DIASPORA AS CULTURES OF COOPERATION

Global and Local Perspectives

Edited by David Carment and Ariane Sadjed

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
Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship

David Carment • Ariane Sadjed
Editors

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Identity and Political Mobilisation of Diasporas: A Gendered Perspective

When my father arrived in Krefeld in Germany in the summer of 1960, after six months of studying German at the Goethe Institute in Hamburg, he and two other young men were the only Iraqis in town. The three had come to Germany to study and were going to return home afterwards. They used to hang out with a group of foreign students alongside their German college friends. All of them ended up staying and marrying local German women.

In the 1970s and 1980s, a number of male political exiles from Iraq joined the three students: mainly communists, Arab nationalists, and Kurdish activists, who had been in opposition to the Ba'th regime that had come into power through a coup in 1968. In the 1980s, a new wave of refugees, including entire families, arrived in the context of the eight-year-long Iran–Iraq war, the atrocities linked to the Anfal campaign against Kurds, as well as the deportations by Saddam Hussein of Shia Iraqis who were allegedly of Persian origin. It was not until the 1990s, however, that a much larger group of Iraqis, fleeing the devastating impact of the first Gulf war and economic sanctions, arrived in Krefeld. Initially mainly several dozens of younger and middle-aged men made it who had managed to come the long and hazardous journey of present-day asylum seekers, some of them crossing over ten countries, using all kinds of transportation under extremely dangerous circumstances, to finally cross the border to Germany and, for one reason or another, ending up

in my hometown of Krefeld. Some of their immediate families managed to come a few years later through family unification schemes. Two of my cousins from Baghdad arrived with their families during this period. Another wave of migration followed the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the increased sectarian tensions and violence as well as lawlessness we have seen unfolding since then. For the first time, female Iraqis came without male family members, some widows with children, some single women. My father estimated a couple of years ago that there were about 300–400 Iraqis in town. However, the latest crisis and atrocities linked to the so-called Islamic State, ISIS, has brought another wave of asylum seekers to Krefeld. According to one of my cousins, who often helps new arrivals by dealing with the German bureaucracy, at least 200 Iraqis have arrived over the last few months, mainly via the asylum distribution policy, often via Dortmund, the seat of one of three main *Auslaenderbehoerden* in North Rhine Westphalia, which is the official state body dealing with foreigners.

Major events in the modern history of Iraq resulted in the flight and the creation of a diaspora of what are now millions of Iraqis; the total population of Iraq is estimated at about 32 million. By 2008, the continuous violence that had unfolded since the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 had displaced a total of 4.7 million people: 2.7 million of these were internally displaced persons (or IDPs), and the remaining two million had fled the country in search of refuge, adding to the already existing Iraqi communities in many parts of the globe (Al-Ali 2007a). Based on anecdotal evidence, over the past ten months tens of thousands of Iraqis have been fleeing due to the atrocities committed by ISIS, but also due to the escalating sectarian violence. Iraqis have become the third largest refugee population after Afghans and the Palestinians.

Layers of Migration and Intersectionality

I have recounted the story of the growing Iraqi diaspora in Krefeld because it is linked to my family's history, but also because it illustrates a number of important conceptual points which I would like to address in my preface. What is now considered to be an Iraqi diaspora actually

consists of multiple, even if sometimes overlapping, waves of migration, all rooted in specific historical circumstances and motivations, including changing social, economic, and political upheavals and tragedies. Iraqi diasporas, just like diasporas of other ethnic and religious backgrounds, also consist of different types of migrants, ranging from refugees, asylum seekers, and other forced migrants to those seeking labour, education, and family unification. The different migration trajectories of Iraqis who have left under different circumstances with respect to Iraq's history of dictatorship, sanctions, and multiple wars, coincide with the migration of different ethnic and religious groups, as well as people of varying political conviction, but also, crucially, different social class backgrounds. Social class very much divides the first generation of Iraqis, who sought education and professional training, from more recent generations of migrants who fled dictatorship, wars, persecution, but also economic hardship.

The migration trajectory of my father's generation, for example, is radically different to that of my cousins who came as asylum seekers during the sanctions period, and whose precarious legal status has combined with an increasing Islamophobia that was not existent when my father arrived. In fact, when invited for Sunday lunch for the first time to my mother's parents' house in 1965, a rather conservative Catholic German family that was not happy to see my mother dating a foreigner, the first question my grandfather posed was "Are you a communist?", which made sense given that this was the height of the Cold War. Forty years later, my cousins are primarily perceived as Muslim before Iraqi or Arab.

We know from other diasporas across the world that serious intra-diaspora conflicts tend to arise as new waves of migrants meet people of previous waves who might preserve bygone traditions or who left with greatly differing political views and circumstances (Vertovec 2005: 4). Sometimes older generations of migrants want to close the door on newer migrants, due to an economic crisis and limited resources, but also fearing that higher numbers of migrants from their specific country of origin might increase racism, and, in the case of migrants of Muslim background, Islamophobia. This has also been obvious in the Iraqi context, where older generations of migrants were much more secular and less sectarian in outlook than newer waves. But older generations might

be judgemental and patronising towards more recent arrivals. Although, in the Iraqi context, as in other diasporas, we also find evidence of intra-generational help and solidarity.

Different trajectories of displacement and migration clearly shape identities and political orientations, as do the specific social, economic, and political circumstances and conditions in countries of settlement (Al-Ali 2007b). People who were forced to flee in a context of war and violence might be less inclined to get involved in political mobilisation than those who had to flee political persecution. However, empirical evidence in the context of my own work among both Bosnian and Iraqi refugees shows that the relationship between the specific trajectory of migration and the level and kind of political involvement is not straightforward. It is complicated by other factors linked to the specific political developments in the country of origin, a person's positionality within these developments and conflicts, but also the politics in the country of settlement, accessible resources, available social and political networks, work-related circumstances, and individual inclinations and experiences (Al-Ali 2002a,b, 2007b, Al-Ali and Pratt 2009).

My father, for example, increasingly alienated from political developments in his country of origin, never got involved in politics but became very active in humanitarian work. During the sanctions period our garage turned into a storage place for clothes and medicine, which he continuously collected and sent to Iraq. His best friend Hashem, a Turkman from Kirkuk, a Turkish-speaking minority that mainly lives in the north of Iraq, became very much involved in a Germany-based Turkman diaspora political organisation.

Now, one major variable and aspect that is often neglected when studying identities and political mobilisation of diasporas is that of gender. Several waves of Iraqi migrants were predominantly male, corresponding to the prevailing and historically specific gender norms and relations. First generations of students, for example, were largely male. This changed in the 1960s, when Iraqi women started to seek education abroad as well. In more recent decades, women have joined the growing diaspora in increasing numbers, first as part of family reunification schemes, but then also in their own right, seeking refuge, asylum, education, and employment. This corresponds to a wider global trend, not only

in the context of forced migration but also labour migration, where we see evidence of the feminisation of migration.

Gender-based legal differentiation is often an issue for women whose legal status, such as leave to remain, is frequently tied to male family members, particularly husbands. However, I should stress that a gendered lens is not merely about noticing whether migrants are male or female, or paying attention to the potentially different migration motivations and trajectories of women and men, their specific experiences of the journey, the processes of settling down and creating new homes away from home. A gendered lens is crucially a lens that is interested in configurations of power, inequalities, and injustices. Having moved away from earlier essentialist articulations of women's oppression and gender inequalities, I pay attention, as do many other feminist scholars, to the multiple and complex processes in which gender is constituted and constitutive of other power relations and hierarchies. The notion of gendering allows us to shift from states of being, however fluid, performative, and tangential, to the ways different configurations of power intersect at specific historical moments and in particular empirical contexts.

So a female migrant is a woman in two unequal gender regimes, that of her country of origin and that of her country of settlement, but simultaneously she's positioned in regard to unequal relations of economic class, of nationality, ethnicity, religion, sexuality, and so on (Anthias 2013). And it's the way these various positionalities intersect that shape each other's influence on her, and her chances in life—her own relative power or powerlessness. The same with male migrants, who are not only exposed to and involved with contestations of masculinities that are also always in flux and in the making, but are also positioned in relation to configurations of power linked to ethnicity, class, religion, political affiliation and, crucially, sexual orientation.

Changing Meaning of Diaspora

But let me complicate the picture even further and address the changing meaning and significance of diasporas: As Vertovec stated, the word "diaspora" is "of Greek origin and means 'to sow over or scatter.'

The archetype of forced expulsion and dispersal, persecution, a sense of loss, and a vision of return has been the historical Jewish experience" (2005: 1). Other classic historical diasporas include the African diaspora rooted in slavery, the Armenian diaspora rooted in the Armenian genocide, as well as the more recent Palestinian and Kurdish diasporas, both rooted in atrocities and oppression.

I would like to take a moment to pause and highlight the Armenian genocide, which started over a hundred years ago. On 24 April 1915, the Ottoman government embarked upon the systematic decimation of its civilian Armenian population. The Armenian population of the Ottoman state was reported at about two million in 1915. An estimated one million had perished by 1918, while hundreds of thousands had become homeless and stateless refugees. By 1923, virtually the entire Armenian population of Anatolian Turkey had disappeared. Recognition of what happened in the past and commemoration are clearly important for the Armenian diaspora, as they are for the Jewish diaspora and other diasporas rooted in genocide and human rights abuses. But while we need to remember the atrocities of the past, recent pictures of Yezidi refugees fleeing ISIS haunt me. So do pictures of Palestinian refugees caught in the crossfire in Yarmouk refugee camp in Syria; the increasing persecution of Christian and other religious minorities in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East. Meanwhile, sectarian as well as politically and economically motivated violence continues to displace tens of thousands of Muslims as well.

Clearly, over the past years, "diaspora" has become a term of self-identification among many different groups who migrated, or whose ancestors migrated, from one place to another. As Vertovec stated over a decade ago, "Belonging to a diaspora entails a consciousness of, or emotional attachment to, commonly claimed origins and cultural attributes associated with them" (Vertovec 2005). He added: "Such origins and attributes may emphasise ethno-linguistic, regional, religious, national, or other features. Concerns for homeland developments and the plight of co-diaspora members in other parts of the world follow from this consciousness and emotional attachment". In policy circles, the question of diasporas as potential "peace makers" or "peace wreckers" has gained particular momentum, given the wide range of conflicts, wars, and forms

of violence, as well as attempts at conflict resolution and peace processes (Smith and Stares 2007).

In this context, a gendered lens is instructive, as feminist scholars have been arguing for many years that for women peace does not merely mean cessation of armed conflict. But, for women, violence very much exists on a continuum. We know that historically and cross culturally there is a relationship between the increased militarisation of societies and the rise in instances of gender-based violence (Al-Ali 2007b: 46–47). This has implications for the type of political mobilisation among women in the diaspora, whose nationalist, ethnic, or political struggles are often intertwined with struggles for more gender-based rights and equalities.

Moving away from older paradigms about integration and acculturation, more recent scholarship recognises the significance of transnational networks, activities, and social fields in shaping diasporic identities, belonging, and political mobilisations. As Vertovec has argued, "Enhanced transnationalism is substantially transforming several social, political and economic structures and practices among migrant communities worldwide" (Vertovec 2007). However, only limited attention has been paid to the various ways transnational fields and activities are gendered; that is, the various ways women and men are positioned differently in terms of prevailing gender ideologies and relations. Unequal citizenship rights for men and women might hold true in the context of both the country of origin and the country of residence. Women's activities might be conditioned by a set of regulations based upon hegemonic interpretations of gender roles within both their country of settlement and that of origin. These regulations condition their activities, their identities, and their likelihood of getting involved in political activities. For example, women are assigned duties and responsibilities in the reproductive spheres, which they are expected to carry out while being in their country of origin and in the diaspora. The obstacles posed by social customs and normative rules might prevent them from keeping up links with what is perceived to be "back home". And I am not speaking specifically about Muslim diasporas here, as these gendered norms and patterns are found across different diasporic groups (Al-Ali 2007b: 45).

On the other hand, gender ideologies and cultural norms might enable women to engage with women from different ethnic and religious

backgrounds or political convictions easier than it would be for their men-folk. This has certainly been the case among the Bosnian and Iraqi women and men I have interviewed in the past. As women were perceived to be less significant for political processes, their transgression of "talking to the other side" was less threatening than if men had done it. Moreover, some women appeared to have been more willing and eager to build bridges and mobilise as women, rather than in terms of their ethnic and religious affiliation or political parties. This is despite the fact that women who reach out to "the enemy" are frequently branded traitors and "loose women". And, certainly we should avoid falling into the trap of essentialising women as natural peace-makers, as we know that women can be most fervent supporters of violence and conflict (Al-Ali 2007b: 47).

Muslim Diasporas in Europe

Now, the final set of issues I would like to address in this preface relates to the specific debates and issues linked to Muslim diasporas in Europe. Anti-Muslim racism and Islamophobia have increasingly characterised media discussions, policy debates, and public opinion in the context of Europe's concern with "the other within". In this context, I would like to raise the following points:

Firstly, although the numbers of Muslims in Europe are growing, they remain a small minority, and this small minority is extremely diverse in all kinds of ways. In 2010, there were some 20 million Muslims in the European Union, about 4 percent of the total population.

According to the Moving People, Changing Places website, in the section on European Muslims,[1] they are from:

> many different national and ethnic backgrounds, from various classes and sects, from rural as well as urban areas. They have had different experiences depending on their nationality, ethnicity, level of religiosity, adherence to secular values, age, gender and sexuality. Some have lived in Europe for several generations, including many Turkish and Kurdish Muslims in Germany; and South-Asian Muslims in the UK.

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[1] http://www.movingpeoplechangingplaces.org/locations/muslim-diasporas.html (Accessed 22 February 2016).

Others have arrived more recently from Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, like my cousins who came from Iraq in the 1990s. I find Steven Vertovec's notion of super-diversity (2007) useful in capturing the dynamic interplay of variables when we look at the identities and political mobilisation of people of Muslim origin in Europe today. These variables include country of origin—itself comprising a variety of possible subset traits such as ethnicity, languages, religious tradition, regional and local identities, gender, social class—all potentially influencing cultural values and practices. Then we have the specific migration channels—often related to highly gendered flows, specific social networks, and particular labour market needs. Another crucial variable is legal status—including numerous categories determining a hierarchy of entitlements and restrictions. According to Vertovec:

> These variables co-condition identity constructions and maintenance as well as political mobilisation, along with factors surrounding migrants' human capital, particularly educational background, access to employment, locality—related especially to material conditions, but also to other immigrant and ethnic minority presence—, and the specific responses by local authorities, service providers and local residents (Vertovec 2007: 3).

My second point, and here I will add to Vertovec's conceptualisation of super-diversity, relates to the broad continuum of secular, religious, and Islamist identities and positions. Clearly, we need to take ISIS and other Salafi as well as Shia extremist groups seriously, and I personally do not believe that a liberal multi-cultural attitude of "let them be" is helpful, especially when it comes to women and gender issues. However, while more needs to be done to counter the radicalisation of Muslims, especially young Muslim men and women, across Europe and elsewhere, the vast majority of Muslims are not sympathetic or supporters of political Islam, certainly not in its violent manifestations. Moreover, just as many people of Judeo-Christian background might be culturally identifying with a specific religious tradition, many Muslims are secular, whether they are practising or not, even some are actively practising anti-Islamiosity, as Reza Gholami shows in his work.

I would argue that the general designation of "Muslim" tends to conceal more than it reveals, given the huge differences I have alluded to throughout this preface. Given the increasing Islamophobia within Europe, such a designation might not only be analytically problematic, but also politically dangerous. Many thinkers before me have stressed that the stereotypes, essentialisations, and attacks on Muslims and Islam are of course contributing to a sense of alienation and radicalisation. It also leads to knee-jerk reactions and overzealous concerns about authentic identities and culture. Although the story here is far more complex, it is beyond the scope of this preface to address this in any depth or detail.

Moreover, and this is my third point, even if numbers of self-identified Muslims are increasing in Europe, rather than reacting with panic or knee-jerk right-wing reactions appealing to cultural authenticity and purity, I think it is about high time that we rethink the concept of Europeanness and European identities, as well as its composite national identities. Islam and Muslims are not out there, external to Europe. Islam and Muslims have been part of Europe for a long time and will be more so in the future. I would even argue that Europe and Europeanness need to be understood transnationally. Clearly, what is happening politically, socially, and economically in places like Iraq, Turkey, Syria, and the many other countries of origin for people with or without Muslim background will influence identity constructions and political mobilisations of diaspora populations.

Some countries in Europe are doing better than others in recognising that Muslims are an integral part of diverse and pluralistic societies that increasingly characterise Europe and the larger contemporary world. The UK, for example, partly due to its long, even if problematic, history of colonialism and encounters with Muslim populations, particularly from South Asia, is probably the most progressive country within Europe in terms of the normalisation of British Islam and British Muslims. But even within the UK, there are of course problems, and British Muslims have become increasingly racialised and exposed to racism and Islamophobia over the past years.

Finally, contestations of gender norms, relations, and identities are central to cultural constructions of social identities and collectivities. Often women are perceived to be both biological and cultural reproducers of a

nation or a community, and they tend to constitute the symbolic "border guards", especially for communities that feel under threat (Yuval-Davis 1997). The centrality of gender has been most acute in the context of the so-called clash of civilisation and the unfortunate "us versus them" rhetoric that has become particularly acute in the post 9/11 world. Among both Muslim diaspora communities on the one hand, and those constituencies eager to preserve the Judeo-Christian character of Europeanness, worrying about Muslim encroachment in Europe on the other hand, women and wider gender norms and relations have become the key symbol. I am personally not impressed with or in support of Femen's provocative protests, although I am also critical of those who in the name of fighting racism and Islamophobia become apologetic of oppressive practices against women and men who do not confirm to heteronormativity. As both contestations of femininities and masculinities, as well as wider gender norms and relations have increasingly taken centre stage in debates, protests, and resistance on all sides, it is clear that a gendered lens is crucial for academics and policy makers alike.

Nadje Al-Ali

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1

Introduction: Coming to Terms with Diaspora Cooperation

David Carment and Ariane Sadjed

Since the early 1990s, diaspora studies have promoted non-essentialist conceptions of identity, culture, and belonging that exceed the framework of the nation state and explore new connections between global and local contexts (Brah 1996; Clifford 1994; Tölölyan 1996). However, the exact definition and boundaries of what constitutes a diaspora and its role in cooperation are still contested. Research on diaspora cooperation covers a broad range of approaches, reaching from micro analysis of niche-identities within particular ethnic groups to macro analyses about the role of diaspora communities in particular state formations (for discussions about the definition of diaspora, see Brubaker 2006; Tölölyan 1996).

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The term diaspora is derived from Greek, meaning dispersal or scattering of seeds. Today, the term diaspora describes the experience of movement or displacement and the social, cultural, and political formations that result from it. The growing importance of diaspora communities around the world has led to increased recognition of the positive role they play in the domestic affairs of their respective homelands and as global and regional actors, agents of change, and knowledge brokers in their own right.

At the same time, the term diaspora connotes some elements of negativity that we want to rectify. It has been increasingly used to describe asylum seekers, stateless peoples, refugees, immigrants, displaced communities, and ethnic and religious minorities at risk and in conflict. It is this simplistic distinction between positive and negative that we wish to unwrap more carefully.

Diaspora most commonly refers to those born outside a host state, but may also include subsequent generations that maintain strong ties to the country of origin; the defining quality of a diaspora is a dynamic linkage with the country of origin. These linkages may include: political lobbying; economic development, including remittances and investment; social tasks, including the promotion of human and cultural linkages—for example support for diaspora newspapers. All of these activities can take place at the individual level (through family networks) or at the institutional level (through international organisations). Following Steven Vertovec (2005), this volume emphasises that the claims and criteria surrounding diasporic boundaries and membership should be self-ascribed. More recent studies on the conceptualisation of diasporas have shown that a reduction to ethnic origins or identities is far too simplistic and does not allow us to understand motivations for diasporic engagement (Sinatti and Horst 2014).

Diasporas as Agents of Cooperation

Evolutionary anthropology describes cooperative behaviour as the result of a complex interaction of genetic and cultural factors (Henrich et al. 2010; Chudek and Henrich 2011). From early on, children internalise

the social norms of the culture they live in, which promote different degrees of interdependency and different notions of how cooperation should work, leading to the emergence of different preferences and motivations when cooperating (Amici 2015: 19). These social norms and interdependencies also apply to cooperative behaviour on a larger scale. The Social Sciences have long explained cooperation as motivated by instrumental rationalities aimed at the individuals' personal gain. But more recent research has brought moral dimensions such as altruism back into the debate (Batson 2006). This expansion of the motivations for cooperation is helpful because it departs from simplistic assumptions about the individual and its interests. Since interests can be multi-sited, less explicit, and even contradictory, a more nuanced approach for analysing informal networks, social exchange, and moral economies as part of acts of cooperation is needed.

Cooperative and non-cooperative behaviour involves psychological, cultural, and political aspects and leads to different solidarities and alliances. Social and cultural anthropologists have looked at processes of social exchange for analysing cooperation. Marcel Mauss (1925), Claude Levi-Strauss (1949), and in their following, Mary Douglas and Baron Isherwood (1980) built the theoretical foundations for understanding how the actual and symbolic exchange of goods reflects hierarchies, power relations, solidarities, and normative orders within social groups. These "bargaining problems" (Sen 1990) affect personal aspects of self, but also one's identification with a collective group, as well as how a community positions itself within a particular nation state and globally. Considering the question of acquiring social prestige, cooperation also applies to the process of creating networks, spaces, and identities—such as in the World Wide Web or as a distinct ethnic and/or religious group.

Including a wide range of topics, geographical regions, and disciplinary approaches, the contribution of this book is to highlight the specific, multi-layered, and sometimes quite ambivalent processes of how cooperation is established, institutionalised, or undermined on different levels and in various diasporic contexts. While much has been written about diaspora in the context of globalisation, much less has been considered in the context of cooperation. For example, in their volume, *New Approaches to Migration? Transnational communities and the transformation of home*,

Al-Ali and Koser (2002) reconceptualise transnationalism, home, and belonging. However, while the aspect of movement is primary, our book does not restrict the concept of diaspora to groups who have migrated (recently). Also, the aspect of cooperation locates our volume in debates about interconnectedness. not only between home and host states, but in a more global context. An important feature of our volume is the political implications of everyday practices, memories, and religious identities that other books in this field do not cover.

To this end, *Homelands and Diasporas. Holy Lands and other Place*, by Levy and Weingrod (2004) reconceptualises the relationship between homeland and diaspora, but it remains the main angle through which the volume's case studies are analysed. In contrast, our volume provides a wider framework for analysis, including the often neglected role of those who 'stay at home', to offer a deeper comparative perspective.

In brief, this volume bridges different methodological and epistemological approaches in order to emphasise that diasporas are not a monolithic entity with the same objectives and trajectories. We will show how diasporic communities are both transformed and transformative in the process of moving from the country of origin to the country of settlement. Therefore, it is necessary to analyse the origins of diaspora groups, as well as to monitor changes within them. In this way, it is possible to assess "their simultaneous positioning in several social locations both to accommodate to and to resist the difficult circumstances and the dominant ideologies they encounter in their transnational fields". (Glick-Schiller et al. 1992: 5)

Further, when we speak of diasporas we refer to transnational and flexible identities and allegiances; people who have not completely left their homeland, but serve as the bridge between homeland and their host state. This link to the 'homeland', however, does not only have to be physical, but also includes imagined representations of a time and space, to which an actual return might not be possible. Interpretations of migration as a disruption of a previous state of equilibrium rest on essentialist assumptions about the wish to return to places of origin because this is 'where they belong'. Instead, the focus of this volume will be on the agency of diasporic groups, not insisting on a (forced or voluntary) dispersion and a

continued longing for 'home', rendering the diasporic situation primarily oppressive.

Understanding diasporas as a space characterised by the intersection of economic, political, cultural, and psychic processes, makes it necessary to consider in the analysis factors such as global inequalities, modern information and production technologies, foreign policy agendas, as well as multi-national cooperation. In this process, a variety of factors will be carved out that contribute and/or impede social, political, cultural, and economic success of a particular diaspora group and the likelihood they will embrace cooperation.

The capacity and willingness of diasporas to act as 'agents of cooperation' is grounded in the relationship between diaspora groups and their homeland. The literature examining diasporas as agents of cooperation falls into two main categories. The first is primarily theoretical and generally posits that diaspora actions are shaped by the way 'diaspora' is defined (Ragazzi 2012). The second is more practical in focus, examining questions of diasporas' engagement through analysis of government policies towards diasporas (Gamlen 2008; Ragazzi 2009) and ways of diaspora engagement (Brinkerhoff 2011).

The capacity for diasporas to act as agents of cooperation is fundamentally grounded in large and complex literature that seeks to understand and conceptualise 'diasporas'. In essence, different definitions of diaspora influence the way that actions by diaspora groups are understood. For Ragazzi (2012), such definitions can be divided into two general categories—"diaspora as an essence" and "diaspora as a practice". The essentialist understanding of diaspora "runs parallel with academic conceptions of diaspora as a 'thing'—something that exists out there—or a group or social formation that possesses specific characteristics" (p. 108).

The essentialist understanding is typically associated with Safran (1991), who developed a set of six criteria for identifying and defining a 'diaspora' as a distinct population. More recently, Shain and Barth (2003) adopted a similar definition that conceptualises diasporas as "people with a common origin who … identify themselves … as part of the homeland's national community, and as such, are often called upon to participate, or are entangled, in homeland-related affairs" (p. 452). While grounded in Safran's (1991) basic principles, Shain and Barth (2003) essentially

frame diasporas as actors in international politics (Ragazzi 2012). For Shain and Barth (2003), diasporas become the "paradigmatic Other of the nation-state" (Shain and Barth 2003: 450), where a shared kinship identity of individuals living outside of home states renders diasporas "aptly suited to manipulate international images" and influence foreign policy decision-making (p. 451).

Understanding diasporas as international actors raises questions concerning the ways in which diasporas are conceptualised relative their homelands within the international system. In a study of Armenian-American and Jewish-American diasporas' involvement in home conflicts, Shain (2002) argues that diasporas occupy a 'third level' between domestic and interstate peacemaking, where diasporas are perceived as essentially autonomous agents acting between home and host states. Alternatively, Ragazzi's (2009) work on diaspora governance appears to frame diasporas as recipients of homeland efforts to exert transnational power through diaspora engagement, while Koinova (2012) adopts a middle-ground between understanding diasporas as autonomous actors and recipients of homeland policy.

Interestingly, Koinova argues that "regardless of how strongly original homelands aspire to govern their populations abroad, powerful diasporas individuals, institutions, and networks enjoy a relative autonomous vis-à-vis their homeland" (p. 4). For Koinova, in addition to varying degrees of autonomy, the relationship between diasporas and homelands is also influenced by the 'positionality' of diaspora actors, where positionality is understood as the relative power diasporas derive from various social positions in particular contexts. Such positionality provides diasporas with specific power relative to other political actors.

In direct opposition to the conceptualisation of diaspora as a definable actor, the procedural understanding identified by Ragazzi (2012) (diaspora as a 'practice') defines diaspora by the process of identification, homogenisation, and monopolisation of representation through which diasporas are produced. By this definition, diasporas are conceptualised as "loosely organised and shifting networks of solidarity" that play a role in diaspora representation (Ragazzi 2012: 109). For Clifford (1994), for instance, diasporas are more than a byproduct of the nation state and global capitalism, signifying not only the movement of people, but

"political struggles to define the local, as distinctive community, in historical contexts of displacement" (p. 308). Similarly, Brubaker (2006) argues that diaspora should be thought of as an idiom, stance, and claim rather than a "bounded entity" (p. 12), where the term diaspora is seen as directly linked to the formation of the identity of a population ascribed by individuals either within or outside of the diasporic group.

Definitions of diaspora that focus on the processes that produce diaspora identities, rather than considering diasporas as a clearly demarked category, opens the conceptualisation of diaspora to include groups that may be subject to similar processes. For instance, Brah (1996) seeks to move beyond understanding 'diaspora' in relation to defined borders and the 'politics of location', suggesting instead that diaspora be conceptualised as a broader 'space'. For Brah, 'diaspora space' can be 'inhabited' "not only by diasporic subjects but equally by those who are constructed and represented as indigenous" (p. 16). As a result, diaspora space, "includes the entanglement of genealogies of dispersal with those of 'staying put'" (p. 242).

In essence, conceptualising diaspora as the processes involved in the formation of diasporic identities alters not only the landscape of actors that can be considered 'agents of cooperation', but the perceived 'homeland' with which they cooperate. For Al-Ali and Koser (2002), the meaning of 'home' for transnational migrants has begun to change, where home may no longer be tied to a specific geographical location. For instance, Armbruster's (2002) study of Syrian Christian refugees in Germany and Turkey reveals that for some transnational migrants, the notion of 'home' is conceptualised in terms of identity and belonging.

More recently, Shain (2008) suggests that in the post-9/11 world, changing migration patterns require a rethinking of the relationship between diasporas and their homeland. As borders become increasingly permeable, Shain suggests that "the people" increasingly transcend state boundaries and that "identity-focused competitions within and between states engage the attention and interests of kin communities that may reside far from the arena of 'homelands'" (p. 5). As a result, Shain argues that both the subjective factors related to the self-conceptions of identify as well as objective reality of the territorial homeland combine to shape national identity.

In essence, transnational forms of identification have important implications for the conceptualisation of 'citizenship' (Ragazzi 2014b). According to Ragazzi (2014b), the act of engaging in diaspora policies for citizenship, where states extend rights to citizens outside of the geographical state, can be considered a practice of "post-territorial citizenship". Essentially, "post-territorial citizenship" moves beyond the "territorial referent as the main criteria for inclusion and exclusion from citizenship, focusing instead on ethno-cultural markers of identity, irrespective of the place of residence" (p. 8). As a result, Ragazzi suggests that while citizenship is inextricably linked to history and different rationalities of power, the contemporary era has loosened the linkages between territory, identity, and political orders.

The relationship between diaspora policies and "facets of 'external' or 'extra-territorial citizenship'" is not new. According to Gamlen (2008), such policies redefine 'national society' through seeking to integrate diasporas into the home state. While some criticise diaspora policies as attempts by home states to 'interfere' with their diasporas (Fitzgerald 2006), others praise diaspora policies and subsequent 'engagement' (Newland and Patrick 2004).

In a normative analysis of diaspora policies, Gamlen (2008) examines the main arguments for and against diaspora policies, suggesting that "good diaspora policies are important to policy makers at the national and supranational or global level" (p. 4). For Gamlen, 'good' policy is not more policy, but rather more coherent policies for diaspora engagement. Through examining three main areas of diaspora-state policies (home state interests, obligations between states and emigrants, and cooperation between states and migrants), Gamlen finds that "better diaspora policies are needed in order to avoid the arbitrary inefficiencies and injustices that currently characterise state-diaspora relations".

Moving away from normative analyses, Ragazzi (2014a) seeks to understand the proliferation of home state policies towards diaspora groups by assessing findings from an original typology of diaspora policies in relation to three key explanatory frameworks—the structural-instrumental framework, the ethnic framework, and the political-economy hypothesis. Ragazzi finds that diaspora policies are best explained and determined by political-economic realities (neo-liberalism, planned economy, and

welfare state), where states that exhibit 'closed' diaspora policies have highly controlled financial and closed trading systems, while 'global-nation' states, those with the widest range of diaspora policies, are seen as the most de-regulated economies. Interestingly, these political-economic realities are said to be more important determinants of diaspora policy than "state interests and their position in the international capitalist system", where several countries with comparably low GDP utilise different types of diaspora policies. While this difference could be explained by varying degrees of government capacity, it suggests that home states may not actively use diaspora policies to engage transnational populations as agents of cooperation, particularly for development.

In contrast, Brinkerhoff (2012) examines actions taken by home governments to actively create enabling environments to encourage diaspora engagement in national development. Based on the understanding that diasporas have the potential to contribute to home state development through a variety of means, Brinkerhoff (2012) develops a framework for characterising home government efforts to foster diaspora contributions. While Brinkerhoff's framework identifies a series of home government policies to enhance diaspora contributions, such as resourcing (through direct public funding, matching grants, and investment in diaspora business), partnering when mutually agreeable, endorsing diaspora actions, facilitating action through various incentives (such as providing a network among diaspora groups and creating government agencies or initiatives to engage with diasporas), normative questions surrounding whether diasporas should be engaged remain important caveats.

Importantly, understanding diasporas as agents of change requires engaging with questions surrounding how diasporas engage. The literature on diaspora engagement is fairly substantial and highlights several key ways by which diasporas contribute to home state development. Firstly, diasporas are increasingly contributing to homeland development through the provision of remittances (Brinkerhoff 2011), and other forms of economic investment, notably FDI (Graham 2010). Secondly, Brinkerhoff (2008, 2011) points to the capacity for diaspora philanthropy to contribute to development efforts. In part, Brinkerhoff (2008) suggests that philanthropic diaspora organisations have the capacity to navigate and overcome the legal and social challenges associated with engaging

in at-risk societies. Third, diasporas can further contribute to homeland development through the provision of human capital via return migration, either temporary or permanent (Brinkerhoff 2011), and knowledge transfer (Ragab et al. 2013). By combining local knowledge and networks with knowledge, networks, and skills from abroad, Brinkerhoff (2011) notes that diasporas contribute human capital to both private and public sector development.

In addition, diasporas can contribute to homeland development through influencing policy and attitudes at home. For instance, Riddle and Brinkerhoff (2011) argue that diasporas in host states face institutional environments that are likely to differ from those at home, where diasporas adapt to new environments through a process of "institutional acculturation". Using a case study of Thamel. com, an agency led by Nepalese entrepreneur Bal Joshi, Riddle and Brinkerhoff find that through circular migration, Joshi had the relevance and credibility in both Nepalese and American contexts to influence institutional arrangement (beliefs, norms, incentives, and behaviour) at home.

Similarly, in examining diaspora influence in host states, Shain (1999) argues against the popular understanding that diasporas and ethnic influences on US foreign affairs is damaging, suggesting instead that diasporas reinforce, uphold, and promote American values abroad. For Shain (1999), "the marketing of values such as democracy, human rights, free-market economics, and religious pluralism is likely to reflect positively on US civic culture by marginalising contrary forces of isolationism and separatism" (p. 8). Moreover, Lyons and Mandaville (2012) suggest that transnational populations are frequently used by political actors to advance policy goals, where globalisation has opened the space for diasporas, as well as home state actors (government, political parties, and social movements) to influence international constituencies.

Interestingly, underlying diaspora engagement through philanthropy and the transfer of human capital is the understanding that diaspora knowledge of homeland culture provides a comparative advantage that allows diasporas to contribute to development in states and regions that are traditionally considered high risk. Graham (2010) challenges

this typical logic, suggesting that the higher level of information possessed by diasporas actually causes diaspora investors to respond more quickly and strongly to changes in political risk at home. In essence, this finding implies that diaspora direct investment can act as both a complement to, as well as incentive for, improvements in governance quality at home, where diaspora investors' response to change could motivate reforms and contribute to domestic growth and stabilisation (Graham 2010).

While some (Graham 2010; Brinkerhoff 2011) suggest that diasporas may be well positioned to support home country development, particularly in fragile contexts, Adamson's (2013) study of diaspora involvement in the Kurdish–Turkish conflict shows that in some cases, diaspora may actively promote or exacerbate conflict through a number of causal mechanisms including ethnic outbidding, strategic framing, lobbying and persuasion, and resource mobilisation. This finding is in opposition to Ragab et al. (2013), whose study shows that the Syrian diaspora in Germany has contributed to peacebuilding at home through economic, political, and social engagement. Economically, the diaspora has contributed remittances to support families in Syria and those that fled to neighbouring regions. At the same time, the diaspora has contributed politically through lobbying against government practices and raising awareness within Germany, and socially through the provision of humanitarian assistance.

Interestingly, Ragab et al.'s (2013) study suggests that in the Syrian-German case, diaspora engagement may have been limited by a lack of policies and programmes to support the peacebuilding activities of the diasporas in Germany. Similarly, in examining the German-Tunisian diaspora in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, Ragab et al. (2013), suggest that while the Tunisian diaspora was eager to engage and cooperate with the German development agencies, time and resource constraints appear to have limited the extent of cooperation. In both cases, host state policies appear to limit diaspora engagement, suggesting that the capacity and degree to which diasporas act as agents of cooperation may be partially linked to host, as well as home state policies.

Cultures of Cooperation: Between the Global and the Local

We generally don't think of diasporas as cultures of cooperation in the same way we would, for example, international organisations, regimes, or institutions. In today's world, these traditional forms of international cooperation face complex challenges, including major power diffusion, economic uncertainty, and a loss of confidence in the norms they uphold as key elements of global governance in solving public problems. Traditional perspectives on global cooperation typically encompass understandings of governance as conducted by formal organisations in which non-state actors are viewed as more of a challenge or a hindrance to governance and cooperation than a positive contributor. Nowhere are these challenges better illustrated than in the debates about how non-state actors are thought to diffuse power and authority, which adds additional layers of complexity to governance and obscures accountability.

The idea of diasporas as cultures of cooperation raises important questions about hierarchy and authority. Namely, who is responsible for, and what are the implications of creating and implementing, policies derived from the shared interests, problems, and issues the world faces today. Diasporas provide a unique window on these problems on a global scale, whether they pertain to questions of co-habitation and inter-ethnic cooperation, interdependence, negotiating identity, state and nation building, revitalising financial systems, rethinking citizenship, addressing horizontal inequalities, the challenge of displaced and stateless peoples, or underdevelopment and insecurity.

Though the volume is focused on the cooperative aspects of diaspora, there are bound to be both cooperative and non-cooperative dimensions in all diaspora activity. There are limits to cooperation. The pursuit of group interests may bring benefits to the group but may produce counterproductive outcomes for the host state when it proves incapable of adapting to the new realities that diaspora groups present. In some cases, that adaptation may entail an unhelpful change in immigration policy, or a failure to recognise that the host state serves as a launching pad for mounting an insurgency or an independence movement abroad.

Indeed, the question must be asked as to whether we are not witnessing a new hybrid form of multilateralism, evidenced by the growing prominence of diaspora networks focused on addressing global problems. As political and economic organisation becomes increasingly complex, institutions cannot keep up with the pace of changes in the international system. In such situations, diaspora have begun to fill the gap opened by the concomitant weakening of traditional forms of cooperation, for example the rise of global financial systems and the decline of the nation state. As private actors, their search for certainty and stability resonates within global governance structures looking for solutions to complex public problems.

Increasingly diasporas have emerged as an important force in international relations, but their precise role remains more an informality within the scope of global cooperation, taken more as a given than as an actor that might require or benefit from more precise rules of practice or even legal structures that would allow their cooperative instinct to realise their full capacity. There are nascent mechanisms in play around the world but these are not being fully realised and gaps remains in their application.

In policy circles, the question of diasporas as potential 'peacemakers' or 'peace wreckers' has gained particular momentum, given the wide range of conflicts, wars, and forms of violence, as well as attempts at conflict resolution and peace processes. How do we account for different forms of mobilisations between and within different diasporic communities?

We know that as transnational actors, diasporas have different impacts on international politics and cooperation. Groups of exiles, refugees, migrants, and other forms of diaspora populations contribute to political processes in both their native and adopted countries. This is what we refer to as the push and pull of diaspora cooperation, bridging home and host state.

We also know there is a variety of positive contributions that diaspora populations can and do make to their homeland; community-based NGOs, professional networks, and political entrepreneurs all have the potential to bring about positive change. Such cooperation can come about through diaspora members who physically return to their country of origin to provide expertise in the homeland, to be business investors,

or to work with local NGOs. These diaspora are pulled back into their homeland affairs to contribute positively there.

Exposure to positive governance and democratic norms in the host state can also help shape and influence the same structures in the homeland. Consider as an example, a diaspora sending country and the informal mechanisms of cooperation at the household level that work to support its moral economy. In this case we have diasporas as facilitators if not agents of change who adapt to the changing circumstances around them to support the homeland economy.

Those who do not return may serve as a source of guidance, information, new ideas, best practices, and appropriate technologies in a form of pushing cooperative outcomes from the host state to the homeland. Non-returning members of the diaspora can contribute to the overall positive process of return. In both cases, diasporas represent identity formations that continue to evolve in a space in between.

How this space is constituted and which resources it offers to different members of diaspora communities are both crucial to understanding how processes of homogenisation and heterogenisation, as well as micro and macro politics, engage with one another. Diasporas are also key drivers of development through remittances, the transfer of human and social capital, and through direct support for democracy processes and peacebuilding in fragile states. Brinkerhoff's (2008) argument that diasporas are most effective when they invest in social capital rather than consumption is worthy of consideration.

Barriers to international engagement of diaspora groups can also be due to personal factors, such as the aforementioned lack of economic resources. Although not all diasporic communities arrive economically unstable, many of those leaving their homelands do share this characteristic. Their capacity to be politically involved while at the same time trying to establish a home is compromised by a lack of resources and time. In some homelands, structural incompatibilities between the ideology of nation building and national minorities are the key determinants of whether a homeland group will seek diaspora support.

Clearly, the policy frameworks adopted by home governments with respect to diaspora populations can have a substantial impact on countries' ability to capitalise on diaspora contributions to development,

governance, and security. To a large extent, positive and effective diaspora engagement depends on the existence of sound government policy designed to enable and encourage diaspora investment in areas of primary importance to the country. When neglected or poorly conceived, government policy can represent a significant barrier to diaspora involvement; in extreme cases, such barriers can provoke opposition to the government among diaspora populations. There are a number of policy initiatives that are explicitly aimed at developing relationships between home countries, host countries, and diaspora communities. They range from the highly formalised to light and informal procedures such, such as flexible citizenship laws, residency, visa access, political rights, portable pensions, social services, and tax incentives for investment.

Most significantly, diasporas are a force for mobilising resources through individual and household investments, and increasingly through collective donations to fund development projects in their home communities. These factors are often thought to contribute to a homeland's resilience, which refers to a coping ability that allows a country to withstand or recover from economic shocks, and are reflected in macroeconomic stability, microeconomic market efficiency, good governance, and social development. Over time diaspora communities may increasingly influence policy decisions of the host state as the communities grow in size and political mobility. These formalised linkages then reinforce their role as vital human conduits for guiding human, social, and economic capital into their home countries; capital which is capable of contributing to democracy promotion, state rebuilding, and development among other things.

In that light, we must understand diaspora cooperation as a productive, positive, and permanent condition that will allow us to understand how nation states and their international institutions are shaped by individual subjectivities among diaspora groups that are evolving over time. National, ethnic, class-based, or religious aspects are not fixed and stable but evolve differently, depending on the social context. By looking closer at these 'internal' variations among diaspora communities, we are able to capture the mutual interdependencies of today's global communities.

These points are reinforced by Nadje Al-Ali, who in her preface argues that at a time of a heightened sense of crisis with respect to potential

terror threats, economic austerity, controversial immigration policies, and debates about freedom of speech, academics have a particular responsibility to inject nuance into media and policy discourses. This need for nuance and complexity is particularly acute in relation to current debates about Muslim diasporas in Europe, which are often represented in a simplistic and stereotypical manner as a homogeneous group of people with the same beliefs, motivations, political aspirations, and values. Yet diasporas of all ethnic and religious backgrounds consist of multiple waves and layers, ranging from refugees, asylum seekers, and other forced migrants to those seeking labour, education, and family unification. Different trajectories of displacement and migration clearly shape identities and political orientations, as do the specific social, economic, and political circumstances and conditions in countries of settlement.

Anti-Muslim racism and Islamophobia have increasingly characterised media discussions, policy debates, and public opinion in the context of Europe's concern with 'the other within'. But is the designation of 'Muslim' actually meaningful in a context when diasporas are clearly rooted in very different national, ethnic, and political struggles, and where communities and individuals identify themselves with a broad spectrum of secular and religious positions? And, equally pertinent, isn't it about time to rethink what European and its national identities actually mean and signify?

A discussion about diasporic identities in Europe needs to go in tandem with an interrogation of 'Europeanness' and European nation states' identities. Moving away from older paradigms about integration and acculturation, more recent scholarship recognises the significance of transnational networks, activities, and social fields in shaping diasporic identities, belonging, and political mobilisations.

Volume Outline

In Part I of the volume, "Negotiating Identities: Accommodating Home and Host State Policies", we consider the relationship between identity politics and cooperation in the context of religion, secularism, and intra-diasporic hierarchies. The three chapters in this section point to

ambivalences and conflicts within diaspora communities, as ethnic and religious identifications are transformed in order to accommodate to the host states.

In Chap. 2, "Contested Diaspora: Negotiating Jewish Identity in Germany", Karen Koerber discusses tensions between different communal identity constructions of the Jewish diaspora in Germany, due to the immigration of Russian-speaking Jews to Germany since 1989. It outlines that the conflicts connected with the immigration of the Russian-speaking Jews are connected to the requirements and constraints of the symbolic and institutional order that affects the actions of Germany's Jewish minority, that is, its actors and organisations. This chapter is partly based on interviews the author held with members of the Russian-speaking Jewish diaspora in Germany in partnership with the Jewish Museum in Berlin. For one, the symbolic image of a community of victims risks clashing with the actual heterogeneity of Jewish lives in present day Germany. Further, it stands increasingly in conflict with the manifold narratives that, following the Russian Jewish migration, have gained in importance and have resulted in a shift in the identity of the Jewish community in Germany. And finally, it collides with the processes of transnationalisation and multiple forms of belonging that are definitive for the future of the Jewish diaspora in Germany. By pointing out these dynamics, the chapter presents an important and nuanced contribution to discourses about post-Holocaust Jewish identity in Germany that also has implications for the Jewish community globally.

In Chap. 3, "The 'Sweet Spot' between Submission and Subversion: Diaspora, Education and the Cosmopolitan Project", Reza Gholami starts from the premise that diasporic living is necessarily diasporic praxis—i.e., it always-already engages the forms and institutions of home and host nation states in a variety of ways, not least subversively. This makes diasporas a powerful force in the contemporary project of 'cosmopolitanisation'. However, there are two caveats: diasporas—at least for now—depend on being settled in host nation states; and they can themselves become sites of ethnic/religious/secular absolutism and exclusivism.

This chapter explores, therefore, whether it is possible to identify and 'harness' forms of diasporic practice which utilise both 'the national' and 'the diasporic' while challenging and destabilising them. Looking at the

UK Iranian diaspora, Gholami posits that 'diasporic education' is an example of such a practice—a concrete tool for enabling cosmopolitan modalities of living and consciousness. His argument is that a particular mode of interaction between certain types of diasporic organisation and (host) national structures opens up a 'sweet spot' through which the absolutist/exclusivist tendencies of both become 'stripped away' to leave us with practices and logics that are universally human. Viewing and theorising 'being diasporic' in this light allows to perceive it as the most potent force and logic for challenging extant hegemonies and moving towards a cosmopolitan future.

In Chap. 4, "The Influence of Islamophobia on Ethnic and Religious Identifications among the Iranian Diaspora: Iranian Jews and Baha'is in Germany", Ariane Sadjed explores identitarian dynamics among religious minorities from Iran in connection with perceptions of Islam in the Western world. Sadjed's research is based on interviews the author held with Iranian Baha'is, Jews, and Muslims in Germany in 2014 and 2015. The interviews focused on their role as a minority in Iran (pre- and post-revolutionary), and how these identifications shifted after their migration to Germany.

Based on historical studies, it is pointed out that the formation of religious identities and the interaction between the Muslim majority and religious minorities in Iran at times used to be more flexible and hybrid than today. Looking at the relationship between Iran and Western countries from a post-colonial perspective, Sadjed identifies those factors that allow for this flexibility in regard to religious identities and under which circumstances it has become more restricted.

While the religious traditions of Baha'is and Jews have their own internal histories and logics of connecting with and distinction from Islam, Sadjed's study suggests that the current trend is to frame one's religious identity as non-Islamic, and in some cases even as non-Iranian. Religious and ethnic identifications are, on the one hand, based on the time of emigration from Iran and the respective policies of nation building experienced there, but also on one's socioeconomic background, and age. On the other hand, tendencies of Islamophobia in the host country encourage a demarcation from one's Iranian heritage. Against this background, this chapter discusses the homogenisation of religious and ethnic identities in

the host state that contributes to a separation of the rich traditions that Iranian Baha'is, Jews, and Muslims commonly shared.

Chapters in Part II, "The (Im-)Possibilities of Cooperation in Constructing Home and Belonging", deal with different levels of cooperation: within families, web-communities, and for creating a shared past as 'victims'. The three chapters point to the simultaneity of cooperation and conflict: While Gaibazzi describes how rural household structures are destabilised by the mobility of some of their members and the ensuing bargaining over resources and remittances, Koinova and Nikolko are interested in the creation of an imagined—peaceful and/or victimised—past.

