Entangled Pieties

Muslim-Christian Relations and Gendered Sociality in Java, Indonesia

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In memory of a-má and for Gian Noelle

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In the summer of 2008, the first time I visited the Central Javanese city of Salatiga, I stayed for nine weeks with a family that was more multi-religious than I could have imagined. The Javanese Muslim mother, who was practically the head of the household, lived with her second husband, who was a culturally Hindu Balinese. The mother was an employee of Satya Wacana Christian University. She had two sons, who also lived in their Javanese-style house. The older son, unmarried, was from the mother's first marriage with a Chinese Indonesian, which made the son a Javanese-Chinese Muslim. The second son was married to an orphaned Catholic woman, whose ancestry was unclear, but according to the daughter in-law's own account she was probably from Eastern Indonesia. Their marriage was sanctified in a church with a pastor who was the Muslim mother's friend, and they now had two children. During my stay, it was clear that the Javanese mother tried hard to educate her grandchildren in "Islamic ways." She sent them to Islamic classes and asked them to study Arabic. Her husband, who was also the step-grandfather of the children, remained culturally Hindu, not unlike the way she remained culturally Islamic, except she hoped that her grandchildren would grow up more "Islamic."

The fact that the first impression I had of Salatiga was so multi-religious piqued my interest in broader social relations among people who have different religious backgrounds. Although Salatiga is much less well-known than the massive cities of Jakarta or Surabaya, nor as celebrated as the cultural centers Yogyakarta and Surakarta, it

nevertheless accommodates an impressive religious heterogeneity and a higher concentration of Christian residents than these other major cities.[1] Nationally known as a small place characterized by rich ethno-religious pluralism, Salatiga represents an epitome of the modern civic pluralistic society in Indonesia that is rarely covered by most international news since the events of 9/11 and the Bali Bombings. Indeed, global mass media sometimes give an impression that they care about Indonesia only when there is news about the growing market in Asia, disputes over territories, or volcanic eruptions, alongside the persistent theme about the persecution of Christians, women, and other religious minorities. Alternatively, the image of Indonesia as home to "moderate peaceful Islam" persists in a stark contrast with a simplified and demonized "Middle-Eastern Islam." At best, the fact that there are some 20 million non-Muslims living in this country has led travelers, reporters, and political scientists to portray Islam and Christianity as two tangible, separate entities that either collide with, or tolerate, each other.

Living in Salatiga for 12 months between 2009 and 2010, and returning again in 2012 and 2013, I learned that, in real life, Islam and Christianity are often not separate entities in contemporary urban Java. They consist of real people and real lives, which inter-mingle with one another in complicated ways. Especially in the Javanese neighborhood (*kampung* or *perumahan*), the most basic local community in Java for many people still today, it is the norm, not the exception, for Muslims of disparate factions and Christians of different denominations to celebrate rites of passage together.

This entanglement does not mean, of course, that religious differences are never an issue. They often are, particularly as recent Islamic and Pentecostal revivals have gained strength in the nation at least since the 1990s. Violence in the name of religion has, time and again, shocked local communities. Gerry van Klinken characterizes the years between 1997 and 2001 as the peak of mass-based ethnic/religious violence in specific provinces within the country (2007). Muslim–Christian violence occurred in several places, and most devastatingly in Ambon, where small town conflicts were escalated into a total civil war. This period is also an example of what Jacques Bertrand (2004) calls "critical junctures" after the fall of Suharto, when attacks on religious minorities happened in Java periodically. To make things worse, in 2005, the Indonesian Council of Religious Scholars (MUI) issued 11 fatwas[2] denouncing pluralism, inter-faith prayer, inter-faith marriage, and even cross-religious inheritance from parents to children (Gillespie 2007, 219).

In the 2010s, problems with religious pluralism have continued. In Java, most cases of violence fall under the category of "urban riots," meaning they are not secessionist, ethnic purges, religious wars or terrorist bombings (Aspinall 2008). Rather, they are small incidents typically "targeting the places of worship, homes and businesses of Christian and ethnic Chinese minorities" and "lasted a day or two and claimed few lives" (ibid., 560). The scale of destruction is less than that of other types of violence. Persecutions against the Ahmadi, Shiite Muslims, and Christian communities occurred in different regions, while national and local public officials often indirectly condoned such attacks by issuing regulations that severely restrict the freedom of religious minorities to worship and organize themselves publicly.[3] In February 2011, a blasphemy case in the Central Javanese town of Temanggung resulted in riots that destroyed three churches. In the city of Surakarta (Solo), just about an hour's southbound drive from Salatiga, a suicide bomb was detonated in a Pentecostal church (*gereja pentekostal*) and injured 22 people[4] that same year.

The question of religious pluralism seems more relevant than ever, both in Indonesia and globally. Since the 1990s, within just three decades, we have witnessed ethno-religious violence in Yugoslavia, Hindu–Muslim strife in India, far-right discourses against minorities and immigrants in Euro-America, Buddhist violence in Myanmar, and the rise of the notorious "terrorist state" in the Middle East, alongside the never-ending conflicts following the Israeli occupation of Palestine. While it is important to understand the occurrences of violence, we also need to realize that "peaceful lives" in real-and-existing places are also teeming with social tensions, which nonetheless are contained with various kinds of political or social power. The actual process of creating and sustaining pluralism is, hence, a question facing all societies in the modern world, not only in the most war-torn areas, but also in seemingly uneventful places, such as Salatiga and cities like it. After all, multiple religious revivals since the mid-1980s have ensured that the rules of community life are no longer the same. How do middle-class Muslims and Christians renegotiate social life in a time of both Islamic resurgence and Pentecostal expansion? What are the impacts of these religious trends on the social position of women and religious minorities? Further, how do different forms of piety and gendered sociality influence each other across religious borders, since Muslims and Christians are bound to encounter each other in the religiously mixed neighborhoods, where important communal rituals still take place?[5] Equally important, does the deepening

Islamization necessarily translate into a growing social conservatism towards women and religious minorities? Do Indonesian religious movements, despite supporting the development of civil society and democratization (Hefner 2000; Ramage 1995), in fact work to impose restrictions upon women? These pressing issues have concerned many observers (Hasan 2006; Hefner 2009; Rinaldo 2008; Smith-Hefner 2005; Sidel 2006).

This work addresses these questions and contends that religiosity should be explored as a complex phenomenon entangled with gendered sociality and religious others, instead of a preordained outcome of a self-contained religious tradition. By exploring ways of managing difference from an array of Muslim and Christian perspectives, this study aims to demonstrate the inadequacy of static, de-contextualized views of Islam, Christianity, and their followers. Instead, it strives to humanize pious people who have a long history of dealing with cross-religious encounters in a less privileged part of the world. A multi-religious city such as Salatiga is a fabulous space in which to probe this question. Indeed, Java in general has been known for its religious diversity, at least since Clifford Geertz's classical studies (1960) of the Muslim pluralism of Java and other important subsequent works (Beatty 1999; Bowen 1993; Dhofier 1999; Gade 2004; Hefner 1987; Ricklefs 1979; Woodward 1989; Van Bruinessen 2002). Today, Javanese religious diversity has grown all the more cosmopolitan and pronounced. "Traditionalist" Muslims, reformist Muslims, puritan "Salafists,"[6] Javanese Protestants, Javanese Pentecostals, and Chinese Pentecostals—all hold positions in the society. How exactly these people negotiate and relate to one another in a Javanese city and in the broader Indonesian society is the driving question that has motivated the writing of this book.

The Special Case of Religiosities in Indonesia

For readers who are not familiar with Indonesia, it is important to point out that this is the largest Muslim-majority country in the world, and the Javanese account for more than 40% of the population. About 87.6% of the total population, more than 200 million souls, self-identify as Muslim, along with 6.8% and 2.9% of the population being Christian (Protestant) and Catholic, respectively (BPS Indonesia 2010). There has long been an over-simplified idea that the Javanese are merely "nominal Muslims," due to their strong local traditions and the continuing influence of earlier Javanese traditions often labeled as Hinduism and Buddhism. I will

demystify this idea with greater detail throughout the book but, here, I wish to stress that Islam has been an integral part of the local religious life for centuries, although notions about what constitutes the proper practice of Islam have undergone significant changes. While many scholars have explored Islamic revival movements in Indonesia over recent decades, this book is specifically dedicated to the gendered encounters between normative Islam and Pentecostal Christianity, a topic that has largely gone unnoticed.

Before we start, however, it is necessary to offer general readers a brief introduction to the special status of religion in the Indonesian nation. Four points need to be mentioned. First, belief in a monotheistic God has been considered a basic obligation of citizenship for all Indonesians since the founding of the Republic of Indonesia in 1945. Second, atheism is illegal, while the practice of local religions is considered contrary to modernity and national development. This has been so at least since the New Order regime (1965–1998). Third, religious education at all levels of schooling has been compulsory for at least the last 40 years. Last, proselytizing someone who already has a (recognized) religion is illegal and, often, the pretext for persecution under by-laws.

The long-term effect of these policies was more than nominal. With the endorsement of the constitution and related policies, religion has been elevated to an unavoidable duty of citizenship, the indispensible element of civilization, even a prerequisite of modern humanity. In addition to issues of reconciling religious diversity with the Muslim majority in Indonesia, state support of these religious policies was particularly heightened by the intense backlash against supposedly atheistic communism that was the raison d'etre for the New Order regime after 1965. All other belief systems outside of world religions were labeled *kepercayanan* (beliefs), which were generally associated with derogatory implications, such as "backwardness" and "primitiveness" (Atkinson 1983, 685). Religious education was viewed as a part of this ambitious project of remaking a docile and "civilized" citizenry out of the kaleidoscopic, religiously and culturally variegated people of Indonesia. In all educational institutions, from elementary school to university, students were required to receive religious instruction according to their respective faiths. This formal instruction has helped construct the absolute importance of religiosity as part of the self and of society. Having a religion not only meant rejecting communism, it also meant embracing a form of modernity that was

consistent with nationalist development. Consequently, most populations in remote regions, at least officially, gave up their traditional religions for Christianity or Islam (Hoskins 1987, 138).

Promotion of world religion and mass education were certainly not the only statecraft of New Order regime. To further consolidate state power, an indoctrination program called *Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila* (Guide to Comprehension and Practice of the Pancasila, or P4) was conceived in 1978. The P4 program was intended to be the glue that connected all the segments of the nation by cultivating the proper nationalist mindset. From civil servants to students, peasants to housewives, everyone was provided with compulsory Pancasila courses. This program made it explicit that the nature of the nation was rooted in Pancasila as a distinctively Indonesian ideal of pluralism that suited this unique country of unity in diversity. The course particularly endorsed a state version of religious pluralism: every monotheistic religion is good in itself and superior to atheism, and every citizen of the nation, who by default believes in a religion, should peacefully co-exist.

Despite the pluralist discourse of Pancasila, the tension between Islamizers and Christianizers continued to provoke conflicts. To appease some Muslim groups' protest, specific laws were made regarding worship facilities, an issue I will discuss in more detail in Chapter 3. One major ideological battle revolved around three perceived threats to the nation's moral balance: "Christianization," "an Islamic State," and the betrayal of Pancasila (Mujiburrahman 2006). Major policies were read in accordance with a more conservative religious perspective. For example, the 1974 Marriage Act, supposedly a "secularizing" law (Blackburn 2004), came to become a ban on marriage between individuals of different religions, indirectly mandating that each religion should maintain endogamy. Conversion remained an option for those determined to marry outside their community, but was increasingly stigmatized.

The government promotion of monotheist doctrines, the standardization of religious textbooks, and the sharpened sensitivity to the line between religion and culture, all contributed to what Robert Hefner has called the processes of "religionization" in Indonesia (2011). Like the late nineteenth-century Islamic reform movements, religionization is the modern version of the outcry against "Javanized Christianity" and "Javanized Islam." Unlike earlier Islamic reformism, however, this time the Christian Protestant and Muslim reformist views have been much more mainstream.

WOMEN AND MINORITIES TODAY

Indonesia's ongoing and multi-faceted Islamic revival has gained considerable attention among contemporary academics and other observers, and is plainly quite visible in Salatiga as well. However, attending to religious life in contemporary Salatiga reveals several surprising and paradoxical phenomena that one usually would not associate with Islamic resurgence. First, the most recent wave of Islamic revival has been accompanied by a strong Pentecostal movement that has been gaining converts from all the other Christian denominations in Indonesia, and has lead to a proliferation of Pentecostal and charismatic churches in Salatiga. Second, although overall there is a greater desire for all things Islamic, the community nevertheless punishes those who are considered to be too "fanatically" Islamic to be properly sociable. Third, although Christians constitute a minority in most neighborhoods, they are disproportionately represented in the neighborhood organizations that remain socially relevant in local affairs. Last, instead of being marginalized by the spread of stricter norms of proper Islamic social behavior, Muslim women have acquired heightened salience in public gatherings, substantiated by their representations in important rites of passage. All these phenomena were repeatedly manifested in my observations of daily life in Salatiga.

At 2:35 on a Monday afternoon in February 2010, I was helping with the food preparation for an upcoming meeting of the women's neighborly association in Bu Wati's dark and tiny kitchen. Surrounded by the mortars teeming with freshly ground chili paste and two aluminum pots full of flavorful yellow rice, I heard Bu De and Bu Nina, talking about a new *Pak RT* ("Father RT") in the neighboring RT but still in the same RW (a *rukun warga*—harmonious citizens—is an administrative unit supervising several *rukun tetangga*). A Father RT is an unpaid official position in the neighborhood, literally meaning the "Father" of the "Harmonious Neighborhood" or *rukun tetangga* (RT), the smallest neighborhood administrative unit. Although unpaid, having a position in the RT is considered honorable, since only respectable people can be elected. Bu De and Bu Nina proceeded to gossip about a "fanatic," who I later figured out was a Salafist—namely, a follower of literalist and puritanical approaches to Islamic doctrines. What surprised me, however, was the fact that this "fanatic" and the Pak RT they were talking about were one and the same.

Trying their best to clarify things for me in their euphemism nice and slow, Bu De and Bu Nina distinguished two types of people in the

neighborhood: "the willing" (*yang mau*) and "the unwilling" (*yang tidak mau*). This distinction had nothing to do with the immense umbrella of Islam or Christianity, they said, be it NU or Muhammadiyah, Catholic, or Protestant. Instead, it had everything to do with whether or not one makes efforts with regard to mutual help and *bersilaturahmi* (an Arabic-derived Indonesian word, meaning "to socialize and reciprocate") with one another. Some people cannot even fulfill the most basic etiquette of greeting, they complained.

"Like what?" I asked.

"Well," Bu De said, "the willing *salim* (shake hands in a light brush) with one another; the unwilling *salim* with no one, and especially not with women." Bu De recalled the scenes of the circumcision ceremony or *sunatan* last month we attended together, where a man was standing in the other entrance of the tent. His presence was easy to recall, of course, for unlike most of the men who wore a *batik* (Jv. wax-resistant dye clothes) shirt and *songkok* (Jv. fez) hat, he was wearing a long white robe with a white rounded cap, smiling a bit reluctantly at four other men who were shaking hands with one another. As it turned out, this man was a member of *Lembaga Dakwah Islam Indonesia* (the Indonesian Institute of Islamic Dawah, or LDII), a Salafist organization loyal to a literalist and puritanical approach to Islam. According to Bu De and Bu Nina, this Salafist man had never attended any public ritual, or let his wife and female relatives attend the women's neighborhood Islamic sermon group. Then they told me the following story.

One day, it was about to rain. The neighbors of this Salafist man noticed that his family was not home yet, so they helped remove the clothes that were hanging on the clothesline. Upon coming home, this man and his family saw their clothes were preserved. The first thing they did was to launder everything again, because they believed that the clothes were already polluted by unpurified hands. All the nearby neighbors of course felt insulted and were quite agonized by this, but what could they do? They mulled over the issue for a while, thought about the mess that the country had been dragged in by such attitudes, and finally they decided to change him. In the election of the head of RT, they voted to make him the Father RT. The man was surprised, but also reasoned that due to his higher standard of virtue, certainly he should be the local leader. Yet, as soon as he took the position, he found himself constantly in the regular neighborhood meeting and hectic communal rituals. Once he assumed the responsibility for attending public rituals, he was too embarrassed to avoid shaking hands. "So as the Father RT," Bu Nina said, "he has no choice but to interact with us."[7]

This conversation between Bu De, Bu Nina, and me, suggests that the presence of the perceived "fanaticism" requires neighbors to take different kinds of actions. In this moral universe in which Bu Nina and Bu De reside, neighbors are aware of the heterogeneous constituencies inside their community. On the Muslim side, there are followers of the "classicalist" Nadhlatul Ulama (literally "the awakening of Islamic scholars") and the "reformist" Muhammadiyah (literally "the followers of the Prophet Muhammad"), which are the two most influential mass Muslim organizations now claiming 30 million and 29 million members, respectively, in the nation. On the Christian side, followers of Catholicism and Protestantism, respectively, constituted the most prominent minorities, about 6.5% and 14.8% in the city and 2.9% and 6.9% nation-wide (BAPPEDA 2011; BPS Indonesia 2010). Finally, there are members of new religious sects such as the LDII, whose percentage is small but whose presence is an obvious disruption to the customary social life.

In Bu Nina and Bu De's joint account, the LDII is singled out due to its members' refusal to engage in the customary greeting or the "Islamic handshake" (*salaman*) (Geertz 1960, 68), which is a slight palm-to-palm touch using both hands between two people. Despite different interpretations regarding the propriety of hand-touching today, Javanese people generally see *salaman* as the basic etiquette when entering a demarcated ritual space, or when meeting with elders. Indeed, it is unthinkable not to humbly and calmly touch the hands of those present when one enters a wedding reception, a funeral, a circumcision ceremony, or even just a neighborhood council's meeting. Given the ever-more complicated religious profiles in the city, however, neighbors more often encounter religiously inspired disruptive behaviors that threaten the core values of the neighborhood community. By putting the Salafist on the spot, challenging his understanding of piety, and forcing him to shake hands with others, the neighbors were able to secure what they deemed as the integrity of the community and the proper manifestations of interpersonal respect. In the case of dealing with the Salafist, then, *salaman* is also locally construed as the basic bodily discipline enlisting normative sociality against the encroachment of "fanatical" religiosity.

If, on the one side of the religious heterogeneity, we have the newly Salafist Muslims, on the other side we have Protestants and Catholics. It should be remembered here that Christians do not live separately but, rather, side-by-side with the Muslim majority. They attend each other's rites of passages, which usually take place in the neighborhoods, with some

parts conducted in mosques or churches. Christians may even serve as the major greeters in Muslim-centered ceremonies, if they are (or used to be) in the position of Father RT/RW or Mother RT/RW (Fig. 1.1). Father and Mother RT/RW need to be present in important rites of passages in order to fulfill their duty, so as not to impair the social status of the host family by the negligent absence of local officials, or to risk their own reputation as respectable families in the neighborhood. As greeters in these important occasions, Christians prove themselves capable of representing the community.

Indeed, Christians being disproportionately elected as the head of an RT/RW is not uncommon at all in Salatiga. This seemingly odd arrangement indicates a socio-religious paradox in terms of the rights and the privileges accorded to different groups. Socially, Christians are more vulnerable than Muslims to marginalization and exclusion, which in many cases has pushed them to volunteer more in their neighborhoods in order to blend in and obtain social approval. The last thing Christians need is to be gradually marginalized and thereby allow their marginalization to be blamed on their supposed arrogance as Christians who disrespect Islam. The result is, however, paradoxical: as Christians are disproportionately represented in the positions of the organizations within the neighborhood, some conservatives take it as further evidence that the Muslim majority are unfairly ruled by the Christian minority.

Just as surprising as Christians' active roles in local neighborhoods, women are also squarely at the center of public life. In the most important rites of passages, such as the circumcision ceremonies and weddings that I have attended, women were invariably the majority of ritual witnesses regardless of religious identity. "Important" women such as the Mother RT and Mother RW were in the ritual forefront even if they were not Muslims, while other Christians who were not *tokoh lokal* ("local figures") stayed behind. In other Muslim holiday celebrations, such as the Prophet's birthday, the majority of mixed participants were women, most of whom were the members of the neighborhood Islamic sermon group. In light of authoritative ethnographic accounts of male-domination in Javanese communal rituals in the past (Geertz 1960, 12; Woodward 1988, 62; Peacock 1978, 34), this shifting position of women from "behind the scenes" to the main stage alongside Islamic revival deserves our attention (for similar observations, see Brenner 1998, 175–177). It compels us to reconsider the relationship between women and Islamic resurgence, especially the

assumption that the latter must constitute a major obstacle for women's rights.

Theoretically, the prominence of women and minorities in a Muslim-majority community in a time of Islamic resurgence represents a fresh modification to the two influential understandings of piety and subjectivity[8] within contemporary anthropology and Asian Studies. One current of thought has construed Muslim public piety as a moral cultivation of virtues, which emphasizes the importance of the Islamic telos—to practice the doctrines in order to realize oneself—and dismisses the question of freedom and empowerment as irrelevant to Muslim women's piety movements (Mahmood 2005). The other approach understands the global Islamic resurgence as providing new avenues for participation in deliberative politics, which explores the various collaboration of Islamic movements with democratic values and the meanings of modernity (Hefner 2000, Eickelman and Piscatori 2004; Mir-Hosseini 2006; Starrett 1998, Doorn-Harder 2006). Meanwhile, a great number of excellent works on Indonesia have shown that the appeal of Islamic revivals in Indonesia has involved individual self-cultivation and social improvement in the realms of education, economy, consumption, entertainment, and arts (Boellstorff 2005; Gade 2004; George 2009; Hoesterey 2008; Jones 2010; Rudnyckyj 2009).

Relatively less explored in this body of literature, however, is the place of the entanglement of Islam and Christianity in ordinary life. Building on the aforementioned works, this study suggests that we approach the issue of piety by treating religions as ongoing movements and not rigid entities, keeping in mind that their manifestations sometimes critically intertwine with each other across religious borders. To do so, I strive to discuss everyday cross-religious interactions that are defined by multiple forms of social embodiment and discursive actions. As shown in the vignette of the Salafist, the perception of "puritan piety" against the customary demand of sociality asks for a more inclusive purview of the cultural heterogeneity in the complicated forms of religious life. After all, in the face of the complex religious profiles of the neighborhood we have mentioned, it is hard to see how a singularly defined Islamic morality or public reasoning can account for the contested ways of being Muslims and Christians in relation to one another. Indeed, it urges an investigation of the dynamic relationship between changing forms of piety and sociality in the pluralistic reality of everyday life.

I second the anthropologist Birgit Meyer's insightful reminder in the *Annual Review of Anthropology* of 2004 that a fruitful future direction for the studies of religion will be to go beyond a single religious organization or movement (2004, 451). The works of Marshall (2009), Peel (2000), Soares (2006), Farhadian (2005) and Kim (2007) on Muslim–Christian encounters in African and Indonesian societies have shown a promising direction for such innovative inquiries. This book continues this effort by mapping out the complexity of religious life in an Asian Muslim–Christian setting, where localized sociality has been put to the test of multiple religious movements. In addition, I contribute to this growing body of literature on inter-religiosity by enriching the whole picture with women's and minorities' experiences, without which, I argue, the complex picture of the current religious lives would be flattened.

Field Sites and Data

To tell the story of Salatiga, let me offer a brief introduction to this multi-religious city. Like Bogor, near Jakarta in West Java, and Malang, near Surabaya in East Java, Salatiga was a Dutch-colonial town built for military bases, plantations and resorts in the midst of volcanic ridges and connected to the historic port of Semarang. As a consequence of the Dutch rule and complex translocal migration, as early as 1905 Salatiga already demonstrated a high ethno-religious diversity, as there were 800 Europeans, 1,300 Chinese, and 80 other "Foreign Orientals" out of a total of 12,000 residents (Eddy 2007). According to the Salatigan historian Eddy (ibid.), a city's population at the time had to be at least 10% White for it to be designated a municipality (Dut. *Gemeente*, Indo. *kotapraja*). The legal triadism divided people into the White race (Europeans and also the Japanese), Foreign Orientals (mainly Chinese and Arabs), and natives. In order for Salatiga to become a city, the Dutch government twisted the racial reckoning. The Chinese and Arabs were strategically counted as White, and the criteria were met: thus, Salatiga became a city in 1917, the smallest municipality in the entire Indies.

Due to Salatiga's privileged access to Dutch resources, the city enjoyed relatively advanced facilities and amenities. In the 1920s, one could find schools; electricity; telephones; a telegram service; railways; hospitals; a movie theater; a fancy hotel named "Kalitaman," complete with a sign reading *Verbodenvoor honden en inlanders* ("Dogs and natives prohibited"); a recreational center "Societeit Harmonie" for dancing, again

natives were prohibited; a "taxi" transportation service between Semarang and Solo run by a Chinese enterprise; and a train station nearby in Ambarawa where the three cabin classes strictly followed the apartheid. By 1930, Salatiga had assumed the status of a perfect sanatorium for the Dutch in Central Java. Along the major road *Toentangscheweg* (today's Jalan Diponegoro), the avenue to Semarang, one could find a collection of Dutch villas and bungalows, whereas on *Soloscheweg* (today's Jalan Sudirman), the channel to Solo, Chinese merchants founded their *Chinese Wijk* (Chinese District) and made the downtown area that has retained its status as the commercial center of the city until today. Other roads were named after the Dutch royal family members, such as the *Prins Hendrkstraat* road and the *Willemslaan* (Eddy 2007). In other words, from 1830 to 1930, Salatiga had become a European city in the Indies. Even today, Salatigans still refer, with pride, to a title that the Dutch government once gave to the city: De Schoonste Stad van Midden-Java, or "the most beautiful city in Central Java."

Salatiga's colonial and European character in the past, however, fails to fully explain its large proportion of Christians today. This is because Christian missionizing in Java had been, until the early twentieth century, almost a total failure. In colonial Salatiga, although there were missionary societies and European officials' families around Salatiga who had established some tiny congregations, in general the cultural impact was negligible. A more detailed account is provided in Chapter 2. For now, let us return to the more recent profile of Salatiga.

According to the 2010 census (BAPPEDA, Badan Perencanaan 2011) Salatiga numbered 174,234 inhabitants, and Protestants and Catholics comprise 21% of the population. In the 2000 census conducted by the provincial government (BPS Indonesia 2000–2010), this number was 23%.[9] Despite this possible decline in the Christian population,[10] compared with Central Java in general and the capital city Semarang, where the Christian population amounted to 2.8% and 12.9% in 2000, respectively, Salatiga has a highly Christianized demographic profile relative to the predominantly Muslim environment. Yet, this profile does not appear as unusual if we consider that virtually all metropolitan cities in Java are at least 10% Christian. Hence, Salatiga should not be read as an "exception" but, rather, should be seen as a heightened version of a common pattern in urban Java.

The proportions of Muslims and Christians in Salatiga have remained largely stable since the 1970s. An expansion of territory occurred in 1992

due to increasingly vibrant urban activities of trade, government apparatuses, and housing. That year, the city government changed the border between Salatiga City and Semarang Regency on the basis of Regulation Number 69. As a result, the administrative area of Salatiga City was expanded from 3,890.86 to 5,678.11 hectares by incorporating a part of Semarang Regency consisting of 13 village districts (*kelurahan*). The number of village districts rose from 9 to 22, and the entire population from 86,476 in 1990 to 174,187 in 1996. This administrative expansion incorporated many villages on the outskirts, all predominantly Muslim areas, which explained the minor increase of the proportion of Muslims in the population from 74% in 1990 to 78% in 1995. Since 1995, the Muslim population has ranged between 77% and 78%, with Protestants numbering between 13% and 15% (and with Catholics between 6% and 9%). While suburban neighborhoods tend to be all-Muslim, most neighborhoods in the city are Muslim-majority mixed with a Christian-minority.

My field sites cover a wide array of public and private spaces, from neighborhoods to houses, and from markets to churches. These spaces are more than physical spaces where people conduct their daily transactions and where production of goods and relations take place. They are also the places where residents and migrants, Muslims and Christians, old and new, meet and mix with one another. They are, in sum, sites of identification, recognition, participation, and contestation of citizenship, where social relations are negotiated, reaffirmed, or reshaped (De Certeau 1984; Madanipour 2003).[11]

Culturally and geographically, Salatiga can be roughly divided into downtown (*kota*), neighborhood villages (*RT/RW//kelurahan*), and rural areas (*desa*). The downtown area includes the core areas closest to the road Jalan Jenderal Sudirman (to Solo) in the middle of the city. It tends to be commercial, diverse, and anonymous, with a high density of churches of different denominations. In contrast, rural areas tend to be ethnically homogeneous, close-knit, and predominantly Islamic. Between them, the neighborhood villages consist of houses, small shops, local mosques, and prayer houses, and a smaller number of Javanese Christian churches.

The three types of space are not mutually exclusive and can, in fact, be directly adjacent to one another once off the major roads,. Hence, the stories told in this work are primarily, but not exclusively, from the neighborhood villages and downtown area, where religious diversity has created novel forms of cross-religious imaginings in the organization of

rites of passage, neighborhood meetings, collective protests, and Church activities.

The journey into the religious life of Salatiga was full of surprises. I first came to Salatiga in the summer of 2008 as a student of an Indonesian language program for American students at Satya Wacana Christian University (UKSW) based in the city. Before I arrived, I had already decided to study religious change in Indonesia for my dissertation at Boston University, but I was not certain where I should start. The environment of Salatiga impressed me with its religious diversity. Just next to UKSW, there was a branch of the prestigious Islamic elementary school Al-Azhar. In the suburbs was Edi Mancoro Islamic boarding school, a well-known educational institution devoted to inter-religious tolerance. Later in that summer, I discovered that, in fact, there had been very little research on Christianity in Java. As the expanding influence of various Islamic movements in Indonesia has aroused intensive interest and concern about women in the recent scholarship, I decided to focus my research on the impacts and responses to Islamization as experienced by women from various religious traditions, including Javanese Christianity. In 2009, a National Science Foundation grant sponsored my comparative study on changing gender norms among female members of three religious organizations in the context of the recent Islamic resurgence. The first two were the two largest Muslim organizations in Indonesia, "classicalist" Nadhlatul Ulama (NU) and "reformist" Muhammadiyah, as mentioned above. The third organization in my original proposal was the women's wing of the largest Javanese Christian church in Central Java (GKJ).

The second densest zone of population in the city, as indicated by the second darkest color on the map, is where Sinaran and Graha are located. They are situated between the downtown area and the loosely populated rural area. The two Pentecostal churches, Ester and Fendi, are located in the downtown area, as indicated by the darkest color (Map 1.1). The exact locations are not identified in order to keep these places anonymous.

Not long after I entered the field, however, this research plan was complicated by the gap between expectations and reality.

First, as I befriended members of the Muslim organizations and visited them in their neighborhoods, I was struck by the obvious fact that the neighborhood women's Islamic sermon groups (*pengajian*) cross-cut the line between NU and Muhammadiyah. Knowing that there had been some long-term prejudices and practical differences between the two

Map 1.1   Research sites in Salatiga. The darkest area indicates the area with the highest population density in the city. Map made by Hsin-Di Shi

organizations, many questions emerged with regard to the balance between sociality and piety. In 2010, this curiosity motivated me eventually to move into the Graha neighborhood, where members of Muhammadiyah and NU lived side-by-side, and where I, in turn, could more easily participate in the Islamic sermon group.

The darkest area identifies the area of the highest population density in the city. It is also where the two Pentecostal churches are located. The second darkest area identifies the area of the second highest population density. It is where the two neighborhood communities are located. They are not specified in order to keep their identity confidential.

After I moved into what I call the Graha (pseudonym) neighborhood, one day a member of Aisyiyah who lived in the same neighborhood convinced me to be a "*penggembira*" (literally "the cheerful person," meaning cheerleader) for the upcoming annual national council of Muhammadiyah in Yogyakarta. I rode along on one of the chartered buses full of Muhammahdiyah members, only to realize much later that this was a 5am to 8 pm "cheerful" event mostly spent on the bus because anything within a five-kilometer radius of the national council or *Muktamar* was virtually paralyzed by buses and crowds. Compared with these unanticipated missions, the most enjoyable task remained sitting in the mosque and listening to sermons during *pengajian* (Islamic preaching sessions), which were always entertaining. Partaking in these social gatherings in the neighborhoods proved to provide a wide-open window for me to see the rich fabrics of sociality and everyday pluralism in Salatiga.

The second departure from my original research proposal was even more unexpected. When I began my primary fieldwork in 2009, my first accommodation was a girls' dorm, or *kos*, near the campus of UKSW, where the tenants were mostly students. I found *kos*-life to be quite intimate. I started to dine out with some of them and was invited to join other activities as well. I was soon introduced to another popular religious culture: Pentecostalism. I was led to Ester church and Fendi church (which are, for their privacy, pseudonyms), the congregations in the downtown area, where I experienced my first contact with speaking in tongues, healing, and deliverance. The exuberant atmosphere in the congregations shocked me, and reminded me of the academic works on the globalization of Pentecostalism I had read when I was preparing for my comprehensive exam at Boston University. The popularity of Pentecostalism was further attested by some GKJ members who told me privately that nowadays they felt compelled to emulate the charismatic worship style in order to "keep their sheep."

The "culture shock" for me was never that there was a singular bizarre custom of an alien "culture." What struck me the most was the juxtaposition of different religious signs and expressions so closely adjacent and sometimes intertwined. It was only in my wildest dreams that, in this tiny city, the two largest religious revivals in the present-day world—Islamic resurgence and Pentecostalism—could co-exist. Yet, it also said something useful about the nature of globalizing cultures today, as this co-existence must be found in many other places in the world as well. Then, my original plan to research GKJ was complicated by the cutting-edge status of charismatic churches in the city.

With these modification, I carried out the main 12-month ethnographic fieldwork from October 2009 through September 2010. Follow-up fieldwork took place in 2012 and 2013. My participant observation has focused on two Pentecostal congregations, Ester and Fendi (pseudonyms, as noted before), which claimed about 400 and 150 members respectively, and two Muslim women's Islamic sermon groups in the neighborhoods of Sinaran and Graha (pseudonyms) (Figs. 1.1 and 1.2), which had about 70 and 60 households, respectively.[12] As opposed to the "voluntary" and de-territorialized nature of Christian congregations, Sinaran and Graha are Muslim-majority neighborhoods that consist of middle-class to lower-middle-class residents bound together by geographical proximity.

I regularly followed Church services, fellowships, Islamic sermons (*pengajian*), the meetings of a neighborhood women's organization (PKK, "Family Welfare Empowerment"), and also attended life-cycle rites including weddings, funerals, *tahlilan* (Muslim prayers after a funeral), as well as social outreach and major religious festivals encompassing Eid al-Adha, Christmas, Easter, Eid ul-Fitr, etc. Other methods used in the study include interviews and archival research (including articles from programs distributed at celebrations of Muslim holidays, Church news, pamphlets, tabloids and other newspapers, journals, and magazines). In 2012 and 2013, I revisited Graha and Sinaran, and stayed in Bu Wati's new house near Sinaran (because she had moved out of Sinaran), as well as attending services in the Ester church and visiting two key Pentecostal friends that had contributed much to my dissertation.

Lay sources offer a means of situating cross-religious relations in its social context and reveal the experiences of believers and their families in religious activities. If Christians and Muslims see the development of piety as a key location for reinvigorating their faith and social relations, a study

Fig. 1.1   One corner of the Sinaran neighborhood

Source: Photo by the author

of day-to-day religious expressions can further explore the encounters between the realities of cross-religious social life and the ideals of religious convictions.

SUBJECTS AND PERSPECTIVES

The Pentecostal pastors of Fendi and Ester, as well as the leaders in the Muslim sermon groups in Graha and Sinaran, held a quite positive view regarding civic pluralism in the city. From their rosy perspective, Salatiga has managed to remain a safe and peaceful place even in the nation's most tumultuous moments, such as the political upheavals in 1998. A common account that proves this sentiment was told to me repeatedly. On the main road of the city, Jalan Diponegoro, the Indonesian Christian church (GKI) and one of the largest mosques in the city, Masjid Pandawa, are

Fig. 1.2   One corner of the Graha neighborhood

Source: Photo by the author

across the street from each other, and they regularly use each other's parking lot. On Sunday, Christians park at the mosque. On Friday, Muslims park at the church. This idealized picture is the kind of pluralist story that many religious leaders of Salatiga like to present as the spirit of their city. My interpretation, of course, is aimed to complicate the story by considering the tensions and fusions among ordinary people across religious boundaries. My goal is to explore the ways in which pluralism is practiced in actual contexts and to show that the units at work in "pluralism" are not bounded mosaic squares but negotiated flows of religiosity.

In order to explore this often overlooked aspect of the inter-religious entanglement, I develop the concepts of "dialogic religiosity" and "entangled pieties" as two sides of the same coin. By religiosity I mean embodied qualities of inclinations, beliefs, and behaviors that are guided by religious doctrines and practices; piety refers to a more subjective experience and accomplishment of religiosity. In this vein, "dialogic religiosity" contends that the process of making religiosity is dynamically derived from anticipation of and responses to multiple religious voices, which carry specific socio-political implications. "Entangled pieties," on the other hand, highlight the complex manifestation of religiosity as a

product of negotiations among multiple social forces. Dialogic religiosity as entangled pieties, then, is not to be defined as a fixed set of religious doctrines embodied or a mindset freely chosen, but constructed by a constant flexibility of thoughts and praxis that always anticipates and responds to a *super-addressee*. Here, I adopted Russian philosopher and literary critic Mikhail Bakhtin's formulation of the role of a super-addressee: an imagined voice derived from a higher authority that a speaker or writer addresses beyond an immediate audience. This super-addressee could be "God, absolute truth, the court of dispassionate human conscience, the people, the court of history, [or] science" (Bakhtin 1986, 126), or, in our case, the fellow Indonesian citizens, the neighborhood, the nation, the *umma* (the global Muslim community), Christian believers, and other audiences in the world.

My goal is more than looking for what people say their religion really *is*, or what they say other people's religions actually *are*, or even where the common ground between two religions *may be* by creating or upholding different interpretations of texts. Instead, my analysis is primarily about the ongoing processes in which people's interactions with religious others have continued to have impact on themselves, and constituted the social relations and religious embodiment that reshape their opinions and public behaviors. Like Bakhtin, I find the loci of the struggle of dialogic imagination in the *acknowledgement of the multiple worldviews* in the novel, well beyond the actual "dialogue" between characters (2008[1981]). My goal is to present an ongoing process of re-socialization and re-adjustment of social actions in the changing definition of legitimacy and the quest for identification or distinction in the multiple religious contestations. This viewpoint is important and helpful in the larger anti-orientalist enterprise that I am faithful to, in that the concept of dialogism can steer us to a focus on the mutual influences between cultures, rather than on their bipolarized and essentialized imageries that serve to mask domination in culturalist language (Said 1993).

Many scholars have pointed out that Bakhtin's theory of literary criticism is no less than a system of social theory (Holland et al. 2001). By defining the novel as "the higher stylistic unity" of a diversity of social "languages" or "heteroglossia" (2008[1981], 262), each representing "a world view" (ibid., 271), Bakhtin makes it possible to see the artistic creation of a novel similar to the discourses made about a community. Specifically, heteroglossia can be seen as a useful index for cross-cutting and dialogically engaged cultural existences, and the social world that a

particular set of heteroglossia represents is one lived by social actors who acknowledge divergent voices in society and who are capable of representing and manipulating these different worldviews. Equally important, there is always a dimension of historicity in the eternal struggles and inherent connections between heteroglossia, or between heterogeneous voices in society:

> Thus at any given moment of its historical existence, language is heteroglot from top to bottom: it presents the co-existence of socio-ideological contradictions between the present and the past, between differing epochs of the past, between different socio-ideological groups in the present, between tendencies, schools, circles and so forth, all given a bodily form . . . each of these "languages" of heteroglossia requires a methodology very different from the others; each is grounded in a completely different principle for marking differences . . . Therefore languages do not exclude each other, but rather intersect with each other in many different ways. (Bakhtin 2008 [1981], 291)

Here, I bring Bakhtin's analysis of language into social theory by replacing each instance of "language" in the quote with "culture," by which I mean a particular way of organizing meaning that can constitute "tendencies" or "schools," if institutionalized and transmitted systematically. In this book, I will show how the "tendencies" and "schools"—factions of Christianity and Islam—"intersect in many different ways."

Fundamentally, the question of dialogic religiosity in this book is how coeval Islamic and Christian activities influence each other in people's everyday lives, which should have their historical counterparts elsewhere that deserve other studies. The concept of dialogic religiosity that I wish to develop in this book is meant to be a replicable form, which can be evoked thousands of times at numerous specific historical conjunctures throughout the history of religious and ethical consciousness.[13] The particular circumstances of dialogic religiosity vary enormously in every case, yet the broader dynamic helps us to rethink dialectical relations produced in the mutual imaginations between religious communities that have substantial ramifications not only in inter-faith relations, but also in the internal expression of religious cultures.

Notes on Ethnicity

Ethnicity continues to contribute to the religious dynamics that I explore in this work. Statistically, Central Java is one of the most ethnically homogeneous provinces (95% being Javanese) in Indonesia. In urban areas, especially college towns, however, this profile is much more complicated due to the influx of students, teachers, and staff from all over the country. Additionally, in Salatiga, ethnic Chinese are well-represented around the campus of the Christian University and downtown area, where there has historically been a commercial center that was controlled by Chinese business enterprises since the Dutch ruling. In the urban neighborhoods slightly farther from the downtown area, however, one finds stronger ethnic homogeneity: Javanese comprise the predominant group, yet, the religious profile remains heterogeneous. Virtually all members in the two women's Islamic sermon groups I studied are self-identified ethnic Javanese, or culturally Javanese due to marriage and long-residence. In the neighborhoods they reside in, there is also the presence of Javanese Protestants and Catholics. Being a Muslim is still an important ethnic marker for most Javanese in general, given their cultural knowledge has long been nourished by Islam-informed local customs (Hefner 1987). For non-Muslim Javanese, the colonial and post-colonial construction of "Javanese culture" (Pemberton 1994) also has its modern reincarnations in artifacts, symbols, rituals, music, performing arts, and literature, offering some options for non-Muslim Javanese to make themselves more "Javanese" in other contexts.

In contrast to the relatively homogenous ethnic constitution of the neighborhood villages, the charismatic Church congregations in the city are particularly heterogeneous. Their members include migrants from all over Java and from Ambon, Manado, Papua, and other areas, and their ethnic profile encompasses Chinese, Javanese, Ambonese, Minahasan, Batak, Papuan backgrounds, and more. None of these churches bothers to document their ethnic composition. Some would even take the question as a potential insult. As the pastor of the Ester congregation, Pak Toni, explained to me, "ethnicity or whatever in the eye of God does not matter," and believers "work together, and do not envisage differences" (*kerja bersama, tidak memandang perbedaan*). Under my persistent inquiry about the ethnic identities of members, he described the proportion between the Javanese and ethnic Chinese in the congregation as "fifty-fifty." In the Fendi congregation, due to its high concentration of

Christian college students, ethnic Chinese may account for slightly more than half of the members. Nevertheless, among the leadership, Javanese believers are still well-represented. This is arguably a remarkable development in Indonesian Christianity, given the long-term tradition of ethnic churches since the colonial period.

The weakened correlation between ethnicity and religion in Indonesia is not unique to Pentecostal congregations but, in fact, is a long-term development of "dissociated identities" (Kipp 1993) in which ethnicity is, to a greater degree, secularized and culturalized apart from the religious domain. For example, in recent years there have been some celebrity Islamic preachers of Chinese descent, and, in the Semarang area, we can even find a local Indonesian community led by a Chinese *kyai* (Javanese term for the head of a local Islamic community, typically centered around an Islamic boarding school). Although the dissociation between ethnicity and religion is not reflected in all aspects of life and is far from complete, recent transformations do render the ethno-religious picture of Indonesia more dynamic and ambiguous.

Indonesian Pentecostalism reminds one of the legendary story of the Azusa Street Pentecostal mission in Los Angels has long furnished a classical example of multi-racialism: led by an African American preacher, attended by many whites, Asians, and Latinos. Given the assumption that everyone is equal under the Spirit, African Americans and women leapt to speaking publicly at services (Wacker 2003, 103–105). In Brazil, the lines between *negros* and light-skinned evangelists are blurred (Burdick 1999), although racial divides were partially reinstated later (a phenomenon that also occurred in the United States as well). In Zimbabwe, the multi-ethnic Zimbabwe Assemblies of God has challenged the previous impression that its congregations were dominated by the ethnic Ndau, and attempted to embrace a more inclusive pluralism to transcend its sectarian tendencies (Maxwell 2000, 257). Despite its myriad forms of proliferation, global Pentecostalism has continued to feature its egalitarian inspirational logic in its outreach among its converts, who are encouraged to see their first and foremost identity not as one of class, race, gender, or ethnicity, but as children of God (Burdick 1999, 123; Freston 2001, 81; Robbins 2004b, 125).

In the most successful Pentecostal congregations in Indonesia today, ethnicity is downplayed. What is embraced, instead, is a more blunt Indonesian-ness and universal Christian identity. Nevertheless, the transformation of ethnicities deserves more rigorous studies that cannot be covered by this current study. In this book, I will only demonstrate several

gendered aspects of the religious life among ethnic Chinese Pentecostals as they seek out moral self-cultivation in the city. I will show how, by claiming a higher divine authority and showing great ambition to save *pribumi* souls, Chinese Pentecostals confront their discomfort and fear of "being Chinese in Indonesia," and defy the stereotypes that associate them with wealthy outsiders by re-gendering those stereotypes. I will argue that their keen desire to become moral is dynamically conditioned by the ethnic structures, from which they liberate themselves and find Pentecostalism a powerful idiom to address the psychological need to be religious and successful in this society.

