The Annals of the International Institute of Sociology

NEW SERIES - VOLUME 7

SOCIETIES, CORPORATIONS AND THE NATION STATE

E.K. Scheuch & D. Sciulli
(eds.)

BRILL

THE ANNALS
OF
THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE
OF SOCIOLOGY

NEW SERIES — VOLUME 7

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF SOCIOLOGY

The International Institute of Sociology is the oldest continuous sociological association in existence. It was founded in 1893 in Paris by René Worms. Early distinguished members included scholars such as Max Weber, Lujo Brentano, Enrico Ferri, Franklin Giddings, Ludwig Gumplowicz, Achille Loria, Alfred Marshall, Carl Menger, Edward A. Ross, Gustav Schmoller, Georg Simmel, Albion Small, Gabriel Tarde, Edward B. Tylor, Ferdinand Tönnies, Alexandre Tchouprov, Thorstein Veblen, Lester Ward, Sidney and Beatrix Webb, and Wilhelm Wundt.

THE ANNALS OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF SOCIOLOGY

SOCIETIES, CORPORATIONS AND THE NATION STATE

NEW SERIES – VOLUME 7

EDITED BY

E. K. SCHEUCH AND D. SCIULLI

BRILL
LEIDEN · BOSTON · KÖLN
2000

Gedruckt mit Unterstützung der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft
Printed with support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Die Deutsche Bibliothek - CIP-Einheitsaufnahme

Societies, corporations and the nation state / ed. by E.K. Scheuch and D. Sciulli. – Leiden ; Boston ; Köln : Brill, 2000
ISBN 90-04-11664-8

ISBN 90 04 11664 8

PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

CONTENTS

1. SOCIETIES, CORPORATIONS, AND THE NATION STATE

Erwin K. Scheuch

I

Usually, titles of congresses addressing a whole discipline do not mean very much. Each general congress in sociology is a kind of test how much cohesion remains in a discipline that is most alive in its many specializations. To require adherance to just one topic would be unreasonable.

In planning for this congress we followed nevertheless one Leitmotiv: The return to the classices. This cannot possibly mean that we turn into undetached Durkheimians or Rossians, Spencerians or Weberians.

What this was meant to signal is the usefulness in reconsidering the concerns of the classics, their topics and not their answers. In this way sociology might regain some of its societal usefulness as a science of orientation. For us today it is hard to believe that at the turn of the century the *New York Times* sent journalists to cover the Yale lectures of Ross, or that a sociologist such as Tönnies could write a bestseller that had fourteen editions, or that Simmel was the star of intellectual salons.

Sociology has since become quite useful in many applied fields, and there is nothing to be said against sociotechnics as it is one way to test the usefulness of codified knowledge. However, the dramatic changes that we experienced in the last decade or so appear to increase in momentum. The intellectual public must gain the impression that sociologists in their emphasis on micro sociology become as irrelevant for intellectual orientation in our time as the models of micro economics are for the understanding of modern economies.

There is one very good reason why many sociologists—probably the great majority—feel uncomfortable with macro sociology and the events it has to deal with. The metaphor of a train is apt here. Those in a speeding train looking backwards see the unfolding of an orderly landscape, but those looking out of the window as the landscape slides by witness an unconnected plurality of pictures that do not seem to be part of a coherent whole. That is the core of the difficulty in practicing macro sociology in rapidly changing societies.

True, at any one time the mass of details tends to overwhelm comprehension. However, for the historian the passing of time has served as a sorting

out of what is of longterm significance, and what was of merely peripheral importance. The sociologist needs to opt for one of several perspectives, a perspective that guides his attention in the hope that what is ignored is of far less importance than what is at the center of his attention.

Emphasizing social change is a promising priority, especially if one makes the right choice in understanding this change as modernization. There is an often ignored central aspect to the kind of social change that we christen "modernity." To contemporaries in such societies the present is experienced as a transitory situation moving to a new and more agreeable equilibrium. This is historically a quite ununsual way in living with the disarrangements of the day, but in the West this has been taken for granted ever since the last two centuries. There are many varieties in identifying what is central to the process of modernisation or the state of modernity. We ourselves maintain that modernization has no telos, and that only further change and no new equilibrium can be expected.

The revolution in transport and communication, the world-wide marketing of goods and services, the breakdown of the bipolar world order leading to a fluid political pattern with (currently) 27 small scale wars—all of this rapidly increases the interdependence between cultures and states. Unavoidably this leads to strains and destabilization—in addition to opening opportunities. Sociology is called upon to help the interested public to understand better these processes of change.

To the classics of our discipline, the processes of disintegration were more tangible than the elements of cohesion. "Would the confused change of the day lead to a new order?" was the common theme around the fin de siècle. The discipline is once again called upon to choose "big topics" and avoid being drowned in a mass of small studies.

In our time we live with a perplexing disintegration of seemingly monolithic orders side by side with the reemergence of cultures and ethnic identities long believed to have been submerged. Obviously, there is both less stability in large scale systems and more stability in smaller entities than had been assumed by intellectuals. And equally obvious, we have to take long-term views and include a historical dimension in our analysis of current affairs. This is a situation where sociology could regain the centrality for an intellectual discussion of the large issues that it had in several advanced countries around the turn of the century.

The organization of societies into states is vastly more complicated than earlier assumed, given that much of the thinking has been based on Western Experience. We are now realizing that the penetration of the state into society is not as deep nor as lasting as was originally expected by the elites

who imposed these changes. The units that once constituted the USSR offer important lessons in this regard. Furthermore, conditions are even more complicated if the physical space of societies and of states do not coincide, as is the case in most of Africa. And yet the existence of the state is by now virtually indispensable for modern institutions.

In the social sciences evidence has accumulated that "mediating institutions," the units and organizations between the private worlds of daily living and the institutions and groupings at the level of the collectivity (such as local bureaucracies, corporations, voluntary associations), are of crucial importance for an understanding of the relations between society and the State. Mediating institutions appear also to be the carriers of traditions, and a minimum of traditional stability—compare also non-Western experiences—is the condition for successful modernizations.

Given sociology's emphasis on processes of social differentiation, we have not concentrated equally on the forces of social cohesion. While earlier sociologists thought that societies rested on social control (Ross) and normative consent (Parsons), we discarded these notions when we began to explain processes of diversification and decay, emphasizing microsociology (e.g. "rational choice"). However, by redirecting our attention to a "middie level" of social organization, i.e. mediating institutions, we can perhaps gain a better view of the tension and balance between both the centrifugal and centripetal forces in societies.

There are two ways to miss the intellectual challenge. One way is the flight into specialization. This is not a rejection of specialization—as it affords concrete insights—but a critique of specialization that fails to ask what is in it for the discipline at large. And there is the even more misguided reaction to the turmoils of the day by appealing to kind feelings and uplifting thoughts. Problems of cultural clashes and conflicts of interest need to be viewed as realities. In much of the 19th century economics was called the "dark science" because it was very often the bearer of bleak tidings. At the end of the century sociology must not be afraid to be the "dark science" if it is that what needs to be reported. But sociology would also fail if it were to neglect the counterveiling forces of stability in a situation of turmoil.

The International Institute of Sociology needs to be the forum for the large issues at a time when other fori are being submerged by the routines of what Kuhn christened "normal science".

II

That people in countries such as the USA, or Japan, or Germany live under conditions and in ways that are—by and large—unprecedented should be undisputed.[1] It should also be acceptable to label this condition "modernity", and the changes leading to this condition "modernization". It is highly controversial what constitutes the defining criteria of this condition.[2] On the way to specifying our own approach we identified 11 other perspectives:

(1) Modernization as the realization of the programs of the Enlightment (e.g. Jürgen Habermas, Ralf Dahrendorf, Richard Münch)[3]
(2) Modernization as the dominance of individuality and subjectivism (e.g. Georg Simmel, Friedrich Nietzsche)[4]
(3) Modernization as the movement from community to society (presumably Ferdinand Tönnies, but definitely Charles Cooley and William G. Summer)[5]
(4) Modernity as the prevalence of "modern" personalities—due to modernizing experiences (the "individual modernity school": Alex Inkeles, Daniel Lerner)[6]

---

[1] There is, however, a controversy whether modernity is a stage in the process of evolution the end of which is still open, or a quantum jump into something unprecedented. We are still undecided on this issue but if pressed would take the position of an evolutionist. The opposite position, that modernity is a condition of discontinuity in social history, is a central thought in the writings of Anthony Giddens, e.g. *The Consequences of Modernity*. Polity Press, Cambridge (UK), 1990.

[2] Erwin K. Scheuch: "Schwierigkeiten der Soziologen mit dem Prozeß der Modernität". In: Wolfgang Zapf (Hg.): *Die Modernisierung moderner Gesellschaften*. Frankfurt 1991, pp. 109–139.

[3] The names of three authors that differ in their general orientations signals that we are here not referring to a "school." Rather, we illustrate a shared and yet broad outlook that is dominant in the cultural intelligentsia with three social philosophers. Ralf Dahrendorf: *Gesellschaft und Demokratie in Deutschland*. München 1965; Jürgen Habermas: *Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne 1985*; Richard Münch: *Die Kultur der Moderne*. Frankfurt 1989.

[4] Donald N. Levine (ed.): *George Simmel on Individuality and Social Forms*. The University of Chicago Press. Chicago 1971, especially section IV through VI. Also Georg Simmel: Gesamtausgabe, vol. II Frankfurt 1992; idem: *Philosophie des Geldes*. Berlin, 6th edit. 1958.

[5] Charles H. Cooley in: *Human Nature and the Social Order*, 1902, and in: *Social Organization* 1909. Around the turn of the century the dominant paradigm was modernization as a movement from a "warm" to a "cold" form of human existence. William G. Sumner's postulate of social change as a movement from "folkways" to "stateways" is as much part of such a shared problem understanding as is Durkheim's view of social evolution as a change from mechanical solidarity to organic solidarity. Even Max Weber was part of this mood in the social sciences. "Gemeinschaft" versus "Gesellschaft" fits only in part into this evolutionary model, as Tönnies did not believe that a social order as a system dominated only by "Kürwille" (the type of action characteristic for "Gesellschaft") would be possible; societies would differ in the degree to which they were "Gesellschaft", but none could do without elements of Gemeinschaft.

[6] Daniel Lerner: *The Passing of Traditional Society—Modernizing the Middle East*. Glencoe (Ill)

(5) Modernity as the consequence of modernizing elites (Joseph Schumpeter; David McCelland)[7]
(6) Modernization as the movement from the dominance of the primary sector to that of the secondary sectors, and again from a dominance of the secondary sector to that of the tertiary sector (Charles Fourastié, Colin Clarke, Walt Rostow)[8]
(7) Modernization as the necessary consequence of democratisation following successful bourgeois revolutions (e.g. Barrington Moore)[9]
(8) Modernization as the consequence of mass participation in public affairs (e.g. Gabriel Almond, Sidney Verba, in a way also Samuel Huntington)[10]
(9) Modernization as an "extension of citizenship"—the granting of "political rights", "economic rights", and "social rights" (T.H. Marshall)[11]
(10) Modernization as the process of "nation building"—and nation building as a sucession of characteristic conflicts (Stein Rokkan)[12]
(11) Moderinzation as the institutionalisation of market economy, welfare systems, and political democracy (Wolfgang Zapf).[13]

1958; Alex Inkeles and D.H. Smith: *Becoming Modern—Individual Changes in Six Developing Countries*. Cambridge (Mass) 1974. A defense of this approach against criticism is to be found in Alex Inkeles: "Understanding and Misunderstanding in Individual Modernity." In: Louis Coser and Otto N. Larsen (eds.): *The Uses of Controversy in Sociology*. New York 1976.

[7] David C. McClelland: *The Achieving Society*. Princeton 1961. Clelland explicitely bases his concept of modernization—as a consequence of a sufficient number of persons with high "n-achievement"—on Joseph Schumpeter's view of the key role of entrepreneurs.

[8] Colin Clark: *The Conditions of Economic Progress*. London 1940; Charles Fourastié: *Die große Hoffnung des 20. Jahrhundert*. Köln, 2nd edit. 1969; Walt Rostow: *Stadien des wirtschaftlichen Wachstums*, Göttingen 1966; idem: *Politics and the Stages of Growth*. Cambridge (Mass.) 1971. A concise but in our opinion sufficient presentation of the "stages"-school can be found in Günter Wiswede: *Soziologie. Verlag moderne Industrie*, Landsberg, 2nd edit. 1991 pp. 252 ff.

[9] Barrington Moore: *Political Power and Social Theory*. Cambridge (Mass.) 1958; idem: *Soziale Ursprünge von Diktatur und Demokratie*. Frankfurt 1969; idem: *Injustice*. London 1978.

[10] High rates of participation were for a long time taken as an indicator of modernity, especially in American political science. The "classic" of this orientation is Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba: *The Civic Culture*. Princeton 1963. See also Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie, and Jae-On Kim: *The Modes of Democratic participation*. Beverly Hills 1971; Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie: *Political Participation in America*. New York 1972; Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie and Jae-on Kim: *Participation and Political Equality*. Cambridge (UK) 1978 (this international survey includes Japan). For a critical assessment see W.R. Schofeld: "The Meaning of Democratic Participation." In: *World Politics*, vol. 28 (October 1975), p. 141; Samuel P. Huntington: "Postindustrial Politics—How Benign Will it Be?" in: *Comparative Politics*, vol. 6 (January 1974), pp. 163–191. The most important international study with this "participation-is-good, more-participation-is-better" outlook is Samuel H. Barnes and Max Kaase (eds.): *Political Action*. Beverly Hills 1979.

[11] T.H. Marshall: *Class, Citizenship, and Social Development*. New York 1965.

[12] Stein Rokkan: *Citizens, Elections, Parties*. Oslo 1970; idem: *The Politics of Territorial Identity*. London 1982; idem: *Centre-Periphery Structure in Europe*. Frankfurt 1987.

[13] Wolfgang Zapf (ed.): *Theorien des sozialen Wandels*. Köln 1971.

All these aspects are undoubtedly associated with what we intuitively understand as modernity and modernization, but with the exception of the notions 6 through 11 they are not really referring to structural aspects. And any characterization of modernity that omits references to structural changes is deficient in a major way. Whatever the one-sidedness of these other approaches may be, by their very diversity they demonstrate that the state of being modern should be viewed as a system of great complexity, far from earlier notions of modern societies as rationally constructed machines. Therefore it is not reasonable to expect a single concept that catches all facets of "modernity." Rather it is necessary to be selective in identifying features that hopefully catch structural universals.[14] In such an attempt both macro and micro features of social existence should be combined, as the option for one or the other appears to us as a major weakness of many of the theories referred to above.

As societies such as Japan, Germany and the United States differ from one another in many ways, a question, whether there is more than one way to modernity? sounds moot. And yet such a question casts doubts on an idea central to most modernity theories, namely the underlying sameness of all non-traditional societies. Social science history shows us that the start of former traditional social orders on their way to modernity differed not only in time but also in their existence as social entities: some were already nation states, other had fragmented political orders—such as Germany and Italy; some of these societies were—by the standards of their time—both populous and affluent such as France, while others such as Sweden were poor.

The roads to the current state of modernity were not identical either, as there was wide-spread diffusion and consequently different "learning times." The oldest industrial nation was of course England. In its initial stages of economic modernization several features of the type of wage labor characteristic for late medieval agriculture in Western Europe were carried over into mining in greater depth than hitherto, and into early textile mills.[15] Thus, contracts were given to whole families, and this meant that males, females, and children were at first working in coal mines and factories. Working under industrial conditions, however, forces individual work contracts, requires (so far!) a separation of work from the habitat.[16]

---

[14] Such a structural approach as the one sketched here is rejected by Robert Nisbet on principled grounds: He argues that circumstances that are particular to a time and a location take primacy against structural factors when accounting for social change; cf. *Social Change and History*. London 1969.

[15] For details see Peter Mathias: *The First Industrial Nation*, London, 2nd edit. 1990.

[16] The "classical" author for the British Experience is E.J. Hobsbawm: The Age of

No other major industrialising country repeated the employment of whole families on the scale of Britain. The concept of an individual work contract to labor in a central place (the mill or factory) as the way to organize wage labor quickly diffused.

Which leads to a third feature that was usually neglected when discussing modernization as processes of change in Western societies: The readiness to learn from other experiences.[17] Contemporaries in other countries of the early industrialization in Britain observed the social costs of this change, as it e.g. was reported by the various Royal Commissions, and they were determined to counter such developments.[18] T.H. Marshall described for Britain the extension of the right to vote as a means that would channel the great social conflicts and ills into managable processes.[19] By way of contrast, Germany introduced a welfare system to counter directly the social costs of industrialization, and specifically to give workers a stake in their society at a time of rising conflicts between Western European nation states. Japan is the prime case of modernizing as eclectic yet systematic social borrowing—thus taking the Prussian army, but the British navy as models.[20]

Last but not least there were attempts to harness economic forces to serve better political goals. For Germany the peculiar mixture of socialistic elements with those of state-capitalism that the Nazis introduced as an economic order is a case in point. The Leitmotiv of this order was: technological

---

Revolution 1789–1848. London, 5th edit. 1995, and *The Age of Capital 1848–1875*. London 10th edit. 1995.

[17] An example is the development of welfare measures as part of the employer-employee relationship e.g. in France to counteract the "pauperization" of the factory worker. Peter N. Stearns contrasts this with developments in Britain and in Germany in: "Die Herausbildung einer sozialen Gesinnung im Frühindustrialismus." In: Peter Christian Ludz (ed.): *Soziologie und Sozialgeschichte*. Special Issue no. 19 of the *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, 1972, pp. 320–342.

[18] These reports of the Royal Commissions were no unbiased sources on the conditions in early industrialization but written with the hope to trigger remedial legislation. However, many contemporaries read these reports as factual descriptions—such as Karl Marx for whom they were the empirical base for theories such as "fallende Profitrate" or "Verelendung". Friedrich List formulated his program for protective tariffs first for the Deutsche Bund and then for the USA with reference to the crippling consequences of free trade in England.

[19] T.H. Marshall, op. cit.

[20] Manfred Pohl: "Die Systeme sozialer Sicherung in Japan und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Versuch eines wertenden Vergleichs". In: Christian Deubner, Leo Kißler and René Lasserre (eds.): *Modell Japan?* Frankfurt 1990, pp. 17–32. In the same anthology also Edgar Andréani: *Das japanische System der sozialen Sicherung: ein Modell Japan für die europäischen Industriegesellschaften?*, pp. 33ff. Sehr instruktiv ist Stephan Leibfried: "Sozialstaat" oder "Wohlfahrtsgesellschaft"—Thesen zu einem japanisch-deutschen Sozialpolitikvergleich. In: *Soziale Welt*, vol. 45 (1994), pp. 389–410. The coexistence of modern and premodern features is claimed to be also characteristic for Japan; Thomas Immoos: *Japan = Archische Moderne*. München 1992.

modernization yes, economic modernization only in individual firms but not in the economy, and in social life a return to imagined forefathers.[21] As the Nazis had only six years until the start of World War II it is impossible to judge whether this peculiar order that Jeffrey Hert christened "reactionary modernism" would really have penetrated into all of society, but the ease with which Germany after 1945 returned to a Weimar social order gives grounds for doubts.[22]

Modern societies are not carbon copies of each other, nor are the current so-called post-modern societies. That they each have peculiar features does not invalidate the assertion that due to structural identities they show a family likeness.[23] This assertion requires an abstract conceptualization for what is meant by modernity that enables us to characterize a society both in its distinct features and in its characteristic likeness with others.

Societies that were latecomers to economic developments are hospitable to debates about their uniqueness. Germany is one case where historians have argued about a special road ("Sonderweg") of Germany into the modern world. Japan is another case in point. But for Japan the assertions of being a special case go further: Not only was there a special road to the present order, but the resulting order itself was distinct—so the assertions go. Proceeding from the writing of Tominaga, Y. Lilulu and F. Wang claim that there is an Asian variety of modernism: There are now attempts to postulate an Islamic Road to modernity and a muslim way of being modern. In Iran this is the official ideology.[24]

---

[21] Goffrey Hert: *Reactionary Modernism—Culture in Weimar and the Third Reich.* Cambridge (Mass.) 1984, identifies as one of the modernizing parts of the politics of the NS government the conscious adoption of the American experience of former luxury goods to become articles of mass culture.

[22] Erwin K. Scheuch: "Eine andere Republik?" In: *Politik und Kultur*, vol. 8, no. 4. Berlin 1981, pp. 3–23.

[23] An instructive recent study of 15,000 Managers and Executives in the USA, Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Japan shows both important differences and structural likeness. Charles Hampden-Turner and Alfons Trompenaars: *The Seven Cultures of Capitalism.* New York 1993. See also Klaus Hildebrand: "Der deutsche Eigenweg." In: Manfred Funke et al. (eds.): *Demokratie und Diktatur.* Bonn 1987, S. 15–34.

[24] In: *International Sociology*, vol. 6, no. 1 (March 1991), pp. 25–36; Cf. Timothy Mitchell and Lilu Abu-Lughed: Questions of Modernity. In: *Items*, Dec. 1993, pp. 79–83.

III

The concept of "Wirtschaftsgesellschaft"

The classics in sociology identified as the process central to modernization and the resulting modernity the mechanism of social differentiation. Emile Durkheim called it "division du travail", but social differentiation was what he meant. In this process that can be described both in micro and macro-sociological terms the differentiated sectors can unfold their "Eigendynamik". "Eigendynamik" refers to the kind of rationality and consequent efficiency that is characteristic to a sector in society.[25] "Eigendynamik" has as yet no translation or real conceptual equivalent in other languages. It is a combination of two mechanisms: a feedback within a system that leads to a reinforcement. The result is a presumed stream-lining plus self-serving as a common pathology. It seems that in the English language the general term "social dynamics" suffices. This can be observed in religion being organized into churches, in the military becoming businesslike, and above all in bureaucracies and in economic matters.

The current Germany considers itself a social market economy. As Walter Eucken conceived his model of a market economy, and as it was developed further by Alfred Müller-Armack, the "Soziale Marktwirtschaft" was a market economy within a set of constraints ("Datenkranz") that were socially and politically stipulated. This is quite the opposite of the current American conception of monetarism in a globalized economy, determined by the acts of individual firms being managed according to the principle of shareholder value. With globalization, practices such as hostile take-overs diffuse internationally.

This dominant process triggers resistance, which in the economy has as its most important form the moralization of products. Thus, in the USA grapes from southern California or oranges from South Africa changed from being a fruit to a product of evil. Another example is the rating of companies as socially responsible. Science is another differentiated area. In Germany, the chief mechanism used to control science is the assertion of unacceptable risks resulting from research. To maintain that the central characteristic of modernization is social differentiation does not imply that this development is conflict free; quite the contrary.[26]

---

[25] A theoretical presentation of "Eigendynamik" with many instructive examples is to be found in Renate Mayntz and Birgitta Nedelmann: "Eigendynamische soziale Prozesse." In: *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, vol. 33 (1987), pp. 648–668.

[26] A summary of the resistances to modernity is attempted in: "Schwierigkeiten mit der

And differentiation is accompanied by processes of de-differentiation—de-differentiation being often the condition for further differentiation.[27] In agrarian societies with partial literacy, "scribe" was a skilled trade. With the spread of printing, writing became a "cultural technique" that in modern society everyone is expected to master as much as one now eats with utensils. Other skills that earlier were specialized occupations are driving a vehicle or minor forms of bookkeeping. In our days operating a PC is becoming a cultural technique with the consequence that the typist is a dying occupation. The latter example is instructive in its illustration of a twist that social differentiation has shown in the 20th century.

Social differentiation is the dominant trend on the macro level. On the micro level it is accompanied by a pressure to learn to function as the low-skilled companion to a craftsman. This is what we call the "new division of labor".[28] We need basic skills as electricians, plumbers, carpenters, gardeners, even lawyers and physicians to be fully comfortable in a modern society. As a shadow to the visible further specialization, especially in skilled occupations, there developed lay roles for the same area. Functionally, one can interpret this array of lay roles that we consider a characteristic by-product of differentiation in the 20th century as a means to tie the highly specialized occupations back into the social fabric.

One major aspect of modernization is the change in the meaning of space and time. Through technical developments in transportation people living under "modern" conditions have a much larger life space, and in turn this possibility for high individual mobility is a prerequisite for further differentiation in the economy, in social contacts, and in culture. In the USA the telephone is said to have invigorated kinship ties. With modern communication technologies distances shrink further.

It was only about 150 years ago that minutes came in use to specify time—e.g. for train departures. Time zones were defined that allow us to synchronize behavior world-wide. The computer enables us to make time schedules, including work relations, highly flexible. And the social differentiation

---

Modernität als Kultur". In: Erwin K. and Ute Scheuch: *Wie deutsch sind die Deutschen?* 2nd edit. 1992. Bergisch Gladbach, pp. 52–82. Erwin K. Scheuch: "Vom schmerzlichen Werden einer modernen Gesellschaft." In: *Hamburger Jahrbuch für Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftspolitik*, Vol. 35 (1990), pp. 27–51; S. Kalberg: "The Origin and Extension of Culture Pessimism." In: *Sociological Theory*, vol. 5 (1987), pp. 150–164.

[27] E. Buß and M. Schöps: "Die gesellschaftliche Entdifferenzierung." In: *Zeitschrift für Soziologie*, vol. 8 (1979), pp. 315–329; also Hartmut Tyrell: "Anfragen an die Theorie der gesellschaftlichen Differenzierung." In: *Zeitschrift für Soziologie*, vol. 7 (1978), pp. 175–193.

[28] Erwin K. Scheuch: "Das Verhalten der Bevölkerung als Teil des Gesundheitssystems." In: Harald Bogs et al. (eds.): *Gesundheitspolitik zwischen Staat und Selbstverwaltung*. Köln 1982, especially pp. 102–105.

creates a demand for flexibility, for time arrangements to be tailored to individual needs. At the same time the time horizon widens we need to plan ahead for longer time periods, consider retirement conditions already at the time when we enter the labor force.[29] Time management becomes a crucial social skill at the micro level. At the macro level this is paralled by treating time as an economic commodity of central importance.

With all this differentiation there is still social integration, albeit a precarious one. The "Eigendynamik" occurs within boundaries set by a society. Countries differ as to the space between boundaries—in the USA the space for Eigendynamik of the economy being larger than in Western Europe. But Eigendynamik without boundaries would be selfdestructive—as in the case of a completely globalised economy where speculation in non-existing assets such a derivatives, futurers, or strippings is the most important road to dominance.

In Western cultures that understand themselves as modern, the economic arguments do certainly not enjoy unlimited respect, but take precedence before other considerations in those spheres where economic Eigendynamik is culturally defined as acceptable, often even as desirable. From this perspective we think the best characterization of these societies is not "industrial societies"; this may have been plausible for the second half of the 19th century.[30] For the 20th century "Wirtschaftsgesellschaft" is the more appropriate designation. Two different translations into English are possible: Market societies or Commercial societies.

IV

To the classics the mode of thinking and action that characterized modern economics was pervasive for society at large. "Rechenhaftigkeit" was the label that was to denote this style in interpersonal relation[31]—and that has since become the model for an approach in sociology, namely rational

---

[29] Ansgar Weymann: "Modernisierung, Generationsverhältnisse und die Ökonomie der Lebenszeit." In: *Soziale Welt*, vol. 46 (1995), pp. 369–384.

[30] In German the term "Industrie" is much narrower than "industry" in English. "Industrielle Produktion" in German is largely tantamount to physical manipulation in factories. Consequently, the familiar term "Industriegesellschaft" is quite misleading as at no time a majority labored under these conditions. The English term, however, has a much wider meaning, ranging from diligence to involvement in a trade. The Webster defines industry as "systematic labor especially for some useful purpose or the creation of something of value". Therefore in English there is no problem in speaking of "the tourism industry", while in German the equivalent "Tourismus-Industrie" sounds at best alien.

[31] Max Weber is frequently misunderstood, especially in the United States, in his emphasis on rationality as a characteristic of modernization. "Das reale Handeln verläuft in der

choice.[32] "Rationality" was for the classics, however, not so much a description of actual behavior but rather a cultural norm—just as the companion notion "Verwissenschaftlichung".[33]

At this point it should be helpful to introduce the conception "life sphere".[34] "Life sphere" denotes an area in social life that as the result of social differentiation is seen as being governed by its particular set of norms, that is being respected as having an "Eigendynamic". Actors in such a life sphere—work, leisure, commercial transactions, politics, family life—are expected to behave appropriate to that space, and exclude for the moment habits and orientations that guide these very same actors in other life spheres. This is possible through "privacy", i.e. the ignorance of or neglect to ascertain what alter does outside the particular life sphere at issue. Through differentiation privacy becomes a structural possibility, and the development of norms in reaction to this is the basis of even formal rights to privacy in several spheres. At the same time the connections between the differentiated life sectors are loosened: modern societies are "loosely coupled"—even though Embree coined this term to catch a characteristic of some modernizing societies.[35] Loose coupling is a condition for the Eigendynamik in the economy, technology, and science. What keeps the system from exploding is what Simmel called the crossing of social circles (Kreuzung sozialer Kreise).

Rationality as the cultural norm for actual behavior is expected in those life sectors that are held to be guided by the norms of functional specificity,

---

großen Masse seiner Fälle in dumpfer Halbbewußtheit oder Unbewußtheit seines 'gemeinten Sinns'. Der Handelnde 'fühlt' ihn mehr unbestimmt, als daß er ihn wüßte oder 'sich klar machte', handelt in der Mehrzahl der Fälle triebhaft oder gewohnheitsmäßig. Nur gelegentlich . . . wird ein (sei es rationaler, sei es irrationaler) Sinn des Handelns ins Bewußtsein gehoben". "Rational" is the interpretative frame in accounting for action and the cultural norm in appropropriate action fields. Max Weber: *Soziologische Grundbegriffe*. J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Tübingen 1960 (an excerpt from Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft). The quote is taken from the explanations to §1, the definition of sociology, section I, no. 11, last paragraph.

[32] For a variety of views on rational choice see Brian Barry and Russell Hardin (eds.): *Rational Man and Irrational Society?* Beverly Hills 1982.

[33] A fuller exposition of "Rechenhaftigkeit" as a cultural norm can be found in R. Penrose: *The Emperors New Mind*. Oxford 1989; also idem: *Shadows of the Mind*. Oxford 1994. The "classical" source is of course Simmel: *Philosophie des Geldes*, op. cit.

[34] A more detailed explanation of "life sphere" is given in Erwin K. Scheuch and Marvin B. Sussman: "Gesellschaftliche Modernität und Modernität der Familie." In: *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, special issue no. 14 Soziologie der Familie, 1970, pp. 239–253. The article also explains the empirical approach favored by us at that time, "options analysis".

[35] J.F. Embree: "Thailand—A Loosely Structured Social System." In: *American Anthropologist*, vol. 52 no. 2 (1950), pp. 183–191; also H.D. Evers (ed.): *Loosely Structured Social Systems—Thailand in Comparative Perspective*. New Haven 1969; R.B. Glasman: "Persistence of Loose Coupling in Living Systems." In: *Behavioral Science*, vol. 18 (1973), pp. 83–98; K.E. Weick: "Educational Systems as loosely Coupled Systems." In: *Administrative Science Quarterly*, vol. 21 (1976), pp. 1–19; Erik Cohen: *Thai Society in Comparative Perspective*. Bangkok 1991, especially chapter 3: The Problem of Thai Modernization.

universalistic standards, affective neutrality, and oriented towards actual performance—to use the pattern variables of Talcott Parsons. From the many meanings of rationality we use in this context economic rationality, leaving open whether this manifests itself in a concrete situation as a short term or a long term profit maximizing. The latter, too is part of calculating behavior—of course in the sense of bounded rationality.

Even in the economy there is less individual rationality in actual behavior than is the cultural norm. Team-work, group work, motivational training, courses in empathy are fully legitimate deviations from individual profit maximizing. To turn an objective relationship into one where subjective meanings become apparently dominant is a familiar trick in sales ("friendship price") and in personnel management ("because its you"). In this way universalistic standards are neutralized and the rules of the game are changed. Rationality can be experienced as perilious—even by top managers, as the wide-spread use of absurd gurus, fads, and cults among business leaders demonstrates—by the same business leaders that officially make decisions on the basis of fractions of a percentage point.

In contrast to the perspective of the classics, we postulate that rationality is not pervasive. As life spheres that are considered crucial for the well-being of the collectivity, especially the economy, become more rational—the current globalization is a case in point—other life spheres become emotionalized.

A prime example of this switching of areas where by now emotionality is required is the Western family. Until about 200 years earlier it was, much as today's firms, considered to be a working unit. Marriages were arranged, the selection of partners being guided by rational criteria—which meant largely materialistic ones. Marriage was understood to be an institution, and institutions cannot be built reliably on emotions. At the same time emotions such as trust and feelings of mutual obligations were prerequisites for economic relationships that were meant to last—transactions in markets being a partial exception. Philip Ariès has shown how matter-of-fact relationships between parents and their children were at that time.[36] According to Gernsheim-Beck there developed in the early part of the 19th century a new standard for middle class families in Western Europe. Wives should—rather than could—now love their husbands and experience his successes as the realization of their own longings. Then children and parents were expected to love one another, and finally as a last stage in the emotionalizing of the bourgeois family husbands were required to love their wives.[37]

---

[36] Philippe Ariès: *L'enfant et la vie familiale sous l'ancien régime.* Paris 1960.

[37] Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim: "Wir wollen niemals auseinandergehen—zur Geschichte von

Emile Durkheim in his "lois du contraction" has provided us with the analytical apparatus for this process. The shrinking size of the family due to modern life conditions is paralled by a loss of functions. Care in the case of illness and/or old age becomes the task of physicians and hospitals, for learning the most important cultural techniques children are sent to schools, and as a unit of production the private households loose functions. At the same time mutual emotional support gains in importance. René König identified the emotional wellbeing of family members as the central function of today's nuclear families in the economically developed countries.[38]

A society with only rational relations and only rational institutions is an anthropological impossibility. It is incorrect to invoke Tönnies as an opponent of this view. To him community and society were endpoints of a scale to characterize existing societies—none of which would be like those analytical endpoints. In support of our position we would like to cite Max Weber as the most important proponent of modernity as increasing rationality. In his vision for the future Weber shivered at the thought of a rational bureaucracy dominating all spheres of life. Would the "iron cage of bureaucracy" be the final stage of the rationalization of human existence? Let us add that Weber, of course, did not equate the dominance of bureaucracy with the expansion of the state but with an institutionalized mode of dealing with tasks.[39]

Habermas christens the assumed inroads of technical-economic rationality—in the terminology of neomarxism "instrumental rationality"—into the private worlds of every-day life "colonialization" (in the original "Kolonisierung der Lebenswelten"). In so far as this occurs it is the same process as the presumed "commercialization" of life spheres where other standards should prevail. We will not take issue with the observations that commercialization and instrumental reasoning can be observed in situations where they are illegitimate, but we do take issue with the contention that the occurrence in these situations is something new.[40]

We consider this notion of modern society as a melange of the cultural

---

Partnerwahl und Ehe." In: *Deutsches Jugendinstitut* (ed.): *Wie geht es der Familie? Ein Handbuch zur Situation der Familie heute.* Munich 1988; idem: "Von der Liebe zur Beziehung." In: *Soziale Weit.* Special issue no. 4. I. Berger (ed.): *Die Moderne—Kontinuitäten und Zäsuren.* Göttingen 1986.

[38] According to König this has two major emphases: the socialization with its newer dominance of close parent-child relations as the "second socio-cultural birth", and the emotional support of parents for another. René König: *Die Familie der Gegenwart—ein interkultureller Vergleich.* Munich 1974, especially chapters IV and VI.

[39] It is probably due to the timing of his speech that Weber's warning against socialism is rarely cited. In 1917 in Vienna Weber cautioned that socialism was in effect the fusion of two bureaucracies, of governments and of industry. The very fact that at present they often opposed each other limited bureaucratic control over lives.

[40] Cf. Jürgen Habermas: *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns.* Frankfurt 1981; idem: *Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne.*

norms of rationality and emotionality central for our understanding of modernity. The many criticism of "commercialization" are an indicator for the resistance to extending economic rationality to such spheres where "it does not belong".[41] "Rationality" is expected as a style of problem solving in all spheres and for all aspects that are not considered to be one's private concerns. To do justice to the importance of non-rational, especially non-economic elements, it is not advisable to introduce a new label such as "post modern", as this suggests a novel condition; which is definitely not the case.[42] There is no society with a high degree of functional differentiation that would not be a balance of contradictions.[43]

The spirit of this assertion runs, of course, very much counter to the perspective of mainstream sociology. The majority of sociologists would agree that at any given time all complex societies are full of contradictions. Having acknowledged that, however, they would argue that this is the consequence of unequal speed of change for different life spheres. While many would object to being linked to the "cultural lag" theory of William F. Ogburn, in reality his view of change has become part of our "cultural knowledge". There is a direct analogy to the evolutionism of Herbert Spencer.

We advocate as a perspective to view contradictions as a constant feature of complex systems forcing ever new states of equilibrium.[44] It is precisely these tensions that—if managed—cause the dynamics of modern society as against the stability of older systems of High Culture (Hochkulturen) after their having found an equilibrium.

V

Some German sociologists maintain that the decisive structural feature of societal modernism is the breakdown of social regularities such as common role obligations, that the determining character of social conditions declines, and that positions lose their importance in prescribing behavior.[45] Ulrich

[41] On the notion of "instrumental rationality" see Erwin K. Scheuch: "Instrumental Reason As a Concept and a Characteristic of Modern Societies." In: Carlos Mongardini (ed.): *Due Dimensioni Della Società—L'Utile E La Morale.* Rome 1991, pp. 145–150.

[42] As the inventor of "post modernism" credit is usually given to Jean Francois Lyotard: *The Post-Modern Condition.* Minneapolis 1985. A critique of post modernism is found in Anthony Giddens: *The Consequences of Modernity.* Cambridge (UK) 1990.

[43] For a further discussion of contradictions as an integral part of the social structure of a given society see Enzo Mingione: *Fragmented Societies.* Oxford 1991.

[44] For such a succession of equilibria economists use the concept "Fließgleichgewicht".

[45] Hartmut Esser: "Verfällt die soziologische Methode?". In: Wolfgang Zapf, op. cit. S. 743–769. With "Soziologische Methode" Esser means structural functionalism would indeed be pointless if structural influences were to evaporate. That they leave more room today for

Beck even writes about the individualization of society—which in its literal meaning would be, of course, a conceptual impossibility.[46] This school of thought is an overreaction to a real change that we prefer to characterise differently, namely as the widening latitude between constraints, as the change from determination to limiting conditions for choice.

Beck argues in addition that "modern" means that we are living with unprecedented risks without being able to hold someone or some institution responsible. By way of contrast we agree with Anthony Giddens that characteristic for the current situation are low-probability high-consequence risks that are controversial and counterfactual at the same time.[47] As Giddens argues, this is far from the imagination of Max Weber that eventually the iron cage of bureaucracy would provide a stable control over individuals. To Giddens, modernity is rather a "juggernaut", a giant moving "something" that is out of control and crushes everyone that stands in its way.

We think this is a completely ahistorical argument. Early death and incurable ailments were part of the consciousness of medieval man; the admonition "memento mori" was all present. Beck's and Giddens' view of risks as a distinguishing feature of modernity is also blind to the certainty of gigantic natural disasters such as vulcanism, earthquakes and collisions with meteorites.

Differentiation leads to the specification of life spheres, and privacy as a new norm allows as to function in such an area largely regardless of what we are in other areas. We are used to a life where work and the private residence are separated, where we are able to function differently with bureaucratic organizations and a leisure group of our choice. Managing the differences between the various spheres becomes a necessary social skill. Totalitarianism is the attempt to negate this kind of differentiation by enforcing the same ultimate meaning across all life spheres.

In most of these life spheres there is room for choice: the further away they are from economic transactions, bureaucratic interchange and requirements due to technology, the greater the room for choices. Family life is a case in point. There is still the image of the "normal" family situation: A man and a wife with their underage offspring, but at any given time only around 25 percent of adults in Western Europe live in such a situation. For many it is a phase in the life cycle followed by other ones that are likely to last longer; for still others it is a life form that they reject or fail to attain. Ego may chose to be single, or live as a single parent; be a "dink" (double

---

individual responses than earlier, that there is freedom within constraints, does not invalidate the approach.

[46] Ulrich Beck: *Risikogesellschaft—auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne.* Frankfurt 1986.

[47] Anthony Giddens, op cit., pp. 124–134.

income, no kids) or part of a dual work family, which further subdivides by the meaning of work (career or income); live in a three-generation-household or try out a commune. To Beck this is proof that the family as in institution is a thing of the past—but that is definitely in error. Structural regularities remain such as the pattern of neo local residence, bilaterality in the definition of relatives, and in spite of high rates of divorce the family is monogamous. Very few people remain life-long unmarried—much fewer than e.g. in Medieval times. And with an average duration of marriage of 15 years today this is about the average length of marriage in earlier German society. The major difference is the mode of ending a pair-relationship: earlier death, now (in approximately one-third of marriages) divorce.

On the micro level, the characteristic of living in a modern society is having to make choices, the characteristic at the macro level providing or opening up choices. Choices follow from differentiation—particularly in spheres where we are not expected to be rational. Where alternatives are chosen primarily according to ego's values or taste we suggest labeling them "options". It follows from the approach outlined above that options increase specifically in the sector of the AGIL scheme that Parsons named "integrative". The higher the demands following from rationalization in a large part of life, the greater the functional necessity of options in others. "Options" refer to a structural element that is objective and related to macrolevel features. The compliment at the micro level is "option awareness"—the ability of members in a modern society to perceive alternatives.[48]

Managing the differences between life spheres and being aware of options is not the same as what Beck means by individualization.[49] Pluralization is the more adequate descriptive term. After all, the preferences are exercised within constraints, and they are by no means to be viewed as arbitrary. Much as options are a functional imperative following from differentiation and rationalization, they do not lead to the the same acceptance of the results as do norms that leave no choice. In economics the consequence of having to make a choice between two desirable alternatives means a feeling of loss; the technical term for this is opportunity costs. If in the former GDR after years spent waiting until at long last the poor imitation of an automobile called Trabant was finally delivered, it could satisfy more than now a decision between immediately available attractive real automobiles.

---

[48] For a more detailed exposition see Erwin K. Scheuch and Marvin Susman, op. cit.

[49] Ulrich Beck: "Der Konflikt der zwei Modernen". In: Wolfgang Zapf (ed.), op. cit., pp. 40–53. Largely in agreement with Beck is Stefan Hradil: "Sozialstrukturelle Paradoxien und gesellschaftliche Modernisierung", ibid., pp. 361–369.

A social system with a wide range of choices and options has a structural problem: Predictability of behavior. If actors cannot predict the behavior of their alteri, efficiency in social interchange declines drastically, and conflicts become omnipresent. In our own "Lebenswelten", we know that this is not so, that we experience most interactions as free of surprises. This can be accounted for conceptually if we postulate that increasingly the standardization of persons in a society is being replaced by the standardization of situations, including the definition of some such situations as room for innovation and the unexpected. The very same person that we just experienced as very reliable in one situation will most likely surprise us if we meet him in a different and for us as yet unfamiliar setting.

We can refine this notion further with reference to the analysis of modernity as experienced in daily life. Let us combine the idea of a standardization of situations with the concept of life sphere. In those life spheres where rational behavior is presumed to govern interactions, the situations need to be standardized regardless who the alteri are as "whole" persons. Conversely, in life spheres that are part of our private life, expectations do not abstract from the concrete partner in a situation. It is here that the "true person" can realize itself by displaying aspects of himself that—for better of for worse—are surprising. On the individual level this calls for "understanding" as a socio-cultural skill to manage one's private life. It was Georg Simmel who maintained that the "psychologysing" of relations was a central element of modern societies.[50] In this way we can account for the seeming paradox that modern societies are experienced at the same time as highly standardized (high "role pressure"), and individualistic.

These were the main considerations guiding us in developing a framework for the congress. Of course not all meetings were conceived with reference to the concerns and conceptual framework here. Even if one had attempted to do this, it would have been an impossibility as this is the first time the framework is presented even though aspects had been published in various places, and the first part had indeed been sent to colleagues whom we wished to involve in the World Congress.

With five plenary sessions and approximately 36 working groups with around 200 papers one can only be sure when all those proposing a meeting do actually show up, and still others may arrive at the congress with very acceptable suggestions for ad hoc meetings. Such a congress must try to accommodate as many orientations and colleagues as can be justified. Yet in spite of all this diversity this World Congress was meant to have

[50] This does not apply to all life spheres in a modern system. Psychologysing in a situation where actors are presumed to meet as rational beings is disapproved as a form of intrusion.

some overriding perspectives, which is what the scientific congresses of the IIS had in its earlier years.

We have a congress within the congress. The European Community presents on Monday and Tuesday is TSER Program looking at Social Exclusion and Social Integration. Thus, this Conference within the Congress has a unifying theme, too.

And to emphasize our advocacy of looking at the classics we appeal to your senses as well: One of our colleagues is an accomplished artist. For this World Congress he has assembled some of his works: Picture of the classics in sociology.

Appendix

VI
National identity

Using observations from a cross section of individuals, it is concievable that we can arrange societies in a rank order of increasing "modernity". But with such an empirical base we are likely to miss the elements that are distinctive for a country. After decades of comparative research using surveys we know that we cannot account for the differences between France, England, the United States and Japan on the basis of differences in marginals for individual responses. Japan and Germany are good cases in point. Evaluations of newer technologies on the individual level do not differ very much from each other in Japan and Germany, but the kind of technological solutions and the technology as a social institution in the two countries is as different from each other as are the technology policies in the two polities. The Japanese and the Germans as aggregates do not account for the distinctiveness of Japan and Germany as countries.[51]

When in the Western world modernization spread from early modernizing parts of the economy such as mining and textile to other branches, and from the economy to administration, the military and so on, this did not

[51] On the basis of this experience we proposed the term "individualistic fallacy" for an attempt to use aggregated individual values to characterize a collectivity. Erwin K. Scheuch: "The Development of Comparative Research—Towards Causal Explanations". In: Else Øyen (ed.): *Comparative Methodology*. London 1990, pp. 19–37. See also Henry Teune: "'Comparing Countries—Lessons Learned'" in the same volume. This experience motivated the publication by Hans-Peter Meier-Dallach, Rolf Ritschard and Rolf Nef: *Nationale Identität—ein Faß ohne empirischen Boden*. Zürich 1990.

occur within a vacuum. Unlike the thinking in some of the schools of modernity the traditional institutions were not swept away but rather transformed, changed their functions in part, and arrangements between traditional institutions and newly developed ones were found.[52] As Stein Rokkan argued, the modern societies of Western Europe show a strong family-likeness as they had to cope with similar conflicts of central importance. National identity can then be conceptualized as national specificities in outcomes of these central conflicts plus the changes in the character of pre-modern intermediary institutions.[53] The Scottish parliament, the German Handwerkskammer, and the French system of academic certifications are cases in point.