In Chap. 5, "The Homing of the Diaspora: Ancestral Households and the Politics of Domestic Centering in Rural Gambia, West Africa", Paolo Gaibazzi is concerned with a Soninke-speaking community in Eastern Gambia. Although long characterised by intense migratory movements, over the past half century this area has been polarised by (male) international emigration. Virtually all households in rural Soninke communities have men (and often entire family nuclei) residing in other countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, and North America, as well as in the urban areas along Gambia's Atlantic coast. The chapter discusses how households have adapted to this migrant economy and the diasporisation of their families.

Gaibazzi denaturalises notions of 'home' and 'centre' by analysing how domestic production and reproduction anchor migrants to their home. According to the agrarian ethos of migration he describes, the household constitutes not simply the place for young men to learn to be loyal to when they travel away; it is also the very source of their migratory success. Non-migrant members, however, compete over the loyalty of expatriate householders to ensure a share of their monetary remittances. Gaibazzi illustrates the tension between cooperation and competition by describing how different family units strive for primacy by working, obeying, and providing benefits for their father and household head. At the same time, the quantity and quality of cooperation between the household as a whole and its diasporic members depends on the capacity of its senior authorities and other members to negotiate a viable solution. In cases when a domestic unit is formed away from home, the diasporic home necessarily decenters the ancestral home from the geography of

resource allocation, also leading to translocalities within, but not of, one household.

In Chap. 6, "Conflict and Cooperation in Diaspora Mobilisation for Genocide Recognition", Maria Koinova argues that genocide recognition has been central for sustaining the Armenian diaspora for over a century. The 2015 genocide centennial demonstrated that political claims about genocide recognition are not subsiding but further spreading globally to various agents of civil society. Her chapter tries to understand how such claims become sustained through mechanisms of conflict and cooperation, which are internal and external to the Armenian diaspora. Internally, the Armenian diaspora has shown remarkable levels of unity and cooperation among different groups and generations seeking acknowledgement and redress of a violent past. Nevertheless, the ways in which such claims were pursued have been marked by bitter rivalries among three diaspora parties, historically competitors to each other. Externally, Armenian diaspora activists have been in cooperative and conflictual relationships with other diasporas. Arameans and Pontus Greeks, also affected by the 1915 genocide, have been for a long time allies to the better-organised Armenians. On their part, Armenians have sought to build relationships and draw parallels from other groups that have mobilised.

In Chap. 7, "Political Narratives of Victimisation in the Ukrainian-Canadian Diaspora", Milana Nikolko is concerned with ethnic identities as a complicated mix of historical narratives and language(s), political events, and everyday activities. The specificity of the identity construction process where ethnic groups are incorporated within multi-ethnic societies, follows from re/creating a common history of the group within the host country and a careful preserving of memories and connections with the home country. In her case study of Ukrainians in Canada, Nikolko shows how diaspora identities are comprised of multiple interpretations of traumatic events and upheavals and a mixing of time and places from 'Here' to 'There'. These connections are marked on a calendar, in memorable dates, and in remembering days of national pride and sorrow.

Nikolko's chapter analyses how the idea of common trauma becomes a part of the narrative for a particular diaspora group and a source for mobilisation, coherence, and organisation. Nikolko examines the shared memories and experiences of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada with a

specific focus on the personal stories of survivors: those who lived through the Holodomor Famine in the Ukraine between 1932 and 1933. It considers how these experiences became part of the main discourse for the Ukrainian diaspora and in turn supported their major mobilisation initiatives into the twenty-first century.

Part III on "Diaspora Activism and Cooperation in Comparative Perspective" considers the practice of cooperation among diasporas as essential and increasingly important agents of change in both home and host state settings. Case studies ask how cooperative linkages contribute to the emergence of new norms of governance in key areas such as state-building, forced displacement, and development. Each chapter critically assesses how diasporas influence policy choices and how they are increasingly becoming policy actors in their own right.

In Chap. 8, "Forced Displacement and Diaspora Cooperation among Cypriot Maronites and Bosnian Serbs", Loizides, Stefanovic and Elston-Alphas focus on the interplay between diaspora mobilisation and return home in the aftermath of forced displacement. They investigate the conditions under which diaspora mobilisation in exile could contribute or not to returning home, especially after the passage of time. Drawing on the experiences of Bosnian (Drvar) and Cypriot (Maronite) returnees, it focuses on displacement since the 1993–1995 and 1974 wars respectively, to examine two counterintuitive and (partial) success stories. The chapter sheds light on the local and global networks of cooperation generated by diasporas in exile to advocate, support, and sustain returning home under prohibitive conditions. Specifically, it emphasises the themes of trust, exchange, and social capital in advocating return as manifested in the organisation of refugee and diaspora groups. While recognising the limitations of diaspora politics in Bosnia and Cyprus, it argues that community effort resolves coordination and commitment problems, thereby facilitating voluntary peaceful return, even under conditions of intercommunal fear and economic insecurity.

In Chap. 9, "The Influence of Diaspora Politics on Conflict and Peace: Transnational Activism of Stateless Kurds", Latif Tas considers how the condition of statelessness has affected Kurds, and how statelessness has been constructed and experienced at an individual and collective level in the diaspora, particularly in the context of violence inflicted against

Kurds by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) since 2014. For his research, focus groups and in-depth interviews with 52 individuals from different parts of Kurdistan from Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran were conducted in the UK.

Tas' chapter explores how, for stateless groups like the Kurds, 'diaspora' can mean more than one place—including their land of origin. Tas suggests the concept of 'double' diasporas, where stateless people do not feel that they belong either to their country of origin or to the country in which they now live. The relationship between statelessness and nationalism is highlighted; and the impact of this on diaspora involvement in homeland politics, conflict, and peace is explored. The chapter also focuses on the gender dimensions of conflict and peace, and discusses how Kurdish transnational women's rights activism interacts with conflict and peace activism in their homeland.

Daniel Naujoks' contribution in Chap. 10, "The Transnational Political Effects of Diasporic Citizenship in Countries of Destination: Overseas Citizenship of India and Political Participation in the United States", deals with the question of how certain country-of-origin policies influence political advocacy efforts by their migrant communities. This alludes to the interplay between institutions, transnational practices, participatory processes, and actors' abilities and decisions. Persons of Indian origin emerged as an important political group that established its credentials through several successful involvements in Indo-American relations. In 2005, India introduced a citizenship-like membership status, the Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI).

Naujoks provides an empirically grounded theory of how the adoption of OCI and the status passages towards OCI and US citizenship affect the political participation of overseas Indians in the USA. OCI has affected the political influence of the Indian-American community, as well as the actual political activities by community actors, especially the degree of community organisation, the number of voters and individuals working for political parties, community involvement, as well as financial contributions. The citizenship-like status accomplishes these effects by increasing naturalisation of ethnic Indians in the USA, by affecting categories of identification with and attachment to India, as well as by fostering the good-will of individuals and community organisations towards India.

Chapter 11, "Strengthening Fragile States through Diaspora Cooperation: Beyond Remittances", by David Carment and Rachael Calleja, assesses diaspora mobilisation in regard to fragile states. Research clearly shows that many diasporas mobilise to support their causes, but this often creates unevenness in outcomes and inequalities in access to resources, especially in fragile state settings. For example, as remittance flows increase globally, and as donor governments in the West put greater emphasis on remittances as a core developmental strategy, we should be witnessing a decline in state fragility.

However, many states remain stuck in a "fragility trap" despite the attention they receive from their diaspora. In addressing this puzzle, Carment argues that remittances address only part of the state fragility problematique and that there are other equally important roles for diasporas beyond economic development. This argument is developed by first explaining why a broader definition of state fragility improves our understanding of the importance of diaspora linkages. The author then examines the implications and impact of remittance flows in order to set the stage for the identification of additional factors that can contribute to a reduction of state fragility. Showing that there are roles for diaspora beyond remittances has important implications for the way in which global development policies are directed to fragile states.

In Chap. 12, "Conclusion: Diasporas as Cultures of Cooperation", Sadjed and Carment review the different approaches to diasporas and cooperation in the volume, in order to highlight the common threads across each chapter. In particular, the transnational aspects of interdependency between states, communities, and actors are carved out. We consider how culture and practices are reflected in global and local forms of cooperation and how private subjectivities are seen as shaped by sociopolitical contexts and vice versa.

This perspective emphasises that diasporic identity and community formation are not happening in a social vacuum, but are significantly determined by the specific social context in which they emerge. Implicit normative assumptions, expectations, and values of host societies are of particular interest in regard to how they are absorbed, adapted, and reframed by specific diaspora communities. By analysing these processes we are able to draw conclusions about the power relations and resources

at work in home and host societies, as well as within the respective diaspora group as alluded to in Al-Ali and Koser's discussion on "transnationalism from below" and "transnationalism from above" (2002: 4–5). The chapter concludes with an assessment of the implications for theories on diaspora cooperation and directions for future research.

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Part I

Negotiating Identities: Accommodating Home and Host State Policies

2

Contested Diaspora: Negotiating Jewish Identity in Germany

Karen Koerber

Introduction

In recent years, the concept of diaspora has assumed considerable importance in the academic world. Whereas previously the concept was used in a narrow, historical sense to refer to the classical cases of the partially violent displacement and partially voluntary resettlement of the Jews and the Greeks, and later to the displaced Armenian communities, its significance has now broadened to include virtually all groups living outside of their native territory. Or, as the literary scholar Khachig Tölölian put it in 1991: "diasporas are the exemplary communities of the transnational moment". Here, to a certain extent, diaspora is understood to epitomise a form of socialisation that breaks with our still territory-based categories,

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and in its transnational connections reveals the limits of a "methodological nationalism" (Beck 2004: 187).

Interestingly, this shift in the use of diaspora outlined above has resulted in the clash of two competing definitions, also since the 1990s, within Jewish debates around the identity and significance of the Jewish diaspora after the founding of the state of Israel. These new voices confidently advocate a non-state Jewish diasporic existence and are opposed to the view that sees the founding of the state of Israel as marking the end of the Galut, that is, of exile (Boyarin and Boyarin 1993; Pinto 1996; Aviv and Shneer 2005).

This brief sketch of the rediscovery of the concept of diaspora highlights the term's productive dimension, in particular with regard to the articulation of different ways of Jewish life. Nonetheless, in the following section I want to focus on a blind spot that frequently characterises these discussions using the concrete example of the Jewish diaspora in modern-day Germany. In particular, the debates around the transnationalisation of migration have resulted in diasporic communities being cast, in line with post-colonial discourse, as alternative forms of de-territorialised cultural identities that are constructed in opposition to the societies in which they have settled and that are organised along nation-state lines (Appadurai 1994; Clifford 1997; a critical view is given by Anthias 1998). What is overlooked in such discussions is, for one, the fact that migration populations continue to be shaped by nation-state regimes and their institutional constraints, which has a defining influence on the local form of diasporic communities. Further, the fact of transnational mobility does not necessarily and immediately result in the formation of a diasporic community, or, to put it differently: the diasporas of the present—similarly to the nation states in which they are anchored—are equally confronted with the proliferation of forms of belonging and the facticity of multiple bonds that are the result of worldwide mobilities and transnational forms of communication (Brubaker 2006; on the concept of diaspora as a cosmopolitan praxis, see also Gholami in Chapter 3). As I want to show in the following section, using the conflict-laden developments in the Jewish community in Germany since the 1990s, these dynamic processes are a constant source of tensions and conflicts, regarding, for example, the question of a common ethnic, religious, or

cultural identity, divided narratives about a shared history, or the question of who belongs to the community and where the boundaries of the community lie.

The immigration of Russian-speaking Jews to Germany starting in the late 1980s fundamentally changed the community of Jews in Germany (Koerber 2005, 2009, 2015; Brenner 2012). At that time the Jewish communities in West Germany had almost 30,000 members, a disproportionate number of whom were elderly; and there were about 380 Jewish community members in East Germany. Since 1991, roughly 220,000 Jews and their non-Jewish family members have emigrated to Germany as so-called Jewish quota refugees. Today, around 105,000 individuals belong to a Jewish community, of which approximately 99,000 are Russian-speaking Jews. According to estimates, roughly the same number of people do not belong to a community.

It is, however, not just the figures that document a change. Over the last two decades, the Jewish community has become increasingly pluralistic in religious and cultural terms. Thus, while it may be possible to speak of a revival of Jewish life, this process is also bound up with numerous conflicts. In this context, the historian Dan Diner has predicted that the immigration of Russian-speaking Jews means the end of one phase in "the Jewish history of the federal republic" (Diner 2010: 18). In doing so, he points to a caesura which, particularly in Jewish communities, has become a point of contention between old and new members, namely the different ways in which the Second World War and the Holocaust are remembered. These divergent memories of the Holocaust are not simply a point of reference for conflicts within the Jewish community; they also reveal a shift in its relationship with Germany, which has considerable implications for German-Jewish relations.

Yet it is not just the Jewish community that has changed; so, too, has the host country Germany. In post-war West Germany, German-Jewish relations were characterised above all by the politically symbolic function of the Jewish minority's presence, which served to legitimise the democratisation of the German state (Kauders 2007). After reunification, Germany faced a contested state of affairs, at the heart of which was the gradual political and legal recognition that Germany was a modern immigration society. Recently, the social experience of this ethnic,

cultural, and religious pluralisation has also raised questions regarding a national identity that grew out of a sense of historical responsibility for the Holocaust, and whose memory politics has led to the formation of two groups: the Jews as victims and the Germans as perpetrators. As critics have argued, this construction of a community of memory does not only follow a binary logic; it also ultimately has ethnicising elements, since it excludes the experiences and memories of all those who have migrated to Germany and who have no place in the national culture of commemoration (Georgi 2003; Motte and Ohliger 2004). As I hope to demonstrate below, using the example of Russian-speaking Jewish immigrants, this binary logic also harbours a number of pitfalls for the understanding of the Jewish diaspora in Germany. For one, the symbolic image of a community of victims risks clashing with the actual heterogeneity of Jewish lives in present-day Germany. Further, it stands increasingly in conflict with the manifold narratives that, following the Russian-Jewish migration, have gained in importance and have resulted in a shift in the identity of the Jewish community in Germany. I would like to begin by explaining briefly the entry procedure for the Russian-speaking Jews. Next, I will concentrate on the central conflicts and dilemmas faced by the Jewish communities as a result of the immigration of Russian-speaking Jews. Finally, through a consideration of the second generation of Jewish immigrants, the focus will turn to processes of pluralisation and transnationalisation that are definitive for the future of the Jewish diaspora in Germany.

The Symbolic Field: Moral Politics

Jewish emigration from the USSR and its CIS successor states began in 1989–1990 as unorganised entry into the then still existent GDR. Following initial public and political debates after unification of the two German states, it was transformed into a legally regulated procedure. Since January 1991, the quota refugee law has applied for the admission of Russian Jews.

From the very beginning, immigration of Russian Jews was included in German identity discourse. The particular time, late 1990, lends the

discussion added weight. In the context of German unification, Jewish immigration became a factor with which the legitimacy of the new united German state would be measured. In politics and the media the Russian-speaking Jews were presented as members of a community of victims that developed because of the annihilation policies of the Nazis. The difference between victims of the Holocaust, survivors, and the Jewish immigrants of the present day seemed to be eliminated symbolically. The image of Jews as victims who had to flee the anti-Semitism of the collapsing Soviet Union also seemed to correspond to the legal framework that regulated the process of admitting the immigrants. The legal construction of "Jewish quota refugees" provided the Russian-speaking Jews with refugee status, although they would have little chance of being recognised as political refugees in a regular procedure for obtaining asylum.[1] This practice offered a speedy and unbureaucratic way for a group of immigrants to enter Germany, allowing all persons who could prove their Jewish descent—along with their non-Jewish family members—to immigrate (on the basis of that ethnic affiliation).[2]

Over the course of the 1990s, local and national media began to give voice to a certain disappointment upon the realisation that the Jewish immigrants were failing to live up to both the image of victims and their role as pillars of Jewish culture, and cracks began to form in the figure of the persecuted refugee. The suspicion that economic

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[1] The Quota Refugee Act of 1980 allows for the recognition of an applicant's refugee status, in accordance with the Geneva Convention, when the applicant is still in his/her country of origin or in a third country, without him/her having to go through an official asylum procedure. On this, see Kai Hailbronner, *Ausländerrecht. Ein Handbuch*. Heidelberg: Kohlhammer, 1998.

[2] The distribution of the Jewish quota refugees was the responsibility of the Cologne-based Federal Office of Administration. Distribution was decided in consultation with the individual federal states on the basis of the asylum seeker allocation system; that is, according to the population density of each of the federal states. This was followed by the issue of an entry permit. Applicants received a letter entitling them to a permanent residence and work permit, to social services such as integration support (e.g., language courses), welfare benefits, housing benefit, child allowance, and study grants. Upon completion of a recognised language course, immigrants could make use of services provided by the employment office (further training, retraining, and job-creation measures) and after eight years they could apply for German citizenship. Most Jewish immigrants came from Russia and Ukraine, followed by the Baltic States, Central Asia, Moldova, and the Caucasus. In their countries of origin, most of the immigrants had lived in cities, and the proportion of marriages to a non-Jewish partner was over 50 percent. Overall, the group of immigrants was highly-qualified. See Julius H. Schoeps, Willi Jaspers and Bernhard Vogt, *Russische Juden in Deutschland. Integration und Selbstbehauptung in einem fremden Land*. Weinheim: Beltz, 1996, 31–33.

reasons more than anything had played a role in the decision to leave intensified; the immigrants were accused of having been thrilled to discover the all-important "drop of Jewish blood" in their family (for more on this in greater detail, see Koerber 2005). What fuelled people's mistrust more than anything else, however, was the fact that the immigrants had not affiliated themselves with Jewish communities to the extent that had been expected of them. With the growing realisation that a considerable number of the Jewish immigrants were not very religious, nor had they sought membership of a Jewish community, there was an increasing tendency to reproach them for having an instrumental relationship with their own identity; that is, for having co-opted their Jewishness for the purpose of leaving without committing anything further to it. With this, the legality of Jewish immigration as a whole was thrown into doubt.

At the beginning of 1996, the magazine *Der Spiegel* did in fact publish a letter from the Foreign Office, under the heading "As quietly as possible", which revealed that a halt on the "too generous" admission policy was being deliberated. The letter reasoned that anti-Semitic discrimination in the former Soviet Union no longer constituted a real threat, and that the strengthening of the communities in Germany had not occurred to the extent that people had wished (*Der Spiegel*, 22/1996)[3]. The then president of the Central Council of Jews in Germany, Ignatz Bubis, was able to prevent the stop on immigrant admissions.

Thus, the persecuted Soviet Jew had, in crossing the border, become an economic migrant. He was regarded as having an instrumental relationship with his Jewish identity: he did not avow himself to the Jewish faith, nor did he feel permanently obliged to the community. As such, he evoked the distorted image of the disloyal, slippery Jew, as analysed by Zygmunt Bauman, who revealed his identity precisely in the way that he hid, denied, and mimicked it (Bauman 1992). What was striking in these interpretations was not just the return of anti-Semitic stereotypes. They also revealed that Germany as a country of non-immigration pri-

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[3] Der Spiegel. „So leise wie möglich". Nr. 22, 27.05.1996, accessed March 05, 2015. www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-8928367.html .

marily saw Jewish immigration as legitimised through its strengthening of Jewish communities (Koerber 2015).

A New *German*-Jewish Community?

These inflated expectations placed on Russian-speaking Jews and the renewal of Jewish life reveal the specific symbolic political role assigned to the Jewish community in West Germany in the decades following the war. In his "German-Jewish history of the Federal Republic", Anthony Kauders points out that both Jewish and non-Jewish functionaries had a shared interest in assigning to the Jewish community a function with public visibility (2007: 126). The aim of this "exchange of gifts" (ibid: 129) was the reciprocal recovery of legitimacy and, in connection with this, the growing international recognition of the German state and its resident small Jewish community, the presence of which stood as evidence of a successful democratisation.

The difference between the Jewish community's public role and the reality was exposed once again in the disputes that erupted in the wake of the immigration of Russian-speaking Jews after 1990. The readiness of the German state to strengthen the Jewish minority through the admission procedure went hand in hand with the expectation that it was the responsibility of the Jewish communities to integrate "their" immigrants. This approach was also in keeping with an institutional structure that has defined the organisation of the Jewish community in Germany. In a departure from the racial constructs of the National Socialists, the Jews in post-war Germany are defined as a religious community. As such, the Jewish community acquires the status of a "public corporation" in accordance with the German state-church law.[4] This status is otherwise reserved exclusively for Christian churches and small Christian communities while,

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[4] The corporative status has its origins in the German state-church law, which was adopted in the Weimar constitution in 1919 and was incorporated, unchanged, into the German constitution in 1949 (Art. 140 GG/Art.137 V). Although this guaranteed everyone a right to religious freedom, which religion could enjoy this status, and with it the public recognition of a legally endorsed equal religious community, was subject to a legal decision. The corporative status in fact represents a privileging of certain religious communities; it allows, for example, the right to tax collection and to own endowment property, as well as a right to social benefits with state support.

for example, the approximately four million Muslims living in Germany are still fighting to be awarded the status of a religious community. In the wake of this immigration, local Jewish communities acquired a structural role in the model of the German welfare state.

The readiness of the Jewish communities to align with the expectations of the German state stemmed from their shared vision of what counted as successful immigration. In contrast to, for example, the USA, migrant-driven processes of self-integration, such as the formation of ethnic enclaves, were regarded as normative and therefore as problematic and undesirable. Instead of this, the predominant idea was that Jewish immigrants should both integrate into German society, as well as identify with a specific Jewish identity forged within existing Jewish institutions. What such an identity was meant to look like can be illustrated by the following statement by a long-term leader from a Jewish community:

> I say to people, do you have any idea why you came to Germany? If they say, yes, life was not good in Russia, I tell them, the agreement between the Central Council and the Federal Republic states *expressis verbis* [explicitly]: you should help to rebuild the Jewish communities destroyed by the Nazis. And that means that you need to get involved in the community and the community is not a cultural association, but a religious one, an institution of faith.[5]

This statement gives voice to a twofold integration mission, which clearly defined the relationship between long-term residents and new immigrants. The purpose of this mission was the integration of Jewish immigrants into a German-Jewish religious community. This was a task that took for granted two points that, for the majority of Jewish immigrants, were initially alien: namely the understanding, firstly, of Jewishness as primarily a religious identity and, secondly, of Jewish history as the history of Jews in Germany.

It was particularly this need to redefine their collective identity once they had crossed the German border that was one of the central and most trying migration-related experiences for Russian-speaking Jewish

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[5]Translated from German original. Interview with the chairman of the Israelite Religious Community of Nuremberg, Transcript, 12.

immigrants. Whereas in the Soviet Union they had been members of a national minority, in Germany they were regarded as members of a religious community. For the mostly secular Jewish immigrants this shift from a national to a religious minority constituted a controversial process that was a frequent source of conflict within the communities (Koerber 2005, 2009).

In the early years of the immigration movement, an increasing sense of disappointment set in among the long-term community members. This disappointment was a result of the realisation that although the communities had gained new members, this had not led to fewer empty seats in the synagogues. Instead they saw the Russian Jews as being driven by a sense of entitlement aimed above all at turning the communities into benefit facilities that should also serve the preservation of Russian culture.[6] The demographic shift that occurred as a result of this immigration quickly placed doubt on the long-term community members' integration demands. In effect, the Jewish communities were transforming into immigration communities made up of a minority of long-term members and a large majority of new members. In the following years, the German media, in the light of continuing conflicts between the two groups, explained this as the consequence of a split community divided between "Jews" and "Russians".

What these accounts fail to bring to light is the way in which the Soviet Union's atheist and repressively anti-Semitic politics had generated among the Jews who lived there a specific group consciousness that the sociologist Zvi Gitelman has described as a "latent ethnicity" (Gitelman 2003: 108). Characteristic of this symbolic group affiliation was a growing distance from a religious-cultural understanding of Jewishness during the course of Sovietisation that went hand in hand with a process of either forced or voluntary assimilation (Slezkine 2004; Stanislawski 1995).

Their specific experience of being integrated on the one hand, and being socially and institutionally stigmatised as Jews on the other, formed part of an ethnic Jewish identity that was also brought to light in the disputes over the Jewish communities in Germany. In these disputes, the

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[6] "Jüdische Gemeinden streiten über echte Mitglieder," *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 5 December 1995, 7; "Ein Fall für den Mond," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 13 October 1997, 7.

immigrants lay claim to a sense of belonging largely formed passively in relation to their origin as different from an understanding of a religious Jewish community.

However, since the 1990s there has also been another area of conflict that has frequently erupted in the day-to-day running of the community. This conflict can be described as the result of an encounter between competing narratives (on the politics of narratives, see also Nikolko). For the Jewish communities in post-war Germany, the memory of the Holocaust formed the central point of reference of their identity that also fundamentally shaped their relationship to the Federal Republic. In this context, Dan Diner speaks of a "spell" cast over Jews living in Germany in the first decades following the end of the war, to describe the Jewish people's constitution of itself through its dissociation from everything the Holocaust represented (Diner 2012: 15). Even when the second generation's coming of age made it clear that the Jews would stay in Germany, the relationship with the "land of the perpetrators" remained ambivalent and problematic (Broder 1979; Fleischmann 1980).

A brief look at the increasingly state-coordinated memory culture underscores once again the symbolic role that the Jewish community acquired in post-war Germany. Whereas in the 1950s events commemorating the Holocaust were organised by Jews and other persecuted groups, and took place either in private or away from the public sphere, as early as the 1960s we can observe a development towards public forms of commemoration, in which the Church and local and state politics were partly involved alongside Jewish communities (Bodemann 1996). This process of an increasingly nationalised commemoration of the Holocaust peaked in the 1980s and to this day is symbolically represented in the annual events commemorating the November pogroms of 9 November 1938. In the different forms of public commemoration, the Jewish communities occupy a self-evident position as representatives of the collective of victims.

The immigration of Russian-speaking Jews introduced a new collective memory that had at its centre not the Holocaust but the "Great Patriotic War", and, connected with this, the victory over Germany. In many communities the rift between these different narratives has erupted in connection with the celebrations on 9 May, the day of the victory over

fascism, which in the Soviet Union was regarded as the most important public holiday. It is not just in the stories of contemporary witnesses that the "Great Patriotic War" assumes a central role, but also in those of successive generations; after all, there is hardly a Soviet family who did not lose anyone to the war. Nevertheless, the difficult history of Russian-speaking Jews also includes the fact that the Holocaust was not part of official Soviet memory. Jewish victims were counted as civilian war victims, and in the wake of the anti-Zionist politics of the post-war years, commemoration of the Holocaust was forbidden. It was only in the middle of the 1980s that the reform programmes Perestroika and Glasnost introduced a shift in memory politics as a result of which, hesitant as it was, the commemoration of Jewish victims of the Holocaust became possible (Altman 2006).

Thus, at first glance it seems that there are two opposing memory cultures in the Jewish communities that have the winners of the war on one side and on the other the victims of the Holocaust. However, looking more closely at the family stories of the Russian-speaking Jews, we can observe a process of revaluation, deferral, or overlapping of different memories, enabling both the war and the specific fate of the Jews to become visible. The cultural theorist Aleida Assmann describes personal memory as a "dynamic process, in which one constantly engages with the past anew in accordance with the conditions and needs of the present and in doing so only admits as much of the past as one needs or can tolerate" (Assmann 2007: 175). In the case of the Jewish immigrants, the experience of the present includes the encounter with Germany's writing of history and the identity of the Jewish communities in which the Holocaust has become an elementary part of the collective memory. Reflecting the effects of Soviet ideology, which had no interest in emphasizing the specific fate of the Jewish minority in the Second World War, many of our interviewees point out how little they knew about the Shoah in the past. Their encounter with the memory culture of the Jewish communities now meant that the Holocaust was gradually becoming incorporated into their own post-Soviet consciousness. The different forms that this process can take are shown using the examples of the quotations below from contemporary witnesses and members of later generations, in which the influences of family stories, political commemoration, and

traditions overlap. Nevertheless, it is striking that the memories of the specific fate of Jews remain, across generations, embedded in the context of the Second World War:[7]

> The blockade [of Leningrad, K.K.] had a strong impact on me as a child and as a person. It was the most difficult time of my life. […] People were starving and dying. My mother was hit in an airstrike on 22 September 1942. She was badly injured and died the next day. […] The city where my sister lived was occupied by the Germans. Years later, I received a letter which described in detail how they murdered all the Jews. They were rounded up, forced to undress and were shot in a mass grave.[8]
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> It is not a matter of one dictatorship conquering another. Thousands, hundreds of thousands of Jews fought in the Red Army because if Hitler had defeated the Soviet Union all Jews would have been killed. And everyone knew this. And the Jews had no other choice. They also fought for their own lives, for their families, against the National Socialist dictatorship. If the Soviet power had lost this war, what would have happened then? Who [*sic*] of us Jews would have survived? No one. And unfortunately, when we start to discuss this, the Jews who have been here for a long time don't understand this.[9]

The war makes up the leitmotif of these stories, yet its significance for the Russian-speaking Jews has changed since their migration. Soviet memory culture and the memory of the Holocaust do not simply stand unrelated in opposition to one another. Rather, as transnational actors, the Jewish immigrants refer to both forms of collective memory in order to cultivate their own forms of memory within these. This also has a bearing on how both these forms of collective memory are positioned in the present day. In this context, the witness's quotation about the Leningrad blockade and the mass shooting of Jews once again draws attention to the fact that the Holocaust is not one uniform narrative, but is composed of multifaceted layers of experience that only become visible through the

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[7] The quotations are taken from interviews with Russian-speaking members of Jewish communities from a comparative study of communities, which was undertaken from 2005 to 2008 as a joint project between the University of Applied Science of Erfurt and the University of Erfurt.

[8] Translated from German original. Alexander, P., b. 1924, Transcript, 2, male, 84, 3.

[9] Translated from German original. Nikolaj, S., b. 1964, Transcript, 9.

(hi)stories of the Russian-speaking Jews. That the successive generations also pay tribute to the specific experiences of their relatives in the war years is shown in the example of the Russian-Jewish author Lena Gorelik. In 2013, the successful writer wrote a moving preface to the diary of Lena Muchina, a young girl who had survived and portrayed part of the Leningrad blockade 1941–1942 (Gorelik 2013). Gorelik's family comes from Leningrad, which today is once again called St. Petersburg. The blockade was part of her history education and featured in Soviet propaganda, but it is also the history of her family and the stories of hunger, death, and survival during those years are part of her family's shared memory. Her text makes clear that the Russian-speaking Jewish immigrants have contributed to the pluralisation of the Jewish community's communicative memory with their own painful, different experiences that also demand a place around the central narrative of the Holocaust. This is not so much a counter memory as an extension of the collective Jewish memory that, in turn, will also cause the identity of Jewish communities in Germany to change.

Jews in Contemporary Germany: An Outlook

The conflicts that have arisen since the early 1990s through the immigration of Russian-speaking Jews shed light on how a minority, whose public profile and self-image were essentially defined in relation to the Holocaust, is increasingly characterised by internal negotiations about its future form as a heterogeneous community that increasingly takes its presence in Germany as given. At the same time, the conflicts and problems outlined here document the ambivalent effects of an institutional and symbolic structure that up until now has been formative for the way in which the Jewish minority in Germany organises itself. The definition of the Jewish community as a religious community that is organised through local Jewish organisations and is represented by the Central Council of Jews in Germany gives the Jewish minority a voice in the political arena. After all, the Jewish community enjoys a "corporative identity", that is, a group identity legitimised by the state and its institutions and that acquires a special symbolic role against the back-

ground of German history. Particularly in Germany, a country whose jurisdiction for a long time did not allow for the political participation of immigrant minorities, it represented a precarious yet enduring exception, towards which—as the sociologists Michal Bodemann and Göcke Yurdakul have demonstrated with the example of the Muslim community—other minorities have also oriented themselves in their struggle for recognition (Bodemann and Yurdakul 2005). Nevertheless, within the Jewish communities this has been a source of a continuing conflict that has manifested itself in particular through the immigrants' move from a national to a religious minority. What is at stake here is a group identity that, although it promises public recognition, does so under the condition that this group formation takes place within boundaries marked by both the host society and the Jewish community. As a result, the Jewish communities are at the centre of symbolic struggles that essentially boil down to disputes over the shift in meaning of the category "Jewish".

These struggles gain in significance in light of the fact that, in the process of integrating the Jewish immigrants, the communities have taken on a central role that, approximately 20 years on, has left them exposed to considerable problems. Similarly to 1989, they are struggling with high numbers of elderly members and declining membership figures. In short: they are lacking young members, or, more accurately, young members who have jobs.

A current study being run by the Jewish Museum in Berlin has produced initial insights into the everyday reality of those young adults aged 20 to 40 who immigrated as children with their families within the framework of the quota policy (Koerber 2014). Preliminary results have indicated a trend similar to the latest results published by the PEW Research Center in 2013 on American Jews in the age group of those born after 1980.[10] These identify a trend towards a more secular understanding of Jewish identity that dovetails with a drop in figures as far as membership of a Jewish community is concerned. In an online survey we asked 268 women and men from our study group, among other things, how they would define Jewishness. In contrast to the official definition in Germany

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[10] "A Portrait of Jewish Americans", 1 October 2013, 1–20. http://www.pewforum.org/files/2013/10/jewish-american-full-report-for-web.pdf

of a religious community, in first place, 44 percent of the participants cited ethnic belonging, followed by 19 percent who stated the idea of a cultural community, followed by an understanding of Jewishness as defined by a Jewish lifestyle. The definition of a religious community only came in at fourth place. When asked whether they belonged to a Jewish community, 37 percent said they were not members of any community. Over 50 percent of those asked described their Jewishness as liberal and secular (Koerber 2014: 9–12).

These numbers tie in with a criticism frequently levelled at the often perceived rigid, religious character of the communities, in particular where the exclusion of non-Halachic Jews is concerned. Further, membership is often based on strong local ties and the assumption that people will be part of the community for a long time—factors that are not in keeping with interviewees' own needs, interests, and mobile lifestyles that favour flexible, temporary forms of belonging (Gromova 2013).

Thus, while we can observe a shift in the religious-cultural practices and forms of belonging within the Jewish religious sphere in Germany, there are also differences concerning the meaning and form of state and cultural belonging. While participants in previous Jewish migrations in the decades following the war felt only loose connections with their countries of origin, in this context we can identify, by contrast, multiple forms of belonging not only in the first but also the second generation. One example of this is the former German politician Marina Weißband, who emigrated in 1993 at the age of six to Germany from Kiev in Ukraine with her Ukrainian-Jewish family. Her accounts of her family's migration highlight the very circumstances that had brought Jewish immigration at the beginning of the 1990s into such disrepute. For instance, she reveals how difficult the departure from Ukraine had been for individual family members; how virtual and real contact with her country of origin is simply a fact of life. Marina Weißband is Jewish, a German citizen, and a Russian-speaking Ukrainian citizen. She holds both passports and has spent weeks at a time in 2014 in Majdan Square in Kiev, supporting the democratic movement during the current conflict. In doing so she is the epitome of those simultaneous or "mobile forms of belonging" (Strasser 2009). Her case not only demonstrates that in a globalised world, belonging and biographies have been set in motion, but also that

people inhabit different worlds at the same time and are able to position themselves quite comfortably within this perpetual being-in-motion (on different patterns on belonging, see also Sadjed).

The example of Marina Weißband highlights a further feature that distinguished Russian-Jewish immigration and has by now been vocalised as a political issue by various figures. In 2012, the aforementioned author Lena Gorelik, during the debate around the xenophobic arguments of the German politician Thilo Sarrazin, published a book in which she describes her experiences as a migrant in a country that, 20 years and four successful German-language novels later, still registers with amazement that she really does speak German rather well (Gorelik 2012). In a similar way, but in another debate, the author Olga Grjasnowa, who also immigrated to Germany as part of the quota policy, has also raised her voice (Grjasnowa 2014). Both authors described experiences of exclusion and discrimination that have nothing to do with their Jewish origins, but rather with their status as migrants in Germany. They criticised the non-acceptance of educational qualifications and the disregard for educational success acquired outside of Germany, and characterised these exclusion mechanisms as the structural failure of a society that still responds to the challenges of immigration with strategies that isolate migrants.

Conclusion

The disputes around the Jewish community's new identity highlight a dilemma in German politics, a consequence of the shift from Germany's self-image as a "community of memory" towards the politics-shaped present of a modern immigration society. Insofar, the conflicts and problems going on in the Jewish communities also document the ambivalent effects of an institutional and symbolic order that up to now had a great influence on the organisational form of the Jewish minority in Germany and is about to change. Thus, the new Jewish community in Germany represents less a "new German-Jewish identity" and rather the fiercely contested outcome of a newly forming Jewish diasporic community, whose origins, frames of reference, and forms of organisation do not—crucially— just lie in Germany. These developments are comparable to

observable changes of the Jewish diasporas in neighbouring European states. Especially, they apply to the younger generations who move away from Holocaust commemoration as a "negative" civil religion and are reinventing "positive" diasporic Jewish traditions in new religious and secular forms. This insistence of the centrality of diaspora as the essence of Jewish cultural life does not only stand in contrast to the concept of Zionism (Boyarin and Boyarin 1993). Furthermore, following Carment and Sadjed, it proves as an example that diasporas are not a monolithic entity. Instead, we are witnessing how diasporic communities are transformed in the process of migration and do represent identity formations that continue to evolve in a space in between.

For researchers, this does not only mean opening up the field to observations that allow the diversification of Jewish identities and cultural practices to come into focus. They should also make clear that—and show how—the proliferation of Jewish forms of belonging also generates new conflicts and leads to new forms of community building that happen beyond or contrary to the established structures of the Jewish communities. To put it more generally: the changes in the Jewish community in Germany document tensions and struggles that are typical in general of diaspora communities in today's world. These include the attempt to assert forms of cultural autonomy as an alternative to nationalist migration regimes and their institutional constraints. Equally, they highlight the challenge of being confronted with the heterogeneity of constructions of belonging that consider themselves to be sub- or transnational and are therefore constantly changing and challenging the borders of the community.

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3

The 'Sweet Spot' Between Submission and Subversion: Diaspora, Education and the Cosmopolitan Project

Reza Gholami

Introduction

Diasporic living is necessarily diasporic praxis. That is, in their everyday living diasporans explicitly or implicitly implicate, critique, expose, define, subvert, sometimes extend, the integrity and hegemony of *both* the nation-state and 'the diaspora'. Diasporic praxis, then, is a double-edged sword, always with the potential to work in two directions towards inclusivity and exclusivity—cosmopolitanism and essentialism. But I nonetheless believe it to be a crucial capacity of diasporic living, because regardless of the direction in which the sword cuts, 'being diasporic' always implies a unique mode of agency; and because in the right circumstances diasporic praxis can provide *vital impetus and concrete tools* for the journey towards a cosmopolitan (i.e., more equal, inclusive, reflexive, and

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globally oriented) future. This chapter is about these issues, and about the difficult but pressing question of how we might begin to identify such concrete tools and 'harness' their potential. It takes the view that diasporic living is a normal and permanent feature of the world and is thus interested in bringing diasporic modes of agency to bear upon the critical questions of conviviality in the contemporary world. In other words, although diasporic communities are often viewed as *problems* in debates around diversity, one of the arguments of this chapter is that they in fact hold key solutions, and any serious attempt at finding solutions must be sincerely interested in what diasporic communities 'are doing' and how their actions engage wider national structures.

A key issue in this context is cooperation between various actors/stakeholders in the global arena. And as Carment and Sadjed suggest in the introduction to this volume, our very understanding of global cooperation needs to be reconceptualised to include diasporas and the advantages they offer. In this chapter, I am interested in a particular mode of cooperation between certain diasporic and host-national organisations. As I explore below, this cooperation is intriguing because it is the result of a set of circumstances, and produces a set of outcomes that neither the diasporic nor the national organisation can fully control. As such, it allows us to revisit the debate around the relationship between diasporas and the nation-state and move it forward by focusing on some of the possibilities for cosmopolitanism that arise from their interaction.

Much has been said in recent years about the challenges that transnational processes pose for the nation-state, seen usually as a top-down, ideologically proscriptive entity (cf. Faist 2010). And diasporas have featured prominently in that literature. Since the mid-1990s, they have been seen as the very embodiment of the problematisation of the logic of the national, and perhaps the best arbiters of alternative models and spaces of living (see *inter alia* Appadurai 1996; Bhabha 1994; Brinkerhoff 2012; Clifford 1994; Gilroy 1987; Hall 2000). However, there is also compelling evidence for the still predominant power of nation-states in the configuration of human living and experience across the globe (cf. Holton 2011). A third dimension in this debate is the equally

important reminder from within diaspora studies that some diasporic groups can be as essentialist and exclusivist as any nation-state (Anthias 1998). In such cases, diasporic groups utilise their transnational connections and citizenships, and all the advantages these afford (perhaps we could call this their 'diaspora capital'), to influence the politics/policies of home and host nation-states in their favour (Kapur 2004; Axel 2008).

The literature is right to highlight the conflictual relationship between diasporas and nation-states and to underscore the myopic tendencies rife in both. However, not enough attention is paid to instances or processes of interaction/cooperation between diasporas and nation-states. And I argue that this is a necessary move if we are to seriously challenge those essentialist tendencies. The first step in doing this is to understand that the *settlement* of a diasporic community in a host nation-state is deeply significant. To paraphrase Tölölyan (2007), the logic of the sedentary is a persistent feature (and desire) in people's migrations; and diasporic communities rely on ongoing engagement with the homeland,[1] as well as the civic spaces of the host country to define and assert themselves. Thus, the 'nodes', as Tölölyan calls them, between the connections are of crucial importance. Diasporas, therefore, are not so much about dispersion or return—subsequent generations may have no recollection of the former and no desire for the latter. Rather, they are about the practices and discourses produced by those generations, which neither belong fully in home nor host country.

The next step is to inquire more intently into those 'settled' practices and discourses and examine how diasporic communities engage and cooperate with the national structures of their host societies. This provides an opportunity to explore the 'cosmopolitanising' role that diasporas play. Of interest, therefore, is the question of what diasporas *do*, given that 'what they do' is potentially transformative at ethnic, national and transnational levels. My suggestion is not dissimilar to Brubaker's call to view 'diaspora' as a 'category of practice' focusing on specific diasporic

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[1] Gaibazzi's chapter in this volume shows that the home society as well as those who 'stay behind' play a far more central and productive role in the life of the diaspora than we may have previously appreciated.

projects rather than on 'the diaspora' as a bounded entity (Brubaker 2005: 13; see also Raman 2003). I argue that there are some practices through which diasporic communities resist and challenge the power of home and host nation-states on the one hand and their own potential essentialisms on the other, while maintaining some sort of a relationship with those positions. I also argue that such practices and modes of inter-action are of crucial significance to the project of cosmopolitanisation; and that identifying and studying them allows us to 'harness' and rede-ploy their potential. Using a case study from my ongoing research among UK Iranians, I will analyse what I have called 'diasporic education' as an example of such diasporic practice. Diasporic education refers to recent pedagogic and curricular activities and logics in Iranian supplementary schools that, due to social and historical shifts, engage with national and diasporic positions in the way described above. They are also transnation-ally produced and globally oriented. I aim to show that these activities and interactions open up a 'sweet spot' between submitting to and sub-verting both national(ist) and diasporic essentialism. As we will see, the sweet spot is pregnant with the energy and tools required to challenge/transform extant hegemonies more explicitly and systematically by 'strip-ping away' excessive nationalism and diasporicity from cultural forms, rendering them potentially cosmopolitan.

Towards Cosmopolitanisation via 'Stripping Away'

Nation-states can no longer lay exclusive claim to or fully control all the processes that take place within their borders. Nor do those borders have the power—if they ever did—to act as hermetic seals. They have little choice but to let in/out all kinds of flows and movements, some of which are regarded as 'pollutants'—and not just environmental. This is largely the consequence of globalisation, which also acts inside nation-states. Beck (2002) calls this cosmopolitanisation. And in this way, 'globality' touches the bodies, minds and souls of everyone, even those vehemently opposed to it. Beck's notion of cosmopolitanisation is predicated upon being self-critical and is characterised by a 'dialogic imagination' which:

…is aware of the clash of cultures and rationalities within one's own life, the '*internalized* other'. The dialogic imagination corresponds to the coexistence of rival ways of life in the individual experience, which makes it a matter of fate to compare, reflect, criticize, understand, combine contradictory certainties. (2002: 18, original emphasis)

Thus, as opposed to the monologic imagination of the nation-state which constantly strives to exclude the otherness of the other, cosmopolitanisation includes all kinds of otherness. Specifically, cosmopolitanism comprises five dimensions:

1. including the otherness of nature
2. including the otherness of other civilisations and modernities
3. including the otherness of the future
4. including the otherness of the object
5. overcoming the (state) mastery of (scientific, linear) rationalisation

While the first three relate to external factors, the last two are internal to the subject (ibid.).

Beck's contention is that cosmopolitanisation results in a pluralisation of nation-state borders, or an implosion of the dualism between the national and the international. This means that the cultural, social, political and economic borders operating within and between nation-states become increasingly challenged and redrawn, which leads to what Beck describes as 'a legitimation crisis of the national morality of exclusion' (ibid., 19) and poses critical questions about the rationale for national hierarchies, as well as for how we experience and deploy our sense of responsibility. This is an important point, for it underscores the fact that over the past couple of centuries, nation-states have hijacked intrinsically human capacities such as responsibility and used them divisively to exploit/exclude some to the benefit of others.

These ideas challenge the logic of the national at its very core and, I think, render it untenable in any serious consideration of a more egalitarian future. But such a challenge raises further questions. Beck talks about the importance of having cosmopolitan principles, norms and memories, which gain expression through the law. He uses the transnationalisation

of the memory of the Holocaust as an example. But the question is surely: how? How, that is, do we mount an effective challenge to hegemonic nationalist structures while—at least for now—we depend on those very structures to mount any sort of challenge? What if those structures decided to shut us down, as is indeed the case in many countries? I think we can get at these questions by posing another about Beck's example of the Holocaust: why—as others have also asked—has the memory of the Holocaust, arguably much more than other episodes of genocide and ethnic cleansing, been so successfully transnationalised and cosmopolitanised? This is in no way meant to detract from the horror of the Nazi atrocities against Jewish people; nor do I think there is anything to be achieved from a comparison of scales of bloodshed. What I am interested in is examining whether a particular type of interplay between the national and the diasporic is able to produce circumstances *conducive to* cosmopolitanisation.

The case of the Holocaust—how it became so prominent especially in the USA—is indeed instructive. Not surprisingly, it manages to sharply divide opinions among Jews and non-Jews, Zionists and anti-Zionists alike (cf. Novick 1999; Finkelstein 2000). Novick has talked about how collective memories such as that of the Holocaust lose or gain significance at certain times, and become redefined according to the felt needs of a generation. And Finkelstein has located the 'Holocaust industry' as a powerful force in American and Israeli politics. Both agree that the Holocaust has come to feature so prominently in American consciousness not so much because of the event itself or any links it may have to notions of trauma, but because of certain types of representation and interaction between American Jews and the American nation-state and its institutions and industries. From this perspective, whatever the reality of the Holocaust, its entanglement in national and minority politics and culture makes it emblematic of what I referred to above as *excessive nationalism and diasporicity*. However, it cannot be denied that the Holocaust is also about a universal set of issues including persecution, suffering, resistance and hope. Once we strip away the disagreements and accusations, which seem to me to relate entirely to excessive nationalism and diasporicity, *that* is where we end up. Therefore, the fact that a certain set of social, political, cultural and historical processes have coalesced

to give prominence to the Holocaust in powerful countries such as the USA and the UK is in the context of this chapter not important because it answers the 'why the Holocaust?' question. It is important for looking at its prominence *after the fact* and asking: *how* were the specificities of nationalism and diasporicity stripped away to leave us with something that is deeply relevant to all human beings everywhere—something that transcends nation-states and ethnic groups and has the power to influence them?

In order for the Holocaust to gain common recognition and form the basis of common experience, the event itself has necessarily had to be disconnected from sub-ethnic, ethnic and national specificities. Novick has described it as a 'common denominator' and a 'consensual symbol' which could only have come about in a '"folk Judaism"—less bound by tradition and less scrupulous about theological consistency' (1999: 200). This does not mean that when diverse school children in the UK today talk about the Holocaust they are unaware of its particular links to German Jews during the 1930s and 1940s, or that specific ethnic and religious groups cannot commemorate the event in their own unique ways. It means, rather, that the event has been decoupled *enough* from, and cannot be fully claimed by, any particular ethnic or national ideology. So, whether it happened through a historical accident or ideological and financial manipulation, a rather serendipitous by-product of interactions between the Jewish diaspora and the USA vis-à-vis the Holocaust has been the stripping away of excessive nationalism and diasporicity.