OVERVIEW WITH CLOSE-UP SNAPSHOTS

This chapter elucidates the dramatic changes Salatiga has undergone during its growth from a Dutch settlement, to a modernized "Christian" Javanese city, to its current situation as a complex multi-religious zone characterized by Islamic and Pentecostal revivals at the beginning of the twenty-first century. I lay out this work's research methods and theoretical perspectives by starting with an ethnographic puzzle—the prominence of women and minorities in a Muslim-majority neighborhood community—and sets the stage for the ways in which Islamic pieties and Christian identities are contingent and negotiated through inter-religious imaginations and changing gender roles.

Chapter 2 addresses the religious heterogeneity of Javanese society today. It delineates the co-evolution of Christianity and Islam in Java from the nineteenth century to the current democratic period—specifically, the interaction between Christian and Muslim organizations that are striving to achieve indigenous goals of modernity and prosperity in their respective religious idioms. Based on a critical genealogy of the mutual influence and competition between Islamizers and Christianizers, I outline the historically unprecedented present—the children of Javanist Muslims have become orthodox Muslims, whereas a great number of the offspring of mainline Protestants are becoming born-again Christians.

Chapter 3 provides a new interpretation of the problem of church-building in Indonesia. Beginning with a public controversy regarding state-owned land leased to the Javanese Christian Church that, in 2008, became the object of a demonstration of 5,000 Muslims demanding equal access, this chapter analyzes the strategies Pentecostal preachers use to build churches in this difficult environment. I demonstrate that Christian

and Muslim actors take each other into consideration pre-emptively before formulating their opinions and actions. I argue that, in the national context, the periodic Muslim protests against the alleged plot to Christianize Indonesia are not baseless hyperbole but, rather, are deeply rooted in a long, painful, post-colonial struggle in a world where Islam and Muslims have been unfairly ridiculed and subjugated. This point will be seen clearly as Muslim leaders of Salatiga narrate how their fate is bound with that of Palestinians and as the Pentecostal preachers invite Christians in Salatiga to thank God that there are still Christians in the Middle East. Local controversies over worship facilities thus cannot be seen as purely local, but should be regarded as intertwined with Indonesian Muslims' and Christians' perceptions of their broader place in the world.

Chapter 4 examines the intersection of gender, sociality and Muslim–Christian difference in community life. I provide five ethnographic stories to show that recent Islamic revivals have produced uneven effects on Muslim and Christian women: Muslim women reciting the Qur'an for a mixed audience to celebrate the Prophet's birthday at the neighborhood mosque; women taking collective action to punish unsociable neighbors regardless of religious affiliation; the prominence of women's Islamic sermon groups in life-cycle ceremonies; a pair of Muslim and Christian women who are best friends reflecting on the network of neighborhood women who cook for circumcision ceremonies, and other rituals; and the different roles Christian women and men take in Muslim life-cycle celebrations. Through these stories, I show that the recent Islamic resurgence has led to a more prominent position for Muslim women in ritual space, but may have had the unintended consequence of limiting Christian women's participation in these events. Men, regardless of religious identities, however, are less affected.

Chapter 5 explores the intersection of gender and ethnicity in the Indonesian Pentecostal movement. It is intended to show how the Pentecostal movement enables a reconfiguration of gender, morality, and ethnic relations, particularly for ethnic Chinese. I provide four ethnographic tales from the Pentecostal corners of Salatiga: a successful Chinese businesswoman who lost her "real Chinese" husband; a Chinese caterer with a hostile Salafist neighbor; a Pentecostal workshop for becoming a better Christian woman; and, finally, the life transformation of a male gangster-turned-pastor. I demonstrate that, although Chinese Indonesian Pentecostals are assertive within their worship halls and revivals, they strive to shake off ethnic stereotypes attached to them by creating a prosperity

theology that downplays materialism, and by developing an ambivalent discourse of gendered submission in the predominantly Islamic nation. This argument adds some complexity to the understanding of Southeast Asian Christianity's role in boundary maintenance and modernization, a pattern that scholars have widely identified among ethnic minorities in Southeast Asia. Here, charimatic Christianity enables ethnic Chinese to position themselves in a way that is morally acceptable to the wider society. Their religosity allows them to transform or dilute ethnic markers and to achieve greater cultural integration within the nation. Their Pentecostal piety—explicitly Christian, but also ethnically blended—carries possibilities for a greater integration into both a Christian and an Indonesian identity.

Chapter 6 delineates the ways in which the inter-religious women's neighborhood organization—*Pemberdayaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga* ("Family Welfare Empowerment") or PKK—works to support cross-religious solidarity. After a brief overview of typical feminist approaches to the PKK, I then move to provide three series of cross-religious inter-actions related to the PKK network. First, is a Pentecostal woman uttering Islamic greetings and a Protestant woman joining in the Arabic prayer prior to every meeting of the PKK; the second is food sharing at the end of the PKK meeting, in which Muslims eat Christian-homemade food; and the third is the cross-religious home visits on the major holi-days of Islam and Christianity, in which Muslim and Christian PKK members exchange words and food based on the religious character of the holiday. I discuss the ways in which cross-religious adoptions of words and substances can materialize interpersonal trust, but note that cross-religious solidarity in the neighborhood does not exclude a sense of competition with, or even hostility towards, other religions. Once the context is moved outside of the neighborhood community and towards more exclusively defined religious communities, a strengthened religious identity may erode social belonging in the neighborhood. As such, pluralism is always an unfinished project.

The final chapter of this book, *Conclusions*, explores the implica-tions for the Islamization of public life and the social normalization of Islamic practices, as well as the ongoing competition between Christianity and Islam in Indonesia and beyond. This chapter inter-rogates the theoretical implications of this study, making comparisons with prominent studies of women's Islamic piety and with typical approaches to religious diversity that treat Christianity and Islam separately. Finally, I conclude the ways in which anthropological

studies of religion can be more fruitful if we closely examine the interactions between followers of different religious communities and pay serious attention to the ambivalent and tenuous construction of peaceful pluralism.

Notes

1. More than 21% of the population here profess to Christianity, including Protestantism and Catholicism. For details and sources of the statistics, see the following text.

2. Simply put, "fatwa" means legal opinion and advice from qualified religious scholars of Islam, although its definition and effects remain debated. See M. B. Hooker, *Indonesian Islam: Social Change through Contemporary Fatawa* (Hooker 2003, 240).

3. On the other side of Indonesia, in Papua province, the Tolikara incident took place in July 2015, in which persecution, committed by the predominantly Christian population within the region, occurred against the Muslim minority.

4. See the *Jakarta Post*, 2001, September 26, by Slamet Susanto and Bambang Muryanto. http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/09/26/suicide-bomber-terrors-church.html. Retrieved on January 5, 2016.

5. In the most general sense, I am asking this question in relation to the question raised by anthropologist Ulf Hannerz over two decades ago: "how do meanings differentially distributed among people relate to one another?" (1992, 9) The theoretical assumption here is that all culture is internally diverse and meanings are always unevenly distributed. My task in this book is to understand the ways in which meanings derived from different religious movements may influence each other.

6. The term "Salafist" is used locally in Salatiga in the twenty-first century to refer to those newly emerging religious puritan Muslim groups who claim to observe more authentic forms of Islam, as opposed to other mainstream Muslim groups. It should not be confused with the late eighteenth-century Salafi-Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia, or the partially Salafism-inspired early twentieth-century Islamic modernism in Indonesia.

7. Field notes, February 8, 2010.

8. I define subjectivity loosely as a mode of linkages between self-identity, knowledge, and embodiment that processes the limits and resources of how one feels, (re)acts, thinks, means, and so forth, of themselves in relation to the socially related others and the world. It is not as encompassing as Bourdieu's outline of practice would allow (Bourdieu 1977), or as unchangeable as Douglas' primary experience would envisage (Douglas

1973). Nevertheless, I owe a great deal to Douglas' insights into the human body as inscribing social boundaries, and Bourdieu's conceptualization of the enduring inclinations and sensibilities, or *habitus*. I hence see subjectivity as an unfinished, indeterminate project (Biehl et al. 2007) that are based on long-established possibilities, which are themselves subject to unintended change.

9. More research on the probability of statistical anomaly is needed. The agencies that conducted the surveys in 2010 and in 2000 are different. The former is the Regional Body for Planning and Development in Salatiga, and the latter is the provincial government. Unfortunately, the former's 2000 census and latter's 2010 census are not available. The national statistics on the Christian population in Indonesia indicate that, for the first time since the 1960s, the Christian percentage of the population has declined, albeit by only a small amount. If the statistics are correct, then the percentage of Christians in Salatiga dropped slightly.

10. The decline cannot be seen as an absolute trend, since between 2001 and 2005 there was a 2% increase in the share of the Protestant population and 2% decrease in that of the Muslim population. More recently, assuming the statistical data are not problematic, the trend has been reversed by a minor increase in the Muslim population and a decrease in the Protestant population.

11. Importantly, these negotiations are not as easily malleable as de Certeau would wish. Indeed, although the city in this book is practiced in its being and practiced in its shifting, these practices are grounded upon or limited by long-term tendencies of cultural dispositions and social sensibilities contested in specific fields.

12. To keep the neighborhoods anonymous, I will not specify the actual number of households in Sinaran and Graha. The Sinaran neighborhood and Graha neighborhood are based on their administrative *rukun warga*. *Rukun warga* ("harmonious citizens" or RW) is an administrative unit supervising several *rukun tetangga* ("harmonious neighborhoods" or RT). In the district that supervises these RW neighborhoods I study, it has on average 893 residents and about 200 households in 2008 (BPS Kota Salatiga 1980–2011). Not every married woman in Sinaran and Graha is a regular participant of the sermon group. Yet, most households have a member of the PKK (*Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga*—Family Welfare Development) or, in the *Reformasi* era, *Pemberdayaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga* (Family Welfare Empowerment), which is locally practiced as a married women's neighborhood organization.

13. This concept of dialogic religiosity can be applied to historical studies of religious movements as well. It could be used to understand the creation of the Israelites' monolithic God as the religion of a minority flanked by other

polytheist states; the birth of Islam as a "Judaism for Arabs" in a time of wars and chaos; the transformation of the term "Hindu" from a reference to those who lived east of the Indus River by those who lived west of it, including the Arabs and the Greeks, to a term that encompasses the enormous local forms of practices as they were conceptually totalized into a system named "Hinduism"; the rise of scripturalism in Islam as a response to the newly "rationalized" European nations after the scientific revolution, whose military aggression posed a serious threat to the Ottoman empire; King Abdulhamid's admiration of Christianity and the modern education he supported in the hope of reviving Islam; the condemnation by Qasim Amin, the "first Egyptian feminist," of the veil as the quintessential symbol of the backwardness of the people in the nineteenth century, not because European women had rights to education and democracy (they did not), but simply because a backward, gendered imagery of Egypt is a convenient justification not only for Western domination, but also for indigenous reformation (Ahmed 1992); and so forth.

Generating Religiosities

The Entangled History of Islam and Christianity in Java

> *In the period since the Muslim Brotherhood, pioneered by Sayyid Qutb, we are invited to think how to stand firm on the base of Islam itself. Islamic movements are nowadays pioneered by intellectuals who have fathomed Western culture and, after discovering all its secrets, have returned to Islam with full conviction . . . . If the Western world were asked, which do they regard as more dangerous, Communism or Islam, Westerners will spontaneously answer, "Islam is more dangerous" . . . . Because of this, even if political colonialism has ended, the West and the Communist world want to try to introduce a new colonialism which is more dreadful; that is, colonialism of thought.*
>
> Hamka 1970[1]

Mecca Mugs, Mecca T-Shirts

On a Friday afternoon in November, 2009, I had my first bible study meeting in Java with 11 women from the Javanese Christian Church (GKJ), the mainline Protestant ethnic Javanese church. As it turned out, nine of them had Muslim family members. The hostess, in her forties, had a Muslim brother; another woman, in her fifties, was herself from a Muslim background. Because she hated to *ngaji* (learning Qur'anic recitation) in Arabic as a teen, she converted to Christianity. The stories that exemplified most the dialogic prominence of everyday religiosity came from the two oldest ladies among us. They shared some experience of living between Islam and Christianity during the late 1960s and the 2000s. Bu Garini, aged 68, said to us:

I do have siblings who are Muslims. But, there is no problem . . . For example, several years ago . . . when they went on pilgrimage, [I] also received a special uniform to wear to see them off at the plaza . . . out there. I accepted it, but of course I did not wear it. Well, I didn't want them to see that I refused to wear it, so I excused myself from seeing them off. When they came back, I was also given many souvenirs of Mecca. Still happy [that I could] get gifts! Like Mecca mugs, Mecca T-shirts . . . You see, there is no problem.[2]

Fits of laughter from the other women showed that I was not the only one who was amused by the story about a Christian receiving gifts from Mecca. Then, Bu Mada, aged 76, a small, hunched old lady with a pair of heavy glasses with granny chains hanging near her ears, quickly responded:

When I was young we were still in East Java . . . the entire village converted to Christianity. Entire. Perhaps nowadays it is hard to have that kind of village again, no? Imagine, the entire village became Christian! But interestingly, when we had to hold rituals like a funeral, we still needed someone who knew things, how to do things, like that. So whom would we call? Still Father *Modin* (Islamic official). Well, okay, let's call Father *Modin*. But, Father *Modin* himself is a Christian. What (*Lho*)! How could Father *Modin* be a Christian? Well, since a long time ago he had already been Father *Modin*. After he converted to Christianity, he was still known as Father *Modin*.[3]

Bu Mada's story made us laugh again. In Indonesia, leaders are often respectfully called by the title of their position rather than their personal names. *Pak* is the standard honorific term to address an adult man or an old man; *modin* refers to the Islamic official in the village. A *modin* administers funerals, marriage, divorce, inheritance, religious tax, and many other communal rituals (Geertz 1960, 206–207). "The Islamic official himself is a Christian" is intriguing precisely because it is unthinkable. How can a man with a Muslim title simultaneously be a Christian? The metanarrative of this joke is premised upon the current incommensurability between a Christian identity and a Muslim one. But, as the joke also indicates, such exclusivity was not always the case. In the specific context Bu Garini referred to, the social identity of being Muslim and the religious identity of converting to Christianity was just in the process of being resorted as mutually exclusive, but at the time was still blended.

Here, the Javanese concept of "streams" (*aliran*) is useful for a deeper understanding of the evolution of religious pluralism in Java that was so nicely captured in Bu Garini's narratives. *Aliran* in Javanese literally means "a channel for diverting water that also serves as a boundary marker in a rice-field." In Indonesian, it simply means "streams." Previous studies have a more restricted meaning of *aliran*, specifically referring to the ideological-cultural identification in the 1950s (Jay 1969; Ricklefs 2013). In this chapter, however, I will stick to *aliran*'s specific meaning as a "religious faction" and use it as a lens to search for a genealogy of religions in Java. The concept of "dialogic religiosity" (see Chapter 1) will assist me to explore this history, in which the evolving generations of *aliran* within "Islam" and "Christianity" are partially but critically dependent on their dialectical developments in an ongoing competition. In this process, "Islam," "Christianity," and "culture" are not three separate entities, but dynamic parts of an interwoven universe. This universe, I argue, has been constantly reshaped by communities' dialogic imaginings about the indigenous and the West, the nationalist and imperialist, as well as the backward and modern—all entangled with changing Indonesian notions of dignity and prosperity.

How European Encroachment Strengthened Java's Islamic Reformism

As indicated by a rich body of literature on the complicated processes of the Islamization of Java, Islam has become deeply integrated into Java's cultural flesh through multiple sources of religious authority. These sources of Islamic religiosities encompass the palace-centered, philosophical "mystic synthesis" (Ricklefs 2007, 10); text-based Islamic scholarship and schools (Van Bruinessen 1994); international Muslim networks from Arabia and Persia to India (Woodward 1989; Laffan 2003); popular *wayang* shadow puppet performance among villagers (Headley 2000), and more. These important works, each in its own way, complicated the old image of Islam in Java as simply a veneer on top of the Hindu–Buddhist traditions (cf. Geertz 1973).

One important revelation of these works is that the plural faces of Islamization in Java should not be understood simply in terms of the negotiation between a rigid Islam and local custom but, rather, as more dynamic relationships that involve the politics of cross-regional social

forces. Several historical developments illustrate this point, and they show the entanglement between foreign powers and locally mobilized Islamic networks. Starting from the fifteenth century, "Indo-Persian systems of northern India" inspired "the Javanese imperial formulation of Islam" (Woodward 1989, 57), allowing indigenous kings to elevate their status in the "Age of Commerce" (1450–1680, Reid 1993 [Book II]). In the sixteenth century, the aggressive European monopoly of spices (after a long period of largely peaceful commerce) precipitated more states' conversion to Islam (Schrieke 1957, 230–267). In the seventeenth century, the Muslim sultans and spice merchants across Nusantara[4] had responded to the Portuguese onslaught by regrouping around Islamic centers from Sumatra, Brunei, and even requested military aid from the Ottoman Empire (Reid 1993 [Book II], 132). Those Islamic kingdoms of Aceh, Banten, and Mataram, which had been competing among themselves previously, increasingly shared the same oppositional sentiment against the Western newcomers. Similarly, in the following centuries, the Dutch encroachment and colonialism unwittingly intensified the archipelago's Islamic reform movements with links to Mecca and Cairo, most notably since the nineteenth century.

In fact, the Dutch had long been paranoid about "the Mecca-originated" international conspiracy against what they deemed as righteous colonialism (Laffan 2003, 39). Many pieces of evidence suggested that the Dutch held ambivalent, sometimes contradictory, attitudes towards Islam in Java. At times, they believed that Javanese people were merely superficial Muslims.[5] At other times, they showed downright Islamophobia. Nothing was more revealing of this than the fact that the Dutch banned Christian missionizing in Java[6] for a long time, seeing it as a time bomb to stir up "Moslem fanaticism" (Gunning 1915, 64). Further, when the first Javanese translation of the New Testament was painstakingly completed, it was immediately confiscated by the government to avoid stirring up the sensibilities of the Muslim population; while the Dutch Missionary Society was allowed to send a large number of missionaries to the Moluccas Islands in 1814, there was only three granted to Java (Ricklefs 2007, 89–90). Hence, the bible was banned, and any book that smelled of "Moslem fanaticism" was also banned. Among those banned books, there was the work of al-Falimbani, who had called for a "jihad" in Java in his letter written in Mecca and sent to the Mangkunegaran prince of Solo (Ricklefs 1979, 155). Some of his other works were reworked during

the nineteenth century into a popular text that threatened hell-fire for all who worked with the Dutch (Siegel 1969, 74–77).

Yet, the Dutch influence was just about to deepen, and it required local cooperation. After the crackdown against the last indigenous aristocrat-led armed resistance in Java, the Diponegoro Rebellion (1825–1830), the Dutch authorities co-opted the Javanese aristocratic class (*priyayi*) and implemented various disastrous policies, including the Cultivation System that was introduced in 1830[7] (Ricklefs 2007; Carey 1976). With the help of the *priyayi* and Chinese middlemen, the Dutch obtained the necessary access to organize the labor force while dividing the society into racially segregated segments that were easier to manage and incapable of large-scale rebellion. The peasants were displaced from their hometowns and dispossessed of land, turning themselves into wage laborers in the process. As a result, by the late-nineteenth century colonization had created a polarization between pro-colonial "haves" and anti-colonial "have-nots." As the Dutch co-optation of the elite *priyayi* removed the possibility of a class of indigenous authority that commoners could rely on, the popular classes began to look to Muslim leaders as guardians of native welfare (Hefner 2009, 19; Kartodirdjo 1972), partially because the religious tie was the only meaningful network beyond the village community that was left (Nakamura 1983).

Several factors influenced the formation of this new stratum of Muslim leadership. The Muslim merchant class had long possessed some social and commercial ties with Muslim intellectuals in Arabia, but the ties were strengthened thanks to European steamships, the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, and the economic interests that the Dutch authority saw in taxing passports for Mecca (Ricklefs 2007). The numbers of pilgrims (*haji*) from Java since the mid-nineteenth century increased dramatically. Based on his trip to Arabia and extensive interviews, Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, the Dutch official and scholar, suggested in 1885 that *Jawi*,[8] the name referring to Southeast Asians in the Arab lands, formed the single largest community in the Holy City (Hurgronje 2007, 129). Upon returning, the *haji* typically opened Islamic schools, and imported religious knowledge and trends, erecting new criteria of Islamic piety (Van Bruinessen 1999, 49). Some of the books composed by the *Jawi* community, which later became popular in the archipelago, got under the skin of the Dutch and were subsequently banned (Azra 1992, 512). Nevertheless, Islamic reforms continued.

The greater influence of Islamic scholars, then, owed a considerable debt not only to the devastating colonial rule, but also to the colonial

policy that allowed pilgrimage to Mecca, which strengthened the forces that drew *Jawi* Muslims into "deeper dialogue with global Muslim civilization" (Hefner 2009, 12). Various tides of reformism within Islamic communities in the Middle East inspired *Jawi* Muslims. Like their Middle Eastern predecessors, Muslim reformers in the Dutch Indies reasoned that, to compete with the Western powers, Muslims should abandon superstition and embrace science, technology, education, and medicine, while maintaining their spiritual autonomy. Islamic reformism as a form of dialogic religiosity reveals that a renewal of religious identity and a call for cultural change was forged explicitly to address the challenge posed by a powerful religious other.

During this period, Christianity was commonly called *agama tahi asu* ("the religion of dog manure"), a religion that forced people to ignore traditional customs, including circumcision, almsgiving, *slametan*, and *wayang* (Partonadi 1990, 51–52). Muslim leaders, including the *haji* (those who made the pilgrimage), *santri* (students of the Islamic boarding schools), *modin* (the Islamic official of the village), and village leaders often rallied to denounce Christianity for destroying their culture, denying their Javanese ethnicity, and collaborating with colonization. These leaders warned their people to stay away from missionaries and ridiculed Javanese converts as *Landa wurung, Jawa tangung*, meaning "not yet Dutch and half-baked Javanese" (Partonadi 1990, 50).

Reports from Christian missionaries confirming this point were abundant. In 1857, upon observing the rapid spread of Islamic boarding schools, the Dutch missionary Zeldam Ganswijk remarked that Islam would "ever more penetrate the spirit of the population" (cited in Ricklefs 2007, 90). In 1863, Poensen noticed the increasing influence of the students of Islamic schools (*santri*) over those who "inclined to paganism," and predicted that, sooner or later, Islam would "entirely penetrate the organism of the moral and spiritual life of the Javanese world" (ibid., 93–94). A few decades later, the French Orientalist Antoine Cabaton, after spending two years in the Netherland Indies, concluded that "the religion of Java is a sincere Islamism" and that most Javanese were "earnest Mahomedans" (1911, 136).

The rise of Islamic reformism did not create a monolithic religious culture, however. A split developed among different groups of Islamic educators, all having their ties with scholars in the Middle East. Two major groups emerged: the New Group and the Old Group. The New Group (*Kaum Muda*) were Muslims who wished to "rationalize"

Islam, and made education and medicine their focal issues. They emphasized the transparency and perfection of the Qur'an and the Sunna (the Prophet's Tradition) and strived to purge Islamic traditions of what they considered as local innovations (*bid'a*), such as ritual meals, the worship of saints, and so forth. They rejected the classical texts consisting of the legal opinions of "scholars, jurists, doctors and Sufis of the formative centuries of Islam" (Dhofier 1999, viii). They jettisoned the curriculum that the Old Group (*Kaum Tua*) taught in their *pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools), while upholding an idea that Islam was understood as "knowledge and practices *detached* from any particular place" (Bowen 1993, 33, 37, my emphasis), distinguished from local forms of religiosity and removed from embedded social relations. This was the group of people whom I call the "reformist" Muslims in this book.

In response to the attacks from the New Group, the Old Group, who I call the "neo-traditionalists," defensively reformed their curriculum by adding secular subjects and expanded their *pesantren* in the 1930s.[9] They began justifying their support of contested Islamic traditions not based only on precedent, but also on a deep concern for strengthening an indigenous Islamic society. They reaffirmed the importance of their faithful reliance on the study of classical religious texts, affiliation with the Shafi'i school of Islamic jurisprudence, the recitation of a catechism to the deceased immediately after burial, and pilgrimage to the burial sites of Muslim saints (Hefner 2009, 21). This contest over how to reform Islam resulted in the founding of the reformist Muslim organization, Muhammadiyah ("the Followers of the Prophet"), in 1912, and the subsequent establishment of Nahdlatul Ulama ("the Awakening of Religious Scholars"), in 1926. These were to be the two largest Muslim organizations in the Netherland Indies and, later, in the Republic of Indonesia.

In general, the Islamic soul of Java grew stronger in tandem with the deepening colonial penetration. It is not surprising, then, that missiologist Kraemer would lament in 1923 with regard to the modest number of Javanese converts that, "considering the hard soil of Islam, a respectable piece of work has been accomplished" (Kraemer 1923, 268). Looking back on this period, however, many of the most successful efforts to convert the Javanese were disapproved of by Western-led churches, because these were led by indigenous missionaries who excessively "Islamized" Christianity.

Islamizing Christianity, and Christianizing Islam

Indeed, the only major successful Christianizers in Java during the colonial period were all the indigenous leaders who created more overtly "Islamized" forms of Christianity. In some rural areas, their "Islamized" Christian gospel gained some currency among lower-class Javanese, in contrast to the small enclaves of European, Eurasian, and Chinese Christians in the cities. These local Christianizers were the "heretically" charismatic indigenous (or at least half-indigenous) leaders, who were also called *kyai*, the same title that Muslims call the headmasters of Islamic schools in Java. The first influential Christian *kyai* was Conrad Laurens Coolen, a Eurasian of Russo-Javanese ancestry who, in 1825, founded a new settlement in Majaagung, East Java. He led a gamelan orchestra at his Christian services, incorporated the Muslim creed spoken in Arabic "*La illah la illolah*" ("There is no God but God") into the Christian creed sung like a Sufi *dhikr* (repeated recitation), and set up *wayang* shows to tell biblical stories. He soon converted hundreds of villagers. Dutch missionaries were critical of this development, calling it a form of Christianity "beyond recognition" (Ricklefs 2007, 112).

The idea of building special Christian villages as a missionizing strategy contributed to a temporary concentration of Christian congregations in the scattered parts of rural frontiers of Central and East Java (Aritonang and Stenbrink 2008, 676). A Javanese hermit from Jepara on the northern coastal area (the *pesisir*), called *kyai* Ibrahim Tunggul-Wulung, would be the first successful mass evangelizer in Central Java. (In fact, even today, the Ester Pentecostal congregation I worked with still enshrined him as their spiritual predecessor and screened a documentary about him.) More than Coolen, Tunggul-Wulung consciously contrasted his *Kristen Jawa* with the *Kristen Landa* ("Dutch Christianity") (ibid., 673). He founded three new Christian villages north of Jepara. By the time of his death in 1885, he had converted more than 1,000 disciples, an achievement that none of the Dutch missionaries could have dreamt of.

Two aspects of these Christian *kyai* are worth mentioning, as they directly address the dialogically formed pieties entangled with locally Islamized culture and the foreign import of Christianity. First, in these Christian *kyai*s' framework, Christianity was but another form of knowledge (Ar., *ilm*, Indo., *ilmu*), whose nature was not inherently different from other religious inspirations already received. Both Coolen and Wulung were believed to possess supernatural powers much like some

Muslim *kyai*, such as running at amazing speeds, turning people's heads into those of animals, flying, appearing in two places at once, and so on (Ricklefs 2007). Second, the nature of Javanese Christianity at this point was a source of empowerment to cope with the threat of foreign powers, rather than evidence of co-operation with the colonizers. This point is most clearly revealed by the legend of the last powerful Javanese Christian *kyai*, Sadrach.

Born in 1835, Sadrach was once a typical *santri* student in a *pesantren*. Seeing his former guru convert to Christianity upon failing in a debate with Tunggul-Wulung, he sought out the Christian *kyai* and was similarly converted. He then followed Tunggul-Wulung travelling through Java, especially on the east coast, and later was baptized in Batavia in 1867. In the coastal southern area of Central Java, Sadrach built his first Christian village and started challenging other Javanese *kyai* and *guru* to public debates. Upon defeating these Muslim *kyais*, he accepted their conversion along with their followers. From 1870 to 1873, he built five churches and converted 2,500 Javanese. These churches were called "mosques" (*mesjid*), and women were instructed to wear headscarves when inside. By 1890, it was said that Sadrach had more than 7,000 disciples. By 1880, five of his churches were all burned down by mobs, which could be taken to indicate that people started to realize that one could *really* be both Javanese and Christian at the same time. Sadrach was later arrested by the government for instigating his followers not to accept the smallpox vaccination (Partonadi 1990, 63–65). When released, due to insufficient evidence of crime, Sadrach returned to an even stronger position among his followers who, in 1882, named themselves *Golongane Wong Kristien kang Mardika* ("the Group of Independent Christians"). When Sadrach died in 1924, however, his church collapsed without his charismatic leadership. His congregations were dispersed and absorbed by the societies of missionaries already attempting to incorporate Sadrach's community and undermine his authority.[10]

Around 1909, there were about 5,000 Protestant Christians in Central Java, Sadrach's followers not included (Ricklefs 2007). Sadrach's death marked the beginning of a shift from village Christianity to urban Christianity in Central Java, when more Western-influenced church organizations took hold among indigenous populations (Aritonang and Steenbrink 2008, 677; Akkeren 1970, 138). These churches grew through the forms of social welfare projects, such as establishing hospitals, schools, and teacher's seminaries, particularly in the two inland Sultanate

cities, Yogyakarta and Surakarta. Two legacies were to become the most persistent forms of dialogic religiosity: medicine and education.

The champions of medicine and education were the Christian Church of the Netherlands (GKN) and its daughter Church the Javanese Christian Church (GKJ). In Central Java, they were the first to emphasize the necessity of working in urban settings (Aritonang and Steenbrink 2008, 677). Absorbing a large part of pre-existing missionary societies, they also represented a reaction against Sadrach's "Javanized Christianity." They expanded the enterprises of medical care and schooling to advance their influence in society. The GKN initiated intensive contacts with the *priyayi* and created a type of congregation that showed self-confidence and power. Within 20 years after 1910, the GKN supervised a number of hospitals with well-equipped medical personnel in Yogyakarta and Surakarta, including a teacher's seminary that later developed into the present *Universitas Kristen Duta Wacana* (ibid., 681). These projects attracted people from Javanese and ethnic Chinese backgrounds who had a desire for literacy and employment as teachers, nurses, or evangelists (see also Kipp 1995, 868).

This highly visible Christians' influence partially explains why it was in this southern part of Central Java, not the supposedly "hardcore *santri*" northern coast, where an organization such as Muhammadiyah was brought to life. Muhammadiyah was conceived fundamentally to addresses the challenges of Christianity, or, more precisely, to face the confluence of Christianity and modernity. The founder of Muhammadiyah, Ahmad Dahlan, was said to have had close relationships with Christian missionaries. In fact, he was called by his Muslim opponents a *Kristen putih* or "white-Muslim-Christian," as white usually meant "pious Muslim" as opposed to *abangan* (literally meaning "red") or "Javanist Muslim" (Burhani 2011, 337; Maarif 1998, 3–4). As an *abdi dalem* (court retainers) living in the Kauman area, Dahlan was opposed by the chief religious official of the Sultantate of Yogyakarta. Muhammadiyah was once denounced as being *Kristen alus* ("subtle Christianity") (Maarif 1998, 3–4). This was because, James Peacock remarked, Dahlan made Islam "too Christian" (1978, 70) by opening a Dutch-speaking Muhammadiyah school for the children of the *hajis*. According to Peacock's interpretation, people in Java feared organizations such as the Muhammadiyah because the Muslims were traditionally not strictly organized, and they thought that "to organize was to become Christian" (ibid., 70). Eventually, however, the Muhammadiyah survived these criticisms. It successfully founded social welfare institutions "patterned

after Christian missions" (Schumann 1974, 7; see also; Elder 1946, 338) by combining provisions of modern education, and the care of the poor and sick.

In sum, Christianity only became a significant presence in Java after it was first mediated by Islamic sensibilities. Additionally, had it not been for the establishment of schools and hospitals, Christians would have remained relatively isolated from the mainstream social matrix. Once established, these institutions expanded the terrain of dialogic religiosity, and Muslim reformers adopted the modern forms of education and medicine they had learnt from missionaries. Not only Muhammadiyah reformists, but also neo-traditionalist NU reformers, have subsequently been deeply involved in modern methods of organization. Their experiences in organizing would later allow them to participate as political actors in the nationalist movements, especially during the Japanese occupation (1942–1945).

NATION-BUILDING AND RELIGIONIZATION

The Japanese rule was short but its influence on Indonesia was strong and manifested in many ways.[11] Other than supporting indigenous and localized political leadership, the Japanese authority also actively politicized religious identities. They recruited *kyai* to reach out to rural areas, and established the Masyumi organization to contain the contending wings of Islam, specifically the Supreme Islamic Council of Indonesia (*Majlis Islam A'laa Indonesia*) that consisted of NU and Muhammadiyah members. In just three years, the Japanese partially transformed *kyai* from religious scholars to political leaders.

This politicization of Islam intensified after World War II, as young Indonesia's national solidarity was torn apart by the competing ideological currents respectively led by the Soviet bloc, the West, and Islamic activism. With communism rising and distrust against the Western-dominated "free world" growing, the local communist party began implementing land reform, often attempting to seize *santri* land, which in turn infuriated the *santri* and reinforced their conviction that communism was anathema to Islam (Ricklefs 2013, 71). In 1948, the tension broke out in the Madiun Affair, a rebellion in which the communist party targeted religious leaders and killed about 8,000 officials and civilians, including several notable *kyai*. Not only the relation between the Muslim and communist parties, but also the trust that the nationalist party had previously had with the communist

party, worsened irretrievably. The nationalist party started to see the communist party as an internal enemy that was only conditionally tolerated for the greater goal of total independence.

The entire decade of the 1950s, following the achievement of total Independence in 1949, unleashed the full conflict of the politicized religious identities, or what later came to be called *aliran* politics. As Geertz (1960) observed in the 1950s, the PNI (the nationalist party) became linked to the remnants of the Dutch-supported ruling class *priyayi*; the PKI (the communist party) came to represent the Javanist Muslims *abangan*; and the vote of the "orthodox Muslim" *santri* was divided by increasingly Muhammadiyah-oriented Masyumi and the break-away NU party. As the 1955 elections approached, the *kerudung*—the loose headscarf that was donned previously by both *santri* and *abangan* women for ritual occasions—became a key symbol of distinction, always worn by *santri* and never by *abangan* women (Ricklef 2013, 91).

Slogans, songs, and skits were made for each campaign, and the landscape was flooded with posters, billboards and banners of the PKI's hammer and sickle, the PNI's buffalo in a triangle, the Masyumi's crescent moon and star, and the NU's globe surrounded by a looped cord and stars. Brawls, threats, slander, and kidnappings became commonplace. The social atmosphere of Java at this point, as an allegedly PKI-affiliated official in Semarang noted, was suffused with "poverty, black magic, Javanese spiritual cults, and Islamic fanaticism" (Ricklefs 2013, 94). Here, something that escaped Geertz's triadic typology (1960) was one more layer of the complexity: Christians' presence in the picture. It is witnessed that, during the 1950s, Salatiga was home to both Javanist *and* Christian strongholds to the point that *santri–abangan* opposition elsewhere was partially transformed into Muslim–Christian antagonism (Ricklefs 2013, 145–146).

Despite these politicized *santri–abangan–Kristen* distinctions, the first Indonesian democratic election ended peacefully. However, the highly divided parliament it produced led to political deadlock, which eventually ushered in Sukarno's dictatorship. Sukarno attempted to bridge the rift between ideologies through his personal charisma. Nevertheless, his left-leaning radicalism and the country's extreme poverty in the early 1960s already showed the crisis of the regime.

The critical moment for the country came when an abortive coup was blamed on the communist party in October 1965. In the following months,

General Suharto rose to power in the name of protecting the nation in crisis, launching a violent campaign to annihilate all the communists and suspicious dissidents. As the political reshuffling ushered in a vast redistribution of power, hatred resulting from recent years of poverty and religious conflict was inflamed into killing (Hefner 2000). The communist party was portrayed as the top enemy of the nation, and its strongholds in Java and Bali became zones for bloody execution. In Java, Muslim youth groups worked in conjunction with the military, searching out and executing suspects from village to village (Boland 1982, 146; Mujiburrahman 2006, 24; Willis 1977, 92; Hefner 1993a, 114). In the Salatiga region, memories of Madiun were revived and the slaughter was justified as a righteous retaliation (Ricklefs 2013, 76). Within a year, at least half a million suspected supporters of the communist party were killed in the country. In the aftermath of the regime shift from Sukarno to Suharto, the communist party was not only outlawed, but has subsequently been remembered as a synonym for immorality and disorder. This view was presented and propagated by a state-produced film made in the 1980s, a masterpiece of drama lasting three-and-ahalf hours and titled "The Betrayal of the September 30th Movement by the Communist Party" (G30S), which was broadcast annually until 1998. In the film, communists are portrayed as traitors, sexual perverts, and beasts (Wieringa 1992).

To root out remaining communist ideology, new standards of religiosity were set up for the nation. Suharto's New Order regime reaffirmed the importance of the Pancasila state ideology outlined in the preamble to the 1945 Constitution, consisting of five principles: belief in One God, humanitarianism, unity, democracy, and social justice (Kim 2007; Ramage 1995). Since then, every citizen has been required to profess a state-recognized religion that fulfilled the requirement of a prophet, holy book, and international recognition. By the end of the 1970s, the state-approved religions included Islam, Protestant Christianity, Catholicism, Buddhism, and Hinduism (Boland 1982, 231; Mujiburrahman 2006, 27). Under such political pressure to proclaim a formal religious affiliation, many former *abangan*, who were tired of the accusation that they did not really have a religion, started to view Christianity as an attractive option (Jay 1969, 14–21; Hefner 1985, 125–141; Hefner 1993a). As a result of state pressure and the Church's cooperation, two million Indonesians converted to Christianity, more than one million being Javanese (Akkeren 1970; Willis 1977).

If the lines between religions were once drawn more sharply at some levels, the boundaries between culture and religion were also increasingly

marked. Absorbing a great number of political refugees as religious converts during the late 1960s and the early 1970s, churches in Java started to worry about the "statistical Christians" problem (Sumardi 2007, 90–91). In the eyes of many churches, the influx of nominal Christians threatened to break down the integrity of Christianity. The question of sincerity became an issue as many new converts merely took refuge in Protestant Christianity to escape political persecution. Facing a large number of nominal Christians, church boards became increasingly sensitive about the compatibility of "Javanese traditions" with Christianity. These traditions included the *slametan*—the ritual meal held at passage points in the life cycle, on calendrical holidays, at certain stages of the crop cycle, upon changing one's residence, and so forth (Soekotjo 2009). Such concern represented a parallel phenomenon of the comparable, but much better-known, encounter between reformist Islam and Javanese customs.

The debate over boundaries between Christianity and traditional customs are familiar to anthropologists (Cannell 2006), although the topic is rarely brought up when it comes to Java. In Sulawesi, Sumatra, and Sumba, anthropologists have elaborated the accommodation between Christian ethical values and local animistic practices, a development sometimes resulting in the modern separation between the domains of *agama* (religion) and *adat* (cultural customs), as well as secularization of the customs (Adams 1993; Atkinson 1983; Aragon 2000; Hefner 1993a; Hoskins 1987; Keane 2007; Kipp 1993). Despite these developments, as Atkinson, Kipp, and Aragon have indicated, Christians in Indonesia have increasingly taken their religious identities seriously, such that a paradigm of seeing Christianity as an alien, inauthentic import imposed by Western missionaries is no longer appropriate. For many Javanese Christian convert communities, initial motivations that had little to do with faith have been superseded by more serious commitment to a religious identity (Hefner 1993a, 122).

Christians in Salatiga still experience a tension between orthodox-minded piety and culturally defined sociality. On the one hand, the GKJ and Catholic churches have been trying hard to be Javanese, perhaps trying harder than many of their Muslim counterparts. They maintained the singing of hymns in Javanese and the performance of the gamelan, although at least since the 1980s Indonesian has replaced Javanese to become the dominant language in church services. On the other hand, however, many pastors feel deeply ambivalent towards the *slametan* ritual meals, and some even avoid using the word *slametan* altogether. For them, to name a ritual as the way of *slamet*—the term for the cultural notion of safety and

tranquility, as well as for salvation in the Christian doctrine—is to imply that the ritual itself can bring about *slamet*, which risks blasphemy.

In order to carry out these rituals while being true to Christianity, GKJ members in Salatiga have replaced the term *slametan* with *syukuran* (Indo., the ritual of gratitude) and transformed the ritual content into a form of prayer fellowship. Muslim urbanites have followed a parallel path, replacing the term *slametan* with *syukuran*, so that they could emphasize the ethical part of the ritual and eschew the older, now backward, instrumentalist-cum-magic image of ritual offerings to "guardian spirits" in exchange for safety. Some older GKJ members even further separated such events from pre-Christian tradition by using the loan-word *bidstond* (Dutch. prayer meeting). A Dutch name guarantees the Christian nature of the ritual, just like the Indonesian name *syukuran* guarantees its modern character.

Muslim reformists' demand for a strict boundary between religion and custom has come to be the standard perspective in Salatiga, even among the so-called neo-traditionalists. Mbak Nur, a state-run elementary school teacher and a member of the classicalist Muslim organization NU, held that *syukuran* was "not part of Islamic teaching but of tradition" in Java. Nevertheless, in her own words, it was "a good tradition." As long as people kept in mind that the gathering had nothing to do with appeasing local spirits or the souls of the recently deceased, she reasoned, such social reciprocity should be praised and preserved.

This tension between a "de-cultured" religion and a separated realm of local tradition is perhaps most obviously felt in the post-funeral rituals on the 7th day, 40th day, and 100th day after the departed has passed away. Many Muslim communities in disparate countries such as Bosnia, China and Indonesia all have similar traditions of memorial rituals, which indicates that this may in fact be a long-standing popular Islamic practice. Nevertheless, this ritual practice has been rejected by reformist Muslims and neo-traditionalist Muslims who have decided to see it as a result of un-Islamic influences. In Java, it is customary to assume that the soul lingered after death for 40 days, and during this period angels would interrogate the soul. Many do recitation and chanting to remind the deceased of their Islamic obligations and to alleviate the suffering of the deceased, yet reformists see such a practice as un-scientific and irrational. The chairwoman of Aisyiyah's local branch, Bu Zulfa, for example, told me that once human beings die, people could not do anything for the soul, since individuals must be held accountable for their own deeds.

This sensitivity over the non-Islamic status of post-funeral rituals was evident in the several *tahlilan* memorial rituals I attended during my

fieldwork. In April, 2010, I attended the 7th day post-funeral ritual for an elderly lady. As my field notes document:

> A tent was quickly set up right on the alleyway outside her house, but it was the neighbor's house that was used as kitchen and reception. The ceremony was rather short, about half hour, consisting of prayers, a brief statement and collective chanting that repeated *La illah la illolah* or "there is no God but God," which by that time I already could follow with ease. After the ritual finished, I asked two women who were sitting next to me about the meaning of the ritual. They reassured me that *tahlilan* was intended to console the family members left behind by the deceased, and that they did not really mean to do anything to the deceased's soul. Imagining people who could judge their practice as un-Islamic, they had prepared a more rationalized expression of religiosity and the notion of the separation between culture and religion. In other words, even for practitioners who wanted to keep questionable customs, they had to dialogically resort to an orthodox language or manner to justify their practices.[12]

Although today many Muslims still practice memorial rituals, they refrain from openly admitting that it is for the deceased. Rather, a common view has it that the memorial sessions are to comfort the family. This perspective is also shared by many Javanese Christians, who also practice the tradition of memorial rituals. A GKJ pastor assured me that the purpose of the 7th and 40th day memorial services was merely to comfort the family, not the deceased person.

Like their counterparts in Sulawesi and Sumatra (Aragon 2000, 276; Bowen 1993, 327), Christian churches and Muslim organizations in Java reached out to grass-roots society and aimed to "modernize" their doctrines and practices. Both Christian and Muslim institutions strove to eliminate ancestral ritual practices in favor of more "modern" monotheistic ones with a monotheistic God wielding the only legitimate supernatural power. In the late 1980s and onwards, the presentation of offerings to village guardian spirits (Geertz 1960, 26; Jay 1969, 33) and those celebrated at ancestral shrines (Geertz 1960, 121–128) that had thrived in the 1950s vanished one by one (Hefner 1987). There were attempts to make traditional forms of ancestor worship or other cults of mysticism into a recognized religion modeled after Christianity or Islam, but they all failed to gain the state's recognition (Hoskins 1987,152; Hefner 1987, 538).

The perception of Islam or Christianity "as a superior ethical code for modern man, as a workable social doctrine for modern society, and as a fertile source of values for modern culture" (Geertz 1960, 127)—once

used to describe a minority of orthodox Muslim Javanese only—could be applied to a great majority today. By the 1980s, Indonesia had become a land even more influenced by standardized religious education and mass religious organizations. These foundations were laid for a new wave of religious renewal movements.

ISLAMIC RESURGENCE AND PENTECOSTAL CHRISTIANITY

At least since the mid-1980s, the multi-faceted Islamic resurgence and the rise of Pentecostal Christianity are among the most significant religious developments in Indonesia. Three inter-related factors underlie these religious movements: mass education and class mobility, globalizing worldviews through media technologies, as well as non-secular subjectivity. A brief account of these factors in the development of Islam and Christianity is discussed below.

