nature as a sum of opposing forces continually in conflict with each other.

Ch'i and *Li*

In contrast to dichotomous modeling of *cosmos* in terms of contrary powers and laws of nature, the constant and endless motion of *ch'i* had been generally employed for grasping the basic structure of nature by ancient Chinese researchers. Basically, the conception of *ch'i* can be understood as the confluence of the vital forces. To put it differently, *ch'i* understood as "the fusion and intermingling of the vital forces"[18] is singularly responsible for the emergence and production of empirical objects. It is worthy of emphasizing here that continuous, holistic and dynamic motion *ch'i* should not simply be understood as "matter-energy" or "material force," "pure energy," "force," "spirit," "vapor," or "air." It rather seems to be a rapidly rotating, constantly changing "vital force" or "vital power," continually in flux.[19]

In addition to its vitality, commonly accepted conception of *ch'i* by Chinese scientists and philosophers seems to prevent them from conceiving *cosmos* in an atomistic or particularistic way. In contrast to atomist philosophers of ancient Greek, according to whom invisibly tiny material particles are considered as responsible for the existence of all material things, Chinese philosophers in this or that way insisted on grasping the real essence of myriad things-whether living or inanimate- as various forms of dynamic, active and non-intentional vital energy. In this sense, Chinese conception of matter is evidently different from its ancient Greek counterpart:

> But the two concepts [Western and Chinese conceptions of matter] are quite different, in that *ch'i* is dynamic, while matter is inactive; *ch'i* penetrates everything, while matter is solid; *ch'i* is constantly changing, while matter is static. Chinese cosmology treats *ch'i* as

> existentially prior to matter – the condensation of *ch'i* constitutes matter. Everything is comprised of *ch'i* and the various degrees of purity or impurity determine the levels of existence. Human beings are made out of the purest of *ch'i*, while lower animals are produced by *ch'i* with greater impurity. *Ch'i* is not volitional; hence, our creation is not the result of any intentional production. *Ch'i* condenses and rarefies, but it never gets exhausted or even diminished. *Ch'i* pervades the universe; in other words, the universe is simply the totality of *ch'i* in perpetual motion and constant alteration. In this cosmology, the cosmos is viewed as being composed of a great force (*ch'i*) that has no mind of its own. The great force permeates everything in the cosmos; as a result, everything is interconnected in this organic whole.[20]

Ch'i as a self-generating naturalistic description of the impersonal cosmic function in the ancient Chinese science is, therefore, liable to the great harmony of nature, as exemplified in Lao Tzu's words: "The ten thousand things carry the yin and embrace the yang, and through the blending of material force [*ch'i*] they achieve harmony."[21] One of Confucian classics, namely The *Book of Changes* (*I Ching*) also declares that emergence of things becomes possible with the combination of essence and *ch'i*.[22] Likewise, a naturalist thinker Wang Ch'ung underlines spontaneity of circulation of *ch'i* with the following words: "When the material forces (*ch'i*) of Heaven and Earth come together, all things are spontaneously produced, just as when the vital forces (*ch'i*) of husband and wife unite, children are naturally born."[23] The last example is from Chang Tsai's study entitled as "Correcting Youthful Ignorance:"

> The Great Harmony is called the Tao. It embraces the nature which underlies all counter processes of floating and sinking, rising and falling, and motion and rest. It is the origin of the processes of fusion and intermingling, of overcoming and being overcome, and of expansion and contraction. At the commencement, these processes are incipient, subtle, obscure, easy, and simple, but at the end they ar extensive, great, strong and firm. It is *ch'ien* ("heaven") that begins with the knowledge of Change, and *k'un* ("earth") that models after simplicity. That which is dispersed, differentiated and discernable in form becomes *ch'i*, and that which is pure, penetrating, and not discernable in form becomes spirit. Unless the whole universe is in the process of fusion and intermingling like fleeting forces moving in all directions, it may not be called "Great Harmony."[24]

The conception of *ch'i* often employed in the ancient Chinese philosophical and scientific classics, thus, basically denotes spontaneous harmony of interrelations within both in natural and human world. Nature viewed as spontaneous and regular circulation of *ch'i* seems to denote that the radical opposition – a characteristic of ancient Greek thought – between sensible and intelligible is totally unfamiliar to the Chinese scientists. *Ch'i* is, in this sense, apparent as the fusion of husband and wife's vital forces. A child in this perspective is not simply regarded as a separate entity emerged as a result of a certain cause, namely sexual intercourse, but as an expression of unified two different vital forces. Even if there are opposites in human and bare nature, they are still considered as complementary and harmonious.

At this point, it would not be entirely appropriate to note that Chinese scientific and philosophical language seem to be in conformity with the intuited harmony of nature. Chinese primary concepts like Heaven and Sky (*Tian*), pattern (*Li*), things (*wu*) or the way (*tao*) were not regarded as precise representations of nature *qua* nature. Discerning the *cosmos*, listening its harmony and inner transformation of self in a way to adapt itself in accordance with the harmony are likely to be main

tasks of scientific language, not precise representation of *cosmos*. Questioning the roots (*rhizomata*) or searching for the "unmoved mover" (*proton kinoun ou kinoumenon*) would be regarded by ancient Chinese researchers as something strange, not inevitable pursuit of scientific practices.

Let us here note that Joseph Needham draws our attention to the contextual, ambiguous, poetic, imaginative, pictorial, non-abstract, therefore, practical nature and usages of the Chinese scientific language.[25] As he exemplifies, the word *Li*, usually translated as "ceremony," "rites," "pattern" or "principle," "pattern/principle" or "organizing pattern," "politeness," "traditional mode of behavior," "good custom" is an undefined term gaining variety of meanings in diverse contexts, like the words *spirit* or *point* in English.[26] The word of *Li* understood as "principles," basically refers to "inherent patterns of organization for the objects, beings, and forces to which they pertain."[27]

The word of *Li* in several aspects resembles to the western concept of "law of nature" or Greek conception of *archai*. Nevertheless, due to the lack of a conception of creative divinity in Chinese cosmology, spontaneously regular, harmonious coexistence of all beings were not described by having recourse to the idea of "law of nature," which helped to promote the rapid growth of the new science in the West. It had never been employed in ancient China, which is in parallel with the Chinese naturalization of the divine. It might be argued that this leads to a unique view of *cosmos* and "closed the way to developing any form of transcendental thought,"[28] but also opened a different possibility of engaging in non-interventionist philosophical and scientific activity. Nature is not seen as something waiting for being grasped fully by means of certain scientific or philosophical concepts having a fixed meaning. It is rather regarded as a living organism intuited and adapted to, as exemplified in the words of naturalist Confucian thinker Hsün Tzu: "Nature (*Tien*, Heaven) operates with constant regularity. It does not exist for the sake of (safe-emperor) Yao nor does it cease to exist because of (wicked king) chieh. Respond to it with peace and order, and good fortune will result. Respond to it with disorder, and disaster will follow."[29]

A Comparative Interpretation

Joseph Needham reserves his seven volume monumental work entitled *Science and Civilization in China* to explain the emergence of such an organicist, non-interventionist thought by having recourse to the specify of the social relations and the web of beliefs within the Chinese society. For Needham, there is no special mystery about the relatively "steady state" of Chinese society and their construction of empirical reality though cosmic order.[30] His social analysis points to the nature of agriculture, geographic isolation of China, the early necessity of massive hydraulic engineering works because of the need for the large irrigation networks, the centralization of government, the principle of the nonhereditary civil service, government-sponsored scientific activity, living in an agriculturally dominated, uncarpeted

landscape, non-existence of value system of merchants, the absence of idea of laws of nature or creator of the universe like God, relatively non-interventionist character of the central authorities, the political position of Taoism and Confucianism, etc. All these economic, social, geographic and political factors play their role in constitution of a distinct *life-world*, based on which a tradition of science peculiar to ancient China emerged.

Let us here emphasize again that the political calamities with the rapidly changing political regimes implemented in Greek city states resemble to their variety of cosmologies. *Cosmos* in the periods of political instability had been perceived like a struggle-oriented political constitution of diverse types. The universe, for them, was nothing different from the rule of kingship, an oligarchy of balanced powers or an anarchic struggle.[31] In ancient China, on the other hand, the emphasis was more often on establishing harmonious relations among human beings living under the same sky, although the universe was liken to a natural monarchy. At this point, one of Jagues Gernet's remarks shows us that why nature had not been conceptualized through the opposition of forces or powers by the Chinese fourth-and third-century thought:

> It is easy to see what concept of society and nature is implied by such a philosophy: Order can never result from the external intervention of a power of command, nor from an arbitrary, authorial division of functions and powers, nor from a balance dependent upon an agreement reached between antagonistic forces…The activity of the sovereign is similar to that of the farmer who does not more than encourage the growth of his plants and in no way intervenes in the process of germination and growth. He acts in accordance with the orders of Heaven (*t'ien*), and identifies himself with it. The principle of order is to be found only things that are. It cannot be immanent in the world.[32]

This mode of thinking seems to be closely related with the value system of farmers who are more inclined to be respectful to the nature; simply because their life obviously depends on cyclical movements and changes of nature, not on the political success or accumulation of wealth as in the Greek cities. This might be the very reason why Chinese scientists like the ordinary farmers were more prone to be attentive observers of nature. Foreseeing what will happen by means of recording every single change in the surrounding world has a vital importance for them. The scientific problem was, then, not transforming the nature, but being able to cope with it. Thus, it would not be a surprise that the intellectual activity of traditional Chinese scientist was protected as a "recording" activity by means of well-established bureaucracy, which was necessary for the accumulation of a huge body of knowledge for the regular organization of society; while "debating" as a form of intellectual activity emerged in ancient Greek city-states in accordance with the citizens' struggles for gaining more political power at *mesoi.* We should here emphasize again that the emergence of distinct modes of intellectual activity at different societies were related to diverse *life-worlds*, which gave rise to different results: In contrast to the Greek approach seeking causal relations in nature, Chinese science was mainly interested in classifications for practical means.

Such a "recording" activity in China was concerned almost only with empirical and practical means and not with general laws or rigorous demonstrations. In Vernant's

designation, Chinese scientists "were not engaged in a quest for the truth, the non-changing and non-contradictory" but they took quite a different path "towards a more precise analysis of the factors ordering the social and cosmic spheres."[33]

Regarding this point, let us note that unlike the Ptolemaic astronomers, astronomers in China were not interested in the calculations of the dimensions of universe, because the purpose of their observations was not building an abstract conceptual scheme or a model truly representing the *cosmos*, but was exclusively making calculations for calendering precisely. This is why "whether the *cosmos* is flat or spherical is no concern of the [Chinese] astronomers."[34]

Not only Chinese astronomy, but also Chinese mathematics is practical, in contrast to abstract, deductive, pure geometry with proof of the ancient Greeks. Needham's comprehensive works on Chinese mathematics illustrate the point that Chinese mathematicians' interests were always practical, simply because their works were closely bound up with the bureaucratic government system. Hence their works were devoted to the problems which ruling officials had to solve; e.g., land measurement and survey, granary dimensions, making of dykes and canals, taxation, rates of exchange.

There seems to be a radical difference between Chinese practical arithmetic and the theoretical, abstract, pure, deductive Greek geometry. Unlike Chinese mathematicians who did not develop geometry like the one in Euclid's *Elements*, or a native calculus but gave surprising advances in arithmetic for making their jobs precisely in the agrarian bureaucratic civilization; how and why did philosophers in Ancient Greece develop systematization and rationalization of mathematics?

Husserl in his "Vienna Lecture," argues that a new theoretical attitude, which is intentionally directed to live in accordance with the ideal of pure *theoria* in order to acquire the knowledge of unconditioned truth for sake of itself, not for the some practical means, emerged in ancient Greece. In the seventh and sixth centuries B.C., in Greece, "[t]here arises *a new sort of attitude* of individuals towards their surrounding world. And its consequence is the breakthrough of a completely new sort of spiritual structure, rapidly growing into a systematically self-enclosed cultural form; the Greeks called it *philosophy*."[35] Philosophy for Greeks, according to Husserl, became a common cultural spirit, a life-interest for all-encompassing universal science. In this cultural climate, perfection of theoretical life turned out to be a vocational attitude. The philosopher became the one who devotes himself to the life of pure *theoria*. In Husserl's words, "[m]an becomes a nonparticipating spectator, surveyor of the world; he becomes philosopher."[36] This seems to open a way for the philosopher who considers himself as the lord of the universe, who can reach Archimedean point by which he becomes able to depict whole world as it is. This is also the crucial difference of ancient Greek scientific or philosophical culture from the Chinese way of being related with the world in a practical, intuitive and non-interventionist manner.

It seems that the emergence of a distinct theoretical attitude in Greece, following Needham's interpretation, might be closely related with the reduction of all quality to quantities, proclaiming the uniformity of space and time throughout the universe, the affirmation of a mathematical reality behind all appearances. Let us note that these are all analogous to the merchant's value-system and it seems to be striking that

the rise in the level of mercantile activity and its reception in ancient Greece as a group of city-state democracies, albeit variable in variety of aspects, distinguishes the Greek civilization from the Chinese civilization. The systematization and rationalization of mathematics in ancient Greece is likely to be closely related with both simultaneous developments of exchange-based economies along with the general adaption of mercantile culture in the city life. Let us note further that for merchants, everything can in principle be reduced to or more properly measurable with a quantity. This is to say that mathematics is not responsible for the quantification of all qualitative properties; it rather became a sign of common cultural spirit of living in accordance with quantified values in ancient Greece. It might here be interesting point that although ancient Chinese arithmetic so advanced in many respects (for example, handling negative numbers, calculations of quadratic, cubic and simultaneous linear equations, highly precise calculation of value of π, the very early appreciation of decimal place-value and the zero blank), they "never spontaneously invented any symbolic way of writing formulae" and strangely "the equational form remained implicit, and there was no indigenous development of an equality sign(=)."[37] The emergence of abstract, deductive, pure geometry with the proof in ancient Greece and the development of concrete, empirical, applied or practical Chinese arithmetic are worthy of being compared comprehensively in further studies.

Hence, variety of different factors in constitution of diverse *life-world*s needs to be scrutinized in a much more detailed manner so as to enlighten the phenomenological foundations of variant scientific representation of *cosmos*. As an initiation for further discussion, I would like to propose that in a society where there is a conception of opposition of powers between competing political forces, *cosmos* seems to be understood in parallel with the political ideal *isonomia*. In ancient Greece, social antagonisms, conflicts, confrontations were much more violent and war-oriented than in ancient China. Then, it should not be surprising that Greek philosophers were inclined to perceive the *cosmos* as never-ending war of conflicting powers, which are supposed to be responsible for regularity and equilibrium in nature. In contrast, in a cultural spirit which strives for promoting the peaceful co-existence of all animate and inanimate beings, scientists could be more prone to perceive *cosmos* as a continuous, holistic and dynamic harmony. That is to say, diverse representations of *cosmos* would be an expression of different tacit presentations of *life-worlds*.

Notes

1. Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (2nd ed., Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1970), p. 120.
2. Ibid.
3. Edmurd Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences*, trans. David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 123.
4. Edmurd Husserl, *Formal and Transcendental Logic,* trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1969), p. 3.

5. For a discussion clarifying this point, see Wim Christiaens, "Basic Ontology and the Ontology of the Phenomenological Life World: A Proposal," *Foundations of Science*, 11 (2006), pp. 249–274.
6. In the ancient traditions under consideration, in both ancient Greek and Chinese languages, there was no term that "exactly corresponds to 'science,' even though they generally have rich vocabularies to talk of knowledge, wisdom, and learning." See G.E.R., *Ancient Worlds, Modern Reflections: Philosophical Perspectives on Greek and Chinese Science and Culture* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 12 and see also p. 31. This is why I prefer to use the term "scientific practices" instead of "science."
7. See Joseph Needham, *Science and Civilization in China*, 7 vols. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1954–1976), Vol. 2, p. 47. Hereafter cited as *SCC*.
8. John G. Blair, "Change and Cultures: Reality Presumptions in China and West," *New Literary History*, 24:4 (1993), p. 930. Cf. Nathan Sivin's comment: For Chinese scientists "[t]he texture of reality is too fine and too subtle to be completely apprehended." See Nathan Sivin, "Max Weber, Joseph Needham, Benjamin Nelson: The Question of Chinese Science" in *Civilizations East and West: A Memorial Volume for Benjamin Nelson*, ed. E.V. Walters et al. (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1985), p.46.
9. Jean-Paul Reading, "Greek and Chinese Categories: A Reexamination of the Problem of Linguistic Relativism," *Philosophy East and West*, 36:4 (1986), p. 352.
10. G.E.R. Lloyd, *Ancient Worlds, Modern Reflections*, p. 30.
11. See Joseph Needham, *SCC* Vol. 3, p.164. This diagnosis seems to be supported by Chenng Brothers' words: "In laboring to apprehend (lit. exhaust) patterns fully, we are not necessitated to attempt an exhaustive and complete research into the patterns of all the myradial phenomena in the world, nor we can attain our aim by fully apprehending only a single one of these patterns. It is simply to accumulate (lit. pile up and tie together, *chi lei*) a large number of (of phenomena). Then (the patterns) will become visible spontaneously." Cited in *op cit*., pp.163–164.
12. Jean-Pierre Vernant, *Myth and Society in Ancient Greece,* trans. Janet Lloyd (New York: Zone Books, 1993), pp. 97–98.
13. See Heraclitus, *Fragments*, trans. T.M. Robinson, (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1987), fr. 53 and fr.102.
14. Aristoteles, *Physics*, 204 b 22.
15. Platon, *Republic*, 483b–d.
16. Jean-Pierre Vernant, *Myth and Society in Ancient Greece*, p. 97.
17. For a much more detailed and excellent support of this claim from a similar angle, see also Gerard Naddaf, *The Greek Concept of Nature* (New York: SUNY Press, 2005) and Geoffrey Lloyd and Nathan Sivin, *The Way and the Word: Science and Medicine in Early China and Greece* (New Hevan and London: Yale University Press, 2002).
18. Tu Wei-Ming, "The Continuity of Being: Chinese Visions of Nature," in *Nature in Asian Traditions of Thought: Essays in Environmental Philosophy*, eds. J.B. Callicott and R.T. Ames (New York: New York University Press, 1989), p. 72.
19. One of the S. Nakayama's remarks on *ch'i* clearly shows this vitality. He acknowledges that Chinese view of pathology explained the cause of disease by malfunctioning of the circulation of *ch'i*: "The *Ch'i* in external forces, e.g. wind, coldness, hotness, humidity, penetrates into the body's internal organs and causes disease. Internally, the disturbance of the circulation of *Ch'i* though the five *tsang* (the heart, liver, spleen, lungs, and kidneys) and the six *fu* (the gall-bladder, stomach, large intestine, small intestine, bladder, and *san-chiao*, an imaginary organ is also cause of disease)." See S. Nakayama, "Science and Technology in China," in *Half the World: The History and Culture of China and Japan*, ed. Arnold Toynbee (New York: Winston Press, 1973), pp. 145–146.
20. JeeLoo Liu, *An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy: From Ancient Philosophy to Chinese Buddhism* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), pp. 6–7.
21. Wing-tsit Chan, trans. and comp., *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 160.

22. See ibid., p. 265.
23. Ibid., p. 296.
24. Ibid., pp. 500–501.
25. However, poetic and practical nature of such 'terms' would not simply be regarded as a theoretical weakness: "It is not that science and technology are unsuitable subjects for poetry" and "to create a counter factual hypothesis requires imagination. The Chinese imagination was not only vivid in the creation of technical terms, but also in picturing conditional situations, both straightforward and counterfactual." See Joseph Needham and Kenneth Robison, "Literary Chinese as a Scientific Language," *Comparative Criticism: An Annual Journal*, ed. E.S. Shaffer, 13 (1991), p. 11 and p. 15. In Needham's another study, he emphasizes that such contextual usages of words did not prevent scientific activity and make it non-logical, because "formal logic was fully and perfectly incorporated in the linguistic structure of Chinese." See Joseph Needham, *SCC* Vol. 1, p. 112.
26. Another example for contextual nature of Chinese scientific and philosophical language would be the word of *fa*: "The word *fa* covers a wide range of meanings, such as law, punishment, custom, duty, discipline, method, technique, and model, and has concepts of law, statecraft, and power. In Buddhism, it means Buddhism itself, the law preached by the Buddha, Reality, Truth." See Wing-tsit Chan, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, p. 786.
27. Derk Bodde, "Chinese *Laws of Nature*: A Reconsideration," *Essays on Chinese Civilization*, eds. Charles Le Blanc and Dorethy Borei (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), p. 98.
28. Jaques Gernet, "Social History and the Evolution of Ideas in China and Greece from the Sixth to the Second Centuries B. C.," in Vernant's *Myth and Society in Ancient Greece,* p. 87.
29. Wing-tsit Chan, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, p. 116.
30. According to him, "traditional Chinese society was highly organic, highly cohesive. The State was responsible for the good functioning of the entire society, even if this responsibility was carried out with the minimum intervention." See Joseph Needham, *The Grand Titration: The Science and Society in East and West* (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1969), p. 212. Additionally, as Jaques Gernet points out, in China, "there was no violent crisis or confrontation between the *demos* and the aristocracy leading to a radical change in the political constitution and a revaluation of the whole past, but rather an evolution that, despite its great scope, allowed accommodation and compromise." See Jean-Pierre Vernant, *Myth and Society in Ancient Greece*, p. 86.
31. Cf. G.E.R. Lloyd, *Methods and Problems of in Greek Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 141. For a more detailed elaboration on this issue from slightly different angles, see also Gerard Naddaf, *The Greek Concept of Nature*, especially pp. 113–116 and Geoffrey Lloyd and Nathan Sivin, *The Way and the Word: Science and Medicine in Early China and Greece*, pp. 174–187.
32. Jaques Gernet, "Social History and the Evolution of Ideas in China and Greece from the Sixth to the Second Centuries B. C.," in Vernant's *Myth and Society in Ancient Greece,* p. 86.
33. Jean-Pierre Vernant, *Myth and Society in Ancient Greece*, p. 85.
34. S. Nakayama, "Science and Technology in China," p. 144.
35. Edmurd Husserl, "The Vienna Lecture: Philosophy and the Crisis of European Humanity," in *The Crisis of European Sciences*, p. 276.
36. Ibid., p. 285.
37. See Joseph Needham, *SCC* Vol. 3, p. 152.

Part II

Apel's Project of Cognitive Anthropology for Non-Western World and a Supplement of Muslim Proposal

Abdul Rahim Afaki

Abstract This paper critically evaluates Karl-Otto Apel's project of cognitive anthropology which he excavates for contemporary non-western world to deal with the problem of historicism. Apel defines the problem as non-western man's distancing from his own tradition due to his engagement in a dialogical mediation with Western tradition. In this process of acquaintance non-western man experiences the crisis of break with his tradition due to the inevitable adoption of the Western technical-industrial form of life. Apel attempts to solve the problem by presenting the triadic structure of cognitive anthropology comprising of scientistics, hermeneutics and critique of ideology. This paper argues that in this triadic programme, which Apel has generally designed for non-western societies, there are at least two such elements which seem unlikely to be compatible specifically with Muslim tradition. The first element in Aple's theoretical structure is its *historical* orientation denying every possibility of referring to the *ahistorical* meanings in the making of tradition. The second element is his taking the technique of psychotherapy as the critique of ideology. This paper deliberates to provide with alternative lines to follow if a Muslim society is to construe a philosophy of history to deal with the problem of historicism as Apel identifies it in his major work, *Transformation der Philosophie* (*Towards a Transformation of Philosophy*).

In his major work, *Transformation der Philosophie* (*Towards a Transformation of Philosophy*), Karl-Otto Apel philosophically undertakes the problematic defined by the epistemological and cultural crisis of non-western societies due to the Western invasion in terms of its epistemological and cultural dominion. In this paper I intend to critically evaluate Apel's advice which he gives to non-western man in order to deal with this problematic. Considering the problematic as a 'problem of history',

A.R. Afaki (✉)
Department of Philosophy, University of Karachi, Karachi 75270, Pakistan
e-mail: abdul_afaki@yahoo.com

A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), *Phenomenology and the Human Positioning in the Cosmos: The Life-world, Nature, Earth: Book One*, Analecta Husserliana 113,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-4801-9_5, © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

he suggests that non-western societies should expound a philosophy of history as 'a cognitive anthropology' with a triadic structure having scientistics, hermeneutics and critique of ideology as its elements. Apel's philosophical solution for the problem is not viable in my view for Muslim societies though it may be fully applicable to other non-western societies. Two things in Apel's theorization are such that they cannot be easily adjustable in Muslim societies: first, the orientation of Apel's theorization is wholly historical; and second, the third element of the triadic structure of cognitive anthropology namely the critique of ideology is incorporated in the system as the model of psychoanalysis. My argument is to analyze the question of compatibility of these two elements of Apel's theorization with how should Muslim mind acquaint with West following Apel's lines.

My whole argument is bipartite. In section "Apel's Cognitive Anthropology," I summarize Apel's argument as a philosophical advice for non-western man and in section "Ahistoricality of Meanings and the Islamic-Hermeneutic Reflexivity," I suggest how contemporary Muslim societies, if they are ready to follow Apel in construing their philosophy of history, should deliberate to choose the appropriate lines to follow.

Apel's Cognitive Anthropology

Apel's response to the problem of historicism, one's distancing from his own tradition due to one's engagement in a dialogical mediation with a foreign tradition, is a little complex. Apel advices non-western contemporary man to construe a philosophy of history in order to address the problem of historicism characterized as the crisis of break with his tradition due to the inevitable adoption of the Western technical-industrial form of life. This philosophy of history should be both hermeneutic and scientistic in character. Its hermeneutic character may help one interpret the linguistically handed down heritage of one's own and the foreign tradition, while the scientistic character may help one explain the remnants of traditions which are given linguistically undocumented. This binary function of interpretation and explanation, according to Apel, makes the philosophy of history aptly address the problem of historicism which the contemporary non-western man is facing. The constitution of such a cognitive scheme is based upon Heidegger's notion of Being-in-the-world. Apel opines that the 'constitution of meaning' is impossible by a pure consciousness itself. Instead, the knowing consciousness can arrive at the meaning constitution by its concentric 'living engagement' with the world though it may be 'eccentric' in its own. This life a priori of knowledge, i.e. the knowing consciousness' engagement in life as a condition of its knowledge makes it a being-with-others whose 'intended meanings become mediated with the possible meaning intentions of other human beings in such a manner' that it can really mean something. According to Apel, language is a precondition for this 'intersubjective validity' of the constitution of meaning, as the linguistic signs are instruments for the mediation of meanings among human beings who are engaged in life. Furthermore, language or linguistic signs are not in themselves the objects of knowledge rather they are the preconditions of all knowledge. Thereby Apel calls language 'the bodily a priori (*Leibapriori*) of knowledge' (pp. 46–48).[1]

Both preconditions of knowledge stand in a complementary relationship to each other, i.e. in the whole of knowledge the life a priori of knowledge mutually and necessarily relates to the a priori of consciousness though in 'the actual production of knowledge' either of them may take up the leading position. This complementary relationship between the two preconditions with the possible leading role of either can be understood in their relationship to theoretical reflection and practical knowledge. The life a priori of knowledge may take lead as a precondition in the accumulation of knowledge concerned with 'experience' including natural sciences as here the knowledge is attained through experiment in life. On the other hand, 'all theory-formation is an attainment of knowledge through reflection' where the a priori of consciousness takes up the lead. In his cognitive anthropology which is enlargement of the Kantian question of the preconditions for the possibility of knowledge, these two preconditions are not the only ones, rather Apel counts one more at the level of a priori. According to him, our engagement in life as a precondition for the attainment of all knowledge elevates a further precondition for knowledge to the rank of an a priori which is a 'specific cognitive interest' behind our living engagement of knowledge. Drawing from the development of modern physics, Apel does not only explain the 'a priori' nature of the cognitive interest, but he also shows the difference of 'exact natural sciences' from the 'human sciences' on its ground. '[T]he prior dependency that the problems of modern physics have upon the possibility of operative verification' by the instrumental intervention by man in nature is the ground of man's cognitive interest that leads him to the living engagement of modern physics. This specific 'methodologically relevant interest' of a natural scientist, which Apel considers as 'supra-individual' and 'quasi-objective' in nature, is entirely different from that of a human scientist who has 'divergent practical interest and world engagement that lies at the basis of the so called human sciences.' Here Apel arrives at the actual thesis of his project of cognitive anthropology that is an answer to 'the old disputed question of the relationship between the natural and the human sciences.' He responds to the question in terms of the triadic structure of scientistics, hermeneutics and the critique of ideology. In his bipartite argument he demonstrates (i) against the idea of a unified science, 'the assertion of complementarity between scientistics and hermeneutics' and as well as (ii) 'a dialectical mediation of explanation and understanding in the critique of ideology' (pp. 49–50).

In his cognitive anthropology, Apel attempts to enlarge the Kantian question of the preconditions of knowledge whereas the neopositivists are trying to reduce the Kantian question as much as possible by their notion of a 'unified science.' Drawing from the development of behaviourism, the neopositivists attempt to reduce the human sciences 'to a pre-scientific heuristic in the service of' the natural sciences on the ground of the 'psychological aspect of the distinction between explanation and understanding.' Theodore Abel analyzes the psychological aspect of the relationship between understanding and explanation in his essay, *The Operation Called "Verstehen"* by an example as follows:

> "If…I see that in the event of sudden drop in temperature my neighbor stands up from his writing desk, chops wood and lights his fire, then I automatically interpret that he was cold and therefore sought to bring about a situation in which he was warm." (p. 52)

Referring to Abel's example, Apel shows the neopositivist approach to the understanding-explanation dichotomy where 'understanding is only equivalent to a component of the logical operation of explanation.' For, as the above example shows, through interpolating or understanding the 'observed behaviour' one is led to conceiving a 'behaviour maxim' precisely corresponding to a 'causal hypothesis' which can become a ground for a causal explanation of behaviour (pp. 52–53).

Apel rejects the status of understanding as merely a heuristic prelude to the scientific explanation. He expounds the notion of complementarity between explanation and understanding or interpretation referring to Dray's theory of historical explanation. Dray opines that the historical explanation unlike the natural science and the social science explanation as we have seen above in case of behaviorism are not grounded upon 'general law-like hypothesis.' The historical explanation cannot be viewed as a 'deductive- or inductive-nomological explanation.' Instead, its 'plausibility' is attained by 'a relationship between an event and the necessary condition for the occurrence of this event'. The first necessary condition is concerned with 'the insufficiency of conditions for the prognosis of the event.' A historian cannot predict the occurrence of an event on the ground of some causal hypothesis, as the conditions he discovers are not the causes but 'the intentions of acting human subject' which become 'rational grounds for action.' The second necessary condition is concerned with its own 'validity in the context of a given total situation.' This is the condition which Abel completely ignores in his neopositivist analysis of understanding as shown above. Explaining Dray's standpoint, Apel refers both to the later Wittgenstein's insights regarding the language-game theory and Heidegger's notion of Being-in-the-world. In a historical explanation the total historical situation of an action is not tantamount to the collection of empirical data that has a law-like causal connection to the action. Instead, it is a hermeneutical situation of a particular being-in-the-world in which the meanings of both the action and the situation are constituted by hermeneutical circle on the ground of language. That is to say, on the platform of language or language-game the situation in whose context the action is understood is itself understood by the help of 'the intentional understanding of the action itself'. Despite all of the hermeneutic presuppositions the understanding of meanings of both the action and the situation remains a heuristic prelude to the explanation of historical facts 'that certain events have occurred as a result of other event' though the context of events is 'mediated by the understanding of rational grounds, emotional dispositions, socially binding behavioural expectations, institutionalized values and individual goals'. This somewhat justifies why the positivists take the historical explanation as analogical to the 'natural scientific causal explanation.' As Apel has already denied this status of 'understanding' as a heuristic prelude to 'explanation' he presents the idea of complementarity between 'hermeneutic inquiry' and 'natural scientific objectivation and explanation of events.' This complementary structure is clarified in the context of cognitive anthropology which takes language as a 'precondition for the possibility and validity of natural science.' The natural scientific endeavor is not solipsistic, i.e. a natural scientist 'cannot explain something for himself alone' rather he always needs a 'communication

community'[2] whose 'intersubjective agreement' makes explanation a knowledge gaining activity (pp. 53–58).

The complementary structure, he further clarifies, of 'the explanatory sciences that presuppose the subject-object relationship' and the interpretative sciences that presuppose the intersubjective relationship can be understood in relation to man's two 'equally important complementary cognitive interests:'

1. an interest that is determined by the necessity for a technical praxis as the basis of insights into natural laws;
2. an interest that is determined by the necessity for social, morally relevant praxis. (p. 59)

Both of these interests are complementarily directed towards agreement among the interpreters in a communication community. And the communication not only comes to happen amongst the individuals in a contemporary community but it functions between the living and the 'past generations in the manner of a mediation of traditions'. This mediation of traditions, according to Apel, not only provides man with the technical knowledge and the enriched understanding of possible meaningful motivation which gives them their superiority over the animal kingdom, but it, particularly when it occurs in crisis, 'is the only cognitive anthropological location out of which the hermeneutic sciences can emerge and out of which they, as a reality of European and Asiatic high culture, did emerge'. So the complementarity of scientistics and hermeneutics is based upon the existence of a communication community which is the precondition of all knowledge whether it is accumulated in the subject-object dimension or in 'the intersubjective meta-dimension' (pp. 59–60).

Here Apel raises the question concerning the 'problem of philosophical foundations of hermeneutics' as follows:

> Is there a *methodological abstraction* through which a scientific investigation of intending or expressed meaning is possible at the level of intersubjective agreement between human subjects. (p. 61)

Apel rejects both Schleiermacher and Dilthey's affirmative response to the question on the ground of his notion of the complemetarity between scientistics and hermeneutics. This affirmative response of the founding fathers of modern hermeneutics is characterized by drawing a parallel relationship between scientistics (objective natural sciences) and hermeneutics (interpretative human sciences) which leads towards 'the normatively unbinding but scientifically universally valid understanding of the hermeneutic sciences of the spirit (*Geisteswissenschaften*)'. This is what Apel has already rejected as discussed above in the light of his notion of 'complementary cognitive interests' determined, on the one hand, by the necessity for a technical praxis and, on the other, by the necessity for social, morally relevant praxis. Here the interpreter is supposed to mediate traditions through a process of understanding which is normatively bound to life by the precondition of the life a priori of knowledge 'as the dependence of the intersubjective manifestation of meaning on the meaningful perceivable "expression"'. Both Schleiermacher and Dilthey believe in 'the normatively unbinding' rather than 'the normatively binding' procedure of understanding which, according to Apel, as a consequence 'leads to the problem of nihilistic "historicism"'. The normatively unbinding

understanding is like the process of scientific objectivation through which an interpreter acts as a collector of meanings of all binding truths and norms 'in the contemporaneity of an "imaginary museum"' by breaking himself with tradition and life. '[A]fter having lost all connection with tradition', such an interpreter is 'reduced by the historical-hermeneutic sciences' to the state in which history becomes virtually absent. Actually the hermeneutic sciences and their naturalizing objectivation of binding norms and truths replace as an alternative both of traditions and history (pp. 60–62).

In order to repudiate the idea of an interpreter as a collector of meanings of naturally objectivated norms and truths Apel refers to Gadamer's rejection of the 'possibility of a systematic progressive objectivation of meaning in the human sciences' being influenced by the natural scientific ideal of attaining objective knowledge that 'leads to the emasculation of historical tradition'. An interpreter, for Gadamer, cannot break with historical tradition, on the one hand, and he cannot exclude on the other the application of his understanding 'to practical question of life.' Owing to this twofold task of philosophical interpretation, Gadamer equates the model of an interpreter with 'the model of a judge' whose 'understanding of written law' is applied by himself in the court room or with 'the model of a director' whose 'understanding of a drama' is applied by himself when he stages it. In both of these models, 'understanding does not destroy the binding nature of tradition but mediates it with the present' (p. 62).

Apel does not fully agree with Gadamer though he appreciates his attempt of safeguarding the mediation of tradition through understanding. The Gadamerian attempt of equating the model of a good interpreter with the model of a judge or a director is something which Apel disagrees with, as Gadamer 'goes too far when he disputes the meaning of the methodological-hermeneutic abstraction from the question of truth and equates the model of the judge or director with that of the interpreter'. '[T]he scientific understanding of meaning,' Apel argues, 'presupposes a methodological abstraction' which 'is already suggested in the pre-scientific realm by the interpreter's situation'. The interpreter's 'pre-reflexive engagement is a part of hermeneutic understanding' and it 'is fundamentally different from that of the director or even the judge.' So '[t]he interpreter's own specific function within the mediation of meaning in the context of practical situations in life is already completely different from that of the director or even the judge' (p. 63).

Apel also disagrees with Gadamer's forceful demand for a binding application of the interpreter's understanding as the judge or the director who may actualize it in his making judgment through his understanding of written law or in his staging a drama after having understood it respectively. He considers that kind of demand to be an 'ideological corruption.' The mediation of traditions cannot simply be attained through 'the interest of the application of understanding.' Instead, it is a complicated mediation that cannot be made possible only 'by means of hermeneutic abstraction from normative validity'. Here Apel poses solution to the problem of philosophical function of hermeneutics by suggesting a tripartite task: First, the task of a rational integration of the results of hermeneutical sciences can only be undertaken by the philosophy of history; second, the philosophy of history not only draws

upon the hermeneutic sciences rather it must encompass both the hermeneutic and the explanatory sciences; and third, it must incorporate a 'methodological approach that can be reduced neither to the questions raised by scientism nor those raised by hermeneutics' (pp. 63–66).

At this point Apel approaches the second part of his bipartite demonstration that is concerned with the dialectical mediation of explanation (objective-scientific method) and interpretation (hermeneutic method) in the critique of ideology. The exposition of this part of his argument concerning the philosophical foundation of hermeneutics will show the real concern of non-western societies with his project of the cognitive anthropology.

Non-western man's adoption of 'the European technical-industrial form of life and its specific foundations' forces him to distance himself from his own tradition. This emergent crisis of break with tradition, which Apel calls 'the problem of historicism' cannot be resolved 'solely by hermeneutic reflection.' Rather along with it non-western man must also 'achieve a quasi-objective, historical-philosophical system of reference'. He must preferably seek a 'philosophical and scientific orientation' to mediate a hermeneutic understanding both of his own and foreign, particularly the western, 'traditions of meaning by sociological analysis of those economic and social orders' which he belongs to (p. 66). Furthermore, the interpreter is always to face certain limitations and contradictions in order to understand the texts of temporally and spatially distant cultures.

Critically analyzing the guiding principles of empathetical understanding-'making oneself contemporary with an ultimately identified oneself with the author of the text that is to be understood', one can 'illuminate' the philosophical assessment of the problem of historicism in the situation of one's own culture. Apel agrees with Gadamer to consider the principle of empathetic understanding as an 'illusion.' According to the former, when an interpreter attempts to reflexively understand an author and his text, then his interpretation is far more than the empathetic reconstruction of the author's life experiences. The interpreter reflexively transcends the author and his inner experiences of the life-world that were objectivated in the text to understand the author better than he understands himself. This is what Apel calls 'the reflexively transcending understanding' rather than the empathetic reconstruction of the author of the distant cultures.

There are always certain limitations and contradictions faced by the interpreter in order to understand the texts of temporally and spatially distant cultures. In the course of history, human beings have always been unable to have a transparent and lucid understanding either of their 'intentions' and 'motives' behind their actions or of at least their conceptions of meaning that are objectivated in the linguistic documents like historical and literary works. They have always been and still are unable to put the full and pure expressions of their intellectual 'convictions' and 'intentions' in the linguistic texts and so the major part of their history remains in the natural and actual forms of life. When an interpreter is to mediate the tradition he finds a huge 'barrier to understanding' due to the 'contradictions which are determined by the intermeshing of sense and nonsense, intended actions and naturally determined reactions' (p. 68).

Here one can understand why Apel does not find merely a hermeneutic reflection enough to mediate tradition. Instead, he puts emphasis on undertaking a philosophy of history that seeks to integrate both hermeneutic and explanatory sciences. The hermeneutic side of the philosophy of history is concerned with the interpretation of those motivations and intentions of life that can be understood by the drive of 'the hermeneutic interest in intersubjective agreement.' Whereas the explanatory scientific side of the philosophy of history may deal with those 'factually contingent factors of human history' which are unable to rise to the level of intersubjective agreement because they are not 'subjectively transparent but are merely factually effective and can only be analyzed by means of a quasi-objective explanatory science' (p. 68).

With the dialectical mediation of hermeneutic and explanatory methods Apel incorporates the critique of ideology through the model of psychoanalysis. Drawing from his notion of the 'partial suspension of hermeneutic communication' Apel equates the critique of ideology with the technique of psychotherapy further relating to the mediation of explanation and interpretation. In a discourse between people, one party does not take the intentions of the other 'seriously hermeneutically', rather 'distances himself from the other objectively as a quasi-natural entity.' He no longer attempts to create the unity of language in communication, but rather seeks to evaluate what the other person says as the symptom of an objective situation which he seeks to explain from outside in a language in which his partner does not participate' (p. 68). This is what Apel calls 'the partial breakdown of hermeneutic communication in favour of objective method of acquiring knowledge' and which he further equates with the situation wherein a psychotherapist treats his neurotic patient. The breakdown of hermeneutic communication is to have an analogical relation to 'the break with tradition' that we have already mentioned as the problem of historicism. Responding to this problem Apel proposes to explore a philosophy of history that must, on the one hand, unify both hermeneutic and scientistic methods and, on the other, 'adopt the objective distantiating cognitive role of a psychotherapist regarding 'the behaviuor and meaning claims of what has been handed down [through tradition] and of contemporaries'. The hermeneutic method of historical explanation emphasizes that 'the objective context of events as a result of historical reconstruction is mediated through an understanding of the intentions of participating human beings' whereas the scientific explanation of history attempts to mediate the causes behind the events 'by methodological analysis of objective, operating factors of which the responsible actors are not at all conscious as meaningful motives' (p. 69).

Apel considers 'the quasi-objective cognitive achievement of the behavioral sciences' as an ideal form of scientistic explanation to be incorporated into his proposed method of philosophy of history. His cognitive model finds itself in a mid-way between the methods mentioned above by realizing a connection between 'the quasi-natural causal process of a specific mode of societal practice and the neurotic symptoms of individuals in this society'. This proposal takes the form of a psychoanalytic-psychotherapeutic model as a critique of ideology, as it, on the one hand, analyzes human history to diagnose the ailment of the social sciences, and on

the other, cures the ailments by therapy of the society. The guiding cognitive interest of this model, Apel argues, 'corresponds to the life-a priori of a psychosomatic self-diagnosis and self-therapy of mankind' (pp. 71–72).

Ahistoricality of Meanings and the Islamic-Hermeneutic Reflexivity

Apel's project of cognitive anthropology as discussed above seems to work within the historicity of one or more traditions. The historicity as essentiality of this paradigm limits its benefits for one who tends to interpret the change or transformation of a historical continuum or tradition through a text which is ahistorical in character. This is the case of transformation of Islamic tradition during any phase of history. In order to interpret such a transformation one will have to explore a hermeneutics which may incorporate the ahistorical or the divine with the historical or the mundane. This divine-mundane mutuality is something that is absolutely missing in Apel's philosophical suggestion.

Islamic tradition is a historical continuum like all other specific traditions but unlike the western one it is a continuum that began to rise in a linguistically specific culture through a specific set of meanings revealed to the Prophet from the ahistorical divine origin. Therefore, in any phase of its historical development if a Muslim is to therapeutically approach to it he cannot neglect how it was originally initially to rise out of the revealed meanings in the Prophetic era.

The linguistic orientation of the development of pagan-Arab tradition guaranteed an intersubjective meaning context of Arabic language wherein the Prophet was succeeded in making the Arabs understand the word of God. The Qur'an itself explains that if it had been revealed in a language other than that which the Prophet shared with his original addressees, the pagan Arabs would have never convinced by it.[3] For, the intersubjective meaning context established through the pagan-Arab tradition was given to the Prophet and the pagan Arabs at the plane of Arabic language. It would, therefore, be unlikely for the Prophet to convince the Arabs through interpretation of any text other than the Arabic one. The Arabic language shared between the Prophet and his original addressees would be a precondition of all understanding and interpretation of the Qur'an construed either by the Prophet, his companions, their successors, or any other individual or group belonging to any epoch throughout the history of Muslims. This reminds us of Apel's notion of the precondition of language for all cognition as he expounds in his project of cognitive anthropology.

The Qur'an was revealed in the perspective of that meaning context through the signs and symbols of Arabic language whose meanings were prejudged or "prejudiced" by the Arabs with reference to their tradition. This prejudiced meaning, on the part of the Qur'an, was a misunderstood or misinterpreted meaning of a linguistic symbol with reference to its traditional use in the pagan Arab life-world. Besides, the pre-Islamic life-world was not homogenously pagan or polytheist

(though predominantly to be so), rather there were certain monotheistic elements out there in that culture, which reflects that there was a plausibility of understanding regarding the traditional meanings of a linguistic symbol. The polytheist-monotheist dichotomy of meanings of a linguistic symbol might have always been there in that culture to give rise to the misunderstanding. Had the only source of meanings been the traditional life-language complex, it would have been impossible for an individual to cleanse the misunderstandings from his culture. He could instead cleanse his own reason as per the historical predominance of tradition. But the transformation of pagan-Arab tradition into Islamic-Arab tradition shows that there is a source of meanings which is far stronger than that of the historicality of tradition. This is an ahistorical and divine source which we call the Qur'an, which bestowed on the Prophet the neologisms of meaning along with his ability of hermeneutic praxis to realize that ahistoric neologisms in the historic life-world.

The Prophet, through the divine neologisms, attempted to eliminate the prejudiced misunderstandings of his original addressees regarding the traditional meaning of the linguistic symbols by the way of a dialogic-hermeneutic process. The dialogue between the Prophet and his addressees was realized on the plane of language given to both of the parties through tradition. His addressees were equipped with the prejudiced and misunderstood meanings of the traditional linguistic signs while the Prophet was the bearer of the divinely revealed neologisms of the same signs. This is the most significant aspect of the dialogic-hermeneutic process that the neologisms were not to bring the new symbols with the new meanings rather the divinely appropriate meanings for the old traditional symbols which were being used with the mundanely corrupt meanings in the pagan-Arab life-world. There were two horizons: the first was the mundane-historical horizon of tradition which was given to both the parties engaged in the dialogue in terms of language-life complex of the Arabs. The Second was the divine-ahistorical horizon of the Qur'anic neologisms corresponding to the first through the same complex. The fusion of the two horizons, to use Gadamer's phrase,[4] was realized when the Prophet made them fuse together through his hermeneutic praxis. The fusion of the divine or ahistorical and the mundane or historical horizons through the Prophetic-hermeneutic praxis gave rise to the understanding between the two parties regarding the use of traditional-linguistic symbols in terms of the Qur'anic neologisms. This is the uniqueness of the Prophetic hermeneutics that it convinced the pagan Arabs to come into the fold of Islam through the fusion of the divine and the mundane horizons on the plane of the language-life complex. The Prophetic hermeneutics, by introducing the neologisms for the religiously significant traditional-linguistic symbols, not only developed the tradition further but meanwhile it also guaranteed the cleansing of the tradition culturally, socially, ethically and politically from all of the pagan or non-Islamic attachments to it.[5]

The above discussion shows how the mundane-divine or the historical-ahistorical mutuality defines the orientation of Islamic tradition which Apel neglects in construing his project of philosophy of history as a cognitive anthropology for non-western societies. Apel focuses the historicity of tradition while presenting his idea of the reflexively transcending understanding of a text objectivated by an author of distant culture. This reflexive transcendence is not simply possible

for a Muslim interpreter due to the essentiality of historical-ahistorical mutuality of Islamic tradition.

Instead of the reflexive transcendence the Islamic-hermeneutic reflexivity seems to be more viable for a Muslim interpreter if he has to therapeutically approach to Islamic tradition. I have worked out this notion with reference to the theorization of reflexive modernity as expounded by Scott Lash. Drawing from Heidegger's notions of '*Sorge* (Care)', '*besorge* (concern)', '*fürsorge* (solicitude)' and Bourdieu's notion of '*habitus*' as an 'unthought category', Lash expounds the concept of 'hermeneutic reflexivity.' Man (*Dasein*) is a being-in-the-world who lives in his life-world with 'shared meanings and practices.' Human life, as a shared practice, is bound to the triad of *Sorge*, *besorge* and *fürsorge*. The first is the 'Care' for *Dasein* itself, the second is its 'concern for things,' and the third is its 'solicitude for other human beings.' Another way of situating the self in the matrix of shared meanings of a society is found in Bourdieu's notion of habitus. Lash interprets Bourdieu's habitus in terms of his own conceptions of hermeneutic reflexivity and reflexive community. Man (I) is thrown in community (We), so that all growth of 'I' will be consistent with its 'involvement in 'we.' Self's involvement in community is defined by the Heideggerian notion of *Sorge*, which is to say, self is engaged with community through 'Care for things and other human beings in everyday communal practices.' According to Bourdieu, the most foundational (ontologically) plane of human conduct is the 'field' of 'habits,' 'the *Sitten*' the 'unconscious and bodily practices and categories of the unthought.'[6] Bourdieu further interprets the *Sitten* to construe them as 'predispositions' and 'orientations' being the most fundamental and 'immediate' for 'conscious conduct.' Having the *Sitten* as the determinants of all shared practices in background, reflexivity operates not through concepts in the sphere of some conceptually given world (Beck and Giddens) rather through habits as predispositions and orientations that situate 'knowers' in their community or life-world. It means one's thoughts are construed not as 'categories but as interpretive schemata' in the context of life-world which makes reflexivity be a hermeneutic operation on the plane of 'communitarian moments.[7]

Let us see what Islamic-hermeneutic reflexivity would be, if it were there as a ground for a Muslim interpreter to therapeutically approaching to Islamic tradition. Reflexivity does not mean here the late modernists' reflection about modernity itself to replace it with another form of modernity, which is to say, reflexivity is not an operation of reinforcing modernity by patching various modernist theoretical pieces together. It is instead one's reflection on one's own self in terms of shared meanings and practices through which one is situated in the community. The categories required for the operation of the self-reflection should not be the cognitive structures that may have already been given to one being an ideologue of fundamentalism or modernism etc. In order to make one's reflexivity Islamic-hermeneutic in character, one must not also get to the most fundamental plane of human conduct like habitus, to use Bourdieu's term. In case of one's being Muslim to share meanings and practices with the others in the context of Muslim community, one's reflexivity operates through the *Sitten* already objectively given in the form of revealed meanings. All concepts are construed either on the ground or in the light of these meanings and all habits as given in the community have already been conventionalized in

accordance with these very meanings. Being *ahistorical* (divine) in character these meanings are always *a priorily* given in the community for all *historical* endeavors like theoretical constructions of Muslim mind or conventionalized praxis of Muslim community. Owing to their being ahistorical (divine), these meanings are always found to be obscured by an historical (mundane) mind, and so these meanings cannot be taken as fixed patterns for man's thoughts and practices. They must instead be taken as interpretive schemata, to use Bourdieu's phrase, which can be historicalized on human plane through interpretation. Reflexively approaching to these meanings may be hindered due to one's in hand affiliation with certain ideology, as the ideological meanings may be like opaque determinants that do not allow an ideologue to see through them anything external to his ideological boundaries. Any intellectual attempt of transcending the opaquely closed ideological matrix to find oneself in a porous location may take form of the critique of ideology.

The critique of ideology that is at issue here has not to adapt the model of psychoanalysis presuming the ideologue to be a patient with the symptoms of being unfree, intolerant and narrow-minded towards the other meanings. At issue instead is one's urge of transcending the historical-interpretive bounds of ideology in order that one may find oneself at the most fundamental plane of revealed meanings in their necessary relation to the historical life-practices. In this regard, the ideologue is not a psychotic needing psychotherapy to become normal in having ideas and doing acts accordingly. Rather he is one who deliberately rationally adopts an interpretive paradigm in order to solve the problematic of how to practice in a historical life-world the ahistorical meanings that have already been revealed for the same purpose. If this deliberate rational submission to an authority leads one to showing the symptoms of intolerance and myopia, even then a psychotherapist cannot accomplish the task, as he refers, in order to treat one's disorder, to one's history rather than the ahistorical side of meanings one has been practicing in one's life-world. For accomplishing this task one instead requires, instead of a psychoanalyst, an interpreter *par excellence* who can translate the ahistoricality (divinity) of meanings not only into the communicative historicality of conversation but also into the historical life-practices. The model of the Prophetic hermeneutics, therefore, is the most appropriate one to accomplish the task, as a prophet not only communicates the divine meanings to the mortals but also interprets them both on the planes of conversation and life-praxis.

Conclusion

My bipartite discussion concludes that the contemporary Muslim societies cannot adopt Apel's scheme of cognitive anthropology, as it is expounded in general for contemporary non-western societies. Rather contemporary Muslim mind should deliberate philosophically through at least two dimensions. First, it should change the historical orientation of Apel's project into the historical-ahistorical mutuality of hermeneutic endeavor to be safely incorporated with the scientistics. With this

orientation every form of interpretation will be susceptible to mutually taken historical and ahistorical spheres of meanings. And it can further relate safely to the explanation required to cognize the linguistically undocumented corpus of knowledge handed down to the contemporary mind through the process of history. The second dimension of the philosophical deliberation is concerned with the third element of Apel's cognitive anthropology namely the critique of ideology as the technique of psychoanalysis. This element's being a critique of ideology of therapeutic nature is not problematic but it seems to be unjustifiable for Muslim mind in the form of psychotherapy. With the historical-ahistorical mutuality of understanding of tradition the third element, instead of the technique of psychotherapy, should be the Prophetic model of life therapy both with words and deeds.

Notes

1. The page references throughout are to Karl-Otto Apel, *Transformation der Philosophie* (*Towards a Transformation of Philosophy*), trans. Glyn Adey and David Frisby (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980).
2. The notion of the communication community originally belongs to Charles Sanders Peirce who expounded the idea of a 'semiotic community of interpretation' which was a 'community of experiment' for the natural scientists wherein they shared their explanation with others by coming to some agreement with them about their explanation. The major contemporary hermeneuticists like Apel, Habermas and Ricoeur owe to this notion for expounding their hermeneutical philosophies. See *Ibid.*, pp. 58–61 as well as its n.26.
3. The Qur'an says: "Verily this is heedfully revealed from the Lord of the worlds. The Trustworthy Spirit came down with it, in the perspicuous Arabic language (*bi lisan 'Arabı mubın*), to thy heart so that thou mayest be from amongst the cautioners (*al-mundhirın*). …Had we revealed it to any of the non-Arabs, and had he recited it to them, they would not have believed in it." (*Shu'ara'* 26:192–199).
4. For Gadamer's idea of understanding tradition in terms of his notion of horizon as 'a range of vision' of one in a 'hermeneutical situation' with a 'particular vantage point' from which one is to see the effective-history of tradition, and then the emergence of understanding out of the fusion of horizons of past and present of tradition see Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode* (*Truth and Method*) trans. G. Barden and W.G. Doerpal (New York: Crossroad, 1975), pp. 269–273.
5. I have summarized this account of historical development of Islamic tradition through the Prophetic hermeneutics on the plane of Arabic language from my own earlier work. For the details of how the Prophet succeeded in using the divine neologisms in the making of Islamic tradition one should see Abdul Rahim Afaki, The Historicality of Linguistic Signs and the Ahistoricality of Meanings: The Role of Divine Neologisms in the Making of Islamic-Arab Tradition, in Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (ed.), *Timing and Temporality in Islamic Philosophy and Phenomenology of Life* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), pp. 195–221.
6. This notion of the 'unthought' is entirely different from that of Mohammed Arkoun's which he excavates in developing his project of 'the critique of Islamic reason.' To cognize the difference one should see Mohammed Arkoun, *The Unthought in Contemporary Islamic Thought* (London: Saqi Books, 2002).
7. Scott Lash, Reflexivity and its Doubles: Structure, Aesthetics, Community, in Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash (eds.), *Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), pp. 110–173.

El Horizonte Rítmico Del Lenguaje (Trasfondo Fenomenológico En Las *Coplas* De Jorge Manrique)

Antonio Domínguez Rey

Abstract Entre el siglo XV y el XX la poética ha buscado en la forma la variedad de la vida, pero el contenido apenas cambia más allá de los grandes temas tradicionales. La forma sigue engendrando contenido y éste se conforma según los modos o posturas que el hombre adopta mientras vive. Jorge Manrique estableció en el siglo XV los cuatro vértices de orientación humana: tierra, hombre, cielo, Dios. Heidegger los repite cinco siglos después buscando en la voz humana la esencia del pensamiento poético. En el ritmo del poema resuena el interior de la vida que conforma una estancia.

Between the XVth and the XXth centurias poetics has sought the variety of life in Form, but Content has barely changed beyond the great traditional themes. Form keeps begetting Content and the latter adapts to the attitudes Man adopts during his lifetime. Jorge Manrique established in the XVth century the four pillars of human orientation: Earth, Man, Sky, God. Heidegger rediscovers these pillars while looking for the essence of Poetic thought in the human voice. The interiority of Life sounds in the rhythm of the poem, thus becoming a dwelling.

La poesía de Jorge Manrique, poeta español de la segunda mitad del siglo XV, nos sitúa, como un arco, en la transición del Renacimiento al Clasicismo hispánico. Compuso uno de los monumentos universales de la poesía, las *Coplas sobre la Muerte de su Padre*, don Rodrigo Manrique, maestre de la Orden de Santiago y fallecido en 1476.

El poema es una reflexión memorable sobre el paso del tiempo y la caducidad de la vida resuelta, no obstante, en memoria ejemplar de cumplimiento suyo, según programa y destino personal de conducta. El acorde de la voluntad humana con la divina (estrofa XXXVIII).

A. Domínguez Rey (✉)
Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (UNED), Madrid, Spain
e-mail: adominguez@flog.uned.es

A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), *Phenomenology and the Human Positioning in the Cosmos: The Life-world, Nature, Earth: Book One*, Analecta Husserliana 113,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-4801-9_6,

Las *Coplas* ya son además frontispicio de la poética moderna, por más que su lenguaje, composición, figuras y hasta técnica estrófica, pertenezcan casi por entero a la retórica de la Edad Media. Cada estrofa conjunta dos coplas de seis versos (sextilla) rimados correlativamente en cada una de ellas: a, b, c, / a, b, c // d, e, f, / d, e, f. Los versos son octosílabos de dos en dos (1º-2º, 4º-5º) y tetrasílabos o pentasílabos el 3º y 6º de cada copla. La figura estrófica crea así una plantilla regular de dos en dos unidades (copla y copla), por una parte; tres a tres (primeros tres versos y tres siguientes de cada copla); dos a dos de nuevo separados por el verso tetrasílabo, denominado de pie quebrado y cuya estrofa se conoce desde entonces como manriqueña. Los tetrasílabos forman, a su vez, par, de tal modo que el poema avanza con unidades ternarias (tres más tres) que comprenden pares de octosílabos, pares de tetrasílabos o pentasílabos asimétricos, pares de rimas (a… a, b… b, c… c, etcétera), algunas de las cuales coinciden en copla y copla:



Y la segunda copla tiene la misma estructura de versos, variada la rima. El pie quebrado reproduce o contrabalancea con sus sílabas (normalmente cuatro, pero hay algunos de cinco) uno de los hemistiquios del octosílabo, de cuatro o cinco pies métricos, por lo que cada verso se corresponde además con otro, formando par rítmico. El apareamiento de rima y ritmo, persistente, modulado, alterno o contrapuesto, configura unidades a la vez sucesivas y quebradas, como las ondas del río, pero también recurrentes y reflejas, en retorno, como las olas del mar.

El pie quebrado de cada estrofa o semiestrofa completa sentido o proposición introduciendo *arsis* mental seguida de apódosis o *thesis*. Se conforma así una alternancia de impulso, inicio o arranque, propuesta, desarrollo, ondulación y descenso, cierre semántico, lo cual sugiere cadencia de ideas y sensaciones asociada al ritmo fónico -métrico- y fonológico, psíquico.[1] El pie quebrado rompe a veces

[1]El dinamismo alcanzado con estos recursos procede de la fluencia rítmica del ánimo y del entendimiento fundidos en unidad de creación poética. Las estrofillas de arte menor oscilan en la lírica tradicional española entre treinta y cuarenta sílabas (20+20 en las *Coplas*). En ellas apreciamos

aparentemente la armonía con pentasílabos que resultan en realidad cuatro sílabas al formar sinalefa la primera con la última del verso precedente ("el ánima gloriosa-an/ gelical", VII) o al asumir este la primera del tetrasílabo, en anacrusis: "pues que todo ha de pasar-por/ tal manera" (II). Estos fenómenos sensibilizan la interpolación de ideas, afectos -*pazémata*-, la subsunción o *intususcepción* de tiempos y la recurrencia sonora o mental de una resonancia continua de fondo que integra cuerpo, mundo y conciencia como voz suya implícita.

La imagen conceptual sobre la que se funda el tema central (caducidad de la vida) es la proporción semántica vida : río :: muerte : mar, de tal modo que:

> Nuestras vidas son los ríos
> que van a dar a la mar
> que es el morir (III)

Cada término o concepto asocia además otros que funcionan como campo conceptual y semiótico suyo, según los rasgos más sobresalientes. La vida se disocia en tres niveles correlacionados: terrena y temporal perecedera, de gloria y honor que confiere el éxito humano, y última o de duración eterna. La muerte comprende, en lo terreno, los sacrificios de la brega diaria, sus sufrimientos, la caducidad de la vida y el tránsito a su tercer nivel, el eterno. Esta contraposición semántica es típica de la Edad Media y remonta al estoicismo y tradición bíblica.

La dualidad alterna, acompasada, de la tríada de versos y sus correspondencias duales crean un movimiento interno sobre fondo recurrente cuya imagen plasma y simboliza, a la par, el flujo y la duración del tiempo. Manrique, dice José Bergamín, descubre "la circulación temporal poética de la música en el pensamiento".[2] Las modulaciones del espacio estrófico entre copla y copla, verso y verso, de tres en tres, instauran un volumen fonémico e icónico en el que resuena el transcurso de la vida con sus acciones y la reflexión que su paso induce en la conciencia. El ritmo asocia la alternancia de la respiración y el movimiento meditativo del ánimo y tanto del andar como, nos atrevemos a decir, de la cabalgadura, a la que Manrique estaba acostumbrado en su oficio de caballería.

La transición del tiempo entre el irse de la vida y el venir de la muerte avanza y retrocede como quien sale y vuelve al punto de origen pero ya con otro horizonte de existencia. Son acciones con *se* reflejo, impersonal y anónimo, procesivo, dotado de carácter aparentemente neutro y cuyo pliegue retorna las acciones sobre sí mismas sin apenas algún relieve, como cayendo, declinándose en dominio de nadie: "cómo se pasa la vida, / cómo se viene la muerte" (I); "quán presto se va el plazer"; "cómo en un punto se es ido"; "No se engañe nadie, no" (II); "derechos a se acabar" (III). Sin embargo, la inapariencia funcional del pronombre reflejo resulta decisiva.

---

esa correspondencia de sucesión por niveles gramaticales, prosódicos, métricos y el tono de la estructura musical mediante los fenómenos de "desarrollo, arranque, vuelo y cadencia", observa Agustín García Calvo en *Tratado de Rítmica y Prosodia y de Métrica y Versificación*, Editorial Lucina, Zamora, 2006, pp. 607, 609. (Respetamos la particular ortografía del autor, que no coincide por entero con la norma oficial del castellano). A todo ello se une el tono melódico y pausal de la semántica rítmica, que evoca, entre otras referencias, los *Salmos*.

[2]Bergamín, José, *Al Fin y al Cabo. Prosas*, Alianza Editorial, Madrid, 1981, p. 204.

El *se* acusativo deslíe el contenido semántico de los verbos, su despliegue, como arrastrando un movimiento opaco y subyacente en cualquier acción realizada. Es el carácter neutro de la caducidad inscrita en la posición nominal y humana de sujeto, pero también el movimiento acusativo que indica anonimato e inexistencia. Una transición refleja con valor semántico intransitivo. Las acciones de *pasarse*, *venirse*, *irse* concluyen en el sujeto sin más horizonte que la acumulación inane de espaciotiempo, como aquella sucesión continua de las ondas fluviales y el retorno a sí misma de la masa marítima, donde confluyen los ríos. He aquí otro valor icónico del *se* pronominal. Alude al mismo modo de formación conclusiva: "por tal manera". A ello se refiere también la donación implícita de expresiones como *es gibt* en alemán o el *ahí* generalizante del *haber -il y a-* francés, el *hay* español, transcurso persistente y no agentivo del mundo sin significado, sin conexión sintáctica, apagada la voz del hombre y su transformación del aire respirado en sentido. Lo que serían el mundo y sus cosas ausente la condición humana.

La estrofa inicial del poema es una descripción fenomenológica de la deconstrucción de la temporalidad humana y, *a contrario*, de su constitución originaria. El instante del tiempo se sume entre la expectativa de futuro, la esperanza de su continuo o duración en el tránsito permanente y su desrealización interna.

Esa estrofa sitúa el tema o *qué* temático de la enunciación en el *cómo* del darse o haberse ahí del acontecimiento, su fenómeno. Un *cómo* que causa admiración ponderada ("tan callando") e intensiva ("quán") dentro de la conciencia avisada ("recuerde", "despierte"), también refleja, meditativa:

> Recuerde el alma dormida,
> abive el seso y despierte
> contemplando (I)[3]

El *cómo* interrogativo a la par que admirativo y la intensidad ("tan", "quán") indican la calidad del tono y, por ello mismo, el grado del afecto o afección del ánimo, el *pathos* del intelecto sentiente y del sentido ("seso") inteligente. Todo ello, además, en silencio:

> cómo se pasa la vida,
> cómo se viene la muerte
> tan callando (I)

La vivencia de este fenómeno nos sitúa en la contemplación del mundo, la mundanización de la vida, su acotamiento o suspensión. Como acto intelectual no se limita, sin embargo, a una epojé fenomenológica ordinaria, pues lo suspendido tiembla, vibra, inquieta. Es fenómeno según el cual el modo de acceso a su constitución descubre el proceso de la misma, sin distanciarse del objeto considerado. Contiene su tránsito, la patencia del tiempo. Abstrae resonando.

Tal pervivencia y asistencia del fenómeno a sí mismo caracteriza el método poético. Al revenir la reducción a su base material, dóxica, la experiencia de partida

[3] "Abive" se escribe actualmente "avive".

adquiere nuevo sentido. No es ya la del comienzo, que sigue vibrando ahí, sino ella más sus antecedentes y precondiciones, aquello que posibilita el sentido emergente. Los valores mundanales descubren entonces su valor de tránsito y apoyo, su estimación -*estimativa* de Ortega y Gasset-, la confianza del acto humano fundado en naturaleza objetiva, una especie de fe animal ("animal faith" de George Santayana) que genera esperanza de vida.

La suspensión realizada no deja de lado lo suspendido. Mantiene en acto el proceso de reducción mirando a donde se verifica y despliega incesante, de tal modo que crea una relación interna -emocional, sensitiva, perceptiva, lógica, imaginaria- entre la intención y lo intuido, la indeterminación y sus concreciones, lo homogéneo y sus diferencias, etcétera. La contemplación, el objeto contemplado y quien contempla se hallan inmersos en el mismo fenómeno. Su resultado es precisamente el poema verso a verso, estrofa a estrofa, palabra a palabra, sílaba a sílaba. A cada unidad la transe una inherencia que la correlata con otros elementos, de tal modo que todas ellas, las unidades, se corresponden. Cada una está en otra al mismo tiempo y bajo algún determinado aspecto.

La primera parte de la tercera estrofa (III) citada es un ejemplo claro de esta correlación intensiva. Los dos primeros versos muestran un ritmo contrapuesto, trocaico uno (óo óo óo óo), yámbico y anfíbraco otro [oó oóo oó(o)] si consideramos anacrusis entre la sílaba final del segundo y la primera del tercero. Tal suposición plantea dificultades métricas y prosódicas que afectan al verbo ser en tercera persona, monosílabo *es* que pierde intensidad fónica al diptongarse con el relativo *que* y ocupar posición átona como cierre del pie anfíbraco: *la mar/ quees*.

La lectura propuesta confiere al pie quebrado tensión laxa de anapesto (ooó) o de peón en tercer grado (ooóo) al tener en cuenta el valor doble de la sílaba *rir* de *morir* por ser final de verso.[4] Esta laxitud aparente principia en la sinalefa ya señalada de *que* y *es* (*quees*). La forma verbal (*es*) suspende su probable acento de intensidad en posición postónica. Sin embargo, esta misma posición crea una expectativa emocional. El contenido semántico del verbo *ser* -se habla del tránsito de la vida hacia la muerte- subsume la tensión en una atonía que estalla precisamente en la última sílaba acentuada del pie quebrado: (*quees*) *el morir* [(o) ooó(o)].

[4] Si mantenemos cinco sílabas en el verso de pie quebrado [óo oó(o)], retornamos al troqueo (óo) y al anfíbraco [oó(o)], cuyo acento recuerda el del yambo. El verso resume entonces el contrabalanceo de los dos anteriores y conserva la intensidad semántica, definitoria, del verbo ser: *queés el morír* (acentuación métrica). Y aún caben otras hipótesis de medida, como considerar la suspensión átona del verbo en sinalefa, prescindiendo de la anacrusis, y acentuar, en consonancia con el acento en segunda sílaba del verso anterior, el artículo *el*: *quees él morír* [(oó oó(o)]. También resulta posible una transición de tono bajo en las dos primeras sílabas, breves (*quees el*: oo), y entre la tensión final de *mar* y *morir*, fundidos en una sola imagen. En la primera de las hipótesis, el verbo ser (*es*) incrementa la tensión fonológica de *mar*, dos acentos métricos casi seguidos -media la transición de sílaba final del segundo verso- o dos crestas fónicas separadas por corte tonal agudo. Y la tensión remata en *morir* con el intervalo de las dos sílabas breves intermedias, que tanto pueden oscilar a una u otra banda con distintas posibilidades métricas. Estas opciones indican el alto grado de interpretación hermenéutica de la estrofa y la inquietud anímica que la mueve, propia de un oleaje interno a pesar del tono meditativo, o como consecuencia suya.

El encabalgamiento de la anacrusis (*la mar/ quees*) está siendo la quiebra y suspensión crítica de aquel tránsito.

La imagen implícita en el ritmo de las olas, horas y días fluyentes, contrabalanceados en los acentos métricos de los dos versos iniciales de la estrofa, vivifica la desembocadura de los *ríos* en el *mar*. A su vez, la aliteración sucesiva de consonantes (nasales, oclusivas, fricativas, alveolares) y vocales confluye también en el tercer verso. Se produce entonces un fenómeno de inherencia atributiva. Las dos sílabas de *morir* acumulan el valor fonoicónico de las palabras *son*, *ríos* y *mar*, así como otras latencias prosódicas y rítmicas, por ejemplo el punteo monosilábico de los tres versos, que incide también en la medida silábicamente marcada de *mo-rir*.

El *cómo* del proceso está siendo la formación interna del *qué* temático. Lo que se muestra se dona desde su fuente y tal don es su propia forma dimanando.

El *se* fenomenológico añade al *cómo*, por otra parte, la declinación del tiempo según "nuestro parecer" (I), es decir, teniéndolo a mano, acumulado, sólido, poseído. Y esto es el fundamento del afecto: recordar lo sentido reconociendo en ello lo "mejor" de la vida, su "tiempo pasado", el cual retorna y entonces causa, "da dolor", como dice el poema (I).

Esta coincidencia de gusto en el afecto vivido y, en cuanto caduco, doloroso, se extiende históricamente hasta el trasfondo anímico de la poesía romántica del siglo XIX e incitación de búsqueda tras el tiempo perdido en la transición al siglo XX.

La suspensión efectuada desvela lo sabido subyacente en el fondo de todo conocimiento como *a priori* suyo, un participio pasivo no obstante dinámico, pues su pasividad pesa y condensa elevando capas sucesivas de constitución no obstante inmaterial o más bien energética: la forma que *se* configura y deviene, en el caso aquí presente, poema.

El sentido de la realidad humana depende de la forma sustanciada en continua correspondencia de elementos. Encierra en sí una serie de atributos correlacionados según aquello ya sabido y latente. Este conocimiento implícito que inquieta y deslíe se contiene en nódulos de afecto cuya constitución nos descubre el modo operativo de su emergencia. El objeto está siendo tal formación de correspondencia, no sólo el carácter de lo objetivo narrado. En el poema de Jorge Manrique la objetividad parte del tono cadencioso y persuasivo que late con el pálpito de la conciencia. Es tono del afecto cognoscente, sentido.

Estos dos conceptos, conciencia y sensación percipiente, son un mismo fenómeno en lo sabido tan afectante como afectado. Dimanan en el tono de las estrofas, desde el comienzo hasta el final. El tono nos abre al mundo en que nos hallamos inmersos. Evidencia la síntesis (vida, fama, honor) del punto presente, el ahora de la concepción poética, y a la par el intervalo (dolor) e interrupción (muerte) de lo sintetizado. Tono y timbre, singularidad de vida sobre la común existencia humana y en la vibración resonante del mundo.

Todo ello se concentra en el *se* abriendo un hueco correspondiente al sujeto en nominativo, pero la relación pronominal de este caso dota al acusativo de un efecto objetivante y discursivo de la acción enunciada. El pronombre *se* recuerda el rumor latente de la desrealización compacta y desfondamiento anónimo de la realidad y

el sujeto constituidos, como consumiéndose en su sustancia, pues se han formado plegándose. El *se* reflejo nos permite asistir a este fenómeno como en *travelling* cinético o plano corrido, pero objetivando el proceso, concretándolo. La acción interna es contemplativa ("y pues vemos el presente") e incitadora ("Recuerde", "abive"), al tiempo que conmina ("No se engañe nadie, no"). Entre sujeto y acusativo transcurre el caso o acontecimiento, el *cómo* de su evanescencia, cuyo carácter semántico radica en lo verbos afectados por el *hay* (*hat -habere* latino-más adverbio *ibi*) del *se* convertido a su vez en un adverbio de transición, como moviendo el acto designado a una posición de presente cuya consistencia es solo el momento de enunciarla.

El pronombre *se* indica además el modo permanente del despliegue léxico-semántico de las formas verbales que lo integran. Cifra la modalidad constitutiva del tiempo. Todo cuanto acontece en el intervalo del presente, pasado y futuro, transcurre "por tal manera" (II), o como dice anteriormente otro lírico también del siglo XV, Juan de Mena, "La vida pasada es parte / de la muerte advenidera, / es pasado por est'arte / lo que por venir s'espera".[5] Las expresiones "por est'arte" y "por tal manera" indican el modo del *cómo* temporal en la transición de tiempos:

> No se engañe nadie, no,
> pensando que ha de durar
> lo que espera,
> más que duró lo que vio,
> pues que todo ha de pasar
> por tal manera. (II)

La conciencia vincula sus actos extendiendo la intención más allá del alcance real intuido. Lo así extenso crea un espejismo de permanencia tal que se irradia fuera de lo que sentimos y experimentamos. Confía en que siempre sucederá "por tal modo" (XXXVIII). Pero esta confianza engaña y confunde. Distiende un lecho movedizo de autoafirmación cognitiva. Por eso conviene no engañarse. El poeta recurre a palabras de valor negativo cuya conexión en la frase resulta positiva: despertemos, avivemos el sentido, la razón esclarecedora.

Los infinitivos "durar" y "pasar" reflejan la acción indefinida de los otros lexemas verbales subyacente en el vínculo de sus morfemas con el significado y atribución que cada palabra comporta en sí misma y en relación tanto con otras como con la realidad nombrada y con quienes, receptores, las escuchen y reciban. Los morfemas gramaticales de tiempo, modo, aspecto, número, persona, determinan una relación en el conjunto de correlaciones indicadas. El presente se estría a pesar de la confianza y se disuelve en las tensiones que lo forman.

El *qué* del *cómo* en *travelling* y plano corrido de la escena, envolvente, se condensa y resulta círculo interior del tiempo. Las ondas de la voz ritmada avanzan

[5]Mena, Juan de, *Coplas de los Pecados Mortales*, versos 33–36; citado por Miguel Pérez Priego (ed.) en Jorge Manrique, *Poesías Completas*, Espasa Calpe, Madrid, 1990 (15ª ed.), p. 154, nota 18. (Seguimos esta edición para las citas concernientes a las *Coplas a la Muerte de su Padre*, de Jorge Manrique. La cifra romana entre paréntesis designa el número de la estrofa).

resonando en todas direcciones, con lo que también revienen y fundan la estancia de entendimiento, siempre "por tal manera", distendiendo el ser de confianza (Heidegger) que la *ek-stasis* del *Dasein* procura. Cada sílaba marca un centro de irradiación en todo el poema.

Jorge Manrique ya avanza el diagrama fenomenológico del transcurso del tiempo y su modificación retencional, el carácter en apariencia inmutable de la continuidad perceptiva. Este modo de darse "por tal manera" difiere, no obstante, incluso cuando se repite un mismo sonido en distintas posiciones del verso o de la estrofa, como las negaciones "No… no" anteriormente citadas o las aliteraciones nasales (n… n… ñ… n… n), vocálicas, estas con asonantes internos en mitad del verso (a… e, a… e), u otros recursos métricos de troqueos sucesivos: óoóoóoó(o).

Los elementos silábicos retumban en consonancia con el flujo fónico general configurando un continuo en el que toda cesación sonora da paso a otro sonido cuyo nuevo presente resuena en la retención del anterior y se modifican mutuamente. Tales tránsitos generan curvas receptoras de ondas reflejas provenientes de la extensión rítmica de un sonido o de otras unidades fonémicas. Se establecen centros isotópicos en los que alternan armónicamente los sonidos entre sí desde centros reflejos e irradiantes.[6] Cada punto de tiempo timbra dentro de la vibración de fondo activando las sombras pasadas de otros presentes ahora evocados, traídos a primer plano de conciencia. Es la caída en profundidad del presente en el pasado, descrita por Husserl en los párrafos décimo y undécimo de las *Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins*.[7]

Existe una base fonoacústica que posibilita estos fenómenos y que apoya la elación del sonido en voz y fonema, así como procesos psíquicos y perceptivos cuyas bases neurológicas, de circuitos también recurrentes, inclinan a pensar en efectos homólogos. La "sensación temporal" creada ya no es el "tiempo real" que la induce: "Cuando el sonido finaliza, la sensación no desaparece instantáneamente: la persistencia de la sensación continúa. Esta persistencia de la sensación es directamente proporcional a los aumentos de frecuencia y/o intensidad".[8] Por otra parte, la acumulación propia del *axis rítmico* -acento, cantidad, tono y timbre-, coincidente en español con "la penúltima sílaba métrica de cada verso",[9] se disemina por otros ápices de este, en cesuras, hemistiquios y algunos acentos métricos. Los refuerzos de intensidad y frecuencia se corresponden con impulsos emotivos, de intuición, recubrimiento de percepciones, imágenes…, índices del valor simbólico de todo el poema.

---

[6]En tal sentido se pronuncia el estudio actual de la armonía consonántica y vocálica desde centros receptores de rasgos fónicos de otras unidades sonoras o centros expansivos, donantes, siguiendo una tendencia de búsqueda y copia (SEARCH-AND-COPY) en posiciones relativas de elementos (RELATIVIZED LOCALITY) y según determinadas constricciones fono-fonológicas. (Cf. Andrew Nevins, *Locality in Vowel Harmony*, Linguistic Inquiry Monographs, 55, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mss, 2010). Frederic Mailhot & Charles Reiss, "Computing long-distance dependencies in vowel harmony", *Biolinguistics* 1 (2007), pp. 28–48.

[7]Husserl, Edmund, *Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893–1917)*, Hss. X, Martinus Nijhoff, The Haag, 1966, pp. 27–31.

[8]Quilis, Antonio, *Métrica Española*, Editorial Ariel, Barcelona, 1996, p. 31.

[9]Ibid., p. 96.

Las ondas sonoras de vibración actual distienden un arco de resonancia que dota al presente de cada articulación fónica de un horizonte cuya vigencia es más virtual que efectiva. El presente se desvanece cayendo retenido en una profundidad que confiere a cualquier otro presente advenido aquella resonancia y arco de vibración múltiple. En la actualidad del sonido la *impresión* presente deviene conciencia *retencional*.[10] El punto de donación originaria se modifica continuamente y "por tal manera".

Al proceder de este modo, se origina además una presentación descriptiva (Darstellung)[11] de lo contenido en el flujo del desarrollo impresivo y perceptivo, como un lecho neurofluyente o depósito de circunvoluciones y sombras recurrentes. Husserl atribuye a la sucesión de impresiones sensitivas un recubrimiento cuyo lazo de conexión es la semejanza o similitud que genera una unidad perceptiva respecto de otra. La evanescencia declinada del sonido y sus impresiones fonoacústicas ecoan traslapándose y, procediendo así, se presenta una ostensión en unidad de formación o "según la misma forma". El tiempo fenomenológico (datos sensibles y aprehensiones de cosas) y el tiempo-espacio ("die Raum-Zeit") de los objetos se recubren entonces punto por punto.[12] Las unidades inmanentes y trascendentes se constituyen de modo análogo, "por tal manera". Es la constitución simultánea de la intención dirigida al objeto y lo que este determina en la conciencia al percibirlo. Por eso decíamos anteriormente que la suspensión poética mantiene en actualidad continua lo sentido, lo percibido y a quien siente percibiendo, o viceversa.

La ostensión descriptiva, en realidad la expresión que se produce en el acontecimiento mismo, manifiesta a su vez el fondo de recubrimiento sobre el que se origina la idea. Se abre un tiempo de resonancia en la dinamicidad perceptiva, vibratoria, una extensión de similitud en la que las ondas, siempre diversas, proceden de un mismo foco de emisión y resuenan "por tal manera", dejando tras de sí algo idéntico en la conciencia ostensiva del tiempo. Y esto es el lenguaje mismo para nosotros. En su proceso se nos presenta la moción objetiva de las cosas al experimentarlas y, sobre todo, la orientación de su sentido: la idea naciente.

Así pues, la constitución de la cosa o coseidad implica un espacio-tiempo vibrante o extensión perceptiva en presencia de un objeto determinado.[13] La relación de una idea con otra remite a este punto de vibración común originaria. En consecuencia, la abstracción contiene un ámbito de resonancia y correlaciones al que revierte su contenido, aquellas vivencias que la hicieron posible.

Aunque el proceso temporal se desvanece de continuo ("Y pues vemos lo presente / cómo en un punto se es ido / y acabado", II), queda un rescoldo o huella vivencial del desfondamiento. En su horizonte oscuro ("einen dunklen horizont")[14] y sobre los perfiles de la realidad percibida mediante asociaciones o equivalencias

[10] Husserl, Edmund, op. cit., p. 29.

[11] Ibid., pp. 92–93.

[12] Ibid., p. 93.

[13] Ibid., p. 65.

[14] Ibib, p. 84.

de un objeto relacionado con otro, asoma un instinto, podríamos decir, de ámbito transicional al que revienen más perfiles "por tal manera". Esta tendencia esboza un trasmundo de la objetividad y conformación así presentada, en sucesión fenomenológica de retenciones, protenciones, apresentaciones, retenciones de retenciones. Y en este flujo de la constitución interna del contenido inmanente funcionan también las modificaciones reproductivas de sus contenidos pasados o futuros, los recuerdos, deseos, expectativas.[15] Fluencia y nódulos de contención irradiada.

Son unidades correlativas. Contienen un centro tensional de relación, donde se constituyen. Podemos entrar en ellas y observar la vibración que las forma, donde se trascienden a otras unidades distintas de sí mismas. Tal tensión forma parte de la expectativa que busca, a veces en vacío, punto de apoyo, suelo.

Hay un mundo vivencial que nos remite a otro ignoto cuyo complemento intuitivo engendra un horizonte de expectativas colmadas con diversas ficciones o fantasmas (*fictum* o *ficta*, lo fingido de la ficción que intuye antes de saber si engaña o verifica) que inquietan, a su vez, al sujeto que las intuye y trata de comprenderlas. Jorge Manrique encuentra aquí el trasmundo de la fe: "Este mundo es el camino / para el otro que es morada / sin pesar" (V). La caducidad del presente se revela en el desvanecimiento de las cosas que lo habitan: su "poco valor" al perderlas, envejecer, arruinarse, según reflexión de la estrofa octava.

Vemos, pues, que del tono espontáneo de la tierra pasamos, mediante el aire articulado de las sílabas que produce y lo contienen, a un *cielo* especial, el de las ideas, y en ellas a contenidos que son objeto de interpretación intuitiva. A estos contenidos los dotamos de valor según justifiquen el trasmundo que revelan, tanto si valen en otro orden de este mismo mundo cuanto más si contribuyen a aquella revelación trascendental: esfuerzo, virtud, valentía, honra, fama, "gran amor de su tierra", humanidad y… muerte (XXV-XXXIII).

El ser humano se enfrenta en diálogo reflexivo con la muerte que lo llama ("vino la Muerte a llamar / a su puerta", XXXIII) y descubre en ese momento un presente especial de inminencia, pues amenaza la sucesión constitutiva del tiempo. La premonición de muerte contiene un tránsito o entretiempo, un intervalo que nos desequilibra en la punta extrema del punto, pero dentro de él, pues aún no se ha producido, aunque ya acontece de algún modo. Su virtualidad inquieta el presente del ahora amenazado en su constitución interna. Y entonces se impone la razón vital del acontecimiento, "por tal manera", es decir, la vibración ambiental de la vida descubierta en el tono del poema. El fin o término previsible, aún tensión futura (valor gramatical del sufijo *-ble*), todavía dura, y por tanto ha de perdurar, donde sea, como dura el pasado que lo potencia y tal cual consiste el valor vivo donde acontece. La resonancia asume esta tensión final dando paso a otra fase u "otra vida más larga" (XXXV), "perdurable" (XXXVI), cuya intuición es la "esperança" (esperanza) sobrevenida al gasto del tiempo mundano "por tal modo", que ahora se revela inútil y mezquino. Esta expectativa se cumple intuitivamente en la adhesión "conforme" de la voluntad propia "con la divina / para todo" (XXXVIII).

[15] Ibid.

Jorge Manrique nos sitúa en el salto cifrado de existencia (Karl Jaspers) partiendo de la caída mundana de lo a mano (*Vorhanden* de Heidegger) y del sobrevalor o elación que las relaciones internas del tiempo conforman como rastro en la constitución objetiva de la conciencia. La esperanza así emergente objetiva una tendencia de la voluntad viéndose caduca, pero no obstante vinculada con algo trasmundano que llega, llama y *se* presenta en forma de Muerte. Es el mundo de la fe animal y natural fundado en el esfuerzo de la vida cotidiana y el salto a lo divino desde la Tierra mediado algo Otro cuyos valores confrontan, paradójicamente, y desde el diálogo con un Tú transcendente (XXXIX), las valencias de los actos humanos: lucha, fama, honor…, duración caduca que ostentan los objetos y ansia, por tanto, de continuarla desde la tensión que provocan. Esta inquietud proyecta la fe natural de las acciones, su resonancia humana y el desfondamiento que revelan, en aquel futuro cuya inminencia de presente lo presenta tenso y amenazado en su fondo sin que en ningún instante falte la asistencia de vida "por tal manera" y "por tal modo".