Both Germany and Japan are widely understood in political sociology to be cases of corporatistic intermediation, and of social and economic antagonisms tempered by consensualism.[54] Not only in contrast to the United States—which, by the way, is the aberrent case with respect to intermediary surviving institutions—but also in comparison with France and England, Japan is most Japanese in the survival of pre-modern intermediary institutions and consensual mechanism, and also Germany is distinctly German in this respect, and in its adjustment of these structures to the modern economy.[55]

The corporatism of Germany is not merely a survival of pre-modern conditions but also a result of social engineering by the national socialist regime during the second half of the thirties. At that time the existing corporations and voluntary associations were restructured to serve as "transmission belts" for the central government and the Nazi party. For example, the voluntary student association (AStA) of the Weimar Republic time was transformed into a corporation with mandatory membership. Guilds had survived in Germany for many occupations; the Nazis made the operation of a shop or a craft dependent on membership in the appropriate guild. At the same time, competition between shop keepers was reduced by making the opening of a shop dependent on a "needs test"; shop keepers of the same trade had to decide whether a new shop was needed. Other mechanisms for elim-

---

[52] Rolf Vente: "Industrialization as Culture". In: Rolf E. Vente and Peter Chen (eds.): *Culture and Industrialization*. Singapore 1982, pp. 86–111.

[53] Stein Rokkan: "Nation-Building and the Structuring of Mass Politics". In: Shmuel N. Eisenstadt (ed.): *Political Sociology*. New York 1971, pp. 293–411. Dankwart Rüstow: *A World of Nations*. Washington 1968. Reinhard Bendix: *Nation Building and Citizenship*. New York 1964.

[54] Philippe C. Schmitter and Gerhard Lehmbruch: *Trend toward Corporatist Intermediation*. Beverly Hills 1979. Erwin K. Scheuch: *Wird die Bundesrepublik unregierbar?* Köln 1976. One of the earliest authors to stress the positive functions of intermediary institutions, instead of treating them as remnants of traditional orders, and obstacles to mobilization, was William Kornhauser: *The Politics of Mass Society*. New York 1959.

[55] Erwin K. Scheuch: "Continuity and Change in German Social Structure". In: *Historical Social Research*, vol. 13 (1988), pp. 31–121.

inating competition were examinations of knowledge and skills in an area. Thus, if one wanted to operate a cigar store, a test of competence with smoking material had to be mastered.

Contrary to the ideology of the left, the Nazis were distrustful of capitalism and markets. Consequently, they introduced a peculiar form of planned economy. "Four year plans" defined the economic goals in terms of quantity for each branch, later down to the level of firms. The capitalists were transformed into rent-collectors; while nominally they remained owners, they were told what to produce in what quantity and at what price. They had to calculate the cost of operations according to a binding accounting scheme (the "LSÖ"), but they were allowed to charge 6 percent on top of cost as earnings.

According to a description by Yusada Yawata for the policies in Japan in the thirties,[56] there were considerable similarities to policies in Germany for an identical reason: the power structure imagined that eventually an armed conflict was inevitable, and that capitalism as a system was inadequate to mobilize and concentrate resources for that eventuality. The strengthening of traditional institutions and values was therefore not the result of a criticism of competitive structures in the economy, but followed from the wish to subordinate other goals to the one of military preparedness and that to serve the increase in the power base: power took precedence before economic benefit.

Many of these newly instituted or revitalized features of a "pre-modern" era survived after 1945, and in retrospect they were advantageous in the first postwar decade. After that the market type of economy was a stimulant in reconstruction even though it was unfamiliar as Germany was a classic country for agreements on constraint of trade.[57] The system remained largely consensual. Dissent is bought off—the introduction and operation of co-determination is an example. Until recently, the political and economic system was a highly predictable consensual system, where the economy received market signals from its involvement in the global markets—nearly one-third of the GNP resulting from exports. "Germany represents the type of 'cooperative capitalism', while the United Kingdom is an example for 'competitive capitalism'"—that is the conclusion at the end of an empirical investigation of interlocking directorates of the 623 largest German corporations and the 520 largest English enterprises.

---

[56] Yawata (in the process of publication).

[57] Paul Winhold and Jürgen Beyer. "Kooperativer Kapitalismus". In: *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, vol. 47 (1995), pp. 1–36. See also Erwin K. and Ute Scheuch: "*Bürokraten auf den Chefetagen*". Reinbek 1995, pp. 55–81 and pp. 231–241.

Intermediary institutions were added in the process of modernization. A very important case is the system of voluntary associations: cooperatives, interest groups, trade unions, professional associations, political parties (of the Western European type), and a large and increasing number of "private" associations (i.e. "Vereine").[58]

In the Western part of Germany more than half of the adult population is a member in at least one of those "private" associations; in addition about 25 percent are members of a special interest association. Contrary to the views spread by culture criticism, networks of private relations are important in the life of around 85 percent of West Germans, both for emotional support ("strong ties") and for help in managing one's life in a both commercial and bureaucratic environment ("weak ties").[59]

Networks serve two types of functions: linking levels of a society and structuring relationships between the units at any one particular level. In concentrating on individuals and organizations as actors in sociology, too little attention has been given to relationships as units of analysis. Georg Simmel or Leopold von Wiese, and in the USA Howard S. Becker, with their emphases on relationships as the building blocks of society, had little impact on the profession. The dominant paradigm was the actor as a unit of analysis—whether as a person or as a collective actor. The relationship between units on the intermediary level are largely unresearched, the empirical studies at the Max Planck Institut in Cologne being a rare exception. "It is argued that both in the economy and in policy making, network phenomena are in fact becoming more prominent. This is linked to functional differentiation, a core process of societal modernization which implies the existence of partly autonomous societal subsystems . . . In this structural context, interorganizational networks . . . can provide a solution to coordination problems typical of modern societies".[60]

To summarize these arguments, we view economically developed countries as networks in which institutions and institutions, people and people, as well as people and institutions are loosely coupled. Cultural norms between

---

[58] The best overview about German "Vereine" is currently Heinrich Best (ed.): *Der Verein.* Bonn 1993. See also *Statistisches Bundesamt* (ed.): Datenreport 1994. Bonn 1994, Part II, section B.

[59] Usually, it is support networks that are discussed. The classical source is M. Granovetter: "The Strength of Weak Ties". In: *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 78 (1973), pp. 1360–1380. Our own understanding was strongly influenced by Barry Wellman: Network Analysis—some Basic Principles. In: R. Collins (ed.): *Sociological Theory.* San Francisco 1983. To use social network information to characterize macro structures compare Edward Lauman: *The Bonds of Pluralism.* New York 1973.

[60] Renate Mayntz: "Modernization and the Logic of Interorganizational Networks". *MPIFG* Discussion Paper no. 8, 1991, Cologne.

different life spheres are contradictory, and people are expected to make choices as a way to keep social dynamics going. These social systems are politically organized as nation-states that gain their specific national characters mainly from the mesh of intermediary institutions and connectivities. The meaning of the political organization is changing with the increase in international interpenetrations.

The impact of globalization diminishes national sovereignty as it is increasingly difficult to direct the economy by way of an economic policy. This does not mean the withering away of nation-states. The systems of social security were developed according to different principles in the political framework of sovereign nation states. Today, the most important function of the political shell called nation-state is to guarantee the systems of entitlements.

There is an inherent contradiction between globalization—with financial transactions and not production as its core—and the expectations of the citizenry. As the newest study by the RISC group shows, the wish for a high level of social security increases while the importance of so-called postmodernistic values declines. The result of studies on values shows: Good times permit emphases on self actualization, bad time are good for traditional values. Not only behavior is contingent, but the hierarchy of values is contingent as well. The worlds of immediate experiences, the "Lebenswelt", and the macro developments are drifting apart.

The globalization in economic processes, in consumer goods and in notions of the good life, greatly stimulated by developments in global media, is often seen as the coca-colazisation of everyone. On closer look it is less obvious than assumed what this means. Coca cola in different parts of the world comes in culture specific flavors: the bottle is the same, the content is not. The same goes for Nescafé: The cans are the same everywhere, but there seven different varieties in taste. The satellites reach into all corners of the world but experience shows by now: the basic diet has to be regional, if not local, with international programs added as "flavor".

Globalization does not penetrate, much as the nation-states did not completely penetrate their societies. Globalization as a further step in the modernization process does not create a global society but adds further contradictions to the ones that we live with—and can live with because we are modern.

2. VALUES IN A POLYTHEISTIC WORLD

Raymond Boudon

Introduction: "polytheism of values"

The idea that we would live in a world where "common values" would have disappeared, in a world irreversibly characterized by a Weberian "polytheism of values" has become a widespread belief. It is an essential by-product of the relativistic worldview that is so influential today. According to this dominant relativistic view, values would be objectively ungrounded and ultimately a purely individual matter.

This axiological relativism explains many features of modern societies. Thus, a prominent sociologist of law, Mary Ann Glendon (1996) has recently shown that in the US lawyers and judges tend to see their role, even at the level of the Supreme Court, in a new way. Instead of accepting the idea that a judicial decision should aim, in principle at least, at being grounded on impersonal reasons, they develop a "romantic" conception of their role. They are namely convinced that the answer to the question as to what is right or wrong is of a basically subjective character and that personal conviction is the only basis on which their decisions and actions can be legitimately grounded.

Tocqueville had the impression that America developed often in advance features that were likely to appear in Europe after some delay. This seems to be the case in the example I have just considered. In France, too, many observers consider that the judges tend to have a new conception of their role: this role would not merely consist in a prudent application of the law; it would imply that they develop their own ideas as to what is right or wrong. To take an example illustrating the influence of relativism from the field of education, a movement called the "value clarification movement" has developed in the US. It starts from the principle that values are a matter of purely individual decision and draws from this principle the consequence that any effort to teach values and norms would be incompatible with the dignity of individuals and should consequently be banished.

This axiological relativism also has consequences in a field of special interest to us, the history of sociology. Weber is becoming popular again in sociological circles because he would have anticipated the success of relativism in the postmodern world. Postmodernist writers interpret his "polytheism of

values" as meaning that we would have definitely recognized the subjective character of our positive and normative ideas about the world. Values would be an entirely private matter. Individuals can endorse any values they want with a unique provision: that by so doing they do not limit the freedom of other individuals to follow the values of their choice. Thus, Bryan Turner (1992, p. 7) writes: "(. . .) the revival of interest in Nietzsche (. . .) for the development of poststructuralism and postmodernism (. . .) has been parallel to the revival of interest in the shaping of Weberian sociology by Nietzsche".

The difficulty however is that the shaping of Weberian sociology by Nietzsche and the Nietzschean interpretation of Weber's "polytheism of values" in particular are actually foreign to Weber's original intuition. Weber meant by this expression a simple idea: that the moral synthesis produced by Christianism had irreversibly lost its strength in the modern world and that, against the hope of a Comte or a Durkheim, it would not likely be replaced by a new, modern, non religious synthesis. Weber never said that relativism was the ultimate truth in descriptive and prescriptive matters. He cannot be held as a forerunner of postmodernism.

Axiological relativism contradicted by evidence

What matters is that the Nietzschean postmodernist interpretation is contrary to easily observable facts. Most people agree that democracy *is* a better political regime than the various forms of despotism, that liquidating apartheid in South Africa was a good thing, that corruption is a bad thing, etc. In other words, on innumerable subjects people have the impression, not less today than yesterday, that the normative statements and the values they endorse, far for being private, can be considered objectively valid. So the current axiological relativism is contradicted by the beliefs of people. Of course these beliefs can be illusory. But, if we were to accept the view defended by postmodernist writers that they are illusory by nature, we should have to analyze the causes of such widespread "false consciousness": a question which postmodern writers do not answer satisfactorily when they raise it at all.

This axiological relativism is also contradicted by the fact that, as opinions polls show, the opinions of people, far from being randomly distributed, are on the contrary highly structured on many subjects. Thus, in a recent strike in France, young French doctors opposed a measure proposed by the government according to which if the sum of the individual

medical prescriptions would in a region exceed some threshold fixed in advance, each physician would have to refund a proportional part of his earnings to the social security system. A strong majority supported the strike because people felt that the measure contradicted the principle according to which one should not be made responsible for the actions of other people. In that case, the axiological reaction was grounded on a basic principle without which the inscription of the idea of responsibility in the social world is not possible.

This discrepancy between the theory according to which values would be mere opinions in a postmodern world and the fact that many values are lived as objectively grounded raises interesting questions. Why this discrepancy? Why is the subjectivist postmodernist theory of value so influential? Are value feelings an expression of "false consciousness"? What are the available alternative explanations? How should value feelings be properly explained? Here are the questions which I would like to examine in the present communication.

A question in the sociology of knowledge

Dealing with the first question, I will leave aside the general causes as to why relativism is widely spread to concentrate on a single point, namely the responsibility of the social sciences in the legitimation of this modern relativism. It should indeed be noted that the social sciences owe to some extent their influence to the fact that they have frequently stressed, against other traditions, the idea that positive and normative beliefs might be illusions. Some examples illustrate easily this idea.

- To Marx and the Marxian tradition, moral feelings are mental ghosts in the human mind.
- To Freud and the psychoanalytical tradition, moral feelings are the product of the Oedipus complex.
- To the positivist tradition, *ought* cannot be derived from *is*.

Hence, it can never be shown that something is good or bad or that it should be done. If I have the feeling that X is good and that it is my duty to do X, this feeling is necessarily an illusion. Its causes cannot lie in the reasons on which the subject believes wrongly it would be grounded. This positivist argument can be found in Pareto's work and in many others'.

- To behaviorists in the style of Skinner, moral feelings are produced by social conditioning.
- To sociologists belonging to the Durkheimian tradition, values and norms are cultural features which tend to be perceived as good by social actors because they have been socialized to them.
- To anthropologists, values are features developed by singular cultures. To the members of a culture they appear as objectively grounded. To the outside observer, they appear as arbitrary. Frenchmen shake hands, for instance; Englishmen do not.

Montaigne expressed this latter theory perhaps for the first time, when he contended that we tend to consider as good or bad what is generally considered as good or bad by most people around us. The prominent anthropologist Geertz (1984) quotes Montaigne in his classical paper on "Anti-anti-relativism", in which he contends that anthropology would have definitely shown the truth of relativism, i.e. the theory according to which there would be no truth, neither positive nor normative.

On the whole, it is easily checked that the most visible and possibly influential contemporary social scientists and philosophers have contributed, each in his fashion, to the idea that values are mere illusions: they would be "socially constructed" illusions; to others, as Foucault, they reflect relations of power among classes or individuals.

Why have such theories been so easily accepted? One reason, rightly underlined by Nisbet (1966), is that since Freud and Durkheim the idea that illusion is a normal state of mind, that our ideas are produced by forces that we are unable to control or even be aware of, has become a commonsensical idea in the social and human sciences.

I quote Nisbet (1966, p. 82):

> Durkheim shares with Freud a large part of the responsibility for turning contemporary social thought from the classic rationalist categories of volition, will, and individual consciousness to aspects which are, in a strict sense, non volitional and non-rational. Freud's has been the more widely recognized influence. But there is every reason to regard Durkheim's reaction to individualistic rationalism as more fundamental and encompassing than Freud's. Freud, after all, never doubted the primacy of the individual and intra-individual forces when he analyzed human behavior. Non-rational influences proceed, in Freud's interpretation, from the unconscious mind within the individual, even though it is related genetically to a racial past. The individual, in short, remains the solid reality in Freud's thought. In Durkheim, however, it is community that has prior reality, and it is from community that the essential elements of reason flow.

On one point, though, I would propose to correct Nisbet's statement: it is true of Freud, but rather of neo-Durkheimians than of Durkheim himself, since, notably in his *Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, the French sociologist stresses the fact that religious beliefs should not be treated as illusions, and that generally illusions cannot last (Boudon, 1999).

The naturalistic reaction

The discrepancy between the theories proposed by Marxians, Durkheimians, anthropologists, positivists, and other intellectual movements, according to which values would be illusions even as the conviction of people is that they are not, has produced a reaction in recent years. Against the relativistic-culturalist view of values, some philosophers, sociologists and anthropologists have proposed naturalistic theories.

Is there a moral sense?

The American criminologist and political scientist James Wilson (1993), possibly one of the most interesting theorists in this category, proposes to go back to the old notion of human nature and to recognize that our moral sense is a crucial ingredient of it. Wilson's version of the Aristotelian tradition is interesting because it is grounded on the findings of modern social sciences, particularly social psychology. More precisely, Wilson claims that the findings produced by these disciplines confirm Aristotle's views on moral sense.

Wilson is not the only social scientist to propose this intellectual move of going back to the venerable notion of human nature. The anthropologists Melford Spiro (1987), Roger Masters (1993) among others have also tried to rehabilitate this notion and, by so doing, to avoid the deadends of culturalism and relativism. Some writers, such as the sociobiologist Michael Ruse (1993), go even further on the path indicated by Wilson: they not only analyze moral feelings as natural, but try to show that they are the product of biological evolution. Sociobiology would be, according to Ruse, the discipline specifically habilitated to account for moral feelings, since they should be analyzed as the unconscious product of biological evolution. He even goes as far as to claim that the very fact that we do not see the reasons for many of the moral obligations we normally follow should be analyzed as the product of the wisdom of biological evolution. The fact that we are unaware of the effects of biological evolution on our minds would be the cunning of nature, a *List der Natur*. Philosophers, such as MacIntyre

(1981), have also proposed modernized versions of the theory of morals once advocated by Aristotle. Returning to Wilson, his general thesis can be summarized by the statement: "we have a core self, not wholly the product of culture" (Wilson, 1993: 11). We owe our moral sense to our human nature.

Four features of human nature

To Wilson, the reality of this moral sense can be detected as the existence of sympathy, of a sense of fairness, of self control and a sense of duty. Cultural variations would develop on these basic features of human nature, but, as such, these features should be considered as universal. To ground his theory, Wilson gathers findings from psychology and social psychology and draws fascinating conclusions from well selected works.

Some observations are frequently brought against the notion of an instinct of sympathy, for example that people being attacked in the subway often do not get any help from fellow passengers. But social psychology shows that such facts should not be interpreted as they usually are. Many socio-psychological experiments show that the smaller the number of people present when such an attack occurs, the higher the probability that the victim will be helped. This suggests that people are reluctant to help, not because they would not like to, but because they do not feel entitled to decide in a unilateral fashion that they should themselves enjoy the social approval which normally rewards those who help others. This social approval is of course in itself also a symptom of the instinct of sympathy.

Beside this sense of sympathy, we are led in our behaviour and feelings by a sense of fairness. Here again, experiments from social psychology support Wilson's claims. In an illuminating experiment, subjects are asked to play a game called the ultimatum game: £100 are available in the pocket of the experimenter. Subject A is allowed to make any proposal he wishes as to the way the £100 should be shared between himself, A, and another person B. B only has the right to approve or reject A's proposal. If he rejects it, the £100 remain in the experimenter's pocket. If he accepts it, he gets the sum allocated to him by A. With the "rational choice model" in mind, according to which people are exclusively concerned with maximizing the difference between benefits and costs, one would predict that A would make proposals of the type "£70 for me A, £30 for him, B". For in that case, B would not refuse the proposal and A would maximize his gains. In fact, the most frequent proposal is equal sharing. It is true that this outcome contradicts the utilitarian axiomatics of the rational choice model in its current version.

That moral sense should not be diluted, as the utilitarian tradition proposes, into the rewards people get from their behaviour that can be detected because compliments make us uncomfortable rather than happy when we feel that we do not deserve them. The bright pupil who receives a good grade because his teacher is positively prejudiced toward him does not appreciate the compliment, as many observations from social psychology demonstrate.

I will not insist on self control, another feature of human nature, according to Wilson. He again follows Aristotle here, who made it a main virtue. The ground for the importance of self control is best expressed by a metaphor forged by Konrad Lorenz. Man is a bundle of instincts. He needs a "parliament of instincts", says Lorenz, to decide which of those instincts should be satisfied and which repressed. Self control has the function of being this parliament. Its social importance can be easily checked. Those who put this parliament on vacation lose the respect and esteem of others. The political man without self control is not likely to have a very long public career. Even if drug addicts are better treated, handled and considered today than yesterday, yielding to drug addiction is never considered positively, even by drug addicts themselves.

As to the sense of duty, the last component of human nature considered by Wilson, it is true that people often behave altruistically without being forced to do so. As Adam Smith wrote, we follow the orders of "the man in the beast".

Wilson is surely right to stress the limits of social conditioning against all these anthropologists, sociologists and other culturalists to whom any behavior is the product of socialization. He rightly recalls that young children cannot be socialized indifferently to any stimulus. It is possible to induce the fear of snakes by an appropriate conditioning, not of opera glasses.

Should moral convictions be explained by moral sense?

What should we think of Wilson's theory? I certainly do not claim for my part there is no moral sense, but only that this factor can explain moral and generally normative feelings to a very limited extent. Wilson leaves us disappointed, it seems to me, in the sense that his theory is far from being general: a lot of evidence about moral feelings cannot be explained.

For example, some redistribution policies produce the impression in the minds of social actors that they are fair, others that they are not. Now, the evaluations we bring to bear on social policies can evidently not be analyzed as a mere effect of human nature, even though they can be influenced by a sense of fairness. Another objection: how can a moral theory based

on human nature explain the historical variations of our moral sensibility? Tocqueville reports, in his *Democracy in America*, that Madame de Sévigné, a French writer of the 17th century, describes in one of her letters to her daughter how greatly she enjoyed attending a public execution. Capital punishment has not been abolished everywhere, but nobody today would admit enjoying, and probably few people would have the capacity to enjoy, such an event. Those with this capacity would be considered to be affected by serious psychological problems, while Madame de Sévigné is considered to be a normal person of her time. How can a theory based on human nature explain such changes in our moral sensitivity?

Or take Wilson's analysis of fairness. We certainly have a sense of fairness, and more generally a sense of values. But why are these values preferred in particular circumstances and not in others? Why is fairness defined in such a way in some circumstances and otherwise in others? In many cases, people are very eager to see for instance that rewards are exactly proportional to contributions and define fairness as the correspondence between contributions and rewards. In other cases, they seem not to care about this point. In some circumstances, fairness is defined by the notion of equality, in others by that of equity.

A cultural theory would provide an explanation for many of these observations more easily than a naturalistic one: we do not live in the same culture as Madame de Sévigné, hence our values are different. But such an explanation would not explain why our values are different. In other words, we are facing a dilemma: Wilson's natural theory fails to explain many observations, while cultural theories provide truncated explanations.

In fact, it is not necessary to choose between nurture and nature. A very simple example shows that we do not need to evoke any moral sense, or cultural conditioning, to explain familiar moral reactions. The Swiss psychologist and sociologist Piaget made himself famous by memorable pages on the marbles game. When a child playing marbles cheats, he will immediately attract a negative reaction from the other children. Why? Not because they would have internalized cultural norms according to which playing marbles and following the rules of the marbles game would be good, for, without having been told that cheating at marbles is bad, any child reacts negatively against cheating. Nor because the rules of the marbles game would be written in our genes, which have probably nothing against cheating in marbles games. Why this reaction? Because the children find the game interesting, and for this reason play it. Now, cheating destroys the game: it makes it uninteresting. So, children have strong reasons to reject cheating and, as many observations show, they are aware of these reasons at a very early age.

This simple example illustrates possibly what Max Weber called *axiological rationality*. Though the sense of this notion has been widely discussed, I would take it as meaning that people believe in norms and values because they make sense to them, and more precisely because they have reasons to endorse them. In other words, when taken in this sense, the very notion of axiological rationality tells us that the reasons people have to believe what they believe are the causes and the *only* causes of their normative beliefs. In spite of its apparent simplicity, this idea is a powerful and fruitful ingredient of any theory of moral sentiments. It implies that instead of using a cultural or a natural theory of moral feelings, we can interpret moral feelings in a rational fashion. "Neither nature nor nurture, but reason" would be the formula summarizing it. Moreover, from the basic point in Weber's writings of the distinction between instrumental and axiological rationality, we draw the statement that axiological rationality is non instrumental, i.e. non consequential: it considers reasons that have nothing to do with the consequences of an action or of a state of affairs.

The reasons of moral convictions

The marbles players have strong reasons not to accept cheating. Generalizing from this example, I would contend that when we believe that X is good or bad, we *always* have strong reasons—though we can be more or less conscious of these reasons—for believing that X is good or bad. This assumption implies, in other words, that moral conviction is not different in essence from positive conviction. I believe that the square root of 2 is irrational in the mathematical sense, that it cannot be expressed as the ratio of two integers p and q, because I have strong reasons for believing so. If we take seriously the notion of axiological rationality as I interpret it, we should also accept the idea that the source of moral convictions lies in strong reasons which, of course, can be context dependent. To use a somewhat provocative formulation, I would say that moral truths are established in the same way as cognitive truths.

Strange as the idea may appear at first glance, it is not difficult to illustrate. I will start with a trivial example. Why is democracy considered a good thing? Because the statement that it is a good thing is grounded on solid reasons.

I need only refer here briefly to classical theories to make this point more concrete. A good government serves the interests of the citizens rather than its own interests. For this reason, the members of a government should be exposed to the risks of elections. Electing the government does not insure

that the best candidates will be elected, but it limits the risk that they will disregard the interests of the people. Democracy does not and cannot prevent corruption. But it makes it less likely than other types of regimes. A legally elected government can overthrow democracy and there is no absolute protection against this risk. An independent press and an independent judiciary are indispensable elements of a democracy, since, by their critical function, they can expose and prosecute corruption or political mismanagement. Of course, judges and the media can be corrupted. But other judges and media people will plausibly have an interest in denouncing the corruption of their colleagues.

If we examine these arguments, it is possible to see that they derive from principles, for instance that any government should serve the interests of the people rather than its own. Starting from this principle, the argument then shows that elections, an independent press or judiciary system are appropriate means to reach the goal of making it more rather than less likely that the government serves the interests of the people rather than its own.

My objective is not to defend democracy (it obviously does not need my defending it), nor to be original in matters of political philosophy, but only to suggest that there is no substantial difference between the ways in which positive and normative statements are grounded. We believe that the square root of two is irrational because we have strong reasons for believing so. We believe that democracy is a good thing because we have strong reasons for believing so, reasons which have been developed by writers such as Montesquieu, John Stuart Mill, Tocqueville[1] and others. We feel entitled to proselytize, to expect and help the expansion of democracy around the world because we believe it is good, and we believe it is good because we have strong reasons for believing so. We would never dream of explaining our belief in physical statements by making them the effect of some obscure instinct or of socialization. Why should we evoke such mysterious mechanisms as far as normative statements are concerned?

The objection will possibly be made at this point that political philosophers develop their theories from principles, and that these principles cannot be demonstrated. Otherwise, they would not be principles. This is so but the same objection can be raised against any theory, positive as well as normative. Any physical theory, for instance, also rests on principles. And the principles cannot be demonstrated except by other principles and thus *ad infinitum*. This paradox, called after H. Albert as Münchhausen's trilemma, because it evokes this German legendary figure who tried to get out of a

[1] I have left aside here the consequentialist arguments in favor of democracy (as: it makes economic development easier). They have been developed again recently by Olson (1993).

pool by pulling on his own hair, has never stopped science. As Karl Popper has shown, the fact that we need frameworks to think on any subject and principles to develop any theory does not prevent us from criticizing the frameworks and principles. We endorse principles in normative as well as in positive matters, because they are fruitful. If they are not, we reject them. Even the statement that a number should be even or odd was not always obvious, as is borne out by the fact that Greek mathematicians considered the number one as neither odd nor even. This example shows that even in the case of arithmetic, we need not accept the idea that principles should be obvious.

Trivial as it may appear, Popper's observation that we need principles before we can derive consequences from them and that we need to see the consequences before we can judge the principles, implies that knowledge, as against a received idea, is circular. This has been stressed by some sharp-minded thinkers, such as the German sociologist and philosopher Georg Simmel. Curiously enough, we reject this idea and perceive it as unacceptable as far as positive knowledge is concerned, while we accept it much more easily as far as normative knowledge is concerned. The reason for this difference is that we believe in the possibility of a positive truth, but not of a normative truth. In both cases, however, we have to accept the validity of Münchhausen's trilemma and recognize by so doing that knowledge—positive and normative—is circular. So, the trilemma does not contradict the possibility of reaching truth and objectivity. Otherwise, we would have to accept that science cannot reach objectivity.

The example of democracy suffices possibly to show that a value statement "X is good" can be as objective as any positive statement. If the feeling that "democracy is a good thing" were not objectively grounded, one would not observe a general consensus on the subject in democratic societies. One would not understand that against the principles—basic in international relations—which require respect for the sovereignty of foreign states, pressures on foreign governments which aim to begin or develop democracy are generally well understood and approved by public opinion. How could these collective feelings be otherwise explained? Theory and empirical sociology converge here. Of course, I am not saying that consensus is a proof of truth, but only that when consensus appears, it has to be explained by making it the product of reasons likely to be perceived as objectively strong.

An objection can be made here, namely that democracy is not actually considered by all as a good thing and that it was certainly not always considered so. To the first objection, it can be easily answered that non believers are also easily found as far as the best established scientific truths are

concerned. The other objection is less easily rejected. The consensus on democracy is recent. Before the First World War, universal suffrage was criticized. Pareto, for instance, saw in this right another of the symptoms of human craziness which he liked to collect and prophesied that it would generate social chaos. Does this not show that our belief that democracy is good is a product of socialization rather than of reason and that it has little to do with our beliefs in scientific statements?

The fact that moral truths are historical is a deadly objection against theories of moral feelings that propose to derive these feelings from human instincts and, in particular against Wilson's theory, but it is not contrary to a rational theory of moral feelings. It is true that we tend to consider rationality and historicity as incompatible. Probably this belief is due to some extent to the fact that Hegel, who made the two organically interdependent, has a rather bad reputation today. But Hegel was right here, provided that we interpret him carefully.

Consider scientific beliefs. In Aristotelian physics, any physical movement is produced by some force or set of forces. This sheet of paper moves because I apply force to it. If I did not apply force, it would not move. So, Aristotelian physicists had strong reasons for believing that any movement is the effect of some force. But they drew conclusions from this statement that were acceptable to them but unacceptable to us, namely that when a ship keeps on moving after the wind has fallen some force should be responsible for this movement. They tried therefore to figure out what this force could be, and introduced the assumption that the movement of a ship produces a turbulence which would keep the boat moving. After a while, an objection was raised against this theory: "if this argument is right, the hypothetical turbulence would have the effect that the straw in a strawheap on the ship would fly in opposite directions depending on whether the heap is located at the front or at the back of the deck". Since the direction in which the straw flies does not actually depend on the location of the straw heap on the deck of a ship, the Aristotelian physicists came—slowly—to the conclusion that the principle according to which there could be no movement without a force producing it was false. And they came to a new principle, which we now consider as evident, namely, that a body that moves needs a force to be stopped, exactly as a body not moving needs a force to be brought into movement. This is the so-called "principle of inertia". The feeling of obviousness which it produces today in our mind is the product of historical processes by which ideas are produced and socially selected.

The same kind of story could be told about normative as well as positive statements. Imagination is the weakest of our faculties. When radiowaves were discovered, it was generally thought that the use of this discovery would

be limited to making possible communication between boats and the coast during foggy weather.

This weakness of our imagination is not less in moral matters. As suggested by George Trevelyan, Voltaire did not believe before he came to England that a society could function in an orderly manner if writers were allowed to publish what they wanted. And, to come back to my earlier example, as long as actual democratic regimes or at least political regimes embodying some of the features of what we call democracy did not actually exist, nobody could imagine them, nor give them *a fortiori* a positive value. Then, during the civil war in England in the seventeenth century, the principle of the separation of the executive and legislative powers appeared and its effects started being evaluated and positively appreciated. Later, theories of democracy were developed by analysts such as Montesquieu, John Stuart Mill and others who presented the principle of the separation of powers as crucial. At this point this principle came to be perceived as evident in the same fashion as the principle of inertia appeared to be evident after it was understood that it solved many physical puzzles.

But the story does not end here and further objections were made to other principles of democracy we consider today as obvious. As I said before, even at the beginning of the century, the argument that universal voting would produce chaotic political effects was developed by political theorists. In fact, the word "democracy" had generally a negative connotation until late in the nineteenth century. But universal voting was introduced in many places without producing chaotic effects. So, an argument which had previously been plausible was weakened by the evidence of experience. It was also argued that freedom of the press would produce all kinds of undesirable effects, before this too was eroded. Freedom of the press does produce undesirable effects. But restricting it produces even more undesirable effects. Nobody would now doubt this. In the same way it has also been argued that capital punishment is necessary because without capital punishment, homicides will increase. Capital punishment was abolished in many countries without producing any increase in homicide rates. From that moment, it was perceived, in many Western countries not only as barbarian, and contradictory to basic values, but as useless, so that the public evaluation of it changed progressively, exactly as the Aristotelian notion of the turbulence responsible for the movement of ships and arrows was progressively eroded. Some months ago *The Economist* published an article on the reintroduction of capital punishment in several American States. The weekly periodical argued against it on the ground that capital punishment would be more expensive than a long term jail sentence. One has immediately the impression that this argument is not the right one: perhaps the author of

the article devised reasons likely to appeal to his readers, but was against capital punishment for reasons different from those he exposed. But the important point is that the article conveyed the sense that one should be against capital punishment.

The rational (or alternatively, the cognitivist) theory of moral and generally axiological feelings which I propose here is not only *not* contradicted by the fact that moral convictions change over time, but it can explain such change more easily than other types of theories.[2] The fact that science is historical, that a statement treated yesterday as false is treated today as true, was never held as an argument against the possibility of reaching truth in scientific matters; in the same way, in moral matters, the fact that some institutions were held as bad yesterday and are now considered good is not an argument against the fact that moral evaluations are grounded on strong reasons in the minds of people. Moreover, it is hard to see that normative irreversibilities, as scientific irreversibilities, could be explained in a satisfactory fashion, if not rationally. The principle of inertia is considered irreversibly valid because it is objectively better than the principles it replaced. In the same fashion, as noted by Tocqueville, we will never again hear somebody explaining that he or she enjoyed being the spectator of a capital execution. Capital punishment can be reintroduced depending on political circumstances; but we will never be able to experience and express the feelings of Madame de Sévigné.

I do not contend namely that there are no historical contingencies, on the contrary. If there were no contingencies, there would be no innovations, neither scientific nor moral. On this point, we must definitely stop following Hegel's intuitions. Tomorrow, totalitarian regimes can reappear. But unless human memory is destroyed, the idea that democracy is better than despotic regimes will remain present in human minds.

The argument that change in moral values confirms relativism rests finally on a fallacy. Truth, whether moral or positive, *is not* historical. But the research for truth, positive or normative, *is* historical. The fact that science has a history is not an argument against the possibility of scientific truth. The fact that morals have a history is not an argument in favor of moral relativism. Truth cannot be reached at once. History does not legitimate historicism (in the sense of moral relativism), contextual variation does not justify sociologism or culturalism.

---

[2] Elsewhere, as in Boudon and Betton (1999) and Boudon (2000), I propose to call it "judicatory", using the english translation of the qualification ("urteilsartig") Max Scheler rightly applies to Adam Smith's theory of moral sentiments.

Of course, I do not contend that an axiological truth lies hidden ready to be discovered on all subjects. This view is false as far as positive knowledge is concerned. We did not know until recent years whether bees have a language or not in spite of the fact that von Frisch got the Nobel Prize in 1953 for having "proved" it. On many moral questions, we are in the same situation. Life continuously brings to the surface new positive and normative questions. Many of them remain provisionally unsolved, while others are possibly unsolvable.

The false evidence of a gap between ought *and* is

If our moral convictions rest upon strong reasons, why then is the similarity in this respect between the positive and the normative ill perceived? The main reason is that it contradicts many influential traditions, which I have already evoked at the beginning of this article. The empiricist and the positivist traditions insist that *ought* cannot be drawn from *is*, as already mentioned. Ayer was so convinced on logical grounds that *ought* cannot be logically drawn from *is* that he defended the view that moral feelings should be interpreted as hidden, ill expressed or badly theorized commands. "You ought do so" would mean according to him "Do so", or "I would like you to do so". Moral feelings would then be the expression of commands, of wishes or of feelings.

Ayer (1960)[3] follows the same line of argument as Pareto before him. Pareto was so convinced that normative statements could not be demonstrated that he also interpreted normative statements as the hidden expression of feelings. Hence his sarcasms against Kant. Kant claimed that he had demonstrated the truth of the categorical imperative and hence the truth of a statement such as "one should not steal". To Pareto, because it is impossible to draw *ought* from *is*, Kant's proof is not a genuine proof but rather the socially acceptable formulation of a wish. "Do not steal" would mean, according to Pareto: "do what Kant likes; since he does not like stealing, do not steal".

On the whole, the idea that moral statements cannot be objectively grounded was treated as evident, but by a host of influential thinkers who differ from one another in all other respects. Strangely enough, positivism and empiricism converge in their interpretation of moral feelings with the irrational *sociological* theories of Marx and Durkheim and with the irrational *psychological* theory of Freud. All these thinkers agree with one another that

[3] See also Urmson (1968).

moral convictions cannot be grounded rationally. The reasons on which subjects believe that their axiological beliefs are grounded are to Marx, Freud, Nietzsche or Durkheim, as well as to Ayer and Pareto, inspired by "false consciousness". The reasons subjects see grounding their beliefs should not be considered as their genuine causes but as mere "rationalizations".

Existentialists for their part, in the same way as positivists, consider that moral beliefs cannot be grounded and, like them, propose treating the reasons given by subjects as illusory. Moral decisions would be "absurd" in Sartre's vocabulary.

Consequential reasons

So, the idea that normative beliefs cannot be grounded has become widespread under the influence of various social factors which I cannot analyze here for lack of space, but also because it has been supported by many influential intellectual and social scientific movements. Empiricism, positivism, Marxism, Freudianism, existentialism, sociologism, postmodernism and other -isms, different as they are from one another in most respects, agree on one point, namely that moral and generally normative convictions cannot be rationally grounded.

But the idea that normative beliefs cannot be grounded has also been reinforced by the relative weakness of the rational theories of moral and normative feelings developed by sociologists. These theories are rational in the sense that, to them, the reasons for the normative beliefs of social actors are their causes. But, with the exception of Max Weber and a few other writers, most rational theories of axiological beliefs explain moral values by their consequences. Some of these theories are powerful, but, because of this consequentialist restriction, none of them can be considered a general theory of normative feelings. Consequently, they cannot efficiently counterbalance the influence of the irrational theories of normative beliefs.

We can consider as an example *functionalism.* In its most acceptable versions, it says that an institution is good if it is congruent with the adequate functioning of a social system which people appreciate. The example of Piaget's marbles game is relevant here. Cheating is considered bad because it destroys a game children are interested in. In the same fashion, restricting the admission of new candidates to a club is generally considered to be good because free admission would be detrimental to the aims followed by the club. These functional explanations can of course be easily accepted. But functionalism cannot be considered a general theory which could be applied to all value statements. Thus, it can explain why admission to clubs is generally restricted,

but not why we believe people should be free to leave a club. We are morally shocked when sects retain members against their will. The source of our moral indignation evidently lies not in the fact that retaining members is detrimental to the sect.

Consider as another example the *contractualist* tradition. Rousseau says we should accept to be "forced to be free". By this famous statement, he meant that, in the absence of legal and social constraints, we would be tempted to be free riders to our own disadvantage as well as to the detriment of all. Without traffic lights, all of us would gain some freedom, but traffic would freeze. So, we are better off when we accept the constraint of traffic ligths as well as all kinds of political constraints. In this case also the bad consequences of natural freedom is the reason why, according to Rousseau, exchanging our *natural* freedom with all its advantages for *civil* freedom is a good thing.

A very influential contemporary theory, so-called "*rational choice theory*," has tried to show that social norms should always be explained by the anticipation of their consequences. Many current decisions in private or public life can effectively be accounted for by this "rational choice model".

So, the axiom common to functionalism, contractualism and the 'rational choice theory', according to which "X is good" if the consequences of X are good and bad if they are bad, is a powerful one. These theories are sufficient to explain many axiological beliefs.

Axiological reasons

But they cannot however be held to provide a *general* axiological theory. This is because the reasons underlying the axiological belief that "X is good or bad" do not always deal exclusively with the consequences of X. This is a crucial point. Irrational theories of norms and values to a great extent draw their strength from the fact that, on many subjects, we have the strong conviction that X is good or bad without the consequences of X being clearly good or bad. Examples are easily found in terms of normative and particularly moral feelings which can be explained, not by consequential reasons, but by reasons which I propose to call *axiological*, in deference to Max Weber. Recognizing their existence extends the power of the rational theory of moral feelings and considerably weakens the irrational position.

As it is well known, Weber distinguished between instrumental (*Zweckrationalität*) and axiological rationality (*Wertrationalität*). Though the distinction is not clear in Weber's writings, it can be interpreted as pointing to the distinction I have in mind between consequential and non consequential rea-

sons. If the reasons of social actors were only of the consequential type, the category of instrumental rationality would be sufficient. Traffic lights are good because without them the situation of all would be worse. In the same way, if a bridge were not built in an appropriate fashion, the consequences would be bad: the bridge might collapse. Therefore, consequential and instrumental rationality are one and the same thing. The most classical example in discussions about morals, the example of the negative value attached to the act of stealing, shows, however, that many moral feelings are not the product of instrumental rationality.

The idea that moral judgments are basically irrational has been expressed in the most provocative fashion by Mandeville. Stealing provokes a negative feeling. But this feeling cannot be rationally justified, suggests Mandeville. Of course, stealing has negative consequences as far as the victim is concerned, but the consequences are good to the thief. Society mobilizes all kinds of threats and penalties against thieves. But if the thief can be deterred from stealing, he cannot be convinced that stealing is bad.

Mandeville's argument was used by Karl Marx, who evokes it and makes it more systematic in *Capital*: the social consequences of stealing are ambiguous, he contends, some being socially bad, some good. It is bad to the rich, but provides jobs to lawyers and locksmiths. We could easily go further than Marx. Thieves are a blessing to insurance companies. And not only to them. Today, thanks to thieves, people in poor urban areas can get at lower prices many goods, such as electronic goods, which they could not afford otherwise. They do not even necessarily know that the low price they pay for them is the effect of the fact that the goods have been stolen. In many cases, they simply have the impression of being offered a bargain. This dual market has the happy consequence of inverting Caplovitz' famous theorem. Since, because of their scarce resources, the poor are limited to low quality products, said Caplovitz, it turns out that "the poor pay more" for their refrigerators or washing machines. This may be so, but thanks to thieves "the poor pay less" for their video-, tape-recorders or HiFi sets. Possibly, this unintended redistribution from the rich to the poor is more efficient than the redistribution generated by fiscal policies. In that case, thieves would achieve what politicians are unable to accomplish. Moreover, since it makes the demand broader, stealing has a positive effect on supply. So, stealing is possibly good, not only from a social, but also from a macroeconomic viewpoint, since it could have the positive effect of reducing unemployment.

Mandeville and Marx's sarcasms and paradoxes are more profound than they seem. They demonstrate by a *reductio ad absurdum* that it is impossible to show that stealing is a bad thing, when starting from a consequential viewpoint. Nobody has proposed to legalize stealing, though. From which

source, then, does our conviction come that stealing is bad? Not from its consequences. From what then?

To explain the normal feeling that "stealing is bad", one has to reconstruct the non consequential reasons behind it. They are not difficult to find. Social order is based on an adequation between retribution and contribution. With the exception of particular circumstances when, for instance, citizens are physically or mentally unable to contribute, a reward must correspond to a contribution. Now, stealing is a typical violation of these basic principles of social organization, since the thief unilaterally attributes to himself a reward without offering any contribution as a counterpart.

Obvious as it is, this case shows that reasons, though of the non consequential type, can easily be discovered behind the negative feelings normally aroused by the act of stealing. This example has important consequences: it shows that the basic argument on which the irrational theories of morals are grounded, namely that no reasons can be found behind the negative feelings produced by stealing and other deviant forms of behavior, need not be accepted. No consequential argument can prove that stealing is bad. No instrumental reason can convince us that thieves should be prosecuted. But axiological reasons can.

The same analysis could be extended to many other examples of moral feelings. Thus, corruption has of course negative effects on the well-being of taxpayers and consumers. But this effect is small and hardly visible. People tend to be very sensitive to corruption, though. A few years ago, the Spanish and French governments were dismissed by voters because they had not struggled against corruption. The negative feeelings against corruption are produced by reasons, but by reasons of the axiological, not consequential type.

These examples suffice to suggest that the Weberian notion of axiological rationality, once properly developed, solves very important theoretical problems and many sociological puzzles. It explains why a theft, even of minor value, produces such a strong reaction on the part of the victim. Observers often fail to understand this crucial point: "Why such a strong reaction to a minor theft, when the thief is a poor man, a marginal individual toward whom society is so unfair?". Yes, but the theft violates the basic principles of any social exchange. This example has also the advantage of showing that a utilitarian analysis in the style of the rational choice model is irrelevant here. The indignation of the observer of a theft will grow, other things being equal, if the thief has robbed a weak human being, an old woman for instance. But it will hardly grow with the amount stolen. So-called minor delinquency is an important social problem today not because the amount of the minor violations of the law has increased, but because the small rate of prosecution gives the public the feeling that the political

authorities do not care enough to enforce the basic principles of the social bond. These puzzles cannot be explained without the category of axiological rationality.