Previous studies regarding the emerging Indonesian Muslim middle-class *habitus* since the 1980s give us helpful clues regarding the complex interplay between religion, politics, and social class (Rinaldo 2008). Due to the heavily circumscribed political structure prior to the fall of the authoritarian regime, Islam has long provided a new generation of educated young adults with a safe, alternative, and appealing arena in which to voice their dissatisfaction with society (Collins 2004). Through a variety of interpretations of Islam, these youth have articulated a morally superior critique of their parents' generation, and have fostered a simultaneously religious and modern subjectivity. The combination of middle-class mobility and Islamic faith began as a counter-culture during the heady developmentalist period of the Suharto New Order regime (Brenner 1996; Smith-Hefner 2007; Jones 2007), but it later became an increasingly mainstream phenomenon in the following decades.

In the 1990s, Islamic discourses of democratization and pluralism were actively developed by influential Muslim intellectuals, notably Nurcholish Madjid. Pro-democracy discourses supported by Islamic rationales were widespread among the educated middle-class during the anti-government protests in 1998, 12 years prior to the Arab Spring. Yet, in the 2000s, the mushrooming of a different cohort of Islamic gurus has brought "Islamic lifestyle" to a whole new level. Mass education and mass media have given preachers who lack traditional Islamic credentials and backgrounds to take on roles of religious authority and reach large audiences.[13] Televangelists and popular preachers combined American-style self-help and Islamic preaching, emerging as charismatic figures to teach the audience to "Get Rich in 40 Days," "Create a Caliphate to Rome," or "Experience Heaven

in Your Home" (Hoesterey 2008; Fealy 2008). Islam started to have a neoliberal branch (Rudnyckyj 2009), side-by-side with the Muslim pro-democracy and social justice movements.

Dazzled by the ever-expanding territory of Islamic enterprises, Indonesia's post-Suharto urban landscape has become increasingly marked by individual choice and consumerism. While in many ways public Islamic piety has become more visible and mainstream, the possibility of secular lifestyle choices has simultaneously grown. The cosmopolitan urban landscape of consumer choices seems to provoke a certain amount of desire for moral leadership among the middle class.

The fusion of aspirational class mobility with modern religiosity is geared towards the development of a particularly Indonesian virtue that finds secularism unconvincing. Among educated Muslim urbanites, the discontent with the idea of Western hegemony that is both morally decadent and hostile towards Islam has always been in the air, even among those who are not always ritually observant. Many college students living in Salatiga have not hesitated to share with me their horror at the inhuman treatment of the Palestinians by the Israeli state. They circulated online photos showing the cruelty of the U.S. army in Afghanistan and Iraq. A friend of mine even admitted to me that he was thrilled when 9/11 happened, because the United States deserved to know how it felt to live under attack, the commonplace situation of Palestinians for decades. This distrust of the United States, however, does not prevent them from enjoying democracy, Hollywood movies, and English hip-hop songs.

Even among the most liberal Muslim leaders in Salatiga, their non-secular self-image is often construed in contrast to a simplified image of the West. The chairwoman of the local branch of the Indonesian Women's Coalition, a self-identified feminist, told me once that Westerners were deeply "frustrated" by atheism, unethical utilitarianism, and moral deca-dence, and that was why they were very far away from God. Like other Muslim feminists that I know, but perhaps in the most confident manner, she assured me that Islam was the way to human liberation and morality in society. Her headscarf is a display of her pride in being a Muslim woman—one who is liberated from a Western womanhood that confines women to the role of a tempting sex object.[14]

These three intertwined factors discussed above—mass education and class mobility, globalizing worldviews through media technologies, as well as non-secular subjectivity—have also played significant roles in the transformation of Christianity in Indonesia. In Central Java alone,

church-sponsored universities such as the Universitas Sanata Dharma and UKSW are seen as being among the top schools in the province. In fact, Christian universities have been known for their "quality education" since the end of the nineteenth century, and it is no secret that many Muslim parents chose to send their children to Protestant or Catholic schools for better education. More than two decades ago, an article published by the reformist Islamic Muhammadiyah Congress held in 1990 already explicitly expressed admiration for Christians schools (Muhammadiyah 1991,104–105, cited in Kim 2007, 183):

> As we witness in Indonesia, Protestants and Catholics have spread their religion professionally. For two decades since the installation of the New Order Government, we have witnessed an extraordinary expansion of these two religions: the increase in the percentage of Christians, many churches and the spread of schools [established by Christians].

Under the legacy of New Order mandatory religious affiliation and religious education, as well as the influence of transnational Christian media and missionary networks, even the children of "nominal Christian" parents nowadays display a more deeply internalized Christianity as an integral part of their self-identity. Unsatisfied with what they view as the superficial religious affiliations of their parents and grandparents, they have begun to see mainstream churches as soulless places to worship God. In the 1990s, many young adults who studied at Protestant and Catholic schools turned to charismatic Christianity. Unlike their parents who go to church to attend solemn services, these youths go to church to yell, clap, and play pop-gospel music.

Indeed, one of the major reasons that charismatic Christianity appeals to the younger generation is the dynamic style of worship that deftly capitalizes on media technology and cosmopolitan tastes. English songs are enjoyed beside Indonesian ones. The Australian rock-and-worship band the "Planetshakers" is highly popular, and so is the Indonesian band "True Worshippers." The born-again Pentecostals diligently read Indonesian translations of gospel books written by American authors such as Joyce Meyer and Choo Thomas. Their Indonesian versions have become best-sellers. Even the local version of the Hebrew word *shalom* (Indo., *sialom*) has been creatively appropriated as the Pentecostal counterpart of the Muslim greeting *Assalamualaikum*, and is uttered in services, and written in emails and text messages. The desire to achieve

religious authenticity linguistically is dialogically entangled with a competition with Islam, but also intertwined with a greater need for English-mediated, cosmopolitan expressions.

Another reason that charismatic churches are popular among the youth from the Christian minority lies in their ethnic dimension. In the contemporary vista of Indonesian Christianity, Pentecostalism appears to be able to transcend ethnic divides. While most of Indonesia's Christian communities have been ethnically defined since the colonial period, in Pentecostal churches today the ethnic profile is pluralistic, encompassing members from Chinese, Javanese, Ambonese, Minahasan, Batak, Papuan backgrounds, and more.

As a result, the internal shifts within the Christian sub-communities precipitated the expansion of Pentecostalism, its ethnically pluralistic congregations, and its international connections.[15] This was not the first appearance of Pentecostalism in the country, although it was the first time that it became a mainstream movement among Indonesian Christians[16] (Aritonang and Steenbrink 2008, 687). The so-called "prosperity gospel" rapidly increased its territory in the 1990s and 2000s. This theology was first introduced by the American authors Norman Vincent Peale, Kenneth Hagin, and Robert Schuller, and was then propagated in Asia, especially by Paul (who later becomes David) Yonggi Cho from Korea (ibid., 892). One of his prominent disciples in Indonesia is Yakub Nahuway, later the chairperson of Mawar Sharon, an Indonesian Pentecostal denomination that is rapidly spreading in college towns across the country.

Pentecostalism is no longer a marginal phenomenon in Indonesia. In terms of its size, Aritonang and Steenbrink suggest that of around 17 million Protestants, at least 6 million are Pentecostals, including those who remain nominally registered in mainline churches (2008, 882–883). They believe that this number is even greater if we count those fellowships with charismatic styles present within the mainline churches since the early 1970s. They even predict that Pentecostals in Indonesia could soon become "the first power" within the Christian communities in Indonesia, instead of "the third power" after the Roman Catholic and the mainline Protestant churches (Fig 2.1).[17]

In sum, the success of Pentecostalism is linked to the ways believers spread and sustain their religion. The self-aware, emotionally-charged conversion experience is crucial. Like their Karo counterparts in the North Sumatra region, although in a different context, Christians in

Fig. 2.1 A Pentecostal service in Salatiga in November, 2009

Source: Photo by the author

Java turn to Pentecotalism after "depression and angst...followed by an encounter with the Holy Ghost and a 'baptism by fire' that had healed and totally reoriented the individual's life" (Kipp 1995, 869).

This dramatic emotional conversion pattern sets a stark contrast with the mainline ethnic churches following Dutch Reformed traditions that insist conversion should not occur prior to a sufficient period of study. The cheerful clapping and dynamic entertaining atmosphere of worship has also remained an appealing feature. Pentecostalism has provided a cosmopolitan way to deepen a pre-existing Christian identity that was, in many cases, acquired originally out of practical reasons, such as abiding by state policies. Now, the Christian faith became personally meaningful. In an interesting parallel to the phenomenon of the children of Javanist Muslims becoming orthodox, many offspring of mainstream church members have become born-again Christians since the 1990s.

In the 2010s, tensions persist between certain Islamic and Pentecostal movements in many parts of Indonesia. In West Java since the 2000s, animosities between hardline Islamists and aggressive evangelicals have triggered attacks against churches (Jones 2010, 1). On the other end of the archipelago, Pentecostalism has been a major rallying point among the Dani of Irian Jaya in opposition to the influx of Muslim migrants (Farhadian 2007, 117). In 2011, a suicide bomber struck the Bethel Full Gospel Church in Surakarta in Central Java—a Pentecostal church affiliated with the best-selling author Rick Warren's megachurch in the United States—and wounded 28 people (Kumar 2011). In the same region, earlier that year, extremists vandalized three churches in retaliation for the allegation that local Pentecostal churches were converting Muslims. These episodes are some of the more violent manifestations, reminding one of the widely-reported waves of violence between 1998 and 2003[18] in the country that concerned many observers.

Since 2003, collective violence and radicalism have lost their momentum in the ongoing institutional consolidation of democracy and reconstruction of civic society. Yet, the aftermath of the eruption of violence in the name of Islam (and, in some cases, in the name of Christianity) was devastating enough to push local leaders of the NU and Muhammadiyah to reconsider their positions in society, particularly their relations with one another (Chao 2014). Here, I wish to emphasize again that these violent episodes by no means negate the more uneventful, mundane realities of daily life. Indeed, most people's lives exist between the quotidian areas between absolute peace and outright conflict, and their stories need our attention, not least when we are making inquiry of how pluralism actually works in everyday life.

Ongoing Competitions

This chapter has outlined a history of Javanese religious plurality from an inter-religious perspective, particularly highlighting the entanglement between Islam, Christianity, and Indonesian notions of modernity. The religious landscape today features a growing urban middle class with their particular cultural preferences for religious products and services linked with cosmopolitan ideas and transnational networks. Tensions persist between certain religious groups and conflicts have occurred during the 2010s.

If this chapter has dwelled on the social history of Salatiga's religious diversity, Chapter 3 deals with its cultural geography. As I shall demonstrate, the new generations of *aliran* across the terrains of Islam and Christianity in Salatiga are transforming the spatial and psychological horizons of believers, testing the possible limits of inter-religious harmony.

Notes

1. Hamka, "Beberapa tantangan terhadap Islam dimasa ini," *Pandji Masjarakat Year* 4, no. 50, 1970, pp. 3–5.
2. Field notes, November 27, 2009.
3. Field notes, November 27, 2009.
4. "Nusantara" is a Sanskrit loan word, meaning "between islands," which refers to today's maritime Southeast Asia.
5. Cornelius van Vollenhoven's compendia on indigenous tradition in the Netherlands Indies (1936).
6. The ban on missionary work in Java was not lifted until the end of the Diponegoro Rebellion (1825–1830), after which the Dutch assumed "undisputed control of Java" (Carey 1976, 52; Ricklefs 1981, 113).
7. This was a Dutch government policy in the mid-nineteenth century for its East Indies colony that required a portion of agricultural production to be devoted to export crops. Indonesian historians in general refer to it as "Compulsory Planting".
8. Prior to the European domination over the region, many Western and Muslim outsiders had portrayed the Malay archipelago as "united by an Indic tradition that had accommodated the recent advent of Islam" (Laffan 2003, 15). According to Laffan, at the societal level, whether people's parents were Javanese, Chinese, Indian, or Arab, as long as they converted to Islam, they could freely mix in and became *Jawi*, the "race" of Muslims "from Persia to the Philippines" (ibid., 14).

9. Prior to the twentieth century, *pesantren* were the only formal education institutions found in Java. They offered an almost exclusively religious curriculum to a mix of students including future religious leaders, court poets (Florida 1995), and members of the ruling class (Pemberton 1994, 48–49).

10. In addition to Dutch missionary societies, there was a non-confessional Salatiga mission supported by Dutch and German evangelizers. Each of them only had a few hundreds converts, except one that had several thousand.

11. Since the outcome of the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), the impressive success of Japan once led some Indies intellectuals to entertain the possibility that the ascendant Japanese could convert to Islam and help guard the Muslim world against European oppression (Laffan 2003, 162). A few decades later, when the Japanese fleet defeated the allegedly impregnable British strongholds from Malaya and Singapore to Ceylon and Sri Lanka in three months in 1942, the Indies subjects further realized one thing: Asians could overthrow Europeans, as long as they were equally modernized (Osborne 1985). In the end, the Japanese did not convert to Islam. But they did help Indonesians ward off the Dutch return after World War II.

    During the three years of Japanese rule that began in 1942, Indonesians achieved a greater degree of political organization than had ever been seen under the Dutch. Political mobilization was implemented down to the village level. Much of what would become the first Indonesian military was trained by the Japanese authority. Sukarno and Hatta, the president and vice-president-to-be, were released from the Dutch prison and given positions of leadership by the Japanese government. It was guaranteed now that, even if the Dutch returned—which they did in 1945 in outright violation of the principle of self-determination, the Dutch would be greeted with a revolutionary army (Osborne 1985).

12. Field notes, April 13, 2010.

13. For parallel phenomena in the Middle East, see Eickelman and Piscatori (2004, 131).

14. Field notes, January 22, 2010.

15. Following Cox (1995, 310), Riesebrodt (1993, 45–46), and Robbins (2004b, 123), I separate Christian fundamentalism, which emphasizes the authority of the Bible in a literalist command to live by a strict ethical code and reject the belief in unmediated human contact with the Holy Spirit, from Pentecostalism, in which believers receive the gifts of the Holy Spirit and obtain ecstatic experiences such as speaking in tongues, healing, and prophesying.

16. The earliest presence of "classical" Pentecostalism in Indonesia can be traced to the missionizing of the Bethel Temple church from Seattle, USA, in

1921. Pentecostalism remained a marginal denomination, although limited evidence suggested that there was an impressive growth due to the convergence between the post-1965 mass conversion and the arrival of US-based neo-Pentecostal movements in the 1970s

17. It is clear that the streams within Christianity are no less heterogeneous than those flowing in Islam. In addition to Catholic churches, mainline churches, and the rising Pentecostal congregations, there are also smaller communities of Seventh-day Adventists, Baptists, and Mennonites. It is too early to say whether mainline ethnic churches will be buried in the new trend. What is certain, however, is that all of them have felt the influence of Pentecostalism.

18. Between 1998 and 2003, when the central government was seemingly weak and when social order was disrupted by the Asian Financial Crisis, a cascade of severe ethno-religious violence broke out, and some small towns in Sulawesi and the Maluku islands virtually experienced a civil war between Muslims and Christians (Van Klinken 2007). In Java, paramilitary groups were formed in a response to the multi-dimensional crisis. These groups were, before the socio-economic turbulence, apolitical religious movements calling for a return to the Qu'ran and Sunna in the mid-1980s. This is related to the Salafiyya (purification) movement, found in the Middle East since the 1970s, which has its roots back in the eighteenth century. As the New Order collapsed, some of them soon mutated into militants and radicals (Hasan 2006). Some, such as the notorious Laskar Jihad, even went so far as to send members to the Ambon civil war to help local Muslims combat the Christian force in 2000 and enforced a *rajm* (stoning) sentence against a member who committed rape in Ambon in 2001, as proof that they were ready for the implementation of *shari'a*. Related studies have demonstrated the ways in which the influx of Saudi ideology coupled with partially state-led radicalization of Islam were engineered to split the pro-democracy Muslim social movements, and the effects of these ultra-conservative movements continued even after the authoritarian regime collapsed (Hefner 2000). As a result, in the realm of civil society the Indonesia public experienced a rise of extreme Muslims who openly and proudly distinguished themselves from mainstream Muslim organizations—particularly the NU and Muhammadiyah.

Engineering Horizons

Controversies Over Landscaping and Belonging in Salatiga

Islam will never disappear from the surface of the earth, but it might disappear from Indonesia, if the [Indonesian] Muslims do not stand up for it.

Ahmed Dahlan.[1]

Muslims and Christians are the same nationals who achieved Independence and we should not feel that we [Muslims] are still colonized [by Christians].

Islamic University Foundation of Salatiga 2007[2].

This chapter narrates the processes through which Muslims and Christians in Salatiga map their new religious aspirations onto the city landscape and link the city's religious profile to twenty-first century global geopolitics. It looks into efforts of engineering religious horizons, both physical and psychological. The verb "engineer"—in Indonesian, *merekayasa*—is a local concept that means political maneuvering, including ways to generate controversies and to open up new space for renegotiation. Interestingly enough, *merekayasa* also means "preventing," that is, coping with a foreseeable problem and solving that problem, such as avoiding traffic jams by guiding the movement of vehicles. These two meanings of "engineering" capture vividly the Muslim and Christian narratives about their respective positions in Salatiga, which have been materialized in the transformation of the city landscape at least since the

1990s. Moreover, these narratives highlight the complex, dialogic aspect of religious subjectivity across Muslim–Christian boundaries.

I shall soon recount the recent drama over the religious landscaping of the city, and I believe it is useful to start from a recent controversy over the religious identity of the political leader, the mayor. But, to understand the controversy, it also requires some background knowledge about mayoral elections in a deeply multi-religious Indonesian city. In mayoral elections since the onset of the democratizing era, a Muslim–Christian alliance on a single ticket has been a strategic, although not consistent, tactic for winning votes in multi-religious areas. Usually, the mayoral candidate represents the largest religious group, and the vice-mayoral candidate stands for the second largest religious community. Manado in North Sulawesi, Ambon in the Moluccas, and Salatiga in Central Java are all cities that exemplify this electoral strategy. This does not mean that religious identity directly dictates political choices, or that there is an easy correlation between them, given the highly changeable cross-party coalitions and individual party affiliations in the Reformasi era. Yet, religious identities matter, and their political significance can be teased out by more micro-level observation. To cite an example, Muslim supporters of the minority-friendly and nationalist PDI-P in Salatiga may switch to vote for a more hardline Islamic party such as the under certain circumstances, but Christian supporters are much less likely to do so.

The religious effect is diluted, however, as many Indonesian political parties are not strongly ideological. In order to secure enough votes, major parties frequently ally with each other regardless of their putative ideologies, and they change their coalition each time. In the end, it is not uncommon to see candidates for mayor and vice-mayor from different political parties and different religions, even if this kind of alliance does not always guarantee victory. In 2001, a Muslim–Christian team (a single ticket including a Muslim candidate for mayor and a Christian candidate for vice-mayor) won the 2001 mayoral election. In 2006, the same team won their re-election in 2006. Although this strategy seemed to be succeeding, the dynamic changed in 2007.

For Salatiga, 2007 was a year of misfire and backfire that cast light on the invisible linkages between religious subjectivity and the city landscape. The first episode was initiated by the response to the death of the Muslim mayor Totok Mintarto, who passed away at an Intensive Care Unit in Semarang on February 9. At the time, Totok had already started his second term with his Christian vice-mayor John Manuel Manoppo, a career civil servant. According to the law, Manoppo assumed the position of mayor, and a vice-mayor would be elected from the City Regional Legislative Council

(DPRD). A DPRD member from PDI-P, who was also the wife of the deceased mayor, Diah Sunarsasi, was selected. Christian staff working at the UKSW wanted me to know that no Muslim man was ready to be the right hand of a Christian man. Therefore, that a Muslim woman assume the deputy position was logical. But of course, the strongest reason was simply that Diah was the wife of the former mayor.

The shared power of married couples and bilateral family members in political families in the broad Southeast Asia region is a familiar theme (Mijares 1976; Hewison 1999; Trajano and Kenawas 2013). A recent study even suggests that Salatiga has had the highest proportion of female candidates in mayoral elections out of six multi-religious Indonesian cities (Fox 2012). Whether the idea that women have a particularly high profile in Salatigan politics is correct or not, in the following years, no one could fail to see the gigantic posters with city slogans featuring the newly minted female vice-mayor in her *jilbab*, the Indonesian term referring to the Islamic headscarf that covers the hair and neck. By tying her scarf loosely to leave her hair partially visible, Diah signaled that she was Muslim but not "too" Islamic. These huge posters with themes such as "CREATE A CLEAN CITY" or "STAY AWAY FROM DRUGS" featuring the veiled vice-mayor were set up around the city square, surrounded by churches that have long been said to be taller and bigger than the city's mosques.

So, the mayoral and vice-mayoral positions were now filled again by a Christian and a Muslim, but the year 2007 was far from over. Towards the end of the year, the city government cancelled the permission for the outdoor city-wide joint celebration for Christmas for security reasons, citing threats of terrorism and bombs posed by certain radical groups (*Suara Merdeka* December 24, 2007). This was a huge blow to Christians, regardless of their denominations. The outdoor joint celebration for all Christians was a major annual event normally held in Pancasila Plaza. Due to the current political scenes following the inauguration of the "Christian mayor," however, the Christmas celebration was now ordered to move into Kridanggo Stadium. This ban on outdoor Christmas celebration continued in 2008 but was lifted in 2009. The unusual prohibition thus seems to have been a special measure taken in 2007 and 2008 in the context of a recent, unexpected reversal of the normal Muslim–Christian political arrangement.

Judging by the sudden call to prohibit large outdoor Christian activities, one could unmistakably identify the anxieties about the Christian mayor's leadership of a Muslim-majority city. As this chapter will show,

the death of the Muslim mayor of Salatiga and his substitution by the Christian mayor unleashed and mobilized entangled sentiments about religion, politics, and post-colonial struggles in this city. The escalation of inter-religious tension reached its peak in 2007 and 2008, conjuring a deeper history and a wider geography of religious subjectivities in competition over the direction of the religious cityscape.

Overcoming the "Christian" Nickname

For historical and sociological reasons, Salatiga's fame as a Christian city has long been nourished by the prominence of Christian communities in this small municipality. The first reason is the presence of the renowned Christian University of Satya Wacana, and the surrounding dorms and restaurants frequented by students from Papua, Maluku, and Sumatra, as well as ethnic Chinese. Another important feature is the colonial legacy that gave birth to a downtown area that is relatively dominated by Christian-Chinese business and churches. Yet, this impression needs two more nuanced qualifications. First, Salatiga has always been a Muslim-majority area, but this statistical fact was usually obscured by its reputation as a Christian area. Second, in terms of the city landscape and infrastructure, Salatiga has been less and less a "Christian city" since the 1980s. Simply counting the newly built places of worship reflects this change. While the relative proportions of religious adherents have achieved equilibrium with minor fluctuation since the 1970s (see Chart 3.1),[3] the number of worship facilities has grown rapidly. More than any other worship places, mosques have had the highest growth rate, 642% since 1980 (from 26 to 193 buildings, see Chart 3.2, compared with 22 and 72 Protestant churches). In other words, Salatiga has always been Muslim-majority, but only in recent years has the architecture begun to reflect this.

It should be noted that the comparison of the growth rate of worship facilities is misleading. For one thing, the type of social ecology that a local mosque involves is quite different from that of a church. While a large downtown mosque may serve a wider congregation beyond the residents of its location, most mosques in the city are embedded in local neighborhoods, the most important social community besides the family in Javanese society. That is to say, most mosques serve residents who are connected by location. Because of this, there is a saturation point for the smallest neighborhood unit to build more mosques once it has obtained sufficient facilities. By contrast, a church congregation in urban Java is a

Chart 3.1 Religious populations in Salatiga

Source: Statistics reports of various years from BPS Kota Salatiga (1980–2011) and BAPPDA.

Chart 3.2 The growth of worship facilities by type in Salatiga

Source: Statistics reports of various years from BPS Kota Salatiga (1980–2011) and BAPPDA.

group of volunteers whose members are, most often, not neighbors and whose social relations are not defined by location. Even if there are only a dozen congregants, there is an incentive to build a separate church.

Since churches and mosques rely on quite different types of social community, it would be an inadequate comparison to relate the proportion of the number of worship facilities directly to the religious population per capita, which would lead to the false conclusion that Protestant Christians are slightly over-represented. A more rigorous ethnographic and historical account would suggest that Islamic facilities have enjoyed a much more dramatic growth than any other types of worship place since the 1980s. It thus is precisely due to this growth that the following incident seems all the more bizarre and thus begs an explanation.

We return to 2007 following the death of the Muslim mayor. No sooner had Manoppo taken up the post of the mayor than a group was formed to advocate more Muslim control of city land. This group was called the *Yayasan Universitas Islam Salatiga* (Salatiga Islamic University Foundation, or YUIS), organized by a Muslim leader and judge from the Salatiga Religious Court, H.M. Fauzi Humaidi. YUIS' central demand was for Muslims to be granted Land Cultivation Rights (*Hak Guna Usaha*, or HGU) to the partially state-owned land called White Cross (*Salib Putih*) in the Argomulyo district. The land in question was partially managed by an organization called the *Yayasan Sosial Kristen Salib Putih* (White Cross Christian Social Foundation) and the GKJ. On this land, the YUIS envisaged an Islamic University, or an Islamic Center.

The land of White Cross was chosen as the target of protest for reasons that transcend the typical analysis of symbolic and material resources. White Cross used to be a disaster relief settlement, and an important symbol for Christian communities across Salatiga and missionary societies abroad. The beginning of this settlement was precipitated by a serious volcanic eruption of Mt. Kelud in East Java in 1901, when dispersion of volcanic ash swept over all of Java, destroying numerous plantations and fields near Kediri and Semarang (*New Zealand Herald* 1901, July 6). In conjunction with the spread of a cholera epidemic, panic-stricken refugees came to Salatiga in need of food, shelter, and medicine (Apriliani 2014, 36–37). The Dutch-English missionary couple van Emmerich of the Salvation Army soon acquired 42 hectares from the Dutch government to provide long-term medical care following the initial disaster relief effort. The relief center continued its work and formed the White Cross Colony

in 1926, with more land acquired and more funds secured from the Netherlands in the following decades. The center was suspended due to the Japanese Occupation and, after Independence, it was handed over to the Javanese Christian Church (GKJ) in 1952. Since this time, the land had been used by and legally assigned to the GKJ under the rubric of HGU—namely, the right of usage of state-owned land.

But, in 2007, the sudden arrival of the Christian mayor created a special moment for the Muslim activists from the YUIS, joined by the MUI of Salatiga. Seemingly, the protest was solely focused on securing HGU for Muslims. After insistent protests, in August the Christian mayor attempted to mollify the protesters by promising to provide a new office for the MUI, as well as funding for a Grand Mosque (*masjid agung*) for the city. My dear friend Pak Zulfa, one of the local leaders of the Muhammadiyah and a member of the MUI at Salatiga, was positive about this development. He was a great supporter for civic pluralism and inter-religious harmony. All he wanted was better facilitated worship places that could serve as icons and symbols for Muslim solidarity in Salatiga. I still remember being at a small diner near the city Plaza in 2009, when Pak Zulfa and Bu Zulfa told me jointly that, up to this point, Salatiga did not have a Grand Mosque (*masjid agung*), except for the ongoing construction of a large campus mosque at the State Islamic College (STAIN). There were only two Great Mosques (*masjid besar*), Masijd Pandawa in Jalan Sudirman and Masijd Kauman in Jalan Diponegoro. They envisioned a Grand Mosque that could be compared with those in Semarang, Solo and Demak. For this to happen, and due to the corruption issues that delayed construction, the *masjid agung* project needed help from the city government.

Yet, the fundraising for a Grand Mosque or a MUI office was not enough for the YUIS. Even after the YUIS acquired an endorsement from the mayor's office to have access to White Cross in September 2007, it was up to the National Land Agency (BPN) Regional Office at the provincial level to settle the legal dispute. Within a year, between 2007 and 2008, the YUIS and BPN Regional Office had several exchanges of correspondence in formal letters (Seo 2014). One of the regional major newspapers, *Solopos*, helped inflame the issue and portray the Christian mayor as a partisan, Christian-biased, incompetent leader for Salatiga City. The land dispute made its way to the national news, so that even the Office of the Vice President of Indonesia and the provincial government of Central Java were forced to respond, and the BPN had to inform the President, Home Affairs Ministry, Religious Affair Ministry, and so forth,

of their final decision. Finally, in December 2007, the BPN decided to extend the GKJ's HGU in White Cross to the year 2033.

An exclusive account on the Christian side of the story may make Muslim Salatigans seem rather irrational. After all, as I suggest above, Islamic worship facilities had never been more developed in Salatiga than they were at the time of the protest. To comprehend the movement— arguably the largest protest ever in Salatiga since the onset of democratic reform in 1998—one must take into consideration the revival of Islamic awareness, the timing of the protest, and the dialogic struggles that go along with it. Once we view each of the rival groups with empathy and pay attention to different perspectives across religious borders, the protest surrounding White Cross—the most intensified manifestation of religious sentiments in the city in the recent past—starts to make sense.

As a matter of fact, the ambition to challenge the exclusive right to use the land of White Cross had already been conceived several years previously; some local stories contend that the plan was conceived as early as 2001. During the mayoral election campaign in 2006, the issue was raised again, and gained considerable attention. At the time, a collective statement was signed in April 2006 by seven local Muslim figures, including Kyai Abdul Nashir Asy'ari, Kyai Fadlun Barmawi, and Kyai Abda Abdul Malik, all headmasters of several Islamic boarding schools (*pesantren*) from the Tingkir district in Salatiga. The statement illustrated why they chose Golkar-nominated candidate, Bambang Soetopo or "Brother Topo" (who went on to lose to then incumbent Muslim mayor Totok), and almost all the reasons given were tied to the aspiration of expanding Islamic institutions in Salatiga. To cite some concrete rationales in the statement, these Islamic schoolmasters believed that "Bother Topo:"

> recommends concerning the state-owned land in White Cross, out of the 97 hectares 50 will definitely be used by the Muslim ummah later in 2007 . . . [He also] actively supports the founding of a [full] Islamic university in Salatiga, so that the Islamic community would have more self-esteem (*harga diri*).[4]

The undertone of this statement is that Muslims need to have more self-esteem because, currently, they do not have enough. The underlying assumption: even after the construction of so many mosques, Muslims would feel somewhat inferior to Christians in this city without a full Islamic university.

The same rhetoric that was merely an interlude in 2006 now gained wide resonance in 2007, thanks to the accidental rise of the Christian mayor, but most critically precipitated by the impending expiration of the GKI's HGU for White Cross at the end of 2007. This time, the rhetoric of Muslim inferiority was strengthened into a provocative, post-colonial argument that invoked a Christian/colonizer vs. Muslim/colonized framework. On November 5, 2007, the YUIS published a letter addressed to GKJ, asserting:

> Muslims and Christians are the same fellow citizens who achieved *Independence*, and we should not feel that we are still *colonized*. For the common interest in a wider society, the Muslim community shall manage 50 hectares and the Christian community 48 hectares [in the land of White Cross]. (Sinode GKJ 2008, quoted in Seo 2014, my emphasis)

Through these words, a community of the "we" was forcefully asserted in ways that were unusually harsh in Salatiga. The "we" as a unified entity not only simplified Muslims in Salatiga, but also dialogically created a homogeneous, Christian "they," who were implied to be even more united, as if there were never disputes between denominations. As Mbak Sri, a second-year student of STAIN and the head of the women's branch of the Muslim Students Association (HMI) in Salatiga, said to me:

> The issue of Christianization (*Kristenisasi*) is a serious one. Many people have the impression that this is a Christian city, while the truth is that it is *not*. [Yet] even though Christians are the minority, they are strong. We [Muslims] are the majority, but we are not united. Recently we again see a new church built, just around the Pancasila Plaza. This is but one sign of Christianization in this city. That's why we Muslims have to work together. That's why we allied with all other Muslim organizations to protest the continuing domination over the land of White Cross by Christians.[5]

Mbak Sri's opinion seems to simplify and neglect the internal rivalries between different Christian denominations. In order for the framework she pictured to work, the Christian communities must be conceptually reduced to a singular entity. But, in doing so, Mbak Sri also asserts the urgent need for Muslim unity. In her account, the urgency of sustaining an Islamic resurgence in Salatiga is partially, but critically, tied to the challenge of Christianization.

Was this statement merely hyperbole that was only shared among a small number of radical groups? In fact, despite the steadily rising number and further improvement of mosques and Islamic schools in the city, the shadow of Salatiga as a "Christian city" still looms large, even in the minds of mainstream Muslim leaders. Regardless of the remarkable Islamic revival in Salatiga, the growth and continued visibility of local Christian facilities has concerned the local leaders of the Muhammadiyah and NU. The chairwomen of the local branch of Aisyiyah—Bu Zulfa, for example— harbor ambivalent feelings on this matter.

Born in Yogyakarta, Bu Zulfa moved to Salatiga after marriage. She often recounts her life in Yogyakarta, where the Muhammadiyah was founded in 1912 and where its headquarters has remained ever since. Compared with her birthplace, the scale and strength of Aisyiyah in Salatiga is rather small. The reason for this is because, she once told me in the teacher's office in the high school where she taught the religion of Islam, "[in a way,] Christians are the majority of the city here [in the downtown area]." She considers the Christian influence as partially related to the relative weakness of Muslim non-governmental organizations in the city, where Muslims of various factions and sects have redirected more of their efforts into their immediate communities, the neighborhoods. But, generally speaking, Bu Zulfa fully supports religious freedom and the right of Christians to build churches.

A similar perception about the Christian influence in the city is also expressed by Mbak Nur Hidayati, a 29-year-old Islamic elementary school teacher who affiliates with the NU. Almost in every sense, Mbak Nur is a friendly, open-minded, and self-confident career woman who cares about the wellbeing of the society. But she also holds a concerned attitude towards the Christian presence in the city. One night in January, while waiting for an Islamic sermon meeting to begin in her house, she told me with regard to the controversy over "Christian domination" in Salatiga:

> To "dominate" ... well ... this sounds very disturbing in its connotation ... But it is true that now in all [Indonesian] cities, or in the city [here], there are many Christian worship places (*peribadatan Nasrani*) ... almost in every corner, and at every moment there are perhaps some [who] observe that Christian [facilities] are much bigger or that there is a much greater number [than Muslim facilities], whereas if we look at the data we realize they are but a minority ... it is not just [that there are] many worship places, but also many schools ... even Muslim children—many of them also go to Christian schools. Then, those who ... how

should I put this . . . who have a strong faith in Islam would of course hold a more critical attitude about these matters . . . so if a person wants to say that "Christians dominate Salatiga," it is up to her/him.[6]

Fears about *Kristenisasi* is thus not just an Islamist agenda only supported by religious extremists. It is a concern shared by leaders and members of the mainstream, pro-democracy, Muslim organizations such as the NU and Muhammadiyah. Like Bu Zulfa, Mbak Nur rejects Islamic political agendas, such as the implementation of Islamic law as national law, and holds that there should be no discrimination against people of different religions. Despite such pro-pluralist views, when it comes to worship facilities, Mbak Nur shares fears that Christianity has been spreading in the country, and that their facilities have been disproportionately erected regardless of the feelings of the majority in society. In other words, it was a latent sense of a violation of fairness and dignity that made even pro-pluralism Muslims feel ambivalent when this issue was raised.

So, were such fears really that irrational? At least two aspects should be considered before making any conclusion. First, there existed a historical consciousness in Salatiga that can be molded into a de-colonizing framework given the right context, particularly so in the post-1998 democratizing era, when freedom of expression is ensured. Second, previous strategies for Islamic revivals in Salatiga had already paved the way for the White Cross protest.

First, the local sentiments towards the past Dutch rule have long been ambivalent. Salatiga's Muslim intellectuals were nostalgic about the city's European past. Yet, at the same time, they were somewhat disappointed with the limited success of *indigenous* (read: Muslim) development. A member of an agricultural reform association in Salatiga eloquently criticized the domination of religious groups on the land of White Cross at the expense of poor farmers. In 2008, he offered a different perspective on the basis of a post-colonial framework regarding the issue. In this framework, he extensively cites Sukarno, the first President and the enduring icon of Indonesian's spirit of independence from his *Penegasan berbagai segi pokok revolusi Indonesia* ("Affirmation of Indonesian Revolution from Various Key Aspects"):

What we should break down (*jebol*) now is imperialism and feudalism, in order to build an Indonesia that is fully independent and democratic. This

matter represents the first qualification (*syarat*), which is absolute and useful for the continuation of breaking down exploitation (*penghisapan*) of humans by humans. Indonesian Revolution without land reform is simply bombast without essence. (quoted in Wawan 2008)

Also in 2008, online networks of Muslim activists shared several articles that included a famous piece named "Salatiga, Under the Shadow of Christianity" (*Salatiga, Di Bawah Bayang-bayang Kristen*) (Sukur 2008); the article explicitly links class and religious difference by depicting luxurious cars parking in front of churches. Simultaneously, a website was created to promote a project called "Salatiga, the City of Pious Muslims" (*Salatiga Kota Santri*). It later changed its original name to "Pious Salatiga Muslims On the Net" (*Santri Salatiga On the Net*), but continues to be a voice on behalf of Muslim interests to this day.

The White Cross dispute appears to be capable of invoking class consciousness and post-colonial sentiments that could potentially mobilize people to question the legitimacy of Church facilities in the city, making the issue larger than a problem of local Christian–Muslim competition over specific lands. The agricultural reform association in Salatiga (Wawan Suyatmiko 2008) observes that some farmers living in the nearby area or directly working on the land in question were first involved in the protest via the PKB Islamic party. These "ordinary people" (*wong cilik*) had no intention to offend either the Islamic or Christian sides of the conflict and, due to realistic considerations, they had no means or motivations to redirect the dispute onto the plight of the poorest farmers owing to religious competition. Ultimately, it was still through Muslim organizations that the challenge of the status quo was made possible.

Seen from this light, the White Cross controversy was an opportunity for Muslims to express long-standing frustrations over their perceived inferiority and foster a greater sense of Muslim solidarity. This point was attested by the fact that, on March 2, 2008, 5,000 Muslims showed up at the *Al-Atiq Kauman* mosque and walked to the mayor's residence to protest. The protesters were from the Indonesian Networks of Mosque Youth, the HMI, the Union of Indonesian Muslim Students Action, the Student Movement of Indonesian Islam, the youth branch of the NU, and the youth wing of the Muhammadiyah. These protesters are not necessarily anti-pluralism. To cite an example, the members of the HMI Salatiga are extremely diverse, and some of them even support the rights of the Ahmadiyah, a religious minority that was often considered a deviant sect in

Indonesia. Indeed, the HMI even organized volunteer teams to guard against anti-Christian attacks at the outdoor Christmas celebration in 2014. The protest was about something else: primarily dignity, aspiration, and majoritarian democracy. It should be noted that most Catholic and Protestant organizations in Indonesia have long been either pro-regime or politically quiescent, while Muslim dissidents and mass organizations have been accorded more space to exercise social power and democracy. The protest surrounding White Cross marked the intersection of democratic expression and Islam in the Salatiga region, in contrast to the 1993–1994 protests preceding Reformasi that centered around freedom of speech on campus and which was not framed in religious terms.[7]

Second, the Islamization of Salatiga was an ongoing cultural project backed by many groups, and the pattern of its struggle was fairly consistent, rather than irrational. To cite the most famous example, it was no secret in Salatiga that the State Institute of Islamic Studies or STAIN was founded specifically to provide quality Islamic education that could compete with the Satya Wanaca Christian University or UKSW. The birth of STAIN was brought about by a number of different Muslim organizations that cross-cut the neo-traditionalist and reformist divides, including the NU, Muhammadiyah, and the NU-based Pesantren Luhur Foundation. The Pesantren Luhur Foundation, and the Al-Azhar elementary school and junior high school that it later founded in the same place, was conspicuously located right next to the UKSW. The Foundation was later aligned with a national organization of Islamic boarding schools around 1968. The Al-Azhar elementary school only formally started in 1998, when the foundation was led by Fuad Bawazier, a national politician who had close ties with Suharto's family and who was allegedly involved in financing the top Islamic militia Laskar Jihad (Hasan 2006, 154). Later, the land for building the Al-Azhar Junior High School was donated by local businessman and politician H. Bambang Sutopo in the form of an Islamic trust or *waqf* (*wakaf*) in 2004. As mentioned earlier, Bambang Sutopo was a strong mayoral candidate in 2006, who proposed further establishment of Islamic institutions in the city and who promised access to White Cross for Muslim constituencies. In 2006, he only lost to Totok by some 7,000 votes.[8]

Like the social and material forces that made the Al-Azhar schools possible, STAIN was born out of equally heterogeneous forces. Although STAIN's first faculty was founded by the NU, it was the help of H. Asrori Arif—a Muhammadiyah figure who donated a piece of land, and the later

addition of more generous state funding as well as Saudi donation—that eventually enabled STAIN's predecessor, the *Institut Agama Islam negeri* (the State Institute for Islamic Studies), to take shape during the 1980s in Salatiga. Today, STAIN's faculty includes NU scholars, Muhammadiyah members, as well as so-called "NUMU" (a combination of NU and Muhammadiyah) supporters who accept both classical scholarship and reformist interpretations. The NUMU phenomenon has been a trend in Indonesia and is not unique to Salatiga; however, in Salatiga's case the Christian factor has obviously helped push the merging of the typically rival Muslim organizations.

From the perspective of the urban Islamizers in Salatiga, then, the Al-Azhar Islamic schools were built next to the UKSW, and the STAIN is at Pancasila Plaza, where many churches are located. Since 2010, one has been able to see the already-completed STAIN Grand Mosque from the City Plaza. The cityscape has undergone considerable change and, in some key sites, Islamic icons have been installed next to Christian ones. In the context of these earlier successes in asserting the city's Islamic identity at key Christian sites, the desire to continue the pattern at White Cross was not entirely surprising.

Perhaps the protests did not yield a substantial result immediately but, from several perspectives, the event was an unforgettable hallmark for Muslim youth in Salatiga. Perhaps it could have been a story that did not involve Christians. Perhaps it could be just about Muslim solidarity. But it was never understood that way, and it would not be as appealing that way. Since the late colonial period, to be just as good as Christians, or to have a decent education and institutions, was always the aspiration of non-Christian groups. Although no huge piece of land in White Cross was ultimately gained, the protest reproduced, and renewed, a discursive effect in which the need for an Islamic revival in Salatiga was inextricably linked to a defense against Christianization. (Fig. 3.1)

BUILDING RESTRICTIONS

In the previous section, I have outlined an answer as to why a piece of land at the outskirts of the city became so important to thousands of Muslim protesters. I unpack the question by showing the ways in which the Muslim activists map their renewed religious consciousness onto the city landscape, and delineate the long-term sensibilities through which Muslim attitudes toward Christians were reframed to have a post-colonial valence at a specific time. Now, I would further argue that the White Cross controversy presents a specific case of entangled piety.

Fig. 3.1   The long-awaited Grand Mosque in "the Christian City" Salatiga
Source: Photo by the author.

In Chapter 1, I briefly implied that the presence of a super-addressee lies at the core of linguistic subjectivity, through which a speaker forms a voice and takes a social position among multiple worldviews that are stratified by moral discourses as a responsive footing in the world. Importantly, this process predates any utterance—indeed, even before intention; hence, the process is always dialogic (Bakhtin 2008[1981]). To apply such linguistic subjectivity more broadly to religious subjectivity here, we can see that Muslim activists envisage how other national fellows outside of Salatiga think of the city: a Christian city. As Muslims of Salatiga, they feel the continuing Christianization of the city intensely, and many of their narratives regarding the need for more Islamic facilities echo strongly with this feeling. In other words, Muslim activists articulate their religious aspirations when they take into consideration the perspectives of outsiders and the social position of Christians in the city.

Bearing this concept of entangled piety in mind, the next question I deal with is the dialogic narratives of Pentecostals in Salatiga, who have been building new churches faster than any other Christian denomination in the country, and who have also experienced the most attacks since the late 1990s. What follows in the chapter is an analysis of Pentecostal narratives of "the miraculous church-planting" conditioned by the politics of engineering cityscapes. I will argue that these narratives present another case of entangled piety. Further, I will contend that these narratives not only demonstrate the unfolding of local Muslim–Christian intersubjectivity, but also indicate a serious flaw of the global humanist discourse of religious freedom.

Before we move into that discussion, however, it is helpful briefly to review the most relevant legal regulations concerning worship facilities in Indonesia. The feeling that Islam needed "affirmative action," however absurd it may sound (aren't we talking about the country that has the most Muslims in the world?) arose in the post-1965 political arrangement to reward (with limits) the regime's Muslim supporters during the political transition. Although Muslim parties and hardline Muslim groups were soon marginalized, the "affirmative action" was later reinforced by the worldwide Islamic revival led by Iranian revolution and the parallel influx of Saudi funding. Muslim activists' lobbying of the Department of Religious Affairs has led to several measures that legally restrict the activity of Christian missionaries in Muslim-majority areas. In 1978, the Department of Religious Affairs issued several decrees. One stated that it was forbidden to direct a new religion to a person or persons who already have another religion (No. 70, No. 77/1978). The other stipulated that official permission was required to receive foreign missionaries and funds (No. 20/1978) (Aritonang and Steenbrink 2008, 212–213). In 2006, the law regarding Regulation on Building Houses of Worship (No. 1/1969) was revised to require an even larger number of signatures of approval from people living in the neighborhood where a new worship place was to be built before construction could begin.