La adhesión al Tú transcendente resultaría, con todo, salto en el vacío, si no se presentara también en "tal modo" y "tal manera". Y es esta la figura humana de la encarnación divina en "forma cevil" (vil o muy vil) de hombre con "baxo (bajo) nombre", aludiendo el poeta a la presencia humana de Dios hecho hombre.

Jorge Manrique asume el ideal cristiano de la existencia medieval y ya concentra las cuatro regiones del marco del mundo cuya correlación determina, según Heidegger, la proximidad de unas cosas con otras: tierra, cielo, dios y hombre.[16] Una proximidad anterior a lo próximo, formada en la relación natural del espacio-tiempo viviente ("der Zeit-Spiel-Raum"), de tal modo que cada una de estas dimensiones da, abre tiempo ("die Zeit zeitig") y espacio ("der Raum räumt"), respectivamente, y cuya temporalización y espaciamiento es la generación léxica, la palabra, producida según un mismo modo de unión, como en Jorge Manrique: *das Gleich-Zeitige* del filósofo y "por tal manera" del poeta. El lenguaje temporaliza espacializando.

La relación del lenguaje con la muerte, sigue diciendo Heidegger, desprende resplandor vivo ("blizt auf"),[17] brilla alzándose y de forma aún impensada ("ist aber noch ungedacht"), pero señala, nos hace señas, puede darnos un signo e indicarnos así el modo como la palabra nos reclama ("uns zu sich be-langt") y aproxima (el poema, la fábula, lo Dicho: "die Sage"), formando parte de esta aproximación el reclamo de la muerte. El resplandor del signo nos sitúa en la dirección o camino del modo de búsqueda a partir de esa señal o encuentro, la visita, por ejemplo, de la Muerte que llama a don Rodrigo y altera, extremándola, la temporalidad constituyente de su persona.

[16]Heidegger, Martin, *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1985, pp. 197–202. Cf. Antonio Domínguez Rey, "Jorge Manrique: razón poética y humanística del lenguaje", en Pedro Aullón de Haro (ed.), *Teoría del Humanismo, IV*, Editorial Verbum, Madrid, 2010, pp. 331–353.

[17]Heidegger, Martin, op. cit., p. 203.

En la correlación de las cuatro regiones antes citadas -tierra, cielo, dios y hombre- acontece el resplandor del signo o búsqueda del modo iluminante, que es el proceso del poema mismo ("die Sage"), lo fabulado de lo Dicho en el decir constituyente. Y esa búsqueda se conforma también iluminándose como orientación en cuyo transcurso la correspondencia de objetos y dimensiones abriga y libera la forma *es* de la pregunta por el ser de la cosa, aquello que queda impensado en lo Dicho o lo está diciendo; por tanto, la relación misma de la palabra pronunciada al *es* subyacente o silencio formante de todo lo que existe.[18]

La profundidad del poema descubre la formación de la naturaleza. Otro poeta del siglo XV, el Marqués de Santillana, relacionado también con Jorge Manrique, entrevió esta profundidad ontológica de la poesía partiendo del análisis filosófico de la naturaleza, cinco siglos antes que Heidegger: "Oyó los secretos de filosofía / e los fuertes pasos de naturaleza: / obtuvo el intento de la su pureza / e profundamente vio la poesía".[19] Las cosas pulsan, miden; la reflexión contempla el silencio desde donde asoman aquellas y moran, sin ruido alguno, en la paz procesiva del tiempo y extensiva del espacio, comenta Heidegger glosando a Stefan George, poeta de comienzos del siglo XX.[20] Y en esa paz silenciosa brilla la luz del pensamiento en el poema, decía ya Santillana en el siglo XV. El pensamiento poético.

El poema reclama tanto futuro cuanto ahonda en el ser oculto de su emergencia. Y esto funda para nosotros la ontopoesía o ritmo del pensamiento poético. El poema de Jorge Manrique es un ejemplo claro de esta visión profunda de la poesía.

El encuentro con la Muerte, simbolizada con letra mayúscula, pues no se trata de su dimensión ordinaria, aunque va comprendida en ella, provoca, decíamos, un desfondamiento de los valores mundanos y, desde esta caída o declinación del tiempo, instaura un intervalo final que induce un salto. Pudiera ser salto en el abismo, que de algún modo se muestra en aquel desfondamiento, pero la virtud o valor de vida impulsa más allá de su límite. La transición mediada se concreta en figura de Dios-hombre aceptando, por la fe, un Tú transcendente. Es la solución medieval suscitada por el entretiempo humanamente definitivo. Ahora bien, si atendemos al proceso rítmico del poema, a su semántica no menos melódica -el ritmo de imágenes-, el salto transicional de Jorge Manrique parte de la conformación de la voluntad humana así inmersa en la divina como el agua del río en la del mar inmenso. El poeta encuentra en el intervalo del extremo vivencial la fusión duradera del tiempo, como diciendo: si aquí, en la tierra, todo punto del tiempo tiende a recubrirse y a instaurar valor; si además hay una forma, la del lenguaje, que revierte la caída del tiempo en pilar o pie de apoyo de un arco u horizonte que lo elicita y descubre nuevos valores, entonces la curva del ritmo sigue su proceso al sonar la nota u onda aparentemente última, cuya vibración abre más espacio-tiempo, aunque este se muestre virtualmente como camino en horizonte, una tercera vía de encuentro ya duradero.

---

[18] Ibid., p. 204.

[19] Santillana, Marqués de, *Comediada de Ponza, Sonetos, Serranillas y Otras Obras*, Editorial Crítica, Barcelona, 1997; estrofa XXVII, p. 144.

[20] Heidegger, Martin, *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, ibid., p. 204.

La conformidad de voluntades, humana y divina en la figura y rostro de Dios-hombre, mueve también a consentimiento, el cual transforma el tránsito de muerte, su "trago" duro, en aceptación gustosa, "clara e pura" (XXXVIII).

Existe, pues, nos dice Jorge Manrique, una llamada extrema que con-forma y con-siente, atrae-con desde el sentimiento a la con-versión o ritmo duradero, entrando en una forma correlatada y además consciente. Lo impensado pero de algún modo sabido con-mueve el asentimiento de conciencia "por tal manera".

La llamada revela un exceso y este la recuperación del tiempo en forma de vida cuya duración es auténtica, consistente y cierta. Se intuye un tránsito o entrada en forma que desemboca, como los ríos, en otro aspecto pleno de vida. El sentimiento descubre una forma de ser en continuo rebrote de sí misma y plegándose sobre sí, lo cual conforma el contenido del lenguaje según Hegel,[21] pero rechaza, al mismo tiempo, lo caduco, añadiéndole algo continuamente nuevo, observa ahora Husserl.[22] El poeta ve en el transcurso del ritmo aquello que se da y es su conexión o lazo momentáneo y además lo nuevo que cesa y fluye. Constituyente y constituido coinciden, aunque no en todas sus consideraciones, dice Husserl de la doble intencionalidad manifestada en el flujo de conciencia: *es* y algo se muestra necesariamente sí mismo ("eine Selbsterscheinung").[23] Ve el ser y su transcurso, cuyo modo consiste en trascenderse fluyendo. Y en cuanto *es*, vibra, dilata, pro-yecta, constituye. Y así acontece también el poema. Desde tal consideración, la conciencia es enteramente poética.

El presente amenazado de muerte abre en la esperanza un futuro redentor del intervalo supremo, pues la esperanza espera, dice Lévinas, "pour le présent même".[24] Sin ella no existiría el tiempo tal como lo conocemos y pensamos. Su tensión descubre un grado de valor máximo o "tercero", según diversas transcripciones críticas, frente a los otros dos mundanales, la vida simplemente heredada y la gloria en ella obtenida con el proyecto de su cumplimiento.

La experiencia de muerte, muchas veces vivida por Jorge Manrique en el campo de batalla, alcanza ahora, rememorando la de su padre, un tránsito que recubre la transición fónica entre unidades de vida y del lenguaje. Sustrae el fenómeno objetivo, saturado, como dice Jean-Luc Marion,[25] a la mirada del mundo y a su efecto entre la gente, de tal modo que lo sentido con-forma su intuición, desborda y descentra lo constituido sobre las cuatro regiones de Heidegger y los cuatro rasgos de la ontología crítica: cuantidad, cualidad, relación, modalidad, según el vuelco que Jean-Luc Marion hace de las categorías aristotélicas partiendo del infinito de Lévinas.[26]

---

[21] Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1998, p. 62. Cf. Antonio Domínguez Rey, *Lenguaje y Fenomenología. (Fundamento Poético del Lenguaje)*, Editorial Verbum, Madrid, 2009, p. 45.

[22] Husserl, Edmund, op. cit., p. 82.

[23] Ibid., p. 83.

[24] Lévinas, Emmanuel, *De l'Existence à l'Existant*, Vrin, París, 1986, p. 158.

[25] Marion, Jean-Luc, *Étant donné. Essai d'une Phénomenologie de la Donation*, PUF, París, 1997, p. 300.

[26] Ibid., p. 369.

El diálogo con la muerte ha de entenderse, por tanto, como acceso de la conciencia a otro orden de realidad. El poeta engarza un juicio leve -valor explicativo de las transiciones o conjunciones del argumento: pues, que, si, aunque- comparando la vida saturada por la apariencia objetiva de los sentidos con el sentimiento de su vacío temporal, con lo que se ve abocado a una respuesta que ya no tiene otra palabra que el hecho de sentirse llamado. La palabra que dice se trueca en escucha silenciosa de voz ajena que confiere otro sentido al desfondamiento de los significados previos. Estos mismos se convierten entonces en puntos transicionales de la verdad duradera, aquella que pretende la continuación firme del tiempo fundado. Su fluidez surte un agua continua que salta, como dice san Juan en su Evangelio (4, 14), hasta la vida eterna.[27]

Siendo el fin ("das Ende"), la Muerte no es lo último ("das Letzte"), sino aquello a lo cual tiende la fuerza primitiva del comienzo,[28] por lo que aún se abre en ella un resquicio o grieta ("Riss") de espacio-tiempo, la hendidura más entrañada, "Die offene Stelle", resume Heidegger.[29] Y esta abertura se dilata continuamente, añade Lévinas, como Decir sin Dicho: "Au Dire sans Dit, il faut une ouverture qui ne cesse de s'ouvrir et qui se déclare comme telle. Le Dire est cette déclaration."[30] Su sinceridad desnuclearíza y sobrepasa la contención representativa del signo. El fundamento del lenguaje excede el contenido de sus propios productos.

La llamada y su respuesta acontecen en modo vocativo. El poeta se siente convocado fuera del coto de existencia desdoblándose en dos personajes, la Muerte y don Rodrigo. Y lo hace desde caso ablativo (ex) y dentro del proceso existencial anónimo (se) o colectivo (nos, nosotros) en que se convierten las vivencias. El yo resuena plural y siempre que se abstrae de "nosotros" vibra en su coro como voz de fondo, de tal suerte que la relación *yo-me* (mi, a mí) sigue siendo plural en las formas de relación mancomunada. Incluso hay un reflejo de yo en el espacio locutivo *él* de tercera persona, dentro del vocativo. Cuando el poeta conmina al alma en general a que despierte, avive, contemple, es también el alma colectiva, común, pero personalizada, pues la llamada convoca a la conciencia que siente el ritmo del tiempo sucediendo en cada uno de nosotros, los apelados. Yo es el punto tensivo de vibraciones resonantes. Lo sentido orienta el espacio-tiempo en que vive y lo trasciende. Su sonido es algo común continuamente ajeno y propio [nos (yo-me)], la apertura de una llamada que convoca a todos en la vibración resonante, retroproyectiva y polirradiada, del poema, hacia un Tú duradero: la verdad del tiempo.

El vocativo excede el marco de la gramática por ser el caso de la relación antepredicativa o actitud fónica de la respuesta y responsabilidad incursa que toda llamada presupone. Conocer con-voca, llama, apela. Obtenemos así una descripción

---

[27] Juan Evangelista, san, en Eloíno Nácar Fuster y Alberto Colunga (eds.), *Sagrada Biblia*, B. A. C, Madrid, 1964, p. 1104.

[28] Heidegger, Martin, *Beiträge zur Philosophie. (Vom Ereignis)*, B. 65, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1994, p. 416.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Levinas, Emmanuel, *Dieu, la Mort et le Temps*, Grasset, París, 1993, p. 219.

gramatical de los casos en la que *yo-me* (nominativo y acusativo o dativo) descubre una relación transitiva que, en realidad, viene reflejada desde las circunstancias intermedias. La voz llega antes, incluso con un solo gesto: afecta al *yo* en su *me* (*mi* adjetivo y *mi* pronombre). La afección me precede y prelata los actos intencionales del yo. Vivimos una distancia que nos distiende en objetividad o estado continuo de *yecto* (Heidegger). Figura suya es también el caso vocativo. Por eso la donación refleja también resulta, como dativo (para mí, a mí), vocación exótica, prerradiada. El vocativo es la relación primaria del nombre convocado ante las cosas que lo llaman y, a veces, lo reclaman, situado, por tanto.

El yo presupone su afecto sobre, desde, en un espacio-tiempo prepositivo, en el que se da cuenta de sí mismo. Viene de sí a sí generándose, genitivo, pero desde la ab-lación o latido viviente, abierto al medio o mundo donde se instaura. La caída o el hecho de ser arrojados al mundo (Heidegger, Sartre), aún supone llamada, convocatoria. Una ética antecedente, previa. Jean-Luc Marion entiende que la relación *me* de "je *me*" acontece en una donación acusativa no diferenciada del ablativo, pues "je *me* reçois de l'appel qui me donne à moi-même, avant de me donner quoi que ce soit".[31] En francés, tal relación "je *me*" pasa por "moi-même". Posibilita la apertura de cualquier otro don particular, pero, aún así, lo que se abre lo hace en, desde, por, para, aquí, allí, ahí, allá…, en una situación existencial. Y con todo, la preposición está siendo el espaciotiempo ostensivo. Aunque falte el objeto donado ("objet essentiellement manquant") y se abra "sur un écart vide",[32] lo codonado o adonado ("l'adonné") se da *ad*, adhiriéndose, inherente, prepositivo: un lugar coevo de la posición o del tiempo inaugurado.

La posición instantáneamente determinada por una preposición gramatical es la prerrelación rítmica del tono que llama resonando y subtiende luego el mundo de las objetivaciones, significados y sentido, como en el poema de Jorge Manrique. He aquí su principal efecto de modernidad. Crea un ámbito de resonancia que trasciende el lugar concreto de las posiciones objetivas reclamándose de sí mismo hacia lo otro o Tú transcendente. Prelata y orienta incluso la articulación fónica. El ritmo sintoniza, entima. Procede del tono ambiental del cuerpo animado. Y su efecto sonoro resulta de la interacción cuántica de la producción articulatoria y percepción acústica, ambas también sinestésicas, del sonido verbal.[33]

Todo ello implica varios fenómenos. Así como el aire respirado se transforma en vida y esta ya no se reduce solo al oxígeno que la mantiene, el aire espirado en la voz comporta un cambio que tampoco se explica únicamente por sus condiciones previas. Las dota de una función diferenciada. El sonido de la voz desaparece e instaura con su resonancia, en el mismo acto e instante, una moción especial que

[31] Marion, Jean-Luc, op. cit., p. 371.

[32] Ibid., p. 370.

[33] En tal sentido, son notables los análisis de Kenneth N. Stevens ("The quantal nature of speech: evidence from articulatory-accoustic data", en Edward E. David, Peter B. Denes (eds.), *Human Communication: a Unified View*, McGraw Hill, New York, 1972, pp. 51–56); René Carré y Mohammed Mrayati (1990). Cf. *Journal of Phonetics* (1989).

altera su sustancia y subsume la evanescencia en la apertura libre, creativa, de una entidad nueva que denominamos signo. Hay una tensión continua de audición y escucha, pues el oído es órgano continuamente abierto al *il y a* y *es gibt* o *hay* de la instauración en el mundo. Los *quanta* del lenguaje son las unidades de la correlación presencia-ausencia determinada por la incisión fónica del hablante. La actualización de un elemento puede estudiarse en función de aquellos otros susceptibles de aparecer en posiciones iguales, semejantes, homólogas, simétricas y asimétricas, siempre correlatadas, de tal modo que la presencia supone un factor o coeficiente relativo de ausencia. Ahora bien, esta ausencia es susceptible, por ello, de objetivación, como viniendo de un fondo aún ignoto, indeterminado, imprevisible, resonante, inmemorial. La tendencia de lo conocido a un trasfondo suyo todavía ignorado, o viceversa, de lo desconocido que asoma a través de alguna brizna de tiempo o espacio, es valor cualitativo de la forma o proforma en proceso, su *quale*. Depende de la intensidad más que de la cuantidad del lenguaje. Aquí, más puede ser menos, y menos mucho más. Y esta valencia repercute en los valores de las demás unidades. Se produce un efecto de supercorrelación entre *quanta* y *qualia*, por el que cada elemento se asocia a otro diferente en alguno de sus rasgos y juntos determinan una unidad trópica.

La elación sonora así producida, cuánticamente cualificada, supone, en ese mismo instante, una experiencia singular de conformación articulada del movimiento anímico. Dota al sujeto de una sensación específica de espacio-tiempo según el tono conformado. Esta elación es coeva del movimiento cenestésico del organismo y de la caducidad sonora. Aparece entonces la tensión receptiva, de escucha y alerta, que dilata aquella otra de apertura acústica permanente, y además deíctica, un horizonte de indicaciones. El sujeto locutivo percibe el efecto sonoro que produce y reconoce su voz resonando -vibración fonoacústica- dentro de sí mismo (*je-moi-me*), lo cual contacta su propia afección y autoestima. Este reconocimiento abarca más unidades articuladas que las sentidas e intendidas, como avanzando un horizonte de comprensión dilatada. Entre la producción y reconocimiento silábico puede haber una diferencia de dieciocho sílabas. La intención abarca y comprende más que lo producido articulando.

Hegel situó en este espacio-tiempo la aurora de la autoconciencia, de algún modo simultánea al movimiento cenestésico, sensóreo y perceptivo, ya prelatada en la organización del feto. Su apertura expresa la fluidez real del tiempo transcurriendo y esta fluencia es el interior del sujeto, de tal modo que el yo resulta ecuación del tiempo durando y presentándose a sí-mismo sucesivamente mediante a-presentaciones que se sustituyen unas a otras.[34] Y esto lo comprueba en la acotación espaciotemporal del verbo y sus valores rítmicos, es decir, las valencias externas así producidas, en las que podemos entrar analizándolas. La autoconciencia es rítmica. Por eso el lenguaje producido, evanescente, pierde densidad y vive de la repetición

[34]Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik, III* (GA, 15), Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1970, pp. 156–157, 295, 304, 311. Cf. Antonio Domínguez Rey, *Lenguaje y Fenomenología*, op. cit, p. 41.

mecánica, pero el originario nace en el manantial del tiempo interno y expresivo. El ya realizado se reanima en éste, el poético.

Como es sabido, Hegel recurre a una doble negación de la unidad así procesada, el signo. Negación contenida en la evanescencia del sonido articulado y de la moción interna subsiguiente, el efecto-afecto que induce y que la autoconciencia siente poco a poco como el tiempo que ella misma está siendo, lo suyo en propio, su duración interna. La autoafección es tiempo-yo resonando en las sensaciones, rítmico, dado en continuas series o secuencias, modos interpuestos, apuestos, opuestos, sobrepuestos, inherentes, de a-presentaciones.

En esto acontece un fenómeno singular. El fluido interno se autoexpresa con autonomía y, al proceder así, se autopresenta objetivamente. En ese mismo acto se reconoce como objeto desbordado por la fluencia temporal de sí mismo. Se descubre diferente de sí en la emergencia o nota lo aún más de sí-mismo, por lo que está negándose en su propia afirmación y sigue siendo lo en sí o *Selbst* en tal intervalo, de tal modo que se asiste continuamente a-presentándose, como el tiempo cuya ecuación es yo.

Todo esto sucede sintiendo, percibiendo, conociendo a medida que un objeto, incluido el *Selbst* en cuanto tal, se yuxtapone a otro en el espacio, pero cuya continuidad se condensa en un punto perceptivo del tiempo sin dejar de darse continua, otra vez "por tal manera". Lo yuxtapuesto continuo en moción a-ferente, condensada, que se niega y, en ese mismo instante, afirma otra cosa -*Aufhebung*-, revela, ahí mismo, la formación del proceso o el proceder de la forma pura cuyo contenido es la dimanación de sí misma o afluencia del tiempo que denominamos yo, la sustancia viva del sujeto. Solo es auténtico, manantial o surtidor puro, lo que "por tal modo" acontece.

El tiempo de la doble negación así operada, la del sonido y del temblor interno subsiguiente, concluye Hegel, es el tiempo del sujeto.[35] Por tanto, y a nuestro juicio, la posición inicial del aire espirado y articulado desata un proceso que subsume la negación o *muerte* del sonido como vida de la conciencia u origen del conocimiento, un modo de combustión gnoseológica. Y esto acontece rítmicamente, "contemplando" en silencio ("tan callando") el modo ("cómo") en que se efectúa el paso del tiempo. Ese punto de emergencia, acontecimiento o *Ereignis*, en sentido heideggeriano, es instante apenas situado, un roce, una huella, un aura, el rastro del aire o de un ángel, pero suficiente para desatar el proceso del conocimiento, su origen constitutivo. La ausencia del ángel prueba su presencia, diría Dante Alighieri.

Lo que queda o resta, permanece fugándose. Es recubrimiento de instantes e intervalos verificado en el entrecruce atómico de vibraciones y tensiones anímicas: el punto vinculante y vinculado de conciencia. A la percepción sucesiva de objetos similares o distintos entre sí corresponden momentos particularmente similares,

[35] Ibid., p. 164. Cf. Antonio Domínguez Rey, "Transcendencia del ser en el lenguaje según Hegel", en Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (ed.), *Transcendentalism Overturned. From Absolute Power of Consciousness Until the Forces of Cosmic Architectonis*, Analecta Husserliana, Volume CVIII, Springer, Dordrecht, Heidelberg, London, New York, 2011, pp. 613–631.

observa Husserl,[36] dados "por tal manera", es decir, rememorando o condensando como un limo los momentos de conciencia. La unidad perceptiva resulta del entrelazo de sensaciones y su vibración interna se irradia sobre lo percibido: <<líneas de semejanza>> resuenan en uno y otro instante de sucesión similar. Alcanzamos entonces una relación *a priori* que fundamenta toda comparación y subtiende la intuición de similitud y de diferencia en el pensamiento, sigue reflexionando Husserl.

El fundamento prelativo lo extiende Ángel Amor Ruibal a latencia preontológica del ser en cuanto noción implícita de todo conocimiento y a cualidad interna suya el poeta Antonio Machado, desde la consideración rítmica del lenguaje.[37] La irradiación prerrefleja fundamenta la elación de sonido y sentido formados en esa correlación constituyente. Crean un ámbito común, antes que estructura, el cual dinamiza instantáneamente sus propiedades convirtiendo al sonido fónico en significante y abriendo la fuente originaria del significado. La elación del sonido ya es, en ese momento, y por inherencia de resonancia, tensión conceptiva. El significante se origina conceptualmente. En él asoma el comienzo más primitivo de la concepción, la significancia del sentido. Por ello la crítica literaria vio en esa correlación de propiedades un dinamismo interno de similitud operativa.[38]

Es el efecto del principio energético o energía predicativa de Humboldt, de tal modo que la unidad de recubrimiento (Husserl) ahí procesada está siendo el predicado yo de aquel hueco entrevisto por Hegel en la cesación sonora del signo. Es el abismo (Kluft) de Humboldt, la grieta ascendente (Riss, Aufriss) de la fenomenología y crítica hermenéutica desde Hegel a Heidegger y la teoría de la recepción literaria (Hans Robert Jauss, Wolfgang Iser). Y ante el abismo solo cabe el salto (Nietzsche, Noam Chomsky) y salto del corazón, su impulso (Sprung) ante la grieta (Zerklüftung), glosa Heidegger.[39]

Se genera así un salto cuantitativo, atómico, poético, que inaugura una gramática del mismo orden, cuántica. No el cuanto del elemento atómico inmutable, sí el continuo y constancia de una relación cuyos polos son puntos o cruces de vibraciones resueltas en haces permanentes de irradiación múltiple o resonancia polirradiada, es

[36] Husserl, Edmund, *Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins*, op. cit., p. 62.

[37] Domínguez Rey, Antonio, *Ciencia, Conocimiento y Lenguaje. Ángel Amor Ruibal (1869–1930)*, UNED-Espiral Maior, Madrid, A Coruña, 2007, p. 68. Antonio Machado percibió el efecto cualitativo interno del ritmo al crear este un ámbito de resonancia cuya vibración vivencia el tránsito del tiempo y la formación objetiva del conocimiento. El *esquema externo* de la lógica temporal -correlación de premisas y conclusiones- no coincide con el íntimo, de tal modo que en el de la lógica "*A no es nunca A en dos momentos sucesivos*"(Antonio Machado, "De un Cancionero apócrifo [1924–1936]", en *Poesía y Prosa, Tomo II. Poesías Completas*, Ed. crítica de Oreste Macrí, Espasa Calpe-Fundación Antonio Machado, Madrid, 1989, p. 681). La rima conjuga sensación y recuerdo y nos sitúa "dentro y fuera de nosotros mismos" ("Cancionero apócrifo", ibid. p. 703). En esa conjunción se funda "el sentimiento del tiempo", que tiende a lo universal cualitativo.

[38] Frye, Northrop, "The Sound of Poetry", en Northrop Frye (ed.), *Sound and Poetry*, Columbia University Press, New York and London, 1967 (3ª), pp. 101–102.

[39] Heidegger, Martin, *Beiträge zur Philosophie*, op. cit., pp. 227–289.

decir, la conformación material y corpórea del infinito, tal como la conciencia humana puede sentirla y entenderla.

El cuanto de acción poética es aquí la cualidad subyacente de la resonancia cósmica, por una parte, y de la conciencia acuciada, por otra, del vocativo en que se instaura. Una *vocación* ontopoética que convierte cada unidad de articulación y pensamiento en cruce a la vez receptivo y emisor de rasgos, elementos, funciones. Esta asunción o acepción subsumida, *intususcepta*, hace que el fenómeno receptor sea también irradiante, como el de una partícula atómica al incidir en otro campo gravitatorio. El efecto es cualitativo en la trayectoria de la conciencia, cuya resonancia expande sus latidos -intuiciones, intenciones, empatías, cenestesias, sinestesias, imaginaciones, correlaciones y otros fenómenos semenjantes- con inherencia de atribución interna. El reflejo y transducción de rasgos, elementos, funciones, sintagmas, figuras topológicas de esquemas fonémicos, fono-(sin)táctico-semánticos, los superpone con implicaciones entreveradas que refuerzan y acrecen las superposiciones homólogas de la física cuántica en el sonido y estructuras neurobiológicas. Cada microelemento es unidad potencial de información relativa que *busca*, pero cuyo encuentro ya no es *copia* del otro elemento, aunque lo integre, pues el lugar de irradiación varía lo encontrado, lo transforma cualitativamente, como sucede en realidad con las partículas atómicas en el campo de gravitación proyectiva. Se produce algo semejante a lo que Albert Einstein denomina acción fantasmal a distancia. Los valores se superponen irradiando los ya existentes y creando otros nuevos.

Constatamos así una elación cualitativa de resonancia fonémica, corporal, psíquica, perceptiva, fono-semio-sintáctica, ética y *theológica*, otro modo de *arsis* y *thesis*.[40] Su función rítmica responde a un fondo vocativo cuya estructura es hermenéutica: la conciencia lectora -emisor o receptor- se halla inmersa o entra en un flujo cuya forma la desborda y proyecta en un campo gravitatorio trascendente. Y al observarlo, lo singulariza: el poema.

[40]En esto difiere notablemente el efecto armónico de la poesía respecto del estudio cuántico del sonido en el lenguaje. La elación poética induce un alzamiento vibratorio o perceptivo sobre o desde la caída, evanescencia, del sonido articulado. En la falla o dilución sonora hay apertura de consonancia, respuesta. El pie avanza o se retrae resonando, ascendiendo, bajando, y cada posición suya es *thesis*. La donación rítmica convierte en receptores a otros sonidos y ella misma resulta también propioceptiva. Y este fenómeno es prelativo respecto del de *búsqueda-y-copia* fono-fonológica, que imita el modelo computacional del que parte. En poesía, el donante actúa siempre recibiendo, en consonancia. El modelo anteriormente citado de SEARCH-AND-COPY (Andrew Nevins, op. cit., cf. primer capítulo) basado en la posición relativa de una fuente emisora (RELATIVIZED LOCALITY), presupone, sin justificarlo, un fundamento correlativo o de correspondencia (función AGREE de la gramática minimalista de Noam Chomsky). Asume la imagen o megametáfora de un ordenador previamente producido bajo impulso ontopoético, que la ciencia no estudia. Proyecta sobre el esquema computado, algorítmico, la elación mental, como si el hombre hubiera inventado un producto cuya producción o *sistema computacional* es la inherencia del *sistema cognitivo*, según la ecuación ontológica implícita, tampoco justificada, de Chomsky en *The Minimalist Program* (MIT Press, Cambridge, Mss., 1995). Se presupone que el cómputo, *mathema*, es metonimia o sinécdoque de toda unidad gnoseológica. El algoritmo sigue siendo *tropo*, una función compleja cuya forma contiene su propio principio fundante.

El resultado de la actividad articulatoria, sensitivo-perceptiva y fono-semántica, no se reduce tal cual a las condiciones y fundamentos que lo posibilitan. En la pronunciación de una palabra intervienen, observan los neurólogos, unos cien músculos. No percibimos conscientemente los rasgos mínimos articulatorios de la voz y la inherencia fono-semántica del sentido en el haz de ondas sonoras cuya intersección constituye unidad fono-acústica. Existe un proceso de "horizonte oscuro" cuya revelación ya presupone para el hablante hallarse instalado en la articulación corpórea y, por ello, antropológica de sentido. Y se instala de modo activo, pues interpreta cuanto percibe, la relación fonoacústica realizada. La percepción del habla implica un halo simbólico de carácter hermenéutico. "Thus perception is essentially an act of interpretation since it is clear that there is no linear correlation or 'direct path' between the acoustic signal and the assigned symbolic representation. What perceivers do *not* do is discover or register the linguistic objects of what they hear –this would imply that these objects and their labels are in the soundwave. What they do is interpret what is heard in a complex process of assignment, from what they already know, of symbolic representations".[41]

El lenguaje se formaliza entonces como vínculo de materia sensible y conciencia naciente. La duración perceptiva del flujo sonoro sintetiza el tiempo que así se concreta en unidades autorreflejas e irradiadas. Lo reflejo suyo resulta además de la irradiación en que se constituyen. La facultad lingüística induce en el sonido fónico una moción fonológica cuyo impulso está siendo artículo de la mente, una forma suya.

Podemos entrar en estas unidades reflejas y analizar sus componentes. Al hacerlo, percibimos además que se activa en ellas la moción inicial, es decir, el recuerdo cuya presencia vigente permite vincularlas con otras sucesivas y de organización idéntica u homóloga. Están mostrando de algún modo el proceso de síntesis dinámica que las constituye "por tal manera", según se dieron ya en algún momento del flujo que permite reproducirlas. Este acto de reproducción es simultáneo y congénere de la vida y transcurso del universo, observa Gustav Gerber.[42]

Si tenemos también en cuenta que la moción articulada se da en un tono o resonancia peculiar del organismo, tales unidades contienen la acción que las constituye. No la acción instantánea, ya producida, sino las condiciones y fundamento de su realización. El tono es algo característico del acto aunque la unidad ahora articulada sea otro punto del flujo continuo. La lingüística se funda precisamente en la determinación reproductiva de estas unidades cuya realización evidencia el flujo real del tiempo. Si cada punto suyo fuera absoluto, un corte definitivo o caída mortal en la sucesión de uno y otro, no habría conexión posible entre sus fases. La vibración subjetiva del tiempo está asegurando el vínculo de los intervalos, pues si se produjera un olvido total, tampoco habría conexión de recuerdos, y la de presentes

[41] Tatham, Mark, Morton, Katherine, *Speech Production and Perception*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2006, p. 20.

[42] Gustav, Gerber *Die Sprache und das Erkennen*, R. Gaertners Verlagsbuchhandlung Hermann Heyfelder, Berlín, 1884, pp. 64–67.

sería fluencia sin sentido, el puro estar o ser ahí (Dasein) opaco del universo. Se insinúa, pues, un subsuelo de la forma conectiva o un horizonte no reductible a los objetos ni a cada uno de los instantes sucesivos.

El tono garantiza un modo de ser en el mundo y una presencia permanente que en el hombre es escucha y apertura porosa, cenestésica y cinética, a la que pertenece además la emisión espirada del aliento en forma de voz. Esta acción está implícita en el acto articulatorio con resonancia afectiva del sonido así realizado.

Herder se sorprendía de que estas acciones sonoras no fueran ya de algún modo lo que en ellas actúa. Se pregunta por ello si se trata de predicados sin ningún sujeto, siendo así que la acción sonora se inicia en contacto con el mundo de las cosas, a través de la idea que de ellas nos formamos: "el tono debió designar la cosa, así como la cosa donó el tono". Y de esta observación deduce que ahí se constituye el nombre, pues la acción que se está realizando es el *verbo*, la verbalización sonora. Y concluye: "*los nombres derivaron entonces de los verbos y no los verbos de los nombres*."[43]

La acción contenida en aquellas unidades es el acto de nominación, el nombre. Nada extraño, por tanto, que, partiendo de los nombres, actualicemos las condiciones y fundamento del acto que los constituye, es decir, el mundo antepredicativo.

El análisis basado en el contraste de lenguas, por lo menos de algunas, descubre, por otra parte, dice Ivan Fónagy, una connaturalidad de percepción, emoción y expresión en sus hablantes, de tal modo que la unidad articulada ya presupone un movimiento mental preconsciente e inherente al gesto fónico, del que la metáfora es imagen especular y verbal suya.[44]

El tono está siendo resonancia de una percepción antepredicativa del mundo. Y esta resonancia no solo se adhiere al acto fónico. Es algo suyo inherente. Tal inherencia justifica que consideremos al lenguaje atributo del hombre en su constitución antropológica.[45] Es función orgánica de la autoconciencia. Ivan Fónagy correlaciona incluso los sonidos glóticos y las cualidades auditivas que experimentan los niños en los juegos fónicos -libido narcisista- con el ritmo cardíaco de la madre.[46]

La energía empleada en la articulación es connatural, divide el flujo de la voz en unidades y las correlaciona con los movimientos realizados. El fraile Martín Sarmiento (siglo XVIII) vio en este "modo de dividir la voz o *sonido*" un *teorema universalísimo* de la creación léxica o Ciencia *Etimológica*. Consiste en que los fonos (*letras*) de un mismo órgano de habla "*se convierten o se mudan, recíprocamente entre sí*."[47]

---

[43] Herder, Johann Gottfried, *Sämtliche Werke*, ed. de B. Suphan, Berlín, 1891, p. 52.

[44] Fónagy, Ivan, *Languages within Language. An Evolutive Approach*, John Benjamins Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 2001, p. 345.

[45] Domínguez Rey, Antonio, *El Drama del Lenguaje*, Editorial Verbum-UNED, Madrid, 2003, p. 98.

[46] Fónagy, Ivan, *La ViVe Voix. Essais de Psycho-Phonétique*, Payot, París, 1983, p. 119.

[47] Sarmiento, Martín, *Elementos Etimológicos según el Método de Euclides*, Fundación Pedro Barrié de la Maza, A Coruña, 1998, pp. 332–333.

La producción sonora induce efectos de semejanza y alteración diferenciada en función del movimiento fónico. Hay, por tanto, un proceso metonímico básico en la configuración articulada de la voz, cuyos sonidos se forman continuos, discretos o "a saltos de *consonancias*", dice el fraile benedictino.

Cabe concluir entonces, y por una parte, que la connaturalidad de la acción locutiva, congénere del universo, del mundo objetivo y de la reproducción sensórea, determina una sinergia o efecto cuántico de la mente no reducible a las precondiciones o suma de los elementos concitados. Por otra parte, esta correspondencia de factores descubre el fondo del proceso cognoscitivo de la temporalidad mediante la conversión y mudanza de puntos articulados, sus correlaciones vibrantes, armónicas o no, simétricas o asimétricas, es decir, comparativas, fundadas en el movimiento locutivo del flujo sonoro, sus proporciones, metátesis y semejanza.

Bajo tal preámbulo, puede decirse que la sinergia antepredicativa es el fondo del conocimiento. La articulación ya establece un ámbito rítmico y es premisa, dice Julio Stenzel,[48] de los actos locutivo y comprensivo, es decir, de la captación sentida del tiempo, que se está articulando a la par del flujo aerodinámico de la voz en zonas espaciales del aparato fonador.

El ritmo del lenguaje experimenta la constitución espacio-temporal del conocimiento. Y el espacio-tiempo de la instauración del mundo en el hombre es la nominación de sus aprehensiones, el nombre. Así como la realidad lo motiva, así corresponde él articulando nombres. Tal correspondencia está siendo lo que en ese instante *es* y no otra cosa: la constatación de ser. Lo que surja en ella necesariamente y como algo con personalidad propia ("eine Selbsterscheinung"), según Husserl, una forma o modo de conciencia originaria sin ser aún objetiva, o lo que actúe en la acción articulada -recordemos la pregunta de Herder-, va revelándose en la correlación *es* o *siendo*, aquello que está siendo en cuanto siendo (*to on he on*; *ens inquantum ens*, de la *Metafísica* aristotélica, 1003a, 21–22),[49] conforme al cambio de posición o caída (caso) de cuanto se da originariamente fluyendo.

La voz se divide consonante siguiendo el movimiento de los órganos impulsados por la espiración del aire previamente inspirado y en consonancia con algo presentido, percibido, inteligido o imaginado. La división supone cambio múltiple (*metá*) de posiciones o tesis (*thesis*) en forma adverbial, prepositiva, exenta o acoplada, con caso genitivo, acusativo, dativo y valores de entorno o situación: en medio, entre, por detrás, hacia atrás, en seguida, con, etcétera. Y así también el nombre (metonimia) según las mociones de caso recibidas.

La voz plasma además la orientación de la energía muscular del cuerpo y el impulso anímico de las sensaciones, percepciones y conocimiento en general. Y esta orientación sigue o es el ritmo orgánico del sujeto que aparece en persona como centro o eje de las posiciones realizadas. Por eso identifican Humboldt y

[48] Stenzel, Julio*, Filosofía del Lenguaje*, Revista de Occidente, Madrid, 1935, pp. 34, 35.

[49] Aristóteles, *Metafísica*, ed. trilingüe (griego, latín, castellano) de Valentín García Yebra, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1970, pp. 150, 151.

Hegel esta energía posicional y metafórica, de cambio continuo, con la moción predicativa, el primero,[50] y la fuerza de dar nombre, el segundo: "die Nahmengebende Kraft", es decir, la captación (Nehmen) de lo concebido al moverse anímicamente y expresado como nombre (Nahme).[51]

Al vibrar, el tono abre conceptualmente el espacio del mundo en el hombre. Es tono del mundo (Tonwelt) y tono-espacio (Tonraum), los denomina Wilhelm Schapp,[52] o sitio espacial de la sensación, toposensitividad, resume posteriormente Ortega y Gasset. El punto y expansión vibratoria, temporal, del tono acontece, por tanto, dividiendo el espacio de la voz, como dice Martín Sarmiento, en sonidos continuos, discretos o consonantes. Hay una posición inicial constitutiva en cada uno de ellos y un vínculo de unión o tránsito cuya marca es el acento fonémico. La vinculación fónica se muestra transitiva y este movimiento de tránsito (*metá-foreo*) permanece en todo el lenguaje.

El punto de posición resonante permite identificar los sonidos por sí o no -son o no son tales unidades-, sostiene Agustín García Calvo estableciendo un eje de coordenadas con la duración sucesiva, "lógicamente disjunta", de fonemas y la escala gradual, discontinua, del tono.[53] Una de las condiciones básicas, para este autor, de los recursos "físicos" de la gramática, consiste en "no ser contínuos". La diferencia de posiciones entre términos fónicos <<ha de permanecer netamente "cualitativa", esto es, decidible por 'sí o no' sencillamente, sin intromisión alguna de medida sobre un contínuo>>.[54] En la sucesión de la melodía se dan "puntos de catástrofe", intervalos de ruptura con vibraciones diferenciadas, discontinuas. Y estas alteraciones "corresponden con los primeros harmónicos que se desprenden del tañido de una nota (…) y que como tales intervalos privilegiados los reconocen por lo menos cualesquiera oídos humanos…".[55] Las estructuras gramaticales serían entonces ejemplos de tales puntos de ruptura o "catástrofes".

El sentido vibratorio de las frecuencias y la resonancia confieren al punto articulatorio del lenguaje, que es complejo, una expansión correlacionada de ondas siempre presente o activable en cualquier momento. Esa correlación propicia la diferencia

---

[50] Humboldt, Wilhelm von, *Schriften zur Sprachphilosophie*, Cotta'sche Buchhandlung, Stuttgart, 1988 (1963), pp. 428, 434. Cf. Antonio Domínguez Rey, *El Drama del Lenguaje*, op. cit., pp. 107–110.

[51] Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, *Jenaer Systementwürfe III. Naturphilosophie und Philosophie des Geistes. Vorlesungsmanuskript zur Realphilosophie (1805–1806)*, GW, B. 8, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 1976, p. 189. Cf. Antonio Domínguez Rey, *Lingüística y Fenomenología. (Fundamento Poético del Lenguaje)*, Editorial Verbum, Madrid, 2009, p. 44. "Transcendencia del ser en el lenguaje según Hegel", en Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (ed.), *Transcendentalism Overturned*, op. cit., pp. 613–631.

[52] Schapp, Wilhelm, *Beiträge zur Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung*, V. Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1981 (1910), pp. 28, 31, 32, 35. Cf. Antonio Domínguez Rey, *El Drama del Lenguaje*, op. cit., pp. 201–202.

[53] García Calvo, Agustín, *Tratado de Rítmica y Prosodia y de Métrica y Versificación*, op. cit., pp. 70–72.

[54] Ibid., p. 72.

[55] Ibid., p. 75.

que dota a la posición de un exponente múltiple de relaciones, seleccionadas unas respecto del fondo resonante constituido por otras. En este diferencial se basa el aspecto negativo del fonema para el funcionalismo lingüístico. Sus unidades son puntos en orden a la producción de sentido e inciden en el aire como haces de relaciones. La discontinuidad se produce en la sucesión radiada de harmónicos y el lenguaje resulta la adecuación singular de la intención significativa en un momento, más o menos dilatado, de la existencia humana.

La captación y permanencia de lo intuido vincula el tiempo-espacio sonoro, que se pierde materialmente, pero dura en esta aprehensión fonoconceptiva denominada significante: porta, lleva significado. Lo perdido en la rarefacción aerodinámica de la voz dona en su tránsito una forma de contención cuyo vínculo permite reproducirlo. Y esto es resultado del acento en tanto inscripción del hombre en el mundo y sus vinculaciones silábicas, el metro y el ritmo.

Hegel se percató de la evolución rítmica del acento de las palabras según se desarrollan las raíces al designar lo captado, sus variantes, el tiempo de captación y las posiciones personales -pronombres- de la intersubjetividad locutiva.[56] La duración silábica -larga, breve-, el metro, marca la posición -acento, cesura- y orden de sonidos respecto del núcleo fónico; a su vez, el vínculo de sílabas procede igualmente organizando unas respecto de otras (coarticulación) en orden al sentido que las reúne. Su marca es el acento métrico, fonológico o ambos al unísono, según la evolución de cada lengua.

Estas vinculaciones revelan la elación del acento rítmico sobre el metro o medida pautada, punto a punto, de los sonidos, es decir, de la moción anímica sobre la sustancia del aire movido por los órganos fonadores. La moción fonológica condensa la sustancia acústica en forma captada y está siendo la realidad aprehendida, su modo de percepción, el tiempo transcurrido, tanto anímico como ontológicamente objetivado y la posición interlocutiva, entre hablantes y la realidad mediada. La unidad de sentido engloba las diferencias articuladas en unidades rítmicas. La temporalidad externa -sílaba, metro, ritmo, verso: unidades de tiempo acotado- se conforma con la representación interna de lo vivenciado. El ritmo es vínculo objetivo del conocimiento. Y no se contiene, como tal, en ninguna de las unidades que integra, sino que las trasciende surgiendo del fondo resonante que lo impulsa. Por eso excede también el alcance del contenido semántico de las palabras por él reunidas, o les confiere otro sentido.

Tal fusión de eventos, fases y modos solo se da en el fundamento rítmico del lenguaje o forma sustancial, animada, del conocimiento. Y esto es la poesía: proceso rítmicamente diferenciado del vínculo consciente de la realidad objetiva.

El ritmo desentraña así el valor de predicación discursiva de la realidad que ya tenía entre los presocráticos. La sucesión fónica de la palabra griega *rein* (verbo *reo*) significa la fluencia natural de las cosas que designa. Y *rihtmós*, nombre derivado, añade a la raíz, con el sufijo *-thmós*, y según Émile Benveniste, "la modalidad

[56] Humboldt, Wilhelm von, *Ästhetik, III*, op. cit., p. 302.

particular de realización, tal cual se presenta a los ojos."[57] Por tanto, el sufijo revela la relación de lo particular a lo común, genérico o abstracto, de la acción indicada por el lexema sustantivado. De ahí que la forma distintiva *rithmós* signifique el "ordenamiento característico de las partes en el todo",[58] definición también válida para la composición semántica de la estructura gramatical. Cabe decir, por ello, que en el ritmo late el fundamento real del lenguaje o condensación fónico-psíquica del pensamiento.

Henri Meschonnic integra este valor procesivo de la palabra ritmo en el concepto de *significancia* o "valores propios de un discurso y de uno solo", pues el ritmo, dice, "es la organización misma del sentido en el discurso". Ahora bien, como el sentido pertenece a la actividad del sujeto de la enunciación, el ritmo es también "la organización del sujeto como discurso y por su discurso."[59]

Retomamos entonces la moción predicativa de Humboldt y la expansión discursiva de la fuerza nominal, según Hegel. Meschonnic reconduce la *significancia* del signo al discurso siguiendo la concepción lingüística de Benveniste. Desconecta el signo de la tradición léxica ("Le <<sens>> n'est plus dans les mots, lexicalement") y acentual, métrica, de las palabras. No obstante, el sentido presocrático y platónico de *rithmós* incluye la generación lexemática del discurso, pues su moción ya es real, procesiva. La palabra contiene el discurso que la engendra y ella sintetiza. El acento distiende el tono y este sigue acentuando las palabras en el período del discurso. El ritmo engloba efectivamente, como dice Meschonnic, lo acentual, la prosodia -sucesión vocálica y consonántica- y la entonación. Añadamos, con todo, que el léxico ya ritma predicando (de) la realidad y su conformación mediante los morfemas y el tiempo adjunto, este en verbos y algunos sustantivos. El nombre nombra fluyendo, ritmando. El discurso es el *plus* de significancia implícita en el lenguaje, aquello que lo trae a presencia fundando una nueva esencia.

Meschonnic traslada este proceso a la etimología en cuanto figura constituyente del sujeto. Aprecia en ella su tensión cognoscitiva: la relación de sujeto y objeto. Hay ahí un escenario histórico de la formación de la sociedad y del hombre.[60] El *hypokeimenon* griego y el *sujectum* latino que lo traduce se basarían en un estatismo que la poesía transforma en tensión originaria convirtiendo al sujeto sometido, atado, en actividad de sí mismo.[61] Pero este es, creemos, el sentido que ya tienen la raíz y sus morfemas en griego desde Heráclito, los estoicos, Platón y Aristóteles. Tal sentido lo desentrañaron Hegel y Amor Ruibal al analizar, respectivamente, la forma *plástica* de la proposición filológica y al anteponer la formación procesiva del predicado al sujeto que enlaza sus atributos y cualidades cifrando el vínculo en palabras.

---

[57] Benveniste, Émile, *Problèmes de Linguistique Générale, 1*, Éditorial Gallimard, París, 1966, p. 332.

[58] Ibid., p. 330.

[59] Meschonnic, Henri, *Critique du Rythme. Anthropologie Historique du Langage*, Verdier, París, 1982, p. 217.

[60] Ibid., *Politique du Rithme. Politique du Sujet*, Verdier, París, 1995, p. 199.

[61] Ibid., p. 200.

La función sujeto es la inscripción rítmica del conocimiento corporeizado en un mundo de vibraciones múltiples. Tanto la división inicial locutiva como esta emergencia de sí-mismo indican algo positivo dado en la dilución del flujo sonoro. Desapareciendo el sonido, emerge y se revela la moción que lo elicita. La ausencia en que aquel se abisma desde algo en cierto momento presente adquiere nueva función. Hegel ve en ella una prefiguración de muerte, pero está siendo en realidad metamorfosis de una fuerza orgánica instintiva, intelectual y verbal, que anuncia la potencia creadora del hombre. Y el análisis temporal de esta creación descubre, por una parte, según vamos viendo con Jorge Manrique, un reclamo o llamada cuya estructura pide respuesta; por otra, una constancia o fluencia continua de presente cuya poíesis o realización introyecta más allá de sí misma esperando otro presente más duradero. Tal potencia elativa emerge en cualquier punto del tiempo. Inscribe al sujeto en una forma sustancialmente constitutiva y lo transforma proyectándolo a un encuentro exótico, inédito. La ausencia dice entonces el mundo inexplorado de creación que transe al hombre. Puede acuciarlo dejándole presentir el vacío del que su propia vida *ex-siste*, como reflejo cuántico de la nada en el acto de creación absoluta. Esta ausencia difiere de la evocada en el signo, que sería un eco o traza suya.

El ritmo de Jorge Manrique en las *Coplas* plasma el sentido originario de fluencia natural y el periódico, ondulado, de las aguas fluviales y marinas, al que se une el propio de la actividad humana. El orden estrófico del poema lo consolida. Tal ritmo conforma el particular de existencia respecto de un sentido cuya tensión se cumple, en este caso, en el Tú que trasciende el esquema dialogal del discurso.

El legado fenomenológico y *avant la lettre* de las *Coplas* consiste en responder a la llamada en cumplimiento de sentido. La forma del contenido puede ser una u otra según los conocimientos de época, pero la respuesta implica una determinada, aunque solo consista en confirmar su inexistencia. Hasta el extremo del límite se responde "por tal manera", adjuntando tiempo al tiempo, experiencia a experiencia, la cual se autoconfirma de modo semejante, si a su forma de donación miramos, en el ápice del punto final, donde la sensibilidad intuye cesación de tiempo y carencia de sentido. Aquello que sirve de fondo a la experiencia constituida en argumento, lo viviente, carece entonces de sustancia. No tendría sentido, por tanto, pero su forma induce a preguntarse por él hasta el límite, pues callar sería también un modo de respuesta. Y tampoco valdría lo experimentado. La experiencia ya no da razón o no verifica por entero la forma sustancial en que consiste. La apertura de la respuesta no puede cerrar el resquicio de la tensión viviente ante la inminencia del tiempo gastado. La evanescencia continuamente retornada en los intervalos del tiempo e intersticios de la sensación nos descubre en la forma de la vida otra potencia humana cuyo ejercicio y cumplimiento ya no depende del punto "gastado" del instante, sino de lo que su tensión augura: el origen de la duración que inquieta y vida ansía, desea. Y esto requiere una invención continua de sentido que fundamente la revelación ya obtenida del tiempo y cualquier otra nueva, su fuente. La imposibilidad extrema manifiesta un modo de cumplimiento posible.

La elación continua del ritmo procede del origen incesante del tiempo. El poema instituye la verdadera naturaleza del hombre: dar sentido a los actos respondiendo a la llamada de sus latidos fluyentes. El hombre comprende así la forma en que se

halla incurso desde su nacimiento, la ontogénesis que lo afilia en el universo. La elación del sonido natural resulta entonces onto y filogenética. Integra la respiración particular en el aire y correlación cósmica de la que procede. Lo así elegido ya no es arbitrario tal como la lingüística lo considera, sino elección libre y espontánea de la naturaleza acorde con lo que el hablante siente, conoce y entiende. Es acto creativo, poético. La significancia procede creando. Su significante retoña de la natural raíz común del hombre o se expande como vibración cuántica y atómica del salto energético ahí producido. El punto del tiempo se da en forma duraderamente procesiva. La gota de agua se funde en la inmensidad que la condensa.

Aristóteles entrevió esta filiación vegetal del significante al describirlo como vástago o retoño del pensamiento (*Ética a Nicómaco*, I, 6, 1096ª, 23–24).[62] Duns Escoto vio en la forma *intellectus* un modo de *ser-con* del ente predicado. Nicolás de Cusa y Juan de Santo Tomás consideraron su raíz biológicamente o, como los estoicos, esperma mental del conocimiento. Husserl recurre al símil de un *fluido anímico*. Ortega y Gasset intuye un plasma cálido y energético que estalla en metáfora como bomba atómica. Todas estas y otras comparaciones aluden a ese instante de institución expansiva, vegetal, biológica, anímica y neuroatómica.

El análisis temporal, rítmico, del lenguaje evidencia el período de onda fonoacústica -*quark up*, *quark down*, dice hoy la física atómica- en función simultánea de origen y destino del hombre, un reclamo de latido y una respuesta ansiosa a un Tú cuyo halo inspira e insufla donando sentido en el campo gravitatorio del espacio-tiempo. Este guión intermedio es la generación léxica de las ondas, la masa audible de un proceso sustancialmente diferenciado y acorde con la naturaleza perceptiva humana.

La explicación de este salto significante sobre el abismo -Kluft, Riss- abierto en la conciencia del hombre, la hallamos en el lenguaje. El entrelazo y entretiempo de las impresiones perceptivas -los nervios continúan el flujo gravitatorio-, de la articulación fónica -nueva forma de energía- y su vibración tanto en el oído propio como ajeno -transducción energética-, de quien escucha, nos sitúa, viene a decir Humboldt, en el campo gravitatorio, original: "in der ursprünlichen, nicht weiter zu erklären Einrichtum der menschlichen Natur."[63]

Humboldt alude, como Heidegger más tarde, al presente incesante, activo, de la energía que se apropia cualificando: *Ereignis*. No basta con detectar el fluido y su evanescencia ("das Entspringens"), pues fluye y evanesce desde (*aus*) donde o hacia donde (*ent-*) se origina.

La energía fonoacústica del significante reverbera en el oído de los interlocutores y esta vibración común inquieta el fondo originario de donde procede despertando un ansia profunda de encuentro o tú cuya llamada responde con el sentido que ordena los actos en un horizonte de integración rítmica. La palabra adquiere esencia

[62] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Harvard university Press, Cambridge, Mass., MCLXXXII.

[63] Humboldt, Wilhelm von, "Ueber die Verschiedenheit des menschlichensprachbaues und ihren Einfluss auf die geistige Entwicklung des Menschengeschlechts [1830–1835]", en *Schriften zur Sprachphilosophie*, op. cit., p. 426.

y el lenguaje se expande al oír y responder alguien a quien habla.[64] El pronombre tú, dice Humboldt, no se contrapone como un no-yo de tipo *él* frente al yo "en la esfera de todos los seres", es decir, lo externo e interno, sino que su fundamento es "la esfera del actuar común mediante la influencia recíproca."[65] El pronombre *él* está inmerso más bien en el vínculo *yo-tú*, cuya unión se da y ejecuta en el lenguaje y es entonces cuando el hombre experimenta la revelación de sus sentimientos más profundos. El vínculo del lenguaje descubre el destino de la naturaleza humana: unirse en un sentido común originario. Y así resulta la lengua espejo del (y su) mundo.[66]

Lo común de esta antelación aún no objetualizada procede de la tensión rítmica inherente a la comunicación de los interlocutores -ninguno siente el latido sin el otro- y precede a la comunidad de entendimiento acaecida convencionalmente en el encuentro humano. Retoma la espontaneidad de la expresión que la ciencia del lenguaje suspende en virtud de una regularidad ya retardada respecto de su origen, la del signo solo considerado funcionalmente. En tal sentido, y como observa Lévinas, el término común es posterior a los términos de la relación, pues estos se comunican y en la sonoridad del sonido efectuado se revela una relación irreductible,[67] la resonancia del ser que ningún sujeto agota, su inherencia alterativa. Ya no se trata de un sonido al lado de otro, en cadena o con rasgos suyos sobrepuestos, como sucede en el signo. Cada resonancia suya procede de su ser *para-otro*, frente a frente, sin que esta posición sea solo apuesta, circunstancial. La inscripción que todo sujeto comporta en sí precede originariamente a sus actuaciones o está en ellas tendiendo siempre al encuentro de aquello que lo fundamenta. Y esto cambia el valor del signo en símbolo, pues hay resonancia más allá de su forma significante, a la que desborda.[68]

Yo y tú actúan al unísono en, sobre y desde *ello* o *él*, el aquí-ahora de toda presencia (*il y a* de Lévinas), cuyo horizonte objetivo es la relación *afectante* Yo-Tú antes de que Yo resulte lo objetualizado de ese participio, tal cual entiende Martin Buber esta relación existencial subsumida en todo objeto.[69] La conversión del participio presente en sujeto activo-objetivo de la correlación reversible, contenida en la expresión *Yo-afectante al Tú*, evidencia el *a priori* ontológico y pronominal del conocimiento. Esa relación intersubjetiva resulta lo *Ello* o dirección *Él* que tiende, intensa, en todo Yo y Tú. Es algo más que la "persona objeto" o "persona lógica" en tanto aquello de que siempre se habla ("est celui de ce dont on parle"), como sostiene Gustave Guillaume,[70] pues "aquello de (lo) que se" ya lleva dentro de sí la

[64] Ibid., "Ueber den Dualis [1827]", op. cit., p. 139.

[65] Ibid., p. 139.

[66] Ibid., p. 140.

[67] Levinas, Emmanuel, *Parole et Silence et autres Conférences Inédites*, Oeuvres 2, Éditions Grasset-Fasquelle, París, 2011, pp. 92, 94, 98.

[68] Ibid., pp. 92, 95.

[69] Buber, Martin, *Yo y Tú*, Ediciones Nueva Visión, Buenos Aires, 1994, p. 21.

[70] Guillaume, Gustave, *Leçons de Linguistique de Gustave Guillaume 1948–1949*, publiés par Roch Valin. *Grammaire Particulière du Français et Grammaire Générale (IV)*, Les Presses de l'Université Laval, Québec, 1982, pp. 51, 52.

relación objetiva (*de*) *afectante* antes citada y de modo pronominal vario: *celui*, *ce*, *dont*, *on*. La preposición *de* indica la dirección intencional, deíctica -genitiva y ontológicamente determinante: trae y lleva a término-, del pronombre Él (Ello), es decir, de toda orientación nombre, aunque se trate del lexema de un verbo. El participio presente *afectante* funda la relación óntica de toda ontología como *a-fecto*. La preposición *ad* indica esa dirección pronominal inmersa en el *pathos* de la subjetividad humana. Lo que se prepone (*pre*) va hacia (*ad*) porque es pro-nombre (*pro*). La relación de tránsito inscrita en la vieja raíz *pr* contiene esa dimensión alterativa pronominal que las lenguas concretan de diverso modo, en las románicas a partir del pronombre latino *ille*, *illa*, *illud*.

El pensamiento o razón dialógica descubre un anhelo alterativo o inclinación social hacia "un *tú* correspondiente al *yo*". Su correlación determina y otorga certeza al concepto, cuyos rayos se ven reflejados en la respuesta emitida por otro.[71] Ahí, respondiendo, se constituye la objetividad plena y la posibilidad del lenguaje. Humboldt llega a esta conclusión observando la simetría bilateral del cuerpo humano y de los animales resaltada por August W. von Schlegel en la fantasía, entendimiento y arte. El lenguaje es un nuevo objeto de la naturaleza humana que reobra sobre ella y la escinde -Kluft- abocándola al encuentro y respuesta de ese tú ansiado que en Jorge Manrique es Tú con mayúscula, pues cifra el origen profundo del tiempoespacio -ahora sin guion intermedio- habido en la sensibilidad y por el deseo de duración eterna que descubre en él inquietándolo y con-formándolo de otro modo, presintiendo en la forma rítmica de su ser sentiente el origen duradero. Un presentimiento que se confirma en conciencia "clara y pura" por un acto de voluntad inducida que se adhiere a lo sentido. Tal acto responde al tirón del vacío entreabierto por el desgaste del tiempo, su forma entrecortada, el pie quebrado. De él nace esa otra sustancia etérea, segura sin masa específica propia a no ser el anhelo mismo que la vibra.

Resulta curioso comparar este estado cuya vibración tensa el espíritu en el límite de la conciencia con la hipótesis física de una masa ya no gravitatoria inducida por el vacío atómico de los electrones en un campo fundamental, ignoto, que atraviesa el universo. La agitada masa de las representaciones reaparece cuando el vacío se agita, altera. Se constata entonces, podríamos decir, un punto cuya existencia comporta, como en geometría, una singularidad o cambio instantáneo del objeto, que en el caso de la conciencia humana supone transformación de la persona. El proceso sonoro del sonido humano establece una situación semejante al quebrar el silencio del entorno o incidir en el ruido ambiente. La calidad de su forma, comenta Lévinas, hace rodar el tiempo -"le son roule le temps lui-même-[72] y lo desplaza desbordando también al mundo en él contenido.

Lo singular del poema de Jorge Manrique es, repetimos, la esperanza entreabierta en los intersticios del tiempo al mostrar su tránsito un modo de vivencia que no halla en sí misma la duración que presiente y anuncia. Y este estado coincide con un mundo de fe humana cuyos valores temporales quedan sometidos a la misma

[71] Humboldt, Wilhelm von, "Ueber den Dualis [1827]", op. cit., p. 158.

[72] Levinas, Emmanuel, *Parole et Silence*, op. cit., p. 91.

experiencia de incumplimiento o saturación respecto de lo que inauguran. El Tú del poema excede "la esfera de todos los seres", el mundo objetivo, allí donde se da la acción común de un dios con el hombre, su "influencia recíproca". Tal fluencia sobrepasa el límite de la forma humana en cuanto ser sensible -no sentimos la concepción que pudiera justificarla, pero sí el vacío que la anuncia-, cuya apariencia resulta, ante el Tú transcendente, reflejo *vil* y de "bajo nombre" (XXXIX). La rima *nombre-hombre* en el campo rítmico de la humillación alienante contrapone la *maldad* del *ethos* humano, las acciones bélicas y *contra natura* del hombre, con la divinidad del Tú en clara escena representativa del mundo medieval religioso.

La forma de la figura conceptiva o respuesta de época, su contenido diacrónico, no desacredita el foro existencial de la "vida verdadera" anunciada, es decir, su fundamento o fondo propio. Tal es para la conciencia mundana del narrador lírico de la última estrofa del poema (Cabo) la cuarta región heideggeriana del ámbito poético: el mundo esplendente -*gloria*- donde habita, con luz incierta o clara, según la hondura conceptiva de esta experiencia, aquel Tú divino, cuyo ámbito de existencia solemos denominar *cielo*.

El poema de Jorge Manrique asume la negatividad del lenguaje y la trasciende en el *ethos* de la Voz que subsume el yo-tú mundanal en la persona de un Tú divino: diálogo del alma con su creador al reconocer el don de vida recibido y respuesta dada con él retornándolo a quien se lo pide, en el extremo de la existencia. La forma común del acto volitivo es la donación de vida: "dio el alma a quien gela (se la) dio", dice el narrador lírico en la última estrofa del poema (Cabo).

Se cumple en esto el lugar rítmico del lenguaje retornando la voz al acento cuyo tono plenifica. La negación habida en el acto fónico y la ausencia en él revelada, presente en la metafísica fenomenológica desde Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger y el deconstructivismo, entreabre el polo correlativo de la región dialogal, donde acontece la "influencia recíproca" en tanto lugar del lenguaje. Lo negativo de la voz descubre precisamente el modo de acceso a la posición fundante, donadora de vida. El sujeto lírico calla para oír la voz del Otro en el límite de la conciencia. Escucha en silencio cómo ruedan las palabras, los signos ya creados, que desaparecen y resurgen, cómo se conforman organizando y generando nuevo sentido. Tal rotación desvela el fondo de su aurora, el punto fontanal del tiempo, cuyas unidades cesan apenas engendradas, pero persisten latentes en aquella vibración interna también caduca, según Hegel. La dilución ha descubierto, sin embargo, y mientras todo esto acontece, algo antes inaudito, *inconcebible* en su profundidad, pero cuya impresión deja reflejo en cuanto ahora alcanza la inteligencia, por escaso que ello sea. Aparece un *gramma* nuevo que no satura incondicionalmente el fondo que lo posibilita. Cabe pensar entonces en una Voz sin sonido, pero potencialmente sonora, es decir, en tanto pueda engendrar, *decir* aunque solo fuera un eco suyo, un prelenguaje. Algo *decible* y, por ello, audible, inteligible, acorde de algún modo con la conformación humana.

El carácter sufijo (*-ble*) le viene al *gramma* de aquel fondo *inconcebible*, misterioso, un *inconsciente de naturaleza*, necesario, que habla y predispone a otro orden del espíritu y, aunque inaccesible por entero, se deja provocar, dice Jean Paulhan

intentando descubrir el presupuesto incondicional de la forma poética y de un estado de conciencia que permite formular su fundamento sin concebirlo del todo.[73]

La poesía busca el latido interno de la posibilidad del lenguaje, su carácter dicente, la moción cognoscitiva que está germinando, aquel retoño o vástago significante detectado por Aristóteles. De él procede la palabra poética como fermentación del pensamiento. Ella explica la declinación del sonido y de la moción interna, pues toda realización suya plasma solo el *gramma* o el hueco antecedente de la voz acuciada por la emergencia continuamente innovadora, cuyo instante presiente, como huyendo, briznas, huellas, atisbos suyos. El metro marca y fija esos impulsos mientras el ritmo oscila en todas direcciones con moción de sentido en fuga contenida. Imprime el acento del fenómeno así engendrado. La evanescente materia sonora y psíquica del metro se funde en el ritmo y adquiere moción poética del principio que la fecunda. Recupera el canto continuo que oímos al sucederse un punto tras otro punto del tiempo, como un latido sigue a otro en el impulso constante de vida. Y de ese suceso continuo, plasmado en las *Coplas* de Jorge Manrique como entrega del alma a su creador, nos queda solo el "consuelo" de "su memoria" (Cabo).

El fundamento rítmico del lenguaje nos sitúa en la donación primigenia de sentido o fuente poética del pensamiento. El hombre no puede desprenderse de la voz una vez articulada porque con ella descubre el carácter dicente de la inteligencia, la Voz previa, antecedente, el fondo dialogante del pensamiento con la realidad impresiva. Ahí se funda el carácter poético de la conciencia y, por tanto, de la filosofía también creadora. "La filosofía, reconoce Giorgio Agamben, es ese diálogo del hombre -el *hablante* y el *mortal*- con su Voz, este valeroso recobrar la Voz -y con ella una memoria- frente a la muerte, asegurando así al lenguaje su lugar. La Voz es el mudo compañero ético que corre en auxilio del lenguaje en el punto en que éste revela su in-fundamento. Callando, con su <<soplo>>, asume esa ausencia de fundamento y le da lugar".[74]

Estas palabras cuadran perfectamente como glosa del poema de Jorge Manrique al asumir el caballero don Rodrigo el diálogo con la Voz de la Muerte, que es la de la conciencia en su último extremo (XXXIV-XXXIX). Sabemos ya, no obstante, que la "ausencia de fundamento" a que se refiere Giorgio Agamben está fundando de nuevo ("le da lugar") porque se trata, ciertamente, del *acontecimiento originario*.[75] Ahora bien, si entendemos este *lugar* como deíxis o indicio de una voluntad dicente ("quiere-decir el puro tener lugar del lenguaje") que inaugura el ser frente a la nada que lleva dentro, bien rememoramos el Génesis bíblico, bien presuponemos -y sería lo mismo- aquel carácter decible (*-ble*) del pensamiento, aunque sea para decir la muerte que conlleva el sonido en su articulación fónica y la otra, metafísica, que anula, en el fondo, el acto creativo que promulga. Entonces, el fundamento que

[73] Paulhan, Jean, *Clef de la Poésie*, Éditorial Gallimard, París, 1944, pp. 25, 40, 49.

[74] Agamben, Giorgio, *El Lenguaje y la Muerte. Un Seminario sobre el Lugar de la Negatividad*, Pre-Textos, Valencia, 2008, p. 153.

[75] Ibid., p. 139.

se pretende negativo de la libertad y del lenguaje, es decir, de la condición humana, está siendo lo positivo de la negación, aquello que la posibilita. Al decir que esto, el signo, no es aquello designado, la realidad referida, el *no* remite aún a algo que nos viene de fuera, un "dehors". Y este forismo es el ser continuamente abierto del lenguaje, su escucha incesante. Aun dentro del mundo, la palabra tiene fondo adverbio y prepositivo. Indica movimiento, antelatido, desplazamiento, relación, cambio, *metá*: en medio, entre, por detrás, a continuación, después, en seguida, en comunidad con, en compañía de, por medio de…

¿Cómo es posible que a la negación la funde algo positivo? En función precisamente de aquello que descubre insinuándose en su forma. Niega la pretensión absoluta de toda expresión configurada, pues lo descubierto en la posición lógica al decir *sí* o *no*, al juzgar, aún depende del Tú u Otro dimanante, dialógico. Está en tensión de respuesta.

El poema de Jorge Manrique recupera el sonido dramático -Logos- del lenguaje más allá de la negación aparente que muestra. Lo negado resulta apertura -franja, rendija, velo, huella, sombra- o resquicio por donde asoma la *salud* que subyace, sigue reflexionando Jean Paulhan, "en el fondo de nuestra pérdida".[76]

Efectivamente, las negaciones sonora y psíquica de la articulación del habla y la vibración consecuente de la sensibilidad interna -imagen, esquema, sintagma…, huella o "soplo" del ángel-, son el embozo oscuro del resplandor o cara solo insinuada, pero "clara y pura" en el poema, del "paso de un misterio" que arruina los lugares comunes.[77] La síntesis de tiempo aquí alcanzada goza "de una virtud nueva que no estaba en los elementos".[78] Las expresiones prestadas, el metro consabido, la tradición cíclica y el conjunto de palabras del siglo XV aún no habían descubierto esta forma nueva de las *Coplas*, aunque algunas ya formularan su contenido. Es la virtud de la elación sonora y del fundamento rítmico del lenguaje, que dotan a la materia verbal de "una cualidad inédita" cuya expresión deviene "necesaria" en el poema.[79] El ritmo descubre la correspondencia fórica subyacente en las palabras y sus condiciones de realización efectiva.

Las *Coplas* de Jorge Manrique renuevan la sonoridad significante confiriendo rostro a la Voz sin sonido, pretemporal, y al sonido sin voz, mundano, en un tiempo cuya dilución abre en el intersticio dialógico de la conciencia la tensión presente y proyectiva del pensamiento poético. La poesía dialoga siempre con el Tú u Otro de la Voz fundante. Sus figuras históricas son emblemas o manifestaciones irregulares, decibles, en las que el Tú dicente entra antes -parangonando un argumento de Amor Ruibal sobre el alcance gnoseológico del conocimiento divino- como predicado que como sujeto o tema absoluto. Así han de entenderse las saturaciones intuitivas

[76] Ibid., p. 88.

[77] Paulhan, Jean, *Clef de la Poésie*, op. cit., p. 87.

[78] Ibid., p. 84.

[79] Ibid., pp. 85, 83.

de cada época al responder a la llamada del Tú transcendente. De ello procede, dice el filósofo gallego, "el fenómeno que se observa de que cuanto más estrecho y pobre es el concepto formado de la Divinidad, tanto mayor es la intervención sensible que se le da en las cosas, anulando la eficiencia de las causas segundas y creando, a veces, un dios para cada cosa; que es a manera de cristalización irregular de los juicios cualitativos de carácter religioso en que Dios entra como predicado".[80]

El poema predica de un sujeto intuido en la franja continua del entretiempo cuyos intersticios son poros de una presencia respirada. Su aliento se presiente e insufla palabras necesarias, por lo menos *inevitables*, del fundamento dialogal objetivo. Los temas son pocos -tierra, hombre, dios, cielo-, pero el cristal de sus figuras y predicados se multiplica con la rueda del tiempo. Abarca innúmeras relaciones sociales. En tal sentido, el esquema dialógico y polirradiado de fondo temporaliza la existencia en contacto resonante con el mundo en que vive. La poesía revela constantemente la relación intersubjetiva del hombre, donde acontece y se ubica el lenguaje. El hecho de retener en el ritmo la ausencia evanescente del sonido articulado, asume también la muerte en función de la vida hasta en los poros resucitada. Por eso es una muerte diferente a la de Rilke, Malraux, Heidegger y Sartre, señala Leo Spitzer contraviniendo una observación de Pedro Salinas próxima al sentido que Rilke asigna al morir propio, en principio extraño, pero que va dentro de uno mismo.[81] El poeta humaniza el último instante y lo salva poéticamente, advierte Stephen Gilman insistiendo en el sentido interno de brote natural que Pedro Salinas resalta en la personificación que tanto Jorge Manrique como Rilke realizan de la muerte, cada uno según circunstancias de época respectiva.[82] Efectivamente, don Rodrigo recibe a la muerte que "viene", se aproxima, llama "a su puerta" (XXXIII) y dialoga con él haciéndole ver la continuidad de ese momento en la duración auténtica de vida. El poeta la recibe, trata, asume, reconoce como suya: "y consiento en mi morir/ con voluntad placentera" (XXXVIII). Tenía costumbre de afrontarla abiertamente en el campo de batalla. La vio en rostros ajenos. No le extraña, por tanto. La acepta cuando llega a avisarlo de otro contratiempo que también exige ánimo e impulso combativo, pero cuyo fin difiere cualitativamente, pues libera e integra en modo de vida "perdurable".

No se trata del ser para la muerte de Heidegger, ni de la muerte rilkeana que llevamos dentro y consentimos con fluencia vegetal que corona la vida solo como entelequia; tampoco de la nada donde el ser se ahueca, de Sartre. A Jorge Manrique, la muerte le muestra un grado aún superior, extremo, de *virtud* singular que se

[80] Amor Ruibal, Ángel, *Los Problemas Fundamentales de la Filosofía y del Dogma*, Consellería da Presidencia e Administración Pública, Xunta de Galicia, Santiago de Compostela, 1995 (Santiago, 1914), p. 332.

[81] Spitzer, Leo, "Dos observaciones sintáctico-estilísticas a las *Coplas* de Jorge Manrique", NRFH, 4 (1950), p. 22, n. 30.

[82] Gilman, Stephen, "Tres retratos de la muerte en las Coplas de Jorge Manrique", NRFH, XIII, p. 310, n. 10.

irradia y da sentido pleno a la vida dejándola -resume Pedro Salinas- "en el umbral de la máxima esperanza, la inmortalidad".[83]

El principio de esperanza excede, como en Ernst Bloch cinco siglos después, las condiciones materiales de la existencia al constatar que el *modo* temporal de fenómenos concatenados no sustancia la acción y los valores de ella derivados, a no ser este principio descubierto en tensión rítmica que transforma la sucesión de presentes recordados, históricos y vitales, en prosodia de un acento intuido que aún no tiene cantidad métrica. Una vez presentida, la esperanza induce dinamismo de inminencia en el ánimo: "No gastemos tiempo ya/ en esta vida mezquina/ por tal modo" (XXXVIII). Es intuición animada. Anuncia algo que adviene de continuo. Impulsa e inicia otro *modo* acorde con el poético ya fundado, pues su movimiento de "ritmo interno", expone Leo Spitzer, "nos empuja hacia adelante, a través de su principio, su medio y su final (según la definición de San Agustín)".[84] La muerte es otro pie prosódico de un ritmo existencial. Salta en proceso, como el poema.

El método poético inaugura entonces un *tempo* cuya vibración transforma el sustrato del presente irradiando sus partículas nanológicas en la sustancia aérea, respirada, que es la vida de la conciencia. El contenido del presente, advierte Schopenhauer, se iguala identificándose en un fondo siempre igual a través de la totalidad del tiempo. La imposibilidad de discernir de modo inmediato esta identidad (de presentes) constituye precisamente el tiempo, forma y límite de nuestro intelecto, concluye el filósofo alemán.[85]

Jorge Manrique afronta ese imposible abriendo en él, "por tal manera", un resquicio o modo diferente de recuerdo y memoria fundante: el ritmo persistente de la conciencia. Una resonancia de fondo subtiende los períodos rítmicos y crea un campo perceptivo profundo que transforma la evanescencia del sonido en ámbito de búsqueda. La ausencia es reclamo de esa Voz implícita. Dilata e impulsa la mente hacia lo desconocido saturándolo con emisiones fónicas inducidas por la vibración del tiempo y coevas de aquella resonancia o radiación creadora de fondo. La muerte revela entonces -Shopenhauer se percata de ello siglos después- una voluntad oculta, en principio ciega, sin ubicación determinada o ahí fijo -*ubi sunt?* de las *Coplas*-,

---

[83] Salinas, Pedro, *Jorge Manrique o Tradición y Originalidad*, Seix Barral, Barcelona, 1974, p. 204. El sentido que le da Rilke a la muerte ya está prefigurado en Jorge Manrique en cuanto algo extraño a la vida y que, por eso, "nos arrebata". Sin embargo, si la asumimos y hacemos *nuestra*, madurándola "en nosotros", descubrimos "el morir que brota de su vida, para que tenga amor, sentido y urgencia… La gran muerte que cada uno lleva en sí es el fruto en torno al cual gira todo." (Citado por Pedro Salinas, Ibid., p. 181). Hay en uno y otro poeta una petición rogatoria a Dios -Jorge Manrique- o al Señor -Rilke-; incluso un mismo preámbulo de esperanza entrevista en la "urgencia". Jorge Manrique descubre, en cambio, la aceptación conforme de la voluntad humana en consonancia rítmica con la divina. Rilke desvela el sentido vegetal de la muerte en la sustancia del vivir mismo.

[84] Spitzer, Leo, Ibid., p. 23, n. 31.

[85] Schopenhauer, Arthur, « Über den Tod und sein Verhältnis zur Unzerstörbarkeit unsers Wesens an sich », in *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, cap. 41, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1986, pp. 612–613.

luego iluminadora, cuyo juicio triunfa sobre la oscuridad originaria,[86] pero no como un reflejo suyo homólogo, según deduce el filósofo, sino, para el poeta, con sentimiento placentero de luz mental afectiva, "clara y pura". Entendimiento y sentidos concuerdan de consuno (*Cabo*, última estrofa del poema) y restauran el don de vida que aún es su instante supremo.

La llamada de la muerte (XXXIII) desdobla el relato -tiempo infinitivo del narrador: "vino la Muerte a llamar/ a su puerta"- en presente dinámico de conciencia personalizada -tiempo gerundio: "Diziendo"-. Su inminencia, lo aún no cumplido, pero inquietante, dialoga con el sujeto de la escena, el maestre don Rodrigo, moribundo, quien la asume, apropia. La vive como último "trago", bebiendo su tiempo, pues la muerte solo vive inquietamente, presentida, en quien la experimenta. Aún es, reflexiona Max Scheler y cita Pedro Salinas, "en una o en otra forma, una acción, un acto del ser viviente mismo".[87] Y el diálogo remueve la estructura continua del presente autónomo desde un Tú cuya palabra desnucleariza lo igual, pero no idéntico, de la sustancia viviente. Un Tú afondado en todo poema. Su vibración ausculta la entraña misma del instante, que no cesa ni amenazado de muerte. Sería esta un ictus suyo, pues la vida nace y continúa incesante con sentido dentro.

La meditación poética de la muerte traspone el tiempo, lo transe. Antecede a la articulación del sonido con latencia de voz informe que presagia incontenible algo distinto del *fuera* o forismo en que acontece. Conocemos esa voz, sin embargo, *dentro*, desde y en sus unidades fónicas. Su presencia dramática responde en el poema a la solicitación que la voz del narrador lírico le hace con tono plural e imperativo que asume a todas las personas posibles del diálogo: a tanta gente y forma suya, yo, tú, él, nosotros, vosotros, ellos, "di, Muerte, ¿dó los escondes/ y traspones?" (XXIII). Y cuando se la llama, responde: "Buen cavallero" (XXXIV).

La tensión aguda de la pregunta en la estrofa XXIII -monosílabos y corte apelativo con cesura punzada- se distiende en el segundo hemistiquio y pie quebrado con paralelismo sintáctico, morfológico, de rima y aparentemente prosódico, pero con ritmo encabalgado, entre trocaico y anfíbraco.[88] Esta distensión prevalece luego al iniciarse el diálogo de la estrofa XXXIV. La voz es aquí sugerente, persuasiva, consoladora.

El presente dialógico lleva dentro la pregunta implícita de su fondo: *ubi sunt*? La presencia solo vive de sí misma. Descubre que algo inmortal la transe, pues el ritmo que la engloba, y así también a la muerte, habla más allá de su instante resonando aún después de la vida. Este ritmo cesa en tanto permanece y su lapso aún es instancia

[86] Ibid., p. 595.

[87] Salinas, Pedro, Ibid.,p. 183.

[88] El ritmo de las *Coplas* establece, según veíamos al comienzo de este estudio, una inherencia de atribución interna que irradia y disemina el sonido entre líneas, hemistiquios, secuencias. Conjuga el metro por *trova* y el silábico, con lo que unidades átonas adquieren valor fónico en función del *decir* o canto medio del poema, entre la música y el ritmo del habla. Jorge Manrique adelanta en tal sentido, pero no es el único, formas rítmicas internas evaluadas por Gerard Manley Hopkins en el siglo XIX.

propia, tránsito de pie silábico, quebrado. La quiebra retumba…, continúa en otro ámbito. La muerte viene incluso desde el fondo de la voz, pues *dice* silenciando.

Jorge Manrique sobrepasa la distinción de Epicuro entre los actos irreconciliables de vida y muerte, pues esta siempre resulta, recuerdan Rilke, Lévinas y otros creadores, extraña, ajena, del o de lo *otro*. Nadie asiste a su propia muerte. Hay, sin embargo, una vivencia suya real, una escisión sentida en carne propia. Por esta fisura, o en ella, respira lo incontenible del tiempo, su imposibilidad misma, un trasmundo, aquello que nunca llega a memoria ni conocimiento y, sin embargo, inquieta: el rostro o llamada del prójimo ("autrui"), el desgarro de lo Mismo -mismidad identitativa del mundo en la conciencia- por el Otro.[89] Un agujero negro que altera y fagocita la luz del conocimiento objetivo hacia su posibilidad misma. La figura de lo sucesivo como otro de sí que deslíe la identidad compacta del yo y descubre su persona orientada a la donación de origen. En el Tú con mayúscula de Jorge Manrique hallan su lugar de encuentro el yo o tú dialógicos. Los modos de vida -gozo, lucha, poder, dominio, guerra, fama, sufrimiento, fracaso- son posturas humanas del límite que la inteligencia constata ante el fenómeno inmemorial de la existencia abocada al infinito. Esta inmensidad mantiene en Jorge Manrique, sin embargo, el tono de la conversación compungida y auspiciada por un deseo y querencia que no anula la sentida razón de la personalidad propia. Un sentimiento que reconoce sinceramente el desvío e incomprensión del tiempo verdadero, por lo que somete la gloria de su valor y merecer mundanos a la *gloria* divina. Y esta actitud manifestada como súplica de perdón por esa lejanía del origen duradero responde a la fuente del *bien* ahora reconocido como subsunción infinita del sufrimiento en propia carne "sin resistencia", donde se *conforman* la voluntad divina y humana, en la *persona* del Tú transcendente encarnado. El poema concluye con la exaltación de Cristo o figura del *Ecce Homo* evangélico. Nunca lo nombra como tal, sino oblicuamente, con pronombre cuya lejanía histórica se reduce en el cara a cara del diálogo -transición del pronombre demostrativo "Aquél…/ aquél solo invoco yo" (IV), "aquel fijo (hijo) de Dios" (VI), al Tú humanizado- y sin confundirse las personas convocadas formal o sustancialmente. El yo lírico reconvierte el tono en conformidad de sentimiento compartido (XXXVIII).

Esta exposición franca del yo como *me voici* despojado de sus atributos esenciales en pro de una existencia desnuda hasta el límite de sí misma en Otro, donde se ubica la relación que sostiene al individuo -lo no dividido-, relación ética para Lévinas más allá del ser acotado como tema de representación ontológica, no pierde en ningún momento su carácter de persona. La firmeza de ánimo considera y sobrepasa de otro modo las figuras éticas que Lévinas intercala, comprendiendo también en ellas la fecundidad de la familia, en el tránsito al infinito de un *decir* constante, *iterativo*, no identificado con nada "sino con la voz que se enuncia y se entrega."[90] Una exposición de confianza absoluta.

[89] Levinas, Emmanuel, *Dieu, la Mort et le Temps*, op. cit., p. 128 ; cf. p. 123.

[90] Ibid., p. 220. Cf. *Parole et Silence*, op. cit., pp. 311ss.

Lévinas o la crítica en él fundada aún vería seguramente un retorno a la tematización del *decir* en lo *dicho* del final o *Cabo* de las *Coplas* al retener en la *memoria* colectiva el último instante del yo vivo y en la reciprocidad de la donación -"dio el alma a quien gela (se la) dio"- una figura del "residuo irresorbible de actividad" que todavía permite al yo ser personaje presentado y le concede representarse como santo, lo cual supone un límite o el reposo de ser absuelto.[91] No habría absolución posible para este resto -figuras de la forma mortal humana- asumible, sin embargo, en la tradición cristiana de Dios humanizado. Tanto en esta concepción evangélica como para Lévinas, la figura mortal del dios, reconocida también en el judaísmo, aunque de otro modo y con significado diferente al del cristianismo, es base de una sabiduría en la que resplandece su reino y se fundamenta la santidad de la búsqueda. Ahora bien, la santidad que unos y otros desean y consienten es la misma: Dios viviente.[92]

He aquí la diferencia del poeta con Lévinas. Sobre la coincidencia de una *gloria* sin reposo posible, *anárquica*, sin principio, que estallaría sin dejar rastro al tematizarla,[93] la distinción abismada de una carne humana asumida por Dios mortalmente -paradoja de toda paradoja- y como forma, no obstante, de vida duradera, infinita. Un *fuera-dentro* absoluto, inexplicable, pero asumible. Asunción de metro y prosodia en el ritmo del poema. Para Lévinas, la inspiración del canto poético no es primera, pues adviene en la exposición del *me voici*, prelación incluso del *decir* sobre la donación,[94] donde se situaría el poema. Si hay resonancia, lenguaje, y abre otro ámbito o modo de ser, algo suyo vibra, late y tiembla en la palabra.

El canto de Jorge Manrique fluye en la exposición misma del ritmo, pues el *recuerdo* a que nos convoca desde el comienzo es precisamente el *decir* que se expande continuo como energía de una materia también oscura que atrae y distorsiona los temas y figuras del mundo sometida a una intensa atracción gravitatoria. La astricción de la voz anterior a la luz, de la onda sonora cuya resonancia se ilumina en algún instante de la existencia. Instante singular e irrepetible. Único.

La poesía se nos muestra entonces como el verdadero fundamento de la existencia. Es, como dice Jürgen Trabant, hervidero de libertad y vida socialmente diferenciada. Crea un espaciotiempo en cuya resonancia ya no hay lugar para la muerte, el odio y la opresión. El lenguaje poético, concluye el citado lingüista alemán, diferencia y distingue. "Es la diferencia de la especie".[95]

En el ritmo diferenciado del acento de cada hombre alcanzamos el origen del lenguaje y de la creación humana.