The examples I have just evoked were taken from ordinary life. Other examples can be taken from political life, such as the action of the Western powers against *apartheid* in South Africa. Introducing democracy in South Africa was *ex ante* risky: the process was exposed to potential severe dangers. Hence, from a consequential viewpoint it was hard to decide whether the action should be taken. But axiological reasons prevailed here over consequential reasons and axiological principles of a lower order. This explains why the political pressures against *apartheid* were generally approved by public opinion in the West.

This example shows that one should not present the choice between *Verantwortungsethik* and *Gesinnungsethik*, the ethics of responsibility and the ethics of conviction, as being always an open choice, because in some cases axiological rationality dominates consequential rationality. Thus, progress in medicine has reduced infant mortality and this circumstance is generally and rightly acknowledged as being an important cause of underdevelopment and hence of all the evils generated by underdevelopment. But who would accept that reducing infant mortality was not desirable progress? In that case axiological rationality dominates consequential rationality, and the ethics of conviction dominates the ethics of responsibility.

At this point, I would like to introduce two incidental remarks of interest from the point of view of sociological theory. The first one is that not only exchange theory but also the contractualist or the 'rational choice theory' may be seen a special cases of the cognitivist theory proposed here, since they consider normative feelings as grounded on reasons—but of a special kind in each case.

The second incidental remark is that the *sentiments* of justice or injustice, legitimacy or illegitimacy are rightly so called since they include an *affective* dimension; nothing is more painful than injustice. But they are at the same time grounded on reasons. Moreover, the strength of the sentiments is proportional to the strength of the reasons: I suffer more from injustice if I am convinced of the validity of my rights. Finally, the "cognitivist" analysis of these sentiments has the advantage of explaining easily why, when I believe that "X is good, legitimate, fair, etc.", I am at the same time convinced that the generalized Other should endorse the same statement. My sentiment is grounded on reasons which I hold to be transsubjectively valid in the sense that I have the feeling that other people should have the same sentiment. In its "cognitivist" version, methodological individualism is clearly immune to the objections against atomism.

The objection of pluralism

Another objection is often presented against any rational theory of values, namely that while descriptive truths are unique prescritive truths are often not. To this it can objected that prescriptive truths can be unique. Thus democracy is universally considered as a better regime than despotism. On the other hand, the context can explain why, say, a given institution is considered as good here and as bad there. Thus, Popkin (1979) has shown that in village societies people have strong reasons to prefer unanimity to majority rule, while in modern democratic societies we have strong reasons to prefer in most collective decisions a majority rule. The fact that X is perceived as good here and bad there does not imply that the value statement is arbitrary. It can be grounded in the two cases on strong reasons.

Also, it should be recognized that many prescriptive questions can be answered in several equally satisfactory fashion. Thus, the State has the function to make sure that when a citizen is victim of the violation of law by another citizen, this injustice is repaired, but, according to the British tradition, this does not imply that the State itself should have a right of prosecution against the violations of law. The British common law starts on the contrary from the principle that the victim itself, not the State, should originate the prosecution. In continental systems, the same basic principle according to which an injustice suffered by a citizen should be repaired is enforced by making the State responsible for the prosecution. The two solutions have their advantages and disadvantages, but the two are grounded on strong reasons.

Conclusion

I have tried to show that axiological convictions are experienced as evident because they rest upon systems of reasons that, though often half-conscious, are perceived as objective. The feeling that "X is fair" implies that the subject believes that everybody else would also endorse this statement. The value statement "X is good" is perceived as *transsubjective*, this adjective meaning that the subject cannot endorse it personally if he does not have the impression that everyone should endorse it.

A non-negligible theoretical benefit of the rational or cognitive theory which I have argued for here is that it clarifies the nature of the moral constraints which puzzled Durkheim. In what sense do we use the notion of "constraint" when we say that we have the feeling of a moral constraint? Exactly in the same sense as we have a feeling of constraint in the case of

mathematical statements. Once we have understood the reasons as to why the square root of 2 is irrational, we cannot think otherwise: we feel constrained to think so. In the same fashion, once we have the moral conviction that we have spent an unfair time, say, on a case, we cannot think otherwise because this statement is unconsciously grounded in our mind on strong reasons. Constraint, consensus, conviction, reasons constitute a system of elements which belong together. Reasons are not reasons when they cannot be publicly defended. They cannot be experienced as reasons if one does not have the feeling that others would also endorse them. This interpretation of moral constraints drawn from the rational cognitive theory I propose is easier to accept than Durkeim's metaphors and implausible assumptions about the mysterious social forces constraining the minds of social actors.

Again, the main reason why a rational theory of moral feelings may appear to be shocking lies in the strength of all these traditions that see a wide gap between *ought* and *is*. The disenchantment of the world has still widened this gap. Moreover, the rational theories of norms and values available today, the "rational choice" theory or in particular the functionalist theory, fail to explain such trivial phenomena as the negative reaction against stealing or the public reaction against minor delinquency. We solve many of these difficulties by extending the notion of rationality and taking seriously Weber's distinction between axiological and instrumental rationality. But, if we do so, we have to accept the idea that there are axiological truths in the same way that there are, say, medical or physical truths.

Maybe this rational theory of norms has a special relevance in today's world where "community" seems to have become the ultimate moral referent. Clearly, the positive value granted to the idea of community has to be related to the fact that culturalism is so popular today. Culturalism legitimates the idea of community. We do not, however live in a world of incommensurable "communities" and "cultures", and we feel concerned by what happens in other communities. The simple fact that most people feel concerned by what happens in Bosnia, China, Rwanda or Sudan constitutes a challenge to culturalism.

References

Ayer, A.J. (1960), *Language, Truth and Logic*. London: Victor Gollancz.

Boudon, R. (1999), "Les *Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse*: une théorie toujours vivante", *Année sociologique*, 1999a, 49, 1, 149–198.

—— and Betton, E. (1999), "Explaining the feelings of justice", in Boudon, R. and Cherkaoui, M. (eds.), *Central Currents in Sociological Theory* (8 volumes), London: Sage.

—— (2000), *The origin of Values, Essays in the sociology and philosophy of values*, Somerset, NJ: Transaction Publishers (forthcoming).
Geertz, C. (1984), "Distinguished Lecture: Anti anti-relativism", *American anthropologist*, vol. 86, n° 2, 263–278.
Glendon, Mary-Ann, *A nation under lawyers*, Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1996.
MacIntyre, A. (1981), *After virtue*, London: Duckworth.
Masters, R.D. (1993), *Beyond Relativism: Science and Human Values*. Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England.
Nisbet, R. (1966), *The sociological tradition*, Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press.
Olson, M. (1993), "Dictatorship, Democracy and Development", *American Political Science Review*, 87(3): 567–576.
Popkin, S. (1979), *The Rational Peasant. The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
Rorty, R. (1989), *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity*, Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press.
Ruse, M., (1993), "Une défense de l'éthique évolutionniste", in Changeux, J.-P. (ed.), *Les fondements naturels de l'éthique*, Paris: Seuil, 35–64.
Spiro, M.E. (1987), *Culture and Human Nature: Theoretical papers of Melford E. Spiro*, edited by B. Kilborne, and L.L. Langness. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Turner, Bryan S. (1992), *Max Weber: from history to modernity*, London: Routledge.
Urmson, J.O. (1968), *The Emotive Theory of Ethics*, London: Hutchinson.
Wilson, J.Q. (1993), *The Moral Sense*, New York: Macmillan.

3. FREEDOM VS. CONTROL IN POST-MODERN SOCIETY: A RELATIONAL APPROACH

Pierpaolo Donati

1. *The problem and theses of this paper*

Modern sociological theory was born based on a specific reflection as to the antithesis between freedom and social order (the latter in the sense of control), as polarities irreducible to one another within which social life unfolds. Freedom is generally thought of as the possibility of action unbound by conditioning. On the contrary, order (control) is intended as a bind that conditions action from the outside. Conditioning and binds are first conceived as naturalistic, then as normative, and finally mechanical.

The point to which I wish to draw your attention is that, to moderns, freedom is outside control (i.e. extrinsic to its forms). Social control *as such* cannot make one free, cannot be a component of freedom, but only expand or diminish the chance for freedom, which is built on other foundations. Freedom lies in the subject (individual, collective or historical), while social control lies in external constrictions (in the form of rules, either structural, normative or functional).

The previous statement may be mitigated by saying that both liberty and control are conceived within a shared framework characterized by rationality, contractuality and conventionalism. One assumes that both sides of the distinction may and must be made increasingly rational, contractual, conventional. What this means is explained by the various competing concepts of rationality, contract and conventionalism.

Some have observed that western social thought, compared to other cultures, places freedom ("liberation" of the subject, beginning with the individual) as a priority and as a limitation of control. But I'm not so sure this is true. Of course, only in the West do we find radically libertarian theories, unknown to other societies. But it would be stretching to maintain that modern sociological thought interprets society only as a process of liberation or, vice-versa, only as a process of control, although these unilateral temptations are anything but absent.

We can instead state that modern sociological theories still differ today on the side of the distinction (freedom/control) from which they choose to observe society: some see society from the side of freedom and as a

function of freedom (I will call these *lib* theories), while others see it from the side of control and as a function of social control (I will call these *lab* theories). In both cases, however, social aspects are defined and analyzed according to conceptual categories that are substantially identical (referring to the same meanings) and fall within the same binary distinction logic.[1]

As modernity develops, the "*lib/lab* complex" increases, in which the two poles—*lib* and *lab*—are gradually placed in increasing synergy. Sociology legitimates a configuration of society in which *lib* and *lab* feed one another, however opposite they appear. This is the framework that should be highlighted (§. 2).

Observing social reality from a *lib/lab* standpoint has certain consequences: (i) it leads to theoretical paradoxes, and (ii) it contradicts many aspects of empirical reality. Modern and contemporary social theories raise these two sets of problems. In an attempt to respond to these problems, sociology transforms its very nature: from an explanatory and/or interpretive narration of social reality, seen as a phenomenon that emerges independently, it becomes a means for the paradoxical construction of social reality itself (§. 3).

Those who have sought a non-paradoxical composition between freedom and control within the paradigms of modernity, specifically Talcott Parsons, have failed. No matter how hard they try, sociological theories which refer to the classics (up to and including Parsons) do not see how freedom and control can be reconciled, in the sense of mutual support or at least significant relations with one another. Freedom and control are assumed as two tracks—infinitely parallel—along which sociological theory runs, but nothing is said about how they are intrinsically connected. Sociology therefore finds itself with the continuous need to return to the discussion on the categories of freedom and control. In doing so, it generates theories that are by necessity anti-modern, neo-modern or post-modern (§. 4).

This highlights the fact that modernity has made a bet. It has configured the relationship between freedom and control as a typical *synergic antithesis* between the two terms of the distinction. But today this bet seems about to be lost. As a matter of fact, in today's western society, we can note that the contingencies for both freedom and control are increasing, that both

[1] The fundamental binary distinction is that of freedom/equality. Some might object that these are not antithetical terms, since "equality of the conditions of freedom" also exists. But one might respond to this objection that the conceptual category "equality of the conditions of freedom" is paradoxical, and therefore does not eliminate the binary nature of the *lib/lab* distinction. Indeed, sociological analysis reveals that the processes that encourage liberty are against social equality, and vice-versa social controls are introduced to reduce the inequality deriving from the existence of certain freedoms.

sides tend to pursue their own paths, that their meaningful bonds no longer hold—at least those that were considered meaningful until recently.

The relationship between liberty and control cycles endlessly and ends in a void, or it remains limited by forms of self-understanding (*lib/lab*) that prevent society from developing new stable and meaningful relations. As a matter of fact, if the *lib/lab* logic is radically extended to all forms of social life, it generates catastrophes. If instead it is restricted to inhibit further possibilities for synergy, it runs the risk of leading to degenerative processes, e.g. a regression to pre-modern forms of social life or a leap into post-modern destructuration. Modern management of the freedom/control coupling becomes increasingly problematic.

At the end of the twentieth century, many are reintroducing a neo-modern reading of society understood as a system that can simultaneously increase freedom and social control, making both rational, contractual, conventional. But this is an illusory dream. The synergy no longer acts as a guiding criterion for all of society (for its logic consumes what is human in the social much more than it can produce it). At the most, the *lib/lab* logic may be reproduced in strictly limited sectors. In any case, the binary distinction of freedom/control no longer interprets the figure of the dialectic between civil society and the State, which lies at the foundation of the modern era. The freedom/control distinction is reduced to a mere conceptual pair, analytical in nature, that no longer grasps the meaning nor the functions it held in modernity. One wonders, then, whether modern sociological theories that reason in terms of *lib/lab* might contain some actual ideological biases based on a type of society which, with the twenty-first century on the horizon, now appears obsolete.

In truth, the very crisis of the dialectic between freedom and control leads us to believe that we are entering a post-modern era, such as to impose substantial changes to the most general assumptions of sociological theory. The society of globalization changes the categories of modern times. Many feel that freedom manifests itself as "new subjects" and control as "new social rules". New theories are born for subjects and social rules. But even these representations are insufficient for interpreting what is happening—the passage to the post-modern—because they do not grasp the novelty in the social realm. Theories that remain within the *lib/lab framework* see subjects and rules, but *not the generation* of society. Generating society becomes—peculiarly, for the first time in human history—building a network of communicative relationship networks (§. 5).

The thesis of this paper is that the passage from modern to post-modern society is specifically distinguished by the need to move towards a *relational approach* to the freedom/control distinction, which is *post-lib* and *post-lab*,

post-individualistic, post-holistic. Such an approach may allow us to see the new, historically unique aspects of social formation that are taking place before us more clearly (§. 6).

2. Lib *and* lab *meet and shake hands*

2.1. In modern sociology, despite the debates between *lib* and *lab* thinkers—or, if we prefer, methodological individualism and holism—society is seen through the common framework of a historical process that conceives of itself as individual and/or collective liberation from the ascriptive ties of the community (*Gemeinschaft*) (read: life-worlds), to move towards progress in which Reason, be it individual or collective, micro or macro, of action or social systems, leaves its contractualistic mark on society.

Within this scenario, freedom is intended as freedom "*from*" (thus as an opening of contingencies of existence, and not merely dependencies), rather than as freedom "*for*" something or someone. And within this framework, social control is intended as external, coercive regulations rather than as intentional and purposeful choices according to a moral conscience inherent in the subjects and their relationships.

Some might object that this is simply the positivistic, functionalistic side of sociology, so to speak. I feel the same way. But the point is that within modernity no great western sociological theory appears immune from creeping positivism, which even pervades those theories intended to be non-functionalistic or even anti-functionalist (Marxian theories, for example).

Why is positivistic functionalism considered to be limiting and simplistic but then permeates every theory and ends up winning in the end?

I believe the reason lies in the fact that *lib* and *lab* theories are not truly opposites, but largely *complementary*: they "dance together", so to speak. This very dance is what feeds positivistic functionalism. Freedom and regulation, whether aimed at the individual or collective, work together in a certain way (to be defined below) to build that symbolic and institutional complex (*lib/lab*) that contains the collective conscience of our times and "good system governance". The categorical imperative says: we must expand all freedoms under the sole condition that they do not create a constriction for anyone; and good governance is considered an expansion of all possible freedoms as long as they are "compatible" with one another and with the concurrent principles (especially equality and solidarity) that act as external binds.

a) From a methodological standpoint, this means that individualism and holism "shake hands", support and complement one another.

b) From an applied standpoint, this means that society is conceived as a game between freedom and control along the Individual-Government axis, through continuous re-negotiation between the market and the state.

Even empirical research sees through the same lenses. To give an example, anyone wishing to prove that school choices are individual rather than controlled by the system can do so. But everyone is forced to admit, in empirical results, that the growth of individual freedom does not alter stratification structures (R. Boudon, 1979). Individualism and holism meet and shake hands.

This is the *lib/lab* paradigm inherent in modernity. It proposes a synergy between freedom and social control that constitutes the "propulsive engine" for the entire historical-social formation. The engine works like this: social control is used to free individuals, and freedom is used to make control more rational and functional to progress, under the assumption that one can be freed from the binding nature of social relationships without putting social order in danger.

2.2. Even today, western sociological theory thinks of society in these terms: as the *battle* between the *forces of freedom*, representing the propulsive (innovative) thrust, generally free of any need for *a priori* ethical justification, and the *forces of social control*, representing a brake (self-preservation, safety) and generally requiring justification, which must become increasingly technical-functional. The burden of proof is on control. The brake refers to the public sphere and must be used only when others' private freedom is violated, not before and not for any other reason. The fuel for the history machine is the liberty/control distinction used as a synergic antithesis between the private and public.[2]

The engine of the modernity machine, thus configured, is fueled by a potentially infinite energy—or at least that is how it is represented. "Progressively" removing constrictions to freedom, making it potentially unlimited, means creating an inexhaustible source of resources. If one then manages, in a complementary fashion, to invent a form of social control that does not block this process of liberation, but instead uses control to expand freedoms, then social control itself is no longer an insurmountable obstacle, but rather a mere identification of temporary limits and functionally necessary mechanisms to ensure that the freedom machine runs smoothly.

---

[2] By this expression I mean the use of the public to privatize the private, and vice-versa, the use of the private to publicize the public. It is important to emphasize that this takes place for the development of one based on the development of the other, according to a mutual system/environment relationship.

Those forms of society that interrupt this process are viewed as deviations, pure accidents, temporary halts or stopovers. This is how we interpret, on the one hand, political dictatorships (whether they be communist, fascist, Nazi, or other types) that eliminate freedoms, and, on the other hand, those forms of capitalism considered "rampant" or haphazard (*casino capitalism*), which do not guarantee equal freedoms for all. In the eyes of the *lib/lab* paradigm, dictatorships and unregulated capitalism are "unintentional effects" which must be once again subjected to the (same) freedom/control directive distinction. Modernity is convinced that the *lib/lab* machine is expandable in terms of progressive upgrades. It refuses the idea that this logic has extra or meta-social binds or limitations, and that each new cycle may generate situations that are more problematic than before.

This is how the West represents itself: as the best of all possible worlds. Dominant sociological theories reassure it that this is indeed the case.

The West believes it has harnessed the freedom/control antithesis as the engine of history. The engine of society has certain analogies with a nuclear propulsion engine: it is considered to have practically unlimited resources, with extremely high performance, although with some inherent risks. This is how the globalized society of communication is considered. It is assumed that the risks are generally controllable, but this re-introduces the same guiding distinction within what has just been distinguished. The problem of discovering what might be achieved by changing the guiding distinctions of this arrangement is systematically avoided.

This configuration characterizes modern sociological theory from the nineteenth century to the present. Indeed, my thesis maintains that a theory is considered all the more "modern" the more it assumes this very configuration. To avoid it means risking the development of a pre-modern or anti-modern sociology.

The dance where *lib* and *lab* shake hands is still the prevailing arrangement of western society. In the meantime, however, its limits have become apparent. We are gradually realizing that it prevents the observer from seeing beyond the—quite limited—horizon at which it appears that all possibilities have their place, while instead the opposite occurs. Indeed, many possibilities are not at all thematized or discussed, and many of those that are prove to be more virtual than real in the end. In brief, one realizes that the *lib/lab* approach does not see the morphogenesis within society as an emerging associative or surplus form that combines freedom and control according to means that escape modern logic.

3. *The modern concept of the freedom vs. control dialectic leads to paradoxes and contrasts with the empirical reality*

3.1. The *lib/lab* configuration begins to be placed under serious discussion when it encounters systematic malfunctions, thus when one realizes that it can no longer function structurally. There are many crisis paradigms. Most of these take note that a development machine, as conceived, encounters structural limitations in its external and internal environments (to cite just one author, see F. Hirsch, 1995). One cannot exploit nature indefinitely (physical resources). One cannot make the ecosystem indefinitely artificial. One cannot polarize social relationships indefinitely towards total isolation or total constriction, under penalty of pathological repercussions.

Yet, not everyone sees that critical results are the product of specific relationship processes between freedom and social control that generate vicious or perverse circles. What I would like to emphasize here is that the *lib/lab* complex intrinsically, in itself, leads to situations that are unsolvable paradoxes and that contrast mightily with the needs and experiences of daily life. Let us examine these two aspects.

3.2. In the first place, to describe society specifically as a synergic antithesis between freedom and control leads to unsolvable paradoxes, which come in two forms: (a) freedom enters into contradiction with itself; (b) social control loses its legitimacy. Let us examine these separately.

(a) The exaltation of freedom as the absence of restrictions—in particular normative restrictions—internal to agency and its subject thwarts freedom and eventually causes it to self-destruct. Early modernity still works with a concept of freedom that means interdependency, thus the choice of the environment from which to depend. But in the symbolic code that modernity generates, it is written that this is a purely temporary limitation, because freedom as such consists of the possibility of abandoning interdependency or the choice of dependencies. Is it perhaps not true that money, with the freedom to choose a specific transaction, must also transmit an increase of freedom as the possibility of escaping other constrictions for further transactions? The guiding norm of society is no longer a pattern of value, but the convertibility of anything into anything else (P. Donati, 1991, chap. 4).

As long as this process remains restricted to limited groups of people (the modern elite), only the highest social classes experience a lifestyle in which freedom is an end unto itself. Only they, for the moment, enter the paradoxes. When the process becomes a mass phenomenon, one realizes that all of

society takes on the characteristics of a "deviant majority". We are at the "drift of liberalism" (M. Schooyans, 1991), thus within a social arrangement in which freedoms cancel each other out. One must then note that the civil society born of the Protestant Reformation no longer exists (A. Seligman, 1992), that it has run out or defeated itself. The very idea of *civil* comes under discussion. To generate a civil life one must create new social institutions which—far from encouraging a "lightening of ethics" (as A. Gehlen believes, 1986)—manage to intertwine freedoms and controls through morally significant relationships between them.

When the old relationships fall, one must seek new rules for the creation of social institutions that reflect an ethic of freedom not entirely detached from control. But the horizon of resources and possibilities remains limited. Since it is imperative to be modern, and since we are modern to the extent to which we do not seek rules which can constitute freedom from within, but only mechanisms to reduce the undesired effects of freedom, then social norms are unintentionally configured as vicious circles within the system of freedom. To put it bluntly: many private behaviours are permitted, but their public effects are punished or blamed (as happens when a country permits a certain use of drugs in the private sphere, but punishes those who sell it and blames those who become drug-addicted).

(b) Something similar takes place for control. A concept of social control as external and coercive towards action and its subject removes all substantial legitimacy from social order and renders functionally ineffective those mechanisms (institutions and rules) that should ensure it. The more social rules are separated from the subjects' motivations and interior aims, the more they are perceived as purely artificial and constrictive, and therefore free of any human sense; they become purely a technical necessity, which may in turn be artificially reduced.

There are abundant indicators of these results. We might briefly recall: the collapse of conditional normative orders (based on norms such as "if x occurs then do y"); the collapse of the institutional welfare state; the fact that the law has changed from guarantor of social order to a source of social disorder. In all of these instances, social control is first delegitimized in terms of aims and values, then reduced to a technical point and thus subject to procedural rules that chase their own tail. For example, the welfare state was created to achieve greater social justice, but was then reduced to a functional fact of redistributing resources. It was then subjected to rules of effectiveness which not only made entitlements depend on the existence of a surplus of economic resources which are necessarily always scarce, but

may be pursued even outside a certain political-institutional setup, thus making the *ethos* of welfare more and more evanescent.

The control machine begins to waver. This phenomenon may be described as the emergence of an order based on chaos or entropy (M. Forsé, 1989), or as a differentiation that creates more problems than it solves (N. Luhmann, 1984). Some, using other language, speak of the death of public goods, while others declare the death of privacy. But few see that these demises are produced by that very modernity that exalts the *lib/lab* synergy, i.e. the pursuit of greater freedom through controls carried out as a function of non-normative freedoms.[3]

3.3. In the second place, the *lib/lab* code contradicts empirical evidence and subjective experiences of daily life. Modern sociology describes the relationship between freedom and control as a synergic antithesis that always finds a new and better balance. But that is not how things really are.

In common sense experience, the growth of freedom is always problematic, as is the growth of social controls. To conceive of society as a "society of individuals" (N. Elias, 1978) with increasing "individualization", i.e. as a society capable of "individualizing individuals" (U. Beck, 1992) according to increasingly less constricting rules, appears to be highly misleading for at least two reasons. (i) Firstly, this underestimates the fact that the individual is prey to new herd instincts, new forms of alienation directions and orgiastic and herd group dynamics. (ii) Secondly, this also does not mention the fact that new forms of institutionalizing individuals appear that are not functional to the subject's freedom (in the end, what else have many authors such as M. Foucault and J. Donzelot told us?).

It is beyond doubt that new freedoms appear on the one side, and new controls on the other. Nevertheless, this growth is not parallel. Most of the time it is asymmetrical in space and time, and remains highly problematic in the rules that guide social processes. The idea that social control may be configured in such a way as to ensure greater individual freedoms without

[3] By non-normative freedoms I mean those freedoms that are purely negative (i.e. intended as freedoms "from" something or someone). Negative freedoms see the *alter* only as a limit and constraint to *ego*'s action. On the contrary, positive (i.e. normative) freedoms are those that are oriented towards (they are "for") something or someone. The latter see the *alter* not merely as a limit, but as a condition and resource for *ego*'s agency. In this case, *ego* is free to act insofar as he/she can promote *alter*'s freedom as a condition and resource of his/her own action. Contrary to the unrelated concept of negative freedoms, the positive concept emphasizes the relational nexus existing between *ego* and *alter*, which becomes the focus of sociological interest. Of course, positive freedom does not deny negative freedom; on the contrary, it guarantees it.

significant relations between freedom and control lead to mystifying forms of systemic control, which bring about the schizophrenia typical of daily life in our times.

The experience of contemporary men and women is that they live between two entirely discrepant levels of reality. On the one hand, they are theoretically free to do anything they like, on the condition that it remains private. The culture of globalization reinforces this feeling in them, which is that they may "privately" enter the realm of virtual reality, so to speak. On the other hand, when they deal with the facts, men and women find that the opportunities to satisfy their social needs are socially limited and structured. Many specific freedoms and identities are denied. The ideology of egalitarian control ensures that men and women have the same freedoms and opportunities, but in practice the opposite occurs. Social freedoms and opportunities are *gendered*, or differentiated by gender, and the egalitarian viewpoint does not allow us to see the new inequalities that are generated. And yet the globalizing machine of modernity provides a representation that denies this fact. It may admit the existence of inequality only as a temporary situation, while waiting for the synergic *lib/lab* antithesis to continue further, and thus engender forms of control that ensure more freedom.

The conclusion is that in the globalization processes under way today the ideology of freedom masks widespread non-freedoms, and the ideology of equality masks new inequalities. Social control is not functional to many freedoms nor to many equalities that one would like to pursue from the standpoint of human needs and rights.

4. *Attempts to reconcile freedom and control conducted within modernity*

4.1. In the course of its history, *lib/lab* thought has tended to represent society as a construction in which everything works out in the end, thanks to the fact that conflicts may be led back to rationality through the synergic antithesis of freedom/control. It may be said that this attitude constitutes the sociological mainstream even today.

Parsons' theory represents the finish line and point of greatest morphostatic equilibrium in modern sociological thought between freedom of action and the need for social order, between private and public, or, to use the words of J.C. Alexander (1983), between substantial and formal voluntarism. Parsons is the last of the moderns to theorize as to the horizon of that contact between reason and revelation which, according to many (A. Seligman, 1992), is the origin of the modern spirit and its idea of freedom (civil society) that may be regulated through a system (State) conceived as a struc-

tural form of conditioning needed in order to reach common goals. In Parsons, the *societal community* may combine freedom and control only because it still has something that transcends both. It incarnates the spirit of a freedom that is born "from within" social actors, and can compromise with the social system because it rests on a cultural system with religious roots. But Parsons is no longer able to justify this arrangement, which appears to be grounded in an unduly normative vision of society. Because of how his theory (read: AGIL diagram) is formulated, it absorbs and rationalizes the transcendent element, the vital source (of values) of the system. Within the very logic of Parsons' AGIL, the subject of freedom disappears against the determinations and structural limitations of social action. Indeed, in Parsons it is already evident that society (even as civil society) is the immense contraption that secularizes transcendent (i.e. religious) concepts and values.

With Parsons and immediately thereafter ends the dream of the starry heaven above that is reflected within us. The Kantian spirit of modern sociology dissolves. It is no longer so easy to reconcile freedom and control. The *lib/lab* synergy can no longer be considered a normally functioning process. Normality becomes the very fact that the mutual conciliation of freedom and control no longer works.

Parsons thought that freedom consisted of individuals internalizing the value patterns and control mechanisms of the Protestant ethic and Freudian schematics in socialization terms. Now this ethic no longer exists, and Freudianism has been overturned. Thus it is revealed that this kind of thinking was "modern" only in part; it actually reflected a few pre-modern convictions. Specifically, modernity thinks that freedom cannot be founded (constituted) on control. This is the exact point where Parsons fails, and must be abandoned.

It becomes clearer why and how Parsons never found a way out of the dilemma that lies at the heart of all modern sociological theory, and that can be expressed by the guiding question: how is it possible to limit the (modern) social system's demand to control all areas of human life, beginning with the pretense that something comes before the system and that, through it, legitimizes its institutions? Parsons' theory still assumes that: freedom and control (i) work within a certain symbolic framework of values, and (ii) increase each other by respecting the famous cybernetic hierarchy (LIGA). But both of these conditions have collapsed today. Thus the guiding question becomes: how can the social system develop, or even survive, if it globalizes contingencies and searches for its regulatory form within this globalization? Parsons' theory is by now useless in answering this question.

4.2. Sociology in recent decades is a declaration of the failure of Parsons' theory as the apex of modern theorization on the freedom/control dilemma. Three alternatives arise after Parsons:

a. run the risk of being anti-modern, and thus refute that freedom and control are merely external limitations for one another, therefore making use of connections and interdependencies that reciprocally bind freedom and control together under the aegis of whatever structure or prerequisite or meta-social requirement;

b. define oneself as neo-modern, thus reintroduce the synergic antithesis between freedom and control in search of new forms of compatibility achieved by adjusting re-selected mixes and contingencies;

c. or, one may enter the post-modern, further destructuring the two terms and their relationships.

These are three different ways of criticizing the modern view of society and of foreseeing the post-modern.[4] Of course, various configurations of mixes between these three modes are also possible. And indeed, the real post-modern is a mixture of these three "pure" types of response. Let us briefly examine them.

a. The anti-moderns are characterized by claiming alternative systems for distinguishing freedom/control from those used by modernity. They highlight how society performs selective reductions of complexity that differ from those typically used in modernity. These distinctions and selections generally have a "community" outlook (indeed, this category includes many of the so-called "communitarians"). There is no lack of traditions in this sense. K. Polany is one, F. Le Play another. K. Marx, E. Durkheim, M. Mauss could well be considered the fathers of yet other traditions, all in a different voice. But, apart from the observation that, today, only a few schools put forth approaches that reject a *lib/lab* interpretation of the contingency play, what is most relevant here is to consider that contemporary sociology has developed a new sensibility. Reasoning about our society requires something more than simply recalling a classical perspective. It requires that one be

[4] It is not difficult to place the various currents of today's social and philosophical thought within these three ways of responding to the crisis of modernity. In terms of the morphogenetic theory (Archer, 1995), they may be easily classified: the first category includes the neo-communitarians (who commit errors of *downward conflation*); the second includes the neo-liberals (who commit errors of *upward conflation*); and the third are the neo-relationists (who commit errors of *central conflation*).

able to point out more highly differentiated and complex means of reducing the globalization of contingencies. Anti-modern cannot be pre-modern. And many of the above mentioned schools seem to be unable to avoid these pitfalls.

b. The neo-moderns distinguish themselves by reinterpreting society within the *lib/lab* synergy, more loosely and with a few variations. Many of them repeat Parsons without Parsons' faith. They are uncertain as to exactly what parts of Parsons may be preserved, and what must be changed. But they essentially propose bringing multidimensionality into the primary assumptions of Parsonian thought, which means opening the theory to greater contingency. They also intend to reconcile freedom and control in the form of *lib/lab* democracy. But to what extent is this possible when the basic assumptions of control in the cybernetic hierarchy within the AGIL framework fail? This is not at all clear. And thus the freedom/control dialectic is now even more uncertain, more replete with indetermination. J.C. Alexander (1994) attributes its possibility to exist and develop to the ability of cultural traditions to produce and reproduce, but this solution appears highly problematic. J. Habermas said it long ago, proposing his own solution of an "unlimited community of discourse", which in turn is utopian.

The neo-moderns expand the contingencies of freedom and controls, but in doing so lose certain essential prerequisites for preserving both. They realize that freedoms must have independent subjects, but the latter are by now a ("deviant") minority since most individuals are prey to systemic mechanisms and pervasive heteronomous pressures. They are still searching for forms of control that should meet functional needs, but a functionalist explanation of control runs up against a chronic deficit of meaning where modernity is carried to extremes. In short, the neo-moderns attempt to re-launch modernity without the myths and illusions that gave modernity its forward thrust. They want to "purify its spirit". But, in my opinion, the attempt appears conceptually backward compared to the phenomena under way. The neo-moderns prove themselves unable to grasp the new.

c. Those who instead draw the radically coherent consequences of the loss of normativity in social systems are followers of post-modern thought, whose greatest breaking point with humanistic tradition lies in systemic neofunctionalist thought. Luhmann (1984) elaborates a theory intended to immunize from the crucial problem implicit in neo-modern thought: i.e. making the freedom/control relationship depend on the ability of traditional cultures to regenerate. With Luhmann, freedom is radically placed outside the system, in the so-called system environment, where the human subject may

fluctuate as desired. For him, communication is enough to create control. There is no more need for culture as a necessary prerequisite and framework to organize the relationship between freedom and social control.

Neo-functionalism thereby reaches a decisive turning point in the direction of a *radically contingent* relationism between freedom and control. With Luhmann, sociology proves itself ready to be placed in that crucible of post-modern thought that cuts all human ties between freedom and control. In this light, Luhmann appears simultaneously as the grave-digger of modernity and the lark of post-modernity. This lark, however, has no wings; Luhmann's post-modernity cannot take flight. Beyond the metaphor, it cannot indicate any cultural innovations complete with a sense of humanity. It cannot distinguish the human-social from the inhuman-social. On the contrary, this is the core problem of the post-modern world.

4.3. The difficulties that modernity encounters in managing the freedom/control relationship foster a multitude of theories based on the paradoxes and contradictions between the two terms of the relationship. It would require a great deal of space to deal with this topic as a whole. Here, I would rather call your attention to the fact that the end of modernity is revealed by its inability to achieve its promises, summarized in the triad of freedom/equality/fraternity. From this standpoint, one realizes that the *lib/lab* complex (freedom/equality) has made solidarity residual and continues to corrode the primary and secondary forms of social integration (non-systemic). The *lib/lab* complex systemically empties the fabric of sociality (P. Donati, 1993). Society discovers that it is a powerful machine that turns life into merchandise. The appearance of the post-modern is marked by the need to reintroduce the third pole (solidarity) within a historical context in which the freedom/control combination has taken on the abstract form of *general intellect* (of Marxian memory) that appears and materializes more each day in the globalization processes implemented by the new communication technologies.

The crisis of the *lib/lab* complex is manifest as soon as one must appeal to some form of social solidarity—not occasional or marginal—and realizes that the *lib/lab* setup does not provide for it. Then, and only then, when one realizes that the destruction of solidarity has exceeded the critical points of social cohesion, does it become apparent that *lib/lab* sociology can describe society only as a paradox. The crisis emerges gradually, asymmetrically in various systems and social institutions, and at different rates for different societies. But, at a certain point, one is led to wonder: what is the glue of society?

Within the winning model of western modernization, beyond the threshold where solidarity is radically eroded, the existence of sociability, as a *sui generis* reality, may no longer be assigned to freedom nor control, nor to a

combination thereof, simply because the modern definitions of freedom and control implode. The only alternative that remains is to conceive of sociological theory as the construction (and management) of paradoxes.[5] The dialectic between freedom and control becomes something else in relation to the dream of primitive modern civil society. The reconciliation between freedom and control appears increasingly despairing, because these two realities separate beneath the figure of an environment (containing freedoms) that fluctuates around the system (containing control) without the two being able to communicate. Sociology must choose whether to continue to reason within this framework, or to consider an alternative.

In this regard, my thesis is that many of today's attempts to examine the relationship between freedom and control end up merely taking note of implosions, irrationalities and distortions, rather than seeing positive aspects. They do not go beyond the crucial boundary of modernity, which is not to see the origination and originality of the social sphere as a reality *sui generis*. I would now like to prove this with reference to a peculiar analysis of society, concluding with a reflection on the theoretical implications of my discourse, leading to a change in the paradigm of how the freedom/control relationship is understood in post-modern society.

5. *Limitations and obsolescence of the* lib/lab *paradigm: must we think in terms of subjectivity and communication rules?*

5.1. In late modernity, the freedom/control dialectic meets structural and cultural limitations beyond which it may not go. What are these limits? We may summarize them briefly by stating that the late-capitalist arrangement:

a) identifies control with mere technical needs, or functional mechanisms, which should be managed by impersonal systems (regulated through negotiations between the state and the market),

b) identifies freedoms using the yardstick of market freedom, thus generalizing freedoms with mercantilism by analogy,

c) makes all associative spheres of social solidarity (i.e. non-profit oriented actors, otherwise called "social private" spheres) residual, allowed only to survive in the most marginal regions of society,

---

[5] Neo-functionalists offer several paradigmatic versions of this. Alexander (1997) sees civil society as prey for a paradoxical nemesis between freedom and control, the particular and the universal, rather than as an expression of a functional synergy between them. Luhmann (1990) sees society as a paradox in itself and elaborates what he calls "eurialistics", intended as a strategy to prevent being blinded by it.

d) weakens the civil culture of the life-world, i.e. debilitates the civic commitment of families and informal networks through privatized and standardized forms of consumption and behavior.

The *lib/lab* arrangement now stands on a process of ethical un-differentiation; or, as others say, on ethical-cultural relativism (as a matter of fact, unlike other societal systems, ethics does not have a proper internal differentation symbolic code). This is the background against which advanced society, entering the twenty-first century, no longer represents itself as the best of all possible worlds, but only as one of the many possible variations of one world that is infinitely "otherwise possible".

Indeed, many old problems remain unsolved, and others arise that the *lib/lab* arrangement cannot confront. These problems have to do with:

– the crisis of the welfare state induced by the growth of freedoms guaranteed regardless of the negative consequences of private behaviors (L. Mead, 1986),

– the overflowing of markets beyond national confines and other control apparatuses (L. Scott, J. Urry, 1987; C. Offe, 1988),

– the unregulated dynamism of mass-media networks which create what is called the new global society (D. de Kerckhove, 1997),

– the increasing risk of amoral behavior by subjects, against the increasingly "mechanical" nature of control systems which have by now long stopped relying on the purposeful, intentional motivations of subjects in areas such as drug taking and selling, environmental pollution, the diffusion of hazardous lifestyles, the perverse effects of the mass media—especially TV—on people and their communicative relationships (U. Beck, 1992).

5.2. All of this shows that the *lib/lab* paradigm has become obsolete in understanding what is going on in many areas of social life. It no longer interprets the deepest meaning of problems, no longer offers viable solutions for managing them with an acceptable degree of satisfaction. The inadequacy of the paradigm is revealed in the fundamental subsystems of society.

a. Politics no longer has control of the supporting structures of society (state and market), and tends to close itself into a self-referential political-administrative subsystem, while on the other hand it would be necessary to see the political nature of the various spheres of life.

b. New civil and human claims for freedom emerge that cannot be derived from market freedoms or generalizations thereof, but lead instead to other spheres and require other generalized symbolic means (different from money).

c. New intermediate social formations arise, with their own subjectivity, that cannot be included within the individual-state axis, the hinge of modern citizenship.

d. An ethical question about nature has emerged ("ecology") that cannot be related to political ethics (which remains governmental) nor business (market) ethics, i.e. the two ethics whose symbiosis has formed the hinge of government in the modern system.

The *lib/lab* distinction becomes obsolete as the guiding distinction of society precisely when it is no longer able to see:

i) the developments within each subsystem of society,
ii) the relations that change the relationships between these subsystems,
iii) the emerging effects of their interaction.

An analysis of all of this would require a great deal of space. To my mind, the end result, however, is that the *lib/lab* arrangement must be limited to its own terrain. The *lib/lab* code must be functionally specialized and limited to a few concrete mechanisms of social protection that safeguard the basic acquisitions of modernity in the form of a minimal safety net. These functions cannot be any longer the guiding functions of the societal system. To go further, society needs a fundamental change in the guiding distinctions upon which social institutions are built.

5.3. At the present time, the passage to new paradigms of relationship between freedom and control is marked by a language and symbolic codes that refer to the interplay between the subjectivity of the actors and social rules, mediated by the "world of communications". The post-modern society tends to be described and interpreted within the framework: subjectivity of actors/communications system (with its symbolic codes, means and rules of communication). This is the system with which we would like to confront the emerging phenomena that are expressed today: in the increasingly apolitical attitude pervading all of society, in the form of *autós* (need to render autonomous the links between freedom and control within each sphere of life); in the development of new, alternative markets (known as "social" markets since they are non-profit); in the appearance of new social networks and aggregations; in the emergence of new cultures of difference. All of these phenomena are barely present or not at all foreseen within the *lib/lab* arrangement.

The framework that I call "communications paradigm" takes note of these new phenomena. But how does it interpret the changes under way? It gives many answers. But, generally speaking, communicationists believe:

– that the apolitical attitude of society may be resolved by allowing the rules to emerge from the "community of discourse" of the subjects and from the so-called communicative hyper-cycles; however, it remains to be seen whether this leads to a re-politicization of the social sphere or produces an additional gap in the political character of society;

– that freedoms may be managed by translating them into new forms of communication, including new, non-monetary forms of "money"; here, again, it remains to be seen whether these means activate a new sociality or, on the contrary, put the social context within which communication takes place into latency, thereby distorting social reality;

– that the new subjects must be understood as communicative actors, no longer protagonists of historical revolutionary battles nor activators of collective resources but rather bearers of new cultural codes in which identity and interests blend in a vital-existential manner;

– that the relationships between society and nature may be rethought as "clean ecological communication"; but it remains to be seen whether it is possible to avoid the further artificialization of nature itself, beyond limiting a Faustian exploitation.

The new paradigm of globalization centered around subjectivity and social rules mediated by communication on a planetary scale certainly revises the *lib/lab* logic, as a logic of modernization. But in turn, it leaves the relationships between freedom and control hanging. The communications system is often once again viewed as a product between administrative and market demands into which it is difficult to introduce elements of *Lebenswelt.*

At the end of the 20th century, a representation of society as the world of communication—or rather, as an infinite number of cohabiting worlds of communication—becomes dominant. One wonders: how and to what extent does this new paradigm manage to go beyond the limits of the *lib/lab* arrangement? It acquires a few new advantageous features, but also persistent weaknesses. The gains lie in the fact that the subject is now seen as freer to express his internal self and relate to others. The weaknesses persist in the fact that this paradigm once again has problems accounting for the social pathologies that derive from the progressive scission between freedom and control, intended respectively as interior and exterior, intimate relationships and generalized relationships, private and public. To manage these scissions solely through mere communications leads to an additional loss in the ability of actors to relate to each other. The logical consequence are the various theorems of the death of the subject and the implosion of social ties (Taylor, 1989).

My thesis is that the two paradigms—*lib/lab* and communications—certainly contain discontinuities. The paradigm of society as communication lends itself better than the previous one (*lib/lab*) to grasping the new social aspects. But I also believe that the communications paradigm does not offer an adequate view of freedom and control as social relations.

5.4. In the new communications paradigm, freedom lies in the subjects and control in the procedures of the communication system. But one wonders: what relationships exist between the subjects and the communication system? Supporters of these paradigm fall into two distinct positions.

On the one hand there are those who maintain that subjects and the social system have in common only communication and no more than communication. They assure us that communication can act on its own as a vehicle for both freedom and control, making both of them more contingent because freedom and control take on the nature of pure communication. This seems to dissolve the paradoxes and contradictions towards non-virtual reality.

On the other hand are those who state that the "society of communication" is far from being that way. They note that communication is always embedded in social relations which come first and go beyond subjects and the communication system. They emphasize that freedom and control are achieved in a context where choices do not depend on pure communication, much less correspond to pure contingencies. This raises the view of a truly "relational" society as opposed to the relationistic (non-relational) fading society of the "pure" communicationists (who reduce relations to simple communication).

The view of pure communicationists leads us to observe that freedoms, far from having content, are increasingly formal and empty, and do not create that minimum of "political" glue upon which the vitality of the spheres of daily life depend. They even have trouble directing exchanges towards a social purpose. We note that daily life dissolves into a globalization that is a standardization of the Mind. The rules to which social control is entrusted appear increasingly impersonal, more systemic, and increasingly less of the life-world and social interaction. The world of the media does not show (does not generate!) those spheres of social integration and symbolic cultures (*ethos*) needed to fill the void left by the modern.

By contrast, we note that freedom and control can relate only in certain contexts and under specific conditions, in such a way as to express action aimed towards values and capable of social integration. Note that this takes place:

a) in personal care services and within a new professional ethic of social work, conceived as services to the *alter* while respecting his characteristics, potential, and membership perspective;

b) in service organizations, where private freedoms are enacted for purposes of community utility rather than solely for the instrumental interests of the members of these organizations;

c) in social relationships that undertake to assume a new attitude towards "nature", considered not as a mere physical ecosystem but especially as a symbolic referent that offers new mediations of meaning for human life.

Within these environments and types of social relations arises something in common that reveals the novelty of the social sphere. This is the *sui generis* reality of society, when expressed in an *original* and *originative manner.* Original, since social relations arise in peculiar and independent ways outside the systemic regulations of the State-market complex. Originative, since social relations come into existence through an otherness of symbolic exchange that is not imposed from outside nor an aim unto itself because it operates as an ordering I need, as a pattern of value, as a rule and as a medium. Why create caring relationships, why respect actors for their differences and peculiarities, why work for the good of others, why celebrate the value of nature? Because, in all of these cases, the relationship between freedom and control is configured with a relational structure and culture of symbolic exchange whose paradigm lies in giving, not elsewhere.