The Iranian Diaspora in the UK: Excess and Engagement

Allow me to develop these ideas through the more specific and recent case of UK Iranians. The UK Iranian diaspora is far too complex to be looked at in detail in this chapter.[2] It will serve here mainly as an example that derives its usefulness from the fact that it is (1) replete with what I have called excessive diasporicity (mainly related to issues of secularism

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[2] For a detailed coverage including demographic information, see Gholami 2015.

and Islam); (2) it actively tries to engage with the UK along educational and cultural axes; and (3) 'sweet spots' seem to be increasing/intensifying. This section will look at these three features, focusing in particular on emerging models of Iranian 'supplementary' education as a way to explore processes of stripping away and the coalescence of a sweet spot.

Secularism and Islam

It is widely known that the Iranian diaspora largely owes its existence to Iran's 1979 Islamic Revolution. Therefore, the revolution's history and subsequent developments are essential for having any sort of understanding of Iranian diasporic living. In this context, Shi'ism and its contested social, political and cultural role take centre stage. During the revolution, Shi'ism became more than anything a focal point, a symbol of Iranian national unity, which drew together vastly heterogeneous social and political positions that did not necessarily agree with its theology or politics but pragmatically found it powerful enough to mobilise the country against the heavy-handed and pro-West rule of the monarch, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (cf. Keddie 2003; Spellman 2004). Thus, although post-revolution discourse has tended to cast the whole issue as a conflict between Islam and Western secularism (and so has the West), the revolution was primarily about social inequality, the lack of political plurality, and felt cultural misrepresentation. Nonetheless—and owing to the fact that post-revolution Iran became an explicitly Islamic state; and the fact that the pre-revolution elite who left Iran were overwhelmingly secular royalists and were followed by many other secular or non-Muslim groups—social, political and cultural contestations and conflicts have continually centred on the place of Islam and secularism in Iranian life.

It is for this reason, among others, that I find the concept of secularism less than useful in the Iranian context. Especially in the Iranian diaspora, 'secularism' has come to denote a set of discourses, practices and sensibilities that foremost problematise Islam, not other religions; and in many cases, they aim to totally eradicate the Islamic from the Iranian (or 'the Persian'). I call this non-Islamiosity (Gholami 2015). Examples of non-Islamiosity range from seemingly mundane daily activities that people

engage in without necessarily being fully conscious of them—such as certain patterns of consumption and social behaviour—to seemingly more calculated political expressions—such as slandering or totally excluding Islam in diasporic media.[3] Non-Islamiosity, in this sense, is a considerable force of social transformation in the Iranian diaspora today (and I believe its impact is increasingly being felt inside Iran as well). In the UK, for example, its negative representations and social exclusions are influencing the ways in which devout Iranian Shi'a live and experience their religious identities (ibid.). By the same token, non-Islamiosity is also being used by many Iranians as a mechanism for self-making. It is thus a liberatory modality of power which allows subjects to fashion their desired 'free' selves by helping them to subdue/defuse their 'residual' religious inculcations. In all these ways, non-Islamiosity is diasporically excessive. A non-Islamious identity may be open to non-Iranian ways of living; but this inclusiveness is far from the inclusive dimensions of Beck's cosmopolitanism. It is strategically predicated upon realising for the subject his/her desired experience of *Iranian-ness*.

Engaging (with) Britain

It is clear that the myopic practices of non-Islamiosity are unlikely to pave the way for a cosmopolitan future. However, settlement in a host country and the challenges of conviviality, particularly in super-diverse societies, can compel even myopic positions into mutual engagement, with potentially interesting effects. Studying diasporic institutions provides useful insights in this regard. By the early 1990s, it was clear that most UK Iranians would probably settle in Britain permanently. They and their off-spring then began to engage much more actively in British and Iranian social life, seeking out opportunities, participating in existing institutions and setting up new ones. Of course, Iranian institutions in the UK include those that cater to the needs of a specific religious or ethnic minority such as Zoroastrians or Baha'is. They also include those

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[3] One TV presenter, for example, declared that the Qur'an has less value than pornography (Gholami 2015: 136).

that are affiliated to the Iranian government (e.g., The Islamic Centre of England). But what interests me here are the institutions that engage directly with wider British society and often with the British authorities. These include the Iranian Heritage Foundation (IHF), the British Iranian Business Association (BIBA), the British Iranian Medical Association (BIMA), the British Iranian Community Development Organisation (BICDO), Refugee Women's Association (RWA—founded and currently run by an Iranian woman), and SAAM Theatre Company. An important point about these organisations is that due to their 'British-Iranian' nature they have to be culturally and politically diverse. They therefore tend to value/promote Iranian culture in its broadest sense while also commemorating key events of the British calendar and possibly others. In the case of RWA and SAAM, inclusion extends explicitly to other ethnic minorities from Asia, Africa and Eastern Europe.

More specifically, organisational inclusiveness relates to three factors. Firstly, whether directly or indirectly, intentionally or unintentionally, these organisations often represent or speak for 'the Iranian community'. Therefore, they tend to construct an image of 'the Iranian' which is agreeable to the Western palate and conforms to idealised images of a highly successful, sophisticated individual. For BICDO, for instance, this is an overt aim, as its leader and two of its board members recently explained to me in interviews. BICDO has ambitions of seeing Iranians in Britain's 'corridors or power' (a goal that is supported at least in principle by Britain's political establishment). This, then, acts as a determining factor in the organisation's behaviour and activities. That is, regardless of the personal attitudes of its decision makers, the organisation must behave in a way that is deemed culturally, politically and legally satisfactory by wider British society. Secondly, as the public profiles of those in charge of such organisations gain strength, there is also the potential that the Iranian government takes an interest in them, especially as many regularly travel to Iran for business and pleasure. Again, therefore, they cannot take positions which may bring unwanted scrutiny and criticism.

The third factor is funding. Funding is particularly instructive because both funder and funded depend for their continued existence on the transaction taking place. It would seem, therefore, that funding transactions allow national and diasporic institutions to assert and maintain

their integrity; but in reality they end up destabilising that very integrity. British-Iranian organisations—whose activities have tended to revolve either around community support, education and culture, or around a specific professional identity—find themselves in an environment of intense competition with a multitude of other organisations for limited funding opportunities. Between them, RWA and SAAM cite the European Union, the Equality and Human Rights Commission, London Development Agency, Arts Council England, the Lottery Fund and the City of London, as well as a number of charities, as their sources of funding. And BICDO, being interested in building research capacity, often bids for research grants (e.g., from the British Council). In this climate of competition, it goes without saying that funders are able to impose some requirements on an organisation's projects. The British Council, for example, plays an important role in building relations between the UK and Iran (despite officially not having any political involvement). This position hugely influences the Council's funding activities. However, funders cannot exert total control either and must recognise a diasporic institution's identity and objectives, which is usually why they consider funding it in the first place. Funding, then, is a significant reason for cooperation between diasporic organisations and the social, political and cultural spheres of mainstream British society. What is noteworthy, however, is that although both sides are able to dictate the terms of engagement to an extent, none is able to do so fully. That is, the result of their interaction is something that is greater than both of them; something that always-already challenges and undermines the integrity and power of national and diasporic structures, forcing them to make concessions, thus opening the possibility for new/alternative modes of praxis.

This is what I have been referring to as the 'sweet spot'. But it is not so much a 'new space' in the sense of Homi Bhabha's 'third space' (1994)—a disruptive space resulting from the encounter of colonising and colonised cultures, which throws into sharp relief the ambivalences of self, other and historical narrative. Rather, the 'sweet spot' denotes *the potential* to reclaim and/or recreate human practices from the grip of excessive nationalism and diasporicity and render them cosmopolitan. And it offers specific energy and tools for doing so. It results from the suspension of notions of absolute power in national and diasporic imaginations in

relation to one another; and it is driven by the fact that both nation-states and diasporas live significant parts of their lives through transnational processes.

Supplementary Schools

In the Iranian diaspora, education has been a key site for this kind of cooperation. This is because of the high emphasis that Iranians in general place upon 'being educated', as well as the importance they have tended to attribute to the Persian language and notions of Iranian culture. Iranian educational activities are mostly aimed at Iranian children and young people and usually take place in the form of supplementary or Saturday schools. In London, schools such as Rustam School, MTO College and Andisheh School are dotted across the city and offer Iranian children and young people tuition, with Farsi as the medium of instruction, on a range of subjects. However, they also increasingly offer tuition using English as the medium of instruction on the core subjects of the English National Curriculum (English, Mathematics and Science) across all year groups.

What is most of interest here is that the nature of Iranian supplementary schooling has been changing over the last decade. Mrs. White, Head of Rustam School, the first and currently largest Iranian school in London, told me the history of this change in her school.[4] Having been established in 1981, Rustam quickly gathered momentum, rising to its current leading status boasting 300 pupils and 54 staff. Mrs. White also believed that her school acts as a role model for the other 16 Iranian schools in London.[5] Rustam's founding principle was to ensure that the children of Iranian immigrants learned Persian, their mother tongue. However, today Persian can hardly be said to be Iranian children and young people's mother tongue, as their parents overwhelmingly also speak English as their first language. Farsi, therefore, said Mrs. White, is being taught as a second language.

This shift has posed some significant challenges—but I think also opportunities—for Iranian schools. The first challenge is to their business

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[4] I interviewed her at Rustam School in November 2014.

[5] This was her estimate but is difficult to verify as official numbers do not exist.

model. Whereas in the past, schools such as Rustam relied financially on tuition fees and community support, they are now facing a potential decline in pupil numbers and must look elsewhere for funding while also rebranding themselves somewhat to stay relevant to contemporary clients and funders alike. In the case of Rustam, this has meant networking and collaborating with a wide range of Iranian and British organisations, including the IHF (from which Rustam has successfully obtained funds in the past), BIMA, BICDO, the BBC, and the National Resource Centre for Supplementary Education (which imposes a quality assurance framework). As a result of these collaborations, Rustam now reaches wider sections of the local (not necessarily Iranian) community and offers a more varied educational and cultural experience—such as a range of activities aimed at improving physical and mental well-being. In this vein, some Iranian schools are beginning to embrace the increasing demand of parents of all ethnicities for supplementary tuition in Maths and English. Therefore, the Iranian schools I have worked with have increasingly attracted pupils from an array of ethnic and religious backgrounds. MTO College, for example, which is based in Highgate in north London, now enrolls a number of Turkish, Serbian and even white British pupils. It goes without saying that this diversification has a considerable impact on pedagogy, curriculum and school management, as well as on the school's cultural events. Heads and teachers now find that they cannot take 'Iranian culture' for granted. But interestingly, this has not meant using 'British culture' as a common denominator. The 'alternative' nature of these schools is never in question, and staff are acutely aware of their difference from the mainstream. As I mentioned earlier, it is often this very difference which makes them attractive to funders and clients.

The key point here is that in the context of the aforementioned changes, the *raison d'être* of Iranian supplementary schooling has shifted to being about allowing minority groups to live well and succeed within British society on the one hand and about encouraging pupils and parents to see and commit to the value of living multi-lingual/multi-cultural lives on the other. This brings us to the second challenge. Iranian schools are finding it difficult to identify teaching materials suitable for the current situation. For years, schools like Rustam relied on Iran's official text books. However, with

increasing professionalisation and diversification, those text books are losing their appeal and viability. They are also ideologically and culturally alien to Iranian children and young people and prevent deep levels of engagement. In this context, schools—and Rustam has been at the forefront of this—are taking it upon themselves to develop entirely novel educational materials. These materials can come from formal long-term projects such as writing and publishing entire text books, or more ad hoc activities such as synthesising existing resources to 'make up' new materials.

Two points are particularly important here: firstly, schools sometimes develop their materials in collaboration with similar organisations across the world. Rustam, for instance, has worked with schools in Canada and Australia. This is a *diasporic* activity which utilises transnational networks and local realities simultaneously while largely by-passing the regulatory powers of any given nation-state. Secondly, however, the contents of these materials are entirely relevant to, in fact pre-suppose, living in a Western nation-state, while raising in the pupil a positive awareness of his/her difference. Moreover, they show the host country to be full of or defined by all sorts of differences, thus painting a horizontal picture of difference. They thus emphasise a very different vision/experience of being a successful Western citizen, assuming that being Iranian and being, say, British are significantly/permanently entwined. Thus, they do not allow the full 'closure' of ideas of exclusive Britishness and exclusive Iranian-ness.

Diasporic Education

Crucially, 'supplementary' schooling in the way I have described happens within a space that is not and cannot be fully nationalised. During my observations of and interactions with staff and pupils, they always conveyed an understanding that the school is not bound by the National Curriculum; that home and host governments cannot exert control over what goes on at the school. It is for this reason that I have been placing 'supplementary' in inverted commas throughout the chapter. These schools are much more than that. Supplementary schools and schooling have been the subject of academic discussions at least since the early 1980s (e.g., Stone 1981). The main focus of these analyses was West Indian

Saturday schools in Britain, which were shown to be a form of grassroots action against the racism that was rife in the British education system (see Chevannes and Reeves 1987; Mac an Ghaill 1991). Supplementary schools have also been seen as important sites of multi-ethnic education (Reay and Mirza 1997). What the literature has not paid attention to, however, and what I believe emerges very clearly from the Iranian case, is that we can usefully think of some forms of supplementary schooling as a *diasporic* activity, or 'diasporic education' to be more precise.

I started this chapter with the statement that diasporic living is diasporic praxis, in that it is predicated upon modes of thought and action which necessarily—even if implicitly—engage, critique and destabilise the national. I also argued that 'the diasporic' is significantly about the activities of *settled* communities and their transnational connectivity. This casts a wholly new theoretical light on supplementary schooling. Focusing on diasporic education, thus, means focusing on a concrete set of educational practices which:

- Come to exist through the transnational connections of diasporic communities
- Engage and problematise notions of 'home' and 'host'
- Are aimed at improving the lives of diasporan children as settled citizens of 'host' nation-states, usually in ways which fall outside the ability/willingness of mainstream education
- Prevent the 'closure' of essentialist hegemonies at national and ethnic levels
- Cannot be ultimately regulated by national or diasporic policies

Diasporic education, as praxis, offers a proactively radical sort of edge that can enable teachers and students to engage with the cosmopolitan project more consciously and intently. It thus also involves seeing supplementary schools as possible sweet spots and exploiting their immense potential to further the cosmopolitan project. As we will see, they are sites in which people can reclaim, recreate and re-experience those aspects of our humanity that have been so successfully hijacked by nationalist and ethnic ideologies. If it is retorted that people live those aspects *through* specific national and ethnic identities as a way to imbue them with

meaning, my response would be that we need different/better strategies for conviviality henceforth; strategies that allow for specific identities and meaning-making but without an insistence upon full closure, historical essentialism and the ever-present potential for exclusion/exclusivism. I would argue that diasporic education is concrete enough that it enables us to understand, 'harness' and redeploy the processes through which excessive nationalism and diasporicity are stripped away to leave us with knowledges and practices that can be called cosmopolitan.

Allow me to see if I can pin down its concreteness. A key characteristic and contribution of diasporic education, as we saw above, is the development of transnational teaching materials, which are germane to diasporic and national living without fully succumbing to either of them. Here, although the 'host's' nationalism and the 'identity' of the diaspora meet one another in a space of mutual respect and recognition, this very encounter destabilises both of them at all levels. Thus, being Iranian, British, or British-Iranian (or anything else for that matter) all become fundamentally re-imagined and re-experienced. This, of course, as I also mentioned, is intensified by the fact Iranian schools are becoming more and more ethnically diverse, and must therefore find ways of catering for that diversity. To ground this more firmly in an example, the cultural events and celebrations that punctuate the Iranian calendar are increasingly developing a cosmopolitan flavour—not too dissimilar to what Beck describes as the transnationalisation of the memory of the Holocaust. Nowruz,[6] the most widely celebrated of all Iranian festivals, is a good example. Rustam School now celebrates Nowruz in a way that openly recognises that the festival 'belongs to' many other cultures and not just to Iranians—something that traditionally Iranians tend not to talk about. In fact, it posts on its Facebook page a video clip in which people from around the world, including high-profile individuals such as the Obamas, congratulate Nowruz in many different languages. It has posted another video that explains the international importance of the spring festival. In this way, any Iranian specificity is 'stripped away' and Nowruz becomes foremost about how people around the world celebrate the arrival of spring, which is something that virtually anyone anywhere

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[6] The first day of spring (vernal equinox), which also marks the New Year in Iran and other Persianate cultures.

could choose to participate in. I should note, however, that 'stripping away' does not mean that Nowruz loses its Iranian-ness for Iranians. Not at all. What I mean is that stripping away *loosens the rigid grip* that any culture might believe it has on Nowruz, so much so that insisting on a tight grip all but seems illogical in the minds and experiences of people. Stripping away, in this sense, has a *real and palpable* effect upon the human experience. After this loosening, however, Iranians, or anyone else, can celebrate Nowruz in any way they wish, knowing that theirs is just one way among many, *and* knowing, crucially, that they can choose to celebrate the festival differently.[7]

The final point to make relates to pedagogy. *Diasporic education pivots on the principle that teaching and learning in the contemporary world possess an intrinsically transnational tendency.* The fact that curricula have become nationalised and their subjects neatly distinguished and placed in hierarchies is, if anything, a historical aberration, an anomaly which must, and now can, be undone. I think there is great merit in Beck's idea that the future can today more easily be imagined globally than nationally. And it is this moment we must capitalise upon. Teaching diasporically, therefore, is foremost a pedagogical commitment. It is a commitment to the principle that knowledge must no longer be allowed to be defined and monopolised by revisionist national politics which use it to address the skills requirements of the capitalist economy. Students may well wish to learn those skills; but they must have a say in what knowledge is and what they want to do with it. Furthermore, it is a commitment to actively design curricula that have been 'sourced' globally and instil global thinking. Current national curricula go to great lengths to offer pupils 'experiences of the national', a deeply problematic imposition. They off-set this through discourses of multi-culturalism offering pupils experiences of 'other cultures'. But this is equally problematic because 'other cultures' are carefully selected and defined in accordance with wider national politics and hegemonies. They can also usually be mapped onto existing nation-states. It is high time, therefore, that education offers students meaningfully human experiences—experiences that have undergone 'stripping away'.

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[7] Other important celebrations, including *sizdah-be-dar and Charshanbe souri*, are undergoing a similar process but cannot be discussed due to lack of space.

Conclusion

This chapter has been about whether diasporas, as communities settled within nation-states, have anything concrete to contribute to the project of cosmopolitanisation. That is, whether their modes of interaction/cooperation with host-national structures have any bearing on challenging and undoing the essentialist tendencies of both the nation-state and the diaspora, thus giving rise to modes of living that are more inclusive, reflexive and global. My arguments have been premised on belief in the fact that 'diasporic living' is immensely significant because it simultaneously engages national and diasporic structures in transformative ways. Diasporic communities should therefore be seen as a permanent and potent feature of the world. Too often, they are viewed as entities that somehow 'stand out'. We have not yet managed in our imagination to 'blend them into' the world. Once we do that, we can focus on the huge implications of their agency. I would argue that of central importance in 'being diasporic' is exactly the field of tension between settlement and mobility that diasporas embody and straddle. It is there that they draw the logic of the national into all sorts of encounters that it would much rather not be drawn into. And it is there that they open up 'sweet spots' where the excesses of the national *and* of the diaspora itself can be stripped away, yielding an immense potential to reclaim, recreate and redeploy practices and knowledges that are—and have always been—globally human.

I considered British-Iranian organisations in general and supplementary schools in particular as a concrete example of these processes. In the schools, we find the right conditions for studying the 'stripping away' and harnessing the potential that results from it. I have also tried to advance the concepts of diasporic education and diasporic pedagogy. Diasporic education, I argued, comprises a set of formal and informal pedagogies and curricula, which are always transnational in nature but possess a *globally* oriented and cosmopolitan impetus, and which exploit the potentialities of the diasporic *and* the national while escaping their ultimate grip and destabilising them. Whether in education or elsewhere, the particularity of the type of cooperation between the diasporic and the national is of crucial importance. As I showed above, 'sweet spots'—

which neither the national nor the diasporic can fully control; which undermine hegemony and essentialism at national and diasporic levels; which make the logic of excessive nationalism and diasporicity seem non-sensical and indefensible; and which possess the quality of 'rendering cosmopolitan'—only come about when diasporic and national institutions interact with each other *willingly* and '*on friendly terms*', each promising, as far as possible, to maintain, even celebrate, the integrity of the other; to respect and support the objectives of the other. It is only this sort of cooperative encounter that allows for such promises to be made—and there is no reason to doubt their sincerity—yet produces an energy all of its own, which takes away something from the very integrity it was supposed to protect. In the process, it also shows that integrity to have always been arbitrary, contingent, problematic; compelling us to re-think our understanding of and commitment to diversity and conviviality, no longer in terms of asserting endless differences along ethnic and national lines, but to foreground our shared humanity.

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4

The Influence of Islamophobia on Ethnic and Religious Identification among the Iranian Diaspora: Iranian Jews and Baha'is in Germany

Ariane Sadjed

Introduction

The role of religion in the formation of diaspora community and identity is at the centre of academic and popular interest. In this chapter, I will discuss how religious minorities from Iran frame their ethnic and religious identity in a discursive framework that is shaped by Islamophobia.[1] As Iranians—even non-Muslim—they are confronted with racism because of their (ethnic) origin from the Middle East.

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[1] Islamophobia is a form of racism and defined as the subalternisation and inferiorisation of Islam produced by the Christian-centric religious hierarchy of the world-system since the end of the fifteenth century (Grosfoguel and Mielants 2006). However, the usage of the term is a matter of debate (Benz and Pfeiffer 2011).

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In the West, Islam is often regarded as incapable of coming to terms with religious difference and as incompatible with what is understood as the liberal, secular state. But the situation of religious minorities in a Muslim society such as Iran is far from ordained by religious differences alone. It is important to bear in mind that discrimination against minorities including Baha'is or Jews has not been stable throughout time, nor is it inherent to Islam (Lewis 1984; Tsadik 2007). Under certain circumstances, religious identities in Iran were surprisingly hybrid and allowed a certain extent of fluidity. Mehrdad Amanat (2011) has traced the conversions from Judaism to the Baha'i faith in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Iran. Amanat describes how, depending on the situation—i.e., for business transactions or marrying a spouse with a different religion—an individual switched from one religious identity to another, or at least blurred clear distinctions between different religious traditions and affiliations.

As noted in the introduction, diasporas can be understood as a space where national boundaries and identities are transcended and hybrid, as well as where ambivalent forms of belonging are produced. However, a homogenisation of identities and canonisation of religious traditions is also prevalent in the diaspora—creating new borders and differentiations within the community. I argue that the current negative perception of Islam in Western countries had led to the development of distinct and sometimes quite narrow repertoires of identification for Bahai'is and Jews in the diaspora community—which are even in contradiction to individual experiences.

In the West, Baha'is are primarily known due to their persecution in the Islamic Republic.[2] While the situation of Baha'is in Iran is indeed dire, my intention is to problematise the overarching dominance of this discourse that leads to many aspects pertaining the relationship between

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[2] A few examples are: www.bic.org/focus-areas/situation-iranian-bahais/current-situation, http://news.bahai.org/human-rights/, www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-oppression-of-bahais-continues-in-iran/2013/11/12/4b5dcf34-4b0f-11e3-be6b-d3d28122e6d4_story.html, http://publicaffairs.bahai.us/with-aching-hearts-bahais-of-the-world-focus-on-the-events-unfolding-in-iran-the-birthplace-of-their-religion/, http://iranpresswatch.org/, www.kas.de/upload/veranstaltungen/2009/09/090919_iran.pdf [all accessed 17 Nov. 2015]. See Nikolko in this volume for the significance of narratives of victimisation for diaspora mobilisation.

the Baha'i faith and Islam being cut out. In this way, Baha'is are made 'accomplices' to a false dichotomy in which the West appears as democratic and liberal on the one hand, and Islam, reactionary and totalitarian on the other.

Regarding Iranian Jews, too, existing discrimination has become a dominant trope in which conflicting actualities are dismissed or silenced. These ambiguities are not least reflected among the Jews who are currently living in Iran and do not seek to leave the country. At present the Iranian Jews are still the largest Jewish community in the Middle East, but have shrunk to 20–25,000 (from 80,000 in 1979) members. They have refused several offers from the state of Israel to leave Iran and settle in Israel (Ram 2009).

Much has been written about the rigid enforcement of Islam in Iran and how the oppression of religious minorities has led to their alienation. But up to now it has been largely neglected how Islamophobic discourses outside of Iran contribute to and exacerbate this ongoing alienation. In the diaspora the multifaceted experiences of religious minorities from Iran are reduced to a narrow conception of the Islamic 'other'. Possible identifications with the country of origin are being erased, and with it the potential of Iranian immigrants to the West are diminished to act as mediators between societies and cultures.

My data comes from 16 biographic interviews focusing on the individuals' history and experiences in Iran and in Germany. The biographic interviews were conducted in Germany in 2014–2015 with Baha'is, Jews and Muslims in Germany who left Iran before and shortly after 1979, and immigrants who came from Iran after 2000, as there is a generational gap due to the reasons for emigration and socioeconomic background (Alexanian 2006). Another sample includes second-generation Iranian Muslims, Jews, and Baha'is. In addition, participant observations were conducted at Baha'i centres and meetings, as well as at synagogues in the *Rhine-Ruhr* metropolitan region. The vast majority of my interview partners were medical doctors or highly skilled in another profession, which is representative for the Iranian immigration to the West (Bozorgmehr and Sabbagh 1988). While most of them had been living in Tehran, I also interviewed people from other cities and rural areas in Iran. The

narratives of religious and ethnic identity focus on three main tropes that I have identified in my fieldwork and will be elaborated below: progress, modernity, and secularism.

Religious Identity Among the Iranian Diaspora

The Iranian diaspora in the United States represents the largest community of Iranians outside of Iran. There are approximately 600,000 to more than one million Iranian-Americans.[3] Europe, Germany, and Britain are home to the largest Iranian communities (Hesse-Lehmann and Spellman 2004). The community in Germany comprises about 100,000–120,000 Iranians, concentrated in urban areas such as Hamburg and the *Ruhr* area.

The Baha'i faith comprises about seven million members worldwide. In Germany there are about 12,000 adherents.[4] The number of Iranian Jews in the United States is estimated between 50,000 and 60,000 (Melamed 2008), while there are very few left in Germany.

Since the attacks on the World Trade Centre in 2001—and especially since the rise of the Islamic State Group ISIS or *Daesh*—Islam is increasingly associated with extremism, intolerance, and violence (Cesari 2010). The open adherence to Islam has become contested and in some cases a detachment from Islamic practices can be observed in the diasporic context. An Iranian woman from a secular Muslim family, who has been living in Germany for 13 years, describes a situation when she was celebrating the Iranian New Year—Nowruz[5]—at her workplace:

> In order to be a Muslim you have to be very strong. I might not have the courage. It is a very bad time for Islam. Look what the image of Islam is. But this has nothing to do with Islam. Previously, when someone said that,

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[3] http://www.paaia.org/CMS/demographics–statistics.aspx [accessed 20 Nov. 2015].

[4] It is not possible to determine the percentage of Baha'is of Iranian origin in this number. www.thearda.com/QuickLists/QuickList_40c.asp [accessed 23 Oct. 2014].

[5] Nowruz (lit. New Day) is the first day of spring. Due to its pre-Islamic origin it is celebrated by many Iranians of different religious affiliation. The custom is to put up the Haft-Sin (Seven 'S') table, on which seven items starting with the letter 'sin' in the Perso-Arabic alphabet are placed. The Koran and the book by Hafiz are additions that are differently practised from family to family.

I thought to myself: 'bla, bla, bla'. But the problem is, the Iranians [in Germany] don't say it when they are religious. (…) It is nowadays very difficult to say that you are Muslim, that you are religious. (…) At work I made a *Haft-Sin* table for Nowruz and also put a tiny, tiny Koran on it. What do you think what was going on then?! 'You must put a *Hafiz*[6] on it', they said. I said, 'if this book then the other one, too. Both books must lie on the table, that's how I grew up'.[7]

This passage exemplifies how even a person who is not outright religious is bewildered and frustrated with the rejection of Islamic practices by her Iranian co-workers. In this particular situation we can observe a very strong rejection of Islam—even when used as a cultural symbol—that is not uncommon among the Muslim-Iranian diaspora. This form of doctrinal secularism (Asad 2003) is a result of both home- and host-state policies: the secularisation promoted under the authoritarian Pahlavi monarchy (1925–1979), and the repugnance against the ensuing politicisation and absolutism of Islam since the consolidation of the Islamic revolution, strongly shaped tendencies of secularism in Iran on the one hand. When moving to host countries such as Germany or France, on the other hand, Muslims are expected to practise a secularised form of their religion in order to be socially accepted (Shooman 2014).

Reza Gholami (2014) has pointed out how diasporic identity of many Iranians unfolds in a way that stigmatises or eradicates Islam exclusively—in order to fashion a desirable self. I argue that the host societies enforce this marginalisation of Islam by upholding a normative context of secularism that is conceptualised along dichotomous and exclusivist terms vis-a-vis religiosity, and Islam in particular. However, religion and a religious community play an important role in the diaspora because they offer a home and networks to people who otherwise feel as strangers in a new country. In one of my interviews with a young Iranian couple that had come to Germany recently, and converted to the Baha'i faith while in an asylum seekers' hostel, they stated clearly that they had moved away from the city in southern Germany to a place "where more

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[6] A fourteenth-century Persian mystic and poet, a national symbol in Iran, whose works have permeated everyday life.

[7] Telephone interview, 9 Oct. 2014.

foreigners lived" because in the former city they were too often confronted with racist remarks and discrimination. They also told me how difficult it was and still is to find an apartment or a job, and to learn the language.

Since the Baha'i community is rather small, and many of its members are first- or second-generation Iranians and speak the language, they feel "at home" there. The couple said that were it not for the Baha'i faith they would have not been able to endure the hardships of migration. Their religion kept them going, otherwise they might have given up and returned to Iran. Interestingly, they had not been very religious as Muslims in Iran. Only in Germany, when they converted to the Baha'i religion, did they actively embrace the new faith, and participate in regular meetings, prayers, and missionary activities. This example illustrates that certain aspects of migration and diasporic life encourage individuals to become more religious than in their country of origin—even if they come from an "Islamic Republic". The couple's account of their first contact with the Baha'i faith back in Iran and the path that led to their conversion was very personal and pointed to individual motivations. However, as I intend to show below, abandoning Islam and converting to the Baha'i faith is also to be seen in a wider social context, in which personal decisions become intertwined with sociopolitical structures.

In the next section, I will discuss selected paragraphs from the interviews I conducted, debating the motivations and ambiguities that lead to the adaptation of a certain ethnic and/or religious identity in the diaspora.

The Trope of Progress

As Middle Easterners, Iranian Jews are also confronted with Orientalist stereotypes among Jewish communities themselves (Shenav 2006; Shohat 1999; Piterberg 1996). These stereotypes frame Jews of European descent (*Ashkenazim*) as more civilised than their Middle Eastern brethren. *Mizrahi* Jews—defined as living in or coming from the Middle East—are regarded as primitive, unclean, and ignorant (Shohat 1988). Because of their intermingling with their Islamic environment, they are sometimes

accused of having a flawed knowledge of the 'true' Jewish tradition.[8] These forms of racism render 'Jewish' and 'Middle Eastern' identities as mutually exclusive and in consequence encourage Middle Eastern Jews to put aside the 'Oriental' aspects of their identity. As Norman Stillman has pointed out, *Ashkenazi* institutions in Israel and the United States actively discourage *Mizrahi* rites and encourage the adoption of norms, modes, and mentalities of *Ashkenazi* religiosity by Jews from the Middle East and North Africa. These processes have been termed 'Ashkenazification' (Stillman 1995: 76) or 'Ashkenormativity'.[9]

Among Iranian Jews these ethno-cultural hierarchies are criticised and internalised at the same time. One of my Jewish interview partners, who left Iran in the late 1960s as a 19-year-old, studied in Germany, and later became the chairman of a consulting company, describes the following situation:

M: "It is like this, the European Jews feel they are something better. That's how it is. Partly they are entitled to it. On average the European Jews have a much higher education, they are cultured [in German: 'sind in der Kultur zuhause'] (…) and that makes itself felt in the contact with the Orientals. Look at Israel, in politics, in culture. How many Orientals do you find there? They were all of Polish, of Russian origin. The founders of the state, the leading people. And now, who was from Iran? (…)".

Q: "And can you maybe describe a concrete experience when you felt like, 'I am now disadvantaged due to my Iranian background, or seen as different'?"

M: "Concretely, that someone said something discriminating, no. I can't say. But as I mentioned before, I was on the board of *anonymised* [a high council of Jews in Germany]. There I was the only Oriental. And I had the feeling, you don't have a chance, you

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[8] This notion has a long history: A Western traveller described the Jews of Iran in the seventeenth century as follows: "Jews only by name. They do not know any Hebrew and have no knowledge at all of the Jewish religion though they still observe some ceremonies of the ancient law, but so much changed through the mixture with the ceremonies taken from the Maures and the heathens that they are not anymore recognizable" (Figueroa, cited in Fischel 1982).

[9] http://blogs.forward.com/forward-thinking/208473/learning-to-undo-ashkenormativity/ [accessed 30 March 2015].

cannot get to the chairmanship here. That is as well as impossible, the quasi Germans, partly of Polish origin, partly of Romanian origin, they will divide it among themselves and you don't have a chance".

Against this background, Iranian Jews have to find alternative ways to craft a successful identity in the diaspora. They need to make their Iranian identity rather invisible in order to become a 'proper' Jew. Mr. Maani,[10] who came to Germany in the early 1960s, provided an insightful example:

Regarding Iran, I left Iran with delight. I always say, if I had been Christian, I would have made the sign of the cross when I was out of the country. Somehow the mentality, the way of life, I did not like it so much. (…) For one, I had the Jewish community [in Germany], then I was the first Jew after the war in a German student's fraternity (…) I learned a lot, I must say, through this engagement. I learned a lot. How to conduct a meeting, how, let's say, to speak up in a community and to represent an opinion. I believe that even my German, it is not perfect but reasonable, I learned it there. Because I was forced to speak German with everyone. Had I remained with the Persians, I think I would not have made such progress.

The interview passage above displays the adaptation of selected patterns of an *Ashkenazi* (European-Jewish) identity. First, a reference to Christianity is introduced. Then, the lack of feelings of belonging in regard to Iran is described, and contrasted with Judaism and the Jewish community. By mentioning his membership of a fraternity, Mr. Maani references an emancipatory bourgeois culture. He distinguishes the organisation of which he was a member from more conservative and nationalistic fraternities, thereby implicitly positioning himself in reference to the history of burgeoning democratisation in Germany. Especially his mentioning of being the first Jew after the war in a German fraternity is a source of accomplishment and pride for him—although as an Iranian Jew he was not affected by the Holocaust. This is not to deny Mr. Maani's right or desire to participate in any organisation he chooses to. What is striking about this narrative though is that being the first Jew in a German

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[10] All names are anonymised.

organisation after the war is of particular relevance because of the history of Jews in Germany—a history that has become the dominant trope of Jewish identity worldwide but is unrelated to Mr. Maani's individual experience.[11] In his last sentence the difference of engaging in Jewish rather than in Iranian circles is clearly teamed with the word 'progress'.

Due to the Holocaust and the resulting relationship between Germany and Jews, belonging to the Jewish minority in Germany can bring about certain social and political advantages. This is not to say that there is no anti-Semitism in Germany, and portraying Jewish identities in Germany as advantageous would be inaccurate. But Bodemann and Yurdakul (2005) have pointed out how other minority groups in Germany seek to acquire specific contents and forms of Jewish organisation in Germany because they expect advantages from it. Weighing this context against the image of Iran in the West, the choice between a Jewish or an Iranian identity tends to give preference to the former. I discovered this trend in first- and second-generation Iranian Jews in Germany. In post-war Germany the possibilities of engagement in Jewish organisational structures provide more social prestige and recognition for someone who enters the society as a 'foreigner', than organisations founded by or dealing with (Muslim) Iranians.[12]

Against this background, it is not surprising that many Iranians strive for a separation from their country of origin. This is all the easier for non-Muslim Iranians. A Jewish-Iranian lady who was born and raised in Germany told me: "At one point I realised that being Jewish was not just a religion but also an ethnicity. So I see myself as Jewish, rather than Iranian." For many of my Jewish respondents it was quite common to have erased their Iranian ethnicity and to have developed a new affiliation for Israel as their homeland.[13]

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[11] Mr. Maani then assures me that during the Second World War Iranian Jews escaped their extinction by a whisker because the Germans had already planned their annihilation but were stopped just in time. This is a common trope among Oriental Jews in order not to be excluded from the main trait of Jewish identity—the Holocaust.

[12] For the symbolic public role of the Jewish community in Germany, see Koerber in this volume.

[13] These processes are not merely driven by individual preferences but connected to socio-political dynamics. In a talk at UCLA, Saba Soomekh recounted from her experience as a professor teaching Iranian-Jewish history in Los Angeles: "When I ask them, who knows the Iranian national anthem? Only the Muslim students raised their hand. And I ask my students who knows the Hatikvah

The Trope of Modernity

As a reform movement that developed from Islam, the Baha'i faith had a strong impetus of modernity. It criticised decrepit structures in Iran ranging from the religious and political authorities, to issues such as class, gender, and individual religiosity. Many of these ideas were influenced by European enlightenment thought (Cole 1998) and thereby carried an aura of progress and novelty, rendering members of the community as an avant-garde in Iran.

One of my Baha'i interview partners, Mr. Alizadeh, now a German citizen, experienced harsh discrimination in 1980s' Iran. The situation of young men like him was exacerbated by the Iran–Iraq war that was going on at that time (1980–1989). However, he has no animosities against Muslims and tries to challenge anti-Muslim stereotypes. Like most of my interview partners, he recounts experiences of Germans assuming that he is a Muslim. When they find out that he is not, they start insulting Muslims and congratulate him or express their relief that he is not one of them. Mr. Alizadeh recalls an experience in which his neighbour immediately started badmouthing Islam after he found out that Mr. Alizadeh was not a Muslim.

Another interview partner, Ms. Emtesali, tells me that when she clarified that she was not Muslim, her acquaintance expressed utter relief, stating: "Thank God! You don't look like one anyway." This statement points not only to symbolic markers of Muslim identity such as the *hijab*, which Baha'i women do not wear, but also to differences in social class: the largest group of immigrants in Germany are the so-called guest workers (*Gastarbeiter*), rural working-class migrants who have been coming from Turkey since the 1960s—a very different socioeconomic group than the mostly highly educated and middle-class immigrants from Iran.

Although both of my Baha'i interview partners actively challenge stereotypes of Islam, they also clarify that Islam is not the appropriate

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(national anthem of Israel, A.S.), every single one of them raises their hand…, because most of them go through Jewish day schools. My Persian Jewish students can tell you every war Israel was involved in but they don't know anything about Iranian history." Soomekh contends that for most Iranian Jews, particularly the second generation, Israel has replaced their national identity. The video of her talk is available at: www.youtube.com/watch?v=o0j-Z9mOW-E [accessed 4 Nov. 2014].

religion for our times anymore. This mindset derives from the Baha'i principle of 'progressive revelation'. It implicates that all prophets of the world religions were appropriate for their respective time, and that Baha'u'llah is the right prophet for the present.

Mr. Rezvani, an Iranian Baha'i in his early 40s, who was born and grew up in Germany, puts it this way:

R: "The cultural aspect, yes. Hospitality and such things, that surely is of Iranian origin. But other than that, to be honest, outside of the Baha'i community there was zero contact with Persians. Zero. At least in my family. That means, only contact with Baha'is was Persian, other than that we were German. Really, Persian culture, no…"

Q: "But for example, you are specialised in methods developed by Avicenna. Is this a coincidence?"

R: "Well, this also is rather Baha'i than Persian. Abdul-Baha[14] and Baha'u'llah talk about this kind of medicine that is all about nutrition and Abdul-Baha praises the medicine of Avicenna as the true medicine basically and thus I have studied it. If this is the true medicine, you have to learn it and try to understand it" (laughs).

The linkage between Avicenna and Abdul-Baha is exceptional: Avicenna (980–1037), one of the most significant thinkers of the Islamic golden age, is revered by Iranians regardless of their religious or ethnic affiliation as an example of progressive science in medieval Islam. However, Mr. Rezvani discards this 'Islamic' heritage and considers Avicenna's teachings as significant because they were endorsed by Abdul-Baha. Mr. Rezvani thereby frames the Baha'i teachings as modern and in accord with science. He then mentions that his parents still practice some Iranian cultural traditions that he and his family have discarded, adding: "All that is adopted by Baha'u'llah from Persian culture, yes. Everything else, I don't even know it, have no experience with it".

There seems to be a selective approach to both cultures: elements of the Islamic-Iranian heritage are accepted when they are either explicitly

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[14] Abdul-Baha Abbas (1844–1921) was the son and successor of Baha'u'llah (1817–1892), the founder of the Baha'i religion.

endorsed by Baha'i religious authorities, or not in contradiction to but compatible with German culture and Western modernity.

As a consequence, what is obscured is that many of the reformist aspects of the Baha'i religion are closely related to Islamic reformist thought and cannot be seen as outside of or in opposition to it. Baha'i principles such as religion as a catalyst for education, accessibility of religion to the masses, science and the importance of rational thought in the interpretation of the holy texts, consultation, as well as the independent search for truth,[15] are central topics in Islamic reformist thought of the late nineteenth and twentieth century (Majeed 2004). These influences were unknown to most of my Baha'i interview partners. Rather, aspects of reform and progress are perceived as intrinsic to the Baha'i faith, independent from Western ideas and in contrast to what is considered as an unchanging 'Islam'.

While Baha'is enjoyed more freedom under the Pahlavi monarchy (1925–1979) than since the revolution in 1979, they were still not included in mainstream definitions of Iranian national identity. The policies of Reza Shah Pahlavi, and his son and successor Mohammad Reza, were oriented towards modern nationalism, in which religious affiliations were regarded as less important. Due to Baha'is strong orientation towards education, the community progressed and many families were able to acquire wealth in an overall climate of economic growth. Baha'is and Jews were able to reach the middle- and upper-classes, and although some of them even occupied high offices in the civil service, to a certain degree they remained outsiders. But the particular animosity towards Baha'is cannot be explained with 'Islamic' sensibilities alone, since also some secular nationalists were staunch enemies of the Baha'is. The resulting emigration from Iran, and in most cases the impossibility of return, has caused strong feelings of loss in regard to the homeland. Feelings of nostalgia are mixed with memories of humiliation or violence, causing a very ambivalent emotional connection to Iran. I encountered strong feelings of nostalgia among my interview partners who lived in Iran during

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[15] In Muslim modernist movements this practice is called 'ijtihad', meaning the use of "independent reasoning in jurisprudence to confront new contemporary situations not directly addressed by the Qur'an and the Sunna" (Hidayatullah 2014: 33).

the Pahlavi era, when a more secular urban middle- and upper-class life-style was prevalent. Baha'is who lived in Iran before 1979 recall a spirit full of optimism and pride, with which all kinds of discrimination were defeated.[16]

I conclude from these observations two aspects of ethnic and religious identification among the Iranian diaspora. First, for members of minorities who enjoyed their life in Iran—before as well as after the revolution—being a religious minority *and* Iranian is not an opposition. Interview partners who lived in rural areas, or in a period when oppression of minorities was more severe, however, tend to prioritise their religious identity over their ethnic identity. They do not so much identify as Iranian but rather as (German) Baha'is or Jews. In other words: when the expression of one's religion was severely impeded in the homeland, individuals' religious identification was intensified at the cost of the ethnic or national identity. When religious expression was possible—despite discriminations—the ethnic/national identity was more likely to be endorsed.

Second, identifications in the diaspora are influenced by processes in the homeland and the host country: The identity of Baha'is as distinctly non-Islamic and more modern than Islam has to be seen in the historical and political context in which the movement carried out a break from its Islamic roots.[17] At the same time, the conception of Iranian nationhood only includes Shi'i Muslims as 'real' Iranians and post-revolutionary government in Iran continuously strives to delegitimise all attempts at renewal within or stemming from Shi'ism—such as the Baha'i faith.

The Jewish experience has a different trajectory: Since Judaism is accepted as a religious minority in Iran, Jews—other than Baha'is—are able to practice their religion, pursue education and carreers, and are

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[16] There are important differences between the generation of Baha'i immigrants who came before or shortly after the revolution and those who are coming to Germany more recently: Besides the tendency towards a lower socio-economic status, the recent Baha'i immigrants do not display the same pride about being Baha'i anymore. This is most probably a result of the attempts of the post-revolutionary government to erase the presence of Baha'is from Iran. The various strategies at work here have created a generation of Baha'is who no longer feel the sense of pride that was prevalent among the older generation.

[17] It is not possible to elaborate on the history and development of the Baha'i faith in Iran within the scope of this chapter. For the formation of a Baha'i identity and its relationship to Islam, see Amanat (2005), Cole (1998), and Scharbrodt (2008).

represented in the government. Furthermore, in contrast to Baha'is, who emphasise that they are not attached to a certain nation state but global citizens, the state of Israel actively tried to promote the emigration of Jews from Iran to Israel. However, in both cases the distinction from the Iranian heritage is exacerbated by anti-Muslim sentiments that the Iranian diaspora encounters in the host society.

The Trope of Secularism: Separation between Religion and Politics

The central tenet of secularism, the separation between religion and politics, has come to signify the degree of modernity and civilisation a society has achieved (van der Veer 2001). The compatibility of the Baha'i religion with secularism as a marker of modernity is central for most of its members. This view has been promoted distinctively under the leader Shoghi Effendi in the mid-twentieth century. In this process, the history of the movement as progressive and revolutionary, however also defiant and militant, was turned into new paradigms. Following the politics of modernisation implemented by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and Muhammad Reza Shah in the 1920s and 1930s, Shoghi Effendi welcomed the secularisation of Muslim societies. However, the Baha'i writings are not unanimous in regard to the relationship between religion and politics.[18]

When I asked Mr. Alizadeh how he felt as a religious person in the secular environment of Germany, he stated that since secularism was a principle of the Baha'i faith, the situation in Germany was "normal" for him, while what is happening in Iran was "not normal". He thus described himself in line with German society and at the same time distanced himself from Iran. Mr. Alizadeh was one of my respondents from rural Iran who had suffered severe discrimination as a Baha'i in the 1980s. He expressed explicitly how relieved he was to have found refuge in Germany.

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[18] For Baha'i writings on the relationship between religion and politics see: http://bahai-library.com/uhj_theocracy [accessed 1 December 2015]. The controversy regarding this issue can also be observed in online forums such as the 'Baha'i Questions Resource Forum' on Facebook, where members recently discussed whether the Baha'i law opposing same-sex marriage can be overruled by a national civil law that allows same-sex marriages.

However, many interview partners regretted that German society neither knew anything about their religion, nor was it interested to learn about it. Ms. Emtesali for example mentions that, "Regarding religion, it is not so easy in Germany. I have not seen real seekers yet." The Baha'i communities in Germany are committed to a set of religious rules and missionary activities and thus have little in common with mainstream German society. Also for Mr. Rezvani, a second-generation Iranian Baha'i, the current situation in Iran is problematic, not because of the religious character of the state, but due to a wrong interpretation of religion. His view differs from the secular perspective in so far that he does not find the religiosity of the society itself problematic but the current interpretations.

These dissonances between individual understandings of secularism and one's commitment to the Baha'i religion show that people's life experiences and biographies do not easily align with and conform to certain idealised positions that they are assumed to have as a follower of a particular worldview or denomination. The Baha'is I interviewed were not aware of or did not admit to any tensions between the secular German society and their individual practice and belief as a Baha'i.[19]

The strive to adopt an otherness from Islam and to position themselves as progressive and in line with a secular, liberal society is not only a matter of belief. These responses are to be seen in the context of actual experiences of 'otherness' in Germany: Although it is not possible to generalise, cultural differences exist and many practices among the Iranian diaspora—Baha'i, Jewish, or otherwise—can differ significantly from German mainstream society. In the face of increasing racism that many immigrants from the Middle East encounter in German society,[20] the appropriation of secular ideals can be explained as a deliberately exhibited sense of belonging to overcome the status of a 'foreigner'.[21]

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[19] This is not to suggest that German society is completely secular or that all religions are treated equally by the German state. For a critical reading of what is understood as a 'secular society' see Mahmood (2015).

[20] In 2015, attacks on refugee homes quadrupled according to the Federal Criminal Police Office in Germany: www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/bundeskriminalamt-anschlaege-auf-asylunterkuenfte-haben-sich-2015-vervierfacht-a-1066932.html [accessed 19 Jan. 2016].