The laws are often interpreted in the international press and scholarship as obstacles to Indonesian religious freedom, or even as proof of Muslim intolerance of apostates. Such an easy interpretation forcefully judges the Indonesian rules against a universal yardstick of freedom, while neglecting at least two critical dimensions in this matter. First, underlying the two types of religiosity that many Christians and Muslims imagine for themselves are very different notions of human agency, which are themselves

products born of particular historical circumstances. Second, Muslim intolerance tends to be exaggerated and reported out of socio-historical contexts, while the recent European intolerance towards Muslim buildings is forgotten by the same reason that would be rejected as simply an illiberal excuse in non-Western contexts.

First, let me summarize quickly the different conceptions of human agency entailed in various religious readings of Indonesian pluralism. The Christian interpretation is a familiar one to most readers. For Christianity, particularly in its post-Enlightenment form of theology championed by Calvinism, religion is an individual matter predicated on the notion of sincere faith, a notion of subjectivity also embedded in the history of Western secularization (Asad 2003). Individuals are presumed to have free will and the autonomy to renounce the pre-Christian past in order to become a new man. For such theology, nothing can be more anathema than the restriction imposed on the freedom that is believed to be completely inherent in and bounded to the individual. This tendency is reinforced in the Indonesian context as in other non-Christian places, since the possibility of individual conversion is the very precondition of missionary work. Not surprisingly, for Indonesian Christians "Indonesian pluralism" ensures the right to choose religion and to change one's religion (Mujibrahman 2006; Sidjabat 1960, 288).

By contrast, the Muslim majority's reading of the state pluralism is rather different. Besides individual faith, it is also a matter of the wellbeing and prosperity of the Muslim community. Not unlike the majoritarian principle surrounding the mosque controversies in many European countries since the 1990s (Cesari 2005; Allievi 2009; Maussen 2009; Sunier 2005), church construction in Muslim Java is often accused of overshadowing the majority's interests. Yet, unlike minority situations in Europe that often stir up debates regarding cultural racism (or its denials) and assimilation (especially its insufficient force), in Indonesia it was the postcolonial or anti-Western sentiments that were invoked instead.

For many Indonesian Muslims, religion represents many things. It is more than a matter of personal spirituality; it is a matter of social norms and communal solidarity, and a matter of indigenous dignity in response to Western hegemony. It is almost against the notion that to be modern must be Western, that the followers of reformist Islam have advocated a vision of a modern society that is simultaneously modern, Islamic, and non-Western. In this aspiration, Muslims are modern, and the authentic leaders of indigenous societies, rather than a second-rate copycat of

Western culture, be it secularism or Christianity (Nakamura 1983). This is clearly reflected in Hamka's words that "Islamic movements are nowadays pioneered by intellectuals who have fathomed Western culture and, after discovering all its secrets, have returned to Islam with full conviction" (1970, 3–5). Combining the fate of Islam and that of society in general, the Muslims approached the state-endorsed pluralism as granting the right for diverse religious communities to co-exist, not a license for freely proselytizing Christianity (Mujiburrahman 2006).

While the decrees of 1978 (No. 70 and No. 77) represented more accurately many Muslims' versions of "religious pluralism," in reality Christians have never ceased being active among non-Christians. The laws are sometimes merely symbolic, to show general respect to Islam on paper. On the ground, whenever local churches receive new converts who "already had another religion," evangelizers always emphasize that it is a thoroughly voluntary act on the part of converts, with no missionary activities involved. Even among those liberal-thinking Muslims for whom the universal discourse of "religious freedom" has made huge inroads, when it comes to building churches in Muslim-majority areas, they still appear ambivalent. Building new and more churches is sometimes a taboo, and Christians know that well. The sensitivity to this taboo is even integrated into the ways church founders articulate the stories of their origin.

Enshrining Miracles

The architecture of the Pentecostal church buildings of Fendi and Ester bears a paradox of public passivity and secret superiority. On the inside, Ester and Fendi's worship halls were gorgeous. In Ester's, two symmetrical rolls of velvet banners were neatly juxtaposed on the two sides of the front altar, with different captions on them, such as *mujizat* (an Arabic-derived Indonesian word, the standard translation of "miracles" in the Indonesian bible), *bahasa roh* ("glossolalia"), *rendah hati* ("humbleness"), and so on. In Fendi, the hall appeared to be a professional concert venue. On the outside, Fendi's worship hall was hidden in a once abandoned theater; it was a plaster building amid a few canteens, shops, and a motorcycle repair shop in a quiet corner of downtown. A small banner with the church's name on it was hung above the entrance, surrounded by a six-foot tall aluminium fence. The inconspicuous façade could easily allow someone to drive past by without even noticing it was a church.

Three blocks from this place, Ester's worship hall was located in a reno-vated dormitory above a parking lot. A larger banner was hung above the entrance, with a schedule of worship activities. Besides the banner, from outside it still looked very much like a dormitory. No cross on the roof, and no green courtyard—the two characteristics that typically marked the buildings of mainline churches, such as those conspicuously located in downtown Salatiga.

Mosques are almost the exact opposite of these small charismatic churches, generally having austere interiors and more elaborate outward appearances. Inside, there was always a covered prayer hall with a flat carpeted floor, with limited decorations; on top of the roof stood a pole that supported the crescent moon and star, one or two domes, and occasionally a minaret. Embodying affective, sensual materiality entangled within a host of relations, religious buildings evoke social memory and visual legitimacy in the city. Old church buildings have a historical legiti-macy that new churches do not; new mosques display their long-awaited glory that old ones do not necessarily enjoy. In these dynamic urban re-compositions of Salatiga, then, different religious powers are made present (or absent) and acknowledged (or erased) through discrepant styles of the interior and the appearance of worship facilities.

To better grasp the imaginative engagement and skillful avoidance materialized by Pentecostal church buildings, in what follows I elaborate on the politics of the contrasting narratives about church-building and the spread of Christianity from Christian and Muslim perspectives in Salatiga. I will show that, under the pressure of the majority's Islamization and the general suspicion of Christianity, Pentecostals have largely internalized the necessity to downplay the involvement of human intention in the con-struction of their churches. To begin, I will recount the fantastic stories of Pentecostal miracles circulated in Salatiga.

The 47-year-old son of a Catholic family, Toni Yusuf, converted to Pentecostalism after his wife miraculously became pregnant in 1988 despite numerous medical confirmations of their barrenness. He said to me:

> I never had a plan to build a church, not even becoming a pastor. It was merely one day in 1990 that I dreamed that this place had become a church. At the same time I saw the name "Ester" right there, and I had not even heard of the name yet. "What is this Ester?," I asked. It was only after that I asked my friends whether they had heard of the Ester churches, and they said

it was in Surabaya. Oh really, I see, I said. And then I just forgot. I did not care. Several years later I was encouraged by a spiritual mentor (*Bapak Rohani*) from Ester in Semarang to organize a bible study group (*Family Altar*, or FA). When we had the FA, we were often called and asked by many different people, "You guys want to build a church right?" "Absolutely not," I always said. We were just a small worship group. But the mentor kept telling me "This will become a church. It definitely will." Well, I did not believe it.[9]

Toni did not believe that this dream was prophetic. After all, he had no place for a church or money to build one. Most importantly, he did not wish to become a pastor. Years later, when Toni wrote an article addressing the history of his congregation for the church website,[10] he cited Psalm 127: 1 "Unless the Lord builds the house, its builders' labor in vain" (interview with Toni Yusuf, December 10, 2009). Toni's church opened in 1998, built upon the renovated dormitory that belongs to his mother-in-law.

Toni Yusuf's story is not only popular among the local congregation, but also received some attention from local and national Christian media. His experience is understood as a miracle. A description of it was published in a Christian magazine based in Salatiga and in the official Ester magazine in Surabaya, arguably the "capital" of Pentecostalism in Indonesia. The latter is circulated nationwide.

A comparable story is said to have taken place at almost about the same time to a different young man in Salatiga. This time, it was a 16-year-old named Dimas.[11] Dimas observed that thousands of freshmen arrive at the Christian University of Satya Wacana each year.[12] Some of the Christian students, once detached from their natal families, stopped going to church. Dimas was disappointed to see that the newcomers were eroding the reputation of Salatiga as "a Christian city." As a result, he started a worship group with a few other enthusiastic friends. As the worship group grew larger, Dimas was encouraged by a pastor from Semarang to initiate a church. The young leader rejected the idea at once, and insisted that he had no intention to build a church. In fact, in order to show just how much he disagreed with the idea, he disbanded the fellowship and ordered his followers to go to other churches.

What followed afterwards changed Dimas' mind. After he closed down the fellowship, his followers simply stopped attending Sunday services. Dimas started to feel guilty. He reasoned, he was the one who brought the

fellowship to Jesus, but also the one who abandoned his fellows. Finally, encouraged by his spiritual mentor and his prayer to the Holy Spirit, Dimas agreed to start a congregation in 1998, which is now the Fendi church in Salatiga.

In telling these origin stories of their founding, Ester and Fendi are articulating a similar message—it was never their intention to build a church. Rather, the initiators were "chosen" by a destiny which was determined by divine will. Although not explicitly stated, the undertone regarding the Christian minority's status behind these narratives is clear; just like one can never admit the intention to convert Muslims into Christians, one can never "have the intention" to build a church. Christianization is such a taboo that the denial of a willful intention to build a church has logically become the first part of its own chronology. The narratives also share same ontological premises. The inception of both Fendi and Ester is presented as the result of *mujizat*, or miracles deriving from divine intervention, rather than human intention. In the case of Dimas, the miracle is the passive young man who eventually submitted to the idea of becoming a church founder. In the case of Pak Toni, the miracle is the prophetic dream and the fulfilled prophecy.

Human initiatives of course weigh significantly in the process of building a new Pentecostal church, but they are downplayed by church founders. Before remembering his dream, Toni Yusuf had, in fact, looked in several different places for the location of his church-to-be, only to be met by objections from neighborhoods and local religious leaders in the city. It was at such an impasse in late 1996, that his wife reminded him of the prophetic dream, in which his mother-in-law's boarding house was turned into a church. Similarly, before Fendi's young founder Dimas could start a new church, he had led his followers through the "wilderness" phase, during which they moved from unused classrooms, a rented place in a GKJ church, and other temporary places. These endeavors are not mentioned in the officially documented origin story.

Miracle discourse is not unique to Pentecostalism in Indonesia. But for Indonesian Pentecostals, miraculous origin stories serve a particular function in helping to situate their churches in the larger society. Not only are there prophetic dreams and miraculous occurrences, there are also stories about mysterious donors who would appear unexpectedly to rescue a church-building project. The origin stories that feature a mysterious donor tend to emphasize not the capacity of wealthy church members, but the humble origin of the church, the financial difficulty of the building

project, and the mysterious source of financing. Mysterious donors are often depicted as local people, so that donations are not equated with illegitimate subsidies from a foreign missionary society, which could be construed as part of an international conspiracy of Christians to undermine Indonesia's Muslim community. Both the re-establishment of the Indonesian Bethel Church (GBI)'s Johar Salatiga branch and the Pentecostal Church of Isa-Almasih at Salatiga (GPIAI) fit this category of miracle stories, as do those of many other churches in Indonesia.[13]

Because these founders of Pentecostal churches emphasize their passive tone of narrating the inception of their churches in an environment where their presence is not always welcome, the miracle discourse in Java has a slight difference from the theology of a strong individual voluntarism that characterizes Pentecostalism worldwide (Marshall 2009, 45; Martin 2002, 145; Maxwell 2000, 249; Schram 2010, 465). Certainly, this voluntarism and the performed passivity are not mutually exclusive, but it is worth paying attention to the purpose it serves in this particular context. Miracle stories help the local struggle for church-planting in an environment that imposes strict limits on worship facilities. They justify the intention to build a church in a place where admitting such an intention publically would guarantee controversy.

As such, a church-building story is carefully crafted to situate the church in the wider society. Such sensitivity is perhaps best epitomized by the legend of the founding father Abraham Alex Tanuseputra, commonly referred to as Pak Alex, of the Bethany Church, one of the fastest-growing Pentecostal denominations in the country today. Pak Alex decided to launch his ministry after he caused a terrible car accident and the life of the allegedly dying victim was miraculously saved in the late 1960s. He later managed to build 14 churches in the suburbs of Surabaya, East Java, but failed to secure a place to build a church in the city proper. One day in 1985, he had a dream. He saw a building and a number, 38. He did not know the meaning of the dream, and upon waking, kept searching for a possible location to build his church in Surabaya. One day, he learned about a wealthy Muslim landlord who was in a coma. He went to the hospital, prayed for this Muslim and God awakened him.[14] This Muslim man, in turn, generously donated a piece of land for the new church. The land is precisely at 38 Manyar Rejo II Road in Surabaya.[15]

In this narrative, the role of miracles and that of Muslim–Christian relations are all the more accentuated. The identity of the grateful and compliant donor, a Muslim, serves to legitimize the acquisition of land for the church. Moreover, healing a Muslim and peacefully winning the

Muslim land through the belief in a miraculous deed by God cleverly dissociates the evangelizer from the agentive position, and helps him avoid the accountability for building a new church.

One may ask: Do the stories effectively help Pentecostals justify their churches in a society whose majority objects to churches being built in their neighborhoods? The answer is yes and no. Pious Pentecostals believe these miracle stories wholeheartedly.[16] In fact, miracle stories are constantly told in sermons and printed in best-selling books, many of which are not merely local, but also translated from English-speaking countries. Miracle narratives are an integral part of the basic repertoire for a Pentecostal sermon, just as common at a service as rock gospel music. More importantly, they are powerful stories that forge the Pentecostals' identity in the context of a wider Christian-phobic society.

But there is more to the miraculous origin stories than a cagey gesture to shirk the responsibility for creating potential discord with mainstream society. A bold statement is behind the miracle narratives: the foundation of the church is authorized by God. In other words, God's mighty power stays on the side of the "chosen few," a truth which is attested by the creation of the church. Revelatory dreams and miracles, then, serve as a meaningful instrument through which a taboo can be bravely embraced and even proudly presented.

Most Muslims are not aware of these miraculous stories. After all, what many Muslim leaders have been trying hard to do is to warn their fellow to stay away from Christian missionaries and evangelizers. This caution is widely acknowledged by both Muslims and Christians. Even the bulletins printed by Pentecostal churches often carry the caption "For Internal Members Only", so that they will not be suspected of being tools of proselytization. But this, of course, does not mean that Pentecostals give up the mission that they deem to be their sacred duty. Their claim over legitimacy remains just as acute, even if they partially internalize the Muslim environment that surrounds them and, in turn, make accommodating gestures. In the origin stories of the new charismatic churches, the miracle discourse empowers the Pentecostals to deal with Christian-phobia in Indonesian society by downplaying human intention and claiming a higher authority.

Linking the Local and the Global

In Chapter 2, I have outlined how, in Muslim-majority Java, discourse of Islam's dignity has been invoked as a form of indigenous empowerment against colonialism, owing to the intersection between the specific type of

rule, the class formation in Javanese society, and the pan-Islamic networks beyond colonial borders. Indeed, what Appadurai depicts as "the crucibles of a postnational political order" (1996, 22) in which nothing is merely about the local that already existed long before the current discourse of "globalization." But Appadurai is right to point out the unprecedented intensity of such political orders and mass-mediated feelings. Religious identities that transcend national borders and can come to affect national identities are among the most illuminating examples. In Nigeria, for example, demonization of Islam is commonplace among Pentecostal congregations. The famous priest Adeboye even went so far as to suggest that Islam was *the* obstacle to God's plan to make Nigeria a Christian nation that would initiate the eschatological revival out of Africa to the rest of the world (Ojo 2001, cited in Ukah 2009).

Pentecostalism and Islam are politicized to a much lesser degree in Indonesia than in Nigeria, but their competition in both countries is comparable: their horizons are the globe, not merely the nation. For some Indonesian Muslims, the presence of vibrant Christian activities in Indonesia would indicate the encroachment of Christianity at the expense of the global Muslim community, while, for some Indonesian Christians, they must be cautious to confine any speech that might be considered as provocative to insiders' circles. A local sermon inside a church can thus be global in nature. In mid-December 2009, at a city-wide pre-Christmas celebration in a charismatic church in Salatiga, a famous charismatic pastor from Jakarta gave the following speech to the Salatiga Christians:

> They [Muslims] do not understand. [They ask]: 'Huh, how come God can be *born*?' Then they are like this: 'Jin—gle—be—ll . . . Jin –gle –bell' (imitating the style of Arabic chanting, with the congregation bursting into laughter) . . . (silence). I say God comes to be with us, God will save us! They do not understand that when the End Times come, eventually Christians will win (the audience clapping, the pastor paused for a while) . . . . Foolish. Truly foolish those who do not believe.
>
> . . . The Gospel and Jesus Christ is not a religion for Westerners. The Gospel and Jesus Christ is for everyone. Even not all the Arabs are Muslims! Thank God, there are still Christian Arabs in the Middle East! (The congregation applauding enthusiastically).[17]

In the sermon, the pastor was imaging how Muslims imagined Jesus Christ. Indeed, this dialogic imagination allows him to grasp how

absurd the notion that God has a son and the son is always God himself must seem to many Muslims. The speaker not only had the absent Muslims audiences' assumption in mind, he also exemplified intersubjectivity (see also Hill 1995).[18] Here, the Pentecostal preacher, to some extent, crossed the religious boundaries to ask the question from the Muslim perspective before he dismissed it. In his dismissal, he offered a parody in which a Muslim awkwardly sings the world-renowned Christmas carol "Jingle Bells." Although in the song it was English, not the Indonesian language, that indexed Christian identity, the preacher carefully clarified that Christian identity is not a privilege to Westerners only. By invoking "Jingle Bells," then, he is representing a global Christian culture that cannot possibly be appreciated by Muslims. Muslims, in this parody, could only use a tedious Arabic chanting style that corrupts a joyful "Christian" song into a laughable melody. For the preacher, the two ways of singing symbolize the incompatibility of identities, which are things that really matter, unlike national borders, race, or ethnicity. This ideal of dissociation between religion and ethnicity reaches its climax when the preacher acclaimed, "Thank God, there are still Christian Arabs in the Middle East!" Like Indonesian Muslims who would imagine the Middle East as the "central land" of their religion, the Pentecostal preacher takes the Middle East as the most symbolically important area to "conquer."

Like their Christian counterparts, Muslims in Satiga have an equally global view of their religious community. On the Day of Sacrifice (*Idul Adha*, Ar. Eid al-Adha) in 2009, thousands of people gathered in the city's Pancasila Plaza to pray together. After the prayer, people then listened to a keynote speech, which was given by Pak Zulfa. Part of his sermon dealt with the suffering of Muslims in the world:

Today we gather again in celebration of *Idul Adha* as a symbol of the unity of the Muslim community. More than a billion Muslims at this moment are knitting togetherness into a sturdy bond of faith. Far out there, different races, nations and languages now unite in a great ritual, namely the holiday of *Idul Adha* . . .

The teaching of Islam is very loaded with guidance of social justice and the same rights between human beings . . . thousands or even millions of people in other places perhaps do not have things to eat, [and] they cry over their fate. They are hungry and thirsty, [and] they lost their property and residence. They lost their children, wives, husbands,

parents or relatives . . . they may even have to flee from their homeland
due to disaster or conflict . . .

   Isn't it a kind of brutality if we just let them suffer there, while we do not
bother to help them? Because of this I ask you who are capable of donating
some parts of your property to help diminish the suffering of our
fellows . . . [19]

The community that the sermon entails is a Muslim ecumene across
the lands and seas and particularly those who are suffering. Later on
that day, Pak Zulfa told me that "those who suffer" include all the
poor, the Palestinians, and victims in wars such as the recent Iraq War
and Afghanistan War. Although not made explicit, Pak Zulfa's speech
has roots in great sympathy towards Muslim fellows whose nations are
ravaged by Israel and the United States, a sentiment that is widespread
in Indonesia. This sentiment is often manifested in anti-Israel protests
that periodically take place in major cities and in the charitable dona-
tions to Palestine. One recent accomplishment is the "20,000 rupiah
per person movement" (about 1.5 USD now, but 2.5 USD back then)
since 2008 that granted the Indonesian non-governmental organiza-
tion Medical Emergency Rescue Committee a total of Rp 21 billion
(about 2.18 million USD) to complete the Indonesian Hospital in
Gaza.

   Linked to the contemporary position of fellow Muslims in the
world, the self-perception of being "not good enough" among the
Muslim majority is in a great contrast with the self-congratulating
Christian minority. The theme of the unity and the togetherness of
the Muslim community in the sermon is more than a commonsense
cliché. It serves to support the understanding of their positions not as
a majority with a minority mindset in the country, but a subjugated
minority struggling in an anti-Muslim world. In recent world history,
Muslims are still those who have been defeated and degraded by the
West. When the boundaries of the imagined community extend
beyond national borders, the status of majority and minority can be
easily reversed.

   As Muslims perceive themselves as a community in need of empower-
ment, it is not surprising that the discourse of the Christianization of the
nation can be so frightening for some, especially when the discourse can
borrow strength from a statistical perspective. The Christian proportion of
the total Indonesian population was 2.8% in 1933, 7.5% in 1971, and 8.9%

in 2000. In Central Java, the number was merely 0.2% in 1971, and 2% today, and above 10% in bigger cities (Ricklefs 2001, 379). While the main growth was between the late 1960s and the late 1970s,[20] and not the 2000s and 2010s, there is some evidence to call it a slow but perceivable Christian expansion.

This kind of contestation over the city's personality is not unique to Salatiga. The northern Sulawesi city of Manado has almost exactly the same problem, if not more so. Manado is viewed as "a Christian city" because 60% of the population is Christian. Yet, Muslims still account for about 30% of the residents. There, churches broadcast their hymns and rock gospels more vehemently than mosques. At least since the 2000s, Muslims have also started to be more observant. As a result, Christians accuse Muslims of "acting as if they were living in a Muslim city," whereas Muslims jibe that the Christians "act as if they were living in a Christian country."[21]

The "as if" logic concerning the appropriate character of Manado can only be partially applied to the situation in Salatiga. Unlike Christians in Manado, Christians in Salatiga could not say that Muslims are acting as if they were living in an Islamic city, because Muslims are, in fact, the majority. Nevertheless, Muslims could say that Christians were acting as if they were living in a Christian city, and they indeed have. They pointed out that it was time for the invisible Muslims to come out of the shadows, and they accomplished that goal quite successfully.

This perception about a thriving Christian minority was unequivocally conveyed in the sermon at the city-wide worship on the day of Feast of Breaking the Fast (*Idul-Fitri*, Ar. *Eid al-fitr*), held, again, at the Pancasila Plaza on August 23 in 2010. Following the morning prayer performed by thousands of people, the head of the Religious Ministry of the city government gave the following sermon:

> *Idul Fitri* reminds us of one aspect of co-religious life (*hidup berjamaah*) based on awe towards God The Most Glorified. Attending to brotherhood in the tie of *Ukhuwah Islamiyah* (Ar. love for Muslims) continuously, [and] fertilizing solidarity with Muslim fellows, we will always obtain tranquility, victory and prosperity as an individual or as a member within the diversity in this city of Religious Heart (*hati beriman*) that we love.
>
> Umat Islam has to unify their steps in one goal of Magnificence of Islam by putting aside the differences between streams (*aliran*), factions, colors and social class. Togetherness and unity represents great strength so that *umat Islam* will not be defeated (*tak terkalahkan*). Umat Islam does not

want to become like foam in the middle of the sea. We don't want to become a Muslim community whose existence cannot set an example. We must not become the Muslim community once pointed out by the Apostle of God in his dialogue with [his] companions:

"An era will come, in which other religious communities will arrive and seize you, almost like a gang of people who are gluttonous, clustering and fighting with one another around the dish of their food."

Muslim Fellows may God give you all blessings (*rahimakumullah*).

Hearing the utterance of the Apostle of God about the fate of a generation of Muslims like that, companions asked: "Can it be that because at the time we Muslim community numbers little as minority, Apostle of God?"

The Apostle replied: "No, your number at the time is a lot! However your quality is like foam adrift on the waves."[22]

The theme of Islam "not to be defeated" was explicitly uttered or implied throughout the speech. Especially when it came to the scene depicted in the dialogue between the Prophet and his companions, the story became a cautionary tale insinuating the religious rivalry in Salatiga. Seemingly, the insinuation reproduces the notion of a majority with a minority mindset, a critique that reduces the dynamic of the global Muslim–Christian politics into a domestic counting of religious populations. The call for unification and empowerment of the *umat*, however, belies Muslims' deep aspiration to rectify the humiliation of Islam in recent human history, in order to overcome the quality of drifting foam and to go beyond the diverging streams.

Most Muslim leaders in the local neighborhoods still hold a pacifist pluralism at heart, and do not advocate a bellicose attitude as the means to Muslim self-empowerment. Yet, in response to the expansion of Christianity, they urge Muslims to "upgrade" their quality and to give up the differences between their religious "streams." The expectations of Muslims are thus not merely to follow God's law, erect worship facilities, or make their men attend Friday prayers, but to be a strong and dignified people in the face of the religious other.

In the end, the basis for Muslims feeling threatened by Christianity is not merely determined by the absolute numbers of the constituencies in a location, but also by the perceived national, and even global, status of Islam vis-à-vis Christianity, and the ways Islam and Christianity have become sharpened into national and transnational identity markers.

Mutually Constituted

I have presented two stories of religiosity intersecting with the legitimacy of the city's religious landscape that are crucial in understanding the alternating perspectives of religious pluralism espoused by Christianizers and Islamizers in Java. The major lesson of these examples of engineering and counter-engineering in Salatiga is the importance of seeing inter-religious relations as constitutive of religious identities, rather than merely their by-product. Christian and Muslim communities are ever mindful of one another in a specific post-colonial context, and they take each other into consideration pre-emptively before formulating their opinions and actions. A focus exclusively on one single community would lose sight of this entangled aspect of pluralism, and overlook the fact that even the consciousness of religious minorities can critically reshape the identities of religious majorities. The periodic Muslim protests against the alleged plot to Christianize Indonesia in the national context are not merely baseless hyperbole invoked by irrational extremists, but inclinations deeply rooted in a long, painful, post-colonial struggle in a world where Islam and Muslims have been unfairly ridiculed and subjugated. This point is seen clearly as Muslim leaders of Salatiga narrate how their fate is bound with that of Palestinians.

By showing how Indonesian Muslims and Christians actively imagine the other's potential reactions to a possible future, I demonstrate the inadequacy of the taken-for-granted idea of "religious freedom," as it assumes that faith is simply a matter of individual spirituality, rather than communal solidarity and historical identity. Local Christians know well enough to tactically emphasize the compulsory calling, whereas Muslim leaders warn about the encroachment of Christianity as a more effective way of staging self-empowerment. The engineering of the religious landscape in Salatiga makes it clear that Muslim–Christian relations play an effective role in the demonstration of religious subjectivity. It also shows how the externalization of religiosity into material buildings is at stake in the overall urban planning and the city's identity.

As I will reveal in the following chapters, dialogically formed discourses between Muslims and Christians in Salatiga find their manifestations in many aspects of daily life, and the seemingly peaceful co-existence always contains constant renegotiations and uneasy tensions.

NOTES

1. Dahlan is the founder of Muhammadiyah. This saying is quoted in A.M. Ali 1957, 33.
2. Sinode GKJ 2008, quoted in Seo 2014.
3. All data is from various statistics published by BPS Jawa Tengah and BPS Kota Salatiga from 1980s to 2010, and BAPPDA.
4. Field notes from a flyer, January 22, 2010.
5. Interview with Mbak Sri, January 12, 2010. The following interviews and field notes included in this chapter appeared in an earlier work of mine (Chao 2014), a shorter piece about church construction in Java, which gave much less contextualization of the actions of Muslim groups in Salatiga. This chapter expands the earlier work and digs deeper into the logic of the construction of Muslim facilities in the city, tying this analysis to the specific context of Muslim–Christian dialogic relations in Salatiga.
6. Interview with Nur Hidayati, November 19, 2009
7. A protracted faculty strike ensued in October 1994 after the UKSW fired Dr. Arief Budiman, an internationally well-known sociologist and long-time critic of the New Order government. Dr. Budiman was fired after having questioned the procedures of the election of a new rector in 1993. The expulsion of Dr. Budiman led to demonstrations by faculty and students, who called themselves the "pro-democracy group." See Human Rights Watch, Academic Freedom in Indonesia: Dismantling Soeharto-Era Barriers, September 1, 1998, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a83a4.html [accessed 20 January 2016].
8. In 2011, when Bambang Sutopo ran for mayor again, he teamed up with the city councelor and the wife of the incumbent Christian mayor. He lost the election again.
9. Interview with Toni Yusuf, January 25, 2010.
10. To protect the privacy of the informants, the website is purposely concealed.
11. Many Indonesians only have a single name. Although "Dimas" is a pseudonym, the person is similarly referred to with only one name in the officially documented story of the Fendi church.
12. Contrary to common belief, however, the majority of students at the UKSW are Muslims.
13. A famous example is the origin story of the Pentecostal Church in Indonesia in Surabaya, in which the mysterious donor appears while the pastor was napping. The identity of the donor is concealed in the story.
14. The story is recounted by Rev. Faradhy Henkky in the headquarters office of Bethany Indonesia in Surabaya on March 20, 2010.
15. Also from the Interview with Rev. Faradhy Henky, on March 20, 2010.
16. This was expressed to me in numerous informal conversations.

17. Field notes, December 15, 2009.
18. Although the context is quite different, this case reminds me of one of the best anthropological illustrations of this Bakhtinian linguistic intersubjectivity, Jane Hill's documentation of the performance of Mexican peasant Don Gabriel's multi-voiced eulogy for his son who died in a foreign-owned factory (1995). Don Gabriel's subjectivity is predicated upon the very possibility of the crossing between social stances, between the Spanish-speaking capitalist and the Mexicano-speaking moralistic worldviews. By extension, such intersubjectivity applies to contexts well beyond performing a eulogy. Be it chatting with neighbors, giving a sermon, or talking to an anthropologist, wherever and whenever social actions take place in a world where multiple voices/worldviews constantly encounter each other, we will have dialogic intersubjectivity that involves personalized stratification of worldviews.
19. Field notes, November 27, 2009.
20. See Hefner (1993b), for a socio-political account of mass conversions to Christianity after 1965.
21. This was shared by the professor Dan Slater in person in Ann Arbor on December 9, 2011.
22. Field notes, August 23, 2010.

Regendering Community

Women Reshaping Javanese Rites of Passage in Mixed Communities

> *[Muslim] women contribute to the creation of messages of great beauty, power, and potency. They not only have access to the divine, but they also help to create it both for themselves and for others. Their voices, loud, strident, and authoritative, are heard by all and often emulated, even by men.*
>
> Rasmussen 2010[1]

While Chapter 3 depicted Muslim–Christian dialogical narratives concerning local landscapes and global communities, this chapter discusses women's shifting roles in Javanese rites of passage within the religiously mixed neighborhood community. I demonstrate the co-evolution of more self-consciously Islamic community rituals and women's greater visibility in them. In doing so, I argue that the recent Islamic resurgence has involved a more prominent position for Muslim women in ritual space, but may have had the unintended consequences of complicating Christian women's participation in these events.

In what follows, I first point out Muslim women's heightened salience in Islamic holiday celebrations and rites of passage in the wake of recent Islamic resurgence. This phenomenon may seem at odds with common perceptions, but actually has been reported by scholars in Indonesia and Malaysia (Frisk 2009; Rasmussen 2010). While many Muslim societies in Southeast Asia have been known for practicing softer gender segregation

than their Arab counterparts, Javanese rituals are nevertheless known for relegating women to behind-the-scenes labor and granting men the prestigious roles (Brenner 1998; Geertz 1961; Sullivan 1994). Further, as the more recent Islamic revival has a more hardline international strain (Hasan 2006), concerns are raised about the rise of stricter segregation of women and minorities. In response to these pressing issues, this chapter will provide a more complicated picture by presenting ethnographic descriptions of Javanese Islamic life-cycle ceremonies in neighborhoods, noting the changing roles of women and minorities.

Muslim Women's Authoritative Voices and Prominent Presence

One of the unforgettable moments during my stay in Salatiga was the celebration of the Prophet's birthday (*maulud*) during the Islamic calendar year 1431 (February 27 of the Gregorian year 2010). The celebration was so important that Geertz labeled it one of "the two most important calendrical ceremonies" of *slametan* ("Javanese rituals meals," Geertz 1960, 79).[2] The then 45-year-old Bu Eka was the lead singer and conductor of the tambourine ensemble for the ceremony that day, and she had no reservations about admonishing the men in the team to follow the tempo of her voice closely during the practices and rehearsals before the actual ceremony. On those nights before the *maulud*, she often yelled at Mas Agus, a middle-aged male resident and voluntary drummer who had a tendency to miss the beat. Once, she even ordered him to take off his jacket so that he would be more agile. He always obeyed her bashfully.

On the evening of *maulud*, after the last prayer of the day, the residents of Sinaran gathered in the neighborhood mosque. Bu Eka's enchanting solo in Arabic signaled the beginning of the celebration. Her voice resounded through the microphone connected to the speakers of the mosque, permeating the otherwise quiet, dark night, and marking her prominent presence among the seated congregation of 120 women and 60 men, even if she were dressed in the same batik uniform shirt as the other 50 members of the neighborhood women's Islamic sermon group. Praising the Prophet in singing is commonly considered as an exquisite merit for the individual and for those who hear it. In front of the mixed audience and on behalf of the community, Bu Eka sang with extraordinary confidence. The idea that women's voices are seductive, and therefore *aurat* (parts of the body to

be clothed or prohibited in public), was firmly suspended. Although most *adzan* (call for prayer from mosques) continue to feature male voices, female voices have been featured in formal prayers and ritual singings.

Following two *Shalawat Nabi* that wished God's blessings upon the Prophet Muhammad, Mbak Catur started the opening recitation. Already aged 30, Mbak Catur was still enrolled at the STAIN for a bachelor's degree. Her father is an active member of the reformist Islamic organization Muhammadiyah, as well as a regular preacher for retired people in the neighborhood. In general, they actually disliked this kind of boisterous event. Many of their fellow Muhammadiyah members and friends have eschewed these overly musical rituals. But, for Mbak Catur, to participate in communal events in the neighborhood still served well the goal of a greater internal Islamization among Muslims who were not "good Muslims" yet. Mbak Catur decided to do what she could do best. She became a leading reciter in the women's Islamic sermon sessions, which are simultaneously attended by both reformist and neo-traditionalist Muslims.

After Mbak Catur's powerfully enchanting Qu'ranic recitation in Arabic, we heard the Indonesian translation of the verses by 20-year-old Mbak Icha, who was also a STAIN student and the head of the mosque youth organization. She was wearing her favorite headscarf in a stylishly asymmetrical diamond pattern in blue and white. She had just recently started her practice of fasting on Mondays and Thursdays to follow a sunna (the Prophet's tradition) in early 2010. After the translation, the congregation sang the song of *maulud* in unison in Javanese. Later, a young man from the planning committee for the day's event stepped forward to report, but his presentation was soon cut short due to the arrival of the vice-mayor of Salatiga, the wife of the deceased former mayor mentioned in Chapter 3.

The vice-mayor gave an elaborate greeting in her glamorous make-up and headscarf, flanked by two members of her entourage. Upon her departure, the ceremony resumed. The *rebana* band played music intermittently during each transition of the ceremony until the last songs following the main sermon given by one of the regular male preachers in Sinaran. Soon, we started to get snacks and hot tea passed around the congregation from hand to hand. Finally, the distribution of snack boxes marked the end of the *maulud*.

The night of *maulud* in Sinaran encapsulated how Javanese Muslim women have reshaped the expectation of rituals' validity in the community. Mbak Catur's Qur'anic recitation, Mbak Icha's translation,

and Bu Eka's singing were all presented as appropriate expressions of a sincere love for the Prophet, gestures that would accrue rewards for all in the neighborhood. They contributed to what the ethno-musiologist Rasmussen called the female authoritative voice (Rasmussen 2010, 211) that I quoted at the beginning of this chapter.

The details of such a *maulud* provide different angles to reconsider the relation between religiosity and gender in Javanese society. How do we understand women's public participations against the classical anthropological accounts? Consider Geertz's sweeping account of the *slametan* in the 1950s, in which men were depicted as solely responsible for attending ceremonies, confirming ritual efficacy, and fulfilling communal obligation:

> The ceremony itself is all male. The women remain *mburi* (behind—i.e., in the kitchen), but they inevitably peek through the bamboo walls at the men, who, squatted on floor mats *ngarepan* (in front—i.e., in the main living room) perform the actual ritual, eating the food the women have prepared. (1960, 12)

Because rituals often take place over the weekend or the late afternoon and evening, and because many participants are professional women themselves, the common excuse that "the men are at work" does not quite explain the gender skew. Brenner expresses the same bafflement she faced in explaining this phenomenon a decade earlier (1998, 175–176):

> It was equally striking, given the ethnographic record, that women, not men, were carrying out the rites as the representatives of their households. These were not unimportant rituals ... almost invariably, women outnumbered the men by a significant margin ... How are we to account for the fact that ... women are entrusted more than men with matters of ritual efficacy, as well as with matters of money?

Like Brenner, I had similar experiences. I can cite many examples. To name but a few, at Bu Wati's niece's wedding in June of 2010, there were more than 300 neighbors in attendance (although there were about 400 households invited, some did not come in person but sent a donation). The vast majority of the guests were women in their miscellaneously-colored headscarves and layered robes, many of them from the *pengajian* group. Men constituted less than one-third of the guests, and they were seated away from the stage. In another wedding I attended in April in

another part of Salatiga, most men were similarly seated away from the center and stayed on the periphery.

Weddings are not the only type of rites of passage in which the women outnumber or at least equal the men. In fact, in all types of public rituals held by Muslim families I have attended in urban areas—circumcisions, weddings (see Figs 4.1 and 4.2), funerals, post-funeral commemorations, and other *syukuran* to mark smaller turning points (such as a birthday, promotion, graduation, etc.)—women tended to be the majority of the guests. If this is, indeed, a widespread phenomenon, how do we understand it? Before I address how women have come to play roles that were previously thought of as men's preserve (see Geertz 1960, 12; Sullivan 1994, Woodward 1988, 62), however, we need to further tease out the core elements in the continuation and

Fig. 4.1   A Javanese wedding in Salatiga in April, 2010
Source: Photo by the author.

Fig. 4.2   A Javanese wedding in Salatiga in April, 2010

Source: Photo by the author.

transformation of Javanese communities: the neighborhood, ritual meals, and Muslim women's ascendance in ritual space.

THE HABITUS OF *BERSILATURAHMI* IN JAVANESE NEIGHBORHOOD COMMUNITIES

There has been both continuation and transformation of the kinds of neighborhood communities in Salatiga from those that have been documented by anthropologists working in Java since the 1950s. Geertz (1960) and Jay (1969: 66) established the understanding of the key role of close residence in the Javanese moral world, which rests upon regular mutual help, cooperation, and trust (also see Koentjaraningrat 1985). The cooperative community is defined by *rukun* (harmony), a "state in which all parties are at least overtly at social peace with one another." As Barbara Hatley puts it, Javanese neighborhood pride and solidarity required

"participation in the mutual-aid networks of the *kampung*, self-identification with the local community, and being identified by one's neighbors as being of, rather than merely in, the *kampung*" (1982, 57).

But, rather than simply endorsing an essentialist understanding of "Javanese culture," scholarship has also revealed that such Javanese neighborhood structures were molded by the Japanese wartime administration, as well as post-Independence regimes for governance and social control. Chapter 1 briefly mentioned the formal units of "harmonious neighbors" (RT or *rukun tetangga*) and "harmonious citizens" (RW or *rukun warga*).[3] Both administrative units include a number of local office-holders led by the head of the RT and RW, all of whom are elected locally and none of whom is salaried. They are authorized to "assemble tax monies, register and monitor residents and visitors, collect demographic and economic data, disseminate state directives, promote government plans and policies, extend local infrastructure, administer social welfare services and generally help to advance national development" (Sullivan 1986, 37).

The dimension of governmentality notwithstanding, the practice of *gotong-royong* (mutual-help) has been integral to the fabric of Javanese social life and also survived social change in some parts of Indonesia. John Bowen, for instance, argues that neighborhood lives and the cultural notion of *gotong-royong* reflect "genuinely indigenized notions of moral obligation and generalized reciprocity," even though such lifestyles *are* an extension of a cultural superstructure that transmits social control through self-sufficient management and unpaid mobilization of village labor (Bowen 1986, 546). More recent work in the 1990s revealed both the preservation and transformation of the neighborhood networks among the Javanese. Mary Hawkins demonstrates that the Javanese community in South Kalimantan in the 1990s still emphasized *rukun* as the basic tenet of neighborhood lives and that the best manifestation of *rukun* was still the organization of ritual meals (1996, 231). Guinness, based on his involvement in a *kampung* in Yogyakarta for more than 30 years, reclaims the salience of neighborhood lives that demonstrate "strong local impulses to community, quite independent of state action" (2009, 24). These portraits give us some valuable information about the communal characteristics of some urban neighborhoods in Indonesia, surprisingly more durable and vibrant than some earlier predictions would have it.[4] In a most simplified way of explication, then, behaviors that belong to the concept of *gotong-royong* are the quintessential *habitus* of Javanese community, although it is often more reflected upon and more discursive than Broudieu (1977) would have it.

In middle-class neighborhoods in Salatiga today, rites of passages that rely on mutual help are still carefully carried out. Neighborhoods are where important rites of passage take place, and where neighbors and officers of the RT and RW assume the obligation to attend, organize, and witness public rituals. All the close neighbors assumed at least some degree of responsibility to partake in key rites of passages, particularly weddings and funerals. Instead of using the phrase *gotong-royong*, however, people more frequently conceptualize attending communal rituals and gatherings as acts of *bersilaturahmi*. This is an Arabic-derived Indonesian word meaning "to socialize and reciprocate," and it includes all social behaviors that bodily materialize *gotong-royong*. Neighbors *bersilaturahmi* in important rites of passage by fulfilling their obligation to organize and witness public rituals. Public ritual holds its power in legitimizing one's social status in the community. As Woodward (1988, 80) and Beatty (1999, 34) have observed, the guests in a Javanese public ritual are present not merely as a passive audience, but also as active *sekse* (Jv. "witnesses") who validate the reiterated intentions of a host and the completion of a collective prayer.

But just how strong is this sense of community? What is the consequence of not participating in all this? What is the punishment for deviance from the locally sanctioned "good" behaviors[5] (Bourideu 1996, 17)? In the urban milieu today, being the social outcast may not have any substantial consequences immediately, except that one is more secluded and not welcomed. The moral boundaries in the neighborhood only to some extent dictate the force of public pressure. The Salafist Father RT I mentioned in Chapter 1 was, in fact, not the most undesirable kind of neighbor, since he had converted to *bersilaturahmi*, the proper way of socialization with others. The quintessential example of a undesirable neighbor in the larger "harmonious" project, according to several women who were the cadres of the neighborhood organization PKK (*Pemberdayaan dan Kesejahteraan Keluarga*, or before 2000, *Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga*) in that particular RT in Sinaran, was a couple who was involved in Islamic charity.[6] The wife was from East Java, while her husband was from *Nusa Tenggara* (Southeast Indonesia). They led an austere lifestyle. The couple made soap and sold it as a livelihood in addition to the financial support they received from the charity organization. Neighbors somewhat disliked them, and the reason was no more than that they never held a *syukuran*—"the ritual of gratitude," a more urbanite, generic term for all sorts of *slametan*, the ritual meal. That meant this couple never organized rites of passage, that they never invited people to their place, and that they were not in the exchange system.

Years ago, a rumor was circulated after the woman's delivery of a baby following three unfortunate miscarriages. One cadre of the PKK in Sinaran said to me privately in her house:

> How did she eventually get pregnant? That must be some sort of *adat* (ethnic custom) from *luar Jawa* (outside of Java). Swallow some evil drink and resort to some deviant ritual. Now they have a little girl, but they still did not bother to hold a *syukuran*. What are they thinking? Non-Javanese people are just weird, don't you think?[7]

It seems that, despite all the forces of deterritorialization (the neighborhood consists of some recent migrants from other parts of Java and beyond) and diversification (their class and religious profile is heterogeneous) in Javanese urban life, the will to preserve the social community sometimes takes the form of moral judgments that may seem harsh. In fact, many women in the Sinaran neighborhood experienced miscarriages before they had their first child. But their eventual announcement of pregnancy was celebrated by neighbors and the officers of the RT and RW, as long as it was accompanied with a series of Javanese ritual meals. On the contrary, the hard-won pregnancy of the couple who never held *syukuran* was considered illegitimate, precisely because they did not pay "the symbolic taxes" that "every group expects of its members" in the form of holding life-cycle ceremonies (Bourdieu 1977, 95). There were no congratulations for the new-born child of the unsocial neighbors; worse yet, people treated it as if the couple did not deserve the child.

The lesson here is that it is never enough to be "pious" or to be "a good Muslim," unless one also engages in the minimum amount of *bersilaturahmi*. Working for an Islamic charity should have been a respectable career, but holding no life-cycle ceremonies is enough to discredit a life seemingly virtuous and noble. Consequently, neighbors treat the deviant behaviors of the couple as an offense, and punish them by circulating the rumor that the child was produced by occult magic. Bourdieu's remark on the naturalization of inclinations and actions sums up the scenario (1977, 95):

> Because, as in gift exchange, the exchange is an end in itself, the tribute demanded by the group generally comes down to a matter of trifles, that is, to symbolic rituals (rites of passage, the ceremonials of etiquette, etc.),

formalities and formalisms which . . . seem such "natural" things to demand ("It's the least one can do . . . " . . .) that abstention amounts to a refusal or a challenge.