---

[91] Ibid., p. 219.

[92] Ibid., *Du Sacré au Saint. Cinq Nouvelles Lectures Talmudiques*, Les Éditions de Minuit, París, 1977, p. 121.

[93] Ibid., *Dieu, la Mort et le Temps*, op. cit., p. 221. El desbordamiento de la forma sonora abre a la presencia de "un otro ser" y esto recibe también el nombre de *gloria* en Lévinas. Cf. *Parole et Silence*, op. cit., p. 90, 92, 95.

[94] Ibid., p. 216.

[95] Trabant, Jürgen, *Was ist Sprache?*, Verlag C. H. Beck, München, 2008, p. 294.

Kinds of Guise Bundles

Semiha Akıncı

Abstract Unlike concepts, which are abstract, supra-temporal entities, guises are actual entities, budding, blooming and drying, as the flowers which instantiate them. Whether the usual things in the universe are to be construed as only bundles of such guises, or whether a material core, essentially foreign to guises in being indestructible and of itself ineffable, has to be posited as a substratum which keeps the guises together, has been hotly debated throughout the history of philosophy. Plato sided with the first alternative, while Aristotle expounded a doctrine closer to the second. In this article an effort is made to defend the first alternative through drawing attention to a platitude: not all guise bundles hold together their ingredient guises in the same way, there are various different modes of guise cohesion, yielding different kinds of guise bundles. In none of the diverse kinds does a material core appear to be indispensable for bearer identity to be displayed or retained. As a side-product a rough doctrine of guise-bundle categories is suggested.

Towards a Rough Doctrine of Guise-Bundle Categories

Sentences parse into two main sorts of semantical components: the information, what the sentence says, and the topics, what things it is about. In classical terms, the first component is called the *describans*, the second the *describanda*. [The singular is '*describandum*'.] This is simply a generalisation of the grammatical subject – predicate distinction.

In the artificial language of predicate logic, one symbolises this formation by representing the general structure of arbitrary sentences as $F(n_1, \ldots, n_k)$, where the

S. Akıncı (✉)
Faculty of Communication Sciences, Anadolu University,
26470, Tepebasi-Eskisehir, Turkey
e-mail: sakinci@anadolu.edu.tr

A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), *Phenomenology and the Human Positioning in the Cosmos: The Life-world, Nature, Earth: Book One*, Analecta Husserliana 113,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-4801-9_7,

F represents – all – the information involved in the symbolised sentence, (possibly as a conjunction of separate predicates), and the n represent the topics it is about. [In practice no more than three things are taken as joint subjects of single sentences, but *recherché* examples involving maybe ten separate things, even, may be concocted.]

A description is like a name in picking out a thing, but like a sentence in giving information about that thing: it gives information which could – hopefully would – single out the thing in question from the rest of the things which might be involved. "Zeynep, the younger daughter of the first seriously debilitated philosophy lecturer of the Republic of Turkey." This description is a very close derivative of the sentence which would ensue from replacing the comma with 'is'. They both serve the same purpose: to pick out Zeynep, to introduce her.

Not all descriptions pick out their topics uniquely, as the above example does. "The grand-children of the acting president of the Turkish Republic" does indeed describe only one person as of early 2000, but not by dint of its meaning: the very same form of words may describe five – or even more – different children by Spring 2005. It is easy to discern singular descriptions, those which apply to at most one thing, in English: they involve use of the definite article. 'The'. [Note, however, 'the grand-children in the plural.] The general case is for information to be general, to be applicable to different – sets of – topics at different times. [For those who make a distinction, everything in this note applies only to actual entities and their descriptions: most of these issues do not come up at all in the realm of abstract entities.]

The information content of sentences, and of their derivative descriptions, are called their sense, and the set of things they apply to, describe, on a particular occasion of use, their referent(s). So, their sense is common to all tokens of an expression type, but their referents are token-specific. Thus the sentence "Zeynep is a tall, nubile young lady", if used to mention one lady 'Zeynep' designates, is true of her, but untrue when used to mention an elder relative having the same initials. This is because the sense remains constant: not meaning one thing for the younger lady, another thing for the elderly one. Hence sense pertains to expression types, whereas reference may be different from one occasion of use to the next, depending on the intension of the user.

[In the usual case, what the intended reference is revealed by a number of context-dependent factors, such as the usual referent of the expression in question in a given social context. Reference appears incapable of being fixed uniquely in terms of expressions alone, however. Descriptions involving mention of relations to unique individuals are only circular in this respect: that point of unique reference would then have to be fixed only in terms of language, *ad infinitum*. "Aaron's younger daughter" describes a young lady uniquely only once the reference of 'Aaron' is fixed uniquely. So reference, unlike sense, is not exclusively a linguistic affair: social and contextual factors intervene in fixing reference.]

Descriptions may be regarded as complex predicates, linguistic counterparts of concepts. Descriptions with the same sense but different reference introduce different manifestations of the same concept in different *rebus*. One minor reason for adopting this construal is that it allows a simple answer to the ages-old conundrum: no two

yellow roses are quite the same colour, so why call them all by the same name? All yellow roses are instances of the concept 'rose-yellow' that is why they are all called by the same name. But they are each different instances of that concept, and display that difference in their colour as well as their shape, etc.

H-Ñ Castañeda has called these particular examples of concepts 'guises' – if I do not misunderstand –. Unlike concepts, which are abstract, supra-temporal entities, guises are actual entities, budding, blooming and drying, as the flowers which instantiate them. Whether the usual things in the universe are to be construed as only bundles of such guises, or whether a material core, essentially foreign to guises in being indestructible and of itself ineffable, has to be posited as a substratum which keeps the guises together, has been hotly debated throughout the history of philosophy. Plato sided with the first alternative, while Aristotle expounded a doctrine closer to the second.

In this article an effort is made to defend the first alternative through drawing attention to a platitude: not all guise bundles hold together their ingredient guises in the same way, there are various different modes of guise cohesion, yielding different kinds of guise bundles. In none of the diverse kinds does a material core appear to be indispensable for bearer identity to be displayed or retained. As a side-product a rough doctrine of guise-bundle categories is suggested.

That guises come in bundles is another way of saying many different descriptions all apply to the same thing: Zeynep is a philosophers' daughter, Zeynep is a tall, attractive young lady, Zeynep has a most repellent temper, Zeynep has very high ambitions, etc. This means all the corresponding guises are borne by the same individual, they are held together in the unity of an individual. It is easily shown that the relation of pertaining to the same individual defines an equivalence relation among guises. Cannot this equivalence relation itself be taken as their object, as what it is that they describe their common reference?

This construal is quite close to the hearts of contemporary Platonists, but there are two difficulties in the way: there are several different equivalence relations holding together guises in diverse ways, and it is seriously questionable whether a special sort of descriptions, framed in terms of intensional predicates, do pertain to their putative referents, or indeed to anything at all. Both difficulties suggest there is more than one kind of guise bundles, and not all guises pertain to some one bundle or other. This note uses these premises to argue against the materialistic contention that a specific kind of guise peg, functioning as a substratum on which all relevant guises are fastened, is not feasible.

Firstly, for things which become memorable, there are guises which pertain to them throughout their memorable duration: "fame guises" I shall suggest calling them. the guises 'coming from a Thracian royal family', 'being the first European ruler to conquest land large enough to make an empire', 'being buried in North Western Turkey', are fame guises of Alexander the Great which will be his, describe him correctly, for as long as he is remembered. These examples indicate that some guises come to attach to their topics at various phases of their career, even after they cease to be. Being buried near Gebze Township is a guise which came to attach to Alexander after he was dead.

Extremely few individuals, even among people, become memorable: many people do not remember even their parents for any length of time. Secondly, then, there are guises which pertain to their topics throughout their lifetime. The total bundle of such guises Aristotle called the essence of the topic in question. The same word is used in this note. [Because Aristotle did not recognise relational properties, his notion of essence differs somewhat from the one suggested here.] Among essential guises are those pertaining to kind, peculiarities, invariable relations, essential functions, etc. [The vexing question "When do things cease to be themselves, when are they destroyed?" can be answered in terms of essential guise bundles: when they lose a specific set of their guises, different for each sort of topic, which jointly constitute their essences.]

"Being a crippled fathers' daughter" is an invariable relation of Zeynep: she cannot be otherwise while remaining herself. "Being a female human being" is about her kind (although whether sex is an unchanging characteristic has become debateable of late); and "being her fathers' favourite offspring" is about an essential function of hers. Hence these three are some of the essential guises characterising Zeynep. Note that "being a human being" derives from a very dense predicate, involving 'mammal', 'capable of speech', 'having a pregnancy period of roughly 310 days', among its constituents. Alternately, 'living thing with such-and-such a DNA structure' could be taken as the core concept.

I shall suggest that fame guises, along with other sorts of guises, wrap themselves around essential guise bundles, as a second layer, like wrapping yellow wool on top of white. The essential guise bundle is the definitory one, encompassing the *sine qua non* characteristics of the topic of description, all others being accidental, though in different ways. Alexander might not have established the Hellenistic empire, but he would not have been that Alexander, did he not come from a Thracian royal family. Once a topic is described in any way at all, all of its essential guises are also invoked: this is not true for other, accidental, guises.

Thirdly, there are aspectual guises, attaching to aspects of their topics. Zeynep is young lady only from 1995 to 2005, in that temporal aspect of herself. Harun is a serious, courteous, thoughtful elderly gentleman – only if he is in his good mood; if not, pity poor you! This is how 'geniacal' and 'insane' may both apply to the same topic, as they have too many famous people. Split personalities may be likened to wool strands of different colours being wrapped on distinguishably different parts of the same essence bundle.

"The Evening Star" describes one aspect of Venus, whereas "The Planet second nearest the Sun" describes an essential feature. Why? How does one distinguish? Venus cannot change its orbit – for ought we to know, at present – but it is not visible in the evening horizon except in the early evenings. This indicates that the whole bundle of guises corresponding to the topic of a group of co-designative descriptions may be invoked by any one of them singly, accidental ones as well as essential ones.

"The family car's being in the houses parking place", "The family car's being in front of the shop" are guises which pertain to their topic, a certain car, in a way

different from the way "The family car's having been painted mallards head green" pertains to it. The third guise yields information about a change that took place in its topic, as the first two do not. I suggest calling guises like the third 'altering guises', and those like the first two 'situational guises'. Roughly, altering guises come from unary predicates, situational guises from multi-variable predicates. [Things might not be that simple, however: A's being separated from B is a binary predicate, but the wise know how profoundly such an occurrence can change the internal characteristics of both A and B.]

All sorts of guise-bundle cohesions suggested thus far assume that guises attach to, are wrapped on, their topics, themselves balls or bundles of other guises. There are reasons for holding that this is not always so for guises based on intensional predicates, of which "X believes that" has come to be taken as paradigmatic. Assume CK believes that GR's father is a former pentathlon champion holding three cups. Assume, just to be on the safe side, that there is no such person, i.e. who is both GR's father and pentathlon champion. [One cannot be absolutely certain, can one?]

There is, then, no bundle of guises for this description to wrap itself onto: no other description holds of the putative topic of this guise. For such null descriptions I suggest saying their fictitious topic is just themselves, just that one guise, in its function of being a topic of CK's unfounded belief. While *de-re* designation is to guise bundles, *de-dicto* designation is to single guises. The referents of a description are, in this construal, all guise bundles of which the describing guise is an ingredient, whereas its sense is only that single guise. Thus an articulate answer is offered to the question "What is the sense of a description?"

How may the received notion of 'lump of matter' be approximated in this bundles-of-guises framework? I take it that 'matter' alone is a generalisation on "lumps of matter", signifying the totality of all lumps of matter. The received notion of matter implies that lumps of matter endure all conceivable processes of change, so that no they bear no guise essentially. This in turn implies no lump is essentially different from any other: hence the use of 'matter' in place of 'lump of matter'.

Lumps of matter are still distinguishable at any slice of spime, however, by their spimoral position. [I use 'spime' to abbreviate 'space-time'; 'spimoral' is short for 'spatio-temporal'.]. Such positional specification would imply the size and shape of any lump at any given moment, and this is all the identity the received notion requires. This position fixing depends only on determination of some arbitrary point of spime as the initial point of reference.

All other phases of the entire universe, on either temporal side of the point of reference, could be described – in mathematical terms, but that is a fine way of describing – w.r.t. This unique reference point, and any lump of matter would then be describable as an infinite – because indestructible – sequence of finite ordered tuples of spime co-ordinates. Nobody is saying all this is practical, I am concerned only to show at least one way of describing lumps of matter is possible. Of course; how would lumps of matter be conceivable otherwise? This construal indicates, however, that lumps of matter are, at best, random dispersions of bundles of accidental characteristics.

Bibliography

Austin, J.L. 1962. *Sense and sensibilia: Reconstructed from the manuscript notes by G. J. Warnock*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Black, Max, and Peter Geach (eds.). 1970. *Translations from the philosophical writings Gottlob Frege*. Oxford: Basil Blacwell.

Castaneda, H.N. 1983. The self and its guises. *Nous* 17(1): 60–62.

Castaneda, H.N. 1984. Tomberlin, Frege and Guise theory: A note on the methodology of dia-philosophical comparison. *Synthese* 61(2): 135–147.

Castaneda, H.N. 1988. The semantics of thinking, dia-philosophical pluralism and Guise theory. *Metaphilosophy* 19(2): 79–104.

Dummet, Michael. 1981. *The interpretations of Frege's philosophy*. London: The Trinity Press.

Salmon, Nathan U. 1982. *Reference and essence*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Enmeshed Experience in Architecture: Understanding the Affordances of the Old Galata Bridge in Istanbul

Semra Aydinli

Abstract Today phenomenology points out the ways for a 'return to experience' in architecture emphasizing spatiality which is the primary condition of all lived-world. Understanding the spatiality as a complex interlocking of time, space, culture, material, detail and way of life gives rise to the "whole" pattern involving interwoven network relations. This whole pattern can be grasped throughout the enmeshed experience which makes it possible to be in constant dialogue and interaction with the narrative space. Considering architecture as a narrative space also engender the different ways of seeing, of reading from an interpretive frame with our entire bodily experience. In doing so, it is possible to touch, behold its spatiality in which cultural, political, economic, psychological and social dynamics are meshed as a whole. In this paper, the term of enmeshed experience will be introduced considering the intervention of the Old Galata Bridge at length, some notions such as multiplicity, becoming, production of sensation, duration, spatio-temporal experience, complexity and legibility. As a result, enmeshed experience points out the ways to grasp the remarkable, inexhaustible range of possibilities for future regeneration projects.

Introduction

By the end of twentieth century, critical opposition to globalization, in parallel to duality, had caused a retreat from the cultural theories to search for holistic approaches to cultural identity issues. The consequences of the growing preoccupation

S. Aydinli (✉)
Faculty of Architecture, Istanbul Technical University,
Taskisla, Taksim, Istanbul 034287, Turkey
e-mail: aydinli1@itu.edu.tr

A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), *Phenomenology and the Human Positioning in the Cosmos: The Life-world, Nature, Earth: Book One*, Analecta Husserliana 113,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-4801-9_8,

with cultural identity in contemporary architecture emphasize that architects today need more holistic ways of thinking than ever. Holism requires to refer to the phenomenological inquiry that focus on the "both and" way of thinking instead of "either or" in order to deal with the paradoxes of contemporary architecture. Phenomenological readings of architecture as an urban experience therefore become significant in a world where the architecture at large scale has lost its interplay with paradoxes, and its creative ground. Generally speaking, the phenomenological inquiry liberates and opens up architect's sensation and imagination; and merges the thoughts and perceptions at the place where seeing with his/her mind's eye triggers the architect's creative thinking. Rethinking architecture with its paradoxes and its multiplicity can be considered as the extension of the creative thinking and it necessitates an interpretive framework as a spine of phenomenological readings. In this study the interpretive framework, consist of interwoven network relations has been proposed to clarify the term "enmeshed experience". In recent years, investigating the spatiality known as the primary condition of architecture and its lived world has become more crucial than ever and it can entirely be understood by phenomenological perspective. Phenomenology emphasizing the equivocal status of being both perceiver and perceived, has pointed out the ways for understanding the deep meaning of spatiality. Steven Holl[1] clarifies the term spatiality via experience through the following sentences: *Experience is not only via objects or things, yet space is only perceived when a subject describes it. As that* subject *occupies a particular time, space is thus linked to a perceived duration. The virtual body, as a system of nerves and senses, is oriented in space. Body is at the very essence of our being and our spatial perception. As we move through spaces, the body moves in a constant state of essential incompletion. A determinate point of view necessarily gives way to an indeterminate flow of perspectives* (Holl 2006).

Steven Holl addresses to Maurice Merleau-Ponty who defines the enmeshed experience as a flow of time namely becoming, as a whole of interactions, perceptions, connotations and memories. It is a process of connections and articulations with no ground, end or single intent. In this process some places having cultural codes, hidden dimensions motivate the experience into a differential becoming that constantly produces new events and elaborates a new conception of sense. Each event therefore opens up to its own world throughout a dialogue between the perceiving subject and the perceived object; and then space becomes place having a sense of place. This phenomenon can be grasped throughout a prolonged perception/interaction that proceed as both a process and the product. Along with the perceived duration of the prolonged interaction, several stages emerge in the form of image that can be called as a product and then this image gives a way to a different way of seeing and thinking called process; and this articulation of being both process and product proceeds within a spiral pathway. Enmeshed experience, therefore, emerges throughout the prolonged perception/interaction that engenders a dialogue triggering

[1] Steven Holl is a contemporary architect who designs his buildings in relation with the concepts borrowed from Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology.

the imagination and motivating to rethink the existence of how the present formations, relations can be carried to the future; namely opening up to the new ideas for future configurations.

In this paper Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of perception (Langer 1989, p. 25) has been the key source for understanding the deep meaning of 'spatiality' through the bodily experience which is embedded in the praxis of enmeshed experience flowing timeless pathways in nonlinear relations. Timeless pathways designate to think about the past from present and carry them with intuitions to the future simultaneously. Gilles Deleuze and Pierre-Felix Guattari (1987) define the nonlinear relations referring to the term 'becoming' as an immanent behavior. According to Deleuze and Guattari, 'becoming' as a noun implies the pathways along which an entity may be transformed whilst retaining some resemblance to its former self. Accordingly, the enmeshed experience helps us to be aware of the term 'becoming' to invent new trajectories, new responses, unpredictable futures. Because of its paradoxical references the term 'becoming' can be considered as an escape from the old, with its constraints, converting desire into opportunity. While experiencing the cultural codes of architecture in a global city such as Istanbul, the term 'becoming' articulates our understanding of how different generations, reflecting the character of their journey through time, is linked to unpredictable, indeterminate, never-accomplished actualization. Accordingly, the enmeshed experience in Istanbul having traces of different generations facilitates to understand its spatio-temporal relationships. The term 'becoming' makes legible these urban traces which are hidden and waiting to be discovered for future urban transformation projects.

One of the urban transformation projects in the Golden Horn is the Old Galata Bridge and its close environment; the most efficient intervention has been done as a translation of the architectonics into the exhibition space for 2005 design week. It has been a temporary spatial organization for design week and after the exhibition, the spaces under the bridge have been used by the artists' and designers' workshop spaces quite a while. The short term intervention project has begun with the site analysis but not using only the conventional techniques, rather has been addressed to the phenomenological inquiry that is the subject of enmeshed experience. The spatial configurations of the existing construction, architectonics in other words the affordances of Old Galata Bridge which are hidden behind its spatio-temporal relations and multi-sensory qualities have been all understood by the enmeshed experience. The main idea behind this intervention project is that the Old Galata Bridge as a cultural being should not be preserved as an entity frozen in time; its spatio-temporal configurations that engender the memory should be understood comprehensively in order to problematize the reciprocal relation between the past and present. First the designers have begun with the comprehensive analysis on the existing building, the bridge and its close environment through the enmeshed experience that has triggered the memory as an integration of mind-body-environment. There is no better tool than architecture to redesign the link between mind–body and the environment through which the mind cannot be separated from its phenomenal senses via body. They have also discovered the poetic image of Galata Bridge which was enriched by the memory affecting the mind and the sensation that open the

doors to conceive its narrative space. Re-reading the Bridge as a narrative space has motivated the designers to understand distinct fields as a whole. This analysis gives way to the synthesis simultaneously so that the new ideas in the old city triggers the 'becoming' which emerges at the stage of our twenty first century life without losing its "aura" and the essence of all historical testimony. Along the duration of enmeshed experience the term 'becoming' help the designers to understand the affordances of Old Galata Bridge, re-reading and mapping its urban traces. In this context, the designers began to find the new ways of re-reading and mapping the city through its incomplete experience which has been the result of 'becoming' to understand all the affordances of the Old Galata Bridge.

In this paper, the notion of enmeshed experience will be introduced inquiring how the affordances of Old Galata Bridge can be grasped through its multiple meaning layers, referring to the ambiguous notions such as becoming, production of sensation, multiplicity, complexity, mystery and legibility. Those ambiguous notions have sustained for grasping remarkable, inexhaustible range of possibilities of the lived-world. Enmeshed experience therefore has facilitated to understand the potentialities of the lived world that opens the doors to the connotations within the context of spatial voids, fragmented and incomplete images. In the course of enmeshed experience, they all have emerged from a series of overlapping urban layers that have constituted memory as a spatio-temporal entity.

Interpretive Framework for Enmeshed Experience

Phenomenology entails a deeper, interpretive dimension in the form of hermeneutics.

It allows for understanding the truth in terms of the enmeshed experience which offers a depth model for understanding human existence in relation to the environment. This model for 'understanding' can be identified by the interplay between reasoning that is logical and reasoning that is intuitive. For this reason, we have to change our thoughts, perceptions in understanding architecture as a whole which requires the shift from mechanistic to holistic conception of reality.

In the context of holism,[2] the city of architecture can be considered as a multidimensional phenomenon involving interwoven network system of physical, cultural, political, economic, psychological and social aspects. They all refer to each other creating new connections experienced as a sense of place with its in-between

[2] The term 'holistic' refers to an understanding of reality in terms of integrated wholes whose properties cannot be reduced to those of smaller units. The idea behind this holistic approach is that the dialectic contradictions are complementary and configuration of the whole depends on a continuous oscillation between two poles in which all transition takes place gradually and unbroken progression (Capra 1997).

concepts, which are naturally ambiguous. The interwoven network system of body-mind-environment constitutes the structure of enmeshed experience that can be understood through the interpretive framework. It is possible to discover how the entities release a series of enabling and transforming potentialities through the interpretive framework. In considering the truth that enmeshed experience cannot be grounded on man, the subject, culture or language; designers have to focus on the flow of life in the course of their spatial explorations. As a task of interpretation of Old Galata Bridge, the interpretive framework has been conducted to chart the ways in which designers had imagined and produced fictions, ideas and assemblages referring to the flow of life. On the other hand, the task of interpretation has been conducted from a base of in-between reality on the part of enmeshed experience in Istanbul. The representational images of the city have the power to overcome the tension between tangible/visible and intangible/invisible aspects which coincide with the tension between the sensible and intelligible experience. The intangible/invisible channels of the city also hold within themselves perceptual energies referring to place – memory. Memory which brings together most of the points that have been made so far, has a key role to produce sensation; and it contributes to the articulation of remembered experience, articulated embodiments. According to Deleuze, production of sensation is a continuous state of 'becoming' as the time is folded, bent or enveloped in with space. *During the production of sensation, folding architecture offers us the possibility to rethink about a dynamic relation of its urban space and its power of the image that trigger "Intertwining" of body and mind carrying specific implications for concrete ways of seeing* (Colebrook 2002).

The enmeshed experience of the big picture in Istanbul in relation with the Old Galata Bridge has triggered to rethink the memory of space – place which has been neglected throughout the fragmented history. As seen in Fig. 1, the flowing timeless pathways of the old bridge bring together all the cultural, physical and social layers. The whole structure of these articulated layers nourish each other during the production of sensation. The meaning layers of both Istanbul and the Bridge therefore have enhanced the enmeshed experience through the interactive relationship between the physical world and the human being creating a 'lived-world', in Merleau-Ponty's words the 'perceived-world'. The primacy of the perceived - world of everyday experience is emphasized by Merleau-Ponty (1968) as following: "*Space is not the setting (real or logical) in which things are arranged, but the means whereby the positing of things becomes possible.*" For Merleau-Ponty, the perceived-world is firmly anchored in the mutual relationship between the environment and the structure of human body; its potentialities for action.

The spatial character of perceived–world reflects the modes of enmeshed experiences in two ways, ranging from the abstract, measured space of geometry to the concretely experienced space of everyday life. In relation to the term perceived–world, enmeshed experience merges objects and fields reflecting the relations and transactions between the people and the physical world. Consequently, all meaning layers which are brought together as a mesh according to the context are embedded in the praxis of experience. Lefebvre (1996) in his work called *Writing on Cities* states that: *"Even though it is a marking whole, the city cannot be reestablished*



Fig. 1 Old Galata Bridge had connected the two different cultures in Istanbul

from the signs, the semantics of the city. The city is not only a language; but at the same time, it is an experience". Lefebvre emphasizes that the experience sets a new frame from which we interpret what we perceive, drawing attention to the dynamics of everyday life; in other words, he defines enmeshed experience from a reversible perspective of the organic relations. From a reversible perspective, all the boundaries and thresholds, even our perceptions and memories can be transformed into the traces through their continuity from the real to virtual. While running about the everyday life, passing through the edge of the life, our relationship with these traces is only an illusion. Enmeshed experience therefore, helps us to understand the organic relations between everyday life and architectural form, considering the continuous oscillation between the virtual and the real. From this perspective, organic relations refer to the nonlinear relations having dichotomy, contrasting but complementary relations between the parts and the whole. It is a kind of mutual relationship having a continuous oscillation between the spatial character of the city and everyday life in which different cultures had lived creating multilayered meaning patterns.

By discovering the multilayered meanings of architectural and urban traces with their visible and invisible dimensions make us to re-read the architecture of city/city of architecture as a narrative. Accordingly, it is possible to grasp the affordances of the Old Galata Bridge in Istanbul by re-reading its narrative that associates particular ideas and events with specific forms and shapes and their relationships. Besides, re-reading its image as a narrative provides a reversible way of seeing deeply and implicitly; plus a move towards an intuitive vision. From this perspective, Istanbul can be re-read somewhere in-between the nature and culture, the order and chaos, simplicity and complexity, consistency and variation, unity and fragmentation, transparency and opacity, enclosure and spaciousness, singularity and juxtaposition. These opposing concepts, which oscillate back and forth, create shifting balances because of asymmetrical dynamics and make its in-between reality more legible.

The natural-cultural-historical milieu creates a sense of place in Istanbul because of its in-between reality. Both its imaginative and poetic ambiguity holds memories and images in an integrated whole giving rise to the concentrated power for stimulation. Its cultural and social dynamics creating a power of image also transform space into place where its poetic ambiguity give rise to production of sensation. The enmeshed experience makes it possible to explore the inexhaustibility of contrast



Fig. 2 Interwoven relationship created by the shifting balances

and its poetic images creating shifting balances between its streets/urban voids and the buildings/urban solids. The configuration of Bosporus with its topography and its coast line also contributes to experience its poetic image meshing both a sense of enclosure and spaciousness. The spatial configuration of Istanbul represents a mesh formed by all shifting balances between water with land, street with sky, solids with voids because of the interwoven relationship which is similar to the Escher graphics (Fig. 2). These shifting balances of the city produce sensation and create a sense of place that can be grasped throughout the enmeshed experience.

The Bosporus connecting the Golden Horn, the Black Sea and the Marmara Sea, has a key theme, which gives the environment a memorable and legible character. Istanbul, in relation to its topography, its built and natural environment creating natural axes such as Bosporus and the Golden Horn, passing over constructions such as bridges, railways, and highways, and walls such as city walls, aqueducts express the invisible ideas, aesthetics and lifestyle having rich urban traces. These traces are positioned within the memory of the city, with their physical, cultural and historical characteristics. The multilayered character of these urban traces makes the city out of time, in other word timeless.

The sketches from Le Corbusier, explain much of these urban traces in Istanbul that reflect the spatio-temporal relations; one of them as seen in Fig. 3 is an identical image of Istanbul that has been drawn by Le Corbusier during his travel to Istanbul. The spatio-temporal relations grasped by enmeshed experience make it possible to think about where we are and what is unique and special about our surroundings.

As a contemporary spatio-temporal entity, the skyscrapers having a paradox, both destroy the silhouette and produce a contemporary appearance of the city. The power of contrast, seen in Fig. 4, both history with geography, local values with global issues, power of the "building image" with the "city image" portraying the dynamic interplay create a tension throughout its spatio-temporal experience.

Fig. 3 Enmeshed experience of the spatio-temporal relations in Istanbul

Fig. 4 The spatio-temporal experience in Istanbul

Understanding the Affordances of Istanbul and the Old Galata Bridge

Before re-designing the spaces of the bridge for innovative ideas of the exhibition, designers first have tried to understand the affordances of Old Galata Bridge and Istanbul re-reading its entity as a narrative space. The interpretive framework mentioned before has motivated them to understand its aura (Fig. 5) as a whole and to discover its affordances. Besides, the poetic image of Galata Bridge has contributed to the formation of its narrative space affecting the mind and the sensation simultaneously. Thus spatio-temporal configurations of narrative space has engendered the memory problematizing the reciprocal relation between past and present.

From this perspective, the image of Old Galata Bridge should not be objectified in the form of nostalgia and should be modified into a spatio-temporal entity through reading its narrative space as in-between reality. Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1968, p. 54) describes "in-between" reality as a "*ground on which it is universally possible to bring things together*". *Beyond the physicality of space, a 'sense of place' is not merely a place of events, things, activities, but something more intangible, which emerges from the continuous unfolding of overlapping spaces, materials and details.* Juhani Pallasmaa draws attention to the notion of Merleau-Ponty's *"in-between*

Fig. 5 Re-reading its narrative space as a spatio temporal entity

Fig. 6 Affordances of Old Galata Bridge merging on 'sense of place'

reality", that it might be an analogous to the moment in which individual elements begin to lose their clarity, the moment in which objects merge with the field (Holl et al. 1994).

Spatial character of the Old Bridge with its steel construction (Fig. 6), especially spaces under the bridge and its relation to the water and to the city consist of many invisibles creating a '*sense of place.*' Before the design week enmeshed experience has help designers to understand the affordances of the bridge by discovering its sense of place. As Merleau-Ponty points out "*.enmeshed experience cannot be grounded on man, the subject, culture or language. It is the task of phenomenology to chart the ways in which bodies imagine and produce fictions, ideas or assemblages which are produced from the flow of life. It is a way of thinking and seeing the world as a flow and connection of interacting body subject"* (Langer 1989, p. 158)*;* designers, architects as a body subject have to grasp the tension between reality and possibility to uncover the hidden dimension of this tension. In this context, the spatial character of Istanbul gives rise to a '*sense of place'* and expresses a common mode of being between the earth and sky which articulates the mode of being in-between reality.

Merleau-Ponty continues his explanation on bodily experience as following: *"….the structure of the phenomenal body already implies the structure of entire perceptual field. The anchoring of the body as a 'natural self' institutes a physical or 'natural' space and thereby opens up a 'human space' which encompasses the world of emotions, dreams, myths and madness, as well as the world of reflection"* (Langer 1989, p. 174).

Fig. 7 The morphology of the Bridge as a source of inspiration

Old Galata Bridge being a hybrid cultural heritage is differentiated by its morphological structure (Fig. 7) that brings about a possible source of inspiration to create new ideas. Arbitrary demolitions and sudden radical policy changes also has made the Old Galata Bridge such a big and exciting puzzle. Enmeshed experience of the Bridge has made legible its in-between reality represented by both the visible and invisible dimensions in understanding this big and exciting puzzle. This phenomenon has opened the doors for the possibilities of discovering new relations and fused horizons that we share over time producing sensation. And it has also helped us to get closest to the cultural codes and their original, structural dialectics that has emerged in reciprocity of perceived world and perceiving body. In this context, the enmeshed experience of Galata Bridge has provided some clues for it's the future preservation project. In this process, the knowledge about the bridge cannot be only considered as documentary evidence; rather, it speaks to the emerging cultural awareness. As architects we have to rethink the local values in relation to the global issues, using technology and knowledge on behalf of innovation. We have to bring social awareness, environmental sensibility and ethic responsibility to our works considering into the phenomenological concepts such as enmeshed experience.

Concluding Remarks

The urban experience, writes Harvey (1989), is about ways of seeing the city, of reading its text and find interpretive frame in which to locate the million and one surprises that confront us on the street. In this paper, an interpretive frame has been structured with a holistic way of seeing and thinking interwoven within network relations of physical, natural, cultural, political, economic, psychological and social dynamics of Istanbul. Reading its text through this holistic way of seeing engender to be aware of some nodes of this network relations as in-between reality which is naturally ambiguous. Thus phenomenological inquiry of how do we experience the complexities and contradictions within this interwoven network system conduct us to explore its enmeshed experience. A sense of place should be understood according

with its spatiality, namely its spatial forces created by the dynamic interplay among the opposing but complementary concepts. Its spatiality, in turn brings about the memorable spatial characteristics that create the production of sensation giving some clues for understanding its enmeshed experience.

In this paper, the term enmeshed experience has been interpreted and inquired considering into the following questions: how the enmeshed experience as a dynamic process proceeds in a non-linear structure; how the affordances of architecture as an experiential knowledge come to the reader and how they are experienced in their dynamic unfolding; which conditions provide situational togetherness and a total interrelatedness of the perceiver subject and perceived object; what makes spatio temporal relations to be experienced as production of sensation; how the present formations and relations can be carried to the future; how the affordances of architecture open up to the new ideas for future configurations. Some of these questions have emerged structuring the interpretive framework for this paper; however there is no need to find an absolute answer to these questions. Exclusively being aware of these issues will facilitate to re-read a city of architecture/architecture of city as a hypertext having a lack of linearity that fabricates the signifier her/his own semiotic manifestations, sequences or meanings. Scholars, architects, planners and policy-makers are to assess the potential of enmeshed experience, taking into consideration the spatio-temporal relations before designing the regeneration projects in order to understand the possible ways of interventions.

References

Capra, F. 1997. *The web of life: A new scientific understanding of living systems*. USA: Anchor.

Colebrook, Claire. 2002. *Gilles Deleuze*, 125–138. London: RoutledgeCritical Thinkers.

Deleuze, Gilles and Pierre-Felix Guattari, 1987. *A thousand plateaus: Capitalism and schizophrenia,* trans. B. Massumi, Mineapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p.25

Harvey, David. 1989. *The urban experience*, 250. The John Hopkins University Press: Baltimore and London.

Holl, Steven. 2006. *Parallax*, 13. Princeton Architectural Press: NewYork.

Holl, Steven, Juhani Pallasmaa and Alberto Perez Perez-Gomez. 1994. *Questions of perception: Phenomenology of architecture,* a+u July Special Issue, 63.

Langer, Monika M. 1989. *Merleau-Ponty's phenomenolgy of perception*. London: Macmillan.

Lefebvre, Henri. 1996. *Writings on cities.* Trans. and ed. Eleonore Kofman and Elizabeth Lebas, 219–27. Oxford: Blackwell.

Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1968. *The visible and the ınvisible: Followed by working notes,* Northwestern University Press, 46.

Part III

Plato on Return to the Nature

Olena Shkubulyani

Abstract Philosophical legacy of Plato is inexhaustible and we continue to find in it the thoughts and images that may serve for us as replies on questions of our contemporary actuality. The same is an image of Socrates contrary to his custom leaving town and being in rapture with the nature. Plato creates it in "Phaedrus" in order to explicate true sense of the idea of man's return to the nature, to natural condition that sophists interpreted on base of deconstruction of human sensuality. At the same time in discussion with sophists, he overcomes his former narrow-rationalistic approach to understanding of human sensuality and works out completely new notion of it by discovering its metaphysical, universal, truly rational sense. In the country, Socrates, the personification of the very reason, comes back to his own sensuality and transforms himself into human natural living being that is endowed with loving (erotic) point of view of subject-object identity. Thereby he finds a living force of the very nature and becomes capable to realize an act of radical reflection (human self-knowledge). The nature shows itself in "Phaedrus" as a coworker of this act because it on its part gets possibility to grow further through reflective human being in accordance with its own essence. In our days, when process of human alienation from the nature and decomposition of human sensuality is continuing to go full swing Plato's understanding of the idea of return to the nature is very topical.

The idea of returning to the nature, to the so-called natural human condition accompanies all history of humanity. Moreover, periodically it as belonging to ideology of Enlightenment seized consciousness of whole ages. Philosophy, as a rule, did not remain apathetic towards these situations. In face of its most outstanding representatives, it got involved in argument with narrow-mindedness of this ideology in order to liberate a true spirit of Enlightenment and this bore rich fruits for

O. Shkubulyani (✉)
50A Svoboda L., Prospect, kv.44, 61204 Kharkov, Ukraine
e-mail: konos@rambler.ru

A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), *Phenomenology and the Human Positioning in the Cosmos: The Life-world, Nature, Earth: Book One*, Analecta Husserliana 113,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-4801-9_9,

philosophy itself, especially for developing new approaches to understanding of human nature. The most known example is how I. Kant has taken up a challenge thrown by the French Enlightenment: he has worked out the concept "natural/phenomenal man" as corresponding to understanding of human nature by the French enlighteners, set against it the notion of "moral man", and distinctly formulated a demand to stay "the natural man" under authority of morals (the practical reason). However, there is a less known example that relates to the much earlier epoch and had quite different philosophical results as to comprehension of human nature and its assessment. Besides, it has especial interest for studying since may be considered as a model of all subsequent cases when philosophers disputed with enlighteners on subject of human nature: positions of the opposite sides have been revealed in it at once in their gist and potential wholeness.

The speech is about a period which sometimes be called the Ancient Greek Enlightenment. Then in a role of enlighteners, fighters with obsolete traditions and dark superstitions, sophists acted. They put forward an ideological program, which in spite of its liberating potential was destructive not only for the Ancient Greek culture but also for all human culture as such. Its basic demand was to live by nature, according to its laws instead of human arbitrary laws and customs. Against this demand, "divine" Plato argued. In dialogue "Phaedrus" he created one of his most unexpected artistic images, which can be considered as his repulse to the sophistic appeal to the nature. It is an image of Socrates on the nature. We see in it Plato's own version of the idea of man's return to the nature.

"Phaedrus", the dialogue in which Plato formulates the anthropological question (what is a human being by his nature?) and expounds his teaching of Eros that can be considered as a prototype of phenomenology, has many unusual details. Moreover, all atmosphere of this dialogue is special because in it Plato only time takes Socrates out town walls and develops its action not within a house, or on the market area but on a background of the nature. One summer day Socrates and his young friend Phaedrus take a walk by river, find a comfortable place under a plane-tree where they give themselves up to conversation about Eros with that intellectual passion which is so characteristic for the Ancient Greek manner of conversation. Here, on the nature, Socrates philosophizes in condition when he "in defiance of custom is hold by some flood" (Платон. Федр, 238 c d.//Платон. Сочинения в 3 т. Т.2.Москва, Издательство «Мысль», 1970, с.157–222) and in defiance of custom too tells a mythical story (about life of heavenly human soul) by drawing no mediators, as about that he experiences himself. Can be the atmosphere of the dialogue considered as accidental detail having no philosophical sense? No, it cannot indeed.

If to look attentively at a behavior of Socrates out of town, it can notice that a radical change happens in him. At first, he demonstrates full indifference to the nature. He never ventures outside the gates because he, as he explains himself, is "a lover of knowledge, and the men who dwell in the city are my teachers, and not the trees or the country" (ibid, 13d). He tagged along with Phaedrus only for the sake of hearing a speech of Eros delivered by the famous speaker Lysias and taken down by young man, Lysias' pupil and favorite. However, as soon as the friends come to the place he demonstrates behavior that obviously contradictories his own words.

The high spirits overcomes Socrates. Everything he sees around causes in him irrepressible delight – the lofty and spreading plane – tree, the agnus in the fullest blossom and the greatest fragrance, the cold stream, the singing of cicadas, the sweet breeze, the gentle grass, the invisible but perceptible mythical beings. All his sensations are much intensified. All his sense organs are in acting and directed to maximal perception. It seems he aspires to become one with the nature and perceive it by all his being in whole. In short, the former indifference to the nature is replaced by being in love with it. The image of Socrates on the nature begins to coincide with his image as "raging" in which F. Nietzsche saw a meaning contradiction to Socrates-rationalist. What sense of the metamorphosis that occurs with him?

It is not by chance that the participants of Plato's dialogue speak of the nature in a context of the mythological question. It was burning in this period of the Ancient Greek history. A choice of Socrates' companion and, consequently, the very title of the dialogue stress a significance of this question for main idea of it. When Plato wrote it, Phaedrus was already a man of mature age, the known connoisseur of mythology. In the dialogue, just he raises question whether Socrates believes in mythic tale of Orithyia. It is evident that Phaedrus in fact wanted to know whether sophists are true in their skeptical relation to myth, in Socrates' opinion. Accordingly Socrates answers in the following way: "I might have a rational explanation that Orithyia was playing with Pharmacia, when a northern gust carried her over the neighbouring rocks; and this being the manner of her death, she was said to have been carried away by Boreas" (ibid., 229 c). It is a significant example of sophistic tries to give "probable explanations" to myths which Socrates calls "home-bred wisdom" that requires nothing but inventiveness of mind (ibid., 229d). Criticism of sophists decomposed the mythical world outlook. They reduced myth to description of natural phenomena and opposed to mythical picture of reality an objective picture of the natural world. It may be said that sophists discovered the nature (as objective, completely independent from human being reality) in the ancient world. However, they did not give themselves an account of that the nature, which they revealed and to which they appeal, was a result of alienating it from the human soul as its own subject. Owing to their endeavors the human soul has leaved the nature together with myth and remained it empty, soulless, having no essence and no reason.

It is no wonder, therefore, that the nature, as sophists understood it, i.e. as alienated object spoke nothing to the soul of Socrates and in its turn did not cause in it reciprocal response. Such nature is something "alien" to him (and to human nature in general) and may not be teacher for him indeed. Socrates speaks in scornful tone just of it. However, is it called alien the nature to which he obviously snuggles up? No, it is not. Quite another picture of the nature is in accordance with his delightful loving look at it. We see indeed a lovely land, where it is cosy and joyful to man, where he and his soul feel themselves at home, in native conditions. Here everything is fragrant with old national belief, a light myth and inspires with trembling of veneration from invisible presence of sacred, which is felt as something though surpassing man, but not alien or hostile to him.

A reader of Plato's dialogue sees the nature by Socrates' eyes, through prism of his perception and the author intentionally points out specific features of this perception.

First of all, it is characterized by especial freshness, pureness. The world of nature is completely new for Socrates. That is why Phaedrus even compares him with a stranger. Socrates, as spoken, has no custom to venture outside the gates and consequently everyday impressions do not his look less keen. In addition, his look does not grow muddy by considerations of use or cognitive curiosity. Accordingly, the nature in his perception appears also so fresh and pure as if it has been just created. Just thanks to his position of stranger (of reduction of all that might predetermine his relation to the nature) he could see the nature as something his own, not alien that consequently deserves to be cognized too in accordance with the Delphian inscription to him to know himself.

Belief in myth (in which structure of human consciousness is given in the first place) is only that determines Socrates' perception of the nature. However, his position regarding myth also does not remain absolutely the same. He rejects sophistic criticism of myth on pretext of that he has no leisure for seeking rational explanation to every mythic miraculous event or monster and therefore prefers to trust myth as "generally accepted" (ibid., 230a). In this relation to myth as to generally accepted, we feel some removal, absence of personal involvedness. He well knows mythical tales. He notices all shrines during the walk. However, his position as to myth has a character rather of bookish knowledge, but not of personal interest, experience. Only afterwards he begins, we notice, to experience myth personally, feels its truth as that of his own experience. According to this he perceives the nature mythically, sees it in light of myth that gives to his perception just more great freshness, pureness and at the same time spiritual elation. To see the nature in light of myth means to see it as arena of action of living beings, living forces. In the country the mythical consciousness completely reanimates in him so that later on he begins create his own myth just as Homer or Gesiod.

The exit of Socrates out of town walls has of cause symbolical significance. The nature to which he comes back is ahead, not behind. He does not come back to naïve identity with the nature when man does not distinct himself from it. He does not come to it as reality that is perfectly independent from man as well. In order to reach it he had to step forward and leave fortifications that reason constructed for its protection. Socrates, the embodiment of the very reason, comes out limits of his own rational narrow-mindedness. Stepping forward he at the same time makes a returnable movement. He reverts to trust to his own sense organs, to sensations of his own body. Such trust was peculiar to the so-called naive man but later on, the rational, abstract – cogitative attitude to reality undermined it. When Socrates actively gives himself up to his sensations, perceptions, it confirms that a transformation in his attitude to own sensuality has occurred. Now he believes that sense organs do not deceive him. He does not doubt that the visible, sensually perceived world is real, not seeming. The atmosphere of joy, pleasure in which Socrates experiences communication with the nature only testifies that it opens to him as endowed with essences and as meriting positive appreciation. Together with this belief, it seems, pathos of life, of its fullness, abundance comes to Socrates too. Otherwise, it is difficult to explain how he can experience beauty and beneficial character of the surrounding nature so passionately.

Furthermore, we can say that in nature's lap the primordial Greek spirit (that expressed itself most brightly in mythology and art) comes to life in Socrates. It was pointed out that Greeks perceived the external world's things with especial clarify and keenness. However, their receptivity to appearances never led to transformation of this world into simply mechanism serving for utilitarian human aims (happiness, well-being) but on the contrary, it meant their capacity to clarify it ideally. They did not devastate, belittle value of the sensually perceived world but ennobled it because a distinctive feature of their relation to it was being in love for it. Thus, in full accordance with the Ancient Greek spirit, the world of nature in Socrates' perception appears as particular clear, distinctive, sunny bright, illuminated as though the Sun itself is being in love with it.

In "Phaedrus" Plato shows a drama of reason's attitude to sensuality that has been played completely in the Greek antiquity and only was repeated during the subsequent epochs. Three speeches about Eros accord with three points of view on sensuality – rational-cognitive (of sophists), abstract – metaphysical, ascetic and the point of view, which we can determine today as phenomenological (it belongs to Socrates). The earliest of them is ascetic. On it, guilt for a low valuation of human sensuality lies. Asceticism deprived human sensuality its essence, transformed it into abstract bodily sensuality, which is capable to give only "appearances" or "phenomena" (in sense of Kant). At one time, Plato himself shared this point of view and now in the image of Socrates on the nature he gets rid of it. It means that he overcomes dualism of soul and body, mental and physical, subject and object that asceticism has caused. When sophists stepped on to the stage of an ideological life of Ancient Greece Plato saw in reality to what logic conclusions dualism conducts. The ascetic point of view kept the truth of human sensuality, although in perverted state: it created the other, transcendent, over-sensual reality from alienated human sensuality. However, sophists, these positivists and postmodernists of antiquity, have lost it completely. The speech of Lysias (Phaedrus repeats it to Socrates) is a striking confirmation to this. Its main thesis that the non-lover should be accepted rather than the lover concludes a denial of value of love and human condition of being-in-love, a refusal from life of soul in favor of alienated, abstract, soulless corporality and its "healthy" needs. Ascetics denied Eros because of its sensual character although they beforehand have reduced human sensuality to bodily longing themselves. Sophists denied just very love while without reserve recognized all rights of longing. Dispassionate cold longing is only that they remained to man and on service of that put human mind. The task that they put before reason was to justify claims of abstract human corporality. Sophists refused any passion, any soul experiences as hindering free realization of longing and of getting enjoyment. Ascetics and sophists both wanted to seize human sensual nature reduced to longing with help of reason. However, if the first wanted to do this for the sake of reaching spiritual aims the latter wanted to do this for better satisfaction of very longing: they tried to tie down human sensual nature by it itself, on base of rational cognition of it. That is why the speech of Lysisas so impresses by its cynicism. Relations between teacher and pupil are reduced in it to open deal "enjoyment in exchange for knowledge". It should be acknowledged that the sophistic reason copes well with its task: Phaedrus has been

tented almost completely by Lysias' speech, its reasonable character and consistent arguments with pretension even on morals.

Thus, sophists went further on the way of decomposition of human sensuality. They closed man in limits of his soulless body (that is for them only object of longing, but not bearer, subject of senses) and its needs without exit in other worlds and turned human body in deadlock. Their intention to live in accordance with nature led to very sad consequences. Nevertheless, Socrates despite his very skeptical relation to Lysias' speech notes that it contains some truth. This truth is that Eros indeed is quite the opposite of abstract bodily longing.

To overcome dualism Plato restores unity of soul and body and besides, due order of relations between them. The naturalistic, psychophysical "order" was characteristic for naive mythic interpretation of human being: naïve Greek in fact considered soul as body. (We apply here the term "order" and the opposition "psychophysical, or naturalistic – purely psychical" as accordingly Kant and Husserl applied them). Sophists rejected mythic consciousness and naïve interpretation of human being as soul-body unity but inherited naturalistic "order". However, if naïve Greek understood human body as alive, animated, and intelligent and a main principle of his interpretation of himself was that sort of body sophists gave the same significance to the abstract, soulless, lifeless body. Unlike them, Plato states the mental, psychical "order" of relation between soul and body: he makes soul a main principle of human self-comprehension, considers body as funded in soul, and thereby at once lifts its status unjustly belittled by asceticism. As consequence, he returns to human sense organs significance of instruments of soul and restores trust to them. To see became again to mean to understand. We find sole explanation of sudden enthusiasm that seizes Socrates in the country in the following: tuning of his soul has changed as if a switching of registers has taken place and he discovers for himself that his living animated body, which connects him with the surrounding nature, is something "his own" too, not "alien".

However, the question is for what Plato restores soul-body unity if he then also separates them from each other. A procedure of separating soul from body is a necessary precondition of human self-knowledge, of human soul's reflective revolution to itself and Plato makes it indeed. Nevertheless, he realizes it otherwise than it has been did earlier, from the ascetic, abstract – metaphysical point of view and accordingly gets completely other results. The abstract – metaphysical way of separating soul from body, as spoken above, has caused the dualistic approach and only strengthened naturalistic interpretation of human soul. Until it remained not overcome, it eventually provoked "the revolt" of abstract, empty corporality against lifeless spirituality. Sophists were the first who raised such a revolt. Plato avoids with success the mentioned consequences because he separates soul from body not descending from a position of their unity. How is it possible?

The abstract metaphysics has drawn a dividing line directly on soul, on its living "body". That the soul has its special "winged body" we know from the third speech about Eros. Socrates delivers it when the erotic enthusiasm reaches peak in him and pours out in the act of "recollection" of the heavenly soul's life and destiny. As we had already explained, Plato discovers that human soul as it is by its idea, i.e. pure

soul, has objective, "bodily" side too owing to which only, it is fastened closely to the very Beingness ("the field of the truth"). It is a human soul's capacity to show (appear) senses and wanting to appear them. Thus, human soul in whole is unity, identity of "soul" and "body", subject and object, sense and appearance of sense. It is a living being. The metaphysical fact that pure (ideal) soul has objective side is a metaphysical reason of human being's capacity of love. Eros according to Plato is a receptivity of human being to appeared senses (living beings), its especial sensitivity to them, and wanting of them. It is a force of specifically human sensuality. It is not by chance therefore that he gives that sort of love the name "Eros" having meaning of just sensual love. (He does not call it, for example, *philia).* When consequently abstract metaphysics (asceticism) alienated human soul from its own objective, "bodily" side (part) and thereby devastated, downed it so that it has lost its special character and amalgamated with abstract corporality it meant only one thing: the Greek thinking began to lose its main intuition of living being.

Therefore, Plato "sews" together that has been cut so ineptly up to him. By restoring wholeness of soul he eliminates the consequences of ascetic vivisection of it. At the same time, he makes his own operation of separating soul from body, living from lifeless. His philosophical scalpel dissects man and all human manifestations not horizontally, on the upper and lower parts so that the first is inevitably considered as funded in the second (as Husserl proved), but vertically, on the left and right. Everything that belongs to pure soul he stations on the right side and the rest, belonging to bodily, naturalized soul, – on the left one. Therefore, a small detail of the dialogue – Phaedrus keeps copy of Lysias' speech in the left hand – is not accidental but has a determined sense. He dissects Eros on the left (this is a subject of the first speech of Socrates in which he expounds the ascetic view) and on the right, accordingly on Eros of "seamen", i.e. slaves and Eros of free men. Thereby he resolutely refutes a generally accepted opinion that human condition of erotic passion is not free. Unlike his predecessors, ascetics and sophists, he distinguishes passion as slavish condition of soul, passive affect and as condition of freedom, active affect and gives a model of philosophical approach to comprehension of various human displays. Plato reserves the vital living being's point of view but raises it on the higher, purely psychical, metaphysical level and realizes it as a point of view of subject – object identity. Thanks to it, he finds so great force of philosophical distinguishing.

Why does the nature look so fine, pleasure in Socrates' eyes? It is because its image is in full accordance with true human nature as endowed with erotic force, as having overcome alienation from its sensuality. Socrates sees in the external nature a print of such human nature that he defines as "meek" (gentle), "simply" and "modest". Plato gives these definitions in fact at once in his wording of the anthropological question in which he opposes human nature to titanic although their meanings are discovered completely only to the end of the dialogue. This wording deserves separate considering because it contains almost all shades of the term "nature" as it is applied in antiquity. Setting human being against Typho, a mythological monster that can serve as an ideal sample of titanic nature, Socrates asks: "am I a monster more complicated and swollen with passion than the serpent Typho, or a creature of a gentler and simpler sort, although is modest but by its nature participating in

divine fate?" (ibid., 230 a). Thus, Plato compares two creatures, human being and Typho, in accordance with their origin, composition, and, of cause, with kind of their sensual nature.

On his origin, Typho is a purely earthly creature and consequently absolutely alienated from reason and its senses. Human being, on the contrary, has heavenly origin. Any human soul has its "absolute past" in which it was a contemplator of the Beingness. However just for this reason, human being is a more modest creature than Typho who according to myth had pretensions to dominate over the Earth as having no power of reason over him. For human being to realize its divine, heavenly nature means to fill its soul's "body" by senses. Nobility of origin imposes a deep obligation upon human nature and presupposes modesty before face of gods (ideal living beings having capacity to appears senses perfectly) because only way for human soul to realize its task is to follow and imitate gods in their intention to contemplate of the Beingness. Plato's understanding of human nature as modest was obviously directed against sophists, who were enthusiastic about unlimited capacities and possibilities of man and generated tendency to doubtful adventures in Greeks. On his composition, Typho is complicated creature uniting in his body signs of human being and various animals (first of all, of serpent). Unlike him, human being is simply as he has nothing from animal in its composition. Everything in it including body has human, i.e. intelligent character. Finally, on kind of his sensuality, Typho is furious. He knows no humility. As to human nature, it is meek because it is not longing, aspiring to possess a subject of its longing. It is loving, testing awe of loved subject, its beauty and sense appeared in this beauty as manifestation of absolute beauty and sense (truth). However, meekness of human nature paradoxically coincides with its capacity to rage. Plato opposes erotic rage as true human passion to blind animal fury.

It is evident that "meekness", "modesty", and "simplicity" of human nature are not a certificate of its weaknesses as Nietzsche considered. All this descriptions say about power of Eros inherent in it. As a force of "wing" (growing and grown), it has power "to lift heavy in height", in metaphysical space of pure appeared senses, or ideal living beings ("heavenly souls"). That is why the lover lifts, ideally clarifies himself, his perception and a subject of his love as well. In addition, he has strength to bear bodily pangs of "wing's birth". Experience of love as Plato describes it is alloy of pleasure and suffering. Sophists by denying Eros betrayed their main secret: because of their feebleness, they have not strength to love. It is interesting that Socrates considers the main thesis of Lysias (non-lover should be preferred to lover) insincere, false. He says that Lysias only simulates a non-lover. In reality, he is a lover too. Thus, Socrates plays a role of "philosopher of suspicion". He suspects that in actuality Lysias is seized by Eros too. He also loves beauty. However, since he loves beauty of body alienated from soul his love cuts a way to sources of senses and is transformed into a force denying own essence. Such Eros is a contradiction of itself, a force that is no able to grow. Love for beauty of body must bring out own limits to more high and deep love. As Plato explains in "Feast" this love is a first stage of growing Eros. Lysias's "left" Eros on the contrary reduces this love to bodily longing. In a result full erotic weakness, longing to enjoyment without any

suffer, any soul experience or strain denies true force. Socrates thanks to his far-sightedness discovers very gist of cynicism of Lysias' speech. Lysias simply tries to use pure intention of youth soul of Phaedrus (love for beautiful reasoning) for reaching his aims: erotic weakness wants to intercepts growing erotic force.

For definition of human nature as Plato describes it, it seems the word "lovely" is the most suitable as having especially warm-hearted, intimately human tinge. Socrates in his conversation with Phaedrus applies it continually. He calls "lovely" his young friend and mythical Pan, the owner of country where the speakers have settled down. It can be said that everything that surrounds him in the country is lovely in his eyes because his own soul under influence of Eros becomes loving, likeable, mercy. The external nature is in harmony of his human nature and looks meek too. Nothing titanic cannot be noticed in its image. It is not spontaneous, destructive, ruthless, and extremely indifferent to any individual life force. On the contrary, it is very likeable to human being. We could continue indefinitely a line of epithets, which are suitable, in our opinion, for describing the nature as it looks in "Phaedrus". It is air, transparent, penetrated with light, blossoming and so on. Although Plato devoted only several lines to it, he as true genius expressed in them so much that we have a boundless scope for our meditations. We without any strained interpretation could find out correspondence between a condition of the nature, expressed in every epithet and a condition of Socrates' soul (consciousness) and therefore to catch the smallest shades of his experiences. However, it will be enough to say the main: Socrates experiences the nature as a revelation of his own soul, his own human nature. He clearly understands it through appearance of the nature and it directly appeals to be experienced as such, in itself.

A mediation of the nature is a necessary propedevtic stage on the way leading to human self-knowledge. Socrates comes in a new, unknown to him earlier world of the nature thanks to Phaedrus. This fine youth plays a role of "guide" for him. Socrates calls Phaedrus an excellent guide because he finds a spot for conversation, which is "divine", not only simply comfortable. This place is such that it leads Socrates in a condition of "divine rage" as if itself. In the dialogue, every mythical parsonage connected with this place plays its role in a process of strengthening of erotic rage that seizes Socrates. Phaedrus finds it not intentionally, but not by chance. As spoken above he like Socrates is intellectually possessed one. He learns sophistic skill of eloquence but in contradistinction to his teachers likes speeches passionately, i.e. for the sake of them themselves. In actuality, he decided to walk out of town in order to practise delivering speech. Consequently, Lysias has not tempted him finitely. The fact that he obviously has doubts as to the sophistic critique of myth also confirms that Phaedrus succeeded in reserving his living soul. Just this makes him especially lovely in eyes of Socrates. When he therefore calls Phaedrus an excellent guide he hints at a passionate condition of the youth owing to which he might find so happy place. Socrates is also a possessed lover of speeches. He acknowledges that he passionately, almost like mad likes to hear them. They are both enthusiastic possessed ones because they both have a spark of true Eros. However, in the beginning of the walk they both are lovers of alien speeches. It means that they are ready to believe in that was not experienced by them themselves and "was

perceived by ear". Later on Socrates resolutely recants this way of knowledge. Thus, erotic enthusiastic condition of Socrates up to some moment is not complete, perfect. He is not rapt by gods similar to Orithyia. He is in raptures over speeches that were not generated like living beings by him himself. He does not experience enthusiasm from his own generative living force and life as such. For the present, his Eros is too small and weak to be a generative force and his erotic condition until is not condition of life. It is the very moment to say that the term "nature" was widely used in antiquity, first of all, by the ancient philosophers in just one more meaning, namely, as principle of any growth and creative force. For example, M. Heidegger pointed out that for Ancient Greeks the nature is a growing, growth itself and grown in the process of the growth. He stressed that growth in their understanding had the elementary and wide sense that opens in primary human experience, as event that penetrates everything. It is undoubtedly that Plato kept in his mind this understanding when he thought about Eros as a force penetrating human sensuality. In his dialogue "Feast", he gives a strict and final definition of Eros as "an aspiration after generation in beauty" and clearly shows that Eros has capacity to grow up to its own limit, i.e. that it is a living natural growing force of human nature. Thus, in order to become a generative, creative force Eros has to grow completely. As is seen from "Phaedrus" a process of its full maturing according to Plato is fulfilled on the nature and thanks to the nature. Here, in "the divine place", in the environment of divinities of the nature (the embodiments and personifications of its living forces) he begins to look at the nature by new loving look and the latter in its turn replies to him in according way: it is revealed to his look in its particularly beautiful, splendid, appearance. Phaedrus whose beauty is inner, not only outward leads Socrates in the world of beauty of the nature and thereby gave food for further growth of his Eros and of his human sensuality.

In laps of nature, Socrates' loving point of view gets into good training. The nature is a highest expression of everything that is visible, perceived by sense organs. Accordingly, as noticed above, all sense organs of Socrates are involved in perception in very active way. Since every of them becomes a center of erotic force, a loving point of view the sensations, perceptions delivered by them do not contradict each other. All these sensations are aims in them themselves; they have positive character and conclude in them positive assessments of life. In a result, Socrates' sensuality widens and deepens. It draws everything that is accessible for it and at the same time is concentrated, gathers in single whole, as if is transforming into single organ of perception, which possesses especially keen sensitivity, especially great force of love and of positive valuating. As L. Feuerbach, one of the best experts in the question of human sensuality, noticed, every sense is universe and infinity but only in its own region, in its own species; however, spirit, which is essence of sensuality, overcomes "provincialism" and insufficiency of senses as it unites them in general identity of sense that embraces in it everything that is sensual. Thus, we have a right to say that sensuality of Socrates reaches its essence. It in whole finds universal, general, spiritual (metaphysical) character. Socrates himself changes into "the absolute sensualist" (Feuerbach), into creature that has capacity to sense everything utterly and most sensibility to everything. In addition, his erotic point of view finds character of

firm establishing. It becomes so stable that it is not destroyed on transition from perception of visible subjects to perception of invisible, pure metaphysical subjects (essences). Together with widening and deepening his sensuality, his capacity to see alive and divide it from dead widens and deepens too. Socrates sees the nature in light of idea of living being, as animated, full of living forces (mythic living beings, gods and divinities) and such a look he carries over immediately his own soul. He turns the loving look of his soul upon it itself in act of self-knowledge.

In "Phaedrus" Plato draws two realities, the natural, sensually perceived world and the metaphysical world of ideas, or ideal living beings that borders on "over-heavenly" region of the Beingness. A picture of the fine solar summer day, the blossoming attic nature, two friends, the teacher and the pupil, peacefully talking in the shade of the tree, at murmuring stream corresponds to the first. As to the metaphysical reality, Plato represents it in a picture of the Ancient Greek cosmos which is finite, geocentric, heterogeneous, alive and full of senses appeared by ideal living beings (cosmic gods, or planets and stars). It is a house of the human "heavenly" soul, a space where her tragic destiny is carried out and "the absolute past" of the earthy, embodied soul is created. Plato, the great artist, creates impression that this space as if swings open suddenly above the heads of two friends. Thus, he disposes both realities on one, vertical line and we, the readers of the dialogue, perceive them as opening from the same point of view, though at different levels of height that are in fact two different levels of rationalizing (ideally clarifying) of the same world. In "Phaedrus" he develops new type of rationality, which is based on living being as on its fundamental principle and opposes it to narrow rationality of ascetics and sophists who reject significance of true human sensuality together with its erotic point of view.

Plato's belief in human sensuality of course is rooted in the ancient notion of human being as microcosm that is in proportion to macrocosm. However, he lifts it on level of metaphysics too as he makes always in regard to traditional notions. P. Florensky, the known Russian religious philosopher and scientist, the adherent of the philosophical-anthropological tradition, which begins, in his opinion, just from Plato, discovered idea of human being as microcosm in the followings assertions. Metaphysical finds expression in anthropological and anthropological expresses metaphysical. Human perceptions are in accordance with the main metaphysical lines of the world. If we find deep difference in our senses, it is because that actuality of the world contains these different parameters itself. Human modes of sensual relation to world are the metaphysical axes of the very world and therefore human senses are gates of knowledge. Anthropology is not a self-sufficing isolated consciousness but a condensed, representative being. It reflects by itself the widened being that unites everything in single whole. That every human sense and human sensuality in whole has spiritual, metaphysical character is a position that accords to Plato's approach indeed. However, it should be stressed that he discovers the very source of the accordance between human being, its sensuality and macrocosm. This source is in "the absolute past" of any human being, whose soul was a contemplator of the Beingness. Consequently, to be microcosm in full sense human being must accord to cosmic gods' way of life, i.e. periodically to be uplifted and realize acts of "recollection" of its past when its soul traveled following gods to the height of heavens.

Human sensuality by its nature is intelligent, full of senses, but it does not mean that such intelligentness is completely unconditional givenness. It has its metaphysical foundation – contemplation of the Beingness. In such approach, an understanding that human sensuality is a problematic phenomenon puts. It is in need of continual support; otherwise, it may be destroyed and then human being will lose its significance of microcosm. Plato who is a philosopher, not a representative of so-called traditional knowledge, sees a possible danger attended by any human phenomenon because of its problematic character. Only human loving look sees everywhere symbols of the highest, ideal reality. The nature for it is such symbol too that reminds to human soul about its first, "heavenly" home, its cosmic origin and life. Socrates had no an interest in the nature as abstract alienated object, but he has a great interest in it as a reminder of the highest reality.

The supreme expression of unity of Socrates with the nature, a mutual sympathy between them is that the nature is not indifferent to a matter of human self-knowledge and philosophizing in general. It is rather an indispensable helper, friendly partner or even an "interested person". It turns to man by its beneficial side and grants to him conditions that are very comfortable for philosophical conversation. Socrates is delighted with these conditions. The friends can keep from burning sun under cover of the plane-tree, lie down on gentle grass (Greeks, as is known, had a talk in recumbent position), sense cool water of the ringing, murmuring stream that as well as the singing cicadas puts in a philosophical frame of mind, feel cool breath of wind reminding about destiny of Orithyia and so on. The nature not only makes inclined to philosophical conversation, but also, moreover, induces urgently to it. The figure of Pan testifies to it. This divinity invisibly is present during all conversation: he is a sovereign of the place where the friends have his disposition. After delivering his first speech in which he blamed Eros from the ascetic point of view Socrates was going to leave the place. Phaedrus stops him. He warns him from leaving shade at the hottest time of the day and takes his attention that the so-called "immobile midday" has come. The last remark contains an obvious hint. Creeks called the summer hot immobile midday "the hour of Pan". In accordance with their mythological notions, it is a time of especial appearances of this divinity. Pan has a rest at this time. That is why it is dangerous to move and rustle: the angry divinity can cause panic fear. However, it is impossible to sleep just as cowardly slaves-herdsmen as well: Pan can cause heavy oppressive dream. Socrates stays for delivering his second speech, which is an apology of Eros. As he confesses, his inner demon (a voice of his own nature) stopped him. Thus, the conversation reaches its peak just at "the hour of Pan" when the Sun is in zenith and simultaneously comes to the Earth maximally nearly. It is a time when the nature as if stands still but human soul has to be awake, when an activity of human sense organs should come to a stop, but human highest functions have to act. Human soul is to turn away from the sensually perceived world, shuts from it in order to make reflexive turn to it itself and to "see" its own idea.

Just at the midday, a choice between servile and free behavior stands before man with especial keenness. On this occasion, Socrates says the following mythical tales. If to sleep at that time, just as lazy slaves that the singing cicadas easily lead into temptation of dream a chance to gain kindness of the Muses of philosophy may

be lost: cicadas inform them whether man sleeps or is awake. Thus, free man must resist mental laziness as well as he must overcome fear of Pan. His soul must be in working. Sultry serenity of summer day only stresses especial condition of Socrates' soul, which is awake to extreme extent – it rages.

A picture of the midday nature drawn by Plato is an ideal attic landscape, flooding with bright light. Before our eyes, there is a cosy little corner, which is close from fuss of the rest world and at the same time open to the metaphysical world. We rightfully can see in this picture a philosophical landscape. Plato gathers and focuses the natural reality in the locus (point) of space and time where there is an exit in metaphysical reality. Here, in "the place of Pan" and in "the time of Pan", a door connecting both realities is opening and the highest human act is fulfilling. Here, in "the divine place" there is a center and a top of the natural world, where all power of it, its force of growth and creation is concentrated, where it overcomes itself by being transformed into power of human nature, into human erotic living force of self-knowledge and philosophizing. Transition from one reality in another does not mean that human being tears its connection with the nature. On the contrary, only a strongest connection with the nature makes possible such transition. It is not by chance that Socrates at the end of the dialogue addresses his prayer to Pan, the divinity that unites everything (as the ancient philosophy understood this mythical personage) and expresses great erotic and productive force of the nature. He asks Pan to help him to become internally beautiful. Earlier, in the last part of the dialogue, which is devoted to skill of eloquence (art of disputation), Plato attributes this skill to nymphs and Pan. Taking into consideration that he unlike sophists understands skill of eloquence as an ability to give definitions by dividing all human displays on "the left" and "the right", i.e. by applying the philosophical (phenomenological) method, his address to Pan with such request is justified. As spoken above the nature of which personification Pan is not only shows itself as the main helper of human being in philosophizing; it philosophizes in him itself as his partner since just in him it reaches its highest stage, essence, end and destiny. Socrates by return to the nature restores connections with it, with very life and thereby gets into natural flood of life that carries him in accordance with its own direction (according to the current of Gang, as Nietzsche would say) of which visual expression, symbol movement of the Sun is.

Plato attributes the erotic condition to one kind of the highest human conditions that he calls "the divine madness" ("obsession", "rage") and connects with Apollo, Dionysus, the Muses and Eros. They are "divine" and at the same time natural. They are conditions of life reached by merging of human consciousness with flood of life that has in eyes of Ancient Greeks divine character. Socrates at once noticed that the spot under the plane-tree is sacred to Achelous and the Nymphs, the divinities of rivers and springs that as Greeks believed cause madness and acquaint man with secret forces of the nature. The all mentioned human conditions are sensual. Various human forces manifest themselves in them, but to every of them its own form of sensuality corresponds. Therefore Plato makes out four sorts of human sensuality, accordingly – prophetic, mystic (initiatory), poetic and philosophical. The erotic condition is a form of philosophical rage and it is sensuality of philosopher that Plato describes in "Phaedrus". However, since he considers it as the highest form of

human sensuality, which includes in it the other forms as its own aspects, we has to see in it human sensuality as such. The rest forms of human sensuality as aspects of erotic condition turn into true creative, metaphysical forces that bring man out the natural world. Socrates' soul sees the ideal world of essences so clearly like prophet sees the space-time world and things belonging to it (he says directly that human soul is a prophet). Accordingly, he tells a mythic story about heavenly life of human soul. Like mystic, sensitive to primordial base of the world and aspiring to identity with it, Socrates gives Eros to seize him in order to lift himself to the metaphysical heights; his creation as mystic is a composing an effusive dithyramb in honour of Eros in which he establishes value of Eros (he says himself that his speech is a dithyramb). Like poet, endowed with imagination, he creates probably the most beautiful optimistic tragedy in human history – about inevitably fall of human soul from heaven and embodiment of it in earthly body. However, as a philosopher Socrates creates his own soul by force of recalling (reason): the metaphysical foundation of human soul is knowledge of its source ("from where") and its aim ("where"). Plato considers the all mentioned forms of human sensuality as true. However, in his opinion, only the erotic, philosophical sensuality has general character because only it is reasonable (spiritual), completely corresponding to its essence since it is a sensual side of very reason. Plato discovers that reason, on the one hand, is sensual, living and human erotic sensuality, on the other hand, has reasonable (metaphysical) sense and consequently reflexive character. Intention to perception of itself is inherent in it. Socrates experiences all stages of the erotic condition and gives every of them the positive assessment including certainly the stage of his love for the nature. On this stage, he finds the point of view of living being from which he then, on the highest stage of the erotic condition, perceives and comprehends his own soul and its main intention. Thanks to coming back the nature with all that this implies, the erotic condition of Socrates reaches its essence: it is transformed into obsession of life, of life's growth.

As to sophists, they were bare rationalists and that sort of sensuality atrophied in them. They knew only one kind of madness, which is lack of reason and illness. When Lysias denies Eros, he thereby denies value natural human conditions of life and changes human being into unnatural, contradicting to life destructive force. Socrates' critic notion that Lysias as if swims on his back against current can be applied not only to a composition of his speech but also to his position in whole that deserves to be thrown aside. Concerning asceticism Plato is not so categorical. Socrates in his first speech about Eros simulates that he is of same opinion as ascetics, puts on mask of ascetic. However, when he tears this mask off himself he does not throw the ascetic position aside completely and includes its truth, denial of "left" Eros, in his own point of view. He regards it as narrow-minded because of not comprehending it itself, but not destructive absolutely.

In this connection, it is necessary to notice both likeness and essential distinction between the role of Socrates in Plato's "Phaedrus" and that which satire played in the Ancient Greek tragedy. Nietzsche's interpretation of satire in his early work devoted to birth of the ancient tragedy forces us to draw this parallel. He saw in this character "the prototype of man", "the imaginary natural man", precisely pure "living

being". The Greek tragedy as it is known had intentionally complicated construction. Its action developed before spectators as a vision, or dream of the chorus of satires. The end of it, as Nietzsche considered, was to emphasize the significance of natural human condition for seeing the truth, the tragic destiny of human individual in the world, and to transform spectators in the according way. The text of Plato's dialogue is constructed in many respects by similar way. This is not surprisingly. In youth, he wrote verses (some of them, for instance devoted to Pan and Eros, remained) and tragedies and it is naturally, that he used this youth experience when he had to show Socrates as speaking about that he experiences and generates himself. The metaphysical world, which opens before us, is a subject of Socrates' "recollection". We see "recollecting" Socrates (it is the actual reality of the dialogue) and what he "recollects" – a tragic destiny of heavenly human soul. However, the revelation of Plato's hero carries erotic character. It is a manifestation of force of Eros, not of Dionysus. "Recollection" is the logos of Midday, of the nature, which reaches its highest point in human being's nature insomuch as just in it all natural, vital forces receive their supreme, ennobling expression. The truth of "recollection", or erotic reason is that of Midday. "The Midday logos" comprehends the nature in light of its finite aim, as directed to this aim in order to growth father infinitely through human living being. As to "the Midnight logos" of Dionysus, it, on the contrary, sees the nature what it is in its very source, primordial basis, and in its dark, awful depths. A seal of this primary source lies on satire as "the natural man". His naturalness corresponds to embryonic stage of human being when he stays within the nature, in indiscernible unity with it, when his reason, his consciousness yet sleeps. Nietzsche's satire, therefore, does not philosophize. He dreams, "hallucinates". He experiences life not on a peak of vital strain, not in the act of wakefulness of soul but in a drowsy, pensive condition. Plato's "sunny", "midday" thinking is based on high valuation that Greeks gave to distinct form in general and, first of all, to form of human living being.

Intuition of human living being is a main Plato's intuition. Probably just owing to sophists he noticed that the Greek thinking began to lose it and recognized consequences of this loss. That's why he recovers, comprehends, intentionally and consistently develops it in his own thinking. Socrates in "Phaedrus" asserts that even speech must be similar to living being. Its composition must have legs, trunk (body) and head. Internal and external must be in harmony between them and with the all whole. Commenting this thesis H.G. Gadamer stressed that this conceptual language which wide using in antiquity Plato made the beginning of corresponds to human everyday dealing, i.e. to human primary intuitions completely. We on our part have to conclude that the dialogue "Phaedrus" in whole must be similar to living being as well. It is evident that functions of "trunk" and "head" fulfill the parts that are devoted accordingly to speeches about Eros and skill of eloquence. Then the first part of the dialogue in which Plato describes meeting of Socrates with Phaedrus, their out-of-town walk by river and coming to the place under the plane-tree and which serves as introduction, prolog is compositionally "legs" of it. As we tried to prove this part responds precisely to Plato's require that "lower limbs" of speech must be proper to its "trunk" and to it in whole. According to Aristotle who follows

Plato, so as to tragedy should be similar to living being it must be constructed around one whole and completed action. In "Phaedrus" such action is a growth of Eros. We see how this natural, living, self-growing to its own limit force of human sensuality grows and having reached maturity manifests itself in reason's act of radical reflection and how Socrates seized by Eros is transformed in the country into full-bodied living being, i.e. into subject of such reflection. Semantic unity of all parts makes "Paedrus" "the united living logos" indeed, as one antique commentator called it. That's why this dialogue (as creations of Plato's thought in general) possesses so great inexhaustible generative force for us.

It is surprisingly how Plato adjusts all details. The dialogue begins with that Phaedrus is going to walk out of town because the doctor advised him to make such walks. Socrates agrees with the opinion that out-of-town walks are useful for health. The walk, hence, was to have ostensibly health-improvement character. It has reached this aim indeed. Moreover, the health-improvement effect from it has exceeded all expectations. In midday of one solar summer day, there was a miracle of recovering human soul. As things turned out, it is not body that requires improvement in the first place, but soul. Like real physician, Socrates gives a diagnosis to human being – a birth trauma, a fault in the mental "body" (loss of wings on embodiment of soul in a mortal body), shows an erotic way of its recovering, and is cured himself. Thus, he (or Plato in his face) completely unexpectedly proves to be a continuer of old tradition in accordance to which philosophy regarded as physiology, art of doctoring, i.e. as a kind of knowledge of the nature.

Many ages have passed after walk of Socrates and Phaedrus in neighbourhood of Athens. The whole historical worlds have collapsed. The European humankind has outlived "dead of God" (the Christian values) and today, as the postmodernist philosophers assure, is outliving "dead of man" (the humanistic values). However, much earlier just one more great "dead" has occurred that has predetermined all the rest. "Great Pan is dead!" – this heart-rending howl marked a downfall of the ancient world. Together with Pan, an understanding of significance of human love for natural, sensually perceived world – not sentimental, pastoral, but truly platonic, leading to human full-bodied self-knowledge – has abandoned man. The nature has stopped to be a coworker of man in his main matter; he on his part has lost an understanding of significance of own sensuality (own nature in general) and went on way of decomposition of it. Now he is staying at the edge of the natural world, which he has deprived his love and at the lowest limit of own nature. The drama of human sensuality that Plato performed in "Phaedrus" today threatens to transform into tragedy, which will not be optimistic. The contemporary man obviously hesitates between rational care for healthy body, sex, and environment (just as sophists) and aspiration to break off down, directly in the abyss: "the anguish on primordially natural" (Nietzsche) finds in him, in his imagination, frequently perverted, ugly, disgustingly naturalistic forms. It seems he is too weak in order to lift the natural world and his own nature up. Nevertheless, he has no other exit how to revise his relation to the nature and his own sensuality in the direction that Plato pointed out more than 2,000 years ago. It is his duty to return to the nature.

Bibliography

Гадамер Г.-Г. Актуальность прекрасного. Москва, Искусство, 1991. – 367с.
Лосев А.Ф., Тахо-Годи А.А. Платон Аристотель. Москва, Молодая гвардия, 1993 – 383с.
Лосев А.Ф. Природа. // Человек, 1994, N3. Москва, Наука, с.139–149.
Мифологический словарь. Москва, «Советская энциклопедия», 1990. – 672 с.
Ницше Ф. Рождение трагедии. Москва, Издательство Ad Marginem, 2001. – 736 с.
Платон. Пир. // Платон. Сочинения в 4 т. Т.2. Москва, Издательство «Мысль», 1993, с.81–134.
Платон. Федр. // Платон. Сочинения в 3 т. Т.2. Москва, Издательство «Мысль», 1970, с.157–222.
Роде Эрвин. Реферат для «Центральной литературной газеты». // Ницше Ф. Рождение трагедии. Москва, Издательство Ad Marginem, 2001, с.219–237.
Роде Эрвин. Реферат для воскресного приложения к «Северогерманским всеобщим известиям». // Ницше Ф. Рождение трагедии. Москва, Издательство Ad Marginem, 2001, с. 228–241.
Савченкова Н. Альтернативные стили чувственности: идиосинкразия и катастрофа. Издательский дом Санкт-Петербургского государственного университета, 2004. – 164с.
Фейербах Людвиг. Избранные философские произведения, т.1.- Москва, Издательство политической литературы, 1955. – 676 с.
Флоренский П.А. Пути и средоточия. // Флоренский П.А. Т.2. У водоразделов мысли. Москва, Издательство «Правда», 1990, с. 26–40.
Хайдеггер М. Основные понятия метафизики. // Вопросы философии, 1989, N9. Москва, Институт философии РАН, с.116–163.
Эрн В.Ф. Верховное постижение Платона. // Эрн В.Ф. Сочинения. Москва, Издательство «Правда», 1991, с.463–532.
Ямвлих Халкидский. Комментарии на диалоги Платона. Санкт-Петербург, Издательство «Алетейя», 2000. – 320с.
Shkubulyani O. // Plato's Teaching about "Living Creaure" and Phenomenology. – Logos of Phenomenology and Phenomenology of the Logos. Book Two. The Human Condition in-the-Unity-of-Everything-there-is-alive. Individuation, Self, Person, Self-determination, Freedom, Necessity. Edited by ANNA-TERESA TYMIENIECKA. The World Phenomenology Institute, Hanover, NH. USA. Published under the auspices of The World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning. A.-T. Tymieniecka, President. Springer. – p. 45–60

Nature's Value and Nature's Future

Leszek Pyra

Abstract There are some fundamental attitudes which man may have to nature. One of them is an anthropocentric approach, which is perhaps most common and so to say "natural", and therefore not as questionable as the other kinds of attitudes. The other kind of a relation may be called biocentric. It has, surprisingly, quite a long tradition, too. The theory that all life is morally considerable was most fully elaborated and expressed by Albert Schweitzer, and in the second half of the twentieth century this view was popularized by Kenneth Goodpaster. The most fully elaborated and advanced theory has then been worked out by Paul Taylor. Next come those who say that one should take lessons from ecology and often develop the so called ecocentric theories. They recognize the moral primacy of the wholes over singular entities. One of the first representatives of such thinking was Aldo Leopold. Then his theory was explained and creatively reinterpreted by J. Baird Callicot. It soon appeared, however, that biotic communities (ecosystems?) can hardly be treated as objects of moral consideration. Nowadays there is a lot of discussion going on about value-pluralism in reference to nature; different points of view have been presented and analyzed in connection with the above problems.

In the second part of the paper the problems concerning nature's future has been presented and discussed. Nature seems to be in danger because of different human activities polluting food, air and water, diminishing biodiversity, eliminating wild nature, etc. The greatest challenge men face nowadays is to live with the rapid changes men initiate themselves. The planet Earth is undergoing a great transformation which may be dangerous to mankind as such, not necessarily to the planet itself. Generally, there seem to be at least three different perspectives of man's practical, future relation to nature. The first one is very pessimistic: it means

L. Pyra (✉)
Pedagogical University, ul. Rozrywka 20/69, 31-417 Krakow, Poland
e-mail: lepyra@op.pl

A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), *Phenomenology and the Human Positioning in the Cosmos: The Life-world, Nature, Earth: Book One*, Analecta Husserliana 113,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-4801-9_10,

environmental catastrophe. We know that man is capable of destroying its own species, and many other species too, but it does not mean that he will be able to destroy the whole planet. The second possibility means that global inequality and environmental degradation continue and increase. The third one means the change of the way of life of the rich. It is closely connected with the category of sustainable development. But is such change of the mentality of rich people really possible? There are many reasons to be pessimistic, unfortunately. But man's future is entwined with nature's, whether man wants it or not. He should not forget it. Never.

In the above context Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka's views concerning the world of nature (to be precise: the relation man-nature) have been presented and discussed. Especially these aspects of Tymieniecka's thought have been considered which contribute to the environmental ethics. Within her theory cosmology and anthropology intertwine and present life as a dynamic unity of different spheres of life, namely: vegetal, animal and human. I think that the philosopher insists on the view that man, thanks to his creativity, must tend to preserve equilibrium between nature and culture, and thus should act as "Custodian of everything there is alive." Man is able to develop his own life fully only when he has the adequate view of the All, which constitutes to a certain extent the holistic vision of the world from "the germinal preorganic and organic circuits" to "sentient, sympathetic, psychic, social and cultural circuits of life". In Tymieniecka's Phenomenology of Life nature is conceived as "unity-of-everything-there-is-alive". Within such unity the sharp dualism between material and spiritual is obviously rejected. The "Ontopiesis of Life" and "self-individualizing of life" process shows that nature and culture are distinguished, but not separated, man is to rise from the natural to the Human Condition, thus manifesting himself in his freedom and dignity. Contemporary man is obliged to reconsider fundamentally his position in cosmos. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka claims that the "Human Creative Condition" within the evolutionary spread of the "logos of life" means that man should respect the "crucial web of all-there-is-alive", therefore he should be responsible for and respect the totality of life, because "life on earth depends on the measuring and creative wisdom of human beings". And, last but not least, it is also shown in the paper in what way Tymieniecka's Phenomenology of Life not only confirms but also enriches some categories already present in contemporary eco-philosophy.

The view that all life should be morally considered is not a new invention. Albert Schweitzer in the year 1923, in the book *Philosophy of Civilization*, writes: "True philosophy must start from the most immediate and comprehensive fact of consciousness: I am life that wants to live, in the midst of life that wants to live" (Schweitzer 1949, p.157). It can be clearly seen that this formulation expresses unanimously the reverence for all life, and for all life without the gradation of any sort. It imposes on the theory under discussion the dilemma, often called *Schweitzer's dilemma*, because in some critical situations it may be difficult to decide which life is more precious, that of a human, of a dog, of an insect?

In the 1970s Kenneth Goodpaster strongly underlined that: "nothing short of being alive seems to me to be a plausible and nonarbitrary criterion" (Goodpaster1978,

p. 310). In this context he criticizes Peter Singer's sentientism, that is the view that only beings able to suffer or to feel pleasure should be considered morally. Goodpaster thinks that sentience is only an adaptative mechanism helping to realize an animal's interest and therefore interests are to be taken most seriously when constructing an environmental philosophical theory. When one takes plants into consideration one notices immediately that they have interests, too. Namely, they need access to water and sun, because when deprived of them they would not develop, or even exist. In fact those having faith in sentientism think that both living entities, like plants and artifacts created by man, like cars or computers are somehow alike in this respect, that they both are not able to feel pain or pleasure. Of course when we take interests into account we may claim that both plants and artifacts have interests, but obviously they have them in different sense, namely plants need hydration and nutrition for their own good, and artifacts need different things (for example electric energy) because their owners want them to be in good condition when they use them for their (owner's) purpose. It is said that living things have interests of their own. Such is a basic intuition shared by most men.

Paul Taylor in turn constructs the biocentric egalitarian individualistic ethics. According to him: "Environmental ethics is concerned with the moral relations that hold between humans and the natural world. The ethical principles governing those relations determine our duties, obligations, and responsibilities with regard to the Earth's natural environment and all animals and plants that inhabit it" (Taylor 1986, p. 3). It should be underlined that the author is interested only in those ecosystems that are free of human intervention, therefore he is interested in wild things. The author notices that the natural environment is slowly turning into a vast artifact, and such situation needs watching and also developing a new ethics introduced and observed by humans. Therefore he introduces and develops an ethics which is independent from human ethics. His ethics refers to wild communities of life which deserve moral concern and consideration because of the value they possess inherently.