[21] For the conflation of the terms Muslim and immigrant, see Spielhaus (2013).

Conclusion

Most of my Baha'i and Jewish interview partners who had come to Germany more recently reported that they had experienced relief among German fellow citizens when they found out that they were not Muslim. While 'Islam' and 'Muslims' are at the centre of hostility to foreigners nowadays, this points to a general bias against people from the Middle East, including secular Muslims and religious minorities—in other words: people who 'look like Arabs' in general.[22] These increasing forms of racism encourage religious minorities from Iran to demarcate themselves from Islam as an undesirable aspect of their Middle Eastern heritage. Many of my Baha'i and Jewish interview partners told me how they tried to counter prejudices against Islam in German society. At the same time, tensions between their own religious practices and ideals of a secular society recede into the background.[23] This can be seen as a strategy to cope with actual foreignness Iranians experience in Germany—regardless of their religious affiliation.

The rigid and polarising perception of Islam within the last two decades (Brown 2006) has clear implications for diasporic identity formation. The Iranian diaspora, and religious minorities in particular, could be cultural mediators and agents of cooperation because they have knowledge about Islam and a repertoire of interreligious experiences that are very little known outside of Iran. When specifically asked, my interview partners recalled many interactions between members of minorities and the Muslim majority in Iran that were characterised by respect, humour, and appreciation—and not exclusively discrimination (Sadjed 2014). They have a first-hand experience of how politics in Iran aligned itself with religion over time and are thus be able to differentiate more clearly between Islam and its instrumentalisation by politics. But this stock of knowledge lies idle and can hardly be articulated in a context that is dominated by a

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[22] In January 2016, two Israeli students were attacked in the German city of Dresden by men who shouted, "Fucking Arabs, get out of our country!" http://www.sz-online.de/nachrichten/rechte-pruegeln-israelische-studenten-3295524.html [accessed 24 Feb. 2016].

[23] This is not to judge Baha'i principles such as the prohibition of same-sex marriage, pre-marital intercourse, or drinking alcohol, but rather to point out their deviation from what is understood as a secular-liberal lifestyle.

discourse that renders Islam exclusively as violent, oppressive, and radical. Thereby boundaries between religions are reinforced and the potential for interreligious exchange is minimised. This development plays into the hands of the conservative factions dominating the political landscape in Iran, who are engaged in creating a rigid form of Islam, in which all interrelations with other religious traditions are erased.

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Part II

The (Im-)Possibilities of Cooperation in Constructing Home and Belonging

5

The Homing of the Diaspora: Ancestral Households and the Politics of Domestic Centering in Rural Gambia, West Africa

Paolo Gaibazzi

Introduction

As in most West African countries, diasporic relations have a large footprint in the Gambia. They feature in virtually every domain of social, economic, religious, and political life. Migrant remittances play, in particular, a vital role in the domestic and national economy, as well as in local development initiatives. In this chapter, I seek to unravel some of the key features of this culture of cooperation between the Gambia and its diasporas.[1] While scholarly attention to this theme is overwhelmingly concerned with migrants and their relations to the homeland, I focus in contrast

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on homes in a migrant-sending setting, specifically on households in Soninke-speaking rural communities in Eastern Gambia. Soninke (male) migration has deep historical roots, and since the mid-twentieth century, it has further intensified and globalized, giving rise to sizable diasporic communities, especially in Africa, Europe, and North America. Soninke migrants are known in the Gambia as worldwide travelers who nevertheless remain closely attached to their family, community, and tradition.

In what follows, I show that Soninke migrants' loyalty does not simply result from a natural sense of belonging to family and place. Rather, I seek to de-naturalize migrants' loyalty (Sinatti and Horst 2015) by describing the domestic production and reproduction through which migrants become anchored to their home. In so doing, this chapter dovetails with Bruce Whitehouse's (2012a) work on a Malian Soninke village, which describes the "centripetal forces" powered by non-migrants in order to ensure migrants' loyalty. The chapter documents similar forces, such as the remittance economy and transnational childrearing, which embed migrants within their ancestral household.[2] However, in addition to de-naturalizing migrants' loyalties, I seek to do the same with "home," by complicating the notion of "center" in such "centripetal forces." Simply put, the direction of the diasporans' ties and resource flows depends on what and where home is. Although diasporas obviously contribute to making and transforming the meaning of home (Al-Ali and Koser 2002; Tas, this volume), my focus is on the ways in which households purposefully construct themselves as "homes" of the diaspora. I will show that ancestral households strive to feature as permanent centers, hubs of socio-cultural reproduction that are indispensable to the functioning of the migrant moral economy.

Ancestral households juggle with a number of competing claims of home-making. The reproducing of migrants' loyalty thus depends on a delicate politics of domestic centering, both internal to the household and vis-à-vis diasporic formations. Soninke households are rarely harmonious, cohesive wholes. Usually large conglomerates composed of several family units and crisscrossed by various kinship affiliations, they thrive

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[2] This chapter develops a complementary conceptual reading of processes of domestic reproduction and (im)mobility analyzed in greater detail in Gaibazzi (2015).

on what Amartya Sen (1990) has labeled "cooperative conflict," in which household members haggle over the pooling of resources, including migrant ones. Non-migrant members often compete for the loyalty of expatriate householders, each mobilizing norms and affective ties, especially to ensure a share of their monetary remittances. Competition may lead to conflicts and divisions that distribute loyalty unevenly within a given household, thus creating homes within the home.

The formation of homes outside the home further complicates the domestic politics of centering. Although many men leave their wives and children in their paternal household, many also bring them along. Diasporic nodes of the household may become more permanent homes, eventually decentering the rural ancestral household in the geography of redistribution of resources and commitment. This process is most evident in the urban areas along the Atlantic coast of the Gambia, rather than in foreign countries, for migrants sometimes buy urban homes for their own family unit even before they return from abroad.

Gambian Soninke Diasporas

In pre-colonial and colonial times, Soninke speakers were prominent members in the Muslim trade diasporas (*juulas*) in Senegambia and the Western Sahel (Manchuelle 1997). Starting from the mid-twentieth century, Soninke communities in the Gambia River valley have progressively globalized their migrant networks. This expansion was driven at first by new trade markets in West and Central Africa, but from the 1970s onwards, labor migration to the West began in earnest; a trend that continues to date, despite ebbing somewhat after the 2008 financial crisis. In parallel, residence abroad has become lengthier, leading to the formation of sizable diasporic communities. Today, Gambian Soninke villages are highly translocal communities whose members are dispersed across the world, the largest expatriate communities being found in Western Europe, North America, and West and Central Africa. As mentioned, another large diasporic community is found along the Atlantic coast

of the Gambia, which was formed initially by mostly wealthy migrants returning from abroad and placing their families there. Seasonal labor migration from rural villages to the cities is also common.

Although restrictive policies of immigration in numerous countries of destination limit international emigration, Soninke men still consider mobility a prominent avenue to personal and collective prosperity. Since the 1970s, households have also become increasingly dependent on the money remitted by their expatriate members. In this period, food and commercial (mainly peanuts) agriculture has stagnated, if not declined, as a consequence of deteriorating climatic and marketing conditions in the Upper River and the rest of the region. In addition to food, migrants pay for medical bills, school fees, ritual expenses, their parents' pilgrimage to Mecca, vehicles and agricultural equipment, and consumer items, as well as for larger projects, such as housing improvements and small- and medium-sized businesses. Wealthy expatriates typically invest in community projects, such as the building of mosques. Hometown associations (HTAs) have, however, emerged as the main promoters of local development, particularly with respect to educational and medical facilities, pro-poor assistance, and small-scale infrastructure. HTAs raise project funds primarily among expatriate villagers; in a number of European countries, they have also cooperated with state and non-governmental development organizations interested in migrants as "agents of development" (cf. Timera 1996: 65–73; Daum 1998; Sinatti and Horst 2015).

Similar trends are observed in the rest of Gambian society. Since the 1980s, all social strata have invested in international migration in response to growing economic insecurity and in order to maintain or increase socio-economic status. Compared to the Soninke, whose migration concerns mainly unskilled men (and their wives), the average Gambian migrant population includes a higher percentage of educated people, and is more balanced in gender terms. Historically, student migration is also prominent. Since 1994, when a bloodless coup d'état ushered in a new regime, a number of political dissidents, journalists, intellectuals, and ordinary citizens have fled the climate of oppression and persecution created by the *Jammeh* government. Gambian diasporas, especially in the USA and in Europe, but also in Senegal, have indeed become thriving sites of alternative information, civil society, and political

mobilization against the regime. The regime has consequently been hostile to cooperation with the diaspora, whose voice is barely heard in the national media.[3] Unlike neighboring Senegal, Gambia has developed scant institutional and policy instruments to engage its diaspora. On the other hand, the regime has generally had a laissez-faire policy with regard to migrants' local development initiatives and economic investments that do not threaten the regime's interests. Although migrants have little say in official discourse, the regime does not actively oppose their contribution to their household economy.

The Ancestral Household as the Home of the Diaspora

What Soninke speakers call *ka* (pl. *kanu*), or household, occupies the top of a hierarchy of places labeled as "home" (*kaara*) (village, region, nation, and so on). "This is where it all began," Soninke speakers say with reference to their ancestral household, stressing continuity. The importance of the *ka* as a repository of shared origin and destiny cannot be understated. This has also very practical implications for diasporans. The household is also a place where "you can always go back to," a safe haven in which to take refuge whenever conditions away from home disrupt travel and residence. Failure and disruption are, in fact, common in the history of Soninke migration. In the early 1990s, for instance, several thousand Gambians fled civil war in Sierra Leone and Liberia, which at that time probably hosted the largest diasporic community of Gambian Soninke. Rural households made space for a large number of them. Similarly, when travel is dull or disrupted (by unemployment, business failure, illegality, deportation, and so on), there is a strong sense that one should

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[3] Tensions between the diaspora and the Jammeh regime escalated on 30 December 2014, when a dozen Gambian migrants from the USA and Germany, some of whom had become naturalized citizens of those countries, attempted a coup while the president was abroad. The initiative, which was disbanded by the presidential guard and was condemned by a number of members of civil society in the diaspora, prompted a series of arrests and retaliations on the part of the government. Due to their lower levels of education and a widespread attitude of avoidance of political involvement, Soninke migrants are generally not very active in diasporic politics.

come home, stock up on blessings from one's seniors, and then try to venture out again. The uncertainty of being strangers in a foreign land thus contributes to cementing ties to home and the possibility of return (Whitehouse 2012b). However, in this section I also show the internal dynamics that produce this sense of "home."

The *ka* can be defined, more precisely, as a joint household occupying an enclosed space that includes several accommodation units, stables, granaries, and a small plot of cultivated land.[4] Although a number of different relatives and strangers may reside in the *ka* at any given time, permanent membership to the household is established through patrilineal descent and patrilocal marriage; that is to say, members of the *ka* are either people related through the father's line, or women of other lineages who marry men of the *ka*. Upon marriage, the sons remain in the *ka*, while married daughters leave for their husband's household. At its minimum, therefore, a *ka* comprises a married man with his wife or wives and their unmarried children. A *ka* may include several such family nuclei, and extend across generations (including parents and married sons), and within generations (agnatic brothers and their dependents). Authority in the *ka* is distributed according to gender, generation, and age, with elder men wielding the most power. Accordingly, the household head (*kagume*) is the eldest genealogical man living in the household. The household head supervises production, distribution, and consumption of subsistence, which rests on a neat division of labor between genders. The men of the household produce staple food (various types of cereals) on the collective farms, and from this the women will prepare meals in a central kitchen. As in the rest of the region, intergenerational and gender relations are the foundation of the political and moral economy of the Soninke household (Meillassoux 1981). Having been raised, fed, and cared for, children are in turn expected to provide for their parents and elders when these are no longer fit to work.

According to this logic, elders wield authority and extract work from juniors. Sons are primarily responsible for providing food by working in the communal fields, while unmarried daughters help their mothers with

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[4] On the Soninke *ka*, see: Pollet and Winter (1971: 356–358), Razy (2007b: 71ff). The Gambian Mandinka household presents similar characteristics (Kea 2013).

child care, domestic work, and farming small plots. In so doing, both sons and daughters earn blessings (*barake*)—a transcendental vital force believed to foster personal and collective prosperity—that parents and elders (and holy persons) convey from God to the juniors.[5]

In the current regime of mobility, these structural principles of the agrarian household have largely remained the same. Men continue to provide for the family, eventually by migrating, and wield authority over it; women rear children and carry out domestic chores; children must respect their seniors and must take responsibility for their household once they grow up. It is not simply that households have resisted change brought about by migration. Since mobility has historically been constitutive of this social milieu, it would be misleading to think of rural households as pre-existing units that are subsequently affected by outmigration. In a way, the opposite is true. Intensifying outmigration has also been a strategy adopted by domestic groups, and in particular by men, in order to extend and reproduce the agrarian socio-cultural, economic, political, and moral order in space and time (Gaibazzi 2015: 16). In this view, the household requires a degree of fixity and stability for migrants to be able to venture out and acquire the resources needed to maintain and increase the prosperity of the household, and to pass it on to future generations. In the rest of this section, I thus describe some of the dynamics that locally construct the household as a "home," in the sense of a permanent center or mooring in a setting of heightened mobility and diasporic formation.

Some linguistic metaphors exemplify how the rural world is extended outward so as to encompass the migrants. Soninke speakers may refer to the "foreign destination" as *terendengunne*, travel-bush. A recurrent cultural trope in many West African contexts, the bush (*gunne*) stands in contrast to the civilized spaces where people normally live. It is the place of wilderness, representing both danger and opportunity. Whether it is by farming, gathering firewood, hunting, or by any other activity, people go to the bush in order to come back with something. In the same way, traveling away from

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[5] By contrast, elders may curse their juniors, thus preventing them from advancing in life. Although cursing is rarely done, it constitutes a powerful disciplinarian tool in the hands of elders (cf. Hardung 2009).

the safety of home, men venture out, facing uncertainty and dangers, in search of opportunities to earn money by either laboring or trading. They then come back with "something," usually money, but also new experience and knowledge. In local terms, migration is indeed referred to as a "search for something" (*fo mundiye*).

This transposition from "bush" to "travel-bush" is not solely metaphorical. In the household, the migrants' mission is equivalent to that of the farmers' one to the bush. While the non-migrants cultivate crops and bring them back to the household granaries, the migrants are tasked with bringing back supplementary staples. This synergy is clearly demonstrated in the granaries or storage rooms of the household, where bundles of millet and sorghum sit alongside bags of store-bought rice acquired with migrants' remittances.

These norms and principles of domestic cooperation are actively cultivated from an early age. Let me focus on male children, the prospective migrants. Parents rarely expect boys to remain in the village once they grow up. Some will eventually have to stay and look after the household and the farms, but given a chance, others will have to venture out in search of money. Yet before they leave, parents typically want their children to become good farmers, householders, and villagers, and of course to learn at least the foundations of religion.[6] In a sense, boys must embody the bush in order to be able to succeed in the travel-bush, thus transposing rurality to migrancy, and encompassing the latter within the agrarian socio-cultural order. Farming will turn boys into hard-working men and teach them the merit of shedding sweat to provide the family with food. By so ensuring subsistence, they earn the blessing they need in their future ventures (abroad and at home). In family compounds, boys will further learn to respect their elders as well as to feel for others and their needs. In short, rural life creates disciplined, productive, and empathic men, not simply people full of norms and ideals, but virtuous subjects exhibiting specific ethical habits and affects. According to this agrarian ethos of migration, the household constitutes not simply the place that they learn to be loyal to when they travel away; it is also the very source of

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[6] Traditionally, Quranic teachers provide religious education.

their migratory success. For this same reason, they must then redistribute and collectivize their incomes with those who stay at home.

Migrants invest in this model of rural childrearing. As they often travel alone, they leave their spouses and children in their parental household. Those who do take their family abroad frequently send the children back to their village household for various lengths of time, sometimes for the entire duration of their upbringing after infancy. Grandparents and the migrant's elder brothers (i.e., classificatory fathers of the children) often actively solicit the sending home of diasporic children. Building on the widespread institution of child fostering in West Africa, transnational upbringing further underscores the social, cultural, and moral centrality of home. In the first place, there is a strong sense that a period at home is indispensable for the children to know their family and culture (Razy 2007a), and thus to learn where they come from. Migrant parents are often afraid that their children might grow foreign to home, and even reject the parents' authority and/or adopt immoral lifestyles (Whitehouse 2009). The disciplinarian environment of rural households is thought to prevent such developments, and is used deliberately as an educational corrective for spoiled or misbehaving children (Bledsoe and Sow 2011).

Stayers carry out a large amount of the social and economic work required for the household to function as a home for the migrants and their children. While rural households are financially dependent on migrants, migrants in turn depend on non-migrant householders for a plethora of tasks. For instance, the kinship system sanctions children addressing their father's brothers as classificatory or social fathers. Indeed, when the father is abroad, his brothers contribute to rearing his children by behaving as paternal figures, using a mix of authority and affection. Dependence on stayers also relates to other domestic domains. In particular, the household head organizes farm work and food supplies, and manages the migrants' remittances that are earmarked for collective consumption. Should the migrants be temporally unable to remit (due to unemployment, economic crisis, and so on), he will nevertheless strive to provide for the family, including for the wives and children of those migrants. As the leader of the household, he will further ensure peaceful relations within the household and will represent the household in lineage and community affairs. Together with other householders, he makes

sure that the migrants' wives cooperate with the other women in the household, and protects them from the attentions of other men.

In sum, the household features as the home of the diaspora by virtue of being a center of social reproduction of the capability to migrate and lead a diasporic life. This centering of social, economic, cultural, and moral resources ensures that migrants remain actively linked to their home. This homing of the diaspora requires a tremendous amount of organization and work, not only between migrant and non-migrant members, but also among the non-migrants. It is to these dynamics of internal and external cooperation that I now turn.

Homes Within the Home

So far, I have considered the forces that construct the household as the center of its diasporic satellites. At a closer look, however, the household appears to be a center made up of several centers. In large Soninke households, there are usually several family units (*dimbaya*), one for each married man and his dependents. These family units enjoy a certain degree of autonomy, which increases over time as the family head progresses toward seniority, and his entourage of dependents grows in size. Each unit is nevertheless under an obligation to pool a sizable amount of its workforce and resources for the collective subsistence and well-being of the household as a whole. Although rules and customary arrangements exist, exactly what and how much is pooled is most often negotiated in practice, and may change over time, depending on the power relationships and quality of cooperation between units *and* individual members. In the following two sections, I analyze some of the mechanisms that either integrate or partition the ancestral household, thus shaping the social and geographical distribution of centers of attraction vis-à-vis migrants' loyalties. In this section, I am mainly concerned with internal forces of aggregation and disaggregation, and with the ways in which migration plays into these forces.

While normative views of domestic cooperation stress solidarity and selflessness, competition and individual affirmation are not silenced. On the contrary, householders, especially the men, are expected to strive for

honor and prosperity, from which the entire household would benefit. It is in this sense that migration provides an avenue to personal-cum-collective success. The household provides men with an arena for converting wealth accumulated abroad into social prestige. Indeed, migrant domestic investments often greatly surpass subsistence levels, with migrants striving to build a better house than that of their brothers or neighbors, to take their parents and elders to Mecca, to provide vehicles and prestige goods to their household members, and so on. Clearly, this race for prestige is an additional mechanism by which ancestral households manage to center their migrants' commitment and attract resource flows.

However, too much competition could be divisive. For it to be productive, competition must be balanced with solidarity and cooperation. Amartya Sen's (1990) concept of "cooperative conflict" applies quite well to local views of what holds households together in the Soninke milieu, as well as in other parts of the Gambia (Kea 2013). In the Mande world—the wider ethno-linguistic constellation to which the Soninke belong—the tension between cooperation and competition is thematized by two key cultural concepts (Bird and Kendall 1980: 14–16; Braun and Webb 1989: 516–517; Kea 2013: 109–110). Literally meaning "being children of the same mother," *maarenmaaxu* (the equivalent of *badingya* in several other Mande languages) expresses unity, harmony, and equality in kinship relations, and, through extrapolation, in a number of other social domains as well. Children of the same mother are expected to love and care for each other. *Faabarenmaaxu* (*fadingya* in other Mande languages), or "being children of the same father," expresses, in contrast, rivalry, hierarchy, and individualism. Children, especially sons, strive for primacy by working, obeying, and providing benefits for their father and household head.

Ideally, a successful and harmonious household manages to strike a balance between cooperation and rivalry, unity and hierarchy. However, splits often appear and assume structurally recurrent forms. Unsurprisingly, the most typical of these forms is the competition between cohorts of children in a polygynous marriage. According to Islamic rules, men may marry up to four wives, and in this region, senior men are frequently married to more than one woman.[7] The polygynous

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[7] Having many wives and children confers status on men in terms of "wealth in people." Men have historically used outmigration as a way of accumulating the necessary finances for marriage. In recent decades, migrant wealth has partly maintained and intensified polygyny.

husband should treat each of his wives fairly and equally; the latter should, in turn, use their affective and moral power to instruct the children to honor their fathers and the rest of the family. Yet acrimony along maternal lines may develop, and become further exacerbated when the father (the unifying figure) passes away. This has far-reaching implications for the homing of migrants' loyalties. Let us take the example of a household made up of two cohorts (A and B) of brothers resulting from their father's two wives. After the death of the father, the eldest son (belonging to A) takes over the leadership. Under his stewardship, the household still operates as one unit: men farm on the same field and women take turns in the communal kitchen, cooking food stored in the joint granary. The household has a migrant (from B) abroad, who sends money to the household head, as he did to his father, for him to buy bags of rice and other subsistence staples. He also places his wives and children under the tutelage of his full and half-brothers. However, due to strained relationships between wife A and wife B in the past, the two cohorts are now less motivated to cooperate in other domains that are not strictly obligatory. The migrant from cohort B sends extra food for his mother and for his family unit, and he refurbishes only his section of the house. He also sponsors the emigration of his own younger brother, reinforcing the remittance base of his cohort, while ignoring pleas from cohort A that has not yet managed to send a migrant man abroad. Needless to say, this uneven distribution of resources gives rise to jealousies and disputes within the household. Over time, the household may evolve into formally divided sections that acknowledge one household head, but act as autonomous households: two fields, two kitchens, two granaries, and so on. Alternatively, the household head may seek to negotiate with the migrant and/or his mother to overcome past difficulties in the name of unity. He may do so in a number of ways, including resorting to the intermediation of senior authorities in his and mother B's lineages.

Albeit brief and schematic, this example presents but one of the multiple, often overlapping modalities of cooperative and conflictive behavior existing within households. It is important to say that not all households are conflictive, let alone that mothers of migrants necessarily pull

households apart. My point is, rather, that differently positioned subjects and groups in the household wield a sort of "centripetal power" vis-à-vis migrants. In principle, these powers are hierarchically ordered according to generation, gender, and age, converging toward the figure of the household head, who should then ensure balanced redistribution; but the particular history of domestic relationships and migration, as well as other structural or contingent factors, affect the actual distribution of migrants' loyalties. Consequently, the quantity, quality, and intensity of cooperation between the household as a whole and its diasporic members depends on the capacity of its senior authorities and other members to negotiate a viable solution.

Homes Outside the Home

Mobility and diasporization contribute an additional factor of complexity to domestic cooperation and conflict. Not only can family units and particular individuals in the household multiply or recalibrate the centers inside the household; since family units are also mobile, such centers can also be delocalized. In this section, I thus describe some of the spatial trends of household formation, and the opportunities and challenges that this homing outside the home poses to rural households.

As mentioned, married men have a certain degree of autonomy with respect to their family unit. For a migrant man, one way in which autonomy is expressed is taking his wife abroad. Although it is very common for men to migrate on their own, since residence abroad has become lengthier in recent decades, a number of men have taken their spouses along and formed a domestic unit away from home. Some have a wife staying with them, while the remaining one(s) stay at home. For migrants in West Africa and other places where immigration policies are uncomplicated and travel inexpensive, the wives of migrants have been taking turns, spending varying periods of time at home and abroad. For migrants in the West, this solution is more difficult because of legal constraints on family reunions and polygyny at their destination.

With regard to the household, the decision to delocalize the migrant's own family unity partly or wholly is contingent upon numerous and

often conflicting considerations. By so doing, in fact, the migrant sub-tracts valuable resources and workforce from the household. This move is generally unproblematic when the migrant has a spotless record of com-mitment to home. Having ensured food supplies for years, improved the housing situation, sponsored the emigration of other members, and so on, the migrant may legitimately dedicate himself more fully to his own family unit and partly pass on the responsibility for the larger family to younger householders. His mother will nevertheless have a strong say on the matter, depending on whether she has enough daughters-in-law by her side to work and care for her. The wife in question definitely also has a say; wives of migrants often, though not always, wish to go abroad in order to be more independent of their in-laws and eventually to be able to work and earn their own money. On the other hand, in a polygynous marriage where circulation is limited, the decision about whom to take along is very delicate, for the selected wife would undoubtedly enjoy pref-erential treatment compared to the other wives. This might trigger rivalry between co-wives and their cohorts of children.

Banjul and Serekunda, the coastal urban area, offer an alternative or supplementary option for migrants abroad. Instead of a migrant taking his wife abroad, he might relocate her in a house in the city, which he either pays rent for or has constructed on property he has purchased. A more or less accepted reason for doing so is that the city provides better educational facilities for the children (a point to which I will return). On their part, women often cherish and plead for this urban solution; the absence of in-laws puts them alone in charge of the house, while the husband remains fully responsible for their maintenance.

Foreign and urban domestic offshoots either reinforce or weaken the rural ancestral household, and often do both at the same time. The dia-sporic home necessarily decenters the ancestral home from the geography of resource allocation. Migrants have to pay rent (or for property), food, bills, and other expenses; as a consequence, the portion of remittances ear-marked for the ancestral household consumption may decrease. Reduced remittance flows are, however, only one aspect. As noted, if occurring at the right moment in the domestic developmental cycle, when other members may complement or replace the migrant in breadwinning, the disruption is limited. In addition, all the mechanisms of centering

described in previous sections still apply. The migrant may leave one or more wives at home, send his children born abroad to his village home, and so on. If he has a house in the city, he may decide to open it up to the members of his household, who then circulate between city and countryside. In this way, his private property is re-collectivized as an external satellite or branch of the rural household, in line with the agrarian logic of migration as an outgrowth of the domestic community. In a limited number of cases I have witnessed, the household as a whole becomes a truly translocal formation. Senior returnees who take up residence in the city may, at some point, become household heads in their ancestral households too. Some delegate the function to one of their younger brothers already there, but others are under pressure to take up the position. They thus reside alternately in the countryside and in the city, often relocating some of their family to the village.

In a not so rosy scenario, the formation of a diasporic home may signal a progressive exit from, or partition of, the ancestral household. A migrant may envisage the development of an urban house as a first step in a future plan: after return, he will take up residence in the city rather than in the village. Anxious to acquire private assets and thus express their economic success, some migrants may rush to buy property in the city prior to having developed their ancestral house. In addition to their wife/wives and children, they may have either or both of their parents move to the city. Migrants are often motivated to do this for their parents as a way of alleviating the rural hardship they have endured for their children, and treating them to a more comfortable life. In the city, ailing parents may also have access to better medical facilities. As the center of migrants' loyalty is thus moved away from the rural home, they may more legitimately invest in urban property (indeed a private property). The urban house thus becomes a new home, a center of attraction, and a form of cooperation between Gambia and diaspora.

Aside from a personal project of autonomization, a migrant's urban household may provide a partial exit strategy to move away from conflicting households, without necessarily having recourse to formal scission. In the past, an offshoot generated by conflict or by demographic growth usually had two options: remain in the family compound under the authority of the household head but as an autonomous unit, farming

its own land and consuming its own food; or move out and found a new compound in the same village or in a nearby one. These two processes still occur, yet today a splintering section may still pool workforce and subsistence goods while diverting other resources toward the city compound. To return to the example sketched in the previous section, the migrant from cohort B may construct a house in the city, which he then opens up to the rest of his cohort. His mother and siblings may circulate between rural and urban homes, but those of cohort A may be discouraged from doing so. In this case, there is translocality within, but not of, the household; cooperation may continue in the cohort, shifting its center of gravity vis-à-vis its diasporic satellite toward the city compound.

Urban Homing

Urban households are more than diasporic formations. They are increasingly regarded as homes in their own right that either complement or replace the ancestral households, including in the latter's privileged relation with the diaspora. The Banjul and Serekunda area is not only attracting an increasingly greater portion of migrants' housing investments, but is also becoming a center of socio-cultural reproduction that caters for urban, rural, and diasporic people. To further illustrate this, let us return briefly to the issue of transnational childrearing.

Soninke urban residents originating from the Upper River are still a minority, roughly 10 per cent of the overall Upper River population. This is nevertheless a large enough community, and a wealthy one; moreover, a sense of national belonging exists: coastal Gambia is not a foreign country. Many Soninke living in Serekunda still consider their proper home to be their village of origin. Nevertheless, many of the long-term urban residents readily admit that they are not going to return to their village. In the city they have their businesses and they have raised their families. Many are certainly concerned that their children risk losing touch with home, language, and customs, for the Soninke are a minority in the city. Yet though many regularly send their children back to their villages, many others are instead in favor of more "modern" forms of upbringing that focus on formal education, both Islamic and secular. For some time

now, therefore, it is no longer a question of "either … or," but of combining "tradition" and "modernity." Since the 1980s, migrants concerned with the future generations of Soninke urbanites have formed associations, and in the late 1990s, financial contributions gathered within the community led to the construction of the Imam Malick Islamic Institute, in which the lingua franca and most of the students are Soninke.

According to an estimate provided by one member of staff, children of migrants make up about 40 per cent of the student body at the Imam Malick Institute. This indicates that the city is polarizing transnational childrearing. Children also attend schools in a number of other facilities, whether religious or secular. They either stay in their father's urban house with their mothers, or are fostered by urban relatives of the migrants. Of course, migrants may integrate urban and rural upbringing. Some of the children attending school in the city spend time with their ancestral households during the summer holidays, which coincide with the farming season. Alternatively, migrants may send some of their children to the village and others to the city. Nevertheless, we can safely conclude that urban settlements are operating as proper homes, places in which the functions of social reproduction normally performed by the ancestral household are now available.

Conclusion

By offering glimpses of the complexity of homing in Gambian Soninke communities, this chapter has sought to de-naturalize the home in diaspora–home cooperation. There is no paucity of scholarly work documenting how diasporas imagine and transform the concept of home; here I have instead focused on how homes imagine and reproduce themselves in a wider system of social reproduction of mobility and permanence. Soninke households feature as the epicenters of outgoing movement. They construct themselves as homes by featuring as the centers of social reproduction that make diasporization possible in the first place. Reciprocities, power relations, social assets, and ethical orientations cultivated at home ensure continual dispersal-cum-centering, producing mobile subjects while anchoring them to place. However, households are

not harmonious wholes; they are constituted by several homes or family units that compete for migrants' loyalty.

These sub-centers are concentrically and vertically integrated according to gender and seniority, so that the household head features as the pivot around which flows and redistribution are organized. This domestic centering of diasporic flows is not automatic, but depends on solving "bargaining problems" (Sen 1990) among household members. Indeed, conflicts along generational, gender, and age axes might divide the household, restricting household-wide cooperation to particular domains (e.g., subsistence), whereas in other domains sub-centers act as independent homes. Diasporic family units might also become more autonomous, progressively withdrawing from the ancestral household. To be sure, none of these processes of de-centralization proceeds teleologically or irreversibly. I have shown that ancestral households, or sections of them, are able to extend themselves translocally in order to re-encompass diasporic formations. Yet, while showing remarkable resilience and adaptability, rural households are no longer the only homes for the diaspora. Urban Gambia is attracting not solely migrants' housing investments, but also their homing investments—thus de facto functioning as a new home for the external diaspora.

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6

Conflict and Cooperation in Armenian Diaspora Mobilisation for Genocide Recognition

Maria Koinova

Introduction

Scholarship on transnational diaspora mobilisation has grown substantially over the past decade. Driven by the increasing global linkages between states, diasporas, and other non-state actors, works have emphasised the role of diasporas in terrorism (Byman et al. 2001; Hoffman et al. 2007), conflict and peace-building (Collier and Hoeffler 2000; Shain 2002; Shain and Barth 2003; Adamson 2005; Smith and Stares 2007; Orjuela 2008; Koinova 2011), democratisation (Shain 1999; Koinova 2009; Kapur 2010), and international development (Kapur 2004; Brinkerhoff 2008). Many of these works have focused on the agency of diasporas as non-state actors, and on exogenous and endogenous factors affecting their mobilisation. Other scholars have viewed diasporas as

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targets of sending states, which seek to engage their diasporas remotely in domestic processes. States do so instrumentally, through identity-based, or governmentality logics (Gamlen 2008, 2014: Ragazzi 2014; Tsourapas 2015). In previous work, I have argued that separate positionality logic needs to be considered, as diasporas amass different powers from the socio-spatial linkages to the contexts in which they are embedded (2012). Conflict and cooperation have been discussed in some works, but have not yet been explicitly theorised upon. As Carment and Sadjed point out in Chap. 1, attention to cooperation has been especially scarce. In a global world, cooperation is no more confined to nation-states, even if such are still considered to carry the primary agency in world politics. Conflict and cooperation take place among different agents and by way of different logics.

This chapter seeks to explore in more depth the mechanisms of *conflict* and *cooperation* in transnational diaspora politics by focusing specifically on the case of the Armenian diaspora and its mobilisation for genocide recognition. Over an entire century since the 1915 genocide, the objective for genocide recognition has sustained the globally spread Armenian diaspora. The central question explored here is: how did conflict and cooperation help sustain the issue of Armenian genocide recognition for an entire century? I argue that both mechanisms have been crucial to maintain the longevity of the issue in the collective memory, and on the public policy agenda. Conflict and cooperation take place both within and outside of the community. Within the Armenian diaspora, activists have been involved in cooperation with different diaspora groups, despite often existing party rivalries. Externally, Armenian diaspora activists have been involved in both cooperative and conflictual relationships with other diasporas. Conflict has been pronounced with Turks and Azeri in the diaspora, who have developed their own counter-mobilisations. Arameans and Pontus Greeks, also affected by the 1915 genocide, have been long-time allies to the better-organised Armenians.

This chapter proceeds with clarification of concepts, and a review of the literature on transnational diaspora politics, with specific focus on conflict and cooperation. The piece further features relevant data about the globally spread Armenian diaspora, and its mobilisations. Mechanisms of conflict and cooperation are then consequently engaged through the

illustration with empirical details. The chapter concludes with a discussion about the main motivations of diaspora entrepreneurs to engage in conflict and cooperation regarding genocide recognition.

Definitions of Concepts

Several concepts crucial to this chapter—diaspora, diaspora entrepreneur, conflict, and cooperation—are due to be discussed first. I adopt a definition of 'diaspora' by Adamson and Demetriou: 'A diaspora can be identified as a social collectivity that exists across state borders and that has succeeded over time to: (1) sustain a collective national, cultural, or religious identity through a sense of internal cohesion and sustained ties with a real or imagined homeland and (2) display an ability to address the collective interests of members of the social collectivity through a developed internal organisational framework and transnational links' (2007: 497).

A 'diaspora entrepreneur' is considered a formal or informal leader in a certain diaspora group, who makes claims on behalf of the original homeland, and organises resources to pursue such claims. Diaspora entrepreneurs have what Brinkerhoff (2013) calls 'in-between advantage' with their positioning between two worlds and ability to connect them, in what social networks analysis calls a 'brokerage' mechanism (Koinova 2011; Adamson 2013). Diaspora entrepreneurs could aspire to speak on behalf of the entire group, but they are often individuals embedded in specific institutions and networks, and thus are not representative of the entire diaspora. I do not see diasporas as homogeneous groups, but as groups constituted of a conglomeration of individuals who make common claims. In the case of the Armenian diaspora, such a common claim is genocide recognition.

I view 'conflict' and 'cooperation' as specific practices that diaspora entrepreneurs pursue vis-à-vis others. I base my understanding of 'conflict' on a well-established definition by Coser (1956): this is the 'struggle in which the aim [of the opposing agents] is to gain objectives and simultaneously to neutralise, injure, or eliminate rivals'. This broad definition

of social conflict opens opportunities to study ethnic and racial politics among other social phenomena (Horowitz 1985: 85).

Since the unit of analysis here is diaspora entrepreneurs, whose behaviour may or may not aggregate to those of entire groups, I consider 'cooperation' as a social phenomenon, rather than actions by institutions and states on the level of the international system (Keohane 2005). While seeing instrumental motivations in diaspora entrepreneur's practices, I nevertheless do not consider 'cooperation' only as the evolution of 'interactions among egotists' (Axelrod 1980). A complex mix of instrumental interests, beliefs, and values could further drive cooperative behaviour, as Carment and Sadjed mention in Chap. 1. I understand "cooperation' as a social phenomenon, when interactions between at least two agents take place, whose aim is to gain specific objectives. Agents' interests are respected during negotiations taking place to adjust attitudes and expectations, and symbolic or material resources are pulled together to achieve common goals.

Theories of Conflict and Cooperation in Transnational Diaspora Politics

This review features literature specifically addressing issues of conflict and cooperation with regard to conflict-generated diasporas and their linkages to polities experiencing contested sovereignty. The Armenian diaspora case discussed here belongs to this universe of cases, together with other diasporas such as the Albanian, Bosnian, Iraqi, Kurdish, Palestinian, Somali and Tamil ones. Conflict-generated diasporas—refugees who flee war or persecution, as well as their descendants—are considered to form their diasporic identity around the trauma of displacement and myth of return. The trauma becomes embedded in family narratives, transmitted to the second and subsequent generations, and integrated into the identity of individuals and communities, thus becoming foundational and difficult to dismantle (Tölölyan 2000; Shain 2002; Sheffer 2003; Lyons 2006; Cohen 2008). This identity-based role of trauma

distinguishes conflict-generated diasporas from others formed on the basis of voluntary and economic migration.

Conflict-generated diasporas are also often connected to polities experiencing contested international and domestic sovereignty. Krasner argues that international legal sovereignty entails the recognition of a state by other states that are already part of the international system. Domestic sovereignty is the 'formal organisation of political authority within the state and the ability of public authorities to exercise effective control within the borders of their own polity' (1999: 4). Diasporas can have linkages to their original home-states, to adjacent territories of that home-state, and to diasporas living in other global locations. For example, Albanians from Albania and those from former Yugoslavia had little mutual linkages during the Cold War, but they connected in the diaspora, and later built links with ethnic brethren scattered across the globe (Koinova 2013). During the war in former Yugoslavia, also Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs formed thick bonds in the diaspora, which they could not form in the region (Koinova 2015). In the diaspora these individuals and groups formed cooperative relationships in what Putnam (2000) would consider 'bonding' connections. They connected with others on a homophily principle, when they felt close to others because of common traits. Such links could often be politically driven to change the *status quo* in the original homeland, and in that sense become conflictual with other states or non-state actors who make counter-claims.

A large literature in the early 2000s discussed how diasporas can become agents of conflicts in their original homeland. This literature emerged after a major impetus by a World Bank statistical study demonstrating that civil wars resist resolution if they are linked to large diasporas in the USA (Collier and Hoeffler 2000). Concurrently, qualitative method studies focused on a variety of practices through which diasporas exacerbate such conflicts. As long as a nationalist struggle continues, diasporas are more likely to remain engaged in homeland politics (Sheffer 2003). Diasporas can be 'long-distance nationalists' who could act irresponsibly, because they do not face the consequences of their actions (Anderson 1998). Countries of origin can appeal to diasporas to create national campaigns on foreign soil (Haegel and Peretz 2005; Waterbury 2010; Ragazzi 2014). They can send remittances and humanitarian aid, recruit fighters

and become drafted as fighters themselves, engage in criminal and terrorist networks of violence, lobby homeland governments and international organisations, stage demonstrations, and disseminate propaganda, among other practices (Byman et al. 2001; Hockenos 2003; Adamson 2005; Brinkerhoff 2011; Koinova 2011). Diasporas may embed their traumatic identity in diaspora institutions, and resist conflict-resolution, because they fear that a resolution of the traumatic issue would render their institutions obsolete (Shain 2002). Diasporas may resist resolution also because rebels consider them financial resources (Kaldor 2001; Adamson 2013; Salehyan 2007).

As a reaction to this grim portrayal of diasporas as conflict-actors, another strand of literature emerged in the mid-2000s to show that diasporas can also act moderately and as peace-makers. Diaspora displacement can offer reorientation and reframing of social identities rooted in conflict and obedience to authoritarian practices (Shapiro 2013). Diasporas can participate in peace processes and reframe conflict-generated identities (Smith and Stares 2007; Orjuela 2008; Lyons and Mandaville 2010). Studies of post-Yugoslav diaspora attitudes in Sweden challenged the idea that traumatic identities of conflict-generated diasporas are less reconciliatory than those of the homeland-based compatriots (Kostic 2012; Hall 2014; Karabegovic 2014). Diasporas may even engage in practices of democratisation, when their countries of origin experience contested sovereignty. But they are still likely to invoke the liberal creed to justify particularistic nationalist goals (Koinova 2009). Diasporas may also act as agents of transitional justice in post-conflict societies (Young and Park 2009; Hoogenboom and Quinn 2011).

The literature on diasporas as peace-makers is much more limited than that on conflicts. It is scattered along different thematic lines, and is often intertwined with the study of diasporas and development. Although offering ideas about cooperation, the latter scholarship will not be reviewed here, as it does not speak directly to the central subject of this chapter, genocide recognition. Diasporic practices have been central to the reviewed literatures, but they have been analysed as contributing to large-scale political processes. They have not been focused on the mechanisms of conflict and cooperation per se. Looking more closely into how conflict and cooperation take place on a specific issue, genocide recognition, I further seek to better elucidate such diasporic practices.

Methodology

This chapter rests on data gathered from the large-scale European Research Council project 'Diasporas and Contested Sovereignty', studying the conditions and mechanisms leading to different levels of mobilisation among six conflict-generated diasporas in the EU: Albanian, Armenian, Bosnian, Iraqi, Kurdish, and Palestinian.[1] I conducted over 60 semi-structured interviews with Armenian diaspora entrepreneurs in the UK, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Germany, which inform this chapter. I sought to interview male and female representatives, although Armenian diaspora politics is primarily a male phenomenon. I conducted interviews in English, German, Dutch, and Russian. Armenian-language interviews were conducted in Swedish and Dutch, mediated by translators. In this chapter, I further build on my earlier knowledge on the Armenian diaspora gathered in the United States and Lebanon, as well as on secondary literature. This chapter is explorative, hence not seeking to understand causal relationships, and not invoking dependent and independent variables. It nevertheless sees the 'sustenance of diasporic claims for genocide recognition' as the phenomenon of central interest, alongside the mechanisms of conflict and cooperation that could contribute to it.

Overview of the Armenian Diaspora

The centennial of the 1915 Armenian genocide was commemorated widely in 2015. A century earlier, the Young Turk regime of the collapsing Ottoman Empire started to round up (and eventually massacre or expose to an imminent death in the Syrian desert) an estimated 800,000 to 1.5 million Armenians (Panossian 1998: 84; Armenian National Institute 2015). A century later, the Armenian genocide is recognised as such by the European Parliament and the parliaments or governments of 23 countries, among numerous key institutions and political figures, such as Pope Francis of the Roman Catholic Church. But the event

is still officially denied as 'genocide' by the successor state of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey, despite a growing movement for recognition within its own civil society.

The Armenian diaspora is considered 'classic', since it existed even before the period of nation-states formation (Sheffer 2003: 75–77). The Armenian diaspora was scattered in the Caucasus and the Middle East, outside of the historical Armenian lands (Pattie 1999: 3). A pivotal moment for the formation of Armenian national identity was the 1915 genocide, which dispersed the diaspora to Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Greece, Eastern Europe, and other areas, where Armenians either settled or lived temporarily. Over time, the USA and France became important migration destinations, with other countries in Western Europe—such as the UK, Netherlands, and Sweden—accepting Armenians over time. Historically Russia has hosted a large Armenian diaspora, which arrived from Armenia proper. This diaspora was primarily driven by economic reasons (Galkina 2006: 181), and was little affected by the genocide experience. Although Armenians from Russia are an important economic factor for Armenia at present, their mobilisation for genocide recognition is minimal. Genocide recognition dominates the communal agenda of diaspora individuals and institutions in the USA, Europe, and the Middle East. There are estimated 50,000–70,000 Armenians living in Turkey today, where assimilation of emigration has continued until the present. There is no reliable data about the overall Armenian diaspora, but estimates speak of more than five million spread globally. There are more people living in the diaspora today, compared to the three million living in Armenia proper (Statistics Armenia 2014).

Conflict and Cooperation *within* the Armenian Diaspora

Conflict within the Armenian diaspora has been present through the existence of three parties, which flourished in exile after the genocide. These are: the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF, or Dashnaks, est. 1890), the Armenian Democratic Liberal Party (ADLP or Ramgavars, est.

1885), and the Social Democrat Hunchakian Party (SDHP or Henchaks, est. 1887) (see also Tölölyan 2000). Within-group competition for the hearts and minds of refugees and subsequent generations may evade the attention of policy-makers, preferring to see diasporas as monolithic and to deal with selected diaspora members to conveniently speak for the entire community. Nevertheless, in the Armenian diaspora—as in other diasporas—it is important to look deeper into the different political factions, and to understand the basis on which their conflict operates. On many occasions such conflicts are interpersonal, but on others they might be driven ideologically, as in the case of the Armenian diaspora.

The ideologies of the three Armenian diaspora parties were anchored in the fight for Armenian independence from Ottoman and Russian rule in the late nineteenth century. They also incorporated the Armenian genocide issue after 1915. Differences in party stances were visible early on, but became entrenched especially during the Cold War. At that time, each party had its own Apostolic Church, and cultural and charity organisations (Panossian 1998). The Dashnaks advocated revolutionary methods for achieving independence, while the Ramgavars and Henchaks were more moderate, although they also differed ideologically. Differences were also pronounced regarding how each party viewed the national question in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh within the Soviet Union. While Armenian statehood was supported with the formation of Soviet Armenia, in the early 1920s the communist leader Joseph Stalin still allotted the Armenian-inhabited territory of Nagorno-Karabakh (henceforth Karabakh) to neighbouring Azerbaijan. Karabakh was given territorial autonomy, but not a republican status. While none of the Armenian parties was welcome in Soviet Armenia, where party pluralism did not exist, the Dashnaks fiercely opposed the Soviet government. The two other parties sought to resolve the Armenian question within the confines of Soviet politics (Libaridian 1999).

Conflict took place also transnationally, and especially between the diaspora-based ARF and the first post-independence Armenian government in the early 1990s, and during the war in Karabakh (1991–1994). President of Armenia, Ter Petrossian, refused to officially recognise Karabakh after its declaration of independence, seeking to avoid that Armenia was implicated

in irredentism (Koinova 2011). The ARF was staunchly opposed to this stance. They sought to support Karabakh as the cradle of 'Armenianness', and accused the president of 'abandoning Karabakh' (Panossian 1998). There was also conflict over the government's policy towards Turkey. The Armenian diaspora—with ARF at the forefront—insisted that Turkey's recognition of the 1915 genocide precede any rapprochement with Armenia (Koinova 2011). This approach has been enhanced by a more recent insistence that Turkey recognises the genocide before it enters the European Union. Although Turkey's EU accession is becoming less plausible because of recently growing authoritarianism, a staunch Armenian diaspora stance on the genocide recognition issue is considered as bringing impediments to the regional negotiation processes.

After the end of the Cold War the Dashnaks became the most influential among the three parties, not least because they managed to maintain a global network of supporters in over 20 countries, and to successfully insert themselves into Armenian domestic politics. Ideological differences, but also capacities to access the system, became a subject of party competition. Dashnaks managed to register the ARF into the political competition in Armenia, but were banned in the mid-1990s (Knobel 1995). After Ter Petrossian stepped down from power, the ARF re-entered Armenian politics in the 2000s, gained representation in the parliament, issued presidential candidates, and even acquired ministerial posts. They became the party at the forefront of advocating for the recognition of the Armenian genocide. Dashnaks displayed a more nationalist approach compared to the two other parties, which over time began advocating more social and economic issues. Ramgavars participated in Armenian elections, but their influence domestically and in the diaspora waned in the 2000s. Henchaks became part of the opposition, but did not become influential either. Hence, although political differences remained alongside the left-right spectrum, the non-resolved issue of the Armenian genocide recognition, and Karabakh's position as a non-recognised *de facto* state, empowered the more nationalist Dashnaks.