One wonders: is one who makes a gift free or forced to do so? From a common sense viewpoint, the answer is that the first to do so, of his own spontaneous volition, is free, while he who reciprocates is in some way forced by the norm of reciprocity. But, to my mind, this distinction does not hold. Within the giving circuit it is difficult to track down the "first" move. Who or what is the *primum movens* of giving? The subject's freedom or the norm of reciprocity as a symbolic exchange? If we admit that an individual may be totally free as a speck, an atom, that moves throughout the emptiness of social space as it pleases, then the *primum movens* is the individual. But such an individual does not exist in the social field (M. Archer, 1995). Anyone who gives a gift responds to internal and external needs that are born and live in a context of relationships within which only the gift has meaning (A. Caillé, 1996). The gift is a relationship in itself, where the subject's freedom meets social constrictions. Each impulse takes place in a social environment and achieves a social reality, and is not imposed in an entirely binding fashion on that concrete individual. This human freedom lies within social determinism but at the same time transcends it. With this observation we go beyond simply

noting that human beings move freely within social determinism (discussed by G. Gurvitch, 1963). We find that the system of social relevancy has changed.

5.5. The society of communication goes beyond the *lib/lab* concept if and to the extent to which it performs two operations: first, it makes "other" freedoms and "other" forms of control possible; second, it relates them according to a new symbolic code. If it does so, it is because it places the relationship as the underlying assumption of a new metaphysics of the social world, after western technology has replaced the classical, rational ontology of beings.

There are many different ways to interpret society *as a social relationship* between freedom and control (thus with different AGIL-relationships). Only a few of these ways are innovative. Among them, there are those marked by instrumental motives (which remain within the A-G complex), and those marked by symbolic exchange motives (mutual giving) which stem from L-I. As M. Mauss has demonstrated (A. Caillé, 1996), only reciprocal giving can generate new forms of sociability, while instrumental motives are more likely to lead to its consumption.

The new civil society is born as a place where human relationships are taken seriously. In order to provide care, to organize a collective service, to respect and emphasize nature, it is necessary to make specific choices. In these domains, one must develop social relationships in which freedom and control *penetrate each other*, and thus remain *interdependent, interpenetrated, and interactive* according to new processes. Civility emerges to the extent that human relations become significant "otherwise" in the sense of taking on the significance of a *good in itself*, and to the extent that this "*relational good*" is pursued as such.

In short, this is my thesis. Society is (and is becoming) post-modern if and to the extent to which it takes the originative and original nature of social relations seriously, sees them and enacts them, placing communication within the relationship and not making the relationship a by-product or superstructure of communication (as late modernity does). For this type of society to emerge, freedom and control must distinguish themselves and rejoin relationally (as it happens within the logic of reciprocity), rather than act as a binary division that proceeds by progressively excluding one side from the other through the logic of *re-entry* (as envisaged by G. Spencer Brown, 1979). Only if things are seen in this light can one realize that post-modern society is divided into many social spheres which differ because they conjugate the meaning of freedom and control—and their relationships—differently. In particular, we can distinguish four types of spheres:

– market spheres, where freedom means competition for profit, and control is assigned to the pricing system;

– government spheres, where freedom is represented by exercising the right to vote, and control is entrusted to obedience of laws;

– service spheres, where freedom means symbolic exchange, and control lies with associative social exchange rules;

– the spheres of family and informal networks, where freedom is an action of mutual giving, and control is entrusted to the rules which make this relationship valuable.

This multitude of intertwining spheres is the foundation of a new societal configuration.

6. *A relational approach to freedom vs. control dilemmas in post-modern society: possible scenarios*

6.1. I have described the crisis of late-modern society as a product of that peculiar, synergic antithesis between freedom and control which has been postulated since the beginning of modernity. I have also maintained that this symbolic code (*lib/lab*) can no longer act as the guiding code for the entire societal system. It becomes a mechanism for highly limited choices in specialized social sectors. I would now like to draw the theoretical implications of this way of interpreting society beyond modernity.

The overall premise lies in assuming that the freedom/control relationship is an antithesis only in particular instances. The antithesis—especially when synergic—is only one of the possible reductions of the relational dilemmas between the two poles. It lends itself to describing the relationship between state and market, but not relations within and between the other spheres of life. Generally speaking, a complex, multi-faceted relationship arises between freedom and control.

When this reality takes on a new appearance, we enter the after-modern world[6] where alternative relating processes emerge because the relationship

[6] The term "after"-modernity means simply what comes historically after the modern era at the very moment when the basic criteria of social action and organization are no longer referred primarily and exclusively to the concepts of freedom and equality as they have been envisaged by modern Enlightment. The concepts of freedom and control, *lib* and *lab*, become only two operators among many, and are not absolute, but must be referred to other principles which, in turn, may reveal more relevant. I introduce the term "after"-modern in order to avoid the many ambiguities inherent in the "post"-modern discourse.

between freedom and control may now be seen and enacted with many more degrees of contingency on both sides. This contingency is selectively reduced in different ways, according to communication contexts, *since these are relational contexts.* That this type of society presents new problems, and even immense risks, is intrinsic to its relational nature.

6.2. From a theoretical standpoint, a fact then emerges: freedom and control are not simply two dimensions inherent in every social relation, but are social relations themselves which must be conjugated differently in different social environments.[7] We must define freedom and control as social relations, and do it without making their interaction with other relations and dimensions of social action—such as for example with solidarity—antithetic or even perverse.

Freedom not only stands outside control, but also inside it; freedom is a form of control and its source of justification. Control not only offers greater or lesser opportunities for freedom, but constitutes it, in the sense that it creates the various forms and degrees of freedom itself.[8] Freedom and control work together, not mutually exclusive alternatives. Instead they are contexts and opportunities that develop one another. To see this, we must consider the freedom/control distinction as a relationship of social relations. But how is it possible to consider freedom and control as social relations?

a) As far as freedom is concerned, modernity has viewed it as a social relationship that may be played in many ways. By introducing new distinctions (differentiations), it has made unique relational universes possible.

For example, by introducing the *distinction between freedom "from"* (negative) and *freedom "for"* (positive), it has on the one hand expanded negative freedoms as demands for non-interference, and on the other opened new horizons of positive freedoms as needs to achieve significant goals. As another example, by introducing the *distinction between procedural freedom* and *substantial freedom*, it has on the one hand increased the possibilities for automatic social relations and on the other made new relationships of significant human intention possible.

---

[7] To claim that freedom and control are social relations themselves means that they can be conceived of as AGIL-relationships, which in turn means that freedom must have its own internal controls, while control must have its own internal freedoms. Or, otherwise stated, you cannot disconnect freedom and control entirely, but you can only redefine the relations among their components.

[8] To use the philosophical language of Erich Przywara (1962), one might say that modernity (from Kant to Parsons) adopts a logic of "above → within" that negates the reciprocal, thus the logic of the "within → above".

The *lib/lab* complex, however, still sees the first side of these relationships almost exclusively. It mainly sees negative and procedural freedoms, while it has great difficulty seeing positive and substantial freedoms. This explains why much of sociology has observed freedom essentially in the form of the contingency inherent in "money" (as a generalized symbolic means), releasing the adaptive function (the A of AGIL) from the rules of input/output exchange and from all forms of self-restriction, thereby making all social relationships abstract and instrumental. By doing so, sociology has obscured the reverse processes, those through which new embodied, value-based, heavily intertwined and at the same time self-restricting social relationships have produced social forms outside those regulated according to the *lib/lab* logic. Many sociological theories have not realized that the social relationship is a mutual action, and have thus ignored the fact that vital associative worlds produce positive and substantial freedoms outside the state-market complex.

b) The same has happened for control. Modernity generated new distinctions of social control; that is, it created control as a social relationship that can be played out in many diverse ways. For example, by introducing the *distinction between systemic control* and *social integration control*, it has on the one hand built new rules without human intentional meaning, and on the other opened up room for norms otherwise rife with significant intentional meaning. As another example, by introducing the *distinction between hetero-control* and *self-control*, it has on the one hand been able to construct impersonal apparatuses of social security and regulation, and on the other to explore the worlds of internal regulation (mainly biopsychological, and only marginally conscience-based).

The *lib/lab* complex still sees the first side of these relationships almost exclusively: it sees systemic and coercive control towards subjects, while it has difficulty seeing the control of informal rules within subjects and social actions. This explains why sociology has ended up seeing the social domain as that which negates the authenticity of the self (i.e. society as a powerful machine that denies the bio-psychological identity, or "individuality"), rather than that which makes it possible.

6.3. Modernity tends to play out freedom and control as opposite dimensions, negatively correlated, that define a sort of "*relational hyperbola*" between *refero* and *religo*[9] in which they may develop only inversely (fig. 1). In moder-

[9] On these dimensions, which refer to the Weber (*refero*) and Durkheim (*religo*) traditions, see P. Donati (1991). The expression "relational hyperbola" is explained and handled within the modern cultural and philosophical context by A. Cevolini (1997).

nity it is assumed that if freedom is expanded along the *refero* axis, then control is reduced along the *religo* axis, and vice-versa. It is always improbable to find a balance point on the hyperbola (and this difficulty leads to the constant reduction of the social world to a series of problems only, viz. the well-known process of *Problematizierung*). Consequently, society is described as an antithetical oscillation between *statu nascenti* movements and processes of institutionalization.

In the course of developing this dynamic, the forms of social control tend to liberate freedoms as much as possible. As long as the game remains within certain limits, it is possible to find mixed solutions while remaining on the hyperbola. But it is no longer possible beyond certain thresholds. The asymptotic development of control must expunge freedom in the system environment (thus outside institutions). The same occurs for the asymptotic development of freedom, which confines controls to its environment (thus only within system operations). In one direction, freedoms are placed outside the social sphere (thus outside social institutions), and in the other social control becomes only systemic (i.e. mechanical) and remains without justifying values.

The *lib/lab* complex thus ends up stretching the social sphere asymptotically towards "polar layouts", dominated by control (along the *religo* axis of functional limitations) or freedom (along the *refero* axis of merely symbolic references). I hypothesize that this formula of reading modernity may be generalized using the AGIL diagram, to observe post-modern society as a relational society born of modernity (fig. 2). In representing society as a hyperbolic organization (interpreted according to the AGIL diagram: fig. 2), the space of relations between freedom (*refero*) and control (*religo*) delineates the scenarios for both micro and macro social forms emerging in post-modern societies. We have eight possible hyperbolic escapes[10] (fig. 2):

a. G → A: decisional (political) freedom is asymptotically reduced to the economic mechanisms of the market;
b. A → G: the mechanisms (binds) of the market are cancelled out by free political decisions;

[10] The "hyperbolic escape" may be defined as follows: if the AGIL-system is reduced to one dimension (*refero* or *religo*, in one of their dual poles), the other dimension is placed in its environment (the asymptote corresponds here to the *re-entry* of the systemic differentiation according to N. Luhmann). For example, if the love relationship becomes "pure" (intimacy, as though suspended in a normative vacuum), or, otherwise stated, when the love relationship is reduced to the pure L of AGIL, then the institution (the *religo* in the couple) is placed outside the AGIL-system formed by the pure love relationship (in other words, the social institution of the couple becomes only one of the many possibilities represented on the horizon of the pure love relationship).



Legend:
refero = symbolic (value and intentional references = freedoms)
religo = functional (adaptive and regulative binds = controls)

Figure 1. The relational hyperbola of modernity[11]



Legend:
refero (L-G axis) = culture (symbolic and significant)
religo (A-I axis) = structure (adaptive regulative)

Figure 2. The relational nature of post-modern society

[11] The distinction refero/religo is, in its turn, relational. To understand this, take for instance the dilemma competition (marketization) vs. social control (welfare provisions). This dilemma can be played by putting these two poles either as refero/religo or as religo/refero respectively, depending on the point of view of the observer/actor of the situation (who stresses one as freedom against the other as control). The hyperbola of fig. 1 becomes specified only when it is articulated within fig. 2.

c. G → I: decisional (political) freedom is reduced to the rules of social exchange in the so-called third sector;
d. I → G: social exchanges in the third sector give way to political decisions;
e. L → A: informal relationships take on the characteristics, especially the restrictions, of the market;
f. A → L: the market is cancelled out within the network of informal relationships;
g. L → I: informal networks give way to third sector organizations;
h. I → L: third sector organizations accentuate their nature as informal networks.

To describe society as a relational-hyperbolic tendency of social forms is an alternative to the description based on the functional primacy of one of the four functional prerequisites A,G,I,L. The functional primacy of one of the four poles is no longer possible (as Parsons and Luhmann still believe) for the entire society. Only trends are possible, as asymptotic convergences of the hyperbolas on one of the relational poles (A,G,I,L around fig. 2); these however cannot—as a single dimension—ever absorb the others, which are pushed to develop in other social spheres. To develop a code for the freedom-control interaction in one direction (in a certain relational sphere) means to push for other codes of that interaction to be developed in other directions (in other relational spheres).

If we consider the vertical axis in fig. 2 (*refero*) as culture and the horizontal axis (*religo*) as structure, we can summarize the four possible response scenarios to modernity as follows. Social forms may:

1) *remain on the hyperbola*, i.e. in some intermediate point; this is the neo-modern scenario that still bases itself on the *lib/lab* yardstick;

2) *escape* into the *refero*, for G or L through charismatic movements characterized by a purely intentional ethic (even irrational); in these cases, pre-modern types of political movements may emerge (meaning that they un-differentiate the system in the G pole), or cultural movements of post-modern action (which give primacy to latency values in L); in these instances, affirmations of freedom prevail over demands for control;

3) *escape* into the *religo*, for A or I; in the first instance we are faced with hyperfunctionalism, in the second with new social markets;

4) finally, they may *produce a morphogenesis* of the social (and therefore of the societal system) through relations emerging from the interaction of all of these dimensions. This marks an *after-modern* society. Its main character consists in going beyond modern forms of social differentiation through new

competitive as well as solidaristic games among the different dimensions of social relations, thereby generating social forms unknown to the previous society. These new forms will be vital insofar as they are original and originative, as I have said before. Of course, strains, conflicts, and even struggles will not disappear. Just the contrary is true.

The new society will result from this "game". Paths 2 and 3 remain "exceptional", in my view, in the sense that they may occur in spatially and temporally limited spheres of the social realm. As far as the general framework of the societal system is concerned, the global challenge is played out between paths 1 and 4.

All of this may be stated in yet another way. We may hypothesize that society changes its structure from a *hyperbolic configuration*, typical of the modern, to a *relational configuration*, typical of the post-modern. In the former, freedom and control are played out as a synergic antithesis, while in the latter they are played out relationally (i.e. as an emergent property of reciprocal action). The underlying theoretical hypothesis, which will obviously require several empirical studies for verification, says: the more freedom and control differentiate, the less they become separable and must be newly *bound* and *referred* to one another. This may happen by staying in one of the four hyperbolas; in this case, solutions to social issues will still be "modern" (although giving room to "other modernities"). But it may also happen that a new relational AGIL-complex will be born (when both binds and references change for the whole AGIL-system); in this case, solutions to social issues will be after-modern, in the sense that they escape from the synergic antithesis between freedom and control. Freedom and control will be configured as qualitatively new relationships with new cultural (*refero*) and structural (*religo*) dimensions. Then, society rediscovers its relational nature, the fact that it is made up of relationships where relationship itself implies references and binds which interconnect in a *sui generis* manner. In conclusion: the more society becomes post-modern, the more each relationship (each sphere of social relations) must be based on its own guiding distinction that sees freedom and control not as identifiable or collective attributes in an antithetic contraposition, but as characteristics of differentiated, specific networks of relationships that are regulated (and regenerated) based on an autonomous nexus between freedom and control.

6.4. I do not believe that debates on agency and structure, on subjectivity and rules, have highlighted this new reality clearly enough. They have undoubtedly contributed to seeing many aspects of the morphogenesis under way today (T. Burns, T. Dietz, 1992). But they have not seen the overall

relationality of the social sphere. Most times they have reduced the new relational quality of society to a single hyperbola. Just to cite an example, consider the "pure relationship" theorized by A. Giddens (1992), which represents an escape from a pre-imposed social structure through the hyperbolic paths that tend asymptotically to the flight toward pure latency (L in fig. 2).

Perhaps by adopting a relational paradigm sociology may see how norms of freedom and control lie neither simply in individuals (as "abstract" subjects) nor in systems (the "fully structured"), but in social relations when taken seriously for what they are: real (fully social) reciprocal action between subjects. Herein lies the novelty of civil society, which beyond modernity no longer coincides with the formalities of political democratization, but rather with social subjects that express a new process of civilization (P. Donati, 1997). The political expression of this project is "societal citizenship", intended as citizenship distinct from the governmental sense. Societal citizenship is built as a co-growth of freedom and control within a framework of social solidarity, through distance relationships between civil society and the state, rather than as an ascriptive emanation of the nation-state (implemented, as in modernity, through the principle of progressive inclusion of the populace in it).

Social relationality is the new glue of society, not the state, an abstract normative system, or an abstract adaptation system. It may perhaps be called "the political" (*le politique*) of social exchanges, as opposed to "the politics" of the political party system (*la politique*) (according to the distinction made by A. Caillé, 1993). But we must see that the political stuff of society consists of its "relational glue", and we must observe it in an adequate way. "The political" has become simultaneously more global and more local. It has spread throughout all relational dimensions of society and at the same time has become differentiated within each societal sphere, according to autonomous intersections (nexi) between freedom and control. In the 21st century, society will be able to manage "the political" only as a form of relationality unknown to the moderns.

References

Alexander, J.C., *The Modern Reconstruction of Classical Thought: Talcott Parsons*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1983.

——, "Modern, Anti, Post, and Neo: How Social Theories Have Tried to Understand the 'New World' of 'Our Time'", in *Zeitschrift für Soziologie*, special issue, vol. 23, n. 3, June 1994, pp. 165–197.

——, "La società civile democratica: istituzioni e valori", in P. Donati (a cura di), *L'etica civile alla fine del XX secolo: tre scenari*, Leonardo, Milano, 1997, pp. 107–156.

Archer, M., *Realist Social Theory: The Morphogenetic Approach*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995.
Beck, U., *Risk Society. Towards a New Modernity*, (Engl. transl.) Sage, London, 1992.
Boudon, R., *La logique du social*, Hachette, Paris, 1979.
Burns, T., Dietz, T., "Cultural Evolution: Social Rule Systems, Selection and Human Agency", in *International Sociology*, vol. 7, n. 3, 1992, pp. 259–283.
Caillé, A., *La démission des clercs. La crise des sciences sociales et l'oubli du politique*, La Découverte, Paris, 1993.
——, "Ni holism ni individualisme méthodologiques. Marcel Mauss et le paradigme du don", in *L'obligation de donner. La découverte sociologique capitale de Marcel Mauss, Revue du MAUSS*, n. 8, 2° semestre 1996, pp. 12–58.
Cevolini, A., *L'iperbole relazionale della modernità*, Doctoral Thesis, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Bologna, 11 July 1997.
Connolly, W.E., *Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca-London, 1991.
De Kerckhove, D., "I nuovi media e la società civile", in P. Donati (a cura di), *L'etica civile alla fine del XX secolo: tre scenari*, Leonardo, Milano, 1997, pp. 83–106.
Donati, P., *Teoria relazionale della società*, Angeli, Milano, 1991.
——, *La cittadinanza societaria*, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 1993.
——, "Alla ricerca di una società civile. Che cosa dobbiamo fare per aumentare le capacità di civilizzazione del Paese?", in P. Donati (a cura di), *La società civile in Italia*, Mondadori, Milano, 1997.
Elias, N., *Über den Prozess der Zivilization*, Haus zum Falken, Basel, 1936–39.
Forsé, M., *L'ordre improbable. Entropie et processus sociaux*, Puf, Paris, 1989.
Gehlen, A., *Urmensch und Spätkultur. Philosophische Ergebnisse und Aussagen*, Verlag GmbH, Wiesbaden, 1986.
Giddens, A., *The Transformation of Intimacy. Sexuality, Love and Eroticism in Modern Societies*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992.
Gurvitch, G., *Déterminismes sociaux et liberté humaine. Vers l'étude sociologique des cheminements de la liberté*, Puf, Paris, 1963.
Hirsch, F., *Social Limits to Growth*, Routledge, London, 1995.
Luhmann, N., *Soziale Systeme. Grundriss einer allgemeinen Theorie*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M., 1984.
——, "Sthenography", in *Stanford Literature Review*, vol. 7, n. 1–2, Spring-Fall 1990, pp. 133–137.
Mead, L., *Beyond Entitlement. The Social Obligations of Citizenship*, The Free Press, New York, 1986.
Offe, C., *Disorganized Capitalism*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1988.
Przywara, E., *Schriften*, Band III: *Analogia entis. Metaphysik. Ur-Struktur und All-Rythmus*, Johannes Verlag, Einsiedeln, 1962.
Schooyans, M., *La dérive totalitaire du libéralisme*, Editions Universitaires, Paris, 1991.
Scott, L., Urry, J., *The End of Organized Capitalism*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1987.
Seligman, A., *The Idea of Civil Society*, The Free Press, New York, 1992.
Spencer Brown, G., *Laws of Form*, Dutton, New York, 1979.
Taylor, C., *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1989.

4. THE UNIVERSALITY OF FREEDOM AND CONTROL

Margaret S. Archer

Choice or Conundrum

Political philosophy recognised the freedom/control relationship as a conundrum: the Social Sciences represented it as a choice. Thus Rousseau's dictum, "man is born free but is everywhere in chains," states a dilemma for what follows. Should we seek his emancipation from social bonds in the belief that there is a real possibility of human action unbounded by society's conditioning, or should we rather study humanity's bounded state? The latter might seem to take up Rousseau's own suggestion that we cannot conceive of individuals prior to the institutions by which they live, since in every form of society individuals have reasons for their will, and these reasons vary with the form of social institutions. Yet, if relativism were the end of the matter, then who "signed" the social contract? Philosophically, the conundrum reappears. Historically, however, the social sciences accentuated the choice over the conundrum and basically within each discipline there was a polarisation between those choosing freedom versus control, or vice versa. The following array is illustrative rather than exhaustive:

Figure 1. Freedom and Control in the Social Sciences

Politics	–	Liberalism	Vs	Collectivism
Economics	–	Free Market	Vs	Planning
Law	–	Rights	Vs	Obligations
Industrial Relations	–	Deregulation	Vs	Regulation
Psychology	–	Active Agent	Vs	Passive Agent
Psycho-Analysis	–	Id	Vs	Super-Ego
Sociology	–	Voluntarism	Vs	Determinism

Everything in the left hand column represents what Donati[1] calls "lib" choices: everything in the right constitutes "lab" choices. He is completely correct that from modernity onwards, theorists have eventually settled for

[1] Pierpaolo Donati, "Freedom versus control in post-modern society: a relational approach". 33rd World Congress of the International Institute of Sociology, Cologne, 1997.

some version of a "lib/lab" alliance. What I seek to show is that this is necessarily the case, and because necessary it is universal and, as such, cannot be the particular characteristic of modernity, post modernity or any particular period whatsoever. Ideas and institutions have distinctive historical forms, but the generic interdependence of freedom and control cannot be historicised to free the future as the potential moment for either untrammelled freedom, immune from constraints, or for unresisted control, insulated against subversion.

Instead we need to re-state the generic dilemma which, with considerable loss of elegance, runs "man is born with certain degrees of freedom but is everywhere subject to conditioning constraints". This itself merely repeats Marx's appreciation that "Man makes history, but not under the circumstances of his choosing", or from the other side, John Stuart Mill's acceptance that enlightened self-interest needs the helping hand of education for enlightenment about our real interests.

Thus, the body of this paper falls into four sections. *The first* advances the argument that the relationship between concepts of "freedom" and "control" has a *particular* logical status, one of four possible relations, namely that of a "constraining contradiction" which means that the two terms are simultaneously incongruent but mutually invoking.[2] *Secondly*, it is argued that their ineluctable relationship confronts advocates of either with an inescapable situational logic, namely the need to elaborate a form of syncretism which links the two concepts rather than repudiating one of the terms (and the same goes for any institutional arrangements which are advocated). Here it will be shown that extreme *one-sided syncretic endeavours*, seeking vastly to privilege "freedom" or "control," have failed because of the need to appeal to elements of the antipathetic term, which cannot be eradicated but whose incorporation challenges the main term in whose defence such theories are cast. The whole "choice" approach, listed in the introduction for the various social sciences, merely replicates this scenario in each discipline and has served to set all back for years. *Thirdly*, relatively new attempts at confronting the dilemma by "concept-stretching" to elaborate a more generous form of syncretism (which does not mean that the truth lies in the middle, since the "old" middle ground is vacated too) are examined for how far they can deal satisfactorily with "how", "when" and "under what conditions" there will be more freedom and voluntarism or more control and determinism. The main contenders in Sociology are held deficient in this respect because the two syncretic formulae advanced suffer, respectively, from a generalised

[2] See Margaret S. Archer, *Culture and Agency*, Cambridge University Press, 1988 and 1996 for a full discussion of the relationship, chapter 6.

indeterminacy (Giddens) or an overly historical specificity (Habermas). The root causes of both are traced to their inadequacies in re-conceptualising relations between "the parts and the people", or in other words "social and system integration", or again "structure and agency", which is merely another way of stating the generic dilemma of "freedom and control". If Giddens fails, it is because he seeks to transcend these pairs rather than relating them, and if Habermas fails it is because he seeks to historcise their relationship as a one-time encounter. The *conclusion* therefore is that the interplay between freedom and control is a universal one whose variations can only be understood relationally in terms of the degrees of freedom (and the strategic uses made of them) and the stringency of constraints (as conditional not determining influences), in a given society (or societal sector) at any particular time—with both society being transformational and, over time, its agents being transformed in the self-same process of seeking societal transformation.

1. *Freedom and Control as a Constraining Contradiction*

Constraining contradictions' are logical properties of the relationship between two items in the Cultural System which exert an effect when anyone wishes to maintain either element (whether a theory, a belief or an ideal). The whole effect of the constraining contradiction is dependent upon human activity, for the existence of the incompatibility between items A and B is of no social consequence if no one asserts or advocates either. However, where "freedom" and "control" represent our A and B we are never short of historical takers (or for that matter social scientific proponents). Their contradictory element is obvious, to the point where freedom and control could (simplistically) be viewed as zero-sum, or (with more sophistication) as a minimax formula. However, that would leave the two in the position of a *competing* contradiction, where both parties accrue maximum benefit from inflicting maximal damage on the other and reducing it to minimal proportions, if total elimination is not on (in argument or reality). Instead, here we confront a *constraining* contradiction whose key feature is that, given protagonists of A exist, then their action in invoking A (freedom) also ineluctably evokes B (control) and with the logical contradiction between them.

The reason for this is a necessary connection between A and B, that is, the "dependence" of A on part of the general preserve of B. For A cannot stand alone; it is compelled to call upon B, to operate in terms of B, to address B, in order to work at all. This is part and parcel of the *theoretical* constitution of A; but part of the parcel that is B constitutes a threat

to A because it simultaneously contravenes it. Thus those seeking to sustain A are heavily constrained. They cannot simply repudiate B for they must invoke part of it, but if B is fully actualised it threatens to render A untenable. And when freedom and control represent our A and B, this state of affairs is the same for defenders of the two, for both the contradiction and the constraint are fully symmetrical. Let us see how this is the case for both.

Where freedom (A) is concerned, the constraining element arises because in order to be conceptualised, let alone exercised, any version of freedoms *from* (negative) or freedoms *for* (positive) depends upon the control of others. *At its minimum, any freedom conceived of in a social context necessitates the (controlled)* non-interference *of other parties.* Often such freedoms evoke more control (e.g. for two antagonistic groups to enjoy freedom of assembly involves controls on both and on third parties, witness Northern Ireland). Classical models of the free-market *presumed* such non-interference as a transcendental condition of their possibility and necessarily resorted to the controls of monopoly commissions when threatened by cartelization in practice. Equally, utilitarian models of felicific calculus quickly embraced the Benthemite Panoptican, for imprisoning the brutish who, incapable of acting on their own enlightened self-interest, endangered that of others. Indeed it is precisely this recognition that freedoms cannot be exercised without control, which has led some to deem the language of rights to be pointless and to substitute for it the language of obligations (procedural or substantive controls) (e.g. a "right to work" has become a standard feature of the 160 or so Constitutions in the world as well as being enshrined in the UN's 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. As such it coexists with the most variable employment rates and appears to have no effect upon levels of unemployment).[3]

In parallel, where control (B) is concerned, the impossibility of complete "codification" against every contingency, necessitates "smart" controls, entailing assessment, evaluation, judgement and innovation, in short the freedom to respond appropriately to unforeseen exigencies. For error-detection can be mechanical, but error-correction usually needs to be intelligent. (Or, as some historians might put it, if absolute power corrupts absolutely then some need to be free of absolutist control to protect authoritarianism against itself). Equally, control exerted by legitimate authority is dependent upon self-control, for it requires both a self who is free enough to confer legitimacy (which otherwise is merely manipulated consensus) and a robust enough self who can exercise self control (and not seek a referendum on every

[3] Mary Ann Glendon "The Right to Work: Towards full employment", paper presented to the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences, Rome, April 1997.

decision). This requires neo-Kantian man who can heed the stern voice of duty and choose to over-ride pressing desires, because neo-Humean man (as the slave of his passions or prisoner of his subjective mental set)[4] is incapable of heeding the uncongenial obligations of current control even when it is in his long term interest. *At its minimum, then, controls conceived of in a social context require that agents (collective and individual) have sufficient freedom to evince the intelligent response productive of the preferred state designated by controllers.* (Hence the observation that free labour was better for productivity than control-intensive slavery).

Thus there is no effective method of containing the problematic relationship between "freedom" and "control" and there is no way of evading the problem by the simple repudiation of one term or the other. This is the force of the "constraining contradiction'. It relentlessly fosters a clash between the two contradictory components and does so through the situational logic it creates for the actors involved. For if A and B ("freedom" and "control") are logically inconsistent then no genuine resolution is possible between them, but if B remains unaltered it threatens the credibility or tenability of A and vice versa. Consequently, the situational logic dictates that continued adherence to A renders a *correction* of its relationship with B mandatory. Corrective action involves addressing the contradiction and seeking to *repair* it by re-interpretation of the components involved.

The basic proposition advanced is that the situational logic generated by the constraining contradiction, which is concerned with the *correction* of inconsistency, generically results in ideational *syncretism* (that is, the attempt to sink differences and effect union between contradictory elements concerned). Correction can thus follow three paths:

(1) A $\leftarrow$ B, i.e. correcting B so it becomes consistent with A.

(2) A $\leftrightarrow$ B, i.e. correcting both A and B so they become mutually consistent.

(3) A $\rightarrow$ B, i.e. correcting A so it becomes consistent with B.

All three paths lead to syncretism, but they differ considerably in terms of which element changes and how much it alters in the course of the repair work.

[4] See Martin Hollis, *The Cunning of Reason*, Cambridge University Press, 1988, ch. 6.

2. *Freedom and Control: One-sided syncretism*

Obviously, for adherents to A, (whether this stands for "freedom" or "control") the preferred solution is (1), since here it is B which undergoes the revision, then leaving A both intact and in congruence with redefined B.

Thus the situational logic of correction places the onus on those who adhere to A to engage in the active project of eliminating the contradiction by furnishing a re-interpretation of B (sufficient minimally to remove their inconsistency and maximally to present B as doing nothing but serve A). This constitutes a real assault on the logical problem, at the Cultural System level, for basically it seeks to substitute a re-interpreted B^1, which is compatible with A, for the original B which was in contradiction with A.

If an inconsistency can be corrected by method (1), which can be called "one-sided syncretism", the situational logic provides no impetus whatsoever towards more generous syncretic moves. *Thus firm protagonists of "freedom" or "control" (those who have made their choice on figure 1) have to confront the situational logic, by re-definition of the opposing term, sufficient to allow its (unavoidable) syncretic incorporation, without this entailing substantial alterations in the principal term (be it "freedom" or "control') and, above all, without in any way ceding its primacy.* In Donati's terms, this spells robust "lib" theories incorporating some subordinate and re-defined "lab" concessions, or, equally robust theories of "control" integrating minimal concessions to "freedom", again appropriately re-defined. What will also be underlined is the difficulty, once syncretism has been conceded, in holding to method (1), that is in sustaining it as one-sided.

Method 1 and its problems

Initially, the syncretic element is limited to the drive to produce B^1 which, in resolving the inconsistency, leaves A triumphant—"freedom" or "control" retain their primacy. This manoeuvre can be tracked for the strong programme of "freedom", whose ontological base was pugnacious individualism, whose explanatory framework was full-blooded methodological individualism and whose political philosophy vaunted the free-market, the open society and the absence of constraints upon either, since otherwise this would spell the Road to Serfdom. Syncretic concessions were obvious from the fifties onwards in the treatment of both individual and society.[5] Basically,

[5] Hence from the beginning the Individualists individual was a creature strangely overburdened by social properties. Thus Watkins' classical statement of Methodological individualism, namely that "according to this principle, the ultimate constituents of the social world are individual people who act more or less appropriately in the light of their dispositions

the problem was one of how to present untrammelled freedom in a social context and the "solution" consisted in portraying social constraints in a one-sided reductionist manner, namely, such elements of control emanated simply from "other people" (this represented the re-defined B^1).

The advancement of B^1 was necessary because social reality cannot be confined to individuals and their dispositions. Hence those aspects of the social context which are indispensable for both identification and explanation were themselves incorporated into individual terms (that is, as features of "people'). The acceptable predicates of "rock-bottom explanations" could include "statements about the dispositions, beliefs, resources and interrelations of individuals" as well as their "situations . . . physical resources and environment".[6] As Lukes puts it, "the relevant features of the social context are, so to speak, built into the individual."[7] There are two serious ontological objections to this syncretic procedure of incorporating the social context by re-defining it as "other people". On the one hand, in what recognisable sense are we still talking about "the individual" when he or she has now been burdened with so many inalienable features of both social and natural reality (cultural systems, socio-cultural relations, physical resources and the environment)? On the other hand, can the social context (let alone the natural world) really be disaggregated in this way, such that role relations are purely interpersonal matters, belief systems are only what certain people hold and resources are just what you or I have laid our hands on? This syncretic manoeuvre has sought to leave our voluntarism (freedom) untrammelled by reinterpreting social constraints and enablements (controls, albeit conditional ones) as predicates of people.

In fact this type of monadism characterised both sides of the debate. In order to work at all, the Individualist ontology had grossly to inflate "the individual" by incorporating into people anything social to which it may be necessary to refer. In strict parallel, the strong form of Collectivism strips the individual of everything of interest, leaving him or her as nothing but Durkheim's "indeterminate material", by bundling personal properties (thoughts, convictions, feelings) into collectivities—as the "collective conscience"—and thus representing them as predicates of "the social". These then constitute

---

and understanding of the situation" immediately raised the problem that such individual people confronted situations which were social rather than individual, (which was recognised in Popper and Wisdom's preferred designations of their positions as "Situational Individualism"), see J.W.N. Watkins, "Methodological Individualism and social tendencies", in May Brodbeck (ed.) *Readings in the Philosophy of the social sciences*, Macmillan, New York, 1971, p. 270.

[6] Ibid., pp. 270–1.

[7] Steven Lukes, "Methodological Individualism Reconsidered", *British Journal of Sociology*, 1968, 19:2, p. 125.

equal and opposite ontological defects but represent exactly the same form of one-sided syncretism, conducted respectively by the liberal defenders of individual freedom and the collectivist advocates of society's hegemonic control.

The problem here, with both sides, is that "mean" syncretism was devoted to the redefinition of B alone such that a minimalistic element of control could be injected into our individual freedoms (without significantly limiting them) or an equally minimal degree of freedom could be allowed in merely to energise control systems (without a significant ability to alter them). As the two locked into the protracted battle between Individualism and Collectivism (plus their explanatory programmes), on neither side could a method of correction prove workable which consisted in the re-interpretation of the other side alone. Successive versions of B^1, B^2, B^n failed to eliminate the contradiction because the original B resurfaced to discountenance the B^n substitutes. On the contrary, adducing them merely reanimated the contradiction and served to render more controversial the central tenets of A—pure individual freedom in society or purely collectivist control of society.

Since neither could produce a triumphalistic A through the "simple" syncretic manoeuvre of correcting B so that the two became congruent—this serves to account for why theorists then engaged in a more thorough-going form of syncretism. For, on the face of it, this is contrary to their initial ideational interests. But if and when method (1) fails, not only is there a stimulus to further syncretic endeavour, but some of the tools for it have also been forged in the process of failing—criticism which progressively assumes an elaborative character and critics who are as familiar with the enemy terrain as with their own.

Method 2 and its problems

Basically, this more generous type of syncretism consists in the accommodation of A to B (method (2)) in order for the former to survive at all. Here it is A which bears the brunt of re-interpretation in the process of corrective adjustment to B, under the pressure of mounting critique. In short this corrective adjustment of A to some version of B spells a radical change in its character: a shift to an A^1, A^2 and then A^3 often indicates social demise of the theory in relation to the salience originally achieved for A and a degenerating problem-shift within the theory itself. The change in character can be profound when an idea is on the run. This degenerative transformation can be traced for both the "freedom" and the "control" paradigms.

Thus, on the one hand, liberal individualism presented itself as having a new lease of life in Rational Choice Theory, a redefined A^1 whose promise consisted in the supposed ability to account for the unacknowledged conditions

of action and to derive complex social structures from its "model of Man", i.e. from some property pertaining to the free human being. The promissory note consisted in a new advanced analysis of social organisation as the *product* of human interactions, freely entered into. Progressively, however, the "model of man" who could deliver the goods had to undergo successive re-definitions to enable him to account for social structure, its properties and powers of control. Eventually the fourth generation model (of refined A) entered the degenerative problem shift stage—a route which is only followed when the situational logic leaves no other means of correction available and which signals bare survival tactics.

The unacknowledged conditions of action were always one of the main problems with the individualist view which regards society from the bottom-up, seeing structure and culture as resulting from contemporary individuals, their dispositions and combinations. This, as was argued, burdens contemporary agency with responsibility for all current features of society. Since it over-accentuates voluntarism, it also constitutes an under-constrained picture of "wo/man" (or an under-enabled one for that matter). This is because it makes no allowance for inherited structures, their resistance to change, the influence they exert on attitudes to change and, the delineation of agents capable of seeking change. Hence the initial enthusiasm for the Rational Choice calculus which would reveal these forms of social control as the products of individual freedom, which did not curtail it.

The first contender (A^1) was "rational man" of classical economics, whose calculus, consistency and selfishness organised his desires, resulting in choices which summed to produce social reality.[8] The fact that this model of "rational man" could not cope with phenomena like voluntary collective behaviour or the voluntary creation of public goods, led some (who conceded defeat over the Prisoner's Dilemma or the Free-Rider problem) to complement him with an inner running mate. Enter "normative man" (A^2), who shifts to a different logic of action under circumstances in which he realises he is dependent upon others for his own welfare.[9] Yet again, inexplicable macro-level effects remained, and "emotional man" (A^3) joined the team to mop up structural and cultural properties based on expressive solidarity or willingness to share.[10] The trouble with this multiplication of complements, all inhabiting the same being, is that it eventually comes full circle ending

[8] Amartya Sen, "Rationality and Uncertainty", *Theory and Decision*, 1985, 18.

[9] See Amitai Etzioni, *The Moral Dimension: towards a New Economics*, 1988, Free Press, New York.

[10] See Helena Flam, "Emotional Man: 1. The Emotional Man and the problem of Collective Action", *International Sociology*, 1990, 5:1 "Emotional Man: II Corporate Actors as Emotion-Motivated Emotion Managers", *International Sociology*, 1990, 5.2.

up with the "multiple self"[11] and the suggestion that we treat "man" like an organisation (A^4). Yet this is a completely vicious circle and a degenerating spiral: some sort of "man" was wanted to explain that which was problematic, namely social organisation, but now we are enjoined to use the explanandum in order to conceptualise the explanans, the nature of man! What is going wrong here is still the original and desperate incorporation of all emergent and aggregate social properties into the individual. The syncretic end of the line has been reached from the side of "freedom" for on method 3, the most generous syncretism has not enabled a re-defined A (a model of man) to be adduced whose nature can freely account for the constraints of his social environment, thus effecting ideational unification with those defending the causal efficacy of controlling structures. Instead of sinking the differences between the two elements of the constraining contradiction, individualism has sunk itself.

On the other hand, much the same scenario unreeled for the collectivist defenders of the control paradigm. Here the early attempts to incorporate Durkheim's "indeterminate material" as the mere energiser of the social system were most blatant in Parsonian Functionalism. In the later works the linkage basically consisted in according hegemony to the institutional components constituting the social system (AGIL) and feeding in the people through a maturational process of socialisation conducted via the same components, but running the opposite way round (LIGA).[12] For Parsons and later Luhmann, this was not an abstract model but an endorsement of the autonomous existence of systemic processes which defined and controlled courses of differentiation from the surrounding environment. The parts are symbiotically connected to one another and their adaptive interaction runs free from human decision-making.

After the long barrage of criticism to which the original formulations were submitted, the emergence of neo-functionalism in the 1980s had syncretism as its explicit agenda, since Alexander and Colomy[13] defined their project as one of making systemic functionalism and action theory mutually compatible. The fundamental manoeuvre was to discountenance systems as self-activating and to re-conceptualise them (A^1) as merely framing the conditions of action which establish broad limits on the types of new social arrangements which are likely to arise—it being admitted that similar systemic

[11] Jon Elster, *The Multiple Self*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986.

[12] See M. Devereux in Max Black (ed.) *The Social Theories of Talcott Parsons*, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1961.

[13] Jeffrey C. Alexander and Paul Colomy, "Towards Neofunctionalism", *Sociological Theory*, 3:1, 1985, p. 22.

configurations can produce a variety of institutional outcomes due to the diversity of possible agential interventions. Nevertheless, an institutional change can only enhance systemic survival if it contributes to its functional needs. Yet the latter are now not only non-controlling but they are also opaque (except in Luhmann's re-interpretation, when crises make them transparent). Thus it becomes doubtful whether they can retain any explanatory power whatsoever, particularly if it is further conceded that, in any case, societal action is underdetermined by functional needs. The rescue bid (A^2) consists in arguments that systemic crises pressurise agents to generate change, that those changes which stick do so through trial and error, until reduction in the crisis state signals that functional necessities have been met and the new form of differentiation thus becomes reinforced and stabilised.

These addenda, coming from beyond neo-functionalism itself, produced a major problem for the "neo-functionalists" syncretic formula (A^1). For it was they themselves who insisted that new levels of differentiation do not coincide with systemic solutions since their effects are dependent upon the perceptions, interests and reactions of agency. Again we see the same syncretic implosion as Individualism underwent: a system, A, has been so redefined to incorporate social action that there is no-longer a relatively autonomous systemic whole by virtue of whose functional needs outcomes can be evaluated as functional or non-functional. If the system and systemic requirements no longer function as any kind of control-centre, since outcomes have been ceded to agency, then the degenerative programme shift has been entered here too since systemic thinking survives only on the diluted claim to supply a descriptive model (A^3) or over-view which serves to detect important processes and to organise data. Yet if the descriptive model of functioning social systems now makes no claims to causal efficacy, why should it even be retained as a framework of description? If influential power has now been ceded to agential interaction, why should one expect its outcomes to conform to the functionalist picture? It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the system itself has been killed off in these re-definitional manoeuvres.

3. *Freedom and Control: a new synthesis*

One of the standard accompaniments of degenerating research programmes is desertion by their adherents, generally associated with calls to "transcend" the terms of the original dilemma and heralding new approaches which promise to go "beyond . . .". This was undoubtedly the case here, as revised forms of Individualism and Collectivism failed to solve the problem of *freedom versus control* in their own terms, by either "mean" or "generous" syncretic

endeavours. What is often neglected however, by those calling a plague on both old houses, is that their novel attempts to "transcend" the traditional debate in question are nevertheless responses to the same constraining contradiction whose situational logic still makes the discovery of a synthesis between freedom and control imperative—precisely because neither concept can repudiate the other. What ensues is a different type of syncretism, but the theoretical endeavour is still to syncretise the two: what changes is that the process is no longer one-way, for all efforts are no-longer focused on re-definitions of A or B alone. They consist in correcting both A *and* B *simultaneously* so that they become mutually consistent (method 2).

Fundamentally, this form of syncretism is achieved through A and B both undergoing re-interpretation or "concept-stretching" such that A^1 or A^n becomes consistent with B^1 or B^n, the two new versions having shed the contradiction which dogged their ancestors. The fact that a shift occurs in the nature of A and B alike should not lead syncretism to be construed as a process of convergence, for correction has nothing to do with finding *a via media.* On the contrary, this form of syncretism is morphogenetic, it amplifies deviations from both points of departure and the syncretic repair performed on their derivatives signals a new arrival point—genuine cultural elaboration takes place.

In general, method (2) leads to progressive problem-shifts as theorists are propelled towards bolder syncretism. Those who failed to produce a "goodness of fit" by tampering with A or B alone, became a body of adept tamperers. As Durkheim noted, once reason, criticism and the spirit of reflectiveness develop, simple fidelism is destroyed by the development of techniques to defend the faith. It is not necessarily the case that the successful syncretic technique is propounded by the original adherents of A or B. Indeed what increases is the critical readiness of later advocates to identify and incorporate techniques appropriate to the task.

Syncretism is morphogenetic because through it a new item enters the intelligibilia—a new theory or a new doctrine—but it is not always possible. A syncretic formula rendering an A^1 and B^1 congruent may simply not be found, or found convincing, and it is not always the end of the story, for syncretism is often a rolling stone rather than a fixed resting place providing lasting shelter for adherents to A^1/B^1. This is what I will argue was the case for two principle assaults on the problem of combining freedom and control—those of Giddens and Habermas.