The American author introduces two notions connected with human centered and life centered theories, namely of amoral agent and a moral subject. According to Taylor: "A moral agent, for both types of ethics, is any being that possesses those capacities by virtue of which it can act morally or immorally, can have duties and responsibilities, and can be held accountable for what it does" (Taylor 1986, p. 17). On the other hand moral subjects are entities which can be harmed or benefited. The author distinguishes between material and formal conditions characteristic to traditional humanistic ethics and environmental one. The material conditions for humanistic ethics is *respect for persons*, whereas in environmental ethics it is *respect for nature*. In case of formal conditions they are the same for both kinds of ethics. It means that they should be: general in form; universally applicable to all moral agents; intended to be applied disinterestedly; advocated as normative principles for all to adopt; and be taken as overriding all nonmoral principles. The author claims that from the biological point of view humans are animals which have evolved from earlier forms of life. For him it is an axiom that: "we are biologically dependent upon a sound, stable order in the Earth's natural ecosystems. We share this aspect of

reality with all nonhuman species" (Taylor 1986, p. 48). One can fully agree with such a statement.

In case of Taylor's ethics the moral attitude of respect for nature is considered to be an ultimate moral attitude. Men show true respect for nature when they act or refuse to act out of consideration for the good of wild living things. The author claims that respect for nature attitude is an ultimate attitude, which means that it is the most fundamental kind of moral commitment a man can take. Quite opposite to this attitude is an exploitative attitude. In connection with this the concept of good of a being is propagated by the author. It means that wild animals and plants have inherent worth due to the fact that they are members of the biotic community of a natural ecosystem, and as such they are moral subjects to which duties are owed by moral agents. Taylor opts for egalitarianism (similarly as Schweitzer), and he expresses his position using following words: "Whatever its species may be, none is thought to be superior to another and all are held to be deserving of equal consideration" (Taylor 1986, p. 79). Such radical position poses different difficulties, similar to those implied by Schweitzer's theory.

The biocentric outlook on nature constitutes the basis of the attitude of respect for nature. In this context four beliefs are distinguished. Taylor formulates them in the following way: humans are members of the Earth's Community of Life on the same terms as other living things; the human species, together with numerous other species, are integral elements in a system of interdependence guaranteeing their survival; all organisms are teleological centers of life; men are not superior to other living beings. According to the author humans are a recent arrival on Earth, an addition to the order of life that had been established for hundreds of millions of years and, what seems obvious, while humans cannot do without other species, these species can certainly do without humans.

Taylor formulates some rules obligating in his environmental ethics. The first of them is the rule of nonmalaficence, which means the duty not to do any harm to any entity in the natural environment that has a good of its own. The so called noninterference consists of two kinds of negative duties: the first one requires men to refrain from placing restrictions on the freedom of an individual, the second one requires a general "hands off" policy with regards to the whole ecosystems and biotic communities. The next rule, that of fidelity, means the duty not to break the trust that a wild animal places in us (as is often done in hunting, trapping, fishing). The last, but not least, is the rule of restitutive justice, which obligates man to restore the balance of justice between a moral agent and a moral subject in case when some harm has been done to the subject.

It happens quite often that human values conflict with the good of nonhumans. In this context Taylor formulates a set of priority principles that cut across both the domain of environmental ethics and human ethics (Taylor 1986, pp. 263–313). The material condition valid in this sphere is fairness, which means that all parties to the conflict are treated fairly. Then follow the principles regulating human behavior in regard to nonhuman life. The principle of self defense means that a moral agent may defend itself against dangerous organisms even if it sometimes means killing them. The principle of proportionality means that greater weight is to be given to

basic than to nonbasic interests, disregarding whether human or not. The principle of minimum wrong means that humans, when need be, may violate nonhuman interests causing least harm. The principle of distributive justice requires that when the interests of the parties are all basic ones and there exists a natural source of good, each party must be allotted an equal share. The principle of restitutive justice in turn means that some form of reparation is needed when wild animals and plants are destroyed. According to Taylor when the above mentioned principles are observed man can achieve full ethical harmony between human civilization and nature, he can achieve a balance between human values and the well-being of animals and plants in natural ecosystems. The so far existing culture has been predominantly anthropocentric, the time has already come when it should be moved in the direction of biocentrism, claims Paul Taylor. Of course such biocentrism means concentrating on wild living things, first of all. Commenting on the ethics of bioculture, Taylor notices that man using hybridization and different breeding programs, is able to produce the kinds of animals and plants that well serve human needs, and men should treat them well. He stresses numerous times that his environmental ethics refers only to wild and/or semi-wild nature.

Towards the Wholes (Holism)

Some think that we need a new way of looking at morality, a way that stresses the moral primacy of the wholes over the individuals. Aldo Leopold, the American forester interested in philosophy, is widely thought to be an initiator of environmental philosophy. His ethical views are usually called "land ethic". Leopold's most known ethical imperative sounds as follows: "A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise" (Leopold 1990). It should be underlined that Leopold refers to wild nature, first of all, similarly as Taylor does. But, contrary to Taylor, his ethic is not individualistic, it is holistic, because Leopold thinks wholes are more important than individuals. It should be also noticed that today we rather speak about the good of ecosystems than the good of biotic communities. Nevertheless it is sometimes difficult to make ecosystems, understood as gatherings of individuals, the objects of moral concern. The problem is that beginning from ancient times ethics, starting from Socrates till the middle of the twentieth century, was referring to individuals, not to groups. In the light of this Tom Regan names Leopold's views "ecological fascism" (Regan 1983), according to him land ethic disregards totally the rights of individuals.

Among the contemporary holistic versions of environmental philosophy the most original seem to be the views of Holmes Rolston III. The American thinker notices that for thousands of years man has actually been unable to destroy whole species. The situation changed radically in the second half of the twentieth century, especially when man started to use heavy equipment. Man realized that many species of plants and animals were endangered by his activity, some were beyond reclaim, and some

had no perspectives. Biologists and activists began to alarm public opinion that something should be done, because otherwise many species would soon disappear, some ecosystems would collapse, etc. In result some philosophers started to be interested in the problem under discussion. As was already mentioned the so far existing ethics was interested in individuals, therefore collective entities, such as species, were of no interest to it. Joel Feinberg wrote: "We do have duties to protect threatened species, not duties to the species themselves as such, but rather duties to future human beings, duties derived from our housekeeping role as temporary inhabitants of this planet" (Feinberg 1974). It appears therefore, that we have direct duties to men living in future, but not duties to species as such. Some thinkers take practical reasons into consideration. Passmore, for once, writes: "a species often turns out to be unexpectedly useful, a tropical plant to contain pharmacologically valuable substances" (Passmore 1974). Somewhat similarly thinks Holmes Rolston III, who writes: "Destroying species is like tearing pages out of an unread book, written in a language humans hardly know how to read, about the place where they live" (Rolston III 1988). And we humans, should not be careless beings, but prudent ones. During Earths' history there developed several million species, nobody knows how many disappeared. The theoreticians think that those species which disappeared outnumber the existing ones. Rolston underlines: "The developmental view that triggered the great loses of biological diversity in this century did not arise from traditional cultural values, either classical or primitive. These losses began when science-based models were exported to traditional societies. The damage done within primitive and classical cultures (which was sometimes considerable) pales beside damages done in our own century when these cultures: opened up for development, when they got entangled in the world markets and military alliances, when they aspired to Western standards of living, and when they are secularized" (Rolston III 1990). It seems that human excessive consumerism is to be blamed, especially for the rapid disappearance of wildlands and the consecutive extinction of many species. At the same time Rolston is fully aware that for the classical philosophy when dealing with species there is a great difficulty consisting in this that species are gatherings of individuals, therefore a matter of some convention, whereas classical philosophy attributed duties to individual beings. Many ethicists think that moral duties are only oriented to individuals, not to groups, and Rolston knows that but at the same time he is fully aware that such an entity as species exits and constitutes the living processes, the living streams of evolution. In this context he writes: "A species is a coherent, ongoing form of life expressed in organisms, encoded in gene flow, and shaped by the environment" (Rolston III 1988, p. 136). As such it deserves human respect, especially in the light of the fact that species last genetically much longer than individuals which constitute them. The death of an individual is not as important as the death of a species, because an individual can be substituted by another individual, whereas a species cannot. Rolston therefore writes: "Every extinction is a kind of superkilling. It kills 'essences' beyond 'existences'" (Rolston III 1988, p. 144). He claims that man has duties in fact not to any arbitrary category, but a to a continuous, living stream of life. A given exemplar of a given species may be reproduced again and again, whereas a species (when lost) can never be recovered.

Therefore the individual is subordinate to the species, not the other way round. Such is the author's conviction, which can be succinctly expressed in a thesis that wholes are more important than parts constituting them. But there remains a very important problem of a practical nature , how to take care of endangered species?

According to the American author they can be preserved in zoos and botanical gardens. It is not the most desired way, however. Such *ex situ* preservation takes care of some artifacts or souvenirs rather than the original living organisms. Bu in such way some organisms can be preserved for future generations. What is actually most desired is *in situ* preservation, which means preservation in wild conditions, in an ecosystem that produced species and is still doing this by different selection pressures. But in order to do this man should take care of some still greater wholes, namely ecosystems. Especially Aldo Leopold claimed that man should develop an ethics invoking respect and love for some ecosystemic wholes and some admiration for their integrity, stability and beauty. But could such criteria be applied to the concept of nature as a phenomenon indifferent, or even hostile to man? They certainly could not. Leopold wondering through forests noticed not only struggle there, but also adaptation, competition, cooperation and interdependence. The contemporary biologists underline the importance of the first of these categories, namely adaptation, and in result propose the category of "the better adapted" instead of Darwin's proposal "survival of the fittest". In nature we have the situations for example, when predator and prey try to outcompete each other and eventually they usually get involved into some kind of coevolution in which some balance is achieved, some undisturbed *status quo*, the state in which both prey and predator, parasite and host, can live and, what more, even flourish. According to Rolston in ecosystems there is not only conflict, there is also much cooperation because eventually it is to the advantage of predator and parasite to disturb prey and host species as little as possible under given circumstances. According to the so-called optimization theory the mutations which prove beneficial to the members of the species are selected for, and the disadvantageous ones are abandoned; in result those mutations are eventually selected which guarantee a kind of symbiosis. Among some ecologists there appears an opinion that ecosystems are objectively valuable communities to which some duty may be attached.

According to Rolston an ecosystem includes both some order and a certain amount of openness. Writes Rolston: "There is weak organic holism – communitarian holism – not strong organismic holism (…). The looseness is not simplicity but is itself a form of environmental complexity that generates organismic complexity" (Rolston III 1988, p. 173). The American author thinks that in nature an ecosystem generates order, which is rich, beautiful and integral, and which eventually exceeds all the component parts thus creating not a simple collection but a certain structure. Ilya Prigogine makes a sharp distinction between "closed systems", in which different things originate, develop and deteriorate according to a certain pattern, and "open systems", in which energy maintains itself. At the same time he points to the fact that the open systems of becoming are primordial, they are open to exterior forces and exchanges of energy, interactive with surrounding environment. According to the ecosystemic approach when values are discovered in ecosystems man should

think about working out some rules of moral character obligating when one deals with them. As Leopold claims man should love, and of course take care of "the land, the natural processes by which the land and the living things upon it have achieved their characteristic forms (evolution) and by which they maintain their existence (ecology)." An ecosystem is somehow a **cradle of life** as such; therefore it deserves man's respect.

When it happens that there appears a conflict between the interests of individuals and some greater wholes, for example ecosystems, holistic approach assumes that the community is more important than the individual; according to both Leopold and Rolston community's beauty, integrity and stability come first. To add some value to ecosystems Rolston presents them as some peculiar, unique entities, and shows in what ways they maximize individuality of a plant or an animal. First, due to the stochastic contingencies and idiographic historicity that each particular organism is beset with, organisms differ among themselves. Second, very long periods of time evolutionary ecosystems have steadily and consequently increased the number of species on Earth from zero to several million, with processes such as extinction and respeciation generating and differentiating more and more new species. Third, the increase in quantity goes hand in hand with the increase in quality, especially in the case of some most complicated organisms. Consciousness and self-consciousness have emerged. As a result, persons have appeared in history, and culture has been superimposed on nature, changing the latter rapidly, often drastically. Rolston concludes that ecosystems are good examples of some steady prolific trend of nature. When nature is being examined scientifically it is easy to notice that processes are more important than individuals. Such opinion constitutes certainly the essence of holism. It is obvious that nature has some progressive forces built into her, which have ultimately produced so many million species, starting virtually from zero. Such prolific nature, generating so many different forms of life, is certainly worthy of human greatest respect.

Nature's Future

Media keep informing us that nature as such is in danger: biodiversity is diminishing, climate is warming up, the ozone layer is increasing, and so on and so forth. We are aware that water and air are constantly being polluted. Our food is poisoned with chemicals. We lose contact with wild nature because there is less and less such nature. The cause of such changes is undoubtedly man. Are there any chances to change his activity at all? We should be fully aware that man has a great ability to change the global environment in a way we do not fully understand, and we can be sure at the same time that such changes are under way. The previous century has witnessed the greatest increase in environmental destruction and certainly the greatest increase in global population in human history. Global population is now seven billion and if the growing rate continues (1.14 % per year) the population will double in about 60 years. And such a great amount of people have a great, negative

ecological impact upon Earth. We should be aware that according to WWF's *Living Planet Report* humanity, since the 1980s of the previous century, has began to consume resources faster than the Earth can regenerate them. We should be also aware that the future of the next generations depends on our present actions. Garret Hardin, in his famous essay *The Tragedy of the Commons* (Hardin 1968), asked the readers to imagine a pasture shared by herders. Each of them individually benefits from grazing animals, while the costs are spread all over all the herders. Thus a particular herder is interested in adding animals, since he gains all the benefits but shares the costs. As result we get the situation in which there comes to overgrazing and the collapse of the whole pasture. Hardin also proposes the analogy of the lifeboat, which can carry maximum 60 people, the boat occupied by 50 people and surrounded by 100 people who are going to drown if left outside the boat. The solutions are as follows. Everyone can be allowed in the boat, and in result all people drown. Ten additional men can be allowed, but the problem which ones to choose arises; in addition to this life boat is in danger due to the possibility of being overloaded. No one can be allowed – this is a solution for which Hardin opts.

In the context of above considerations Hardin suggests that people in poor countries should get no food aid. The result of such help is that a population which gets it will breed up to the next crisis point at which it will require again food aid. This cycle continues until food aid cannot be provided any more. At this point the whole poor population starves to death. Garret Hardin claims that more poor people will eventually die if we respond to their demands than if we do not.

According to Dale Jamieson (2008) there are three possible scenarios for what the future may look like: environmental catastrophe; continuing and increasing global inequality and environmental degradation; a change in the way of life of the world's most privileged people. The author notices that at present we are living in the midst of the three scenarios, and in future we may have a similar situation. Jamieson rightly pays attention to the fact that green rhetoric about "saving the planet" implies that if men do not radically change their lifestyles Earth will collapse. It seems hardly possible that men could destroy the whole planet, because life as such is very resilient to damages; probably men could destroy humankind and some life, but certainly not all of them (in Tymieniecka's opinion Logos of Life is too strong for that!). Nevertheless taking into account the increasing consumption and population some kind of a catastrophe is awaiting at the door. Many people in developing countries begin to live in the way in which men in developed countries live. Such factors as: energy consumption, meat production, automobile ownership, etc. are increasing dramatically in such countries as China and India. Jamieson notices that, according to certain studies, if everyone lived the same way as the average American, we would need 5.3 planets with the resources of Earth (Jamieson 2008, p. 197).

According to the second scenario global inequality and environmental degradation will increase. It should be remembered that the developing countries exert a great negative influence upon climate (In China there is already more than 500 new coal-powered electricity generating plants!). In addition to this many countries in Africa, South America and Asia are custodians of much of the world's biodiversity.

Without cooperation with them many species may be lost forever. In the light of this rich countries should make a deal. They should offer new technologies (pay for them) to the developing countries; in such way these countries omit the highly polluting developing model that was once followed by Europe and North America. But we do not know whether there is a chance for such deal today. As far as reducing consumption and moving towards sustainability is concerned rich countries are unwilling to do this. Jamieson is especially pessimistic as regards USA. Statistics, economic indicators pay an especially important role in American media and society, in American consciousness. Environmental worries often seem inconsistent with economic growth. The situation seems to look better in Europe, where people are more interested in greater leisure, more equality, less poverty, and greater provision of public goods. It should be remembered that the celebration in (of) consumption is relatively recent, especially in those European countries which belonged to the Soviet block. We do not know what will happen in future, that is which scenario will prevail. Will it be some combination of the three? It is highly probable, I think. But what will happen depends partly on us, living *hick et nunc*. We should not forget about it.

Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka's Views and Environmental Ethics

In her introductory word to Book 4, entitled *In Praise of Philosophy*, Tymieniecka writes: "To philosophize is not only to project a view of the world and life and so obtain life's bearings amid the ALL, but is also to offer guidelines for human conduct, to distinguish right and wrong, good and evil" (Tymieniecka 2000, p. XXX). She is quite conscious that phenomenology aimed at devising an impartial way of cognizance/constitution of reality. Her phenomenology differs from Husserl's in this (among other features) that it is interested primarily in life, and not only in life of human beings alone. She writes as follows: "In the new phenomenology, expanded to take in all the ways of life per se, what is at stake is not strictly human reality, specifically human centered focusing operations, but all modes of human functioning, all human involvement in the orbit of life" (Tymieniecka 2000, p. 4). Her metaphysics is the result of wonderment in connection with a phenomenon of life. In general she distinguishes three spheres of being: cosmic sphere (pre-life sphere), the biosphere and the sphere of self individualizing life, of which the highest peak is reached in men, and particularly in human culture, in which the logos is most mature. Tymieniecka repeats again and again that the so far existing phenomenology (and to some extent contemporary philosophy) does not pay enough attention to the phenomenon of life as such. Therefore she often writes the word "life" using capital letters (LIFE). I know some environmental thinkers in Poland who, in somewhat similar contexts, write in the same manner the word "nature" (for example Piątek 1998). The other known Polish philosopher, Henryk Skolimowski, fascinated by the analytical philosophy at the beginning of his career, then accused it of practical impotence and favored the philosophy of respect for nature, for every living being

(compare: Skolimowski 1993). Similarly Tymieniecka after her long-lasting fascination by the Husserlian theory then began slowly to see that this phenomenology is adequate to things as such, but cannot deal with life. Therefore she writes: "No wonder that traditional philosophy by relying on the sclerosed universal features offered by cognition and its analysis barred the way to the revelation of the nervous system of all philosophy, *life*" (Tymieniecka 2000, p. 75). When the difference between life and non-life is considered it should be underlined that Tymieniecka notices that there is no definite demarcation line between them, remaining at the same time quite conscious that there is definitely the difference between a pile of sand and of ants. Developing her Phenomenology of Life Tymieniecka tackles also the problems concerning the environment, and she does it not only marginally. In her *Logos and Life* she makes the following statement: "A novel starting (…) the most promising one is that offered by a new inquiry into the ontopoiesis of life itself through the access that we gain it via the creative sources of the specifically human differentiation of the logos of life at the primogenital point of the Human Condition as a station in the evolutionary radiation of the logos" (Tymieniecka 2000, p. 98).

There is a great need, according to the American thinker, to reformulate the notion of nature. Nature and culture are supposedly quite different realms, but they can meet each other in a friendly embrace, by means of the creative/ inventive act of a human being. Sometimes Tymieniecka escapes from speculative philosophy, loaded heavily with metaphysics, and shows her passion as a nature lover and gardener. Look at this rather longish passage: "Turning back from these speculative distances to our concrete reality of life, let us recall what a wondrous sight is the spontaneous sprouting of new plants from mother earth in early spring, at any possible vacant place! The dance of vegetation, the symphony of nature. Indeed, each plant stands on its own appearing as an actor upon the stage of the world of life to initiate its play with steps meticously choreographed, following the sequence of a virtual script, drawing on it like an actor on his/her memorized directions. Yet although they stand on their own and get from within their very individual set of moves to perform, they are not insensitive and separated soloists, but bend to the moves of other players, who attune their own moves to theirs so as to participate together in the logoic performance, in the dance that the logos of life stages and enacts, initiates, and guides. The logos of life appears in the great spectacle backstage; there it works and manifests itself" (Tymieniecka 2000, p. 115). It can be easily seen that Tymieniecka is a great optimist, believing in the eternal march and advance of life. She therefore believes in the power of life and writes: "although some species disappear in the evolutionary course of life, though civilizations disintegrate and exit the stage, though human beings wage incessant wars against each other and sometimes wipe out entire societies or groups, these are replaced by new incoming species, civilizations, societies, and so life continues. (…) Nothing is lost" (Tymieniecka 2000, p. 123). From what I know Tymieniecka some years ago was intensively reading, or rather rereading, the writings of Henry Bergson, being especially interested in his category of *elan vital.* Giving a long interview, on the occasion of receiving a honorary doctor's degree in Bergen, she was asked whether her views are a kind of vitalism. Her answer is characteristic: "Bergson (…) was

certainly right. It is incredible to see how life originates from between two pieces of stone next to each other, a tiny bit of soil below, and in a year you see all sorts of plants trying to get out, fighting for life."[1] And in the next sentences she goes on saying symptomatic words: "I am a passionate gardener. This is one of my great passions. When I am going away from home in summer, I regret that the flowers will be flowering away before I get home. I follow the development of weeds very closely. It is a continuous struggle to maintain weeds at the same proportion to cultivated plants, because weeds have a tendency to take over everything. And weeds are as beautiful as flowers. So, my garden – which is rather enormous – is a weed garden. I have no heart to remove all the weeds. I have a special sensitivity toward the elan vital of plants. But there is such an agglomeration of originary elements which come together to generate life… and among them one which is most striking, namely indiwidualization, be it of a weed or of a fish, or of a human being, which is an indiwidualization of the Logos."[2] It appears that Bergsonian *elan vital* comes out of the Logos of Life. This Logos has not only pure force within it, but it is a shaping force which is marvelous, which decides that individualizing causes that this particular plant develops and not the other, this particular animal, and not the other, and, last but not least, certainly this human being with its spiritual endowment, a human being which touches divine. It should be also underlined that Tymieniecka does not introduce measure of what is higher and lower in nature. For her the unity of everything alive is most important, because there would be no spiritual life without various phases of life preceding spirituality. Can we then call her views an egalitarian biocentrism? Of the sort that Paul Taylor develops?, or Albert Schweitzer? I do not think so. The category of the Logos of Life and the divine hidden behind it make all the difference. But perhaps Pierre Teilhard de Chardin's views are quite close to Tymienieckan position? The problem certainly requires some closer examination.

Then Tymieniecka reminds Heraclitus, according to whom "One is All". One's destiny is fulfilled within other lives, in and outside the web of life on Earth. Her intuition is expressed in the title of one of the subchapters: *The Web of Life: the Unity-of-Everything-there-Is-Alive.* The Polish-American creator of ontopoiesis tries to present the view of the All, and she means specifically "the great vision of the All-in-becoming" (Tymieniecka 2000, p. 650). Her vision of the All reminds of the thousands years old traditions of the East: Hinduism, Buddhism, etc., which rather slowly reach European consciousness. When contemporary disputes of different environmental thinkers are taken into account one notices a lot of disagreement, instead perhaps of cooperation in the field of ecophilosophy. According to the author much responsibility is put upon man, as the highest manifestation of the logos. Human "entering into the workings of the logos of life itself may promote or hinder life, advance or destroy it. It is now to some degree left to human genius to

[1] An Interview with Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, in: *Phenomenological inquiry,* Volume 32, October 2008, p. 32.

[2] Ibidem, p. 33.

superintend the logos of life as it discerns, evaluates, and decides" (Tymieniecka 2000, p. 130). Tymieniecka ascribes to man a certain very important role, namely writes that man, and only man, is "Custodian-of-the-unity-of-everything-there-is-alive" (Tymieniecka 1988, Part I, p. 4). According to her this is because among the different forms of life, the human being has attained the most advanced complexity as the free and creative differentiation of the logos of life. Using his creativity man must preserve the equilibrium of forces between "nature" and "culture", and he does this acting by measure and proportion. Tymieniecka does not leave any doubt about it writing that men should strive at "measuring and creative wisdom" that "life on earth depends on" (Tymieniecka 2000, p. 625). Summing up Tymieniecka's views concerning environment Carmen Cozma writes: "…our phenomenologist of life succeeds in outrunning usual oppositions, like: 'humanistic' – 'naturalistic' ethics, 'anthropocentrism' – 'biocentrism'; especially, the individualistic or holistic approaches, choosing to synthesize them, in terms of an integrator phenomenological discourse upon the structured ecological order of micro- and macro-cosmos, upon the creative Human Condition within the unity of life" (Cozma 2007). And still a longish citation from Kim Roger's *Reason and Life,* with which one can easily agree and which, at the same time, may serve as a final conclusion: "Tymieniecka's view of the emergence of the world of life-conditions or life-world is far superior to the conception presented by either transcendental phenomenologists or existential phenomenologists, both of which treat Nature's involvement in this process in passive terms. They consequently miss entirely the significance of the interplay between Nature and the inner structuredness of human life which, on the contrary, Tymieniecka brings out strongly" (Rogers 2003).

References

Cozma, Carmen. 2007. *On ethical in the phenomenology of life*. Roma: Edizioni Eucos.

Feinberg, Joel. 1974. The rights of animals and unborn generations. In *Philosophy and environmental crisis*, ed. William T. Blackstone. Athens: University of Georgia Press.

Goodpaster, Kenneth. 1978. On being morally considerable. *Journal of Philosophy* 75: 308–325.

Hardin, James Garret. 13 December 1968. The tragedy of the commons. *Science* 162: 1243–48.

Jamieson, Dale. 2008. *Ethics and environment*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Leopold, Aldo. 1990. *A sand county almanac*. New York: Ballantine Books.

Passmore, John A. 1974. *Man's responsibility for nature*. London: Gerald Duckworth and Co. Ltd.

Piątek, Zdzislawa. 1998. *Etyka środowiskowa. Nowe spojrzenie na miejsce człowieka w przyrodzie*. Kraków: Wydawnictwo UJ.

Regan, T. 1983. *The case for animal rights*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Rogers, W.Kim. 2003. *An introduction to an ecological approach in philosophy*. Lanham/New York/Oxford: University Press of America Inc.

Rolston III, Holmes. 1988. *Environmental ethics*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Rolston III, Holmes. 1990. Science-based versus traditional ethics. In *Ethics of environment and development: Global challenge and international response*, ed. Ronald J. Engel and Joan Gibb Engel. London: Belhaven Press.

Schweitzer, Albert. 1949. *Out of my life and thought.* Trans. C.T. Campion. New York: Henry Holt.

Skolimowski, Henryk. 1993. *Filozofia żyjąca. Eko-filozofia jako drzewo życia*. Warszawa: Pusty Obłok.
Taylor, Paul. 1986. *Respect for nature: A theory of environmental ethics*. Princetown: Princetown University Press.
Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa. 1988. *Logos and life,* Book 1: *Creative experience and the critique of reason.* Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.
Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa. 2000. *Logos and life*, Book 4: *Impetus and equipoise in the life-strategies of reason.* Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic.

(Mis)Triangulated Human Positioning in the Cosmos: (Un)Covering the (Meta) Physical Identity of Agents of Good and Evil in Head and Silko

Imafedia Okhamafe

Abstract Through two attempts from creative literature, my paper reconsiders the root question that has faced humanity perennially since antiquity: reducing or even eliminating death, illness, suffering, and poverty from the human condition. Usually, this life struggle inevitably raises the problem of the ultimate source(s) of good and evil in the cosmos, especially on earth. The modern world has, of course, understandably and increasingly left this knotty problematic mostly to science, especially physical science, but contemporary knowledge has also increasingly become interdisciplinary. Phenomenology belongs simultaneously to science and non-science. As Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka demonstrates and insists in a 2008 interview, "phenomenology has entered all sectors of knowledge" (Tymieniecka 1). My paper specifically seeks to locate the places and uses of the heavens in human affairs in Bessie Head's 1974 novel A Question of Power and Leslie Marmon Silko's 1977 novel Ceremony. The setting of Head's novel doubles as a terrestrial-ethereal setting, which enables Elizabeth to function as the protagonist of a contradictory double world. Similarly, Silko's novel has a double main setting and a double main plot consisting of verse sections and prose sections, with the former as ethereal and the latter as the terrestrial. Both novels try to account for reducible but inevitable human suffering.

Through two attempts from creative literature, my paper reconsiders the root question that has faced humanity perennially since antiquity: reducing or even eliminating death, illness, suffering, and poverty from the human condition. Usually, this life

I. Okhamafe (✉)
University of Nebraska, 6001 Dodge Street, CB 123E, Omaha, NE 68182-0208, USA
e-mail: iokhamaf@mail.unomaha.edu

A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), *Phenomenology and the Human Positioning in the Cosmos: The Life-world, Nature, Earth: Book One*, Analecta Husserliana 113,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-4801-9_11, © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

struggle inevitably raises the problem of the ultimate source(s) of good and evil in the cosmos, especially on earth. The modern world has, of course, understandably and increasingly left this knotty problematic mostly to science, especially physical science, but contemporary knowledge has also continues to be increasingly interdisciplinary. Phenomenology belongs simultaneously to science and non-science. As Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (2008) demonstrates and insists in an interview, "phenomenology has entered all sectors of knowledge" (Tymieniecka 1). My paper specifically seeks to locate the places and uses of the heavens in human affairs in Bessie Head's (1974) novel *A Question of Power* and Leslie Marmon Silko's (1977)[1] novel *Ceremony*.

[1] This novel has no titled or numbered chapters or divisions of any kind. To facilitate reference or further research, and since the novel has a series of prose sections interspersed with verse sections (which I argue thematically parallel, advance, and reinforce each other), I have framed the entire novel as a double series of alternating prose and verse sections. I have accordingly numbered the verse sections (27 in all) as indicated below:

1st verse section, pp. 1–4.

2nd verse section, pp. 13–14.

3rd verse section, pp. 37–38.

4th verse section, pp. 46–49.

5th verse section, pp. 53–54.

6th verse section, pp. 57–59.

7th verse section, pp. 71–72.

8th verse section, p. 82.

9th verse section, pp. 105–106.

10th verse section, p. 113.

11th verse section, pp. 128–130.

12th verse section, pp. 132–138 (second longest).

13th verse section, pp. 139–141.

14th verse section, p. 142.

15th verse section, p. 143 (shortest).

16th verse section, pp. 143–144.

17th verse section, pp. 151–152.

18th verse section, p. 153.

19th verse section, pp. 170–176 (longest)

20th verse section, p. 180.

21st verse section, p. 182 (second shortest)

22nd verse section, p. 206.

23rd verse section, p. 247.

24th verse section, pp. 255–256.

25th verse section, p. 257.

26th verse section, p. 258.

27th verse section, pp. 261–262.

The setting of Head's novel doubles as a terrestrial-ethereal setting, which enables Elizabeth to function as the protagonist of a contradictory double world. Similarly, Silko's novel has a double main setting and a double main plot consisting of verse sections and prose sections, with the former as ethereal and the latter as terrestrial. Both novels try to account for reducible but inevitable human suffering.

Bessie Head's (1974) novel *A Question of Power* thematizes a journey, a "soul-journey" that dramatically interrogates the being and operations or practices of power-relations at a cosmic level through ethereal and terrestrial setting and characters. The novel has two sets of characters: the characters that inhabit Elizabeth's mind or her inside and the characters that live outside her mind (the characters that live in the Botswanan village of Motabeng in southern Africa). The third-person narrator notes that in the searches for eternal goodness, "none of mankind's God-like figureheads recorded seeing what she [Elizabeth] saw on this nightmare soul-journey" (Bessie Head 35). Elizabeth posits and tests the question of the meaning of the ideal life, which for her means the natural grandeur of life, and how it forever eludes us "because, in the heat of living no one had come to terms with their own powers and at the same time the powers of others" (35). To dig into the abyss of cosmic being or cosmic life, the novel addresses frontally and centrally the power relations of sanity and insanity or normality and abnormality or the earth and the sky (aka the terrestrial and the heavens). To undertake this arduous journey (the soul journey), Elizabeth, the protagonist, makes a topographic shift and thus relocates her mind and the people in her world. This semi-black/semi-white single mother moves from her South African town to a village, Motabeng, in Botswana (southern Africa). Only as an insane woman does her sanity emerge. There is sense in madness which only the mad knows and can articulate better. In Elizabeth's hell journey, she studies her soul and the souls of others, if by soul we here mean the abyss of one's being or the evolution of one's being as a whole. Elizabeth "was entirely dependent on Sello for direction and equally helpless, like a patient on his doctor for survival" (35). Elizabeth "had been so intensely drawn inwards" for so long "that her mind dwelt entirely at this intangible level of shifting images and strange arguments. She lay quietly in the dark," and asked, "Why was everything so pointed, so absorbingly profound? The wild-eyed Medusa was expressing the surface reality of African society. It was shut in and exclusive. It had a strong theme of power-worship running through it, and power people needed small, narrow, shut-in worlds. They never felt secure in the big, wide flexible universe where there were too many cross-currents of opposing thought." The "awakening conflict" "disturbed her." The narrator adds that "Sello had introduced her to the soul-reality of the black man" and that "They had stood and addressed her as soul equals." Furthermore, "Other nations, harsh climates, high peaks of endeavor and suffering had shaped her soul. Their soul-communication to her and Sello was terribly important – that people who had suffered from the wanton cruelty of others prefer the truth at all times, no matter what it might cost them" (38). Sello "had introduced his own soul, so softly like a heaven of completeness and perfection" (14). The question of whether one can depend on "social-revolution" (19) or one's "soul-revolution" (11) for any salvation becomes more problematic. *A Question of Power* digs into "the mechanics of

power," "soul-revolution," "social revolution" and by defining love as perfection and thus impossible on earth, she wonders if humans can attain such love outside the earth, but she quickly also realizes that we probably have "no safeguard against" evil anywhere and that "nothing" lies at "the end of all life" (36). The book contends then that "*If the things of the soul are really a question of power, then anyone in possession of power of the spirit could be Lucifer*" (199). The mechanics of power suggests the inevitable coexistence of the divine and the demonic or of good and evil and as such the permanence of human suffering and human death.

The book features at least three Sellos: "live" Sello or the Motabeng resident who usually drives around the village in his green truck, and the other two Sellos who live in Elizabeth's head: one Sello wears a monk's robe and apparently symbolizes the good aspect of humanity, and the other Sello wears a brown suit and perhaps personifies the evil aspect of humanity; initially, this Sello associates with Medusa, a Dan associate who also appears as a double: the "live" Dan (a friend of the "live" Sello, a cattle millionaire, and an African nationalist) who lives in Mobateng village; the second Dan lives in Elizabeth's head and identifies with Satan. Part 1 of this novel counters evil Medusa with Kenosi's goodness, while Part 2 counters Dan's evilness with Medusa's fine friendship. Elizabeth's vegetable garden plays a positive and therapeutic counterbalancing role throughout the book. Initially and ultimately, the two imaginary Sellos (the Sellos in Elizabeth's mind) accentuate her potentiality for both good and evil as a vital aspect of her personality. But the "beauty and harmony built up in her outside circumstances" contradict "the tormented hell of her inner world." She devotes half of her daily time to her people-full life as a vegetable gardener. Her vegetable garden associates include "English volunteers" and Motabeng "village ladies" (157). Motabeng abounds with stories of how "people of totally foreign backgrounds" made "tentative efforts" "to work together and understand each other's humanity" and "establish the brotherhood of man" (158). A young English man from London comes to Motabeng to work at a local brewery. He lives adjacent to Elizabeth's house. He complains to Elizabeth about her landlady refusing to take rent money from him, a gesture which does not sit well with him. Elizabeth knows the woman; she and the woman "used to make seedlings together" (158). The landlady explains away her refusal to accept rent money from him as "a kindness to a … foreigner," but the narrator says that "the story went a little deeper than that," for "People believe in tenderness, especially in tender heavens of compassion," which "belonged to a God in the sky who would do everything for the poor in some magical way" (159). However, "Elizabeth was never to regain a sense of security or stability on the question of how patterns of goodness were too soft, too indefinable to counter the tumultuous roar of evil." She keeps wondering why she keeps "stumbling down to the garden with the roar of hell in her ears" (159). Arguably, this failure of Elizabeth's vegetable garden life to make a dent on the question of evil and suffering slowly leads her to the torturing realization that humans cannot crack the secret of the mechanics of power and hence ultimately everything is a question of power. Sello tells Elizabeth, who prefers "to die alone": "All I told you about the times of darkness was true." Elizabeth fears going to sleep, lest "she should wake up the next morning alive but without a mind. She sat up half

the night" but "Just near dawn she dozed off," and "Instantly Dan arose before her" and tells her, "I have the power to take the life of your son. And he adds that "He will be dead in two days" (195). Elizabeth wakes up and asks Shorty to deliver a note to Mrs. Jones (an old lady), a note which says, "I'm sorry I hit you. I've lived in a nightmare world of no compassion for three years." Mrs. Jones shows up at Elizabeth's house and advises her, "You must not be afraid of evil. Jesus overcame evil a long time ago," and she adds, "I simply put my trust in Jesus." The old lady declares, "Lord, take my life for your service. Use me as you see fit …. I do everything you tell me to." The humanity of Mrs. Jones begins to appear to Elizabeth again at long last, but Elizabeth admits her inability "to absorb anything now" and declares her "heart and mind" dead "as if" her mind and heart "are not really there." Mrs. Jones tries to comfort or console her by telling her not to worry, for she will "pray for her" (196). Elizabeth thinks that "When people pray" to God to help them, they are appealing "to something they have in mind that is consistently tender, a concept of goodness that is almost feminine in its pity and mercy" (196–197). In other words, people anthropomorphize God, but she insists that in actuality, such people "are praying to a God they will never see, because there is no God like ordinary people." Does Elizabeth then think that God as an extraordinary or superhuman being exists? She seems to think that people will find only people like Medusa and Dan "in heaven and hell," but they "won't find ordinary human kindness and decency there" because "God in heaven is too important to be decent …," a thought Elizabeth does not complete. Shorty has "a high fever," and since Elizabeth remembers Dan's prediction that Shorty would die within 2 days, she "rushed him to hospital" and they returned home soon because of a festering "bruise on his knee," which is what in the first place has led to his fever. Shorty falls asleep. Dan announces his intention "to go with B…. The Womb" because of her unforgettable womb, and then Dan and B get it on and on. Sello dismisses this behavior as "savage cruelty!" and then defines love as "two people mutually feeding each other, not one living on the soul of the other like a ghoul!" (197). Elizabeth says, "Thank you! Oh God, thank you for the lever out of hell." The narrator describes Sello as "the soaring skybird" who "rose, but this time he came walking towards her drenched from head to toe in light." As for Dan, he "was still going on her bed with The Womb." Dan "looked up at Sello with black, shocked eyes. For a split second he forgot he was God. He scrambled to his feet," looking "like a South African Afrikaner Boer "who had been caught contravening the Immorality Act with a black woman." However, "Sello only looked at him from a great height and said nothing." The novel says that "Dan recovered himself. He spat at Sello." Dan looks at "Elizabeth with deadly hatred," declares his hatred for Elizabeth, and vows "to pursue" her until he destroys her. He then walks away, "slamming the door hard," but The Womb also leaves the house, crawling. Elizabeth then asks, "Who is he?" and Sello answers, "Satan." Directly or indirectly, the narrator frequently associates "the dark Motabeng night" with Sello, Dan, and Elizabeth and usually in scenes that feature "the battle of wits" between Dan and Sello or Dan's brains versus Sello's brains (198). This night association forms part of the larger eternal war between the will to evil and the will to good or the war between and within Elizabeth's inside (mind) and Elizabeth's

outside (the characters in the community). Sello tells Elizabeth that he will take away "the major danger," Dan's power, because the combination of Dan's power and Dan's "will to evil could create such darkness it would be oblivion," but he will take away Dan's power through Elizabeth, who, he says "was created with ten billion times more power than" Dan. However, she "will never know" her power because he (Sello) "will never let" her see it. Sello will never let Elizabeth see her power "because I know what power does." What does power do? Apparently, the novel reinforces the notion that power (regardless of who holds it) corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely and one-sidedly, on the side of evil. Throughout the novel, the double and parallel plot moves complexly toward the titular conclusion: "*If the things of the soul are really a question of power, then anyone in possession of power of the spirit could be Lucifer*" (199).

In this Sello logic, every human with power wants "to be God" solely or potentially on the basis of his or her power. But Sello appears to regard power and the human as inherently separate phenomena. Does every human not come into being with the capacity for ontological power or the thinkability of anything or the power to think about anything? (as opposed to ontic power, where we routinely mark or identify or claim our status in the management of our private or public life). Phenomenology of power studies ontic-ontological power. The Elizabeth character supposedly affords us an opportunity to gain "insight into absolute evil" (200), a study which seems to conclude that while absolute evil exists, absolute good does not. In light of this painful or irredeemable tragedy, billions of humans restlessly seek mostly metaphysical uses of ethereal phenomena, such as the heavens or sky or whatever looms beyond the terrestrial. The ethereal begins to function (psychologically and otherwise) as metaphysical means of terrestrial escape or as spiritual and economic intercessory agents for humans. Elizabeth seeks absolute certainty of truth, "But in spite of those three or four years of sustained nightmare," such certainty eludes her. According to the narrator, she admits that "she really knew absolutely nothing, except that she had gained insight into … the German concentration camps," where "inmates cried for God but none came." Elizabeth's "insight only strips her of her remaining illusions 'about God or mercy or pity'." In one instance, "A victim simply stared in the face of evil, and died." Elizabeth's Sello has endured "this rigmarole of hell" (200). Sello affirms his forever friendship with Elizabeth, which Elizabeth thinks means that she and Sello will supposedly "meet again in other lives." In the spirit of this forever friendship, she asks Sello if he would like to be her brother, and Sello says yes. Sello adds that he would shop for "suitable parents for us," which for Elizabeth means parents who do "not believe in prophecies" (200–201). The narrator describes Sello as having "the heart of a wild gambler." He has "a travelling bag" that holds "incandescent light," which for Dan means "the message of the brotherhood of man." Elizabeth leaves the story "unresolved." She records only one side "of her own observations and speculations," but cedes the other side to Sello, the "Old Father Time," who controls the other side. Elizabeth eventually tires of "the crookery of Dan." Sello claims that Elizabeth has his wife (Buddha's wife), who emerges from "Elizabeth's person" and "walks toward Sello" (201).

On the other hand, Elizabeth does not regret her "encounter with Dan" because "The suffering she had endured had sealed her Achille's [sic] heel," though she concedes that his role has been "that of the brutal murderer for love." But his murdering has an underlying (perhaps unintended) lesson. Dan plays the dubious role of being "one of the greatest teachers she'd worked with, but he taught by default – he taught iron and steel self-control through sheer, wild, abandoned debauchery; he taught the extremes of love and tenderness through the extremes of hate; he taught an alertness for falsehoods within, because he had used any means at his disposal to destroy Sello." Moreover, "From the degradation and destruction of her life had arisen a still, lofty serenity of soul nothing could shake" (202). The novel ends partly with a sky note or sky poem, a poem that celebrates the powers or ability of human souls to fly skyward or "fly about the sky." Elizabeth struggles with "the basic error" that seems to relegate "all things holy to some unseen Being in the sky" (205). Elizabeth insists that any "revelation" at all in her suffering has to be "the reverse of Mohammed's dramatic statement" that "There is only one God and his name is Allah. And Mohammed is his prophet." For Elizabeth, "There is only one God and his name is Man. And Elizabeth is his prophet" (206). Elizabeth does not appear to be affirming man or woman here as God in a metaphysical sense but perhaps only in the sense that good and evil come from humans, not from some being outside humanity. In other words, we see here a picture of individual humans as agents of humanity, not agents of a metaphysical being in, for instance, the Islamic or Christian sense. Elizabeth tries to expel metaphysics from religion, as she experiences some "peaceful, meditative privacy." Her serenity arguably shows in "Her painful, broken nerve-ends quietly knit together." She puts "Shorty to bed, and for the first time in three years, embraced the solitude of the night with joy." The Motabeng night no longer appears as a signal of something sinister or ominous. Elizabeth comes to terms with the night even as the nature or terms of the day or sun or sky or the ethereal remain unknown (or even unknowable) but this lingering ignorance does not bother her much anymore. Put differently, Elizabeth eventually becomes indifferent to the question of power or God as a metaphysical question or phenomenon. What difference does it make anyway if God exists as a metaphysical being and yet such existence makes no difference in ending or reducing terrestrial death or terrestrial suffering?

While Elizabeth in *A Question of Power* regards individual humans like her as (direct) agents of the cosmos or the human condition (rather than agents of God on earth or agents of some other metaphysical being), Leslie Marmon Silko's *Ceremony* seems to view human and non-human beings as cosmic agents or intercessors. *Ceremony* suggestively institutes the ethereal (such as the sky or the sun) as the foundation or basis of the terrestrial. The novel's double main plot runs from the beginning to the end without any chapter at all and without any titled or numbered sections. The novel's double main setting and double main plot always tend to overlap. Ethereal and a few non-ethereal beings dominate the ethereal setting and plot; the ethereal also constitutes the capital of the cosmos (a capital certain terrestrial characters often visit to get advice or instructions). Humans and some non-humans dominate the terrestrial setting and plot. However, the ethereal plot and the terrestrial plot often echo or parallel or reinforce each other from the beginning of the

novel to the end of the novel. Furthermore, the ethereal characters and the ethereal setting sometimes have representatives or representations in the terrestrial zone of the universe. Put differently, the ethereal and the terrestrial interact and overlap so much that sometimes one hardly knows how to differentiate these two aspects of cosmic being. The core of the ethereal plot, presents itself 27 times in verse and occupies about 22 of the novel, while the terrestrial plot presents itself in prose and occupies about 78 of the work. The shifting narrator moves in and out of both the ethereal and the terrestrial, and the verse parts frequently intersperse the different (ritual) ceremonies in the novel. Sometimes, the verse sections (usually relatively short) and the prose sections (often relatively long) alternate in developing the novel's plot.

Tayo, a Laguna Pueblo veteran of World War II, suffers from a severe cultural or spiritual disconnection when he returns home. He has to regain his lost connection through a ceremony vetted by the ethereal or its representatives – a ceremony that would lead him to the ethereal source of his physical and cultural wellbeing and reconnect him with the material world. *Ceremony* begins with a heuristic thesis in verse: Stories "aren't just entertainment." Stories are for fighting "off /illness and death," and "You don't have anything/if you don't have the stories." The narrator implicitly identifies theorists (Western theories) as opponents of stories (Indian stories) and admits that "Their evil is mighty," but quickly contends that this evil of theirs "can't stand up to our stories," and hence "they try to destroy the stories," and "let the stories be confused or forgotten" (Leslie Silko 2). This question of evil intertwines with witchery, a phenomenon the novel discusses at length later. The ceremony as therapy frame comes from three sister co-creators "of the Universe" (Ts'itsi'nako or Thought-Woman or aka the spider, Nau'ts'ityi, and I'tcts'ity'I) of the "Universe/this world/and the four worlds below." The narrator says, "I'm telling you the story/she is thinking" (Silko 1). One thinks in and through stories; one does not just randomly make up stories. The 1st verse concludes with Spiderwoman or Thought-Woman's note: "The only cure/I know/is a good ceremony" The verse's last word: "Sunrise," which is also the last word of the novel and the last word of the last verse section, the 27th verse section. The novel begins as the sun or son, native son (Tayo) as Tayo wakes up in the very next section, the prose section that immediately follows the first verse section, where the narrator tells us that Tayo "didn't sleep well that night" (Silko 1). He hallucinates. He hears loud voices, fever voices: Laguna voices, Japanese voices, etc. As he struggles with his relationships to the past, he, for instance, mixes up World War II scenes with his Uncle Josiah or his Grandma or his Aunt Thelma or his cousin Rocky or his mother (Laura) or his Laguna Pueblo scenes. Tayo's Indian memory is tangled. But his troubles began long before he returned home from the war. The Army doctors call his sickness "battle fatigue," and they identify his "hallucinations" as "common with malarial fever." The military authorities "acted as though nothing had happened" (Silko 8). He remembers how he prayed against the jungle rain during the war and thinks that the drought in his reservation homeland comes from his prayer. In the 4th verse section, twin brothers Ma'see'wi and Ou'yu'ye'wi who are supposed to be "caring for the mother corn altar," encounter Pa'caya'nyi, the son of Old Woman K'yo but a son

who does not know his father. Pa'caya'nyi comes from the ethereal Redleaf town in the north; he asks, "You people want to learn some magic?" The people say "Yes, we can always use some." The twins who are supposed to be "caring for the/ mother corn altar" fall for "this magic too," and they ask him, "What kind of medicine man/ are you/anyway?" Pa'caya'nyi answers, "A Ck'o'yo medicine man" (Silko 46). The twins then challenge him, "Tonight we'll see/if you really have magical power." Pa'caya'nyi proceeds to demonstrate his magical ability. With his mountain lion by his side, "He undresses and paints "his body/the whorls of flesh/the soles of his feet/ the palms of his hands/the top of his head," and he wears "feathers/on each side of his head." He makes "an altar/with cactus spines and purple locoweed flowers." He lights "four cactus torches/at each corner." He makes "the mountain lion lie/down in front" and at last his magic is ready. He strikes "the middle of the north wall," takes a piece of flint, "he strikes the middle of the north wall," and "water poured out of the wall/and flowed down/toward the south." He asks his audience, "What does that look like?/Is that magic power?" He strikes "the middle of the west wall/and from the east wall/a boat came out," and he asks, "What do you call this?" (Silko 47). Ma'see'wi admits, "Yes, it looks like magic all right." But looks can be deceiving; as the narrator notes, Pa'caya'nyi, the Ck'o'yo medicine man, has succeeded in fooling the twins and "all the people." The magic so attracts the twins that they begin "playing around" with it and thus neglect or ignore "the mother corn altar," the source of nurture. The twins assume that they no longer have "to worry/about anything." For them, the magic will take care of their custodial responsibility. The magic has tricked them into believing in this magic. The twins' irresponsibility irks Nau'ts'ity'i (the co-sister creator we first see in the first verse section) and takes action. She says, "I've had enough" and adds, "If they like that magic so much/let them live off it/So she took/the plants and grass from them" (Silko 48). Drought and famine reign. How the terrestrial can regain ethereal trust, especially from this sister co-creator becomes a terrestrial struggle and preoccupation throughout the novel. Tayo's quest for a proper medicine man to undo the damage of the fake or magical medicine man picks up steam. In the prose section that follows this fourth verse section, the narrator observes the "sun … moving toward the west," and Tayo (who never directly appears in any of the verse sections) squints, "trying to find some clouds on the west horizon." Tayo "wished then they had taught him more about the clouds and the sky, about the way the priests called the storm clouds to bring the rain." The narrator notes that "Tayo watched the sun for a long time, and at the Acoma road they stopped and he watched it disappear behind the hills in the west" (Silko 49). Earlier in the second verse section, we find another violation of ethereal ethics that directly relates to the fourth verse section. Summertime arrives, and Iktoa'ak'o'ya-Reed Woman, who "always" takes "a bath" "spent all day long/ sitting in the river/splashing down/the summer rain," "But her sister/Corn Woman/ worked hard all day/sweating in the sun/getting sore hands/in the corn field." Corn Woman tires of her sister's behavior and so she angrily scolds her "for bathing all day long." The scolded sister returns "to the original place/down below" and "no more rain" thereafter." Verse section 2 continues, "Everything dried up/all the plants/the corn/the beans/they all dried up" (Silko 13). The verse ends with "the

people and animals "thirsty" and starving" (14). In the prose section that immediately follows this second verse, Tayo prays away the rain "and for the sixth year it was dry" (14). He feels guilt as he observes the devastation of the drought. At the LA train depot he recalls his encounter at the hospital with two doctors. He says that "For a long time he had been white smoke" and "He did not realize that until he left the hospital, because white smoke had no consciousness of itself. It faded into the white world of their bed sheets and walls. It was sucked away by the words of doctors who tried to talk to the invisible scattered smoke" (14). He associates this white smoke symbolism with non-Indian medicine and Western or Europeanized theories of being and hungers now for authentic Indian medicine or Laguna Pueblo stories of being. He claims that Western doctors' medicine has failed him for it "drained memory out of his thin arms and replaced it with a twilight cloud behind his eyes" (Silko 15). Indian medicine man Ku'oosh takes over where Western medicine men end or fail. Ku'oosh thinks Tayo's ignorance of certain "Indian" things may be rooted in "the distant circumstance of an absent white father" (Silko 35). Auntie, a Christian woman and Tayo's mother's sister (Laura, aka Little Sister), has never come to terms with Josiah's and dead Little Sister's scandals: Josiah has a Mexican girlfriend and Little Sister has a child (Tayo) with a white man. Auntie raised her own son, Rocky (a full blood) and her sister's son, Tayo, a "half-breed" (Silko 30). Old Grandma tells Auntie (her daughter) that Tayo "needs a medicine man," but Auntie worries about what people will say if the family seek the help of a medicine man. She says, "You know how they are …. They'll say, 'Don't do it. He's not full blood anyway'." She fears that such a story will resurrect "All that gossip about Josiah and Little Sister." Old Grandma interrupts her, "He's my grandson. If I send for old Ku'oosh, he'll come. Let them talk if they want to." She asks her daughter rhetorically, "Why do you care what they say?" (Silko 33). But Auntie does not give up easily. She recalls what "the Army doctor said, 'No Indian medicine' Old Ku'oosh will bring his bag of weeds and dust. The doctor won't take it" (Silko 33). Old Grandma prevails. Ku'oosh arrives, and he begins reviewing Tayo's situation. The medicine man says, "If Uncle Josiah had known then maybe he could have told you before you went to the white people's big war." The medicine man looks at Tayo's eyes and declares, "But you know, grandson, this world is fragile." Remember that the first verse section ends with "the belly," a pervasive metaphor or symbolism in the novel. Nausea plagues Tayo and when it catches him, he vomits. Tayo tells Auntie that "The light makes me vomit," but she does not seem to buy this explanation. She pulls "down the shades" and stares at him "as if she could see the outline of his lie in the dim light." However, Tayo had the Army doctors on his side; they "told her and Robert [her husband] that the cause of battle fatigue was a mystery, even to them." Tayo thinks again and again about "Josiah and the spotted cattle, all scattered now, all lost" (Silko 31). According to the narrator, Ku'oosh sees the word "fragile" as full of "intricacies of a continuing process, and with a strength inherent in spider webs woven across paths through sand hills where early in the morning the sun becomes entangled in each filament of web" (Silko 35). Tayo's guilt intensifies. He thinks "he had done things far worse, and the effects were everywhere in the cloudless sky, on the dry brown hills, shrinking skin and hide taut over sharp bone" (Silko 36).

Ku'oosh takes on the responsibility of healing Tayo. The third verse section points out the necessity of the Scalp Society ceremony to absolve "warriors/who killed/or touched dead enemies." So World War II Indian veterans like Tayo "had things/they must do/otherwise/K'oo'ko would haunt their dreams/with her great fangs and/everything would be endangered" and "the rain wouldn't come/or the deer would go away" (Silko 37). The things these ex-killers must do involve "The flute and dancing/blue cornmeal and/hair washing" (Silko 38). The sixth verse displays the debauchery many of Tayo's friends or associates (such as Pinkie, Leroy, Harley, and Emo) engaged in at the Dixie Tavern. This verse section continues and parallels the Dixie Tavern scene in the prose section that immediately follows the fourth verse section. The fourth verse section features the effects of the drought or famine and the efforts of the people to appease Nau'ts'ity'I who imposed the punishment on the people because they "were fooling with" Ck'o'yo magic. The people decide to send an emissary "to ask for forgiveness." They wonder how hummingbird manages to look "so good," so "fat and shiny" and with "plenty to eat." Hummingbird says, "Down below/Three worlds below this one/everything is/green/all the plants are growing/the flowers are blooming/I go down there and eat" (54). In the prose section that follows the sixth verse section, the Dixie Tavern scene continues. Emo takes pride in the killing of Japanese and shows his trophy, a bag of human teeth. Emo's celebration or discussion of destruction apparently turns Tayo off. Tayo has to resist the temptation places such as the Dixie Tavern (which represents or symbolizes lechery). The seventh verse section opens with the hummingbird and the people's knowledge of the wherewithal of their mother. Hummingbird, having "looked at all the/skinny people," "felt sorry for them." He urged them to have "a messenger" and advised them to "Bring a beautiful pottery jar/painted with parrots and big/flowers." Hummingbird adds, "Mix black mountain dirt/some sweet corn flour/and a little water." Furthermore, the messenger will "Cover the jar with a/new buckskin/and say this over the Jar" (Silko 71). What will the messenger say? The messenger will say and sing the following "softly/above the jar": "After four days/you will be alive/After four days/you will be alive/After four days/you will be alive/After four days/you will be alive" (Silko 72). Repetition remains a constant in many chants or ceremonies. In the prose section that follows, we know of Tayo's "promise to Josiah to help with the Mexican cattle" (72). Tayo's illness has a high ceremonial price, especially because of his "twisted" feelings, which now have "tangled roots," with "all the names for the source" now "buried under" "out of reach" "English words." The narrator insists that "there would be no peace and the people would have no rest until the entanglement had been unwound to the source" (69). Auntie Thelma warms herself to shocking Tayo with a secret, which would complicate Tayo's recovery and at the same time open a way out of his syndrome. She says, "Your uncle and grandma don't know this story" (69). She reveals to Tayo the circumstances of his birth. Laura had been out all night, so "before sunrise," Thelma says, I went outside the house and "toward the river." She continues, "I stood on that sandrock, above the big curve in the river, and there she was, coming down the rail on the other side." The narrator takes over, "She looked at him closely." Thelma continues, "Right as the sun came up, she walked under that big cottonwood tree, and I could see her clearly:

she had no clothes on. Nothing. She was completely naked except for her high-heel shoes. She dropped her purse under that tree. Later on some kids found it there and brought it back. It was empty except for a lipstick." All Tayo could say is ask, "Auntie, what did she look like before I was born?" (70). He thinks back to a picture of her mother. Shame overwhelms him now that he understands the secret only he and Auntie supposedly know. This prose section that reveals Thelma's secret to Tayo and that reawakens Tayo's wondering about his mother immediately precedes the seventh verse section which opens with the people's knowledge of the whereabouts of their own spiritual mother, Na'ts'ity'i, whom we see earlier in the fourth verse section. The seventh verse section connects with the prose section that follows it, the prose section where Tayo reminisces about his mother, including her death, how Auntie opposed Tayo joining the Army while Josiah and Grandma supported the move, and details of the Ulibarri-Josiah cattle deal.

In the 8th verse section, "a big fly" flew out of the jar, and Hummingbird announces that Fly will fly with him to "the fourth world/below/Down there" to Nnau'ts'ity'i to find out "what she wants." The narrator describes this fourth world as a place with "another kind of daylight," as a place where "everything was blooming/ and growing," and a place, where "everything was so beautiful" (82). In the 9th verse section, Fly and Hummingbird arrive at their destination: their spiritual mother (Nau'ts'it'i), whom thy give "blue pollen and yellow pollen," "turquoise beads," and "prayer sticks." When she asks them what they want, they say "food and storm clouds." But she requires them to "get Buzzard to purify/your town first/and then, maybe, I will send you people/food and rain again." So "Fly and Hummingbird/flew back up" (Silko 105). On their return home to the fifth world, this world, they "told the town people," the Laguna people, "that old Buzzard" has to first "purify the town" (106).

The prose section that immediately follows this verse section says that medicine man Ku'oosh gives up on Tayo. Ku'oosh's ceremony has not worked on Tayo. In the 10th verse section, Hummingbird and Fly take pollen, beads, and prayer sticks to old Buzzard so that he can "purify our town," but he sends the two emissaries back because they included no tobacco. Just as Hummingbird and Fly have not been able to complete their mission, Tayo has not been able to complete his healing ceremony with Laguna medicine man Ku'oosh. Ku'oosh recommends another medicine man, Betonie, a non-Laguna man. LikeTayo, Betonie has hazel eyes. Betonie had a Mexican grandmother "with green eyes" (Silko 119). Betonie warns Tayo, "They will try to stop you from completing the ceremony" (Silko 125). But who are the "they" who would try to abort Tayo's therapeutic ceremony? The narrator states that Tayo's "sickness was only part of something larger, and his cure would be found only in something great and inclusive of everything" (Silko 125–126). Betonie points out that people wrongly think that "ceremonies must be performed exactly as they have always been done" and forget that "from generation to generation," "the ceremonies have always been changing." He acknowledges that "At one time, the ceremonies as they had been performed were enough for the way the world was then. But after the white people came, elements in this world began to shift; and it became necessary to create new ceremonies." In his own ceremonial practice, he

himself has "made changes in the rituals," and consequently, "The people mistrust this greatly," but he insists that "only this growth keeps the ceremonies fresh." From this progressive view of Indian ceremonies, it perhaps becomes safe to assume that Ku'oosh, a conservative Laguna full blood medicine man proved inadequate for the task of healing Tayo. Betonie advocates proper ceremonial changes because "things which don't shift and grow are dead things," and such things "the witchery people want" (Silko 126). Witchery succeeds mostly because of its capacity to make people "fear growth" Witchery counts on people clinging to the ceremonies in their pure (undiluted, unmixed) forms and thus the power of witches "will triumph" (Silko 126). For Betonie, humans themselves are the agents of change, the agents of change are not some metaphysical beings or some other resident outside of cosmic being. Trying to preserve things in their purity regardless of the changing circumstances involved in the calculus of those things insures death rather than survival of those things. In this sense, old man Betonie's perspective seems comparable to that of Elizabeth in *A Question of Power* (although not entirely comparable) since in the Betonie world certain individuals appear to be inherently identified as agents – in this case, medicine men. In Elizabeth's world, everyone is an agent, everyone can be an agent, and no one is inherently an agent of change. Betonie drums the importance of the mysterious Mount Taylor into Tayo. Tayo's genealogy-based guilt continues to haunt him. He confesses to Betonie, "I wonder sometimes because my mother went with white men," and as the narrator adds, "The birth had betrayed his mother and brought shame to the family and to the people." Betonie advises Tayo by cautioning him against stereotyping whites or stereotyping Indians. "Nothing is that simple. You don't write off all the white people, just like you don't trust all the Indians." This Betonie-Tayo prose section ends with the arrival of a Navajo boy, Shush (Betonie's assistant). Shush means bear. Shush would assist Betonie as Tayo's ceremony proceeds. The eleventh verse section briefly interrupts and yet echoes the theme in the Betonie-Tayo prose section. This 11th verse section tells a story about how with the help of a medicine man (and his assistants), a family finds their missing child amid the land of bears. Then the Betonie-Tayo prose section continues with Tayo's ceremony. Betonie warns Tayo not to "be so quick to call something good or bad" since "There are balances and harmonies always shifting, always necessary to maintain" (130). Tayo's guilt keeps intensifying, this time over Rocky's death. On Tayo's veteran colleague Emo's belief about the impotence of Indian ceremonies vis-à-vis "the sickness which comes from" white people's "wars, their bombs, their lies," Betonie says, "That is the trickery of the witchcraft. They want us to believe all evil resides with white people …. But white people are only tools that the witchery manipulates." However, Betonie complicates the genealogy of witchery by locating its origins among the Indians, "I tell you, we can deal with white people, with their machines and their beliefs. We can because we invented white people; it was Indian witchery that made white people in the first place" (132). The 12th verse section attempts a genealogy of witchery. It says that "Long time ago/ in the beginning/there were no white people in this world" (Silko 132). It adds that "there was nothing European/And this world might have gone on like that/except for one thing:/witchery." It continues, "This world was already complete/even

without white people/There was everything/including Witchery." Then something "happened," "These witch people got together/Some came from far far away/across oceans/across mountains," and "Some had slanty eyes/others had black skin." Next, "They all got together for a contest/the way people have baseball tournaments nowadays/except this was a contest/in dark things" So all the witches of the world from all different directions "got together" for "a witches' conference" (Silko 133). Eventually, the conference/contest yielded "only one" winner "and no one ever knew where this witch came from/which tribe/or if it was a woman or man" (Silko 134). This winning witch tells the conference participants, "What I have is a story," and all the other witches laugh. The victorious witch says, "Okay/go ahead/laugh if you want to/but as I tell the story/it will begin to happen" and "white skin people" come into being, but "Then they grow away from the earth," the sun, plants and animals , and "They see no life," "only objects." These whites "fear the world/They destroy what they fear/They fear themselves" (135). Thus the witches' conference unleashes into the universe whites whom it identifies with the objectification or commodification of nature or life or with the abuse of both the social and physical environment or with the agency of "terrible diseases" (Silko 137). The other witches realizes that the new addition of witches (the white witches) stands only for destruction or the bad or the evil and therefore they call on the winning witch to "Call that story back." The winning witch responds, "It's already turned loose/It's already coming/It can't be called back" (138). This mythic *Ceremony*-genealogy of witchery in this 12th verse section has at least one basic problem. If witches can make things happen, why can't witches make things unhappen? Or if witches can call things forth, why can't they call things back? Why can't they uncall things? If the racial or sex or gender identity of the winning witch is unknown and if before the creation of whites all the witches were of all races except white, how can Betonie, for instance, claim that Indians "invented white people" or that "Indian witchery" "made white people in the first place"? Furthermore, this Indian mythology practically holds all whites responsible for all evils (especially pp. 135–138) in the world, yet Betonie says earlier that people "want us to believe all evil resides with white people …. They want us to separate ourselves from white people …. But white people are only tools that the witchery manipulates; and I tell you, we can deal with white people, and their beliefs. We can because we invented white people in the first place" (Silko 132). Whether in Betonie's account of witchery or the 12th verse section account of witchery, both tend to identify witchery or witches as a metaphysical phenomenon, a situation that *A Question of Power* tries to counter with perhaps more or less success.

The 13th verse section involves a story about the powers and roles of Coyote, Dark Mountain, the old Bear, etc. The 14th, 15th, and 16th verse sections (each separated by short prose sections) show certain crucial aspects of Tayo's ongoing ceremony under the direction of old Betonie, the "Navajo" medicine man. In the prose section that immediately follows the 17th verse section, Tayo drinks Indian tea, and Betonie tells "him to sleep" (Silko 144). Tayo dreams of "the speckled cattle" and then wakes up. This speckled or spotted cattle constitute one of the four elements in Betonie's vision, the others being the stars, a special mountain and a

special woman. Apparently, Tayo has to experience (wholesomely) these elements one by one and as a whole to fulfill the completion of his ceremony with Betonie. Betonie's mini-autobiography appears too and Tayo keeps finding more and more similarities with Betonie's genealogy and tribal history. In the 17th verse section, Fly and Hummingbird's quest for tobacco continues. They had returned to get the tobacco "But there was no tobacco," so they "fly/all the way back down/to the fourth world below/to ask mother where/they could get some tobacco," and mother (Nau'ts'ity'i) tells them to "Go ask caterpillar" (Silko 151–152). In the prose section that immediately follows the 17th verse section, Tayo's ceremony continues. We see (through the narrator) Tayo "thinking about the ceremony the medicine man had performed over him, testing it against the old feeling, the sick hollow in his belly formed by the memories of Rocky and Josiah, and all the years of Auntie's eyes and her teeth set hard on edge. He could feel the ceremony like the rawhide thongs of the medicine pouch, straining to hold back the voices, the dreams, faces in the jungle in the L.A. depot, the smoky silence of solid white walls." Betonie reminds Tayo, "One night or nine nights won't do it any more [sic]; the ceremony isn't finished yet." Betonie draws "in the dirt with his finger" and says to Tayo, "Remember these stars. I've seen them and I've seen the spotted cattle; I've seen a mountain and I've seen a woman" (152). This vision-related dimension of the ceremony marks the second phase of Tayo's ceremony. The 18th verse section follows up the witchery theme of the 12th verse section but focuses on one aspect: the evil effects of witchery. In the prose section that follows this verse section, Tayo leaves Betonie and Shush (Betonie's assistant) "in the mountains" (Silko 153). Tayo returns to Laguna to re-join his friends, associates or acquaintances (Harley, Leroy, and Helen Jean) and to face the ceremonial challenges ahead. Tayo resists temptation. At some point, Tayo thinks that "Someone was shaking him out of the tall tree he was in. He thought it might be old Betonie telling him to get on his way, telling him that he'd slept too long and there were the cattle to find, and the stars, the mountain, and the woman" (167). The 19th verse section returns to a Ck'o'yo-related character very similar to the kind we found earlier in the 4th verse section. Like in the 4th verse section, the magician here comes from the same "Up North/around Reedleaf Town." They call this magician Kaup'a'ta or the Gambler. He lives in a house "in the peaks of the Zuni mountains." He keeps his "gambling sticks all stacked up" as he waits "for people to wander/up to his place." He often walks around showing "off his fancy clothes and expensive beads" and ready to gamble with people for their clothes, beads, etc. (Silko 170). But the Gambler does not gamble fairly. He mixes cornmeal with human blood and unbeknown to his victims, he feeds this mixture to them as food. Anyone who eats this food stands no chance of winning because it robs its eaters of their power. Eventually those who gamble with him lose everything, including even their lives. The Gambler has a gambling secret which enables him to have extraordinary power: "up there/in the Zuni mountains," he captures the stormclouds, who by the way "can't be killed." (Silko 172). The stormclouds' father, the Sun, notices the disappearance of his children. Their disappearance lasts 3 years. As long as the Gambler imprisons them, drought and famine reign everywhere. Only the Spider Woman knows how to unlock the Gambler's secret. Grandson asks

Grandma (Spiderwoman) to intercede. She gives him some medicine to take and warns him not to "eat anything he offers you" (Silko 173). Through the intercession of Grandma, the stormclouds get their freedom and Sun Man says, "I have found you!/Come on out. Come home again/Your mother, the earth is crying for you/ Come home, children, come home" (Silko 176).

In this crucial prose section that immediately follows the 19th verse section, Tayo, in the course of looking for the spotted cattle, meets Ts'eh, a somewhat mysterious young woman who wears "her hair long" (177). Tayo also sees Betonie's stars. The 20th verse section follows up the Hummingbird/Fly emissary theme that we last saw in the 17th verse section. This time Caterpillar prepares and gives Fly and Hummingbird the requested tobacco. In the prose section that follows, Tayo makes sure she does not lose sight of the trail marks that will enable him to locate the spotted cattle. The 21st verse section pays homage (through sunrise) to "Father of the clouds" (182). Throughout the novel as in this 21st verse section, the narrator invokes the sunrise repeatedly. The prose section that follows this 21st verse section focuses on Tayo and his relationship or affair with Ts'eh. He also spots the spotted cattle, one of the four elements in Betonie's vision. The 22nd verse section is a chant, sung by a hunter, which ties in with the theme of tracking something (just as Tayo states it in the prose section, "I was looking for some cattle" (Silko 206)). The 23rd verse section echoes several past themes, such as witchery. The 24th verse section features the roving ambassadors Fly and Hummingbird, who took tobacco from Caterpillar in the 20th verse section and who now in this 24th verse section deliver the tobacco to old Buzzard, who now tells them, "Okay/Go back and tell them/I'll purify them/I'll purify the town" (255). Buzzard purifies all directions of the being of everything – the east, the south, the west, and the north, and with this gesture "Everything was set straight again/after all that ck'o'yo magic." The storm clouds return home, the plants grow again, food now available in abundance, and happy people again. So sister co-creater (Nau'ts'ity'i) whom we first see at the very beginning of the novel warns her children to "Stay out of trouble/from now on" and that "It isn't very easy/to fix up things again" and tells them to "Remember that/next time/some ck'o'yo magician comes to town" they should avoid him (256). In the prose section that immediately follows this 24th verse section, we see Tayo in the aftermath of the test of his resolve by the human destroyers (Emo, Leroy, Pinkie) or those involved in the Harley torture. Tayo and the Laguna elders (including Ku'oosh) meet at the kiva. The 25th verse section returns briefly to the Mountain Lion theme, while the 26th verse section summarily re-addresses Coyote. The 27th or ultimate verse section ends the novel just as a verse section begins the book. In this last verse section, darkness begins "its journey/with witchery" and ends it with the phenomenon "sunrise." The last word ("sunrise") of the novel's first verse section and the last word ("sunrise") of the novel's last verse section suggests that Tayo, the Laguna Pueblo sun/son rises in the beginning, falls in the middle, and rises again at the end.

Both Bessie Head's *A Question of Power* and Leslie Silko's *Ceremony* dramatize fictionally and phenomenologically the hybridity of good and evil and its relationship to the persistence of death and suffering in the human condition.

References

Head, B. 1974. *A question of power*. London: Heinemann.
Silko, L.M. 1977. *Ceremony*. New York: Penguin.
Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa. (August 27, 2008) *An interview with Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka*. Bergen, Norway. http://www.phenomenology.org/Bergen-Interview.htm. Accessed 10 May 2011.

Beyond the Human-Nature Dualism: Towards a Concept of Nature as Part of the Life-World

Karen François

Abstract In this paper we demonstrate how dualism was finally installed by the philosophy of Descartes. He not only establishes a dualism between mind and body, he also established a dualism within epistemology; a dualism between the knowing subject, – the cogito ego – and the nature beyond. Although Husserl was fascinated by the philosophy of Descartes and his quest for a true foundation of knowledge, he formulated a critique on the dualism and the separation of human being from the life-world. We are bringing together Husserl's criticism on the misinterpretation of the relationship between scientific theories and the life-world, and contemporary ideas on how to overcome this dualism. Therefore, we introduce the work of contemporary philosophers like Haraway, Latour and Boehm. We demonstrate how these new insights change the way we think about ourselves and our place in the world in fundamental ways: the world now becomes something that we are embedded in and part of, rather than something we are detached from and merely observers of, as representationalism suggests.

Introduction

How can we think beyond the human-nature divide that is omnipresent in Western philosophy of science? With the philosophy of Descartes the divide between mind and body was settled and the world was thought of as the opposite of subjects and objects. Moreover, Descartes (1966) prescribed in his *Regulae ad Directionem Ingenii* (dated around 1628)[1] how subjects should know this world of objects. This kind of naturalism was criticized by Husserl, which he called a misinterpretation of

K. François (✉)
Faculty of Art and Philosophy, Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Free University Brussels (VUB), Room 5B425, Campus Etterbeek, Pleinlaan 2, B-1050 Brussel, Belgium
e-mail: karen.francois@vub.ac.be

A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), *Phenomenology and the Human Positioning in the Cosmos: The Life-world, Nature, Earth: Book One*, Analecta Husserliana 113,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-4801-9_12,

the relationship between scientific theories and the life-world (Husserl 1970a, b). Husserl's philosophy has given rise to the idea of a co-constitution of human-nature and of subject-object and influenced contemporary philosophers from diverse fields of interest.

We want to link up these ideas of dualism versus co-constitution referring to the work of the feminist philosophy of Donna J. Haraway, the phenomenology of Rudolf Boehm and the constructivist philosophy of Bruno Latour. Our approach departs from Haraway's (1991a, b) critics on the hierarchical dualisms where the relation between human beings and their life-world takes center stage and are viewed as mutually constituting each other. Thinking in terms of the co-constitution of human and nature clears the way to dwell on the 'in-between' of these hierarchical dualisms human/non-human, subject/object, and fact/value poles. With Latour (1999) we state that the world and its concerns do not present themselves in scientific facts or what he calls *matters of fact*. It is indeed noteworthy to see how *matters of concern,* as part of the life-world, are always already framed into these *matters of fact*. According to the co-constitution view however, scientific *matters of fact* are the objective sedimentations of a subjective (i.e. scientific) engagement. By introducing Boehm's phenomenological concept of *topical truth*, we aim to lighten up the normative entanglement 'between' these sedimentations of co-constitution. Rather than questioning the *logical truth* of the answer to a question, *topical truth* questions the truth of the question that is posed: it is to be conceived as a measure for the adequacy and relevance of the construction, i.e. the framing of the issue at stake. Rather than conceiving of knowledge in terms of representations of the (social or material) world, the co-constitution perspective and its concept of *topical truth* now emphasizes the socio-material practices from and within which these representations arise. Such a view then also changes the way we think about ourselves and our place in the world in fundamental ways: the world now becomes something that we are embedded in and part of, rather than something we are detached from and merely observers of, as representationalism suggests.

In the first section, we discuss the philosophy of Descartes and the way he installs dualism. In the second section, we work on Husserl's criticism of this dualism and how the human being became separated from his or her life-world. In the final section we will go into the question of how to overcome this divide between human being and nature. Therefore, we want to link up these ideas of dualism referring to the work of the feminist philosophy of Donna J. Haraway, the constructivist philosophy of Bruno Latour and the phenomenology of Rudolf Boehm.

Settling the Dualism: Descartes' Dream

In this section on dualism we want to commence with the philosophical thinking of Descartes, knowing that he was not just thinking in a vacuum. He in turn was certainly influenced by the dualistic thinking of Plato. Latour (2004) situates the beginning of the strict dualism in the work of Plato. With his metaphor of the cave in *The Republic*,

he makes a strict division between the metaphysical world of ideas, the world outside, and the inferior world of perception, the world inside (Plato 1978). The world of human beings is situated inside the cave. Beyond that world, there is the world of the *Ideas*. With this perception of the world – the world of nature and the world of human being – a duality is installed between the world of the political and the world of science. From this dual perspective, human being is facing the world, he or she is not taking part in that world. More detail on the initial philosophy of dualism in ancient Greece can be found at François (2011a, b).

At the dawn of modernity we have a further constitutionalization of dualism with Descartes, who developed dualism in the field of epistemology. Human being is facing the world as a *cogito ergo sum* and thus able to get a grip on this world, but not anyhow. For Descartes, there is only one way to get to know the world, namely from the universalist principles of mathematics, the so called *Mathesis Universalis*. Descartes introduced his analytico-synthetic methodology in *Regulae Ad Directionem Ingenii* (translated as Rules for the Direction of the Mind); his first philosophical work, dating around 1628, and left unpublished until over 30 years after his death. Descartes' method is based on reducing the unknown to the known, using the epistemological principles of intuition and deduction (François and De Sutter 2004). This method is compatible with mathematical proofs, which are deducible from the premises and axioms. Descartes announces his project of the mathesis universalis in the first rules:

> **Rule 1** The purpose of any intellectual inquiry should be to reach solid and true judgments about everything that occurs.
> **Rule 2** We should attend only to those objects of which our minds appear to be capable of having certain and indubitable cognition.
> **Rule 3** Concerning the things proposed, one ought not to look at what others might have thought or at what any one might have conjectured, but only at what we can either clearly and evidently intuit or deduce with certainty; for in no other way can knowledge be acquired.[2]

Descartes set out his program very clearly. Based on this first rule, one should conclude that human being should engage with 'everything that occurs'. However, in the second and third rule, he presents the epistemological constraints put on obtaining certain knowledge. To Descartes there is only one possible way to obtain certain (and to him true) knowledge, namely by using mathematics as the method par excellence; the *Mathesis Universalis*. The concept *Mathesis Universalis* refers to a kind of universal and unifying science by which all problems can (and have to) be solved. This unifying factor of all problems is the fact that they can be characterized by quantity – be it discrete or continuous. Eduard Jan Dijksterhuis (1950) raises the concepts *ordo* and *mensura* as the central notions in the methodological prescriptions of Descartes. This means that only those problems which are quantifiable can be the subject of human epistemological activity. Descartes' dream of the universal and unifying science appears already in his first writings (letters) from 1619 (Bos 2001). The story goes that Descartes had his famous dream on the 10th of November 1619 in which he had a vision of the unification of all sciences

(Davis and Hersh 1986). In his *Regulae* and later in his *Discourse on the Method* (from 1937) with its significant subtitle *Properly Guiding the Reason in the Search of Truth in the Sciences*, Descartes (1953) established a new philosophy of truth. Human beings have to direct their minds only to those objects of which our minds are capable of attaining indubitable cognition. Descartes thus proposes the powers to obtain certain knowledge to be intuition and deduction and the rules of mathematics. It was Galileo who proclaimed that 'the book of nature is written in the language of mathematics'; now Descartes explained how to set up the relation between this 'book of nature' and the human mind. In looking for the unification of science and even for the whole of knowledge, there is only one and the same method: the *Mathesis Universalis*. As Husserl (1970a, b) mentioned:

> After Galileo had carried out, slightly earlier, the primal establishment of the new natural science, it was Descartes who conceived and at the same time set in systematic motion the new idea of universal philosophy: in the sense of mathematical or, better expressed, physicalistic, rationalism–phylosophy as "universal mathematics". And immediately it had a powerful effect.[3]

Descartes settled a dualism between the objective world of nature outside and the world of human being. At the same time he created a dualism within epistemology. From now, the real world is the objective world of mathematical truths, as opposed to the world of the misleading senses (as he describes it so beautifully in his *Second Meditation,* with the example of a piece of wax. See Descartes 1997: 144). Husserl's statement, that Descartes' program of the universal mathematics became immediately a powerful effect, is confirmed by contemporary philosophy. Davis and Hersh (1986) stated that, "The social and physical worlds are being mathematized at an increasing rate."[4] They added, "We'd better watch it, because too much of it may not be good for us".[5] Let us now move to the critiques Husserl formulated on Descartes' dream of a unified mathematized world.

Husserl's Criticism: How a Dream Became a Crisis

Husserl's critiques on the worldview Descartes created as the only real world is expressed in his early writing *Philosophy as Rigorous Science* (from 1911)[6] and in his final work *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* (from 1937).[7] In the *Philosophy as Rigorous Science,* Husserl criticizes the application of mathematics within the natural sciences and how the objective world is created as the first world. In his *Crisis,* Husserl went further by criticizing the way the life-world became the forgotten world even though it is the meaning-fundament of natural science. Therefore, Husserl describes naturalism as a misinterpretation of the relationship between scientific theories and the life-world.

Let us first go into the critiques as formulated in his *Philosophy as Rigorous Science*. According to Husserl, since Galileo, the natural sciences focused on the invariable primary qualities, as opposed to the variable secondary qualities that appear to us through the senses. Behind the phenomenal world would be a world of

mathematical entities: the invariable entities, which are the essences of nature. Human being became separated from nature and the only way in which the human mind should grasp this nature is by representing it in a mathematical language. Since the rise of science, these primary qualities are perceived as the true representation of the world. The world of the secondary qualities is the misleading world of appearance. Therefore, the first world is the real and objective world, the second world is the subjective world. Husserl calls this method of the natural sciences not just an imprecise mode of expression, he calls this a bad theory about its proper operation: "Yet that is more than an unclear expression; it is a bad theory for its good procedure" (Husserl 2002: 268).[8] Husserl turns this philosophy of science on its head. First, he will formulate a severe criticism of the naturalistic positivist science that supposes a *world in itself* and this without any foundation. Husserl will then argue that there is only one true world, namely the world that appears to us. Even if we have a quest for the invariable unity in the phenomena (the search for the *eidos*), we would do better to use these phenomena instead of disable them. These phenomena are certainly not a fantasy world, but a manifestation of that world of reality. For Husserl, it is the objective scientific approach to the world that settled the separation between nature and human being. It was not so much the Cartesian dualism that underlies this separation, but "Galilean "mathematization" of bodies that separated bodies from the world of everyday life and intentionally".[9] Husserl concludes his *Philosophy as Rigorous Science* with a description of the nature of philosophy (*Wesen der Philosophie*). It is a return to the very origin of being, into the sphere of direct intuition. The biggest step to make is to recognize that the real philosophical intuitions are at the basis of the phenomenological inquiry. It is for Husserl an endless field of work that needs to be unlocked. And here stands Husserl's phenomenological method; that of mathematics. He argues that opening up this field of work will be done without any indirect symbolizing and mathematizing methods, without the apparatus of the conclusions and evidence, but plenty strict and for all major findings of philosophy.

> Yet it lies precisely in the essence of philosophy, insofar as it returns to the ultimate origins, that its scientific work moves in spheres of direct intuition, and it is the greatest step our age has to make to see that with philosophical intuition in the right sense, the *phenomenological seizing upon essences*, an endless field of work opens up and a science that, without any indirectly symbolizing and mathematizing methods, without the apparatus of inferences and proofs, nevertheless obtains an abundance of the most rigorous cognition, which are decisive for *all* further philosophy.[10]

Husserl takes up these themes in his later work. In *The Origin of Geometry* (from 1936),[11] Husserl is looking for the real origin of ideal objects and of the objects of the empirical sciences. Husserl takes the objects of geometry as the paradigm from which the problem of the constitution of objectivity shall be explained. The mathematical objects of geometry are the instantiating example from which Husserl is creating a phenomenological foundation of both the mathematical ideal objects and the objects of the empirical sciences. The real origin of these objects takes part at the life-world; it is the original self-evidence, the first intuition that objects are grounded in (François 2011a, b).

In his *Crisis,* Husserl goes one step further by criticizing the substitution of the real world by a mathematical construction:

> But now we must note something of the highest importance that occurred even as early as Galileo: the surreptitious substitution of the mathematically substructed world of idealities for the only real world, the one that is actually given through perception, that is ever experienced and experienceable – our every-day life-world.[12]

Real objects, or the real world are defined as objects of possible sense perception and it is the founding intuition which gives the object (Farber 2009). In his *Origin,* Husserl describes how the objectivity of the objects is constructed. In his *Crisis,* he goes a step further by indicating that the constructed objective world is accepted as a substitution of the real life-world. More, the life-world, which the objects are grounded in is simply being forgotten and empty of meaning:

> Galileo was himself an heir in respect to pure geometry. The inherited geometry, the inherited manner of "intuitive" conceptualizing, proving, constructing, was no longer original geometry: in this sort of "intuitiveness" it was already empty of meaning.[13]

The power of mathematics consists in the possibility to reduce all variability of the subjective interpretations to a single objective world, which is accessible to everyone. In that sense, Morris Kline (1985), as a historian of mathematics, describes the use of mathematics as paradoxical:

> The mathematician strips away molecular structure, color, and thickness of lines to get at some basic properties and concentrates on these. So did Galileo penetrate to basic physical factors. The mathematical method of abstraction is indeed a step away from reality but, paradoxically, it leads back to reality with greater power than if all the factors actually present are taken into account at once.[14]

However, exactly this power of objectifying gave rise to the idea to be practiced on the concrete world as such. If one is convinced of the possibility of philosophy as achieving an objective science of the world, then pure mathematics, applied to nature, fulfills this project in the best way. It was Galileo's project to represent nature in an objective and true way. To Husserl, it was Galileo's idea that nature is constructively determinable and can be represented as an objective world. All qualities and all concreteness of the sensibly intuited world are just manifestations of an "objective" world.[15] For Husserl, mathematics is merely one method to represent the world. He compares it literally as a garb, be it of 'ideas':

> Mathematics and mathematical science, as a garb of ideas, or the garb of symbols of the symbolic mathematical theories, encompasses everything which, for scientists and the educated generally, *represents* the life-world, *dresses it up* as "objectively actual and true" nature.[16]

Husserl describes how human being became separated from nature by means of the ideal of knowledge. From now nature is only represented as an objective world outside. The significance of this world is indeed open to everyone, although this world has lost its meaning. The significance of this objective world is empty.

In the following section, we want to go into contemporary ideas on the concept of nature and the dualism between nature and human being as formulated by Donna J. Haraway, Bruno Latour and Rudolf Boehm. They changed the way we think

about ourselves and our place in the world in fundamental ways. The world now becomes something that we are embedded in and part of, rather than something we are detached from and merely observers of, as representationalism suggests.