Cooperation took place between the different parties and generations primarily because of the remembered trauma of the Armenian genocide. A traumatic identity trumped ideology, personal, and transnational rivalries on numerous occasions. As Libaridian notes, the trauma of the geno-

cide was behind the vision of all three parties that secessionism from the Soviet Union was a bad idea for both Armenia and Karabakh. A traumatic identity drove the diaspora to fear secessionism, as diaspora entrepreneurs saw a plausible scenario that national independence would alienate Russia—an age-old protector of Armenians—and pave the way for Azerbaijan and its regional ally Turkey to intervene in Armenia and Karabakh and commit a new genocide (1999). The issue of the Armenian genocide, initially absent from Armenia's foreign policy agenda, was gradually incorporated into it after President Robert Kocharian came to power in the late 1990s. It continues to be on Armenia's foreign policy agenda at present, and its salience has grown.

While scholarship claims that sending states incorporate diasporas into their foreign policies (Gamlen 2008; Naujoks 2013; Ragazzi 2009; Waterbury 2010), on this occasion it is visible how powerful a diaspora has been, to integrate an issue important to it, the genocide recognition, into the foreign policy of the home-state. One needs to remember that this issue has not been central to Armenia proper, because its population did not experience the genocide, and Soviet Armenia was also not fond of it. The cooperation on this occasion took place between diaspora parties, ARF more specifically, and local politicians in opposition to Ter Petrossian. Hence, transnational coalition was the mechanism of cooperation, which nevertheless served purposes of conflict, and so managed to oust a government from abroad.

Cooperation among Armenian parties, NGOs, and the Apostolic Church took place with centennial commemorations in 2015. These were an impressive series of events organised two years in advance. Although it would be exaggerated to claim that different parties and NGOs did not pursue their own interests to promote their own genocide recognition activities, collective interest trumped individualism logic. There was a decentralised campaign to recognise the Armenian genocide in different locations, which functioned well. Local and global lobbying for genocide recognition took place, acknowledging specificities of contexts, and brought significant results, with Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Germany, Luxembourg, Russia, Syria, and the Holy See of the Catholic Church issuing official statements or adopting official resolutions. The genocide memorial in Armenia's capital Yerevan attracted local

politicians, diplomats, and state dignitaries such as France's President François Hollande and Russia's President Vladimir Putin (Thornhill 2015). Diaspora individuals with global visibility—such as reality TV star Kim Kardashian—went to Yerevan for the first time for the centennial commemorations (Walker 2015).

A final word about cooperation is due regarding the role of the Armenian Apostolic Church. Religious institutions—and the Armenian Church among them—have the capacity to unite populations abroad in the absence of a state. In this sense, they are also political institutions, although they would avoid being associated as such. Although participation in the church has not always been conflict-free, due to clashes of personalities and party interests, different branches of the Armenian Church have been united in their appeal to recognise the genocide. They organised numerous events for the 2015 centennial, and asked their parishes to adopt a localised approach and lobby the citizenry in their neighbourhoods (Armenian Church 2015). As interviews, and my participant observation in Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK in 2013–2015 point out, the Armenian Church was central in lobbying civil society beyond high-politics.

Conflict and Cooperation *Outside* of the Armenian Diaspora

In order to achieve genocide recognition, major efforts of Armenian diaspora entrepreneurs have been directed towards external actors, who either prevent or facilitate the achievement of genocide recognition objective. Major targets of Armenian diaspora mobilisation have been Turkey directly and Azerbaijan indirectly, as the latter supports Turkey's stance on the Armenian genocide, and is a party to complicated peace processes, including the future of the *de facto* state of Karabakh. Targets of mobilisation are also the activities of a large Turkish diaspora, especially in Europe, as they have often been counter-mobilised.

Conflict directed towards Turkey and Azerbaijan takes place through various means, lobbying being among them. As argued elsewhere,

Armenian diaspora lobbying in the USA was instrumental for the 1992 passage of two acts by the US Congress during the war in Karabakh, especially when Azerbaijan was advancing on Armenian territory. These were the Humanitarian Aid Corridor Act and Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act. They aimed at preventing the USA from sending financial aid to Azerbaijan. Passing these acts was a remarkable achievement given the strong US interests in Azerbaijani oil (2011). Regarding current efforts at genocide recognition, Armenian diaspora entrepreneurs target host-states for their friendly stances towards Turkey, as in Germany, or for non-implementation of parliamentary decisions to recognise the Armenian genocide into actual foreign policy, as in Sweden. In the narrative of diaspora entrepreneurs, host-state interests in Azerbaijani oil and seeking support from Turkey as a NATO ally in the war on terrorism, prevent their host-states from making further commitments or policy implementation.

Conflict can also take place in the form of a protest. For example, the visit of Turkey's President Recep Erdogan to Vienna in 2014 was met with protests and counter-protests. As News.am points out, around 14,000 supporters of Erdogan took part in some demonstrations, while another 8000 were mobilised in a counter-protest, where Armenians, Kurds, Assyrians, and Alawites were present. At that rally, Armenian National Committee members [i.e. part of the Dashnak's networks] delivered speeches. There was a 'melee during the demonstrations', but nobody was hurt (21 June 2014). Azeri diaspora entrepreneurs have been traditionally less mobilised against the genocide, but became active more recently. The logics of 'domestic' and 'international' conflict politics have blended in the diaspora.

Even if seeking a conversation with the 'other' in the diaspora, conflict still prevails. During my fieldwork in Berlin in April 2015, at the time of the centennial, a public debate took place between leaders of the Armenian and Turkish diasporas. Despite a decent start, the moderator needed to diffuse tensions between the speakers, and between the speakers and the audience, visibly mobilised to attend by both sides. Speakers and supporters from both diasporas were able to sit together and discuss contentious issues in the same space, but their views of the genocide recognition were still diametrically opposed.

Cooperation often takes place on the basis of building of formal and informal coalitions with other diasporas. As the earlier example of Erdogan's visit to Vienna shows, Armenians and other ethnic groups could be seen at protests. This is not a mere coincidence. Armenians have built informal coalitions with the well mobilised Kurds, as both groups see Turkey as their enemy. Armenian diaspora entrepreneurs have been acting in what the realist strand in International Relations would call 'balancing', or alongside a popular maxim that the 'enemy of my enemy is my friend'. Armenian diaspora activists claimed in conversations with me that they do not have cordial relationships with the Kurds, because some Kurds participated in killing and exploiting property of their ethnic brethren during the genocide. Nevertheless, they formed relationships with them to pressure Turkey on issues of human rights and genocide recognition. Turkey applied for accession to the European Community, the predecessor of the EU, in 1987, but negotiations started only in 2005. This became an opportune moment to form coalitions in the diaspora. On this occasion, clearly instrumental interest was able to bridge ethnic and religious differences, and to overcome painful historical legacies, at least as long as the fight against the 'common enemy' continues.

The cooperative relationship between Armenian diaspora entrepreneurs and other diaspora groups is often based on traumatic experiences. Arameans and Pontus Greeks are also descendants of survivors of the 1915 genocide, when the Young Turk regime attacked various Christian groups. This solidarity is based more on a common trauma than on common religion, although religious framing could surface in terms of affinity when targeting host-land policy-makers, or in juxtaposition to Muslim groups, Turks in the first place. Armenian diaspora entrepreneurs connect also to the influential Jewish diaspora, although the latter's members are rarely seen in protests against Turkey. Armenian diaspora entrepreneurs look up to the Jewish diaspora with admiration for its ability to bring a widespread acknowledgment of the Holocaust, and seek their advice in lobbying. In an example of solidarity during the 2015 centennial campaign, the Jewish Holocaust museum in New York hosted a series of lectures, and issued an official statement (2015).

Conclusion

This chapter focused on exploring the mechanisms of conflict and cooperation employed by Armenian diaspora entrepreneurs when seeking recognition of the 1915 genocide. I discussed how both conflict and cooperation *within* and *outside* the diaspora have been vital in this endeavour. This conclusion discusses the motivations and dynamics driving diaspora entrepreneurs to engage in conflict and cooperation regarding a highly contentious traumatic issue, which has been difficult to resolve.

Conflict has been mostly based on traumatic experience, historical legacy, and counter-mobilisations. *Within* the Armenian diaspora, three parties disagreed on their ideological orientations, but most notably alongside their visions on how to achieve national independence and genocide recognition. Conflict has become transnational, with a diaspora focused on genocide recognition and a homeland government focused on practical foreign policy solutions. *Outside* the diaspora, conflict has been implicated in the lobbying against Turkey and Azerbaijan, the main state adversaries against genocide recognition, as well as against a non-state actor, the large Turkish diaspora, especially in Europe, which has been counter-mobilised. Azeri diaspora has been more recently mobilised. Most of the empirical examples have shown that the traumatic experience was unsurmountable, and has led to both value-based and instrumental motivations to engage in conflict behaviour.

Cooperation, much less discussed in the literature, has also taken place, but not as a genuine 'bridging experience', in Putnam's (2000) terms. I see relationships built ad hoc and based on specific opportunities and constraints, which are not conducive to the formation of social capital on cross-cutting cleavages. Relationships with other groups were often instrumentally driven, even if in different ways. Formal and informal *coalitions*—a little explored mechanism in the literature—has been at the core of Armenian diaspora entrepreneur's linkages to the Pontus Greeks and Arameans, as all had common experience in the genocide. Instrumentalism could also be discerned in the relationship to the Jewish diaspora, because of its influential international stance and experience in global lobbying, although genuine admiration and respect are also part

of the story. It is encouraging to see that instrumental action has driven informal coalitions with the Kurds as well, despite their different religion, and despite their historical implications in the genocide. On this occasion, instrumental interest, even if pooled together against Turkey as a common enemy, has been framed and pursued on issues of universal human rights. Discursive practices regarding human rights and acknowledging memory became quite important in these inter-diasporic interactions. Even if cooperation is pursued not always with altruistic ideas in mind, it could have a value-based effect and serve altruism, as perpetrators are pressured to acknowledge past wrongs, and abused populations are encouraged to come to terms with their past.

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7

Political Narratives of Victimisation in the Ukrainian-Canadian Diaspora

Milana Nikolko

Introduction

Contemporary ethnic identities are a complicated mix of historical narratives and language(s), political events, and everyday activities. The specificity of the identity construction process, whereby ethnic groups are incorporated within multi-ethnic societies, follows from (re)creating a common history of the group within the host country and in a careful preserving of memories and connections with the home country. Diaspora identities are comprised of multiple interpretations of traumatic events and upheavals and a mixing of time and places from 'Here' to 'There' (Cohen 2008). These connections are marked on a calendar, in memorable dates, and in remembering days of national pride and sorrow (Brewer 2006).

This chapter analyses how the idea of common trauma becomes a part of the narrative for a diaspora group, as a source for mobilisation, coherence, and

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organisation. It examines specifically the shared memories and experiences of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada with a focus on the political influence of the personal stories of survivors; those who lived through the Holodomor Famine of Ukraine between 1932 and 1933. It considers how these experiences became part of the main discourse for the Ukrainian diaspora in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, and in turn supported their major mobilisation initiatives, as echoed in recent dramatic events in Ukraine.

Before I begin my analysis, I want to emphasise that this chapter will not focus on the problem of the Great Ukrainian Famine, the Holodomor of 1932–1933. I will refer to some of that in a general context, but this particular tragedy of the Ukrainian people during the Soviet epoch requires deep, precise, and detailed historical analysis. The work of collecting the evidence of the Holodomor, including working in the Ukrainian KGB archives, has already started, but it will take years for systematic analysis. The focus of this chapter is to analyse the political dimensions of Holodomor interpretations among Canadian-Ukrainians.

The Holodomor

The twentieth-century history of Ukraine is packed with no shortage of dramatic events and nation-level tragedies. After the Soviets established the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1922, this territory experienced a widespread shortage of food, the starvation of people and recurring famine: in 1922, 1932–1933, and in 1946. The most devastating famine emerged in the eastern and central parts of Ukraine in 1932–1933 and became known as the Holodomor (*Голодомор* in Ukrainian, transl.: "Extermination by hunger"). During the Holodomor, millions of citizens of the Ukrainian SSR, the majority of whom were ethnic Ukrainians, died of starvation. There is not enough evidence to specify the exact numbers of victims, but different researchers estimate mortality between 2.4 and 7.5 million. Although there are no relevant sources on the number of deaths due to a lack of records, the estimated number increases significantly when the deaths inside heavily Ukrainian-populated Kuban are included (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Holodomor).

The main discussion focuses on the causes of the Holodomor, including the role of natural factors, forced collectivisation, and the policy of "Raskulachivaniya" (liquidation of individual farmers culture).[1] Was the primary cause bad economic policies or the long-term plan of Joseph Stalin, to eliminate the Ukrainian independence movement?

Debates about the Holodomor involve the 'denial camp', who refuse to recognise the famine and believe it was caused by natural reasons, those who accept reports of famine but see it as a policy problem and those who recognise it as being intentional and specifically anti-Ukrainian (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Holodomor, Institute of National Memory http://www. memory.gov.ua/). Since 2006, the Holodomor has been recognised by the independent Ukraine and 14 other countries as a genocide against the Ukrainian people carried out by the Soviet regime.

The Theory of Victimisation

The Ukrainian-Canadian diaspora is one of most powerful ethnic groups in the modern Canadian political landscape. The diaspora actively represents Ukrainian-Canadians in domestic politics and also serves as an advocate for Ukraine in the international arena. The group's political identity was mostly formed towards the end of Cold War (the last three decades of the twentieth century) and focuses primarily on the idea of political recognition of the tragedy of the Ukrainian Famine of 1932–1933.

Victimisation is a post-factum process, involving interpretation, reflection, and comparison of the trauma. Fixation or fixity (Bhabha 1994) is an important feature of victimisation discourse in the ideological construction of otherness. Fixity, as the sign of cultural/historical/racial difference in the discourse of colonialism, is a paradoxical mode of representation:

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[1] From the 1932 harvest, Soviet authorities were able to procure only 4.3 million tons, as compared with 7.2 million tons obtained from the 1931 harvest.

it connotes rigidity and an unchanging order as well as disorder, degeneracy, and daemonic repetition. Likewise the stereotype, which is its major discursive strategy, fixation is a form of knowledge and identification that vacillates between what is always 'in place', already known, and something that must be anxiously repeated (Bhabha 1990:18) Fixation on the Holodomor trauma in this particular episode of the 'homeland's' colonial past for Ukrainian-Canadians has led to a 'victim complex'.

Public discussion and hence a fixation on Holodomor crimes couldn't possibly have happened during the Soviet Union era, because of the totalitarian character of the regime. But that has not prevented the Ukrainian diaspora from taking over the mission of distributing truths and facts about starvation in Soviet Ukraine. The Holodomor topic has united separate Ukrainian diasporas (European and North-American together with Australian). Regardless of their migration from different regions of Ukraine, waves of settlement, cultural attitudes, and church affiliation (Greek-Catholic for the immigrants of the western part of Ukraine or Orthodox Christianity for the central and eastern parts), awareness of the Holodomor is increasing. But perceptions over time have changed too, with different attitudes towards the Soviet Ukraine too. For example, Ukrainian-Canadians struggled to protect their heritage. With the arrival of new immigrants after World War II, awareness of the Holodomor gave the Ukrainian diaspora a strong impulse for political coherence and social unity.

For Ukrainian-Canadians the fixation on the 'Other' (in this case the Soviet regime) has provided a distinctive place within the cultural landscape of Canada's ethnic communities. Similarly, seeking justice within the international community and changing the international agenda has become a primary goal. Thus, the battle for moral support, truth, fairness rectitude, and future retribution has helped soften the differences among people with Ukrainian heritage in Canada. Group solidarity has manifested itself through the pursuit of truths about the Holodomor and has put Ukrainian diaspora groups on the same path as Jewish diasporas in recognition of the Holocaust.

In more general terms, the idea of innocent victims, including civilians, women, and children, provides for a simple dichotomy to understand the victim–perpetrator relationship (Bouris 2007: 15). But in

the case of Ukraine, this simple dichotomy doesn't apply, because of its complexity imbued in particular by class struggle, including Bolsheviks versus kulaks ('kurkul' in Ukrainian; individual farmers who massively rejected Soviet collectivisation). In addition, the areas affected by starvation include parts of Russia (Urals, Siberia, and North Caucasus) as well as what is now Kazakhstan. In addition, many perpetrators in Ukraine were Ukrainians from the region, and the violent expropriation of land and the denial of food was conducted as much by Ukrainians and controlled by the Ukrainian communist party.

Despite the apparent complexity of the issue, within Ukrainian-Canadian political discourse, famine narratives became a dominant theme in the 1970s. It was during this period that we saw the mobilisation of Ukrainians around this shared trauma, even though the memories were more often symbolic (as we will see later, the number of Holodomor survivors in Canada was probably less than 50 people). The memory of physical and emotional injury gave a powerful impetus to friendship among Ukrainians, at a time when the Church was falling by the wayside, and the cultural and linguistic identity of Ukrainians in Canada was diminishing as the population aged. The Ukrainian identity was beginning to soften due to the majority of the Ukrainian diaspora being Canadian born.

According to Bouris, victim identity is 'the identity of the one who suffered injustice, the one who needs to see the perpetrator accept full responsibility for the wrongs that have occurred' (Bouris 2007: 21). Having in mind this definition, there have been problematic areas in collecting and interpreting the evidence of the Great Famine (1932–1933). First of all, the full investigation of this tragedy started only around 50 years ago. But even at the end of the 1980s (with KGB archives still closed to researchers), the evidence collected remained largely circumstantial and anecdotal, as just a limited number of eyewitnesses and victims were still alive.

Second, there was the question of who would be named as the 'perpetrator'. Stalinism? The Soviet regime? Communism? Ukrainian Soviet leaders and local elites? Modern Russia as heir of the Soviet Union? (see more on this question Arendt 1963) All of these questions remain without answers in Ukrainian historiography to this day. But for Ukrainian-Canadians these questions were answered long before academic expertise

took hold of the subject. They were part of an ongoing anti-Soviet narrative that had started at the end of the 1960s.

In brief, faced with conditions of diminishing collective identity, the political victimisation ethos helped Ukrainian-Canadians create a stable image of the antagonist, the Other, a source of crime perpetrated upon the Ukrainian people. This victimisation narrative finds as its source the acts of the Soviet regime, and above all Stalinism, and the specifics of collectivisation, Sovietisation, and ultimately the Russification of Ukraine. Moving forward 40 years, and the current conflict in Ukraine fits neatly into this pre-existing environment of achievement—the pursuit of freedom by Ukraine from Russia. The Holodomor becomes the dominant narrative for the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada. Today, the Ukraine diaspora, perceiving a similar threat, acts accordingly towards its brethren in Ukraine and their opponent. The goal is to help, instruct, and rebuke.

In general terms, narratives of victimisation are intended to make social and political trauma a central part of ethnic group identity, within the context of broader political national identities. Subsequent consolidation, focusing on a particular event and even the rejection of minor narratives, becomes particularly important in the era of globalisation and in the presence of the media and international legal organisations, who interpret and pass judgement on perceived 'truths'. Waiting for justice and seeking support from (or hoping for support from) the international community helps reduce the immediate desire for revenge and discourages conflict parties from pursuing violent confrontation. These processes may well be a positive aspect of politicised victimisation (Bauman 1989: 28).

The minuses are also there: victimisation is often used by political elites to promote their goals and to help consolidate their constituents. Politicised victimisation might be an effective way of distracting from structural problems of a political system, or as a way of building power for counter-elites. In other words, a victimisation narrative, because of its high intensity and focus on the past, might remove from the political agenda questions of modernisation and the necessity of structural changes in a society (see more on this topic Zaytsev 2015). In this sense the Holodomor, as a focusing event based on shared trauma, has already provoked conflict: conflict over who decides what is truth and who controls the eastern and western parts of Ukraine.

As a group phenomenon, the transfer of victimisation from personal experience to political psychology is difficult to discern from a methodological perspective. First of all, we must ask how adequate are the reflections of personal experiences, and whether one correctly derives generalisations from these experiences. There is also the question of how exactly the transfer of experiences from the individual to the group through testimonies and memoirs and eyewitness accounts takes place.

Ukrainian-Canadians

There are over 1,200,000 people of Ukrainian descent living in Canada. The difficulty in analysing the Ukrainian diaspora is that it is not easy to generalise about such a large diaspora that is scattered over at least 40 different countries, and which, in modern times, has a history of more than a hundred years abroad. Most Ukrainian-Canadians were born in Canada (approximately 92 percent of the Ukrainian population in Canada were born there). "The movement of Ukrainians abroad over the past 125 years has been an extraordinarily complex process that has touched all segments of society, including young and old, men and women, peasants, wage labourers, intellectuals, professionals, government officials, soldiers, and members of the clergy. Most researchers suggest that the Ukrainian diaspora is made up of four 'waves of migration', each a mixture of labour migrants and political refugees" (Satzewich 2002: 23).

The first wave, which took place roughly between 1880 and 1914, consisted mainly of labour migrants. This period constituted a classic labour diaspora in that these migrants were trying to escape poor economic conditions and were almost exclusively in search of wage labour. Many of the people who left the Ukrainian territory at the turn of the century did not have a clear sense of themselves as Ukrainians when they moved abroad. Many first-wave migrants became 'Ukrainian' in the diaspora. Most of the Ukrainians who emigrated westward during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries came from the Austro-Hungarian Empire, in particular, the provinces of Bukovyna and Galicia, along with Carpatho-Ukraine.

The second wave occurred between 1920 and 1930, and consisted of a combination of labour migrants and political refugees. Most of the political and business organisations of Ukrainian-Canadians were established in that period of time, among them: the Ukrainian War Veterans' Association (OUN—UWVA), Sich (a youth movement), Ukrainian leftists (ULFTA), fraternities and business associations (Satzewich 2002). A sharing of cultural attitudes and an aesthetically dominated symbolic universe were among the main characteristics of the first and second migratory waves of Ukrainians to Canada.

The third wave occurred between 1940 and 1954, and consisted mainly of political refugees. Between 1945 and 1955, 250,000 eastern and western Ukrainians emigrated to the USA, South America, Australia, and various parts of Europe. The resettlement of over 100,000 Ukrainian displaced persons in the USA had contradictory implications for the formation and development of the Ukrainian diaspora. On the one hand, it enlarged the diaspora and provided an opportunity for the further development of relationships and solidarity between co-ethnics. But it also produced certain centrifugal tendencies insofar as it contributed to the further factionalisation of an already divided Ukrainian diaspora in Canada. Between 1955 and the mid-1980s, there was virtually no westward migration of Ukrainians. During this time, communication with Soviet Ukraine was problematic, but it also gave a resource to Ukrainian-Canadians to create a strong understanding of their identity and specific role as a diaspora group, both for Canada and for Ukraine. Special attention should be given to this third wave,[2] firstly, because they brought oral evidence of the Ukrainian Famine(s),[3] and secondly, because they were among the strongest advocates of the victimisation of the Ukrainian people during the Soviet era.

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[2] The fourth wave began in the late 1980s and continues to this day. The majority of fourth-wave emigrants are labour migrants, although some refugees can also be found within this wave. "This means that the Ukrainian diaspora is made up of elements of first-generation migrants who first formed a combination of labour and victim diasporas, and people who are separated by as many as four or five generations from their immigrant ancestors and who tend to display more of the features of a cultural diaspora." The new impulse was given to Ukrainian-Canadians after the end of World War II (Satzewich 2002:23).

[3] As noted, Ukrainian history of the twentieth century contains some tragic episodes with extreme numbers of population deaths caused by lack of food.

The Third Wave

Over time, this third-wave narrative of victimisation become one of the central elements within the socio-political makeup of all Ukrainian-Canadians. It has since become one of, if not the main mechanism for the unification of Ukrainian communities across Canada. The Great Famine—or Holodomor—appears in various written memoirs as a specific Ukrainian phenomenon and set of experiences within a global context of genocide and repression. It is also a commonplace narrative widely known and accepted by Eastern Europeans. The Holodomor is listed among the many famines that occurred during the greatest expansion of repressive power under the Ukrainian Soviet apparatus (for example the early 1920s, 1932–1933, and 1945–1946).

Only in the 1980s did the collection of texts on the subject reach such a volume that generalisations about the phenomena could be considered. This was a period when the Soviet Union was on the verge of collapse, heightened ideological pressures were diminishing and censorship in the country was weakening. The first researchers and journalists began their study of the famine almost simultaneously in the USA, Canada, and Western Europe. By the end of the 1980s, the first investigations of the Great Famine had started and it soon became one of the central national narratives in Ukraine and among its diasporas (Kasyanov 2010: 26–27).

Victims and Perpetrators: The Otherness of the Soviet Regime

The Holodomor as a shared trauma was articulated in the Ukrainian diaspora from the early 1950s, when the country began to generate refugees, including those forcibly deported for political reasons. These refugees went to Germany, and later emigrated to Canada. Hunger and famine appear in their memoirs as a specific Ukrainian phenomenon within a global context. Moreover, these memoirs incorporate commonplace narratives and were reflected in the broader context of World War II tragedy discourses (Sysyn 1997: 201).

Throughout this period, there emerges the formation of 'stable' narratives of collective trauma and descriptions of similar experiences of group members. These include especially the desire to talk about physical and mental suffering, and convicting and punishing the offender. These narratives also speak of the desire for justice, retribution, and revenge. The line between victim and perpetrator becomes erased. Political victimisation also creates a stable image of the antagonist, or the Other as the source of the crime.

The essential element of all this corpus of evidence, and the starting point of the long road to recovery for the Ukrainian-Canadian diaspora towards the recognition of the Holodomor, is mainly the testimonies of survivors. Although Ukrainians in the USA were aware of the starvation and terror unleashed by Stalin's regime against Ukrainians in the Soviet Union from the moment these events began, only 40 people (Mokrushyna 2010: 107) who suffered through the Great Ukrainian Famine arrived in Canada, mainly after the World War II. Therefore, the first eyewitness testimonies of the Holodomor began to appear only in the early 1950s.

From the Famines to the Great Famine to Holodomor: The role of Academia

It took almost two decades after the end of World War II for the Ukrainian community and new migrants to start a community discussion on its Great Famine(s). The very first evidence appeared in community newspapers, which discussed the different episodes of Famine in Ukraine (1920, 1932–1933, 1946–1948) in the middle of 1950s. These were sporadic discussions with very little or no academic resonance. That situation changed in the 1960s, when the Cold War rivalry became the dominant paradigm in international relations. The Great Famine (now singular, and relating only to the historical events of 1930–1932) became an instrument of anti-Soviet propaganda.

This international agenda was simultaneously supported by the growth of support in, and the active involvement of, local initiatives

among Canada's prairie provinces (Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta).[4] Later, the agenda became widespread among Ukrainians throughout the rest of Canada. According to Ukrainian-Canadian activist Manoly Lupul's memoirs (Lupul 2005), during the period between 1960 and 1980 these Ukrainian-Canadian initiatives became widespread.

Ukrainians also at this time became very much involved in federal work on Canada's multicultural policies, where their concerns could find voice and resonated with other ethnic communities (Ukrainian-Canadians as other ethnic communities were squeezed by the two dominant founding nations: Quebec and Anglos, culturally, economically, and politically). Over time, the Ukrainian diaspora found out how to gain support for their shared trauma (Fujiwara 2012).

Holodomor recognition occurred both in the USA and in Canada (Conquest 1968; Mace 1986). The process was simultaneous and well-coordinated. In December of 1985, the US commission on the Ukraine Famine was established, 'to conduct a study of the 1932–1933 Ukrainian Famine in order to expand the world's knowledge of the Famine and provide the American public with a better understanding of the Soviet system by revealing the Soviet role' (Hobbins and Boyer 2001, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._Commission_on_the_Ukraine_Famine).

The very important step for legitimacy of the Great Famine to the mainstream political discourse was the process of creating an International Commission of Inquiry into the 1932–1933 Famine in Ukraine. The idea for the formation of an international commission to investigate this famine was suggested by Toronto lawyer Danyliv, at the fourth Conference of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians, held in December 1983. The commission was headed by Ignat Bilinsky and it started its work in 1988. It had an international board of leading lawyers, among whom were John Sopinka (Canadian lawyer and judge of the Supreme Court of Canada, the first Ukrainian-Canadian appointed to the high court), Pavlo Chumak, Stepan Rozsokha, Jacob Sundberg, and John

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[4] Canadian provinces with a high concentration of Ukrainians.

Peters Humphrey.[5] The commission published its report in 1990 and it gained wide international attention and discussion (for more details: Hobbins and Boyer 2001).

Canadian domestic policy regarding the Holodomor got a second push via the Ukrainian government. After the Orange Revolution in 2004, newly elected president Viktor Yuschenko made recognition of the Holodomor tragedy one of his top priorities. This initiative was greatly supported by the Ukrainian-Canadian diaspora. In 2008, the Canadian government unanimously passed Bill C 459; an act to establish a Ukrainian Famine and Genocide ('Holodomor') Memorial Day and to recognise the Ukrainian Famine of 1932–1933 as an act of genocide.

The bill received royal assent on 13 June 2008, making Canada one of the few countries in the Western world that officially supports Ukraine's effort to gain international recognition of the Great Famine of 1932–1933 as a genocide against the Ukrainian people. At the time, Halyna Mokrushyna pointed out: 'This Act is a testimony to the successful, tenacious awareness campaign that the Ukrainian-Canadian community has been leading for decades within Canada and internationally'. The text of the act translates the main message of this campaign: the Holodomor was deliberately planned and executed by the Soviet regime, under Joseph Stalin, in order to crush the Ukrainian people's aspirations for a free and independent Ukraine, and caused the death of millions of Ukrainians in 1932 and 1933 (Mokrushyna 2010: 77).

Documents on the Holodomor prepared by different Ukrainian organisations, and delivered to every office on Parliament Hill, helped a lot in this educational campaign, since members of parliament had all the material first-hand, and could judge for themselves the truthfulness and validity of arguments presented in the bill. It was a concerted effort without which Bill C 459 would not have passed in such a short time. In the resolution, where it states that the Canadian government recognises the Ukrainian Famine of 1932–1933 as an act

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[5] J. P. Humphrey is a Canadian legal scholar, well known for his work on a first draft of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and his investigation of genocides. According to Kasyanov (2010: 24), Humphrey proved with arguments that the Holodomor had all the evidences of genocide against Ukrainian people.

of genocide, it proclaims that throughout Canada, in each and every year, the fourth Saturday in November shall be known as 'Ukrainian Famine and Genocide ("Holodomor") Memorial Day'. The resolution also contains the same reasons, mentioned in the text of the bill, for which the Canadian Senate and government should recognise the Holodomor as a genocide against the Ukrainian people: the need to acknowledge the positive contribution of the Holodomor survivors to Canadian society; Canada's condemnation of all war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocides; and Canada's defence of human rights and valuing of the diversity and the multicultural nature of Canadian society (Mokrushyna 2010: 84).

Implementation and Commemoration: History as a Memory

Ukraine's tragic past plays a crucial mobilising role for Ukraine itself, but it became specifically effective in Canada for Ukrainian-Canadians. This impact is played out in school curricula, memorable dates, memorials, everyday symbols and rituals, together with conferences, political events, and legislation. One of the explanations for this significant impact in Canada is the absence of a significant memorial date for Ukraine and Ukrainians all over the world. To be clear, Ukraine obtained formal independence on 24 August 1991. Although this is a national holiday, it never was symbolically unique for Ukraine. Ukraine obtained independence as a reaction to a coup against Mikhail Gorbachev, just days away from the rest of Soviet Republic. The traditional military parade on Independence Day was inherited from the Soviet past and never had any specific Ukrainian characteristics.

So the commemoration of Holodomor (the fourth Saturday in November) has become a new commemoration day for Ukrainians all over the world, making it uniquely Ukrainian and unifying at the same time. This very private event of lighting a candle in the window provides a combination of individual and public acts, and creates a solemn movement of intense solidarity. This candle ritual, introduced to Ukrainian

society by James Mace, became very popular in 2006 and has grown in popularity ever since.

Initially the commemoration of Holodomor created a controversial reaction in Ukraine. First of all, because it was recalling an entire Soviet period of Ukraine's past that was uncomfortable and not clean cut. These circumstances display a strong post-colonial and resistant attitude (Turner 2006: 210), when the national significance of the commemoration is exactly opposite to the previous Soviet epoch. If during the Soviet time, the narratives of famine(s) were absolutely prohibited, after the Orange Revolution, they became one of the major sources of generating national belonging in Ukraine. Even more so, they have become a major national focus for Ukrainians in Canada.

Holodomor anniversaries play an important role in boosting the Holodomor awareness campaign in Canada. For instance, four provincial bills recognising the Holodomor were introduced on a day closely preceding the fourth Saturday of November, designated as a Day of Remembrance of the victims of the Holodomor (22 November2007 in Manitoba, 30 October 2008 in Alberta, 25 November 2009 in Quebec and British Columbia). Saskatchewan was the first province to recognise the Ukrainian Famine of 1932–1933 as a genocide against the Ukrainian people and to establish the fourth Saturday of November as a Memorial Day for the victims of the Holodomor (Mokrushyna 2010).

In Saskatchewan, the Holodomor is included in history courses recommended for grades 7–12, and is part of a teaching unit on Stalin's totalitarian regime and the creation of a police state. In the introduction to the topic, the Holodomor is framed as a terror unleashed by Stalin against Ukrainian peasants with the aim of destroying the Ukrainian nation and its people as a political and social force (Mokrushyna 2010). In Manitoba, the Ministry of Education has created a separate section on Holodomor education and awareness, under the general rubric of Diversity and Equity in Education. In Ontario, the Holodomor is included as a supplementary teaching unit in a grade 11–12 course on Canadian and World Studies, within the section on Citizenship and Heritage. So indeed, the Holodomor topic has moved from academic debates to school curricula and has become a significant part of the multicultural history of Canada.

Conclusion

As a conclusion, I would like to quote Halyna Mokrushyna, who conducted interviews with Ukrainian activists and those who led Holodomor awareness campaigns in Canada. Mokrushyna concluded that the most popular personal reason to be part of this campaign was 'the theme of *Ukrainianness*, or belonging to the Ukrainian nation and culture' (Mokrushyna 2010: 110, 122). Memories of the Holodomor have undeniably become one of the central parts of Ukrainian-Canadian identity.[6]

Contemporary ethnic identity is a complicated mix of historical narratives and language(s), political events, and everyday activities. The specificity of the identity construction process, where the ethnic group is incorporated into multi-ethnic society, is strengthened by recreating a common history of the group within a host country and in a careful preserving of memories and connections with the home country. A diaspora's identity is often fulfilled by crossing interpretations of the past, antagonisms with the Other, and with a mixing of time and places between 'Here' and 'There'.

During the twentieth century the symbolic universe for those Canadians with Ukrainian heritage was fundamentally transformed from one of cultural/religious domination to the political manifestations of the Holodomor. This dramatic change was mainly influenced by the activity of third-wave political immigrants, who established themselves in Canadian culture and became more permanent and active among Ukrainian communities. This transformation took place within the changing international agenda and heightened tensions of the Cold War. Last, but not least, the identity construction process within Canada's Ukrainian community resonated within the large-scale process of creating a Canadian multicultural nation, where each and every diaspora has a chance to support its interpretation of history and traditions without pressure. The contemporary problem of the domination of the victim narrative in Ukrainian-Canadian discourse lies in the ongoing divisions of Ukrainian society, intergenerational differences, and continued denial

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[6] See the recent controversy with the Canadian Museum of Human Rights and Victims of Communism Memoria (Butler 2015).

of the Holodomor. With the Holodomor, Canada's political scene has been witness to the creation of a victim complex. A complex that is fixated on problems and questions of interpretation, but not on the structural problems of Ukrainian society.

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Part III

Diaspora Activism and Cooperation in Comparative Perspective

8

Forced Displacement and Diaspora Cooperation among Cypriot Maronites and Bosnian Serbs

Neophytos Loizides, Djordje Stefanovic, and Danae Elston-Alphas

Introduction

This chapter examines two theoretically informative cases of diasporas as agents of cooperation: Serbs in post-Dayton Drvar, Bosnia, and Maronites in post-1974 Cyprus.[1] Studies of social organisation and cultures of cooperation in diasporas/displaced groups are rare (Celik 2005; Nikolko and Carment 2010; Koinova 2014). Yet, as these cases illustrate, diasporas

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[1] The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was self-proclaimed in 1983; it is recognised only by Turkey, in violation of Security Council Resolution 541, 18 November 1983. For alternative legal interpretations to the status of TRNC, see Necatigil (1983), Loucaides (1995), Chrysostomides (2000), and Yesilada and Sozen (2002).

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can develop an effective network of cooperation involving international agencies and moderates across ethnic or religious divides. Such networks, we argue, could dramatically improve human rights and facilitate the return process following a protracted displacement. Moreover, the two case studies offer a wide range of within-country episodes to refine current theoretical perspectives on diasporas with broader implications for the literature.

Victims of 'ethnic cleansing' have returned home in significant numbers all over Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) but no municipality has been as successful in peacefully reversing ethnic cleansing as the Drvar region in the western part of the country. In 1991, 97 % of Drvar's 17,000 inhabitants were Serbs. After the September 1995 offensive by Croat forces, the only original inhabitants who remained were 83 older people in isolated villages. However, by 2000, Serb returnees represented 70 % of the local population, making Drvar the first municipality in which the pre-war majority was restored via peaceful returns.[2] This was achieved despite bitter resistance from ultra-nationalists across the ethnic divide.

Decades before the Yugoslav wars, Cyprus had similarly experienced ethnic cleansing in various waves, leading to the island's *de facto* partition in 1974 (Hadjipavlou 2007; Yesilada and Sozen 2002). Unsurprisingly, analyses of the Cyprus problem have focused on Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots, ignoring other indigenous groups on the island, such as the Cypriot Maronites.[3] There are around 6000 Cypriot Maronites today, descendants of emigrants from Syria and Lebanon who arrived in the eighth century (Hourani 1998; Varnavas 2002). It is estimated that in 1224, there was a sizable Maronite community of approximately 60–72 settlements; this declined to only four villages in 1878, after persecution by Ottoman rulers and assimilation pressure from the Greek-Cypriot

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[2] ICG, *Bosnia Refugee Logjam Breaks*: *Is the International Community Ready?*, ICG Balkans, Report No. 95, 4–5, 30 May 2000.

[3] In addition to Maronites, there are two other constitutionally recognised minorities, Armenians and Latins (non-Maronite Catholics are primarily descendants of Venetians). There are also Roma, particularly among Turkish-Cypriots, as well as a growing number of immigrant groups in the south and post-1974 Turkish settlers in the north. Following 1974, the Turkish government encouraged tens of thousands of mainland Turks to settle in Cyprus. For precise figures, see Loizides and Antoniades (2009).

majority (Hourani 1998; Dib 1971; Hill 1972; Varnavas 2002). All four ancestral Maronite villages, Ayia Marina, Asomatos, Karpashia, and Kormakitis, are located in the northern part of the island, with their native populations largely displaced because of the 1974 Turkish invasion and partition of the island. Until recently, the villages were practically unpopulated, with Asomatos and Ayia Marina serving as military stations for Turkish occupation forces. With the partial exception of Ayia Marina, Maronites remained neutral during the 1963–1974 bi-communal clashes and had close connections with foreign governments and the Vatican, which pledged to protect them. Nevertheless, they did not escape the fate of Greek-Cypriots in the areas currently under Turkish military control and ethnic cleansing. Until 2006, only 130 elderly Maronites had managed to stay, primarily in Kormakitis, today the centre of Maronite life and the only place where Cypriot Maronite Arabic is still spoken (Varnavas 2002; Theodoulou 2004; Athanasiadis 2004). This chapter examines the process of diaspora cooperation in negotiating return, aiming to draw broader theoretical conclusions from the experiences of Cypriot Maronites and Bosnian Serbs in the Drvar region.

Displaced Serbs in Drvar as Agents of Cooperation

While the victims of ethnic cleansing have returned home all over Bosnia, the Drvar region has been the most successful in peacefully reversing ethnic cleansing. The pre-war majority has been restored through peaceful returns (ICG 2000: 4–5), despite the bitter resistance of both Croat and Serb ultra-nationalist parties,[4] and in spite of lukewarm international support (ICG 1998a: iv). In fact, the early phases of the war provide a rather typical picture of ethnic cleansing and actions by nationalists to prevent its reversal. While the Bosniac nationalist party argued (at least in principle) in favour of the right of return, the main Serbian and Croat

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[4] The SDS, the main Bosnia Serb ultra-nationalist party, strongly resisted the Serbian refugees' desire to return to Drvar, as it hoped to use these people to settle the parts of Republika Srpska from which non-Serbs were cleansed (ICG 1998a: iii)

ultra-nationalist parties were openly opposed.[5] The Croat ultra-nationalist HDZ fought the returns every step of the way, making hostile relocations of Croat internally displaced persons (IDPs) from central Bosnia into Drvar, issuing 'looting permits' for the homes of Serbs who declared their wish to return (ibid: 5), and withdrawing monthly subsidies from municipalities where the returnees' parties won local elections (ibid: 13). Ultra-nationalist Croat politicians even incited ethnic riots against returnees and international organisations in October 1997 and April 1998. This resistance was to no avail (ibid: 5–6).[6] Not only did refugees from the Drvar region start returning in large numbers well before the country-wide turn of the tide in 1999–2000, but they won municipal elections (ibid: 1–2, 13), gained significant representation in the police force and local administration, and recovered their demographic majority status.

While experts are still struggling to explain the successes of the citizens of Drvar in reversing ethnic cleansing, evidence suggests the resilience, social capital, and organisation of the returning community were key factors. The Drvar DP association (Coalition for Drvar) was formed when it became clear that the nationalist governments ruling different parts of Bosnia were not truly interested in implementing the right of return. One of the first successes for the leaders of the organisation was to convince followers to vote in their pre-war hometowns against the wishes of Serb nationalists, who counted on those votes to consolidate control in ethnically-cleansed parts of Bosnia. In 1997, Mile Marceta was elected mayor of Drvar because of election rules permitting refugees to cast absentee ballots in their pre-war place of residence. Described by international media as a 'symbol of hope in a land of hate', the soon-to-be mayor convinced around 1600–2000 displaced persons to accompany him back to the municipality (Wilkinson 1998; McDougall 1998).

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[5] More specifically, SDS (Serbian nationalists) and HDZ (Croat nationalists) focused on consolidation of control over the territories their armies had captured and ethnically cleansed, trying to 'right people' the territories under their control by permanently settling 'their own' displaced people and preventing the ethnic others from returning. The Bosnian Muslim counterpart, SDA, was formally committed to the returns, but in practice, it promoted Bosniac returns to the territories 'lost' during the war, while discouraging the return of Croats and Serbs into Bosniac-controlled areas (ICG 1999: 16)

[6] A particularly nice touch was making sure that the roads to villages with Serb returnees were not cleared of snow in the winter (ICG 1999: 14).

Despite Croat resistance and an assassination attempt against Marceta himself, refugees managed to re-establish themselves in their ancestral land. The organisation not only helped to reverse ethnic cleansing, but also played a leading role in mobilising support from the international community and locally from the multi-ethnic country-wide Coalition for the Return of the Expelled.[7]

Why aren't such examples more prevalent in post-conflict societies? Specific political mechanisms in the Dayton Peace Agreement facilitated the process of return in the case of Drvar. Annex 3, art. IV of the Agreement stipulates that 'a citizen who no longer lives in the municipality in which he or she resided in 1991 shall, as a general rule, be expected to vote, in person or by absentee ballot, in that municipality'.[8] In Drvar, many IDPs continued to have a vote in their pre-conflict municipalities, even while in exile. As per article 20.8 of the Bosnian Election Law, remote voting for displaced persons will remain in place until decided otherwise by the UN High Representative or the Parliamentary Assembly of the BiH.[9] In fact, voting rights were a key element of the Dayton architecture in Bosnia, in contrast to other UN-led peace mediations, such as the 2004 Annan Plan for Cyprus. The Plan, which failed to be approved by the Greek-Cypriot community in a referendum, stipulated significant restrictions on the political rights of displaced persons (unlike post-2015 mediations on the island). In contrast, Dayton's institutional mechanisms allowed refugees and IDPs to maintain financial, institutional and political ties with their home region.

The Bosnian return experience was not an unalloyed success, however. While the property restitution policy in Bosnia was a major success—with about 90 % successful resolution of the repossession cases—the return of property generally did not lead to the return of people, as many victims of forced displacement exchanged or sold their property. Even in

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[7] DP associations played a key role in the return process elsewhere in the country. For example, the Bosniac DP association facilitated return to Zvornik (Dahlman and Toal 2005: 350) and Prijedor (Belloni 2001, 2006, 2008: 163, 181).

[8] For the original text of the Dayton Accords see http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/BA_951121_DaytonAgreement.pdf.

[9] See https://www.izbori.ba/Documents/documents/English/Laws/Election_Law_of_BiH-eng.pdf.

the townships where community effort led to mass return, the return was not followed by well-designed and funded local economic development programmes. Consequently, many returnees left again, now for economic reasons—to find jobs. Furthermore, even under the best of conditions, some groups of forced migrants may not be interested in return. Surveys among the Bosnian displaced show elderly men are the most likely to return, and young women are the least likely (Stefanovic and Loizides 2015). This difference might be related to greater opportunities for women in urban Bosnia (or Western countries of exile) compared to small towns or rural Bosnia. While Bosnia's urban areas were once famous as centres of multi-ethnic life, post-war urban minority returns are few and remain restricted to places such as Drvar. Bosnia's cities are now overwhelmingly mono-ethnic.

Displaced Maronites as Agents of Cooperation in Cyprus

Since 2003, an opening in the Green Line dividing Cyprus has allowed Greek-Cypriots and Maronites to visit their villages. In 2003, Serdar Denktash,[10] then serving as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the unrecognised TRNC (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus), hinted that Maronites would be also permitted to resettle in their pre-1974 homes, a decision ratified in 2006 (Leonidou 2006). Nevertheless, displaced Maronites faced multiple problems, including delays in the implementation of the resettlement laws, destroyed properties, military restrictions on entering two of their villages, and new occupants living on some of their properties. Although not as aggressively opposed as Bosnian Serb leadership, the official Cyprus government maintained an ambiguous position as to whether Maronites should return, warning them to be careful in their dealings with Turkish-Cypriot authorities and be sceptical of their promises. According to the official government view, Turkish-Cypriots aimed at token concessions to impress the international community (Christou 2003). Nevertheless, within five years of the decision

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[10] Also son of veteran Turkish-Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash.

to allow resettlement, the overwhelming majority of Cypriot Maronites had rebuilt their houses in Kormakitis for permanent or temporary accommodation.[11]

The success of Maronite mobilisation may be attributed to the strength of their community organisations while in exile. Cypriot Maronites retained their own ecclesiastical institutions, schools, sports teams, and close networks of business groups. They avoided assimilation within the Greek-Cypriot community, although they actively participated in politics, directing their influence primarily towards the moderate wing of the centre-right Democratic Rally (DISY) and nominally-communist AKEL. The strength of the community is demonstrated by the election of several Maronites to parliament during this period, including Klavdios Mavrohannas, an AKEL representative from Kerynia, Marios Mavrides, an Economics professor elected for Democratic Rally, also in Kerynia, and Antonis Hadjirussos, the minority representative of Maronites in Parliament (voted by all Cypriot Maronites in a separate electoral roll). In addition, former Vice-President of DISY and current Minister of Interior Socrates Hasikos has been traditionally supported by Maronites in his Kerynia district.[12]

In the past, during the Clerides administration, members of the Maronite community were elected in or appointed to key positions, including parliament, the Supreme Court, and various ministerial positions (Varnavas 2002). Their parliamentary representation demonstrates a continuation of tradition to accommodate Maronite representatives in key posts.

The community held together in other ways as well. After the events of 1974, a large proportion of the community collectively settled in Anthoupoli, Kotsiatis,[13] and Marki, in refugee housing estates and Turkish-Cypriot houses. According to Cypriot Maronite scholar Maro

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[11] Observed by first author during visits to Kormakitis in December 2004 and July 2007; see also Zaman (2005).

[12] First author's field-research notes.

[13] Most Maronite residents of Kotsiatis come from Ayia Marina; the second largest Maronite village, now a military camp. Although Asomatos and Karpasha are also military camps, due to the fact that Ayia Marina is heavily armed, and as noted in the text, refugees cannot visit or even enter the village for any purpose, making it inaccessible.