Structuration theory explicitly aims to transcend the old dualities,[14] par-

[14] Anthony Giddens, *Central Problems in Social Theory*, MacMillan, London 1979, pp. 4–5.

ticularly that of freedom (voluntarism) determinism (control) and it does so by boldly reconceptualising them as an *inseparable duality*. In other words, syncretism here entails the substitution of a new A/B amalgam, such that freedom and control are mutually constitutive. This rests upon a novel "ontology of praxis" where structural properties (i.e. constraints or enablements which are another way of portraying social controls) have to be drawn upon in the routine production of action, which by instantiating them is also responsible for their reproduction or transformation. Hence the core ontological notion of "structure as the medium and the outcome of the reproduction of practices",[15] where elements of social control have now been rendered activity-dependent (upon highly "knowledgeable" agents whose freedom of action severes them completely from the passive "cultural dope"). Therefore such controls have no independence from the practices which constitute them (though structural properties are omnipresent because necessarily drawn upon in each and every practical act) (Archer 1982, 1988, 1995).[16]

As a syncretic solution, Giddens's theory ultimately ends in indeterminacy. This arises because endorsement of inseparability results in a fundamental inability to examine the interplay between voluntarism and determinism because freedom and control presuppose one another too tightly. The only way in which the two can be examined "independently" is through an artificial exercise of "methodological bracketing". On the one hand, institutional analysis (of structural constraints/enablements) brackets strategic action and treats these controlling properties as "chronically reproduced features of social systems" which emphasises their *recursiveness*. (Here critics would interject that such features have differential durability—compare the slow change of feudalism with frequent changes in interest-rates—yet the capacity to differentiate between them is forfeited in structuration theory). On the other, in examining strategic action or the uses to which freedom is put, then institutional analysis is bracketed and what is studied is the voluntaristic mobilisation of society's rules and resources by agents. This leads immediately to the reverse of recursiveness, instead change or its potentiality, is thus inherent in all moments of social reproduction.[17] Here an equally spurious changeability appears as a product of this methodological device—the malleability of structural controls (constraints/enablements) is not only high but is constant over time. (Critics would counter that these different structural features have

[15] Ibid., p. 69.

[16] Margaret Archer, "Morphogenesis verus Structuration", *British Journal of Sociology*, 33, 1982, see also *Culture and Agency*, Cambridge University Press, 1988, chapter 4 and *Realist Social Theory: the Morphogenetic Approach*, Cambridge University Press, chapter 4, 1995.

[17] Anthony Giddens, *Central Problems*, op. cit., p. 114.

to be seen as differentially malleable or resistant to change because of what they themselves are rather solely due to the practices adopted towards them—which in any case are conditioned by them). In sum, the bracketing device produces a pendular swing between divergent images—of the chronic recursiveness of controls and, alternatively, of total voluntaristic transformation.

Indeterminacy is thus compounded. Since what is bracketed are the two aspects of the "duality of structure", then controlling properties (constraints/enablements) and agential freedoms are separated out by placing a methodological *epoché* upon each turn. But because these are the two sides of the same thing, then the pocketed elements must thus be *conterminous in time* (the co-existence of the *epochés* confines analysis to the same *époque*). It follows from this that *the historical interplay between structure and agency (between conditioning control and agential freedom) logically cannot be examined.*

Thus, the central syncretic notion of "duality" precludes any specification of the conditions under which agency can most readily induce change, compared with circumstances under which they are constrained to reproduce the status quo. Because it cannot theorise about the *interplay* between the relative stringency of constraints *and* the strategic use made of agential degrees of freedom, the theory then retreats into broad generalisation about the "essential importance of tradition and routinisation in social life"[18] to account for recursiveness. Where transformation is concerned, Giddens allows at most that there are "critical situations" or "critical phases" where the drastic disruption of routine heightens susceptibility to alternatives. Then "there is established a kind of 'spot welding' of institutions . . . which may subsequently become resistant to further change".[19] Not only is such a *post hoc* designation dubious, but Giddens himself concedes that this constitutes the explanatory limits of structuration theory, accepting that "there is little point in looking for an overall theory of stability and change in social systems, since the conditions of reproduction vary widely between different types of society.[20] As a syncretic formula, seeking to transcend the duality between freedom and control, it collapses into complete indeterminacy as to *when and where* there will be more voluntarism or greater determinism. His syncretism is acknowledged merely to represent a "sensitisation device": it tells us correctly, that there will universally be elements of freedom and control present, but that is the nature of our problem: it is not its solution[21]—which requires historical specification.

[18] Ibid., p. 7.
[19] Ibid., p. 229.
[20] Ibid., p. 215.
[21] Consequently Giddens admits he "does not think this is useful, as some others have

In Habermas we confront the exact opposite, namely, a theory which is highly historically specific about the clash between freedom and control, but which denies the universality of their problematic interplay. This difficulty is fundamentally rooted in the A^2 and B^2 terms which Habermas advances as his syncretic resolution of the problem of freedom and control. Quite unlike Giddens's conflationary formula of "duality", Habermas's and A^2 and B^2 stand for distinct parts of society (the lifeworld and the system respectively), which far from being mutually constitutive are distinct ("uncoupled") and set on a historical collision course.

Thus, on the one hand, the lifeworld represents the site of freedom and consensus, his A^2, whilst on the other hand the system, with its controlling media of money and power, which operates behind our backs, constitutes his new B^2. The differentiation or "uncoupling" of the system from the lifeworld in early modernity, the colonising by the former of the latter in high modernity, then sets the scene for a decisive encounter between freedom and control in the present time of late modernity. The implication is threefold: (a) that once there was a time of unendangered freedom, (b) that the constraints emanating from systemic controls are restricted to a given époque, and, thus, (c) that a time of freedom can come again.

I would query all three, and to do so by questioning his conception of the lifeworld as the site of freedom, his conception of the system as the site of control and from there go on to question their confrontation as a one-time episode which can resolve their antinomy and establish human emancipation. To query A^2 and B^2 leads directly to querying the historicity of their supposed one-time A^2/B^2 confrontation/resolution.

Habermas's whole point in insisting that the "archaic" components of the Lifeworld (language and culture) were communal, uncontroversial and conscious was that there existed nothing in it which was other than a *resource* to agency. Therefore, in stressing exclusively *enabling* role of culture, the Lifeworld becomes the universal ground of human freedom, since by definition it is fully shared, fully known and fully sufficient for all eventualities. Elsewhere, I have argued against the attribution of all three properties to it as constituting yet another version of the evergreen Myth of Cultural Integration.[22] In other words, Habermas presents culture as an exclusively *enabling* force for freedom and reserves *constraints* for influences intruding from the system, particularly from the controls of their steering media, money

---

tried to do, to 'apply' structuration theory as a whole in research projects" A. Giddens, "Structuration Theory and Sociological Analysis", in J. Clark, C. Modgil and S. Modgil, (eds.) *Anthony Giddens: consensus and controversy*, Falmer, Basingstoke, 1990, pp. 310–11.

[22] Margaret S. Archer, *Culture and Agency*, second edition, 1996, op. cit., chapter 10.

and power. In this way he lays the foundations of his evolutionary account of growing systemic colonisation of the lifeworld, which then constrains and distorts rationalised communicative action, preventing the latter following its intrinsic "inner logic" which, under conditions of rationally motivated understanding, would ensure a consensus formation that rests *in the end* on the authority of the better argument.[23]

Thus whilst the Theory of Communicative Action eschews the compacting of "freedom" and "control", characteristic of Structuration Theory, it is equally incapable of providing an analytical tool kit of general applicability for examining the interplay between "freedom" and "control" at all times, since it substitutes for this its historically over-specific account. Instead, the analysis is (i) contemporary, (ii) thematic and (iii) metaphorical. Thus, within modernity the system intrudes on the lifeworld through various forms of "colonisation"—"interference', "mediatisation" or "technicisation"—to which the lifeworld eventually responds with "resistance" in the form of new social movements which attempt to defend the quality of life.

To insist (i) that the present conjuncture is where the relative importance of freedom versus control, voluntarism versus determinism or the social versus the systemic will be decided, conveys a feeling that we live in exciting times, when the gargantuan antagonism which has evolved between the Lifeworld and System will be resolved for good or evil. But this sets up a contrast category, the past, which has to be examined in different terms which boil down to a rather speculative historical treatment of (ii), the themes of progressive rationalisation and differentiation. The methodological effect is to dichotomise the pre-Enlightenment dark ages, unamenable to analysis in terms of interplay between social and system integration, as distinct from enlightened times, when the outcome of the so-called "enlightenment project" depends upon how the antagonism is resolved. Yet, (iii) the metaphorical heroics of "resistance" *contra* "intrusion" may endow new social movements with millenarian significance, but once the metaphors are cashed in propositionally they appear to be heralding an unlikely dawn in which quality of life can be determined free from "interference" by the control of money and power or the constraints of polity and economy, that is from the effects of materially-based structures.

This is idealism in both senses: a philosophical idealism which looks to a cultural hegemony regained in the future because Lifeworld domination, it is maintained, once held sway in the past. It is also utopian idealism in its rhetoric of "reclaiming" those areas of the Lifeworld which have succumbed

[23] Jurgen Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action*, Vol. 2, *Lifeworld and System*, Cambridge, Polity, 1987, p. 145.

to incursions from the System, that is to any of us who regard the interplay between the two as universal and inevitable. Habermas's avoidance of the constant need to examine, explore and explain the interplay between the social and the systemic represents an unhelpful misappropriation of Lockwood's original distinction[24] between properties of agents and those of structures. For Habermas's interpretation "not only misrepresents dynamics within the modern economy and polity", it also leads away from Lockwood's basic insight that every social whole, whether a kinship group, a traditional community, a voluntary association or a business organisation can and *must* be viewed from both a social-and a system-integration point of view—both as a set of interacting actors and as a configuration of institutionalised parts and complexes that both enable and constrain actors and the games they play with each other.[25]

4. *Conclusion*

For those who confront the conundrum of freedom and control (together with all their cognate terms) yet refuse to conceptualise their relationship as a matter of mutual constitution, which is historically indeterminate, or of historical evolution, which culminates in one over-determinate moment, the problem remains one of syncretism. We are still dealing with a constraining contradiction between freedom and control, that is between *two* elements (contra Giddens) and ones which are *universally* in tension (contra Habermas). Therefore, we remain searching (on method 2) for an A^n B^n which enables us to theorise the interplay between freedom and control over time.

It is suggested the social realism provides the basis for such a syncretic formula since it disengages the emergent powers of the people from those of parts of society (thus dealing with a universal dynamics), and enjoins examination of their interplay at all times and all levels (for it is not limited to the present conjuncture) since the properties and powers of the parts and the people are *sui generis*, yet transformable, transforming and transformative—which is what social theorising is all about.

What is crucial then is that the morphogenetic perspective (as the methodological complement of social realism) maintains that freedom and control operate over different tracts of time—an assertion which is based on its two

[24] David Lockwood, "Social Intergration and System integration" in G.K. Zollschan and W. Hirsch (eds.), *Explorations in Social Change.*

[25] Nicos Mouzelis, "Social and System integration: Habermas' view", *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 43, 1992.

simple propositions: that structure (its constraints and enablements) necessarily predates the actions (conditioned but not determined) which transform it, and that structural (or cultural) elaboration necessarily post-dates those actions (which are the conjoint product of human freedoms exercised within the context of inherited controls).

In *structural conditioning*, systemic properties are viewed as the emergent consequences of past actions: they are the products of "current" degrees of freedom strategically utilised under the "historic" constraints then confronted. Once structural and cultural controls have been elaborated over time they are held to exert a causal influence upon subsequent interaction. Fundamentally, they do so by shaping the situations in which later "generations" of actors find themselves and by endowing various agents with different vested interests according to the positions they occupy in the structures they "inherit" (in the class structure, in the social distribution of resources, or in the educational system for example). From this follows a conviction that "the properties of social structures and systems must be taken as given when analysing the processes of action and interaction,[26] because of the conditional influence exerted by the former on the latter. In short, when we talk about structural properties and their effects from the morphogenetic perspective, we are also endorsing the realist notion of emergence and its causal powers. Thus we accept that the results of past actions have effects in their own rights later on, as constraining or facilitating influences upon actors, which are not attributable or reducible to the practices of other agents, in the present tense.

However, *Social Interaction* is seen as being structurally and culturally conditioned but never as determined by either (since agents possess their own irreducible emergent powers). On the one hand, the mediatory mechanism which transmits structural and cultural influences to human actors consists in the former moulding frustrating or rewarding contexts for different groups of agents, depending upon the social positions they occupy and the ideas they endorse. In turn it is argued that these experiences of frustrations or benefits condition different situational interpretations and dissimilar action patterns: groups experiencing exigencies seek to eradicate them (thus pursuing structural or cultural change) and those experiencing rewards try to retain them (thus defending structural or cultural stability). Regularities of this kind, detectable in subsequent patterns of interaction, are reflections of these objective opportunity costs. Nonetheless, their effect is only conditional: they force no-one, but simply set a price on acting against one's self declared

[26] Percy S. Cohen, *Modern Social Theory*, London, Heinemann, 1968, p. 205.

interests and a premium on following them (consequently, detectable regularities do not even approximate to constant conjunctures). To acknowledge this involves nothing more sinister than the Weberian assumption that most of the time for most people there is a rough congruence between their interests, interpretations and actions. On the other hand, since conditioning is not determinism, the middle element of the cycle also recognises the promotive and creative freedom of interest groups and incorporates their capacity for innovative responses in the face of contextual constraints. Equally, it accommodates the possibility of reflective self-sacrifice of inherited vested interests on the part of individuals or groups, but always at a price.

The *Structural or Cultural Elaboration* which then ensues is interpreted as being a largely unintended consequence. The modification of previous systemic properties and the introduction of new ones is the combined product of the different outcomes pursued simultaneously by various social groups. The unintended element largely results from group conflict and concession which together mean that the consequential elaboration is often what no-one sought or wanted. (This is what separates the morophogenetic approach from simple cybernetic models based on goal steering: here the positive and negative feedback loops, resulting in structural and cultural elaboration and reproduction respectively, run free of any control centre. This is also what unites it with the realist assertion about the non-predictability of change in open systems.) The end-point and the whole point of examining any particular cycle is that we will then have provided an analytical history of emergence of the problematic properties under investigation. At this point, which is also the start of another cycle, the elaborated structure constitutes a new conditional influence upon subsequent interaction, and the concepts and theories we employ to deal with this next cycle may well have to change in order to explain this change that our subject matter has undergone. In other words, "freedom" and "control" vary not only in degree over time, but also in their institutional or ideational expressions.

Thus every morphogenetic cycle distinguishes three broad analytical phases consisting of (a) a given structure or culture, (a complex set of relations between parts), which conditions but does *not* determine (b), social or socio-cultural interaction. Here, (b) also arises in part from action orientations unconditioned by social organisation or the cultural status quo but emanating from current agents, and in turn leads to (c) structural/cultural elaboration or modification—that is to a change in the relations between parts, where morphogenesis rather than morphostasis ensued. The cycle is then repeated. Transition from (a) to (c) is not direct, precisely because structural/cultural conditioning is not the sole determinant of interaction patterns. Only

collectivists conceptualise a movement straight from (a) to (c) without mediation; the realism endorsed here cannot countenance such a move.

What methodological individualists claim is that action alone (b) constitutes the necessary and sufficient conditions for the explanation of (c). To them (a) can be eradicated. Advocates of the morphogenetic perspective do not deny that social interaction is the ultimate source of complex phenomena (which include both unintended, aggregate and emergent consequences): they simply maintain that because this causal chain unravels over time and each anterior action sequence was itself structurally conditioned (i.e. subject to control), we acknowledge that we cannot deduce (c) from (b) alone and thus have to consider agents' activities (strategic of degrees of freedom), to be necessary but not sufficient conditions of structural/cultural change. Therefore, to account for the occurrence of structural or cultural elaboration (c), interactional analysis (b), is essential, but inadequate unless undertaken in conjunction with (a), the study of prior structural or cultural conditioning.

Hence, the distinctive feature of the social realist approach is its recognition of the temporal dimension, through which and in which structure and agency shape one another via morphogenesis and the double morphogenesis (in which agency is itself transformed and transforms its own freedom of action in the course of seeking social transformation).

This dialectical interplay of freedom and control recognises (a) that neither term can effectively be reduced to an epiphenomenon of the other, (b) that nor can they be elided together as two faces of the same phenomenon, who consequence is to preclude examination of their interplay, (c) that freedom and control are necessarily and therefore universally intertwined in a "tensed" interaction, such that (d) by *not* conflating them, it becomes possible to investigate the stringency of systemic control in combination with the degrees of agential freedom, at any given time and in any particular context, and from that (e) to explain how specific outcomes are sometimes *more* attributable to agents strategically capitalising on their freedoms, yet at other times are more explicable as the result of a enduring stringency of constraints—in a social setting which, like all others never allows agents untrammelled freedom, nor hedges them about by deterministic control.

5. THE CONTEMPORARY SCENE—MULTIPLE MODERNITIES

S.N. Eisenstadt

I

As we are approaching the end of the twentieth century, new visions or understandings of modernity, of modern civilization, are emerging throughout the world, be it in the West—Europe, the United States—where the first cultural programme of modernity developed, or among Asian, Latin American and African societies. All these developments call out to a far-reaching reappraisal of the classical visions of modernity and modernization.[1]

Such a reappraisal should be based on several considerations. It should be based first of all on the recognition that the expansion of modernity has to be viewed as the crystallization of a new type of civilisation—not unlike the expansion of Great Religions, or great Imperial expansions in past times. Because however, the expansion of this civilisation almost always and continually combined economic, political, and ideological aspects and forces to a much longer, its impact on the societies to which it spread was much more intense than in most historical cases.

This expansion indeed spawned a tendency—rather new and practically unique in the history of mankind—to the development of universal, world-wide institutional and symbolic frameworks and systems. This new civilization that emerged first in Europe later expanded through the world, created a series of international frameworks or systems, each based on some of the basic premises of this civilization; and each rooted in one of its basic institutional dimensions. Several economic, political, ideological, almost world-wide systems—all of them multi-centered and heterogenous—emerged, each generating its own dynamics, its continual change in constant relations to the others. The interrelations among them have never been "static" or unchanging, and the dynamics of these international frameworks or settings gave rise to continuous changes in these societies.

Just as the expansion of all historical civilisations, so also that of the civilisation of modernity undermined the symbolic and institutional premises of

[1] S.N. Eisenstadt, *Modernization: Protest and Change*, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1966; idem, *Tradition, Change and Modernity*, New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1973; idem, *Modernita, Modernizzazione e Oltre*, Roma, Armando Editore, 1997.

the societies incorporated into it, opening up new options and possibilities. As a result of this a great variety of modern or modernizing societies, sharing many common characteristics but also evincing great differences among themselves, developed out of these responses and continual interactions.

The first, "original" modernity as it developed in the West combined several closely interconnected dimensions or aspects: first, the structural, organisational one—the development of the many specific aspects of modern social structure, such as growing structural differentiation, urbanisation, industrialisation, growing communications and the like, which have been identified and analyzed in the first studies of modernisation after the Second World War; second, the institutional one—the development of the new institutional formations, of the modern nation-state, of modern especially national collectivities, of new and above all capitalist-political economies; and last and not least a distinct cultural programme and closely related specific modes of structuration of the major arenas of social life.

The "classical theories" of modernisation, of the fifties of the twentieth century, indeed the classical sociological analyses of Marx, Durkheim and to a large extent even of Weber[2]—or at least in one reading of him, have implicitly or explicitly conflated these different dimensions of modernity; even if analytically distinct, they come historically together to become basically inseparable. Moreover, most of the classics of sociology as well as the studies of modernisation of the forties and fifties have assumed, even if only implicitly, that the basic institutional constellations which came together in European modernity and the cultural program of modernity as it developed in the West will "naturally" be ultimately taken over in all modernizing societies. The studies of modernization and of convergence of modern societies have indeed assumed that this project of modernity with its hegemonic and homogenizing tendencies will continue in the West, and with the expansion of modernity, prevail throughout the world. Implicit in all these approaches was the assumption that the modes of institutional integration attendant on the development of such relatively autonomous, differentiated institutional spheres will be on the whole similar in all modern societies.

But the reality that emerged proved to be radically different. The actual developments indicated in all or most societies that the various institutional

---

[2] E. Kamenka, ed., *The Portable Karl Marx*, New York, Viking Press, 1983; M. Weber, *Die Protestantische Ethik: Kritiken und Antikritiken*, Guetersloh Germany, Guetersloher Verlagshaus, 1978; idem, *Politik als Beruf*, Berlin, Dunker and Humblot, 1968; idem, *On Charisma and Institution Building: Selected Papers*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1968; *Emile Durkheim on Morality and Society: Selected Writings*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1973.

arenas—the economic, the political and that of family—exhibit continually relatively autonomous dimensions that come together in different ways in different societies and in different periods of their development. Indeed, the developments in the contemporary era did not bear out this assumption of "convergence" and have emphasized the great diversity of modern societies, even of societies similar in terms of economic development, like the major industrial capitalist societies—the European ones, the U.S. and Japan. Sombart's old question: "Why is there no socialism in the U.S.?" formulated in the first decades of this century attests to the first, even if still only implicit, recognition of this fact. Far-reaching variability developed even within the West—within Europe itself, and above all between Europe, or Europe and the Americas—the U.S., Latin America and Canada.[3]

The same was even more true with respect to the relation between the cultural and structural dimensions of modernity. A very strong, even if implicit, assumption of the studies of modernisation was that the cultural dimensions or aspects of modernisation—the basic cultural premises of Western modernity—are inherently and necessarily interwoven with the structural ones. This became highly questionable. While different dimensions of the original Western project have indeed constituted the crucial starting and continual reference points for the processes that developed among different societies throughout the world, the developments in these societies have gone far beyond the homogenizing and hegemonic dimensions of the original cultural programme of modernity.

Modernity has indeed spread to most of the world, but did not give rise to a single civilization or to one institutional pattern, but to the development of several modern civilizations or at least civilizational patterns, i.e. civilizations which share common characteristics but which tend to develop different even if cognate ideological and institutional dynamics. Moreover, far-reaching changes which go beyond their original premises of modernity have been taking place also in Western societies.

II

The civilization of modernity as it developed first in the West was from its very beginning beset by internal antinomies and contradictions, giving rise to continual critical discourse which focused on the relations, tensions and

[3] W. Sombart, *Why Is There No Socialism in the United States?*, New York, ME Sharpe, 1976 (1st ed. 1906).

contradictions between its premises and between these premises and the institutional development of modern societies. The importance of these tensions was fully understood in the classical sociological literature—Tocqueville, Marx, Weber or Durkheim—and was later taken up in the thirties, above all in the Frankfurt school. So-called "critical" sociology, however, focused mainly on the problems of fascism and then became neglected in post-Second World War studies of modernization. It came again lately to the forefront to constitute a continual component of the analysis of modernity.[4]

The tensions and antinomies that have developed within the basic premises of this programme were: first, between totalizing and more diversified or pluralistic conceptions of the major components of this programme—of the very conception of reason and its place in human life and society, and of the construction of nature, of human society and its history; second, between reflexivity and active construction of nature and society; third, between different evaluations of major dimensions of human experience; and fourth, between control and autonomy. In the political arena these tensions coalesced with those: between a constructivist approach, which views politics as the process of reconstruction of society and especially of democratic politics, as against a view which accepts society in its concrete composition; between liberty and equality; between the autonomy of civil society and the charismatisation of state power; between the civil and the utopian components of the cultural and political program of modernity; between freedom and emancipation in the name of some, often utopian, social vision; above all between Jacobin and more pluralistic orientations or approaches to the social and political order; and between the closely related tension between, to use Bruce Ackerman's formulation, "normal" and "revolutionary" politics.[5] These various tensions in the political programme of modernity were closely related to those between different modes of legitimation of modern regimes, especially but not only of constitutional and democratic polities. On the one hand, a tendency to seek procedural legitimation in terms of civil adherence to rules of the game or in different "substantive" terms. On the other

---

[4] H. Joas, "The Modernity of War: Modernization Theory and the Problem of Violence," *Symposium on War and Modernization Theory—International Sociology*, Vol. 14, No. 4, 1999, pp. 457–472; idem, "For Fear of New Horrors: A Reply to Edward Tiryakian and Ian Roxborough," *Symposium on War and Modernization Theory—International Sociology*, Vol. 14, No. 4, 1999, pp. 501–504; E. Tiryakian, "War: The Covered Side of Modernity," *Symposium on War and Modernization Theory—International Sociology*, Vol. 14, No. 4, 1999, pp. 473–490; I. Roxborough, "The Persistence of War as a Sociological Problem," *Symposium on War and Modernization Theory—International Sociology*, Vol. 14, No. 4, 1999, pp. 491–500; H. Joas, "Die Modernitat des Krieges," *Leviathan*, Vol. 24, 1996, pp. 13–27.

[5] B. Ackerman, *We The People*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1991.

hand, a very strong tendency to promulgate other modes or bases of legitimation—above all, to use Edward Shils' terminology, various primordial, "sacred" (religious or secular) ideological components.[6]

It was around these tensions that there developed the critical discourse of modernity. The most radical "external" criticism of modernity denied the possibility of the grounding of any social order, of morality, in the basic premises of the cultural programme of modernity, especially in autonomy of individuals and supremacy of reason. It denied that these premises could be seen as grounded in any transcendental vision. It denied also the closely related claims that these premises and the institutional development of modernity could be seen as the epitome of human creativity. Such criticisms claimed that these premises and institutional developments denied human creativity, flattened human experience, and eroded moral order, the moral—and transcendental—bases of society, thereby alienating man from nature and from society. The more internal criticisms of this programme, which could often overlap or become interwoven with the "external" ones evaluated the institutional development of modern societies from the point of view of the promises of the cultural and political programmes of modernity as well as from the point of view of the basic antinomies and contradictions inherent in this program. Of special importance here was the multifaced, continual and continually changing confrontation of the claims of the programme to enhance freedom and autonomy with the strong tendency to control; to inequality and continual dislocation of various social sectors that developed with the crystallization of modern institutional formations.

III

All these antinomies and tensions developed from the very beginning of the institutionalization of modern regimes in Europe. The continual prevalence of these antinomies and contradictions had also—as the classics of sociology were fully aware of, but as was to no small extent forgotten or neglected in the studies of modernization—far-reaching institutional implications and were closely interwoven with different patterns of institutional constellations and dynamics that developed in different modern societies. With the expansion of modern civilizations beyond the West, in some ways already beyond Europe to the Americas, and with the dynamics of the continually

[6] E. Shils, "Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties," in idem, ed., *Center and Periphery: Essays in Macrosociology*, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1975, pp. 111–126.

developing international frameworks or settings, several new crucial elements have become central in the constitution of modern societies.

Of special importance in this context, the relative place of the non-Western societies in the various—economic, political, ideological—international systems differed greatly from that of the Western ones. It was not only that it was Western societies which were the "originators" of this new civilization. Beyond this and above all was the fact that the expansion of these systems, especially in so far as it took place through colonialization and imperialist expansion—gave to the Western institutions the hegemonic place in these systems. But it was in the nature of these international systems that they generated a dynamic which gave rise both to political and ideological challenges to existing hegemonies, as well as to continual shifts in the loci of hegemony within Europe, from Europe to the United States, then also to Japan and East Asia.

But it was not only the economic, military-political and ideological expansion of the civilization of modernity from the West throughout the world that was important in this process. Of no lesser—possibly even of greater importance—was the fact that this expansion has given rise to continual confrontation between the cultural and institutional premises of Western modernity and those of other civilizations, of other Axial civilizations[7] as well as non-Axial ones, the most important of which has been, of course, Japan. Truly enough, many of the basic premises and symbols of Western modernity as well as its institutions—representative, legal and administrative—have become indeed seemingly accepted within these civilizations. But at the same time, far-reaching transformations have taken place and new problems have arisen.

The attraction of these themes—and of some of these institutions for many groups within these civilizations—lied in the fact that their appropriation permitted many groups in non-European nations—especially elites and intellectuals—to participate actively in the new modern (i.e. initially Western) universal tradition, and selectively to reject many of its aspects and Western "control" or hegemony. The appropriation of these themes made it possible for elites and broader strata of many non-European societies to incorporate some of the universalistic elements of modernity in the construction of their new collective identities without necessarily giving up specific components of their traditional identities or their negative attitude towards the West.

---

[7] On the Axial Age Civilizations, see S.N. Eisenstadt, "The Axial Age: The Emergence of Transcendental Visions and the Rise of Clerics," *European Journal of Sociology*, 23/2, 1982, pp. 294–314; idem, ed., *The Origins and Diversity of Axial-Age Civilizations*, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1986.

The attraction of these themes of political discourse to many sectors in the non-Western European countries was also intensified by the fact that their appropriation in these countries entailed the transposition to the international scene of the struggle between hierarchy and equality. Although initially couched in European terms, it could find resonances in the political traditions of many of these societies. Such transposition of these themes from the Western European to Central and Eastern Europe and to non-European settings was reinforced by the combination, in many of the programmes promulgated by these groups, of orientations of protest with institution-building and center-formation.

Such transposition was generated not only by the higher hierarchical standing, actual hegemony of the Western countries in these new international settings, but also by the fact that the non-Western civilizations were put in an inferior position in the evaluation of societies which was promulgated by the seemingly universalistic premises of the new modern civilizations. Thus various groups and elites in East European, Asian and African societies were able to refer to both the tradition of protest and the tradition of center-formation in these societies, and to cope with problems of reconstructing their own centers and traditions in terms of the new setting. From this perspective the most important aspect of the expansion of these themes beyond Western Europe and of their appropriation by different groups in the non-Western societies lied in the fact that it was possible to rebel against the institutional realities of the new modern civilization in terms of its own symbols and premises.[8]

IV

But the appropriation of different themes and institutional patterns of the original Western modern civilisation in non-Western societies did not entail their acceptance in their original form. Rather, it entailed the continuous selection, reinterpretation and reformulation of such themes, giving rise to a continual crystallization of new cultural and political programmes of modernity, and the development and reconstruction of new institutional patterns. The cultural programmes that have been continuing developing in these societies entailed different interpretations and far-reaching reformulations of the initial cultural programme of modernity. They entailed different emphases

[8] See S.N. Eisenstadt, *Fudnamentalism, Sectarianism and Revolutions: The Jacobin Dimension of Modernity*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, esp. ch. 4, and idem, "Multiple Modernities," *Daedalus—Special Issue on Multiple Modernities*, forthcoming Spring 2000.

on different components of this programme, on its different tensions and antinomies and the concomitant crystallisation of distinct institutional patterns. These different programmes and institutional constellations have developed first of all with respect to the interpretation of the basic conceptions and premises of the ways of modernity as they have been reinterpreted in different modern civilizations; in their conception of themselves and of their past; and with respect to the construction of symbols of collective identities and their negative or positive attitudes to modernity in general and to the West in particular.

These differences between the different cultural programmes of modernity were not purely "cultural" or academic. They were closely related to some basic problems inherent in the political and institutional programmes of modernity. Thus, in the political realm, they were closely related to the tension between the utopian and the civil components in the construction of modern politics; between "revolutionary" and "normal" politics, or the general will and the will of all; between civil society and the state, individual and collectivity. These different cultural programmes of modernity entailed also different conceptions of authority and of its accountability, different modes of protest and of political activity, and questioning the basic premises of the modern order and different institutional formations. In close relation to the crystallisation of the different cultural programmes of modernity there has been taking place in different modern societies a continual process of crystallization of different institutional patterns and of different modes of critical discourse. The focus here has been on interrelations and tensions between different institutional arenas, and between them and the different premises of the cultural and political programmes of modernity and their continual reinterpretations.

The preceding considerations about the multiple programmes of modernity do not negate the obvious fact that in many central aspects of their institutional structure—be it in occupational and industrial structure or in the structure of education and cities—very strong convergences have developed in different modern societies. These convergences have indeed generated common problems, but the modes of coping with these problems, i.e. the institutional dynamics attendant on the development of these problems, differed greatly between these civilizations.

But it is not only with the societies of Asia or Latin America that developments took place which went beyond the initial model of Western society. At the same time in Western societies themselves there have developed new discourses which have greatly transformed the initial model of modernity and which have undermined the original vision of modern and industrial society with its hegemonic and homogenizing vision. There has emerged

a growing tendency to distinguish between *Zweckrationalität* and *Wertrationalität*, and to recognize a great multiplicity of different *Wertrationalitäten*. Cognitive rationality—especially as epitomized in the extreme forms of scientism—has certainly become dethroned from its hegemonic position, as has also been the idea of the "conquest" or mastery of the environment, whether of society or of nature.

V

These different cultural programmes and institutional patterns of modernity were not shaped by what has been sometimes presented in some of the earlier studies of modernization as natural evolutionary potentialities of these societies; or, as in the earlier criticisms thereof by the natural unfolding of their respective traditions; nor by their placement in the new international settings. Rather they were shaped by the continuous interaction between several factors. In most general terms they were shaped by the historical experience of these societies in civilization, and by the mode of impingement of modernity on them and of their incorporation into modern political, economic and ideological international frameworks.

In greater detail these programmes were shaped by several continually changing factors. First, they were shaped by basic premises of cosmic and social order that were prevalent in these societies in their "orthodox" and "heterodox" formulations alike as they have crystallized in these societies throughout their histories. Second, they were shaped by the pattern of institutional formations that developed within these civilizations, especially in their encounter with other societies or civilizations. Third, they were shaped by the encounter and continual interaction between these processes, and the new cultural and political programme of modernity, the premises and modes of social and political discourse prevalent in the different societies and civilizations as they were incorporated into the new international systems. In this encounter of special importance were the internal antinomies and tensions or contradictions in the basic cultural and above all in the political programme of modernity, as it developed initially in the West—and even in the West in a great variety of ways, and as it became transformed with its expansion—and with the internal changes in Western societies. Fourth, the dynamics and internal tensions and contradictions that developed in conjunction with structural-demographic economic and political changes attending the institutionalization of modern institutional frameworks.

It was the continual interaction between these factors that generated continual changes in cultural programmes and their continual reinterpretations.

The major actors in such processes of reinterpretation and formation of new institutional patterns were various political activists and intellectuals in conjunction above all with social movements. Such activists, intellectuals and leaders of movements promulgated and reinterpreted the major symbols and components of the cultural programmes of modernity and addressed themselves to antinomies and contradictions within these programmes and between them and institutional realities.

In all modern societies, such movements arose in relation to the problems attending the institutionalization and development of modern political regimes and their democratization, of modern collectivities and the expansion of capitalism and new economic and class formations. Whatever the concrete details of these agendas, they highlighted the continual challenge of the contradiction between, on the one hand, encompassing, totalistic, potentially totalitarian overtones based either on collective, national, religious and/or Jacobin visions, and, on the other, a commitment to pluralistic premises. None of the modern pluralistic constitutional regimes has been able to do entirely away—or can even possibly do away—with either Jacobin component. The ubiquity of this challenge has also highlighted the possibility of crises and breakdowns in the very nature of modernity.

VI

Thus within all modern societies continuously developed new questionings and reinterpretations of different dimensions of modernity, and in all of them there have developed different cultural agendas. These developments attest to the growing diversification of the visions and understanding of modernity, of the basic cultural agendas of the elites of different societies—far beyond the homogenic and hegemonic vision modernity that were prevalent in the fifties. While the common starting point of many of these developments was indeed the cultural programme of modernity as it developed in the West, more recent developments gave rise to a multiplicity of cultural social formations which go far beyond the very homogenizing and hegemonizing aspects of this original version.

Thus many if not all of the components of the initial cultural vision of modernity have been challenged in the last decade or so. These challenges claimed that the modern era has basically ended, giving rise to the post-modern one, and were in their turn counter challenged by those, like Jurgen Habermas, who claimed that the various post-modern developments basically constitute either a repetition, in a new form of criticisms of modernity which existed from the very beginning, or constitute yet another manifes-

tation of the continual unfolding of modernity.[9] Indeed, it can be argued that the very tendency or potential to such radical reinterpretations constitutes an inherent component of the civilization or civilizations of modernity.

This is even true—even if in a very paradoxical manner—of the most extreme anti-modern movements that developed in the contemporary period, namely communal-religious, especially fundamentalist ones. Their basic structure, or phenomenology of their vision and action, is in many crucial and seemingly paradoxical ways a modern one, just as has been the case with the totalitarian movements of the twenties and thirties. These movements bear within themselves the seeds of very intensive and virulent revolutionary Jacobinism, seeds which can, under appropriate circumstances, come to full-blown fruition.

VII

Thus, while the spread of modernity has indeed taken place throughout most of the world, it did not give rise to just one civilization, one pattern of ideological and institutional response, but to several basic variants—and to continual refracting. In order to understand these different patterns, it is necessary to take into account the pattern of historical experience of these civilizations. The importance of the historical experience of the various civilizations in shaping the concrete contours of modern societies which developed in the historical spaces of these civilizations does not mean, as S.P. Huntington seems to imply in his influential "The Clash of Civilizations,"[10] that these processes give rise to several closed civilizations which basically constitute a continuation of historical civilization. It is not only, as Huntington correctly indicates, that modernisation does not automatically imply Westernization. What is of crucial importance is that there takes place the crystallization of continually interacting modern civilizations in which even inclusive particularistic tendencies are constructed in typically modern ways. But it is not only that there has been continually developed multiple modern civilizations. These civilizations, which shared many common components and which continually constituted mutual reference points, have been continually developing, unfolding, giving rise to new problematiques and continual reinterpretations of basic premises of modernity.

---

[9] J. Habermas, *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1989.

[10] S.P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Future of the West*, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1996.

Within all societies there developed new questionings and reinterpretations of different dimensions of modernity, and in all of them there have been different cultural agendas. All attest to the growing diversification of the visions and understanding of modernity, of the basic cultural agendas of different sectors of modern societies, far beyond the homogenic and hegemonic vision modernity that were prevalent in the fifties. The fundamentalist—and the new communal-national—movements constitute one such new development—in the unfolding of the potentialities and antinomies of modernity. Such development may indeed give rise also to highly confrontational stances—especially to the West—but these stances are promulgated in continually changing modern idioms, and they may entail a continual transformation of the cultural programs of modernity. While such diversity has certainly undermined the old hegemonies, it was also closely connected—perhaps paradoxically—with the development of new multiple common reference points and networks, with a globalization of cultural networks and channels of communication far beyond what existed before.

At the same time the various components of modern life and culture were refracted and reconstructed in ways which went beyond the confines of any institutional boundaries, especially those of the nation-state—giving rise to a multiple pattern of globalization, studied by such scholars as Arjun Appendurai, Ulf Hammerz, and Roland Robertson.[11] It is this combination of growing diversity in the continuous reinterpretation of modernity and a developing of multiple global trends and mutual reference points that is characteristic of the contemporary scene.

[11] A. Appendurai, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1996; U. Hannerz, *Transnational Connections: Culture, People, Places*, London, Routledge, 1996; R. Robertson, *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture*, London, Sage, 1992.

6. COMMUNITARIANISM AND THE PRIVATIZATION OF BELIEF: THE CASE OF U.S. CATHOLICS

William V. D'Antonio, Ph.D.

This paper examines two related questions: first, the paper examines the thesis that American Roman Catholics continue to exhibit a communitarian ethic that urges them to use government to help others. We suggest it is this ethic that moved the U.S. bishops into the public arena, in the 1970s to promote anti-abortion legislation, and in the 1980s to urge dialogue about nuclear war and peace, and the U.S. economy. Further, I look for evidence that Catholics as voters expressed this ethic to a greater degree than did Protestants in their support of President Clinton and the Democrats in the 1996 elections.

Second, even if it is possible to show that a communitarian ethic exists in more than an ephemeral way among U.S. Catholics, the question remains, what impact if any has it had on the so-called privatization of religious belief that is reported to have swept over the country since the 1960s? In addition to examining the behavior of the bishops and the voting of the laity, the paper presents information that shows signs of a significant communitarian movement that may radically change the way at least some Catholics see their Church and their roles in society. This phenomenon is the growth within the Catholic Church of small groups called small Christian communities (SCCs), known also as small Church communities, small faith communities, or comunidades eclesiales de base (base Ecclesial communities).

These groups are in some measure a part of the phenomenon of small group growth that was documented by Robert Wuthnow in his 1994 book, *Sharing the Journey*. While Wuthnow's overall evaluation of the small group movement was positive, one of his concerns about it was that the groups were too often closed in on themselves, rather than looking out for ways to improve the common weal. Thus, it is important to ask if the SCCs within the Catholic Church are similarly oriented, or whether they may presage a further breach in the privatization wall?

At issue is the question whether there continues to exist within the Catholic religion a quality that David Tracy (1981) had identified as the "analogical imagination," which he contrasted with the more "dialectical imagination" that he found among Protestants. Tracy proceeded to explain how the analogical imagination was more likely to produce a communitarian ethic among

its adherents than was the dialectical imagination among Protestants. The dialectical imagination was more likely to produce the individualistic ethic that has so strongly characterized American society from its founding.

Building on Tracy's work, Greeley (1989) decided to test the thesis that "the fundamental differences between Catholicism and Protestantism are not doctrinal, but are manifestations of more fundamental differing sets of symbols" (1989: 486). According to Greeley, the communitarian ethic that is a product of these symbols should manifest itself in human relationships that are other centered, and that seek the common good, and ultimately, that "express a special option for the poor." Greeley made clear that the differences between Catholics and Protestants were not to be taken as of a zero-sum nature, but rather as tendencies that were more or less present in one or the other religious imagination. Thus, it is not as if Catholics are only "other-centered," while Protestants are only "self-centered." Indeed, there is more than enough evidence from social research of the strength of individualism across Catholic as well as Protestant groups in the United States. In a later section we will summarize Greeley's findings and relate them to the purposes of this paper. Here we raise the following questions:

a – Is the communitarian imagination reflected in the policy issues addressed by the U.S. bishops in American politics during the past quarter century?
b – Is it found in the kinds of Catholics who are elected to the U.S. Congress?
c – Is it to be found in Catholic more than in Protestant voting patterns?
d – And is there evidence for it in the goals set forth by the leaders of the organizations that are fostering SCC development in the United States?
e – Finally, is there any evidence of this ethic in the activities, attitudes, values, and beliefs of Catholics who belong to these small Christian communities (hereinafter referred to as SCCs)?

A Word About the Privatization of Religion

There has been much writing about how the events of the 1960s in the United States brought about the demise of religion as an effective force in the public arena. Indeed, the decade began with the election of the first Catholic as President of the United States. But in campaigning for election, Kennedy had made clear that he was a strong supporter of the Constitutional principle of the separation of church and state. In doing so, he set the stage for the ensuing secular liberalism in American politics. Beyond that trend, the 1960s brought with them assassinations, social movements, the Vietnam

War, and especially within the Catholic Church, the great debate over birth control and the pill, Vatican II and issues of freedom of conscience and structural reform of the Church, and a special concern for the poor. In its wake came two important encyclicals, *Populorum Progressio*, 1967 (*On the Progress of Peoples*), and *Humanae Vitae*, 1968, (*On Human Life*). The former provided a strong critique of contemporary economic systems, especially the individualistic excesses of the West. The latter encyclical reiterated the Church's ban on contraception other than rhythm, while for the first time acknowledging marital sexuality as a good in itself.

Meanwhile, mainline churches faltered in the face of the challenges posed by the Civil Rights, Women's and Students' Rights Movements and the Vietnam War. Traditional authority structures within all major social institutions were shaken, and some institutions like the U.S. federal government and the mainline religious bodies, have been slow to recover their former legitimacy (D'Antonio et al., 1996: 29–30).

In their review of this period, Roof and McKinney (1987) concluded that a major result of these events was that religion had "lost force as an integrative influence in America". What they meant of course, was that mainline Protestant liberal religion had lost its influence. "With the collapse of the religious and cultural middle," they asserted, "the result is the effective elimination of religious values and symbols from the conduct of public discourse" (1987: 33). Religious values and beliefs among the moderates and liberals persist in a highly privatized form, that is, they are to be found if at all in highly individualized religious psychology, without the benefits of strong supportive attachments to believing communities (1987: 7–8), that is, mainline denominations. Indeed, so great was this collapse in their eyes, that they feared that American society was now threatened by a rising amoralism on the one hand, and on the other hand, a reactionary sectarianism rising from the newly emerging religious right.

Stephen Carter, a Yale Law Professor and self-acknowledged liberal, offered a severe critique on how American law and politics under liberal leadership had trivialized religious devotion (*The Culture of Disbelief*, 1993). In his view,

> Political leaders, commentators, scholars, and voters are coming to view any religious element in public moral discourse as a tool of the radical right for reshaping American society. But the effort to banish religion for politics' sake has led us astray: in our sensible zeal to keep religion from dominating our politics, we have created a political and legal culture that presses the religiously faithful to be other than themselves, to act publicly, and sometimes privately as well, as though their faith does not matter to them (1993: 3).

Thus, in the eyes of the critics, it was not so much that people did not believe, as that they no longer looked to the mainline religious institutions

as the source for norms of daily conduct. The irony was that the religious right, while constituting only a minority of the population, had become highly organized at local levels, and had begun to exert influence on national politics across a range of socio-sexual issues (sex education, abortion), as Roof and McKinney had projected.

The rise of the religious right as a force in American public life led some scholars to argue that the country was split in two by a kind of culture war (Hunter, 1991). DiMaggio et al. (1996) tested the culture war thesis and found that American society was less polarized in the 1990s than it had been in the 1970s, and that even without the supposedly leavening influence of mainstream religious bodies, a broad national consensus had emerged.

This consensus was evidenced also in studies of American Catholics (Greeley. February 22, 1997: 11–15; D'Antonio et al., 1989; 1996) which have consistently shown that growing majorities of American Catholics have developed a consensus on sexual issues, divorce and remarriage, a married priesthood, ordaining women, and conscience as against automatic obedience to the teachings of the pope. As Greeley noted, the Church's formal teachings on sexual matters are supported by only a minority of Catholics. What is at stake is the legitimacy of the moral authority of the papacy when it acts in an autocratic manner. A minority of vocal traditional and politically conservative Catholics support an autocratic papacy, and insist that opposition to it constitutes a culture war.