Beyond the Divide

It is perhaps not surprising that one of the first critiques of dualistic thinking comes from feminist theory. It is sometimes said that women would be more phenomenological than men. Anyway, Haraway has, formulated a sharp critique on the dual thinking that characterizes Western thought. She criticizes the sharp distinction between subject and object, between fact and value, between objectivity and subjectivity. The latter finds its origin in the thinking of Husserl, as explained in his Origin.[17]

With her *Cyborg Manifesto,* Haraway (1991a) has shown that humans are even connected with the products of technology. Human being is no longer isolated from the objects. Human being is interwoven with the objects. With very simple examples, we can immediately say what Haraway means. Think of how our daily communication is organized. Everyone is in contact with everyone via mobile phone, computer, internet, facebook and twitter. People use all sorts of technical aids to function better. Think of glasses, contact lenses, dentures and so on. With her criticism of the dual thinking in Western philosophy, Haraway returns to its true dimension about the relationship between human being and nature, namely as a related statute. Human being is not an isolated entity outside or above nature. He or she is inextricably linked. Thus that commitment has its implication on how we can know of or about that world we are embedded in. From this entanglement between human being and nature, between subjects and objects, Haraway formulates a critique on Western epistemology:

> *Cyborg imagery can help express two crucial* arguments in this essay: first, the production of universal, totalizing theory is a major mistake that misses most of reality, probably always, but certainly now; and second, taking responsibility for the social relations of science and technology means refusing an anti-science metaphysics, a demonology of technology, and so means embracing the skilful task of reconstructing the boundaries of daily life, in partial connection with others, in communication with all of our parts.[18]

In her *Cyborg Manifesto,* Haraway formulates an alternative to the dominant epistemological scientific ideal. She argues in favor of an *embodied objectivity* by rewriting the objectivity criterion in terms of *situated knowledges* (Haraway 1991b, 2000). Embodied objectivity is opposed to objectivism. It is a negotiated truth from different locations (Tickner 1996). According to Haraway, rational knowledge is a process of critical interpretations from different 'fields', different locations, different power blocks, different, so-called categories and different 'decoders' which are situated within the life-world. It is based on prejudice and it arises from power-sensitive conversations (Haraway 1991b). Haraway criticizes on the one hand the Western ideal of knowledge of the "universal, totalizing theory" because it means

a disconnection from the life-world. In this sense she follows the criticism, which was voiced by Husserl in his *Crisis*. On the other hand, Haraway holds a plea to close the gap between the social reality and the world of technology and the sciences. This makes a prelude to social science studies and the impact of science studies on social theory.[19]

With the work of Bruno Latour, we will show that the separation between social reality and the world of the sciences is a modern dream that was never realized (Latour 1997). Within the sciences, the emphasis is always located on the matters of fact or the logical truth. Now is the time to focus our attention on matters of concern or the so called topical truth.

But how can we understand the concepts of logical versus topical truth? Since the times of ancient philosophy we have learned to think within three classical categories; namely logic, aesthetics and ethics. In this classical model, logic has to do with the truth of a sentence, aesthetics refers to the beauty of things and ethics is concerned with justice. Within this paradigm, reasoning about truth is one-dimensional. There exists only one truth, namely the so called logical truth. The logical truth of a sentence A expresses itself in the formal sciences, e.g. mathematics and logics, if one can deduce the respective sentence A, from the accepted axioms, using the right rules to deduce one step from the former one. To Descartes this was the ideal method to gather certain knowledge. Within the empirical sciences, the logical truth of a sentence expresses itself by referring to the correspondence between sentence A and a reality outside "there", a reality which is – most of the time – created in a experimental context, in a laboratorial context, in a vitro context. The reality outside there, is so to speak constructed, constituted to let them give an answer to the problem posed by the scientist. This does not mean that one should deny the existence of a reality outside there. The founding father and mother of Discourse Theory, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985), express the notion of constitution very clearly, as a reaction against the common misunderstandings about discourse.

> The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to do with whether there is a world external to thought, or with realism/idealism opposition. An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, in the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of my will. But whether their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of 'natural phenomena' or 'expressions of the wrath of God', depends upon the structuring of a discursive field? What is denied is not that such objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as object outside any discursive condition of emergence.[20]

The notion of construction and constitution is used to emphasize the way in which reality is represented by human beings, to Laclau and Mouffe the 'discursive condition of emergence'. It emphasizes the way in which 'the world' is epistemized, how it is brought into knowledge, and this can never be the result of a 'neutral' intervention by humans. It always holds a choice for a certain perspective, even if this 'perspective' is the one which is looking for objectivity or the logical truth. Also the logical truth with its search for an objective representation is embedded within a 'discursive condition of emergence'.

Husserl, in his *Crisis,* already speaks in terms of 'interest', where he refers to what Galileo occupied.

> In order to clarify the formation of Galileo's thought we must accordingly reconstruct not only what consciously motivated him. It will also be instructive to bring to light what was implicitly included in his guiding model of mathematics, even though, because of the direction of his interest, it was kept from his view: as a hidden, presupposed meaning it naturally had to enter into his physics along with everything else.[21]

To make a selection of objects that we should attend to is not a neutral business, not even if the criterion concerns the method exclusively as Descartes proclaimed in his *Regulea*.[22] The choice of how to represent objects is what Latour (2004) calls 'Politics of Nature'. In this 'politics' of the representation of things, mathematics plays a crucial part, due to the fact that it seems to be the only method to achieve certain knowledge, viz., by deduction (Goeminne and François 2010). As we mentioned in the first section, Descartes indeed describes the fundamentals of this recommended method in his third rule.

Galileo is the example par excellence of how to apply mathematics to physics, how to represent nature and how to construct the objective matters of fact. Galileo developed a universal law of falling bodies according to which the acceleration of gravity does not vary with bodies, but remains 9.81 m/s^2.[23] Therefore, he had to strip down the facts of their earthly conditions, he realized the disconnection from the life-word. It is this construction of the facts that has yielded him his invariable and universal objective law. Galileo disconnected the phenomenon of motion from its earthly conditions to create an objective matter of fact, expressed in a mathematical law. This objective truth is thus a produced truth based on an interest of human being. Objective matters of facts are constructed so as to give birth to objectivity and universality which can be attained, in principle, by every human being.

The central question of Boehm (2002) is if the result of this construction – the creation of the matters of fact – is interesting, important and relevant. Here we enter the central question of the topical truth. The question of logical truth concerns the question, if a sentence A is true or false. The notion true or false refers then to the correspondence between the sentence A and the object A to which sentence A is referring. Logical truth refers to the correspondence between the epistemized fact and the fact as such (*an sich*), the fact as it exists outside human being, outside the knowing subject, thus creating a matter of fact. The question of what kind of fact should be at stake is of no interest, those of the method itself excepted. The question of the topical truth concerns the question about the relevance of the object of inquiry, a relevance which is determined by contingent human relations. To Boehm, the fundamental interest and concern of human being is founded in the experience of its material needs and the desire for a meaningful life; the former called needs, the latter interest or concern. From this epistemological point of view, human being is again connected to the life-world. Human being is standing in its world and affected by concrete needs and interests. Topical truth is a thematic question of truth. It is this question that the human intellectual inquiry should deal with. The question of topical truth refers to the matters of concern, to what issue is at stake, to the things human being is concerned with. Here, the topic of the inquiry remains the a priori

question. Let us conclude by arguing that the move from the matters of fact to the matters of concern goes hand in hand with the shift from the dominant perspective of the logical truth to the topical truth. This shift can close the gap between human beings and the outside presumed world of nature.

Conclusion

In this article we demonstrate how dualism was finally installed by the philosophy of Descartes. He not only established a dualism between mind and body, he also established a dualism within epistemology; a dualism between the knowing subject, – *the cogito ego* – and the nature beyond. Although Husserl, who was fascinated by the philosophy of Descartes and his quest for a true foundation of knowledge, in his later work formulated a critique on the dualism and the separation of human being from the life-world. Following the fundamental criticisms of Husserl, there are current examples of criticism of the dualism and solutions are offered to transcend dualism. Haraway was criticizing the dual epistemology of western philosophy and of the sciences. Latour argues for a move from matters of fact to matters of concern. With the work of Boehm (2002), we mainly focussed on the epistemology and the critical philosophy of science with its shift from the question '*How to know?*' to the question '*What to know?*'. From the perspective of topical truth, science has to turn around the issues or the topics of people's concerns instead of having the topics of scientific consideration enter into the readymade method available to reach objective knowledge, viz. mathematics.

Notes

1. The manuscript which was written in Latin, was first published in Dutch translation (1684) by Glazemaker, a member of the Spinoza-circle. The Latin edition *Editio Princeps*, dates from 1701. The *Regulae Ad Directionem Ingenii* have later been also translated as *Règles pour la direction de l'esprit* (1963) and *Rules for the Direction of the Mind* (1984–1991).
2. Descartes 1997, pp. 3, 5, 8 (AT X, pp. 359, 362, 365).
3. Husserl 1970a, p. 73 (Hua VI §16).
4. Davis and Hersh 1986, p. xv.
5. Ibid.
6. Husserl 2002 [1911].
7. Husserl 1970a [1935–1937] (Hua VI). Henceforth cited as *Crisis*.
8. Translation of "Doch ist das mehr als ein undeutlicher Ausdruck, es ist eine schlechte Theorie für ihr gutes Verfahren" (Husserl 1965 [1911], p. 35 [p. 311]).
9. Woodruff Smith 1995, p. 372.
10. Husserl 2002, p. 294. (original emphasis)
11. Husserl 1970b [1936] (Hua VI, Appendix VI).
12. Husserl 1970a, pp. 48–49 (Hua VI, §9h).
13. Husserl 1970a, p. 49 (Hua VI, §9h).

14. Kline 1985, p. 332.
15. Husserl 1970a, p. 33 (Hua VI, §9b).
16. Husserl 1970a, p. 51 (Hua VI, §9h). (original emphasis)
17. Husserl 1970b [1936] (Hua VI, Appendix VI).
18. Haraway 1991a, p. 181.
19. Latour 2005, p.88.
20. Laclau and Mouffe 1985, p. 108.
21. Husserl 1970a, pp. 24–25 (Hua VI, §9a).
22. Descartes 1997.
23. That is, on average, depending on one's geographical situation. It is slightly less (9.79 m/s^2) at the equator and a bit more at the poles (9.83 m/s^2).

References

Boehm, Rudolf. 2002. *Topik, Phaenomenologica 162*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.

Bos, Henk J.M. 2001. *Redefining geometrical exactness. Descartes' transformation of the early modern concept of construction*, Sources and studies in the history of mathematics and physical sciences. New York: Springer.

Davis, Philip J., and Reuben Hersh. 1986. *Descartes' dream. The world according to mathematics*. Great Britain: Harvester Press.

Descartes, René 1953 [1637]. Discours de la méthode. In Descartes (1953) *Descartes. Œuvres et lettres*. Textes présentes par André Bridoux. Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 125–179. Paris: Editions Gallimard.

Descartes, René. 1966 [1628]. *Regulae ad directionem ingenii, avec la collaboration de Giovanni Crapulii*. Den Haag: Nijhoff.

Descartes, René 1997. *Key philosophical writings*. Trans. E.S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross. Great Britain: Wordsworth Classics of World Literature.

Dijksterhuis, Eduard Jan. 1950. *De mechanisering van het wereldbeeld*. Amsterdam: Meulenhoff.

Farber, Marvin. 2009 [1962]. *The foundation of phenomenology. Edmund Husserl and the quest for a rigorous science of philosophy*. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.

François, Karen. 2011a. On the notion of a phenomenological constitution of objectivity. In *Analecta Husserliana, transcendentalism overturned: From absolute power of consciousness until the forces of cosmic architectonics*, vol. 108, ed. A-t Tymieniecka, 121–137. New York: Springer.

François, Karen. 2011b. In-between science and politics. *Foundations of Science* 16(2–3): 161–171.

François, Karen, and Laurent De Sutter. 2004. Where mathematics becomes political. Representing (non-) humans. *Philosophica* 74: 123–138.

Goeminne, Gert, and Karen François. 2010. The thing called environment: What it is and how to be concerned with it. *Oxford Literary Review* 32(1): 109–130.

Haraway, Donna J. 1991a. A cyborg manifesto: Science, technology, and socialist-feminism in the late twentieth century. In *Simians, cyborgs, and women. The reinvention of nature*, ed. Donna J. Haraway, 149–181. London: Free Association Books.

Haraway, Donna J. 1991b. Situated knowledges: The science question in feminism and the privilege of partial perspective. In *Simians, cyborgs, and women. The reinvention of nature*, ed. D.J. Haraway, 183–201. London: Free Association Books.

Haraway, Donna J. 2000 [1998]. *How like a leaf. An interview with Thyrza Nichols Goodeve*. New York: Routledge.

Husserl, Edmund. 1965 [1911]. *Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.

Husserl, Edmund. 1970a [1935–1937]. *The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology*. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press. English translation by David Carr of the Husserl, Edmund. [1935–1937] (1962). *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie.* Husserliana, Gesammelte Werke, Band 6, (Hua 6). Herausgegeben von Walter Biemel. 2 Auflage. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.

Husserl, Edmund. 1970b [1936]. *The origin of geometry*. Appendix VI of The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology. An introduction to phenomenological philosophy, 353–378. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. English translation by David Carr of the Husserl, Edmund. [1935–1937] (1962). *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie.* Husserliana, Gesammelte Werke, Band 6, (Hua 6). Herausgegeben von Walter Biemel. 2 Auflage. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.

Husserl, Edmund. 2002 [1911]. Philosophy as rigorous science (Trans. Marcus Brainard). In *The new yearbook for phenomenology and phenomenological research,* vol. II, ed. B. Hopkins and S. Crowell, 249–295. Seattle: Noesis Press

Kline, Morris. 1985 [1967]. *Mathematics for the nonmathematician*. New York: Dover Publications.

Laclau, Ernesto, and Chantal Mouffe. 1985. *Hegemony and socialist strategy*. London: Verso.

Latour, Bruno. 1997 [1991]. *Nous n'avons jamais été modernes, Essai d'anthropologie symétrique, Poche 26, Sciences humaines et sociales*. Paris: La Découverte.

Latour, Bruno. 1999. *Politiques de la nature, Comment faire entrer les sciences en démocratie*. Paris: La Découverte.

Latour, Bruno. 2004 [1999]. *Politics of nature how to bring the sciences into democracy*. Trans. Catherine Porter. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Latour, Bruno. 2005. *Reassembling the social. An introduction to actor-network-theory*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Plato. 1978. In *Plato. The collected dialogues*, Bollingen series LXXI, 9th printing, eds. Edith Hamilton, and Huntington Cairns. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Tickner, Ann J. 1996. International relations: Post-positivist and feminist perspectives. In *A new handbook of political science*, ed. Robert E. Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, 446–461. New York: Oxford University Press.

WoodruffSmith, David. 1995. Mind and body. In *The Cambridge companion to Husserl*, ed. Barry Smith and David WoodruffSmith, 323–393. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Metaphysics and the Concept of World in Rudolph Carnap and Moritz Schlick

Giuseppina Sgueglia

Abstract In our work we have dealt with the hypothesis of indecomposableness of the elementary lived experiences (Elementarerlebnisse), in order to understand the value and significance of the psychic functions from the standpoint of the tradition that was inspired by the Gestalt psychology and that, apparently has strongly influenced the thinking of the logical neo-positivism, especially the one of Rudolf Carnap.

Starting from the theory of knowledge that we can detect in the work i by Rudolf Carnap, we have analyzed the problem of the ego and the question of the debate between realism and idealism, which determine the development of the idea of psychophysical parallelism, including some overview about the influence of the Neo-Kantian approaches and about the conceptions of Moritz Schlick.

In this sense, it seemed appropriate, focusing our interpretation of Carnap's thought, to highlight the link with the issues of the conflict between the problem of the constitution of empirical reality and the metaphysical problem of reality itself.

In this analysis field have developed our thinking about the same account of the transcendental constitution of objectivity and analysis of the concept of the world.

It seems also important to consider the physical relevance of the concept of world (*Welbegriff*) and the psychological dimension of the lived experiences, both for the analysis of the concepts that refer to a possible interaction (*Wechselwirkung*), as we think it is the case in Carnap's thought, and for the sense of the so-called psychic lawfulness, bound with the problem of the unity of consciousness, faced by Moritz Schlick.

We then questioned about the meaning of the experience and the question of objectivity of state of affairs (*Sachverhalte*), related to the meaning postulates in Carnap's analysis, in the work *Scheinprobleme in der Philosophie: Das Fremdpsychische und der Realismusstreit (Pseudoproblems in Philosophy*: *Other*

G. Sgueglia (✉)
Dipartimento di filosofia, Pontificia Università Lateranense, Piazza san Giovanni in Laterano, 4, 00120 Città del Vaticano, Roma, Italia

A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), *Phenomenology and the Human Positioning in the Cosmos: The Life-world, Nature, Earth: Book One*, Analecta Husserliana 113,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-4801-9_13, © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Minds and the Realism Debate) published in 1928, and Schlick's interpretation concerning the phenomenal facts, concentrating on the works *Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre* (*General Theory of Knowledge*) and *Form and Content*.

Construction Theory and the *Elementarerlebnisse*

Our work seeks through a reading of Carnap's Construction Theory to point out the hypothesis that, starting from experience and the Gestalt tradition, it may be possible to outline a relation between on the one hand psychical events and functions related to experiences lived by the Self, and its identity on the other.

We furthermore intend to suggest it is possible to sketch a kind of analysis highlighting the centrality of the notion of psychophysical parallelism inherited from the eighteen Century psychology, and still present in some of the groundbreaking texts in logical positivism. Construction Theory, which (through the definition of "state of affairs" corresponding to the objectivity of lived-experiences) articulates itself by considering elementary lived-experiences representing the "elementary elements" from an empirical point of view, is based (from a knowledge-theoretical point of view) on the a priori hypothesis of the non-decomposability of lived-experiences, and therefore determines the epistemological sense of the Theory of Knowledge.

According to this analysis, it is exactly to investigate the constitution of concepts and the problem of the scientific synthesis of concepts that the determination of reality via the Theory of Relations is laid out; which is why Carnap specifies the following:

> Thus, we choose a system form with au "autopsychological" basis. It will then be shown how it is possible to envisage these basic elements as unanalyzable units and nevertheless to construct those objects which are later on called the "properties" or "constituents" of these experiences through a procedure which is actually synthetic, but takes on the linguistic form of an analysis. (We shall call this procedure "quasi analysis").
>
> The actual basic concepts of the constitutional system, i.e., those concepts to which all other concepts of science are to be reduced, are not the basic elements, but the basic relations. (Carnap, The Logical Structure of the World, trans. by Rolf A. George for Open Court Classics, Chicago and La Salle, Illinois, USA, p. 13).[1]

The notion that elementary lived-experiences are not divisible into parts and thus not definable is representative of the importance of the semantic function scientific – but also pre-scientific – predicates (in their being "primitive" according to the definition of their "similarity" relation criterion) have; therefore Carnap, according to the Kantian tradition, gives an ontological account of the objects considered as

[1] Es wird also die Systemform mit "eigenpsychischer Basis" gewählt. Dann wird gezeigt, wie es möglich ist, diese Grundelemente als unzerlegbare Einheiten aufzufassen, und trotzdem durch ein eigentlich synthetisches, aber die Sprachform einer Analyse annehmendes Verfahren (die "Quasianalyse") diejenigen Gegenstände zu konstituieren, die dann später "Merkmale" oder "Bestandteile" der Erlebnisse heißen.

Die eigentlichen *Grundbegriffe* des Konstitutionssystems, also diejenigen Begriffe, auf die alle Begriffe der Wissenschaft zurückgeführt werden sollen, sind jedoch nicht die Grundelemente, sondern die *Grundrelationen* (*Der logische Aufbau der Welt*, reprint, Hamburg, Meiner, 1988, p. 8).

well as an epistemological account of the order according to which those objects are known. The tradition originating in Logical Positivism claims that other factors be drawn into consideration when discussing philosophical themes and problems regarding physical phenomena and psychical processes.

We can thus notice how the interpretative hypothesis of the presence of form psychology, or Gestalttheorie,[2] in the Aufbau – most notably in two such important exponents as Wolfgang Köhler and Max Wertheimer – concerns what will then be the treatment of issues concerning the psychical world of others. This treatment goes on with the so-called "problems of essence", as Carnap, in the Appendix of the Aufbau entitled *Scheinprobleme in der Philosophie*, calls ontologically relevant issues. It is thus significant, in order for a consideration of the degree of epistemological priority of objects to be under focus, that their definition and their knowledge – theoretical nature be ascertained. With regard to this, referring to the main issue here dealt with, we underline that in Carnap's work emerges the importance of defining such a concept as "somatic field": this notion represents for Köhler the perception of the functioning of the physical system, starting from the teleological perspective of objectifying perception, deriving from the phenomenological issue concerning lived-experience of consciousness, and which is quite apparent to be tightly connected with the theoretical stance of another exponent of Gestalt Psychology, namely Heinz Werner. Furthermore, the issue concerning the definition of the qualitative nature of sensations turns out to be fundamental for the psychological analysis of the psychical intensity of perception in the perspectives of both Carnap and Moritz Schlick, as far as one seeks to draw upon Stumpf's analysis and conception (Margolis, 1982).

Going back to the initial issues, we shall see how here a relation is outlined between one's own psychical field (according to Carnap's analysis of this concept), and the issue concerning concepts and their constitution, which all is to prove fundamental for the definition of "constitution system" (*Konstitutionssystem*).

And decisive for this analysis will prove the dispute that eventually took place between Carnap and another exponent of the Gestalt movement, Karl Duncker.[3] At any rate, in the analysis provided within the Aufbau the outline of relations is what prevails on the rest, not only (according with a theoretical stance inherited from Russell) in regard to "observable predicates", but also in psychological terms concerning "dispositional propositions", thus meaning a system which is de facto fully characterized by scientific propositions.

As a consequence, the relationship that is ultimately defined between the constructional manifold of scientific language and the issue raised by psychical

[2] Cfr. Gary L. Hardcastle, *Logical Empiricism and the Philosophy of Psychology*, in *Cambridge Companion to Carnap* ed. by Michael Friedman and Richard Creath, Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 228–249.

[3] Cfr. K. Duncker, *Behaviorismus und Gestaltpsychologie.* (*Kritische Bemerkungen zu Carnaps "Psychologie in physikalischer Sprache"*, "Erkenntnis", 3, 1932, pp. 162–176); Ramon Cirera, *Carnap and the Vienna Circle,* Chapter 6 *Conventionalism, Semantics and Logical Syntax*, editions Rodopi B. V., Amsterdam, Atlanta, GA 1994, pp. 268–275.

functions also shows clear traces of an extensional criterion (namely one based on definitions referring to external objects and classes of objects).

In Carnap's thinking all of that receives a structure of its own in order of the relationship between psychical functions and the givenness of objects to be investigated. With this regard, we maintain that the extensional criterion, central to concept construction (*Begriffsbildung*), also concerns sensation analysis and association psychology. Now, this issue appears to be relevant for an extensive and full account of psychical functions, and therefore in order to ascertain which the binds between those and perceptions are, and which in turn determine streams of consciousness.

With regard to this we maintain that objects inherent in the spiritual world, particularly the idea of memory (*Gedächtnis*) of perceptions and lived-experiences, are necessary for the constitution of a theory of empirical reality and the world (*Weltlehre*), and thus for the interpretation of semantic knowledge, even though Carnap's semantic investigation is particularly directed towards the conceptual operations addressed by investigations regarding the rational reconstruction of objectivity.[4]

We therefore state that the function the here discussed theory of knowledge and analysis of elementary lived-experiences – and subsequently the metaphysical issue concerning the relationship with the concept of reality – have, also determines the reflections of the Aufbau on the consideration of the empirical manifold and phenomenal reality.

An instance of the issue concerning an analysis of elementary lived-experiences and the interpretation of the concept of reality is the problem of the Self and the world. Carnap's interpretation of the problem of the Self (made explicit by the here provided account of the class of elementary lived-experiences) highlights what may labelled "a unified expression for that which the elements have in common", namely the possible reference to observation data (cf. § 163).

It thus comes natural in this perspective to scrutinize the conception of the unity of consciousness as expressed by a philosopher like Moritz Schlick, in many respects similar to Carnap, one who underlined the importance of "the original fact of the given", which would have to deal with experiencing and observation.

Indeed in both thinkers we can envisage a kind of identification of the issue of the self and that of the concept of world. We can hereon in the Aufbau read such remarks as the following:

> *The "self" is the class of elementary experiences*. It is frequently and justly emphasized that the self is not a bundle of representations, or experiences, but a unit. […]
>
> *The existence of the self is not an originally given fact*. The *sum* does not follow from the *cogito*; it does not follow from "I experience" that "I am", but only that an experience is. The self does not belong to the expression of the basic experience at all, but it is constructed only later, essentially for the purpose of delineation against the "others"; that

[4] With regard to this we deem the following interesting: Massimo Ferrari, *L'empirismo logico nel suo contesto*, "Rivista di filosofia", XC, 1 1999, pp. 117–132, the analysis provided by Friederich Stadler, *Studien zum Wiener Kreis. Ursprung, Entwicklung und Wirkung des Logischen Empirismus in Kontext*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. m. 1997, and finally R. N. Giere e A. W. Richardson (eds.), *Origins of Logical Empiricism*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis-London, 1996.

> is only on a high constructional level, after the construction of the heteropsychological. Thus, a more fitting expression than "I experience" would be "experience", or still better "this experience". Thus, we ought to replace the Cartesian dictum "this experience; therefore, this experience is", and this is of course a mere tautology. The self does not belong to the original state of affairs (§ 65). (ibid., pp. 260–261)[5]

From a theoretical point of view, the problem of the self is tightly connected with an analysis of reality and the definition of the epistemological and ontological issue about the very idea of world, since that problem underlines the importance of the dispute between Realism and Idealism, and then, as a direct consequence, determines the development of the idea of psychophysical parallelism.

Construction Theory is epistemologically "neutral" in its location just between either of those options and suggests that it may be possible to determine the concept of *thing per se*, as "a non- given real object", according to a tradition belonging as a matter of fact (if one bears Schlick's reflection in mind) to science and not metaphysics (which in turn remains outlined as a theoretical form and "extrascientific field"), and most notably if we consider the problems arising from a consideration of psychophysical parallelism.

This is why a confrontation and clash takes place between the problem of the scientific constitution of empirical reality and the metaphysical problem of reality (*Aufbau* §§ 168–170). And in fact the analysis of the issue of that parallelism seems to take place within the metaphysical stance rather than the point of constitutional definition view of the objects of knowledge, leaving a new theoretical field open for a neo-Kantian ontological investigation, which consistently leads to defining "the psychophysical fundamental situation, by giving reality to things-in-themselves which have different sorts of properties" "fundamental psychophysical situation through the acknowledgment of a reality degree in things-in- themselves already possessing different types of properties":

> It is a familiar fact that metaphysics explains the parallelisms of the first kind through realistic or phenomenalistic postulations of physical things-in-themselves; it is one and the same thing which on one hand appears to me as the visual thing, apple, and on the other hand as the taste thing, apple. Parallelisms of the second kind can be explained through analogous postulations of psychological realities; it is one and the same psychological entity which is, on one hand the representation of an apple and which carries with it, on the other hand, a certain emotional quality. Thus in both cases the metaphysical explanation makes use of a reification (positing as real) or substantialization (in the sense of the

[5] *Das "Ich" ist die Klasse der Elementarerlebnisse*. Es wird häufig mit Recht betont, daß das Ich nicht ein Bündel von Vorstellungen oder Erlebnissen sei, sondern eine Einheit. *Die Existenz des Ich ist kein Ur-Sachverhalt des Gegebenen*. Aus dem cogito folgt nicht sum; aus dem "ich erlebe" folgt nicht, daß ich bin, sondern, daß ein Erlebnis ist. Das Ich gehört gar nicht zum Ausdruck des Grunderlebnisses, sondern wird erst später konstituiert, wesentlich zum Zweck der Abgrenzung gegen die "Anderen", also erst auf hoher Konstitutionsstufe, nach der Konstitution des Fremdpsychischen. Ein passenderer Ausdruck als "ich erlebe" wäre also erlebe oder noch besser "dies Erlebnis", und das wäre freilich eine bloße Tautologie. Wie früher bei Erörterung der eigenpsychischen Basis schon angedeutet worden ist, gehört das Ich nicht zum Ur-Sachverhalt. (Rudolf Carnap, *Der logische Aufbau der Welt*, cit. p. 226).

> category of substance). In a similar way, the parallelism of the third kind, the one that occurs in the psychophysical basic situation, can be explained through reification of things-in- themselves which have two different types of property. (ibid., p. 271)[6]

The point will be to determine how we can investigate questions regarding real and "psychical and spiritual" objects, in order on the one hand for an analysis of the physical sphere, that is of the classes of relations between things (to be determined in their matter-of-fact objectivity), to be provided: on the other, we will have to investigate the relationships those have with physical and spiritual objects.

In our reflection, as far as the *Aufbau* is concerned, it is not simply the problem of the lived- experience of consciousness what matters, but also the prospect of a rational reconstruction of objective knowledge, relative to a system of definitions, and thus as part of a consideration of the transcendental constitution of objectivity and the concept of world (Guido Küng, 1975).

We maintain it is possible to identify rules explaining the constructive procedure of the formal structure of object construction, and define the connection with the functional schemes concerned with the definition of what Carnap calls "fourth language", namely that of fictitious construction (cf. §99), in turn necessarily concerned with the definition of psychical processes and as a consequence particularly demanding. Yet, having to confront the main issue here dealt with, we shall have to bear in mind that not only is it important to remark that in Carnap the associative issue of form (or Gestalt-) psychology determines the meaning of psychical functions and the language expressing them, but also that the analysis of external reality and the laws of nature as provided by Schlick provide a link between the empirical verification hypothesis and the meaning of consciousness and judgements on matters-of-fact. A decisive step is outlined by the contrast between Schlick's interpretation of such notions as nature- and physical world laws (that apply to the world and the concept of reality) on the one hand, and Carnap's account of material rules of inference explaining physical phenomena and reality depending upon conventional[7] rules.

As a matter of fact, the stances taken by these two thinkers differ notably, since whereas Schlick's analysis concerns the importance of the laws of nature and possibly the significance of empirical verifiability (with reference to external reality), which

---

[6] Die *Metaphysik* erklärt bekanntlich die Parallelverläufe erster Art durch realistische oder phänomenalistische Setzung physischer Dinge-an-sich: es ist ein und dasselbe Ding, das mir einerseits als das Sehding Apfel, andererseits als das Geschmackding Apfel erscheint. Die Parallelverläufe zweiter Art können durch analoge Setzung psychischer Realitäten gedeutet werden: es ist ein und dasselbe psychische Gebilde, das sowohl Vorstellung eines Apfels ist, als auch einen bestimmten Gefühlston an sich hat. In beiden Fällen geschieht also die metaphysische Deutung durch Realisation (Real- Setzung) oder Substanzialisation (im Sinne der Substanzkategorie). In ähnlicher Weise wird zuweilen der Parallelverlauf der dritten Art, wie er sich in der psychophysischen Grundsituation zeigt, durch Real-Setzung von Dingen an sich gedeutet, die zwei verschiedene Arten von Eigenschaften haben (*Der logische Aufbau der Welt*, cit., p. 235).

[7] Michael Friedman, 4. Coordination, Constitution and Convention. The Evolution of the A Priori in Logical Empiricism, in *The Cambridge Companion to Carnap*, op. cit., pp. 91–107.

implies a critique of conventionalism,[8] Carnap instead connects the definition of empirical laws to some kind of conventionality, even as regards the very concept of world.

It seems at any rate relevant that one could speak of Schlick's "lawful structure", that concerns the product of empirical laws and seems to derive from the concept of law verifiability. We thus aim to interpret the way in which Schlick deals with judgements and predictions regarding phenomena: we view it as the kind of exemplification of a realistic interpretation of nature laws already sketched in his 1935 "*Sind die Naturgesetze Konventionen*?". Here Schlick is mostly concerned with the importance of "ordinary definitions" which through characteristic features of concepts determine their intensions; intuitiveness, on the other hand, and experience fix the ostension of a given concept and thus its meaning; but it is "implicit definitions" – as we regard them – what enables to conceive of nature's and the world's intelligibility, and thus allow to formulate a hypothesis- and judgement system for nature.

Besides, according to Schlick the constitution of the world's physical objects has to deal with the notion that it is possible to conceive of an interpretation of causality as "functional dependence" between phenomena, as it becomes apparent if we consider the analysis provided in his 1931 *Die Kausalität in der gegenwärtigen Physik*, mainly dealing with the identification of an empiristic theory of world and reality.

This work is in sharp contrast with the neo-Kantian analysis in Ernst Cassirer's *Substance and Function* of world views as provided by physics. Going back to Carnap, we shall now note how the constitution method of the *Aufbau* (1) as it deals with a system of empirical hypotheses and "coordinative definitions" about the analysis of the world and reality is differently structured from when it (2) is directed towards the analysis of "meaning postulates" about the psychical functions of lived-experiences.

Carnap's interpretation of reality and physical objects concerns logical transformation rules (L-rules) and extra- rules (P-rules), as physical laws and material rules, which as a matter of fact turn out to be decisive for the individuation of syntactic statements, mostly object statements. Furthermore, general rules for reduction and transformation of statements are in particular valid for the analysis of quasi-syntactic pseudo-objectual statements determined by the materiality of speaking. In order to make sense of the nature of such statements, we shall recall that they concern "the structure of space and time, the cause-effect relation, the differences and relationships between the physical and the psychical, the character of numbers and numerical functions, necessity, contingency, possibility and impossibility".[9] Pseudo-objectual statements are as a matter of fact so framed as to determine properties about the syntactic relationships characterizing language structure, the notion of proposition

[8] One might usefully read the analyses provided in Sono convenzioni le leggi di natura? in: Moritz Schlick, *Tra realismo e neopositivismo*, a cura di Eva Picardi, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1974, pp. 159–167.

[9] Rudolf Carnap, *Philosophy and Logical Syntax*, London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Turber, 1935, p. 65

and problems bound with the theory to meaning. This in particular turns out to be of the utmost importance for an interpretation of the real character of spiritual phenomena and psychical lived-experiences, all of which could never be addressed by the rigorous methods used in physics. Furthermore, in Carnap's interpretation of the word and reality no properties are determined that could be liable to such a univocal interpretation as the one common in modal logic, instead what is framed is a set of material rules of inference that make up the core of scientific laws.

Therefore, the point is building up, according to rules, a set of hypothetical probabilistic and merely conventional arguments aimed at questioning the very possibility of a physical kind of necessity for causality (according to what we might label a Humean point of view of matter-of-fact "causality" as we might envisage it in logical empirism).

The structural aspect of the interpretation of phenomena is clarified through the identification of relational properties, which in turn represent just the material rules of inference for scientific laws. In this perspective, which is typical of Carnap's logical empirism, scientific laws are compatible with realism and antirealism of nature laws.[10]

The Physical Account Provided in *Weltbegriff* and the Psychical Dimension

The theory regarding construction by means of an abstraction process draws on the separation of the "given" and the apperceptive elaboration of the "lived recognition", so that it is not possible to limit oneself to hypothetical, subjective inferences, and it is in turn necessary to mention the specification and classification of the given by the constitution of an intersubjective world (§§ 148 e 165).

In our most recent work (with the purpose of determining the ontological issue of the concept of world) we considered issues regarding Construction Theory and problems arising from the notion of essence (§§ 157–183), central to a confrontation with the psychophysical issue (§§ 166–169), so that we may finally address the empirical (§§ 170–174) and subsequently the metaphysical concept of reality (§§ 175–178).

Indeed, despite the critique of Mach's "elementism", and abiding by the assumption that objectual propositions may be translated into the language of physics, regarding these passages we may now begin to outline the purport of what Carnap says:

> The second concept of reality (meant as independent of the subject) represents the most conspicuous divergence point between realism, idealism and phenomenalism. These three currents differ in that they attribute reality in the second sense to fields of different amplitudes

[10] Cf. Michele Casamonti, *Le leggi di natura. Per una interpretazione epistemica*, Guerini Associati, Milan, 2006.

> (within an empirical-real dimension). From a *realist* point of view both physical and psychical objects are real. Subjective *idealism*, on the contrary, holds other people's psychical objects, not physical ones, for real (…). *Phenomenalism* on the other hand sees external reality beyond the psychical to be the case, but then, like Idealism, denies that physical objects may be real; this reality applies, according to such doctrine, to things-in-themselves (…). The concept of reality, meant as independence of the knowing sphere) does not belong to (rational) science, but to metaphysics.
>
> The conception just outlined with regard to the concept of reality is similar to the one embraced by positivists, which dates back to Mach. The concept of thing-in-itself refers in its very definition to the concept of reality (in its independence from the knowing subject). Our conception thus confines through this concept with metaphysics as well. Since metaphysics is the extrascientific field of theoretical form (§ 182).[11]

The idea that Construction Theory represents the criterion according to which the neutrality of an epistemological point of view prevails on the unilateralism of currents like realism, idealism and phenomenalism allows to understand the issue about the divergence between the empirical and the metaphysical concept of reality: all of that is outlined in a theoretical framework leading to a full understanding of a realistic stance within both the sciences and, problematically, metaphysics.

Seen in this perspective, the issue concerning intensive sensations (namely of intensity as a relevant aspect of physical phenomena in their sheer qualitative characterization) lets us analyze the *Weltbegriff* stance about realism with regard to scientific activity: this is why, as an example, the outline of spatial ordering, the concept of world and external reality all reflect the intersubjectivity of scientific concepts and their field of analysis. But here another issue arises, since the main purport of Carnap's construal is the sheer structural form of the relationship between elements experienced within the psyche and science, which in its part is about the "description of relationships" and that of properties of physical phenomena as relationships, ascertained starting from elementary propositions.

---

[11] Der zweite Begriff der Wirklichkeit (im Sinne der Unabhängigkeit vom erkennenden Subjekt) stellt den Punkt dar, an dem die Richtungen des Realismus, des Idealismus und des Phänomenalismus aus. Diese Richtungen unterscheiden sich dadurch, daß sie Gegenstandsgebieten verschiedenen Umfanges (innerhalb des Empirisch-Wirklichen) die Wirklichkeit im zweiten Sinne zuerkennen. Der Realismus lehrt, daß die konstituierten physischen und fremdphysischen Gegenstände wirklich seien. Der subjektive Idealismus lehrt, daß zwar die fremdpsychischen, nicht aber die physischen Gegenstände wirklich seien; […] Der Phänomenalismus lehrt wie der Realismus die Existenz von Wirklichem außerhalb des Eigenpsychischen, spricht aber wie der Idealismus dem Physischen diese Wirklichkeit ab; sie kommt nach dieser Lehre den unerkennbaren "Dingen an sich" zu, deren Erscheinungen die physischen Gegenstände sind. […]

Der Begriff der Wirklichkeit (im Sinne der Unabhängigkeit vom erkennenden Bewußtsein) gehört nicht in die (rationale) Wissenschaft, sondern in die Metaphysik. […]

Die angegebene Auffassung über den Wirklichkeitsbegriff ist mit der des Positivismus verwandt, die auf Mach zurückgeht. […]

Der Begriff des "Dinges an sich" geht in seiner Definition zurück auf den Begriff der Wirklichkeit (im Sinne der Unabhängigkeit vom erkennenden Subjekt). Unsere Auffassung verweist demgemäß auch diesen Begriff in die Metaphysik. Denn Metaphysik ist das außerwissenschaftliche Gebiet theoretischer Form (§ 182). (*Der logische Aufbau der Welt*, cit., pp. 245–247).

And indeed, what we see is that Carnap largely devotes himself to a structural analysis of the functional coordination consciousness makes of the "logical and not real relationship" of perception with the external world in its reality.

A structural analysis then sets in to solve the question regarding the identity of the Self and the mental consideration of objects of experience.

Furthermore, Carnap goes back to the analysis of notions about the reality of the external world and the qualities of objects, then trying to question the propositions of body physiology and the functioning they allegedly picture, and in doing so he rivets on the mutual translatability of physical and psychical objects, according to the perspective embraced by him in his constitutional system. As a matter of fact, Carnap poses the problem of essence of the psycho-physical issue that does not come to solution merely by analyzing the interaction (*Wechselwirkung*) between the world, physical reality, and the psychical dimension of lived-experiences, since the issue concerning the definition of the causal relationship between those remains open.

The problem of essence takes on other features as Carnap confronts the interpretation of Identity Theory (as presented by Fechner's scientific psychology which Carnap closely scrutinizes and which is thus dramatically reconsidered by him and partly reduced in its importance). It turns out to be otherwise if we consider Schlick's account of the controversy about psychophysical parallelism: the Austrian philosopher unequivocally poses the definition of the relationship between the world and its "appearances" on one side, and the reality of the *thing-in-itself* on the other. And in this we envisage a possibility for critical solutions that may concern Carnap's thinking as well.

In this sense, the issue concerning some psychical law-like regularity (a technical term, this describes a natural law-like regularity) is confronted by Schlick through the example given by the cerebral localization, in relation with laws of nature, of mnestic remnants of perceptive phenomena of the Self. In the analysis we intend to provide of Schlick's psychical law-like regularities, just as we scrutinize his confrontation with objections against the issue of psychophysical parallelism, and thus see an important reference to Erich Becher's (cf. Becher 1922: *Gehirn und Seele*) Johannes Adolf von Kries' and works (cf. von Kries 1901*Über die matieriellen Grundlagen der Bewusstseinserscheinungen*), both momentous in grounding the criticism against attempts at reducing "psychology to brain physiology". And indeed Schlick states the following:

> All physiological hypotheses start from sense perception as the most important source of mental life in general. In perception, nerve stimuli are conducted from a sense organ (say, the retina of the eye) to a central organ (say, the visual area of the cerebral cortex). After they fade away they leave behind certain traces, residues or dispositions that are utilized to explain memory images and association. The various residues are bound to one another by "threads of association", and if one of the residues is stimulated, then under certain conditions the stimulus radiates out through the threads to other residues, is communicated to them, and in response to this latter physical process there is a revival in consciousness of the representations that correspond to these traces in the brain, for example, when I look at a portrait of a friend, certain cells in my optic center are activated. A connection is set up with other centers, such as the acoustical, and residues are aroused there that correspond to the tonal image of the name of that friend. His name rises to the surface of my consciousness. (Moritz Schlick, General theory of knowledge, p. 315)

In this respect, Schlick's account of a more refined – so do we think – epistemological (*erkenntnistheoretisch*) parallelism, namely the one between brain structures and cognitive functions, is the result of the analysis of physical bodies and their interactions within a possibility of a definition in a symbolic-conceptual system. Not only does the constitutional system, defining the way in which the sciences express things themselves, allow us to interpret a confrontation with the issue concerning the relationship (which again is highly significant) with the philosophical aspects of Köhler's *psychische Gestalten*, but it also lets us define the field for a discussion concerning the essence of the physical analysis and the psychical dimension in the *Aufbau*.

> Thus as ordinarily formulated, physiological hypotheses are unable to provide an explanation for mental events. Some thinkers have therefore concluded that at the point where it fails, the physiological theory must be replaced with a mentalistic theory. In other words, we must revert to the assumption that the mental, the mind, is a reality of *a special kind*. This reality resists description by the spatio-quantitative concepts of natural science and has its own peculiar law-like regularity, which we know from experience as "psychological".
>
> According to this conception, the contrast between physical and designates a difference that is essentially *real*. The "physical" is that reality whose nature can be described by quantitative concepts. The "mental" is that reality for which thus us not the case. Thus here two concepts take on another sense. This new definition *could* coincide with the distinction we made earlier between objective and subjective qualities (which may also be expressed as the distinction between the extramental and the mental). But this is not the case if one assumes, as most of these thinkers do, that there is such a thing as *unconscious* mental being. For the property of belonging to a consciousness is the characteristic, necessary feature of the reality we designated above as subjective or mental. (ibid., 317)

Therefore it seems that from the analysis provided by Carnap it is possible to find confirmation for the idea that it is possible to speak of a translatability into the language of physics of psychological propositions and the observation of physical phenomena as these appear, and that it is thus possible to question the relationship between physical objects and the psychical dimension.

> The problems of the foundations of psychology contain analogues to those of biology just mentioned. (1) Can the concepts of psychology be reduced to those of physics in the narrower sense? (2) Can the laws of psychology be reduced to those of physics in the narrower sense ? (Physicalism answers the first question in the affirmative, but leaves the second open.) The so-called psychophysical problem is usually formulated as a question concerning the relation of two object-domains : the domain of the psychical processes and the domain of the parallel physical processes in the central nervous system. But this formulation in the material mode of speech leads into a morass of pseudo-problems (for instance: "Are the parallel processes merely functionally correlated, or are they connected by a causal relation? Or is it the same process seen from two different sides?"). With the use of the formal mode of speech it becomes clear that we are here concerned only with the relation between two sub-languages, namely, the psychological and the physical language; the question is whether two parallel sentences are always, or only in certain cases, equipollent with one another, and, if so, whether they are L- or P-equipollent (Rudolf Carnap, *The Logical Syntax of Language*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1937, p. 324).

And indeed it is exactly in this respect that we can find grounds for Carnap's idea of the constitution of the concept of "overdetermination of experience", namely a wider interpretation of the foundations of psychology, but at the same time a more severely bounded logico- ontological, and then also metaphysical, analysis.

This interpretation determines the issue of language meaning and the sensibleness of assertions about the empirical reality (where this is freed of the metaphysical claim staked on it by a certain form of empiricist perspective): they condition the reading of the constitution system (*Konstitutionssystem*), and stress the analysis of physical objects rather objects belonging to the psychical sphere of others. The analysis of Construction Theory is deepened by introducing of the possibility for "dispositional predicates" of psychical processes to be dealt with in the framework of the issue about descriptive languages in their extensional character, namely through the determination of the objectivity of factual "states of affairs".

About the Experience and Objectivity of Factual "States of Affairs"

The objectivity of factual "states of affairs" is crucial to formulate definitions grounded on experience, especially if we abide by the suggestions in Carnap's 1928 work *Scheinprobleme in der Philosophie: Das Fremdpsychische und der Realismusstreit*. In this respect we deem the treatment in Schlick's 1936 *Meaning and Verification* fundamental, as much as it is Hempel's reading of the issue concerning the meaning of propositions, so that is it now necessary to underline that on no account can the verification problem be reduced to any "matter-of-fact",[12] and thus seem analyzable in simple reductionist terms, since it necessarily involves an ontological, and then also an epistemological commitment.

In this regard, Carnap marks a significant progress in thinking in his attempt to define the relationship between factuality and propositions, or "sensible assertions", but then he also suggests the hypothesis of perceptive experience and its expression, using the idea that a certain kind of protocols and the specific language used in them may in this respect be fully functional.

The Theory of Constitution of "factual states of affairs" is structured starting from the description of "states of affairs" (*Sachverhalte*) and modal logic (concerning semantic relations of "postulates" of meaning): all of that may be better understood through the notion of context meaning, one that is build up on "known features", and that enables to grasp the relationships existing between certain statements and their truth-values:

> In order to realize a knowledge-theoretical utilisation we take, from the experience of communicating *a*, of which we have consciousness only through perception of the physical signs (a_1), therefore something like the acoustic perception of pronounced words (namely as noises), or the visual perception of written words (as strokes of pen), but not the understanding of those signs (b_1), which is also realised in the lived- datum; from this material, $a_{1,}$ we subsequently infer, availing ourselves of already possessed knowledge, the

[12] C. G. Hempel, *Problems and Changes in the Empirist Criterion of Meaning,* in "Revue Internationale de Philosophie", XI, 1950, pp, 41–63.

theoretical content b_1. This reconstruction certainly presupposes that the words used in the communication of A already be known to us, or that at least we may deduce their meaning from the context (namely, that we may hypothetically infer their meaning). If this presupposition is not verified, then no E_1 experience can be the case and we cannot envisage ingredient b_1 at all: if I receive a letter written in Chinese, all I see is some black strokes, without experiencing myself anything psychical which might belong to others. But if, on the contrary, that presupposition is verified, then I can deduce the meaning of the assertion from the words perceived (namely from the noises heard or the pictures seen) with the help of the meanings of words known to me; and the meaning of the assertion is content b_1, namely the psychical of others which in E1becomes an object of knowledge (…).

The psychical process in A, (b_3), can reconstructively be deduced (by means of that presupposition) starting from physical circumstances (a_3); sometimes, even in the lived-datum itself, this process is not there immediately to be found as something given, but is constructively inferred (…). We only mean to maintain that between the theoretical contents of ingredients b and a of the lived-given there is a logical dependence relationship, which can be shown by the fact that, furthermore, b can deduced by inference from a and drawing upon already possessed knowledge (…).

The meaning of an assertion consists in its standing for some (thinkable, not necessarily existing) factual state of affairs. If a (supposed) assertion does not stand for any (thinkable) factual state of affairs, then it is meaningless proper, and just apparently an assertion. If an assertion does stand for a factual state of affairs, the nit is by all means meaningful, and more precisely: it is true if that state of affairs is the case, and false if it is not. Of a given assertion it is possible to know whether it is provided with meaning well before we know if it is true or false. (ibid., 457–459; 464)[13]

[13] Wir nehmen zur erkenntnismäßigen Auswertung aus dem Erlebnis der verstandenen Mitteilung des A nur die Wahrnehmung der physischen Zeichen (a_1) heraus, also etwa das Hören der gesprochenen Worte (als Geräusche) oder das Sehen der geschriebenen Worte (als Strichfiguren), nicht aber das im Erlebnis selbst außerdem noch vorliegende Verstehen dieser Zeichen (b_1); aus diesem Material a1 erschließen unter Mitbenutzung von früher schon Gewußtem den theoretischen Gehalt von b_1. Diese Nachkonstruktion hat allerdings zur Voraussetzung, daß uns die vorkommenden Worte schon bekannt sind oder sich wenigstens aus dem Zusammenhang erraten (d. h. vermutungsweise erschließen) lassen. Ist diese Voraussetzung nicht erfüllt, so liegt gar kein Erlebnis von der Art E_1 vor, der Bestandteil b_1, tritt gar nicht auf: Bekomme ich einen chinesischen Brief, so sehe ich nur schwarze Striche, ohne etwas Fremdpsychisches zu erfahren. Ist die Voraussetzung aber erfüllt, so kann ich aus den wahrgenommenen Worten (den gehörten Geräuschen oder den gesehenen figuren) mit Hilfe der mir bekannten Wortbedeutungen die Bedeutung der Aussage erschließen; und das ist der Gehalt von b1, das in E1 zur Erkennung kommende Fremdpsychische. […] Aber auch hier kann (unter Benutzung dieser Vorkenntnis) aus den bekannten physischen Umständen (a_3) der psychische Vorgang in A (b_3) nachkonstruierend erschlossen werden; zuweilen ist er auch schon im Erlebnis selbst nicht unmittelbar gegeben, sondern konstruierend erschlossen. […] Es wird nur behauptet, daß zwischen den theoretischen Gehalten der Erlebnisbestandteile b und a eine logische Abhängigkeit besteht, die dadurch nachgewiesen werden kann, daß nachträglich b aus a und dem früher Gewußten durch Schlüsse hergeleitet werden kann. […].

Der Sinn einer Aussage besteht darin, daß sie einen (denkbaren, nicht notwendig auch bestehenden) Sachverhalt zum Ausdruck bringt. Bringt eine (vermeintliche) Aussage keinen (denkbaren) Sachverhalt zum Ausdruck, so hat sie keinen Sinn, ist nur scheinbar eine Aussage. Bringt eine Aussage einen Sachverhalt zum Ausdruck, so ist sie jedenfalls sinnvoll so ist sie jedenfalls sinnvoll; und zwar ist sie wahr, wenn dieser Sachverhalt besteht, falsch, wenn er nicht besteht. Man kann von einer Aussage schon wissen, ob sie sinnvoll ist, noch bevor man weiß, ob sie wahr oder falsch ist. (Rudolf Carnap, *Scheinprobleme in der Philosophie und andere metaphysikkritische Schriften*, Hamburg, Meiner, 2004, pp. 18, 20–21; 26).

We mean to highlight the problems behind the identification of contents of perceptive experience and precisely in this regard we deem it significant to discuss the importance of the reference to "factual states of affairs" (namely according to that stance of Carnap's that is relative to the description of states of affairs or *Sachverhalte*), and thus discuss the subsequent distinction between representations of objects and representations of "factual states of affairs". In this regard, this analysis of factual states of affairs offers again Meinong's point of view (and relevantly his consistent distancing himself from Carnap with regard to the definition of the concept of *Objective*) and the idea that it is possible to determine the content of an assertion independent of object representations.[14] And indeed Carnap, from his point of view regarding how it is possible to represent the issue of the objectivity of factual states of affairs, expresses himself as follows:

> On the direction of intention thus naturally depends that a representation be one of some given factual state of affairs, or the mere representation o fan object; in the first case the lived-datum contains a predicative act that states or denies the existence of that state of affairs. From the above mentioned distinction of both types of representation descends this further distinction, central to our reflections: *a representation of factual states of affairs can give the content of an assertion, whereas the representation of an object cannot* (…), or, in Meinong's object theory terms we shall say that the content of a prepresentation of factual states of affairs is an "objective". (ibid., 469)

By these means, that comes to be stated which is known as the empirical criterion of significance, and which is thus assumed to warrant a solution for the confrontation between Realism and Idealism, thanks to the possibility to outline the analysis of mutual interactions between the phenomenon of the real object and the psychical character of spiritual objects, as well as that of the problem of the essence of concept constructions.[15]

At this point, Carnap builds up his objectivity criterion, since a causal relationship and a constitution system acquire a knowledge-theoretical value; as a consequence, he highlights the definition of a relationship between the physical world of phenomena and facts on the one hand and the psychical dimension on the other, and he insists on the translatability of mental states into assertions relative to the body and psyche.[16]

To conclude, we deem Moritz Schlick's final analysis of factual states of affairs and Realism illuminating; indeed, in such works as *Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre* (*Form and Content*), philosophy of knowledge addresses the analysis of the phenomenal manifold and the mechanisms reproducing "facts" in thought. The function of

---

[14] C. U. Moulines, *Hintergrunde der Erkenntnistheorie des frühen Carnaps, "*Grazer philosophische Studien" 23, 1985; cf. M. Manotta, *L'obiettivo di Meinong tra proposizione e stato di cose,* in "Discipline filosofiche" 1997, 211–236.

[15] Peter Galison, *Constructing Modernism: The Cultural Location of Aufbau*, in *Origins of Logical Empiricism*, Part I The Cultural and Philosophical Context, a cura di Ronald N. Giere and Alan W. Richardson, editors, "Minnessionota" Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume XVI, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, London 1996, pp. 17–45.

[16] R. Carnap, *Psychologie in physikalischer Sprache*, "Erkenntnis", 3, 1932, 107–142.

science is thus preserved, in the attempt to recognize (*wiedererkennen*) phenomenal "facts", even though these present themselves in their incompleteness.

The issue about realism along with that concerning the concept of world are tightly connected with the constitution system: the concept of reality, thought, and the conceptualization this undergoes deal with *kennen* (to know or experience something), than is with an interconnection of concepts and judgements concerning the conception of psychophysical parallelism as well, namely the issue about this is understood in its problematic character with reference to the essence of knowing. With this in mind, it all comes down to outline a possible confrontation between a scientific perspective and that of *Allwörter*, namely universals, which in Carnap's account is extra-scientific and yet proves crucial especially on the pre-categorial level.

> Most formulations of wide use in the *inhaltliche Redeweise* depend on the use of universal terms. Universal words very easily lead to pseudoproblems (…). For instance, philosophers from antiquity to the present have connected with the universal term "number" deep researches and disputes (…). And similarly, numerous pseudoproblems have been posed with regard to the nature of space and time; and this not only by speculative metaphysicians (up to the present time), but by some philosophers (amongst whom Kant) as well, one whose knowledge-theoretical stances were manifestly directed toward empirical science (…). We may recall the large amount of merely apparent questions and speculations about the nature of both physical and psychical reality. And *Scheinfragen* about relations and properties, and with them the entire controversy about universals rest upon the seduction of *Allwörter*. All pseudoproblems of this kind fade away when we use the formal, instead of the content mode of expression, and thus use in the formulations of problems instead of universals term as ("number", "space", "universal"), syntactic words corresponding to those ("numerical expression", "spatial coordinate", "predicate") (*Logische Syntax der Sprache*, 415–416).

In Carnap's analysis the problem of depiction < or substitution > (*Stellvertretung*), referring to judgements about the structure of facts and as such confronts them not so much regarding contents as structural relationships, and appears to solve Russell's issues about knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description in terms that permit to avoid that distinction and that only refer to the issue about judgement and reality.

And in this respect, through Carnap's analysis of experience and external reality we open up new philosophical horizons for discussion about scientific positivism.

Part IV

Nature: Sealing the Humanness. Applying Phenomenology of Life to a Romanian Artistic Work

Carmen Cozma

Abstract The geo-cosmic is a fundamental thesis in the territory of Phenomenology of Life of Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka. The great post-Husserlian project of the "Ontopoiesis of Life and the Human Condition" that the contemporary philosopher has acknowledged over the last decades in world-wide phenomenology offers us crucial ideas as regards the defining seal of the nature in making and manifesting the creative potential of human beingness/becoming. Our aim is to bring out part of the original contribution of Tymieniecka in getting pivots of a deep hermeneutics of art, under the signs of the cosmic vision, by applying it to a famous musical work of George Enescu. The *Romanian Rhapsody Nr.1 for orchestra* represents a relevant artistic creation inspired by the experience of the fundamental relation between man and nature. It is an artistic form of disclosing the application of Tymienieckan thesis about the understanding of humanness' shaping and manifestation as "self-interpretation in life", by linking to the matrix of nature. We get this Enescian artistic work to activating an insight through the musical language concerning the intimacy of humanness resulting within the *cosmos* as the ordering frame in which – as much as we have the access – we can catch part of a fitted understanding of the positioning-of-human being(ness)-in-life.

We start by addressing an invitation to spend a few minutes by listening to a musical work, to reflect upon it and to try to comprehend ourselves as part – and not apart – of

C. Cozma (✉)
"Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University of Iasi, Romania
(this is my home address:
Str. Lascar Catargi, 46, Sc.A, et.II, ap.6, Iasi 700107, Romania)
e-mail: carmen.cozma@uaic.ro

A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), *Phenomenology and the Human Positioning in the Cosmos: The Life-world, Nature, Earth: Book One*, Analecta Husserliana 113,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-4801-9_14,

the immeasurable cosmos. We discover ourselves in a particular situation of grasping some of the "logos of life" manifestations – the central concept of Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka's outstanding Phenomenology of Life.

The position of man in the natural web of life is a leitmotiv of Tymienieckan philosophy, inscribing itself in a precious continuity of the beginnings of cosmological philosophizing, for example that of Platonic theory about "the nature of the whole/the universe" ("της του ολου φυσεως").[1]

The intimate relationship of man with the earth, generally, and the articulations of a real philosophizing style upon the cosmos and the creative humanness can be discovered through the artistic musical productions, in the framework of a phenomenological hermeneutics that we are dealing with in this paper. We selected one of the most beautiful scores in the world history of music, belonging to George Enescu – the founder of the national school of the Romanian music during the end of the nineteenth century. We have been tempted to unfold an endeavor to ascertaining the great relevance of the above mentioned pivotal thesis of Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka's phenomenology, applied to the *Romanian Rhapsody Nr.1 for orchestra* of George Enescu.

Certainly, we need to experience the peculiar mode of human living – an aesthetical and ethical one, alike – by following the signs of a cosmological holistic perspective during the musical audience of the Enescian music.

In contact with *music*, a spiritual tumult invades our entire beingness; and we are revealed to ourselves in a new and unknown previously way. Face to face with the harmonious sounds organized in logical structures under the laws of musical composition, that make the status of an artistic *text* eventually, we find opportunities, maybe the best possible, to activate our unique capacity to participate in, to understand and to interpret the *life's expanse*. We put ourselves in a situation of a much better self-knowledge and comprehension, by the hermeneutic polarity of "proximity and detachment".[2] During a musical audition, we reach to get the chance of living the "absolute moment" – that means "at the same time, self-denial and self-mediation". According to Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Everything that tears one away from anything, concomitantly does restore the whole of totality of being; and thus, the subject installs himself in the profundity of meaning's continuity".[3]

By listening to music, man experiences a sort of universal communication, attending the roots of a *major onto-ethical truth of life* – a concretization of the workings of the "logos of life", in terms of Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka[4]: the Human Condition is inventing itself and is affirming in the world by carrying – among other things – the seal of Nature.

Two plans, the "first" and the "second" – using Nicolai Hartmann's aesthetical language – are working together, in the accomplishment of *musical art*, within the process of intuition and comprehension in creating a unitary view of this complex phenomenon. Enjoying the contact with an audio-sensitive matter, the listener deciphers a spiritual content molded into an artistic form. This content, its sense and the force by which a *musical work* preserves and increases its identity over the time are revealed through the examination of the "relation between these plans in their pure

connection",[5] throughout an analysis of the whole *musical experience*. Thus, we can speak about the relation between the material elements of the structure of musical language and what is 'unreal' behind the spiritual elements of the plan.

Hence, a question comes into profile: What is the reason for *music's life*? What is its genesis, development, strength; actually, its undoubted value throughout its evolution over the millennia?

We maintain that the *ethos* accompanied by the *cosmic logos* constitutes the ground of music art's existence; it is the *ethos* – "rather than the eidos",[6] which assures even the 'ontique-ontologique' differentiation (acknowledged by Martin Heidegger in his philosophy of Being). In discussion is the intimate relation between manifestation/external structuring and intelligibility/internal foundation, between phenomenal existence and subtle essence.

Beyond the empirical domain, that of the organized sounds in melody, harmony, and rhythm, we can examine the substratum of the interiority within which a plenitude of *ethical values* gets their home, encompassing the humanness. For more than 15 years, we have set up the concept of the *meloethics*.[7] It is a complex philosophical construct, a structural-dynamical unity of the components: *mélos*/μελος – song, melody; by extension: music; and *èthiké*/ηθικη – moral, which belongs to ethics; herein, the system of moral values. The concept of the *meloethics* supposes the coexistence of both the previously mentioned elements, by the recognition of each identity in part, as well as their connection on the one hand, and the active relation between them and the whole, on the other hand. Fully speaking, the *meloethics* imposes its effect on us by the musical totality of creation-performance-audition.

The entire history of musical art offers good arguments for the interaction of musical creation and moral values. We discover its beginning in the framework of the Ancient Greeks' *theory of musical ethos* that has influenced all the further evolution of any attempt to theorize the art of harmonious organized sounds. A valuable conception is one which focuses on art as *mimesis/μιμησις poiesis/ποιησις* and *catharsis/καθαρσις*; more explicitly, it is the conception of art considered to be *imitation, creation* and *purification*.[8] The Pythagorean doctrine of the "music of the spheres" and the idea of universal harmony expressed by the concept of number, further developed by Plato and Aristotle, also by the Peripathetics and Stoics – like a theory which admits an immediate correspondence between the phenomenon of music and the movements of the soul – have recognized the peculiar *moral expression and power of music*.[9]

The *meloethics* enlightens us even about the initial used term to designating the music; namely: *hàrmonía/αρμονια*.[10] English speaking, the *harmony* is a very significant term, brought to perfection by the Socratic ideal regarding "consciousness as Virtue". In his turn, speaking about the "authentic music" that is claimed by free people, Plato has defined harmony as the expression of a purified love, of the most noble impulses of human being towards virtue. Therefore, the cultivation of the music must be in concord with the cultivation of the cardinal virtues: courage, temperance, justice and wisdom. Otherwise, among the Ancients, Aristotle was inquiring: "is not the music rather a way to reach the Virtue?"[11]

Briefly, the original notion that has been used for music art, *hàrmonía*, must be got in the sense of equilibrium, symmetry, measure, order, carrying to a complete *moral significance for virtue* – as the excellence of man on the trajectory of fulfilling the elevated level of humanness, as "self-individualization" and "self-creation" in life, as Tymieniecka features the process of human becoming in the unique function of creativity as the "Archimedean point of life" in "a vision of the All".[12]

We could extend our understanding of the profound unity: *cosmos-logos-ethos* that is contained in the most abstract and free art by resorting to some interesting examples from philosophical thinking. For the instant, we just emphasize some coordinates in supporting the concept of *meloethics* – a veritable pathway for anyone who wants to appropriate the ontological nucleus significance of *music art.*

The statement of the *meloethics* has a distinctive sign through the manifestation of the aspiration to an *ideal of existence*, by working up the *feeling of life* to a superior level. And this is, foremost, an *ethical ideal* defining even the ontology of musical creation under the auspices of "making and re-making the *human* unity".[13]

Generally, all *musical works* can be related to *universal human values*, conceived in their *ethical-philosophical determinants*, in the horizon of: utility, pleasure, happiness; and, correspondingly, belonging to three *ethical doctrines*: Utilitarianism, Hedonism and Eudaemonism. Thus, we disclose something of the deep meaning of the humanness, as aspiration, but also as settling down in life; and, consequently, a way is unveiled into the sense-bestowing to our existence and its achievement.

In the area of axiology, *moral values* are brought into bold relief by the theory of artistic musical phenomena, linking not only to the *specificity of musical art*, but also to the *source*, the *genesis*, the *existence of musical works*, to their *message* and *effect*; also, to the *creative process*, the *intention* and the *personality of the subject able to compose music*; and, last but not least, to the *capacities of the subject who listens to the music*.

Certainly, our primary interest is focusing on the *positive ethical values* that cannot be separated from the *humanness* of man and human culture; values like *love* and *communion*, *joy of living*, *dignity, devotion, wisdom, freedom* and *happiness*, the *aspiration towards Good and Beauty, towards harmony and order, towards Logos* – "the Logos of Life" – circumscribing the entire spread of life – as much as we have the access –, in which man and nature/micro-cosmos and macro-cosmos are in dialectical identity – that supposes, at the same time: difference and sameness.

Undoubtedly, getting a real power to convey even the Idea, the "being", in its status of "royal art" – so speaking after Schopenhauer[14] -, *music* reveals us the mysterious principle of existence, making to be heard the voice of *humanity*, the *ideal* of the supreme *general human fulfillment*. The art of harmonious sounds is developing in connection with the cultural and moral evolution of man, by respecting the nature's laws. It is accompanying him at the highest degree of accuracy in which that is for ever the most significant thing to him: *his humanness*, specifically, in the felt tension between what *he is* and what *he should be* and *he would like to be*.

By *music art* we can discover and grasp the action of the creative and moral *liberty* making the uniqueness of our *human condition*. It is the place where we find a great

example for Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka's philosophy about the *creative act* of human being: actually, the core of the "Ontopoiesis of Human Condition".[15]

The magnificent philosophical conception of the author of *Logos and Life* offers us some original opportunities in using the phenomenological apparatus as a fruitful one in the temptation of understanding the rich and in-depth meanings of works of art. Phenomenology of Life contains important elements for both a style of philosophizing upon art, and a method of approach the arts' products, en-lightening our capacities of interpretation-explanation-comprehension of the *humanness* living in relation with the artistic works.

The Tymienieckan manner of philosophizing allows us to encompass much more and much better, deeper and more comprehensive the wholeness of *life* in its meaningfulness as regards the message that is carried by the works of art – that represent, eventually, concrete manifestations of the "logos of life", the "*sense of sense*".[16]

The complex experience in our relatedness to music art is, first of all, one of a sensitive living, followed by wondering, feeling, reflecting, remembering, cognition, valuating, by focusing on the *meaning*'s disclosure and appropriation; making possible the communication and, above all, the *communion* through the awareness of self-experience and no less of the inter-subjective one with the others – humans and nonhumans -, and no less of the opening towards the transcendent referential, too, in a global and dynamic, in an authentic *living* vision. Moving throughout the *unity of living*, to which Gadamer refers, considering the situation that "the work of art wrests the living subject from the life's concatenation, but concomitantly it re-connects the living subject to the totality of existence".[17]

Especially, for man-(the) listener to music, a peculiar *living* is due to the artistic products he is encountering. *Living* means to spring out from the very own self, to transcend the immediate reality, to enjoy the beauty of a unique experience of life. By contemplating art, man exercises a particular form of participating to the meaning of life and of the human condition. The auditor places himself "in the realm of meaning's continuity … which gathers the work of art and the world existence", seeing that "which does wrest the human being from everything, no less it does restore its entire beingness too".[18]

More than any other kind of human artistic expression, *music* is re-presentation, the essential one for the *humanness* of man. For the one who lives the *experience of music*, the labor is one of sensory-emotional comprehension – first of all, by listening to the music – , of meditation upon what has been heard and kept in memory, and after all, of reasoning in order to judge and valuate. This path passes from initial vagueness and spontaneity to clarity and to the integration of the harmonious organization of sounds' substance.

The ethos of music is one of becoming conscious, of amazing and interrogating, of raising problems. Contemplating the sensible musical reality, we secure access to the authentic *human* being. The pathway is one moving *from* and only *through* the sensible existence to the essential *being in the horizon of humanness* – the great work of self-creation of human being in its effort to "self-individualization", "self-explication in existence" and "self-interpretation in life".[19]

By his creations, the composer demonstrates a high level of *generosity, respect* and *duty's filling*, of *sympathy* and *solidarity*, of *communication and sharing in love* with the whole of existence; giving one of the most eloquent image of that status of man as "Custodian of everything-there-is-alive".[20]

Putting into action a twofold attitude of *autonomy* and *relationship*, the musician-creator essentializes an inner and outer world by the fact that he is able to mark the *human becoming* in the horizon of the *kallon kai agathon*/καλλον και αγαθον; respectively, the ideal of the Beauty and the Good illuminating the human life that is developing in relation with the nature life. At the same time, he intensifies the faith in the divine seed putted in man by the Creator – the seed that deserves to be uncovered up through a continuous formative endeavor.

By a very strong psychical resonance, which challenges the listener in living serious effects on his emotions, feelings, thoughts, reactions – producing a *total living experience*, by the "movements of the soul",[21] connected to the earth, to the soil, vegetation, minerals, water, air, etc., the *music art* unveils itself in its *ethical substratum*, helping the human being to inscribe on his/her experience the mark of a vital progress, to work upon the self towards a conquest of the *meaning of life*. Phenomenology of Life comes with a fruitful perspective in approaching the comprehension of music art, in understanding much more as regards the possibility of transcending the daily existence and rising in the superior horizon of the ideal living, enacting our faculties to reaching a superior situation. By the "three movements of the soul toward transcendence": the "radical examination", the "exalted existence" and the "transcending movement" – as Tymieniecka does submit – , the person is revealed in its creative orchestration, on the way of enlightening its innermost destiny, leading itself to a new form of existence: that of *human well-being* in its own strength to self-fulfilling. By these steps in interpretation the work of art, generally, we get even a good trajectory to be followed towards the experience of the universal values of life, through the living of the "absolute moment" that supposes at the same time discontinuity and jump from the usual existence, and return in the deepest territory of enrooting in a valuable continuity.

In Book 3 of Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka's "river-like" treatise *Logos and Life*, a threefold division is mentioned. It can be very well activated for a phenomenological investigation of art; in connection with the intentional cognitive acts: "wonder(ment)" – metaphysics, "fabulation" – aesthetics, and "idealization" – moral theory.[22] Precisely, guided by the Tymienieckan vision in three steps to exploring art, we pass through the intentional acts-moments: (1) *wonder(ment)* – that is the "essential stance" of humankind facing the marvels of existence. This is a form of enchantment, the launching point of human spirit in its turn towards philosophical speculation; (2) *fabulation* – that opens to the level of two species: "fabulae" of philosophy and of literature. The first type engages the intention to discover "the positive truth about life, human existence and destiny, and the universe". The second species of "fabulae" refer to "prototypical human character, conduct, societal organization, visions of humanity" able, by literary interpretation, to serve as models of cultural styles; and (3) *idealization* – that implies the "moral ideals", which is a production, so needed in configuring novel ethical situations in existence. Here comes the value of

"authenticity" of human being in assuming a responsible creative destiny in the world, as "Custodian of All is alive"[23]; and such a role implies an acute sense as regards the man's affiliation to a geo-cosmic existential order.

We think that the *experience of life exercised thanks to the musical art* represents a very effective pathway of seeing the ideal that comes also from the model of the superior cosmic order – and not chaos! –, of inserting it in the womb of reality; and, eventually, to assure our right *human measure*, leading towards our self-education process that relates with our very own beingness, with others, with society and nature. Solitude, but at the same time unity with everything that exists in a common world, beyond our strict individuality; restlessness, but also reconciliation; stumbles, failures, but also *impetus* and *equipoise*; critical judgment, but also obedience to the laws of life – all of these is manifested and developed by the unique experience that a human being may live thanks to the *music art*.

Over the centuries, magnificent composers like J.S. Bach and Händel, Mozart and Beethoven, Tchaikovsky and Dvõrak, Mahler and Richard Strauss, Debussy and Enescu imposed themselves as *musicians* – a category that, in a Platonic sense, implies the status of "authentic *Sages*". They have given us a veritable lesson of an *onto-ethical experience of living* in resonance with all the *geo-cosmic* architectonic of life. Their impressive works, as long as they can be listened to, illustrate the value of our concept of the *meloethics* that registers itself in the vision of the "Ontopoiesis of Life's development" of the monumental phenomenological work of Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka.

Metaphysics, ontology, anthropology, ethics, aesthetics, epistemology – as briefly we could designate the Phenomenology of the "logos of life" – come together with the cosmological view of Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka. It is a view giving an instrument of analyzing music, generally; and in this case, we propose that the in so far exposition to be applied in comprehending the musical audition of the first *Romanian Rhapsody* for orchestra, in A Major, op.11, by George Enescu.

As each of us, as listeners, would realize, the seal of nature can be experienced in its fullness in this early work of George Enescu, that has been written when the composer was 19 years old. The genius of the Romanian musical culture chose an instrumental fantasy in folkloric style to express his homesickness, by remembering – within the musical language – the geo-cosmic space to which he belongs. The *Romanian Rhapsody in A Major* reveals part of the peculiar "spatial horizon", the so-called "mioritic/pastoral space" in the metaphysics of Lucian Blaga.[24]

A phenomenological scrutiny allows us to disclose an entire cultural universe, sealed by the nature, especially by the *soil* in which human beingness is grounded; respectively, the *soil* marking the complex process of "self-individualization in existence", nurturing and shaping, in this case, the Romanian character, its particular *ethos*. The three intentional acts molding the "passions of the soul" in connection with the "elements in the ontopoiesis of culture": *wonder(ment)*, *fabulation* and *idealization* are at stake. The creative humanness manifests itself as being deeply linked to the *soil*. Speaking in terms of Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, we can identify the *soil* as the "naturally polysignificant living space", as "the dwelling place on earth shared by all living beings" in which man is encircled, and no less from which

man elevates himself to the transcendence. All is happening under the action of "*impetus* and *equipoise*" principles of the "logos of life".[25]

Considering the music of George Enescu and the spatial vision of Lucian Blaga's philosophy, the characteristics of an "infinite and rhythmic wavy horizon", with the alternation of "climbing and slope" in a discreet tonality is unveiled together with the sense of "longing": the Romanian hypostasis of human existence, "a trans-horizontal aspiration; the beingness which completely flows towards *something*".[26]

A large scale of the experience of life showing the positioning of man in the cosmos is highlighting throughout the *Romanian Rhapsody*, *op.11*. This music moves the listener between gravity and witticism, melancholy and joy, meditation and action, in a general atmosphere of light, optimism, love of life, happiness; eventually, it gives an integrator and dynamic image of the Apollonian perspective that is worthy to be appropriated and cultivated by the *human creative condition* demonstrating a clear consciousness upon life and upon the status of man in the world as the most responsible participant to the maintenance, the protection and the development of nature's life, as "Custodian of everything there is alive".

By listening to George Enescu's *Rhapsody Nr.1*, we have an opportunity to disclose the truth of Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka's thesis about the "all-alive-unity" and the "nature's harmony", about the *entelechial* principle of life in its "ontopoietic design", and the distinct sign of man who has to inscribe an equilibrium of forces between nature and culture into the flux of life by his *creative potential*. Finally, we get a wise and enlightening opportunity to catch the bold ideas of Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka focusing on "the life-positional horizons of beingness and their orbits: geo-cosmic – ontopoietic – creative – sacral" and on "the human soul in the cosmos and the cosmos in the human soul".[27] And, not lastly, we experience our very own possibility to questioning "the human positioning in the cosmos".

Notes

1. Plato, *Phaedo*, 270c.
2. See Paul Ricoeur, *Du texte à l'action. Essais d'herméneutique, II*, Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1986.
3. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode*. Band 1 und Band 2 (1960). Romanian translation: *Adevăr şi Metodă*, Bucharest: Editura Teora, 2001, pp.106; 109.
4. See Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, *Logos and Life*, Books 1–4, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988–2000.
5. Nicolai Hartmann, *Ästhetik* (1953). Romanian translation: *Estetica*, Bucharest: Editura Univers, 1974, pp. 104–105.
6. See Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, *Logos and Life*. Book 4: *Impetus and Equipoise in the Life-Strategies of Reason*, Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000, pp. 525–568.
7. See Carmen Cozma, *Meloeticul. Eseu semiotic asupra valorilor morale ale creaţiei artistice musicale/The Meloethics. A Semiotic Essay upon the Moral Values of the Musical Creation*, Jassy: Editura Junimea, 1996.
8. See Aristotle, *Poetics*.

9. See, for example, Jules Combarieu, *Histoire de la musique*, Tome I, Paris: Librairie Armand Colin 1930; Th.Reinach, *La musique grecque*, Paris: Payot, 1926; Curt Sachs, *The Rise of Music in the Ancient World*, New York: W.W. Norton & Comp., 1969.
10. See Diogenes Laertius, *Lives and Doctrines of Eminent Philosophers*.
11. Aristotle, *Politics*. Romanian translation: *Politica*, Bucharest: Editura Cultura Națională, 1924, pp. 196–197.
12. See Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, "Measure and the Ontopoietic Self-Individualization of Life," in *Phenomenological Inquiry*, Volume 19, Belmont, MA, 1995, pp. 26–51.
13. Edmond Buchet, *Connaissance de la musique*, Paris: Editions Corrêa, 1940, p. 246.
14. See Arthur Schopenhauer, *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, volume II. Romanian translation: *Lumea ca voință şi reprezentare*, Jassy: Editura Moldova, 1995.
15. See Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, *Logos and Life*. Book 1: *Creative Experience and the Critique of Reason*, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988.
16. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, *The Fullness of the Logos in the Key of Life*. Book I: *The Case of God in the New Enlightenment*, Dordrecht: Springer, 2009, p. xxvi.
17. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *op.cit*., p.63.
18. *Ibidem*, pp. 103–110.
19. See Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, "The Creative Self and the Other in Man's Self-Interpretation", in Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (ed.), *Analecta Husserliana*, Volume VI, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1977.
20. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, "Phenomenology of Life and the Critique of Reason: From Husserl's Philosophy to the Phenomenology of Life and the Human Condition", in Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (ed.), *Analecta Husserliana*, Volume XXIX, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990, p. 16.
21. See Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, *Logos and Life*. Book 2: *The Three Movements of the Soul*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988.
22. See Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, *Logos and Life*, Book 3: *The Passions of the Soul and the Elements in the Ontopoiesis of Culture. The Life Significance of Literature*, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990.
23. *Ibidem*, pp. 18–137.
24. See Lucian Blaga, *Trilogia culturii/Trilogy of Culture*, in *Opere/Works*, volume 9, Bucharest: Editura Minerva, 1985.
25. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, *Logos and Life*. Book 4: *Impetus and Equipoise in the Life-Strategies of Reason*, *op.cit*., pp. 145–148.
26. Lucian Blaga, *op.cit.*, p. 294.
27. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, *The Fullness of the Logos in the Key of Life*. Book I: *The Case of God in the New Enlightenment*, *op.cit.*, pp. 125–211.

References

Aristotle. 1924. *Politics*. Romanian translation: *Politica.* Bucharest: Editura Cultura Națională.

Aristotle, *Poetics*.

Blaga, Lucian. 1985. *Trilogia culturii/Trilogy of Culture.* In *Opere/Works*, Vol. 9, Bucharest: Editura Minerva.

Buchet, Edmond. 1940. *Connaissance de la musique*. Paris: Editions Corrêa.

Cozma, Carmen. 1996. *Meloeticul. Eseu semiotic asupra valorilor morale ale creației artistice muzicale/The Meloethics. A Semiotic Essay upon the Moral Values of the Musical Creation*. Jassy: Editura Junimea.

Diogenes Laertius, *Lives and Doctrines of Eminent Philosophers*.

Gadamer, Hans-Georg. 2001. *Wahrheit und Methode*. Band 1 und Band 2 (1960). Romanian translation: *Adevăr şi Metodă.* Bucharest: Editura Teora.
Hartmann, Nicolai. 1974. *Ästhetik* (1953). Romanian translation: *Estetica.* Bucharest: Editura Univers.
Plato, *Phaedo*.
Ricoeur, Paul. 1986. *Du texte à l'action. Essais d'herméneutique, II*. Paris: Editions du Seuil.
Schopenhauer, Arthur.1995. *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, Vol. II. Romanian translation: *Lumea ca voinţă şi reprezentare.* Jassy: Editura Moldova.
Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa. 1977. "The Creative Self and the Other in Man's Self-Interpretation". In *Analecta Husserliana*, vol. VI, ed. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa. 1988a. *Logos and Life*. Book 1: *Creative Experience and the Critique of Reason*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa. 1988b. *Logos and Life*. Book 2: *The Three Movements of the Soul*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa. 1990a. *Logos and Life*, Book 3: *The Passions of the Soul and the Elements in the Ontopoiesis of Culture. The Life Significance of Literature*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa. 1990b. "Phenomenology of Life and the Critique of Reason: From Husserl's Philosophy to the Phenomenology of Life and the Human Condition". In *Analecta Husserliana*, vol. XXIX, ed. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa. 1995. "Measure and the Ontopoietic Self-Individualization of Life". In *Phenomenological inquiry*, Vol. 19, Belmont.
Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa. 2000. *Logos and Life*. Book 4: *Impetus and Equipoise in the Life-Strategies of Reason*. Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa. 2009. *The Fullness of the Logos in the Key of Life*. Book I: *The Case of God in the New Enlightenment*. Dordrecht: Springer.

The Path of Truth: From Absolute to Reality, from Point to Circle

Konul Bunyadzade

Abstract The Unity of Idea is one, simple and indivisible. In this respect, the Unity of Idea could be compared with the point. At the same time, each man is unique individual in himself. He also creates within the limits of the power that the Absolute Creator has bestowed upon him. Although, as a material and spiritual being, he is the unity of several ideas, he is a carrier of the idea of one man as a whole. From this point of view, man also could be compared with the point.

So it is possible to view the point from two perspectives: as the starting point and as the last point. This, in turn, means that although the point is simple, different approaches could explain the different aspects and essence of the point.

The point will be explained from these two perspectives: as one idea, as the beginning of the creation process and as the particle which is contained in the essence of all beings. The point will be viewed as the beginning of the cognitive process and as the being that could get in itself the knowledge about all other beings.

The processes of creation and cognition happen between two points – they are unfolded in one point and become united in another one. One point is merely the Absolute and Unity and another one is relative and multiple. The relation between two points is possible directly through the straight line, and indirectly through the circle. It is true that some thinkers, especially Christian philosophers, also talk about the relation through the triangle. However, it should be also mentioned that the triangle is a means that leads to the circle.

K. Bunyadzade (✉)
East-West Research Center, Baku, Azerbaijan
e-mail: bkonul885@hotmail.com

A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), *Phenomenology and the Human Positioning in the Cosmos: The Life-world, Nature, Earth: Book One*, Analecta Husserliana 113,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-4801-9_15,

Introduction

The idea of everything precedes its material manifestations and is more perfect. The idea of all spiritual and material beings appeared as the Unity of Idea in the Absolute Being-the Idea which was the first one created by the Absolute Being and which stands a stage lower than Him only.[1]

For the reason that the Unity of Idea is closer to God than any other being, sometimes they have not been separated, but they have been accepted as the same. The views of the thinkers, who accepted this sameness, have been also understood as pantheism. However, for us, no matter from what standpoint it is viewed, the Unity of Idea is the only idea which lies behind the very essence and beginning of the creation process, and all relative ideas are derived from it. It is not accepted in al-Suhrawardi's philosophy of Illumination (Ishraqism), for example, that multiplicity emanates from the Light of lights because of His unity, as well as it is impossible for the form or two lights to be caused by darkness. The first thing which emanates from Him is one abstract light.[2]

It is worth reminding that the first created being has been expressed with different terms in different worldviews. Some thinkers has called it 'the first element' as the first of all contingent beings and their cause, or it is called in peripatetism 'the universal intellect (al-aql al-kulli)' in terms of its being the intelligence of the whole universe, or 'the existence of the whole (everything)' as the cause of the existence of distant planets and 'the motion of everything' as the cause of the motion of planets and etc.. Hegel, in turn, generally considers that '…Reason governs the world. With this we understand that reason is the spirit of the world, remains in it and it has immanent essence and true inner nature'.[3] Views and terms have been changed from time to time, but what is unchanging is truth itself.

Thus the Unity of Idea is one, simple and indivisible. In this respect, the Unity of Idea could be compared with the point. At the same time, each man is unique individual in himself. He also creates within the limits of the power that the Absolute Creator has bestowed upon him. Although, as a material and spiritual being, he is the unity of several ideas, he is a carrier of the idea of one man as a whole. From this point of view, man also could be compared with the point. That is to say, the point is the expression of both macrocosm and microcosm. So it is possible to view the point from two perspectives: as the starting point and as the last point. This, in turn, means that although the point is simple, different approaches could explain the different aspects and essence of the point.

We will explain the point from these two perspectives, that is, we will explain it as a unit idea, as the beginning of the creation process and as the particle which is contained in the essence of all beings. The point will be viewed as the beginning of the cognitive process and as the being that could get in itself the knowledge about all other beings.

The Point According to Medieval Eastern and Western Thinkers

It is possible to encounter the comparison of the Unity of Idea with the point in the works of Eastern and Western thinkers. Ali ibn Abu Talib was the first who spoke on the point: 'What is in the Holy Qur'an is in the first chapter (Surah Fatiha); what is in this surah (chapter) is in the first verse (Bismillah)[4]; what is in **Bismillah** is in its first letter (Ba) and I am the point below **ba**'.[5] By saying 'I', of course, Imam Ali meant the human being who can penetrate all knowledge, as it said in the Qur'an, 'and He taught Adam all the names' (2/31). Later on, this idea was developed further by Mansur al-Hallaj. He says: the point is the basis of every line and the line, in turn, is the collection of points. The point is necessary for the line, and vice versa. Every straight and curved line moves from the point. Everyone sees what is on it and it is a point between two points. It is a proof of the manifestation of the Truth in everything that is seen and observed. For this very reason I said as follows: 'I have seen nothing in everything but God'.[6]

Then, the point is the essence and the truth of every being. The line is the point which has gained form. The point could be cognized by being materially framed, that is, by creating the line. However, the point that al-Hallaj mentioned is not the Absolute Being (God) but is the proof of His existence in everything: 'the true point manifests itself only for giving evidence for its truth, and accordingly, giving evidence for the truth is for proving the argument for Truth itself'.[7]al-Hallaj describes his attitude by using the following diagram:

 [8]

The letter alif-أ shows the One and the letters dal –د– indicate creatures,[9] that is, alif-أ-the long line is the description of One God (الله) and His eternity and dal –د– is the description of the evidences (دليل) within the limits of Him, or the description of the world (دنيا). It means that the point is the cross point of this being with the divine line and also it is the essence that created it. For this very reason, the thinker takes the point within the frame of human thought. However, the true nature of the words of God, the letters of which are 'neither in Arabic nor in Persian',[10] is more extensive than human thought. Then, as is seen from the diagram, every being and every man has its own point, and as al-Hallaj says 'the point resembles its founder'.[11]

Another movement, which was established in the Islamic East, *al-Nuqtaviyya* thought that 'the Qur'an consists of 28 letters and their meaning is in *alif*-أ and the meaning of *alif* meaning is in the point. The point is the beginning of man, and man, in turn, is the beginning of all beings'.[12] At first glance, their view seems to be similar to that of Ali ibn Abu Talib, but, in fact, there are significant differences between them.