In criticizing the ritual avoidance and reiterating their view that "it's the least one can do," neighbors reassert what it means to be a good community member, reinforcing the *habitus* of *bersilaturahmi*.

If the marginalized couple is at one end of the spectrum of *bersilaturahmi*, Bu De and Bu Eka are on the other end. They are faithful practitioners who take seriously the holding of rites of passage in the neighborhood commmunity. Bu De is the owner of a small, simple diner (*warung*) but, for her daughter's wedding in 2010, she spent about Rp 120 million (about 13,360 USD at the time) and invited about 800 people or 400 households. As to Bu Eka, the wife of a civil servant and a former singer, for her son's *khitanan* (circumcision ceremony), she spent more than Rp 15 million (about 1,670 USD) to cover the cost of the food, the *rebana* band, the decoration, and the invited preachers. Considering that the average monthly living expenditure for an urban Central Javanese household in 2005 was estimated between 120 and 150 USD,[8] the household basically paid what a family would normally spend for a whole year (in Bu Eka's case) or seven years (in Bu De's case) on a ritual that only lasts about two hours or a few days. Of course, there were some donations from the guests. Before all the guests left, they gave contributions. This must be done in rather discreet ways, usually by folding one's *buwuh* (an envelope with money inside) into a very small packet, so that the transition of the *buwuh* between hands is as invisible as possible. An envelope containing Rp 20,000 (about 2 USD) was considered a decent amount, but the number can vary, depending on one's wishes and economic status. Suppose that every guest contributed 2 USD (although some sums are larger), it could only cover about half of the cost in either case.

But Bu Eka told me that it was worth it. To a boy, a circumcision ceremony is just as important as a marriage ceremony is to a young woman. If her son did not get a proper *khitanan*, she reasoned, his *amal* (merits) would not count. Moreover, the recognition of the neighbors was vital, and the style of such a key ceremony would linger as a topic of conversation with neighbors. For her, there were two indispensable things at stake: her social relations in the community and the piety of her family.

The Ritual Shift

Despite the strong spirit of *bersilaturahmi* in many cases, it would be a mistake to assume that this *habitus* "engenders all the thoughts, all the perceptions, and all the actions consistent with those conditions, and *no others*" (Bourdieu 1977, 95, my emphasis). To the extent that the Javanese *habitus* of *gotong-royong* and *bersilaturahmi* have persisted, Javanese rites of passages have undergone changes along with the larger socio-economic and religious environment. In fact, social change has often been strongly reflected in rituals. Clifford Geertz's classic piece "Ritual and Social Change" (1957) sharply captures the ideological divides in the 1950s that were undermining Javanese communal solidarity, which lead him to stress the importance of larger socio-political contexts for understanding how communities change. Since the 1970s, highly mobile populations, diversifying religious profiles, and individualizing forces have all threatened to undercut the coherent ideal of the Javanese community. The "harmonious" project has thus faced ongoing challenges, and the emergence of alien groups (such as residents who are locally labeled as "Salafists") is only one of the most recent manifestations of the anti-ritual and anti-reciprocity forces.

The most significant ritual shift since the 1980s that Guinness identifies in Yogyakarta is the decline of the *kendhuren* (2009, 158) and the rise of the Muslim prayer ceremonies *sembahyang* and *pengajian* (ibid., 162–170). Guinness illustrates that *kendhuren* used to be the key form of *slametan* in the 1970s and 1980s, through which households celebrated important occasions in the family life cycle. The *kendhuren* was typically a male ritual (ibid., 155; see also Woodward 1988, 62), where all heads of households gathered together to distribute the ritual meal, although most of the work was done by women through the network of women's *rewang*—also meaning "mutual help," through which women determined the guest list and prepared the food (see Sullivan 1994). Nowadays, Guinness observes, *kendhuren* is no longer practiced. In fact, residents in Ledok think that only old-fashioned people (*wong kuno*) would do *kendhuren* (2009, 155). These exclusively male public rituals have dramatically declined.

Guinness further illustrates that the difficulty of holding an extravagant *kendhuren* for people during the economic hardship in the 1990s does not seem fully to explain this change. Weddings, a ritual that continues to be

marked as a key site showing newly formed kinship and the status transition of a family in the neighborhood, have become more lavish than ever. Guinness thus writes:

> The acknowledgement of community was not lost, however, for the wedding reception was preceded the night before by an Islamic prayer ceremony (*pengajian*) at both the bride's and bridegroom's parental homes, attended in each case by probably 200 RW neighbors (2009, 156).

As the *pengajian* gained more salience in weddings, which have become more luxurious, *kendhuren* became less important. The eclipse of older forms of male-exclusive *kendhuren* (ritual meals) in the wake of more elaborated Islamic *pengajian* should not be considered as a total displacement of men, since women were not completely absent in the past either. Indeed, there have always been some more women-centered communal rituals, such as *minoti*, the seven-month pregnancy celebration, in which people believe the embryo starts to have a soul. In fact, weddings have probably always been more women-centered, since the *pemaes* ritual expert prepares the make-up, dressing styles, and offerings, and then leads the newlyweds through the ritual procedures. The bride's parents also always have a greater say than the groom's.

That being said, we need to put the general change into perspective. The most significant ritual shift lies in the fact that women now almost invariably serve as the majority of ritual witnesses in most of the key rites of passage encompassing circumcision ceremonies, weddings, funerals, and so forth, not just the female-centered *mitoni* ceremony, as in the past. This transformation features a higher representation of women on the public side of ceremonies, which is a further development of Norma Sullivan's observation and argument that women's work in the kitchen behind the scenes was just as important as the men's *kenduren* in the forefront (1994).

The case of the circumcision ceremony illustrates many of the issues involved in women's participation in religious and ritual gatherings.

> On the Sunday morning of 31 January 2010, Bu Eka's son had recovered from his circumcision and was ready for the *khitanan* or the ritual celebration. The gathering started at 10am, when the road was already saturated with sounds of buoyant Arabic music. As people filled the outdoor tents and the seated areas surrounding Bu Eka's and her neighbors' houses, the number of guests reached about 180 (although many donated without

staying), mostly married adults. Women, donning headscarves in a wide array of hues, numbered more than 100 and most were regular attendees of the women's Islamic sermon group (*pengajian*)...Unlike the "men before women" (or men and women are parallel but separated) spatial arrangement during *sholat* (Ar. *salat*, Indo. *sholat*, "the practice of formal prayer in Islam"), some of the female guests were seated right in front of the stage, while the men mostly stayed in the back.[9]

Compared with the past ethnographic literature, one thing that stands out in this important rite of passage is the Islamic styles of music and dress, and the sermon in which women serve as musicians, singers, guests, and audience who actively witness and validate the ceremony. The following is a selected and much condensed record of the interactions between the preacher and the audience that day. Since women and men were seated separately, it was very clear that the preacher was mostly interacting with the women, rather than the men.

Preacher:	Raising a kid is no easy thing...[considering all those] expenses, [one] still can't be sure that the kid will be a good person...the happiness of this life is not lasting...perhaps one can obtain a beautiful wife, but then, as time goes by...the wife will also become NOT pretty...
Women:	[laughed out loud.]
Preacher:	It's more important to have a pious wife than a beautiful wife, [so one can have] heaven in this world.
Women:	Yes! Yes! [collectively]
Preacher:	[turning his head to the male audience] Don't be mad at [your] wife! Because [my] wife is the one who makes me not unchaste, who educates my kids, and who will determine whether I will go to hell or heaven. [turning back to the female audience] If your daughter is proposed to by two men, [and] one of them is not handsome...and NOT pious, while the other is handsome AND pious, what to do now? [pause]...OF COURSE you choose the one that is handsome AND pious!!!
People:	[laughing loudly]
Preacher:	Yet your daughter should also look at the mirror to see whether she is beautiful or not.
People:	[laughing loudly again]
Preacher:	Hopefully [your daughter] will obtain a husband as handsome as [President] SBY.
Women:	[energetically with laughter] Yes! Amen![10]

While the ceremony is to celebrate a boy's circumcision, the focus of the sermon falls on entertaining women. Preaching episodes like these, however amusing, are generally considered to be *ilmu*—that is, knowledge. Being humorous is a way of effectively engaging the audience and of delivering the message, and this preacher was an expert. On the subject of beauty, the preacher reversed a cliché about men's insatiable lust to seek beauty. He pleased the female audience by giving women a license to look for a perfect, pious, and handsome man, thus redistributing the entitlement to "an ideal spouse" to women. In other words, although seemingly it was a male preaching to a mixed audience of men and women, the sermon was actually expressing new gender roles that are popular among middle-class Javanese Muslim women.

Consider the most striking part of this sermon: the preacher said one's wife was the one "who will determine whether I will go to hell or heaven." This assertion squarely counters the old Javanese idiom "*suwarga nunut neraka katut*" ("follow to heaven, fall to hell," or "the happiness or the sufferings of women depends on their husbands"). This idiom, which appears in the stories of the early nineteenth-century classic *Serat Centhini* (or so-called "Encyclopedia of Java") is often cited and denounced by Indonesian feminists to criticize Javanese patriarchy. In the sermon, the logic of the idiom was reversed: the husband's deeds do not determine the wife's fate; rather, it is the wife's piety that shapes the husband's piety.

But it is not merely the content of the sermon that demonstrates the significance of the ceremony. It is also the form that is illuminating. Despite the fact that the preachers are mostly men, women are not merely pupils to be educated. Women are entertained and served by the male preachers who are invited to give sermons. Particularly in weddings and circumcision ceremonies, these preachers work hard to earn favor among the audience to gain reputation and future invitations. In this scenario, Muslim women attend this public event not only to increase their *amal* (religious merit), but also to validate public rituals and have a great time.

How do we comprehend this simultaneous growth of more self-consciously Islamic ritual styles and women's more prominent roles in communal rituals, then? My approach here is to use a Bakhtinian perspective as a good corrective to the more rigid application of *habitus*. While Bourdieu's concept of *habitus* is still useful in understanding certain aspects of the long-term dispositions embedded in Javanese social

relations, it is incomplete and other approaches are needed to deal with social change. For example, scholars have criticized Bourdieu's over-polarization between social actors' reflexivity and doxa (Garnham and Williams 1980). In response to this criticism, McNay (1999) believes that, with the concept of "fields," Bourdieu more effectively deals with the problem of social change and mutability than he did in his original *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (1977). In this book, I am less interested in developing a neo-Bourdieuian theory than using both Bourdieu and Bakhtin's conceptual tools to explore the complex phenomena of dialogic religiosity. I will use Bakhtin's idea of speech genres to handle the cultural diversity that goes beyond the range of "variations" to become actual cultural change. In what follows, I trace the genealogy of women's public piety through Islamic sermon groups (*pengajian*). It is my argument that this ritual shift could not have taken place without the successful women-led, grass-roots Islamic sermon groups.

From "the Friend in the Back" to the Guest in the Front

Pengajian (Indo. *ngaji*, to recite, *pengajian*, the recitation or sermon) is a meeting that incorporates a brief Islamic sermon.[11] Since the 1970s and 1980s, *pengajian* has been implemented all over Java by different interest groups, including Golkar, the ruling party; other reformist Muslim groups such as the Muhammadiyah; and the neo-traditionalist Muslim group, NU (Hefner 1987, 545–547; Jones 1984; Weix 1998). Initially, *pengajian* was viewed by some scholars as an electoral stratagem designed to court Muslim voters (Ward 1974, 82), or a public vehicle for reformist Islamic movements to propagate a state version of ideal womanhood (Baried 1986). Today, however, *pengajian* has become a truly popularized social activity in ordinary neighborhoods, independent of specific political or religious associations.

In at least six neighborhoods I personally visited in Salatiga, there are routinized weekly *pengajian* and holiday *pengajian*. Typically, the former is regularly run by neighborhood-based organizations based on either the Javanese calendar (5 days in each week) or the common Gregorian calendar (7 days in each week). In Sinaran, the women's weekly *pengajian* takes place on Tuesday or Thursday in the late afternoon, except for the second week of the month. Every *selapan* (35 days), based on a combination of the Javanese

and Gregorian calendar, one more *pengajian* would be added. In Graha, the women's *pengajian* takes place once a week on Friday afternoons at 4 pm. The holiday *pengajian* was held by the government and mosques at all levels on *Maulud* (the Prophet's birthday), the Ascension Day of the Prophet, and *Sura/Muharram* (Islamic New Year), as well as *Idul Adha* and *Idul Fitri*. In addition to these major events, *pengajian* has figured more prominently in all the *slametan*, which are now often referred to by urban residents under the category of *syukuran*, or are simply mentioned with the name of the specific purpose of each life-cycle rite. On ordinary days, there is *pengajian*; on special days, there is also *pengajian*.

In terms of the professions of the members of *pengajian*, those in Sinaran vary from small entrepreneurs, lower-ranking civil servants, teachers, petty vendors, to housewives and laborers. In Graha, they are schoolteachers, business owners, civil servants, or housewives. Some of the *pengajian* members in Graha have made the pilgrimage to Mecca, the cost of which (Rp 36 million, about USD 3,600 in 2009) was beyond the financial capacity of many of the members of the Islamic sermon group in Sinaran. For the latter, the cost of such a trip was more than several years of gross income for an entire family.

The typical number of participants varies each time, but is usually around 50 people, and occasionally more, organized by a master of ceremonies, a reciter, a translator who reads the Qur'anic verses in Indonesian, and a sermon preacher. In Sinaran, the group rotates locations within the neighborhood mosques and, each time, invites different teachers, mostly local male preachers such as retired schoolteachers or religious teachers. In Graha, members meet regularly in the main mosque and on each occasion speakers are invited from Islamic colleges, the Muhammadiyah, NU, or the Department of Religion in the city.

In both Sinaran and Graha, a *pengajian* meeting usually starts with the customary *salaman* "handshake" all around, with one's right hand lightly brushing that of another person, and then brought back to one's chest. This must be done with everyone already on the scene, except when one is very late and the activity has already started. During this time, women would chat about household affairs and health matters, while a box for donations was passed around. The maaster of ceremonies would announce news, and remind the members of the next meeting time and location. Then, the preacher would show up. The group then chanted some Koranic verses, followed by a translation, and then the sermon. The sermon might last half an hour or longer. After the sermon, it was recitation again, while the snack

boxes and hot tea served in covered glasses were passed hand to hand from the entrance of the hall until the food had reached everyone. Hot tea is usually heavily sugared; the snack box, often hand-made by members, consists of a combination of standard refreshments: *tahu* (fried tofu), *tahu isi* (fried tofu filled with young bamboo shoots), *sosis* (egg roll with chicken filling), *krupuk* (deep fried starch-based crackers), *kripik singkong* (cassava chips), pudding, and three to five raw green peppers or more. After the boxes were distributed, the attendants would shake each other's hands again, have some small talk, and quickly clear out.

Regarding the features of Javanese neighborhood-based *pengajian*, Bruinessen and Wajidi (2006) portrayed it as "a major form of entertainment" and one that "brings religious merit" (ibid., 235). In a similar vein, the Indonesian anthropologist Bambang Pranowo noticed that, in the rural area of the Magelang regency in the late 1980s, being *humoris* ("humorous") (Pranowo 2009, 154) and keeping the audience from falling asleep is a touchstone of a successful *pengajian* preacher. While *pengajian* constitutes a path for enriching religious knowledge and cultivating moral selves, the successful *pengajian* is conducted in an entertaining way so that the socializing power of *pengajian* is always characterized by witty wisdom.

In addition to serving as a kind of entertainment and as a way of accumulating individual merit, Islamic sermon events are highly women-oriented. Weix's documentation of *pengajian* in the Central Javanese city of Kudus during the 1980s gives us some comparable information (1998, 410):

> This particular prayer group was not uncommon; women's prayer groups were held throughout Kudus in homes, which were comfortable gathering places in which to exchange news. The neighbors acknowledged pleasure in seeing each other on a regular basis.... they quietly conveyed news of families and sought advices from each other as well as from the speaker ... their actions and activities encouraged and enabled others to live as good Muslims ... Neighborhood women distinguished themselves as good Muslims living in a pluralist social environment; they celebrated life-cycle events as *pengajian*.

Two decades later, like Weix, I found that *pengajian* in Salatiga are explicitly Islamized "comfortable gatherings" that allow women to participate in religious meetings while exchanging small talk. While individual cultivation of piety is certainly important, the meaning of Islamic sermons goes well beyond individualist goals. Before and after the meeting, women foster their relations by conveying news and seeking advice for family issues, however

briefly. Women's prayer groups are often more successful, more interesting, and better organized than men's in all the neighborhoods I know in Salatiga. Women are often said to be more *rajin* (diligent) than men (who are said to be "lazy") in organizing and attending *pengajian*. This was, according to my respondents, because the "collective cooking for life-cycle rituals" network or *rewang* has long bonded women together. The difference is that, whereas in *rewang* women work behind the scene, in *pengajian* women participate in public areas that used to be associated with men.

Indeed, *rewang* has been recognized as a particularly feminine aspect of Javanese customary sociability (see also Sullivan 1994; Newberry 2006). While *rewang* partially embodies the Javanese ideal of wifehood as *kanca wingking* ("friend in the back"),[12] it also connects individual women to one another through collectively cooking and cultivating special female friendship. If *rewang* is still a largely "behind-the-scenes" event, a *pengajigan* squarely takes place in a mosque in the middle-class neighborhoods. While the latter has been marked with Islamic piety, these two share a similar *habitus* of female friendship and sociality enacted by female intimacy. Without *rewang*, women's *pengajian* would not have been this popular.

To theorize the popularization of women's Islamic sermon gathering, Bakhtin's concept of multiple "speech genres" can be of much aid here (1986, 87). Speech genres, to borrow Bakhtin's words, are "relatively stable types" of utterances that have particular thematic content, style, and compositional structure (1986, 60). Speech genres encompass different activities such as greetings, small talk, military commands, poetry recitation, news report, religious preaching, and so forth. Each is different based on social, economic, and political factors, and is subject to "alternating with one another." Moreover, a speech genre does not simply stay static, but can change over time, forming "a special history of speech genres" (1986, 65). A speech genre is thus not isolated but, instead, related to the creativity of pre-existing socio-linguistic activities.

In the history of women's *rewang* and its evolution to *pengajian* in Salatiga, small talk and religious learning alternate with one another, blending sociability and piety in unprecedentedly feminized and Islamized ways. In a different vein, Brenner (1998, 177) makes comparable observations of the alternation between *arisan* (rotating lottery) and *slametan* in the batik selling community of Surakarta. Just as *arisan* is not purely for economic gains, but also has a special social valence, *pengajian* is not purely for cultivating individual piety, but also for envisaging a moral community (see Figs 4.3 and 4.4).

Fig. 4.3 A women's Islamic sermon group (*pengajian*) in June, 2010
Source: Photo by the author.

Fig. 4.4 Saying goodbye after a women's Islamic sermon group (*pengajian*) finished in August, 2010

Source: The far left is the author of the book. Photo by Nat Tuohy.

If women's collective cooking combines small talk and backdoor conversations behind old ritual meals, Islamic sermon meetings traverse these backdoor conversations and staged oral theatre performances of Qur'anic recitation and religious preaching. "Women's meetings" add color and interest to the Islamic sermon, which enables several pre-existing speech genres to mix smoothly. Most importantly, it popularizes what would have been a less appealing religious event. The fluidity and changeability of speech genres, then, helps us to identify the creativity of pre-existing socio-linguistic activities that have enlivened the Islamic sermon meeting.

According to several of my respondents, before the burgeoning and popularization of *pengajian* in Salatiga during the 1980s and 1990s,

adult women already had highly connected networks through the PKK and *rewang*. With the rise of Muslim women's well-managed *pengajian*, women have acquired their own public terrain *through cultivating Islamic piety*, building their social visibility on top of the pre-existing social ties. Furthermore, when Islamic resurgence since the 1990s rendered explicitly "Islamic" elements more desirable in rites of passage, Muslim women again shifted their Islamic activity from mosques to life-cycle ritual spaces. Their speech genres shifted between *pengajian* to *syukuran*; "they celebrated life-cycle events as *pengajian*" (Weix 1998, 410).

WOMEN'S NARRATIVES ABOUT PIETY AND MUSLIM–CHRISTIAN SOLIDARITY

If Muslim women have gained more public space in the ritual shift over the recent decades, what has happened to non-Muslim women in this process? In this section, I discuss the implications of the Islamic revitalization for Muslim–Christian female friendship in the neighborhood community. Below, I introduce the narratives of Bu Eka and Bu Enny. Each person reveals her practice of "sociable piety" and female friendship across the Muslim–Christian divide in her own way.

Bu Eka was a charismatic figure in the Sinaran neighborhood. She was born in 1968 in Cebu, East Java, in a Javanese family that affiliated with the Islamic traditions of the NU, although she was never educated in an Islamic boarding school. Since she was a little girl, she had shown a talent for singing despite never receiving professional instruction. After graduating from high school, she became a professional singer for ceremonial events in a *rebana* band in Semarang, where they played a wide variety of music including religious songs, *campur sari* (contemporary Javanese pop), and pop music. Her *rebana* groups won several awards in competitions and contributed to many local ceremonies, photos of which Bu Eka proudly framed and hung on the walls of her living room. It was in Semarang that she met her future husband, a middle-ranking civil servant originally from Salatiga. Even though she had a strong aspiration to continue her career in Semarang, due to the marriage she gave up the career and moved to Salatiga in 1995. Nevertheless, her renown as a singer was soon spread by word of mouth in Salatiga. A *rebana* group centered downtown started to invite her as a guest singer for ceremonial events.

Bu Eka had a son born in 1998 and a daughter born in 2003. After her daughter started formal schooling, she decided to devote more time to childcare and only occasionally accepted part-time jobs as a singer. A few years ago, when her RT was electing a new head of the RT after the Christian Father RT had served the neighborhood for three terms, many asked Bu Eka to be the head of the RT.

> They want me, not my husband, to be the head of the RT! Well, I did not want it. To manage (*mengurusi*) people is too much . . . What is important is *bersilaturahmi* with people. Aren't I already in the PKK and women's *pengjian*? That's enough . . . I have become more diligent in the Islamic sermon group recently over the past years . . . but I am getting old . . . hopefully in the future maybe one of my children will be willing to *mondok* (stay and study in an Islamic boarding school).[13]

Residents in her RT found Bu Eka's outgoing spirit of leadership admirable. Although Bu Eka declined the proposal, she remained active in the neighborhood, largely through organizing *pengjian* and the PKK. More recently, she sent her daughter to a private Islamic school, and was hoping that at least one of her children would one day spend some time in a *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school) to obtain more religious knowledge, which she believed was beneficial for a child's parents, too. While she was waiting for that day to come, she diligently attended *pengajian* for herself. But attending *pengajian* not only serves the purpose of individual merit-making. By categorizing the Islamic sermons as acts of *bersilaturahmi*, Bu Eka also affirms the socializing quality of the activity. On one hand, she sees receiving knowledge in *pengajian* as conducive to accumulating individual religious merits (*amalan*). On the other hand, she regards the social gathering facilitated by *pengajian* and *syukuran* as essential to fostering the integrity of the neighborhood community. In this way, Bu Eka was enacting "sociable piety," which implies an inclination that urges pious neighbors to socialize in order to forge desirable social relations, while regarding the individual cultivation of piety as beneficial for both the self and community.

When it comes to Muslim–Christian relations, however, Bu Eka's attitude was complex and ambivalent. Wary of the spread of fanaticism, she felt it was necessary to spread the true kind of Islam (*Islam yang benar*) that emphasized harmony across different religious populations. Yet, she also felt that in Salatiga, the Christian minority had been too prominent, a

theme discussed in Chapter 3. Affirming that Christians are often the heads of RT and RW in Salatiga, she said:

> [I would say] this is foolish . . . When I moved in [after marriage] I was surprised (*kaget*). How come most people are Muslims but [they are] governed by Christians?[14]

But still, she had a much higher opinion of sociable Christians than those puritanical Muslims who refused to partake in the neighborhood lives. As she commented:

> [As long as Christians are also sociable,] I am kind with everybody . . . Even though I am *Islamic*, the family of the head of the [former] RT [who are Christians] must be invited [to public rituals that we hold] . . . how can it be otherwise? I do not favor one over another (*pilih kasih*). Even the Christians are also good friends (*akrab*) with me![15]

Despite her general attachment to the majoritarian sentiment, in everyday life Bu Eka upheld pragmatism and chose to practice the *habitus* of inter-religious *bersilaturahmi* in a Muslim-majority community that includes Christians. In Bu Eka's logic, a helpful, hard-working and sociable Christian family is a great deal worthier than a ritual-avoiding Muslim family. This point is best illustrated by the case of Bu Enny, a Javanese Protestant also living in the neighboring RT in Sinaran.

Bu Enny was born in 1967 in Salatiga, but worked as a midwife and nurse in Mataram on Lombok Island until 2000. She moved back, for a reason I will reveal shortly. With her husband working in the Indonesian state-owned electricity company (PLN), she considered herself as a house-wife. She did catering as her side job, sometimes it was done for free for the neighborhood. Although Bu Enny was not the head of the PKK in her RT, she was the secretary and the *de facto* head. Her active involvement in the communal rites of passages could be seen from a conversation between her, her best friend Bu Wati, and me:

Me: So would you say that you are retired now?
Bu Enny: Housewife and unpaid event planner of many events [laughing].
Bu Wati: That's right, cooking, that's right, no one would pay (her), isn't it?

Bu Enny:	If there is someone who has events, celebration (*hajatan*), like wedding you know, well, we are the ones who cook, for example I cooked [this thing you are eating]!
Bu Wati:	We are one in this (*kita ada satu*)...like mothers you know, we cook together. [It's called] rewang.
Bu Enny:	That's right, all sorts of cooking, the amount is a lot. Wedding ceremonies, big circumcision ceremonies, August 17th [the Independence day] events. We cook here.
Me:	[Mothers] Cook in this house?
Bu Enny:	Isn't [my kitchen] in the back is spacious?[16]

Although Bu Wati was certain that "we," regardless of religious faith, were "one," and that there was no differentiation between Muslims and Christians, the reason that Bu Enny returned to Salatiga in 2000 to settle has a dark past related to cross-religious conflict in the country. It happened during a period when several provinces in Indonesia were ravaged by ethno-religious violence. As a cheerful and optimistic person in general, however, at this moment Bu Enny recounted this to me with both reservation and resignation:

> When I still had a chance to work until 2000...you know that I was in Mataram, West Nusa Tenggara, [on the Island of] Lombok. But there riots broke out...[and] because I (pause)...and then, I came home here [in Salatiga], my husband in Bali, returning home once a month. Oh well, maybe really God has other plans [for me] to be able to serve [people] here.[17]

Bu Enny paused when she was supposed to say the word "Christian" (as in "*saya Kristen*." Note that "I Christian" is the grammatically correct way to say "I am Christian" in Indonesian). She did not go in a direction that would imply she was a victim of Muslim–Christian violence. Neither did she uphold the value of community without mentioning religious virtue. Instead, she framed the experience as "God's plan" and positioned herself as a servant in the community who cooked for weddings and "big circumcision ceremonies." In her own way, Bu Enny was also performing "sociable piety." Both the past experience of escaping from danger and the current experience of serving people were framed as capable of producing a relation with God.

But Christian women do not only stay behind in the kitchen to cook for life-cycle ceremonies held by Muslim households in the neighborhood community. There are other ways in which Christian women can contribute to public rituals. In what follows, I probe this question by presenting

the ways in which the separate identities of Muslim and Christian neighbors are strengthened in ritual space through gendered signs of religiosity.

GENDERED PARTICIPATION OF CHRISTIAN NEIGHBORS IN MUSLIM CEREMONIES

We are back again to the circumcision ceremony. The celebration included both Muslims and Christians in the neighborhood. This was obvious since, among the four female greeters standing at the entrance of the blue tent built right in front of Bu Eka's house and her neighbors', two were not wearing the headscarf (see Chapter 1). These were the wives of the former heads of the RT and RW, Bu Ida and Bu Maria, who were a Protestant and a Catholic, respectively. Next to them were five teenage girls, who delivered snacks and tea to the guests. The rest of the adult women who were seated all wore the headscarf, including Bu De and Bu Wati, who usually do not don the headscarf unless attending this kind of ritual occasion.

When the Islamic recitation formally began, Bu Ida and Bu Maria disappeared from the visible areas. They went back to the kitchen and inner rooms, where other women were wrapping snacks for the guests. Songs of *Shalawat Nabi* opened the ceremony, followed by the opening speech given by the former Father RT, a Protestant man with a *songkok* ("fez," Indo., *peci*). A young, skillful male preacher gave the Arabic prayer, and a representative of the family thanked the community. What followed was the rather amusing *pengajian* mentioned previously. After the *pengajian* more Shalawat came, this time featuring Bu Eka herself as the lead singer who selected songs to convey a special message to her son. After this and a final prayer, during which the loosely segregated congregation opened their palms facing upwards, the ritual meal began. At the end when the guests parted with the host, Bu Ida and Bu Maria appeared again to shake hands.

The strategy of the presence and absence of Bu Ida and Bu Maria at the *khitanan* captures the ongoing negotiation of the neighborhood community to grapple with the tension between customary sociality and different expressions of piety. In the past, when veiling was not the norm among Javanese Muslim women, a glimpse of the ceremony would not immediately expose each participant's religious identity. Today, as the headscarf has increasingly become the default etiquette among married Muslim

women, especially in more socially significant occasions, the bare head of Christian women increasingly signifies their otherness. While the male black hat symbolized male solidarity across religious divides in Salatiga, the female Islamic headscarf created a marked boundary among those who remained seated in the front. When the Qur'anic recitation began, this gendered boundary between those wearing and not wearing headscarves suddenly became more salient. The bareheaded Bu Ida and Bu Maria retreated to spaces far from the front stage; by contrast, their husbands, wearing neutral *songkok*, stayed in the tent.

The case of Bu Ida and Bu Maria is more extreme than the experiences of other Christian women who do not hold office titles in the neighborhood. In other weddings I have witnessed, a few married Christian women sit inside the tent despite not wearing the headscarf. Their presence was never as salient as that of Bu Ida and Bu Maria, who at the beginning and the end of the ceremony needed to acknowledge everyone. The more salient the women's positions were, the more incongruity their embodied difference could generate.

The headscarf as a gendered religious marker has the potential to divide the population along religious lines. While there is still room for non-Muslims to participate, these Islamic rites of passage in the neighborhood community may have different impacts on Muslim women and Christian women, while men, regardless of faith, are less influenced. As Muslim women have become the majority of the ritual witnesses who represent the community, they also represent Islamic piety more visibly than men do.

The Ongoing Transformation of the Meanings of the Islamic Headscarf

Indeed, one of the most noticeable markers of this ritual shift has been the rise of the Islamic headscarf or *jilbab* (Ar. *hijab*) in Salatiga since the 1990s. At almost every social and religious gathering where middle-aged and middle-class Muslim women are present, there is always a splendid collection of headscarves in many shades, adorned with jewelry, embroidery, sequins, and pins, and folded in different styles. If anything, the public display of headscarves makes women's presence more, rather than less, noticeable. But the practice of veiling in Islam needs some historical contextualization. Veiling is neither an unthinking relic of medieval Islam,

nor a hindrance on women's participation in public life.[18] Contrary to the popular imagination in the West of veiling as an oppressive and concealing institution, the kinds of veiling practices among women I work with does not hide anyone, or diminish anyone's presence. As will be shown, the complex semiotics of veiling in Salatiga belies the simplicity of the early feminist argument about the headscarf,[19] as Islamic femininity has been celebrated in local ways that cannot be easily viewed through a dichotomy of subjugation and empowerment.

Although Javanese women historically have been allowed in the mosque, the market, and generally any other institution that men are entitled to enter (unlike some places in the Middle East), in the Javanese context, since the mid-1990s, the headscarf enables many women to earn more public respect and to expand their role in religious spaces, such that they do not merely have women-only Islamic sermons, but also can recite the Qur'an in front of men, as we saw earlier with Mbak Catur's recitation in the mosque before the mixed audience.

As many scholars have pointed out, the Islamic veil in Indonesia was rarely the norm for mainstream Muslim women's everyday attire until very recently. When it did flourish, it was always connected to its particular local situation. During the 1950s, for example, when religious identity became heavily politicized by the fierce parliamentary competition along sectarian lines, orthodox "*santri*" Javanese Muslim women would wear *kerudung* (a form of the veil that is loose and does not fully conceal the hair) outside of the mosques as an act of boundary-drawing to separate themselves from the "*abangan*" Javanist Muslims (see Chapter 2). Yet, the practice was temporary, and veiling was never popularized outside of the mosque to the degree that it is today. In fact, much like the Turkish secularist experience, for a long time veiling in public was believed to be utterly un-Indonesian.

In Central Java, it was not until the 1980s that veiling started to signify gendered Islamic modernity in Indonesian society. Veiling was thought of as a specifically religious obligation that distinguished the present from the less religiously observant past (Brenner 1996). At the time veiling was still quite controversial and, in some places during the 1980s and early 1990s, an angry mother would yell at her veiling daughter for being "too Arab" and "fanatical" (Brenner 1996). In the late 1990s throughout the 2000s, the practice of wearing the headscarf was initiated by college-educated daughters who later "passed up" the new tradition to the older generations. Through veiling, these upwardly mobile college students chose to

lead a more Islam-minded life in their adaptation to urban environments. They created moral boundaries via the headscarf to navigate through the strange space and potential threats of social life when they were alone and away from home (Smith-Hefner 2007).[20] In these processes, women described the adoption of the veil as "becoming aware" (*jadi sadar*), thus deepening their original Islamic identity through a daily practice of piety. More recently, however, as the wearing of the headscarf has become popularized and massively commodified, it is observed that veiling creates gendered anxieties about superficial consumerism, leading pious women to reframe the expressions of beauty and modesty as compatible with faith (Jones 2010).

In Salatiga, the practice of veiling is diverse, encompassing all the dimensions described above, but also revealing something further, particularly the avenue to status claims in the community. A generational difference is noticeable. For young Muslim women who were born after the late 1980s, veiling could be a type of Islamic fashion, as shown by a "selfie" club named "Hijaber Salatiga" ("*Hijab* wearers of Salatiga"). While their girly fashion risks encountering accusations of abusing Islamic femininity and violating the principle of modesty, women of their mother's generation have a different relationship with the headscarf. Many of these mothers are the pious members of the Islamic sermon group in the neighborhoods, and it is them I primarily consider here. Among them, wearing the *jilbab* is widely considered as a pious embodiment that materializes public dignity in specific occasions. The donning of the headscarf in the neighborhood community serves to enhance Muslim female pride on several public occasions. The actual object of that pride varies with each individual in each context, but are all entangled with both social relations. The meaning of *jilbab* thus cannot be understood without more context. Below, I tell a two-generation story that serves to illustrate just this point.

Female Pride and Islamic Makeup

A UKSW alumna, and now a career woman in Jakarta, Rahma is a cheerful and humorous young teacher, pretty much like her mother Bu Wati. Although most of her life was spent in Salatiga, she once lived in Pontianak briefly in 1998 due to her father's job in PLN, the national electrical utility company. At the time, she had her first contact with the idea of wearing the headscarf.

I was in high school in Pontianak and that was because of peer pressure . . . .
In my school there was a mosque youth organization (*komunitas remaja
masjid*). I joined in only because the guy I had a crush on was in it! . . . Many
of my friends who joined in the community for silly reasons like I did have
been wearing hijab ever since. I think they got some enlightenment or
something.

My auntie started wearing *jilbab* to attract her [future] husband because he
is the son of a Father Haji and a Mother Haji . . . As to Rosma [one of her
best friends at UKSW], she tried hijab so randomly, and then people told her
that she looked nicer in *jilbab*—people will say so to encourage you, you
know.

But Rahma did not adopt veiling, because Bu Wati told her that it had to
be a serious, conscientious decision.

Well, mama didn't allow it. The problem is that mama said, once I wore
it I could not take it off, that it had to be serious. Mama said "think
about it for 3 days first. If you still want to wear *jilbab* you can do that
after 3 days." I thought it was just temporary, and my personality is like,
you know, so easy to get bored. And, it was really hot in Pontianak! So
after three days, I already didn't want to do it . . . I was asked by a senior
student to wear *jilbab*. But really, the guy I had a crush on really become
too religious (*religious banget*), so I no longer liked him. And then, I
moved on![21]

Rahma's account above paints a vivid picture about the diverse relations of
Muslim women to the Islamic garment in completely different contexts.
There are those who, like Rahma, live without a headscarf, and those who,
like her aunt and Rosma, initially wore the headscarf for non-religious
reasons, but later "got some enlightenment." As someone who did not
want to wear the *jilbab* on a daily basis, Rahma felt there was strong peer
pressure. In her experiences, wearing the headscarf as a pious Muslim is
paired with the public image in a specific group like the Mosque Youth
organization, or to impress a potential spousal candidate who happens to
be pious. Yet, voices from the older generation, Rahma's mother, ques-
tioned the sincerity of Rahma's motive, aiming to draw a boundary
between solid faith and transient fad.

Temporality is another crucial factor. Initially in Pontianak, Bu Wati
admonished teenage Rahma for not keeping the proper correspondence
between the inner faith and the external piety *all the time*. Later, however,

when Bu Wati returned to Salatiga and joined the Islamic sermon group in the mid-2000s, she started to wear *jilbab* only when going to the mosque and prayer houses, and, since the late 2000s, also in weddings and circumcision ceremonies. In other words, Bu Wati does not always don the headscarf but, instead, wears it *situationally.* This seeming contradiction does not imply hypocrisy but, rather, suggests the necessity of reading the changing features of time and space that transform the relationship between faith and fabric. Bu Wati's changing attitudes indicate that veiling in Salatiga's neighborhood community has passed from being a sign of serious Islamic observance to an increasingly established norm in social life. While the veil has become a sign of pious solidarity in community rituals for older women, it was often considered an individual choice reflecting individual piety for younger women. Now the adequacy of veiling at important social occasions is no longer subject to social stigma, or purely a matter of personal choice, but an obligation for communal rituals for respectable mothers.

Rahma and Bu Wati's story exemplifies the heteroglossic meanings of wearing, or not wearing, the headscarf among social actors in a social milieu that values outward Islamic signs of piety in rites of passages for middle-aged women as ritual witnesses, on the one hand, and individual choices for unmarried young women, on the other hand. From 2013 to 2015, this ceremonial donning of the headscarf has become even stronger on the day of Idul Fitri, when all the closest female family members of Rahma, including herself, would put on fashionable *jilbab* and *busana muslim* ("Islamic clothing"), posing to take family photos. Many unmarried Muslim friends of mine who do not wear the *jilbab* daily also have the same "family Islamic photo" events on the day of Idul Fitri, revealing that this is a growing trend.

With a few exceptions, most members of the Islamic sermon groups did not have long traditions of veiling in their family. It was really since the 1990s that veiling has gradually seeped into the structure of their self-presentation in everyday life. Take Bu Eka's story, for example. She adopted the veil in 1998 to avoid unwanted male attention and to ward off men's temptation in her workplaces as a singer. But, later, she became more pious even though the initial reason for her to don the veil was not religious. As she became more observant and important in the neighborhood as the treasurer of the PKK in her RT and the music director for major holiday celebrations in her RW, her veil also became ever more inseparable from her body. Bu Eka saw veiling as constitutive of her respectability. She said that showing up in public without a *jilbab* would make her "*kurang pede*" (lack

confidence). Failing to wear it would be no different from going out undressed—in a way, failing to maintain her status in the neighborhood. In short, her embodiment of piety was entangled with socially approved forms of respectability.

To my knowledge, only a few women currently living in Sinaran and Graha inherited their practice of veiling from their families. Take Bu Rosita, for example. Growing up in a Muhammadiyah family in the 1970s, Bu Rosita was already familiar with older forms of veiling. Veiling for her was more or less a natural procession to female adulthood. But her religious observance was not merely unthinking submission to orthodoxy. For Bu Rosita, the meaning of the veil is a statement of confidence. As she once forcefully told me, "As a Muslim woman, one should let other people know one's identity." From her perspective, Islam does not require veiling to control over a woman's sexuality as much as it honors her role as the one who represents the religion both to believers and religious others. In Salatiga this especially meant representing Islam to local Christians.

The perspectives of Bu Wati, Bu Eka, and Bu Rosita reveal situational and multiple forms of self-presentation, and the embeddedness of veiling in each individual's particular family background, life history, and modes of performance. One common theme of their diverse experiences, however, is the ways that the veil helps to build up their self-perceived images in the eyes of their imagined audiences. Two interrelated points can be drawn here. First, the female concern for self-confidence and public respect via veiling runs counter to the older notion that Javanese women acquired their status first and foremost through their husbands, rather than through their own actions and embodiment (Hatley 1993). Second, important studies of veiling in Java and beyond have focussed on dressing as daily practice, and little is mentioned about veiling as a ritual practice. As veiling became the new "normal" among married middle-class women in Salatiga, the different ways of wearing the headscarf encompass variegated modes of dressing, tied to different status claims. The question here is not how to reconcile fashion and faith, but how to perform Islamic femininity contextually. As the human body is the ultimate symbol of society and social boundaries (Douglas 1973), the actual performances can lead to different kinds of boundary-making. While middle-aged Javanese Muslim women embrace daily or ritual veiling for greater confidence in public, the trend may create unintended consequences for non-Muslim minorities, as described in previous sections.

Community Regendered

Javanese Muslim women's heightened role in life-cycle ceremonies is not a trivial transformation, given that scholars have concluded that women's "work" behind public rituals was low-status compared with men's ritual enactment and performance, just like the notion in which men's spirituality was contrasted to women's materiality (Anderson 2006[1972]; Brenner 1998; Sullivan 1986). Unlike the arrangement of gender separation in worship, where women are sometimes seated behind or parallel to men, depending on the mosque, in many public ceremonies today, women can be seated in front of men. While gender asymmetry continues as, most of the time, the preacher is a male, women have more opportunities to organize and perform religious and social activities. These activities were *not* later handed over to men. Rather, women have considerable control over the activities, and they can even claim a more prestigious space in the mosque where the male congregation is also present.

The extension of women's roles from the routine neighborhood *pengajian* to life-cycle ceremonies is best attested by the strong overlapping of participants in the two types of activity, which often results in women outnumbering men on ritual occasions. This communal ritual shift suggests a complex interplay among various transformations of Muslim neighborhood communities. It demonstrates neither a unilateral "trickle-down" model dictated by state policies, or a particular national Muslim organization's agenda—nor its inverse, a model in which the tendencies of ordinary Muslims are determined according to individual psychological states independent from the larger social body. As we have seen, long-term social sensibilities and social impulses for *bersilaturahmi* are firmly present, but modified in accordance with social changes. Muslim women's role in neighborhood life expands as they attend *pengjian* and dress in Islam-exclusive fashions in *syukuran*. However, these changes can complicate Christian women's participation in public rituals held by Muslim households.

Such a ritual shift helps us re-anchor our theory of religion and gender. It makes us reconsider an assumption that revivals of "scriptural religions" must result in an unprecedented expansion of the male domain in public affairs and religious life. In fact, Muslim women have transformed Javanese life-cycle ceremonies and become more prominent in these events, precisely through embracing the politics of "sociable piety." Further, while it shows that the Islamic revival can strengthen the public participation of Muslim women, it may weaken the position of non-Muslim women, who

are also members of the social community. This complex interplay of religion and gender demonstrates the importance of investigating the heterogeneity of communities; it forces us to consider how religiously ethical personhood is also constituted by a network of complex social relationships that are negotiated and re-negotiated to accomodate to a particular array of religious diversity.

Scholarship on public piety has shown how women's roles are particularly vital in redefining moral communities. In Turkey during the 1980s, Göle observed the centrality of veiled female imagery for the Islamic revival as the key symbol of rebellion against Western, secular, and homogenizing modernity (1996, 17). In Lebanon, Deeb (2006) elaborates how Shi'i female activists view Islam as a better form of modernity than Western modernity, which they define as suffering from moral decadence and communal disintegration. Similarly, I see women's engagement in religious life as part of their personal strategies to acquire respectability and engage in the kinds of modern life they wish to pursue. What distinguishes the story I present here is an emphasis on customary sociality, as well as a consideration of gendered Muslim–Christian interactions in a religiously plural community. More specifically, I describe ways in which the representation of religiosity and community are recreated and negotiated by women of different faiths. While this complex interplay of religion and gender is an important feature of Muslim-majority neighborhood life in Salatiga today, in the downtown area, there are different reconfigurations of religion and gender, particularly shaped by Pentecostal believers, the topic of Chapter 5.

NOTES

1. Rasmussen, 2010. Women, the recited Qur'an, and Islamic music in Indonesia, p 212.
2. Peacock, on the other hand, noted that *maulud* was more frequently practiced by "traditionalist" orthodox Muslims and never by the "reformist" Muslims (1978, 44) based on his 1969–1970 fieldwork in Indonesia and Singapore. But, in Salatiga today, *maulud* was jointly celebrated by both neo-traditionalist and reformist Muslims. I have argued elsewhere that this has to do with a greater solidary between the NU and Muhammadiyah due to the rise of extremism (Chao 2014).
3. There was also RK, or "harmonious village," that supervised RWs. In 1988–1989, the RK unit was abolished in favor of the smaller RW.
4. Clifford Geertz and James Peacock, in the 1960s, both suggested that urban neighborhoods no longer represented corporate communities but, rather,

administrative units (Guinness 2009, 169), and that ritual meals would soon lose their appeal.