The manner in which the Vatican and the U.S. bishops have handled the issues of human sexuality on the one hand and social justice on the other hand, has led to an increasing privatism among Catholics regarding the former, and a moderate communitarianism regarding the latter (Casanova: 1994: 175ff; Davidson et al., 1997). Thus, while the great majority of Catholics ignore the Church's teachings on sexual matters, many of those same Catholics do support the Vatican and the American bishops in matters of social justice, and outreach to the poor (D'Antonio et al., 1989; Davidson et al., 1997).

Breaching the Privatization Wall

A review of the actions of the U.S. bishops in the 1970s and 1980s is instructive. The Supreme Court decision in *Roe V. Wade* in 1973, creating a Constitutional right to abortion for a woman, was the launching pad for the U.S. bishops into the public arena, as it was for the many-right-to-life and pro-life groups among Catholics and fundamentalist Protestants. In the ensuing 25 years, the bishops have expended large amounts of time, energy,

money and political resources trying to bring about an amendment to the Constitution that would make abortion illegal under all circumstances. This great, ongoing and divisive debate has effectively brought religious belief back into the public arena. Interestingly, among Catholics, only a minority have given their support to the bishops. The 1992 and 1993 Gallup surveys (D'Antonio et al., 1996: 61–62) as well as most other major national surveys, have found that only 13% of all Catholics, and 22% of the Church's most highly committed Catholics, support the position of the bishops and the Vatican. However, with support also from fundamentalist Protestant groups, particularly Southern Baptists, and from the Mormon Church, a well-organized anti-abortion movement has made significant gains in the public arena, causing a number of modifications in the laws governing abortion. Moreover, the anti-abortion movement has been politically adroit in helping to elect anti-abortion candidates to the U.S. Congress.

Ironically, it seems reasonable to argue that the privatism era ended with the 1973 Supreme Court decision, which at the time seemed like the ultimate victory of secular liberalism. DiMaggio et al. (1996: 738) noted that abortion was the only major social issue on which there was more rather than less polarization in the 1990s compared with the 1970s.

Enlarging the Breach in the Wall of Separation

While the U.S. bishops were focusing on the abortion issue, and trying to recover from the devastating effects of the birth control debate, the Church in Africa and Latin America was moving ahead with efforts to bring alive the social, economic and Church reform teachings of Vatican II. Among these efforts was the establishment on both continents of small faith communities which focused on "a preferential option for the poor."

The 1980s ushered in the Reagan years in American politics, with emphasis on consumerism, individualism, virulent anti-communism, a saber-rattling militarism, and the notion that the government was the cause of most of our social problems.

In this setting the bishops surprised everyone with two pastoral letters, one on nuclear war and peace (1983), and the other on economic justice for all (1986). In their original draft form, the documents were much more critical of the Reagan administration policies than were the final statements. Conservative Catholics within and outside the Reagan Administration managed to bring about significant modifications. Still, the pastoral letters were considered by mainline religious bodies of all denominations as well as other progressive groups, as strong statements calling for nuclear disarmament and

for more government help to overcome poverty and its attendant ills. Thus, they clearly marked the further participation of the Catholic hierarchy into the arena of American public life.

It is important to note here the distinct ways in which the bishops have entered the public arena, first in the 1970s regarding abortion, and then in the 1980s regarding war and peace and the economy. In the former case, the bishops took an absolutist and fundamentalist approach to the abortion issue, using the natural law and deductive logic to make their claim that abortion was not simply a Catholic but a universal human rights issue, always an intrinsically evil act (Casanova, 1994; Burns, 1993).

On the other hand, they used the inductive method with their pastoral letters on peace and the economy. For the general U.S. public these pastoral letters were to be taken as documents for public reflection and deliberation which have the "function of helping to establish collective norms with which to evaluate the morality of public policies and of economic structural practices" (Casanova, 1994: 188–189).

Among Catholic liberals the two letters were hailed originally as forerunners of a more democratic, participatory Church. However, the bishops have not to date put significant financial resources in support of these issues. Nor have they built alliances with liberal senators, many of whom are pro-choice Catholics.[1] Not surprisingly, their results in terms of laws and policy changes have been meager. And on these issues the bishops have failed to gain any support from the main body of anti-abortion Catholics.

To summarize, the bishops have entered the public arena of American politics: first, they have taken an absolutist stand on the abortion issue, and with the help of a well-organized minority of Catholics and fundamentalist Protestants, they have succeeded in narrowing the scope of *Roe V. Wade.*

---

[1] A look at the religious composition of the U.S. Congress provides further evidence for a Catholic Communitarian ethic. As of the 1996 elections, the U.S. Senate includes 55 Republicans and 45 Democrats. Among the 55 Republicans are 8 Catholics, all Conservative and most openly anti-abortion.

There are 15 Catholics among the Democrats, all with liberal voting records according to the rankings of the Americans for Democratic Action and the Consumer Federation of America. These Senators who are Catholic are also to varying degrees pro-choice on abortion.

The odds that Catholics would be elected to the U.S. Senate in the proportions that are reported here are three to one against that happening by chance. A similar pattern was found among members of the U.S. House of Representatives, although the odds in that case were only two to one against the pattern happening by chance.

The only other religious denomination in the Senate in which Democrats significantly outnumbered Republicans was Jews, with nine Democrats and only 1 Republican. American Jews have been the most liberal religious denomination politically, and these findings simply add more evidence to the thesis that Jews and Catholics are the most communitarian-oriented among the U.S. religious groups.

Second, they have taken a much more cautious approach to the issues of war and peace, and the economy, but have been unable to find or unwilling to develop an effective, organized lobby to support their concerns for the poor. Indeed, they were much more openly supportive of Senator Robert Dole, the Republican candidate for President in the 1996 elections, because of his and the Republican Party's anti-abortion stands. The fact that the Democratic Party Platform and Policies were closer to the bishops on matters of concern for the poor, and equal justice for all, seemed to have gotten lost in the process. And the main explanation seems to be the strong pro-choice stands of most Democrats, including the Catholic Senators and members of the House of Representatives.

The religious right has been eager to work with the U.S. Catholic bishops on issues such as abortion, but they do not lend their support when the bishops turn their agenda to welfare, housing, medicaid for the aged, capital punishment, or the environment.[2]

Small Groups and the Public Agenda

Our study of SCCs has as its point of departure a massive study of the small group participation of the U.S. adult population. In his book based on this research (*Sharing the Journey*, 1994) Robert Wuthnow reported that some 40% of all American adults belonged to at least one small group, more than half of which have a religious or spiritual orientation.

Wuthnow found that small groups provided a high level of encouragement and support to their members, as well as a high level of personal satisfaction. He also reported that more than half of American adults said they became more interested in peace or social justice issues as a result of their group membership. Group members were more likely than non members to have done volunteer work.

Further, according to Wuthnow, "having had some kind of profound religious experience or spiritual awakening was a major reason why people in

[2] Nor have the bishops found support from the religious right on the issue of capital punishment. The U.S. bishops, with strong support from the Vatican, have attempted to broaden their pro-life stance by increasingly challenging capital punishment as being against the pro-life principle. The tide of public opinion in the U.S. has turned in favor of capital punishment in the past 20 years, led by the conservatives in general, including strong support from the religious right, which has so far rejected the connection between their anti-abortion stand and the strong anti-capital punishment stand of the bishops. Again, the bishops have eschewed seeking support from Catholic liberals, who tend to support them in their opposition to capital punishment.

small groups became involved in community service" (Ch. 11). Small groups seemed to heighten involvement and giving among religious conservatives better than among religious liberals. On balance, Wuthnow concluded the evidence suggested that small groups reinforced conservative political orientations in our society more than liberal political perspectives.

Wuthnow focused his attention on small groups in general, and made only passing reference to groups emerging under the broad umbrella of the Catholic Church. Our study includes both a national sample of the adult U.S. Catholic population, and an intensive series of surveys, questionnaires, participant observations and interviews with people who are members of six particular types of small groups, here called small Christian communities (SCCs). Also, a major focus of our study has to do with the degree to which Catholics in the general population, as well as Catholics within SCCs, reflect the communitarian ethic in their activities and commitments.

Greeley and Communitarianism

As noted earlier, Greeley (1989) constructed a series of hypotheses to test whether the communitarian, analogical imagination, traditionally more evident in Catholic than in individualistically oriented Protestant behavior, persists in the modern industrial, urban, homogenized world. Among other things, Greeley argued, Catholics were more likely than Protestants to value social relationships, and to seek for social justice in this world.

Using survey data from the U.S. and Europe, Greeley found that he had to reject a series of null hypotheses which had predicted no denominational differences in values and the religious imagination. He concluded: "There is no evidence in the data analyzed in this paper that the analogical imagination is either extinct or becoming extinct. The Protestant ethic and the Catholic ethic are alive and well" (1989: 500).

A Case in Point: the 1996 U.S. Elections

I take the Catholic vote and by implication the Protestant vote in the U.S. 1996 Presidential elections to provide further support for the existence of a still viable Catholic communitarian ethic capable of manifesting itself in the public arena. A brief review of that vote will serve as a prelude to data from our study of SCCs.

The Catholic vote in the 1996 presidential elections went strongly for President Clinton (53% to 37%). Looking closely at the demographics of

Table 1. Issues that Mattered Most to Catholic Voters, 1996 by Rank Order of Importance (in percentages).

Issue	All Catholics	Clinton Catholics	Dole Catholics	Perot Catholics
Economy/Jobs	23	61	28	9
Medicare/Social Security	16	71	21	8
Education	12	85	11	3
Deficit	11	27	54	17
Taxes	11	19	73	8
Crime/Drugs	7	46	44	9
Foreign Policy	4	45	48	7

Source: Voter News and Surveys, exit polls. November 5, 1996.

that vote we find: women (59%), young people aged 18–29 (57%), first time voters (61%), and Hispanic/Latinos (81%), in particular gave Clinton support well above his ultimate margin of victory over Dole (49% to 41%). In all, 32% of Clinton's total vote was from Catholics, who constitute between 25% and 28% of the voting population. Parenthetically, Dole received most of his support from Protestants, mainline as well as of the Christian right.

Why did Catholics vote so strongly for Clinton? Table 1 provides some insights. According to exit polling (*Voter News Service*, 1996), the three issues that mattered most to Catholics were "economy/jobs, medicare/social security, and education." On these issues Clinton's support among Catholics ranged from 61% to 85%. (See also White and D'Antonio, 1997). Interestingly, these are among the issues most frequently supported by the U.S. Catholic bishops in their public statements on social justice, and in their lobbying efforts before Congress.

Candidate Dole and the Republicans made a great effort to use the abortion issue to garner Catholic votes. Many bishops openly and/or covertly supported Dole and the Republicans. But polls taken over recent years have shown a majority of American Catholics supporting the legality of abortion in at least some circumstances. The 1992 Gallup survey (D'Antonio et al., 1996: 62) showed only 13% of all Catholics and 22% of the most highly committed Catholics to be totally opposed to abortion. So it was not surprising to find that Catholics who believed that abortion should be "always legal" or "mostly legal" voted for Clinton 68% and 55% respectively. When

Clinton declared that abortion should be "safe, legal and rare" he was expressing the view of the great majority of American Catholics, and of Americans in general.

Thus, I would argue that the 1996 elections provide some support for the continued existence of a Catholic communal consciousness, or communitarianism. This evidence is bolstered by the findings cited in Footnote 1 above regarding the kinds of Catholics likely to be elected to the U.S. House and the Senate. Communitarian type Catholics are two and three times respectively more likely to be elected than are conservative, more individualistically oriented Catholics. Meanwhile, Protestants dominate the Republican ranks.

Small Christian Communities: their Mission

I turn now to our study of SCCs. These small groups, by whatever name, have been blessed by Popes Paul VI and John Paul II.[3]

The Charismatic Prayer Groups (Ch) trace their history back to the late 1960s, and reflect one major response to Vatican II. While their movement has lost much of the excitement and momentum that attracted millions of Catholics to it in the 1970s, it is still an important movement, generally traditional and supportive of the papacy. Also an outgrowth of Vatican II are groups linked with the Call to Action Movement identified in our study either as Call To Action (CTA) or as Eucharist Centered Communities (ECC). The essential difference between CTA and ECC is whether or not the group specifically included the celebration of the Eucharist as a central part of its gathering activity. These groups tended to be autonomous, and relatively independent of the institutional church, while the charismatics were highly institutionalized, even while enjoying considerable lay leadership and autonomy (Csordas, 1997).

The largest SCC types in terms of numbers are the small general com-

[3] For an excellent historical overview, see John Vandenakker, *Small Christian Communities in the Catholic Church*, 1993. Kansas City: Sheed and Ward. Vandenakker traced the history of small faith communities back to the early Church, and provided a social and theological critique of their emergence in Africa and Latin America as an outcome of Vatican II. He then devoted a major portion of the book to the organizations within the United States that were promoting the growth of small Christian communities, evaluated their theological groundings, and indicated which ones seemed to fit the criteria set forth in the writings and speeches of Popes Paul VI and John Paul II. In addition to the organizations he cited, we have added others that fit a broader definition of small Christian communities. For purposes of this paper, the important criterion under consideration is the degree to which they are committed to a broad communitarian view of the world.

munity types (SGC), a composite of the types identified by Vandenakker. Despite strong institutional ties, these types also enjoy a significant amount of lay leadership and autonomy. The Hispanics are rapidly growing, especially in the South, Southwest and California. And college campus communities (CCC) are beginning to show signs of development beyond the more traditional kinds of campus ministry.[4]

We began our study knowing that the groups on the left were openly committed to both church reform, and to living the gospel in the world, seeking various levels of involvement. We soon learned through interviews and reading of documents published by the groups in the middle, that the leaders of the groups feeding into the SCC movement had a long term vision of commitment, what they called the Church's mission to the world.

For example, a movement called RENEW began in 1978 under the sponsorship of Bishop Gerity of the Newark, N.J. Diocese, as an effort to keep alive the spirit of Vatican II. In the past 17 years it has spread to 124 dioceses in the U.S. and in some places in England and in other countries. In the U.S. it is estimated that some 3.5 million Catholics in groups of 8–10 each have participated in RENEW, studying scripture, praying, and learning to share faith stories, in six week periods during Lent and Advent, for periods up to three years.

The leaders of the RENEW Movement see the initial three year approach as a stepping stone to long term, community involvement which they are now promoting as part of what they call Post-RENEW. They are explicit about anchoring their program in parish-based communities. Further, they explain the purpose of the community is to help people live more like Christ. And that means living a message with social implications, namely how people love one another. A small Christian community's journey includes reaching out to feed the hungry, clothe the naked, comfort the afflicted. These small communities are different from service clubs to the extent the people are conscious of the implications of the mission of Jesus. This may mean at the individual level something as simple as being a care giver for an elderly person, or at the group level it may mean working to replace unjust laws and policies regarding medical benefits or housing for the elderly.

[4] Research on Catholics across generations (Davidson et al., 1997; D'Antonio et al., 1996) have consistently shown that younger Catholics are less bound to the Church as institution, more privatized in their beliefs. So the question arises, if communitarianism is part of the Catholic ethos, and if that ethos is at least in some degree provided to generations via the institutional Church and its teachings, in this case its teachings on social responsibility, may not the privatization that has resulted from the young people's rejection of the Church's teachings on sexual matters, have negative consequences for its social teachings? Thus, the growth of SCCs on college campuses may be a vital element in the continued vitality of a Catholic communitarian ethic.

Thus, the SCCs have as one of their explicit goals bringing the message of Jesus to the public arena. Preliminary examination of the research data suggests there are three stages in the development of a social conscience that leads to outreach in more than general, vague verbal support for the poor.

Stage 1: people act primarily to help members of the group to which they belong;
Stage 2: people move out into the larger public community and volunteer their time in soup kitchens, AIDS hospitals, and the like, and donate money to worthy public causes;
Stage 3: people address issues of Church and civil society, with the hope of bringing about some change in laws and policies.

Research Findings

Stage 1: Membership in small groups over time invariably led people to see members as part of an extended family. Thus, when members needed help they came to expect and receive support from other group members. We found this to be as normal as Wuthnow did (1994). The data showed that most people were preoccupied with meeting the needs and demands of other group members, and did not proceed beyond stage 1.
Stage 2: We found also that over time, a smaller percentage of people moved beyond the confines of their group to participate in some kind of outreach activity. Whether the activity was a function of the group or of the individual acting on her/his own but inspired by the group seemed to depend on the size of the group. The smaller the group the more active it was as a group in helping its members. But the less able it was to participate in community wide activities especially as the latter might appear to be controversial. There is a long history of Stage 2 volunteerism in American society, and it currently enjoys bipartisan political support. (Bezilla, ed.; 1992–93; The New Volunterism Campaign, *Newsweek*, April 28, 1997: 28–32).
Stage 3: The third stage was achieved only by a small number of groups, and generally these groups had been in existence for longer periods of time.

In examining the data from our study, we have continually asked the question posed by Greeley, namely, is there evidence of a persisting communi-

Table 2. Activities SCCs Engage in at Every Meeting, by SCC Type (in percentages)

	ECC %	CTA %	SGC %	CCC %	H/L %	CH %
Prayer	80	92	92	95	97	100
Faith Sharing	59	83	85	57	78	85
Read/Discuss Scripture	63	70	78	52	94	76
Spirituality	59	61	58	71	61	15
Group Silence	30	38	36	19	32	64
Weekend Eucharist	64	14	–	57	34	25
Theological Reflection	33	32	24	29	22	12
Sharing Visions	31	32	20	5	18	21
Home Eucharist	34	4	3	10	4	6
Evangelization	3	3	–	10	45	30
Helping SCC Members	27	19	23	24	31	17
Helping in Need	27	18	16	24	21	12
Issues	21	25	8	10	19	2
N	70	94	526	21	104	98

Note: In many cases, percentages do not add up to 100% because missing cases (people who did not answer the question for one reason or another) are not included.
ECC (Eucharistic Centered Communities)
CTA (Call to Action)
SGC (Small General Communities)
CCC (College Campus Communities)
H/L (Hispanic/Latino Communities)
CH (Charismatics)

tarian ethic among Catholics that will lead them (a) into small communities, and then eventually (b) from stages 1 and 2 to stage 3? And if so, what is the nature of the behavior that qualifies it as communitarian?

The findings are summarized in two tables. Table 2 reports what SCCs do when they gather; Table 3 compares four SCC types with a national survey of Catholics on a range of attitudes, including religious, political orientations, and attitudes toward helping others, as well as actual behaviors involving possible kinds of mission outreach.

SCC members tend to be highly educated, with large majorities of some types (ECC and CTA especially) having graduate and professional degrees beyond the BA. The great majority of members are aged 50 and older, with financial security, and beyond the child-rearing stages of life. The most notable exception to these generalizations are the Hispanics; they are younger, with half their membership under age forty, and still struggling to find their place in the American economy. And, of course, the campus groups are made up primarily of undergraduate and graduate students.

Table 2 shows the activities that the six types of SCCs engaged in at their regular meetings. As expected, prayer, faith sharing, reading and discussion of scriptures were common activities of all types. A majority of all types also said that spiritual nourishment in one form or another was a regular practice at every meeting.

Much less common to the six types were the activities listed at the bottom of the table. These items in their full statement read:

a – Helping members of our SCC;
b – reaching out to the parish and the wider community to serve in soup kitchens, hospices, tutorial work and other acts of charity;
c – addressing structural issues of Church or civil society.

The Hispanics were most likely to say they devoted some time at each meeting to helping fellow members. All groups provided social support in times of grief, trauma and crises: providing food to members who were ill, or to families grieving the death of a member was a common cross-type experience. So was prayer. Overall, about one in four groups within each type devoted some time to this activity at every meeting.

While ECC, Hispanic and College groups were about as likely to reach out into stage 2 activities, Charismatics and perhaps the General SC type were somewhat less likely to confront these issues at their every meeting.

When it came to addressing structural issues, again only three types had as many as 20% engaged in this activity on a regular basis. ECC and CTA groups addressed racial, sexual issues, welfare reform, human rights violations in Central America, the Gulf War and the like and what they could do to counter prevailing trends, while Hispanics tried to confront their own socio-economic situation and how to overcome bias and discrimination as they struggled to find their place in American society.

Table 3 presents findings from a national random sample of U.S. adult Catholics, which we have compared with random samples from four of the six SCCs.[5] For purposes of this paper, the national sample data were divided into two groups:

a – American Roman Catholics (ARC) who still identified themselves as Roman Catholics, but who responded to an open-ended question to

[5] The college groups were in final examinations and not able to complete the questionnaire; the return rate for Hispanics was well below 50%, so they were also not included in this part of the study.

Table 3. Attitudes and Behaviors of U.S. Catholics on a Range of Issues (in percentages and by types)

	ECC	CTA	SGC	Ch	ARC	CGP
N =	103	114	188	105	401	266
1. Mass Attendance						
a. daily	4	18	17	37	3	8
b. weekly	57	58	74	58	30	50
c. at least monthly	35	19	7	2	21	19
d. seldom/never	3	3	–	1	46	23
2. Religiously						
a. conservative	4	17	44	70	33	43
b. moderate	5	21	23	19	21	19
c. liberal	88	63	31	5	42	36
3. Politically						
a. conservative	8	21	45	71	34	39
b. moderate	12	18	22	15	19	18
c. liberal	77	62	32	6	38	40
4. You can be a good Catholic without donating time or money to help the needy						
a. Agree	19	18	33	23	64	50
b. disagree	71	73	59	63	34	49
5. Helping others is very important to me	89	88	83	83	73	83
6. Work in soup kitchen	48	60	44	50	20	31
7. Attend mtg. Catholic Social Justice group	61	72	39	26	8	20
8. Participate in local politics, service clubs	48	48	28	17	25	40
9. Political issues are very important to me	47	32	24	20	26	24
10. Member, Right-to-Life group	5	9	12	33	6	5

ECC – Eucharist-centered Communities
CTA – Call To Action
SGC – Small General Communities
Ch – Charismatic Groups
ARC – Average Roman Catholics in national sample, not members of religious groups
CGp – Roman Catholics in national sample who belong to a religious group

the effect that they had not been nor were they now members of any small group with a religious or spiritual orientation.

b – Roman Catholics (CGp) who responded to the open-ended question by stating and specifying the small group or groups with a religious/spiritual orientation they had been or still were members of. This group (one in three Catholics) is identified in the table as CRGs (Catholics in Religious Groups).

Table 3 provides a broader picture of the US Catholic population, its attitudes and behaviors regarding a possible communitarian ethic. The Ns here for the SCC types represent individual members of SCC groups. Regarding daily and weekly Mass attendance, the Charismatics were the most likely to attend at least weekly, with the average Catholics the least likely to attend Mass at least weekly. But the more interesting finding may simply be that small group membership was a strong predictor of Mass attendance among all types of Catholics.

ECC and CTA were the most liberal both religiously and politically (items 1 and 3), with the Charismatics the most conservative in both instances. Both Catholic subtypes in the national sample were slightly more liberal than conservative.

We have asked question 4 in two previous national surveys of adult Catholics (D'Antonio et al., 1989 and 1996). In the more recent survey (1996: 79) a majority agreed, and in the earlier survey (1989: 57), 44% agreed that a person could be a good Catholic without donating time or money to help the needy. Thus, Catholics in the national sample mirrored the national trends in their attitudes toward the poor and welfare. But the same cannot be said of members of SCCs. Strong majorities of all four types disagreed with this statement, thus, supporting the ethic of social responsibility.

In contrast, a question taken from another part of the survey, asking people what things were important in their lives, showed a much more sympathetic response to helping others. Of course, this response could simply mean helping others in their group, or simple outreach activities like serving in a soup kitchen once or twice a month. And these activities have been long extolled as a part of American volunteerism. Even Ronald Reagan gave verbal support to these activities, as long as they were non-governmental.

Indeed, almost half of all SCC types said they did work in soup kitchens on a regular basis. By contrast, only a minority of the two Catholic types in the national sample said they worked in a soup kitchen, or did other acts of charity.

Items 7, 8 and 9 show that the ECC and CTA members were much

more likely than any of the others to actually attend meetings or consider as very important to themselves social justice and political issues. These were the Catholics who represented the broadest meaning of communitarianism.

Finally, we see that one in three Charismatics said they belonged to a right-to-life group, while small percentages of all others also did.

Discussion

Does the evidence (a) support the proposition that U.S. Catholics, led by the bishops, have breached the wall of separation of religious belief from the public arena, and (b)support the existence of a communitarian ethic in the U.S. Catholic population that may be expected to manifest itself as a growing force in the public arena in the next millennium?

1 – To the extent that support for Medicare, Medicaid, education, environment, Family Leave and related legislation reflects the communitarian spirit, and I believe it does, then Catholics more than Protestants evidenced it in our 1996 national elections.

2 – To the extent that helping others, being concerned for others beyond the narrow confines of one's own group, reflects a communitarian ethic, then Table 3 showed that at least some types of Catholics (ECC and CTA especially), and SGC to a lesser extent, do reflect this ethic. The evidence is much weaker in the national samples.[6]

CTA and ECC types are the smallest in numbers of groups and total members, with a total known adult population around 20,000. SGC has large numbers, about 300,000 adults, spread throughout all regions of the country.

There is certainly a movement to restore a moderate/liberal voice to American politics. A recently formed Interfaith Alliance of religious and other leaders, including Catholics, has begun to speak out on matters of national policy as a counter to the Christian right.

3 – Consider: the leaders of the national organizations devoted to the growth of SCCs, see mission to the world as the ultimate goal of SCC activity.

What are the possibilities?

---

[6] In a 1997 study of U.S. Catholics, the authors reported that "over 90% say that helping the needy is an important part of their own religious beliefs, and 58% accept the idea that Catholics have a special responsibility to help close the gap between the rich and the poor" (Davidson et al., 1997: 201).

a – Catholic women gave 59% of their vote to Clinton;
b – Catholic women outnumber men in all but one SCC type;
c – Catholic women in SCCs are highly educated, generally beyond the child-rearing years, and increasingly open to what they call "a new way of being church."
d – Hispanics gave 81% of their vote to Clinton; the economy, immigration issues and social legislation aimed at helping the disadvantaged will appeal to them for many years to come.
e – Hispanics are the most rapidly growing segment of the U.S. and Catholic populations.
f – Some 11,000 young Catholics have become active in SCCs on college campuses. Will they, can they grow to become a leadership core for the next generation? And will communitarian ideals outweigh the strong current of individualism that still pervades American society? In the 1996 election, 57% of young Catholics ages 18–29 voted for Clinton.
g – Jews and Catholics are the most Democratic of all major religious denominations in the U.S. Senate, currently constituting 53% of all Democrats in the Senate. And they have been consistent in their support of communitarian programs. Catholics, now numbering about one in four U.S. citizens, will probably increase their numbers in the coming decades, with the growth of Hispanic and Asian-American groups, which while no longer overwhelmingly Catholic, can be expected to remain majority Catholic. Thus, the Catholic vote and the degree to which that vote reflects a communitarian ethic can have important implications for the direction of U.S. policies in the coming decade.

So far at least, the U.S. bishops have been more active in promoting their anti-abortion stand than in promoting social issues. Only a minority of the laity stand with the bishops on their absolutist position against abortion. While the bishops have strong support in both houses of Congress among anti-abortion Catholics (overwhelmingly Republican), they appear not to have been willing or able to establish close working ties with communitarian-oriented Catholics (especially Democrats) in the House and Senate.[7]

Can the SCC movement, with its vision of commitment to the public arena, succeed with primarily lay leadership? The next three to five years

[7] At this writing, we are carrying out a longitudinal study of the religious affiliation of Senate and House members, and relating it to their voting patterns on major social legislation. It may well be as Greeley has argued, that both the communitarian and individualistic ethics reflected in Catholic and Jewish cultural patterns on the one hand and Protestant patterns on the other are alive in American politics, even if in muted form.

may well tell us whether this movement like so many before it has run its course, or, has the staying power to find and support communitarian-oriented candidates for public office.

References

Burns, Gene. 1992. *The Frontiers of Catholicism.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Carter, Stephen. 1993. *The Culture of Disbelief.* New York: Basic Books.

Casanova, Jose. 1994. *Public Religion in the Modern World.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Csordas, T.J. 1997. *Language, Charisma, and Creativity: The Ritual Life of a Religious Movement.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

D'Antonio, W.V. et al., 1989. *American Catholic Laity in a Changing Church.* Kansas City: Sheed and Ward.

—— 1996. *Laity, American and Catholic Transforming the Church.* Kansas City: Sheed and Ward.

Davidson, J.D. et al., 1997. *The Search for Common Ground.* Huntington, Ind: Our Sunday Visitor Publ. Co.

DiMaggio, P. et al., 1996. "Have Americans' Social Attitudes Become More Polarized?" *American Journal of Sociology.* 102:3 (690–755).

Greeley, Andrew M. February 22, 1997. "Polarized Catholics? Don't Believe Your Mail." *America.*

—— 1989. "Protestant and Catholic: Is the Analogical Imagination Extinct?" *American Sociological Review* 54:485–502.

Hunter, J.D. 1991. *Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America.* New York: Basic Books.

Paul VI, Pope. 1967. *Populorum Progressio (On the Progress of People).* Vatican City.

—— 1968. *Humanae Vitae (On Human Life).* Vatican City.

Roof, W. Clark, and W. McKinney. 1987. *America's Mainline Religion. Its Changing Shape and Future.* New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press.

Tracy, David. 1982. *The Analogical Imagination.* New York: Seabury Press.

Vandennaker, John. 1993. *Small Christian Communities and the Parish.* Kansas City: Sheed and Ward.

White, J. and W.V. D'Antonio, 1997. "The Catholic Vote in Election '96", in *The Public Perspective.* 8: 4 (45–48).

Wuthnow, Robert. 1994. *Sharing the Journey.* New York: Free Press.

7. BEYOND SOVEREIGNTY: DE-FACTO TRANSNATIONALISM IN IMMIGRATION POLICY[1]

Saskia Sassen

While the state continues to play the most important role in immigration policy making and implementation, the state itself has been transformed by the growth of a global economic system and other transnational processes. These have brought on conditions that bear on the state's regulatory role and its autonomy. Two particular aspects of this development are of significance to the role of the state in immigration policy making and implementation: One is the relocation of various components of state authority to supranational organizations such as the institutions of the European Union, the newly formed World Trade Organization, or the international human rights code. A second is the de-facto privatization of various governance functions as a result of the privatization of public sector activities and of economic deregulation. This privatization assumes particular meanings in the context of the internationalization of trade and investment. Corporations, markets and free trade agreements are now in charge of "governing" an increasing share of cross-border flows, including cross-border flows of specialized professional workers as part of the international trade and investment in services.

The major implication for immigration policy is that these developments have had an impact on the sovereignty of the state and, further, that the state itself has been a participant in the implementation of many of these new arrangements. The state has contributed to the formation of the global economic system and has furthered the consensus around the pursuit of economic globalization. (See various chapters in Mittelman, 1996; Sassen, 1999). Both the impact on the state's sovereignty and the state's participation in the new global economic system have transformed the state itself, affected the power of different agencies within it, and furthered the internationalization of the inter-state system through a proliferation of bi- and multilateral agreements.

---

[1] Reprinted from *European Journal of Migration and Law* 1: 177–198 (1999), based on a paper originally delivered at the 1997 International Meeting of the Institute of Sociology. The broader issues about the state and the global economy are developed in the author's *Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization* (Columbia University Press, 1996) and in *Guests and Aliens* (New York: New Press, 1999).

Immigration policy is deeply embedded in the question of state sovereignty and the inter-state system. As a result it is no longer sufficient simply to assert the sovereign role of the state in immigration policy design and implementation; it is necessary to examine also the transformation of the state itself and what that can entail for migration policy and the regulation of migration flows and settlement. As I argue elsewhere (1999b), it is becoming important to factor in the possibility of declining state sovereignty precisely because the state is a major actor in immigration policy and regulation. Nor is it sufficient simply to assert that globalization has brought with it a declining significance of the state in economic regulation. Why? Because the state has been a participant in this process and is the strategic institution for the legislative changes and innovations necessary for economic globalization as we know it today.

This may seem far removed from the question of immigration policy. But we need to expand the analytic terrain within which we examine the options in immigration policy making in the highly developed countries. And we cannot simply use the state as a background fact, a given.

One of the crucial issues in the transformation of the state that is relevant to immigration policy making has to do with the enormous work of legal innovation necessary for the formation of a global economy. The global economy is both a set of practices and a set of legal innovations within which to encase those practices (Sassen, 1996). Economic globalization has created a new geography of power within which the state finds its sovereign power reconstituted, often diminished. And it has contributed to the formation of new legal regimes and much legal and policy innovation, much of it representing a relocation of authority away from the state.

Immigration policy-making in contrast, has suffered from a lack of innovation in most highly developed countries, with the exception of the work around the formation of the European Union and free trade agreements such as NAFTA and the Uruguay Round of the GATT. In the case of Europe, such policy changes as free movement within the Union and the shift of some immigration policy components to the European level, have required considerable innovation in international law. NAFTA and WTO required the formation of specialized regimes for the circulation of professional services and other kinds of providers; this is likely to include individuals, particularly in the case of many professional services. These regimes within NAFTA and WTO can be seen as containing a form of "migrant worker policy," only that it is addressed to highly specialized workers. Although they are supra-national regimes, there is a growing influence of private sector interests.

These are the issues briefly discussed in this article. One organizing

argument is that this reconfiguration has brought with it a de-facto transnationalism in the handling of a growing number of immigration issues, both domestically and internationally. This can take many forms: the shift of certain elements of immigration policy onto supra-national institutions in the European Union; the sharp increase in the extent and content of collaboration in the US-Mexico Binational Immigration Commisssion; the rapid increase in the use of international human rights instruments by judges adjudicating on immigration and refugee questions in both Europe and the US; and the already mentioned formation of a privatized regime for the circulation of service workers in the major free-trade agreements as part of the liberalization of international trade and investment in services. I consider these and other developments a *de-facto* transnationalism because they are fragmented, incipient and have not been fully captured at the most formal levels of international public law and conventions, nor in national representations of the sovereign state. My argument is, then, that there is more on-the-ground transnationalism than hits the formal eye.

In order to develop this particular way of framing the evidence it is important first to bring some precision to concepts such as economic globalization and transnationalism and their impact on sovereignty and exclusive state authority over its territory. This is the subject of a first, very brief section, confined largely to states operating under the rule of law. The second and third sections focus on the constraints faced by the state in highly developed countries in the making of immigration policy today.

I. *The State and the New Economic Regime*

Two notions underlie much of the discussion about globalization. One is the proposition that what the global economy gains, the national state loses and vice versa. The other is the proposition that if an event (from business transactions to judiciary decisions) takes place in a national territory it is a national event. In other words, dualism and geography (in a narrow territorial sense) are the hallmarks of this type of understanding.

But there is by now a considerable body of scholarship that has shown us that the spatiality of the global economy does not simply lie somewhere in the interstices between states (e.g. various chapters in Mittelman, 1996, and in Knox and Taylor, 1995). To a good extent global processes and institutional arrangements materialize in national territories; even the most digitalized global financial market is grounded in a set of very material resources and spaces largely embedded in national territories. As has been said often, one of the key properties of the current phase in the long his-

tory of the world economy is the ascendance of information technologies, the associated increase in the mobility and liquidity of capital, and the resulting decline in the regulatory capacities of national states over key sectors of their economies. This is well illustrated by the case of the leading information industries, finance and the advanced corporate services. These tend to have a space economy that is transnational and is partly embedded in electronic spaces that override conventional jurisdictions and boundaries.

Yet, this is also a space economy which reveals the need for strategic sites with vast concentrations of resources and infrastructure, sites that are situated in national territories and are far less mobile than much of the general commentary on the global economy suggests. The excessive emphasis on the hypermobility and liquidity of capital is a partial account. We need to distinguish between the capacity for global transmission/communication and the material conditions that make this possible, between the globalization of the financial industry and the array of resources—from buildings to labor inputs—that makes this possible; and so on for other sectors as well.[2] Place is central to the multiple circuits through which economic globalization is constituted. One strategic type of place for these developments is the global city.[3]

As a consequence of this embedding of global processes in national territories, notably in global cities, one of the key features of the role of the state vis a vis economic globalization (unlike earlier forms of the global economy) has been to negotiate the intersection of national law and foreign actors—whether firms, markets or individuals. We generally use the term "deregulation" to describe the outcome of this negotiation. The problem with this term is that it only captures the withdrawal of the state from regulating its economy. It does not register all the ways in which the state participates

---

[2] Alongside the well-documented spatial dispersal of economic activities, new forms of territorial centralization of top-level management and control operations have appeared. National and global markets as well as globally integrated operations require central places where the work of globalization gets done. Further, information industries require a vast physical infrastructure containing strategic nodes with hyperconcentrations of facilities. Finally, even the most advanced information industries have a work process—that is, a complex of workers, machines and buildings that are more place-bound than the imagery of information outputs suggests. I develop this in Sassen, 2000.

[3] Global cities are centers for the *servicing* and *financing* of international trade, investment, and headquarter operations. That is to say, the multiplicity of specialized activities present in global cities are crucial in the valorization, indeed overvalorization of leading sectors of capital today. And in this sense they are strategic production sites for today's leading economic sectors. Elsewhere (Sassen, 2000) I have looked at cities as production sites for the leading service industries of our time; one concern was to recover the infrastructure of activities, firms and jobs, that is necessary to run the advanced corporate economy. I focused on the *practice* of global control: the work of producing and reproducing the organization and management of a global production system and a global marketplace for finance.

in setting up the new frameworks through which globalization is furthered; nor does it capture the associated transformations inside the state. (See Sassen, 1996; see also e.g. Smith et al., 1999; Olds et al., 1999; Biersteker et al., forthcoming; Drache and Gertler, 1991)

Coding everything that involves the national state as an instance of the national is simply inadequate. The theoretical and methodological challenge presented by the current phase of globalization is that it entails a transcending of exclusive national territoriality and of the interstate system yet is implanted in national territories and institutions. Hence globalization directly engages two marking features of the nation state: exclusive territoriality and sovereignty.

Similary, the emergent international human rights regime engages territoriality and sovereignty. What matters here is not so much the moral force of the idea, but the far more practical fact of a rapid multiplication of instruments available to judges and the build-up of case law where this applies, as in the US for example (e.g. Jacobson, 1996; Reisman, 1990). The key issue here is the fact that international regimes or codes, such as human rights, largely become operative in national courts. One could of course simply assert that in such cases we are dealing with what is ultimately a national institution. To do so means discounting even the possibility that the ascendance of such international regimes engages the sovereignty and territoriality of the national state. And since the multiplication of instruments and their growing use by national courts is a very recent development—unlike the concept of human rights—we must at least allow for the possibility that there are new processes afoot also in this realm.

In terms of sovereignty, the emergent consensus in the community of states to further globalization has created a set of specific obligations on participating states. The state remains as the ultimate guarantor of the "rights" of global capital, i.e. the protection of contracts and property rights. Thus the state has incorporated the global project of its own shrinking role in regulating economic transactions (Cox, 1987; Panitch, 1996). Firms operating transnationally want to ensure the functions traditionally exercised by the state in the national realm of the economy, notably guaranteeing property rights and contracts. The state here can be conceived of as representing a technical administrative capacity which cannot be replicated at this time by any other institutional arrangement; furthermore, this is a capacity backed by military power, with global power in the case of some states.

Deregulation and other policies furthering economic globalization cannot simply be considered as an instance of a declining significance of the state. Deregulation is a vehicle through which a growing number of states are furthering economic globalization and guaranteeing the rights of global cap-

ital, an essential ingredient of the former. Deregulation and kindred policies constitute the elements of a new legal regime dependent on consensus among states to further globalization. This manner of conceptualizing deregulation suggests that the duality national-global as mutually exclusive is problematic in that it does not adequately represent what economic globalization has actually entailed for national states.

While central, the role of the state in producing the legal encasements for economic globalization is no longer as exclusive as it was in earlier periods. Economic globalization has also been accompanied by the creation of new legal regimes and legal practices and the expansion and renovation of some older forms that bypass national legal systems. Among the most important ones in the private sector today are international commercial arbitration and the variety of institutions which fulfill rating and advisory functions that have become essential for the operation of the global economy.

These and other such transnational institutions and regimes do raise questions about the relation between state sovereignty and the governance of global economic processes. International commercial arbitration is basically a private justice system and credit rating agencies are private gate-keeping systems. Along with other such institutions they have emerged as important governance mechanisms whose authority is not centered in the state. They contribute to maintain order at the top, one could say.

All of this has had an impact on sovereignty and on the mutually exclusive territoriality that has marked the history of the modern state. This is an extremely complex and highly differentiated history that cannot be adequately described here. There is an enormously rich scholarship on this subject.[4]

There are two points I would want to emphasize about this history here because they are relevant to the subject of this article, particularly the notion that we may need considerable innovation in immigration policy given today's major transformations. One of these points is the fact that at various periods of major transitions there was a coexistence of multiple systems of rule. This was the case, for instance in the transition from the medieval system of rule to the modern state.[5] And it may well be the case today in this period of transition to a global economy. As I will argue later, supranational organizations

[4] This is a scholarship with a diversity of intellectual lineages: e.g. Ruggie, 1993; Wallerstein, 1988; Arrighi, 1995; Jessop, 1999; Rosenau, 1992; Spruyt, 1994. See Sassen, 1996 for a discussion of this literature as it concerns the particular question under discussion here.

[5] Thus, there were centralizing monarchies in Western Europe, city-states in Italy and city-leagues in Germany (See Wallerstein, 1988). Further, even at a time when we see the emergence of nation states with exclusive territoriality and sovereignty, it can be argued that other forms might have become effective alternatives, e.g. the analysis in Spruyt (1994) on the Italian city-states and the Hanseatic league in northern Europe.

today and regimes such as GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services) and NAFTA may well signal the strengthening of other non-exclusive systems of rule today. A second element in the history of the modern state that matters here is the fact of enormous contestation to the formation of and claims by central states (see Tilly, 1990). Again I see this as relevant to the contemporary period in that it signals the possibility of regimes that go beyond state sovereignty or that involve far more developed instances of multilateralism notwithstanding strong resistance among policy makers and analysts to even the idea of such a possibility.

While these new conditions for transnational economies are being produced and implemented by governments and economic actors in highly developed countries, immigration policy in those same countries remains centered in older conceptions about control and regulation. One of the key obstacles to even beginning to think along totally different lines about immigration policy is the widespread conviction that any other approach than border control would lead to massive invasions from the Third World. Much general commentary and policy making wittingly or not tends to proceed as if most people in less developed countries want to go to a rich country, as if all immigrants want to become permanent settlers, as if the problem of current immigration policy has to do basically with gaps or failures in enforcement, as if raising the levels of border control is an effective way of regulating immigration. This type of understanding of immigration clearly leads to a certain type of immigration policy, one centered on the fear of being invaded by people from less developed countries everywhere and hence on border control as the only answer. The evidence on immigration shows that most people do not want to leave their countries, that overall levels of permanent immigration are not very large, that there is considerable circulation and return migration, that most migration flows eventually stabilize if not decline (See Sassen, 1999 for a review of the evidence on these issues). Making these the central facts about the reality of immigration should allow for a broader set of options when it comes to immigration policy than would be the case with mass emigration and invasion. (See also Isbister, 1996).

Can the state escape the types of transformations described here regarding economic globalization, and the pressures towards transnationalism they entail, when it comes to a very different domain, that of immigration policy design and implementation?

II. *Beyond Sovereignty: Constraints on States' Policy Making*

In the case of immigration policy, states under the rule of law increasingly confront a range of rights and obligations, pressures from both inside and outside, from universal human rights to not so universal ethnic lobbies.

First, we see emerging a de facto regime, centered in international agreements and conventions as well as in various rights gained by immigrants, that limits the state's role in controlling immigration. An example of such an agreement is the International Convention adopted by the General Assembly of the UN on Dec. 18, 1990 on the protection of the rights of all migrant workers and members of their families (Resolution 45/158).[6]

Further, there is a set of rights of resident immigrants widely upheld by legal authorities. We have also seen the gradual expansion over the last three decades of civil and social rights to marginal populations, whether women, ethnic minorities, or immigrants and refugees.

In this context, the new 1996 US immigration law, which curtails the rights of undocumented and legal immigrants, can be seen as a rejection of these international instruments. Nonetheless, precisely because these instruments exist the stage is set for at least some contestation. Indeed, some of the provisions restricting the rights of resident immigrants to welfare support have already had to be eliminated or diluted.

We have seen this contestation frequently in the long and arduous history of international human rights codes. The extension of rights, which has taken place mostly through the judiciary has confronted states with a number of constraints in the area of immigration and refugee policy. For instance, there have been attempts by the legislature in France and Germany to limit family reunification which were blocked by administrative and constitutional courts on the grounds that such restrictions would violate international agreements. The courts have also regularly supported a combination of rights of resident immigrants which have the effect of limiting the government's power over resident immigrants. Similarly such courts have limited the ability of governments to restrict or stop asylum seekers from entering the country.

Efforts that mix the conventions on universal human rights and national judiciaries assume many different forms. Some of the instances in the US are the sanctuary movement in the 1980s which sought to establish protected

[6] It should be said that no developed country has signed this convention, mainly because they are unwilling to relinquish discretionary control over migrant workers. Yet the Convention does have moral authority and has served its purposes on various occasions in Europe, discussed later. The European Commission's 1994 Communication on Immigration and Asylum proposed that all member states ratify the UN Convention on workers.

areas, typically in churches, for refugees from Central America; judicial battles, such as those around the status of Salvadoreans granted indefinite stays though formally defined as illegal; the fight for the rights of detained Haitians in an earlier wave of boat lifts. It is clear that notwithstanding the lack of an enforcement apparatus, human rights limit the discretion of states in how they treat non-nationals on their territory. It is also worth noting in this regard that UNHCR is the only UN agency with a universally conceded right of access to a country experiencing a refugee crisis.