For *Nuqtaviyya* which was established by Mahmud Pasikhani, who was the disciple of the founder of *Hurufism*, Fazlallah Astarabadi, 'all beings are in unity, as well as the unity is in the point, and the point, in turn, is in the Earth. The Earth

constantly changes and moves. All beings as well as the heavens which are the important and pre-eternal point for the Earth, are in the relationship with the Earth'. All things that have form and body are the manifestations of particles as well as they are permanent and exist only in this world. It has various forms (mineral, plant, etc.).[13] The circular development line is directed towards the human being and is the basis for every form.[14]

As is seen, although both in Nuqtawiyya and in the views of al-Hallaj, the point expresses the human essence, in *Nuqtawiyya* this point is the beginning of all beings and in Hallaj, in turn, it is ascribed to the human being. The unity in *Nuqtawiyya* is in the point. In the description of al-Hallaj, in turn, the point is not the unity itself but its evidence and *maqam* (station). Eventually, unlike *Nuqtawiyya*, which is mainly based on materilasim and rational thinking, the views of al-Hallaj have irrational characteristics and they are the descriptions of a world which stands above matter.

The point was also discussd in Christian philosophy. For Nicholas of Cusa (1401–1464) ' there is not more than one point. This one point is not anything other than infinite oneness; for infinite oneness is a point which is the end, the perfection, and the totality of line and quantity, which it enfolds'.[15] He also emphasizs that ' in numbering, it is necessary to come to a minimum than which there cannot be a lesser, viz., oneness. And since there cannot be anything lesser than oneness, oneness will be an unqualifiedly minimum, which, by virtue of the considerations just presented, coincides with the maximum'.[16] It is interesting that Nicholas of Cusa express his views by means of the following drawing:



Explaining the scheme, he wrote: ' Next, note that Simple Oneness, which here symbolizes God, has contact with four circles: viz., the maximum circle of the *universe*, the circle of the loftiest *world*, the circle of the loftiest *order*, and the circle of the loftiest *choir*'.[17] It is worth emphasizing that for the philosopher 'the entire power of our mind ought to focus on refining the concept of oneness, for the entire multitude of things knowable depends upon the knowledge of oneness'.[18]

Firstly, unlike Nicholas of Cusa the followers of *Nuqtaviyya* do not accept the Creator and the act of creation. The unity that they accept is not the unity with God, but the unity between material beings. Secondly, for them, the point is the Earth (the four elements) but in Nicholas of Cusa is God. Furthermore, what is of concern in Nicholas of Cusa is the identity of minimum and maximum or the

world and God, but *Noqtawwiyya* identifies the notion of the world with the notion of man.

As to the comparison of Nicholas of Cusa and al-Hallaj, it should be mentioned, first of all, that for both philosophers the point is irrational and its cognition is possible only with over-consciousness. At the same time, the point is maximum for both of them. However, it is the Absolute Being in Nicholas of Cusa and is the maximum of the (both rational and irrational) thought of the created one in al-Hallaj. For Nicholas of Cusa, this maximum is also a minimum and it includes all created beings as well as the human being (ontologically and epistemologically). For Al-Hallaj, also it is the divine essence of the human being, that is, it is the microcosm that includes all things. Namely, it is a minimum but is not a maximum in absolute sense. In addition, although the point in the thought of Nicholas of Cusa is an enfolded and perfect form of the line and all things, it is the evidence of the unity of the relative being with the Absolute Being as well as it is changeable depending on the personality of everyone. For this reason, the point is one in Nicholas of Cusa, but is as many as the number of beings in Hallaj.

The Creation Process from the Absolute to the Relative

According to the sources, the creation process happens in stages. It is possible to observe it clearly in the philosophy of Plotinus as well as in Sufism, Illuminationism (Ishraqism) and in a number of other philosophical systems. There is no general opinion among thinkers on the number of stages. However, we will direct our attention to the same truths between views.

Firstly, the first point-the Unity of Idea is one, perfect and entire. At the same time it includes the multiplicity in itself.

The direction in all creation hierarchies is from the highest to the lowest as well as from the non-material to the material and from the perfect to the imperfect. Plato, for instance, considers the things that exist in the material world as the shadows of the true idea.[19] Namely, material things, to some extent, are not the carriers of idea itself. Plotinus writes: it (the soul) creates, but not in full accordance with the Principles from which it has been endowed: something enters from itself; and, plainly, this is inferior'.[20] For this reason, other beings have lower degrees and are imperfect comparing with the highest being, and 'matter is the fallen sediment of the Higher Order '[21] We encounter a more different view in Abu Turkhan who mentions that the contact with the material embodiment enables every idea *to be copied*. It means that the point is perfect and unfolding it is the division or the distribution of its perfection. In the philosophy of Illumination, for example, the first abstract light (an-nur) is 'poor-imperfect in itself'.[22] 'It differs from the Light of lights only in terms of perfection'.[23] That is to say, the essence of the Light of lights is perfect, but the essence of the first (abstract) light is imperfect comparing with that of the Light of lights, because its essence was created and depends on another one (on the Light of lights). For the reason that it is directly illuminated by the Light of lights,

it has all the characteristics of Him; and 'it is reach because of its primeness' as well as it is the closest light to the Light of lights and is the biggest light among lights. If we ascribe what we have spoken of to the point, it will be clear that the point is more perfect than the line and it is imperfect because it is nothing other than a point in the sight of the Creator.

The point includes in itself numerous points, and the line, the circle, etc. are created from the unity of these points in different versions. For Plotinus thinking 'could not itself perform the act of creation; creation is the operation of that phase of the Soul which contains Ideal Principles; for that is its stronger puissance, its creative part'.[24] As is seen, the philosopher talks about the two characteristics of the Divine Intelligence-the First Cause: for creatures and for Him himself. The Divine Intelligence is the Soul who is the beginning of movement as well as sets all things in motion; as to His motion, it is caused by Him himself. He brings all things into existence but He himself is immortal.[25] It means that as the First Reason, the Divine Intelligence is a being who has relationship with His creatures as well as He is an eternal being who exists for Himself.

It is interesting that the different thinkers of different religions have shared the same view. Namely, Muhyiddin Ibn 'Arabi mentions that ' Know that the one called Allah is Unique (Ahad) by Essence and by all His names, and every existent thing is only attached to Allah by its own lord exclusively, for it is impossible for an existent to possess the whole'[26] and 'The Names of Allah are endless because they are known by what comes from them, and what comes from them is endless'.[27] Meister Eckhart, in turn, thinks that God, who is transcendent and one, is multiple in terms that He forms the essence of beings. However this multiplicity is like 'the skill within the master. God looked at Himself and saw Himself and all things'.[28]

Although the one idea, which belongs to the One Creator, is absolute, it includes the relative eternal ideas in itself. The collection of these ideas, in turn, is not the one idea itself. Although the relative ideas which, across the hierarchy, are separated from the absolute idea and gain forms, are imperfect, they are essentially related to the absolute idea.

Secondly, the point exists in every being both directly and indirectly.

The Unity of Idea is the internal part of every being as relative ideas. It means that every being, in turn, is mutually the carrier or the form of the Unit Idea. IbnArabi writes: 'Allah manifests Himself in a special way in every creature. He is the Outwardly Manifest in every graspable sense, and He is the Inwardly Hidden from every understanding except the understanding of the one who says that the universe is His form and His He-ness (huwiyya), and it is the name, the Outwardly Manifest. Since He is, by meaning, the spirit of whatever is outwardly manifest, He is also the Inwardly Hidden'.[29] Nicholas of Cusa considers that 'God is the enfolding of all things in that all things are in Him; and He is the unfolding of all things in that He is in all things.'.[30] Therefore it could be concluded that the Unity of Idea is interwoven with all created beings- as their essence, main cause and provider of their existence. In other words, for the reason that the whole universe is the manifestation area of the Unit Idea, It is the source of changes and motions that happen there, as J. Böme says, ' every moment of existence is a realization of Goodness'.[31]

The Unit is reflected in multiplicity. The multiplicity, in one sense, explains the essence of the Unit and introduces it as the multiple rays of the sun.

Besides, the Unity of Idea also exists in relative beings indirectly. Namely, if every created being, both material and spiritual, is the relative idea which is related to the Unity of Idea in terms of essence, then it means that every created being consists of the unity of several ideas. According to Salahaddin Khalilov, the main idea 'in the collection of events which were assembled in the same space in an unknown time, connected with each other and combined in the unite-final event' or 'in the very process of the formation of the final event' is what is 'durable in terms of time and is able to pass to the level of stability'.[32] That is to say, the idea that is stable in terms of time is – *main*, and the ideas that substitute each other are merely *the auxiliaries* which have to realize Its embodiment.

It looks like the cover-crusts on a core and the dependence of the existence and importance of these cover-crusts on that core. Mansur Al-Hallaj describes the existence through the following graphic example:



The first large circle in the picture is the potentialities of God, and the second one is the created beings and "third is the meaning and essence of the unity."[33]

On the one hand, it is possible to accept the Unity of Idea itself as a core in the creation process, and the hierarchy, in turn, is, in one sense, its unfolding and its becoming more cognizable. On the other hand, the main idea, which forms the essence of a being, could be accepted as a core, and what lead to its cognition are the auxiliary ideas. Sadr al-Din al-Qunawi writes: 'the human being could cognize a thing not in terms of unity, but in terms of multiplicity'.[34]It is worth here reminding that the notion, which claims that human thought is capable of cognizing not the One but the multiplicity which is His manifestation, is encountered in the thought of Nicholas of Cusa: 'And so, your intellect apprehends that the Maximum is neither identical with nor different from anything and that all things are in it, from it, and through it, because it is the circumference, the diameter, and the centre'.[35]

It appears that the Absolute Being-God Himself is above all beings. The creation process that happens according to His will is the manifestation process of the Unit Idea, which is one in terms of its existence and multiple in terms of its inclusion; to express it with theological terms, it is the manifestation process of the Unit Idea, which includes all the names and attributes of God. Creation is a complex structure and every being consists of the different combinations and variations of ideas.

What determines the existence and role of main and auxiliary ideas is the direct and indirect relatedness of the Unity of Idea with beings.

It is possible to show what we have mentioned and what we have concluded by means of the following scheme:



The scheme, in one sense, is a side view to al-Hallaj's description. The Unity of Idea is only a point from the world of the power of the Absolute Being ant this line, which is directed from the top to bottom, appears in different worlds. It is worth reminding again that although the various thinkers differ in regard to the number of these worlds, the essence remains same. We have attempted to reflect some significant moments in this scheme. Firstly, besides the Unity of Idea is directly related to every world, the very point, which 'intersects' with It, is the centre and central idea of the created world. Secondly, besides every low world has its 'share' from the Unit Idea, it is also under the impact of a higher world. Thirdly and eventually, the human being stands at the other end of the line that is derived from the Unit Idea: the human being who, besides being the centre of the last world, is also capable of being the head and the top of a new hierarchy.

The Process of Cognition – From the Point to the Circle

Recognition and cognition are intrinsic to the human being. That is to say, as we mentioned above, the starting point is the complex of ideas as well as it is the human being who is the starting point of another structuralization. We can describe the

process of cognition, which is able to rise from the material world to the world of ideas, through the vertical state of circle:



The line, which starts from the bottom point, rises to a certain point and then turns back. There are only two points of the circle along the diagonal. That is to say, the stages of rational and irrational cognition can complete one another only in case cognition is realized between the human being and the Absolute Being. Only in this very case, the beginning and the end of the cognition line unite and the circle becomes complete, and thus the beginning and the end disappear. Besides, although two points along the diagonal are unite and are within the same circle, they cannot become same. Unity is possible just in the complete circle, that is, the human being reaches to the unity and perfection only by completing, as the human being, his divinity and materiality in his existence,.

It would be appropriate here to look generally into the opening stages of the point.

The cognitive process consists of rational and irrational stages. That is to say, besides the human mind penetrates into the material beings and events, there are also the things that are thought and cognized by his soul. It means that for the completion of the cognitive process and for the return of the point by being unfolded and drawing a circle, the human thought ought to penetrate not only to the material world but also to the divine world. Namely it should discover new means and methods of cognition and gain new knowledge. The cognitive process, which goes through the rising line, also corresponds to it: from outward to inward and from the material one to the divine one.

Moving away from materiality creates a new thought-form or this moving itself happens by means of thinking. That is to say, they are two or may be one process that mutually complement one another. Hegel says: ‘ the rising of thinking above sensation as well as its passing from the limitations of the finite towards the infinite and its jump towards the supersensuous by breaking the rank of sensual

ones- all these are the gist of thinking as well as this transition is thinking itself. If they say that we should not realize such passage, then it means that we should not think'.[36]

The culmination moment of the cognitive process or the top point of the diagonal of the circle is expressed with different terms in different worldviews: fana, nirwana, nothingness, ignorance, darkness, etc. Dionysius the Areopagite writes: 'We pray that we may come unto this Darkness which is beyond light, and, without seeing and without knowing, to see and to know that which is above vision and knowledge through the realization that by not-seeing and by unknowing we attain to true vision and knowledge; and thus praise, superessentially, it that is superessential, by the transcendence of all things; even as those who, carving a statue out of marble, abstract or remove all the surrounding material that hinders the vision which the marble conceals and, by that abstraction, bring to light the hidden beauty'.[37] It is necessary to clarify a subject. The peak point is man's salvation from all material feelings and states. In this respect, the lack of knowledge and blindness that philosophers have emphasized are not the signs of man's ignorance, but the signs of the end of his rational cognition.

This moment or state is known in Sufism as essential union ('ayn al-jam'). S. Tusi explains it as follows: ' *jam* (union) is the word that indicates to the Truth (al-Haqq) without taking creation (except God) and the universe into account. The universe and creation are two beings that cannot exist by themselves because they are the two sides of nothingness (creation ex nihilo is pointed here). It is also a word which indicates to creation and to the universe. Both of them (union and separation-jam and tafriqa) are necessary for one another. One who indicates to jam (union) without tafriqa (separation) is a denier of the omnipotence of the Omnipotent, as well as who indicates to *jam* without *tafriqa* is a denier of the Creator; and one who accepts both of them (God and His attributes like will, omnipotence, etc.) believes in Tawhid (the unity of God).'[38] It is important here to emphasize that *jam* is not God Himself, but His order and will and such *jams* in His property are as many as the number of human beings.

The last part of the second stage is 'the return' of man to his humanness. The process here develops from the Divine One to the material objects as well as from outer one to inner one and thus the human being comes back with a different thinking and viewing perspective. The return of such new-minded and morally justified people to society is necessary for society, as al-Junaid al-Baghdadi said: 'God has a purpose in sending him back to society. Accordingly, He brings him into society by declaring and showing His blessings upon him. For making him attractive to people as well as for endearing him to people and putting him across, He gives him back his human peculiarities and shines his grace on him'.[39] The final stage is the combination of the first and the last as well as it is the completeness of the circle and the return of man to his essence which is in unity with the Highest Being. Meister Eckhart call it 'God's seeing Himself in you' and Hegel 'the unity of the first and the last'.[40] Al-Hallaj, in turn, considers his last station (maqam) as the beginning'.[41] Abu Yazid al-Bistami says on this subject: Each time when I supposed that I had reached the end, I was said that it was only the beginning'. It does not mean that the

cognitive process has repeated characteristics, but it means that the new layers of the Eternal Divine Truth-the Unity of Idea are unfolded in every new cycle.

Thus the cognition process is circular. Although the circle of every new stage of the cognitive process is the same with the previous one in the first and last point, it is wider than the previous one.



At the same time, every new circle causes to the unfolding of the lower layers of the diagonal line which lengthens until the Unit Idea. This is, in turn, the formation of the new view to the first line, that is, to self-cognition.

It is worth reminding, once more, that the cognitive process is the unfolding of the human point. The Absolute Being, who is the possessor of this idea, stands above this process, although the Unity of Idea is the last point that human cognition can reach. al-Hallaj explains that moment as follows: this is the cognition of 'the One, who is above all beings and is not counted with the finite number one'.[42]



As is seen, there is لا (no, negation in Arabic) inside the circle. It means that this notion is incomprehensible to human thought. For al-Miyanaji, 'God existed before

the first being (the world of unity is meant here) as much as infinity'.[43] It means that the furthest limit that the human being can reach is only the first point of his existence.

The question rightly arises then: if human cognition does not step out from its trajectory, then what is the truth of the state (hal) 'I am the Truth (Ana'l-haq)'? At what point does the division-the process, which starts from the lowest point, become united?

It would be appropriate to look at one of the important details in scheme: there is a point of intersection between the culmination moment of the cognition line of the human being and the line that comes directly from God. This is the moment of the complete unity as well as the intercourse with divine truth and the observation moment of the one truth. It is worth emphasizing that after this moment, man comes back and every word that he is going to say becomes distant from him below essence, that is, the form cannot wholly and perfectly reflect the idea. For this reason, it is advised in Sufism as well as in Taoism and other world-views to keep this state secret, not to express it and to experience it individually. The state 'I am the Truth (Ana'l-haqq)' is the description of the intersection moment of man's own point with the line that comes from the Unit Idea. It is not a coincidence that when we look at the scheme from above then it becomes clear that the points of the Truth and the Perfect Man intersect with one another. This is, in turn, the sign of man's being the final point of the creation process and, so to say, his reflection in the mirror. As al-Qunawi says: 'the Truth (God) is manifested in the Perfect Man (al-Insan al-kamil) with His essence, attributes, names and examples'.[44] However, although the Perfect Man reflects all the attributes of God in himself, in fact, he is a created being.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it could be said that the point is one of the phenomena that thinkers refer to it to show the relationship between the Absolute and the relative. It has become clear from the investigation that the point could be taken in two senses. On the one hand, it is above all beings as the Unit Idea, which stands a stage lower than the Absolute Being and includes in itself the idea and the essence of the whole creation, and at the same time it is in their inward and essence as the idea-source of all beings. On the other hand, it is the human being, who includes in himself the all knowledge and the ability to cognize both the material and divine worlds, and above all, who can be the peak of a new creation structure. The processes of creation and cognition happen between two points- they are unfolded in one point and become united in another one. One point is merely the Absolute and One and another one is relative and multiple. The relation between two points is possible directly through the straight line, and indirectly through the circle. It is true that some thinkers, especially Christian philosophers, also talk about the relation through the triangle. However, it should be also mentioned that the triangle is a means that leads to the circle

Notes

1. See about the Unit Idea. *Kenul Bunyadzade,The phenomenon of the Unity of Idea// Transcendentalism Overturned*, ed. by A.-T. Tymieniecka//AnalectaHusserliana, Vol.108, Hardcover, Springer, 2011. XV, pp. 561–570.
2. Shahab al-Din al-Suhrawardi, *Majmua Musannafat Davvom*, published by Henrie Corbin, Tehran, 1952, p. 126.
3. Hegel, *Наука логики/Энциклопедия философских наук*: В 3-х т. Т. 1, Москва: Мысль, 1974, p. 121.
4. In the name of God
5. Ba is the first letter of **Bismillah**
6. *Akhbar al-Hallaj*, published by Louis Massignon, Paris, 1936, p. 8
7. Ibid, p. 48,
8. Ibid, p. 58
9. *The Tawasin of Mansur al-Hallaj*. Trans. Aisha Abd ar-Rahman at-Tarjumana. The Sufic Path Series. Berkeley: Diwan Press, 1974
10. *Kitab al Tawasin*, published by Louis Massignon, Paris, 1913, p. 35
11. *Akhbar al-Hallaj*, p. 59; *Diwan al-Hallaj*, ed. HashimUsman, Beirut, 2003, p. 127
12. Kulizade, Z. A., *Хуруфизм и его представители в Азербайджане*, Baku: Элм, 1970, p. 253.
13. Ibid, p. 254.
14. Ibid, pp. 254–255.
15. Nicholas of Cusa, *On the Learned İgnorance* (*De Docta Ignorantia*), edited by Paul Wilpert, Hamburg, 1967, vol. 2, p. 65
16. Nicholas of Cusa, *On the Learned İgnorance*, edited by Paul Wilpert, Hamburg, 1970, pp. 10–11
17. Nicholas of Cusa, De Coniecturis (On Surmises), Hamburg, 1972, pp. 195–196
18. Ibid, p. 183
19. Plato, *Государство. Законы. Политик*, Moscow, 1998, p. 354.
20. Plotinus, *Enneads*, p. 106, http://meuser.awardspace.com/NeoPlatonics/Plotinus-Enneads-Free-electronic-text.pdf
21. Ibid
22. Suhrawardi, *Majmua Musannafat Davvom*, p. 128
23. Ibid, p. 127
24. Plotinus, Enneads, p. 106
25. For the details, see Плотин IV, 4/2.
26. Ibn al-Arabi, *Fusus al-hikam*, p. 34 www.sufi.ws/books/download/english/ibn-arabi…/fusus-al-hikam-en.pdf
27. Ibid, p. 13
28. Eckhart, *Духовные проповеди и рассуждения*, tr. М.В.Сабашникова, Saint Petersburg: Азбука, 2000, p. 105
29. Ibn al-Arabi, *Fusus al-hikam*, p. 17
30. *De Docta Ignorantia*, II, p. 66
31. Böme, *Аврора или утренняя заря в восхождении*, tr. А.Петровского, Moscow: Мусагеть, 1914, p. 182
32. S. Khalilov, ‘İdeya və maddi təcəssüm’, *Fəlsəfə və sosial-siyasi elmlər*, 1–2, 2003, p. 128.
33. Al-Hallaj, *Kitab al-Tawasin*, p. 63
34. Al-Qunawi, *Vahdet-i Vücud ve esasları = en-Nusus fi tahkiki tavri’l-mahsus*, tr. Ekrem Demirli, Istanbul, 2002, p. 94
35. Nicholas of Cusa, *De DoctaIgnorantia*, Minneapolis, 1982, I, p. 36
36. Hegel, *Наука логики/Энциклопедия философских наук*: В 3-х т. Т. 1, Moscow: Мысль, 1974. p. 170
37. Dionysius the Areopagite, pp. 205–206, http://www.esoteric.msu.edu/VolumeII/MysticalTheology.html

38. Abu Nasr al-Sarraj al-Tusi, *al-Luma*, Baghdad, 1960, p. 316
39. *Rasil al-Junaid*, Istanbul, 1979, p. 57
40. Hegel, *Философия духа/Энциклопедия философских наук*: В 3-х т. Т. 3, Moscow: Мысль, 1977, p. 12
41. al-Hallaj, *Kitab al-Tawasin*, p. 21
42. Ibid, p. 68
43. Ayn al-Qudat al-Miyanaji al-Hamadani, *Zubda al-Haqaiq*, Tehran, 1341, p. 85
44. Al-Qunawi, *Vahdet-i Vücud ve esasları*, p. 54.

References

Al-Baghdadi, Junaid. 1979. *Rasil al-Junaid*. Istanbul.
Al-Hallaj, Mansur. *Kitab at-Tawasin*/Trans. Aisha Abdar-Rahman at-Tarjumana. http://godlas.myweb.uga.edu/Sufism/tawasin.html
Al-Hallaj, Mansur. 1913. *Kitab al Tawasin*. published by Louis Massignon. Paris.
Al-Hallaj, Mansur. 1936. *Akhbar al-Hallaj*. published by Louis Massignon, Paris.
Al-Hallaj, Mansur. 2003. *Diwan al-Hallaj*. ed. HashimUsman. Beirut.
Al-Miyanaji, Ayn al-Qudat al-Hamadani. 1341. *Zubda al-Haqaiq*. Tehran.
Al-Qunawi, Sadr al-Din. 2002. *Vahdet-i Vücud ve esasları = en-Nusus fi tahkiki tavri'l-mahsus*. Trans. Ekrem Demirli. Istanbul.
Al-Sarraj, Abu Nasr al-Tusi. 1960. *al-Luma*. Baghdad.
Al-Suhrawardi, Shahab al-Din. 1952. *Majmua Musannafat Davvom*. published by Henrie Corbin. Tehran.
Böme, Johan Christian. 1914. *Аврора или утренняя заря в восхождении*. Trans. А.Петровского. Moscow: Мысгеть.
Bunyadzade, Kenul. 2011. *The phenomenon of the unity of idea//Transcendentalism overturned*. ed. A.-T. Tymieniecka//AnalectaHusserliana, vol. 108, XV. Hardcover, Springer.
Eckhart, Meister. 2000. *Духовные проповеди и рассуждения*/Trans. М.В.Сабашникова. Saint Petersburg: Азбука.
Hegel, G.W.F. 1974. *Наука логики/Энциклопедия философских наук*: В 3-х т. Т. 1. Москва: Мысль.
Hegel, G.W.F. 1977. *Философия духа/Энциклопедия философских наук*: В 3-х т. Т. 3. Moscow: Мысль.
Ibn Al-Arabi, Muhyiddin. *Fusus al-hikam*. 34. www.sufi.ws/books/download/english/ibn-arabi…/fusus-al-hikam-en.pdf
Khalilov, Salahaddin. 2003. 'İdeya və maddi təcəssüm*', Fəlsəfə və sosial-siyasi elmlər*. 1–2.
Kulizade, Z.A. 1970. *Хуруфизм и его представители в Азербайджане*. Баку: Элм.
Nicholas of Cusa. 1967. *On the learned ignorance* (De Docta Ignorantia). edited by Paul Wilpert. vol. 2, Hamburg, Felix Meiner.
Nicolas of Cusa. 1972. De *Coniecturis* (On surmises) // Metaphysical Speculations. vol. 2, By Josef Hopkins, Hamburg, Meiner Verlag.
Платон. 1998. *Государство. Законы. Политик*. Москва, "Мысль".
Plotinus, Enneads. 106, http://meuser.awardspace.com/NeoPlatonics/Plotinus-Enneads-Free-electronic-text.pdf
The Areopagite. Dionysius. 205–206. http://www.esoteric.msu.edu/VolumeII/MysticalTheology.html

Newton's Phenomena and Malay Cosmology: A Comparative Perspective

A.L. Samian

Abstract Prior to the dissemination of colonial mathematics, Malay perspective of the phenomena are very much embedded in the traditional proverbs. In this paper, the author examines the ethos of Newtonian mathematics, particularly Newton's view of the phenomena, on Malay Cosmology based on the nineteenth century Malay scholar al-Khatib al-Minangkabawi's book of mathematics, Alam al-Hussab fi-l ilmu al-Hisab. A comparative perspective is given, especially with regard to the human positioning in the cosmos.

Introduction

The Malay World or the Malay Archipelago covers the region which centers on Malay Peninsula, Indonesia, Brunei, Phillipines and Southern Thailand. Among the early settlements were Funan, Langkasuka, Pattani, Singgora, Champa, Kutai, Banjarmasin, Sriwijaya, Indera Giri, Pagaruyung, Padang, Jambi, Airlangga, Demak, Gangga Negara, Malacca, Palembang and Riau. Thus, the term Malay represents a large geographical area. In this paper, the main focus is the Malay World of Indonesia and Malay Peninsula.

Mathematical thoughts which led to mathematical reasoning in the Malay civilization have developed slowly compared to Europe after the seventeenth century, a consequence of the scientific revolution in England. Comparison with other civilizations is important because the current Western science is not the only mathematical science in existence. The idea of 'science' based on Aristotelian thinking is greatly different from the scientific reasoning of Rene Descartes which is anchored to the

A.L. Samian (✉)
Institute of the Malay World and Civilization, The National University of Malaysia, Bangi 43600, Malaysia
e-mail: abdlatif@ukm.my; drlatifsamian@yahoo.com

A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), *Phenomenology and the Human Positioning in the Cosmos: The Life-world, Nature, Earth: Book One*, Analecta Husserliana 113,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-4801-9_16,

mechanical philosophy. Cartesian cosmology is also different from that of Isaac Newton who believes in the existence of vacuum. Aristotle's cosmology is different from Copernicus' and both of them are very different from Einstein's world of relativity. Descartes believes that vacuum does not exist but Newton believes otherwise with his concept of action at a distance. Accordingly, in the comparative discussion in the pursuit of a "deep-down revision of the foundations that faith and reason generate in our reality"[1] concerning mathematical reasoning in Newton's and the Malay World with their respective cosmologies, the writer will not use the meaning of mathematical sciences which depends totally on the current activities that are very quantitative and empirical.

Newton's Cosmology

Newton (1642–1727) furnishes several arguments to show the impossibility of nature to exist on its own despite its mechanical manifestation. In one of his arguments, he appeals to the 'beauty' of the cosmos, the regularities and the irregularities alike.[2] The transition from the view of God as creating and destroying continuously to that of a clock-maker can be seen in Newton's argument concerning gravity whereby he believes that gravity also has some kind of natural power. It is not the case that all natural power rests upon God alone.[3] One can say from this passage that Newton indeed paved the way for a mechanical world view which later dominates the Newtonians.

In addition to the quasi-mechanical view of nature, Newton believes that there is nothing in nature that is an 'excess'. In response to the question of "Why there is one body in our system qualified to give light and heat to all the rest", he says: "I know no reason but because one was sufficient to warm and enlighten all the rest".[4] Newton's cosmos is definitely not a material plenum. There are levels of beings, spiritual and material, each having particular responsibilities given by God. Says Newton:

> And as the planets remain in their orbs, so may any other bodies subsist at any distance from the earth, and much more may beings, who have a sufficient power of self motion, move whether they will, place themselves where they will and continue in any regions of the heavens whatever, there to enjoy the society of one another, and by their messenger or Angels to rule the earth and converse with the remotest regions.[5]

According to Newton, one of the responsibilities given by God to some of these invisible and intelligent beings is to manage the motions of heavenly bodies. Conduitt reported that in one of his conversations with Newton, the latter "seemed to doubt whether there were not intelligent beings superior to us who superintend these revolutions of heavenly bodies by the direction of the supreme being".[6] Apart from the fact that Newton believes in the existence of angles and other invisible beings, interestingly Newton did not embrace the view that Nature is governed by God through a process which he called 'emanation'. Newton rejects the theory of emanation[7] and the theory of the three worlds in the creation of nature because he maintains that both theories are products of heathens worshipping their Kings,

idolizing them after death.[8] Newton's cosmological view is certainly influenced by this belief that truth lies in Christianity since he rejects their explanation about the creation of nature chiefly because the theories originate from the heathens. Embracing their theories of emanation is synonymous with deifying their dead Kings and will results in worshipping the creation instead of the creator.

The concept of God as the mathematician of the cosmos is not entirely new. We can trace it as far back as to the Greeks. Plato's *demiourgos* was a mathematician but he could not be a mechanic in Newton's sense of the word. The *demiourgos* was always constraint by the eternal Ideas and considers it humiliating to make even a mortal pot.[9] What is new in Newton's conception of God as the mathematician is that God is not only a perfect geometer but also an expert mechanic, who makes everything and there is no act of creation which is not proper for his "divine arm".[10] Says Newton:

> To make this system therefore, with all its Motions, required a Cause which understood, and compared together, the Quantities of Matter in the several Bodies of the Sun and Planets, and the gravitating Powers resulting from thence; the several distances of the Primary Planets from the Sun, and of the secondary ones from Saturn, Jupiter, and the Earth; and the velocities of Matter in the central Bodies; and to compare and adjust all these things together, in so great a Variety of Bodies, argues that Cause to be not Blind and fortuitous, but very well skilled in Mechanicks and Geometry.[11]

In view of the above statement, an important aspect of Newton's God is that He is "very well skilled in Mechanicks and Geometry". From Newton's point of view, God is not a mathematician in the anthromorphic sense of an arm chair natural philosopher. He is a mathematician in the sense that He deduces and creates aided by the natural causes which are His instruments. "Where natural causes are at hand", states Newton, "God uses them as instruments in his works".[12] By "natural causes", Newton is referring to "gravity, levity, elastic force, the resistance of fluids, and the like forces, whether attractive of impulsive".[13] Just as a mechanic requires specific instruments to do his job, so is Newton's God. Newton's God closely resembles that of a clock maker. God not only creates the world but like a mechanic, He also maintains it occasionally.

> God made the world and governs it invisibly, and hath commanded us to love, honour and worship him and no other God but him, and to do it without making any image of him and not to name him idly and without reverence…[14]

Newton believes that God who is the most perfect mechanic and geometer, governs the world in a particular way. He is not the soul of the universe, yet he dominates everything. Thus:

> This Being governs all things, not as the soul of the world, but as Lord over all; and on account of his dominion he is wont to be called Lord God, or Universal Ruler; for God is a relative word, and has a respect to servants; and Deity is the dominion of God not over his own body, as those imagine who fancy God to be the soul of the world, but over servants. The supreme God is a Being eternal, infinite, absolutely perfect, without dominion, cannot be said to be Lord God; … The word God usually signifies Lord; but every Lord is not a God. It is the dominion of a spiritual being which constitutes a God: a true, supreme, or imaginary dominion makes a true, supreme, or imaginary God. And from his true dominion

> it follows that the true God is a living, intelligent, and powerful Being; and, from his other perfections, that he is supreme, or most perfect.[15]

Accordingly Newton claims that "All that diversity of natural things which we find suited to different times and places could arise from nothing but the ideas and will of a Being necessarily existing".[16] It is with regard to this aspect of God that Newton writes: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind:…"[17]

Newton's God who is skilled in mechanics and geometry is omnipresent. We have stated earlier that Newton's God uses natural causes as His instruments. There is yet another aspect of God in Newton's philosophy of mathematics wherein He manages the universe by way of His Sensorium. Certainly for Newton, God's Sensorium is not an organ of sensation because He has no such need. At least that much is clear to Newton. God's Sensorium is neither the world nor a Part of Him. Says Newton:

> And yet we are not to consider the World as the Body of God, or the several Parts thereof, as the Parts of God. He is a uniform Being void of Organs, Members or Parts, and they are his Creatures subordinate to him, and subservient to his Will; and he is no more the Soul of them than the Soul of man is the Soul of the Species of Things carried through the Organs of Sense into the place of its Sensation, where it perceives them by means of its immediate Presence, without the Intervention of any third thing. The Organs of Sense are not for enabling the Soul to perceive the Species of Things in its Sensorium, but only for conveying them thither; and God has no need of such Organs, he being every where present to the Things themselves.[18]

In view of the above passage, one is inclined to say that God's Sensorium is "the place of its Sensation". But taking into account that Newton's God "perceives them by means of its immediate Presence without the Intervention of any third thing", the word "sensorium" described by Newton as an aspect of God points to nothing save Its Existence. As a point of fact, Newton writes elsewhere:

> God is the same God, always and everywhere. He is omnipresent not virtually only, but also substantially; for virtue cannot subsist without substance. In him are all things contained and moved; yet neither affects the other: God suffers nothing from the motion of bodies; bodies find no resistance from the omnipresence of God. It is allowed that the Supreme God exists necessarily; and by the same necessity he exists always and everywhere.[19]

God's Sensorium is an aspect of God which only He knows. "As a blind man has no idea of colours", Newton comments, "so have we no idea of the manner by which the all wise God perceives and understands all things",[20] notwithstanding the fact that God knows directly without any intermediary. Unlike His creations, God who is a perfect geometer and a mechanic, knows by his Divine Presence and Divine Wisdom. We claim that it is this concept of God, as a geometer and a mechanic *par excellenc* who is the sole creator of this world, which functions as the underlying *raison d'etre* for Newton to reduce the phaenomena of nature to mathematical laws. [21]

By and large, Newon's concept of the Names and Attributes of God is summarized in the General Scholium of his *Principia Mathematica*.[22] According to him, God "governs all things, not as the soul of the world, but as Lord over all".[23] He is "eternal, infinite, absolutely perfect",[24] and that He is "omnipotent and omniscient".[25] Newton believes that not only God governs all things but He also "knows all things that are

or can be done". Newton adds further that God "is not eternity and infinity, but eternal and infinite; He is not duration of space, but He endures and is present".[26]

In Newton's cosmology, God creates the universe but He does not manage it continuously; he only intervenes occasionally. There is the 'mechanical aspect' of nature. Thus Newton uses phrases such as "Nature does nothing in vain",[27] "Nature is very consonant and conformable to herself",[28] nature "performing all the great motions of the heavenly bodies by the attraction of gravity",[29] that is, nature has the disposition to act independently. In a similar vein, Newton uses phrases like "the power of gravity" or the "power of magnetism"[30]. In presenting a partly mechanical world', Newton is tredding the foot-steps of Galileo[31] in paving the way for a purely mechanical world which later dominates the West and the Malay World.

Newton argues that geometry is the foundation of mechanics. In order for a mathematician to be a mechanic *par excellence*, he should master geometry. In the mathematician's quest for studying nature, he should work like a mechanic by uniting both his head and hand and not simply deducing 'using his head'. Says Newton concerning the significance of mechanics and geometry:

> He that works with less accuracy is an imperfect mechanic; and if any could work with perfect accuracy, he would be the most perfect mechanic of all; for the description of right lines and circles upon which geometry is founded, belongs to mechanics.[32]

According to Newton, phenomena are not made up from the world of brute facts. It is not merely data resulting from sense observations such as the rising and setting of the sun. Rather 'phenomena' to Newton results from observing the sensibles while analysing and thinking about nature and God.

Malay Cosmology

Unlike Newton's cosmology, seventeenth century Malay scholars subscribe to the hermeneutic distinction of macrocosm and microcosm. From the microcosmic perspective, the cosmos consists of at least four dimensions- *alam jabbarut* (metaphorically the world of light), *alam malakut* (the world of herebefore), alam mithal (the world of imagination) and *alam ajsam* (the material world). The three worlds originates form the first world (*alam jabarut*), and are continuous manifestation of God creative act, be it by way of self disclosure, self-revelation, self-manifestation, or theophany (*ta'ayyun*). There are differences of opinion regarding the precise contents of these worlds. For examples, Abdul Samad al-Falimbani from Sumatera believes that *alam arwah* and *alam mithal* are actually *alam malakut* (the world of unseen) whereas Yusuf al-Makasari of Maqassar, Sumatera, equates *alam jabarut* with *alam arwah*, *alam mithal* with *alam malakut* and *alam ajsam* synonymous with *alam shahadah*. Nafis Idris al-Banjari believes that *alam arwah* is not *alam mithal* but an imaginative dimension that exists objectively. [33]Irrespective of their differences, Malay scholars subscribe to the cosmological view of the existence of various levels of reality which is also espoused by Newton. In short, even those who did not subscribe to the operational details of the realities espoused the view

of the existence of hierarchy of realities of the cosmos with God as The Phenomenon in this world and the Hereafter.

The positioning of the cosmos can also be gauged from the traditional Malay children *pantun* '*Halia ini tanam-tanaman, ke barat juga akan tumbuhnya, Dunia ini pinjam-pinjaman, Akhirat juga akan sungguhnya*' (Garlic is not a tree, yet to the West it will grow, the World is but temporary, the Hereafter is beyond tomorrow). Otherwise, there will not be the aphorism *adat bersendikan syarak, syarak bersendikan kitabullah* (religion is the cornerstone of tradition, the Holy Book is the corner stone of religion). They believe that sometimes God works in a mysterious way. There must be a *hikmah* (a divine intervention) if things do not turn out as expected. They do not espoused the *jabbariyyah* doctrine (resigning completely to fate) neither do they subscribe fully to the *qadariyyah* position (man is the measure of all things). Malays writ large subscribe to the perennial value of the middle path-*manusia punya asa tapi Tuhan punya kuasa* (man proposes, God disposes) and last but not least, the proverb *Alam terkembang jadikan guru* (phenomena of nature be your teacher).[34]

In the aforementioned Malay cosmology, there are several levels of reality corresponding to a hierarchy levels of existence, not unlike Newton's. Let us consider the cosmology of the post Newtonian Malay scholar-mathematician Abdul Latif al-Khatib al-Minangkabawi (1855–1915) by way of his book of mathematics entitled *Alam al-Hussab Fi'ilm al-Hisab* (c.1890).[35] According to al-Khatib, this created world cannot be the only reality in existence. Just like other creatures, the existence of this world and all its phenomena comes from the existence of God. God is Existence Itself, that "cannot be counted and do not have numbers".[36] Everything that exist depends on the existence of God and not otherwise. It is not possible to have two existences that are absolutely independent from each other, a manifestation of the sacred unity of Divine Transcendent and Immanent.

Mathematical knowledge issued forth from God. There is a world named as a 'mathematical world' and the existence of this world is based on the existence of Divine Unity. In the preface of his book he said that, "God is Lord of the worlds" and this world includes the mathematical world, material world and spiritual world. The contents of this mathematical world including numbers, geometrical shapes, axioms, theorems, iterative methods, corollary, formula and ideas exist in '*Lauh Mahfudz*' (world of archetypal essences), a world of latent realities. Based upon his understanding of metamathematics, the existence of God and mathematics are always ontologically related. Mathematical knowledge originates from God, belongs to God and brings the practitioner closer to The Divine.

From the epistemological aspect, there are levels of mathematical knowledge not unlike Newton's. God is Omniscient, with the manifestation of the Divine Name *al-Hasib* (The Perfect Mathematician), who is *sari al-hisab* (The fastest to calculate). It is not surprising when al-Khatib begins his mathematic book by stating "All praise to God, the Perfect Mathematician, Who qualifies His creations with numbers (*al-adad*)", following the usual Quranic verses "In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate and Most Merciful".[37]

Since al-Khatib places mathematical knowledge in the domain of religion, he also rationalizes the aspect of its use, which is its practical nature. According to him, the nature of its use is by elevating its status. It is stressed by al-Khatib that "The benefits of mathematical knowledge is abundant because other knowledge need mathematics".[38] He believes that since knowledge of mathematics is placed totally within the religious realm, mathematicians should likewise be conscious of The Divine.

There is an organic relationship between mathematical activities and religion. His book which was published in 1895 during the first phase of British colonialization (1841–1941), still shows the unity of mathematical and religious thought in the period under review. For example, if we consider the effect of the problem as the consequences of the problem and its solution, we can examine the effect from the internal and external perspective. The internal effect points to the internalization of the Divine Names within the microcosm as opposed to the external effect which impacts the macrocosm.

According to al-Khatib, solving mathematical problems produced a personal experience which is spiritually uplifting while contemplating the cosmos. There is a spiritual dimension in solving mathematical problems. In the process of solving a particular problem, they can contemplate the Divine Names and Attributes, thus strengthening the nature of piety (*taqwa)* in them. This internalization increases their knowledge about Divine Unity by way of profound understanding of His Divine Qualities, which is similar to the *Scholia* of Newton's *Principia Mathematica*.

Unlike al-Khatibs's emphasis on the notion of Divine Unity, fundamental to Newton's conception of mathematical knowledge is his understanding of the ontological status of mathematical objects. At the level of sense experience, they are said to be relative, apparent and common. These features correspond to the outward aspect of nature. From the inner aspect of nature in the dimension of the abstract world, mathematical objects are associated with the concept of truth and absolute. In the ultimate analysis, mathematical objects are manifestations of some aspects of Being, a metamathematical position shared by both of them.

According to Newton, mathematics is the best way of deciphering nature but he believes that mathematical reasonings or 'demonstrations' are neither complete nor final. Mathematical truths are bounded by the truth of its principles. He likewise believes in levels of truth. In accord with his belief in the existence of planes of reality, Newton distinguishes between physical truth and mathematical truth. Physical truth concerns the domain of the material world whereas mathematical truth concerns more of the domain of the abstract world of the cosmos.

Conclusion

We submit that the differences underlying Malay cosmology in view of al-Khatib's '*Alam al-Hussab* and that of Newton's *Principia Mathematica* are more in terms of degrees than in kinds. For example, numbers have a more foundational role to

al-Khatib than to Newton so much so that the former based his mathematics simply on the belief that each man has the innate ability to count. Thus man's capacity to mathematize and consequently acquiring mathematical knowledge. On the other hand, Newton includes basic understanding of mechanics as equally important in addition to knowledge of arithmetic (which also deals with numbers), resulting in a more quantitative and empirical orientation of mathematics .

In Newton's mode of mathematization, the process begins from contemplating the phenomena. The cosmos which is initially created by God can be studied mathematically because Newton believes that everything in the external world can be quantified. The "frame and operations of Nature" are reducible to "general rules or Laws" by way of mathematics. Essential to mathematization is the basic knowledge of arithmetic, geometry and mechanics. These three branches of mathematics coupled with the belief that God likewise is the perfect geometer and mechanic form the components of Newton's "rational mechanics" which paved the way for the quantification of mathematics because of his emphasis on that aspect.

Akin to Malays' cosmology, Newton believes that mathematization definitely involves numbers. Furthermore Newton includes what he called 'mechanics' which he deems is equally essential with geometry and number. The inclusion of mechanics and consequently the integration of the three fields; mechanics, geometry and numbers into his 'rational mechanics', by and large, fashions his mode of mathematization. Accordingly, we find that Newton's mathematization and consequently his mathematical findings based on the mathematization of the phenomena of the cosmos are much more structured and quantified than that which is constructed based on the Malay cosmology.

Notes

1. See Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka "The New Enlightenment" in Tymieniecka, A.T. (ed.) *Phenomenological Inquiry: The Tree of Life-A Review of Philosophical Ideas and Trends: The New Enlightenment*, Vol.32, Oct.2008, pp. 7–10
2. See *Principia*, Motte-Cajori, p. 544.
3. See his *Opera Omnia*, IV, pp. 432–442; *Sermons*, p. 215.
4. See his first letter to Richard Bentley in *Sermons*, p. 204.
5. See *Yahuda* MS. 9.2, fol. 140r. *cf*. Manuel, *Religion…,* p.102.
6. See Conduitt letter reproduced in Castillejo, *Expanding Force*, p. 96.
7. It is pertinent to note here that there are likewise theories of emanation in the Islamic cosmological view. Perhaps the most widely received is that of al-Farabi. Unlike the theory of emanation which is the result of the deification of dead Kings (as understood by Newton), al-Farabi's theory of emanation is based on the idea of the hierarchy of beings "in terms of a hiearchy of intelligences and souls and their effusion or emanation (fayd) from God", and concerning God who is the First Cause, "we can have only the principles of our knowledge of it and not the principles of its being". See O. Bakar, *Classification of Knowledge in Islam: A Study in Islamic Philosophies of Science, Foreword by Seyyed Hossein Nasr* (Kuala Lumpur, 1992), pp. 95 and 97 respectively.
8. See *Sermons,* pp. xv–xvi.
9. See R. Hooykas, *Religion and the Rise of Modern Science*, (Michigan, USA), p. 10.

10. Newton uses the phrase "devine arm" at several places. Just to cite two examples, Newton says: "… I do not know any power in nature which would cause this transverse motion without the divine arm". (See Newton's second letter to R. Bentley) and elsewhere, "… the diurnal rotations of the planets could not be derived from gravity, but required a divine arm to impress them". (See his fourth letter, *ibid*).
11. See Newton's first letter to R. Bentley, 10th December 1692.
12. See Newton's letter to Thomas Burnet, Januari 1680/1681, *Correspondence,* Vol. II, pp. 329–334.
13. See *Principia,* Motte-Cajori, p. xvii.
14. See *Theological Manuscripts, op. cit*., p. 54.
15. See *Principia,* Motte-Cajori, pp. 544–545*, Principia*, Koyre'-Cohen, pp. 760–761.
16. See *ibid.*, Motte-Cajori, p. 546; *ibid.*, Koyre'-Cohen, pp. 762–763.
17. See *Theological Manuscripts*, p. 48.
18. Ibid., pp. 402–403. According to Samuel Clarke; "Sir Isaac Newton does not say, that space is the Sensorium God; but that it is, by way of similitude only, as it were the sensory, & c. See H.G. Alexander, ed*., The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence* (Manchester and New York, 1956), under the heading "Clarke's Second Reply", p. 21. See also Samuel Clarke, ed. *A Collection of papers which passed between the late learned Mr. Leibnitz and Dr. Clarke in the years 1715 and 1716 relating to the Principles of Natural Philosophy and Religion,* (London 1717). The extent of Newton's deep involvement with Clarke in the correspondence is discussed at great length by I.B. Cohen, A. Koyre, "Newton and the Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, with Notes on Newton, Conti, and Des Maizeaus", *Archives Internationales d'Historie des Sciences,* 15 (1962), pp. 63–126.
19. See *Principia*, Motte-Cajori, p. 545.
20. See *ibid.*, p. 545. It is importan to note here that although we are ignorant of how God perceives and understands things, Newton believes that we can know how He does things, that is, by way of mechanics and geometry.
21. See R. Bentley, "A Confutation of Atheism (III)," in *Papers and Letters*, p. 364.
22. See *Principia*, Motte-Cajori, pp. 544–546. See also his "A Short Scheme of the True Religion", in Brewster, *Memoirs….,* Vol. II, pp. 347–348.
23. See *Principia*, Motte Cajori, p. 544.
24. *Ibid.*
25. *Ibid.*, p. 545.
26. *Ibid.*
27. See *ibid.*, p. 398. *cf. Opticks,* p. 369.
28. *Opticks,* p. 376 and p. 397.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 397.
30. See Corollary V to Proposition VI in *Principia,* Motte-Cajori, Bk. III.
31. See his 'Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina' in Stillman Drake, *Discoveries and Opinions (New York, 1957), p. 186.*
32. *Principia*, Motte-Cajori, p. xvii.
33. See Mohd Syukri Yeoh Abdullah, Kosmologi dalam Weltanschauung Ulama Sufi Melayu. *Akademika*.(67) (July)2005: 3–22
34. For example, see Tenas Effendy. *Ungkapan Melayu, Pemahaman dan Masalahnya*. (Yayasan Tenas Effendy dan Universiti Malaya; 2010)
35. Ahmad Abdul Latif al-Khatib. *Alam al-Hussab Fi'ilm al-Hisab*. (Cairo; 1895)
36. *Ibid.* p2.
37. *Ibid*. p2.
38. *Ibid.* p4.

References

Abu Hamid. 1994. *Syekh Yusuf Makassar*. Jakarta: Yayasn Obor.

Ahmad Abdul Latif al-Khatib. 1895. *Alam al-Hussab fi 'ilm al-Hisab*. Cairo: Maimuniyah.

Newton, I. 1779–1785. *Opera quae exstant Omnia. Commentariis illustrabut Samuel Horsley*. 5 vols. London: J. Nichols.

Newton, I. 1931. *Opticks, or a treatise of the reflections, inflections & colours of light*. London: G. Bell & Sons Ltd.

Newton, I. 1950. *Sir Isaac Newton theological manuscripts*. Selected and Edited with Introduction by H. McLachlan. Liverpool: University Press.

Newton, I. 1958. *Isaac Newton's papers & letters on natural philosophy and related documents*. ed. Cohen, I.B. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Newton, I. *Sir Isaac Newton's mathematical principles of natural philosophy and his system of the world.* Translated into English by Andrew Motte in 1729. The translations revised, and supplied with an historical appendix, by Florian Cajori (1934), Berkeley: University of California Press. Thus it is refered to as the *Principia,* Motte Cajori.

Tenas Effendy. 2010. *Ungkapan Melayu, Pemahaman dan Masalahnya*. Universiti Malaya.

Wan Mohd Saghrir Abdullah. 1992. *Shaykh Daud Al-Fathani*. Kuala Lumpur: Khazanah Fathaniyah.

Peering Through the Keyhole (The Phenomenology and Ontology of Cyberspace in Contemporary Societies)

J.C. Couceiro-Bueno

Abstract In a world dominated by telematics, information technologies and the media, the experience of time and the world is undergoing a profound change. The image of the world of our era can be condensed into two metaphors: that of an office where work goes on at a frenetic pace yet in total silence; and the somewhat twisted possibility of "observing without being observed" (peering through the "keyhole" of cyberspace) with all the ethically questionable consequences of any anonymous act – the fact that any situation in which humans become anonymous and freed from the fear of punishment brings their basest instincts to the fore is universally known and acknowledged.

Considering a phenomenology of the network of networks (the Internet) is an exercise in practical philosophy is required in order to study the colonisation of *Lebenswelt* (in Husserl's terminology) that has occurred since it was 'mundanized'.

The aim is to overcome the tension that exists between the use of the Internet as a means of liberating oppressed and marginalised peoples, yet on the other hand also preventing it from becoming a tool that vulgarises and degrades knowledge and wisdom. Or to put it another way: rejecting the replacement of thought by mere rudimentary knowledge in order to ensure the survival of our civilisation. At all events, the problem will arise when the Internet ceases to be a mere instrument and becomes an attribute of our culture.

J.C. Couceiro-Bueno (✉)
Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy and Research Methods and Diagnosis in Education, Universidad de La Coruna, Campus Elviña s/n, A Coruña, 15009, Spain
e-mail: juacobu@udc.es

A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), *Phenomenology and the Human Positioning in the Cosmos: The Life-world, Nature, Earth: Book One*, Analecta Husserliana 113,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-4801-9_17,

Creo que esto se refiere a si están bien colocados

The beginnings of the Internet that emerged from an 80s military research project (Arpanet) are widely known. It would go on to become a decentralised set of interconnected communication networks using TCP/IP protocols, which guarantee that the heterogeneous physical networks it contains act as a single and logical network on a global scale.

A group was set up within the US Defence Department to study more advanced computers. During this process, three network terminals were installed: the *System Development Corporation* (Santa Monica), the *Genie* Project (University of California) and the MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology).

The principal problem that arose was related to attempts to connect various physical networks in order to create a single logical one. Work continued over several years on the concept of package commutation. Commutation is a technique that ensures the efficient use of physical links in a network of computers. A package is a group of data made up of two parts: the actual data themselves and the control data, which specifies the route to be followed throughout the network as far as the final destination.

Arpanet then merged with NSFNet, leading to the creation of the term "Internet" in order to define any networks using the TCP/IP protocol. It referred to a global network that used the aforementioned protocol and yet which also included NSFNet and Arpanet.

The Internet experienced exponential growth, bringing with it new applications that would spread this technology around the world. This meant that various locations that were unable to connect directly to the Internet were able to do so via simple portals in order to allow for the transfer of email. Sites such as these with intermittent connections used Fidonet, connecting these networks and the Internet. A number of services expanded beyond the use of email alone and began to offer services such as access to FTP.

Today, probably the most accurate description of the Internet is that of a decentralised set of interconnected communication networks that uses the TCP/IP family of protocols, which guarantee that the heterogeneous physical networks it contains act as a single and logical network on a global scale. As mentioned earlier, its origins date back to 1969, when the first connection between computers was achieved (Arpanet) between three universities situated in California and Utah in the United States.

It could also be claimed that the Internet is a network of networks; in other words, two or more interconnected computers form the beginnings of the network. Computers which in turn are connected to a central server that form an internal network (Intranet). The interconnection of all these into a single network is the ultimate aim of the Internet, as reflected in the metaphor *World Wide Web* (*www*), used as a synonym for the Internet: a series of protocols that allows for hypertext files to be consulted remotely, using the Internet as a means of transmission.

Little is known of the prehistory of the Internet, which must be situated within the context of the emergence in the 1960s of cognitive psychology and the development of artificial intelligence as a result of the decadence of the paradigm of conductivism.

These precedents would lead to a recovery of the key issues of cognitive psychology – memory, language, attention, etc. This in turn would result in an extensive cognitive programme that would include the rapid development of computational processes in both biological systems (the brain) and artificial ones (computers). This research posited that the cognitive functions of the human brain are essentially the same, and both systems can be explained within a general theory of computation. This has been expressed in the metaphorical notion that "the mind is like a computer".

Alan Turing (1950) describes a clear forerunner to digital computers, with his vision of a perfect machine capable of carrying out simple operations on discrete symbols such as forwarding a space, deleting or reading a symbol, etc. This machine would have a practically unlimited capacity for computation, to the extent that, as Turing suggested, it could also imitate intelligent human behaviour (speech, responding to questions, etc.) and even fool an observer who only had access to the answers.

Turing's proposals were followed by cognitive psychology which claims that not only computers are the equivalent to Turing's universal machine, but also the human brain, a thesis posited by authors such as Pylyshyn, Fodor and Minsky, who claim that what we refer to as 'the mind' is merely the application of calculations to symbolic representations. This paradigm is known as symbolic computation and its explanation lies in the processing of information. Hence, the symbols, rules of syntax and calculations that underlie mental processes are measurable entities, comparable with the notions used by computer programmers and technicians.

Whilst it is true that cognitive psychology is contemporary to the development of computers, there have been inner reactions to the mechanistic version (symbolic-computational) that have led to attempts to re-establish the naturalist vision of cognitive functions.

The philosophical version of the symbolic-computational paradigm aims to resolve the problem of Cartesian dualism. Like a computer, the human mind also has a physical component *(hardware)* and a functional one *(software)*. In all cases, the physical nature of the *hardware* is irrelevant in order to understand computational processes. Thus, in order to comprehend the computational nature of a task carried out by a computer, we can rule out the material organisation of the system and focus solely on the description of the program in terms of instructions and routines, etc. We could also even physically create one of Turing's machines – which differ from a digital computer – to execute the same program; alternatively we could use an apparatus that simulates hardware and represents 1 and 0 binary states.

From an approach such as this, the brain could be seen as a computational system whose unique biological features would not be of any particular importance; only the program or programs executed by the brain would be of interest. This functional approach played a key role in the early days of the *network of networks*, although naturally it involved a series of major difficulties and deficiencies.

On the one hand, the idea that our mental processes can be reduced to mere computational programs applied to discrete symbols is unsustainable. We must of course, also consider the role played by the emotions in our conscience and its

functions. None of this can be applied within the framework of the reductionist paradigm of symbolic computation. Yet in addition to this, the brain is a biological system based on a vast number of interconnected processes (neurons) which operate in parallel and communicate biochemically with one another using a series of neurotransmitters. In contrast, computers are far simpler electronic systems that make a series of calculations, generally using a single microprocessor. In other words, computers are processors of pre-coded information. They work using a series of symbols supplied by a human operator. They are machines that do not code or synthesise information directly from an environment, nor do they act upon it. In contrast, the brain can synthesise information on its own, based either on an environment or interpersonally, and also governs the actions of our bodies within said environment. These differences are crucial in a comparison of the computer and the brain.

II

The historical background of the Internet is unquestionably surprising when we compare the type of common mass activities that take place today. No less surprising is the conceptualisation of the ongoing notion of the "virtual" within the sphere of cyberspace.

What do we understand by the term "virtual" within the environment of the network?

The answer is those objects that create an impression of reality. It is a world of representation, of mimesis and copies through which technology aims to supplant the original experience of a real object. Or to put it another way: the technological "production" of an environment of perceptions in which interaction is possible; namely, the modification of the environment in accordance to a series of stimuli and responses. We are immersed in a world of virtual objects yet also one of virtual social relations.

This would appear to be a universally accepted description of the term "virtual". However, it is a concept that is far from being "clear-cut and differentiated". To begin with, it must be said that the opposite of "virtual" is not "real". Instead, it refers to a "physical or material presence", a concept which differs radically from the erroneous idea of reality.

Moreover, erudite neurology has determined that the same group of neurons are activated when something is perceived or imagined. It may therefore be claimed that the brain is unable to differentiate clearly between fact and fiction (it may simply not care). For the brain, the virtual or real nature of a person is irrelevant as it reduces all the sensations it receives to a single abstract signal, regardless of whether those sensations are visual, auditory or of another type.

Indeed, metaphor, the imagination and dreams are all natural virtual or non-presence forms that can be compared perfectly well with "real" experiences, as they enable us to act upon real situations. So essentially, the realm of cyberspace holds

nothing new for us. The "virtual" is a mechanism that uses nature to boost or prepare us for the real and material.

Also worthy of note is the disappearance of spatiality and timelessness. Internet experiences are rootless, as they are located within space. Spatiality is of no interest on the Internet because what matters are the objects of information and their relations. And it is timeless because the relevance of relations between digitalised websites is of an exclusively logical nature. The question of relevance corresponds to the websites, the documents, the images and sounds, etc.

Another relevant issue surrounding the Internet is how to forget that which we no longer wish to remember. Personal identity consists precisely of forgetting others. The question this raises is how we can build an identity in cyberspace if we are simultaneously being reminded of and shown other former ones.

Forgetting is essential for human experience, as it enables us to rid ourselves of banal and toxic memories that may disturb our sense of balance and harmony. Furthermore, it allows us to rebuild ourselves free of those events that could paralyse our experience.

Regarding the treatment afforded by the Internet to the binomial concept of public and private, it must be said that the idea of privacy is shattered by the Internet, bringing about a deep and far-reaching transformation of our social relations.

It is also clear that the Internet impacts profoundly on the idea of intimacy. It has led to the disappearance of privacy, a generalised brutalisation and a sharp deterioration of sensitivity and "care of the self". It has resulted in a generalised belief that the most private aspects of an individual are within our reach and that, in addition, we are "entitled" to pry into other people's private lives. And all this whilst remaining anonymous, openly displaying our most aggressive instincts yet remaining hidden and unseen (symbolised by the metaphor of the "peering through the keyhole", the title of this study).

At the beginning of Book II of *The Republic,* Plato (359d–360d) relates the myth of the Ring of Gyges. Gyges was a Greek shepherd in the service of the King of Lydia. One day, as he was tending his flocks as usual, he came across a ring in an abyss that had opened up following a severe earthquake. Amazed, Gyges ventured down into the abyss where he discovered several marvellous objects including a bronze horse, which was hollow and with several openings. Inside he saw the body of a man who appeared larger than normal and who was wearing a gold ring. Gyges removed the ring and returned to the surface. This ring had the power of making whoever wore it invisible. Gyges took advantage of his new powers to enter the royal palace, where he murdered the King and seduced the Queen, and established a tyrannical regime. This myth is first related in Plato's work *The Republic*. What then is the message behind this myth? The tale of Gyges, a moral or fair man simply because he had no opportunity to be otherwise, but who would act in an immoral and unfair manner as soon as the circumstances were reversed. This story reflects the idea that everyone is capable of acting immorally for their own benefit when the opportunity arises. Moreover, if someone possessing powers similar to Gyges refrains from committing an injustice and seizing the goods and property of others, he would be considered a fool, because no one is willingly fair. Naturally,

this is not the stance defended by Plato. For this reason, Socrates is convinced that regardless of the benefits that may be obtained by acting unjustly, under no circumstances can such actions command respect. Later on, Socrates claims that unfair behaviour is unsustainable: unjust actions cannot be concealed, as the perpetrator is forced to live a lie, constantly protecting himself and in fear that others may act like him. Naturally, this kind of existence cannot be considered a happy one.

The relevance of Platonic thinking with regard to the influence of the Internet on our social and personal relations is particularly striking.

Returning to the issue of privacy, it is clear that exposing our privacy leads to the disappearance of ritualisations that contribute to forming us as individuals and that by nature must be intimate; these include art, morality, love, friendship and eroticism.

As N. Carr (2011, pp. 1–4) stated, the Internet is eating away at the capacity to control our thoughts and to think autonomously. He is likewise convinced that people gravely undervalue their privacy and should this attitude subsist, they will be forced to assume and accept this constant observance, which drags them closer towards a consumer society in detriment to less measurable benefits associated with privacy.

S. Turkle (2011, pp. 421–477) claims that in the future Internet users will roam artificial worlds, adjusting their personality and appearance to their particular preferences at any given time and interacting in a more direct and intense manner with other people, even though they may be thousands of kilometres away. She adds that when one becomes used to company which places no demands on you, as occurs with the Internet, relations with real people, which require an effort, become difficult and even overwhelming.

At all events, the Internet is an instrument which, despite constantly being put forward as an invaluable tool for knowledge and learning, essentially fulfils the object of entertaining and keeping people amused. We live immersed in a society based on entertaining an empty and linguistically destructured public. It is important to be aware of this, as cyberspace will become hegemonic in the coming decades. (In the West we are obsessed with filling schools with computers, yet we are now faced with a scenario whereby young people can move from website to website with ease, yet when faced with a "highbrow" text of six lines they cast it to one side, unable to understand it. Such is culture in modern day society).

Despite the so-called information technology revolution, people conduct their daily lives in much the same way as always: transactions, play, arguments, friends, love, courting and speech (or pestering) as an antidote to tedium.

III

Long before the appearance of the Internet, McLuhan (1995, p. 66) wrote of the advent of the electronic era and electricity, claiming that the world of matter had become one immense nerve, connecting and linking thousands of kilometres in a few thousandths of a second. Unaware of what the Internet would represent for our

age, he stated that the electronic human being of the global village is like an "exposed spider squatting in a thrumming web". In this sense, he was describing the human being as a mix of ontology and technology.

Instead of evolving towards a vast library such as that of Alexandria, the world, wrote McLuhan, has become one vast computer, an electronic brain. And as our senses have gradually abandoned us, so this "Big Brother" has penetrated our interior.

G. Vattimo (2009, pp. 101–107) considers that the future of societies is gradually taking a two-forked direction: that of the information-media bubble (a bubble because it has the appearance of an evanescent sphere, yet firmly closed against all those that are not connected – in all senses of the word); and all other societies that are becoming increasingly primitive due to the widening gap between them and the bubble societies.

In an earlier work on the current mundialization of the Internet, Vattimo (1986, pp. 10–18) forecast a possible new characteristic of the consumer society. He assured us that it is anything but revolutionary or perturbing, as it allows for things to go on as always. He is convinced that in the technical world there is an underlying immobility that science fiction writers portrayed as limiting experiences of reality to image-based experiences.

In this final section we will address in details the "pros" and "cons" of the Internet.

To start with, among the advantages of cyberspace, we could highlight the following aspects:

(a) As a tool, it represents an opportunity for education and cultural emancipation, especially for poorer countries (an issue of considerable importance).
(b) Immediate access to all kinds of information and the emergence of freedom of information without restrictions, censorship or borders, allowing all human beings obstacle-free access to information.
(c) The value of the Internet as a multi-tasking instrument.
(d) The possibility of intercommunication between people with few economic resources.
(e) The Internet is a potential means of combating people's fear of loneliness and having to share their privacy.

On the negative side, the principal drawbacks include the following:

(a) Social control: our lives are observed and inspected, and in consequence, our privacy and intimacy disappear.
(b) We wish to know everything about "the others", yet from a position of anonymity (watching through the keyhole).
(c) It acts in detriment to reflexive thought and personal meditation.
(d) Memory takes precedence over the right to forget, which is crucial to human experience in order to enable us to reconstruct our lives.
(e) The simplification of language: the image prevails over the written word. Lesser structures take priority over more complex ones. Digital writing scorns words. The literal prevails over the interpretative. It is the shift from alphabetic writing (simulating speech) to digital writing in an electronic format. Digital grammar reduces specifically human structures to logarithms of a binary nature.

Finally, it must be said that the existence of the Internet is justified if it represents an opportunity for the education of the most needy citizens and the most severely marginalised communities. However, there is little justification for an Internet that, in the name of fun and entertainment, shatters all the wisdom our civilisation has accumulated. Or to put it another way: if it leads us towards societies in which we are unable to distinguish between what is relevant and what is not.

Bibliography

Carr, N. 2011. The Shallows: What the Internet is doing to our brains. New York: W.W. Norton, pp. 1–4.

McLuhan, M. 1995. *La aldea global*. Barcelona.

Turing, A. M. 1950. Computing machinery and intelligence. *Mind (A Quarterly Review)* 59:236. Oxford University Press.

Turkle, S. 2011. Alone together: Why we expert more from technology and less from each other. New York: Basic Books, pp. 421–477.

Vattimo, G. 2009. Ecce Comu. Barcelona: Paidós, pp. 101–107.

Vattimo, G. 1986. El fin de la modernidad. Barcelona: Gedisa, pp. 10–18.

Part V

Reason and Sense as the Frames and Partitions of the Temple of Life

Salahaddin Khalilov

Abstract The architectonics of the human world is formed by means of reason. For this very reason, we liken reason to the framework and to a basis for a more resistant and rigid system. This system's material, in fact, is knowledge, and its builder is reason. If reason had left this system, it would have collapsed. What leave the system and travel to other worlds and take trophy from them are the senses. However, the senses return and belong to man only then when they are under the control of reason and are linked to each other due to reason.

The principle of cumulativity in science reminds us the framework. The types of knowledge could not only be collected. They ought to be included into the structure of larger constructions, theories and teachings. For this purpose, knowledge ought to be dependent on logical rules or it should be mathematized. However, new discovered knowledge still does not easily become independent from sensation, simile and figurative images. Therefore, for being entered into the framework, they should be moulded into patterns and be adapted to a certain pattern and cliché on the basis of unit logical and mathematical principles. In the article this problem is considered in the aspect of phenomenological reduction.

Different philosophical teachings move either from the sensory reality of things or from the meaning reality. Husserl, for example relies on the meanings of things and on the component of reason and attempts to become free from the senses. As a matter of fact, what is meant by the phenomenological reduction is to be free from the impact of the senses.[1]

For the reason that the human mind cannot directly comprehend an initial reality-a substance, by leaving all these to Metaphysics, or by refusing them, it starts from the image of the thing in mind. However, the preparation of the model of next cognitive processes, of course, considerably simplifies the problem.

S. Khalilov (✉)
Center for Philosophy, Azerbaijan University, Baku, Azerbaijan
e-mail: ssx@azun.baku.az

A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), *Phenomenology and the Human Positioning in the Cosmos: The Life-world, Nature, Earth: Book One*, Analecta Husserliana 113,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-4801-9_18,

Although we do not look for a material or ideal worlds on the basis of phenomena, we see within the human consciousness the prototype of that substance – the metaphysical world, and we advance towards it.

After accepting phenomena as a fact of consciousness, willingly or not, the problem of *assembling* them arises.

The conversion of phenomena into knowledge, and then the re-conversion of gathered knowledge into the model of the world, in fact, resembles the creation of the mirror reflection of the metaphysical world in the space of consciousness. On the one hand, it seems as if Metaphysics is excluded, and on the other hand the same problems arise in a new place and with a new terminology. One of the most important problems in the philosophy of science is the way of the assemblage of knowledge and the creation of the scientific panorama of the world. It is true that the problem of the realness of a separately taken knowledge as well as the ways of the verification of realness are also important. However, the need to the integration between different pieces of knowledge and even between sciences eventually takes us to the problem of the establishment of new world models. On the one hand it seems as if we do not search for anything outside human consciousness, and on the other hand, by taking out what is in their consciousness in any ways (notions, words, mathematical symbols, etc.), men try to create the world of *objective knowledge*.[2] This, in turn, slightly differs from the idea of 'the material reality'.

The philosophers of science claim that scientific theories have been already created as well as the gained pieces of knowledge have been assembled by following a certain rule, or more precisely, they claim that the more complex knowledge systems (teachings, theories), which contain these pieces of knowledge as an element, have been established. As if it is only a mechanism ascribed to science.

However, in fact the vision of each human being about the world, that is, the world of that human being is formed due to new pieces of knowledge added to the previous system and model, and by way of the formation of a more perfect system and model which one day could put these pieces of knowledge into order. This is a certain worldview for every human being. The world of the human being is in fact included in his worldview. It is more systematic, regular, harmonious and perfect in some people, and more irregular and unsystematic in others. The first are called perfect men and the second imperfect or ignorant.

It is true that the human world is not an unchangeable and constant one: some things are forgotten and new ones are added instead. Namely, the human world is a process. However, the human being does not live with his whole world at every turn, he lives in a corner of his own world, or more precisely, he plays with a certain string of it and is coloured to a certain colour of it. That is to say, as if the human being is a resident of his own world; and this world has a map like the globe, but all the points of it are attainable for man, and he stays now in this and now the other corner of his own world and he 'makes a fire' and 'turns the light on'.

Thinking sometimes uplifts us on its wings and takes us far away to eternities. If the human being is not linked to anywhere or to anything and flies away on the wings of thinking then he cannot return back. He would come with nothing if he returned back. That is to say, nothing would come out from this journey.

If the human being is linked to a power or a purpose and if he knows what to look for, then he will not constantly move forward on the wings of thinking, on the contrary he will move through the returning curved line. That is to say, thinking will lead him once again to the beginning, to that same purpose. If there is a beginning or a purpose, then the centrifugal force appears and the trajectories of all thoughts resemble the blossom of the flower as well as the symbolic shape of the heart. The motion is finished where it was started, and what passes is only time, and what remains in this time is a sign, memory and fruit.

Bees fly from one blossom to another, from one meadow to another. However they do not stray away, and finally they bring the nectars gathered from flowers to their hive and these nectars are neatly stored in honeycombs. By being subjected to new modification, these nectars are gathered and are arranged according to a certain order, and thus an optimum gathering opportunity is revealed. A new conclusion and knowledge that is gained from every journey of human thought is not only placed in his memory, but also it brings a new colour, a new shade of meaning to his previous vision of world and to his previous model (to his previous world).

If nothing is planned beforehand and if thought is not aware of the reason of its fly, then it will not return back. What is of concern here, in fact, is reason (intellect). That is to say, what forms a connection with the beginning and provides the attainment of new facts and impressions and then their assemblage to the same nest and after that setting up a rule in this nest is reason itself. However, sensation, feeling, impression and living are what enable human thought to be uplifted, to fly and to travel away. The human being gains a new impulse due to some external or internal effects, and moves away from his own world and goes to travel; and thus he visits new places that he has not seen and known before. He takes from them a new thing for his world. It is possible, of course, that the human being is not cognizant of what he has brought. Namely, it is not impossible that the new impression he has gained could be undiscovered and untransformed into knowledge. However, this indefinite innovation added to the human world, one day, could become clear and could be rationally comprehended as knowledge.

The comprehension of anything means, in fact, that it is possible for the change, which happened after the human being had moved from one situation to the other, that is, for the gained innovation to be expressed with notions and later with words as well as to be transformed into knowledge. In fact, it is a cognitive process which has been partly finished. That is to say, if an impression is not transformed into knowledge, if the human being does not have any feeling for the change that he has undergone and if he cannot express it in words then it is not considered as comprehension.

Excitements, states and impressions have their own separate storehouse and a memory world that is not possible to speak about. It is remembered when man experiences this feeling once again. Man cannot express it and say it to others with his own will. This impression manifests itself sometimes in music and sometimes through a painting or poem. However, it is very difficult to say that to what extent it is adequate to that feeling. What we can say are only the events that have become knowledge and have been placed on the shelves of logical thinking. Or more precisely

these pieces of knowledge can never draw the entire panorama of that intellectual journey as well as they cannot wholly reflect the formed impressions. Only part of them are transformed into knowledge and the rest carve out a niche for themselves in the world of memory as feelings and impressions, or they become completely forgotten. K. Popper said that "I conceded to idealism that our theories are actively produced by our minds rather than impressed upon us by reality, and that they transcend our "experience"".[3]

The transformation of the senses into knowledge becomes possible due to reason; or more precisely, this ability of man is called reason.

The senses are free. The travelling of human being by his moving from his place and world is possible only due to his senses. However, what returns the human being to his place, to his 'Ego' and to his intellectual being is reason. In fact, during the whole journey, reason does not leave man to the senses and always accompanies him. Only due to reason man could return back to himself and takes his trophies to his 'nest', to his world. Indeed, the senses are free and they are not limited to the outlines of a world. Solid bodies, with their gravity, are tied to a certain place, but air, in turn, does not have such concreteness of place, likewise, just like air, the senses can spread far away. It seems that, because it is heavy, reason becomes localized and riveted and it cannot pass out of the circle of 'Ego', as well as it always has one foot tied to the essence when accompanying the senses. If we repeat this metaphor on a bigger scale-on the cosmic and planetary scale we can say that reason has one foot on earth and even it does not take its breath away from the earth when making a cosmic journey. The re-return of the senses to the centre of gravity becomes possible only due to reason.

The architectonics of the human world is formed by means of reason. For this very reason, we liken reason to the framework and to a basis for a more resistant and rigid system. This system's material, in fact, is knowledge, and its builder is reason. If reason had left this system, it would have collapsed. What leave the system and travel to other worlds and take trophy from them are the senses. However, the senses return and belong to man only then when they are under the control of reason and are linked to each other due to reason. When the sense flies far away and when reason does not manage to bring it back then it will lose its connection to reason. In fact, each day and each time so many senses and feelings go away and do not return back. The worst happens when they take the human being with themselves, and sometimes they take him so far that man himself cannot return back to his beginning, his 'Ego' and to himself. In this case people say that he has gone mad.

To sum up, we have used from the notion of the resemblance of the senses with air. The senses have been presented as light and reason as heavy. If we take one more step, we can say that the senses and reason correspond in fact to the different aggregation states of the same essence. That is to say, reason is the thickened sense and the sense, in turn, is thinned reason. The abundance of thickness and the reproduction in weight are what provide thought to be connected to the earth, to the beginning and essence. The thinness and lightness enable the senses to be separated from the gravitational power of the earth and travel far away. Just as back in the days when the balloon was filled with light air (hydrogen) to rise up in the sky.

Then what could be a third notion (the first in fact) which includes the both notions? Can we use the notion of 'thinking' for this purpose? However, the term of 'thinking' is usually used for reason-intellect. That is to say, what is taken as a mechanism and means of thinking is reason. 'Feeling' is not ascribed to thinking. It seems that it is because thinking appears purposely, it is directed by man himself, but the will of feeling is in its own hand. It comes whenever it wants, and vice versa; as well as it carries man from one state to the other. However, it is not always easy for the human being to be absorbed in feeling.

It is not a coincidence that F. Bacon said that thinking should be fastened with lead so that it cannot take man far away. If we take this quotation to the context of the tale of Daedalus and Icarus, it turns out that if it is flied far away wings could be burnt. F. Bacon expresses this process with the word of thinking. We sometimes express the complication in thought and being lost in thought and meditation as a heavy matter, and being absorbed in feeling and the flying of feeling on the wings of thinking as lightness. However, the notion of 'feeling' is used together with the notion of 'thinking'. The expression of ' being absorbed in feeling' is usually used in a negative meaning, that is, this term is used in the meaning of succeeding feeling and not returning back. The expressions of 'the immersion in thought' and 'being lost in thought' show that thought is understood in the context of complication, that is, it is understood as an attempt of reason towards realizing itself. For this reason, because the initiative towards bringing the sense (feeling) and reason to a common denominator and using from a unit term for this purpose is a new initiative, a corresponding common term has not yet created. It is because traditionally these two events have been presented as completely different qualities and even as different essences. Prose, drama, symphony, etc. could be considered as the most corresponding artistic forms to the processes in which both acts, that is, 'thinking' and 'feeling' take part together. In the majority of music types, in painting and in similar types of the arts feelings play a leading role rather than thinking. Impressionism and similar movements could be considered as an attempt towards completely removing thinking from the arts and towards the direct symbolization of feelings only.

Which one's role is more important, sensation or reason, in human life? How are they related to each other and what is their participation level and mutual relation in the entire life phenomenon? This problem has been studied very little in philosophy. Instead, the specific place of science and the arts and their mutual relationship in the structure of social life have been studied relatively more. For this reason, we will attempt to investigate the problem of the correlation of reason and sensation in the structure of personal life by analogy with the relation of science and the arts in social life. Although absolute equality and sameness are not of concern here, but nevertheless there are some similarities that could contribute to the clarification of the problem in question.

The process of scientific creativity is no doubt possible due to the active role of subject. Just like in all creative processes, the author here is the soul too. However, we look at this process mostly from the standpoint of a scholar and researcher. Whereas, without being related to other souls or to the world of souls, the individual

soul cannot produce any new idea with reference only to sensual knowledge that it gains by means of his personal experience, or more precisely, by means of its body that it rules.

Epistemology still attempts to explain the development process of science and the discovery of new scientific knowledge without reference to the notion of the soul and only being limited to reason and sensory experience. For this reason, the models, which are used in this field, are deprived of opportunity to reflect the real course of the creativity process. The real process is more complex and is directly related to the activity of the soul.

What is meant from reason and sense is mostly individual reason and the sensory experience of an individual. That is to say, each person gains all knowledge due to his personal experience. The knowledge that is the products of the experience and the reason of others, is transmitted to others after being verbalized, that is, after being put to a new objective form. Cumulativity, which is one of the main principles of Modern Epistemology, expresses the possibility of the gathering of this objectivised knowledge. Namely, the gathering of knowledge is an independent process that happens on the different plane apart from individual creativity processes, and has considerable social content. It means that the gathering of knowledge is no longer considered as a process that happens in the spiritual world but as a socio-historical event. The conception of Kuhn is one of the obvious examples of this approach.

Karl Popper also considers the problem of the entry of new knowledge into the structure of theory apart from the discovery of that knowledge. Knowledge, in his theory, is separated from its author and enter to an independent existence world- to the world of 'objective knowledge'.[4] In this case, the spirit of the creative scholar is again left aside.

The knowledge that are taken from the personal sensory experience (empirical knowledge), and the experiences of others, and finally the knowledge, which are generalized, systematized and theorised, are different in their origin. To take quantitatively, the vast majority of the knowledge we adopt are the pieces of knowledge that have been attained by the whole humanity during thousands of years. The difference and correlation are incommensurably big by volume. The knowledge that are gained from outside are the products of the experiences of others and they are put under our order after they have been abstracted, shaped, connected to each other with logical schemes and systematised. However, the ideas and knowledge that have been newly discovered and entered to the common 'pail and storehouse' are like a free electron; time will show which of them will be attracted by the nucleus and kept in its gravitational area. That is to say, the fate of new pieces of knowledge is dependent on how they will enter to the system and how they will be located.

What we mean by the world of knowledge (pail. storehouse) is not, in fact, a storehouse, each of them is not kept here in a separate cell; they are included either in the system, and for this purpose they should be freed from their individuality and from their unique sensual covering as well as they should to avoid their individuality for joining the system (because he himself is individually a system), or by being left aside as a free electron they should wait for being taken under the influence of another area. In fact, on the one hand there is a theory and system and on the other

hand there are the *lonely* knowledge around it that lowly wait like a free electron. We have also our own world and our own initiative towards establishing a more general teaching or system, by entering this system, this teaching and the additional free knowledge and furthermore the knowledge, which we carry with ourselves and which are the products of our personal experience, into our own world, and by assimilating them in the energetic area of our soul. Most people are satisfied with keeping the knowledge that come from outside as well as their own knowledge in the separate cells of their memory. The creative scholar and philosopher, in turn, try to gather all of them in a certain way. This gathering act is realized either evidently-consciously by means of the application of certain methods or non-evidently-unconsciously.

Including any knowledge in the creative process requires its resuscitation. Whereas the connection between different types of knowledge is mostly sought after they become depotentiated. This initiative could hardly yield positive results. According to Carl Jung's theory of collective unconsciousness, the sensual world of every person is not a result of only his personal sensory experience but also includes the sensory experiences of previous generations and counterparts. It is possible to ascribe this idea to the knowledge that is at the creative and initial stage. If this idea is applied to Epistemology, then it is possible to come to a conclusion that knowledge is discovered, in fact, not as a round and smooth thing, which has lost all its opportunities and connections, but it is discovered with all its connections and relations. Merely, for expressing it by words and known ideas, scholars mostly clip its wings, make it disconnected and depotentiate it. Then, once again they seek the new forms of connection to enter it to known theories.

The whole problem is that, for expressing new and unknown ideas by means of known ones, it becomes often necessary 'to pare it' and mould it into certain shapes. However, a new-born knowledge considerably loses its originality in this process and by being removed from its natural condition it is framed in the clothes that are not cut for it.

New types of knowledge are pared off in accordance to the criteria and terminologies of the teachings and theories that have been known in advance. Whereas this knowledge would could be the embryo of an entirely new theory. The scholars, who approach the problem more fundamentally, instead of taking a position to hurriedly pare new knowledge and place it anywhere, attempt to keep it alive in its initial and natural condition and to cut out new clothes that fit it.

Building the temple of science does not happen only due to Cumulativity. If we only collect different types of knowledge, the wall will not be durable. For this reason, it is necessary to overlap them on each other as well as pack them and clothe them. However it is not the end of the matter. There ought to be the mutual transition probability between a theory and another one. After climbing to a certain floor and becoming too distant from land, it becomes difficult to go down and then climb up from another part for receiving news from the other side of the wall. Therefore, there should also be doors and windows between walls. For the moving of air, builders even make the middle of frameworks from non-hermetic material.

The most important aspect, which differentiates science from poetry and the arts, is that it has rational frame. The reason why scientific knowledge could be collected, is, that these types of knowledge are closely related to each other with logical chain. In other words, we can compare the plants built from logic with reinforcing concrete constructions. This construction enables both neighbouring rooms and floors to be closely connected to each other. For this reason, this type of the framework is used for building multi-storey buildings. Sensation should not be added here for the durability of framework. The principle of cumulativity in science reminds us this framework. The types of knowledge could not only be collected. They ought to be included into the structure of larger constructions, theories and teachings. For this purpose, knowledge ought to be dependent on logical rules or it should be mathematized. However, new discovered knowledge still does not easily become independent from sensation, simile and figurative images. Therefore, for being entered into the framework, they should be moulded into patterns and be adapted to a certain pattern and cliché on the basis of unit logical and mathematical principles.

However, both creative thinking and sensory experiment are not possible without feelings and senses. In the beginning, the sense and reason are mixed. Then it is cleared from senses and then is patterned and expressed in a language that is understood by everyone; and because everyone understands it cumulativity becomes possible, that is, the next researcher could continue the previous research studies.

However, the creative thinking is not possible outside cold reason and sensual experiences.

For passing from one idea to the other and from one subject to the other the walls between them should be such that thinking could pass to the adjoining room. That is to say, if a building is built from reinforced concrete constructions then the mutual passage becomes impossible, and no room is left for figurative and associative thinking. For this very reason, when the building of science is built, the interval between columns is not built from reinforced concrete constructions, but from light materials and with partitions.

The human being takes possession of knowledge and impressions. These all are preserved in his memory and reminiscence. However, for not depending on his previous life, thoughts and emotional-sensual experiences at every turn, as if the human being forgets them and becomes face to face with the real environment and life as a tabula rasa. If the human being is loaded with an emotion and impression then he cannot react adequately to the demands of the environment and time, because as if he bears the load of a previous environment, situation and another life. He should be freed from the previous loads in order to join the present time, the reality or to become a counterpart to it or to carry the load of this very reality. However, he the question appears: how can this freed human being respond to the impacts of the environment? How could he react to this situation? Certainly, a completely emptied human being (if it is possible to become completely emptied, to become a tabula rasa) could be filled only with the very actual environment, with the present time and be under the influence of it. However, man never becomes completely emptied. He is actually emptied, but potentially, he is always a carrier of his genetic program and previous life in the lower layer; and his attitude towards the environment and

reality is bidirectional. On the one hand he adopts the environment, but on the other hand he tries to impose himself on it. Only after being influenced by the environment and after seeing, feeling and understanding the environment-reality and the opponent, the human being consciously responds to its 'wishes', 'influences' and 'dictations'.