Emmanuel, with the building of Saint Maron public primary school, several Maronite churches, and coffee shops, the areas grew to accommodate the needs of the community. These spaces allowed Maronite identity to intensify rather than diminish. Finally, the Vatican maintained a clear link with the Maronite community through such institutions as Saint George Church in Kormakitis and Terra Santa Collage where Italian Catholic nuns were appointed to teach the Catholic minorities—both Maronites and a smaller Latin community.[14]

Politically, the leadership of the Maronite community supports the reunification of the island, openly declaring its 'responsibility to raise awareness of the positive aspects of a federation and the possibilities that will arise after the solution' (Hadjirussos 2015). In negotiating return to Kormakitis, Maronite civic organisations have been important for multiple reasons. First, they have lobbied the Vatican and Catholic governments to pressure Turkey and Turkish-Cypriot authorities to allow, even facilitate return. Second, their organisations have minimised Greek-Cypriot reactions to perceived preferential treatment of Maronites and maintained rights for the internally displaced in the south while experimenting with return to the north. Third, through their associations, Maronites have built ties with Turkish-Cypriot politicians across the political spectrum, both the pro-settlement left and conservative right, and created the necessary personal and business networks with nearby Turkish-Cypriot and post-1974 settler villages.[15]

Last but by no means least, the associations have put positive pressure on individuals to join the return process by sharing information and logistical support. The Maronite website (http://www.kormakitis. net/), for instance, gives information on return, and prompts members to return and restore their houses before Turkish-Cypriot authorities demolish them for 'safety' reasons. In general, Maronites are very active in the information sector, particularly since the 1974 Turkish invasion. The community produces the following printed and electronic media: *Kinotiko Vima* (Community Tribune) monthly newspaper (2000);

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[14] Interview with Maro Emmanuel (to the third author), Home of Cooperation, October 2015.
[15] For a discussion of the history and politics of settler presence in Cyprus in a comparative perspective, see Haklai and Loizides (2015).

O Typos ton Maroniton (The Press of the Maronites) monthly newspaper (2001); and *I Foni ton Maroniton* (The Voice of the Maronites) radio programme (1999), broadcast by CyBC's First Programme every Friday between 17:00 and 18:00. There is also an official community web page (www.maronitesofcyprus.com), an official Archbishopric web page (www.maronitearcheparchy.org.cy), and web pages dedicated to three of the Maronite villages (www.asomatos.com, www.ayiamarina.com and www.karpasha.com).

Diaspora Dilemmas: Cooperate or Stay Away?

The research on ethnic violence and forced migration has emphasised the importance of security concerns and credible safeguards in conflict situations (Lake and Rothchild 1996; Walter 1999; Fearon 1998). At the individual level, more vulnerable Bosnians and Cypriots (the elderly, women whose male family members were killed,[16] families with small children) are more likely to be afraid to return to a potentially dangerous environment. At the same time, the elderly, women, and families are more likely to be tolerated in 'rival' communities, as they pose less of a threat. For instance, the first version of the Annan Plan proposed that among Greek-Cypriots, priority of return should be given to those over the age of 65.

On the one hand, a sense of vulnerability is likely to be enhanced by personal traumatic experiences during the war, such as assault, torture, loss of a close friend or family member (UNHCR 2005: 3), or repeated and severe ethnic harassment after the war, such as stoning buses carrying returnees, rioting, looting, and burning residential property (Hall et al. 2015). The sense of vulnerability to attack may be increased by a village's geographic position (villages surrounded by ethnic others are more vulnerable to attack than those surrounded by co-ethnics), the residence of ethnic others in the village, and in the case of Cyprus, the presence of

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[16] Studies (such as Belloni 2008: 170) of Srebernica women show that the mass murder of male community members exacerbates a feeling of vulnerability among surviving female family members.

foreign troops.[17] There is some Bosnian evidence that the presence of alleged war criminals, especially in the municipal government and police, and control of the municipal government by ultra-nationalist parties, tend to heighten victims' sense of security risk (Nalepa 2007). Intensity of intercommunal fighting and a local cycle of revenge during the war also increase fears of renewed ethnic violence.[18]

On the other hand, in the case of Bosnian returnees several contextual factors such as arrests of alleged war criminals, the active presence of international troops, and the multi-ethnic composition of the local police force, appear to reduce the fear of physical attack (ICG 2002: 26; Belloni 2008: 179, 182; Nalepa 2007; Dahlman and Toal 2005: 651). In the case of Maronites in Cyprus, international guarantees, particularly pledges of support by the Vatican and the changing environment after the accession of Cyprus to the EU, improvement of relations between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots, and Turkey's candidacy status, appear to foster a sense of security among returnees.[19]

It is important to note that in the absence of such security mechanisms, refugee community organisations may provide substitute mechanisms. For one thing, community organisations could secure a critical mass of returnees, making individual vulnerability less of an issue. For another, refugee organisations could negotiate and help enforce agreements, working with local authorities and associations from other communities in an attempt to control violence. In particular, when these community organisations develop links with civil society groups across ethnic lines, it becomes much easier to manage and resolve tensions (Varshney 2001: 363). Community organisations can help monitor and 'police' in-group members (Fearon and Laitin 1996: 715–735), while local cooperation and information-sharing within institutionalised intercommunal

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[17] Returns in Bosnia indicate that the easiest returns are to ethnically homogenous villages into which no settlers were brought after the cleansing of original inhabitants (ICG 1999: 8).

[18] 'There seems to be a general rule that, if nobody in the family or neighbourhood died of violence during the war, then returnees are accepted back more easily than if a direct loss was suffered' (ICG 1999: 7–8).

[19] Interview with Parliamentary Representative of the Maronite Community, Antonis Hadjiroussos, 2007.

networks can reduce conflict and make in-group policing more credible (Varshney 2001: 395).

That said, we should not assume diaspora cooperation is an easy task, even in small communities. Evaluating the role of the current Maronite parliamentary leader, Mr. Hadjirussos, in establishing bi-communal contacts, one of our respondents said the following:

> I feel he has done a wonderful job throughout the past few years, specifically putting a great deal of energy into safeguarding and supporting the maintenance of the Maronite villages. He has financed many projects; more recently he brought together a group of constitutional experts in order to support Maronite rights with regards to their language, religion and territoriality. Some people feel he has done more work with the village of Kormakitis, however any progress for Kormakitis is a possible progress for all villages. He works with both the Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots very efficiently, however, he has seen great opposition due to the work he has done with the Turkish-Cypriots, many are going as far as calling him a 'traitor'.[20]

As in Drvar, diaspora members promoting cooperation have faced opposition from hardliners, even when sterile nationalist opposition to diaspora cooperation harms their own community's vital interests.

Incentives for Return and Economic Cooperation

Several studies demonstrate incentives are powerful instruments in turning conflict into cooperation, an insight relevant in the study of return (Dorussen 2001). From the conventional rational choice theory perspective, calculations of potential benefits and costs of return should heavily influence the decision-making process of ordinary Bosnians and Cypriots. Factors in the perceived economic benefits of return include the value of the property, perception of economic opportunities, and concerns about

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[20] Interview with Maro Emmanuel (to the third author), Home of Cooperation, October 2015.

the loss of refugee benefits, pensions, and health coverage due to existing regulations in the place of return (Opacic et al. 2005: 68; Nalepa 2007: 23; ICG 2002: 11, 31). It appears that displaced persons with more resources are more likely to return (Holtzamn and Nezam 2004; Zetter 1994), even though the perceived costs of return are higher for potential returnees who have jobs and permanent accommodation in the new place of residence.

In Cyprus, diaspora leaders have found external aid to support the process of revitalising Kormakitis. According to their leader:

> We were able to gain a great amount of funding through the EU as well as the UNDP which has contributed to not only the maintenance of our villages but also in recognising our language and revitalising it. Undergoing basic renovations such as the electricity and water facilities of our village were key to beginning to create a liveable and safe space without placing any weight on either the Greek or Turkish-Cypriot communities.[21]

Bosnia has benefitted from similar programmes, arguably on a much larger scale. In addition, Bosnian returnees did not have to change jobs. Instead, they kept their employment and commuted daily across the internal federation boundaries (Belloni 2008), something common among the Maronites and quite likely to occur in the rest of Cyprus, given the island's size. Paradoxically, in such cases, economic differentials among federal regions could encourage social integration, as people will aim simultaneously for opportunities across the federal border, such as better paid jobs and cheaper living.

We may assume the perception of the comparative economic opportunities in the place of origin and the current place of residence is another factor. Belloni, for instance, argues Bosniac DPs from rural eastern Bosnia came to appreciate the advantages of urban life in Sarajevo and since their displacement they have been less interested in return (2008: 171–172).[22] Similarly, one of our interviewees, a Cypriot Maronite living in England,

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[21] Interview with Parliamentary Representative of the Maronite Community, Antonis Hadjiroussos, 2015.

[22] Ethnic intolerance and continued local rule by Serbian ultra-nationalists in Eastern Republika Srpska must also be serious factors for these Bosniac victims of ethnic cleansing.

argued that those members of the community living abroad, including herself, will not return to live permanently in their villages; instead, they may simply renovate a family house they have inherited. Overall, it is anticipated that most Maronites will contribute to the renovation of their villages and their inherited houses, but will not move back.

Nationalist Ideology and Contact

Diaspora members who have been victims of ethnic cleansing and do not want to live with other ethnic groups are less likely to return than those able to accept multi-ethnicity. International Crisis Group studies claim that the belief that 'we cannot live together after all that has happened' is strongly related to rejection of return (for example ICG 2002; see also Petersen 2002). Presumably, displaced persons with very negative visions of others or the tendency to blame others for injustices are less likely to return. Alternatively, strongly nationalist individuals might be more likely to return if such return is perceived as a way to regain lost territory for their particular ethnic group.[23] Social psychologists have also identified processes of reducing resentment and prejudice between territorially intermingled majority and minority groups, including supportive social norms, education, and common goals (Allport 1954; Brown and Hewstone 2005).

Perceptions of the ethnic 'other' heavily influence how victims of ethnic cleansing see their return. For instance, in an interview with the first author, former Cypriot President George Vasiliou argued that the opening of the checkpoints in 2003 contributed to the failure of the peace process in the following year, as Greek-Cypriots visiting the north lost their hitherto idealistic view of northern Cyprus. During these visits, potential returnees realised the differences separating them from Turkish-Cypriots and resented the socio-economically marginalised Turkish settlers. To address this issue in the context of victims of ethnic cleansing, community diaspora organisations could facilitate the adaptation of a refugee

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[23] According to ICG, this is how the conservative Bosniac SDA party perceives Bosniac returns to Serb-dominated Republika Srpska (ICG 1999: 16).

community to a 'new' environment experienced among Maronites but to a lesser degree among the Greek-Cypriot displaced. Community representatives might negotiate reserved lands, including family houses, village squares, churches, and schools, as well as surrounding land designed to attract returnees and destined for their use. Kymlicka suggests an effective way to protect communities (particularly previously victimised communities) is to establish reserve territories where land cannot be alienated without the consent of the community as a whole (Kymlicka 1995: 43).[24]

Interestingly, Maronite leaders have conceptualised return along these lines, arguing the creation of autonomous Maronite cantons will open the way for similar arrangements elsewhere, particularly in the Karpas Peninsula with its small population of enclaved Greek-Cypriots. In this way, a future settlement will create 'pockets' of cooperation as opposed to a clear-cut physical division between two ethnically homogenous sides.[25]

Conclusion

This chapter has focused on the interplay between diaspora mobilisation and return in the aftermath of forced displacement. Both the counter-intuitive case studies of Maronites in Cyprus and Serbs in the Dvar region focus on the conditions under which diaspora mobilisation in exile could contribute to cooperation. Firstly, the aim of these diasporas has been to support the right and peaceful attempt of their members to return home. Secondly, local authorities had, at the minimum, strong reservations and insisted on restricting these rights to consolidate their demographic dominance. The (partial) forced displacement reversal stories of Cypriot Maronites and Bosnian Serbs can be traced to the development of local and global networks of cooperation generated by diasporas in exile to advocate, support, and sustain return home, even under prohibitive conditions.

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[24] Yet reserves, according to critics, often fail to resolve major problems or satisfy the needs of Aboriginal communities in North America. Social psychologists are divided on this issue, with those favouring inter-group contact pointing to the benefits of some form of integration at the business, social, or residential level (Wagner et al. 2006).

[25] Interview with Maro Emmanuel (to the third author) Home of Cooperation, October 2015.

Could such cases of successful diaspora engagement be replicated in other post-conflict societies? While some conditions appear unique and therefore hard to replicate—such as the massive presence of international agencies in a *de facto* protectorate (Bosnia) or the international involvement of Catholic countries to protect the fairly small Maronite community (Cyprus)—others might work elsewhere. Similar attempts at voluntary 'difficult' return have taken place among Maronite refugees in the village of Biram in Israel and among Assyrian and Kurdish displaced persons in Turkey. In the case of Biram, refugee associations appealed to the Israeli Supreme Court for the return of their village and lobbied the Pope to use his diplomatic weight on Israeli officials to implement the decision. Unlike their Cypriot counterparts, they have not yet managed to get Israeli government approval for their return (Hadid 2009) but won a legal battle in 2015 to connect their church to Israel's electricity grid, hoping that returnees might also benefit in re-establishing their residencies. In the case of Turkey, grassroots displaced persons' associations from Bulgaria and Kurdish-populated regions have played a crucial role in assisting refugees and displaced persons respectively. Particularly in the case of Kurds, such associations have helped members find lawyers and take their cases to the European Court of Human Rights, making the court part of the vocabulary of displaced persons (Celik 2005: 986).

In this chapter, we have posited an additional and important mechanism to support diasporas as agents for positive change. If a post-conflict settlement enables diasporas to vote in local elections in the place of displacement (for instance by a remote voting mechanism), displaced persons might be able to peacefully regain a stake in local political institutions, and thus be encouraged to return. Support for informal associations of neighbours could also be a cost-effective way to facilitate community return, enhancing the sense of safety in numbers and helping to recreate the pre-displacement communal environment. Refugee and displaced persons' associations in Bosnia and Cyprus have been extremely important in the coordination of mass returns, in the mobilisation of refugee block voting to influence local and international politics, and in the reduction of security threats by forging ties with moderates on the other side. Trust, exchange, and social capital could be crucial themes in discussions of return in displacement and diaspora studies more generally, making this chapter's theoretical conclusions relevant beyond Bosnia and Cyprus.

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9

The Influence of Diaspora Politics on Conflict and Peace: Transnational Activism of Stateless Kurds

Latif Tas

Introduction

The conflict between the Turkish state and Kurds is increasing in Turkey and the neighbouring states. Societal divisions between Turks and Kurds are at a boiling point. One of the main reasons for this is that successive Turkish governments are more interested in maintaining their own

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power than in any real attempt at peace-making with Kurds. This chapter focuses on two interconnected arguments. First, it analyses both the ongoing conflict and also the so-called 'peace process' between Kurds, especially the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (PKK; Kurdistan Workers' Party), with their imprisoned leader Abdullah Ocalan, and the Turkish state. Secondly, it explores how, without any state to their name, Kurdish diasporas—both in Turkey and outside—have become increasingly active agents. The links that Kurds in the diaspora have with the international community are described. The effects of these links not only on the conflict, but also on potential roles of 'peace-making', 'peace-building', and 'reconciliation' processes within Turkey, are discussed. The chapter challenges Benedict Anderson's idea that those who live in diasporas keep themselves safe and avoid personal sacrifices (Anderson 1998). Instead, it is suggested that diasporas can be an active part of both peace and conflict. The research reported here suggests that stateless diasporas can provide a training ground for institutions serving potential future states.

Methodology

In order to explore individual and family Kurdish experiences in different diasporas, and their involvement in homeland politics, conflict, and peace, I carried out multi-sited ethnographic qualitative research (as described in Marcus 1995) between December 2012 and February 2016. This included four focus groups and 52 in-depth, open-ended qualitative interviews involving individuals originating from different Kurdish regions, but now living in different part of the diaspora. The research involved a total of 85 Kurdish adults, of whom 45 were women and 40 were men. These individuals were currently living in the UK (London), Germany (Berlin) or Turkey (Istanbul and Diyarbakir). Research participants included community representatives, political and women's rights activists, MPs, co-mayors, academics, journalists, and lawyers.

This builds on work I have conducted on Kurdish diaspora organisation and practices in the UK, Germany, and Turkey, and their transnational connections since 2008, as part of my previous research (Tas 2013a,b, 2014). In addition, reports from different NGOs, brochures

and publications from different Kurdish associations, including PKK were examined; events, seminars, and conferences were followed; and speeches and interviews from different Kurdish and Turkish political and military leaders were analysed.

I want to begin by arguing that there is no real peace process in Turkey. The outcomes of the research reported here show that the aim of negotiations—for both the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the PKK—is actually to monopolise power and violence, rather than to move towards peace. I argue that this 'game' based so-called 'peace process' has further deepened divisions between Turks and Kurds, and opened the door for an escalation of violent conflict. The second argument is that diasporas, especially for stateless people, are not just 'a home away from home'. Forced migration, unequal citizenship, and an unsafe living environment mean that even an ancestral homeland can feel like a diaspora. For this reason, stateless diasporas are not only idealistic protesters, but can also act as positive agents for the homeland and create practical solutions for stateless communities.

The Current Conditions and Crisis

The first sign of the failure of the most recent so-called 'peace process' was seen on 6–7 October 2014 in almost all Kurdish-populated cities in Turkey. Around 50 people lost their lives (Daglar 2014; Pope 2014). Escalation of the conflict between June 2015 and February 2016 has additionally cost more than a thousand lives. As in conflicts over the last three decades, most of these individuals were Kurdish civilians. Several towns have been under 24-hour curfew for months (Amnesty International 2016; Pitel 2016). This means that civilians either starve or face sniper fire. The UK Green Party (2016) Leader Natalie Bennett described the situation:

Kurdish communities in eastern Turkey have been placed under so-called curfews, some for long periods, which has made it impossible for families to secure food supplies, threatened their access to water and electricity and denied those in need access to medical treatment. Amnesty International

has described this as being like 'collective punishment' of these communities.

More than one million people have been affected. 200,000 people have been displaced, some of whom are trying to make their way to Western Europe. There is not only a lack of any substantive progress towards peace, but a worsening of the situation. The conflict has spread all over Turkey. In addition to conflict in the Kurdish regions, between June 2015 and February 2016 there were five big explosions in Diyarbakir, Suruc, Ankara, Sultanahmet, and again in Ankara; and 234 people were killed and thousands of people were injured as a result of these explosions that, it has been claimed, were carried out by Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) militants (Karaca 2016). If these attacks were not the result of Turkish state intelligence collaboration, then there was at least a total intelligence failure on the part of the Turkish state to let these almost similar attacks happen. The majority of victims from the first three attacks were Kurds. The fourth explosion targeted German tourists, while the fifth was directed against Turkish military personnel (Letsch 2016). Following each attack, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan claimed how Turkey is determined to continue its fight against those who carried out the atrocity and the powers behind them.

However, Erdogan has used these ISIS attacks, which have mainly killed Kurds, as an opportunity to start a war; not against Islamic militants, but instead against Kurds in Turkey and Syria (CBC 2016; RT 2016; Tisdall 2016). Instead of retaliating against ISIS militants, Turkey and President Erdogan are once again repeating their old and unsuccessful methods, explicitly aiming 'to annihilate' the Kurdish militants and their supporters (Cakan 2015). Making Kurds the scapegoat is always popular among Turkish nationalists and populist politicians who court the nationalist vote. Doing so also represents an opportunity for the state to divert attention away from the country's major problems. While Erdogan desperately needs to use this card, the PKK also uses Erdogan's anti-Kurdish policies to increase Kurdish nationalism for his own hegemony. Within both Turkish and Kurdish societies it has almost become a crime to be anti-nationalist. These developments support the idea

that, for both the Erdogan-led AKP government and PKK, the so-called negotiations were not about risk-taking to make peace—but about risk-avoidance to maintain the status quo, and so to maintain the current actors' grasp on power. However, without taking substantial risks, including the risk of losing power, it is effectively impossible to broker peace (Dogan 2016).

Before analysing the current conditions in the Middle East and Turkey, and the role of diaspora communities in more depth, I would like to underline that peace negotiations are never easy. Getting started is often—usually—the most difficult thing to do. Conflict will either be temporarily and conditionally stopped, or may even be continuing (Sumbeiywo 2008). Every peace process is like a piece of theatre. There are many players, actors—from different sides—who do not trust each other. Of course, the different sides have different agendas. Some protagonists may be benefitting directly from the war, and can easily choose to destroy any possible peace process. For example, the 50,000 men currently employed by the Turkish state as village guards have no incentive to support peace, since peace will probably mean that they will lose their family's livelihood. Losing their job would also mean losing the weapon they rely on to 'defend' themselves (Geerdink 2014). Other people may want to be perceived as peace-makers, but only so that they can monopolise power and violence for their own benefit. It is even more difficult when there has been a long war, with trust lost between parties and societies. This is the Turkish, Kurdish, and Middle Eastern situation.

With Kurdish populations living in their historical regions in Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Turkey, as well as in the diasporas, one cannot separate the Kurdish and Turkish 'peace process' from ongoing conflicts and wars in the neighbouring countries. Many of the Kurds I interviewed believe that for any successful and permanent peace, Kurds living in all of these places, including the diasporas, must be involved in the peace process. There is an international historical context, with effects on international stability and important human rights issues to consider. These all mean that there is a wider international responsibility to observe, oversee, and to take an active part in the peace process.

Where is the Diaspora for Stateless People?

In this chapter, I am using the word 'diaspora' to mean both a place and group of people. I have already discussed elsewhere (Tas 2014, 2016) that for stateless people, diaspora is not just the 'home away from the original homeland' or 'dispersal of people from their original homeland' described by many researchers (see Connor 1986; Safran 1991; Tölölyan 1994; Cohen 1997; Palmer 1998). Forced internal migration can create a diaspora within a nation-state. Continuing state oppression, weak citizenship, differential minority classification and treatment (Ustundag 2016), and an unsafe living environment all mean that even the ancestral homeland can feel like a diaspora. For that reason, stateless Kurds do not just have one diaspora, they have double or even triple diasporas. For example, a Kurdish family from Diyarbakir may feel as though they are living in a diaspora. When they are forced to move to Istanbul, they are living in a double diaspora. After they migrate to London or Berlin, they are in a triple diaspora. All places feel temporary for them.

The resulting very limited feelings of belonging contribute to increasing mobilisation among the diasporas. Around four million Kurds have already been internally displaced in Turkey, and more than one million Kurds from Turkey have moved to Western Europe. Even more are, and will be, affected by the ongoing conflict in Turkey and the Middle East. The Western world, especially European countries, has turned a blind eye to oppressive and totalitarian leaders such as Erdogan in the hope that they will not receive any further refugees and may assimilate those they already have. However, it is the discriminatory policies of these oppressive leaders that have created the forced migrations in the Middle East and Turkey in the first place. As long as war, conflict, and crime continue as a result of their policies, the tidal wave of more refugees will continue to flow. A recent study by Bosphorus University, Istanbul showed that more than 30 percent of people from Turkey, around 25 million, would like to leave the country because of ongoing political instability (Cumhuriyet 2016).

In the last 35 years, there has never been a day without war and violence in the Middle East and Turkey. The most recent conflict—which

started in March 2011 in Syria, has included Iraq from 2014 and Turkey from June 2015—has cost around 500,000 lives. It has created more than 11 million homeless refugees (BBC News 2016). It is not surprising that all of these wars have disproportionately affected Kurds. Kurdish statelessness is a key reason for the direct and indirect discrimination against Kurds in the various nation states they live in.

In Syria and Iraq, there is currently no rule of law, no consistent authority and, effectively, no state. The Iranian and Turkish states have their own agendas. They are both aiming for a 'big brother' style leadership of the Middle East using, respectively, Shia or Sunni proxies. Neither Iran nor Turkey wants to see Kurds united: since the sixteenth century both are accustomed to using warring Kurdish factions as buffer armies. When Kurds try to move away from this situation, and connect with the international community, then the Iranian and Turkish states try new ways to weaken Kurds and keep them divided. Most recently, at the same time that Turkey was supporting the ISIS against Kurds in the Middle East (Sanchez 2016) and using state violence against Kurds in Turkey, Iran was directly helping and supporting Shia militias fighting in Iraq against both Kurds and the IS. Both countries are happy to see Kurds divided. There is a famous phrase that says, "if you find two brothers fighting, do not try to separate them, otherwise they will both turn on you" (Sumbeiywo 2008). In the Kurdish case, other countries do not just leave Kurdish factions to fight each other, they add fuel to the flames to make sure that the fighting continues.

The History of the Turkish–Kurdish 'Peace Processes'

All these issues and 'big brother' games demonstrate why it is difficult to talk about any real peace process between Turks and Kurds. There have been some talks about possible peace talks. These limited talks have not involved all the different internal and international stakeholders. Instead, they have only been between two political parties or groups (AKP for Turkey and PKK for Kurds). Talks about talks are not new. Around two

decades ago, in 1993, the Turkish President Ozal tried to negotiate with the PKK leader Ocalan through various mediators (Ensaroglu 2013; Tas 2015). At around the same time, conservative Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel, during a visit to Diyarbakir, said that Turkey "recognised the Kurdish reality". Following these positive moves, on 20 March 1993, just a day before the *Newroz* (Kurdish New Year) celebrations, the PKK declared their first—but not their last—ceasefire.

However, these positive movements did not last and the one-sided PKK ceasefire ended in June 1993. This failure opened the door for the very brutal conflicts of the 1990s. The importance of the 'Kurdish question' was acknowledged in 1995 when a progressive Turkish politician, the ex-Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz, declared that democratisation in Turkey and EU accession could not be achieved in Ankara until the problems in Diyarbakir were resolved. In 1997, Turkish Prime Minister Erbakan made another unsuccessful attempt—one of the results of which was a military coup.

The 'Kurdish question' moved beyond Turkey to become a European and international issue with the capture of the PKK founder and leader, Abdullah Ocalan, in 1999. After this arrest the PKK and many Kurdish leaders were initially paralysed. Until 2004, the PKK were effectively militarily silent. However, this was socially, politically, and legally one of the most active times for Kurds and the PKK. According to many of my interviewees in Turkey, Berlin, and London, Kurds and the PKK started to learn about the dynamics of international power, and focus on international politics.

The PPK recruited a new cadre of members and reorganised the approach to armed struggle against Turkey. Perhaps even more importantly, the PKK focused on creating social, legal, and economic institutions in Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and the different diasporas. These institutions were intended to contribute to a possible future Kurdish state, as discussed in a later legal case-study. Transnational Kurdish mobilisation was created and links were made between different capitals, including Diyarbakir, Istanbul, Berlin, Brussels, London, and Paris. Different political parties, associations, and unofficial legal courts were created and developed during this militarily silent, but institutionally very active, period.

Although PKK was listed, and so banned, as a terrorist organisation by many states; political, social, and economic mobilisation continued.

During the same time period, with Ocalan under arrest and PKK militarily quiet, Turkey felt able to relax militarily. However, the effect of the long war with Kurds paralysed Turkey socially and economically. Seeking help from the economic crisis, the focus was on achieving EU accession. Turkey promised to meet the Copenhagen Criteria, and in response, Turkey's candidacy was approved in Helsinki in December 1999. Many important constitutional amendments were passed by the Turkish parliament following Ocalan's arrest, including the abolition of the death penalty and of the state of emergency (Tezcur 2010).

In 2002, after a decade of coalition government, the AKP achieved an electoral majority and were elected, under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Despite the moves towards democratisation, there were no specific constitutional changes recognising the existence of Kurdish ethnicity or language. No positive rights are accorded to Kurds. Instead, thousands of Kurds are in prison. Deaths in custody, extrajudicial killings, forced migration, and unequal societal treatment all impact Kurds disproportionately. Ryan (1994) and Wickham Crowley (1994) claim that democratisation can reduce the capacity and organisation of insurgent movement. This is not so if the so-called improvements are short-term and cosmetic, as is the case for Kurds in Turkey. As long as the underlying reasons for starting rebel movements continue, mobilisation and further radicalisation of that movement also continues. Kurds are forced to live in diaspora condition with unequal citizenship. Kurdish regions were not supported with economic development, and unemployment still remains very high. Silence from the PKK allowed the Turkish state and government to continue to 'wait and see' and apply the old methods of ignorance and assimilation, under the guise of a process of so-called democratisation. Only after the PKK restarted the war on the Turkish state in 2004, did the AKP remember that they have a 'Kurdish problem'. In August 2005, Prime Minister Erdogan claimed that 'the Kurdish problem' was his problem and that he would resolve it through democracy (Yavuz 2009). But very little in the way of resolution was done in the following four years.

In 2009, the AKP opened a public debate about a 'Kurdish opening'. After criticism from Turkish nationalists, including AKP members, this was renamed as a 'democratic opening'. Even this title was too radical for nationalist Turks, and the initiative was rebadged as 'the national unity and fraternity project'. Even though the Erdogan-led AKP had a dominant majority, it was difficult to even decide on a name for negotiations. However, Kurds and some Turks were still hopeful for peace.

Eventually, in late 2008 and the beginning of 2009, with the help of Norway and the United Kingdom, and for the first time in history, Turkish state representatives and the PKK, working alongside members of the Kurdish diaspora in Europe, had direct meetings and peace talks in Oslo. This is now called the Oslo Process. However, this peace attempt could not be sustained. The Turkish government and the PKK each blamed the other for the collapse of the talks in 2011, after the minutes were leaked to the media, and the process was made public (Philips 2015). The broken promises and loss of hope after Oslo were followed again by some of the bloodiest conflicts between Turkish state forces and the PKK since before the 1999 Abdullah Ocalan arrest (Tezcur 2013). The Uludere massacre took place in December 2011, when 34 Kurdish civilians were killed by the Turkish air force (*The Economist* 2012; Al-Monitor 2013; Goel 2015). This escalated the conflict. Following this, Ocalan's meetings with his lawyers and other visitors were cancelled. PKK prisoners in Turkey took part in lengthy hunger strikes at the end of 2012.

During this crisis I carried out fieldwork research in Germany. This included meeting and talking with Sakine Cansiz in Berlin, in December 2012. She was one of the founding members of the PKK and a prominent leader within the Kurdish women's movement. We discussed the conflict and the poor prospects for peace, just a few weeks before she and two other female Kurdish political activists were assassinated in Paris (9 January 2013). The murderer's links with the Turkish Intelligence Service (MIT) have been confirmed (Cumhuriyet 2015; Demir 2015). Despite the bloody war, 67 days of hunger strike, and the Paris assassinations, there was another step towards peace when Ocalan's ceasefire message was read during the *Newroz* 2013 celebrations in Diyarbakir. The PKK and Ocalan openly declared that 'peace process' negotiations were going on. This time the process was named the 'Imrali process', after the island

where the imprisoned PKK leader, Ocalan, has been jailed since 1999. However, the Erdogan-led AKP government claimed for a long time that it was not the government but the state that was in contact with Ocalan and other Kurdish political representatives. This was an attempt to protect the AKP from any damage resulting from this process. They were avoiding, rather than taking, any risks. As Candar (2015) states, the peace process in Turkey between Turks and Kurds was neither transparent nor mediated by a third party. The AKP government attempted to assert its strength by neglecting to include any independent parties, and this damaged the structural viability of the process. Candar (2015) is clear that the "Kurdish issue has become an electioneering tactic on the part of the AKP and therefore any current peace process efforts would be lacking in substance and drive".

Unbalanced 'Peace Processes'

In 2009, the Turkish President Abdullah Gul claimed that "Good things are going to happen" (Turkone 2009), referring to the Kurdish issue, and acknowledging it as Turkey's most important problem. However, seven years after the 2009 Oslo talks, there have still not been any substantive developments. Despite the talks between Ocalan and some key players, including some Kurdish MPs, the Turkish Intelligence Service, and some AKP members, no 'good things' have happened. The current Turkish President Erdogan has been the unchallenged leader of both AKP and Turkey since 2002. He has consistently avoided, at least openly, either being part of the process or even working to move the process on.

The primary issue on Erdogan's agenda has been to promote his personal unchallenged power. This is why he was so keen to change Turkey from a parliamentary system to a presidency. However, after Selahattin Demirtas, the co-leader of the pro-Kurdish Peoples' Democratic Party, the HDP, declared in March 2015 that "we will not make you the president" (Hurriyet 2015), then Erdogan focused on playing the Turkish nationalist card. In April 2015, in direct contradiction of his 2005 Diyarbakir speech, he claimed that, "Turkey has no Kurdish problem". The following

months, he restarted the war against Kurds in Turkey and started a Syrian offensive.

When a peace process only involves a few of the parties to the conflict, and leaders are only concerned with their self-interest, it is not surprising that the results are as observed in the Turkish–Kurdish peace process. If peace negotiations are to be successful, and not rely solely on military action, the different parties must work together and be prepared to take risks to solve the dispute. Without a clear roadmap, a specified timetable, the involvement of all key stakeholders and interested third parties, plus international involvement, it is not possible to even start to resolve the differences between sides who have been in conflict for a long time. Neither key actors within different civil entities, nor all the various relevant political parties knew the details of negotiations between the imprisoned Kurdish leader and the AKP or state representatives. There was no clarity about the peace talks themselves, the possible reconciliation process, or possible new institutions in the formation of a potentially decentralised Turkish state. As we have seen in the Turkish–Kurdish case, empty promises in relation to this sort of so-called 'peace process' almost always open the door for brutal conflict. This is exactly what led to the conflict that started in June 2015. By February 2016, after only eight months, the conflict had cost around one thousand additional lives.

Even if a peace process was successfully developing between the PKK and AKP then, in the long term, the exclusion of the other factions might well increase the possibilities of conflict. For example, Kurdish Hezbollah could turn their guns onto the Turkish state, saying that they do not recognise any peace process, and that they want to fight for an independent Kurdish or Islamic State. Similarly, Turkish nationalists and former members of the Turkish military have not supported any moves towards peace processes with Kurds, including the most recent one. Instead, they have been championing more oppressive types of military operation in Kurdish regions (Yavuz and Ozcan 2007; Gocek 2011).

All previous negotiations were unbalanced. On one side of the imagined 'peace process' was the government of the Turkish state, on the other, an imprisoned leader under the control of that government and the state. Messages from Ocalan about the negotiations were delivered by a few selected Kurdish political party members. Research about peace and

conflict (See Laderach 1997; Wessels 1998; Zartman 2007; Harbom and Wallensteen 2008; Bercovitch 2009; Loizides 2009; Ramsbotham et al. 2011; Hamber 2015) suggests that, at the beginning, any peace process should be limited to only a few actors. But in the Kurdish and Turkish context there has been no substantive process over the last seven years. After all this time, we still do not even know whether there are any mutually agreed principles, and what they might be. There has not been an Observatory Committee. No Truth and Reconciliation Committee had been established until the day of completion of this research. There has been no involvement from the UN or European Union, or other parts of the international community. Nor is it clear who might be the guarantor of any potential peace. Millions of people have suffered and have been forced to move to internal and external diasporas, as discussed above, because of the ongoing conflict.

Understandably, both the migrants and those people who have not moved have very little trust in the ongoing so-called peace process. All this makes both any talks and the overall peace process itself very fragile. The politics of the Middle East are extremely dynamic. Individual players and factions frequently swap allegiances (Rosenberg and Wolfsfeld 1977). It is therefore important that any peace process should include all main actors and factions (Lederach 1997; Zartman 2007; Ramsbotham et al. 2011).

Kurds and Turks can only continue living together if there is a peaceful solution to the ongoing conflict. Even hope for peace cannot continue if promises remain empty. Each new episode of violence acts as a reminder of the previous bad experiences and further increases hate between the different ethnic groups, making it more difficult for future generations to come together and make a durable peace. The recent wars with Kurds in Syria and Turkey will produce new developments, and may even challenge borders in the Middle East, including Turkey. Kurds have moved on from their old method of armed struggle against Turkey into societal resistance. They have named Turkey as a 'coloniser' or 'occupier' state. With the help of the transnational Kurdish diaspora, they have made the Kurdish issue into an international issue, and so brought the Kurdish case to a similar level as the Israeli and Palestinian conflict, as discussed in more detail by Darweish and Rigby (2015).

Diaspora is Not a Safe Haven

The underlying concern here is how to work towards successful negotiations for peace, including a stable post-conflict situation, with the help of Kurdish stateless diasporas. There is a large literature on diaspora, conflict, and peace (see for example, Lederach 1997; Al-Ali 2007; Snyder 2015). One can easily observe deep differences between and within diasporic communities. There is a strong emotional connection between society in Kurdish regional homelands and Kurdish diaspora communities. As in the Kurdish homelands, diaspora societies are not a unitary or homogenous entity. Religious and ideological divisions exist within Kurdish society.

War and conflict over the past 30 years have forced hundreds of thousands of stateless Kurds to flee their homelands in Turkey and other countries in the Middle East in an attempt to secure safety outside of the region. Many of those who have moved to Western Europe experience continued feelings of alienation, with only limited feelings of belonging to their 'host countries', and a frequent sense of living in limbo. These sentiments have been an important engine of Kurdish nationalism, mobilising Kurdish men and women in the diaspora to bring an end to their perceived statelessness (Tas 2015, 2016). The diaspora is seen by many as a safe environment within which to organise: creating not only "long-distance nationalists" (Anderson 1998, 2006; Sheffer 2002; Schiller and Georges 2001; Schiller 2005) but also alternative institutions for a future, imagined state. It can be argued that statelessness, diasporas, and nationalism are strongly connected in so far as statelessness and diasporas can be seen to feed nationalism. Since Kurds have no 'unitary' religious or linguistic identity, many Kurds have claimed that the only way forward is to become much more nationalistic. From this perspective, unity through nationalism is the only way to end Kurdish statelessness and to make a stable peace.

Many Kurds believe that Kurdish people, both as individuals and as a community, have not been 'strong enough' nationalists, since they have not been successful at establishing their own state. The weak nationalism of stateless people, including Kurds, has been part of academic debate in recent years. For example, Ismail Besikci, a well-known Turkish academic

who has researched Kurdish issues for decades, has asserted that, "Kurds are not good enough nationalists. They should not be as democratic as they are today. It's too much. It is not Kurds' business to make Turkey a more democratic country" (Besikci 2014; Hamsici 2014).

Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, who has been imprisoned by Turkey since 1999, has also called on all Kurdish people around the world to unite, and to show resistance against their enemies (Constanze 2014). Kurds who have left the various imagined homelands of Kurdistan to live in diasporas, often take such calls for national solidarity especially seriously. The IS attack on Kobane (Rojova, North Syria), which has cost thousands of lives and caused suffering to hundreds of thousands of people, is the first time in history that Kurds from different parts of the world have joined together to fight for the same cause. These efforts demonstrate a significant shift in Kurdish nationalism: from localised and weak nationalism towards a collective, stronger form of nationalism with the help of diaspora mobilisation. However, some other Kurds argue against stronger nationalism, and instead believe that Kurds need to be more democratic than they are currently. Abbas Vali, another well-known Kurdish academic, said that, "I have to fundamentally disagree with Besikci. Kurds are not democratic enough" (Vali 2015). Kurds who want to promote a more advanced form of democracy are especially concerned about the rights of women and other powerless groups. They even want to champion the right to be heard for those people who hold political views in direct opposition to their own.

Because of long years under the assimilationist policies of the Turkish state, then until recently many Kurds have felt ashamed of their cultural identity. Many Kurds hid their Kurdishness and Kurdish roots (Tas 2014). However, with the recent conflict in the Middle East and, especially, the victorious fighting in Kobane, then more Kurds are now becoming increasingly proud of their Kurdishness. Linked to this, there is increasing Kurdish nationalism. As Kurds are still an underdog minority, this nationalism is developing into an 'aggressive' form which has even been described by Bozarslan (2015) as 'narcissistic nationalism'.[1]

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[1] The term was used for first time by Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) and appeared in his work *Civilization and Its Discontents* (1929–1930), in relation to the application of the inborn aggression in man to ethnic (and other) conflicts.

Members of the Kurdish diaspora have for many years tried to remove the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)[2] from the European Union's list of designated terrorist groups (Channel Four News 2014).[3] Freedom for Ocalan is another key goal of the Kurdish national diaspora movement. These movements are organised under the banner of the Kurdish National Congress (KNC). This was established on 24 May 1999, just a few months after Ocalan was arrested. Underlining the importance of the diaspora communities, the KNC is based in Brussels. This is a temporary arrangement which will last until Kurds have full independence, or at least substantive autonomy.

Under the KNC banner, Kurdish transnational political and protest movements in Europe have made the world aware of the effects of ISIS attacks against Kurds in Shengal, Iraq and Kobane, Syria as well as Turkish state violence against Kurds in Turkey. I believe that Benedict Anderson (1998) is wrong when he claims that members of diaspora communities try to influence what is going on in their homeland without being physically involved in destructive conflicts. As part of my ethnographic research, I was told that thousands of young Kurdish men and women have travelled from London, Berlin, or Istanbul to fight, and help the Kurds in Turkey and Syria. Some of these people are well-educated or work in well-paid professions. Even some of those who remained in their new host countries, or as internal migrants within Turkey, have been arrested for demonstrating their support for the Kurdish cause.

People from the diaspora who cannot go to fight themselves, instead organise fundraising events and take part in lobbying activities and demonstrations with the aim of persuading British and European politicians to help the Kurdish movements in Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran. For example, in September and October 2014, some London based Kurds even went on hunger strike for the Kurdish cause. Between June 2015 and January 2016, thousands of Kurds in different diasporas carried out

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[2] The Kurdistan Workers' Party, *Partiya Kärkeran Kurdistan* (PKK) in Kurdish, began operations against the Turkish State in 1984. Since then more than 50,000 Kurdish and Turkish people have died as a result of the conflict.

[3] The European Union first listed the PKK as having 'been involved in terrorist acts' in 2002. It reaffirmed its position in 2011. Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L:2011:028:TOC [accessed 4 Jan. 2015].

demonstrations and organised petitions against anti-Kurdish state operations by Turkey. Some of these Kurds have been criminalised by the British or Turkish state (See also, Baser 2015; Garmiany 2015; Telgraf 2016).

Kurds are no longer just a local tribal group, operating through kinship networks. The Kurdish lobby in the diaspora may not be as strong as that for Armenians and Jews, but they are moving in that direction (Barzani 2014). Millions of Kurds and their supporters can, and do, take to the streets of Istanbul, Berlin, London, Paris, New York, and Brussels, whenever there is an issue of concern. They also have increasingly strong and close relationships with the governments of their new host countries. For example, Kurds regularly use facilities within the UK parliament for meetings and political discussions, and several MPs and Lords usually input favourably. These increasing links should not be underestimated.

As we have seen, diaspora communities can easily become a driving engine for homeland politics, nationalist movements, and even armed conflict in the original homeland. They can also become an agent involved in putative peace processes. As discussed above, this was the case for the peace process between the PKK and Turkish state representatives, especially the Turkish National Intelligence Service. In 2009, initial negotiations were brokered with the help of diaspora representatives, in the so-called 'Oslo Process'. This example demonstrates that the Kurdish stateless diaspora has already been an active, influential actor in policies affecting its homeland. As one of my interviewees explained, in November 2014:

> If there is going to be any peace with Turkey, it will be down to the diaspora. And that's true for conflict too. We are becoming as strong as the Armenian and Jewish diaspora. Assimilated Kurds in Turkey cannot make peace—or war—without us. We [diaspora Kurds] have suffered. And we [diaspora] will be a part of the decision-making process, if there are going to be any decisions.

A Kurdish academic from London stated that without 'true Kurds' at the peace table, it is not possible to make peace for Kurds. He describes what he means by 'true Kurds':

There are many false Kurds in Turkey and elsewhere. They have been assimilated under a host identity and can only think about their own personal needs, and the importance of their hosts. For example, the Turkish former presidents Ismet Inonu and Turgut Ozal, and other politicians who are involved in mainstream Turkish political parties, like AKP and CHP, might claim that they are from a Kurdish background. But for the whole of their political life, they have worked for the Turkish state. These sorts of people cannot and should not represent Kurds. Another group of false Kurds are those who try to make small changes to Turkish political structure, and so to claim a few minority rights for Kurds. They also don't represent Kurds. Ocalan himself can now be considered as falling into this group, since he has sacrificed the aim of Kurdish independence, for a few baubles. But I can forgive him because he is in Turkish prison. True Kurds are fighting for full Kurdish independence, or at very least, equivalent rights as the Turks have. Only these true Kurds deserve a place at the negotiation table.

This non-negotiable and hypernationalist view can be seen among many forcibly displaced stateless diasporas. Many people like this have very little trust in any so-called 'peace process'. As stated earlier, all of this makes any talks and the peace process itself very fragile. Many of my interviewees do not trust the Turkish state, especially the Erdogan-led government, to make peace. Another of my interviewees explained in London, January 2015:

Of course we [diaspora Kurds] want peace. Who would not want peace? I have lived in three different diasporas in the last 30 years: In Germany, in France and now in the UK. I haven't seen my hometown or my relatives in Turkey since the 1980s. My land was occupied by the village guards. Peace may help people like me to end this misery and to have their land and their home back. But Turkey is not serious about making peace. Erdogan is just playing with us. He needs Kurdish votes and he has used us to stay in power since 2002. He has not made any legal changes in favour of Kurds in his last 13 years in power. He is not a friend of Kurds. We [Kurds] have to think beyond any national borders to help each other. We cannot trust others to help us to make peace; we should create our own state and pull down all the borders that divide us.

The imprisoned Kurdish leader, Ocalan, understands what a potentially important role diaspora communities have. He has repeatedly asked the diaspora to contribute to the development of the peace process both by organising discussions and other events, and also involving European institutions and governments in these events. With this in mind, several conferences (May and December 2013, December 2014) were organised in Brussels by the Kurdish National Congress in the Diaspora (KNK—Kongreya Neteweyî ya Kurdistanê).

At the 13th General Meeting of the KNC, held in Brussels on 25–26 May 2013, it was stated in their concluding brochure that Kurds have the right to live and create their own destiny in their own land as a Kurdish nation, and:

> Democratisation of [the] Middle East can be achieved through the recognition of Kurdish identity and Kurdistan as a nation… On these grounds Kirkuk and other parts of [the] Kurdish region[s] that were taken [by Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran] have to be included again in the map of Kurdistan, and these countries have to show their respect for the map of Kurdistan and its territory.

As we see from this explanation, there are no signs that Kurds, as represented by the PKK and KNK, have dropped their claim of creating a unitary Kurdish state. The Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has also pointed out in many speeches how various Kurdish power-holders, and especially diasporas, play a crucial role in the ongoing conflict and its resolution. The Kurdish diaspora is therefore recognised as an important influencing factor by both sides of the conflict.

Kurds are at Last Learning to Play the System

More tactically, and perhaps more realistically, many Kurdish nationalists have temporarily postponed their aim of creating a Kurdish state in Turkey, as they focus on state-making in Syria and Iraq. One Kurdish legal practitioner in Istanbul, who also functions as a Kurdish politician, said in November 2015:

> Ironically, Kurds have to be thankful to Erdogan and the Turkish state's recent ill-considered internal and foreign policies against Kurds. These have shown the authoritarian face of Turkey to the world and the real extent of discrimination. This has helped Kurds to increase their power. They now control a large area in Syria, and even control some cities in Turkey. Kurds are strengthening connections with various international powers and getting increasing Western support. So I want to see Erdogan in power a little longer. His aggressive policies may actually help Kurds to establish the independent state we have been dreaming of for such a long time.

As long as the fight continues in Iraq, Syria, and Turkey, the most radical Kurds can consolidate their increasingly radical members around that struggle. As Jok says for the South Sudanese case: "nations don't just happen—they have to be planned, forged and crafted" (Jok 2012). Many Kurds in diaspora and also in Turkey are aware that the processes and techniques for state-making are not easy and may take a long time. For example, the Mayor of Kobani acknowledged that, "we [Kurds] are not professional [yet] when it comes to independence" (Abdi 2015). Cemil Bayık, one of the founders and leaders of the outlawed PKK, has said that:

> When the chaos that is engulfing the Middle East is taken into consideration, disarming is not possible… Ankara should change its stance against the Kurds… Turkey should develop peaceful political and economic relations [with Kurds]… Direct communications should be established between [imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah] Ocalan and Kandil [mountains where the PKK militants are based]. And finally, the negotiations should officially be launched. If all these conditions are applied, then our arms might be silenced (*Today's Zaman* 2015).

Many of my interviewees believe that the sort of democratic autonomous system that Ocalan and many Kurdish nationalists currently support for Turkey would not only give time but also allow some of the necessary preparations for a future unitary Kurdish state. Kurds already practice their own legal system *de facto*, for business, family, and even criminal cases, as part of their practical resistance against the Turkish state and

institutions of the state. This is also part of the Kurdish state building project which has been redeveloped and introduced by the PKK for Kurdish people wherever they live, including the UK and German diasporas (Tas 2013a,b, 2014). I discussed 25 cases from a diaspora court in my previous book (Tas 2014), and there showed how the Kurdish diasporas have not only carried out demonstrations or lobbying for their homeland, but also worked towards alternative institutions for a future Kurdish state.