5. In Bourdieu's words, these moral judgments are the result when *habitus* "implement distinctions between what is good and what is bad, what is right and what is wrong, between what is distinguished and what is vulgar, and so on" (1996, 17). In our case, it is inclinations of customary sociality that constitute the lines of distinction.

6. To keep my respondents anonymous and to protect their privacy, I have to conceal the actual name of this Islamic charity.

7. Field notes, February 6, 2010.

8. This number is based on various statistics of BPS Central Java 2005, expenditure per capita multiplied by the household size.

9. Field notes, February 5, 2010. This excerpt from my field notes has appeared in an article of mine (2014) that has a different focus.

10. Field notes, January 31, 2010.

11. Depending on the definition one uses, the origin of *pengajian* can be traced back to what Dhofier identified as a practice in the *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school) (1999, 27–29), or what Geertz observed as weekly prayer meetings (1960, 168–170) named *pengaosan* ("*pengajian*," in Javanese) in Eastern Central Java in the 1950s.

12. This phrase, meaning "friend in the back," designates Javanese women to be "in the back" in the kitchen area (to cook) and in the well area (to wash clothes).

13. Field notes, February 5, 2010.

14. See endnote 12.

15. See endnote 12. This part of the interview has appeared in an article of mine (2014).

16. Field notes, June 16, 2013.

17. See endnote 15.

18. Although it is commonly believed that Islam mandates men and women to cover their *aurat*, the part of the human body that should be concealed in front of men who are not *muhrim* or close kin, the covering is often conceived as a means to guard their honor (Abu-Lughod 1999, 137; Göle 1996, 93), rather than a burden reflecting women's shame. Historically and cross-culturally, the practices of veiling differ widely, from the Arab elite emulating Persian headscarves in the past to the Indonesian middle-class university students aspiring to be modern in the Islamic way in the present.

In Turkey during the 1980s, for example, veiling represented a moral critique of Western hegemony and secularist political repression among the newly educated youth (Göle 1996, 83). To quote from a famous fictional but aptly realistic scene of that time period, "To play the rebel heroine in Turkey you don't pull off your scarf, you put it on" (Pamuk 2005, 337).

More recently, prominent feminist scholar Leila Ahmed also points out that, in post-9/11 America, many audacious Muslims women started veiling—not despite, but precisely because of the stigma that they now endeavored to rectify through being good *and* Islamic Americans in public (Ahmed 2011).

A brief comparison of the headscarf as the chronotopic motif in different time and space is useful here. Contrary to the unveiling movements in the broad Muslim-majority world before the 1960s, since the late 1970s Islamic thoughts and practices, veiling included, were revived globally as ways of achieving alternative modernity to compete with secular ideologies. Partially inspired by the Iranian Islamic Revolution, and different from the Saudi percept that imposed Muslim dress codes mostly strictly on women, revivals of Islamic costumes sometimes served as signs of rebellion in the wide disillusion with nationalist promises of prosperity and of the disapproval of continued Western domination in the Middle East and continued corruption in Indonesia up to the 1990s.

19. Based on their reading of the canonical texts and against the conventional wisdom about the Islamic headscarf, religious and feminist scholars have argued that, strictly speaking, nothing in the Qur'an offers a concrete prescription that directly requires hair-covering (Barlas 2002; Mernissi 1987, 127–129). Indeed, as far as the two most related verses are concerned, it is only said that women should cover their bosom and be modest, or cast an outer garment over their body. While there are four sources of Islamic law, four traditional schools in Sunni Islam, and hence inherently plural opinions in legal affairs throughout history and in different regions, most of the misogynistic mandates were historically derived from the Hadith, not the Qur'an (Mernissi 1991). Scholars hence contend that, assuming head-covering is misogynistic, the custom of hair-covering and related dress codes must be a patriarchal interpretation, rather than a religious mandate. Historically speaking, head-covering was a cultural adoption from the elite culture of Persian or Byzantine courts, not an Islamic injunction inscribed in the Qur'an (Keddie 1991, 2). For ordinary Muslims, these historical contextualizations obviously do not resonate widely.

20. In 1998, for a rather short period of time during the pro-democracy movement leading to President Suharto's resignation, the veiling movement even partially grew into an anti-government symbol among activists against the corrupt New Order regime (Smith-Hefner 2007).

21. This conversation took place via facebook messenger on May 9, 2014.

Regendering Ethnicity

Pentecostal Gender Dynamics Reshaping Chinese Imageries in Java

> *They don't like newcomers. The Dutch were newcomers, the Japanese were newcomers, and the Chinese were also newcomers . . . If I became a gangster, they would not dare to bully me.*
>
> Pak Stephen 2012 [1]

This chapter explores the entanglement of gender and ethnicity within the Pentecostal movement in Indonesia. It is intended to show how the Pentecostal movement enables a reconfiguration of gender, morality, and ethnic relations, particularly for ethnic Chinese. While gendered discourses geared towards the domestication of men and a heightened participation of women are prominent across a variety of Muslim and Christian movements, I argue that the Indonesian Pentecostal case is different in that it aggressively advocates a moralized "feminine" subjugation that is particularly meaningful for Chinese Indonesians. For my purposes here, I provide four ethnographic tales from the Pentecostal corners of Salatiga: a successful Chinese businesswoman who lost her "real-Chinese" husband; a Chinese caterer with a Salafist neighbor; a Pentecostal workshop for becoming a better Christian woman; and, finally, the life transformation of a male gangster-turned-pastor.

The ultimate argument of this chapter is that Chinese Indonesian Pentecostals, while being combative in their spiritual crusades within worship halls and revivals, strive to shake off their ethnic stereotypes by creating a prosperity theology that downplays materialism, and developing an ambivalent discourse of gendered submission in the predominantly Islamic nation. This

argument adds some complexity to the understanding of Southeast Asian Christianity as a tool of boundary maintenance and the path to self-modernization, a pattern that scholars have widely identified among the minorities in Southeast Asia[2] (Aragon 2000; Keyes 1977, 21; Keyes 1996; Tapp 1989, 89). As I shall demonstrate, however, charimatic Christianity enables ethnic Chinese to seek a self-position that is morally acceptable in the wider society. Their religosity allows them to transform or dilute the ethnic markers and achieve greater cultural integration within the nation. Selected testimonies of the church members of Ester and Fendi are given below.

ETHNIC ENTREPRENEUR TRANSFORMED

> July 27, 2010. It was a hot Tuesday afternoon in downtown Salatiga. Ahui talked to a car salesman in her accessory shop while two customers in their Islamic headscarves were walking around browsing several stylish pins. "I can't do that," Ahui spoke in Javanese mixed with a bit of Indonesian to the young Javanese man who was holding a bunch of papers full of tables and figures on them. "How about this model? Just like this [price] okay? How about that?" Ahui asked. "It has to be asked [to the boss] again, sister," the young Javanese guy replied. "Alright already," Ahui concluded quickly, "Thursday [we'll discuss again], right? Thanks, yes?" Finishing the talk, Ahui squeezed through the entrance into the area behind the counter, where hundreds of earrings, tiny plastic boards, hair bands and hair clips were scattered on the floor. Ahui worked with two other Javanese clerks, while listening to Radio Bethany on 107.7FM, a Pentecostal music station in the city.[3]

A native Salatiga resident born of Chinese ancestry (*keturunan Cina*) in 1972, Ahui appears to personify a doubled image of Southeast Asian female traders and shrewd ethnic Chinese merchants. As in many other parts of Southeast Asia where women dominate local businesses and spend their lives calculating and bargaining, women's monetary sensibility in Indonesia is viewed with an ambivalent mixture of denigration and respect (Atkinson and Errington 1990; Brenner 1995; Tickamyer and Kusujiarti 2012). Women are denigrated because financial transactions are the antithesis of the concept of spirituality typically associated with the male practice of meditation; women are respected because they are more capable than men in their resourcefulness, fiscal prudence, and self-sacrificing hard work.[4] In a word, it is the woman "who holds the purse strings" (Geertz 1974, 254).

On a higher level of the economic scale, the role of ethnic Chinese in Indonesian society parallels that which is assigned to Javanese women and elicits similarly ambiguous appraisals in Javanese society. Since colonial times, ethnic Chinese have been alternately courted and praised for their financial skills and despised for their sharp business practices (Reid 2001). These stereotypes are highly gendered. To make a simple list, ethnic Chinese women in Indonesia are said to be too aggressive, too beautiful, too erotic, or too vulgar. Chinese men are said to be too bossy, on the one hand, or too feminized as a bunch of cowards, on the other. These gendered ethnic imageries fit the quintessential ways to otherize ethnic/racial others cross-culturally, in which contradictory representations create a double bind that leads to a no-win situation for the stereotyped minority (Hall 1997, 263).[5] These stereotypical imageries often contain contradictory messages, because the main purpose is discursively to reinforce the supposed normality of the mainstream community, rather than to attain semiotic coherence. No matter what they do, they are always on the wrong side.

Ahui's performance as a Chinese Indonesian businesswoman seemingly further reinforces the association of women with trading that is coupled with the stereotype of ethnic Chinese as more aggressively money-grabbing, self-interested, and hence immoral, than "native Indonesians" (*pribumi*). When I look more closely at Ahui's life, however, there is much more than simply an enactment of a stereotypical story.

Ahui is married to, and was abandoned by, a "real" Chinese man (*Cina asli*). According to her, a "real" Chinese is different from Chinese Indonesians, especially those whose families have resided in Java for several generations, hence their preference for their term WNI (*warga negeri Indonesia*, "Indonesian citizens"). Ahui met her husband in the borderland port-city of Batam, near Singapore, when she worked at a travel agency in the early 2000s. After they got married in 2004 and moved back to Salatiga, they lived with Ahui's mother in a tiny house along an extremely narrow alley and she started a retail business downtown. Her "real-Chinese" husband did not speak Indonesian at all, and so nobody in the family and neighborhood liked him very much. The worst thing was that Ahui's husband started to have an affair with an older woman in Salatiga. Eventually, he took all of Ahui's savings from her and ran away with his mistress. Ever since then, her elder daughter often says to people: "My father is dead. I hate him."

Years later, Ahui finally started to gain success through her accessory store. She imported accessories from China and worked long hours to repay the debt left by her husband. With the success of the first store, Ahui even opened another accessory shop a block away in downtown later in June 2012. Other than being diligent in the retail business, Ahui was also active in social life. She served as the treasurer of the women's neighborhood organization (PKK) in her downtown neighborhood, and often helped host neighbors' regular meetings—a typical women's activity in Javanese neighborhoods that I will further discuss in Chapter 6.

To be clear, Ahui actually converted to Pentecostalism from Chinese popular religion, of which her mother was a practitioner. She became a born-again Christian after she had a miraculous encounter with the Holy Spirit, which made her speak in tongues, and this had happened well before she married her husband. She tried to convert her husband but in vain. Upon her husband's betrayal, Ahui did not give up her faith. On the contrary, she participated in church activities ever more deeply. She not only worked hard for her business, but also helped pastors to build congregations for Javanese in rural areas. She called the peasants "village people" (*orang desa*), rather than "Javanese people" (*orang Jawa*). In this context and others, ethnicity was not always the most relevant parameter for her new social networks. A Javanese pastor dropped by her shop and her home weekly to offer prayer for her and for her mother. She highly praised the Javanese pastor and his ministry, seeing him as an outstanding Christian fellow more than an ethnic other.

The spiritual life not only rescued Ahui from her marital failure, but also prepared a new vista of life for her. While in Java divorce and second marriage had been quite common until the 1980s (Jones 1994), their rates have declined in recent decades (Heaton et al. 2001). Further, to my surprise, Indonesian Protestants have shown great disapproval of divorce.[6] Many GKJ members have assured me that marriage was divine and divorce was forbidden. They told me that, because the married couple took a vow before God, they should not break their promise. Like these Protestants, Ahui firmly refused to remarry, which corresponded to the mainstream Javanese Christian understanding of divorce as a sin. She said:

> I do not miss him at all. Seriously, after I realized how much Jesus loves me, I really do not need a husband anymore...Jesus' love is true and real. My life becomes noble (*mulia*). With Jesus, I do not even need a husband. Jesus will give you more. As long as I have faith in Jesus, I work hard, give my

children good education, well, I mean, I am quite successful, but I did not have good education. Maybe if my children attain better education they won't have to be this hardworking. So, those things were already in the past. I do not think of them very often. I am too busy to think about them.[7]

Ahui now sends her daughters to a primary school that is run by the Ester congregation, where English is the primary language of instruction and the quality of education is locally perceived as superior to the public schools. In Ahui's case, Pentecostalism provides new spiritual networks that extend beyond ethnic and even class considerations. While her conversion took place much earlier, it was not until her marriage was broken that her conversion started to govern all aspects of her social, cultural, and economic life.

Ahui's story is, in many aspects, illuminating of a life transformation of many born-again Chinese Christians in Indonesia. Although in drastically different ways, almost every ethnic Chinese I know living in Salatiga has some memories of being bullied or blackmailed when young; being excluded in school activities until they stopped trying to blend in; being associated with money, greed, and sin (*dosa*) as businessmen. For Ahui, her broken marriage with a "real" Chinese that was consummated in the national borderlands, her role as a trader, and her past financial desperation impaired and stained her life, destroying her sense of security.

To the extent that Pentecostal piety redeemed Ahui from desperation, it also displayed some continuation of her older life, particularly the cultural value of entrepreneurship. Ahui did not make "a complete break with the past" (cf. Meyer 1998), like Ghanaian Pentecostals who jettison their un-Christian customs. As some scholars noted in Zambia and Ivory Coast, conversion to Pentecostalism may carry some legacy from the past and can be embedded in the pre-existing social environment (Haynes 2012; Newell 2007). While the split with her "real-Chinese" husband and her further immersion in spreading the gospel represented Ahui's departure from a life that was "too Chinese" and deprived of blessing, she still maintained her role as an ethnic businesswoman. The more salient difference came from her deeper commitment to Christian faith in ways that help her moralize her wish for success despite failures and frustrations along the way. In her own words, the secret to overcoming anguish is "submission to the Lord" (*menyerah keapada Tuhan*). This answer, while being a religious cliché, contains a deeper index of self-moralization. Her spiritual endorsement of submission summarizes a process of ethnic and

gender transformation that has a deeper history and works towards her conversion to charismatic Christianity.

THE IMMORAL OUTSIDERS

To comprehend how Pentecostalism offers a distinctive style of self-moralization that is particularly liberating for Chinese Indonesians, I propose to portray Chinese Indonesians as diverse social groups embedded in Indonesian society. Scholars have rightly criticized the approach of cultural essentialism that characterizes "Chinese Indonesians" as a homogenous group with a static culture, leaving aside the fact that the construction and deconstruction of Indonesian "Chinese-ness" has a long, complex, and localized history. As I mentioned in Chapter 2, prior to the eighteenth century it was common for Chinese migrants to convert to Islam voluntarily in order to blend into local communities in the archipelago. During the eighteenth century, Javanese courts practiced inter-racial marriage and assimilated ethnic Chinese into the elite strata. As scholarship has shown, it was not until much later, when this part of Southeast Asia was entangled with European colonialism, that the Dutch saw the necessity to divide and rule in order to prevent what they perceived as the subversive alliance between the Javanese and Chinese populations (Hoadley 1988). Hence, the nineteenth-century colonial policies that reified and separated ethnic groups. Dutch authorities politicized racial differentiation and implemented strict racial segregation, setting limits on residence, occupation, dress codes, education, and legal systems along racial lines (Bertrand 2004). Furthermore, to better manage local economies while preventing indigenous economic power, colonial authorities granted the Chinese monopolies of road tolls, bazaar fees, salt, and opium (Ricklefs 2001; Rush 1983). After Independence, while the privileges of being the designated colonial middlemen were removed, the occupational differentiation continued. The Chinese were barred from civil service and the military, and even had difficulty entering state universities. As a result, Chinese Indonesians actually had no choice but to be businessmen. Strictly speaking, then, the "Chinese-ness" of Chinese Indonesians was not something natural and immutable (Tan 1991) but, rather, systematically drawn and reinforced by the colonial authorities and the subsequent independent state.[8]

Throughout the 30 years of Suharto's New Order regime (1966–1998), it was widely believed that the Chinese influenced national

decision-making at the highest level, due to the fact that there existed a handful of cronies around Suharto who happened to be Chinese tycoons (Dijk 2001). The national stereotype of Chinese-owned business often has it that they control an overwhelming part of the national economy. While there is no doubt ethnic Chinese are well-represented among the owners of the largest companies, little accurate information on the total number of Indonesians of Chinese descent exists, much less the true breakdown of their economic power. As an over-generalization of the divide between "Chinese haves" and "indigene have-nots" was accentuated and perceived as an obvious fact in the eyes of the Indonesian public (Bertrand 2004; Dijk 2001), ethnic Chinese found themselves vulnerable to political manipulation and engineered violence.

The "anti-Chinese" imageries have often overshadowed the fact that many Chinese Indonesians living in Indonesia for generations have been physically and socially indistinguishable from other Indonesians, given decades of political and cultural assimilation (Suryadinata 1997). Perhaps most importantly, many of them think of themselves and introduce themselves to the world as "Indonesians" and not "Chinese." In fact, many declined to label themselves "Chinese," as indicated by the 2000 census (Mackie 2005), while many Pentecostals of Chinese ancestry made an identical decline of the label. The un-making of their ethnicity continues during the Reformasi era, despite the fact that many anti-Chinese policies were abolished and there has been a modest "Chinese culture revival" in the country.

That being said, there persists a wide misrecognition of their "entrepreneurial ethnicity." A common stereotype has it that Chinese Indonesians fall short of moral standards (*kaidah moral*). They are said to be dishonest (*tidak jujur*), deceitful (*culas*), stingy (*pelit*), and to conduct the business through "subtle deception" (*penipuan halus*) (Salim 2006). This association of ethnic Chinese with illegitimate prosperity has been so intense that, even in a relatively peaceful place like Salatiga, *keroyokan* (mob attacks) against ethnic Chinese were not entirely unheard of. My 50-year-old Javanese Muslim friend Bu Farida recalled that, when she was a teenager in Salatiga, she was almost attacked once for looking too light-skinned (read: Chinese), until some friends in the mob clarified to the crowd that she was, in fact, a daughter from a Javanese Muslim family, not a Chinese. In many ways parallel to the situation of Jews in Europe, the demonized ethnic group has long suffered from strong social stigma and potential violence against them.

The demonization of the other slips so easily into an accusation of black magic in the Indonesian folk imagination. An infamous sort of black magic is "money witchcraft," which is believed to work through the power of specific satanic creatures (*makhluk setan*) such as *babi ngepet* and *tuyul*. The *babi ngepet* is a swine demon that can pose as a human and allow its contractor to become instantly rich in exchange for something, possibly the practitioner's humanity. The *tuyul* is a kind of child ghost that steals other people's wealth or sabotages other people's business for its master. These creatures are the emblems of the general suspicion of the wealth that merchants accumulate. The accusation that the Chinese raise child-ghosts reflects the social distrust against them in local society. An ethnographic example of this sort of ethnic tension is given below.

Child-Ghosts of a Chinese Christian

Bu Nathania is a member of the successful Pentecostal congregation of Ester. Aged 47, Bu Nathania is a caterer and a vendor. With relatively dark skin, she can pass easily as Javanese in the downtown area, although not in the neighborhood, where people know her Chinese background. She has an average income, and her family is hardly any more "wealthy" than their middle-class neighbors. Like most married men, Bu Nathania's husband participates in the neighborhood's regular RT meetings. One day in 2008, at a time her food stand business was having some success, she found herself the target of a rumor created by a neighbor living next door. This neighbor was a member of the LDII (see Chapter 1), the Salafist organization mentioned in Chapters 2 and 4. This Salafist neighbor said privately to other neighbors that Bu Nathania was raising a *tuyul*, the monstrous child creature that steals wealth. She recounted her reactions at the time:

> Then there was an RT meeting. I purposely walked to the side of him [the Salafist neighbor]. I said to him (with smile): "Father, the other day didn't you say that I raised a *tuyul*? In fact, I do not merely have one; I have two. Wait...maybe I have three! Isn't that right, Father?" I really did say that to him like that.
> Isn't it crazy? To say that I raise a *tuyul*? Why did he say something like that about me? Well we live right next to each other. He must feel that s*udah Kristen, apalagi Cina* (meaning "it's already bad enough that [they are] Christian, let alone Chinese.")

But you know what? I heard (whispering), if the husband joins (LDII), an adult man gets 25 million rupiahs. If he could make his wife and children follow the cult, he then gets 40 million.[9]

Facing the insulting charge of keeping a child-monster in the neighborhood, Bu Nathania's publicly sarcastic response showed an audacious defiance to the stereotyping against her. By performing an obviously phony agreement with the demonic accusation, Bu Nathania refuted, or at least openly challenged, the social credibility of the charge. Thinking dialogically by standing in her neighbor's shoes to imagine how he saw her, she was certain the Salafist made up the rumor. She understood him well enough that she knew he believed that she was an immoral Chinese Christian. In other words, Bu Nathania's utterance in the story was a response to the Salafist. Like the way Bakhtin describes how the dialogic imagination works, any expression is "not a neutral medium that passes freely and easily into the private property of the speaker's intentions; it is populated—overpopulated—with the intentions of others (2008[1981], 294 my emphasis).

In this short narrative, Bu Nathania turned the tables by flipping the story upside down against the Salafist: She did not use any black magic; conversely, he was the one who got paid to join the "LDII cult." By uttering this, Bu Nathania not only defied the accusation against her, but further questioned the moral constitution of those who had questioned hers. Furthermore, she utilized the mainstream idea that Salafists should be ridiculed and questioned, as we already discussed more extensively in Chapter 4. In other words, Bu Nathania resisted an *ethnic* stereotype against her by using another *religious* stereotype against her neighbor. While the cultural logic of immorality still hinged upon the ungodliness associated with money, the dialogic imagination entailed in Bu Nathania's story already bespeaks a broader re-classification of people. Here, the category of the "Chinese Christian" becomes almost a sub-type of the Indonesian "Christian." As Bu Nathania objectifies and refracts her subjectivity through invoking her understanding of the Salafist neighbor's prejudice, she also blurs the boundaries between the two categories.

Bu Nathania's categorization is not a rare case. Today, if one asks around in major Javanese cities about the religious profile of ethnic Chinese, one would have the general sense that *Chinese Indonesians are Christians.* While the negative stereotype of ethnic Chinese still lingers, the classifications of people have shifted to focus more on religiosity and less on ethnicity.

Prosperity Without Materialism

This heightened association between ethnic Chinese and Christianity is rooted in the broad development of Christianity in Indonesia. In the late 1960s, being ethnic Chinese or not belonging to a world religion was once equal to being atheist and communist, which was life-threatening given the political atmosphere. During that period, a great number of Chinese Indonesians opted for Christian religions for their perceived lower threshold of conversion (compared with Islam) and their function of maintaining distinction from the majority's religion. Since then, many Chinese Indonesians have chosen to send their children to Protestant or Catholic schools, encouraged as well by discrimination at state schools, and this has bred a younger generation of Christians by default. When these children grew up and became adults in the 1990s, however, neo-Pentecostalism was being re-introduced to the country by new waves of missionaries, and it quickly captured the attention of the Christian youth, who later made their own version of charismatic Christianity.

One of neo-Pentecostalism's major appeals is the upbeat worship style that fuses ecstatic glossolalia, weeping, and healing, in addition to belief in baptism, the work of the Holy Spirit, and biblical inerrancy (Martin 1990; Maxwell 2005; Robbins 2004b). New churches' expressive and emotive worship style distinguish them from a rather sober brand of Calvinism upheld by older Indonesian Protestant churches, which now are seen by the younger generation of Christians as listless, soulless places to worship God. Especially in the larger cities and college towns, Pentecostal churches offer a new moral aesthetics that is technology-savvy, upwardly mobile, and indifferent to "ethnic" profiling. In Salatiga, as in other Javanese cities, many new converts are ethnic minorities in urban Java, most notably ethnic Chinese, Ambonese, Minanhasa, and others from eastern islands. Pentecostal congregations also attract young Javanese Christians, who are ethnically the majority but religiously the minority. With an aspiration to break away from seemingly soulless forms of Christianity, charismatic congregations bring together students, merchants, teachers, and other professionals in multi-ethnic churches. As domestic migration and international travelling has increasingly de-territorialized ethnic groups, these multi-ethnic Pentecostal churches prove more practical and motivational than the parochial circles of traditional ethnic churches.

An equally important aspect of the global Pentecostal expansion is the Faith Movement, or what we now call "prosperity theology". This

theology has special entanglements with Indonesian Pentecostalism. Prosperity theology is formulated by American authors[10]*to be* explicitly about wealth, summarized by the famous quote of the American televangelist Pat Robertson "I found God, then I found $200 Million." It asserts that personal success is divinely blessed by God and the very evidence of one's true worshipper status. All we need is God's blessing received with diligently guarded individual responsibility. It is propagated in Asia enthusiastically by Paul Yonggi Cho (who later became David Yonggi Cho) from Korea. One of Cho's prominent disciples is Yakub Nahuway, the former chairperson of Mawar Sharon, an Indonesian Pentecostal denomination that is finding great success in college towns across the country. As the seeming retreat of the welfare state in the face of global capitalism demands higher individual responsibility in pursuit of financial wellbeing, it is not surprising that many scholars have regarded the global popularity of prosperity theology as a response to the "neo-liberalization" of the economy[11] since the 1980s (Comaroff 2009; Barker 2007; Pfeiffer et al. 2007).

While the neo-liberal account may help give us some metanarratives of the macro-logics of the state and global capitalism, much research has shown that North American prosperity theology always has local modifications and specific home-grown meanings (Hunt 2000; Cox 1995; Newell 2007; Haynes 2012). To the extent that the new capitalist ethos works together with neo-Pentecostal values of this-worldly wellbeing, global economic situations are not always the best explanations for highly variable faith teachings in different localities. As Marshall-Fratani remarks regarding Nigerian Pentecostalism, as much as Pentecostal conversion promises both material and spiritual gains for individual success, the politicization of the Christian faith also aims to create the "social, economic and political conditions in which to enjoy them" (1998, 285). Nigerian prosperity theology is thus embedded in a moralization of political economy and engineered towards a vision of the collective welfare, not simply an individualized economic success.

Indonesia has never hosted the kind of heavily politicized Pentecostalism that has found such fertile ground in Nigeria. But, as with their Nigerian counterparts, Indonesian Pentecostal preachers must morally control the concept of prosperity. Indeed, the discourse of prosperity in Indonesia has been carefully crafted by Pentecostals. The preachers know too well that, to the extent prosperity theology legitimizes wealth, it also risks reinforcing the old stereotypes assigned to ethnic entrepreneurs, who are

now the bulk of the Pentecostal membership. In this manner, prosperity theology would become an obstacle to moralizing ethnic entrepreneurs and to spreading the gospel further to everyone in the nation, unless the aspect of wealth is presented in a properly subdued way.

Seen from this perspective, it is not surprising that the Indonesian version of faith teaching has eschewed overt celebration of materialism. Even if a number of Pentecostal celebrities have fallen into embezzlement scandals, ordinary believers regard excessive materialism as the Devil's work that their faith must battle with. As the following field notes from a cross-denominational Christian gathering in December 2009 show, the charismatic style of preaching was employed to deliver a conventionally approved message of anti-materialism (*materialisme*) and egoism.

> When an inter-congregational collaboration and joint worship took place before Christmas in 2009, an ethnic Chinese female preacher from the Pentecostal church of GBI was invited to give a sermon to a women's fellowship of the Javanese Christian Church, or GKJ. Although GKJ members were not entirely unfamiliar with the charismatic style of worship, some of them still found the style hard to digest. The preacher opened the sermon by uttering the Indonesian Pentecostal greeting of a Hebrew origin "sialom," followed by the didactic greeting "How are you," designed to be responded with an exhilarating cry of "Extraordinary" (*luar biasa*) instead of the customary answer "Fine" (*baik*). She met scant responses in this verbal exchange, although a few GKJ women quickly made it clear to their fellows that they should reply "Extraordinary" instead of "Fine."
>
> During the 25-minute sermon, the female preacher earned the most cheerful responses when she made jokes in Low Javanese; she did more poorly when she talked in a too loud a voice or too high a pitch, and some Javanese mothers could not help but gently cover their ears. Despite the mismatch between the styles of the two sides, the Chinese preacher enthusiastically alerted Javanese congregants of being wary not to lose themselves in crude consumptive behavior. She presented the modern world as ferociously tempting and admonished the congregation to use wisely the money they earn. Time and again she preached loudly that they must not to be *egois* (selfish) in everyday life, because that would be the devil's work to hinder the true character a Christian should have. The preacher earned herself many "Amin" responses from the congregation.[12]

In this gathering, ethnic difference was superseded by religious difference fostered by a Christian moral economy. Despite the awkward encounters

between the quiet and gentle audience and the loud and confident mora-lizer, the message that both sides agreed upon was the ideal of a moral self —one that was not misled by the glitzy world of consumer capitalism. Indeed, even if the style that the message was delivered with was perhaps too harsh and again reminded the audience of ethnicity (rather bluntly), the very fact that Javanese Christians can be preached to by an ethnic Chinese pastor suggests that the combative tone of the sermon is no longer a sign of aggressive ethnicity, but can equally qualify as a sign of charismatic Christianity.

Today, it is not out of the ordinary for ethnic Chinese pastors to preach to Javanese-majority congregations in cross-denominational settings. At least at this level, we see that ethnic Chinese strive to become moral exemplars in society through a religious language by becoming the carriers of moral messages, the opposite of their stereotypical roles. Especially among the second- or third-generation Chinese Indonesians, turning to Pentecostalism enables them to rise to a platform that transcends their old image as "people of no religion." As the thriving charismatic Christian movement offers ethnic Chinese preachers chances to redeem millions of *pribumi* ("natives," all non-Chinese Indonesians) souls, it works as a new social force that has the potential more broadly to reshape ethno-religious relations and minority politics. To be moral messengers, however, they have promoted a type of prosperity gospel that attempts more modestly to promote prosperity without the sin of materialism.

Cosmopolitan Nationalism

Other than downplaying prosperity theology, some other strategies are involved in the efforts of self-moralization among Chinese Indonesian Pentecostals. These include a Pentecostal cosmopolitanism, and a nation-alist discourse of submission to God and the nation at the same time. The dynamic worship style of Pentecostalism—clapping, yelling, loud pop gospel music, R&B style singing, and English slogans—boasts a percept-ibly American cosmopolitan texture of the service. The Fendi congrega-tion welcomes each of the newcomers by saying to him or her jointly in English, "Hello ____ (name of the person), you are so special!" A friend even told me that, if she prayed in English, God would love her even more.

While English songs are popular, English is not enough for Indonesian Pentecostals. To the extent that the Australian worship band the Planetshakers is highly popular, the Indonesian band True Worshippers

is even more inspiring. While the born-again Pentecostals diligently read Indonesian translations of devotional books written by American authors such as Joyce Meyer and Choo Thomas, they also share born-again videos from non-English countries where there are children who have been to Heaven and Hell accidentally. In recent years, even the Hebrew word *sialom* (Hr. *shalom*) has been creatively appropriated as the Pentecostal counterpart of the Muslim greeting *Assalamualaikum,* and is uttered repeatedly at services, as well as between believers in cellphone text messages and emails alike.

Cosmopolitan manners of worshipping and living may have been the means to justify the choice of being an outsider (consider that, historically, Chinese Indonesians have always managed to transform their marginality into a position as pioneers of national trends). Yet, with charismatic Christianity, Pentecostals are also redefining the meaning of true believers from *outsiders in society* into *leaders of the nation*, even if just symbolically. Pentecostal cosmopolitanism certainly did not announce the demise of nationalism. Quite the opposite, the image of the nation is always summoned in the spiritual warfare against all evils towards a brighter future. The language of the state is also applied, as Pak Alex or the founding father of the Bethany Church openly endorses the pursuit of "theocracy" among Indonesian Christians.

If the message of Pentecostal theocracy is religiously combative, it is also politically passive. Indonesian Pentecostalism is also combative, because it has a clear mission to expand. One of the weekly news publication of the Ester church in November 2009 featured an article written by Pak Tony titled "Work together towards the transformation of Indonesia." In the article, many sentences are all too obviously patriotic yet all too offensive to many Muslim citizens, who have been worried about the "Christianization" of Indonesia; for example, "Imagine if more than 90% of the population were committed Christians!"

Indonesian Pentecostalism at this moment is politically passive, because it only stresses individual success, communal prosperity, and a peaceful nation through the management of hearts and banks, but it goes with no clear vision of structural reform of the state and society. The preachers routinely resort to national discourses that invoke Indonesia as a united nation, the dance groups flaunt the national flag whenever possible, and male ethnic Chinese preachers wear the national emblem batik shirt frequently, contributing to a nationalist Pentecostal aesthetics. In other words, even if they work with ideas and

approaches that are obviously cosmopolitan—English songs, black preachers from South Africa, or the Hebrew greeting—members of charismatic Christianity consistently position themselves as devoted to their country.

This Pentecostal moral nationalism has numerous manifestations on paper. A weekly bulletin of the Fendi church distributed nationwide in August 2010 during the month of Independence Day celebrations advocated that Christians should pay taxes, as Paul instructed, even if they will be embezzled (*diselewengkan*), since it is important for a Christian to fulfill the duty of a citizen. Christians should be obedient (*taat*) to the government, the article continues, and they must be different from those who like to disseminate bitterness and slander their own country. Believers should help the nation to become better. With a background in the national flag's white and red colors, this feature article presents a youth's face overlapping with the national flag alongside the prominent caption: My Country (*NegaraKu*). The phrase "Pray for the nation" (*berdoa bagi bangsa*) is often repeated in the sermon and also printed in Christian magazines. Cosmopolitanism in the Pentecostal assemblages constitutes no hindrance to an overt nationalist identity. Religiosity becomes the marker of morality, and it is framed under the obligation to guard the wellbeing of the nation.

GENDERED SUBMISSION AND MINORITY REDEMPTION

We have so far identified the ways in which Chinese Indonesian Pentecostal preachers have repositioned themselves as *moral citizens* of the nation, attempting to challenge their clichéd image as *immoral outsiders* in Indonesia. The same drive for self-moralization also motivates ordinary believers to change their life, and an important part of that moralization is gender. Indonesian Pentecostalism treats gender norms and domesticity as key sites of reformation, as in some parts of Latin America and Africa (Brusco 1995; Mate 2002). What differentiates this story is the relationship between Pentecostal gender dynamics and ethnic relations in Indonesia. More specifically, I am suggesting that the gender ideology of Indonesian Pentecostalism should be understood through a deeper history of cross-ethnic subjectivity. To further explain what I mean, let us look at a snapshot of a Pentecostal workshop called "Women's Restoration" at the Ester church that I attended on August 11, 2010.

At 9:42 am, 33 voluntary participants including myself were seated in the hall after paying the fee of 50,000 rupiah (about 6 USD, more than enough for two decent meals by the local standard). I saw several familiar faces, not only members of Ester, but also a member of Fendi, who was much younger than most participants from Ester. The participants were divided into five groups. My group consist of three Chinese Indonesians, one Javanese woman, and me; the other four groups of middle-aged Javanese and Chinese women, including bespectacled, short-haired, or bun-wearing grandmothers and mothers in their batik, traditional attire *kebaya* (Javanese blouse) or even *kebaya* with sarong.

We learned that the trainer was a famous female pastor whom I will call Bu Har. As a specialist invited from Surabaya, Bu Har told us that this program was so popular that she had to open more courses in different cities. To warm up our workshop, Bu Har grabbed her microphone and yelled to us: "How are you?" Following the routinized greeting response in Indonesian charismatic churches, we replied: "Extraordinary!" "You are not loud enough," said Bu Har with dissatisfaction, "One more time, HOW ARE YOU?" We yelled louder this time, "EXTRAORDINARY!!" She proceeded to exhort us in a thunderous voice: "Now repeat after me, sentence by sentence, and raise your hand up! Be-ware!" Most of us were stunned by her enthusiasm and remained a bit shy. We did not speak up and that seemed to really make her angry. "You are not loud enough. Repeat again! Beware!" After practicing a few times, we drew a louder and louder voice from our bodies:

Beware! Successful individual! Successful family! Successful church! Yes Yes Yes! (*Beware! Pribadi sukses! Keluarga sukses! Gereja sukes! Yes Yes Yes!*)

After this brief initiation, we would be asked to shout the same "success" slogan over again whenever Bu Har felt the necessity or when we were in transitions between the sessions. In this manner, we were not only the passive recipient of Bu Har's instructions, but also active actors rehearsing a stronger attitude. Within three hours, we became the experts of shouting success.

The two days of sessions were categorized in a variety of themes: women's destiny (*kodrat wanita*), sin (*dosa*), emotion, the power of forgiveness (*kuasa pengampunan*), submission (*penundukan diri*), faithfulness, devotion and loyalty (*kesetiaan*), appearance (*penampilan*), the intimacy with God (*menjalin keintiman dengan Tuhan*) and the power of prayer (*kuasa doa*). All the points were invariably supported by authoritatively presented biblical verses and brief exegesis. Each of us was given a booklet that provides the outline of these topics with blanks within the sentences where we were supposed to take notes and fill in the key words or the entire key answers to questions such as "When will women really become 'women'?"[13]

This workshop is clearly modeled after business management seminars. Many anthropologists, sociologists, and other theorists would find this scenario familiar. The formula of the workshop is a classic example of neo-liberal self-training. It fits perfectly what Foucault describes as the "ethnical work," in which one "performs on oneself, not only to bring one's conduct into compliance with a given rule, but to attempt to transform oneself into the ethical subject of one's behavior" (Foucault 2012, 27).[14]

While such an emphasis on ethical self-training illustrates the important concept of "technologies of the self", it relatively leaves out the socio-historical particularity that constituted the affinity between a particular population and a specific ethical practice. In other words, by focusing on "how" it neglects "why." It dodges the key question as to what brings certain populations to certain workshops. To put it simply: Why do we have a cross-ethnic gathering that teaches women *to become better women* in Pentecostal workshops? The answers to these questions certainly cannot be isolated from the socio-historical contexts. To treat the workshop merely as another instance of a general proliferation of neo-liberal training neglects the particular entanglement of this politics of piety with the pluralistic ethno-religious context of Indonesia.

The Women's Restoration workshop is designed to disseminate an ideal gendered social personality especially for women. Bu Har agitatedly directed us how women could breed and raise the next victorious generation in an ideal Christian family,

> Do not forget that *roh* (spirit) is something each woman has and can resonate with the *Roh Kudus* (Holy Spirit). Your *roh* is not in your husband! God created women as equitable with but *different* from men. The difference could not denied. In fact, women are created by God to endure more (*ketahanan lebih*) . . . if your husband cheated, do not cheat! If your husband had a child outside of wedlock, take the child as your own child. It is hard and heartbreaking, but remember, God will give you more rewards, and you will see.[15]

One key theme here was submission. Bu Har proceeded to discuss a list of a woman's own worst enemies: feeling inferior, "manipulating" the functions of men (i.e. "becoming tomboys"), resistant and rebellious (resisting marriage), and obeying unconditionally without thinking. Behind this checklist is, however, a larger checklist of the sinful daily habits and practices that would corrupt the destiny of women. Here,

Eve (*Hawa*) was introduced as the prototype of women, and the sins that she committed were also sins that women often did and that they should refrain from, which includes indulging in useless talk, wrong friends, wrong perspective, wrong thoughts, wrong decision, wrong actions, and shirking responsibilities. This session ended with the inculcation of a cautious attitude towards betrayal, and the focus on marriage resumed. If the husband cheated, one should not cheat; if the marriage really could not be restored, one should remain single rather than seeking a second marriage. One should seek relationships with God, rather than with men.

Inextricably linked to the concept of submission is *kesetiaan*, meaning faithfulness, loyalty, and devotion. Here, a fine line between submission (*penundukan diri*) and faithfulness (*kesetiaan*) is drawn. In Bu Har's teaching and the guidebook, while submission refers to an attitude that is unchallenging, *kesetiaan* means a connotation of full obedience deeper than submission, but encompassing submission. Women have to be both submissive and devotional (*setia*) to God, because God is the highest authority and is always *mutlak benar* (absolutely right). By contrast, humans, including one's family and spouse, supervisors, and other authority figures can err. To these people, women are not required to be *setia* (devotional). However, submissiveness is always demanded. Even when the authority is wrong, one should consider the rights of another authority to solve the problem. *Tunduk* is thought of as a display of inner strength that is directed ultimately towards God, as well as a capacity to submit to, which is approved by God. Bu Har stated:

> If something is wrong with your husband, you can seek other spiritual leaders or authority, but don't teach your husband! Your husband is your authority. You do not teach your authority. Whatever you want to do, your attitude must be submissive. You can give correction with love and kindness, and you can change the situation by your prayer and your deeds as examples! Now if the authority refuses to change, what should we do? Remember, you have to dare to suffer for the cause of justice, like Jesus has done for us! Forgive those who wronged you, and believe that God as the highest authority will act. Beware [sic]![16]

The trope did not directly mention the nation and the state, but it is not difficult to extrapolate a political message. A stronger case to illuminate this point will be given shortly and, here, we should simply remember that

the emphasis on behavioral obedience in a marital relationship is consistent with the Indonesian Pentecostal discourse on Christians' citizenship that we discussed in the last section. As a submissive wife who should yield to her husband, religious minorities should yield to the majority, because a true believer is always submissive, and never teaches their authority.

In these complex narratives, Pentecostalism sublimates the immoral gendered imageries through a discourse of feminine submission. Although more responsibility falls on women, the gendered submission applies not only to women, but also to men. For example, a new phrase used to address believers that was popularized in 2012 conferred a feminine personality to all true Christians, regardless of sex: *mempelai Kristus*, "brides of Christ." To cite a few examples using the idiom: "Hi brides of Christ, you are invited to attend the evening worship," "Shalom brides of Christ," "God's verses will surely bless all brides of Christ," to name a few. A bride of Christ is construed as loving, unsullied, and submissive.

This praising of femininity in male believers is elaborated more explicitly in the example of Fendi's weekly bulletin on Sunday, February 14, 2010. This Valentine's Day issue featured a cover story called "Just Love Her." The story begins with the following parable:

One man asked, "I no longer love my wife."

His shepherd advised him, "Go home and love her."

He said, "You did not hear what I said. I no longer have any feelings for her anymore."

Then his shepherd replied, "I did not ask about your feelings. I only said, 'Go home and love her.'"

He replied, "But emotionally I won't be honest if I treat my wife like that, when in fact I don't have any feelings."

Then his shepherd asked, "Does your mother love you?"

The man felt a bit insulted, but said, "Of course."

Then the shepherd said, "Think about after she brought you home from a hospital, when you cried hard because your diaper was wet, and she was forced to wake up although her body was still weary, but still had to change your diaper and feed you. Do you think she really enjoyed it?"

The man replied, "No."

The shepherd then said, "Well, then your mother was emotionally dishonest."

This is the goal of this conversation: the great love of a mother is not that she enjoys changing diapers in the middle of the night, but that she is willing to do it although she does not like it.[17]

The story offers an alternative interpretation of Ephesians 5:31–33,[18] verses that are often used to justify women's subordination in the household. First, the analogy between mother and son, Christ and Church, and husband and wife alludes to the idea that a husband has something to learn from Jesus as a caring, sacrificing, and maternal figure. A man should love his wife just as a mother cares for her children. In other words, it is not only women who are instructed to be submissive to authority; men are also encouraged to be more caring and submissive to the status quo, as long as the status quo maintains the integrity of the family. Submission becomes an act of love, and men are taught to love.

The Indonesian Pentecostal gender discourse hence advocates more feminized personalities and submission to the pre-existing social relations, leaving combative aggression only inside the church and the market. Yet, the discourse of submission not only works to dissolve marital anxieties. When accepting submission is equated to cultivating a Christian virtue, the Pentecostal faith also helps transform ethnic tensions. Feelings of inadequacy associated with gendered ethnicity prior to conversion are most substantiated by the following testimony of a male pastor.

A Chinese Gangster Turned Indonesian Pastor

Pak Stephen was a former pastor in the Fendi congregation in Salatiga, the small but truly dynamic congregation we mentioned in Chapter 3. In 2012, he had already been appointed by the headquarters of Fendi in Surabaya to revive its branch in a bigger city, given how successful the church in Salatiga was under his guidance.

Pak Stephen was born in 1981 of Chinese ancestry in a mountainous area around the Javanese city of Wonosobo, where his family had a hardware shop. His grandparents came during the late Dutch period, which makes him a third-generation Chinese Indonesian. Both his siblings and his parents were raised Catholic, since his grandparents had already converted to Catholicism a long time before. During the Revolution, many Chinese were killed in Wonosobo, including Pak Stephen's grandfather. "They don't like newcomers," Pak Stephen said, "the Dutch were newcomers, the Japanese were newcomers, and the Chinese were also newcomers." Many men were killed, women raped, and the Chinese tombs in Wonosobo, according to Pak Stephen, were virtually countless. First, it was the revolutionary war, and later it was the post-1965 killing of suspected communists. Some of Pak Stephen's relatives chose to "go back to" China

in 1967, but most of his relatives chose to stay, not thinking there was somewhere else to "go back to." In fact, Pak Stephen did not even know which province his ancestors came from. "I only know that my grand uncle went to Shezhen…. but when they moved 'back' to China, they were also not considered Chinese either!…My grand uncle could only speak Indonesian!" In other words, in Indonesia, people think they are Chinese; in China, people think they are Indonesian. They are constantly caught in-between, belonging fully to nowhere.