The growing influence of human rights law is particularly evident in Europe. It was not until the 1980s that the same began in the US, though it still lags behind.[7] This has been seen partly as a result of American definitions of personhood which have led courts in some cases to address the matter of undocumented immigrants within American constitutionalism, notably the idea of inalienable and natural rights of people and persons, without territorial confines. The emphasis on persons makes possible interpretations about undocumented immigrants, in a way it would not if the emphasis were on citizens. (For a debate on these issues see *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies*, 2000.) It was not till the mid 1970s and the early 1980s that domestic courts began to consider human rights codes as normative instruments in their own right. The rapid growth of undocumented immigration and the sense of the state's incapacity to control the flow and to regulate the various categories in its population was a factor leading courts to consider the international human rights regime; it allows courts to rule on basic protections of individuals not formally accounted in the national territory and legal system, notably undocumented aliens and unauthorized refugees.[8]

The growing accountability, in principle, of states under the rule of law to international human rights codes and institutions, together with the fact that individuals and non-state actors can make claims on those states in terms of those codes, signals a development that goes beyond the expansion of human rights within the framework of nation-states. It contributes to redefine the bases of legitimacy of states under the rule of law and the notion of nationality. Under human rights regimes states must increasingly

[7] And its weight in many of the Latin American countries is dubious. For a very detailed (and harrowing) account of the situation in Mexico, see Redding, 1996. See also generally Sikkink, 1993.

[8] For instance, the Universal Declaration was cited in 76 federal cases from 1948 through 1994; over 90% of those cases took place since 1980 and of those, 49 percent involved immigration issues, and 54% if we add refugees (Jacobson, 1996: 97). Jacobson also found that the term "human rights" was referred to in 19 federal cases before the 20th century, 34 times from 1900 to 1944. 191 from 1945 to 1969, 803 cases in the 1970s, over 2,000 in the 1980s, and, estimated at 4,000 cases through the 1990s.

take account of persons qua persons, rather than qua citizens. The individual is now an object of law and a site for rights regardless of whether a citizen or an alien.[9]

Finally, the numbers and kinds of political actors involved in immigration policy debates and policy making in Western Europe, North America, and Japan are far greater than they were two decades ago: the European Union, anti-immigrant parties, vast networks of organizations in both Europe and North America that often represent immigrants, or claim to do so, and fight for immigrant rights, immigrant associations and immigrant politicians, mostly in the second generation, and, especially in the US so-called ethnic lobbies.[10] The policy process for immigration is no longer confined to a narrow governmental arena of ministerial and administrative interaction. Public opinion and public political debate have become part of the arena wherein immigration policy is shaped.[11] Whole parties position themselves politically in terms of their stand on immigration, especially in some of the European countries.

These developments are particularly evident in the case of the European Union.[12] Europe's single market program has had a powerful impact

[9] There is a whole debate about the notion of citizenship and what it means in the current context (See Soysal, 1994; Baubock, 1994; *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies*, 2000). One trend in this debate is a return to notions of cities and citizenship, particularly in so-called global cities, which are partly de-nationalized territories and have high concentrations of non-nationals from many different parts of the world (e.g. Holston, 1996; Friedmann, 1995; Knox and Taylor, 1995; *Social Justice*, 1993; Copjec and Sorkin, 1999). The ascendance of human rights codes strengthens these tendencies to move away from nationality and national territory as absolute categories.

[10] While these developments are well known for the cases of Europe and North America, there is not much general awareness of the fact that we are seeing incipient forms in Japan as well (See, e.g. Shank, 1995; Sassen, 2000; 1998: chapter 4). For instance in Japan today we see a strong group of human rights advocates for immigrants; efforts by non-official unions to organize undocumented immigrant workers; organizations working on behalf of immigrants which receive funding from individuals or government institutions in sending countries (e.g. the Thai Ambassador to Japan announced in October 1995 that his government will give a total of 2.5 million baht, about US$ 100,000, to five civic groups that assist Thai migrant workers, especially undocumented ones; see *Japan Times, October 18 1995*).

[11] Further, the growth of immigration, refugee flows, ethnicity and regionalism, raise questions about the accepted notion of citizenship in contemporary nation-states and hence about the formal structures for accountability. My research on the international circulation of capital and labor has raised questions for me on the meaning of such concepts as national economy and national workforce under conditions of growing internationalization of capital and the growing presence of immigrant workers in major industrial countries. Furthermore, the rise of ethnicity in the US and in Europe among a mobile work-force raises questions about the content of the concept of nation-based citizenship. The portability of national *identity* raises questions about the bonds with other countries, or localities within them; and the resurgence of ethnic regionalism creates barriers to the political incorporation of new immigrants.

[12] There is a large and rich literature on the development of immigration policy at the European level. A bibliography and analyses on the particular angle under discussion

in raising the prominence of various issues associated with free circulation of people as an essential element in creating a frontier-free community; earlier EC institutions lacked the legal competence to deal with many of these issues but had to begin to address them. Gradually EC institutions wound up more deeply involved with visa policy, family reunification and migration policy—all formerly exclusively in the domain of the individual national states. National governments resisted EC (and later EU) involvement in these once exclusively national domains. But now both legal and practical issues have made such involvement acceptable and inevitable notwithstanding many public pronouncements to the contrary.

It is becoming evident that many aspects of immigration and refugee policy intersect with EU legal competence. A key nexus here is the free movement of persons and attendant social rights as part of the formation of a single market. In practice the EU is assuming an increasingly important role and the fact that immigration is a long-term feature in these countries is slowly being acknowledged. The monetary and economic union would require greater flexibility in movement of workers and their families and thereby pose increasing problems for national immigration laws regarding non-EU nationals in EU member states. Although the third-country national population is very small, politically they are a very important issue. There is now growing recognition for the need of an EU-wide immigration policy, something denied for a long time by individual states.

In the case of the US, the combination of forces at the governmental level is quite different yet has similar general implications about the state's constraints in immigration policy making. Immigration policy in the US is today largely debated and shaped by Congress, and hence is highly public and subject to a vast multiplicity of local interests, notably ethnic lobbies.[13]

---

here—limitations on the autonomy of the state in making immigration policy—can be found in Sassen, 1999b).

[13] Jurisdiction over immigration matters in the US Congress lies with the Judiciary Committee, not with the Foreign Affairs Committee as might have been the case. Congressional intent on immigration is often at odds with the foreign affairs priorities of the Executive. There is a certain policy making tug of war (Mitchell, 1989). It has not always been this way. In the late 1940s and 1950s there was great concern with how immigration policy could be used to advance foreign policy objectives. The history of what government agency was responsible for immigration is rather interesting. Earlier, when the Department of Labor (DOL) was created in 1914 it got the responsibility for immigration policy. On June 1933, President Roosevelt combined functions into the Immigration and Naturalization Service within DOL. The advent of WWII brought a shift in the administrative responsibility for the country's immigration policy: in 1940 President Roosevelt recommended it be shifted to the Department of Justice, because of the supposed political threat represented by immigrants from enemy countries. This was meant to last for the war and then INS was to be returned to the DOL. But it never was. It also meant that immigration wound up in Congress

This has made it a very public process, quite different from other processes of policy making.[14]

The fact that immigration in the US has historically been the preserve of the Federal government assumes new meaning in today's context of radical devolution—the return of powers to the states.[15] Aman Jr. (1995) has noted that although political and constitutional arguments for reallocating federal power to the states are not new, the recent re-emergence of the Tenth Amendment as a politically viable and popular guideline is a major political shift since the New Deal in the relations between the federal government and the states. There is now an emerging conflict between several state governments and the Federal government around the particular issue of federal mandates concerning immigrants—such as access to public health care and schools—without mandatory federal funding. Thus states with disproportionate shares of immigrants are asserting that they are disproportionately burdened by the putative costs of immigration. In the US the costs of immigration are an area of great debate and wide ranging estimates.[16] At the heart of this conflict is the fact that the Federal Government sets policy but does not assume responsibility, financial or otherwise for the implementation of many key aspects of immigration policy. The radical devolution under way now is going to accentuate some of these divisions further.

States are beginning to request reimbursement from the Federal Government for the costs of benefits and services that they are required to provide, especially to undocumented immigrants (Clark et al., 1994; GAO, 1994; 1995a). In 1994, six states (Arizona, California, Florida, New Jersey, New York and

---

in committees traditionally reserved for lawyers, as are the Senate and House Judiciary Committees. It has been said that this is why immigration law is so complicated (and, I would add, so centered on the legalities of entry and so unconcerned with broader issues).

[14] There are diverse social forces shaping the role of the state depending on the matter at hand. Thus in the early 1980s bank crisis, for instance, the players were few and well coordinated; the state basically relinquished the organizing capacity to the banks, the IMF, and a few other actors. All very discreet, indeed so discreet that if you look closely the government was hardly a player in that crisis. This is quite a contrast with the deliberations around the passing of the 1986 Immigration and Reform Control Act—which was a sort of national brawl. In trade liberalization discussions there are often multiple players, and the executive may or may not relinquish powers to congress.

[15] In this light it is worth noting that in November 1995 a federal judge ruled large sections of Proposition 187 (passed by referendum in the state of California to be instituted in that state) unconstitutional, citing individual rights and the fact that "the state is powerless to enact its own scheme to regulate immigration," this being the preserve of the Federal government of the US.

[16] An important study by the Washington based Urban Institute (Clark et al., 1994) found that immigrants contributed US$ 30 billion more in taxes than they take in services in the early 1990s.

Texas) filed separate suits in federal district courts to recover costs they claimed to have sustained because of the Federal Government's failure to enforce US immigration policy, protect the nation's borders, and provide adequate resources for immigration emergencies (Dunlap and Morse, 1995).[17] The amounts range from $50.5 million in New Jersey for Fiscal Year 1993 costs of imprisoning 500 undocumented criminal felons and construction of future facilities, to 33.6 billion in NY for all state and county costs associated with undocumented immigration between 1988 to 1993. US District Court judges have dismissed all six lawsuits; some of the states are appealing the decision. The conflict is illustrated by the notorious case of the state of California and its US$ 377 million lawsuit against the Federal government. The radical devolution under way now is going to accentuate some of these divisions further.

One of the questions raised by these developments concerns the nature of the control by national states in regulating immigration. The question here is not so much, how effective is a state's control over its borders—we know it is never absolute. The question concerns rather the substantive nature of state control over immigration given international human rights agreements, the extension of various social and political rights to resident immigrants over the last twenty years, the multiplication of political actors involved with the immigration question, and the variety of other dynamics within which immigration is embedded—some of which may be connected to foreign policies of the receiving states (Sassen, 1999).

We can illuminate the issue of the substantive nature of the control by states over immigration with a twist on the zero sum argument. If a government closes one kind of entry category, recent history shows that another one will have a rise in numbers. A variant on this dynamic is that if a government has, for instance, a very liberal policy on asylum, public opinion may turn against all asylum seekers and close up the country totally; this in turn is likely to promote an increase in irregular entries.[18]

---

[17] Pres. Clinton's 1994 crime bill earmarked 1.8 billion in disbursements over 6 years to help reimburse states for these incarcerations costs.

[18] Increasingly, unilateral policy by a major immigration country is problematic. One of the dramatic examples was that of Germany which began to receive massive numbers of entrants as the other European states gradually tightened their policies and Germany kept its very liberal asylum policy. Another case is the importance for the EU today that the Mediterranean countries—Italy, Spain and Portugal—control their borders regarding non-EU entrants.

III. *When Different Regimes Intersect*

Immigration policy continues to be characterized by its formal isolation from other major processes, as if it were possible to handle migration as a bounded, closed event. There are one could say, two major epistemic communities—one concerning the flow of capital and information; the other, immigration. Both of these epistemic communities are international, and both enjoy widespread consensus in the community of states.

The coexistence of such different regimes for capital and for immigrants has not been seen as an issue in the US. The case of the EU is of interest here because it represents an advanced stage of formalization, and in this effort European states are discovering the difficulties if not impossibility of maintaining two such diverse regimes. The European Community and the national governments of member states have found the juxtaposition of the divergent regimes for immigration flows and for other types of flows rather difficult to handle. The discussion, design and implementation of policy aimed at forming a European Union make it evident that immigration policy has to account for the facts of rapid economic internationalization. The European Union shows us with great clarity the moment when states need to confront this contradiction in their design of formal policy frameworks. The other major regional systems in the world are far from that moment and may never reach it. Yet they contain less formalized versions of the juxtaposition between border-free economies and border controls to keep immigrants out. NAFTA is one such instance, as are, in a more diffuse way, various initiatives for greater economic integration in the Western Hemisphere.

Though less clearly than in Western Europe, these issues are present in other regions with cross-border migrations. These are regional systems constituted partly as zones of influence of major economic or geo-political powers, e.g. the long term dominance of the US over the Caribbean Basin. What matters here is that to a good extent major international migration flows have been embedded in some or another variant of these regional systems. The quasi-transnational economic integration characterizing such regional systems produces its own variety of contradictions between drives for border-free economic spaces and border-control to keep immigrants and refugees out.

There are strategic sites where it becomes clear that the existence of two very different regimes for the circulation of capital and the circulation of immigrants poses problems that cannot be solved through the old rules of the game, where the facts of transnationalization weigh in on the state's decisions regarding immigration. For instance, the need to create special

regimes for the circulation of service workers both within the GATS and NAFTA as part of the further internationalization of trade and investment in services. This regime for the circulation of service workers has been uncoupled from any notion of migration; but it represents in fact a version of temporary labor migration. It is a regime for labor mobility which is in good part under the oversight of entities that are quite autonomous from the government. This points to an institutional reshuffling of some of the components of sovereign power over entry and can be seen as an extension of the general set of processes whereby state sovereignty is partly being decentered onto other non- or quasi-governmental entities for the governance of the global economy (Sassen, 1996).[19]

The development of provisions for workers and business persons signals the difficulty of *not* dealing with the circulation of people in the implementation of free trade and investment frameworks. In their own specific ways each of these efforts—NAFTA, GATS and the European Union—has had to address cross-border labor circulation.

One instantiation of the impact of globalization on governmental policy making can be seen in Japan's immigration law Amendment passed in 1990. While this is quite different from how the issue plays in the context of free trade agreements, it nonetheless illustrates one way of handling the need for cross-border circulation of professional workers in a context of resistance to the notion of open borders. This legislation opened the country to several categories of highly specialized professionals with a western background (e.g. experts in international finance, in western-style accounting, in western medicine, etc.) in recognition of the growing internationalization of the professional world in Japan; it made the entry of what is referred to as "simple labor" illegal (Sassen, 2000: chapter 9). This can be read as importing "western human capital" and closing borders to immigrants.

---

[19] For instance, NAFTA's chapters on services, financial services, telecommunications and "business persons" contain considerable detail on the various aspects relating to people operating in a country that is not their country of citizenship. For instance, Chapter Twelve, "Cross-Border Trade in Services" of the NAFTA (White House document, September 29, 1993) includes among its five types of measures those covering "the presence in its territory of a service provider of another Party" under Article 1201, including both provisions for firms and for individual workers. Under that same article there are also clear affirmations that nothing in the agreement on cross-border trade in services imposes any obligation regarding a non-national seeking access to the employment market of the other country, or to expect any right with respect to employment. Article 1202 contains explicit conditions of treatment of non-national service providers, so do Articles 1203, 1205, 1210 (especially Annex 1210.5), and 1213.2a and b. Similarly, Chapter Thirteen on Telecommunications and Chapter Fourteen on Financial Services contain specific provisions for service providers, including detailed regulations applying to workers. Chapter Sixteen on "Temporary Entry for Business Persons" covers provisions for those "engaged in trade in goods, the provision of services or the conduct of investment activities" (Article 1608).

Further, the need to address cross-border circulation of people has also become evident in free trade agreements in the less developed world, notably in Latin America. (For more detailed accounts, including the original treaty documents see Acuerdo de Cartagena, 1991a,b,c; Leon and Kratochwil, 1993; CEPAL, 1994; Torales, 1993; Marmora, 1993; Stein, 1993) There has been a sharp increase in activity around the international circulation of people in each of the major regional trading blocks: Mercosur, the Grupo Andino and the Mercado Comun de Centroamerica. Each one has launched a variety of initiatives in the early 1990s on international labor migration among their member countries. This is in many ways a new development. Some of the founding treaties precede the flurry of meetings on labor migrations and the circulation of people. But it is clear that conditions in the early 1990s forced this issue on the agenda. When one examines what actually happened it becomes evident that the common markets for investment and commerce in each of these regions had themselves become activated under the impact of globalization, deregulation, privatisation. It was the increased circulation of capital, goods and information under the impact of globalization, deregulation and privatisation that forced the question of the circulation of people on the agenda.

In the case of the US and its major immigration source country, Mexico, it appears that the signing of NAFTA has also had the effect of activating a series of new initiatives regarding migration—a sort of de-facto bilateralism which represents a radically new phase in the handling of migration between these two countries. It is worth providing some detail on these.

Not unlike what was the case in Latin America, we are seeing a re-activation of older instruments and a flurry of new activity around the question of international migration. To provide better coordination between the two countries Presidents Carter and Lopez Portillo established the US-Mexico Consultative Mechanism. This eventually led to the formation of the US-Mexico Binational Commission in 1981 to serve as a forum for meetings between Cabinet-level officials from both countries. It was conceived as a flexible mechanism that would meet once or twice a year. One of the early working groups formed was the Border Relations Action group, in 1981.

What is different since the mid-1990s is the frequency, focus and actual work that is getting done in the meetings of the working groups. NAFTA has further contributed to strengthen the contacts and collaboration in the working groups. Particularly active is the working group on Migration and Consular Affairs.[20] There are also disagreements between the two delegations,

[20] The US Delegation for this group is chaired by the Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs and the INS Commissioner.

which are discussed openly. Notably, the Mexican delegation is deeply concerned about the growing anti-immigrant feeling and measures in the US, the US delegation has agreed to work together to combat these developments. The Mexican delegation also expressed concern at the US proposal to expand and strengthen border fences to improve security in various locations. They emphasized the negative effects of such a measure on the border communities and Mexican efforts to resolve the problems in the most troubled locations. Notwithstanding these serious disagreements, and perhaps precisely because of them, both delegations are convinced of the importance to continue the collaboration and communication that has developed over the last two years.

Conclusion

All of these developments have the effect of a) reducing the autonomy of the state in immigration policy making; and b) multiplying the sectors within the state that are addressing immigration policy and therewith multiplying the room for conflicts within the state. The assertion that the state is in charge of immigration policy is less and less helpful. Policy making regarding international issues can engage very different parts of the government. The state itself has not only been transformed by its participation in the global economy, but has of course never been a homogeneous actor. It is constituted through multiple agencies and social forces. Indeed it could be said (Mitchell, 1989) that although the state has central control over immigration policy, the work of exercising that claimed power often begins with a limited contest between the state and interested social forces. These interest groups include agribusiness, manufacturing, humanitarian groups, unions, ethnic organizations, zero population growth efforts. Today we need to add to this the fact that the hierarchies of power and influence within the state are being reconfigured by the furthering of economic globalization.[21]

The conditions within which immigration policy is being made and implemented today range from the pressures of economic globalization and its implications for the role of the state to international agreements on human rights. And the institutional setting within which immigration policy is being

[21] For instance, an item on internal changes in the state which may have impacts on immigration policy is the ascendance of what Charles Keely has called soft security issues. According to some observers, recent government reorganization in the departments of State, Defense, and the CIA reflects an implicit redefinition of national security.

made and implemented ranges from national states and local states to supranational organizations.

Why does this transformation of the state and the inter-state system matter for the regulation of immigration? The displacement of governance functions away from the state to non-state entities affects the state's capacity to control or keep controlling its borders. New systems of governance are being created. Increasingly they may create conflicts with the state's capacity to keep on regulating immigration in the same ways. Further, the transformation of the state itself through its role in the implementation of global processes, may well contribute to new constraints, options and vested interests. The ascendance of agencies linked to furthering globalization and the decline of those linked to domestic equity questions is quite likely to eventually have an effect on the immigration agenda.

The developments described here point to a number of trends that may become increasingly important for sound immigration policy making. First, where the effort towards the formation of transnational economic spaces has gone the farthest and been most formalized it has become very clear that existing frameworks for immigration policy are problematic. It is not the case that the coexistence of very different regimes for the circulation of capital and for that of people, is free of tension and contention. This is most evident in the legislative work necessary for the formation of the European Union. Lesser versions of this tension are evident in the need to design special provisions for the circulation of workers in all the major free trade agreements.

Second, we see the beginning of a displacement of government functions on to non-governmental or quasi-governmental institutions. This is most evident in the new transnational legal and regulatory regimes created in the context of economic globalization. But it is also intersecting with questions of migration, specifically temporary labor migration, as is evident in the creation of special regimes for the circulation of service workers and business persons both within the GATS and NAFTA as part of the further internationalization of trade and investment in services. This regime for the circulation of service workers has been separated from any notion of migration; but it represents in fact a version of temporary labor migration. It is a regime for labor mobility which is in good part under the oversight of entitites that are quite autonomous from the government. We can see in this displacement the elements of a privatization of certain aspects of the regulation of cross-border labor mobility.

Third, the legitimation process for states under the rule of law calls for respect and enforcement of international human rights codes, regardless of the nationality and legal status of an individual. While enforcement is

precarious, it nonetheless signals a major shift in the legitimation process. This is perhaps most evident in the strategic role that the judiciary has assumed in the highly developed countries when it comes to the rights of immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers.

Finally, the state itself has been transformed by this combination of developments. This is so partly because the state under the rule of law is one of the key institutional arenas for the implementation of these new transnational regimes—whether the global rights of capital or the human rights of all individuals regardless of nationality. And it is partly because the state has incorporated the objective of furthering a global economy, as is evident in the ascendance of certain government agencies, i.e. Treasury, and the decline of others, such as those linked to the social fund.

Because so many processes are transnational, goverments are increasingly not competent to address some of today's major issues unilaterally or even from the exclusive confines of the inter-state system narrowly defined. This is not the end of state sovereignty, but rather that the "exclusivity and scope of their competence" (cf. Rosenau, 1992) has altered, that there is a narrowing range within which the state's authority and legitimacy are operative.

There is no doubt that some of the intellectual technology that governments have and that allow them to control, i.e. Foucault's governmentality, has now shifted to non-state institutions. This is dramatically illustrated in the new privatized transnational regimes for cross-border business and the growing power of the logic of the global capital market over national economic policy described.

These are transformations in the making as we speak. My reading is that they matter. It is easy to argue the opposite: the state is still absolute and nothing much has changed. But it may well be the case that these developments signal the beginning of a new era. Scholarship on mentalities has shown how difficult it is for people to recognize systemic change in their contemporary conditions. Seeing continuity is much simpler and often reassuring.

Official immigration policy today is not part of the explicated rules of the new game. Is this helpful in seeking to have a more effective and fair long term immigration policy in today's globalizing world?

References

Acuerdo de Cartagena, Junta. 1991a. *Acta Final de la 1ra. Reunion de Autoridades Migratorias del Grupo Andino.* Lima: JUNAC.

—— 1991b. *Bases de Propuesta para la Integracion Fronteriza Andina.* Lima: JUNAC.

——/OIM. 1991c. *La Migracion Internacional en los Procesos Regionales de Integracion en America del Sur.* Lima: JUNAC.

Aman, Jr. Alfred C. (1995) "A Global Perspective on Current Regulatory Reform: Rejection, Relocation, or Reinvention? *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies* Vol. 2, pp. 429–464.

Baubock, Rainer. (1994). *Transnational Citizenship: Memberships and Rights in International Migration* (Aldershot, England: Edward Elgar).

Biersteker, Thomas J., Rodney Bruce Hall and Craig N. Murphy (eds.). Forthcoming. *Private Authority and Global Governance.*

Bohning, W.R. and M.-L. Schloeter-Paredes (eds.). 1994. *Aid in place of Migration.* Geneva: International Labor Office.

Bonacich, Edna, Lucie Cheng, Norma Chinchilla, Nora Hamilton, and Paul Ong (eds.). *Global Production: The Apparel Industry in the Pacific Rim.* Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994.

Bosniak, Linda S. 1992. "Human Rights, State Sovereignty and the Protection of Undocumented Migrants Under the International Migrant Workers Convention." *International Migration Review* xxv, no. 4: pp. 737–770.

Briggs, Vernon M., Jr. 1992. *Mass Immigration and the National Interest.* Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.

CEPAL. 1994. *Desarrollo reciente delos procesos de integracion en America Latina y el Caribe.* Santiago, Chile: CEPAL.

Cornelius, Wayne A., Philip L. Martin, and James F. Hollifield (eds.) *Controlling Immigration. A Global Perspective.* Stanford: Standford University Press, 1994.

Cox, Robert. Production, Power, and World Order: *Social Forces in the Making of History.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1987.

Clark, Rebecca L., Jeffrey Passel, Wendy Zimmermann, and Michael Fix. 1994. *Fiscal Impacts of Undocumented Aliens: Selected Estimates for Seven States.* Report to the Office of Management and Budget and the Department of Justice, September. Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute.

Drache, D. and M. Gertler (eds.). *The New Era of Global Competition: State Policy and Market Power.* Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991.

Dunlap, Jonathan C. and Ann Morse. 1995. "States Sue Feds to Recover Immigration Costs." NCSL *Legisbrief,* January 3 (1). Washington, D.C. National Conference of State Legislatures.

Espenshade, Thomas J. and Vanessa E. King. 1994. "State and Local Fiscal Impacts of US Immigrants: Evidence from New Jersey." *Population Research and Policy Review* 13: 225–256.

Fagen, Patricia Weiss and Joseph Eldridge. 1991. "Salvadorean repatriation from Honduras.". In Mary Ann Larkin (ed.) *Repatriation under Conflict: The Central American Case.* Washington, D.C.: HMP, CIPRA, Georgetown University.

Franck, Thomas M. 1992. "The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance," *American Journal of International Law,* vol. 86, 1: 46–91.

General Accounting Office. 1994. *Illegal Aliens: Assessing Estimates of Financial Burden on California.* November, GAO/HEHS–95–22. Washington, D.C.: US GAO.

—— 1995. *Illegal Aliens: National Net Cost Estimates Very Widely.* July, GAO/HEHS–95–133. Washington, D.C.: US GAO.

Henkin, Louis. 1990. *The Age of Rights.* NY: Columbia University Press.

Holston, James (ed.). 1996. Cities and Citizenship. A Special Issue of *Public Culture.*

Jessop, Robert. "Reflections on Globalization and its Illogics" pp. 19–38 in Olds, Kris, et al. (ed.) *Globalization and the Asian pacific: Contested Territories.* London: Routledge, 1999.

Isbister, John. 1996. *The Immigration Debate. Remaking America.* West Hartford, Conn.: Kumarian Books.

Journal fur Entwicklungspolitik. Schwerpunkt: Migration. (Special Issue on Migration edited by Christoff Parnreiter). Vol. XI, nr. 3, 1995. (Frankfurt: Brandes & Apsel Verlag).

Paul L. Knox and Peter J. Taylor (eds.). 1995. World Cities in a World-System. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Kratochwil, K. Hermann. 1995. "Movilidad transfronteriza de personas y procesos de integracion regional en America Latina." *Revista de la OIM sobre Migraciones en America Latina.* vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 3–12.

Leon, Ramon y K. Hermann Kratochwil. 1993. "Integracion, migraciones y desarrollo sostenido en el Grupo Andino." *Revista de la OIM sobre Migraciones en America Latina.* vol. 11, nr. 1 (April): 5–28.

Massey, Douglas S. Joaquin Arango, Graeme Hugo, Ali Kouaouci, Adela Pellegrino and J. Edward Taylor. 1993. "Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal." *Population and Development Review,* 19, 3: 431–466.

Martin, Philip L. 1993. *Trade and Migration: NAFTA and Agriculture.* Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics. (October).

Marmora, Lelio. 1994. "Desarrollo sostenido y politicas migratorias: su tratamiento en los espacios latinoamericanos de integracion." *Revista de la OIM sobre Migraciones en America Latina.* vol. 12, no. 1/3 Abril-Diciembre, pp. 5–50.

Mitchell, Christopher "International Migration, International Relations and Foreign Policy." *International Migration Review* (Fall 1989).

Mittelman, James (ed.) *Globalization: Critical Reflections. International Political Economy Yearbook.* Vol. 9, 1996. Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Olds, Kris, Dicken, Peter, Kelly, Philip F., Kong, Lilly, Yeung, Henry Wai-Chung (ed.). Globalization and the Asian Pacific: Contested Territories. London: Routledge, 1999.

OIM 1991b. *Programa de Integracion y Migraciones para el Cono Sur.* Buenos Aires: PRIMCOS/OIM

Panitch, Leo (1996) "Rethinking the Role of the State in an Era of Globalization." In Mittelman (ed.) op. cit.

Rosen, Fred and Deidre McFadyen (eds.) 1995. *Free Trade and Economic Restructuring in Latin America.* (A NACLA Reader). New York: Monthly Review Press.

Reding, Andrew A. 1995. *Democracy and Human Rights in Mexico.* New York: World Policy Institute, World Policy Papers.

Rosenau, J.N. (1992) "Governance, order, and change in world politics," In Rosenau and E.O. Czempiel (eds.) Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–29.

Salacuse, Jeswald. 1991. *Making Global Deals: Negotiating in the International Marketplace.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Sassen, Saskia. 1996. *Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization.* The 1995 Columbia University Leonard Hastings Schoff Memorial Lectures. New York: Columbia University Press.

—— 1999a. "Embedding the Global in the National: Implications for the Role of the State." Pp. 158–171 in Smith et al. (eds.), States and Sovereignty in the Global Economy. London: Routledge.

—— 1999b. *Guests and Aliens.* New York: New Press.

—— 1998. *Globalization and its Discontents.* New York: New Press.

—— 2000 *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo* (New Updated Edition). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Sikkink, Kathryn. 1993. "Human Rights, Principled Issue-Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America." *International Organization,* 47 (Summer): 411–41.

Smith, David A., Dorothy J. Solinger, and Steven C. Topik (ed.). 1999. States and Sovereignty in the Global Economy. London: Routledge.

Social Justice. *Global Crisis, Local Struggles.* Special Issue, *Social Justice.* Vol. 20, nrs. 3–4, Fall-Winter 1993.

Spruyt, Hendrik. 1994. *The Sovereign State and its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems Change.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Stein, Eduardo. 1993. "Las dinamicas migratorias en el Istmo Centroamericano en al perspectiva de la integracion y el imperativo de la sostenibilidad." *Revista de la OIM sobre Migraciones en America Latina.* vol. 11, no. 2 Agosto: pp. 5–51.

Soysal, Yasmin. 1994. *Limits of Citizenship.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Tilly, Charles (ed.). 1975. *The Formation of National States in Western Europe.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Thranhardt, Dietrich (ed.) 1992. *Europe: A New Immigration Continent.* Hamburg: Lit Verlag.

Torales, Ponciano. 1993. *Migracion e integracion en el Cono Sur. La Experiencia del Mercosur.* Buenos Aires: OIM.

Tucker, R., Charles B. Keely, and Wrigley (eds.) *Immigration and US Foreign Policy.* Boulder, Co: Westview Press.

United Nations. 1996. *World Population Monitoring 1993. With a Special Report on Refugees.* New York: UN Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis. Population Division.

Wallerstein, I. 1988. *The Modern World-System III.* New York: Academic Press.

8. TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY AND NATION-STATE IN EASTERN EUROPE

Nikolai Genov

1. *From Convergence to Divergence in Eastern Europe*

A trend toward convergence dominated Eastern Europe for several decades that was politically imposed and maintained. Yet, this trend was also similar to policies taken in the European Community to reduce economic discrepancies between its member countries. In the East, the less developed economies of Romania and Bulgaria received support in order to increase economic homogeneity across the region. This goal did not seem unrealistic because all of the member states were centralized and so could easily mobilize national resources. Moreover, even as national political elites recognized that cultures and political traditions differed across the region, they nonetheless tried to follow the same pattern of political mobilization. This, along with the dominant ideology of internationalism, facilitated a mutual adaptation of economic and political institutions across Eastern Europe.

The European Community's programmes for regional development and common agricultural policy could hardly apply to Eastern Europe, however. In the East, the more efficient national economies extracted larger profits in regional trade. Plus, the region's marked political homogenization rested on violence in both domestic and international politics. The ideology of internationalism did not take firm root in mass consciousness and behaviour. Nevertheless, it seemed on the surface in 1989 that East European societies would begin their transformation from communism to capitalism at similar starting positions. For many observers the region was indeed a monolith, the "Eastern bloc." Naturally, more informed analysts knew that Romania was rather poor, but also debt free. Czechoslovakia's foreign debt was also minimal. Hungary had the highest per capita foreign debt in the region, but most of it consisted of long-term loans guaranteed by foreign states. Bulgaria's per capita foreign debt was lower, but its terms were more unfavourable, consisting mainly of short-term loans from private banks—without guarantees from foreign states.

Despite these differences, even well informed observers expected to see a basically similar process of transformation across the region because it seemed that all of the countries had to resolve common problems. Seen from today's

point of view, however, we now appreciate that four global trends challenging all contemporary societies nonetheless do so in rather different ways (Genov, 1997a: 21f).

First, providing economic and political actors with greater room for discretion and initiative, consistent with a universal trend toward instrumental activism, required firmer cultural and institutional support in Eastern Europe. A major institutional development here, of course, was the turn to market exchange and competitive politics. Second, another universal trend, toward individualism, had already permeated all walks of life in the region because central control could only postpone this, not stop it. Rapid industrialization and urbanization had fostered individualism despite collectivist institutional arrangements to the contrary. The task, however, was to transform these arrangements to correspond with those that support a more institutionalized individualism. Third, organizational structures in Eastern European societies could not resist rationalization, another universal or systemic pressure. Observers expected the dissolution of large state bureaucracies to give way to smaller, more flexible organizational forms, those better adapted to markets and competitive politics. Fourth, the region's isolation and cultural rigidity undoubtedly ran counter to universalism in values and norms, another world-wide trend. Observers expected the transformation to overcome the region's parochialism, and a confrontational pattern that often dominated its culture despite the official ideology of internationalism.

As it turned out, the countries of the region adapted to these global trends in strikingly different ways. Their seemingly common starting point dissolved rather readily into diverging paths of development. A wide variety of cultural and political affiliations reappeared to shape how they adapted to a market economy and democratic institutions. Differences in Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox traditions reappeared. The heritage of the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman and the Russian empires turned out to be surprisingly preserved below the surface of modernity itself and, therefore, more influential than expected. Memories of wars, territorial divisions, ethnic conflicts, and cultural disparities shaped both cultural orientations and political preferences. Differing speeds of continental and global integration as well as qualitative difference in the associations that emerged in various countries only increased the region's economic, political and cultural differences. National rivalries became unavoidable (Comisso, 1997; Genov, 1996a; Glatzer, 1996; Hatschikjan and Weilemann, 1995; Offe, 1996; Weldenfeld, 1996; World Development Report, 1996).

The sheer complexity of the transformation and the complicated paths that domestic and international developments took increased the uncertainties of the process. In fact, individuals and groups in all East European soci-

eties are now confronting the undesirable effects of their own pasts. Seen from this point of view, the region contains numerous exemplars of "risk societies" (Genov, 1996b). Some countries in the region manage to cope with today's risks more or less successfully, namely the former socialist countries in Central Europe. While future developments might easily alter this, right now this sub-region's relative economic and political stability is self-evident. Leaders here made well-conceived decisions concerning privatization, investment, integration in international structures, and other matters, and then implemented them.

But this has not been the case in the rest of Eastern Europe, and my thesis is that the major reason for failure and unevenness is the quality of the states that developed immediately after the transformation began. The disappearance of the East German state and the dissolution of the state in Czechoslovakia, former Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union are simply the most visible manifestations of a more general pattern. In many other cases, a weakening of the nation-state itself now accounts for declines in national production and increases in inflation, unemployment and crime. Another major factor in the transition to democracy in Eastern Europe is the rapid acceleration of individualism. Seen in general terms, this is simply part of a global trend (Beck and Beck-Gersheim, 1994). But seen in the specific context of Eastern Europe, increasing individualism exhibits some specific characteristics that are closely connected to the weakening of nation-states in the region.

2. *Individualism and Nation-State*

There are many ways of defining today's ongoing transformation in Eastern Europe but one is to say that it marks a triumph of individualism over collectivism. Before 1989, constitutional arrangements across the region had stressed collectivism, and yet major rights and duties of individuals were recognized in formal law, if not honored in legal practice. What changed is that the optic or orientation of the new constitutions and constitutional amendments shifted radically. The state's responsibility to preserve and enrich the common good remains a major point of reference, but now the very core of constitutional provisions is various individual rights. Thus it might seem to some that a key problem in adapting to the global trend of individualism has already been solved. But social reality is more complex than legal provisions.

A new obstacle to transparency has surfaced. It is now more difficult to discern the cultural orientation and practical action of individuals than it

was under the old centralized state. The major reason why this has happened is as universal as the global trend toward individualism itself. In fact, only one generation ago, hierarchies in most agricultural East European societies were well known and respected. Patterns of action, tested by tradition, were widely accepted. Facts were clearly defined, and largely uncontroversial. Now, after an initial delay, East European societies are rapidly embracing the culture and practices of *advanced* individualism in their *full* complexity. As a result, "the competition is on; knowledge has to be defended at every point; the open society guarantees nothing" (Douglas, 1993: 11).

As modernization proceeds in the region, the stability, transparency and certainty that attended hierarchy have given way to a mosaic of not only modern elements of social life but also post-modern elements. One typical reaction to the uncertainty that this has caused is an obsession with myths, unconventional religions and magic has become fashionable. These exotic beliefs and practices hold out the promise of filling the vacuum left by once well-defined structures, roles, and expectations. The result is paradoxical. On the one hand, most people in the region suffer from basic problems of modernity, namely unemployment, impoverishment and existential troubles. On the other, many of those who are more secure economically are increasingly responding to uncertainty by indulging in post-modern pursuits, namely the many subtleties of entertainment, hobbies, and other leisure time pursuits. A tiny faction of the new rich, in fact, is narcissistically preoccupied with health, fitness and bodybuilding, a phenomenon more spread in advanced societies. The political equivalent of this practice in Eastern Europe, however, is more foreboding, namely a mass longing for a "strong man" to reduce the general state of uncertainty and anxiety in everyday life. Many individuals suffer from loneliness as they face the unpredictable changes taking place all around them.

Still, a note of precaution is also in order. There is no doubt that the diagnosis above speaks to major problems that span many advanced societies. Modern man is always a stranger even when his environment is more familiar because he or she is still caught up in a rapid stream of events. It always seems that social time is accelerating. Moreover, it is sobering to recall that Max Weber drew attention to the radical uncertainty of modern life when he prepared his speech "Science as a Vocation" immediately after the First World War (Weber, 1992 [1919]). Clearly, individualism and its manifold effects have a history that precedes the travails of people today. Yet, there are sound reasons for insisting that developments in the last two or three decades have substantially increased the tensions and conflicts attending the spread of individualism. And these negative effects are amplified in Eastern Europe by the region's severe economic crisis, political instability and cultural

disorientation. This, in turn, complicates any remedial action that might be taken, which then only increases the pathologies of individualism.

Consider the following sources of uncertainty. First, it is widely hoped in Eastern Europe that foreign investment and transfers of know-how from advanced societies will facilitate and accelerate technological innovation in the region. Moreover, Easterners often examine the recent experience of the advanced world for instruction about their own future. They appreciate that rapid technological change in the West rendered whole occupations and professions obsolete, thereby eliminating the security that once came with certain levels of educational attainment, training and productive skills. Coal mining is a classic example. But technological restructuring today causes even greater social dislocations due to increasing global competition and global transfers of technologies. Thus, metallurgical plants that are currently prosperous in Eastern Europe are likely to follow the fate of steel mills in Chicago or the Ruhr valley. Since it is not easy to predict where the next breakthroughs in science and technology will come, no one can be certain about the prospects for specific lines of production or about the careers prospects of those working in them. So technological innovation will remain as great a source of instability in the East's transitional economies as it is in the West's advanced societies.

Second, in sharp contrast to the nearly full employment that the region experienced before 1989, there is now double digit unemployment in most East European countries. The major exception, the Czech Republic, only proves the rule (Economic Survey of Europe, 1997). So far, regional unemployment is caused mainly by a general recession, but it will soon become more structural as technological change accelerates. The experience of advanced societies demonstrates that we have no reason to expect substantial improvement in the foreseeable future. Rather, we can expect unemployment to increase as technological and organizational change imposes stricter requirements. In this situation, large parts of the workforce have good reason to fear that they will soon join the millions of unemployed. The result is a fierce competition for jobs in which the outcome for everybody involved is unpredictable. There is no doubt that being unemployed is itself a violation of basic human rights. Yet, large groups of people in Eastern Europe cope with this violation now, and many more will have to do so in the future. Moreover, an increasingly global competition for jobs can only complicate investment decisions. Rather than investing automatically in countries with the lowest labor costs, investors look at various factors, including political stability, deposits of raw materials, proximity to expanding markets, and others.

Third, even the most successful East European societies have become

more dependent on global changes in technological transfers, commercial and financial exchanges, and political instabilities. Even the best-informed analysts cannot predict how such diverse factors will combine to influence economic processes. So millions of people have to live permanently with uncertainty because their economic situation might be ruined by international financial speculation or by shifts in production and markets originating at distant parts of the globe.

Fourth, due to political, economic and criminal factors, the once low level of economic stratification that marked Eastern Europe has given way to an increasing gap in income between the highest and lowest wage earners. Moreover, the income gap between East European countries and their rich neighbours to the West has also widened. The effects of this recent development are manifold. German analysts see growing numbers of citizens lacking access to the technical infrastructure of advanced societies (Brock, 1994: 70). In the long run, this will result not only in individuals experiencing greater personal uncertainty but also to their feeling that social cohesion is declining more generally. Both trends can become mutually reinforcing. With this, individuals' sense of uncertainty can intensify irrespective of how the poverty line is defined culturally in any particular country. In Eastern Europe, this is the case not only with the elderly, the unemployed and minorities but also more recently with young people generally, single mothers, divorced persons, drug addicts, and many others.

Fifth, democratic political systems today not only strengthen individuals' legal and institutional positions but also shift basic responsibilities to them. Individuals now make major decisions about education, economic activity, family planning, and health care insurance. Since society is growing more and more complex, the cognitive requirements for making these decisions rationally are far too high for large parts of the population to meet. Thus, these decisions are being made under conditions of imperfect rationality, and in impoverished or disintegrating societies these conditions are become more and more imperfect.

Sixth, the increasing heterogeneity of life-styles renders obsolete many traditional, well-established forms of solidarity and the certainty they contributed to social life. The result is that people enter more and more relationships on a more short-term basis. New personal relationships now dominate the horizon of decisions and actions in which people operate. Certainty is over. The life-world is now filled with individuals who live as if they are permanent strangers, deciphering ever anew the symbols around them.

Seventh, during the 1980s post-materialist values had taken firm root among the younger, better educated generation in Eastern Europe. In fact, the spread of these values became an important dimension in the process

of increasing individualism itself. Stressing nonconformity and innovation, post-materialist values left considerable room for personal preferences and choices. But to what end? Answering this question in the midst of the increasing commercialization of everyday life today, along with the looming risk of unemployment and financial instability, is hardly an easy task. The absence of a clear answer only reinforces uncertainty.

Eighth, under the influence of today's ongoing process of individualism, and keeping in mind the complex institutional options now available to East European decision makers, individuals are being pressed to balance mutually exclusive preferences as they ponder their own alternatives. Should one prefer personal distance in contacts or seek greater intimacy in a social environment that is generally alienating? Should one emphasize achievement, along with competition, or will a more cooperative approach prove to be more promising in the specific circumstances of today's transformation? Should one prefer to take risks in pursuit of personal success or seek more institutionalized routines? Again, not every one has the knowledge, predictive capacity, general intelligence or moral integrity needed to make these decisions rationally. The result is that policymaking in the transition occurs within a more or less permanent situation of schizophrenia.

Ninth, but not least, the sheer number and variety of messages that individuals receive from competing sources of information do not necessarily increase their cognitive rationality. Rather, because information is either manipulated or distorted, or else is lacking in certain areas, the cognitive basis of orientation and action is shakier. Thus, despite people's immersion in a flood of information coming from all sides, they currently make decisions under conditions of information deficits.

Having identified these nine sources of uncertainty in individuals' orientations, decisions and actions, we are nevertheless tempted to doubt that the situation is really this dire and hopeless. In fact, even as individualism extends uncertainty, and potential embarrassment, to millions of people, it is also a blessing for millions of others. Why is this the case?

In advanced societies, the answer is clear. Efficient institutions and organizations eventually emerged to reduce uncertainty. Advanced societies are first of all organization societies. Some organizations may be badly structured and more dysfunctional than problem solving; others may shift their goals; still others may be guided by undemocratic or even antihuman ideologies. But there is no other way to reduce complexity in modern life than to develop and employ organizations. Individualism may well originate with the values and norms of particular groups of people, but it is supported institutionally by various organizations that reduce uncertainty "from cradle to grave" and thereby help individuals to manage risks. Educational and health care

organizations, labour and social welfare offices, pension funds and insurance companies all make the existential problems that individuals face more transparent and manageable, even in the midst of increasing individualism.

Therefore, it is certainly an exaggeration to refer to radical uncertainty when describing individualism in advanced societies. Here we need to take note of the ongoing interaction between individuals and the organizations that reduce uncertainty and thereby support individualism. Kafka's vision of individuals lost in a labyrinth of anonymous organizations is more literary metaphor than sound social science because institutions and organizations are typically transparent and stable in the so-called First World of advanced societies.

The picture is different, however, in the Second World of the former communist bloc. The core difference between the East and West today is the weakening of state institutions in Eastern Europe. This is what makes individualism unnecessarily risky. The weakening of state institutions makes the very process of maintaining the common good problematic.

3. *Integration of Nation-States and Supra-National Integration*

Eastern Europe's increasing involvement in institutions of European integration is often regarded as a key issue in the International Politics of the states of the region. Numerous programmes are designed to support efforts by national legislatures to adjust to the European Union. The PHARE Programme, for instance, offers financial incentives for improving institutions and infrastructure. It seems that extending the European Union eastward serves geostrategic interests on both sides (Weidenfeld, 1997: 79f).

But what are the real conditions of this process? One might try to answer this question by using Bulgaria as an example. Because it deviates from the general stability of East European nation-states in the mid-1990s, Bulgaria reveals in sharper relief the region's general problems and prospects (Genov, 1997b). International agencies could not have anticipated a 10.9 percent decline in Bulgarian GDP in 1996, for instance, but this may signal potential problems of transformation across the region. Moreover, the implications may be even broader. Crises in the East might be similar to crises elsewhere, in the South, the Mexican crisis of 1994 being one case in point.