In inorganic life and nature, the action is equal to the reaction as well as they exist simultaneously. The reaction of living creatures consists of two components; first one as a physical object and according to the laws of physics and the second as a biological system. The instrumentalization, the interval zone and the transformation in man is quiet different, that is, the response and reaction could be postponed here as well as the conscious investigation becomes possible.

As we mentioned above, human memory is full of knowledge and reminiscences; and the human being makes his memory work to respond and applies to whatever he knows. Routine knowledge, abilities and habits play significant roles here.

The activity of man could be based on impression, opinion, hypothesis and supposition. It could be based on empirical knowledge and habits as well as on carefully measured and even theoretically justified knowledge and finally on scientific knowledge.

Ordinary individuals are hardly based on science about everything when living their personal lives and deciding on daily events. Daily life does not have any scientific bases. Life experience, wisdom and some advice of wise people only can help here. The reaction at the level of emotion and impression is not advisable here. However, the life of society, large-scale social activities, in particular professional activity fields are supposed to be based on scientific and academic knowledge.

The logical thinking of man are not only the operations on the thinking of others but also on the thoughts taken from a book and even the thoughts, sentences and meanings that have been removed from man himself. That is to say, what are taken into consideration here for analyzing are not the notions that exist in the internal world of man, but the external ones which are separated from the objectified and structuralized system of eternal relations as well as which are localized and possess the local continuum in thinking space, have the beginning and the end and which are objectified for everyone, that is, the notions which could be passed to others.

The notion of 'reason' is used in different meanings. The operation on already packed, verbalized and objectivised thoughts requires logical thinking skills. Sometimes it is also called reason. However, the process of the packing of impressions, emotions and information is also realized through reason. These are the two different stages and events. The third stage is keeping the ready products of the rational process in mind, that is, it is the stage of memory. When we think on any subject, we have to reconstruct, in our memory, the knowledge about that subject together with the knowledge that we have gained them from other sources.

These all are the operations of knowledge and are realized through logical thinking. What is the most important, however, is the packing of the information transmitted via the senses. What is meant by the passage from sensual cognition to logical perception are the adoption of any peculiarities (in fact the ideal forms) of things and events and verbalizing them by re-transforming them into the living idea. They belong to the cognitive senses. The significant aspect of the cognitive senses

is the acceptance of ideas-peculiarities as a sort of ready products. The main difficulty here is the passage from quality to quantity; because only the state of quality is reflected in the sensual stage. 'The materiality' of a thing or event shows itself in its time-and-space concreteness and quantity descriptions. Ideas, in fact, also have a certain quantity measure and limit.

However, it is not possible to go far away only with reason, that is, after cutting and patterning of received information, impression and image. That is to say, great discoveries could not be realized in this way. For this is a commonly known and used way.

There is a difference between reading (writing) and being read (written). For the reason that thinking is objectivised in a packed thinking system, you can also act there as an object for others. Every packing, however, is perversion and becomes possible on account of moving away from the truth and thus it becomes possible to separate an aspect and put it forward. However there is no other way. The activity area of rational thinking demands a standard way which is comprehensive for everyone. At the same time, this weak aspect paves the way for cumulativety. Only the skyscraper which is built on reinforced concrete constructions could be strong. Individualities, senses-emotions and impressions could be placed in the partitions between frameworks for not crumpling under a heavy load.

For some reason or other, when it is spoken about the role of the senses in the epistemic process, only the cognitive senses are remembered. Then a question arises: how can these five independent senses form the whole image. The formation of the whole images of things in us does not happens due to those five cognitive senses but by means of a number of different, interactive senses. According to Husserl, every appearance of the thing in some way includes the whole thing. Then on account of what does it become possible? The cognitive senses are not capable of it. At the same time we cannot comprehend the different structural levels of the thing. In our daily life we observe things only by means of the senses which are the expressions of macrostructure. If we want to observe the internal processes by dividing the thing into different parts, then another complex of the senses will appear.

Things enter to our daily life only with their macrostructure and total functions. The apple, for instance, forms a certain image in our consciousness as an entire object. The image of a specific apple basically coincides with the general notion of the apple that existed in our consciousness in advance. However, for a pharmacist-doctor, who makes a certain medicine from its seed, the apple will be much associated with that medicine. This is, in turn, the evaluation of one object in different structural levels.

The same object can be a basis, in our consciousness, for the formation of different phenomena.

Time and space are not taken as a moment and point: both of them have a certain duration and interval, and for this reason the same thing could be expressed by different phenomena in different situations. If we comprehend a thing in a certain moment only as a phenomenon, it does not mean that the thing really consists of this

phenomenon. For the reason that Husserl does not accept the material existence of the thing out of phenomenon, he ties to explain these possibilities of diversity as the potential possibility of the world of consciousness itself. Considering this, Levinas writes that the object is never fully comprehended. It means that the approach of Phenomenology, in fact, is closer to Kant's agnosticism and his teaching of 'the-thing-in-itself (das Ding an sich)'. Merely Husserl replaces the concrete existence of the thing with the active existence of consciousness and its potential possibilities.

Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka writes: "In its search for understanding, the human mind oscillates between what is obvious and what is mysterious, what is hidden and what is manifest\ what is visible and what is invisible. It is itinerary, from Parmenides 'goddess and Heraclitus' hidden, through the great Platonic and Aristotelian lines, the neo-Platonists, al-Farabi, Avicenna, Mulla Sadra, Leibniz, Kant, Husserl, and Heidegger, on to the present-day thinking, is that of the metaphysical quest for the key by which to open the seemingly locked access to the stable, generative factors animating the fluctuating reality of life, the human soul, the world, the ultimate destiny of human beings."[5]

The real life becomes possible due to the activation of consciousness. What we experience are the events (phenomena) in the potential world that are drawn to our consciousness (*Herausfassen* in Husserl). The existence of a thing is determined by our drawing it to the sphere of active consciousness.

Naturalism ascribes it directly to nature and to the objective world itself. Husserl's phenomenology, in turn, ascribes it to the world of consciousness. As to us, we put emphasis on the contact of both of them with one another and their being experienced simultaneously. This idea, in fact, was put forward in twelfth century by the establisher of the doctrine of Illuminationism (Israqiyya), Shahab al-Din al-Surawardi. Later on, it was developed further in the philosophies of Mulla Sadra and Abu Turkhan. Al-Suhrawardi calls the transition between two world 'barzakh (the intermediate state)'. On the one hand, he applies the hierarchy of lights to the architectonics of human heart (soul), and on the other hand to the architectonics of the material world. At the point of illumination (Husserl uses the term of intuition), the connection between these two sides arises and this is the life that man experiences.

Life includes both existence forms; it exists as the material being and as the event (phenomenon) of consciousness simultaneously. The bridge between these two edge states and poles is active consciousness, experience or life. Henry Corbin was the first who tried to link Phenomenology with Illuminationism.[6] Later on, Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka discussed this problem in her works in detail. The school that she has established as well as the conferences of The World Phenomenology Institute and the books that have been published by this institute enable Illuminationism and Phenomenology to be compared with each other. I would say that this initiative paves the way, as a whole, for the approach between Eastern and Western philosophical doctrines. It is the result of these efforts that instead of speaking about building the temples of reason and sensation separately, today we can speak of building the entire temple of life, which includes both of them.

Notes

1. Edmund Husserl, *Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, Northwestern Univ Press, 1970, pp. 152–155. 2. Karl Popper, *Objective Knowledge. An Evolutionary Approach* (Oxford: Clarendon ,1975).
2. Karl Popper, *Unended Quest: Intellectual Autobiography* (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), p.82.
3. Karl Popper, *Objective Knowledge. An Evolutionary Approach* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975).
4. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, "The Unveiling and the Unveiled", in *The Passions of the Soul in the Metmorphosis of Becoming*, Edited by Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, Boston, 2003, p. XXIV.
5. Henry Corbin, *History of Islamic Philosophy* (London and New York: Kegan Paul International, 1993), p.209.

Direct Intuition: Strategies of Knowledge in the Phenomenology of Life, with Reference to the Philosophy of Illumination

Olga Louchakova-Schwartz

Abstract This article presents phenomenological meta-analysis of Tymieniecka's phenomenology of life with regard to its strategies of knowledge. The novelty of phenomenology of life consists in special orientation of direct intuition of Tymieniecka's insight. The analysis suggests that the positioning of the direct intuition differes from philosopher to philosopher. Even though this perspective pays attention to individual differences in philosophical thinking, this view has to be distinguished from psychologism as criticized by Husserl, and rather, seen as a development of Husserl's theory of direct intuition. A framework for such analysis can be also found in Islamic philosophies of Suhrawardi and Ibn 'Arabi, who introduced the concepts of individual predisposition, modes of knowledge, and self-knowledge mediated by knowledge by presence. These concepts can be applied to understanding of the origins of philosophical insight. The paper examines in depth the workings of direct, or presentive, intuition in Tymieniecka's descriptions of the phenomenal field of life, and of life per se as a dynamic object. It demonstrates the dialogical nature of interrogation, and the sentience of logos as a horizon of philosophical inquiry. Finally, the paper introduces the concept of process phenomenology, and suggests directions of future research with regard to phenomenology of imagination.

As many have noted, the phenomenology of life introduces not only a new philosophical program but also a radical reformulation of the postmodern paradigm.[1] While the intellectual genealogy of Tymieniecka's thought is in line with both Leibnitz and Husserl, Tymieniecka's vision is unique and fresh. She recreates philosophy in two steps: first is the all-encompassing epoché on preceding philosophical principles, and second is the radiating expanse of new philosophical categories.

O. Louchakova-Schwartz (✉)
Visiting Professor, Graduate Theological Union,
2400 Ridge Road, CA 94709, Berkeley
e-mail: olouchakova@gmail.com

A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), *Phenomenology and the Human Positioning in the Cosmos: The Life-world, Nature, Earth: Book One*, Analecta Husserliana 113,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-4801-9_19,

This new intellectual landscape emerges out of an analytic reflection on the intuitions of life. Life is the starting point of Tymieniecka's analysis, the evidence for the scientific philosophical method, and the overarching horizon of phenomenological inquiry. Returning to things themselves in the phenomenology of life consists in the phenomenon of life as primary evidence; it entails an analysis of consciousness, perception, language, body etc. as consequential to life's tendencies, processes, contents, and structures.

Tymieniecka approaches life through the philosophical inquiry that she calls *interrogation*. *Direct intuition* and reason in her work are neither antagonistic nor working in tandem, in an unusual manner, they serves as a joint, undifferentiated cognitive faculty. I intend to show that interrogation, as uses a combined intuition-reason as a single higher-order faculty, the logos of interrogation.

The phenomenology of life provides a resolution for millennia-old aporiae of mind and matter, subject and object, and existence and essence. This philosophy is also effective in addressing the tricky issues of cognition and representation, and the ontology of the particular and the universal. In larger contexts of Tymieniecka's concept of the unity-of-all-there-is-alive, previously insoluble contradictions seem to be no more than artifacts of particular discourses, or even evidence of errors in philosophical judgment.[2]

After nearly 3,000 years of a history of philosophical ideas, one would expect that "there is nothing new under the sun."[3] Nevertheless, Tymieniecka's reformational insight is radical in its originality. A question thus arises: How does this philosopher attain such an insight? Can it be a matter of method? Tymieniecka not only refutes such technicalities but also maintains that the reduction of philosophy to a method have been a cause of misunderstandings and errors.[4] Tymieniecka is not averse to limited methodological self-reflections: she self-reflects on the generative synthesis of direct intuition and description, scientific investigation, analysis of transcendental constitution, and traditional ontology in her work.[5] Although these approaches are present in her work, Tymieniecka's insight comes forth as much more than a result of the formal application of these approaches. Hers is a whole new strategy of knowledge, initiated by the original positioning of Tymieniecka's concept of *direct intuition*.

I have to give this new concept, positioning of the direct intuition, some context. In Western phenomenology, Husserl developed the theory of direct intuition. This theory, even though it acknowledges the various types of intuition, is essentially universalistic, as expressed in the concept of *noēma-noēsis*. I believe that there is not simply one single possibility but rather a number of possibilities in the *noēsis-noēma* relationship. In order to prove my thesis, I will draw upon a different phenomenological tradition, that of Islamic existentialism, as typology of the modes of knowledge in the twelfth-century Akbarian and illuminationist philosophies gives me the chance to build the necessary analytic framework.

Reaching out to twelfth-century Islamic metaphysics for a philosophical framework is not a matter of finding some hidden medieval quality in Tymieniecka's thought. On the contrary, her system is informed by the discoveries of the natural sciences and novel even by the standards of postmodernism.[6] Consequently, this possibility of comparisons with Islamic philosophy is a matter

of a certain intellectual affinity that, when recognized, assists in the clarification of thought. As in the case of a figure and its background, the thing itself emerges out of juxtaposition.

On the Modes of Knowledge

Epistemology traditionally divides knowledge according to origin, structure, or kind, e.g. logical or intuitive knowledge. These are eidetic types, highly abstracted from experience. The downside of categorizing knowledge in such manner consists in a loss of the particular and an overlooking of the typology of knowledge connected with human individual types. By contrast, epistemology in Islamic metaphysics embraces both the universals of knowledge and the particulars of differences in personal constitution. In his famous analysis of the modes of knowledge, the Sufi philosopher Ibn'Arabī examines such differences through phenomenological hermeneutic analyses of stories from the Old Testament. His doctrine of *wahdad al-wujud* (Arabic "unicity of being") establishes the ontological unity of existence as the real and the truth (Arabic *al-haq*). Reality comes through in 27 modes of knowledge, each of which delivers a specific gestalt of unity depending on the qualities of the individual qualities of the prophet.

Since prophets formulate spiritual and moral norms for their communities, the prophetic modes of knowledge (also known as modes of witnessing the real) reflect the predominant type of awareness in their societies. From the Sufi perspective, history is a sequence of the modes of witnessing. This idea resonates with the contemporary view that every paradigm has its leading thinkers who summarize and define main aspects of knowledge. The shift of the starting point of philosophy from consciousness to life presents a fundamental reorientation in the paradigm of knowledge and in the mode of witnessing.

A particular mode of knowledge takes on a three-way expression, as works, or activities that manifest noble character traits; as states, or the inner expression of invisible realities; and as knowledge, or direct perception of the modalities of reality. There property of the self that underlies these expressions with of the real is known as *predisposition* (Arabic *isti'dâd*).[7] It is possible to make a connection between Ibn 'Arabī's notion of predisposition and Suhrawardi's concept of knowledge by presence. In the philosophy of illumination, knowledge by presence is the immediate apprehension through which the mind knows what exists within it (Cf. Husserl's *noēsis*.) All cognition depends on knowledge by presence, including objectless self-awareness and knowledge of objects, from real objects by their representations in the mind, to purely imaginal or eidetic objects.

Ontologically, Suhrawardi maintains that pure consciousness/awareness/knowledge by presence belongs to the same family of manifestations as physical light. Thus, his theory of knowledge by presence examines the transition from subjectivity to the physical world, from pure awareness to the zone where awareness seizes its object and (in Husserlian terms) the *noēsis* becomes the *noēma*. In oral Sufism, there are references to the spectrum of states of union related to a fluid positioning

of awareness on the cusp of subject and object. There is a typology of character involved in the generation of such states.[8]

This liminal zone of experience, which is hardly accessible for awareness, is not explored in Western phenomenological philosophy. For such a poorly researched matter, it would be unwise to ignore the data from other knowledge systems that are based on the direct apperception of self-consciousness, even if these systems are not strictly philosophical in a traditional sense. With regard to individual predisposition, the relationship on the cusp of pure awareness and objects is also examined in Buddhism.[9] The idea that awareness has a certain positioning, a kind of angle within which it sees things, is also expressed in Carlos Castaneda's series of American Indian–inspired anthropological novels. Both Suhrawardi and Ibn 'Arabī insist awareness has universal aspects and is particularized according to one's mental constitution.[10] This particular position of awareness is not optional for the ego but constitutive.

With such encouraging evidence, it is possible to trace the influences of individual mental constitution in the formation of phenomenological philosophy.[11] Every philosophical phenomenological system claims universality, but the path to universals, which is direct intuition, is positioned differently from philosopher to philosopher. It is the angle of vision, the positioning of awareness, or, in Sufi terms, the predisposition of the heart that defines which shape the phenomenological landscape will take, and how the real or truth will appear and be articulated by a particular knower. Minds, even enlightened minds, differ in their direct intuitions; were it not so, phenomenological systems would exactly replicate one another.[12]

The Varieties of Direct Intuition

Knowledge in phenomenology is obtained through the awareness of the contents of the mind by means of direct apprehension or apperception of the mental phenomena in the same mind. Husserl's theory of intentionality justified the use of direct intuition as a means of knowledge. In his early work on direct intuition, Husserl did not view the ego pole as essential in the *noēma-noēsis* relationship. Suhrawardi, on the contrary, incorporates the ego as an agent in any knowledge, arguing that direct intuition–based self-knowledge is a prerequisite of any knowledge. A similar position is taken by Levinas in his analysis of Husserl's theory: as he remarked, "a description of the structure of consciousness and of intentionality cannot overlook the personal character of consciousness."[13] Levinas further argues that the personal character of consciousness is defined by the presence of the ego pole in all intentional acts. Indeed, in the later writings of Husserl ego appears as an irreducible element of conscious life, a center of judgment, attention, assertion, negation, synthesis, and other spontaneous activities. However, the above-mentioned exclusion of the ego pole from the constitution of intentional relations leads to the maximum possible abstraction of relations in the process of knowing: all personal differences will be lost in overreduction.

On the contrary, in the direct intuition–based approach to knowledge in twelfth-century Islamic metaphysics, overreduction is avoided, and the individual predisposition expresses itself in differences in the modes of knowledge.

Furthermore, when direct intuition is used as an epistemological tool in philosophical phenomenological inquiry, spontaneous noetic activity undergoes modification. While always present in the background of the mind, *noēma-noēsis* relationships should be highlighted in one's awareness in the phenomenological method; this happens only if a change in self-awareness brings these relationship out of anonymity.[14] The subjective experience of direct intuition consists in conscious awareness with regard to the acts of intentional consciousness. The degree of this awareness differs from person to person. It is well known in the practice of Buddhism, Hesychasm, and Sufism that awareness of the internal constitution of the phenomenal field is a tool for self-knowledge and that it can be enhanced by spiritual exercises or meditation training.[15] In other words, the direct intuition of phenomenological method differs in its degree from person to person.

Working off the datum of her experience, the phenomenological philosopher uses direct intuition as an instrument applied to the subject of her scientific research, the phenomenal field where she aspires to see things as they are in themselves. Toward a similar goal, natural science aspires to remove the influence of the observer. In the science of phenomenology, such a removal is not possible, as direct intuition is both the essence of the subjective self and the instrument of knowledge. The phenomenological procedures of epoché or reduction serve such a goal of attaining objectivity by minimizing the influence of the mental environment. Epoché frees both prereflective phenomena and direct intuition from the influence of opinions, beliefs and personal history.

Both Husserl in his phenomenology and Suhrawardi in his philosophy of illumination demonstrated that direct intuition is both the essence of self-awareness and is pervasive to the whole phenomenal field. Thus, direct intuition is foundational to the functioning of the mind. The mind being a system of relations, it is hard to imagine that the functioning of direct intuition is constitution-free. In an ideal scenario, the personal psychological horizon is bracketed out of disciplined reflection. Further, reduction may extend so far as to eliminate the whole constituted self, with its particular self-awareness and spontaneous foci of attention, memory, and judgment, and its overall temporal and spatial dimensions. The residue of such a reduction is the purified direct intuition, which is the pure essence of consciousness, devoid of any qualities.[16] However, consciousness is hardly ever experienced as pure. In most cases, pure consciousness is an abstract idea, or even an artifact of the method of reduction.[17] The notion of pure consciousness serves well in constructing one's theory of mind but is never the reality of the empirical psyche: the two belong to different orders of being. In the reality of experience, both the intuitive apperception of the phenomenal field and eidetic reduction take place in the context of numerous individual constitutive influences, and the unique individuality of the mind as a whole configures the process.

This emphasis on the fact that the direct intuition is not an isolated agent in the ideal mental universe but is always embedded in rich, fluid contexts of the whole mind

has to be distinguished from the position of cognitive relativism. The latter maintains that cognition must always be defined by belief or opinion. Different from belief or opinion, which define truth according to cognitive relativism, predisposition—which influences the properties of direct intuition—is defining cognition more than reflective thinking. If belief or opinion can be bracketed out, predisposition cannot be: first, because it is predominantly anonymous and is difficult to access by awareness (see the previous section), and second, because bracketing it out would mean the loss of all self-awareness, and with it of all possibility of knowledge.[18] Paraphrasing Heidegger's metaphor of the forest in the spirit of Suhrawardi's illuminationism, one can compare this situation with the light in the forest. The degree and quality of light depend on the positioning of the trees, on the location of the sun in its daily cycle, on overcast conditions, but above all on the self-luminosity of the sun. If there is no sun, then the forest is in utter darkness.

Since I am examining the psychological contexts of direct intuition, Husserl's critique of psychologism has to be mentioned here. Husserl critiques the thesis that essential laws of logic are psychological properties, causally connected with prior experience. (Cf. Hanna on epistemic empiricism.)[19] However, my argument concerns not logic but, rather, phenomenological direct intuition. Moreover, logic in psychologism is addressed in the natural attitude, whereas both Husserl's critique and my analysis are both conducted in an attitude of phenomenological reduction. Without epoché, the individual aspects of direct intuition that I am pointing to would be invisible.

Direct intuition should be also distinguished from the faculty of intuition as a psychological property and a variable in psychological research.[20] The psychological faculty of intuition is identified empirically and studied by means of testing or cognitive experiment. By contrast, direct intuition was neither identified nor studied as such in psychology. The relationship between direct intuition and the psychological faculty of intuition is as follows: the Husserlian *noēma-noēsis* relation, which is the essence of direct intuition, underlies any kind of intuition, including the psychological faculty of intuition.

In *Ideas* 1, Husserl constantly refers to various kinds of intuition, such as presentive or eidetic. However, he does not address the factors that could be involved in the generation of this or that kind of intuition. In her reflections on Husserl's account, Tymieniecka (see the sections "Interrogation as Dialogue" and "Logos as a Horizon and a Category" below) views the logistics of stages in Husserl's inquiry as guided by the natural logic of interrogation, which is the manifestation of the logos of life. Intrapsychically, phenomenological inquiry is a sequence of the modes of knowledge, mediated by direct intuition. While the principal *noēsis-noēmata* relations are, of course, sustained throughout the process of knowledge, the structural, content, and temporal mosaic of the modes of knowledge creates the fabric of philosophical insight, which differs from one philosopher to another.

Akin to a difference between the prophetic modes of knowledge described by Ibn 'Arabī, the modes of knowledge too differ from one phenomenological philosopher to another. The modes of knowledge connect with the how, under what angle, and in which horizon, the direct intuition of particular thinker brings out of anonymity the invisible or transcendent aspects of the real.[21] Further, the inquiry will depend on

the degree of the transparency of the mind to direct intuition, the engagement of self-awareness and self-knowledge.[22] As both a disciplined inquiry and a spontaneous, intuitively conceived process, phenomenological philosophizing is connected not only with streamlined cognitive processes but also with the organic growth of the personal insight of the philosopher, connected with a specific mental predisposition. This kind of reasoning can be expanded toward investigations of the origins of any new knowledge that has connotations of certainty and truth: discoveries spring out of the unique positioning of individual direct intuition. Consequently, the particular strategies of knowledge are rooted in the individual varieties of direct intuition. This creates a framework that I will now apply to Tymieniecka's phenomenology of life. The specifics of direct intuition in this case begin with its choice of subject, which is life as a phenomenal field.

The Phenomenal Field of Life

Tymieniecka rarely details the process of her analysis, except in her early works. She never deconstructs (that is, she does not engage in stripping away all meaning); she gives us the end result of her insight (that is, her direct insight-apperception of the essential relations within the flow of life). In her voluminous body of writings, the same process can be tracked again and again. First comes the critical suspension of interpretations of the subject by preceding thinkers; then, lightninglike, the holographic gestalt of the phenomenon itself and of the essential relations within it; then the fleshed-out description; and finally, a fully comprehended and articulated essence emerges out of this description, to pave the road to a new wave of recognitions. The internal cohesion of the vast corpus of her works is due to the innate logic of her inquiry and not to some kind of preliminary mental schema. As in Leibniz's work, Tymieniecka's path to her conclusions is not always explicit. Given the combination of Tymieniecka's organic insight, the extreme breadth of her philosophical themes, and an unusual and original categorizing, a meta-analysis of her system is not an easy task. However, this situation inspires an additional interpretive freedom, a permission to go beyond the spoken and to develop one's own hypotheses of how this philosophy works.

Tymieniecka begins with what first appears to be a self-evident observation: unless there is life, science and philosophy are impossible. Life, a commonsense premise of ancient philosophizing, was rejected by later thinkers in favor of starting points such as consciousness or existence—more sophisticated, more abstracted, or more available to first-person awareness. Tymieniecka's return to the primary realia of life breeds new philosophical discoveries. What appears at first blush to be commonsense reasoning may be in fact a Leibnizian *principle of sufficient reason* for attaining the truth: that is, there must be a sufficient reason for why things are as they are and not otherwise.[23] If life is at the root of knowledge, then there is something in the nature of life that provides for the intelligent design of the whole: if contemplation begins in such a manner, the signification is already embedded in

life, and not bestowed on it. Designs of life lead Tymieniecka to the discovery of the Logos Omnia. The nature-nurture opposition is replaced by a picture of the ontopoietic unfolding of the unity-of-everything-there-is-alive, with the self-ciphering of the emerging logoic possibilities. This kind of insight would be impossible if life were to be treated in the natural, commonsense attitude. Life in this philosophy is subjected to epoché, which renders it available to direct examination and reinterpretation on its own grounds.

Underlying this monumental interpretive shift is a fully developed direct intuition of life—an innovation in Western phenomenological discourse. This intuition is not the natural-attitude intuition of the Presocratics and of commonsense philosophy. It must also be differentiated from the eidetic intuition of Tymieniecka's predecessors in phenomenology—a fact that she herself reflects upon. Her epoché is conducted on the "lived, experienced 'spectacle' within the human experience, [which is endowed] . . . with the inward/outward dimension—the 'within ourselves' replayed without and the without replayed within."[24] This spectacle, which Tymieniecka calls "the phenomenal manifestation of life," includes both the direct intuition and the description of existential manifestations within one's being, such as sentience and the "logoic manifestation," and the overall datum of scientific investigation, traditional ontology, and transcendental constitution. In that, eidetic intuition is also a part of life; thus, *eid* themselves are subjected to the intuition of life.[25]

This total datum of life, both conceptual and perceptual, forms the phenomenal field that in the phenomenology of life is the subject of the direct intuition of life and of further analysis. This view of life in the broadest possible sense creates the possibility of knowing life within the phenomenological dictum of gaining knowledge of things as they are. According to the phenomenology of life, the particular instances of life can be understood only if one views them in relation to the whole of life, both given in and surpassing the givenness of a particular experience. Following the natural unfolding of these relations through direct intuition constitutes the main strategy of knowledge in this philosophy. When viewed so broadly, as inclusive of all phenomenal manifestations of life, the totality of life is identical with its manifestation, and there is no essence separate from it. This phenomenal manifestation of life is the evidence and the measure of truth and the proof of reality, "one gigantic blueprint of the real."[26]

Direct Intuition of a Dynamic Life-Object

Tymieniecka emphasizes that[27]:

> The crucial point of reflection that could claim to be "phenomenological" is the overt or tacit assumption of *immediate, direct evidence* which lies at the roots of all human experience: direct evidence accompanying states of affairs, objective formation by the mind, emotional complexes, intentional acts . . .

As we established, this direct evidence in Tymieniecka's approach is the phenomenal field of life. By Tymieniecka's own analysis, none of her predecessors

in the phenomenology of life dissociated eidetic intuition from the intuition of life.[28] She accomplishes this important move with regard to four aspects: intuition acting in the discerning act that separates the intuition of life from other kinds of intuition; the broadly inclusive presentive intuition embracing all manifestations of life; the intuition engaged in identification of the universal structures of life, as a vehicle of Tymieniecka's interrogation; and presentive intuition underling the acts of seeing these unconditionally universal truths, which is another kind of presentive intuition engaged in Tymieniecka's interrogation. The intuition discerning the universal structures of life is analogous to the eidetic intuition with regard to its abstracting quality; but even then, in its abstraction it retains fidelity to its substratum per se, which is life and not the life of ideas. Other types of intuition are unique to Tymieniecka's inquiry.

In her earlier writings, Tymieniecka describes analytic steps that appear to engage the above aspects of intuition sequentially; in the later works, she replaces these descriptions by atemporal, synthetic gestalen where historicity is a part of structure.

Yet another important feature of her intuition is its focus on the dynamism of life as an intentional object. In her predecessors, across the board, acts of direct intuition tend to capture only what is static[29]:

> Given the spontaneous tendency of the speculative mind to seek a point of vantage from which the all-embracing intuition could be obtained, the cognitive mode of the mind is led to focus on the static, stationary circuits of the artifacts of the lifeworld that the human mind itself establishes.

Tymieniecka's discovery, enabled by the positioning of her direct intuition, is that the phenomena of life only *appear* static, because of objectification by the mind. Therefore, the correct philosophical procedure, which would resolve countless gnoseological conflicts in philosophy, is to focus on the dynamisms and interrelatedness of "virtual moments" of being.[30] Neither is it the case that "a statement of fact or state of affairs ever remains completely enclosed within itself, [but it] refers always with necessity to some factor or factors needed for further completion … and … to its 'possible' but not definitely indicated continuation . . ."[31] The positioning of Tymieniecka's intuition is such that it captures the process—that is, the constant evolution—of the field of life.

Besides the general horizon of life, and besides the ongoing changes within it, she intuits and follows life's growth cone, its ontopoietic front—that is, the fine clearing in which the new "virtualities" are born. Even though experientially these virtualities can appear as deployed from the "Ground of Being" of transcendental subjectivity, their origin is not in pure transcendental consciousness but within the Logos of every preceding stage of the unfolding life.[32] One might say that Tymieniecka's dialogue with Logos is conducted with a high degree of intimacy; she is always connected to the spectacle in which life *creates* its never-ending arabesques. Several vistas appear to be present in this tracking of the Logos of Life. Think of how one perceives calligraphy: stepping back, one can appreciate the whole completed piece, but one can also closely follow the pen of the calligrapher as the design is created, or one can track the

lines of the calligraphy in their developing motion. The perspective one takes depends on one's personal cognitive style. In Tymieniecka's inquiry, her attention is on all three aspects—but then, as a master artist, she penetrates down to the alchemy governing the very flow of the ink.

It is clear that insights into these dynamic structures happen very quickly for Tymieniecka, the moment she "looks." Because she goes directly to this end result in her description of the functioning of her direct intuition, and because she does not have an introspectionist agenda of letting us into the inner mechanics of her mind, her insight may not be convincing at its face. The reader herself has to develop that "gift of the gods," direct intuition, in order to follow Tymieniecka's philosophy effectively, which otherwise may appear to be merely a set of mentally derived schemata or pure metaphors.[33] Tymieniecka's philosophy is phenomenology, so the mastering of one's own direct intuition plays a very important role in developing an understanding of her. One has either to turn inward and develop the same direction of phenomenological intuition or else to give up and disregard her phenomenology as a mere set of abstractions. But they are not abstractions; quite the contrary: they are descriptions. Direct intuition is always central to her method.

The horizon of her intuition is different from the horizons of preceding thinkers not only with regard to life being her object of focus and the subject matter of her research, or with regard to her ability to register the dynamisms of life, but in particular with regard to her capacity of capturing the very process of emergence. I refer to this quality of her intuition as an "ontopoietic intuition."[34] This intuition seizes upon the *novum*, the emergence as it happens through the deployment of the virtualities of life—that is, the warp and woof of that very creative matrix that Tymieniecka describes in a variety of ways in her writings. In the history of insight, this is a unique positioning of awareness, even by the high standards of Sufism.[35] Instances of such awareness are described only in the Hindu metaphysics of Kundalini Tantra, where one can find a set of meditations on the dynamic origins of things.[36] Psychological changes leading to the rise of a similar kind of developmental awareness take place in the psychological process of spiritual emergence.[37]

Both in spiritual emergence and in the processes described in Kundalini Tantra, the emergence of new perceptions has to be accompanied by the rise of new meanings. As new energies appear, life has to give rise to new rationalities as well; otherwise, there is existential or cognitive conflict. The coherence of the self depends on that simultaneous transformation of being and of understanding. In her own philosophical way, Tymieniecka discovers the larger ontological underpinnings of this individualized process of becoming.[38] Neither pure eidetic essentialism nor the opposing philosophical stance, the constructivist orientation toward individual mastery of experience, provides a ground for adequate insight into this process. It is only in Tymieniecka's idea of ciphering that the emergence of new meaning, within life and out of life's own creative depth, is adequately captured: "[W]e dwell in ciphering itself."[39] A human being endows every emergence from the life-matrix (i.e., life's "dynamic flux [that] articulates itself")[40] with a significance uniquely its own. In this scheme of things, Tymieniecka's intuition

serves as a medium for logoic self-interrogation, as Logos both posits and reflects, via Tymieniecka's awareness in her human condition, life's dynamic flux. Tymieniecka's intuition and logos are interconnected, in the cognitive realm as well as in concrete becoming.

Interrogation as Dialogue

Out of all the possibilities available in the phenomenal field, at every given moment direct intuition highlights a certain horizon, creates a new clearing. One can imagine a scenic drive with shifting vistas.[41] In systematic phenomenological investigations, the spontaneous flux of these horizons is intentionally controlled to meet the demands of research agenda. In the case of the phenomenology of life, the sequencing of those vistas and the direction of the intuitional grasping of the phenomena obey the naturally unfolding self-articulation of life through the mind of the philosopher. Tymieniecka's second philosophical category, the ontopoietic Logos of Life, reflects the quality of these transactions as alive, and their sui-generis unfolding combined with logically intelligible self-ordering.

Perhaps in the messiness of experience life may appear chaotic. Therefore, logoic self-ordering has to be discerned through the logical interconnectedness of emerging themes, in dialectical relations between ontological and epistemological foci of inquiry, and in the repetitive cycles of epoché, examination of prereflective data, reflective conclusions, and further epoché. According to Tymieniecka, a somewhat similar intelligence guides Husserl's thinking: for example, his assumed intentional shift from ontology to epistemology is not deliberate but is invariable by the innate logic of his inquiry. Themes are not derived theoretically but are intuited in the prereflective horizon; this can be traced in any philosophy that uses the epistemology of direct intuition, be it the twelfth-century illuminationism of Suhrawardi or the twentieth-century phenomenology of Husserl or of Merleau-Ponty. Thus the interrogation appears logical, because there is an implicit logic (logos) embedded in direct intuition of the prereflective.[42] The *filum Ariadnae* that leads Tymieniecka through the labyrinth of life is linked to this implicit logic: sustained attention to life's phenomena in their fullness, with inward and outward expanses, brings the logos of life to full visibility.

I have already mentioned that the notion of sentience is another key factor in Tymieniecka's recategorizing of philosophy. To my understanding, the term "sentience" points to the simultaneity and sameness of knowing and being in its experiential referent, which is available both as a property of subjective experience and in observations of the networks of life.[43] Phenomenologically the same faculty of conscious experience is captured in the notion of "presence" in Suhrawardi, or the notion of *noēsis* in Husserl: that is, the percipient quality of experience per se.

The conflation of traditionally separate ontological and epistemological aspects of inquiry in Tymieniecka's metaphysics is not theoretical but immediate. This existential unity leads her to the discovery of the principle of the unity-of-all-there-is-alive

and to the recognition of the cardinal feature of life, individuation in the human condition.[44] Because sentience is found on both sides of the human subject/phenomenal field of life duet, the interrogation is indeed a dialogue. Tymieniecka's terminology reflects the live dialogical quality of this inquiry in such usages as "self-articulation" (of life or logos) and "interrogation," as opposed to terms such as "examination," "reflection," or "analysis."

In Husserl's *noēsis-noēma* schema, awareness is on the subject side of the phenomenal field; according to the idea of intentional consciousness, there is always a directedness of awareness. The phenomenal field can be experienced as both actively seen and passively received.[45] It appears that in Tymieniecka's modus of philosophizing, engagement with the phenomenal field of life is more than a receptive or active process of an ego. The philosopher is in dialogue with the sentient Other, a pervasive presence that inspires every motion in the interrogation. The logos of life—that is, the sentience, impetus, and internal logic/intelligence/meaning at the core of manifold patterns of life—attains its self-articulation through this dialogue. Since logos totally informs the phenomenal manifestation of life, there is nothing outside its domain.[46] Philosophical interrogation becomes a part of its self-articulation via the human condition, as an intrapsychic manifestation. (See the section "A Meditation on Sentience: Entering One's Own Logoic Manifestation," below.)

In this view, empirical life is not a set of particular existences that are separate from their metaphysical essence but is a manifestation identical with its essence. As long as one can make oneself present to the flow of life, the inquiry can partner with Logos itself. The inquiry is then taken over by Logos as the process of its self-disclosure, conceived within the logoic scheme of things. Tymieniecka's interrogation is both dialogical with and a manifestation of the Logos of Life, an intrapsychic manifestation.[47]

This dialogical quality is enhanced by Tymieniecka's constant reflection on the process. In theory, systematic phenomenology has to attend to the prereflective level of consciousness. However, the actual practice of inquiry involves shifts from prereflective data to reflective data, to logical conclusions, to synthesis, and then back to the prereflective data of experience. This hermeneutics in phenomenological inquiry is frequently taken for granted. In contrast, Tymieniecka constantly identifies the procedures she engages in and the horizons she navigates.[48] As she states, "Through the embodiment of beingness, the logos of life performs the crucial operation of life—*its positioning*."[49] While navigating the constantly switching vistas of life, she always takes her bearings. This self-reflection is also one of the features of her interrogation that contributes to its radical nature. The fact that consciousness constantly switches its horizons is well known in phenomenology; however, the generative aspect of this shifting has not previously been satisfyingly examined. Nor has satisfying examination been done in regard to the systemic contexts of the horizons of inquiry. Tymieniecka's interrogation pays special attention to the positioning of the locus of her inquiry. Says Tymieniecka: "[T]he acquired findings of today's philosophy lack universal significance because it is still necessary to verify them as being part and parcel of the vast context to which they belong and in which they find grounding."[50] This fidelity to the substratum of

her interrogation makes phenomenology of life adequate to things themselves, more so than in any of the preceding systems.

Thus, engaging in philosophical enterprise, for Tymieniecka, becomes a constant act of receptivity to logos as the latter releases its prompts. Because of this need for attention to larger, systemic contexts, the logic of this interrogation is not the dialectical zigzag of pure ideas but takes place within the complexity of the ontopoietic, self-creative activity of logos—which includes but is not limited to the dynamics of ideas. This complexity leads to specific distinctions: for example, the thematization of life, as opposed to the thematization of being or knowing, assumes an ongoing integration rather than a focus on dichotomies. Another key feature is transcending the aporia between the "fleetingness of being and its essence," or between the logic of essences and the logic of contradiction.[51] This unifying, holistic impulse, where the philosopher's presence does not deconstruct the fabric of perception but rather restores the wholeness of living through the process of inquiry, is characteristic of Tymieniecka's philosophy. Receptivity is a distinctive feature of her presence. She functions as a receptacle for what already is, reversing the pathos of philosophy from the agency of focused inquiry to the receptivity of open awareness toward the acts of being—which are, at the same time, acts of knowing. Her epistemology and her ontology are indivisible, as the "known" replaces the "knowing."

This receptivity, and the subordination of agency to presence, helps Tymieniecka to accomplish the phenomenological reduction of phenomenology itself called for by Husserl. By letting the phenomenological inquiry guide itself from the inside out, Tymieniecka uncovers the logic of the inward/outward articulation of the networks of self-cognizing life.

Logos as a Horizon and a Category

Tymieniecka makes logos into a major presence in her philosophy. In a sense, all of her philosophy is about logos.[52] Logos for her is the Logos Omnia, the main player in the continuum of the world, the self and the sacred. My task in this review is to explicate, or at least to bring to partial visibility, the strategy of knowledge by which Tymieniecka attains this recognition. Her logos is not an abstract formation of the mind but a described intuition whereby Logos is the main horizon of her direct explorations of the phenomenal field of life. Her interpretation of Logos in some aspects overlaps with Husserl's and Merleau-Ponty's understanding of it, which is logos as a logic of inquiry, or logic in the temporal dimension of phenomenal flow. However, in Tymieniecka's work, logos is not used in this rather narrow sense, nor it is replanted into her philosophy from ancient mystical or philosophical contexts. Derived from sentience, her notion of logos is inclusive of both intuition and logic; it is not a thing but a dynamism; and it is responsible for the ordering of life—in other words, her logos is indeed the "verb unifying and discriminating."[53] Not a property of the mind bestowed on the inert nature in the move of signification, this logos is inseparable from life and is an essential principle in life

receiving its full expression in the human condition. Thus, the recognition of this unified intelligence is the means of overcoming the philosophical crisis of reason.

In order to clarify the distinctions between the principle of logos in the phenomenology of life and the concept of reason in prior philosophy, I will refer to Husserl's distinction between logic as understood in the framework of logical psychologism [a position in philosophy of logic which derives the facts of logic from psychological life] and logic as understood in his account of pure logic. The properties of pure logic are not found in the physical, spatiotemporal world, and cannot be experienced or captured by experimental methods. "Pure logic is uniquely characterizable in terms of a set of special non-natural or ideal kinds to which LP has no ontological access (since LP has access only to the physical, spatiotemporal world) or explanatory access."[54] In Tymieniecka's view, there are various types of intelligence that spring forth in ontopoietic sequences of life. Life has its own logic of sequencing and positioning these rationalities among its other potentialities. Based on the fact that life is inherently intelligent, albeit not in an ordinary reason's ways, it is possible to infer that both natural logic and pure logic will be instances in the manifestations of life's intelligence, pure logic emerging in the human condition. Since Tymieniecka views sciences and scientific discoveries as a part of the overall phenomenal field of life, the multiple forms of intelligence found in scientific experiments will be the expressions of logos.

Contrasted with logic as means of knowledge, direct intuition cannot be differentiated with regard to its "natural" or "ideal" properties. In Suhrawardi's account, knowledge by presence ontologically precedes logic (which he proves logically), which leads to elimination of the distinction between ideal and natural, essential and lived. Instead, what is manifested and lived is identical with essential and ideal, as the latter is apparent in manifestation. The only difference between these principles will be in the orders of apparency. Tymieniecka goes even further in this, since for her the essence is identical with manifestations. They will be distinct only in the ways of how, when, and where these modes can be intuited, but they will be the same in their ontological status. Ideal and natural are separate in their positioning, degree, and proportion in life, but unified in Logos Omnium.

The logos of life unfolds in ontopoietic time. Time is the form for logoic self-articulation; life is the field for logoic ontopoietic expression. Like a dance that can be only semiotically separated from the dancer, logos can be only semiotically separated from life and ontologically remains in identity with it. Logos is embedded in the patterns of life and cannot be conceived as separate from it, cannot be viewed as some kind of transcendental principle in its unreachable abode. Nor is it a power beyond the reach of reason. Even though one may overlook its manifest significance, the process of the ontopoietic expression of Logos is revealing rather than concealing.[55] Whether or not the logoic designs are available to description depends on whether the intuition of a given thinker can be in touch with the horizon of logoic self-articulation.

Logos is found—brought out of anonymity—within one's own logoic manifestation first; then one's intuition has to enter the circuits of *bios*, *zōē*, and *kosmos* progressively and regressively encircling it, and then lastly enter into the inner workings

of the primeval Logos, dynamic, self-constitutive, and self-directed. To reiterate, there are three steps to her understanding of Logos: first, the intrapsychic discovery of logoic manifestation—sentience[56]—second, the tracking of the works of logos in life, in many unfolding networks, which gives rise to what I call Tymieniecka's "process phenomenology"; and third, penetration into the process of creation, the primeval Logos, *Imaginatio Creatrix*. These three vistas create the horizon of Logos in Tymieniecka's thought. In the remainder of this article, I will attempt to give a more detailed overview of all three.

A Meditation on Sentience: Entering One's Own Logoic Manifestation

Tymieniecka points to the act of entering one's own logoic manifestation but does not elaborate on it. This absence of detailing on the internal procedure appears to be within philosophical tradition: that's how Husserl and other phenomenologists treat their own inquiries. For example, they describe their epoché, or the first-person process of analytic reflection, but do not specify how exactly they did it: that is, what intrapsychic operations the procedure implied. Generally, these procedures are quite accessible to a reader and easily available to direct intuition. By comparison, because of the shift in the positioning of the direct intuition characteristic of the phenomenology of life, these procedures are not always self-evident and require additional deciphering.

The clues Tymieniecka does give indicate that this internal manifestation of Logos is not that of being distilled of its adjuncts, in spite of the fact that this or that conception of being is a frequent ground for ontological insights.[57] For comparison, I have again to turn to philosophies that maintain an intimate relationship with full potentialities of experience, as such an approach is characteristic of Tymieniecka's own work. For example, in the experiential religious philosophy of Advaita Vedanta, unqualified pure being has to be discovered within one's own experience, as the result of a specific type of reduction away from the phenomena and toward the subject-ego.[58] Thereupon, the experience of being is turned into a metaphysical principle of unitive being. However, this is a result of mental reflection and not a state of affairs within the given.[59] Tymienieckian Logos also has its experiential manifestation: sentience. Sentience is embedded within the natural experience and is realized through the advancement of discrimination based on direct intuition. It is not reduced to the ego pole, but rather it is evenly distributed throughout the sphere of awareness without any intentional vector inherent to it. Intuitively realized as a faculty of life, sentience is a protocapacity of both reason and intuition, the basic "known" of life. Logos, derived from sentience in its multifold manifestations, is intuition and reason in one, or, metaphorically, the intelligence of mind and heart united. In the human condition, sentience is by what one naturally apperceives and apprehends. In philosophical interrogation aimed at the general principles of life, reason and intuition function as one integrative faculty. By comparison, Islamic

existential philosophy embraces a principle of the unification of all the faculties of knowledge for a philosophy proper; similar unification is found in early Husserl, who grounds logic in the direct intuition.[60]

Consequently, the logoic intelligence of life, and sentience, are the two sides of one coin, one principle available in direct intuition but viewed in different contexts. Sentience is a logoic sentience; logos is a sentient Logos. By entering one's own logoic manifestation and tracing it through the phenomenal field, one can experientially recognize the absolute simultaneity of sentience, experience, and meaning. Possibly this simultaneity contributes to Tymieniecka's understanding of the unity of being and knowing in experience. One may conclude that direct, immediate apperception of sentience unmodified by any reflection indeed composes the foundation of Tymieniecka's understanding of Logos. Sentience is fully experiential, but it is not an experience of pure being (as described above) or of pure awareness—and those two are easily separated from each other via the mental exercises involved in any reduction-based path.[61] Logos is realized not in the distillation of aspects of experience but in a discerning recognition of the intrinsic self-radiance of experience. The apperception of sentience as a radiance inherent to all phenomena is not a feature of altered perception but is the substance and real nature of any perception.[62] One may also propose that, for Tymieniecka, the contents of her experience are constituted of logoic sentience, whence her receptive welcoming of all modalities of life. Direct awareness of this self-radiance of logos in life appears to be what leads Tymieniecka to her articulation of Logos as sentient, to her ontology, and to her disputing Kant's and Husserl's theory of knowledge, which is limited to subject-object intentionality. From the vantage point of all-pervasive logoic sentience, the entire domain of life carries the potential for knowledge. It is the expression of logoic sentience as consciousness that occupies a particular horizon in which the subject and the object are matched in a manner prompted by the rest of life's network.[63]

Thus, one's own logoic manifestation relates to the intrapsychic presence of a sentient principle that exceeds the limits of individuality. This Logos is convincing also because Tymieniecka traces its functioning in the emergence of scientific data, which operate as evidence and are not contradictory to metaphysics. Logos, pervasive in all expressions of life, actualizes itself through countless avenues in the enormous diversity of life.[64] Correctly understood, these two categories, life and Logos, initiate the formulation of a framework that resolves a tension between metaphysics and science.

From sentience per se, Tymieniecka expands attention to the functional, structural, generative, and phenomenal levels of logoic self-actualizaton—all of which are vistas for her direct intuition.[65] This wholeness is not of the all-embracing eidetic kind; rather, it is determined via intuition of the logoic manifestation: that is, it includes all the possibilities of awareness available in the human condition. Her categorizing is phenomenologically descriptive: "We reach that [core of the deployment of logoic force in life's dynamic flux] through the phenomenological investigations pursued by Husserl and his numerous distinct followers. Phenomenology, as the most probing philosophical inquiry in history, has brought us to the heart of the logos itself."[66]

Process Phenomenology: Logos in the Dynamic Flux of Life

In the next round of examination, the focus is on how logos actualizes itself in life's ongoing self-creation and self-constitution. It is from this apparent relationship between life and logos, that the rest of the vision in the phenomenology of life develops. For example, in regard to the categories of unity and differentiation, Tymieniecka states: "We must seek the differentiation of living beings not in their participation in the world, but in their ontopoietic process as much as their integrating or gathering reach."[67] The articulation of the sentience of Logos at the very outset in her philosophical system sets up the focus on the ever-present ontopoiesis of life in its developmental dynamics and for uncovering the connections between life's different modes. There emerges a sensible system from what seem to be chaotic modalities of life.

Ontopoiesis, another central category in Tymieniecka's philosophy, is the self-articulating and creative activity of life, expressed in its ongoing logoic orderly self-constitution. It provides for the relationship between the manifestation (life) and its inherent ordering principle (Logos). The generating matrix of life supports the vital networks that unfold into the stages of sharing-in-life and other constitutive phases. Tymieniecka uncovers different modalities in the forces that orchestrate the stages of life, such as gathering, distribution, discrimination, conjoining, bringing into integration, and so forth, that accomplish the purposes of each particular stage.[68] She describes both the concrete points of the matrix and the entire spread of the originating order. She also delineates the main lines of investigation into life's ordering, such as the discovery of life's individuating beingness, the creative emergencies of ontopoiesis, the human creative condition—that is, the capacity to endow with significance and act upon initiative—the emergence of self-awareness in the agency of life, the emergence of the self-directing and all-overseeing mind, and all the phases of the human condition, such as gathering, transformation, radiation, and so on. Hence she conceives "the ontopoietic design, [whereby] we avoid the reduction of one type of rationality to another."[69]

The orientation toward the process, toward ongoing origin and development, follows the thread of sentience in all instances of life and influences Tymienieckian understanding of logos: in contrast to the predominance of static categories in philosophy after the ancients, Tymieniecka's categorical apparatus captures what is dynamic.[70] As the "immovable mover," the "prime cause" and an entelechial principle, the logos in Tymieniecka's philosophy is close to the *theos* of ancient Greek philosophers. By the same token, logos is in effect a principle of activity rather than a noun principle of thingness. Logos's facticity is in action and relation, not in just being there, so its self-predicating semiotics is verblike.

The logoic focus at the core of Tymieniecka's interrogation instructs her to state that[71]

> it is indispensable to envisage [life] from two perspectives: one may take in its surface phenomenal manifestation in its formal, structural, constitutive fashion, or one may peer into the depths of energies, forces, dynamisms that carry it relentlessly onward.

We can see how these two perspectives are actualized in the latter two stages of logoic expression, logos in its unfolding in life and the primeval Logos of creative imagination. In the ongoing processes of life, logos is intuited in its surface phenomenal manifestation; and in the analysis of imagination, Tymieniecka penetrates into the depths of the energies that carry it forward. This first domain, the overall surface-process orientation, can be identified as "process phenomenology" emerging out of the verblike, self-predicating semiotics of the Logos.

In a process-phenomenological analysis, intuition captures life as a dynamic force of its own that prompts its continuing advance. The focus of intuition and interrogation differentiates and expands to include both the structural or constitutive horizon and the dynamic of energies and forces. Following the sentient logos through the patterns of life, Tymieniecka finds that "[a]lthough we apprehend and predicate the status of life by the relatively static form it takes, it is in the energies and play of forces that it takes its shape in the flux of becoming."[72] Thus philosophy faces a difficult manifold task, as "the givenness of life, which in its manifestation extends over multiple spheres of significance, [cannot] be brought adequately to disclosure and clarified in understanding by any one procedure of philosophical enquiry."[73] The method of inquiry, therefore, cannot be limited to this or that type of logic, which would "inevitably meet a dead end."[74] Logic, which is limited by its situatedness in life, cannot grasp all life as the latter expands in all directions and "refracts its modalities and their apparatus into innumerable rays that flow concurrently onwards."[75] The dynamic engagement of direct intuition of the constantly shifting forms and horizons of life is the most adequate method.

This process-orientation permits Tymieniecka not only to identify the structures persisting in this dynamic expanse but to track the positioning of the human condition in the ontopoietic cycle of life. The cycle of interrogation begins with life, which is discovered to be self-individualizing. This leads to a realization that the logos of life is engaged in ontopoiesis, self-creative activity, giving rise to different spheres of self-individualization, such as the spheres of energies and shaping, out of which transcendence of the natural order in the virtuality of the soul emerges. The soul articulates the outward/inward expanse of the nature of life and engages in the differentiation of self from Other and the emergence of a new virtuality, the spirit. Then the spirit begins its descent, presencing the spheres of energies and shaping, presencing the circles of ontopoiesis, presencing the very Logos of Life, and, finally, presencing the self-individualizing life. Thus the cycle is completed, as Tymieniecka both follows the logoic flow in analysis and breaks free from it by establishing herself as a locus of logoic self-reflection. The nonreducible presence of the world, and self as the differentiating principle, define the scope of the analysis. The driving force of this process phenomenology on the "surface level," as a motivator in the human mind that provides the mediumistic agency for the inquiry, is the search for truth. The natural belief of a human being, our basic existential trust,[76]

> consists of our mute natural conviction of the indubitable *constant* background of our reality insofar as our life-individualizing process is simultaneously crystallizing the "outward" framework of our existence within the world and manifesting "inwardly" the entire spread of our vital, existential and creative virtualities as they may unfold.

Further analysis leads Tymieniecka to recognize that "the search for truth is the constructive device intrinsic to the logos' ontopoietic manifestation in life."[77] Thus, the basic drive pushing the search for knowledge inherent to the human condition is discovered to be visible inwardly within this condition as a search for truth and outwardly in the larger scheme of things as a logoic ontopoietic manifestation.

The completing brushstroke in this sketch of Tymieniecka's strategies of knowledge must take us into the thicket of life's self-poiesis, into the intuition of logoic imagination.

Intuition of Imagination

Although the metaphysical, phenomenological and existential aspects of Tymieniecka's concept of imagination have been analyzed by Mardas,[78] the methodological aspects of Tymieniecka's treatment of this feature of Logos merit further analysis. *Imaginatio Creatrix* is the most enticing and esoteric (in the Straussian sense) principle in Tymieniecka's thought. Tymieniecka's conception of imagination plays a crucial role in her understanding of two spheres of life, the overall generative activity of Logos as *Imaginatio Creatrix* and the emergence of the human condition. In the latter, imagination is given a role more important than that of reason—which distinguishes Tymieniecka's phenomenology from the rest of Western philosophy.

Tymieniecka views imagination as the process by which the *novum* manifests in the phenomenal field in different ways. Imagination in its inward aspect is a psychological quality in the human condition and transpires in its outward aspects as *Imaginatio Creatrix*, the principle of imagination that provides for the emergence of the *novum* out of the otherwise linear unfolding of the entelechial momentum of life. Logoic imagination is the very medium that brings about the actual fabric of life out of "nonlife," brings the human condition out of *bios*, mediates ciphering, and provides for the presence of the human condition within the bounds of life. Imagination is connected with the very creation of the fabric of life in the same way that a spider creates a spider's web out of its living body.

In phenomenological studies in general, imagination has been poorly researched, as the intrapsychic workings of imagination do not surrender easily to the grasp of direct intuition. In Buddhist meditation, which is by far the most advanced introspective enterprise in human history, creative imagination is viewed as the function that is both the most difficult to control and the most difficult to "see through" in the pursuit of truth.[79] The same is true of the perspective on imagination in Islamic metaphysics.[80] And even when the generative aspect of imagination can be taken under some level of conscious control, by the most advanced meditators, the process of imagining—that is, the generative act of consciousness—remains hidden to direct intuition. To account for this fact, I suggest that direct intuition per se may have a phenomenal nature. This implies that direct intuition, when it is used in the phenomenological method in the ways I described in the analysis above, is a faculty pertaining to the human condition only. As such, direct intuition itself can be viewed

as a product of the generative aspect of imagination, or a faculty ontogenetically posterior to the logoic *Imaginatio Creatrix,* or both. If this is so, any attempt to capture the origin of direct intuition by means of direct intuition is somewhat like an attempt to touch the surface of water in order to feel how smooth it is: though available to visual perception up to that point, the smoothness of the surface disappears upon being touched. The act of examination alters the natural picture.

In order to phenomenologically capture the ontological aspects of imagination, Tymieniecka first situates imagination within the logoic scheme. Then she examines it through its relationships. She approaches imagination through the clearings created by all other orders of life, from its relation to the biological apparatus of the organic brain to its relations to will, action, reason, and other virtualities of the human condition. Imagination both sets forth the new virtualities and rationalities of life and serves as a cognitive organ, a vehicle by which Logos can see its own potentialities. Says Tymieniecka: "In entering the very workings of the Logos through creative acts that participate in them, we discover the very language of the Logos in action, along with the new set of semantic categories that it reveals."[81] Direct intuition appears to glimpse *Imaginatio Creatrix* only in relations and indirectly through its fruits; on some level, imagination retains its mysterious character.

Conclusions

I am completing the analysis of mental operations, which are engaged in Tymieniecka's journey of knowledge, with a sense of internal stillness and gratitude. Perhaps the above set of mental acts can be viewed as an algorithm of philosophical knowledge. The technical aspects of the *method* are nonexistent in Tymieniecka's case, but her general gnoseological stance is distinct and unique; it is the *novum* of direct intuition.

In my analysis of Tymieniecka's use of direct intuition, I made use of the *noēma-noēsis* theory of intentional consciousness. However, as I mentioned in the discussion above, Tymieniecka herself extensively criticizes that theory's claims to universal applicability; Tymieniecka's broad contextualizing eliminates any doubt that imagination as a cognitive function and as *Imaginatio Creatrix* is much more prevalent in life than the intentional acts of consciousness. Therefore I have to establish a delimiter to my own analysis: positioning direct intuition within the conceptual network of intentional consciousness limits the possibilities for understanding the former and semantically narrows the clearing within which imagination can be fully understood as part of one's own logoic manifestation. Juxtaposed with the fact that Tymieniecka's discovery of the crucial role of imagination in ontopoietic networks is direct-intuition-based—What else could it be?—these points lead me to believe that the very framework for the analysis of direct intuition needs to be eventually revised. It is possible that our concept of direct intuition, which is the major vehicle of Tymieniecka's insight, itself needs further clarification in order for us to understand Tymieniecka's method in her discovery of the role of imagination.

Notes

1. Louchakova-Schwartz 2011a.
2. For the unity-of-everything-there-is-alive, see Tymieniecka 1998a.
3. Ecclesiastes 1:9.
4. Torjussen et al. 2008.
5. Tymieniecka 2009.
6. For more on the phenomenology of life in postmodernism, see Louchakova-Schwartz 2011a.
7. For more on prophetic modes of knowledge, see Chittick 1997; Burckhardt 1975, 1980. For more on predisposition (Arabic *isti'dâd*), see Ibn 'Arab 1975: 21.
8. References to unitive states of experience emerging out of fluid awareness on the cusp of subject and object were made in conversations with Sheikh Yannis Toussulis, of the Malamatia order, throughout 1997. For more on unitive states, see Yazdi 1992. For more on unitive states vs. character, see Niffar 1935.
9. Ajan Amaro, pers. comm., 1995.
10. Suhrawardi 1999.
11. For the individual psychological features of philosophers influencing philosophy, see Gopnik and Schwitzgebel 1998.
12. For the similarities between different minds, see al-Jili 1983: xxv: "Each individual of the human species contains the others entirely, without any lack, his [or her] own limitation being but accidental. . . . For as far as the accidental conditions do not intervene, individuals are, then, like opposing mirrors, in which one fully reflects the other."
13. Levinas 1973: 50.
14. Louchakova 2006b.
15. For more on spiritual practices that develop direct intuition, see Louchakova 2006b, 2007b, c.
16. Husserl 1983 (*Ideas* 1).
17. For further critique of the idea of pure consciousness, and states of the experience of pure consciousness, see Louchakova-Schwartz 2011b.
18. For more on the difficulties in seeing one's predisposition, see Ibn 'Arabī 1975: 20–25.
19. Cf. Hanna 2008 on epistemic empiricism.
20. For psychological studies of intuition as a psychological faculty, see Sinclair 2011; DePaul and Ramsey 1998.
21. Louchakova-Schwartz, forthcoming.
22. Louchakova 2005.
23. Leibniz 1996.
24. Tymieniecka 2009. For more on the formation of the inward/outward dimension, see the section on the doxographic Greeks in Louchakova-Schwartz 2011b.
25. Cf. Levinas's analysis of ontological connotations in Husserl's theory of direct intuition: Levinas 1973: 50.
26. Tymieniecka 2009: 70. Tymieniecka's affirmation of unity of essence and manifestation, and further of existence and knowledge, can be compared to that in Suhrawardi's notion of light/being as fully "apparent" as an immanent essence. See further Yazdi 1992: 89.
27. Tymieniecka 1998b: xii.
28. Tymieniecka 2009: 73.
29. Tymieniecka 2000: 22.
30. Tymieniecka 2004: xxi.
31. Tymieniecka 2009: 12.
32. For an experience-based description of the process of deployment as seen by people in the process of spiritual emergence, see Louchakova 2007a.
33. For direct intuition in phenomenological method, see Tymieniecka 2002a: 8. The misreading of phenomenologically derived descriptions as metaphors or mental schemata happens especially often in interpretations of mysticism, as is discussed in Louchakova and Warner 2003.

34. For more on the habitual fixation of attention on the "stages," see Tymieniecka 2009: 34.
35. One can find references to the dynamism of unity in Proclus; however, these are not philosophically developed. For more on Proclus, see Corbin 1976; see also Chittick 1994. Another philosopher paying attention to dynamic aspects of reality is Whitehead; the comparative analysis of his philosophy with Tymieniecka's phenomenology of life has yet to be done.
36. Singh 1979. For more on intentional consciousness in Kundalini Yoga, see Louchakova 2004: 88 n. 220.
37. For more on ontopoietic intuition in spiritual emergence, see Louchakova 2007a.
38. For more on the ontology of becoming, see Tymieniecka 2004.
39. Tymieniecka 2000: 19.
40. Tymieniecka 2009: 16.
41. The metaphor of shifting vistas captures the dynamic quality of Tymieniecka's philosophy. This term appears for the first time in Louchakova 2007a.
42. Cf. Husserl 1983: 39 (*Ideas* 1, para. 21): "[T]here is something such as pure intuiting as a kind of givenness in which essences are given ordinarily as objects entirely in the same way that individual realities are given in experiential intuition; it is not recognized that every *judging process of seeing* such as in particular, seeing unconditionally *universal* truths, *likewise falls under the concept of presentive intuition, which has many differentiations, above all, those that run parallel to the logical categories*."
43. Cf. Yazdi 1992: 88, the principle of identity between "knowing" the self through knowledge by presence and the "being" of the actual reality of the self.
44. Cf. the unity of being and knowledge in other philosophies. For Husserl, see Levinas 1973; for Merleau-Ponty, see Dillon 1988. For unity in Shrawardi, see Yazdi 1992.
45. For phenomenological reduction as a praxis, see Depraz 1999.
46. Tymieniecka 2009: xxvi.
47. Cf. the Islamic notion of the intuition of existence as a dialogical process involving the self-disclosure of God: Chittick 1998; al-Attas 1990.
48. Cf. analogous attention to states and stages of experience in Sufism: al-Attas 1990.
49. Tymieniecka 2009: xxviii.
50. Tymieniecka 2004: xiii.
51. Tymieniecka 1998b: viii.
52. See, for example, Tymieniecka 2009.
53. Cf. **"**Of the Divine Wisdom [*al-hikmat al-'ilahiyah*] in the Word of Adam," Ibn 'Arabī 1975: 8–9.
54. Hanna 2008: 31.
55. Tymieniecka 2004.
56. There are two configurations of self-awareness that need to be considered in this intrapsychic self-exploration, the egological and the nonegological. For more on the distinction between the two, see Louchakova 2006a: 168 n. 238; Zahavi 2005.
57. For a refutation of the value of experience in the judgment of being, see Tymieniecka 2004.
58. For an example of an analysis describing the gestalt of pure being, see Shankara's commentaries differentiating pure "is-ness/am-ness/we-ness" from phenomena: Warrier 1983.
59. For a critique of reduction, see Louchakova-Schwartz 2011b.
60. For the analogous unity of intuition and reason, see el-Bizri 2008.
61. For a description of how the process of reduction leads to pure awareness, see Louchakova-Schwartz 2011b.
62. To extend the analogy to metaphysical philosophy, in Rizvi's analysis of Mulla Sadra there is an indication that Mulla Sadra's thought constitutes the contents of Mulla Sadra's experience: Rizvi 2009.
63. Tymieniecka 2009: 136.
64. For a discussion of the insufficiency of general analysis of the structures of life for penetration into its core operations and an argument that the phenomenological method is the only kind of inquiry that can uncover the works of logic unfolding, see Tymieniecka 2009: 11–23.
65. Tymieniecka 2009: 95.

66. Tymieniecka 2009: 11.
67. Tymieniecka 2009: 84.
68. Tymieniecka 2009: 84.
69. Tymieniecka 2009: 64.
70. For a variety of systems of definition in philosophy, see Kennedy-Day 2003.
71. Tymieniecka 2002b: xvii.
72. Tymieniecka 2002b: xv.
73. Tymieniecka 2000: 3.
74. Tymieniecka 2000: 4.
75. Tymieniecka 2000: 4.
76. Tymieniecka 2002c: ix.
77. Tymieniecka 2009: 119.
78. Mardas 2004.
79. Longchenpa 1975: 84–203.
80. Mehmet Selim Ozich, a sheikh in the Malamatia Sufi order in Turkey, pers. comm., 1997.
81. Tymieniecka 2000: 13.

References

al-Attas, S.M.N. 1990. *The intuition of existence*. Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization.

al-Jili, ‘A. K. 1983. *Universal man.* Trans. T. Burckhardt. Sherborne: Beshara.

Burckhardt, T. 1975. Introduction. In *The wisdom of the prophets* [Fusus al-hikam], ed. M. Ibn ‘Arabī, Trans. T. Burckhardt and A. Culme-Seymour. 1–7. Sherborne: Beshara.

Burckhardt, T. 1980. Preface. In *The bezels of wisdom,* ed. M. Ibn ‘Arabī, Trans. R. W. J. Austin. xi–xv. New York: Paulist Press.

Chittick, W.C. 1994. *Imaginal worlds: Ibn al-‘Arabī and the problem of religious diversity*. Albany: SUNY Press.

Chittick, W. C. 1997. The Muhammadan inheritance. *Iqbal Review: Journal of the Iqbal Academy, Pakistan* 38(1). Retrieved from: http://www.allamaiqbal.com/publications/journals/review/apr97/8.htm#_edn1

Chittick, W.C. 1998. *The self-disclosure of God: Principles of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s cosmology*. Albany: SUNY Press.

Corbin, H. 1976. Le paradoxe du monothéisme. *Eranos Jahrbuch* 45: 69–133.

DePaul, M.R., and W. Ramsey (eds.). 1998. *Rethinking intuition*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Depraz, N. 1999. The Phenomenological reduction as praxis. *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 6(2–3): 95–110.

Dillon, M.C. 1988. *Merleau-Ponty’s ontology*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

el-Bizri, N. (ed.). 2008. *The epistles of the brethren of purity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gopnik, A., and E. Schwitzgebel. 1998. Whose concepts are they, anyway? The role of philosophical intuition in empirical psychology. In *Rethinking intuition*, ed. M.R. DePaul and W. Ramsey, 75–91. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Hanna, R. 2008. Husserl’s arguments against logical psychologism. In *Husserls logische Untersuchungen*, ed. V. Mayer, 27–42. Munich: Akademie Verlag.

Husserl, E. 1983. *Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy*. Book 1. Trans. F. Kersten. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Ibn ‘Arabī, M. 1975. *The wisdom of the Prophets.* [Fusus al-hikam.] Trans. T. Burckhardt and A. Culme-Seymour. Sherborne: Beshara.

Kennedy-Day, K. 2003. *Books of definition in Islamic philosophy: The limits of words*. London: Routledge.

Leibniz, G. W. 1996. *New essays on human understanding.* Trans. and ed. P. Remnant and J. F. Bennett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Levinas, E. 1973. *The theory of intuition in Husserl's phenomenology*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Longchenpa. 1975. *Kindly bent to ease us.* Part one, *mind.* Trans. H. V. Guenther. Berkeley: Dharma Publishing.

Louchakova, O. 2004. Via Kundalini: Intentionality of consciousness according to Shakta-Vedanta. In *Toward a science of consciousness 2004,* 88. Tucson: Consciousness Research Abstracts.

Louchakova, O. 2005. On the advantages of the clear mind: Spiritual practices in the training of phenomenological researchers. *Humanistic Psychologist* 33(2): 87–112.

Louchakova, O. 2006a. Ontopoiesis and the self: Phenomenological investigations of egological and non-egological condition. In *Toward a science of consciousness 2006,* 168. Tucson: Consciousness Research Abstracts.

Louchakova, O. 2006b. Ontopoiesis and union in the prayer of the heart: Contributions to psychotherapy and learning. In *Logos of phenomenology and phenomenology of the logos, book 4 of the logos of scientific interrogation: Participating in nature—life—sharing in life*, Analecta husserliana, vol. 91, ed. A.-T. Tymieniecka, 289–311. Dordrecht: Springer.

Louchakova, O. 2007a. Ontopoiesis and spiritual emergence: Bridging Tymieniecka's phenomenology of life and transpersonal psychology. In *Phenomenology of life: From the animal soul to the human mind, Book II of The human soul in the creative transformation of the mind*, Analecta husserliana, vol. 94, ed. A.-T. Tymieniecka, 43–68. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Louchakova, O. 2007b. Prayer of the heart, ego-transcendence and adult development. *Existential Psychoanalysis* 18(2): 261–287.

Louchakova, O. 2007c. Spiritual heart and direct knowing in the prayer of the heart. *Existential Psychoanalysis* 18(1): 81–102.

Louchakova, O., and A. Warner. 2003. Via Kundalini: Psychosomatic excursions in transpersonal psychology. *Humanistic Psychologist* 31(2–3): 115–158.

Louchakova-Schwartz, O. 2011a. A paradox of the new enlightenment: The 'endangered' self in the path(o)s of individualizing life. Paper presented at the conference "Phenomenological paths in post-modernity: A comparison with Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka's phenomenology of life." Rome, Italy. [Forthcoming in "Archivio Digitale," Edizioni dell'Università di Macerata.]

Louchakova-Schwartz, O. 2011b. Self and world: Vedanta, Sufism, and Presocratics in the phenomenological view." In *Phenomenology/ontopoiesis retrieving geo-cosmic horizons of antiquity: Logos and life*, Analecta husserliana, vol. 110, part. II, ed. A.-T. Tymieniecka, 423–38. Dordrecht: Springer.

Louchakova-Schwartz, O. 2011. *Phenomenologies of philosophy and mysticism: A framework for comparative analysis. Part 1: Lebenswelt*. Paper presented at the meeting of the International Coalition of North American Phenomenologists, Washington DC, Arlington Library (May).

Mardas, N. 2004. Creative imagination—the primogenital force of human life: Following Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka's thread from the elemental stirrings to human fulfillment. In *Imaginatio creatrix: The pivotal force of the genesis/ontopoiesis of human life and reality*, Analecta husserliana, vol. 83, ed. A.-T. Tymieniecka, xxi–xli.

Niffarī, M. 1935. *The Mawáqif and Mukhátabát, with other fragments.* Trans. A. J. Arberry. Cambridge: E. J. W. Gibb Memorial.

Rizvi, S.H. 2009. *Mulla Sadra and metaphysics*. London: Routledge.

Sinclair, M. 2011. *Handbook of intuition research*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Singh, J., trans. 1979. *Vijnanabhairava.* [Divine Consciousness.] Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. [Date of the original work unknown.]

Suhrawardi. 1999. *The philosophy of illumination.* Trans J. Walbridge and H. Ziai. Provo: Brigham Young University Press.

Torjussen, L.P., J. Servan, and S.A. Øyen. 2008. An interview with Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka. *Phenomenological Inquiry* 32: 25–34.

Tymieniecka, A.-T. 1998a. Inaugural lecture, 'the great plan of life: The phenomenology of life's return to the sources of western philosophy. In *Phenomenology of life and the human creative condition, Book 1, Laying down the cornerstones of the field*, Analecta husserliana, vol. 52, ed. A.-T. Tymieniecka, 3–32. Boston: Kluwer.

Tymieniecka, A.-T. 1998b. The theme. In *Phenomenology of life and the human creative condition, Book 1, Laying down the cornerstones of the field*, Analecta husserliana, vol. 52, ed. A.-T. Tymieniecka, xi–xx. Boston: Kluwer.

Tymieniecka, A.-T. 2000. *Logos and life. Book 4, Impetus and equipose in the life-strategies of reason*, Analecta husserliana, vol. 70. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Tymieniecka, A.-T. 2002a. Introduction: Phenomenology as the inspirational force of our times. In *Phenomenology world-wide: Foundations—expanding dynamics—life-engagements, a guide for research and study*, ed. A.-T. Tymieniecka, 1–8. Boston: Kluwer.

Tymieniecka, A.-T. 2002b. The theme: inaugural lecture—the life-force of the shaping-of-life? In *Life—energies, forces and the shaping of life: Vital, existential, book 1*, Analecta husserliana, vol. 74, ed. A.-T. Tymieniecka, xv–xxxiv. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Tymieniecka, A.-T. 2002c. Topical study: Truth—the ontopoietic vortex in life. In *Life—truth in its various perspectives: cognition, self-knowledge, creativity, scientific research. Sharing-in-life, economics*, Analecta husserliana, vol. 74, ed. A.-T. Tymieniecka, ix–xvii. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Tymieniecka, A.-T. 2004. Inaugural lecture, 'ontopoietic ciphering and existential vision of reality'. In *Does the world exist? Plurisignificant ciphering of reality*, Analecta husserliana, vol. 79, ed. A.-T. Tymieniecka, xiii–xxx. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Tymieniecka, A.-T. 2009. *The fullness of the logos in the key of life. Book 1, the case of God in the new enlightenment*, Analecta husserliana, vol. 100. Dordrecht: Springer.

Warrier, A. G. K., trans. 1983. Srimad Bhagavat Gītā Bhāṣya of Śrī Saṅkāracārya. Madras: Śrī Ramakrishṇa Math. [Date of the original work unknown.]

Yazdi, M.H. 1992. *The principles of epistemology in Islamic philosophy: Knowledge by presence*. Albany: SUNY Press.

Zahavi, D. 2005. *Subjectivity and selfhood*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

What the Lake Said. Amiel's New Phenomenology and Nature

Daria Iwona Gosek

Abstract What message had this lake for me, with its sad serenity, its soft and even tranquility, in which was mirrored the cold monotonous pallor of mountains and clouds? – in his diary Henri-Frederic Amiel is struggling with himself as well as with the world around him. "Being" for Amiel is equivalent to "being in the world". Anthropocentric world view is replaced by "Amiel-centric" world view – in this model there is inseparable, spiritual, personal bond between Amiel and the world. It's romantic legacy and Amiel is the legal heir of Faust, Manfred and so on. Amiel's new phenomenology describes world as a effect of human's mind activity: nature and objects are being re-interpreted. The border between "objectivity" and "subjectivity" is no longer so visible, and every object is emotionally marked. "Intimate Diary" is a record of a human experience: his life in culture and nature, position in universe. In Amiel's thought nature is treated like a piece of art: every tree has its own history, every rock is significant.

"Journal Intime" penned by Henri-Frederic Amiel is one of the most surprising, extensive, mysterious literary works of the nineteenth century. It is so because of its author and the content itself but also due to the controversies, emotions, interest which it aroused after publication. In his book on Amiel, Jean Vuilleumier introduced the name "Amiel's complex" or "Amielism syndrome", which is a characteristic feature of the more recent Swiss literary works written in the Romance language. "Journal Intime", Amiel's self-analysis enabled the Swiss critic to diagnose a certain kind of incapacity and a predilection to self-analysis. On the other hand, considering the matter from the psychological perspective, Vuilleumier suggests that the reason for writing the journal was of therapeutic nature (it was caused by

D.I. Gosek (✉)
Faculty of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University, ul. Grodzka 52, Cracow 31-044, Poland
e-mail: daria.gosek@gmail.com

A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), *Phenomenology and the Human Positioning in the Cosmos: The Life-world, Nature, Earth: Book One*, Analecta Husserliana 113,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-4801-9_20,

Amiel's inability to establish sexual contact with a woman) but, instead of bringing about freedom to Amiel, the self-analysis enslaved him.[1] But not only Vuilleumier treated Amiel as a case. In their article "Writing as Pathology, Poison, or Cure: Henri-Frederic Amiel's journal intime" George S. Rousseau and Caroline Warman analyse Amiel's life and creative work. The Swiss diarist is here treated as an example of pathological compulsive note taking which overshadows the rest of the world and is only a pretext for writing. The authors placed Amiel in the context of romantic melancholy, self-analysis and the exploration of one's own inner self.[2] Thus, "Journal Intime" becomes an illness and therapy, poison and cure – hence Amiel's ambivalent attitude towards his life and journal.

With the help of or 'thanks to' Amiel, many authors carried out the self-analyses of their own kind: by observing his case they simultaneously observed themselves. Stanisław Brzozowski, a Polish philosopher and thinker living at the turn of the twentieth century, viewed Amiel's journal as a negative point of reference, thanks to which he could avoid the dangers of plunging into his own journal and unwillingness to live. Brzozowski formulated "Amiel's paradox": Amiel suffered from the thought about his own creative and literary impotence and simultaneously he became a remarkable diarist, he created an extensive and absorbing literary masterpiece.[3] Fondness, empathy, interiorisation, self-identification with other people – these are the characteristics of Amiel's journal which were pointed out by Brzozowski. According to Brzozowski, the Swiss diarist represented an attitude characteristic for the children of the end of the nineteenth century. The main feature of this attitude was the highly developed ability of objective thinking. In the opinion of the Polish thinker, the main threat was Amiel's well-developed ability of interiorisation (Amiel writes about a 'fluid and vague state' of his mind). He compares Amiel to a looking glass, which reflects and takes in everything. The Swiss man is characterised by his absolute incapacity to live. It has often been mentioned that except for his journal Amiel was not engaged in any creative activity. In this context, the entry from 12th March 1851 is of great significance: "Was there ever any one so vulnerable as I? If I were a father how many griefs and vexations, a child might cause me. As a husband I should have a thousand ways of suffering because my happiness demands a thousand conditions I have a heart too easily reached, a too restless imagination; despair is easy to me, and every sensation reverberates again and again within me. What might be, spoils for me what is. What ought to be consumes me with sadness. So the reality, the present, the irreparable, the necessary, repel and even terrify me. I have too much imagination, conscience and penetration, and not enough character. The life of thought alone seems to me to have enough elasticity and immensity, to be free enough from the irreparable; practical life makes me afraid." [4]

The journal is the record both of Amiel's resignation from taking action and of directing his attention to himself, the inner part of himself. Amiel was called a 'professor without a calling, philosopher without a doctrine, man in love without his woman lover, poet deprived of his lyre, writer having no style whatsoever, aesthetician with a narrow artistic sense, idealist without a star and a believer without God'.

Amiel wrote his journal from 1847 to 1881. It contains about 17,000 pages: they include Amiel's entire life and all his reflections. A year after Amiel's death, his friend Edmond Scherer published a two-volume collection of the entries from the

journal. It was apologetic in character and emphasising Amiel's grandeur. And from the very first publication it provoked controversies, particular editions were accused of being apologetic and the full edition was criticised for revealing the pettiness of the writer. But even this first publication became a sensation and made a great impression on such literary figures as Ernest Renan, Hippolyte Taine, René Du Bos, Leo Tolstoy, Stanisław Brzozowski and Józef Czapski. The journal was viewed as a masterpiece but also as a creation by a small-minded malcontent. A monumental record of the consciousness of a man who made an effort to analyse himself or a record of the shallowness of an intellectual lacking the willingness to live. Critics and commentators focused their attention on the introspection and Amiel's inner life.

Amiel notes: "As a matter of fact there exists only one subject of study: the forms and the changes of the mind". These words are the journal's credo of its own kind. The introspection and self-exploration – the Swiss diarist treats himself as an example – he concentrates on himself and studies himself just as a philosopher studies existence. In 1869 he wrote: "Inner freedom and being conscious of one's consciousness" – but this consciousness is understood somewhat differently. Not in an introvert way but as an expanding consciousness, which embraces the outer space, radiates and engages itself in the process of incorporation. From here spring Amiel's famous landscapes, which are the images of the state of soul. Amiel did not intend to venture to record/create a monumental portrait of his times and to describe his own role. The journal was his intimate space in which he reflected upon himself: "There, thanks to this journal, my excitement has passed away. I have just read the last book of it through again, and the morning has passed by. On the way I have been conscious of a certain amount of monotony. It does not signify! These pages are not written to be read; they are written for my own consolation and warning. They are landmarks in my past; and some of the landmarks are funeral crosses, stone pyramids, withered stalks grown green again, white pebbles, coins – all of them helpful toward finding one's way again through the Elysian fields of the soul. The pilgrim has marked his stages in it; he is able to trace by it his thoughts, his tears, his joys. This is my traveling diary: if some passages from it may be useful to others, and if sometimes even I have communicated such passages to the public, these thousand pages as a whole are only of value to me and to those who, after me, may take some interest in the itinerary of an obscurely conditioned soul, far from the world's noise and fame. These sheets will be monotonous when my life is so." [5]

And this pilgrim, a wanderer treats himself as an object of study, he calls himself a philosopher analysing his own person, he is an example of human nature, the matter on which the research is carried out. Simultaneously, he is aware of his changeability (Amiel compares himself to Proteus), processual character and the dynamism of his self, which cannot be captured by any descriptions or categorising attempts and which is constantly changing, while the journal is the space where one can capture oneself in the here and now. The essence of a human being, according to Amiel, consists in experiencing, a human is an intentional and relational entity living in the world. Even Amiel's withdrawal, his (of course partial) resignation from social life (from marriage, close friendships, career) do not mean that he rejected all possible relations with the world. His journeys, a small circle of friends, acquaintances and obligations resulting from him being part of society – all this makes it impossible to

speak about Amiel as a wanderer and a spiritual outcast**.** The journal is the evidence of his engagement (in a sense, since his engagement was more passive than active) in political affairs (among others, his reflections on democracy and women's issues), in the matters related to the world of art (he writes about literature, music, etc.). However, "Journal Intime" is the journal of one hero: Amiel. And the whole outside world which leaves its stamp on the pages of Amiel's diary is only a pretext leading to the reflections centred on himself.

"This phenomenology of myself serves both as the magic lantern of my own destiny, and as a window opened upon the mystery of the world. I am, or rather, my sensible consciousness is concentrated upon this ideal standing-point, this invisible threshold, as it were, whence one hears the impetuous passage of time, rushing and foaming as it flows out into the changeless ocean of eternity. After all the bewildering distractions of life, after having drowned myself in a multiplicity of trifles and in the caprices of this fugitive existence, yet without ever attaining to self-intoxication or self-delusion, I come again upon the fathomless abyss." [6] "Phenomenology of himself" – Amiel's words seems to be both crucial and enigmatic as far as our examination is concerned. The researcher of his own self observes himself through phenomena, that is the moments when he reveals himself in the here and now, in a particular situation, be it a piano concert, walk, discussion or even the hours of inaction. The subject, "I" is perceived as a phenomenon in which something objective manifests itself – something which can be submitted to analysis, something which can become the object of philosophical examination.

In one of his entries, Amiel calls himself "a container of phenomena" – an area of vision and perception – a conglomerate of experiences. The subject gains self-knowledge on the basis of reflection upon the acts of consciousness. At the same time, Amiel builds a philosophical anthropology of its own kind, presenting himself as a subject which is changing, going through something, conscious and constituted by experience (perception, going through something). Simultaneously, he is not solely the cluster of these experiences. After having detached from these experiences and perceptions he reaches for his own essence, that is the mystery, inexpressible and free from any reflections of everyday life.

Amiel frequently reflects upon his own "facility for impersonal objectivisation". It is supposed to be related to his protean nature, namely his ability of undergoing a metamorphosis and (in a sense) of empathy, as well as his taking in the states of other people or even things. In fact, he would change together with the perceptions which he assumed. At the same time this objectification is connected with a deepened ability to analyse and predilection to contemplative life. And here Amiel's life tragedy begins: "The tragic solemnity of existence strikes us with terrible force, on that morning when we wake to find the mournful word <too late> ringing in our ears!"[7] A human is a temporal being: limited and striving to transcend his own temporariness, to dive in an activity which is often ecstatic and not supported by any reflection. Amiel, due to his spiritual structure, could not (was unable to) take part in the current of life and he remained an observer. This was also because of his protean nature: he was afraid of wearing various masks and losing his identity. Alienation and his excessive concentration on himself – Amiel very early became

aware of his tragic (dramatic) situation in which he put himself: "Self-criticism is the corrosive of all oratorical or literary spontaneity. The thirst to know turned upon the self is punished, like the curiosity of Psyche, by the flight of the thing desired. Force should remain a mystery to itself; as soon as it tries to penetrate its own secret it vanishes away." [8]

"Between us and things how many screens there are! Mood, health, the tissues of the eye, the window-panes of our cell, mist, smoke, rain, dust, and light itself--and all infinitely variable! Heraclitus said: 'No man bathes twice in the same river.' I feel inclined to say; No one sees the same landscape twice over, for a window is one kaleidoscope, and the spectator another." [9] Amiel views a human as a dynamic entity which changes, transforms and in this sense is part of nature perceived from the same processual perspective. On the one hand, he refers to the Heraclitean conception of change as the central element of the world while on the other he shows that a human undergoes the same changes. Amiel even uses the expression that a human is like a kaleidoscope – just as a window through which he sees the outside world and objects.