All these ethnic memories and family stories had a major impact on Stephen's early personhood. In 2012, I asked how he became a pastor, and he told me a story that basically has two themes: drugs and thugs. Growing up as a member of the small and disliked Chinese minority in Wonosobo, Stephen suffered constant bullying and social exclusion. His frustration with this discrimination led him to become increasingly wild as a teenager, fighting and racing motorcycles in the street for fun. In high school, he became a gangster (*preman*) and began selling drugs. While there were a few other Chinese drug-dealers, most of the dealers and nearly all of the buyers were Javanese. By becoming a gangster, Stephen cultivated an image of toughness and aggression completely at odds with the stereotype of the weak and bullied Chinese boy. Thinking retrospectively, he explained that this violent lifestyle made him feel confident to face the Javanese who had bullied him: "If I became a gangster, they would not dare to bully me."[19]

Put simply, Stephen rebelled against the racist formation of society by becoming a tough gangster. He made sure that he was not some cowardly Chinese boy who always *mengalah* ("gave in"), a tendency widely attributed to ethnic Chinese in Indonesia (Arlini 2010, 96). The attitude of *mengalah* means "giving in" to the native Indonesians during situations of conflict by using money or simply silence, to avoid violence, as opposed to engaging in head-on aggression. It is precisely what Pak Stephen hated. To smash that stereotype and inclination, he fully embraced violence and was a faithful practitioner of violence. At this point, he did not believe in God at all. In fact, he hated religious people and loved violent things. "I really loved beating up people…if they didn't pick a fight with me, it did not feel awesome (*seru*)…if they picked a fight with me, I felt awesome-…sometimes I beat people until I laughed."

Despite being a gangster, Stephen was bright. He could get good scores, if he wanted to. After high school, he went to one of the top schools in Central Java, the UKSW, where he said he came to know God.

The critical moment came during a "spiritual concert" (*konser rohani*), when a worship leader asked the audience who wanted to know God. Somehow Stephen wanted to, and he was prayed for, and then really strange things happened. "I felt frightened. My forearm felt overwhelmed . . . I heard clanging sounds (*rencang*) . . . in the past I was never left on the ground when I was beat up." He reassured me that he would always get back on his feet, no matter how much injured he was. But this time, it was different. He could not stand the mysterious force that overwhelmed and subjugated him. He said he screamed loudly at the time, because it was so painful. The Holy Spirit struck him down. Finally, after being paralyzed and feeling so strongly the presence of something almighty, he surrendered. He started to believe in God. A miracle, he said. Ever since then, he submitted himself wholeheartedly to God.

When Pak Stephen converted to Protestantism initially, his family members were angry and refused to talk to him. Pak Stephen persisted despite his Catholic family's disapproval. In 2005, he studied in a Pentecostal missionary school in Surabaya. In 2007, he became a pastor in Salatiga. His family members remained Catholic, but gradually accepted his ministerial status, and eventually supported his career.

Before converting to Pentecostalism, Pak Stephen was a gangster who needed to prove to the mainstream society that he was not some emasculated, "cowardly Chinese man," but a tough hyper-masculine gangster. His life was full of fear, anger, and vengeance, because he was determined to prove the mainstream society wrong. After the conversion, Pak Stephen was tamed, with his self-identity reformulated. He was no longer afraid of being tender and kind, because it was a sign of Christian virtue. He became a man who loves his wife and his congregation, and came to the belief that all Indonesians are in need of salvation.[20] Pentecostalism moralized his submission and tenderness.

Pak Stephen's story restates the issue that has engaged numerous anthropological and sociological studies on the Pentecostal theology of domesticity across the globe. The preaching of Pentecostalism as a "women's movement" (Martin 1990, 52) oriented towards "the reformation of machismo" (Brusco 1995, 5, 125) seemed to have a twist in the Indonesian context, in which charismatic Christianity made possible the affirmation of effeminacy. But it does more. While Pak Stephen's story certainly involves a process of "domestication of men," in many situations the metaphor of submission seems applicable to the entire minority group. The gendered self-fashioning is enabled to become a trope for ethnic self-fashioning.

Regendering Ethnicity

So far, I have considered how Pentecostalism in urban Java dissemi-
nates a prosperity theology without materialism and a gendered dis-
course of submission. These Pentecostal initiatives have roots in the
long-term ethno-religious politics that are beyond the religion itself,
but it is charismatic Christianity that enables believers to challenge the
old ethno-gender-religious stereotypes that often deny minority access
to claim morality. Given the pre-existing limitations regarding their
positions in society, however, rather than competing with the majority
in the realms of Islam, many ethno-religious minorities in Java choose
to venture into the cutting-edge moral terrain and become pioneers
instead of followers.

The current anthropological interests in morality (Mahmood 2005;
Robbins 2004a; Schielke 2009) and Christian prosperity movements
(Coleman 2000; Wiegele 2006) have extensively focussed on the topic
of self-fashioning and subjectivity. What distinguishes our stories here is
the historically constituted social heteroglossia in a multi-religious setting.
I suggest that subjectivity always has a deeper history that is rooted in the
long-term inclinations cast into a shifting religious atmosphere, in which
morality is generated out of social heterolgossia or competing languages of
power. Religious subjectivity is not simply a process of embodying the
perfect image of a discourse debated and enacted; neither is it rigidly
dictated by an all-encompassing force of religion. The Indonesian
Pentecostal piety movement involves a process of self-affirmation that is
formulated in an ongoing conversation with entangled pieties and minor-
ity identity. More specifically, the cultivation of being better Christians is
accompanied by a strong sense of everyday moral nationalism, not only for
the sake of pre-empting potential doubts about their loyalty to the nation,
but to claim moral integrity in society.

If my analysis is correct, the inter-ethnic dynamic of Pentecostalism not
only challenges the established tradition of "ethnic churches" (Aragon
2000; Kipp 1993), but also bargains with the stereotypes of ethnic
Chinese minority being the personification of materialism and immorality
in Indonesia. The Pentecostal faith enables believers to moralize their
social existences. For women, it justifies the "aggressive" manner of
embracing "submissive" femininity suited for the family and nation. For
men, the faith authorizes feminine attitudes as Christian virtues for better
familial rapport and social integration.

Through the language of Pentecostalism, "aggression" and "submission" are both justified and sacrilized as true Christian virtues for individual piety, as well as a divine self-representation that defies ethno-religious stereotyping. Everyday Pentecostalism is thus to be understood in terms of intersubjective contestations between evolving ethno-religious relations and identities, rather than a straightforward endorsement of neo-liberal governance, or of a disciplinary project of self-fashioning arising from within Pentecostalism alone. In other words, the ethnic Chinese's Pentecostal movement in Java is certainly a form of moral self-fashioning. But this self-fashioning is entangled with specific ethnic relations in the Indonesian context with a history that substantializes why, structurally and personally, they would want to be this specific kind of Christian self.

NOTES

1. Interview with Pak Stephen, July 22, 2012.
2. Some notable examples are from the Hmong in Thailand, the Karen of Burma, and the Tobaku in Central Sualwesi.
3. Foot notes, July, 27, 2010.
4. Such disparity in the appraisal of commerce complicates the assumption that women's economic activities outside the home represents a sign of gender equality and high status, compelling scholars to dig deeper into the contradictory and emergent gender ideologies and practices.
5. In the United States, for example, whereas the stereotypical image of Black men as "childish" has been constructed under the histories of slavery, colonialism, and imperialism; another stereotype, the "macho" image of Black men, has also been pervasive (Staples 1982). In considering the dilemma of Black men in American society, Hall remarked that "black men sometimes respond to . . . infantilization by adopting a sort of caricature-in-reverse of the hyper-masculinity and super-sexuality with which they had been stereotyped. Treated as 'childish', some blacks in reaction adopted a 'macho', aggressive-masculine style. But this only served to confirm the fantasy amongst whites of the ungovernable and excessive sexual nature . . . Thus, 'victims' can be trapped by the stereotype, unconsciously confirming it by the very terms in which they try to oppose it and resist it" (1997: 263).

   Hispanic women are also contradictorily stereotyped as both "the half-breed harlot" and "the female clown" that neutralizes the overt sexual threat posed by the former in Hollywood films (Berg 1990). African women are either "sassy" or victimized (hence, like their male counterparts), whereas

Asian women are depicted as overly sexualized or too weak (hence, like their male counterparts).

6. The question of changing perceptions of divorce among different religious populations in Indonesia deserves to be studied more and cannot be dealt with here.

7. Field notes, July 27, 2010.

8. Twentieth-century Chinese nationalism, which drew significant interest from Chinese diaspora, also plays some role in this process.

9. Field notes, December 15, 2010.

10. Some high-profile authors are Norman Vincent Peale, Kenneth Hagin, Robert Schuller, and Joyce Meyer.

11. The global downsizing of government welfare and the rise of private enterprises have generated the general interest in cultivating mind, body, and spirit as "business" practices

12. Field notes, December 19, 2009.

13. Field notes, August 11, 2010.

14. Such ethical self-fashioning can be packaged in a widely variable range of programs: a leadership conference for businessmen, a camp for enhancement in individual responsibility (Ouellette 2008), a self-training manual for Filipina or Indonesian domestic workers to be transformed from "rural girls" to "professional maids," (Rudnyckyj 2004; Constable 2007), or an Islamic training program that teaches one how to manage his or her heart.

15. Field notes, August 11, 2010.

16. Field notes, August 11, 2010.

17. My translation.

18. "For this reason a man will leave his father and mother and be united to his wife, and the two will become one flesh. This is a profound mystery—but I am talking about Christ and the church. However, each one of you also must love your wife as you love yourself, and the wife must respect her husband."

19. Interview with Pak Stephen, July 22, 2012.

20. This kind of redemption story is a common one, even for new Indonesian Muslim preachers. The story typically features the transformation of "a criminal" to a religious person, who becomes famous due to a more or less "self-help" style of religious learning, as opposed to those with a background of traditional Islamic scholarship. Despite the similarity, what is specific about Pak Stephen's case is linked to its special Indonesian Chinese context and the high representation of ethnic Chinese in the ranks of Pentecostal preachers. While there are a few Chinese Indonesians who turned into new Muslim gurus, more research needs to be done to make a proper comparison.

Performing Pluralism

Islamic Greetings, Christian Halal Food, and Religious Holidays

The food in Catholic houses [in Bosnia] was clearly a major problem for Muslims and was often what made them uncomfortable visiting them.[1]

Bringa 1995

[On Christmas Day] Oh more than that (100 people) would come . . . I usually [say] like this, with other elders taking turns . . . what are you gonna cook? Oh I will make sate. *So here I cook meatballs, later in the elder's house some will cook rice . . . Ok, in our RT now there are only 4 Christian families. So we make promises to make foods for Christmas (for everyone in the neighborhood) so that the guests won't eat the same kind of food all over again . . . All the [Muslim] families bring their kids . . . the space is all full, FULL.*

Bu Enny 2012[2]

That is why we [Muslims] say "go home full" (pulang kenyang) *[on Christmas Day].*

Bu Wati 2012[3]

Previous chapters have led the readers to go through the social history and cultural complexity that laid the foundations for gendered pieties among Muslims and Christians. In this chapter, I delineate ways in which women's cross-religious interactions are created to support a sense of everyday citizenship, defined simply as full membership in the community, which arranges

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religious difference on its own terms. To do so, I explore the habitual social practices surrounding the PKK,[4] the semi-formalized organization of women in the neighborhood. These are among the most sustained social interactions in the neighborhood community, in which married women frequently and visibly weave ties between households, reinforcing and formalizing a network of women in the neighborhood. Especially since multiple religious revivals have further divided residents since the 1990s, the PKK has acquired new meanings as an unintended consequence. More specifically, despite having its origins in authoritarian systems of control, the PKK has enabled a limited type of inter-religious social interaction capable of partially substantiating cross-religious solidarity in the local community.

In what follows, I first offer an overview of the typical approach to the PKK and suggest that we view the PKK from a different perspective in a new era. I then move to provide three series of cross-religious interactions that are related to the PKK network. The first series of cross-religious interaction is the adoption of words, in which Javanese Protestant Christians utter Islamic greetings in Arabic; the second is food sharing in the PKK meeting, in which Muslims eat Christian-homemade food; and the last is the cross-religious home visits on the major holidays of Islam and Christianity, in which Muslims and Christians exchange words and food based on the religious character of the holiday. I will pay attention to the ways in which Muslims and Christians live in a world of each other's words and things, and discuss how cross-religious adoptions of words and substances can materialize inter-personal trust and respect.[5] While both Muslim and Christian PKK members act responsively to changing public expressions of Islamic piety, their reasons for doing so are different. Meanwhile, to the extent that PKK members adopt religious utterances and substances across religious borders, their actual practices of religious pluralism do not endorse the equal value of religious differences. Further, while adoptions of other's expressions reinforce cross-religious solidarity, they also have the propensity for "unfinishedness" (Bakhtin 2008[1981], 346); the solidarity they achieve is always provisional, and the meaning of the adoptions is subject to change.

PKK AS A SITE OF GENDERED CITIZENSHIP

PKK originated from the semi-official adult women's neighborhood organizations that were launched by the Suharto regime (1966–1998). It was installed in every single village and urban neighborhood to implement state policies, especially those related to family planning and reproductive

health. The idea of a nationwide women's neighborhood organization was conceived in a home economics seminar jointly held by Ministry of Health, Ministry of Manpower, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Culture and Education, and Ministry of Internal Affairs, in Bogor, West Java, in 1957 (Newberry 2006). The government of Central Java applied the program in 1967 in the province, which later became the model for the broad nationalization of the PKK in 1971. In the 1980s, the PKK was officially incorporated into the structure of village administration through the Maintenance of Village Society program (LKMD) that was conducted in over 70,000 villages in Indonesia. Since being heavily promoted by the authoritarian New Order regime along with other programs for the indoctrination of state ideology, all adult women are assumed to be members of the PKK. With significant success in promoting public health, the PKK won international recognition via a United Nations award in 1989 for its family planning and routine clinical examination programs for all children aged five years and under.

Scholars have generally treated the PKK as a vehicle of development (*pembangunan*), an Indonesian concept saturated with moral responsibility and instrumental modernization processes, including birth control and motherhood training. As the feminist Saskia Wieringa argues, the establishment of the PKK was part of the New Order regime's effort to stabilize society after a period of great upheaval in the early 1960s, in which both men and women were heavily politicized, mobilized, and militarized. The newly minted regime had a vested interest in portraying political women as barbarian whores in order to position itself as the heroic men that reformed these deviant female "beasts" to become dutiful "mothers" once again (Wieringa 1992). As Blackburn observes, the gender expectation of the regime was to make it "return to 'normal', by which normality meant an amalgam of Javanese aristocratic (*priyayi*) and Western bourgeois models of the nuclear family" (Blackburn 2004, 99). The conceptual emphasis on women being obedient wives and selfless mothers was utilized to consolidate family life and to support the kind of social stability and economic growth that the New Order desired and promised to give to the society.

Many of the PKK campaigns have elicited wide criticisms among feminist scholars. After all, the PKK supported the Five Duties of Women (*Panca Dharma Wanita*), expecting women:

1) to be loyal companions of their husbands;
2) to procreate for the nation;

3) to educate their children;
4) to assist their husbands and to manage their households; and
5) to be useful members of society.

Under the New Order rule, the leadership of the PKK nationwide was stratified according to the position of a woman's husband. That is to say, the wives of governors automatically became the heads of the PKK in the corresponding province, and wives of district heads would chair the PKK at those levels, and so forth. In other words, it was the husband's status that determined the wife's position, whereas the wife's willingness, personal ability, skills, or political inclinations were completely irrelevant. Such arrangements seemed to treat women as merely the appendages of men, and understandably worried feminists. Among them, Suryakusuma (1996, 101) even identifies the PKK as the "primary channel between the state and village women through which the official ideology is filtered" (see also Stoler 1977; Sullivan 1983, 136).

The Five Duties of Women was not the only ideology of the PKK, however. Another list, called the Ten Tenets of the PKK, is, in fact, emblazoned on a plaque in all neighborhoods across Indonesia. During my fieldwork in Salatiga, it was the Ten Tenets, and not the Five Duties, that were more frequently mentioned as the topics of the various kinds of activity held by PKK groups. In the plaque, the priority of women's roles in the Five Duties would seem to be much expanded:

1) comprehension and practical application of *Panacasila*
2) mutual self-help (*gotong-royong*)
3) food
4) clothing
5) housing and home economics
6) education and craft skills
7) health
8) development of cooperatives
9) protection and conservation of the environment
10) health planning.

The aim of PKK's tenets, as a modified version of family planning, includes the ambition to produce women who can be loyal supporters of the nation (the first tenet), the neighborhood community (the second, eighth and ninth tenets), and the family (the remainder of the tenets). The PKK

represents part of the statecraft that mobilizes grass-roots society to achieve social control and development in parallel to the implementation of the RT and RW (Hunter 1996; Newberry 2007; Sullivan 1994; Blackburn 2004). RT and RW groups take care of road projects, facility construction, and residence registration; the PKK is in charge of nutrition, immunization, and medical care. Many tenets, in fact, prioritized a sense of citizenship championed by the spirit of mutual help. Although their tasks are different, they often operate in parallel or in coordination. In reality, while there is a preference for the wives of Father RTs and RWs to be the heads of the respective PKK groups, it is acceptable for other women to take this position, and, in either case, the PKK meetings are independent from the RT and RW meetings. In fact, often the heads of the RT and RW groups had to report to the PKK for communicative and administrative efficiency, because the PKK meetings are more frequent, have stronger networks, and involve closer relationships.

Despite the shared public nature of both the PKK and RT and RW groups, studies of these two kinds of neighborhood organization tend to treat them separately and sometimes downplay the gendered nature of RT and RW groups, and the public nature of PKK. While studies of RT and RW groups offers sophisticated interpretations of the oppositional theories between state control and genuine communal reciprocity (Bowen 1986; Guinness 2009; Sullivan 1986), they are relatively silent about women's labor. In parallel, while scholars have accurately investigated the state control over women's sexuality and the domestication of women into desirable wives and mothers (Sullivan 1983, 148), in this emphasis the socializing and multi-religious aspect of the urban PKK is relatively unexplored.

Contrary to conventional impressions, many of the PKK members in Sinaran and Graha are not stay-at-home mothers and wives (see also Brenner 1998).[6] Respected and trusted women in the RT and RW groups, even if currently employed, often can hardly resist the request to take leadership positions in the PKK. Take schoolteacher Bu Siti, for example. She is an active member of Aisyiyah in Salatiga, and she is also the head of the PKK in her RT. I may say that she has a "triple burden" and more: family, work, neighborhood, and civic organization. The fact that "career women" participate practically in the PKK as much as stay-at-home mothers and often assume leadership in PKK challenges the notion that the PKK must have hindered women's advancement. Further, most PKK members I know do not believe that women should sacrifice their own careers just for the sake of the family. They believe that

education and careers are just as important as the family.[7] Hence, neither practically nor ideologically can we really describe PKK members as buying into the idea that a woman's role should be confined to the family. Certainly, the effects of the ideology of the PKK in different kinds of localities can vary widely. But, if there is a common trend, it is *not* a contribution to women's confinement to the household.[8]

The limit of the inculcation of "the housewife ideology" perhaps has no better illustration than what was revealed in a conversation right after a PKK meeting in February of 2010.

> After helping distribute some fifty boxes of food to the neighbors, I asked Bu Wati what the acronym of PKK stood for. Apparently struck by the question, Bu Wati turned down the volume of the Discovery channel on television she had just started watching, and seriously mulled over the question, as if the answer was buried in some ancient, mysterious oracle that has long been lost in translation. Pretty certain that one of the Ks *should* be the acronym of *keluarga* (family), she however could not answer what exactly the actual name was. She then made a call to the "chairwoman", Bu Enny, asking her the same question (Bu Wati likes to call Bu Enny *ketua* or the "chairwoman" although really Bu Enny was the treasurer, not the chairwoman. This is because the nominal head is not really doing anything, whereas Bu Enny is more active and basically in charge of everything about the PKK). Unfortunately Bu Enny also could not remember the meaning of PKK, so Bu Wati hung up the phone. "Oh well," she gave up and said to me, "the name is really not that important...as long as mothers get together, have *arisan*, mutually help (*bersilaturahmi*) and circulate food for the ritual meal (*syukuran*)...What is important is *bersilaturahmi*."[9]

Bu Wati's remarks on the meaning of PKK is similar to what I have repeatedly heard from various respondents in Salatiga in regard to the PKK, whenever I asked about the expanded version of the acronym. The authoritative articulation of the PKK in the past seems to be always secondary to the actual substantiations. The fact that the official name of the PKK was updated from "Family Welfare Development" to "Family Welfare Empowerment" in the post-Suharto era[10] is an unimportant matter, and people largely ignore both the original and the updated jargon attached to the name. No matter what is contained in the ideological slogans of the PKK, it is most commonly understood as being a women's neighborhood organization in the local community on its own terms, not an auxiliary but a parallel part of the more male-dominated RT/RW

system. This selective amnesia about the "government propaganda" of the PKK seems to show that the way women understand the obligation assumed in the PKK is by no means directly dictated by the ideological package distributed by the state but, first and foremost, understood in a general sense of good neighborhood life and everyday citizenship.

Due to the primacy of one's immediately neighborhood as the default social community and the strength of women's networks, women are often the nodes for disseminating news and agents for getting things done. Indeed, the PKK is the *de facto* hub of the community. Even if there are some stereotypes about the PKK as a chance for women to play *arisan*, the routine rotating lottery activity sponsored by members, which constitutes an incentive and a little excitement for members to look forward to at each meeting, or simply a chance to chit-chat, gossip, and stick their noses into other households' business, few would deny the importance of the PKK or its contribution to the community. After all, it is partially through gossiping that the community polices unacceptable differences and gets things done. The labeling of women's talk as "gossip" is more of a cross-culturally ubiquitous gender asymmetry than a full picture of the social meaning of PKK. In practice, if one wants to know what's going on in the neighborhood, one goes to the PKK. While RT meetings are theoretically more representative of the neighborhood as a whole, practically they are less significant to the social fabric of the neighborhood than the PKK meetings. The PKK has become simultaneously a nationalist network and a deeply localized women's club, even after the fall of the authoritarian regime in 1998, when, strictly speaking, participating in the PKK became no longer obligatory but voluntary. Today, some PKK groups even record their local songs and events, create their own music videos and upload them to YouTube. They enjoy being involved with the PKK. In this regard, the PKK also constitutes an excellent antithesis of the modern division of the public and the private by institutionalizing public roles for women in the community.

Seeing the PKK as the hub of the community, here, I propose to highlight the PKK's role in facilitating cross-religious solidarity in the religiously mixed neighborhood, especially in the context of the multiple religious revivals. We will see women as social actors who are capable of creating meanings of their own and who value social reciprocity across religious differences through sharing words and foods across heightened religious borders. Three inter-related series of PKK members' cross-religious interactions are now considered.

Act 1: The Arabic Greeting

On July 13, 2010 in the afternoon, some 20 chattering women passed through the yard of Bu Parjo's residence. They were expecting a PKK meeting. Most were Muslim who wore their hijab, and only seven of them were Christian, who bared their hair. Otherwise, most of them wore their collectively designed uniform of their PKK group in saffron (Fig. 6.1). As usual, everyone had to *salim* (a light hand-brush form of greeting) with every other adult in the room, a behavioral norm that signaled the acknowledgment of proper presence between two people at a ritual occasion. As these mothers slowly seated themselves, the master of ceremonies opened the meeting with the standard Arabic greeting "Peace be upon you and so may the mercy of Allah and His blessings" (*assalamualaikum warahmatullahi wabarakatuh*) and paused for the audience to reply "And peace be upon you and so may the mercy of Allah and His blessings" (*waalaikumsalam warahmatullahi wabarakatuh*).

Although now considered normal, this Arabic greeting was once not as ubiquitous as it became during the 1990s, as remembered by local Salatiga residents (which can also be seen from the public speeches given by Suharto before 1990). Before the Islamic resurgence in the 1990s, the most standard greeting at the opening of an official event was the religiously neutral phrase "Peaceful prosperity to all of us" (*salam sejaterah bagi kita semua*), or "Fathers and Mothers whom I respect." Of course, the word *salam* (greeting) and its etymologically related word *slamet* (peace/safety) ultimately originated also from Arabic, and were long ago localized as the Indonesian terms of greeting in everyday phrases from "good morning" and "congratulations" to "happy birthday." Since they were already Indonesianized, they were not considered specifically Islamic. (Fig. 6.1)

This newly popularized greeting phrase of "Peace be upon you and so may the mercy of Allah and His blessings," however, is considered highly Islamic. It is true that in some Muslim sectors—especially among those we called *santri* back in the 1950s and the late nineteenth century— this phrase has always been used, and it is in no sense new. Yet, it should be remembered that most Indonesian Muslims do not speak Arabic beyond purposes of worship and many did not utilize the phrase as a daily necessity until very recently. It was only with the local and global Islamic resurgence since the 1990s that these Arabic expressions have become ubiquitous in the general public. Not only "Peace be upon you and so may the mercy of

Fig. 6.1 The uniform of the local PKK. Each local PKK group has its self-designed uniform, just like the Islamic sermon group. However, it is not obligatory to wear it during the PKK meetings

Source: Photo by the author.

Allah and His blessings," but also other Arabic terms and phrases are increasingly featured in popular slogans that promote Islamic values. A memorable example is *qalbu*, "the heart of conscience," as it was popularized by the Islamic guru Aa Gym. When I was in the field in 2009, the most trendy Arabic-loan phrase was *sakinah, mawaddah, warahmah,* roughly translated as "loving, peaceful, and blessed" that was used when giving good wishes to a Muslim family. Each year, some new Arabic loan words come into fashion and generate new concepts in the general public.

Surprisingly, among the attendants in the PKK meeting in Bu Parjo's place on July 13, 2010, the one who answered the Muslim greeting the loudest was not one of the Muslims, but Bu Parjo herself. Aged in her early fifties, Bu Parjo is a long-term GKI member who has recently converted to Pentecostalism. She owns a furniture manufacturing factory in her spacious house complex, which employs several of her neighbors' sons and daughters. Her husband is a civil servant in the Department of Energy and resides in Jakarta half of the time. Her daughter, divorced, lives in Australia, and her son remains single and now lives with her in Salatiga.

She is an ethnic Javanese from an elite Muslim background, who became a Protestant after college, and converted to Pentecostalism in recent years.

Other Christians present at the PKK meeting simply remained silent during this Muslim-centered exchange of Arabic greetings. Then, the chairwoman invited everyone to "pray in accordance with our respective religions" (*berdoa menurut agama masing-masing*) at the beginning of the meeting. When this was happening, I could hear the non-synchronized, gently uttered recitation of the Al-Fatihah, the opening chapter of the Qur'an. At the same time, the Christian prayers were completely silent. As soon as the prayer session was finished, the women stood up and sang the official PKK anthem "Mars PKK" ("PKK March"). Like most of the PKK groups, they must sing this song, with the chairwoman conducting the chorus with her hand indicating the beat.

"Mars PKK" or "PKK March"[11]

> Oh all the people of Indonesia
> Let's develop immediately
> Develop a prosperous family
> with PKK
> Let's appreciate and practice Pancasila
> For our country
> Life of mutual help, plentiful
> food and clothing
> Healthy and peaceful home
> Carry out the order in the household
> Tidy and lovely
> Instruct your children in national character
> Skillful and healthy
> Build cooperation maintain the environment
> and the surroundings
> Safe and happy is the planned family
> Long live the PKK!

After this obligatory opening sequence of greeting, prayer, and singing, the meeting proceeded to the special report of the Father RT (the head of the neighborhood council, see also Chapter 4), followed by the regular reports of each division within the PKK. The Father RT, who was not a regular guest, started with the Arabic greeting again, explaining that he

was here to brief the participants on the progress of the road construction on the main road within the neighborhood and ask members of the PKK to fill out the new census form. Then, he also called for their support of the festive activities for the upcoming Independence Day on August 17 in the neighborhood, all in a quite formal tone. He then remained silent after the briefing, while the division executives of PKK concisely took turns giving their updates, often with a brief and matter-of-fact attitude. Whenever a new person uttered her first speech with the Arabic greeting, Bu Parjo would once again answer the loudest in Arabic.

These seemingly trivial interactions in a PKK meeting provide a vantage point for thinking about the kinds of sociality and religious pluralism that people subscribe to in multi-religious urban Java. First, the act of *berdoa* ("to pray") remains the indispensable procedure that precedes a proper social event, in which religiosity is formally seen as an integral part of sociality. Second, the announcement to *berdoa masing-masing* ("to pray respectively") is an acknowledgement of the importance of both religiosity and religious diversity, which is the standard announcement in all the neighborhood councils as well as at PKK meetings. But how exactly are the prayers of different religions conducted at the same time?

In the neighborhood of Sinaran, when the moment of prayer at the beginning of the PKK meeting happens, the treasurer of the PKK and member of the Javanese Christian Church, Bu Enny, always recites Al-Fatihah in unison with her Muslim neighbors, despite her Christian faith. Unlike the audible but non-synchronized Qur'anic prayer in the PKK meeting organized by the upper-middle-class neighborhood Graha, the Arabic prayer in middle-class Sinaran's PKK is loud and virtually has no difference from the way women recite in the *pengajian* (the Islamic sermon group) meeting. In other words, when people in Sinaran were praying "respectively," they were actually doing the unison, audible Islamic prayer, while the Christian prayer is completely silent. Hence, if in Graha we have the Christian hostess who replies to the Arabic greeting the loudest, here, in Sinaran, we have an active Christian member of PKK who even goes so far as to forgo her Christian prayer in favor of chanting Arabic scripture together with her Muslim fellows.

The adoption of the new Islamic greetings among certain Christians is not unique to women's meetings, but is also common in men's meetings. In the neighborhood of Sinaran, for example, when Muslims and Christians sit together and enter the moment of "praying respectively" in the RT meeting, the prayers are almost completely silent, and rather short,

unlike the elaborated and long one in the PKK meeting. Nevertheless, the Christian accommodation is still perceivable even in the RT meeting. During my stay, the secretary of the RT was a Javanese Protestant, and he always served as the master of ceremonies of the RT meetings. Each time, he would open the meeting by saying "*Assalamualaikum warohmatullahi wabarokatuh. Salam sejahtera bagi kita semua*," placing the Arabic greeting prior to adding the religiously neutral equivalent idiom "Peaceful prosperity to all of us." When Muslims opened their speeches, however, they would forgo the phrase "Peaceful prosperity to all of us."

In these PKK and RT meetings, the overtly Islamic form of greeting has replaced the old, religiously neutral one. Here, we can see that the once religiously neutral greeting—"Peaceful prosperity to all of us" — is now increasingly considered a sign of Protestant Christianity. The semantic universality of "Peaceful prosperity to all of us" became inversed, as the phrase became a "marked" form of greeting. The once universal marker became provincialized; the once excessively religious marker became the standard practice.[12]

The intricacy of the double greeting seems to be Christians' acknowledgement of religious diversity, much like Indonesian politicians use five greetings from five religions on some special occasions. The difference is that a politician does this to court minority voters; a Christian does this to court the majority neighbors in a way that her Muslim counterpart need not. Moreover, a Christian always places the Islamic greeting before other greetings on this kind of occasion.

Certainly, not all Christians would go so far as to participate in the Arabic chanting, and it need not be the case to make my point. There are other ways to mitigate the dilemma, such as by simply playing a more active role in the PKK, which would not require one to utter Islamic idioms. My point here is simply to highlight the need for adoption or adaptation, even if it is conducted in different ways. Indeed, to pray in Arabic requires certain particular training, but some Christians can do the recitation because they grew up in a Muslim family and only later converted to Christianity. However, this only explains their capability to recite, not their willingness. If, in the 1970s and 1980s, the spirit of the PKK was supposed to be state-centered and religiously-neutral, today it seems that some of the forms of communication in the PKK meetings have been re-Islamized.

When asked why this was the case, both Muslims and Christians told me that nobody would ever force Christians to do so, and it was

Christians themselves who voluntarily did this because those Arabic greetings and prayers had already become the national greeting and prayer. Ye,t at the same time, there is no denial that only the Islamic prayer *could* become the common prayer, and Christian, Buddhist, Hindu greetings could only become secondary. Christians adopted the Arabic greeting at the PKK and RT meetings to show that they were also trying to meet the new Muslim standards. There was a clear "stratification" among different usage of greetings as "socially significant verbal performance," and Christians were "stratifying language" in accordance with their social significance (Bakhtin 2008[1981], 290). But, importantly, instead of being completely assimilated, these Protestant Christians perform double voices. Their Arabic greeting represents a sense of solidarity with Muslim fellows, whereas their Indonesian greeting preserves their integrity as Christians.

The stratification of religiously marked or unmarked greetings is only a suggestive part of the larger cross-religious sociality in everyday life, in which diversity is contained and the discourse of pluralism is made possible. To continue this exploration, I shall now proceed to the second story, which is about food.

ACT 2: THE CHRISTIAN-MADE HALAL FOOD

Food sharing as a core practice that constitutes belonging across many human societies (Carsten 1995; Counihan 1999; Strathern 1988; Wilk 1999) has an unusually ambivalent meaning in Java. Here, food carries particularly communal connotations beyond the household, since family members do not treat eating together as a daily necessity, and eating is traditionally conducted with discretion and great privacy (Woodward 1985; Geertz 1960). Asceticism in matters of food for spiritual strength is "one of the most widespread beliefs in the culture" (Geertz 1960, 323). The Islamic practice of fasting on Mondays and Thursdays for God's blessing is commonly performed by Javanese women (Brenner 1998, 182). Individual eating is seen as a sign of vulnerability and shame and, even during a ritual meal, people sit and eat quietly alongside chairs that are lined up in a way that conversation and encounter is partially discouraged. Given the fact that eating in the sight of others can potentially be an uncomfortable thing, communal eating is perhaps particularly meaningful. It not only symbolizes the prosperity of the community, but also lays bare individuals' commitment to the community.

Food sharing requires knowledge about what is sharable and what is not. Among Javanese Muslims, adherence to the taboo on pork is obeyed even more strictly than alcohol. This taboo is a direct result of the influence of Islamic law (Woodward 1988, 61), given the fact that pigs are among the most common ritual foods in many pre-Islamic and contemporary Southeast Asian societies. The pork taboo is not simply a conceptual constraint that operates outside of bodily inclinations, but a deeply embodied taste. Many Indonesian Muslims that I know have an undisguised abhorrence towards pork, and simply by thinking of the possibility that some human beings actually eat pork can give them goose bumps or nausea. Bu Eka once told me,

> You are what you eat. If you eat whatever that is *haram* ("forbidden" or "illicit"), of course you will become *haram*.[13]

Although pork is a relatively rare food option throughout Java, it is simply wrong to assume that there is no pork in the market. Indeed, in Salatiga's *Pasar Raya* ("big market"), there is always pork being sold, even if just in one shop (which is not many compared with Solo's *Pasar Gede*, where there is a comparatively huge amount of pork in the market). The slaughterhouses in Salatiga also have pigs. In addition, there are special spots that have pork dishes all over the downtown area and near UKSW. These are low-profile restaurants with inconspicuous appearances, often indistinguishable from other resident buildings, somewhat like the small Pentecostal churches. They are the kind of places people know before they visit. The common assumption is that only Chinese and Eastern Indonesians are the actual pork eaters and pork restaurant owners.

Yet, as I patronized a restaurant in the downtown area a few times to observe who actually ate pork, I discovered that the sweeping claim that "almost no Javanese eat pork" is not entirely true. On the contrary, I met many of my Javanese Christian acquaintances after visiting just a few times, and was told that they ate there fairly often. In fact, some Christians even left me under the impression that eating pork is a proof of their Christian faith. That is, if one really were a Christian, why would one be afraid of pork? Eating pork is as much a challenge as a source of pleasure.

Pork dishes can be homemade as well, not just in the restaurants. One day, in May 2010, I asked what Mbak Yani, the domestic help of Bu Parjo, was cooking. To my surprise, she answered that it was pork. I have known

other Christians families that hired Muslim domestic help, but for the comfort of the latter, they never asked them to cook pork dishes. Whenever they wanted to eat pork, they would simply go to a pork restaurant. But some households, such as Bu Parjo's, did make pork dishes at home. Mbak Yani has been a long-term GKJ member, and as a Christian she was not afraid of pork. I was curious about where she bought pork and whether it was a moral burden to touch, carry around, cook, and consume pork in the Muslim-majority neighborhood. Mbak Yani quickly and defensively replied: "No. There is nothing that cannot be eaten. All [are] delicious (*semua enak*)!" Mbak Yani's swift response showed her moral objection to the moral objection to pork, and revealed a nuanced dietary subjectivity in which breaking *religious other*'s food taboo is an affirmation of minority self-identity.

The dietary subjectivity of Christians is situational. When it comes to PKK meetings and any other social gatherings that include the Muslim majority, all food items must be *halal*—that is, without any usage of pork or its derivatives, without blood and alcohol, and so forth. Here, we see Christians' pendulum movement between a ritualized liberation (regular visits to special pork restaurants and vendors) and a ritualized adoption of neighbors' food taboos. In this respect, Christians purposely eat pork because they wish to prove that they are true Christians; alternatively, they refrain from pork for ritual occasions because they are good neighbors. In both scenarios, the Muslim other is constitutive of the Christian dietary habit. In other words, the choice of what to eat, and how to prepare and serve it, is not merely an expression of religious observance, resistance, and personal agency *within* a single religious worldview, but an intersubjective social action embedded *between* different religious worldviews.

Food is powerful substance that marks symbolic boundaries. It can also work to create social intimacy across boundaries as much as it creates those boundaries. Although little has been written about food distribution and sharing across Muslim–Christian boundaries in the Javanese context, a comparable scenario could be found in Bosnia, described by Bringa (1995, 79).

> I knew one woman who rarely went to visit Catholics even though her close neighbors were friendly with some Catholic neighbors. She had married into the village from a mixed Muslim/Serb village to the east. Her experience of the Bosnian "other" was therefore of the Orthodox Serbs; never having had Catholic neighbors before, they were unfamiliar. However, she explained that she did not like to go "in those houses" because they cooked in lard

(Muslims use vegetable oil). She feared it might be used to cook something they served her, such as cakes, or that a residue might have been left on plates or cups. The food in Catholic houses was clearly a major problem for Muslims and was often what made them uncomfortable visiting them.

As with some Muslims in the multi-religious Bosnian village (before wars tore apart the former Yugoslavia), in Salatiga Javanese Muslims would be upset if they learned that they unwittingly swallowed pork, and would be worried about this possibility when in contact with Christians and ethnic Chinese. It is public knowledge that Chinese restaurants, if serving Muslim customers, must use separate woks and utensils.[14] Many Chinese restaurant also post prominent "HALAL" signs to ensure customers of their halal nature, whereas Muslim-owned restaurants mostly do not bother.

Moreover, the awareness regarding halal food has also been raised in recent decades, particularly after nationwide food scandals in 1987 and 2001. It was revealed that the manufacturing processes of certain halal-labeled monosodium glutamates (MSG) and noodles actually involved the use of pork-derived enzymes (1987) and lard (2001). Both times, the incidents elicited public outcry, and they helped give rise to the halal certification body within the MUI, which now certifies most nationally produced manufactured food. With this awareness of halal food in mind, there is, nevertheless, no way to know for sure that Christian homemade food is, indeed, halal. While most people would not risk being impolite and asking, it does not mean that they do not care when they have interactions with non-Muslims.

Against this background of rising halal awareness, eating at a Christian household as a Muslim in a PKK meeting appears to be all the more meaningful, since food is an indispensible element for such a gathering. Typically, the hostess provides guests with food cooked by herself, her female relatives, neighbors, or her domestic help, if she employs any. The most common treats include sweetened black tea and fried bananas, fried crackers, or fried soybean cakes (*tempe*). The main dish after the event could be *soto ayam* (spiced chicken broth with glass noodles on top of rice) or some other dishes. (Fig. 6.2)

To the question of eating at a Christian household as a Muslim, Bu Wati answered that she would "definitely eat" the food offered by Christians; Bu Siti offered "of course" as an answer, given that "they [Christians] already know" the food taboo of the majority; Bu Eka replied, "Yes I want to"; Bu Ningsih expressed "of course they can be

Fig. 6.2 At the end of a PKK meeting, food was served in Graha in July, 2010. The dish that day was *soto ayam*, an Indonesian dish made of chicken broth stewed with cumin, coriander, and other spices topped with hand-torn chicken strips to be served with rice or glass noodles. Chopped cucumbers, tiny carrot cubes, fried shallots, whole green chili peppers, and raw bean sprouts were placed in separate bowls to be added along with the broth later

trusted." Indeed, at all PKK meetings in Christian households I attended, including the gathering at Bu Parjo's place, Muslim neighbors happily consumed the food offered to them. As Bu Siti told me, asking if the food made by the Christians is halal would be *kurang sopan* ("lacking politeness"), since raising the halal issue is no less than making a statement that Christian minorities are so ignorant or reckless that they put their Muslim neighbors into a situation of ritual impurity, which is too insulting to be acceptable.

In short, for a PKK meeting to be held in a Christian household requires Muslim neighbors to trust that the food being consumed is prepared in good hands. Muslims are supposed to have full confidence in their Christian neighbors, without any inquiries made about the possibilities of the food's impurity. Not asking questions is precisely the demonstration of confidence, an important self-presentation of a Muslim in front of her Christian hostess, which is routinely epitomized in the PKK meetings that are held in the Christian households. Here, the dietary subjectivity of Muslims in a Christian PKK member's household is entangled with required confidence in Christians' knowledge and practice of making food. The choice of eating is not merely an expression of religious observance within a singular religious tradition, but an intersubjective social action embedded in the dialogic imagination of a religious other's respect towards oneself.

Simply by confidently eating in the Christian households, Muslims display an important gesture of social trust in local society. The point is never about whether Christian neighbors would be so devious as purposefully to add "additional" pork into the soup they serve to Muslims. The point is simply that, while Muslim neighbors could choose to not consume any food in a Christian household, most choose to eat there, despite knowing that Christians are pork eaters and cookers. Through consuming food right on the spot, women's PKK meetings become a display of cross-religious trust, and exchange of food materializes the social bonds that work in two different directions. For Muslims, it is a display of trust. For Christians, it is a demonstration of respect.

ACT 3: AT CHRISTMAS AND IDUL FITRI

We have mentioned throughout the book that, since the 1990s, there are more and more exclusively Islamic and Christian activities that divide neighborhood residents along religious lines. Muslims go to the Islamic sermon groups, and Christians go to Bible study groups. An important

bridge across the religious divide between neighbors has been the mutual exchange of greetings on each other's holidays; however, even the legitimacy of cross-religious utterances of Merry Christmas and Eid Mubarak has increasingly become a controversial issue in recent years. Media have cited interpretations from renowned Muslim preachers who have drastically different opinions. In December 2014, for example, Indonesian-born American imam Shamsi Ali was reported to imply that the American way of saying "Happy Holidays" (in order not to offend those who do not celebrate Christmas) was wise (*Republika* December 8, 2008). A few days later, top self-help guru Yusuf Mansur was reported to have asked Indonesian Muslims not to say "Merry Christmas" on his twitter account, which had more than a million followers. This tweet was quickly criticized by Ulil Abshar Abdalla, a founder of the Liberal Islamic Network (Jaringan Islam Liberal), who refuted Yusuf's idea and stated that neither the Qu'ran nor Hadith forbid Muslims from uttering "Merry Christmas" (*Republika* December 11, 2014).[15]

In Salatiga, controversies regarding *ucapan Natal* (Christmas greetings) were aroused each year, especially after 2005 when the MUI issued 11 fatwas, which were interpreted as denouncing inter-religious interactions including Christmas greetings by Muslims (Gillespie 2007).[16] While active Muslim PKK members in Sinaran and Graha continue to honor Christmas, some Muslims have a greater sense of caution than others. For example, Bu Eka and her children participated in some parts of the Christmas party held in the neighborhood and even ate there, "but if it was the *ibadah* (worship), [I] don't want it . . . Only the part that is not *ibadah*." On the other hand, Bu Siti (who is the head of the PKK in her RT) always visited the house of her Catholic neighbor (who is the treasurer of the PKK in Bu Siti's RT) to say *Selamat Natal* (Merry Christmas) and she assured me that it was not an issue (*tidak apa-apa*). In fact, to make her point, she immediately brought me to the Catholic neighbor's house in the next lane, and said "Merry Christmas" to her neighbor as we sat together in the guest room, even though that day was not Christmas.[17]

Overall, the cross-religious visits at Christmas and Idul Fitri are more frequently observed by active PKK members and their families than by others. An active Christian PKK member such as Bu Enny can have more than 100 Muslim neighbors as guests at Christmas. A joint account of her "open house" experience on major religious holidays narrated by Bu Enny and Bu Wati is given below.