Conclusion

Peace negotiations between Turkey and Kurds have never been balanced. Messages from Ocalan about any negotiations are carried only by a few selected Kurdish political party members. Although any peace process must necessarily be limited initially, with only a few actors, there seems to have been no substantive process over the last three decades. Many important Kurdish and Turkish entities, including the diasporas, have never been included in any substantive way. Diaspora, for stateless people, is not only a place outside of their country of origin, but can include their ancestral village or city, when insecurity and inequality continue there. For that reason, Kurds living in diasporas will continue to be active locally and internationally. This will not just affect Turkey but many other Middle Eastern and European countries until Kurds have some secure place where they are treated as full citizens.

Kurdish diaspora communities are the result of, and key actors in any, conflict. They have acted not only as an important driving engine for homeland politics, but also as a way forward to peace and to the development of future Kurdish institutions. Some elements in Kurdish diasporas have recently promoted a 'strong' and even 'aggressive' nationalism. These contradictions may be an important barrier for Kurdish leaders to overcome if there is ever going to be peace.

Turkey, since its establishment as a republic, has never achieved social cohesion. The conflict between Turks and Kurds is one of the major reasons for this. The Turkish state has not tried to make peace in any real way, merely reiterated attempts at military 'solutions'. These have not moved

anything forward in the last hundred years, and are not moving anything forward now. Different Turkish governments have mouthed platitudes and postponed any real actions towards peace. There has never been any substantial move towards building trust and increasing tolerance between and within different ethnic groups. Successive Turkish governments did not show any understanding of the real sociological problems in Turkey. The PKK benefits from pre-existing problems of the Kurds and does not find it difficult to recruit new members. Thousands of young people join the PKK voluntarily every year. This shows that as long as exile conditions exist for the Kurds in Turkey, the PKK or similar organisations will not only exist but will thrive.

If there is to be any long-term and sustainable peace solution in Turkey, then multi-party and international involvement and guarantees are needed. Political and constitutional changes need to be adopted by the Turkish state. Only when this has happened, can societal changes follow.

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10

The Transnational Political Effects of Diasporic Citizenship in Countries of Destination: Overseas Citizenship of India and Political Participation in the United States

Daniel Naujoks

Introduction

Half of the world's 195 countries allow their nationals to retain their previous citizenship when naturalising in another country. Another fifth of all countries recognise dual citizenship for their emigrants under

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certain conditions, often with permission by the government.[1] However, the effects of such policies are virtually unknown. From the country-of-origin perspective, it is often hoped that such policies support the government's capacity to realise its economic and political projects (Fitzgerald 2006). Giving people rights generally increases their opportunities and the effects of the provision of certain rights depend on how such rights affect individual and collective behavior.

While the economic and social effects of migration have been at the forefront of academic and policy debates, migrants' political activities have only recently begun to receive more attention. This includes migrants' involvement in transnational politics in home countries,[2] 'remitting' democratic values to polities of origin,[3] the role of diasporic communities in international relations,[4] as well as political activities by naturalised immigrants and ethnic interest groups.[5] This essay aims at closing a gap between immigration research that concerns itself predominantly with incorporation mechanisms and their conditions in host countries and the increasing body of diaspora[6] research that investigates government of origin policies and incorporation mechanisms of *ex patriae* populations.

While each of these domains has been analyzed separately, the linkages between them remain understudied. This includes the question of how legal and national affiliations in one part of the world can affect opportunities and actions in another. While this study references the citizenship regimes and practices as established by nation states, it is concerned with

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[1] Or 53 and 19 percent respectively, see United Nations (2013). According to Vink et al.'s (2013) global dual citizenship database, in 2013, 70 percent of all countries allowed dual citizenship once their nationals naturalised elsewhere.

[2] Itzigsohn and Saucedo (2002), Levitt (2003), Portes et al. (2008), Spiro (2006), Lafleur (2012), Koinova (2013), and Burgess (2014).

[3] Guarnizo et al. (2003), Levitt and Jaworsky (2007).

[4] Shain and Barth (2003), Varadarajan (2010), and Ragazzi et al. (2012).

[5] Calvo and Rosenstone (1989), Shain (1994/95), R. Smith (1995), Haney and Vanderbush (1999), De la Garza and Pachon (2000), T. Smith (2000), Ambrosio (2002), Lindsay (2002), Mearsheimer and Walt (2007), Rubenzer (2008), Baumgartner et al. (2009), Lieberman (2009), Paul and Paul (2009), and DeWind and Segura (2014).

[6] Diasporic actors are all persons who originate from a certain country, self-identify with that country, and who maintain a meaningful cultural and social relationship with the country (Sheffer 2003; Naujoks 2013a: 12). This includes both citizens and non-citizens of the home country, as well as first and second-plus generation emigrants.

the transnational connections between activities in countries of origin and residence. For this reason, it connects state membership with denationalised (Sassen 2003) and post-national (Soysal 1994) conceptions of citizenship and related practices.

While it is often claimed that dual citizenship may have positive impacts on migrants' economic and political activities, and that it may strengthen ties between migrants and their countries of origin (Schuck 2002: 82; Hailbronner 2003: 80), there appear to be no empirical studies on the effects of dual citizenship. Often, the effect of diasporic membership rights is too closely conceptualised along the political rhetoric that focuses on moral obligations and the exercise of power, rather than on actual consequences at the individual level. This essay addresses the question of how the extension of membership rights in countries of origin can affect migrants' political participation in the country of residence.

My specific objective here is to establish an empirically grounded theory of how the existence of Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI), and the status passages toward OCI, affect the political participation of diasporic Indians in the USA, especially their activities and strength for political advocacy. To the best of my knowledge, no research on such effects and the underlying mechanism currently exists. In recent years, a growing body of scholarship has addressed the question of when people organise along ethnic lines to influence policy-making processes, what the impacts of such activities are, and what are the conditions under which diaspora lobbying is most influential.[7] This essay furthers our understanding of the factors determining ethnic interest group activities and diaspora lobbying. The conceptualisations equally aim at contributing to scholarship on the impacts of dual citizenship, immigrant naturalisation, and diaspora engagement policies.[8] Overall, I seek to bring to bear theories of transnational and diaspora engagement and their impacts on domestic activities, exploring the nexus between changes in citizenship status and individual, intra-group, and inter-group behavior.

This article is part of my larger endeavour to explore the effects of a special membership status in countries of origin on individual and

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[7] For an overview, see Haglund (2015) and note 5.

[8] On the latter, see Gamlen (2014).

collective activities, examining the case of India's Overseas Citizenship (Naujoks 2013a). In 2003, India amended its citizenship act, introducing a new membership status, the Overseas Citizenship of India. OCI gives people of Indian origin without Indian citizenship the right to live and work in India without granting them any form of political participation.[9] In December 2005, the first diasporic Indians were able to obtain their OCI certificates and by January 2015, almost 1.7 million persons of Indian origin had OCI status in addition to their primary citizenship. In mid-2013, when the last detailed data on OCI grants were released, 519,000 out of 1.3 million OCI cards—or 38 percent—were issued to applicants in the USA.

Based on 50 interviews with 53 highly-skilled interviewees conducted in 2009, this essay theorises how a diasporic state membership status—namely, the Overseas Citizenship of India—and the acquisition of US citizenship affect migrants' political activities. The leading methodology for gathering, conducting, and analysing interviews was Grounded Theory, in the tradition of Strauss and Corbin (1990). In order to supplement the findings of the qualitative research, statistical analysis of American Community Survey micro data, immigration statistics, as well as several sources of naturalisation data have been included into the analysis.[10]

In the remainder of this essay, I will provide a brief socio-economic profile of the ethnic Indian community and key points regarding the community's political advocacy efforts. Subsequently, I will explore how a diasporic citizenship status can affect political activism.

The Ethnic Indian Community in the USA[11]

Figure 10.1 shows the general development of the ethnic Indian community in the United States, providing information on the share of US-born, naturalised foreign-born and non-naturalised foreign-born Indians. In

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[9] Another, slightly more limited membership status was the Person of Indian Origin card (PIO card), which was available from 1999 until January 2015. For more details on the privileges and limitations of OCI and the PIO card, see Naujoks (2013a: Chaps. 1, 3), Xavier (2011).

[10] For more details, see Naujoks (2013a: Introduction and Annex).

[11] For an overview of Indian migration, see Naujoks (2013a) and Kapur (2010).

Fig. 10.1   Development of the Indian Community in the USA (1960–2014) *Note*: Data since 1980 refers to ethnic 'Asian Indian only', before 1980 refers to 'India-born'. *Source*: Own calculations based on data from the US Census 1960–2000 and American Community Survey 2005–2014.

2014, 1.1 percent of the total US population, or close to 3.5 million, were ethnic Indians.[12] US citizens among them totalled more than 2.2 million.

On average, the educational achievements as well as the occupational and economic patterns distinguish the Indian community as far above the US national average. The annual household income for ethnic Indians exceeds the household income of all households by 74 percent. More than two-thirds of the ethnic Indian population holds at least a bachelor's degree and 65 percent of employed ethnic Indians in the USA above 16 years of age work in a managerial or professional position (Naujoks 2013a: 37).

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[12] This refers to people who self-identify as 'Asian Indians alone' in the American Community Survey. In 2014, 300,000 more people identified as 'Asian Indians' and another ethnic group, which can be explained by children of mixed marriages or by ethnic Indians, who were born in Suriname, Uganda, and other places where their ancestors had emigrated from India.

Indian-American Political Advocacy—Groups, Platforms, and Experiences

To impact policy decisions, ethnic interest groups attempt to place issues on the policy agenda (so-called framing), provide information and policy analysis, and exercise policy oversight (Ambrosio 2002: 2). The growing Indian-American community, its social and professional standing, as well as its increasing awareness of its political influence, led to the establishment of the Congressional Caucus on India and Indian-Americans in 1993 and the US Senate's Friends of India in 2004.

Table 10.1 sketches the development in the membership of both informal groups. While in the period 1999–2001, around a quarter of all congressmen belonged to the India Caucus, this number rose to a high of 43 percent in 2003 and 41 percent at the end of 2014. Of the 152 members in 2008–2009, 107 belonged to the Democratic Party and 45 to the

Table 10.1 Development of membership in India-related groups in the US Congress

Year	Number of members	Share of all house members (%)
US Congressional Caucus on India and Indian-Americans		
1993	8[a]	2
1997	88[b]	20
1999–2000	115[c]–120[d]	26–28
2001	118[e]	27
2003	130–163[d]	30–37
2003–2004	186[f]	43
2006	176[d]	40
2008–2009	152[d]	35
2011	150[g]	34
2014	>180[h]	>41
US Senate's Friends of India		
2004	20[i]–37[d]	20–37
2008–2009	37[d]	37
2011	40[h]	40
2015	35[j]	35

Sources: [a] Wilson (2012), [b] Business Standard (1997), [c] Hathaway (2001: p. 27), [d] www.usindiafriendship.net, [e] High-level Committee on the Indian Diaspora (2002: 174), [f] Indian American Friendship Council (2004), [g] Embassy of India, Washington, D.C. (2011), [h] Bera (2014), [i] Kirk (2008: 290), [j] Cornyn (n.d.)

Republican Party. Also, the US Senate's informal group, Friends of India, accounts for 35 percent of all senators. The caucus focuses not only on India-related subjects, but also on matters concerning the Indian-American community in the USA. However, observers have noted that it is best known as a foreign policy force (Hathaway 2001: 28). It is important to note that the size of the group may be an insufficient indication for its impact. In 2001, the caucus' co-chairman McDermott complained that only a fraction of its members are committed to helping the community or making a tangible contribution to improving Indo-US relations (Haniffa 2001).

Besides the direct lobby groups, there are specialised professional associations, Indian community organisations, as well as business and industrial associations,[13] like the US-India Business Council, that are also active in community advocacy.[14]

In recent years, advocacy groups, the political rise of Indian-Americans—like Louisiana governor, Bobby Jindal, South Carolina governor, Nikki Haley, congressmen Hansen Clarke and Ami Bera—and the Congressional India Caucus have led to increasing political influence of the community. In 2010, it was reported that at least eight second-generation Indian-Americans were running for Congress or state-wide office and in 2012, at least 12 were in the race for Congress. Janardhanan (2013) also highlights the role of the Indian American Republican Council that raised millions for George W. Bush's 2000 presidential campaign. He also reports that Indian community organisations actively distributed lists of congressional candidates with favourable attitudes toward Indian and Indian-Americans.

The most significant and highly-acclaimed success of the Indian-American advocacy efforts is widely seen in the supporting of the signing of the US–India agreement for civil nuclear cooperation in 2008 and the several steps that led to the final signature, convincing US lawmakers that India was a trusted and reliable partner (Mistry 2013–2014, 2014). Another example of successful advocacy efforts by the Indian diaspora was the removal of US sanctions in the aftermath of India's nuclear tests

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[13] The Indian diaspora in the USA is highly organised, with countless regional and pan-Indian cultural, professional, and charity organisations. A mapping of Indian-American community organisations revealed 346 associations, of which the larger ones had dozens of chapters across the USA, sometimes even in India (Naujoks 2013a, Chap. 1). For an analysis of transnational organisations among Indian immigrants in the USA, see Agarwala (2015).

[14] Parekh (2000) provides examples and numbers for Indian-American political fundraising.

in 1998. When the tests triggered international sanctions, most importantly from the United States, ethnic Indians in the USA and the India Caucus were vocal in explaining India's point of view and lobbying for the relaxation of the sanctions (Therwath 2008). Soon, some of the sanctions were removed and over the next year and a half, the US Congress adopted a series of measures removing or easing the sanctions.

A third important illustration of the Indian-American political leverage can be seen in the context of several 'anti-outsourcing bills' introduced in several states to 'protect American jobs' in 2004–2005.[15] Both a strong Indian-American lobby and Indian-Americans high-up in the corporate ranks of US companies were seen as strong forces against this kind of legislation.[16]

I want to end this brief presentation on a note of caution. While it has been argued that ethnic interest groups can significantly impact policy decisions (Shain 1994/95; Haney and Vanderbush 1999; Mearsheimer and Walt 2007), several scholars find that the power of ethnic lobbies to influence foreign policies is limited, as such policies are generally determined by governmental elites (Lindsay 2002; Baumgartner et al. 2009; Lieberman 2009; Paul and Paul 2009). Analysing lobbying efforts from the Indian-American community, Mistry (2013–2014, 2014) finds that the effects of community groups are generally overstated and that ethnic lobbies are most successful when they join larger coalitions. Leaving it to focused empirical research to prove or disprove relevant claims, here I am more concerned with the effects of citizenship policies in the country of origin than with the evaluation of the effectiveness of such activities.

The Effects of Diasporic Citizenship on Political Participation

I will now turn to explore how the quasi-dual citizenship status that is OCI affects the political participation and advocacy impact of diasporic Indians in the USA. Based on my empirical study, I theorise that the

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[15] These bills ban State contract work from being shifted outside the USA, and limit the use of offshore call centres; these affect less than 2 percent of the total IT work that is outsourced to Indian companies from the USA (NFAP 2007).

[16] As reported by *The Hindu Businessline*, 13 May 2005.

question of whether diasporic actors indulge in political activities depends largely on three factors: that they can, that they decide to, and that they are allowed to undertake such activities. This leads to the categories of actors' *ability*, actors' *decision*, and the *permissibility* of actions (Naujoks 2013a: 305). Country-of-origin citizenship, or here OCI, matters for all three aspects of the relevant activities.

OCI affects the political influence and strength of the Indian-American community, as well as the actual political activities by diaspora actors. The political weight of a community depends on several factors that pertain to the individual level of political involvement, as well as on the degree of organised claims making. Reviewing scholarship on the political influence of *ethnic interest groups*, the following factors can be considered particularly significant:[17]

(1) The number of voters and those who actually turn out to vote.
(2) The financial capacity and contributions, since political influence is closely tied to financial contributions to parties, candidates, and causes, especially in the USA (Baumgartner and Leech 1998; Haney and Vanderbush 1999; T. Smith 2000).
(3) Community involvement of the group and its general social standing (Dahl 1961: Chap. 20).
(4) The number of individuals from that community that work for parties, are members of political clubs (Calvo and Rosenstone 1989), and run for political office.
(5) The degree of organisation and unity of the group. In other words, factionalism and division into several regional, religious, linguistic, and other sub-groups does not help the community speak 'with one voice'. The existence and power of political interest groups, as well as their organisational strength and membership unity are often crucial in drawing attention to the community and bargaining on behalf of it (Haney and Vanderbush 1999: 344–345).[18] This is not to say that

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[17] This review draws on references listed in note 5. Focusing on factors with regard to ethnic interest groups, I disregard contextual factors affecting the political influence, such as convergence of policy goals with the government or the general public ('push an open door').

[18] Calvo and Rosenstone (1989) point to other factors with regard to political participation that affect a community's political influence, such as community members' attendance of public meetings and political rallies, attempts to influence voting behaviour of others, as well as non-electoral activities, such as writing to a congressman and signing a petition.

interest groups necessarily represent the voice of 'the community', or even of its majority. As Haney and Vanderbush (1999: 344–345) point out, it is important that ethnic interest groups provide resources that are valuable to policymakers, such as information, votes, and campaign contributions. Thus, the financial strength and number of voters particularly are assets when the unity of the community allows interest groups to access these benefits.

Assessing how OCI affects the aforementioned categories, I rely on a framework developed to assess all development relevant actions and interactions by diasporic Indians with India, including remittances, diasporic investment, return migration, and philanthropic activities, as well as political advocacy efforts in the USA (Naujoks 2013a). Here, I will focus only on political advocacy and the three relevant principal effects, namely the *naturalisation* effect, the *identity* effect, and the *good-will* effect.

The Naturalisation Effect and Political Advocacy

My calculations in Naujoks (2012) confirm the finding from several other studies,[19] that the availability of dual citizenship, or here OCI, leads to higher naturalisation rates in the country of residence.[20] Depending on the metric used, since the availability of OCI, the naturalisation rate of Indian immigrants in the USA grew stronger than that of all Asian immigrants and all immigrants by 2–13 percentage points, indicating a significant naturalisation increasing effect of OCI.[21]

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[19] For other studies, see Jones-Correa 2001; Woodrow-Lafield et al. 2004; Mazzolari 2009; Thränhardt 2008; Faist and Gerdes 2008.

[20] In Naujoks (2012), I have analysed three distinct rates based on different data sets, namely: (1) annual admissions of legal permanent residents and naturalisations seven years later; (2) naturalisations of the resident population eligible for naturalisation; and (3) naturalisation of specific immigrant cohorts. In order to isolate effects specific to the country of origin from general factors in the USA, I juxtaposed the development of naturalisation rates for Indian, or India-born, immigrants with the respective rates for all Asian immigrants and for all immigrants as comparison groups.

[21] Although other factors related to India or to the Indian-American community—such as India's economic development, the changing rhetoric toward the diaspora, and political aspirations of the community—might have contributed to the increase in the naturalisation rate, the observed increase is likely to be influenced predominantly by the availability of OCI, and before that, by the availability of the PIO card.

Since OCI increases naturalisations of Indians in the USA, it creates a group of OCI-induced naturalisers. Provided that naturalisation per se leads to certain consequences, these consequences become indirect effects of the diasporic citizenship. Thus, the naturalisation effect of OCI lies in the actual consequences of OCI-induced naturalisations. As the availability of overseas citizenship leads to higher numbers of naturalisations it also leads to more voters of Indian origin. Figure 10.1 illustrates the significantly rising numbers of US-born and naturalised ethnic Indians, i.e., eligible Indian-American voters.

Further, naturalisation affects categories of identification with and commitment to the country of residence: first, through the status passage toward citizenship, which includes the naturalisation process, second, through the fact that individuals are US citizens, and third, by ceasing to be (full) Indian citizens. It bears mention that this is not a theoretical statement but grounded in the analysis of my interview data (Naujoks 2013a: Chap. 6). Having citizenship in the country of residence can be seen as one important legal and discursive resource in the formation process of identifications. Becoming a citizen thus affects self-categorisation and commitment toward greater identification with that country. New citizens have and perceive duties in their country of citizenship, such as contributing to local charity organisations and political causes. In their survey of second-generation immigrants in the USA, Portes and Rumbaut (2001: 186–187) find that having US citizenship leads to fewer immigrants self-identifying as members of their ancestral communities (e.g., Mexicans, Vietnamese) and toward self-categorisations as 'Americans'.

The conducted interviews show that becoming an American citizen generally leads to stronger involvement in community issues—starting with greater engagement at one's children's school board, and extending support to local politicians, or hosting fund raiser dinners for presidential candidates.[22] Thus, the increase in India-born US citizens and their community involvement is likely to have a positive effect on the political influence of the community. In addition, one of the major mainstream proxies for integration and assimilation by the host society

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[22] Based on panel data from Germany, Street (2015) confirms that naturalisation can promote political integration, especially if new citizens can pick up habits of political engagement during the formative years of early adulthood.

is the naturalisation rate of a given immigrant community. Higher levels of naturalisation are likely to increase the social standing of the community and hence its political leverage.

Another finding of this study is that the effects of naturalisation are independent of the motivation to naturalise. For example, people who naturalised for solely practical reasons, such as the ease of travelling, witnessed a considerably increased identification with the USA and a change in relevant behaviour once they had naturalised. This reminds us not to draw conclusions too quickly from statements as to the reasons individuals apply for citizenship or to argue that practical motives would undermine the value of citizenship.

It shall be noted that having a second state membership does not have a negative effect on political participation in the USA. Although there are some critical views that look at dual statuses with a certain mistrust, assuming some kind of conflict of loyalty, dual citizenship is not generally seen as detrimental to immigrants' identification and assimilation with US culture and society. Anyway, in this regard OCI is less likely to be compromising than full dual citizenship. OCI card holders have no political rights in India and there are no pronounced loyalties or obligations. The fear of marginalisation of ethnic Indians and the accusation of being more there than here, were strong arguments for the adoption of OCI as a diluted—if at all—citizenship concept (Naujoks 2015).

Greater involvement in the American mainstream has positive effects for Indian-Americans, who act as intermediaries between the two countries, and for advocating both an India-friendly policy and policies regarding the Indian-American community. In addition, naturalisation is likely to increase the income of Indian-Americans, although we do not know much about the extent of such a naturalisation premium (Bratsberg et al. 2002; Scott 2006; Steinhardt 2008). The *income effect* of increased naturalisations may in turn ease financial contributions to political campaigns and candidates.

The Identity Effect and Diasporic Advocacy

The second principal effect of OCI relates to the consequences of this status for questions of identification and belonging with the country of origin—assembled in the *identity effect.* Grounded in my empirical study and an extensive review of sociological, social psychological, and anthropological research, I theorise that a stronger identification with, and attachment to, India increases actions in favour of, and interactions with, the country.

In order to discuss questions regarding multiple identifications, three concrete *identificatory groups* have been distinguished that diasporic actors may self-identify with and feel committed to. These can be labeled as *ethnic, national,* or *civic*, depending on whether we consider the individual in his or her capacity as a member of the ethnic Indian community in the USA (*diasporic-ethnic*); having bonds with India as a nation and with the people living in India (*diasporic-national*); or a part of the Indian state with rights and responsibilities, including those toward the government, political, and state institutions (*diasporic-civic*) (Naujoks 2010b).

A membership status like OCI can affect diasporic-ethnic, diasporic-national, and diasporic-civic identification in many ways. OCI is not full dual citizenship, but it fulfils its function, though sometimes in a limited way and not for everybody. The strongest effect of a dual legal status, such as US citizenship plus OCI, can be expected from the perceived right to call oneself a 'citizen of both countries'. The formal status of belonging to India that is given by OCI not only allows individuals to internally self-label themselves as 'Indian', it also constitutes an argumentative tool and a reminder in the process of external identity negotiation. In this regard, being able to officially label oneself as 'Indian' helps the individual consider him or herself Indian—not only in the cultural sense but also in its (close to) full sense.

The fact that no black-and-white decision between the country of origin and the country of immigration has to be taken decreases the need for detaching oneself emotionally from the country of origin, which need has occasionally been observed in the absence of a dual status around the time of naturalisation. This helps immigrants resist the often exclusive

norms of national community, both in the USA and in India, and allows them to gain public recognition through officially sanctioned multiple belonging. In addition, second-plus generation immigrants find it easier to identify themselves as 'Indians'. They have a direct relationship with the country of their ancestors and grow up knowing about their dual status. This may be regarded as the *perpetuation function* of OCI, i.e., it perpetuates ethnic, national, and civic self-identification and commitment. Furthermore, OCI affects diasporic-national and diasporic-civic attachment by giving overseas Indians who return to India for short- or long-term stays the feeling of being 'Indian in India', i.e., of not feeling alienated and excluded, but rather as still being part of it.

Besides questions of self-categorisation, diasporic *commitment* is of particular importance in assessing the behavioural consequences of identifications. Diasporic commitment is the strength of one's ties with a particular group (Phinney 2004). It involves the degree of *importance* of the group membership in the individual's overall self-concept, its positive *evaluation*, and an emotional involvement with the group, known as *attachment* (Ashmore et al. 2004).

There are five ways by which OCI may increase diasporic commitment, in particular with regard to the national and civic group membership. First, by strengthening diasporic-ethnic, diasporic-national, and diasporic-civic *identification*, OCI also increases the basis for the respective commitment. Second, *being an (overseas) citizen* leads to duties and solidarity with fellow citizens. Third, *becoming an (overseas) citizen* may constitute the basis for a consensual membership contract with emerging responsibilities and obligations. Fourth, in obtaining OCI, individuals feel a *personal thankfulness* and regard it as a *mini-award*, which positively affects their commitment to Indian causes and concerns. Fifth, by *inducing real interaction* with and in India through the conferment of rights, OCI nurtures real ties and attachment (Naujoks 2013a: 237).

Although the final identification process is located at the individual level, one has to consider group processes, both within the ethnic Indian community in the USA and between this community, the US mainstream, and other groups. Many of the individual aspects

of identity negotiations, of group solidarity, and strong ties within the community have an important effect on self-categorisation. By positively affecting individual identification with India and by being centred around common concerns for India (both national and civic), OCI strengthens the Indian community in the USA (diasporic-ethnic identification and commitment) and provides additional incentives to identify with the group. A strong, closely-knit group can then have more power to negotiate its own 'identity' in mainstream and public debate, to speak with one voice and find a common cause. Ambrosio (2002: 58) finds that ethnic self-identification has implications for group cohesion, since persons who identify as a group are more likely to act as one. A stronger commitment to India and a more active concern for Indian affairs increase the readiness to support advocacy efforts in the USA.

The Good-Will Effect and Diasporic Advocacy

The effect of OCI is not only the effect of a certain legal position, of legal benefits, and of status passages. The communication about a status and the process of its adoption per se matter to a significant extent. In this regard, institutional configurations, policy philosophies, and paradigms affect the diaspora's national incorporation.

In Naujoks (2013a: Chap. 7), I have argued that OCI matters not only to its takers, but also to those who are not interested in the status, either because they are politically involved and do not want to have any kind of dual status or because they are happy with a long-term visitor's visa in India. However, in principle, all diasporic actors feel that they are officially seen as something special, and that their contributions to India are valued and appreciated. From the late 1990s, the Indian state's view has witnessed a paradigm shift that can be summed up by the phrases 'from the invisible diaspora to the diaspora empire' and 'from the traitor tune to a pride paradigm' (Naujoks 2010a). In this regard, OCI is interpreted as a message that India listens to the diaspora's demands, acknowledges their contributions and recognises their dual status.

The good-will effect strengthens confidence and trust, which in turn enhance economic and other engagement by facilitating cooperation. My analysis prompts the propositions that in the presence of the demand for dual citizenship by the diaspora, the adoption of OCI is a *signal* that the Indian homeland listens to and acknowledges them. In addition, the availability of OCI generates *general happiness* because the Indian state recognises overseas Indians, *trust* from diasporic Indians toward the Indian government and, in turn, *trustworthiness* on the part of the diaspora.

The *good-will effect* can be expected to raise the interest in political advocacy for India. In fact, most political efforts are not individual acts but collective actions and contributions through organisations that are put in place for the purpose. These associations are not random collectives of individuals. Instead, they are managed by certain elites that have monopolised interactions in a certain sphere. Pluralist theory of democracy emphasises the particular role of leaders, understood as formally or informally recognised spokespersons of the community.

The adoption of OCI may have a reinforcing effect by strengthening the abilities of and the good-will from diasporic political associations. Many of these organisations and their representatives have also lobbied the Indian government for dual citizenship. The adoption of OCI is thus seen (and portrayed) as an achievement of these community leaders. This provides more trust in collective action and the established forms of organisation, and thus, more resources for these organisations. If OCI also strengthens the diasporic-ethnic identification and thus contributes to the overall ties among the Indian-American community, this again may have positive effects on the representation of the group. Further, the diasporic community leaders are likely to value the increase of credibility they earned by the introduction of OCI, and their good-will toward India may give them additional momentum for advocacy efforts.

Action Effects of OCI on Political Advocacy

Figure 10.2 summarises how the several effects of OCI affect factors that are important for diasporic advocacy efforts. The main thrust of this essay was not to confirm that diasporic citizenship has an effect on political participation but how and why.

Fig. 10.2 Individual effects of OCI and diasporic advocacy efforts

The facilitating role of OCI on ethnic, national, and civic identification under the *identity effect* may have an effect on all those who, without OCI, would have had only US citizenship. These are those who naturalised before OCI was adopted (*old cases*), second-plus generation Indian-Americans, as well as for those who naturalised after OCI became available, but who would have taken US citizenship in any case (*certain naturalisers*). The identity effect enhances the degree of organisation and unity of the Indian-American community and induces overseas Indians in the USA to get involved in India-related advocacy and topics of concern to the Indian-American community.

The increased naturalisation due to the availability of OCI may lead to a stronger identification with the USA, more activism and advocacy potential in US politics, and an increased income for Indian immigrants. This increases the number of actual or potential voters, enhances the general social standing of the Indian-American community, can lead to more individuals who are actively working for political parties or even run for office, and increases the potential for political fundraising. The *good-will effect* extends to all groups, most notably it also affects non-takers. It particularly affects motivation to contribute funds and time to Indian-American advocacy causes.

In the last two decades, a large number of emigration countries have adopted certain membership policies, which range from special ethnic-status 'cards' in Turkey, Ethiopia, Pakistan, India, and Hungary, to nationality schemes without political rights and the recognition of full dual citizenship. Bauböck (2003: 706) notes that the establishment of expatriate citizenships signifies an important structural change for the

polities involved. In addition to changes of polities of origin, this essay has argued that emigrant citizenship rights can lead to increased political participation in the country of destination.

The case study underlying this essay leads to a few caveats in the theory that is built on it. Ethnic interest group activism in its form studied here, and in the literature on diaspora lobbying, is a specific US phenomenon.[23] Particular social norms about political participation in the USA also limit the generalisability of some of these findings. In addition, the OCI is a specific diasporic citizenship status. Until recently, the Indian government promoted the status as 'dual citizenship' but it is a special status that differs from full citizenship.[24] Nonetheless, I believe that the mechanisms identified here are somehow representative of more general processes and advance our understanding of how membership in countries of origin can provide incentives for political participation in the polities in which migrants reside.

This essay has demonstrated that state membership policies can have a broad range of effects in the transnational sphere, including domestic political effects in home and host countries. It reminds us that national policies increasingly have transnational repercussions, and that we need to further advance our understanding of the complexities of domestic and multi-sited transnational interactions.

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[23] Singh (2012) examines Indian ethnic lobbying in Canada.

[24] For a discussion on OCI as a citizenship status, see Naujoks (2013b).

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11

Diasporas and Fragile States Beyond Remittances: Assessing the Theoretical Linkages

David Carment and Rachael Calleja

I know you expect me to say come home. I am not going to do that. I have no jobs to give you. Work here and send money home. Levy Mwanawasa, President of Zambia.
I call lazy people, those who go to Moscow and sweep its streets and squares. One feels disgusted with the fact that Uzbeks have to travel there for a piece of bread. Nobody is starving to death in Uzbekistan. The Uzbek nation's honor makes us different from others. Is not it better to die [than scrounge]? Therefore, I call lazy those people who disgrace all of us by wanting to make a lot of money faster there. Islam Karimov, President of Uzbekistan.[1]

[1] Two contrasting opinions from leaders of fragile states. The first an address by Zambia's president to the Zambian community in the USA (cited in Brinkerhoff 2009: 81) and the second, comments by Islam Karimov on state run television in June 2013, in regard to Uzbek migrants working in Russia (http://www.eurasianet.org/node/67157).

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Introduction

Diaspora politics is one of the most significant policy issues of the twenty-first century.[1] For host states, diaspora politics is more salient today for a variety of reasons including changing demography, declining fertility rates, shifts in priority immigrant countries, and changes in refugee processing. For most Western states, immigration is the only source of growth for their populations. But this is a double-edged sword.

On the one hand, many new immigrants come from fragile states where economies are weak, minorities are at risk, and human rights violations and open conflict are common.[2] Today there are over 70 million forced migrants in the world due to conflict and natural disaster (Ratha et al. 2014). Concerns over so-called 'imported conflicts' remain high on the list of security concerns for many Western countries (Mosaic Institute 2011).[3] More and more migrants leaving fragile states are young, well-educated people whose departure exacerbates their home country's

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[1] The term 'diaspora' has come to be widely used in the past few years beyond its original narrow association with Greek, Jewish, and Armenian ethnic communities. Members of a diaspora may include ethnic migrants, first-, second-, or even third-generation immigrants as well as expatriates, students, guest workers, and refugees. The term reflects the rise of truly transnational populations; people who can be thought of as living in many places, playing a vigorous role in two (or more) communities concurrently. The African Union (AU) Commission defines the African Diaspora as 'peoples of African origin living outside the continent, irrespective of their citizenship and nationality and who are willing to contribute to the development of the continent and the building of the African Union'. The African Union considers the diaspora to be the 'sixth region' of Africa. We refer to diasporas as coming from homelands as opposed to 'nation states', since the former is more inclusive of a diaspora that lacks homogeneity but can still can trace direct genealogy to a region or a sub region (Carment et al. 2013).

[2] For example, the African-Canadian population is the fastest growing ethnic minority in Canada and is particularly prevalent in Canada's largest cities, especially Toronto. The 1901 Census recorded 17,400 people of African descent living in Canada, amounting to 0.3 % of the population. Most African-Canadians during this time resided in Ontario or the Maritime provinces. Over the next few decades, the African diaspora in Canada grew slowly, reaching 32,100 in 1961, which accounted for 0.2 % of the population. By 1991, there were 504,300 people of African descent living in Canada (1.9 % of the total population). In 2001, the African-Canadian community was the third largest minority group in Canada, after the Chinese and South Asian populations. The 2001 census recorded 662,200 African-Canadians, representing just over 2 % of Canada's total population and 17 % of the visible minority population. Almost 47 % of all African-Canadians live in Toronto and 21 % in Montréal (Carment et al. 2013).

[3] For example, Cilliers and Sisk (2013) forecast that ten African countries are at risk of remaining fragile beyond 2050. Given that fragile states tend to be more prone to conflict, the fragility trap is thus evocative of Collier and Hoeffler's (2004) conflict trap. However, this correlation notwith-

economic and political development even further (Dumont 2012). In an era of fiscal austerity and global recession, donor countries are increasingly under pressure to generate more effective aid programmes and innovative solutions to reverse this so-called 'brain drain' (Samy 2011).[4]

Diaspora activities, specifically remittances, are considered a viable alternative to traditional aid. But because many fragile states are targets of very large remittances in proportion to their overall economy, they remain vulnerable to remittance shocks when currencies devalue or disasters strike. Remittances, while important, are also a stopgap measure (Migration Policy Institute 2016). Since remittances have become a large component of development finance, Le Goff and Kpodar (2011) argue that dependence on them as a stable source of income must be drawn into question.[5] They and others argue that policy makers in both donor and developing countries must think beyond remittances and aid dependency models towards sustainable development policies that focus on long-term human, social, and physical capital development (Blodgett Bermeo and Leblang 2010; Berthelemy et al. 2009). Further, despite large remittance flows, many fragile states remain stuck in a 'fragility trap' which puts them among the lowest performing states in the world with little indication of exit. At the community level, households become disjointed and suffer when one parent remains overseas for lengthy periods of time with the sole task of remitting back home. Family unification is often impossible.[6]

On the other hand, diaspora communities often enjoy influence and access in their home and host countries, which host state institutions

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standing, not all states trapped in fragility are affected by conflicts, just as most, but not all, countries in conflict are fragile by definition. See www.carleton.ca/cifp.

[4] According to the World Bank, remittances to developing countries are projected to grow by 5.0 % to reach US$435 billion in 2014 (accelerating from the 3.4 % expansion of 2013), and rise further by 4.4 % to US$454 billion in 2015. In 2013, remittances were more than three times larger than ODA and, excluding China, significantly exceeded foreign direct investment flows to developing countries. Growth of remittances in 2014 is being led by three regions: East Asia and the Pacific, South Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean (Ratha et al. 2014).

[5] Consider that India's single largest export in the coming decades will be its bulging youth population. Unable to find work at home they will be encouraged to migrate and remit back home.

[6] For example, the Emirate states typically do not issue visas to the spouses of India's guest workers. Nor does the Indian government typically permit these spouses to move abroad.

typically do not have.[7] This would suggest there are opportunities for diasporas to play a positive and functional role in fragile environments beyond remittances. Apart from remittances, diaspora activity through entrepreneurship, investment, and financing is a central pathway for economic, social, and political development (E-Learning for Entrepreneurship in West Africa Powered by Diaspora in the Netherlands 2016). To harness and utilise diaspora linkages for their own ends, both home and host states are developing policies and programmes that are specifically intended to strengthen diaspora linkages in fragile state situations. Some of these linkages are directed by regional and international organisations where state capacity tends to be weaker, such as in Africa, while in other countries there are policies and institutions that are specifically mandated to manage the 'diaspora file'.[8]

In brief, despite all the challenges that fragile states pose, there is increasing evidence suggesting that diasporas have an important, positive role to play in in these countries as agents of change. Some of this evidence is premised on the understanding that through diaspora activity, fragile states will transition away from dependence to interdependence, and eventually to trading relationships with host states (Carment and Bercuson 2008; Singh 2012). In this regard, diaspora bridging includes activities that are political (e.g., lobbying), economic (e.g., remittances and investment), social (e.g., promotion of the human and other rights

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[7] In fragile states situations there is a tendency to view diasporas, particularly involuntarily diasporas, as being a disadvantaged or marginalised population with minimal influence and power. This perspective tends to overlook that there are diasporas living in Western states who can be very empowered groups, or 'a muscular force in the home countries' affairs.' (University of Peace 2006).

[8] In the area of diaspora policy formulation and implementation, the World Bank's Africa Diaspora Programme has provided Institutional Development Fund (IDF) grants to the African Union Commission (AUC), and the governments of Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, Mali, Uganda, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Tanzania, and Uganda. The ADP is engaged to varying degrees in some countries, including Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, Congo Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Lesotho, Niger, Mozambique, The Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Senegal, and Zambia. The World Bank has been asked to provide expected Summit outcomes related to several 'bankable' projects including: (i) the proposed African Diaspora Investment Fund; (ii) an Africa continent-wide Diaspora Professional Skills database; (iii) an expanded African Diaspora Development Marketplace; (iv) the AUC's Volunteer Program; and (v) the African Institute for Remittances (AIR). On remittances, the ADP with a European Commission (EC) grant, and in partnership with the African Development Bank (AfDB) and International Organisation for Migration (IOM), are facilitating the establishment of the African Institute for Remittances (AIR) in the AUC (see Ferede n.d.).

of the transnational group within different societies), and cultural (e.g., articles in newspapers). Bridging may take place at the individual level (through family networks), or through institutional channels (through community or international organisations). Diasporas are sometimes the first to invest specific knowledge, make use of insider connections, and are often better able to judge political and economic risks than are foreign firms. Examples of the catalysing role that diasporas play in economic and political development include:

- Diasporas make person-to-person connections, investments, and trade linkages by using local knowledge and expertise to support host country relationships with emerging economies such as South Africa, the Caribbean, and India
- Diaspora communities from fragile and middle-income states—such as Haiti, Philippines and Ghana—have persuaded host countries to take a larger role in democratisation, development, and humanitarian assistance
- Global and bilateral trade agreements have strong linkages with diaspora communities such as the Canada–EU trade agreement initiated by la Francophonie in Quebec
- Trade talks with those countries still receiving Official Development Assistance (ODA) have been spurred on by large diaspora communities such as Ukrainians living in Canada

A Fragile States Perspective

The purpose of this chapter is to enhance our understanding of how diaspora communities can sustain and contribute to crucial economic and political activities in fragile states. We are also interested in understanding how fragile states effectively manage the opportunities and risks associated with the presence of diaspora linkages, through policy structures, regulatory frameworks, and institutions.[9] So if diasporas are the agents of

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[9] We recognise that there is an overwhelming desire by governments to instrumentalise diaspora groups; to make them a means to an end. But instrumentalisation cuts both ways and diaspora

change about which we want to know more, we also need to understand the institutional environment in which their activities are taking place.

We argue that fragile states and in particular those stuck in a 'fragility trap', are an important and useful lens through which to understand diaspora effects on political and economic development. But the context here is neither *conflict* nor *security*, narrowly defined, but rather the complex and multifaceted dimensions that contribute to state fragility and which extend beyond the inabilities of government to assert effective *authority* over its peoples and territory. This includes questions of *capacity and legitimacy* with a focus on crucial state–society relations and activities that strengthen both, in situations where poor policy environments abound (Country Indicators for Foreign Policy 2016; Carment et al. 2009).

In brief, by recognising that there are varieties and types of state fragility and that every fragile state is unique to some extent, there are opportunities for identifying appropriate and context specific entry points for diasporas. Accordingly, we refer to Pirkkalainen and Abdile (2009), whose discussion shows that diasporas have a role to play in fragile states beyond 'peace-breakers', or 'peace-builders', (e.g., acting as agents for the promotion of peace and development or both). Indeed as Brinkerhoff (2011) suggests, diasporas contribute to supporting fragile states in other important ways: providing remittances, through philanthropy, providing human and social capital, and by influencing policy.[10]

More formally, we identify three features of 'stateness' where diasporas can influence change: Authority (A) which captures the extent to which a state possesses the ability to enact binding effective legislation over its population, exercise coercive force over its sovereign territory, to provide core public goods, and provide a stable and secure environment to its citizens and communities; Legitimacy (L) which describes the extent to which a

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groups are just as likely to 'instrumentalise' governments by pressuring them in the pursuit of single issue agendas (Gurzu 2011; Carment and Bercuson 2008).

[10] Diasporas have the potential for building social capital through collective donations to fund development of local projects in their home communities and can help offset a declining economy by supporting private consumption. Diasporas also are a potential source of information on the complicated problems in their homelands and can provide valuable insight into priority areas and culturally sensitive issues (Hall and Swain 2007).

particular government commands public loyalty to the governing regime, and generates domestic support for its legislation and policy.[11] Such support must be created through a voluntary and reciprocal arrangement of effective governance and citizenship, founded upon broadly accepted principles of government selection and succession that are recognised both locally and internationally. Lastly, Capacity (C) refers to the potential for a state to mobilise and employ resources towards productive ends, similar to the focus on progressive service delivery.[12]

Examining diasporas in a fragile states context is also important because in combination they pose an unmet policy challenge. Over the last two decades, we have witnessed policy responses to fragile states that are largely reactive 'externally driven projects', leading to costly, ineffective outcomes and often irreversible situations, which require massive amounts of resources and sustained engagement to remedy them. In spite of these massive interventions, more than half of the 40 fragile states in 1980 were still classified as fragile in 2013 according to data from our project, the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) (www.carleton.ca/cifp). About ten of the most fragile states—many from sub-Sahara Africa— remain stuck at the bottom in a 'fragility trap' (Carment and Samy 2012) exhibiting a 'slow-growth-poor-governance equilibrium trap' into which the most fragile states fall.[13]

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[11] For a detailed description of the methodology, see Carment, Prest, and Samy, *Security, Development, and the Fragile State* (2009).

[12] Naudé, W., Santos-Paulino, A. and McGillivray, M. eds. (2011) Fragile States: Causes, Costs, and Responses. Oxford University Press. Chapter Two.

[13] Fragile states represent formidable development, security, and governance challenges. Fragile states are 'problems from hell' or 'wicked problems' that defy simple easy solutions. Wicked problems require a high degree of international coordination, political capital, and shared knowledge to solve. They are immensely complex with multiple levels of consultation, coalitions and blocs standing in opposition to one another. They require diplomacy, skill, and knowledge to fix. Use of force and large-scale military occupations are not viable long-term options. The economic and political challenges are formidable. Fragility trap states are typically further from meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) than any others on the planet. They are the locus of much of the world's violence, both conflict-related and otherwise. They lack an institutional architecture for consolidated and sustainable political competition that ensures elites are answerable to the people they serve. While there are still some deeply entrenched and often predatory regimes among those states we call fragile, many simply reflect a disengaged population weary of governments incapable of providing basic services and a legal system that makes contractual relationships, property rights, and respect for human rights untenable.

Finally, we want to rectify a bias in the literature that tends to focus on the negative impacts that diasporas have on fragile and conflict affected states, leading to a black-and-white, dichotomous presentation of diaspora groups as being either wholly negative or wholly positive influences. There is a need to move beyond this framing. While it may be true that some members of diasporas use host states as a launching ground for perpetuating conflict abroad, many more are just as likely to become targets of manipulation and solicitation from insurgents in their countries of origin. Diaspora groups may unwittingly support conflict by providing money to insurgency fundraising schemes that in fact divert philanthropic donations not intended for that end (Brinkerhoff 2011).[14]

One of the main reasons for the predominance of a negative, conflict-generating portrayal of diasporas is the large body of international relations research that emerged at the end of the Cold War, exploring the connection between diasporas and conflict, rooted in external involvement in domestic wars generally (Saideman 2001; Heraclides 1990) and ethnic conflicts, such as separatism and irredenta specifically (Carment et al. 2006). Much of this research focused on the effects of ethnic group influences to shift the transmission and escalation of conflict from vertical or state-to-state linkages to horizontal forms of transnational diffusion, contagion, and demonstration (Davis and Moore 1997; Lake and Rothchild 1998).

More recent research has focused on the impacts of trans-border communities and the corresponding relational networks that tie them together and that allow members to draw on opportunities and ethnic political resources to intensify tensions between rival groups in their homelands (see for example Shain 2002; Smith and Stares 2007). In this regard Collier and Hoeffler's (2004) empirical study of civil wars, based on the 'greed versus grievance' thesis, is seminal. They find that financial contributions from kin groups abroad offer a rent seeking opportunity for rebel groups, making it more likely these rebels would engage in violence to achieve their goals. Using a regression analysis to analyse 79 wars

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[14] Brinkerhoff, Jennifer, 'Diasporas and Conflict Societies: Conflict Entrepreneurs, Competing Interests or Contributors to Stability and Development,' Global Effects and Local Dynamics of Intrastate Conflicts International Workshop, November 8, 2009.

from 1960 to 1999, Collier and Hoeffler find that the size of diaspora communities in the USA is highly correlated with an increased probability of war reoccurrence (2004: 581).

A related study building on the work of Davis and Moore (1997) by Lars-Erik Cederman et al. (2009) captures the relationship among ethnic groups in power, marginalised groups, and their contiguous transnational kin. They find that trans-border diaspora linkages increase the probability of civil war, but only in cases where the pre-existing risk of war is already high due to large marginalised ethnic groups at risk.

Case study research also contributes to the characterisation of particular diasporas as good or bad (Baser and Swain 2009; Lyons 2004). Indeed, several cases tend to be overstudied in a negative light (such as Somalia, Sri Lanka, and Palestine). In an effort to correct this, Cochrane's (2007) assessment of Irish American connections shows that different elements of the diaspora may work against each other using opposing means to reach counterproductive goals (see Orjuela 2008; Zunzer 2004 for similar examples). As Lum et al. (2012: 204) note:

> The problem of rigid binary categorization is partly caused by the narrow research agendas which characterise much of the current literature. There has been an excessive focus on individual or small numbers of ethnic communities, many of which have been repeatedly studied in several different articles. While there are examples in which a particular faction holds a clearly dominant position throughout the entire diaspora, this is not always true, and restrictively examining a small subset of cases can lead to over generalizations and inaccurate conclusions which are not applicable to transnational ethnic behaviour as a whole.

In reality, the evidence linking diaspora groups to conflict is both mixed and inconclusive. For example, in terms of remittances and conflict, Lubkemann (2008) notes that the ability for remittances to sustain livelihoods during conflicts is a key factor preventing disarmed or demobilised combatants from re-engaging in violence. While Byman et al. (2001) suggests that remittances may also support insurgencies, Horst (2008) finds that even if remittances are not intended to support war, the delivery of remittance financing during wartime renders such spending

part of the larger economy of war. The outcomes that such financing supports is dependent on the context of the specific conflict and the intentions of both remittance senders and receivers.