"Journal Intime" is a record of an intellectual experience of an intellectual and artist. It is the record of the artist whose perception differs from the way other people experience the world. The Polish modernist Stanisław Wyspiański described it as a gift possessed by an artist, who sees this world in a different way, who notices more. Amiel's perception of an artist, of a subject who explores the world, seems to date back to as early as the Romantic Period – it is sufficient to mention Amiel's fascination with 'Faust' by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. However, if we start speaking about Romanticism and Romantic echoes reverberating in Amiel's "Journal Intime", we should mention Manfred Frank and his deliberation on Romantic epistemology. As Frank claims, Romantics believed that it is impossible to talk about things/the world as they are/it is. According to them, it is not possible to separate the world and speak about it as an independent entity. We see the world through its phenomena, that is how it manifests itself to us, we examine it through its representations. For a Romantic reality is unity: its physical (material) aspect and its spiritual aspect (dependent on the subject who perceives it) are one and the same. In this sense, Frank describes Romanticism as a combination of ontological monism and epistemological realism.[10] Simultaneously, Romanticism was under the significant influence of Berkeley. Apart from Berkeleyan idealism, the Romantic Period was also shaped by Fichte: in his transcendental idealism the subject (ego, I) is regarded as a process, is not material but instead it tends to be viewed as an activity, action, and as having a processual nature. Such a perception of a human being assumes that he is active, creatively active, and thus also artistically active. There is an analogy between the activity of nature and human imagination. All this has a considerable influence on the 'Romantic' way of perceiving the world of nature and cosmos. A Romantic inhabits nature, finding it in himself and himself in it. It reflects, shapes, evokes and provokes his emotions: "It is ten o'clock at night. A strange and mystic moonlight, with a fresh breeze and a sky crossed by a few wandering clouds, makes our terrace delightful. These pale and gentle rays shed from the zenith a subdued and penetrating peace; it is like the calm joy or the pensive smile of experience, combined with a certain stoic

strength. The stars shine, the leaves tremble in the silver light. Not a sound in all the landscape; great gulfs of shadow under the green alleys and at the corners of the steps. Everything is secret, solemn, mysterious."[11]

Imagination enables a completely different perception of nature and a human. Together with modern philosophy and the discovery of the philosophical "I", the subject, together with individualism, deepened analysis of the experiences of a particular existence and of the mystery inherently connected with existence (with the existence of not only a human but also of nature, cosmos, world, god), imagination was broadening its horizons: it revealed a new reality – the reality of dreams and the mysteries of existence. It also reached for human being's depth, thus discovering a 'subconscious' human being and exploring what a human being wanted to conceal, what was regarded as gloomy and evil in him and, therefore, rejected. Romantic imagination created worlds just as nature created them. Besides reason and emotion, imagination – thanks to its creative power and its capacity to transform reality – became another instrument helping a man explore the world. Therefore, in a sense, there is no difference between an aesthetic experience evoked by nature and elation resulting from the contact with a work of art. Nature and the world of art are inherently interrelated: "Nothing could be lovelier than the last rosebuds, or than the delicate gaufred edges of the strawberry leaves embroidered with hoar-frost, while above them Arachne's delicate webs hung swaying in the green branches of the pines, little ball-rooms for the fairies carpeted with powdered pearls and kept in place by a thousand dewy strands hanging from above like the chains of a lamp and supporting them from below like the anchors of a vessel. These little airy edifices had all the fantastic lightness of the elf-world and all the vaporous freshness of dawn. They recalled to me the poetry of the north, wafting to me a breath from Caledonia or Iceland or Sweden, Frithiof and the Edda, Ossian and the Hebrides. All that world of cold and mist, of genius and of reverie, where warmth comes not from the sun but from the heart where man is more noticeable than nature--that chaste and vigorous world in which will plays a greater part than sensation and thought has more power than instinct--in short the whole romantic cycle of German and northern poetry, awoke little by little in my memory and laid claim upon my sympathy." [12]

In Amiel's view, art is only highlighting the unclear thoughts already existing in nature: a thought reveals what was ambiguous, what did not manifest itself in all its clarity and obviousness. Art not only presents nature (*mimesis*) but, first of all, art interprets nature by explaining it and revealing its will. Such an approach towards the act of creation and its relation with nature changes as well an attitude of a reader, namely the reader starts to read a play/work of art just as he would read the results of scientific research or reflect upon an issue related to physics. The same process takes place while watching a theatre play and analysing Napoleon's biography: one needs to reconstruct the genesis of existence, the whole existence. This is the hermeneutic effort made to understand an idea.

"What message had this lake for me, with its sad serenity, its soft and even tranquility, in which was mirrored the cold monotonous pallor of mountains and clouds? That disenchanted disillusioned life may still be traversed by duty, lit by a memory of heaven. I was visited by a clear and profound intuition of the flight of things, of the

fatality of all life, of the melancholy which is below the surface of all existence, but also of that deepest depth which subsists forever beneath the fleeting wave." [13] On his way back from Vevey to Geneva Amiel sees a lake. Amiel's reaction is characteristic. The lake does not become an object of admiration evoked by nature's beauty or the element of nature elevated to the level of a work of art. Amiel does not consider its aesthetic qualities. Instead, the lake becomes the reflection of the writer's inner state, it reveals before him the truth about him and the state of his soul. However, it is not the simple reflection mechanism, which is a very popular motif in Romantic literature. Amiel is not a Byronic character, who starts to notice his own loneliness among the mountain summits and who perceives nature as shaping itself to reflect his inner states. The word "mystery", understood as a certain kind of the world's non-obviousness, secretiveness of existence, impossibility to capture, explain or describe all that exists, appears unusually often in "Journal Intime". This ineradicable mysteriousness of existence is not the characteristic exclusive to the outside world which escapes all humans categorising and rationalising attempts (this feature of the world is caused by its changeability but also by its "phenomenological" character and a specific kind of dependence on the particular subject who perceives and experiences the world in a way that is unique for each individual). The outside world exerts an impact on a man as it evokes in him the states in which a human (a discovering being) starts to notice and feel that his situation is in a way analogical to the situation of the world. He is unknowable to himself, there remains in him a mystery, something that is impossible to analyse, something that does not reveal itself fully and escapes him, but at the same time gives him the feeling of infinity, of existence and of this element that cannot be captured. Using poetic words Amiel tries to reach the essence of a man but he faces difficulties, which mainly result from the inadequacy of language. On his search for the mystery in question, Amiel turns to a human's past, namely his mental structure, and he refers to unconsciousness. The foundation of Amiel's anthropology is the experience of a human's unconsciousness while the foundation of his ontology is the secretiveness of existence.

However, Amiel's experience of the world is not a simple solipsism. Reino Virtanen (like other commentators before him) points out that Amiel "plays" with solipsism on the pages of his journal, even only by presenting himself as the central figure of the universe on whom the entire cosmos depends or by emphasising the freedom (or wilfulness) of an individual. According to Virtanen, an "Egocentric individual", solipsism, theoretical egoism were among the most absorbing issues for the nineteenth and early twentieth century writers and thinkers.[14] The presence of this motif in Amiel's literary work should come as no surprise: his advanced ability of self-analysis, deepened self-consciousness prompted him to involve himself in philosophical reflections. Shifting his attention towards subjectivity, Edmund Husserl uses epoche – a method owing to which the objective world becomes the world of an experiencing subject. Thus, it could be said that solipsism is the effect of epoche. But in this case it is the solipsism that must be transcended (as Leszek Kołakowski notes, the moment of transcending solipsism is the weakest point in Husserl's philosophy). It is just the prelude of the phenomenology of intersubjectivity. Husserl's phenomenology is supposed to prove the existence of other "I" except for

one's own "I" (in this context it is worth mentioning the concept of lifeworld). However, in the case of Amiel, we do not deal with the act of transcending the solipsistic thoughts : the diarist, although absorbed in the reflection on his own "I", does not deny the reality of the existence of the outside world.[15]

For Amiel, being means being in the world, being towards the world. It means accepting impressions, responding to them and transforming them. A man is not an isolated subject, he is a subject whose attention is turned to the world and who absorbs the world. The word 'phenomenon' can be found in Amiel's journal; Amiel writes about the phenomenology of himself. In a sense, one could compare Amiel's understanding of a phenomenon to the way a phenomenon was understood by Husserl, or, to be more specific, to the "correlativistic" understanding of a phenomenon, according to which each thing, each object and each existence can be treated as a mere fact for consciousness, as specific data. Therefore, the subject assumes the attitude of 'reflective distance' and thus, the conviction and certainty that a particular object (conceived by the subject) exists (in a real, intentional or absolute sense) are taken into parenthesis. The intentional existence of the object, which is a phenomenon for one's consciousness: in fact, similar intuitions can be found in Amiel's reflections. A human cannot exist in isolation from the outside world: it is the outside world which influences, modifies, surprises and brings a man closer to the mystery of the world and the mystery of a man.

Until now I have attempted to present Amiel's multifaceted, multidimensional and complicated world. "Journal Intime" shows an unusually complex image of the relation between an individual and reality, namely nature, other people and cosmos. An individual is placed in the centre of Amiel's world map. However, this individual is not a kind of theoretical construct or some human being but Amiel himself. In a sense, an anthropological image (model) of the world becomes replaced by the "Amielocentric" one, namely by the model whose central figure is a particular individual experiencing the world, temporal (that is, defined by a particular history), defined (that is, having particular character traits), seen in a relational way (that is, in relation to other individuals and the world itself). Amiel's relation with the world is profound and spiritual as it results from the analogy between the structure of the world and the structure of a man. Amiel's inner landscapes are not only a beautiful and functional metaphor: they constitute the discovery of the fact that a human (like the outside world) can express himself through landscapes, that is the inner states corresponding with the states of the outside world. Simultaneously, the inner states and the states observed by Amiel (outer states) become interrelated by the person of the observer, who incessantly brings them together as well as evokes and provokes them. This relation is of reflexive type: just as the landscape observed by the author of "Journal Intime" influences the inner landscape, the inner landscape modifies the outer one as well. A human and the world are interrelated by a very deep bond. For Amiel, it is impossible to break this strong bond, which in a sense resembles the relations between people: a man is a man only in the world. What is interesting, Amiel's basic experience is his inner loneliness, alienation and the inability to find his own place in the outside world. Together with the fading of (resignation from) social bonds and relations with other people, the author of "Journal Intime" establishes

a specific and unusually personal bond with the world and nature. He discovers himself in them and they become respondents, partners and even mentors for him.

Presented in this light, the relation between a man and the world becomes non-obvious: not denying the existence of the outside world, Amiel points out that this world depends on our perception. We can get to know it only by means of phenomena, namely the impressions felt, interpreted and perceived by an experiencing subject. In this sense the world is a result of the activity of a human's mind: it is not given to us outside of our individual experience and it is always seen through the perspective of an individual and his experiences. Each object existing in the world is experienced by us and evokes particular impressions in us. We reinterpret it, providing it with a meaning, we experience it and we colour it with our emotions. Thus, the objective world and something called objective experience do not exist. Amiel's seems to advocate the subjective stance in this matter. But his "subjectivity" does not exclude the "real" or "objective" world. It only points out to our perception, which creates the world in our eyes.

The subject described in this way is characterised by his activity. He begins to interpret both the natural world and its artefacts related to the world of art (i.e. the world of the objects produced by a human). A man takes an interpreting attitude and enters a deep relation with the work of art which, in a sense, gets incorporated in him. The basis of each aesthetic experience is an experience; the work of art evokes emotions which in turn become absorbed and worked on by an individual. The act of perceiving the outside world seems to be of a similar kind. It is also a statement of a specific and non-obvious kind, but there is an analogy between the influence it has on an individual and the influence that a work of art can have on a human being.

Notes

1. Jean Vuilleumier, *Le complexe d'Amiel* (Lausanne: L'Age d'homme, 1985).
2. George S. Rousseau, Caroline Warman, "Writing as Pathology, Poison or Cure: Henri-Frédéric Amiel's Journal Intime," in *Studies in Gender and Sexuality*, 3:3 (2002), pp. 229–262.
3. Stanisław Brzozowski, *Głosy wśród nocy*, ed. Ostap Ortwin (1st ed. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Krytyki Politycznej, 2007).
4. Henri- Frédéric Amiel, *Amiel's Journal*. *The Journal Intime of Henri-Frederic Amiel.*, ed. and trans. Humphry Ward (New York, A.L. Burt Company, 1890), p. 11.
5. Amiel, op.cit., p.24.
6. Amiel, op.cit., p. 160.
7. Amiel, op.cit., p. 136.
8. Amiel, op.cit., p.104.
9. Amiel, op.cit., p. 254.
10. Manfred Frank, *The Philosophical Foundations of Early German Romanticism*, trans. Elizabeth Millan-Zaibert (New York: SUNY Press, 2004).
11. Amiel, op.cit., p. 18.
12. Amiel, op.cit., p. 42.
13. Amiel, op.cit., p. 58.

14. Reino Virtanen, “The Spectre of Solipsism in Western”, in *The Journal of the Midwest Modern Language Association*, 19:1 (Spring, 1986), pp. 59–76.
15. In this context, some scholars mention Amiel’s Buddhist inclinations. He himself writes about his “Eastern Quietism” and “the predilection to Buddhism”.

Bibliography

Amiel, Henri- Frédéric. 1890. *Amiel’s Journal***.** *The journal intime of Henri-Frederic Amiel.* Trans. and ed. Humphry Ward. New York: A.L. Burt Company.

Blythe, Ronald. 1989. *The pleasures of diaries: Four centuries of private writing*. Paris: Pantheon.

Brzozowski, Stanisław. 2007. *Głosy wśród nocy*. ed. Ostap Ortwin. 1st ed. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Krytyki Politycznej.

Buckley, Jerome Hamilton. 1994. *The turning key: Autobiography and the subjective impulse since 1800*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Frank, Manfred. 2004. *The philosophical foundations of early German romanticism*. Trans. Elizabeth Millan-Zaibert. New York: SUNY Press.

Husserl, Edmund . 1960. *Cartesian meditations: An introduction to phenomenology.* Trans. Dorian Cairns. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

Husserl, Edmund. 1989. *Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology.* Second book: Studies in the phenomenology of constitution. Trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Jolly, Margaretta (ed.). 2002. *Encyclopedia of life writing. Autobiographical and biographical forms*. Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn.

Renan, Ernest. 1970. *Poetry of the celtic races and other studies*. Trans. W.G. Hutchison. New York: Kennikat Press.

Ricoeur, Paul. 1967. *Husserl: An analysis of his phenomenology.* Trans. Edward Ballard, Lester Embree Evanston. Illinois: Northwestern University Press.

Rousseau, George S., and Caroline Warman. 2002. Writing as pathology, poison or cure: Henri-Frédéric Amiel’s journal intime. *Studies in Gender and Sexuality* 3(3): 229–262.

Simeon, Daphne, and Jeffrey Abugel. 2006. *Feeling unreal: Depersonalization disorder and the loss of the self*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Sokolowsky, Robert. 1999. *Introduction to phenomenology*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Virtanen, Reino. 1986, Spring. The spectre of solipsism in western. *The Journal of the Midwest Modern Language Association*, 19:1 59–76.

Vuilleumier, Jean. 1985. *Le complexe d’Amiel*. Lausanne: L’Age d’homme.

How Can Sisyphus Be Happy with His Fate?

Sibel Oktar

Abstract "There is but one truly serious philosophical problem and that is suicide" says Albert Camus in his *The Myth of Sisyphus*. This is to judge whether life is worth living or not. This is literally a matter of life and death. This emphasizes the most profound question of philosophy in a very radical way, that is; "what is the meaning of life?" Each value system could provide a different answer. Thus the scope of this paper is restricted to a more specific argument which will be a review of Camus' interpretation of 'the myth of Sisyphus' and an analysis of an existence in the world in terms of the Wittgensteinian understanding of ethics. Within this context I will investigate the relationships between concepts such as 'suicide', 'death' and 'happiness' as has been defined or suggested by Camus and Wittgenstein. Then I will investigate whether Sisyphus is happy within the confines of the general question what makes me want to live rather than end my life if the world is meaningless. I think Camus' absurd man and Wittgenstein's man who views the world *sub specie aeterni* are the same. When Sisyphus's condition is analysed within this sameness then how Sisyphus can be happy seems clear. I think Camus is right to assume that Sisyphus is happy, as both Wittgenstein and Camus suggest, one can see that there is no purpose of existence other than to live and still be happy. Sisyphus is happy not despite his fate but by recognising this fate and renouncing the amenities of life by embracing his fate.

"There is but one truly serious philosophical problem and that is suicide" says Albert Camus in his *The Myth of Sisyphus*. This is to judge whether life is worth living or not. This is literally a matter of life and death. As Camus puts it, people die when they decide that life is not worth living and not for any other philosophical reason.

S. Oktar (✉)
Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Ozyegin University, Kurbakisi Cad. No: 2,
Altunizade, Uskudar, Istanbul 34662, Turkey
e-mail: sibel.oktar@ozyegin.edu.tr

A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), *Phenomenology and the Human Positioning in the Cosmos: The Life-world, Nature, Earth: Book One*, Analecta Husserliana 113,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-4801-9_21,

This emphasizes the most profound question of philosophy in a very radical way; that is "what is the meaning of life?" What is our relationship with the world and the cosmos? Why do I exist? Is there really a meaning of life, an objective absolute value or is it me that assigns importance to life and think that there should be value in it? Is there an absolute reason for my existence, an aim that keeps me living, makes my life meaningful? Is it worth living in a world that does not have value in it? What is my place in the world or cosmos? What makes me want to live rather than end my life?

It is not an easy task to try to answer all these questions, there is no single answer. Each different world view has an alternative answer. Each value system could provide a different answer. Thus the scope of this is paper restricted to a more specific argument so that I might attempt to give an answer within the confines of a paper. Thus, this study will be a review of Camus' interpretation of 'the myth of Sisyphus' and an analysis of an existence in the world in terms of the Wittgenstein's understanding of seeing the world sub specie aeterni. Within this context I will investigate the relationships between concepts such as 'suicide', 'death' and 'happiness' as has been defined or suggested by Camus and Wittgenstein.

So the above questions will be narrowed down to 'Is Sisyphus happy? How is it possible for him to be happy with such a fate? Thus, this will take us to the main question of this study, namely; what makes me want to live rather than end my life, if I am condemned to a futile activity all my lifetime, if the world is meaningless?

To begin with we must look at the myth of Sisyphus and briefly summarise Camus' interpretation. Sisyphus was the wise king of Corinth (though some dispute this). According to myth Aegina, the daughter of Aesopus, was abducted by Jupiter. Aesopus asked Sisyphus for his help. Sisyphus agreed on the condition that Aesopus provided water to the citadel of Corinth. This betrayal angered the gods and he was condemned to the underworld. Being close to death Sisyphus chose to test his wife's love of him by telling her to cast his body into the public square. Upon waking in the underworld he was angered that his wife had actually obeyed him, he took this disgraceful treatment of his body as proof that she did not love him. He convinced Pluto to allow him to return to earth to punish his wife. But once he had experienced the joys of life once more he had no desire to return the underworld. He could not renounce the amenities of life. All attempts of the gods to recall him failed. Finally Mercury seized him and forced him back to the underworld, there the punishment for his disobedience awaited him – his rock. Sisyphus was condemned to push a rock up a hill only to see it immediately roll back down to the bottom; there he must begin his task again for all eternity.[1]

Camus states that Sisyphus interests him not at the stage of rolling the stone up the hill, but the stage where Sisyphus watches the stone rushing down the hill as soon as he accomplishes his task, and once again he has to go back and push the stone up. Camus defines the later stage as the 'pause'. And for him "that is the hour of consciousness." [2] It is essential to know what Camus means by this 'pause' stage, and how he understands it as the stage of consciousness and how, in the end, he concludes that he imagines Sisyphus 'happy'. The distinction between the stage of rolling the stone up and the stage of 'pause' resembles Sartre's distinction between placing oneself on the 'plane of reflection' and 'the plane of action'.

Sartre states that the consciousness of a man in action has a different nature, this consciousness is not like the consciousness of Sisyphus, as Camus thinks, at the stage of 'pause', it is "non-reflective consciousness." Sartre explains the nature of this consciousness as: "it is a *structure* of *exigency* in the world, and the world correlatively discloses in it complex relations of instrumentality."[3]

For Sartre, when we engage in everyday acts we are realizing them as "exigencies, urgencies, instrumentalities," although there is the possibility of questioning the act itself. In order to do that we must place ourselves "on the plane of reflection," if we stay on the plane of action, the action only reveals the possibilities. At this point Sartre gives the example of an alarm clock. When the alarm goes off it reveals the possibility of going to work. But when we act upon this alarm, we get up and during this action we avoid the responsibility of asking the question whether work is our only possibility. For Sartre, the act of getting up "does not put me in a position to apprehend the possibility of quietism, of refusing to work, and finally the possibility of refusing the world and the possibility of death."[4] The act reveals its possibilities to us in the instant we realized them. At this stage we move to "the plane of reflection" or as Camus puts it, the 'pause' stage. Sisyphus's act of pushing the rock up to hill only reveals its possibilities when he finally accomplishes the task. Thus it would not be wrong to say that while Sisyphus is in the act of pushing his rock up the hill, he is able to avoid the question of whether pushing this rock is his only possibility. As Camus suggests, he could not avoid it at the stage of 'pause'.

This distinction between action and reflection when elaborated upon through Sartre's definition of 'anguish' and 'freedom' paves the way to the consciousness of Sisyphus that is claimed by Camus. After all, for Sartre, "freedom manifests itself through anguish."[5] Sartre also tells us there is a specific consciousness of freedom and that is "consciousness of anguish."[6] On the other hand Camus in his *The Myth of Sisyphus* does not emphasise anguish as Sartre does, he just gives Heidegger's definition of anguish, but his style tries to put distance between him and Heidegger, he says Heidegger writes without 'trembling', whether this shows some doubt in Heidegger's definition of anguish or his whole philosophy is not clear. But it seems that he is more interested with 'anguish' – as defined; when one is lost in the world, s/he feels anxiety, and this anxiety in this case is fear and once this "fear becomes conscious of itself, it becomes anguish"[7] – as long as this consciousness of anxiety is not separated from the absurd. Thus, for Camus, anguish is absorbed in the absurd. Whether Sisyphus feels that anguish or not is not clear yet. Is it the consciousness of anguish that Sisyphus experiences as he is walking down the hill to roll up his stone over and over again? Is he not experiencing this anguish while he is pushing the stone up, i.e., when he is in action? Does this consciousness of freedom make Camus think that at the moment of 'pause' Sisyphus is "stronger than his rock"?

How can Sisyphus be happy while repeating the same futile task, as Camus puts it 'towards accomplishing nothing,' i.e. pushing up the stone again and again and knowing that it will immediately roll down as soon as it reaches the top of the hill? Wittgenstein asks almost the same question: "How can man be happy at all, since he cannot ward off the misery of this world?"[8] Wittgenstein's answer is "through the life of knowledge," whereas Camus's answer is Sisyphus being conscious. Yet, with different terminology, Wittgenstein, limiting himself to the world of what can be

said and avoiding the language of metaphysics, while Camus does not have any such issue; they arrive at the same conclusion that is 'being happy'.

Wittgenstein does not talk about a 'consciousness' that arises through anguish, he talks about his conscience upsetting his equilibrium, which seems to be similar to anguish. For Wittgenstein one must be in agreement with the world to have a happy life. He says: "When my conscience upsets my equilibrium, then I am not in agreement with Something. But what is this? Is it *the world*?"[9] Camus' answer to Wittgenstein's question could be that the something that he is not in agreement with is "living in the state of absurd" which is "this mind and this world straining each other without being able to embrace each other."[10]

Camus' description of the everyday life of a person, although simplified, is strikingly true. You rise, go to work, work the morning session, have lunch, work the afternoon session, go home, have dinner, sleep and then you rise the next day and repeat the same pattern. Also, Camus once more puts it correctly; one generally performs the same repetitive tasks in the work environment especially if one is a 'worker.'[11] Thus it is not much different than the life of Sisyphus, the 'proletarian of gods'. If the worker is happy, why not Sisyphus?

Thus, Sisyphus, the mythological hero, almost shares the same fate as the worker. As Camus puts it, what makes his 'condition' tragic is Sisyphus being conscious. Sartre also gives the example of the worker and examines his/her fate and 'condition'. The worker being conscious or not will make a difference in evaluating his/her 'condition'. He says: "He suffers without considering his suffering and without conferring value upon it. To suffer and to *be* are one and the same for him."[12] There needs to be consciousness for the worker to be able to say "I am not happy!" Unless the worker is aware of his/her possibilities s/he cannot say this. For Sartre, the answer to the question why s/he cannot confer value upon his/her suffering is not because s/he is used to it, rather, "because he apprehends in its plenitude of being and because he does not imagine that things can be otherwise."[13] As for this, Sartre also gives the example of a man who is so fully engaged in a historical/political situation that he fails to see the problems of its political organizations and/or the economy. That kind of engagement in life makes it impossible to think of another alternative. For Sartre, the worker's suffering is not seen as unbearable unless we conceive the possibility of another alternative. Neither Sisyphus nor the worker has such a consciousness while they are fully engaged in their tasks. At the pause stage, there comes anguish and through the anguish freedom manifests itself. This is somewhat like the 'awakening' Camus describes. The worker wakes up one morning and asks "why?"

How is this awakening possible? Although it might be a possibility, is it possible for everyone who is engaged deeply in everyday actions to attain this awakening? It has already been said that, for Sartre, one needs to imagine the possibility of another alternative. How, then, can one imagine another alternative? How can one feel anguish? Can the consciousness of the anguish suddenly appear? There seems to be an element that triggers that feeling of anguish. For Camus, it is to face the 'absurd', it is to realise the difference between the natures of freedom that one

thinks s/he has and the nature of freedom that is manifested through anguish. Camus describes the state before this awakening – the plane of action, for Sartre – as:

> Before encountering the absurd, the everyday man lives with aims, a concern for the future or justification (with regard to whom or what is not the question). He weighs his chances, he counts on 'someday', his retirement or the labour of his sons. He still thinks that something in his life can be directed. In truth he acts as if he were free, even if all the facts make a point of contradicting that liberty.[14]

It is the feeling of 'weariness' that one experiences after accomplishing the tasks of everyday life that initiates the question "why?" if s/he can take a step back and look at her/his life from a distance. At that moment, the meaning that we attached to our lives, all the hopes for future, all the attempts to realise goals that are imposed upon us makes us feel weary or as Wittgenstein puts it 'upsets our equilibrium'. Then, for Camus, one seeks for the unity of mind and the world, seeks for the absolute to gain balance back, to be in agreement with the world. After all, for Wittgenstein, "to be in agreement with the world . . . is what "being happy" *means*."[15] There needs to be a search for knowledge. Where could we find an answer? Camus thinks that all the knowledge in the world would not assure him. He states that: "And you give me the choice between a description that is sure but that teaches me nothing and hypotheses that claim to teach me but that are not sure."[16]

Here, Camus leads us to the well known fact-value distinction. A proposition is 'synthetic' when it is empirically verifiable and 'analytic' when its verifiability depends on the definition of its symbols, i.e., when it is a tautology. But, as Camus implies, the knowledge that comes through hypotheses are not certain, because conclusive verifiability of synthetic propositions is not possible. A proposition is verifiable in strong sense "if, and only if, its truth could be conclusively established in experience."[17] The main difficulty can be clearly seen if you apply the principle of conclusive verifiability to the general propositions of law. As long as these propositions aim to include all cases, it is not possible to verify them conclusively by a finite number of observations.

For Wittgenstein value judgements are neither analytic nor synthetic. Here, we face the fact-value distinction. Wittgenstein distinguishes values from facts. If values are distinct from facts, they are not in the realm of facts, and hence value judgements are not synthetic. So they teach us nothing. If we hold that, analytic statements either do not 'go beyond the concept' or they are tautologies, then value judgements cannot be analytic either. That is exactly what Camus' position is. Wittgenstein makes a distinction between relative and absolute senses of value judgements and he says that it is the absolute sense of value judgements that cannot be said. We can express value judgements if they are relative value judgements, i.e., if they correspond to a fact or predetermined standards. However, absolute value judgements do not correspond to facts. The difficulty is the question on the meaning of life is concerned with the absolute sense of value. The answer to this question, if any, for Wittgenstein, lies in the realm of "what cannot be said." Thus knowledge that depends on facts cannot provide us with anything on this issue as Camus suggests. In his *A Confession* Tolstoy also states that he sought an answer in science but he could not find the

answer there. Although the world cannot provide a rational answer we still long for clarity and this is what is absurd. Camus states that: "At this point of his effort man stands face to face with the irrational. He feels within him his longing for happiness and for reason. The absurd is born of this confrontation between the human need and the unreasonable silence of the world."[18] At the point we realise the absurd we move into a different phase and are able to ask the question: why? When the why arises everything begins, thinks Camus.

When the consciousness of the absurdity of the world begins it transforms man to Camus' absurd man. Camus defines the absurd man as one who "does nothing for the eternal," although seeking an absolute knowledge and the unity of mind and the world is not alien for him, he chooses courage and reasoning. Camus further explains it as:

> The first teaches him to live without appeal and to get along with what he has; the second informs him of his limits. Assured of his temporally limited freedom, of his revolt devoid of future and of his mortal consciousness, he lives out his adventure within the span of his lifetime.[19]

Moreover, with the awareness of his limits and his limited freedom Camus' absurd man sees the "burning and frigid, transparent and limited universe."[20] In that manner, Camus' absurd man would be able to view the world sub specie aeterni, as for Wittgenstein, "To view the world sub specie aeterni is to view it as a whole – a limited whole."[21] I think Camus' absurd man and Wittgenstein's man who views the world *sub specie aeterni* are one and the same. This sameness becomes clear when Wittgenstein defines the mystical and what is it to see the world as a limited whole, which resembles the moment of facing the absurd. Wittgenstein says that: "Feeling the world as a limited whole- it is this that is mystical."[22] Here Wittgenstein suggests a kind of awareness of the limits of the world,[23]the limits of language. What can be said is limited by the propositions of natural sciences and they are not timeless. "The usual way of looking at things sees objects as it were from the midst of them, the view *sub specie aeternitatis* from outside."[24] Statements about facts are always accidental, temporal and not eternal. We can only talk about the limited world that we know through experience, thus we can conclude that there is nothing mystical or ethical in seeing the world as a limited whole. After all, he says that he sets the limits of language, and the limit is defined by the facts. But what is mystical is feeling the world as a limited whole. But these feelings cannot be put into words. However, we are still urged toward the mystical. Wittgenstein almost echoes Camus and says: "The urge toward the mystical comes from the non-satisfaction of our wishes by science."[25] What is defined as mystical by Wittgenstein is facing the absurd through "the unreasonable silence of the world" for Camus. What is 'mystical' in this case is to be able to see that the world is limited and we do not have knowledge of it and it is the absurd man's reality for Camus, the awareness of an awakening and his limited freedom. This is, "[t]he return to consciousness, the escape from everyday sleep represent the first steps of absurd freedom"[26], for Camus. This beginning awakens the consciousness. For Camus, "[a]t the end of awakening comes, in time, the consequence: suicide or recovery."[27]

So, for Camus, this awakening, this consciousness of one's condition, questioning the meaning of life, has two results. All these questions, all these evaluations, attempt to understand the world, attempt to understand one's own being finally takes us to suicide or recovery. Tolstoy seems to have a similar conclusion in mind when he faces the absurd. He states that:

> I could not attribute any rational meaning to a single act, let alone to my whole life. I simply felt astonished that I had failed to realize this from the beginning. It had all been common knowledge for such a long time. Today or tomorrow sickness and death will come (and they had already arrived) to those dear to me, and to myself, and nothing will remain other than the stench and the worms. Sooner or later my deeds, whatever they may have been, will be forgotten and will no longer exist. What is all the fuss about then? How can a person carry on living and fail to perceive this? That is what is so astonishing! It is only possible to go on living while you are intoxicated with life; once sober it is impossible not to see that it is all a mere trick, and a stupid trick! That is exactly what it is: there is nothing either witty or amusing, it is simply cruel and stupid.[28]

So what is the point of living if there is no reasonable meaning of life, if everything I did, I achieved, I worked for will be forgotten when I die, and if only stench and worms will remain. Tolstoy at this point asks the essential question: How can one go on living? Is suicide an answer? Will it put an end to anguish? The weariness I feel? The absurdity? For Camus, "[t]here can be no absurd outside the human mind. Thus, like everything else, the absurd ends with death."[29] Sartre also thinks that "suicide would cause the anguish to cease."[30]

As suicide is so important, in order to better understand it, it is necessary to investigate our attitudes toward death. The main challenge here is "there is no experience of death."[31] Along with Camus, Wittgenstein states the same: "Death is not an event in life: we don't live to experience death."[32] Is it normal to have a fear of death without having an actual experience of death? We never experience it, thus we have no idea what death is like, and we do not know whether death is the end of everything or whether we have an eternal soul. Why then there is such a 'fear in the face of death'? Fear of unknown? Is there any relationship between the 'fear in the face of death' with anguish and vertigo? Sartre's definition of vertigo is very striking. He says: "vertigo is anguish to the extent that I am afraid not of falling over the precipice, but of throwing myself over."[33] This is an example of the difference between fear and anguish. Throwing myself over the precipice is anguish whereas falling over the precipice is fear. Although both will end in death, the difference is falling over is an accident, throwing myself is suicide, a choice, a consciousness of another possibility, a possibility that will end the anguish.

What is this fear in the face of death? Is it simply a fear that the life will end or is it the fear that there is life after death? If the absurd man sees the world as a limited whole, following Wittgenstein, under the aspect of eternity, in a timeless present, why should he have any fear of death. When you view the world *sub specie aeterni*, you are not concerned with what is accidental, what the case is. You are not concerned with the future nor past when you are living in a timeless present, you are not concerned with reward or punishment. Thus, there should be no fear of death. Wittgenstein openly says that there is no notion of that for one who lives in the

present, in his words: "For life in the present there is no death."[34] The man who lives in present has no concern for death. As Cyril Barrett puts it: "They live for the day; when they come to die, they die, and that's that."[35] Wittgenstein also makes a connection between living in present, being happy and fear of death. He says that: "A man who is happy must have no fear. Not even in the face of death. Only a man who lives not in time but in present is happy."[36] Accordingly, Camus' absurd man should have no fear of death and must be happy. Wittgenstein not only makes the connection between happiness and fear of death he also makes references to the relationship between happiness and the purpose of existence, the world, eternity, knowledge and conscience. Thus, it might be too early to conclude that the absurd man is happy. Wittgenstein also tells us that "The world of the happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy man."[37] To understand what the differences of their worlds are it is necessary to understand Wittgenstein's notion of 'will'. Wittgenstein tells us what 'the will' really is; "The will is an attitude of the subject to the world."[38] He adds that 'will' is the only thing can only alter the limits of the world. The fact will always be the same fact, what changes is my attitude. In the same passage Wittgenstein says that "the effect must be that it becomes an altogether different world. It must, so to speak, wax and wane as a whole."[39] Our attitude will change the world totally, whereas the fact remains the same. So as he suggested, the world of a happy man will not be the same as that of an unhappy man, because they have different attitudes to the world. So, whether the absurd man is happy or not will be manifested by his attitude towards the world. If we assign meaning to the world, meaning to life then it is me, my attitude, which gives the world its meaning; the anguish will reveal itself through my attitude towards the world.

Let us first look the absurd man's attitude toward death. Since the absurd man has no concern for the future, as stated before, he has no fear of death and it would not be wrong to say that he has no concept of an afterlife. Would it make any difference whether there is an afterlife or not? If there is afterlife, you should not only live in present, but for the future, even for a future after death. Fear is now the fear of what you did or did not do might have consequences and you will be facing the consequences when you are dead. This line of argument brings us to the belief in the existence of God. The believers' attitudes toward life will differ from the attitudes of non-believers. There is always the possibility of doubt, which may prevent the development of an attitude. This is similar to Tolstoy's doubt, although he concluded that life is meaningless he still asks what if there is something he does not know, what if there is a possibility of some other knowledge. Is it this doubt that keeps us living? On this issue Tolstoy says the following:

> For in the end what are we, who are convinced that suicide is obligatory and yet cannot resolve to commit it, other than the weakest, the most inconsistent and, speaking frankly, the most stupid of people, making such a song and dance with our banalities.
>
> After all, our wisdom, however irrefutable it may be, has provided us with no understanding of the meaning of life. Yet all those millions who make up humanity manage to live without ever doubting its meaning.[40]

How come all these millions of people have no doubt of the meaning of life, but me. They must have meaning attached to somewhere else rather than the world.

Wittgenstein says that: "To believe in God means to see that life has a meaning."[41] Thus the millions of people that see that life has a meaning must believe in God. Hence, their attitude towards life is different. Wittgenstein suggests that:

> If the believer in God looks around & asks "Where does everything I see come from?" "Where does all that come from?", what he hankers after is not a (causal) explanation; and the point of his question is the expression of this hankering. He is expressing, then, a stance towards all explanations. – But how is this manifested in his life?
>
> It is the attitude of taking a certain matter seriously, but then at a certain point not taking it seriously after all & declaring that something else is still more serious.[42]

Here, the believer has a restless longing to understand the meaning of life, but the answer is not coming from causal explanations. The answer needs to be found somewhere else, i.e. faith. This is clear when Wittgenstein questions belief in Christ's resurrection. He says:

> But if I am to be REALLY redeemed, – I need *certainty* – not wisdom, dreams, speculation – and this certainty is faith. And a faith is faith in what my *heart*, my *soul*, needs, not my speculative intellect.[43]

In this way, our longing for knowledge about the meaning of life could end either declaring that there is no meaning of life or by believing that God gives meaning to life. In *A Confession*, Tolstoy tells us of his efforts to obtain this knowledge, when he concludes that science cannot provide this knowledge he admitted that there is no meaning of life. He tried to prove the existence of God knowing this is impossible, he feels like a "fledgling fallen from its nest" if there is no reason for his existence, but he still strived to find meaning. Finally, when there is no hope of any knowledge proving the existence of God, he admits:

> I say that this quest for God was not a debate but an emotion because it did not arise from my stream of thoughts — it was in fact quite contrary to them — but from my heart. It was a feeling of fear, abandonment, loneliness, amid all that was strange to me, and a sense of hope that someone would help me. [44]

All these feelings of fallen, fear, alienation, strangeness, isolation are akin to Camus' absurd man when he comes face to face with the absurd, when consciousness arises. But his attitude towards the world was quite different than Tolstoy's; he chooses courage and reasoning, chooses to live without appeal.

Consciousness of 'it is me giving meaning to the world' would take away the possibility of an absolute meaning of life that is independent of me. Thus, if I do not believe in a God the question about the meaning of life would lose its meaning. Wittgenstein says that: "To believe in a God means to see that the facts of the world are not the end of the matter."[45]Then we can say that not to believe in a God means that the world is made of facts and when life ends that is it. Once you do not need a God to give meaning to life then you will have the burden of taking the responsibility for your own choices. It will be your own attitude "filled with meaning" as Sartre suggests. In the same regard Wittgenstein talks about the happy man and fulfilling the purpose of life:

> And in this sense Dostoyevsky is right when he says that the man who is happy is fulfilling the purpose of the existence.

> Or again we could say that the man is fulfilling the purpose of existence who no longer needs to have any purpose except to live. That is to say, who is content.[46]

Thus one can be satisfied with what one has and not want anything else, not long for any other reason for existence, not need God to give meaning and still be happy. The absurd does not dictate suicide. At this point we could consider a final note on suicide. Wittgenstein says that:

> If suicide is allowed then everything is allowed.
> If anything is not allowed then suicide is not allowed.
> This throws a light in the nature of ethics, for suicide, so to speak, the elementary sin.
> And when one investigates it it is like investigating mercury vapour in order to comprehend the nature of vapours.
> Or is even suicide in itself neither good nor evil?[47]

The first part of the remark on suicide as an elementary sin can be interpreted in various ways, suicide is an elementary sin and not allowed by God because it is the absolute disobedience of God's will, or any authority, any limit, "it is the ultimate form of nonacceptance of whatever happens."[48] There are still limits whether it is God's will or not. But once one investigates suicide as a chemical fact, suicide itself loses its ethical connotations. Will be a fact like any other fact, it will be at the same level as the falling of a stone, neither good nor bad. For Camus, the absurd "does not authorize all actions. Everything is permitted does not mean that nothing is forbidden."[49] The reasoning of the absurd man tells him his limits, as stated before, the temporality of his freedom; he sees the world as a limited whole. Hence if there are some limitations, if there are things that are not allowed, then suicide is forbidden.

Sartre also tells us why the absurd man will not commit suicide while describing the position of Meursault, the main character of Camus' *The Stranger*, who represents the absurd man, in the following way:

> The absurd man will not commit suicide; he wants to live, without relinquishing any of his certainty, without a future, without hope, without illusions … and without resignation either. He stares at death with passionate attention and this fascination liberates him. He experiences the "divine irresponsibility" of the condemned man.[50]

Sartre's interpretation of Camus' absurd man seems to reflect Camus' idea that the absurd does not necessarily dictate death. Camus also states that courage and reasoning will allow the absurd man to live. His attitude toward death is different, it is without fear, but with passionate attention, fascination, knowing that it is the end and that is it. Consciousness of there being no meaning in life does not place the absurd man in a state of apathy. He feels despair, the anguish that makes him the absurd man, if he could be passionate then he could also be happy. Wittgenstein's definition of happiness is already a condition of the absurd man, i.e., to live in present and view the world as a limited whole.

Sisyphus is imagined as happy by Camus because he is conscious and this consciousness makes him know "himself to be the master of his days."[51] There he defeats the gods once more. Now, he is the master, not the gods, despite his fate. Thus for Camus, the world of Sisyphus without gods "seems to him neither sterile nor futile." Hence, he is happy. From his own perspective Wittgenstein defines the happy life as "the life that can renounce the amenities of the world."[52] And his definition of

amenities of the world will take us one step further, that is, "so many graces of fate." Sisyphus can only be happy by renouncing the graces of life and by making himself "independent of fate." At this point we could say that Sisyphus is happy not despite his fate but by recognising this fate and renouncing the amenities of life which were the reason for his punishment in the first place. If he did not have this fate he might not have 'consciousness' Camus suggests. After all, he is condemned to a futile labour because he could not renounce the amenities of the world, because he wanted to experience the joys of life. Now, fate has forced him to renounce the amenities of the world and be conscious that this is it, which could be seen as embracing his fate with good grace.

The fate of Sisyphus, repeated action that accomplishes nothing, symbolises our everyday life and questions whether we could be happy, in actual fact questioning whether it is possible to be happy at all. Our attitude towards the world determines our world. We assign meaning to our lives and our world; we carry the responsibility of our choices on our own shoulders. We keep carrying out the repetitive tasks each and every day. But one day we wake up and ask the question 'why?' We do not run to the window and jump. Yes, suicide might be an option, but choosing recovery is another. The fear of throwing yourself off rather than falling over the cliff, defined as anguish, still ties us to the world, ending our life is still traumatic, and causes anguish, even if we have consciousness and know that life is meaningless. What makes us strive to live despite our circumstances and privations and 'be happy' rather than end our existence is the possibility that we can choose, if we realise that the world does not have any other meaning than we assign to it. This consciousness gives us the courage to live without appeal.

I think Camus is right to assume that Sisyphus is happy, as both Wittgenstein and Camus, suggest one can see that there is no purpose of existence other than to live and still be happy. Sisyphus is happy not despite his fate but by recognising this fate and embracing it, by realising the absurdity by seeing the difference between what the world really is and what he hopes it to be, by realising the graces of his fate, moreover, if he did not have this fate he might not have 'consciousness' as Camus suggests. At this point, Sisyphus sees the world under the aspect of eternity and becomes Camus' absurd man. Wittgenstein's man who sees the world sub specie aeterni, Camus's absurd man and Sisyphus are one and the same and happy.

Notes

1. Albert Camus, *The Myth of Sisyphus*, trans. Justin O'Brien (London: Penguin Books, 2005), pp.115–116.
2. *Ibid*., p.117.
3. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness,* trans. Hazel E Barnes (London: Routledge Classics, 2009), p.60.
4. *Ibid*., pp.61–62.
5. *Ibid*., p.58.
6. *Ibid*., p.58.
7. Albert Camus, op.cit., p. 22.

8. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Notebooks 1914–1916*, trans. and ed. G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), p.81.
9. *Ibid.,* p.75.
10. Albert Camus, op.cit., p.39.
11. See, Albert Camus, op.cit., p.11 and p.117
12. Jean-Paul Sartre, op.cit., p.457.
13. *Ibid*., p.457.
14. Albert Camus, op.cit., p.55.
15. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Notebooks 1914–1916*, p.75.
16. Albert Camus, op.cit., p.19.
17. A.J Ayer. *Language, Truth and Logic* (London: Penguin Books, 2001), p.18.
18. Albert Camus, op.cit., p.26.
19. *Ibid*., p.64.
20. *Ibid*., p.58.
21. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. D.F Pears and B.F. McGuinness (London: Routlege Classics, 2005), # 6.45.
22. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness (London: Routlege Classics, 2005), # 6.45.
23. James C. Edwards suggests that: "To feel the world as a limited whole it is necessary to feel its limit, i.e., to be aware of oneself as that limit of the world." Edwards, C. James. *Ethics without Philosophy Wittgenstein and the Moral Life* (Florida: University Presses of Florida, 1982), p.46.
24. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Notebooks 1914–1916*, p.83.
25. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Notebooks 1914–1916*, p.51.
26. Albert Camus, op.cit., p.57.
27. *Ibid*., p.11
28. Leo Tolstoy, *A Confession* (London: Penguin Books, 2008), pp.20–21.
29. Albert Camus, op.cit., p.29.
30. Jean-Paul Sartre, op.cit., p.56.
31. Albert Camus, op.cit., p.14.
32. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, 6.4311. *Cf. Notebooks*, p. 75.
33. Jean-Paul Sartre, op.cit., p.53.
34. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Notebooks 1914–1916*, p.75.
35. Barrett, Cyril. *Wittgenstein on Ethics and Religious Belief* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), p.39.
36. Ludwig Wittgenstein, op.cit., p.74.
37. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, # 6.43.
38. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Notebooks 1914–1916*, p.87.
39. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, # 6.43
40. Leo Tolstoy, op.cit., pp.49–50.
41. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Notebooks 1914–1916*, p.74.
42. Ludwig Wittgenstein. *Culture and Value*, ed. G.H. von Wright (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), pp. 96–97.
43. *Ibid*., p.38
44. Leo Tolstoy, op.cit., pp. 71–72.
45. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Notebooks 1914–1916*, p.74.
46. *Ibid*., p.73.
47. *Ibid*., p.91.
48. B.F. McGuinness, "The Mysticism of the *Tractatus*," *Philosophical Review*, Vol. 75, No. 3 (Jul., 1966), 305–328, p.318.
49. Albert Camus, op.cit., p.65.
50. Sartre analysis of Meursault, in *Literary and Philosophical Essays*, 1943. Quoted from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_suicide, date14.04.2011.
51. Albert Camus, op.cit., p.119
52. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Notebooks 1914–1916*, p.81.

Introducing Letter from Daniela Verducci Upon Her Inauguration as Vice-President of the World Phenomenology Institute

(June 28, 2011)

Dear friends and colleagues,

I am truly honored to become Vice President of the World Phenomenology Institute and wish to thank Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka for the benevolence with which she has watched my participation in the activities of the Institute, beginning with the 1994 Paris conference on the phenomenology of life—the proceedings of which are collected in *Life. Phenomenology of Life as the Starting Point of Philosophy* (Analecta Husserliana 50, 1997). On that occasion, I was one of a team of four researchers from the University of Macerata who devoted a session titled "Along the Historical Itinerary" to exploring some of the passages of the historical itinerary of life in philosophy.

Over the years our theoretical syntony with and feeling for the phenomenology of life of Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka has grown. From the intuition that the seed of metaphysics could reflower through her thinking, I have pursued a line of research dedicated to delineating, just starting from the lived experience of the lost man of our days, a horizon of meaning adequate for successfully mastering and facing the new and demanding challenges that life continually sends from every part of the intricate network of intergenerative relations that the natural and human ontopoiesis always produces anew.

Accepting the vice presidency of the World Phenomenology Institute thus means for me being able to participate from within in a great philosophical and human undertaking, one that it is essential to bring to a successful conclusion if we want to spare humanity from the return of new barbarisms.

I realize that there will be a great deal of work for me—after all, this is exactly what vice presidents are for! But I am convinced that I will manage not to be overwhelmed because I can count on the collaboration of friends and colleagues who already share with Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka the work of the Institute.

I am referring first of all to my immediate predecessor Tom Ryba, whose contribution to the 2002 encyclopedia *Phenomenology World-Wide* on "Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka's Phenomenology of Life" (pp. 430–460) contextualized so well

A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), *Phenomenology and the Human Positioning in the Cosmos: The Life-world, Nature, Earth: Book One*, Analecta Husserliana 113,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-4801-9, © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Professor Tymieniecka's thought. I also think right away of Konrad Rokstad of the University of Bergen, where in 2008 Professor Tymieniecka was awarded an *honoris causa* doctorate; of Carmen Cozma of the Al. I. Cuza University of Iasi, who has written *On the Ethical in Phenomenology of Life* (Rome: Eucos, 2007); of Patricia Trutty-Coohill of Siena College, who recently edited Analecta Husserliana 106, dedicated to *Art Inspiring Transmutations of Life*; and María Avelina Cecilia, who made a contribution to the encyclopedia *Phenomenology World-Wide* successfully identifying "Phenomenology of Life Integral and Scientific, Fulfilling the Expectations of Husserl's Initial Aspirations and Last Insights: A Global Movement" (pp. 687–716). Special recognition is to be given our Italian colleagues Angela Ales Bello of the Lateran University and president of the Italian Center of Phenomenological Research and Francisco Totaro of the University of Macerata and president of The International Society for Phenomenology and the Sciences of Life—both societies being affiliates of The World Phenomenology Institute. Many other colleagues have shared stretches of the over 40-year journey of the Institute, for example, Professor Erkut Sezgin of Istanbul Kultur University, the host of our work in this conference. I would like to thank him and invite him to continue his collaboration with the World Phenomenology Institute and with me.

I would also like to request the support of Alexander Schimmelpenninck, whom I see in this room, and with him Maja de Keijzer, the editorial director of the Analecta Husserliana series, as well as the support of Jeffrey Hurlburt and Robert Wise, Professor Tymieniecka's untiring assistants.

I declare that I accept the vice presidency of the World Phenomenology Institute.

PLEASE POST!

The World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning

1 Ivy Pointe Way,
Hanover, New Hampshire 03755, United States,
Telephone: (802) 295-3487; Fax: (802) 295-5963;
Website: http://www.phenomenology.org

Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, President; Daniela Verducci, Vice-President

The 61st International Congress of Phenomenology Hosted by Istanbul Kultur University

June 27, 28, 29, 30 and July 1, 2011

PROGRAM

Topic: **PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE HUMAN POSITIONING IN THE COSMOS – THE LIFE-WORLD, NATURE, EARTH**

The Congress begins with an **Opening Reception** at 16:00 on Monday, June 27, 2011, at the ground floor of Önder Öztunalý Auditorium, Istanbul Kultur University.

At 15:00, Registration.

Hosted by Istanbul Kultur University,
Department of Philosophy
Local Organization Committee:
Chaired by: Erkut Sezgin
Members: Mert Cadlar, Omur Ceylan, Emre Ibyk
Program Presided by: Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, World Phenomenology Institute
Assisting with the Program: Professors Carmen Cozma, Maija Kule, Halil Turan
Scientific Committee: ARGENTINA: Anibal Pedro Luis Fornari; AZERBAIJAN: Salahaddin Khalilov; ITALY: Francesco Totaro, Daniela Verducci; NORWAY: Konrad Rokstad, POLAND: Jan Szmyd;

A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), *Phenomenology and the Human Positioning in the Cosmos: The Life-world, Nature, Earth: Book One*, Analecta Husserliana 113,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-4801-9, © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

ROMANIA: Carmen Cozma; TURKEY: Klymet Selvi, Erkut Sezgin, Halil Turan; UNITED STATES: Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka

SCHOLARLY PROGRAM

Tuesday, June 28, 2011 *Morning Sessions*
9:00 – 9:30 AM **On Site Registration**
Önder Öztunalý Auditorium
9:30 AM ***INTRODUCTION***
Chaired by: Erkut Sezgin, Istanbul Kultur University, Turkey

Installation of Professor Daniela Verducci, Macerata University, as Vice-President of the World Phenomenology Institute
Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, World Phenomenology Institute, United States

Tuesday, June 28, 2011
10:00 AM **Önder Öztunalý Auditorium**
9:30 AM ***PLENARY SESSION I***
Chaired by: Daniela Verducci, Vice-President of the World Phenomenology Institute; Macerata University, Italy

COSMOS, THE MEANINGFUL CONSTRUCT
Halil Turan, Orta Dogu Teknik Universitesi, Turkey

COSMO-TRANSCENDENTAL POSITIONING OF THE LIVING BEING IN THE UNIVERSE IN ANNA-TERESA TYMIENIECKA'S NEW ENLIGHTENMENT
Jadwiga Smith, Bridgewater State University, United States

COMPETING CONCEPTIONS OF NATURE, HUMAN NATURE AND THE COSMIC ORDER
Oliver W. Holmes, Wesleyan University, United States

CALL OF PHILOSOPHISING AS "DICHTEN":
WRITING-VOICING-LISTENING-RECITING IN PACE WITH THE RHYMING PULSE OF COSMOS AS *TOTA SIMULTEITAS*
Erkut Sezgin, Istanbul Kultur University, Turkey

"COSMOS" AND SCIENTIFIC PRACTICES IN ANCIENT GREEK AND ANCIENT CHINESE THOUGHT: A COMPARATIVE INTERPRETATION
Sinan Kadir Celik, Ataturk University, Turkey

13:00 **Lunch**
Tuesday, June 28, 2011 ***Afternoon Sessions***
14:30, Room: **Amphi - Z - D1**

SECTION I
Chaired by: Leszek Pyra, Krakow, Poland

APEL'S PROJECT OF COGNITIVE ANTHROPOLOGY FOR NON-WESTERN WORLD AND A SUPPLEMENT OF MUSLIM PROPOSAL
Abdul Rahim Afaki, University of Karachi, Pakistan

THE RHYTHMIC HORIZON OF LANGUAGE (PHENOMENOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JORGE MANRIQUE'S *COPLAS)*
Antonio Dominguez Rey, Universidad Nacional de Educacion Distancia, Spain

A SUBJECTIVIST INQUIRY CONCERNING INTRINSIC VALUE IN ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS
Ayhan Sol *and* Selma Aydin Bayram, Middle East Technical University, Turkey

KINDS OF GUISE BUNDLES
Semiha Akinci, Anadolu University, Turkey

ENMESHED EXPERIENCE IN ARCHITECTURE: UNDERSTANDING THE AFFORDANCES OF THE OLD GALATA BRIDGE IN ISTANBUL
Semra Aydinli, Istanbul Technical University, Turkey

Tuesday, June 28, 2011
14:30, Room: **Amphi - Z - D2**

SECTION II
Chaired by: Danzankhorloo Dashpurev, The Institute of Philosophy, Sociology, and Political Science, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia

PLATO ON RETURN TO THE NATURE
Olena Shkubulyani, Kharkov, Ukraine

NATURE'S VALUE AND NATURE'S FUTURE
Leszek Pyra, Krakow, Poland

THE CONCEPT OF "EXPOSED POSITION" IN EMMANUEL LEVINAS AS CONDITION OF DEFINITION OF HUMANITY GROUNDED ON FORGIVENESS
Julia Ponzio, University of Bari, Italy

(MIS)TRIANGULATION OF CERTAIN COSMIC AND TERRESTRIAL PHENOMENA AS METAPHYSICAL CULTURAL FORCES IN ACHEBE'S "ARROW OF GOD"
Imafedia Okhamafe, University of Nebraska, United States

BEYOND THE HUMAN-NATURE DUALISM. TOWARDS A CONCEPT OF NATURE AS PART OF THE LIFE-WORLD
Karen Francois, Free University of Brussels (VUB), Belgium

Wednesday, June 29, 2011 ***Morning Session***
9:00 **Önder Öztunalý Auditorium**

PLENARY SESSION II
Chaired by: Sinan Kadir Celik, Ataturk University, Turkey

NATURE, SEALING THE HUMANNESS. APPLYING PHENOMENOLOGY OF LIFE TO A ROMANIAN ARTISTIC WORK
Carmen Cozma, University "Al.I.Cuza", Romania

THE PATH OF TRUTH: FROM ABSOLUTE TO REALITY, FROM POINT TO CIRCLE
Konul Bunyadzade, East-west Research Center, Azerbaijan

NEWTON'S PHENOMENA AND MALAY COSMOLOGY: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
A.L. Samian, National University of Malaysia

PEERING THROUGH THE KEYHOLE (THE PHENOMENOLOGY AND ONTOLOGY OF CYBERSPACE IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETIES)
J.C. Couceiro-Bueno, University of La Coruna, Spain

13:00 **Lunch**
14:30 **Organized Sightseeing in Istanbul**
Thursday, June 30, 2011 ***Morning Session***
9:00 **Önder Öztunalý Auditorium**

PLENARY SESSION III
Chaired by: Francesco Totaro, Macerata University, Italy

MIND AND SENSE AS A FRAME AND MEMBRANE OF THE SHRINE OF LIFE
Salahaddin Khalilov, East-west Research Center, Azerbaijan

METHOD AND INTUITION IN TYMIENIECKA'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF LIFE
Olga Louchakova-Schwartz, Institute of Transpersonal Psychology, United States

WHAT THE LAKE SAID. AMIEL'S NEW PHENOMENOLOGY AND NATURE.
Daria Gosek, Jagiellonian University, Poland

HOW CAN SISYPHUS BE HAPPY WITH HIS FATE?
Sibel Oktar, Ozyegin University, Turkey

VERTICALITY OF SPATIALITY
Egil H. Olsvik, Polithogskolen, Norway

13:00 **Lunch**
Thursday, June 30, 2011 ***Afternoon Session***
14:30, Room: **Amphi - Z - D1**

SECTION III
Chaired by: Simen Oyen, University of Bergen, Norway

THE SULLEN SKIES – IS THE MORAL UNIVERSALISM STILL TENABLE?
Velga Vevere, University of Latvia

PLACES, SPACES, MEANING – EXPERIENCED BY THREE AUSTRALIAN WALKS
Lena Hopsch, Chalmers University of Technology, Sweden *and* Steven Fleming, The University of Newcastle, Australia

PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE MANAGEMENT AS THE ECO-EMPATHIC LEADERSHIP
Bronislaw Bombala, University of Warmia and Masuria, Poland

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT BETWEEN IMAGINATIVE FREEDOM AND VITAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE LIGHT OF QUANTUM PHENOMENOLOGY
Mamuka G. Dolidze, Institute of Philosophy of Georgia, Tblisi

NOTHING *IS* WITHOUT *REASON*: CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE PLANETARY FUTURE AS SATURATED PHENOMENA
Wendy Wiseman, Oxyegin University, Istanbul

Thursday, June 30, 2011
14:30, Room: **Amphi - Z - D2**

SECTION IV
Chaired by: Halil Turan, Orta Dogu Teknik Universitesi, Turkey

INTERPRETATIONS OF SUFFERING IN TODAY'S LIFE-WORLD AND PHENOMENOLOGY OF LIFE
Maija Kule, University of Latvia

THE IDEA OF WELL-BEING IN HUSSERL AND ARISTOTLE
Susi Ferrarello, University of Rome, La Sapienza, Italy

HEIDEGGER ON THE POIETIC TRUTH OF BEING
Gulsah Namli, Middle East Technical University, Turkey

POSITION OF HUMAN BEING IN EXISTENTIAL PHILOSOPHY – BETWEEN FAITH AND ATHEISM
Grzegorz Gruca, Uniwersytet Jagiellonski, Poland

THE LATER WITTENGENSTEIN ON CERTAINTY
Aydan Turanli, Istanbul Technical University, Turkey

Thursday, June 30, 2011
14:30, Room: **Amphi - Z - D3**

SECTION V
Chaired by: Egil H. Olsvik, Polithogskolen, Norway

THE PRIMAL CHILD OF NATURE – TOWARDS A SYSTEMATIC THEORY OF ECO-PHENOMENOLOGY
Bence Peter Marosan, Eotvos Lorand University, Hungary

ONTOLOGIA E METAFISICA DEL MONDO NEL PENSIERO DE STUMPF, REINACH E CARNAP
Giuseppina Sgueglia, La Pontificia Universitas Lateranenensis

THE TRUTH IN HEIDEGGER: AN ANALYSIS OF MARTIN HEIDEGGER'S PHILOSOPHY OF ART AS IT APPEARS IN THE *URSPRUNG DES KUNSTWERKES* FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF *SEIN UND ZEIT*
Simen Oyen, University of Bergen, Norway

CREATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE KNOWLEDGE IN LEARNING-TEACHING PROCESS
Klymet Selvi, Anadolu University, Turkey

QUESTIONING HUSSERL'S CONCEPTION OF AN 'PRECEDING ENDOWMENT' (UR-STIFTUNG) AND HEIDEGGER'S CONCEPT OF ENOWING (EREIGNIS)
Eveline Cioflec, University of Fort Hare, South Africa

Friday, July 1, 2011 ***Morning Session***
9:00 **Önder Öztunalý Auditorium**

PLENARY SESSION IV
Chaired by: Carmen Cozma, University "Al.I.Cuza", Romania

THE MODERN ECOPHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGY OF LIFE ON HUMAN POSITIONING IN THE COSMOS – HENRYK SKOLIMOWSKI AND A-T. TYMIENIECKA IN COMPARISON
Jan Szmyd, University of Krakow, Poland

THE HUMAN POSITION AFTER DARWIN'S THEORY. PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS.
Roberto Verolini *and* Fabio Petrelli, Universita degli Studi de Camerino, Italy

THE CONCEPT OF RESPONSIBILITY IN ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS
Hein Berdinesen, University of Bergen, Norway

NATURE AND COSMOS IN A PHENOMENOLOGICAL ELUCIDATION
Konrad Rokstad, University of Bergen, Norway

THE COSMIC MATRIX: FROM SPATIALITY OF THINGS TO THE WORLD AS A WHOLE
Tonu Viik, Tallinn University, Estonia

13:00 **Lunch**

Afternoon Sessions **Friday, July 1, 2011**

14:30, Room: **Amphi - Z - D1**

SECTION VI
Chaired by: Oliver W. Holmes, Wesleyan University, United States

ONTOPOIETIC APPROACH TO HUMAN LIFE-WORLD
Natalia Smirnova, Russian Academy of Sciences

THE TRUTH OF THE WORK OF ART: HEIDEGGER AND GADAMER
Mara Stafecka, Rockford, Illinois, United States

PHENOMENOLOGICAL IMAGINATION AND SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINARIES IN THE ANALYSIS OF HUMAN POSITIONING
Meili Steele, University of South Carolina, United States

ON THE PATH OF NIETZSCHE AND MERLEAU-PONTY: THE EARTH AND THE LIFE-WORLD
Ammar Zeifa, Universite Paris I, France

THE COSMIC DIMENSION OF HUMOR
Anna Malecka, AGH – University of Science and Technology in Krakow, Poland

THE HUMAN BEING IN COSMOS IN MEISTER ECKHART'S THOUGHT – BEING EVERYTHING THROUGH REASON
Ilona Kock, University of Bremen, Germany

Friday, July 1, 2011

14:30, Room: **Amphi - Z - D2**

SECTION VII
Chaired by: Maija Kule, University of Latvia

KANT BETWEEN LEIBNIZ AND BRENTANO: JUDGMENT AND THE ACTUALITY OF THE WORLD
Arman Besler, Middle East Technical University, Turkey

EDMUND HUSSERL ON TRADITION
Andrea Carroccio, Graduate Student at the University of Rome – Tor Vergata, Italy

DEALING WITH THE WASTELAND. JOZEF TISCHNER'S CONCEPT OF EARTH
Piotr Popiolek, Jagiellonian University, Poland

TO WHAT EXTENT CAN I "DOUBT": HEIDEGGER'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF "CERTAINTY" AND "TRUTH"
Emrah Gunok, Middle East Technical University, Turkey

CONCEPTION OF CLASSIC IN GADAMER'S MAGNUM OPUS
Tansu Acik, University of Ankara, Turkey

DUALITY: THE ULTIMATE PHENOMENON OF THE UNIVERSE AS REVEALED IN RECENT SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERIES
Tsung-I Dow, Boca Raton, United States

Index

A
Absolute being (god), 247, 251, 255
Afaki, A.R., 83
Agrippa, C., 38
Akinci, S., 135
al-Banjari, N.I., 263
al-Bistami, A.Y., 254
al-Din al-Qunawi, S., 251
al-Din al-Surawardi, S., 289
Alexandria, P., 35, 56–58
al-Falimbani, A.S., 263
al-Farabi, 289
Al-Hallaj, M., 247, 251
Ali ibn Abu Talib, 247
al-Khatib al-Minangkabawi, A.L., 264, 265
Allah, 250
al-Makasari, Y., 263
Al-Suhrawardi, 289
Amiel, H.-F., 317–325
Amiel's self-analysis
  human being, essence of, 319
  impersonal objectivisation, 320
  inner landscape, 324
  introspection and self-exploration, 319
  life tragedy, 320
  "mystery," concept of, 322
  phenomenology, 324
  philosophical anthropology, 320
  Reino Virtanen criticism of, 323
  self-consciousness, 323
  self-criticism, 321
  solipsism, 323
  subjectivity, 325
  unconsciousness, 323
Anaxagoras, 11, 13
Ancient Greek and ancient Chinese cosmologies and scientific practices
  agrarian bureaucratic civilization, 76
  bureaucratic government system, 76
  Ch'i and Li *vs*. conflicting forces and laws
    atomist philosophers, 72
    cognizable hidden reality, 70
    impersonal cosmic function, 73
    inequality and hierarchical orderliness, 71
    isonomia, 72
    material forces, 73
    non-interventionist philosophical and scientific activity, 74
    social harmony and equality, 71
    ultimate causes, 70
  cultural spirit, 77
  European culture, 67
  exchange-based economies, 77
  heuristic/representational power, 67
  hydraulic engineering works, 74
  intellectual activity, 75
  life-world, 69
  mathematical reality, 76
  non-representational disciplines, 68
  political calamities, 75
  practical activity, 69
  recording activity, 75
  sub-atomic particles, 68
Anguish, 328, 329
A Question of Power, 193, 199
Archimedes, 22, 24

A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), *Phenomenology and the Human Positioning in the Cosmos: The Life-world, Nature, Earth: Book One*, Analecta Husserliana 113,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-4801-9, © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Architecture
ambiguous notions, 144
cultural identity issues, 141
enmeshed experience
body-mind-environment, 145
Bosporus and Golden Horn, 147
interpretive framework, 145
interwoven network system, 144
multilayered meaning patterns, 146
natural-cultural-historical milieu, 146
organic relations, 146
perceived-world, 145
phenomenology, 144
shifting balances, 147
holism, 142
Istanbul and Old Galata Bridge
cultural awareness, 150
in-between reality, 148
morphological structure, 150
re-reading, narrative space, 149
steel construction, 149
phenomenological inquiry, 142
spatio-temporal relationships, 143, 148
timeless pathways, 143
Aristotle, 22, 26, 30–32, 49, 50, 68, 70, 71, 237
Astronomy and Civilization in the New Enlightenment, 4
Atomism, 17
Augustine, 31
Avicenna, 289
Aydinli, S., 141

B
Bach, J.S., 241
Bacon, F., 24, 32, 34–38, 41, 42, 51, 60, 283
Barrett, C., 334
Beethoven, 241
Blaga, L., 241, 242
Boehm, R., 206, 210, 213, 214
Boer, A., 191
Bruno, G., 34, 40, 42
Brzozowski, S., 318, 319
Buddhism, 184, 295
Bunyadzade, K., 245

C
Camus, A., 327–337
Carnap, R., 217–231
Carr, N., 274
Casamonti, M., 224
Casaubon, I., 27
Cassirer, E., 223
Castañeda, H.-Ñ., 137
Causality, 224
Çelik, S.K., 67
Celsius, 22
Ceremony, 193, 194
Chardin, 184
Charles V, 42
Christian, 26–27, 31, 51, 57, 59
Cicero, 31
Ck'o'yo, 195, 197, 201, 202
Cognition
absolute being, 255
divine one, 254
highest being, 254
'I am the Truth (Ana'l-haq)', 256
Jams, 254
omnipotent, 254
rational and irrational stages, 253
Sufism, 254
Cognitive anthropology
all theory-formation, 85
causal hypothesis, 86
communication community, 87
general law-like hypothesis, 86
hermeneutics, 87
ideological corruption, 88
interpreter reflexively, 89
intersubjective agreement, 87, 90
intersubjective validity, 84
Islamic-Hermeneutic reflexivity
communitarian moments, 93
dialogic-hermeneutic process, 92
historical continuum/tradition, 91
interpretive paradigm, 94
mundane-divine/historical-ahistorical mutuality, 92
pagan-Arab tradition, 91
Qur'an, 91
knowing consciousness, 84
language-game theory, 86
language/linguistic signs, 84
methodological approach, 89
Muslim societies, 84
neopositivist approach, 86
philosophical and scientific orientation, 89
preconditions, 85
pre-reflexive engagement, 88
psychoanalytic-psychotherapeutic model, 90
quasi-natural causal process, 90
subject-object relationship, 87

Transformation der Philosophie (Towards a Transformation of Philosophy), 83
unified science, 85
Cognitive psychology, 271
Consciousness
construction theory, 220
direct intuition (*See* Direct intuition)
The Myth of Sisyphus, 329, 331
reason and sense, 280
Construction theory
causality, 224
consciousness, 220
constitution system, 227–228
definition, 218
elementary lived-experiences, 218–219
elementism, 224–225
epistemological parallelism, 227
"factual states of affairs," 228–231
fictitious construction, 222
identity theory, 226
Kantian tradition, 218
knowledge, theory of, 220
lawful structure, 223
laws of nature, 222
memory, idea of, 220
neo-Kantian analysis, 223
physical analysis and dimension, 227
physical and spiritual objects, 222
pseudo-objectual statements, 223–224
psychophysical parallelism, 218, 221, 226
reality and physical objects, 223
reality, concept of, 224
self, problem of, 220–221
sensation analysis, 220
"somatic field," 219
structural analysis, 226
world and reality, theory of, 223
Conway, A., 24, 52–56, 59
Conway, L., 52
Copernicus, N., 23, 25, 40
Corbin, H., 289
Cosimo de' Medici, 24
Cosmology
aesthetical contemplation, 10
Epicureanism
ataraxia, 17
atomic motions, 15
atomism, 17
complementary power, 16
divine interaction, 15
hylozoism, 15
material flow, 16
rational inquiry, 17
submission and ignorance, 17
evolutionary process, 10
Malay cosmology
material world, 263
mathematical activities and religion, 265
mathematical knowledge, 264–265
mathematical problem, 265
world of imagination, 263
world of light, 263
world of unseen, 263
modern science, 17–19
Newton's cosmology
emanation, 260
geometry, 263
god names and attributes, 262
god's sensorium, 262
mathematician, concept of god, 261–262
mechanical world, 263
Plato's demiourgos, 261
three worlds, theory of, 260
right conduct, 9
teleology
decipherable inscriptions, 13
historical interpretation, 14
mathematics, 12
non-human mechanism, 11
philosophical perspective, 11
pre-Socratic philosophy, 12
unchanging order, 13
Couceiro-Bueno, J.C., 269
Cozma, C., 185
Creation process
divine intelligence, 250
manifestation process, 251
material world, 252
multiplicity, 251
world of idea, 252
world of spirits, 252
Creative thinking, 286
Cyberspace. *See* Internet
Cyborg Manifesto, 211
Czapski, J., 319

D

Dan, 190–193
da Vinci, L., 25
Davis, P.J., 208
Debussy, 241
Deleuze, G., 143

Descartes, R., 24, 49, 50, 53, 55, 205–208, 212–214
Dijksterhuis, E.J., 207
Dilthey, 87
Direct intuition
  belief/opinion, 296
  conscious awareness, 295
  eidetic intuition, 299
  epoché, 294
  imagination, 309–310
  interrogation, 302–303
  Kundalini Tantra, 300
  Logos of Life
    ideal and natural, 304
    ontopoietic time, 304, 307
    self-actualizaton, 306
    self-creation and self-constitution, 307
    sentience, 305
  mind, 294
  phenomenology of, 297–298
  presentive/eidetic, 296
  psychological contexts, 296
  vs. psychological intuition faculty, 296
  scientific research, 294
  self-awareness, 294
Donne, J., 44
Dualism
  Descartes' philosophical thinking
    cogito ego sum, 207
    intuition and deduction, 208
    Mathesis Universalis, 207
    universal mathematics, 208
    world of ideas, 207
  Husserl's criticism
    mathematical ideal objects, 209–210
    mathematical language, 209
    naturalism, 208
    objective scientific approach, 209
    real and objective world, 209
  interest, concept of, 213
  logical truth, concept of, 206, 212
  rational knowledge, 211
  technology and communication, 211
  topical truth, concept of, 206, 212
  Western philosophy, 211
Du Bos, R., 319
Duncker, K., 219
Dvõrak, 241

E
Eckhart, M., 254
Ecosystems, 179–180
Ecphantus, 23
Ego
  cogito ego, 5, 46, 206
  direct intuition, 294
  reason and sense, 282
Eidetic intuition, 298, 299
Elementism, 224–225
Elizabeth, 189–193, 199
Empedocles, 23
Enescu, G., 236, 241, 242
Environmental ethics
  culture, 183
  humans and natural world., 175
  Logos of Life, 183–184
  phenomenology of life, 183
Epicureanism
  ataraxia, 17
  atomic motions, 15
  atomism, 17
  complementary power, 16
  divine interaction, 15
  hylozoism, 15
  material flow, 16
  rational inquiry, 17
  submission and ignorance, 17
Epicurus, 17, 71
Eudaemonism, 238

F
Fabulation, 240
Feeling, 283, 332
Feinberg, J., 178
Ferrari, M., 220
Feuerbach, L., 164
Ficino, M., 26
Fictitious construction, 222
Florensky, P., 165
Fludd, R., 40
Fodor, 271
Fontenelle, 24, 61
François, K., 207
Frank, M., 321

G
Gadamer, H.-G., 236, 239
Galen, 22, 24
Galileo, G., 26, 43, 46, 68, 208, 210, 213
Galison, P., 230
Gernet, J., 75
Giere, R.N., 220
Gilbert, W., 49

Good and evil
Ceremony, 193, 194
ethereal plot, 193–194
god, power of, 190
Question of Power, 189, 192, 194, 199–202
soul-journey, 189
stories of, 194
Goodpaster, K., 174, 175
Gosek, D.I., 317
Guattari, P.-F., 143
Guise-bundle categories
altering guises, 139
arbitrary sentences, 135
aspectual guises, 138
derivative descriptions, 136
equivalence relation, 137
essential guises, 138
fame guises, 137
intended reference, 136
lump of matter, 139
memorable duration, 137
situational guises, 139
split personalities, 138

H
Händel, 241
Haraway, D.J., 206, 210–212, 214
Hardin, J.G., 181, 184
Harmony, 237–238
Hartmann, N., 236
Harvey, D., 150
Head, B., 187–202
Hedonism, 238
Hegel, G.W.F., 253
Heidegger, M., 84, 164, 237, 289, 329
Hempel, C.G., 228
Heraclitus, 5, 23, 321
Hersh, R., 208
Hesychasm, 295
Hinduism, 184, 300
Hobbes, T., 51, 53, 55
Holism
architecture, 142
ecosystems, 179–180
optimization theory, 179
species, 178
Holl, S., 142
Holy Qur'an, 91, 247
Homer, 13
Husserl, E., 2, 69, 76, 205, 206, 208–214, 279, 288, 289, 291, 292, 294–296, 301–306, 323, 324
Hylozoism, 15

I
Ibn 'Arabi, 293, 294, 296
Idealization, 240–241
Identity theory, 226
Imaginatio Creatrix, 309–310
Imagination, 272, 309–310, 322
Inge, W., 50
In Praise of Philosophy, 182
Intentional consciousness, 295, 302, 310
Internet
advantages, 276
cognitive psychology, 270
commutation, 270
consumer society, 275
digital computers, 271
disadvantages, 276–277
knowledge and learning, 274
personal identity, 273
public and private, concept of, 273
spatiality, 273
symbolic computation, 271
TCP/IP protocol, 270
timelessness, 273
virtual mechanism, 272–273
world wide web, 270
Isonomia, 72
Istanbul and Old Galata Bridge
cultural awareness, 150
in-between reality, 148
morphological structure, 150
re-reading, narrative space, 149
steel construction, 149

J
Jamieson, D., 181, 182
Jesus, 26, 191
Jones, 191
Josiah, 194, 196–198, 201
Journal Intime. *See* Amiel's self-analysis
Jung, C., 285

K
Kant, I., 2, 4, 156, 289
Kaup, 201
Keller, E.F., 42
Kenosi, 190
Kepler, J., 24, 40
Khalilov, S., 251, 279
Kline, M., 210

Knowledge
construction theory, 220
cumulative development, 36
language/linguistic signs, 84
mathematical, Malay cosmology, 264–265
modes of knowledge (*See* Direct intuition)new world, 22
non-Aristotelian, 23
objective, 280
precondition, 85
rational, dualism, 211
reason and sense
collective unconsciousnes, 285
individuality, 284
lonely, 285
new-born, 285
personal sensory experience, 284
scientific, 286
transcendental conditions, 4
Köhler, W., 219
Kojeve, A., 4
Kuhn, T., 68
Kundalini Tantra, 300
Ku'oosh, 196–199
K'yo, 194

L
Laclau, E., 212
Lash, S., 93
Latour, B., 206, 210, 212–214
Le Corbusier, 147
Lefebvre, H., 145, 146
Leibnitz, 289, 291
Leopold, A., 177, 179, 180
Leucippus, 23
Levinas, E., 294
Lloyd, G.E.R., 70
Locke, J., 53
Logical thinking, 287
Logical truth, 206, 212
Logos and Life, 3
Louchakova-Schwartz, O., 291
Lucretius, 16, 22

M
Mahler, 241
Malay cosmology
material world, 263
mathematical activities and religion, 265
mathematical knowledge, 264–265
mathematical problem, 265
world of imagination, 263
world of light, 263
world of unseen, 263
Ma'.see'wi, 194, 195
Material world, 263
Mathematics
Ancient Greek and ancient Chinese cosmologies and scientific practices, 76
Husserl's criticism, 208, 209
Malay cosmology, 264–265
Mathesis Universalis, 207
new philosophy (neoaristotelianism, intellectual history)
Bacon, the Paracelsans and organic tradition, 40
Descartes and mechanical tradition, 44
humanists, classical revival and hermetic tradition, 25
Newton's cosmology, 261–263
real world, 208
universal mathematics, of Descartes' program, 208
Mathesis Universalis, 207–208
McLuhan, M., 274, 275
Medusa, 189–191
Meloethics, 237, 238
Merleau-Ponty, M., 142, 143, 145, 148, 149, 301, 303
Mersenne, 43, 46
Mind, 294
Minsky, 271
Mithridates, F., 28
Mohammed, 193
Moral values, 238
More, H., 52–54, 56, 59
Moses, 26
Motabeng, 189–191, 193
Mouffe, C., 212
Moulines, C.U., 230
Mozart, 241
Music
authentic, 237
ethos, 237
exalted existence, 240
experienc of, 239
harmony, 237–238
humanness, 239
human well-being, 240
impetus and equipoise, 241
life phenomenology, 240
living, 239

meloethics, concepts of, 237, 238
moral values, 238
proximity and detachment, 236
radical examination, 240
self-denial and self-mediation, 236
transcending movement, 240
universal human value, 238
Muslim societies, 84

N
Nature
amoral agent, 175
distributive justice, principle of, 177
dualism, 174
environmental catastrophe, 181
environmental degradation, 181
environmental ethics (*see* Environmental ethics)
food aid, 181
global inequality, 181
global population, 180
Holism, 178–180
human ethics, 176–177
Husserl's criticism, of dualism, 208
moral subject, 175
nonmalaficence, 176
phenomenology of life, 174
reason and sense, 289
respect of, 176
restitutive justice, principle of, 177
Schweitzer's dilemma, 174
Needham, J., 74
Neoaristotelianism, 23
Neo-Kantian analysis, 223
New enlightenment, 4, 5
New philosophy
ancient philosophical systems, 23
Bacon, the Paracelsans and organic tradition
antiquity, 33
archeus, 39
Archimedean tradition, 43
chemical medicine, 38
Copernican universe, 33
magical tradition, 41
The Masculine Birth of Time, 35
mathematical characters, 40
mechanical arts, 42
misconceptions, 35
nature and femininity, 42
Novum Organum, 34, 36
philosophia prima, 37
rationalism, 37
scientific knowledge, 34
Scientific Revolution, 41
signatures theory, 40
Timaeus, 41
Veritas temporis filia motif, 36
classical antiquity, 23
Descartes and mechanical tradition
biological mechanisms, 48
Cartesian philosophy, 45
cogito ergo sum, 46
De magnete, 49
Discourse on Method, 44, 46
Divine Engineer, 47
hydraulic engineering, 49
local aggregations, 50
magnetism, 49
mathematical method, 44
natural laws, 48
physical causation, 50
physical entities, 45
Principles of Philosophy, 44, 47
skeptical crisis, 46
Stoic ethics, 46
Henry More, Anne Conway and Kabbalah
anthropomorphic language, 57
Cambridge Platonists, 51
classical philosophy, 51
Conjectura cabbalistica, 53
corporeal motion, 54
Digression sur les anciens poetes et modernes, 60
hermeneutical method, 56
historical process, 60
intellectual categories, 53
Kabbala denuda, 53
Lurianism, 58
materialistic mechanism, 52
mechanical philosophy, 54
Middle Nature and celestial Adam, 56
monotheism, 59
Mosaic Law, 57
nizzuzuth, 58
philosophical education, 52
philosophical reputations, 50
Principia philosophiae antiquissimae et recentissimae, 52–53
The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy, 53
redemptive action and restoration, 58
single-substance, 55
spiritual monism, 54
translatio, 51
humanists, classical revival and hermetic tradition

New philosophy (*cont.*)
Aristotelian cosmology, 33
atomism, 31
Corpus hermeticum, 26, 27
death and decay, 33
Egyptian treatises, 27
exoteric teaching, 28
gematria, 29
Hermetic writings, 27
Kabbalah, 28
mathematical sciences, 25
mechanical philosophy, 31
microscope, 31
mystical numerological investigation, 29
natural philosophy, 26
Neoplatonism, 30
Pythagorean concept, 25
scholarship, 24
spatial and temporal measures, 30
sublunary movements, 32
Timaeus, 24
transcendental mysticism, 26
"Written Law," 28
Zohar, 28, 29
intellectual history, 23
Italian Renaissance, 22
Presocratic philosophies, 22
Newton, I., 50, 260–263, 265, 266
Newton's cosmology
emanation, 260
geometry, 263
god names and attributes, 262
god's sensorium, 262
mathematician, concept of god, 261–262
mechanical world, 263
Plato's demiourgos, 261
three worlds, theory of, 260
Nietzschem, F., 157

O
Oktar, S., 327
Omnipotence, 254
Oneness, 248
Ontopoietic intuition, 299
Ortega y Gasset, J., 5
Ou'yu'ye'wi, 194

P
Pa'caya'nyi, 194, 195
Pagel, W., 39
Paracelsus, 38–41
Pasikhani, M., 247
Passmore, J.A., 178
Phaedrus
abstract metaphysics, 160
Ancient Greek Enlightenment, 156
ancient tragedy, 168
asceticism, 159
communication, 158
cynicism, 159
Eros, 156
erotic passion, 161
Greek antiquity, 159
home-bred wisdom, 157
human nature, 156
human primary intuitions, 169
human self-knowledge, 163
metaphysical reality, 165
mythical parsonage, 163
mythical tales, 166
mythology, 157
naive mythic interpretation, human being, 160
philosopher of suspicion, 162
philosophical-anthropological tradition, 165
philosophical approach, 161
philosophical rage, 167
positive assessments, 164
semantic unity, 170
sensations and perceptions, 158
transition, 167
Phenomenalism, 225
Philosophy as Rigorous Science, 208–209
Philosophy of Civilization, 174
Pico della Mirandola, 26–28, 30, 37
Plato, 10, 13–15, 17, 18, 22, 24–27, 29, 30, 206, 237, 273, 274
Platonic Academy, 26
Plotinus, 26
Poliaiano, 26
Popper, K., 282, 284
Porta, J.B., 27
Ptolemy, 22, 24
Pylyshyn, 271
Pythagoras, 26

R
Reason and sense
consciousness, 280
daily life experience, 287
ego, 282
environment, 287

epistemic process, 288
excitements and impressions, 281
external/internal effects, 281
human world, 280
inorganic life and nature, 287
knowledge
collective unconsciousnes, 285
individuality, 284
lonely, 285
new-born, 285
personal sensory experience, 284
scientific, 286
naturalism, 289
personal experience, 284
phenomenology, 288–289
state of quality, 288
thinking, 283
Regan, T., 177
Regulae ad Directionem Ingenii, 205
Renan, E., 319
Richardson, A.W., 220
Rocky, 194, 196, 199, 201
Rogers, W.K., 185
Rolston III, H., 177, 178
Romanian Music. *See also* Music
Romanian Rhapsody Nr.1 for orchestra, 235, 236, 241, 242. *See also* Music
Rosenroth, K., 53
Rousseau, G.S., 318

S
Sadra, M., 289
Samian, A.L., 259
Sartre, J.-P., 328–331, 333, 335, 336
Scherer, E., 318
Schleiermacher, 87
Schlick, M., 217–231
Schopenhauer, A., 238
Schweitzer, A., 174, 176, 184
Self, 220
Self-consciousness, 323
Sello, 189–193
Sgueglia, G., 217
Shkubulyani, O., 155
Silko, L.M., 187–202
Singer, P., 175
Sisyphus, 327–337
Skolimowski, H., 182, 183
Smith, M.F., 15
Socrates, 10, 11, 13–15
Solipsism, 323
Soul-journey, 189
Spinoza, B., 55
Stadler, F., 220
Strauss, R., 241
Subjective idealism, 225
Sufism, 254, 295
Suhrawardi, 293–296, 301, 304
Suicide, 327–328, 336

T
Taine, H., 319
Taoism, 256
Tartaglia, N., 44
Taylor, P., 175–177, 184
Tayo, 194–202
Tchaikovsky, 241
Teleology
decipherable inscriptions, 13
historical interpretation, 14
mathematics, 12
non-human mechanism, 11
philosophical perspective, 11
pre-Socratic philosophy, 12
unchanging order, 13
Thelma, A., 194, 197, 198
The Myth of Sisyphus
anguish, 328
condition, 330
consciousness, 329, 331
death fear, 333–334
fate of, 337
freedom, 329
happiness, 329
meaning of life, 334–335
'pause' stage, 328–329
person, everyday life of, 330
suicide, 327–328, 336
Wittgenstein value judgements, 331
The Origin of Geometry, 209
The Tragedy of the Commons, 181
Thinking, 48
creative, 286
definition, 283
human-nature dualism, 206
logical, 287
rational, 288
Tolstoy, L., 319, 331, 333–335
Topical truth, 206, 212
Transcendentalism: *Overturned*, 3
Turing, A.M., 271
Turkhan, A., 289
Turkle, S., 274
Tusi, S., 254

Tymieniecka, A.-T., 1–5, 174, 182–185, 188, 236, 238–242, 289, 291, 292, 296–310
Tzu, H., 74
Tzu, L., 73

U
Unconsciousness, 323
Unity of idea
  cognition, 252–256
  creation process, 249–252
  macrocosm and microcosm, 246
  Medieval Eastern and Western thinkers, 247–249
Utilitarianism, 238

V
van Helmont, F., 53
van Helmont, J.B., 53
Vattimo, G., 275
Vernant, J.P., 72
Virtanen, R., 323
von Goethe, J.W., 321
von Rosenroth, C.K., 53

W
Warman, C., 318
Wertheimer, M., 219
Western philosophy, 211
Witchery. *See* Good and evil
Wittgenstein, L., 12, 86, 328–337
Wonder(ment), 240
World of imagination, 263
World of light, 263
World of unseen, 263

Y
Yates, F., 30