Me:	So the open house at your place is how long?
Bu Enny:	After we come back from the church about 10 am and till 9 at night.
Me:	If that's the case how many neighbors would come? 100 people?
Bu Enny:	Oh more than that (100 people) would come . . . bring their children and wives. I usually [say] like this, with other elders taking turns . . . what are you gonna cook? Oh I will make *sate*. So here I will make meatballs, later in the elder's house some will cook rice . . . Ok in our RT now there are only 4 Christian families. So we make promises to make foods for Christmas (for everyone in the neighborhood) so that the guests won't eat the same kind of food all over again . . .
BuWati:	If [it is the case of] me I usually make an appointment with older aunt (read: her older sister) and we go to sister's place [Bu Enny's].
Bu Enny:	All the [Muslim] families bring their kids . . . the space is all full, FULL.
Bu Wati:	That is why we say "go home full" (*pulang kenyang*) [on Christmas Day]. The table is full of food and snacks inside jars.
Bu Enny:	If it's *Lebaran*, wah, there will be even more food, and I will be even fuller. No wonder I am fat!!! [laughing]. Usually we visit those who are old, already old . . . if it's people of our age we only greet on the road.[18]

Bu Enny can hold an open house at Christmas for Muslim guests to come every year, precisely because of her active role in the PKK and her close friendship with Bu Wati, who is her Muslim neighbor on the same block. In fact, they are such good friends that, even after Bu Wati later moved to a different RT in 2012, Bu Wati continued to come back to join the PKK that Bu Enny led, so that Bu Wati actually participated in two PKK organizations in her old and new neighborhoods. Because Bu Enny is a skillful event organizer, her house can attract more than 100 neighbors to come on Christmas Day. There, Muslim visitors utter *Selamat Natal* to Bu Enny and her family. On the other hand, if it is on Lebaran, Bu Enny would follow Bu Wati to visit older Muslim neighbors to show respect. As to other neighbors, friends, and family members, Bu Enny would send cellphone text messages of *Selamat Hari Raya Idul Fitri* (Good Idul Fitri) and *Mohon Maaf Lahir dan Batin* ("I ask for forgiveness materially and spiritually"), since literally everyone in the neighborhood uses text messages. In short, this holiday version of dialogic religiosity entails

Muslims and Christians uttering each other's voices in making good wishes, to honor holidays that are not their own.

The reason why so many Muslim neighbors have no problem staying inside and eating in Bu Enny's place is because women in the neighborhoods have always done that. As Bu Wati explained to me,

> Of course we come here [to Bu Enny's place]. Everyone would come. Don't we often go to each other's house already? Every week. So it is not weird at all! [It is] comfortable (*enak*).[19]

Bu Wati's words point out that the cross-religious visits are made more natural by the routine practice of visiting other women's households for PKK meetings regardless of religious identities. While these cross-religious visits only take place once every Gregorian and Islamic year, PKK meetings take place every week and are hosted by the Mother of a household. Meanwhile, although it is PKK members who have been the most familiar guests to her house, in Bu Enny's narrative, it is the male heads of the households who "bring" their "children and wives", rather than the PKK members who bring their "husbands and children". In other words, Bu Enny verbally adhered to the patriarchal PKK ideology and confirmed that cross-religious visits were not merely done by women alone. The event was organized through the PKK network, but it was men who were credited for "bringing" wives and children.

While the neighborhood is one of the most important places for such cross-religious interactions, my informants have wider social networks based on the school, workplace, extended family, civic organizations, and so on. Often, cellphones are used to facilitate cross-religious greetings with these more distant friends, with text message greetings being especially popular. On Christmas Eve and Christmas Day 2009, many of my Muslim friends texted me highly elaborate Merry Christmas messages, patterned after some widely circulated holiday text messages that they sent to other Christian friends. On Lebaran in 2010, I disappointed Bu Zulfa because I was traveling all day with Bu Wati's family to see their relatives and friends, and hence unable to visit Bu Zulfa and to say *Selamat Hari Raya Idul Fitri* (Eid Mubarak or "Happy Eid al-Fitr") personally to her. She kindly forgave me the following day, but this experience made me aware of the importance of meeting and greeting on the major religious holidays between relatives and close friends, even if they profess different religions.[20]

Perhaps nothing summarizes better this exchange of good wishes on each other's important religious holidays than a metaphor of pluralism that members of the PKK often mention to me. The meaning of multiple religions is like climbing Mount Merapi (*naik Gunung Merapi*), the volcano that lies to the south of Salatiga; some people ride motorcycles or cars, and others walk on foot; everyone has a different path, but the goal is all the same, namely God. Therefore, it does not really matter that there are multiple ways to worship God, just like there are, naturally, multiple routes to reach the summit.

Here, let me borrow Bakhtin's definition of chronotope (2008[1981], 84–54) to explore this fiction of Climbing Mount Merapi.

> We will give the name chronotope (literally, "time-space") to the intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships that are artistically expressed in literature .... Time, as it were, thickens, takes on flesh, becomes artistically visible; likewise, space becomes charged and responsive to the movements of time, plot and history ... The chronotope as a formally constitutive category determines to a significant degree the image of man in literature as well. The image of man is always intrinsically chronotopic.

In the metaphor, my Javanese Muslim friends create a chronotope surrounding the mountain long considered as one cosmological point of the great axis for the harmony of the universe in traditional Javanese mythology. This life is artistically visualized in the roads to the summit, which represent multiple religions that are temporary and transient. The summit is the afterlife landscaped, where Muslims and Christians will eventually meet. The image of mountain climbers is someone who is bounded to a time-space marked by co-existing, multiple religious paths. This rather straightforward metaphor differs remarkably from the older, complicated imagery often associated with Mount Merapi. The much older Islamic-Javanese mythology has it that there exists "an invisible North-South Axis beginning at Merapi's summit, passing through the city and ending on the coast to the south. Merapi is the abode of Sunan Merapi, the southern coast is home to Ratu Kidul, the Queen of the Southern Ocean. Both are powerful Muslim spirits" (Woodward November 22, 2012). Proper interactions with and offerings to these Muslim spirits are important for the wellbeing of the land, and thus are important duties of the Sultan of Yogyakarta, whose palace lies directly in between the mountain and the sea. In the latest metaphor of Mount Merapi,

however, the protagonists are no longer the Muslim king and the powerful spirits, but ordinary followers of Islam and Christianity.

While the unstated assumption may be that the members of different religions never meet until they reach the one true God, the metaphor indicates other possibilities. When one utters good wishes to her religious other, be it Merry Christmas or Happy Idul Fitri, two paths to Mount Merapi temporarily cross. In other words, different religions in this fiction are not simply parallel, equally valid, and independent paths to God. These paths also pass one another and intersect, and one can walk onto another path to care for other travellers on the mountain. One goes on another path, even if just briefly, to climb the mountain as if one is another team's member. The exchange of paths alternate both ways, and so it reminds everyone that what they are climbing is indeed the same mountain, and they are not alone in knowing that there are alternative ways. Most importantly, these other paths and other travelers are not strange to them. They have routinely shared food with these other travelers for a long time.

The good intention regarding religious pluralism behind this metaphor is obvious. But is this Mount Merapi trope an accurate reflection of actual social life? Does it have any significance, when only some Muslim PKK members believe in the story, while others such as Bu Parjo, a Pentecostal convert, actually suspect that people of different religions will never meet and, hence, Muslims and Christians do not share the same summit? To the extent that the world represented in a chronotope and the world that the chronotope is meant to represent are different, Bakhtin also carefully shows that these two often sharply drawn categories can interact (2008[1981], 253–254). In other words, this is a story that PKK Muslim members told themselves in a time of widened religious difference and perceived growing inter-religious competitions in society. While this image of pluralism omits the different degrees of difficulty among the different paths—and certainly omits the possibility of volcanic eruption—it does acknowledge the existence of other religiosities within this sacred geography. Perhaps more poetically, this metaphor of climbing up Mount Merapi serves to transform the Islamic-Javanese natural landscape into a God's lesson to be learned, and that lesson seems to be an approval of religious pluralism. (Fig. 6.3)

Women's Social Space for Religious Pluralism

Cross-religious interactions are maintained and innovated by PKK members: the new Islamic greetings that Christians also utilize; Christians'

Fig. 6.3 Catholic and Muslim friends sitting in a Protestant friend's house in July, 2012. The photo on the wall in the middle is the Christian family's portrait in Javanese attire. The poster on the right is a gift from a Pentecostal friend of the Protestant family. It says *Rumah Mujizat* or "House of Miracles"

Source: Photo by the author.

silent prayer next to the audible Islamic prayer in the PKK meeting; Bu Parjo's loud response to the Arabic greeting; Bu Enny's recitation of the Qu'ran; Muslims' confidence in the halal food made by Christians; and holiday visits to wish Happy Idul Fitir or Merry Christmas. These Muslim–Christian interactions make it clear that grass-roots pluralism in practice does not necessarily look for a full elimination of inequality, but demands a public stage for constant social demonstrations of respect and trust. If I may draw a parallel between Bakhtin's analysis of the art of a novel and the art of the system of sociality amid religious heteroglossia, we shall see the fact that PKK is a socially significant practice available to all adult women, and it provides a social space where the combination of religious heteroglossia has formed a unique style, which is increasingly multi-religious.

The "stylistic uniqueness" of this system of sociality is to be found in the combination of its styles, which "cannot be identified with any single one of the unities subordinated to it" (Bakhtin 2008[1981], 262). PKK meetings not only reinforce the bond between women, food, and public sociality as a simple function of the community. The meetings, in fact, allow the multiple voices and religiosities they represent to produce the particular style of sociality that is mixed and multi-religious by nature.

At the same time, however, we should never paint too rosy a picture of peaceful religious pluralism sustained by the PKK. In 2013, when I revisited Bu Parjo, she told me that she no longer wanted to hold PKK meetings at her place as often as she used to. This seemed related to a wider set of complaints about Muslim–Christian relations, which she explained to me at some length in the same conversation. She complained that in Australia, where her daughter volunteered to help refugees, Christian groups were not working hard enough, allowing Muslim groups to get the upper hand. "They built mosques everywhere," she said. Also, she did not like women who wore *jilbab* to enter churches in Salatiga, which seemed to be a further sign of the weakness of Christianity to her. She gave another example of the dwindling power of Christians in general: She used to also hold non-denominational services at home, but the children of the other participants converted to Islam. Finally, she complained about the rapid spread of mosques in Salatiga, "People here have a trick (*trik*). If there is a church, they build a mosque next to it. But the church was already there since the Dutch period! The church came first!" Facing her anger with the broader Islamization in society, it made me reconsider her previous loud Arabic greetings in the PKK meetings; perhaps responding in Arabic represented a refusal to be marginalized by the Islamic revival, and was not simply a display of solidary with her Muslim neighbors.

Performing Pluralism

The cross-religious interpersonal interactions documented in this chapter demonstrate asymmetrical power relations within a kind of peaceful pluralism that actually works for now at the local level. Too often, it is tempting to treat power asymmetry as a symptom of a lack of "religious freedom" or Muslims' intolerance of other religious minorities in Muslim-majority lands. Yet, this discourse of religious freedom easily dismisses the long-term history of power relations between different religions, and ignores the culturally defined social heterogeneity at work.[21] More

critically, this discourse prevents us from exploring what make the most sense at the local level.

To avoid jumping so quickly to that hasty conclusion, I have proposed that we examine how people prepare and position themselves regarding the question of pluralism—that is, to explore the conditions of Indonesian pluralism from the bottom of society, where decisions must be made by ordinary people on a daily basis and not by distant elites. Here, we have witnessed that collective sanctification of religious pluralism is not simply a passive acceptance of the co-existence of differences, but a set of active rules that involve appropriations of religious others' words and things. To the extent that pluralism is *not* free of unequal relations of power but is dependent on them, the commitment to sociality also requires the dominant group to give up some privileges and participate in the sanctification of religious pluralism. Here, public piety and everyday sociality are the very ingredients of everyday citizenship—a citizenship that is not simply dictated by the state and religious authority but by social actors themselves.

To conclude, the PKK have come to unexpectedly represent the local network that cross-cuts religious divides most diligently. Within the moral framework of the PKK, sociality is partially, but critically, embedded in dialogic religiosity, as sociality is achieved by appropriating religious others' voices and substances in order to demonstrate trust and respect. Everyday citizenship and the performance of pluralism do not originate from doctrines of liberal pluralism that honor individual rights and equality; neither is it simple-minded obedience to customary tradition. Rather, this system of civil pluralism is sustained by the long-term gendered social practices that have adopted a variety of religiously marked expressions, and involves complex power relations between majority and minority. Nevertheless, cross-religious solidarity via the PKK does not exclude a sense of competition with, or even hostility towards, other religions. Once the context is moved outside of the neighborhood community and towards more exclusively defined religious communities, the strengthened religious identity may erode social belonging in the neighborhood. As such, pluralism is always an unfinished project.

Notes

1. This quote should not be read as the general situation before the war in Bosnia before the 1990s. In fact, Bringa has shown complex interactions

between Muslim and Catholic neighbors, including a Catholic woman and a Muslim woman who are best friends.

2. Field notes, June 13, 2013.

3. See endnote 1.

4. See Chapter 1, note 10.

5. See Bakhtin 2008[1991], 293–294, the original quote: "The word in language is half someone else's. It becomes 'one's own' only when the speaker populates it with his own intention, his own accent, when he appropriates the word, adapting it to his own semantic and expressive intention."

6. It would be inaccurate and misleading to describe the program of the PKK as aiming to create the subjectivity of a desirable "housewife" only. Most of the literature on the PKK so far has seemed to utilize the term "housewife" without sufficient cultural qualifications. Literally, *ibu rumah tangga* means "the mother of the household." In contemporary American-English usage, a "housewife" means a married woman who does not have a formal job and stays at home. In Indonesia, however, *ibu rumah tangga* means something else. To put it simply, while *ibu rumah tannga* can refer to those who really are "housewives" in its English sense, it could also mean an ascribed status for all married women regardless of their employment status. Whether a woman is formally employed or not, once she is married and assumes some responsibilities over family members, she is entitled to the status of an *ibu rumah tannga*. In my field, career women almost invariably insist that "of course I *am* an *ibu rumah tannga*." In fact, career women feel that their duty as "the mother of the household" is potentially overshadowed by their career and therefore there is an even greater need explicitly to reclaim the role of "the mother of the household," so that they could not be criticized for neglecting their womanly duty.

7. Alternatively, they believe that as long as the family is taken care of, women can pursue education, careers, or whatever they want. In this latter case, the precondition "as long as the family is taken care of" is often used as a conditional acceptance of women's education and employment, rather than a prohibition against it.

8. Statistically, female employment rates (usually underestimated, due to informal employment) in Indonesia since the 1970s have steadily increased (26.6% in 1971, 36% in 1990, and 51% in 2010) at a faster rate than that of males (Manning 1998, 233; BPS Indonesia 2010). The wage disparities associated with gender also declined in all sectors, particularly after 1990 (Dhanani et al. 2009, 18). Although there is no denying that the wages paid to young women in large multi-national factories remains low and wage discrimination in all sectors still renders women vulnerable (Wolf 1992), the majority of these jobs are still occupied by men, with other opportunities

open for women (Manning 1998, 233). For example, there has been a higher percentage of all non-agricultural employment absorbed in government and social services among educated female workers than male (Manning 1998, 250). In the early 1990s, women held approximately one-third of Indonesian civil service positions (Robinson 2000, 153), particularly in the departments of education and health, although the more senior or top managerial and decision-making levels continue to be dominated by males. The 2008 women's share in the labor force was nearly 38%. It was highest in employed domestic labor (76%), health and social work (57%), restaurants and hotels (56%), and education (55%).

In general, female participation in the economy and their wages have increased markedly both absolutely and relative to males, although their wages and conditions are still worse than males. The concentration of women in low-waged and low-prestige jobs is just a small part of the story of the larger picture of changing employment patterns and decreasing wage differentials by gender. In any case, there is no evidence that Indonesian women are more restricted to the home than in the past, and therefore one cannot assume that the PKK has resulted in a change that did not happen.

9. Field notes, February 9, 2010.
10. In Indonesian, the two names are *Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga* and *Pemberdayaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga*.
11. My translation. The original lyrics of "Mars PKK" are quoted here:
    Marilah hai semua Rakyat Indonesia/Membangun segera/Membangun keluarga yang sejahtera/Dengan PKK/Hayatilah dan amalkan Pancasila/ Untuk Negara/Hidup gotong royong, makmur Pangan dan Sandang/ Rumah sehat sentosa/Tata laksana di dalam rumah tangga/Rapi dan indah/Didiklah putra berpribadi bangsa/Trampil dan sehat/Kembangkan koprasi jagalah lingkungan/dan sekitarnya/Aman dan bahagia kluarga berencana/Hidup jaya PKK.
12. This is not unlike the term *warga negara Indonesia* (Indonesian citizen) that, while literally being universal, practically has the implication of "Chinese Indonesian."
13. Her next sentence is: Wait . . . are you telling me that even *you* eat pork, too? That was a rare moment when I felt I could not deny my "pork identity," since I am from Taiwan, a place where rice with minced pork with soy sauce gravy is among the most common dishes. I told Bu Eka the truth, and then she became a bit curious, despite her revulsion, about the flavor of pork and asked me if it was true that pork was delicious. Field notes, February 9, 2010.
14. Not only is Chinese cuisine considered dangerous, but also the Manado dishes such as pork *rica-rica*. A Manado dog dish is also a delicacy among Christians in Salatiga. Out of a disapproval of Manado dishes, a Javanese

saying even mocks Minahasa people as "eating everything except the foot of the table."

15. There are various angles for discussing the permissibility of saying "Merry Christmas" to non-Muslims, but a key issue in the public discourse is the potential violation of *tauhid* (tawhid, "the oneness and uniqueness of God"). One commonly cited Qur'anic verse among those who believe wishing Christians "Merry Christmas" violates tawhid is "Worship none but Allah; treat with kindness your parents and kindred, and orphans and those in need; speak fair to the people; be steadfast in prayer; and practice regular charity" (Qur'an Al-Baqarah 2:83). Those who disagree then respond with other verses such as "Those who believe (in the Qur'an) and those who follow the Jewish (Scriptures) and the Christians and the Sabians and who believe in Allah and the last day and work righteousness shall have their reward with their Lord; on them shall be no fear nor shall they grieve" (Qur'an Al-Baqarah 2:62). See https://remajaislam.com/296-fatwa-mui-seputar-perayaan-natal.html and http://www.voa-islam.com/read/liberalism/2010/12/21/12397/mengoreksi-prof-dr-sofjan-siregar-yang-membolehkan-ucapan-selamat-natal/ (accessed on October 9, 2015).

16. An earlier fatwa was issued in 1981 to forbid Muslims' participation in Christmas celebrations (Sirry 2013).

17. Field notes August 18, 2010

18. Field notes, June 13, 2013.

19. Field notes, June 13, 2013.

20. Indeed, the phenomenon was not unique to Salatiga, but also could be found in nearby places. In a neighboring town, Ambarawa, for example, it is reported that each year Christians organize visits to the house of Islamic leaders on the day of Idul Fitri, and Muslims visit their Christian neighbors' houses to wish them Merry Christmas on Christmas Day (Nurhadi 2005).

21. Although I have used Bakhtin's concept of heteroglossia throughout the book, I disagree with a Bahktinian treatment of speech/social action as having relative autonomy in each movement. Rather, I believe social action is underpinned by the long-term generative embodiment of history, religiosity, gender, and ethnicity. This is why sometimes in the book I need to use Bourdieu's *habitus* to underline this point.

Conclusions: Entangled Pieties

Not Just a Story About Tolerance

Gendered Pluralism in Practice

Proud of Salatiga's fame for its "religious tolerance," the head of the city's Religious Affairs Office (*Kantor Urusan Agama*), Juhdi Amin, told the press in 2003 that one of the secrets of inter-religious harmony in Salatiga was a group called Majelis Pimpinan Umat Agama Salatiga (literally, "Council of Leaders of Religious Communities of Salatiga" or *Majelis Puasa*. Puasa means "fasting."). Stressing that his office had helped organize Majelis Puasa, Juhdi Amin continued to remark that the nation has witnessed disintegration as a result of religious and ideological conflict, by which he might have meant the Muslim–Christian violence in Poso and Ambon (*Suara Merdeka* August 5, 2003). According to him, Salatiga's group was a model for the later development of the Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama (Forum of Religious Harmony—FKUB), a national version of Majelis Puasa that is implemented in every city in the country with religious figures from all major religious groups. One of its functions is the local supervision and approval of permits for the construction of new worship facilities. In Salatiga, both the FKUB and Majelis Puasa include leaders from five religions: Islam, Christianity, Catholicism, Buddhism, and Hinduism.

In terms of the actual contribution to inter-religious harmony in the city, these multi-religious organizations are credited to some extent in the press and academic works, but have also met with some critiques from Indonesians concerned with understanding and improving inter-religious

relations. For example, in a short Indonesian article regarding inter-religious dialogue in Ambarawa, a town near Salatiga, researcher Agus Nurhadi argues that the FKUB's activities are too "theological-normative," and insufficiently "social-empirical." He suggests that FKUB meetings are too elite and "dry and boring" (2005, 172) due to their routine and formal nature. As Agus observes, it is no secret that this sort of "inter-religious dialogue" has already become like a "zombie" (*mayat hidup*), which has far less significance than the real thing—what he calls "patterns of harmony" that operate in grass-roots society (ibid., 173).

Like Agus, I have observed this juxtaposition of two kinds of cross-religious events: one is more theological-normative; the other more social-empirical. Unlike Agus, I have chosen to highlight the importance of gendered pluralism in practice. I could never shake off the underwhelming impression the theological-normative style had on me when I attended a meeting of Majelis Puasa in 2008, where I was immediately struck by the fact that it was rather formal and dominated by male religious leaders. Each religious representative expressed their opinions about the universal values of their religion and reiterated their support for inter-religious harmony, and that was pretty much it. The atmosphere was far more formal and distant between the speakers than that of the social mingling, cooking, chatting, and eating among women in the multi-religious Javanese neighborhoods that I describe in this book.

Having no intention to discredit formal inter-religious dialogue—I especially respect the noble efforts of inter-faith dialogue in post-conflict zones where religious identities have been deeply involved—I have shown the much greater impact of daily inter-religious interactions in general. Women's Islamic sermon groups can cross-cut traditional Muslim factions in the face of an imagined strong Christian community; women have subtly adapted the official neighborhood organizations into women's cross-religious gatherings, bringing together Protestants, Pentecostals, Catholics, neo-traditional Muslims, and reformist Muslims, even if the social interaction is overall more "Islamized."

At the same time, however, my research in Salatiga demonstrates that the rise of Pentecostal churches that compete with traditional ethnic churches as well as the Islamic revival groups has ensured that religious cultures today are deeply entangled with competing discourses of the nation, Javanese sociability, gender norms, state pluralism, ethnicity, and even post-colonial memories. As a result, seemingly uneventful surfaces conceal the undercurrent of inter-religious anxieties; seemingly clashing

religious communities overshadow the cross-religious friendship in neighborhood communities.

Looking at the broad sociological groupings in Indonesian sociopolitical history, it seems to me that the social meaning of the PKK, women's Islamic sermon groups, charismatic Christian congregations, or Pentecostal women's workshops was never merely about women's domestication for men. Although gender hierarchy does exist, these groups should not be seen as primarily institutions aiming to control women. In reality, they have actually promoted the participation of women and minorities in public life, and made religious leadership available to women and minorities in a historically unprecedented manner.

This observation of gendered pluralism continues but also goes beyond the inquiries of other recent works, focusing on women and Islam. While many scholars highlight the rise of "Islamic feminism" from Indonesia and Iran to the Middle East in general (Cooke 2001, Doorn-Harder 2006, Mir-Hosseini 2006, Rinaldo 2008), a contradictory and influential stance has been Mahmood's *Politics of Piety* (2005), in which she dismisses the question of empowerment as inadequate to understand women who primarily want to be virtuous. In Mahmood's analysis of pious Muslim women in Cairo, she contends that the practice of veiling simply represents a religious obligation as "part of a religious doctrine, a divine edict, or a form of ethical practice and that it therefore has nothing to do with 'identity'"(ibid., 343). While this approach conveys an important reminder—that we should not privilege a Western construct of freedom as a universal human desire over other forms of desire—its portrayals of Islam, Western values, and women's experiences are too singular and flattened to account for social interactions between different religious actors and within different social contexts. In my interactions with Javanese Muslim women, for example, I have discovered that Javanese Muslim women's adoption of the veil is simultaneously entangled with contemporarily localized signs of status and sociality, as well as modernity and national identity. Veiling for different women at different ages and on different occasions may mean different things, rather than constituting a singular realization of the self through embodying the religious doctrine. In other words, piety cannot be entirely explained by *the* religious tradition, since religious practice is always embedded in a broader social context.

Another approach—which is compatible with this book, but still focuses on a single group rather than the intersections of multiple

groups—is demonstrated by Deeb's *An Enchanted Modern* (2011). For Deeb, Western modernity and Islamic doctrines are less dichotomized and have both been sources from which pious Shi'i women in Lebanon articulate a powerful discourse of the "pious modern" (Deeb 2011, 30, 218). In fact, Deeb's interlocutors are highly aware of the typical view of them in the Western imagination as "oppressed Muslim women" living in a backward community. In response, Shi'i Lebanese women "combat these external stereotypes about themselves as nonmodern in the same ways that they confronted patriarchal norms in their community" (ibid., 218). As Deeb cites one of her most assertive correspondents, Hajjeh Amal, towards the end of the book (2011, 218–219):

> And this fight is not only an internal one. We are also fighting the outside image of Muslim women. We admit that there are some bad images out there, of very oppressed Islamic women, but this is not the authentic/true [*haqiqi*] Islam
>
> …our goals as women are to improve these images of Muslim women within our society that thinks that women are less than men, and to change the image of the oppressed Muslim women that exists outside our society. This work is part of our religious duty, because woman is the example of everything. A culture is judged by the level of its women.

Hajjeh Amal is dialogically articulating her identity as a Muslim woman against her evaluation of Westerners' imagining of her. Nevertheless, given that the focus of Deeb's study was on a marginalized community in Beirut and Lebanon, how other mainstream groups in the nation view the Shi'i pious modern is relatively unexplored. Precisely because "the community of the Shi'i pious modern is relatively new to the Lebanese national scene" (Deeb 2011, 67), how others in the country evaluate this religious movement and women's role in it is an important question. Do Shi'i women also incorporate the perspectives of their fellow Lebanese in reshaping their identity? More broadly, to the extent that Lebanon is a religiously divided and consociational democracy, what are the possible interactions between Muslims, Maronite Christians, and other minorities in Beirut? How are these interactions gendered? The fleeting presence of Maronite and Orthodox Christians in the rich ethnography of Beirut's southern suburbs leaves the question of women and pluralism untouched, waiting for further research to reveal it.

In this monograph, I have shown that religious people not only have their own complicated definitions of modernity and prosperity, they also have ideas

of other people's definitions. The question is how these definitions interact with one another across religious boundaries, not simply how these definitions relate to gender roles. This concern is also justified by the fact that Muslim women in ordinary neighborhood communities I work with are contextually less concerned with combating patriarchy and re-interpreting religious texts for women's empowerment than concerned with fostering sociability and community in the midst of multiple religious revivals (cf. Doorn-Harder 2006). My interlocutors do possess cherished interpretations of certain scriptures specifically about women's rights, but the social processes that made those particular readings possible need be addressed elsewhere. In this book, I purposefully chose to focus on a different but equally important issue: the interactive imaginings that underlie a wide array of social interactions between a variety of Muslim women and men, and Christian women and men. I look not just at women's narratives about women and piety *per se*, but more broadly at gendered sociality and ethnicity, as well as stratified pluralism.

In sum, while Egyptian, Lebanese, and Indonesian societies are drastically different, there are nevertheless comparable questions of women and religious pluralism at stake. Within Javanese society, a variety of social and religious activities has contributed to localized *and* globalized movements for personal piety, and has significantly transformed the life of women and minorities. When religious cultures widen the gap between people, social trust needs to be accumulated in innovative and particularly religious ways. The result is not necessarily utopian small republics, but local ways of maintaining sociability still work to mediate the diversity, although with obvious limitations. As the organization of neighborhood life in Java survived the New Order into the era of Reformasi, RT and RW groups and the PKK have not vanished, but have become sites for practicing civic pluralism, in addition to their administrative functions. This specifically Javanese-Indonesian case has broader implications. The first implication is to show the importance of everyday practices beyond strictly "religious" domains. The second, and equally important, implication is to demonstrate the salience of the gendered imageries and actions that underpin these everyday inter-religious practices.

DIALOGISM, NOT JUST DIALOGUE

With the case of Salatiga in mind, I wish to sum up this book with a final reflection on Bakhtin's dialogic imagination, in order to explain why the book is not primarily a story about tolerance, but about multiple pieties entangled with one other, and entangled with gendered social relations. In the end, I

hope that this work helps to show the experiential merit of attending to interactions between diverse religious groups and enhances our understanding of religious movements and their interrelations with broader social and cultural change.

Now, let me summarize with a few more words on the difference between dialogism and dialogue. First, dialogism is a constant state of social being, not an ideology or belief such as religious tolerance. This is an important difference, because it helps us realize that people can construct religiosity and negotiate inter-religious relations dialogically even if they never participate in an "inter-religious dialogue." As Bakhtin defines it, the primary location of dialogic struggle is between different types of social actors reflected in literature by multiple literary characters. Hence, well before a social actor can utter anything in an inter-religious dialogue or deliver a religious message, he or she is already a dialogic being interacting with others. Here, languages, or cultures, are multiple and not neutral, saturated with meanings, and not only pushed forward by the speaker's intention, but also "overpopulated" by the intentions of others (Bakhtin 2008[1981], 35). An element of the dialogic is inherent in all our intellectual activities, not just in what is commonly known as a dialogue. The interpretations of others' intentions can work for or against tolerance and there is no guarantee that the result will be conducive to greater tolerance. My use of the adjectival form "dialogic" over the nominal form "dialogue" was intentional, to prevent the reduction of the dialogic to mere dialogue. In fact, studies of "inter-religious dialogues" are not necessarily the best examples of "the dialogic" available to us. Meaning does not begin or end with the utterance of language (Enfield and Levinson 2006, 28). There is meaning inside and outside of an utterance, before and after, and the utterance is only part of the composites of a potential meaning. In other words, to study dialogic religiosity and entangled piety is to approach, simultaneously, the larger socio-cultural processes and the face-to-face interactions that make possible the commonalities, rivalries, or creativities surrounding religiosities.

Second, the concept of dialogic religiosity enables an exploration of the mechanisms that sustain a socio-culturally embedded pluralism, whereas inter-religious dialogue sometimes endorses a discourse of tolerance that potentially neglects power relations. Indeed, as we have learned from Jane Hill's application of Bakhtin's theory of social stratification and linguistic styles in her analysis of the Mexican peasant Don Gabriel's narratives, we should remember that one of the most useful merits of applying the concept of dialogic imagination is to unmask the power of one linguistic style over another. In this book, I adopt this stance to show that, in Java,

there is no doubt that overtly Islamic language and signs are more prestigious than others, and that pluralism always works with, not without, unequal power relations.

A closer examination of power relations also helps us to see how members of the weaker party in the broader social system empower themselves in socially acceptable ways. By naturalizing the more distinguished Muslim way of expression and extending it to include even the Christian population in a PKK and RT meeting, the less powerful party is able to assimilate the prestige of Islamic expression back into the more "general" (*umum*) Indonesian norm of the community. This is a manifestation of agency in the process of adopting voices, especially among people of the less privileged strata. When Christians, not just Muslims, are uttering Islamic greetings or prayers, these expressions become less about being Islamic than being "social." This constitutes a vital reversal of what anthropologists have documented about reformist Islam in the past (Bowen 1993; Geertz 1960; Peacock 1978), when some puritan Muslims strove to purify Islam from communal traditions. What is Islamic is domesticated into being social and public. The dominant religion's power is simultaneously acknowledged, but also neutralized, or at least contained. The intersection between Islam, Christianity, and the norms of gendered sociality are in flux.

DIALOGISM, NOT SYNCRETISM

If dialogism is not the same as dialogue, it is also not syncretism. Although they are not mutually exclusive, we should still keep them analytically separate. Here, Bakhtin's notion of hybridity can help us. Treating heteroglossia as the fundamental condition that endows utterances with meaning, Bakhtin advances a theory of hybridity. He distinguishes two forms of hybridity: organic and intentional hybridity. Organic hybridity is the unconscious processe that hybridizes languages and linguistic styles, which exist "in the historical life and evolution of languages, pregnant with potential for new world views" (2008[1981], 358). In contrast, intentional hybridity is seen as "enabling a contestatory activity, a politicized setting of cultural differences against each other dialogically" (ibid.). An intentional hybrid is thus a "conscious hybrid . . . an encounter, within the area of an utterance, between two different linguistic consciousnesses, separated from one another by an epoch, by social differentiation or by some other factor" (ibid.).

Hybridity, here, is a feature of the dialogic process that defines all speech, and by extension, all worldviews. Heteroglossia is the necessary condition of hybridity, and it is the selection and appropriation from the multiple choices and interpretations that make hybridity possible. In other words, Bakhtin uses the idea of hybridity *not* to imply a pure state prior to it. Rather, the original state is always multiple and already mixed. Syncretism, on the other hand, has a stronger sense of dual systems, a prior state in which two ideas can encounter each other and combine. It is used particularly to analyze a process of competition over religious authority, either by absorbing the stronger party or by attacking the weaker party. If syncretism, in this sense, creates a C out of A and B, Bakhtin recognizes hybridity within A, B, C, D, and E from the onset and assumes that inside all of them there are already ongoing conversations between different worldviews (Stewart and Shaw 1994). Moreover, hybridity can be a feature of situational strategy embedded in a long-term tendency, instead of a replacement of identity. In other words, while a Bakhtinian approach firmly rejects the idea of a pure state prior to hybridity, it nevertheless allows for the existence of authentic and enduring identities, however complex, that make intersubjectivity possible. The identities are enriched, not replaced, by hybridity.

Bakhtin's two senses of hybridity are epitomized by the utterances and actions of Muslims and Christians in the larger Javanese society. Muslims and Christians may occasionally and unwittingly create some religiously "hybrid" (*campur*) phenomena, but in no sense does this mean that they consider themselves as practitioners of a religious syncretism. An obvious example of both kinds of hybridity would be the Arabic loan words, which were the etymological forerunner of Indonesian ways of greeting that have been localized and disassociated from Islam—for example, *selamat pagi* (good morning), as well as the source of prestigious ways of speaking—for example, *assalamualaikum* (May peace be upon you). But, at a deeper level, many of the cultural aspects of religions in Java are parts of longer processes of organic hybridity interweaving Christianity, Islam, and Indonesian cultures. They include the birth of the modern organizing logic of Muslim organizations, as well as secularized education and medical institutions, and, on the Christian side, the idea that God can be translated and understood as *Allah*, and the transformation of Javanese post-mortem rituals into Protestant worship services. This does not represent religious syncretism at all. Instead, it stands for an evolution of dialogic religiosity that develops even stronger claims of authentic religious identities.

The strength of Bakhtin's concept of organic hybridity lies in its consideration of long-term cultural inclinations and their place in a multiplicity of worldviews, which makes it a more useful tool than Bourdieu's *habitus* and *doxa* to explain cultural change. *Habitus* and *doxa*, or cultural inclinations and worldviews embodied, too often assume a singularly stratified system of generative circuits of actions with minor variations, whereas an evolution of hybridity recognizes the plurality of generative forces behind all actions. Thus, in this book I stress the approach of heteroglossia along with a prerequisite that the core solidarity and its capabilities to absorb cultural changes need to be addressed. As such, this work has attempted to highlight the "mixed" (*campur*) nature of organizations, institutionalization, and religious expressions, while stressing the role of the core sociality and the ritual *habitus* that facilitates an evolution of dialogic religiosity.

At the more conscious level, the "intentional hybridity" in the Javanese religious landscape is equally prominent. We have seen in Chapter 2 how a nineteenth-century Christian *kyai*, in an attempt to reconcile two competing religious forces while borrowing authority from the old one to legitimate the new, called the new churches "mosques" and himself "headmaster of the Islamic school." To cite another example from Chapter 5, Pentecostal Christians today creatively adopt a Hebrew greeting as a counterpart of the new Arabic greeting, so that they can also claim a truer, more authentic piety that feels more equitable with the Arabic adoption among the Muslim majority than the Indonesian greetings. Further, as we witness in Chapter 6, both Muslims and Christians at the RT or PKK meetings intentionally utilize the recently popular Arabic greetings, but in different styles and with different aims. The former do this to show their deeper commitment to Islam, whereas the latter do so to display their respect for the majority religion.

All of these are sites of contestation over identity and belonging. Instead of embodying or endorsing a singular religious voice, Muslims and Christians can be double-accented, selectively adopting each other's styles of organization and proselytizing, even temporarily uttering each other's languages. They do more than put A and B together. Rather, they pre-emptively imagine the other voices before they decide they want more mosques and fewer churches; they rehearse the other voices that deny their entitlement to minority worship facilities or membership to the nation, so that they know how to present their borrowed, suppressed, or highlighted religiosity.

Freedom to Sociality

I hope I have shown that Salatiga is rich with stories across religious boundaries and zones of interaction over difference, appropriation, and inequality, rather than a place of a unified homogeneous social world, or a utopian, harmonious, multi-religious land. The theoretical implication of this work is to guide us to look beyond a simplistic understanding of religious cultures as bounded monolithic entities ready to "clash" with one another, so that we can properly examine actual power relations between heterogeneous religious cultures embedded in local society. There are under-explored ways of negotiating difference across religious borders that do not fit the universalist idea of religious freedom. We can particularly learn from the deeds and choices of Indonesian Christian minority members themselves. These are not political activists who are elite and far away from grass-roots social life. These are Indonesian citizens who find themselves living side-by-side with Muslim neighbors. For them, what it means to gain equal acceptance for their religious differences may be quite different from what some universalist ideas presume. They know too well that their religion is never equal to the majority religion, but they decide that it is more practical and desirable to earn the trust of the mainstream society via the local path of reciprocity than via the path of high-end human rights advocacy. This is partially, but critically, why Christians are disproportionately represented in the unpaid neighborhood positions in Salatiga. Some have decided that it is better if they are solidly at the center of the reciprocity loop in the neighborhood, in which a politics of reciprocity means complicated hierarchies. The important revelation here, then, is to make sure that minorities can comfortably blend in and become part of "the mainstream" on a regular basis, as organic members of local communities, rather than as an isolated minority that can only speak for itself in a formalized "inter-religious dialogue."

The social hierarchy in a local community is complicated because it is not simply divided by religious lines. In fact, to the extent that the line between Christianity and Islam can sometimes be blurred, the overlapping zone between sociality and Islam is even greater. Even highly Islamic things have the potential, eventually, to become mere social markers for all; that is the power of Indonesian ways of reciprocity. After all, what is considered appropriately "social" is never a single, stable thing, but a system that is highly dialogic and mutually constituted by the polyphonic and dialogical voices from various minorities and the majority. And so, the

majority themselves are always re-adjusting to the new situations—terrorism, fanaticism, national upheavals, tensions between and transformation of communities, and more.

To conclude, this book was never meant to show how to achieve tolerance, much less to endorse a single model of tolerance: be it a Lockean non-interference stance against the backdrop of English religious violence, a Millerian secular argument for celebration of difference, or a Taylorian politics of recognition (Taylor 1994; see Hayden 2002, for a critical review of the problematics of the concept of toleration). Here, instead of evaluating these normative arguments, each inflected with specific historical backgrounds and political agenda, I think it is just as important to tease out the actual cases of competition and collaboration in the religiously plural societies of our day. Reality is always messy, and there are valid reasons that prevent us from treating the mere presence of difference as a sign of tolerance.

For the people I work with in this multi-religious city, the question is how and when and where to act in accordance with pragmatism and respect, with sarcasm and challenge, or simply avoidance and indifference. Inside the Pentecostal churches, it is uncommon to be Taylorian or Millerian. In the neighborhood, the development of Islamic piety can motivate a Javanese Pentecostal convert and a Javanese Protestant to embrace, or at least accept some Islamic expressions. As for Christmas, there would be more Millerian values on the part of Muslims, and vice versa, when it is Idul Fitri. There is not a single model for toleration that can help us understand these complex interactions, and there is no single model of toleration that should lead us to judge before we even understand the complexity. People do not simply want the freedom to exercise their religion; they also want to gain social respect.

Indeed, the question of difference and belonging in Salatiga is never dealt with by any single model, but by a constant stream of dialogic imaginings. I have shown that actions take place where multiple worldviews constantly negotiate stratification of worldviews and their worth. This is the reason why, in this work, I have developed a concept of "dialogic religiosity." Dialogic religiosity reminds us that the politics of religious subjectivity is never embraced as a fixed set of doctrines embodied or a mindset freely chosen, but as constant social practices that are always partly shaped by anticipation of other religious and social implications. The imaginings across religious boundaries can work to vilify the other group or honor the other group but, in either case, these imaginings are created out of actual social experiences that involve multiple worldviews and their influences upon the self.

Islam and Christianity are two significant forces in Indonesian society, but they cannot be fully understood in isolation. They have to be considered in terms of their interactions in a shared history and locality with a politics of pluralism played out in specifically Indonesian ways. In urban areas, cherished cultural values of sociability and stereotyped ethnic relations are challenged and reformulated by multiple religious movements. Christians and Muslims take actions not simply as undifferentiated Indonesian, Javanese, and Chinese-Indonesian individuals who are dictated to by immutable and bounded "cultures" or "religions." They are gendered cooks, ritual witnesses, local leaders, as well as preachers, gangsters, and volunteer officials in the neighborhood. They speak, dream, talk, eat, and pray as they consider the possible reactions from religious others. They anticipate, negotiate, and sometimes push the boundaries of acceptable behaviors that others have marked, opening space for more possibilities. They certainly draw from their own religious traditions to help themselves understand and respond to religious differences. But they also practice dialogic imaginings about the self and other, and a critical number of these imaginings, in people's aspirations for greater piety and prosperity, are always entangled with each other.

GLOSSARY

abangan Referring to Javanist Muslims. In the past, they have been labeled as "animist" Muslims, as opposed to "orthodox" Muslims. The tradition of *abangan* has declined significantly over the recent three decade.

agama Religion.

aliran A channel and boundary marker in a rice-field in Javanese. In Indonesian, it means "streams." In the past, *aliran* has referred to the ideological-cultural identification in the 1950s. In this book, it means "religious faction."

bersilaturahmi An Arabic loanword. It means "be sociable," particularly with neighbors.

Bu The shortened version of Ibu. Ibu is the standard honorific term to address an adult woman or an old woman.

LDII *Lembaga Dakwah Islam Indonesia* (the Indonesian Institute of Islamic Dawah). *Dakwah* is Indonesian for religious proselytizing. It is viewed as a puritanical Islamic organization for some of their gendered practices.

FKUB Religious Harmony Forum (Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama)

GBI Indonesian Bethel Church (Gereja Bethel Indonesia)

GKI Indonesian Christian Church (Gereja Kristen Indonesia)

GKJ Javanese Christian Church (Gereja Kristen Jawa)

Golkar   Golongan Karya (Functional Group), a political party founded in 1964 with the backing of senior army officers. It was the ruling party during President Suharto's 33-year rule (1965–1998).

HGU   Right of use (hak guna usaha)

HMI   Muslim Students' Association (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam)

Idul-Fitri   Eid-al-Fitr. The most important holiday for Muslims globally.

jilbab   The Indonesian term for the Islamic headscarf that covers hair but not face. Yet, recently more and more people simply call it "hijab."

kampung   Village or neighborhood community. In upper-middle neighborhoods it is called *perumahan* (residence) instead. But, in general, even those living in wealthier neighborhoods like to call their own area *kampung*.

kristenisasi   "Christianization." A term with negative connotation, implying the idea of Indonesian gradually turned into a Christian country.

kyai   The headmaster of an Islamic boarding school.

Masyumi   Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims (Majelis Syuro Muslim in Indonesia), a coalition of Muslim groups set up during the Japanese Occupation of Indonesia during World War II. It was banned by Sukarno in August 1960.

Muhammadiyah   A Sunni Muslim reformist organization established in 1912 in Yogyakarta, Central Java. One of the largest mass organizations in Indonesia. It has hundreds of hospitals and schools (pesantren) throughout Indonesia. In Arabic, Muhammadiyah means "followers of Muhammad."

MUI   Indonesian Ulama Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia)

Nahdlatul Ulama   A traditionalist Sunni Islam organization, established in 1926 in Jombang, East Java. It claims to have 45–50 million members, making it the largest Muslim social organization in the world. It has hundreds of Islamic boarding schools, mostly in Java, but also on other islands.

Pak   The shortened version of Bapak. Bapak is the standard honorific term to address an adult man or an old man.

Pancasila   An Indonesian statement of political principle or philosophy (literally, "five principles"), articulated at Independence in 1945, consisting of five "inseparable" principles: belief in the One and Only God (thereby legitimizing several world religions and not just Islam), a just and civilized humanity, the unity of Indonesia, democracy, and social justice. It became the state ideology under President Suharto and

promotion of alternative ideologies was considered subversion. While now more rarely invoked by officials in such a blatantly ideological fashion, it continues to be a key reference point in discussions of religions and religious pluralism in Indonesia today.

PDIP Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan)

pengajian Islamic sermon groups, or the reading sessions of the Qur'an.

Pentecostals Christians who practice speaking in tongues, healing, and deliverance.

PK, later PKS Justice Party (Partai Keadilan), a political party in Indonesia modeled on the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The party name later was changed to Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera).

PKK *Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga* (Family Welfare Development), women's neighborhood organizations

RT Rukun tetangga (the harmonious neighborhood), the smallest administrative unit that consists of several households.

RW Rukun warga (the harmonious citizens), the administrative unit that consists of several RT groups.

Salafist In this book, it is used by locals to mean those "puritanical" Muslims in general, who are overly strict and who separate themselves from the community by their unconventional gender practices.

santri The students of an Islamic boarding school. In some contexts, it refers to "orthodox" Muslims as opposed to *abangan* Muslims.

sholat Islamic prayer. It is related to *salat* in Arabic.

STAIN State Islamic College (Sekolah tinggi agama Islam negeri)

UKSW Universitas Kristen Satya Wacana (Satya Wacana Christian University)

YUIS Salatiga Islamic University Foundation (Yayasan Universitas Islam Salatiga)

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