Interestingly, Brinkerhoff (2008) notes that in fragile contexts, philanthropists may act as intermediaries among diasporas, traditional donors, and local communities, combining home knowledge with host resources to provide innovative and targeted programming. While philanthropic spending runs the risk of being misappropriated by some transnational networks (Adamson 2005), a bigger risk posed by diaspora philanthropy is the potential for unequal resource distribution to exacerbate tensions and deepen conflict (Horst and Gaas 2009).

In a similar way, Brinkerhoff and Taddesse (2008) suggest that during times of conflict, philanthropic human capital contributions, which tend to stem from diasporas, play a key role in staffing NGOs, and government development and peace-building programmes. However, IOM (2005) and Black (2001) note that while such expertise may be needed, the repatriation of diasporas may exacerbate tensions and challenge the legitimacy of peace-building by deepening or creating new ethnic tensions along the lines of skills and class.

Finally, one of the largest contributions diasporas can make to conflict stems from providing diplomatic pressure and utilizing host country freedoms to lobby for political and partisan aims in home countries (Wayland 2004; Koslowski 2005). While the degree to which diasporas contribute to forwarding conflict or perpetuating peace would necessarily depend on the positionality of diaspora groups and individual actors (Koinova 2012), the point remains that the ability of diaspora groups to influence international public opinion through mobilisation renders the diasporas significant actors in fragile states processes. Today, no diaspora linkage is deemed more important than remittances.

Beyond the Remittance Trap

For fragile states, remittances offer an appealing prospect for economic and political development. On the positive side of the ledger, remittances fill a gap in public spending, help facilitate migration, and promote market opportunities for investment. On the negative side of the ledger,

they can fuel conflict, create dependencies within sectors of society leading to family disruption and in extreme cases, contribute to a 'remittance trap' when alternative forms of external investment and donor assistance are lacking.[15]

As noted, global remittance flows outstrip ODA by a large margin and are now touted as an alternative to public investment and aid. Prior to the financial crisis of 2008–2009, documented remittance flows to Sub-Saharan Africa were about US$20 billion annually. It is estimated that in 2010, remittances to Sub-Saharan Africa were US$21.5 billion.[16]

In examining challenges related to remittance transfer, the ability for both home and host governments to encourage remittance flows has become a central concern (Brinkerhoff 2009). With well-established research examining the impact of remittances on household savings and the ability for banks, credit unions, and private-sector actors to provide services to transnational families (see Gupta et al. 2007; Osili 2007), key obstacles to resource transfer are mostly policy related, such as much needed banking-sector reforms (Orozco 2002b; Gevorkyan and Gevorkyan 2012). For Orozco (2002a,b) and Brinkerhoff (2009), remittance flows could be increased if home and host governments adopted policies to better enable remittance flows. Indeed several programmes to enable remittances have been established internationally, including 'IntEnt', an initiative developed by the Dutch government to provide support to migrants seeking to start small businesses in home countries, and the UK's Department for International Development's 'Send Money Home' programme, which helps diaspora communities send low-cost remittances to home countries (Mosaic Institute 2011).

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[15] "The global average cost of sending remittances increased slightly in 2016, climbing to 7.6 % of the value sent in June 2016, compared to 7.4 % in December 2015 (World Bank 2016). Experts say the price of sending money is inflated by two companies—Western Union and MoneyGram—which hold a duopoly over the global industry."

[16] The OECD, the World Bank, and a variety of regional organisations such as the African Union, the European Commission, and the African Development Banks are trying develop a more formalised working relationship with diaspora groups in order to harness remittance flows. In 2007, The World Bank's Africa Region launched the African Diaspora Program (ADP). The programme focuses on diaspora policy formulation and implementation; financing and leveraging of remittances for development; and human capital utilisation, through diaspora professional networks and organisations, and hometown associations.

The dependence between fragility and remittances calls into question whether a safe exit from fragility might be expected where remittances are so extensive. While some studies have shown that fragile states with remittance inflows have experienced higher growth than fragile states without remittances (McGillivray and Feeny 2008), other studies find only a weak relationship between fragility and remittances, in which year over year changes for particular countries were neither overtly positive nor overtly negative (Lum et al. 2012).

Explaining the differences in these findings depends on how the remittances are used. On the one hand, in terms of the ability for diaspora financing to contribute to equitable growth, de Ferranti and Ody (2007) find that remittances exacerbate inequality, especially during the initial stages of out-migration, since the poorest generally cannot afford to emigrate. On the other hand, in a series of single-country case studies, immigrant money has been linked to greater small business activity in home countries (Kiliç et al. 2007; Woodruff and Zenteno 2007; Dustmann and Kirkchamp 2002), contributing to development through job creation, stimulating innovation, creating social capital across borders, and channelling financial and political capital towards home countries (Newland and Tanaka 2010). These findings are typically confirmed in cross-country studies, such as that by Vaaler (2011, 2013), who finds that remittances from immigrant populations enhance capital access, new business creation, increase economic openness in developing countries, and enhance venture capital access.

Remittances may also enhance equity over the longer-term through increasing financial flows among a broader group of participants and increasing access to financial services. Reinforcing this point, Adams and Page (2005) find that remittances significantly reduce the level, depth, and severity of poverty in developing countries. They find that on average, a 10 % increase in per capita official remittances leads to a 3.5 % decline in the share of people living in poverty in home countries.

However, a crucial point in fully grasping the dynamics of growth in fragile states is to account for two other large financial inflows: Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and ODA. Remittances are said to be 'counter-cyclical', meaning they flow into home countries during times of

economic contraction, and sometimes when the policy environment is poor or unstable. FDI and ODA on the other hand are said to be 'procyclical', coming at a time of economic expansion, growth, and when policy environments are generally more stable and predictable (there are important exceptions to this).

In sum, the positive relationship between remittances and economic growth does not necessarily apply to that subset of states we call fragile. This is because in a fragile states context, FDI naturally being subject to market considerations such as investment opportunities and strong policy environments will be in short supply when market conditions tend not to favour risky investments. Similarly, fragile states tend be underaided as a group ('aid orphans'), although there are also a number of 'aid darlings' (Haiti and Afghanistan for example) that are more likely to be dependent on remittances, all other things being equal.

Fragile states also suffer from absorptive capacity problems, meaning that there are diminishing returns from development assistance beyond a specific point (typically around 25 % of GDP). It is assumed then that in a fragile states context, remittances can fill the 'gap' left by low FDI and ODA flows. Indeed, recent findings from the World Bank confirm this assumption. Remittance flows globally are at an all-time high due to a reduction in the costs of sending money abroad, a spike in the number of natural disasters, and an increasing number of forced migrants living in 'protracted displacement' from zones of conflict (Ratha et al. 2014).

So in theory, remittances may help with initial economic growth in fragile environments where FDI and ODA cannot or do not want to go (Constantinescu and Schiff 2014). But getting to that stage of development where FDI and ODA can 'kick in' requires that diaspora remittances are targeted and specific in purpose and scope. For example, beyond private consumption, remittances could make up for a shortfall or gaps in government spending or they could compensate for a weak public sector where spending on social services might be deficient.

But there is a great deal of variation of remittance inflows, especially in a fragile states context. Reinforcing this point, Newland (2004) and Dade and Unheim (2007) find that the poverty-reducing effect of remittances

is largely dependent on the priorities and strategies of home country governments, again stressing the point that effective policy environments matter. Consider two middle-income countries with the capacity to institutionalise diaspora remittances. Due to its large number of temporary labour migrants, the government of the Philippines has facilitated remittance transfer through eliminating practices (mandatory remittance quotas and overvalued exchange rates) that hamper remittance exchange (Newland 2004).

While these remittance-facilitating programmes target temporary migrants, they remain accessible to diaspora communities and maximise the income stream from remittances directly to households, increasing the poverty-reducing potential of transfers. Indeed the Philippines has an Official Commission for Overseas Filipinos, mandated to handle the diaspora files. The Commission rose to prominence when the country was struck by a typhoon and remittance inflows ballooned.

In the case of Mexico, the government established federal programmes to 'promote collective remittances and to make the sum of individual household remittances greater than the sum of their parts' (Newland 2004: iv), where transferred sums are used to finance local development projects, directly connecting remittances to the poor. Newland reports that while this strategy is being adopted by other Central American and Caribbean countries, poor macro-economic conditions, underdeveloped markets, corruption, and poor investment climate often threaten the success of such policies in weaker, more fragile states.

But because middle-income countries can develop effective pro-diaspora policies does not mean that fragile states have the capacity to do so. Indeed, many fragile states, aware of the benefits of remittances but lacking effective policy environments, are creating stronger relationships with their diasporas in the West, leading to a haphazard 'push and pull' between diasporas and countries of origin. In some cases, financial remittances 'pull' homeland politicians to court and, sometimes, coerce their diaspora to provide remittance finance.[17] In others, the financial remittances of diasporas, critical to many econo-

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[17] Orjuela, Camilla, 'Distant Warriors, Distant Peace Workers? Multiple Diaspora Roles in Sri Lanka's Violent Conflict,' Capacity Building for Peace and Development: Roles of Diaspora, University for Peace, 2006: 217–244.

mies, translate into political rights that allow diasporas to 'push' country of origin politics. But a key obstacle towards harnessing diasporas in a fragile states context may be a general resentment against those who have left.[18] Clearly, when neglected or poorly conceived, government policy can represent a significant barrier to diaspora involvement; in extreme cases, such barriers can provoke opposition to the government among diaspora populations.[19]

Further, even if the policy environment is 'right', assessing the intentions of remitters, and the ultimate use of remittances is highly complex. Even when diasporas have the best intentions, their actions may have unintended consequences and risk destabilising fragile states. As noted, uneven distribution of remittances between households may create new dividing lines between those that receive and those that do not. Remittance flows can also be strongly partisan and therefore divisive and exclusionary—diasporas remit largely to friends and family, and research suggests that it is the poorest and most vulnerable who are the least likely to benefit.[20]

A recent example will help illustrate the dilemmas of remitting to fragile states. For every fragile state like a Zambia, where remittances account for only 0.25 % of the country's GDP, there is a Tajikistan, where remittances account for 41 % of GDP. For Haiti and Yemen, two other fragile states, the proportions are 20 % and 10 % respectively.[21] A 'remittance trap' occurs when increasing fragility motivates even more remittances, leading to greater dependence on remittances, migration out flows, a hallowing out of the economy, and low growth due to a lack of investment opportunities. Notwithstanding Uzbek leader Karimov's rhetoric, fragile

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[18] Appointee, Michelle, 'Diasporas in Caribbean Development', Rapporteur's Report, Inter-American Dialogue and the World Bank, August 2004, p. 5.

[19] The fact that diasporas were able to leave the site of conflict and hardship while others stayed behind and endured the hardships of war can create a divide between those who stayed and those who did not. In some cases the official and civil communities back in the country of origin may prefer not to work with or develop ties with diasporas abroad as a result of these negative feelings, depriving diasporas of legitimacy as advisors.

[20] Turner, Mandy, 'Three Discourses on Diasporas and Peacebuilding,' Paper, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK, 2008.

[21] World Bank data quoted in Lum et. al 2012. p. 210.

states like Uzbekistan depend heavily on migrant workers because there are few jobs for them at home.

Consider the havoc and volatility the Russian rouble crisis is inflicting on those fragile states along Russia's border, which are all dependent on the billions of dollars sent home by migrant workers.[22] The negative effects are twofold because the rouble's drop in value means that migrants are discouraged from staying in Russia, putting an even greater burden on homeland economies when they return. Regionally, the remittance drop in 2015 will amount to more than a $10bn loss because of the weaker Russian currency (The Guardian 2015).[23]

Authority: Governance and Regulatory Frameworks and Remittances

In a discussion of authority, we are concerned with the effects of diasporas to promulgate norms of good governance and democratic development, and support the establishment and strengthening of regulatory frameworks to encourage positive diaspora activities in the homeland. Clearly, the policy frameworks adopted by home governments with respect to diaspora populations can have a substantial impact on a country's ability to capitalise on diaspora contributions to fragility. To a large extent, positive and effective diaspora engagement depends on the existence of sound government policy designed to enable and encourage diaspora investment in areas of primary importance to the country. Recent discourses on governance and diaspora issues have focused on the formation of 'diaspora strategies' at the domestic and international level (Boyle and Kitchin 2011b).

Diaspora strategies, which are explicit policy initiatives aimed at developing relationships between home countries, host countries, and diaspora communities, have begun to emerge in diverse forms, ranging from the

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[22] Most vulnerable are Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, where millions of migrants live and work in Russia. Their return home could contribute to a social upheaval in these weak states.

[23] According to recent data from the World Bank, 21 % of Armenia's economy, 12 % of Georgia's, 31.5 % of Kyrgyzstan's, 25 % of Moldova's, 42 % of Tajikistan's, 5.5 % of Ukraine's, 4.5 % of Lithuania's, 2.5 % of Azerbaijan's and 12 % of Uzbekistan's, rely on remittances. About 40 % of remittances to Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine are from Russia, rising to 79 % for Kyrgyzstan (The Guardian 2015).

highly formalised to light and informal procedures (Ancien et al. 2009; Boyle et al. 2009). However, there are several major themes that emerge as central to the creation of meaningful and viable diaspora strategies.

Agunias and Newland (2012b) cite three key mechanisms for facilitating diaspora engagement: (1) Creating a viable framework conducive to diaspora engagement; (2) Developing diaspora-centred institutions in both home and host countries; (3) Managing programmes that target diasporas as development actors. Of the three mechanisms, encouraging diaspora engagement appears to have generated the most discussion. According to Agunias and Newland (2012a) and Boyle et al. (2009), the establishment of regulatory systems, such as flexible citizenship laws, residency, visa access, political rights, portable pensions, social services, and tax incentives for investment are crucial to deepening interactions between diasporas and home countries. Indeed, Leblang (2015) contends that dual citizenship could help home countries maximise capital flows through making it easier for diasporas to engage in transnational activities.

The potential of remittances to do good (and bad) have been discussed above, but here we are concerned with how they might be strengthened by effective authority structures. One crucial vein of argumentation in this regard points to the role of diaspora communities as providers of development finance (Terrazas 2010; Debass and Ardovino 2009). While Graham (2010) contends that the presence of migrant networks and informational access makes remittances more sensitive to political risk than other forms of investment, Singer (2010) argues that remittances are more stable than other forms of development finance. Based on the understanding that remittances have become a large and staple component of development finance, Le Goff and Kpodar (2011) argue that remittances can reduce aid dependency when they are invested in human and physical capital rather than consumed.

But such a system requires regulatory frameworks covering both banking and remittance management. In terms of banking, one of the key ways by which diasporas can influence development is through maintaining deposit accounts in home countries (Terrazas 2010; Newland and Plaza 2013). Holding deposit accounts helps to increase domestic financial assets, which allow for future lending and further

investment. Additionally, diaspora savings can expand bank capitalisation and facilitate participation in capital markets. In efforts to engage diaspora communities, developing country banks are starting to open branches in host countries. Moreover, the securitisation of remittances has also contributed to the broadening of assets held by domestic banks. Recently, financial institutions have allowed 'credit worthy' borrowers to access international lending at preferential interest rates through the 'future-flow securitisation' of remittances. Essentially, the securitisation of remittances could allow countries with 'speculative' grades according to international rating agencies to receive an actual investment grading rating, facilitating international lending and contributing to investment. Indeed, according to Ketkar and Ratha (2009), there is an estimated untapped potential of $12 billion for remittance-based future-flow securitisation in the developing world.

Furthermore, the creation of public and private entities to offer transnational loans may contribute to the ability for migrants to access credit in host countries (Terrazas 2010). While migrants are able to use transnational loans to provide credit to family in home countries, divergent bankruptcy laws between home and host states make it difficult for migrants to use assets accumulated in host countries as collateral for credit. Programmes such as the Philippine government's Pag-ibig Overseas Program allows Filipino migrants to access home loans after two years of voluntarily contributing to the fund. Similar programmes have been established by the Mexican government, which hopes to provide Mexican migrants in the USA with access to credit, supporting the development of Mexican citizens living abroad.

Legitimacy: Foreign Direct Investment and Property Rights

Legitimacy is arguably the most difficult to measure in a diaspora context. First in regards to measuring legitimacy, the maintenance of social contracts is an important component of individual and group productivity and the maintenance of stable state–society relations (Putnam 2000: 19). Social contracts facilitate the interaction of group members because they create a network of norms that encourage trusting relationships,

which in turn promote constructive outcomes. The non-tangible benefits that individuals accrue through these social connections create a form of capital that reinforces relational norms and strengthen future interactions and agreements (Coleman 1990).

Interestingly, there is a considerable amount of academic material on social capital and ethnic communities, but this research is almost solely dedicated to addressing issues of immigration and integration in new societies. These studies have focused on the role of social networks in helping new immigrants and visible minorities improve their status, generate additional wealth, and gain equal access to community resources (see for example Pieterse 2003; Campbell and Mclean 2002; Gradstein and Justman 2000). It is unclear why the current literature is characterised by such an unbalanced division with a heavy emphasis on host states, even though social capital has been linked to positive outcomes and increased productivity in a variety of contexts, including large businesses (Tsai and Ghoshal 1998), schools, religious institutions (Coleman and Hoffer 1987), and rural communities (Narayan and Pritchett 1997).

In a classic study of trust and associational activity, Robert Putnam (1993) describes how northern Italy is characterised by superior economic and political performance relative to the south. He attributes the disparity between the two regions to differing levels of trust in governing institutions, attitudes towards civic-mindedness, and participation in community organisations. Narayan and Pritchett (1997) produced similar results concerning economic development in rural Tanzania. Using survey data to assess associational activity and trust among households as a measure of social capital, the authors link higher levels of village social capital with increased household expenditures.

In a study of 29 countries Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer (1997) found that, consistent with Putnam's (1993) and Narayan and Pritchett's (1997) work, trust and civic norms were positively correlated with economic performance. Conversely, Knack and Keefer's results did not support the notion that participation in community associations necessarily contributes to social capital, and in some cases, associational activity actually appeared to be counterproductive (1997: 1284). These studies

provide reliable empirical evidence that social capital contributes to positive outcomes with investment being the driver.

Although diaspora linkages have clear implications for generating and supporting these types of relationships, researchers have generally overlooked the potential that they play in strengthening property rights and FDI for building social capital in their homelands.

An article by Alan Smart and Jinn-Yuh Hsu (2004), on the role of the Chinese diaspora and foreign investment in economic development in China, is important in this regard. While the authors concede that ethnic social capital was critical for attracting high risk foreign investment and trust building in early stages of investment in mainland China, Smart and Hsu argue that it alone is insufficient for development in the absence of economic and human capital. They also note that the significance of kinship ties diminished as the investment climate in China matured and stabilised, while economic and human resources such as education became more important (562). This would suggest perhaps a crucial role for diasporas as investors in social capital projects in fragile states.

Two common assumptions appear to underlie the vast literature that focuses on the role of diasporas as investors, offering explanations for *why* diasporas invest in home countries. Firstly, the literature linking diasporas to investment tends to draw on the same general explanations as those used to justify trade linkages—that migrant knowledge of home customs and language reduces the transaction cost of engaging with home countries, while ethnic networks make up for weak legal systems and provide community-based mechanisms for contract enforcement (see Rauch 2003). Indeed, the superior knowledge possessed by diasporas regarding investment opportunities and business practices render diasporas open to investments that may typically be seen as too risky, particularly in post-conflict or resource-poor countries (Terrazas 2010). As a result, diaspora investors possess a 'first mover' advantage when investing in home countries (Leblang 2009; Kuznetsov and Sable 2006).

The second assumption suggests that diaspora investors are likely to accept below-market rates of return due to patriotic sentiment (Kempf and Osthoff 2007; Statman 2000). While patriotic effects counter traditional logic of investment driven by profit maximisation, Kempf and Osthoff (2007) suggest that investors may prefer to accept smaller

financial rewards to invest in socially responsible funds. However, it should be noted that patriotic effects are said to be strongest with first-generation diaspora communities.

In general, the literature appears to identify several forms of diaspora financing, each of which affects development in different ways. On the FDI side, scholars have found that FDI can contribute to development by increasing capital stock and providing liquidity to developing countries, improving domestic capacity for research and development, and by promoting the international transfer of technology (Debass and Ardovino 2009). However, some developing countries have consistently found it difficult to attract FDI due to the relative risk of investing in (sometimes) fragile contexts with poorly developed institutions (Newland and Plaza 2013).

In countries that have difficulty attracting FDI, the diaspora is seen to play an important role as a source of FDI to home countries. Newland and Plaza (2013) suggest that in these cases, exposure to diaspora members may enhance the reputation of home countries to investors, while diaspora members in positions of power use knowledge of home countries to steer foreign investments to home regions. In some cases, the effect of migration on FDI flows to home countries appears to be quite large. In examining the effect of Chinese migrant populations on FDI in China, Gao (2003) finds that a 1 % increase in Chinese population share increases cumulative FDI in China by 3.8 %. Similarly, Docquier and Lodigiani (2010) find that in the long-run, the elasticity of FDI to skilled migration is between 50 % and 75 %, suggesting that skilled migration has a positive effect on FDI flows to home countries.

Interestingly, Debass and Ardovino (2009) draw a distinction between FDI and Diaspora Direct Investment (DDI), which they define as investment that relies on transnational social networks composed of migrants and migrant mechanisms that operate between home and host countries. Essentially, Debass and Ardovino suggest that DDI can foster development in home countries in five ways: (1) through 'brain gain' from the return of émigrés who bring knowledge, technology, capital, and market access to home countries; (2) through enhancing vertical and horizontal 'spillover' in terms of technology and knowledge, where DDI is less likely to prevent such spillover then traditional FDI; (3) through being less

adverse to political risk and economic shocks than FDI investors, where due to feelings of pride and duty towards the homeland, DDI investors are both more informed and are less likely to withdraw investments due to domestic uncertainties; (4) through acting as catalysts for further investment by being 'first movers', ensuring non-resident investors of relative stability and by establishing joint ventures and promoting the export of domestic goods; and (5) by encouraging local market reform to better facilitate future engagement in the global economy.

While it is unlikely that a large proportion of any diaspora group can engage in FDI on an individual basis, individuals can invest in home countries through purchasing shares in investment funds and bonds (Newland and Plaza 2013). In examining the cases of India and Israel, Ketkar and Ratha (2009) find that diaspora bonds enable governments to leverage small amounts from individuals into substantial resources for development. Indeed, in the Indian case, the first diaspora bond issue helped ward off an impending balance-of-payment crisis following internationally imposed sanctions after India's first nuclear test, while in Israel, the government raised $25 billion for infrastructure projects through bond issues. Similarly, diaspora mutual funds are further modes of investment accessible to small investors, some of which have explicit development intentions. For example, the Senegalese investment fund, financed by the Senegalese diaspora, has financed 804 projects valued at $40 million (Newland and Plaza 2013). Additionally, the proposed Liberian Diaspora Fund, a social investment fund managed by Liberians in the USA, hopes to invest in small business in Liberia (Terrazas 2010).

Capacity: SMEs and Trade

There is a large body of research on the determinants of aid allocation but less on the linkages between diasporas and trade (and aid) and support for small businesses, which we call Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). As noted above, the transfer of social and business networks, especially SME activities, can be one of the most positive effects of diasporas on enhancing economic and political relations and growth for both home and host states (Samy 2011). Consider also the social networks

established by returning worker migrants, who contribute to homeland growth through skills and knowledge transfers upon their return (World Bank 2013). As noted, fragile states tend to be underfunded as a group and are subject to greater funding volatility (Carment et al. 2008, 2009), so SMEs pose a risky proposition where aid is more likely to displace such activity and financing might be difficult to obtain. Job creation in fragile states does typically include financing private-sector development. However, a poor business environment and the attrition of capacity in the domestic private sector reduces the effectiveness of traditional SME financing strategies in fragile states.[24]

Not surprisingly, Blodgett Bermeo and Leblang (2010) find that like other forms of development finance, donors tends to allocate higher amounts of bilateral foreign aid to the home countries of large domestic immigrant populations. This point has been reinforced by Vandercasteelen (2012). His original analysis found that migrant populations in a donor country significantly increase a donor's bilateral aid allocation. If a donor is popular among migrants, has better integration policies, is more open towards migrants, or has residents who are concerned about immigration, aid is disproportionally allocated towards aid recipients with a large migrant population in the donor country.[25] In brief, the presence of large diasporas influences these kinds of public financing preferences leading to the possibility of strengthening the capacity of fragile states, (and less so for fragile states where diasporas do not exercise that influence for reasons of size or access).

A similar kind of linkage exists in trading relationships, in so far as the presence of large diasporas do influence trade agreements, policy preferences, and migrant flows. At the most basic level, the literature examining the impact of immigrants on trade flows between host and home coun-

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[24] For example, the World Economic Forum announced a multi-pronged agenda for SMEs in fragile states. They suggest: supply-chain financing and government procurement; use of technology to reduce risks, enhance efficiency leading to lower costs; securitisation and other means of obtaining capital relief for traditional sources of finance; introducing non-traditional sources of long-term capita; capacity building for both financiers and SMEs (Siddiqi 2015).

[25] The author notes: the construction of The International Migration Policy and Law Analysis (IMPALA) database by Harvard University, University of Luxembourg, University of Amsterdam, and University of Sydney is promising. Similarly, no data exists to directly test whether lobby activities of migrant populations affect donors' aid allocation.

tries finds that the presence of a diaspora community increases bilateral trade (Gould 1994; Head and Ries 1998; Girma and Yu 2002; White and Tedesse 2007). The causal linkage centres on the question of extracting 'ethnic surplus value' in the form of cultural and economic competencies (also Brinkerhoff 2009; Gupta et al. 2007; Osili 2007; Leblang 2010; Javorcik et al. 2010; Docquier and Lodigiani 2010; Ye 2010; Kugler and Rapoport 2007). The various strategies that diaspora groups use to promote bilateral trade include the development of networks through personal connections, knowledge translation and providing insights into the operations and culture of the foreign market (Singh 2012).

Indirectly, these diaspora linkages are important mechanisms that simultaneously contribute to economic activity *and* support the transformation of homeland economies (Chand 2012; Chand and Tung 2011; Leblang 2010). That is because, as per Berthelemy et al. (2009) and Ugarte and Verardi (2010), trade acts as a 'pull factor' for potential migrations, suggesting that bilateral trade increases skilled-worker migration to specific countries by enhancing information about labour market conditions. In general, diasporas are seen to affect trade through two main channels.

Firstly, Light et al. (2002) suggest that trade between home and host countries is influenced by a 'nostalgic' effect, where immigrant preferences for home goods increases the demand and market for native country goods in host countries. Indeed, Newland and Taylor (2010) argue that as consumers of home country 'nostalgia' goods, typically foodstuffs and labour-intensive artisanal products, migrant communities provide and facilitate trade in products that tend to face some of the highest trade barriers internationally, helping less-developed countries to integrate into the global economy. Newland and Taylor suggest that given that 'nostalgia' goods tend to be produced at the local level, migrant consumption may contribute to more local and household level earnings in home countries. In doing so, the diaspora market for nostalgia goods may serve to insulate small producers that may be threatened by large-scale production for the global market.

A second branch of the literature argues that the observed link between trade and migration is related to the ability for migrants to overcome information asymmetries through shared language and

culture (Rauch and Casella 1998; Jiang 2007). According to Rauch (1999, 2003), immigrants reduce transaction costs with home countries by creating social networks with fellow countrymen, which deters opportunism and contract violation through community enforcement, and reduce communication barriers to facilitate trade between home and host countries. While, Rauch and Trindade (2002), Dunlevy (2004), Herander and Saavedra (2005), and Combes et al. (2005) find similar evidence of reduced transaction costs stemming from immigrant networks, Saxenian (2002) and Arora and Gambardella (2004) suggest that these channels apply mainly to skilled migrants.

Alternatively, Bryant et al. (2004) warn that immigrants may reduce a home country's exports to various hosts if host country producers are able to replicate and provide host country consumers with substitutes for home country goods. Similarly, it appears that the trade-inducing effect of migration varies according to the anthropogenic make-up (or impact) of the immigrant population (Head and Ries 1998; White and Tadesse 2010) and the degree of their engagement with home countries (Epstein and Gang 2006).

While the majority of the past literature has tended to examine the migration–trade link from the host country perspective, more recent evidence has begun to prioritise the effects of migration on the migrants' home regions. Using the case of Bolivia, Canavire et al. (2006) find a positive link between both immigration and emigration on Bolivian trade. Similarly, Orozco (2013) finds that purchases from the El Salvadorian emigrant community account for as much as 10 % of El Salvador's total exports. In conducting a meta-analysis of past literature relating migration and trade, Genc et al. (2011) find that the migrant elasticity of imports is larger than that of exports for host countries, offering preliminary evidence that migration could contribute more greatly to the trade balance in home rather than host countries. Indeed, looking specifically at the link between immigration and trade in developing countries, Cristóbal (2010) finds that immigration has a positive effect on both exports and imports. Interestingly, he finds that this relationship tends to be driven by the capacity for immigrants to reduce transaction costs between home and host states, suggesting

that 'social' or 'ethnic' networks act as the drivers of the relationship between 'south–north' emigration and trade.

More specifically, Tadesse and White (2011) find evidence that while emigration increases both exports and imports for home countries, emigrants from developing countries exert relatively stronger effects on home country trade than emigrants from more developed regions. They suggest that this difference may be driven by (a) the maintenance of relatively stronger linkages between emigrants from developing countries to ethnic communities; (b) the presence of more developed institutional infrastructure in the global north, which implies already lower trade-related transactions costs, and would render the trade facilitating capabilities of emigrants from developed home countries as moot; (c) the potential for emigrants from developed countries to assimilate/integrate into host countries relatively faster than emigrants from developing regions.

In some cases, however, the gains from trade and investment through diaspora connections often go unrealised. Some research has shown that some diaspora investors are guided by non-pecuniary motives such as patriotism (Riddle et al. 2010), while most research concludes that the informational advantages held by diasporas reduce the transaction costs of entry into home markets and overcoming obstacles to resource transfer and investment (Orozco 2002b; Gevorkyan and Gevorkyan 2012). Such information needs to be fed into the policy process, for as noted by Brinkerhoff (2009), a well-developed mix of government policies (such as banking reform) can prove to be a very important and potent enabler in support of trade. In turn, if diaspora knowledge brokers help facilitate trade relations then there are questions of regulatory policy to be considered. For example, diaspora labour mobility and retention issues are important, because more trade agreements include services (i.e., the World Trade Organization's protocols on movement of natural persons).

Conclusion

In this chapter we sought answers to why some states, under the presence of high remittance flows from diaspora, successfully exit fragility and become stable while others remain fragile for long periods of time. Remittances, we argue, address only part of the state fragility problematique and there are other, equally important but largely neglected or misunderstood roles for diaspora. We sought to rectify this problem by showing that, despite a well-documented body of knowledge on diasporas, only some research makes an explicit connection to the broader problems and characteristics of state fragility in the areas of Authority, Legitimacy, and Capacity (Lyons 2004; Brinkerhoff 2009; Brinkerhoff and Taddesse 2008; Carment et al. 2015). In brief, we addressed a core problem in the literature, namely that the exact impact of diasporas on state fragility remains underspecified (Pirkkalainen and Abdile 2009). Like Le Goff and Kpodar (2011), Boyle et al. (2009), Boyle and Kitchin (2011), Newland (2004) and Newland and Plaza (2013), we believe that theory must think beyond remittances and move towards ideas of sustainable development that focus on long-term human, social, and physical capital development (see also Leblang 2010; Berthelemy et al. 2009).

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12

Conclusion: Diasporas as Cultures of Cooperation

David Carment and Ariane Sadjed

Overview

This book is about the various forms of interdependencies between states, communities, and actors that diasporas engage in. The contributions in it transcend categories such as the local vis-a-vis the global, as well as fixed and stable notions of home and diaspora. The different spaces of cooperation or the lack thereof can—following Ong and Collier—be described as 'assemblages'. Assemblages are the product of multiple determinations and not reducible to a single logic: 'They do not always involve new forms, but forms that are shifting, in formation, or at stake. As a composite concept, the term 'global assemblage' thus points to inherent tensions:

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global implies broadly encompassing, seamless, and mobile; assemblage implies heterogeneous, contingent, unstable, partial, and situated' (Ong and Collier 2005: 12).

Against this background, we do not understand globalisation as simply the homogenisation of lifestyles and practices, neither can diasporas be conceptualised as prototypes for hybridisation. Instead, the studies collected in this volume point to tendencies of homogenisation among a particular diaspora, while creating heterogenous spaces and practices at the same time. This simultaneity points to the multifaceted aspects of globalisation and the importance of embedding these processes in the respective contexts of the sometimes multiple 'homes' that diaspora call their own.

Latif Tas introduces the notion of 'double' and 'triple' diasporas among the Kurdish people, indicating that diaspora does not necessarily imply an element of movement or being away from a homeland: many Kurds who were born and grew up in Turkey already felt as a diaspora there. Tas shows how the diaspora community on the one hand feeds nationalism, but on the other hand is also simultaneously engaged in and influential in processes of democratisation in the country of origin, i.e., Turkey.

Presenting diasporas as the epitome of hybridity and exclusively in connection with the watering down of borders and concepts of the nation state would thus be too narrowly considered. While Gholami's chapter anticipates a softening of concepts of state and nation, Tas presents a case in which diasporic activity actually reinforces these concepts. By different means, both approaches indicate that cooperation between states and diasporas is only possible on the basis of stable notions of identity and belonging—most of which still circle around the idea of a nation state.

Considering the variety of identities in the homeland, even within one ethnic group (i.e., regarding social status, region, gender, and allegiances), diasporic identities can become homogenised or heterogenised along new lines in the host state. Furthermore, the situation of stateless diasporas, or those who define themselves religiously without claims to a particular nation state, challenge some of the dichotomy between one ancestral homeland of origin on the one hand and the host state on the other.

At the same time the local—the ties that diasporas have to specific places—continues to be important in their lives. As Sinatti and Horst have pointed out in regard to transnational networks, they are 'always rooted in local realities (…), although these local realities are often numerous and not just those of ancestral origin. Alongside defending the view that place does still matter, transnational scholarship has also recognised that migrants develop multiple affiliations and loyalties. This suggests a path that lies somewhere in between the mutually exclusive interpretations of migrants belonging to deterritorialised social formations and to locally bound home communities' (Sinatti and Horst 2014: 14–15).

As Carment and Calleja show, linkages to the homeland may include activities that are political (for example lobbying), economic (remittances and investment or brain drain), social (such as the promotion of human and other rights of the transnational group within different societies) and cultural (media production, the creation of subcultures, and so on). These linkages may take place at the individual level or through institutional channels, ranging from grassroot initiatives to international organisations. The engagement in these activities and affiliation with the respective social contexts is a crucial element of identity formation in the diaspora since it often includes conflicting allegiances, rendering the process of identity formation quite ambivalent. These situations have been well documented and explored through both the case study literature and large sample techniques (Brinkerhoff 2011; Lum et al. 2012).

Diasporic community formation and forms of cooperation emerging from it are significantly determined by the specific social context in which they emerge. It is the specific description of these contextual frameworks on the one hand and the broader, comparative assessment of macro-structures of diaspora cooperation on the other that allows us to draw conclusions about the different forms of diaspora activities.

The studies in this book thus describe immigration policies and particular ideas of ethnic identity in the host societies, home state policies on citizenship and nationalism, or socio-economic differences and the role of minorities within a diaspora community.

Fiona Adamson and Madeleine Demetriou (2007) propose that not only host and home state frame the activities and identifications of dias-

poras, but shift the focus more towards individual actors and networks. The contributions in this book show that individuals are acting within a particular social structure—while networks play a crucial role, personal choices such as the wish to return among displaced persons are determined by social and economic capital and the degree of integration in the receiving society. Similarly, private memories of individuals can be shaped by collective feelings of nostalgia, leading to the construction of a distinct imaginary of the past with the respective In- and Out-groups.

In some cases, as discussed by Karen Koerber and Maria Koinova among others in this volume, diasporas actively resist existing notions of belonging as brought forward by already established diaspora communities, the host state, or the country of origin. In these contestations we can observe how diasporas challenge normative concepts about identity or memory. In other cases, diasporas can also act to sustain regimes of power. Stuart Hall (2002) has pointed out that the weakening of nation states through processes of globalisation can lead to defensive and exclusivist formations, promoted by racism and communalism. These alliances and frictions between globalisation and concepts of national belonging are the framework in which diaspora groups situate themselves. This volume shows under which circumstances a plurality of notions of identity, belonging, and citizenship is possible and under which circumstances plurality is restricted.

Intentional or Unintentional Cooperation?

What exactly might be the role of diasporas as cultures of cooperation? First, there is the normative claim that diasporas 'should' have a role to play; an assumption premised perhaps on a particular political perspective that sees diasporas as having common interests, being able to articulate these interests and being able and willing to act on them. Perhaps there is some urgency to finding an answer to exactly how to channel diaspora 'energy' into creative and productive ends. It is well recorded that diaspora groups have in some instances helped finance conflict abroad and are foci of economic and political development in countries torn apart by war. Diasporas are the essential conduits through which both push and pull fac-

tors occur. The involvement may be perceived as benign or helpful, such as peacebuilding, but it may also be destructive and counterproductive by bringing in support for struggles that are in violation of international law.

Second, there is the idea of diaspora cooperation as a nebulous process that defies generalisation across groups. There is some truth to this when it comes to understanding how diasporas function in an interconnected world. It is well-established that transnational and informal knowledge and financial networks established by diaspora groups play a significant role in influencing trade, development, and diplomatic policy. But we know very little about the size of these networks, their degree of influence, or how fast they are growing.

Third and finally, there is the rise in prominence of transnational identities. This is an interesting idea since many diaspora don't 'belong to' any one particular state and some even do not have their 'own' state. Diasporas are transnational actors whose loyalties, values, interests, and connections form a nascent network of collaborative behaviour made salient under certain conditions.

The acts of cooperation between individuals, communities, or states can further be differentiated in terms of deliberate or unintended acts. Deliberate cooperation includes active mobilising for or against homeland policies or engaging in policies of the host state as members of a diaspora. Unintended forms of cooperation apply when a diaspora is vulnerable to pressures from host states to accommodate to particular narratives about their country of origin and their role as diaspora, or as an unanticipated result of migration.

Saskia Sassen (1996) has pointed out how migration flows have historically eluded the political and economic calculus and control mechanisms of receiving states. Taking this aspect of mobility into account as a constituting factor of diasporas, ensuing forms of global cooperation also evade intentions and agendas.

These developments can be particularly well-observed in the case of Jewish immigrants from Russia (Koerber), but also in the changing educational policies of Iranians in Britain (Gholami), the exposure of rural Gambian households to increasing mobility of their individual members (Gaibazzi), and Ukrainians in Canada (Nikolko).

Karen Koerber explains the difficulties in building a post-war German-Jewish community based on the aspirations of the German host society as well as the small remaining German-Jewish community. The influx of Jews from Russia and the Ukraine has turned around concepts of ethnic and religious identity for Jews in Germany and changed the communities profoundly. Her chapter points to the importance of historical contexts in the encounter of different diasporas: in regard to the Second World War for example, German-Jewish narratives compete with Russian-Jewish ones about victors, victims, and ensuing questions of legitimisation. It shows how heterogenous the Jewish diaspora can be within, because the members are shaped by the histories of different nation states. Cooperation is thus impeded by prejudices based on ethnic differences and competing historical narratives.

Reza Gholami's chapter on the other hand introduces a 'sweet spot' as the result of compromises between host society and diaspora community. The emergence of this space is influenced by many aspects of which economic objectives are not the least important. Although the 'sweet spot' is established due to deliberate decisions of educational providers, the outcome of these decisions slips away from the control of both the diaspora community and the host society. The result is a space of enablement and cosmopolitanism, because it exceeds identitarian concepts of various actors involved.

The granting of Overseas Citizenship of India (OCIs) to Indians living in the United States, as discussed by Daniel Naujoks, was intended as a form of strengthening the ties of this diaspora with their homeland. While it was in the first place motivated by the economic benefits that this form of dual citizenship will bring about for India, it has had some—unintended—political consequences, such as increasing advocacy for, and participation in, US politics, as well as stronger identification with India and the USA, leading to stronger ties between the Indian-American community overall. Whether intended or incidental, cooperation is shaped by historical, political, social, religious, economic, and cultural effects that open up particular (im-)possibilities for action.

Agency

The question of diaspora agency is an important aspect throughout this volume. In Chapter 4 we read how ethnic and religious belongings are switched, erased, or substituted—depending on the socio-political context of the homeland and host state. Ariane Sadjed thereby shows how religious belonging is shaped by religious belonging—de shaped by socio-political contexts and vice versa. The overarching narrative of Islam as incapable of dealing with religious difference categorises religious minorities from Muslim majority countries exclusively as the Islamic 'other', and thus erases the proximity these different religions from Iran historically share. Such homogenised conceptions of religious difference impede cooperation as a form of cultural understanding or exchange.

But which factors enhance agency? Regarding the question of return, the chapter by Loizides, Stevanovic and Elston-Alphas suggests that integration of displaced persons alleviates a black-and-white decision between home and host state. All diaspora share a certain degree of nostalgia for home. When diasporas thrive, their decision to return home is encouraged. This should not be seen as a calculus for encouraging the return, rather the opposite: granting diasporas the opportunity to feel at home means that individuals and communities become stronger, which benefits the home as well as the host state. Global networks of cooperation generated by diasporas in exile advocate, support, and sustain return home under prohibitive conditions. They thus facilitate voluntary peaceful return, even under conditions of inter-communal fear and economic insecurity.

Some contributions in this book describe diaspora cooperation connected to transformations of 'home': by creating new economic dependencies, by creating an imagined past, or by resorting to a collective image as victims. Paolo Gaibazzi's chapter on rural Gambian households describes the rural home as a centre around which new homes in urban areas, so-called 'sub-centres' are formed. They are concentrically and vertically integrated according to gender and seniority. This domestic centring of diasporic flows depends on solving 'bargaining problems' (Sen 1990) among household members, at the same time de-stabilising traditional

family structures and authorities. In cases where not the whole family but just a unit migrates, cooperation may continue in this particular cohort, while the rest of the family is excluded and may not partake. The result is translocality within, but not of, the household.

Diaspora activity creates cooperation in one space while preventing it in another—even in the rather small unit of a (extended) household. Processes of unity and disruption can happen simultaneously. Often they are evoked through historical memory to advance a political agenda in the host state.

Cultural practices are not per se conditions for successful cooperation. Neither can cultural traditions be seen as an impediment to transnational cooperation. Both perspectives would perpetuate an essentialist perception of 'culture' and ignore the constant interaction between globalised and local formations of culture. Rather, diasporisation gives rise to new and unprecedented forms of cooperation—and the respective cultural practices are challenged to adapt to them. Diasporisation can thus be conceptualised as a productive condition—while some cultural repertoires are more capable to adapt than others.

Diasporas embody cooperation not only among themselves but between themselves and the state. For example, the idea of diasporas as victims of a historical wrong touches upon a number of important aspects of cooperation—namely the interdependence between state and diaspora, the convergence of a diaspora narrative around a single idea of victimisation, and the role of historical narrative and memory in building group solidarity. Both Maria Koinova and Milana Nikolko explain how memory and narratives of common trauma become central for mobilisation initiatives in the twenty-first century.

We are all, or were at one point, members of one or possibly more diaspora groups. For some, our diaspora connections remain stronger than others. For many immigrant groups, the bonds to the homeland tend to fade with time. Others 'refuse to forget' in the face of adversity and a history of conflict, polarisation, and antagonism. In doing so, these diasporas show us something about the resilience of the human spirit, the importance of not forgetting, and the emergence of cooperation borne from antagonism.

Daniel Naujoks' study highlights how by creating a space for a continuation of relationship with the country of origin and for a network to interact within the Indian community, the OCI also leads to a stronger commitment of the diasporic community in the USA towards India, as well as towards Indian affairs. The possibility of dual citizenship decreases the need for detaching oneself emotionally from the country of origin, contributing to a higher political leverage as the Indian community enjoys a stronger social standing in the USA. In this way, the Indian diaspora can contribute to global cooperation by rectifying biases against their country of origin, leading to better minority protection and group-sensitive equity.

Against this backdrop, it can be stated that diaspora communities 'ultimately move the society towards a greater acceptance and recognition of difference' (Levy and Weingrod 2004: 17). In this light, we must understand diaspora cooperation as a productive, positive, and permanent condition that will allow us to understand how nation states and their international institutions are shaped by individual subjectivities among diaspora groups that are evolving over time. National, ethnic, class-based, or religious aspects are not fixed or stable but evolve differently depending on the social context. By looking closer at these 'internal' variations among diaspora communities, we are able to capture the mutual interdependencies of today's global communities.

Last but not least, we will turn to the question of how norms, expectations, and values of host societies are absorbed, adapted, and reframed by specific diaspora communities. These negotiations cannot be understood without considering the power relations and hierarchies in home and host societies, as well as within the respective diaspora group.

The contributions of this book suggest that we cannot speak of a transnationalisation from 'below' or from 'above' exclusively (Al-Ali and Koser 2002: 5). Diaspora communities are not entities outside or vis-a-vis the state—they are affected by and contribute to transnational practices from below as well as from above, and every so often these processes take place in interaction with each other. The question of which notions of identity, nation, and so on, assert themselves is closely connected to representation and definatory power (Broden and Mecheril 2007).

Diaspora communities as newcomers and even 'strangers' are dependent on knowing and adopting some of these majoritarian norms, in order to become accepted and to actively apply these norms rather than only passively being affected by them. In embracing these norms they are able to exert some power of their own. The Iranian diaspora in Germany, as described in Sadjed's chapter, suggests that the pressure to embrace majoritarian norms is strong for diaspora groups that are lower down in the hierarchy—currently this applies particularly to immigrants from the Middle East.

This also says a lot about the particular national framework and understanding of the 'majority' and 'minorities': In the USA, for example, where the largest group of Iranians outside of Iran resides, and where for economic reasons it is overall easier for immigrants to climb up the social ladder than in most European countries, the Iranian diaspora has a different standing. This position allows the community to actively shape the image of, and foreign policy with, Iran. But the composition and role of a diaspora community is also strongly determined by the relations between home and host country: until 1979, mainly Iranian elites benefitted from the influence of the USA in their home country. The breakdown of this relationship with the revolution in 1979 caused this group of people to emigrate and to seek refuge in the USA, where they created a little pre-revolutionary Iran outside of Iran. The role of individual Iranian-Americans in politics or media, their political affiliation and the specific composition of the networks they created, owe their existence to these specific historical processes.

These examples illustrate that due to the interests of host states, some diaspora groups are more desirable than others—they can be instrumentalised to enforce these interests in the home country. Milana Nikolko's chapter also shows how the Ukrainian diaspora uses host state policies in order to lobby for their own interests. If diaspora community and host state find a common denominator they can thus cooperate to exert their influence on the host state.

At the same time, the diaspora is exposed to norms of good governance and democratic development in the host country. As they export such regulatory frameworks to the country of origin, they engage in another aspect of cooperation by supporting positive diaspora activities.

Outlook

The chapters in this volume provide empirical support for theoretical arguments associating diaspora communities with diverse forms of cooperation at the local and global levels. While there is no apparent pattern in the efforts of diaspora behaviour and organisation, an important next step for researchers is to develop a broader theoretical framework for explaining how and why diaspora communities accomplish their goals, under conditions of uncertainty and conflict.

Political actors and policy makers in home and host states around the world should consider how they can engage diaspora members as partners and allies when making official contributions to global cooperation. While academic research has started to explore how diasporic groups influence the political process in their host states, we must also consider how host states can reshape the perspectives driving diaspora contributions to homelands.

The field of diaspora research is a rapidly growing area of study, but the current literature suffers from some obvious gaps which should be addressed in future studies. Qualitative methods are well suited for examining the complex interconnected linkages between ethnic groups across state boundaries, but future research needs to expand its focus on the collection of reliable and representative year over year data on diaspora activity. Furthermore, there needs to be a greater emphasis on the concurrent influence of transnational diaspora in both their homelands and host countries, not just one or the other. By their very nature, the activity of diaspora members and organisations in one location typically has ramifications for the other locations to which they are tied.

As the size, influence, and importance of diaspora communities continue to increase in the future, the connections linking host countries and homelands will only grow deeper and become more complex. Consequently, the research methods employed to analyse this phenomenon need to be comprehensive and thorough in order to understand and explain the evolving nature of diaspora communities and the kinship ties that link them to their home and host countries.

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Note: Page numbers with "n" denote notes.