A careful examination of Bulgaria's critical situation reveals that the central problem is precisely the capacity of this nation-state to manage the transformation by maintaining and developing integration at a national level. This is also the central problem in integrating Bulgaria into supranational structures. In fact the crucial role of nation-states in managing today's eco-

nomic and social processes has been underlined by the World Bank, which until recently had stressed the integrating capacities of market forces (World Development Report, 1997). The Bulgarian state experienced failures in managing the national economy in 1991, 1994 and 1996 (Genov, 1996c; Genov, 1997b). Such frequent incidents of unmanageability suggest that the causes are more deeply rooted, extending beyond the economy alone.

As was the case in all East European countries, Bulgaria began its transformation with an all-mighty state. Strictly speaking, Bulgarian society was dominated by a state that was coterminous with the then ruling party. Across earlier decades, the state's centralized integration of society had facilitated rapid modernization by concentrating rather scarce resources in strategic areas. Thus, a speedy transition to an industrial, urbanized society became a possibility (Genov, 1997a: 42f).

The creative potential of this state-centered model of social and economic change was soon exhausted, however. Bulgaria's type of social and economic organization became an obstacle to further social innovation. Thus, the high rate of economic growth that Bulgaria experienced during the 1960s and 1970s declined substantially during the 1980s, as was also the case across the region (Human Development Report, 1996: 14). The level of foreign debt accumulated in 1990—$10.9 billion in US dollars—clearly revealed that central planning now lacked developmental potential. Thus, a differentiation of the economy from politics became unavoidable, and then also an internal differentiation of politics itself. This process was substantially facilitated by global requirements for greater economic effectiveness, political democracy, and value-normative universalism.

Although it began belatedly and under unfavourable international conditions, Bulgaria had the potential of adapting creatively to these global requirements when it began its transformation in 1989. However, a series of hasty and incompetent political decisions moved the country from political centralization to destructive chaos. The Bulgarian state retreated from bearing responsibilities that are regarded as the top priorities of any government in advanced societies. This retreat occurred not only in the areas of science and technological development but also in the areas of national investment and control of the banking system. Thus, the dissolution of the centralized state turned into the dissolution of the state's capacity to integrate the national society.

When the reforms began, it was assumed that separating economic processes from state control would result immediately in the economy attaining a degree of integration autonomously, by economic forces alone. Economic integration, in turn, was expected to provide the basis for a grander integration of the economy with politics and culture. This assumption turned out to be

mistaken. State-owned enterprises did not possess the free capital needed to compete autonomously in the market. Key market institutions, such as the stock exchange, had not yet been created. Foreign trade had to be radically re-oriented. The skills of market activity had to be developed from scratch in most cases.

The complexity and urgency of these problems could not be handled effectively without massive interventions by the state, but political deadlock prevented this from happening. Instead, the newly autonomous economic enterprises transferred their own inefficiency to the state budget by defaulting on their loans. As economic production declined and the state lost control over the economy, the banking system collapsed. It turned out that more often than not, economic reforms had been driven by corruption, not policy or planning. The social security system was not able to cope with the massive increase in unemployment and impoverishment.

It became obvious that the state cannot simply retreat from managing the transformation without simultaneously jeopardizing the integrity of the entire social system. In spite of this (Genov, 1997b: chapter 1), the weakening of the nation state continued under the impact of both domestic and international factors. The motivation of state officials declined precipitously. An accelerating turnover of governments prevented strategic thinking on the part of major state institutions. This was all the more vital, however, because now it was widely appreciated that restructuring the economy was not simply a matter of privatizising investment and production.

Clearly stated, the restructuring should have been guided by setting priorities for branches of industry, technologies, products, markets, and other matters. But there was no clear vision about how to proceed in any of these major economic areas, about the ends and means involved. Moreover, channels of information had been destroyed. On the one hand, existing institutions were inadequate for the new requirements of the transformation. On the other, new institutions were introduced slowly, tentatively. Neither a strong state will nor a public consensus on strategic issues of national development could be found. This was clear when decisions had to be made regarding whether to close large inefficient enterprises, but it was equally obvious in the tentative ways in which authorities responded to the restructuring of economy and then the collapse of the national banking system. In broader terms, deficits of administrative rationality in the state's managing of the transformation exacerbated the strategic challenges facing the Bulgarian economy. International events such as the Gulf War and the UN embargo on Yugoslavia, along with the rather limited international support for reforms of the Bulgarian economy, only deepened the crisis.

Thus, when stressing the need to free economic activity from excessive

state control, one can rationally make this case only by assuming that this process will be undertaken by the state itself. The paradox is rooted in reality itself. Only effective state action is capable of changing the very basis of social integration in a civilized, effective way. More precisely, the effective dissolution of a centralized state can only be achieved through a state-managed process. That is why strengthening state institutions is central to effectively reducing the economic, political and social dislocations that accumulate during any transformation. Otherwise, the very existence of the nation-state is placed in jeopardy. Such a strong statement merits elaboration.

First, it is clear that a spontaneous development of market forces alone cannot mitigate the negative trends of transformation. Rather, the need for a "small" but effective state becomes more acute. But the region lost the ideal time for developing state priorities for economic development at the beginning of the 1990s. As a result, privatization is being carried out in a most ineffective way, in the absence of any strategic planning. Moreover, the weakening of the state and delay of privatization, along with the way it was eventually initiated, lent support to a widespread suspicion that the process had been undertaken with an eye to powerful private interests rather than to the common good.

Second, given this turn of events, it became strategically important to stabilize state finances, and the introduction of a Currency Board in mid-1997 was a clear admission that the state could not handle this task by itself. It also strengthens the point that the excessively liberal strategies of the early 1990s had failed to facilitate the transformation.

Third, the "window of opportunities" for developing Bulgarian society remains open, but it is narrowing. This is why a political and cultural consensus concerning the Currency Board is a precondition for success. We can assume, however, that the pressure groups that profited immensely from a "big" but ineffective state are hardly likely to support this policy change. The fact that the introduction of the Currency Board was delayed at several points reflects this.

Fourth, even if the Currency Board is initially successful, there is no guaranty it can consolidate these gains and then use them as a foundation for future action. The core problem is a need to coordinate the efforts taken to stabilize the financial system with the efforts taken to restructure major institutions in other fields of activity. If the process of financial stabilization is not coupled with efforts to stabilize production, to reform social security, and to innovate in regional and local government, then the overall effect might compromise the Currency Board itself. This will certainly result if international support for reform is delayed or remains insufficient.

Fifth, even if the Currency Board succeeds, the economic and social integration of large groups of people will remain problematic, namely the

impoverished groups, the long-term unemployed, young people, pensioneers, gypsies, and others.

Thus, the crucial problem today is to re-establish the state's capacity to manage the transformation and, thus, to establish and maintain the degree of social integration necessary for long-term, sustainable development. This is also a precondition for successfully integrating Bulgaria into supra-national structures, particularly those of the European Union (Axt, 1996). Both social integration and supra-national integration require greater transparency and predictability in national structures and processes. After all, this will simultaneously facilitate Bulgaria's efforts to raise international support for national reform. However, we can also expect international institutions in general and the institutions of the European Union in particular to undergo substantial reforms of their own, as they endeavor to promote continental integration. Here, too, a well-conceived, cautious strategy is need (Berend, 1997: 27–28).

The tasks involved in managing large-scale transformation processes are enormous. Risks of various types are omnipresent. The success of the transformation in Eastern Europe might strengthen democratic states in the region and thus facilitate continent-wide democracy, economic effectiveness, and a general climate of peace and co-operation. But less benign outcomes are also possible. We can easily imagine ongoing failures in the transformation, as the Bulgarian case illustrates. It is unrealistic to exclude from consideration the possibility that unsuccessful reforms might lead to efforts to reduce accumulating dislocations in a non-democratic way.

References

Axt, Heinz-Jürgen (1996) "The European Union as a Catalyst of Modernization", In: Genov, Nikolai. (ed.) Society and politics in South-East Europe. Sofia: National and Global Development, pp. 33–46.

Beck, Ulrich and Elizabeth Beck-Gernsheim (1994a) "Individualisierung in modernen Gesellschaften-Perspektiven und Kontroversen einer subjektorientierten Soziologie". In: Ulrich Beck and Elizabeth Beck-Gernsheim (eds.) Riskante Freiheiten. Individualiserung in modernen Gesellschaften. Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp, pp. 10–39.

Berend, Ivan T. (ed.) (1997) Long-Term Structural changes in Transforming Central & Eastern Europe The 1990's. München: Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft.

Brock, D. (1994) "Rückkehr der Klassengesellschaft? Die neeuen sozialen Gräben in einer materiellen Kultur", in: Ulrich Beck and Elisabeth Beck Gernsheim (eds.) Riskante Freiheiten. . . . pp. 61–88.

Comisso, Ellen (1997) "Is the Glass Half Full or Half-Empty? Reflections on Five Years of Competitive Politics in Eastern Europe". In: Ivan T. Berend (ed.). Long-Term Structural Changes . . ., pp. 29–54.

Douglas, Mary (1993) "Risk as a Forensic Resource". In: Edward J. Burger, Jr. (ed.) Risk. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.

Economic Survey of Europe in 1996–1997 (1997) New York and Geneva: UN Economic Commission for Europe.

Genov, Nikolai (ed.) (1996a) Society and Politics in South-East Euopre. Sofia: National and Global Development.
—— (1996b) "Transformation Risks: Structure and Dynamics". In: Heinrich Best, Ulrike Becker and Arnaud Marks (eds.), Social Sciences in Transition Social Science Information Needs and provision in a Changing Europe. Bonn: Informationszentrum Sozialwissenschaften, 1996, pp. 39–54.
—— (ed.) (1997a) Bulgaria—today and tomorrow. Sofia: Friedrich Ebert Foundation (in Bulgarian).
—— (ed.) (1997b) Bulgaria 1997. Human Development Report. Sofia: UNDP.
Glatzer, Wolfgang (ed.) (1996) Lebensverháltnisse in Osteuropa. Prekäre Entwicklungen und neue Konturen. Frankfurt am Main: Campus.
Hatschikjan, M.A., P. Weilemann (eds.) (1995) Nationalismen in Umbruch. Staat und Politik im neuen Osteuropa. Köln: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik.
Human Development Report 1996 (1996) New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Offe, Claus (1996) Varieties of Transition: The East European and East German Experience. Cambridge: Polity.
Weber, Max (1992 [1919]) "Wissenschaft als Beruf", in Max Weber, Gesamtausgabe Band 17. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr/Paul Siebeck.
Weidenfeld, Werner (ed.) (1996) Mittel- und Osteuropa auf dem Weg in die Europäische Union. Gütersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung.
—— (ed.) (1997) Neue Ostpolitik—Strategie für eine gesamteuropäische Entwicklung. Gütersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung.
World Development Report 1996. From Plan to Market (1996) Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.
—— 1997. The State in a Changing Society (1997) Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.

9. NATIONAL IDENTITY, SOCIAL ORDER AND POLITICAL SYSTEM IN WESTERN EUROPE: PRIMORDIAL AUTOCHTHONY

Eugeen Roosens

Scope

The present paper will focus on the principle of primordial autochthony as a cultural construct and value. I conceive primordial autochthony as a quality attributed to an individual, a social category or group of people, based on being born on a well-defined territory from parents and ancestors who are and have been "first occupants". In most cases, the notion of one's "own soil" is associated with a biological link, formulated in terms of popular biology. "Blood" is frequently used as expressing this genealogical and genetic link. In the cases discussed in the present paper a biological link is implied as the basic "genuine" foundation of autochthony. Primordial autochthony is bestowing an intrinsic quality nobody can erase, defining a person in a durable and encompassing way.

In my view, the combination of blood and soil—*Blut und Boden*—is a strong cultural construct and value in that it combines, symbolically, two dimensions in human life which are quasi universally recognised as instrumentally and expressively important and eminently real: the biologically based inexhaustible goodwill contained in relations of filiation and kinship, and the familiar space of the land on which one is born and grew up. A regional, ethnic, or national, religious or so-called "cultural" affiliation and identity based upon these dimensions of life which are felt and assessed by most people as deeply human and securing is perceived as "natural". Nothing wrong seems to be involved. That is exactly why ethnicity and nationality can be depicted as positive and constructive values (Miller, 1995). But the intimate inclusion in a tight circle on grounds of biological filiation and primordial autochthony at the same time excludes numerous other human beings in one and the same move, and can easily be converted into xenophobia and outright racism.

In this contribution I concentrate on the micro-social level: individuals and face-to-face groups in daily life, without neglecting the link to the meso- and macro-level. I will build my presentation on three empirical case studies: 1) Solo-research about First Peoples (formerly called "Indians") in Quebec,

including fieldwork among the Wendat (former "Hurons") (periodically between 1968 and 1996) (Roosens, 1989). 2) A long-term study about Turkish, Moroccan and Japanese allochthons in Brussels which I have been initiating and directing (Roosens, 1992, 1993, 1994b, 1995). 3) Occasionally, I will refer to research about immigrants in California conducted by American colleagues at UC Berkeley, UCLA and UC San Diego. I have attended this research for eight periods from two to ten weeks, spread over the last 16 years. First, I will use the case of the Aboriginals of Canada to generate an interpretative model that I will apply in the second, main part of my paper to Belgium, and more specifically to Brussels as the self-proclaimed capital of Europe.

Primordial Autochthony in the New World

On the present international scene, primordial autochthony is an highly respected principle. In Canada, a prestigious Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples published a report of more the 4000 pages (1996) at the cost of millions of dollars in which the condition of being an Aboriginal or an autochthon was given its full weight. According to this Report, the fact that the ancestors of the Cree, the Wendat, the Innu, the Inuit, etc. have been living for thousands of years on the territory of what is now called Canada gives them an "inherent" status of first inhabitants—Aboriginals or First Peoples—which is higher than the status of all those who descend from newcomers or immigrants. Aboriginals have more right to be here than others.

The First Peoples (also called First Nations) of Canada stress by their self-attributed title their quality of autochthony (fieldwork Roosens, 1996). This form of self-valuation seems to work very well in today's political climate. Nobody on the public scene of Canada dares to put this cultural construct in doubt. Nobody is ridiculing the notion of Aboriginals, First Nations or First Peoples. The formerly despised label of "Aboriginals" has been converted into a prestigious title. No protest has been formulated by "newcomers" against the idea that to live first on a given land is to bestow some form of priority and a number of "inherent" rights. It is widely accepted as self-evident that the so-called "Indians" and "Eskimos" (the Aboriginals) have been the first. Also, quite a number of today's "registered Indians" and Inuit have much to do with these primordial populations in terms of "blood" and descent. In a paper they presented to the Quebecois commission on constitutional issues, a group of Canadians of various non-Aboriginal

backgrounds who support the case of the First Peoples of Quebec were even induced to call themselves "allochthons" (Le Comité d'appui aux Premières Nations, 1990).

Exactly which criteria must be met to qualify as an Aboriginal can be a matter of discussion. The Report states that membership should not be a question of genetics but of culture, and of feelings of belonging. But the cultural images used in daily life, e.g., in Wendake (formerly "Village Huron"), almost always imply a biological link as the "ideal", "pure", "natural" basis of Aboriginality.

The fact that the former Indians and Eskimos identify as First Peoples and Aboriginals evokes, in the Canadian context and also worldwide, the idea that they have been followed by other, "secondary" peoples or nations who came as immigrants and colonisers. "Allochthons" did not really belong and can only be tolerated or admitted by the consent of the Aboriginals. Since colonisation has been universally condemned and collapsed almost forty years ago in most parts of the world, staying a coloniser in the late 90s as the Canadian State is doing is a shameful condition, a source of embarrassment. In this perspective the First Peoples claim their autonomy not as a right delegated by the Canadian State but as an *inherent* right that has been there from time immemorial, and that they never gave up. They ask "the newcomers" to stop colonisation as all civilised nations in the world have already done, decades ago.

The general consensus that primordial autochthony and the inherent rights attached to this condition can no longer be ignored is reinforced by the fact that also the Parti québécois at the provincial level, and the Bloc québécois at the level of the Federal State are calling for a halt to colonisation. Also the French consider themselves to be a "peuple fondateur"; they claim to have been the first to live on the present soil of Quebec, well before the English who put them under colonial rule. It is remarkable how the *souverainistes* "forget" that they themselves have been colonising the "Indians". True, the Government of Quebec has collected the remarks of the *Autochthones* while preparing the referendum expected to bring independence in the early 90s. But at the same time, the Quebec Government has been suggesting at various occasions that huge parts of Northern Quebec were still "terra nullius" when the French arrived in the 16th and 17th centuries (Coon Come, 1996). This view is forcefully rejected by the Aboriginals or First Peoples who contend that the entire space of Quebec had been occupied for millennia before the "very recent" conquest by the French colonisers. The Aboriginal position is fully endorsed by the Royal Commission and has been published in its Report commissioned by the Federal Government.

Although Aboriginal leaders fear that the Canadian authorities will sim-

ply ignore the Report, "as they always do with that kind of studies", Prime Minister Jean Chrétien put important recommendations of the Report on his election program in May 1997 (*Expanding opportunity* . . . 1997). The quality of primordial autochthony including inherent rights, which is also stipulated in the repatriated constitution of 1982, is mentioned with deference.

The Report of the Royal Commission is proposing the restitution of considerable parts of the Canadian territory to its first occupants. Billions of dollars are asked from the Federal and Provincial Governments in order to establish the autonomy of the Aboriginals based on economic self-reliance. What the Report is proposing is a true reversal of history. All this in the name of what we call "primordial autochthony" and its inherent rights.

The Report also demands the full restoration of Aboriginal languages and culture. The Aboriginals must have the right to use their Aboriginal languages not only in private life, but also in formal education and in all matters of administration. Culture, language and the prescribed use of language, are considered to be congruent with a given territory, exactly as obtains in the territories of the two "founding Peoples" of Canada, the Francophone and the Anglophone Canadians.

It seems self-evident that unlike the Aboriginals and the two other "founding" Canadian communities, recent "immigrants" can not claim the same rights. They have to "adapt". Only the "autochthonous" parts of the nation are granted these collective rights. Immigrants are entitled, however, to use their language and to keep and develop their culture in the private sphere. Aboriginal leaders hasten to stress that their peoples, although numerical minorities, must not be conflated with the "ethnic minorities" who are newcomers ("Oné-Onti" Gros-Louis, 1990). Leading political theorists Kymlicka (1996), Burelle (1995) and others (Taylor, 1994) tend to subscribe to this distinction between "national minorities" and "ethnic minorities", the first being autochthonous, the second allochthonous populations.

The link between territory and biological filiation is strongly emphasised by the Canadian Aboriginals. The expression "ancestral lands" is frequently used. Their land is "Mother Earth", considered a goddess, and the link between the ancestors and the grounds is even traced back to the time of creation: the Creator himself put the ancestors on their grounds as keepers of the land and of all the creatures living on it. Again and again, the religious nature of the relationship with the lands is stressed. So much so that not recognising this relationship might figure as a lack of respect for traditional religion (Sioui, 1994). This "culturally specific" religious relationship was also used by a number of Wendat to win the now famous Sioui case before the Highest Court of Canada in 1990 (Vaugeois, 1995).

Aboriginal leaders have noticed that their claims founded in "primordial autochthony" have not been openly rebutted until now. This successful outcome has reinforced their conviction that their strategy was right and has encouraged them to seek international support. They recently (April 1997) sent delegations to several countries of the EU and to the European Authorities in Brussels. The only negative reaction came from their official Protector, the Queen of England, who refused to see them.

It may be worthwhile to mention here briefly that in another country of the New World, the US, where nationality is also officially considered a matter of option and contract "republican" style, just like in Canada, *Blut und Boden* have been re-emerging as criteria of affiliation and belonging in recent decades, be it in a more "symbolic" fashion and projected into a remote past. Respect for "primordial autochthony" is widely used and proclaimed by US American citizens and residents when they claim and assert their ethnic identities. Their so-called hyphenated identities—Euro-American, Black American, Asian American, Indigenous or Native American, Mexican American, etc.—are referring to territories, parts of the world, their respective places of *origin* to which they relate through *descent.* Also in US popular imagination, the idea of biological filiation and "blood" is associated with territorial "origins". This connection between land, filiation and identity also surfaces in the demands of persons from "mixed descent" who ask that "mixed identities" (e.g. "Native Asian American") be officially recognised by the US administration in the next census. Just like everybody else, a person of mixed origin, must be able to identify in harmony with her feelings. In his book, *Postethnic America* (1995), Hollinger underlines that the so-called ethnic groups used in the census are in fact disguised "racial" blocks—the racist classification of the 19th century wrapped up in another wording. As already said, the parental or ancestral link to territory is essential. Also in US popular discourse today, origin in terms of "blood" and territory are considered "authentic". Ethnic tourism confirms this. Granted, quite a number of US citizens refuse hyphenation and simply identify as "Americans", but the overwhelming majority acts as if affiliation flowing from blood and soil were more basic and genuine than membership brought about by self-ascription and "republican contract". Just like in present Canada, contractual and purely legal and conventional grounds of belonging are considered by many as being of lower value than *Blut und Boden.*

Exactly the same principle of primordial autochthony is at work in European settings, as will appear from field data collected in Belgium, mainly in the Brussels area. Brussels is hosting as many international delegations and civil servants, embassies and lobbies as Washington, D.C. People belonging to more than 100 nations are registered residents in Brussels. More than

30% of the population is allochthonous, and some of the nine townships contain more than 50% recent migrants and immigrants (Van der Haegen, 1996).

Primordial Autochthony in Belgium as a Part of Europe

Natives

Considered at the macro-level, Belgium is a federal state composed of three communities and three regions: the Flemish Community, the French Community, and the German-speaking Community combined with a Flemish Region, a Walloon Region and a Brussels Capital Region. Communities handle person-linked issues like language and culture, while regions are concerned primarily with economics. Accordingly, Belgium has technically speaking seven different governments, the Federal Government being in charge of foreign affairs, defence, justice, etc.

As appears from the nomenclature, the names of the Flemish and the French Communities are derived from their populations: these Communities speak Flemish and French respectively, and are supposed to carry a Flemish and a French culture. When considered at the macro-level of the official federal institutions being a Fleming or a French speaking Belgian or a Walloon is *not* based on filiation or primordial autochthony. When looking closer, however, one notices that the Flemish and the French Communities are congruent with the respective Regions, the Flemish and the Walloon areas. Moreover, in terms of popular culture, it is a very widespread practice to consider community affiliation and regional affiliation as interchangeable. One's identity is constructed both in terms of territory and language and culture. And there is more: someone who inhabits the Flemish Region and does speak Flemish most of the time is presumed to have Flemish parents. In the popular imagination, there is a strong congruence between biological filiation, territory, language and culture. A person with a Mediterranean or Black African phenotype living in the Flemish region will not be considered a "genuine" Fleming, whatever his fluency in the Flemish language may be. Moreover, nobody can become a Fleming through naturalisation: there is no procedure to do so.

A quite similar situation can be found, *mutatis mutandis*, in the French community established in the Walloon Region. (It is interesting to note that the region inhabited by members of the French community is not labelled "French Region"—the pendant of the Flemish region—, but the "Walloon Region". The term "Walloon" differentiates this area from the territory of

France, which is adjacent). However, it should be mentioned at once that the notions and political realities of Flanders and Wallonia are not entirely symmetrical. While huge numbers of Flemings will consider the Flemings as a *volk*, a people, just like many of today's Québécois consider themselves a *peuple*, only a limited part of the Walloons are doing so. In Wallonian discourse Wallonia is a "region" in the first place. Although movements of nation building are active in Wallonia, this dynamic does not seem to take off. One reason may be that, historically speaking, the composing parts of Wallonia presented less of a unity than Flanders. But another factor may be more important. For very many years, the Francophone population of Belgium has been identifying and identified with the Belgian State, as their language, French, was the only official one. Political power, and even catholic church power, was in the hands of Francophones. Very many Dutch speakers were opposing this kind of Belgian State while the Francophones *were* the State (Wils, 1994). It would not be correct, then, to describe the Flemish and the Walloons as just two "tribes" or two ethnic groups.

The Region of Brussels Capital belongs on equal terms to the Flemish and the French Communities which both overlap the Brussels Region. Officially, there is no community of "Brusselers". The Brussels Region takes its name not from the inhabitants, but from the Capital, which the "Walloons" and the Flemings share. The historiography of Brussels in terms of population, language, culture and communities, still is a matter of dispute. But as Brussels is entirely surrounded by Flemish territory, some militant Flemings consider Brussels as primordially Flemish land. If the splitting up of the Communities ever occurs—which Flemish nationalists hope for—they would claim Brussels as Flemish soil. At the other hand, the overwhelming majority of the population of Brussels—French speaking Belgians—, do see Brussels as a French speaking city, primordially "French" territory.

As the Brussels Capital Region is bilingual and bicultural, it is impossible to predict anyone's community belonging from just her birth place. "Brussels" as a locus of origin can mean both Flemish or French Community affiliation. In the case of Brussels, descent is a better predictor. Although things have been different in the past when being a Fleming in Brussels connoted lower socioeconomic status, in the last decades, Flemish parents have tended to educate their children as Flemings. Biological filiation, then, is important in terms of belonging and identity, especially in the Capital. But as the official structures and most of private services and businesses are bilingual and social control is very weak, one can easily pass into the other camp in the routines of daily life. A Fleming may even end up as a member of the French community if he or she really wishes to do so, which is rather unusual. Or one can become someone in between. Or, if asked or

pressed, one may identify as a Belgian, a "unitarian", rejecting the "chauvinistic" or "tribalistic" fragmentation of the country. The same is true for a French speaking person or Walloon.

The people who are considered or presumed to have been "the first present" on a given territory—the primordial autochthons—set the rules in the field of language and in official collective provisions and rights. In the Flemish region the official language of the administration is Dutch (also called Flemish). The same applies to the entire sector of education, universities included. The Walloon region, where the official language is French, displays identical structures, while Brussels, a contested territory, offers both French and Flemish education and administrative services in both languages.

French or German speaking Belgians immigrating into a Flemish town or village are expected to "adapt": if they wish to send their children to a local school they have to accept the local official language as the language of instruction. No one is entitled to expect French from the state administration or state services. The language and culture in the realm of private life, however, are entirely undetermined, and the language used in local small business, voluntary associations, etc. is a question of goodwill, assertiveness and negotiation. Ideally speaking, however, *Belgian internal migrants* are expected to adapt. This adaptation has serious consequences in the field of formal education. Additive acculturation of the children is a minimum requirement. The same principles prevail at the other side of the "linguistic" boundary, separating the Flemish and the Walloon areas.

Just as being a Fleming or a Walloon is grounded in filiation and territory, so is Belgian identity at the level of the nation-state. Here too descent is a predominant criterion: the parent's nationality is determining the national belonging of the children. At least one parent must be Belgian at the time of birth. The country of birth is not relevant. The same model is imposed on foreign residents living in Belgium: their children follow their parents or one of their parents. It is descent which gives you the right to feel at home on a given territory, in casu Belgium. Territoriality is "derived" from descent.

The situation I just analysed is the result of a long struggle. The Flemings—roughly 60% of the total population—who have been the underdog since the foundation of Belgium in 1830 to the end of the second World War had to fight for the recognition of their language as an official language even in their own part of the country: in higher education, in the army, in the administration and justice, etc. Equal opportunity in State employment was another issue. The Flemings eventually won the battle and today are much better off than the southern, Francophone part of the country, so-called Wallonia. A considerable part of the Flemish elite, especially in the 19th century, has passed into the other camp. Their descendants still speak

French among themselves even in the cities and towns of Flanders. In the media as well as in academic jargon they are labelled "ethnic Flemings", suggesting that their "true nature", deep down, is still Flemish. Genealogy is considered to override linguistic and social behaviour.

It is typical that the somewhat 60000 Germanophone Belgians living in the eastern "Cantons" of the country only emerge in collective memory at official occasions, e.g. in the King's annually formal address to the "National Established Bodies", when the Monarch all of a sudden switches from Dutch and French to German. In daily life, the political native debate in Belgium is bipolar, dualistic.

EU Immigrants

It is within this cultural and historical frame of reference that the social and political insertion of both EU and non-EU migrants and immigrants is to be interpreted and understood. As already mentioned, a limited but visible number of Flemings living in Brussels consider Brussels to be Flemish soil. This soil, so they feel, has been "frenchified" in an undue fashion. In their view, Brussels is a city taken over by the Francophones and the French-speaking "ethnic Flemings" who passed into the camp of the enemy. Officially, Brussels is a bilingual city, but only 20% of the population is Dutch or Flemish speaking, while roughly 50% is Francophone. About 30% of the population is of foreign origin (Van der Haegen, 1996). Many allochthons are not speaking any local language, just their native English, Spanish, Turkish or Moroccan dialects, etc. But if they do so, they mostly use French.

This raises a particular tension in the debate beween the two native categories of Belgians. Some Flemish pressure groups feel overwhelmed not only by the French-speaking Belgians but also by the huge numbers of foreigners. To begin with, they resent the presence of the European Parliament and the other "international institutions", fearing that the well-to-do Eurocrats will impose the use of their respective languages. Especially English, but also French, they say, will be forced upon restaurants, shops, hotels and other services who want to sell their goods in the first place, whatever the language of their patrons might be. Besides establishing a kind of undue hegemony which they could never dream of either in London or Washington, these wealthy allochthons act to the advantage of the Brussels Francophones. If they ever speak a native language, this will be French, which is confirmed by recent research (Viaene, 1996). And when in the year 2000 the aliens of European origin will be allowed to vote in local elections, their preferences will turn into a catastrophe for the Flemish minority in Brussels. As

happens in many other countries of the world, an allochthonous constituency of this kind is going to vote for the local majority, namely the French speaking Belgian Brussels majority.

But there is more. Besides the presence of culturally and linguistically domineering alien Europeans and other well-to-do allochthons, Brussels counts more than 19000 Turks and 79000 Moroccans (Leman, 1993) and an unknown but important number of undocumented migrants coming from Africa, Eastern Europe, Asia and Latin America (Leman, 1995). The overwhelming majority of these people either do not speak any native language, or when they do, speak French. French is the second or even the first language of the Moroccans and of many Black Africans. The Flemings of Brussels could well end up being sandwiched between an upper layer of wealthy allochthons and a poor but numerically important alien underclass.

Already for years, enfranchising alien residents, also non-EU foreigners, has been an element of debate in many political circles. The question came up again in full force recently (in 1997) after huge numbers of Belgian citizens were deeply moved by the discovery of the body of Lubna Benaïssa, a little girl who had been violated and murdered by a Belgian criminal. The child was given a kind of national burial covered by television and other media. Thousands of Belgians assisted, and the non-Muslim parents of Belgian abused and murdered children—also the mothers—were allowed to address the audience inside the main mosque of Brussels, a quite exceptional event in Muslim tradition. At that particular occasion many Belgians discovered the Muslim migrants as their fellow human beings, and the same day the question of giving voting rights to "the migrants" emerged in full force and was debated for weeks in a row in the media and in political party committees. As could be expected, the opponents, after a few hours of silence, defined this upsurge as tasteless. Using this abominable murder of a young child as an emotional argument in deciding political matters was despicable, they stated. The question is still unresolved, but a leading political majority party decided in May 1997 to postpone the decision until 2006, a far distant election year. If non-EU residents wish to participate fully in Belgian politics, they must naturalise and become Belgians, party leaders state.

It is in the perspective of these developments that the political positioning of the aliens is taking place. We distinguish EU and non-EU aliens; and within each group, unskilled migrant workers and their families, and middle class and upper-middle class social layers (Roosens, 1994b).

Well-to-do EU aliens, like for instance European functionaries, are fully entitled to live and work on Belgian soil while firmly staying French, Spanish, British, etc. Just like the Natives, all of them feel free to identify not only

by nationality but also by sub-nationality, region of origin and language. Also in their own circles, biological filiation is seen as a determining factor: although the official ideology about national belonging in the country of origin may be different—for instance "republican", as in France—biological filiation is nevertheless a determining element in the social field. Also language is, just like in the Belgian case, a solid marker. And in quite a number of contexts, well-to-do EU aliens are even able to impose the use of their language of origin on Belgian soil.

The way they see their belonging and insertion in a European context is graphically reflected in the kind of school they designed for their children: the "European school". In 1994 there were nine European Schools in Europe, three of them in Belgium (*Schola Europaea* . . . 1993). When the European institutions came into being after World War II, the founding persons were strongly motivated to bridge the gap between European countries, especially between the former enemies. In order to prepare the young for this demanding task, they started from the education of their own children. Instead of importing "foreign" schools in each of the member countries where expatriated functionaries would be working, they opted for a type of integrated school. Children of different nationalities would come to school in the same building. Every single child would be entitled to study in its own first language (L1) from age 6 until age 18. However, courses considered of an easier nature, like geography, history, economy would be dispensed in L2 only. Learning a second language is compulsory and starting at age 6 when entering the school. L3 follows in the second year of secondary school, and a fourth language is optional in the second last year. L2 is called a vehicular language. History, geography, etc. are taught by teachers who are native speakers of the L2 of their audience. In this audience children from different nationalities are sitting together.

When looking at this type of education in its ideal form, such as presented by the organising authorities, this school model allows for the following. Children and youngsters can grow up using their own language, the language in which they have been raised in their first years and which they use at home. The same is true for many other aspects of their culture, as for literature, ways of speaking, body language, etc. There is a continuity between the family and the school. It is reassuring that L1 and C1 are respected by the Institution which organises and manages the school program. At the same time youngsters become aware of the existence of other languages and cultures which they learn, and learn about in their courses. They also live and sit together with children hailing from other backgrounds. All this becomes a matter of daily routine, spread over the years, so that idealisation as well as the formation of unfounded stereotypes about foreigners are prevented.

This structure of formal education reflects a certain vision of international interaction and of the place every nation should occupy in the Europe-to-become. To begin with, nobody is thinking of giving up his own language in favour of more widespread idiom like English of French. The same applies to the other dimensions of culture. Acculturation as a result of putting youngsters of various backgrounds together, is conceived as additive, not subtractive acculturation (Roosens, 1995). L2 and L3 do not replace L1. Equivalence has also inspired the vehicular language system. Every single child has to take an equal load, whatever its national background. Being and feeling a European does not exclude feeling and being French, German or British; quite to the contrary, these forms of national belonging are presupposed by the European identity. And in that sense—at least in principle—the European Union will never be like the United States in a foreseeable future. The founding majority of the US has been imposing its language and many of its cultural traits upon the Natives, the imported Black slaves and the incoming immigrants. Schools of "foreign" expression have been closed down between 1880 and 1920 in several States. President Roosevelt reminded the Americans of German ancestry that there was only room for one language in the US, and the English-only-movement is still with us. The much talked about ethnicity and multiculturality in the US is, with a few exceptions, largely "symbolic" in the sense Gans (1979) has given to this expression. This is not to say that Europe has found a solution to its linguistic diversity; quite to the contrary. But up to now the predominant figure is juxtaposition, not substitution or absorption.

Benign juxtaposition is also found between the native majorities and the EU immigrant workers and their families who came from Spain some thirty years ago (Roosens, 1992). Three years of fieldwork among the Spaniards of Antwerp revealed that the men and women who immigrated as "guest workers" in the 60s were classified as "strangers" at their arrival, just like the Moroccans and the Turks who were there successors. The attitude of the surrounding population was not welcoming at all. This changed over the years, however. Although only a few people out of the more than 80 families we have interviewed learned Dutch—the local language—the Spaniards were considered well integrated by the surrounding Belgian population in the late 80s and the early 90s. When scratching the surface, we detected that contact with the Flemish population outside the work place was almost nil. The "Spanish" continued to identify with their region and sub-national group of origin, and to speak their own dialects. They invested their money in an house or an apartment—or several of them—in their home region which they visited for periods of several weeks a year, while in Antwerp they continued to live in the poorer quarters of the city among Belgians

and other allochthons. They had their own cafés and restaurants which were also visited by Belgian patrons. Their formula of "good integration" was quite simple: the Spaniards had discovered the art of becoming and staying invisible. They abstained from Belgian politics, and once in a while organised a Spanish goodwill party attended by lots of native citizens. Coexistence with a minimum of contact seemed perfectly possible. When the internal boundaries of Europe were abolished for Europeans in the early 90s, EU immigrants were all of a sudden at home all over Europe.

Naturalisation which had been promoted as a means of integration by some politicians until the late 80s became redundant and meaningless. This mega-transformation at the macro-level made it possible to keep one's nationality and ethnic affiliation intact, to speak one's language and to preserve one's culture, even when living on what just a few days earlier had been considered "foreign soil", and protected all Europeans from the attack of extreme nationalists. Racism and xenophobia concentrated mainly on Moroccan and Turkish immigrant workers and other non-EU aliens (Suarez-Orozco, 1994).

But in contrast with the category of privileged EU functionaries, the use of L1, and study of C1 and H1 for the children of EU workers is overwhelmingly a matter of the private sphere. Optional courses are available, but Belgian schools do not offer the same opportunities of continuity in the field of language and culture as the European Schools. Lower socioeconomic categories of foreigners get more and more culturally and linguistically absorbed by the surrounding native majorities in their "second generation". To put it another way, a genuine multicultural setting is a privilege of the wealthy. The children of the Antwerp Spaniards have adapted to the Belgian surroundings in several ways. Their national identity has never been wavering: they all identify as Spanish. Culturally however, diversity is to be found. About 50% of the cases we studied feel very close to their Belgian peers and prepare to stay in Belgium for good. Another 15% experience their dual culture as uncomfortable and are not sure how to handle their problems. Almost the same number of youngsters is very pleased with the opportunity the two different cultures are offering and are fond of manipulating this situation to their advantage. Still another group of youngsters strongly identify with Spain, not only through their nationality but also through cultural contents. They prepare their return to Spain in a very realistic fashion. Relations and friendship with Belgian youth are widespread throughout the four categories of young people. As one can see from these data, a diversity of relations exist between national identity and cultural contents. The two are almost functionally independent. If the political authorities of the EU continue to guarantee the preservation of the national identity and even

the right to keep one's language and culture alive—whatever this means practically speaking—it is perfectly possible that people with diverse national identities will co-exist in the same city or village for many years to come. It is highly probable that national, sub-national and ethnic identities will stay unchanged for a long period while cultural differences will become more and more "symbolic", being reduced to a few cultural markers. Nationality could grow apart from language, territory and culture (Soysal, 1994). Paradoxically, to keep one's nationality of origin through filiation may become an emblem of genuine European citizenship. Hyphenation will be entirely redundant.

Non-EU Immigrants

The logic of inclusion we have been analysing is identically a logic of exclusion. If one uses the criteria the autochthons and the EU residents apply to themselves in order to situate migrants and immigrants hailing from non-EU countries, the latter are automatically excluded from the right to live on Belgian soil *as equals*. At most, they can be tolerated, condoned, protected, but, quite logically, they can not really belong. It is exactly this consequence flowing from the prevailing logic of affiliation which the *Vlaams Blok* is using against the migrant workers coming from Morocco and Turkey (Billiet, 1990; Swyngedouw, 1991; Verlinden, 1991).

For about ten years, the expression "the migrants" has been narrowing to contain workers of Moroccan and Turkish origin only. In the Brussels area, "Moroccans" are *the migrants par excellence*. Well-to-do Turks are not considered to be migrants. Neither are Japanese managers. More than twenty years of research among Moroccans and ten years of fieldwork among Turkish groups conducted by members of Cimo clearly show that the first generation overwhelmingly continue to take their region of origin as their main reference (Cammaert, 1985; Hermans, 1994; Foblets, 1994; Timmerman, 1996). What they hope to implement by migration—mostly a very sad experience at the start—is measured by the norms of the home region. Just like many Mexican migrants in the US, Moroccans and Turks send money and presents home, and invest their savings in grounds, apartments and houses in their region of origin. They return home for their long four or five week annual vacations and display the goods they have acquired in the North. During their vacations parents look for marriage partners for their sons and daughters, searching the conservative families for a subdued son- or daughter-in-law who will keep their own child on the right track in Belgium. Although small groups from both sides try to build bridges, the distrust towards the "immoral" and "godless" surrounding majority culture has remained a strong barrier between the migrant Muslim religious faithful and native Belgian society.

Just as with the native Belgians, affiliation for Turks and Moroccans of both the first and the second generation is running through biological descent and religion, and in a secondary fashion through the nation-state of origin. The kinship network is especially instrumental in the chain migration process and underpins the migrant communities in Belgium. Ethnicity and nationality are symbolised and experienced as eminently familial, and hence, "primordial" (Roosens, 1994a). In television debates, e.g., immigrant youngsters affirm that it is simply impossible to change that kind of identity, even if one becomes a naturalised Belgian. Moreover, as Muslims are required to be buried in a way that is not matching Belgian regulations, and special cemeteries would be required, the body of the deceased is repatriated to their region of origin in most cases. Migrants and their families pay special insurance to private companies in order to make this expensive repatriation affordable. Many elderly people openly state that they prefer to "rest" in their home country, where they really belong.

It strikes social scientists of all kinds as well as many Turkish and Moroccans insiders that Muslim "migrants", once on foreign soil, tend to identify and behave much more as Muslims than their counterparts who stayed behind in the home country, enhancing a feeling of community. At the same time, by stressing their religious affiliation, Muslim migrants find a shelter in the niche of religious freedom provided by the Belgian system. Moreover, allochthons get more prestige by identifying by means of Islam, a world religion, than by their immigrant status. But, almost unavoidably, this strong Muslim identification contributes in a marked fashion to their social exclusion. In most native circles, Islam is not perceived as a friendly religion, and openly identifying by one's religion is felt as "passé", backward social behaviour.

By now, both Moroccan and Turkish Muslim migrants have been for more than ten years under heavy fire from the extreme-right political movements and parties. The nationalistic *Vlaams Blok* has stated repeatedly that the non-EU migrants are fully entitled to keep their ethnic and national identities, their religion and culture, that they should be encouraged to do so, that this is their natural right. But not on Flemish soil. Uprooting for everybody would become unavoidable. Hence, these aliens who belong to an entirely different culture should "go home", even if they were born in Belgium.

These are not simply the attitudes of a tiny Flemish nationalistic minority (Billiet, 1990). In the important city of Antwerp, one of Europe's largest sea ports, more than 28% of the population has recently voted for the Vlaams Blok, which made the Blok the largest political party in the township. The same party obtained about 10% throughout Flanders and Brussels. This important victory caused fear among rival political parties who decided to isolate the Blok by what they call a *cordon sanitaire*. It is striking that the

Blok has only belatedly mentioned the overwhelming presence of the well-to-do aliens in Brussels as a menace to the Flemish culture. Non-EU immigrant workers from the South are an easier target. Moreover, many of them can be spotted by their phenotype and treated accordingly. What is expected from the internal Belgian migrants who move from Flanders to the Walloon region or vice versa, is also expected from non-EU migrants: if they want to stay and to be tolerated, they will have to learn the local language and send their children to the local Belgian school. Even more so than with their EU-worker-colleagues, their language and culture are considered almost entirely as a private matter, and the courses in L1 and C1 are optional and marginal, left in the hands of ill-prepared teachers sent by the respective countries of origin (*Rapport communautaire* . . . 1992).

Not all allochthons coming from non-EU countries undergo the same fate. Economic power and status are important factors providing different conditions and treatment. The well-to-do Japanese expatriates in Brussels studied by a researcher of our team from 1991 through 1996 are a clear illustration (Pang, 1995). With subsidies of the Japanese State and major Japanese Companies, these approximately 3000 Japanese "expatriates" simply transplanted a segment of their society, including their school system, unto Belgian soil. The Japanese school in Brussels, like other Japanese schools all over the world, is identical to the institutions of the home country. The school even follows the Japanese calendar, starting the academic year in the Spring and respecting the Japanese holidays. Unlike most Spanish youngsters, the young Japanese keep tightly to their own circles and do not socialise with the natives or other young people. These Japanese allochthons in Brussels live on a social, political and cultural island. As they import capital and employment, however, nobody ever told them in earnest that they better go home.

When considered from the point of view of culture as an *objectifiable* phenomenon, the particular cultural content of the respective groups discussed in this paper diminishes at different speeds. The subcultures of non-EU migrant workers are eroded at a much higher pace than those of the well-to-do allochthons. A daughter of a "migrant" hailing from the High Atlas in Morocco has much less chances to feel at home in her own language and culture of origin than a child of a high-middle class Japanese well-to-do expatriate or a European functionary.

Conclusions

The same set of constructs and values we are calling "primordial autochthony" can be used both to liberate oppressed minorities, as the case of the Aboriginals

of Canada shows, and to exclude minorities, as the studies of non-EU migrant workers illustrate.

With respect to the Belgian Natives and other Europeans, the various forms of primordial autochthony reinforce each other: territories include each other in a concentric fashion. EU people do not have to change: the territory has changed. The soil under their feet has been given an additional, European layer. Belgian Natives can affiliate in at least three different fashions: as Flemish/French/German speakers, as Belgians and as Europeans. In the three cases they refer to a territory which is officially defined at the macro-social level. Territory appears to be a solid inter-subjective marker. But the way a subject relates to these various territorial entities is biological filiation in the popular sense of the term. Language and history are two other important markers. Language is absolutely objective, transcending the individual and collective "interpretations", while "history" is unavoidably more subjectively tainted and can be almost entirely invented or fabricated.

All anti-racist propaganda and "republican" nation building notwithstanding, biologically defined kinship remains the strongest social criterion of belonging at the micro-, meso- and macro-level in present-day Belgium as a part of Europe. For EU citizens living in another European state, it is not a privilege at all to be granted naturalisation. The privilege of being a European is precisely the opposite: a European citizen can keep all her initial identities based on her original territorial belonging and filiation—regional, ethnic and national—and move to another State while still feeling on her own soil, with all the rights attached. By the same token, non-EU allochthons are excluded in a triple fashion. Fortress Europe, while abolishing internal boundaries for European citizens, is reinforcing its external walls (Stolcke, 1995). This reverberates on the non-EU aliens who happen to be living in the Citadel, especially on the socioeconomically weaker.

As the phenomena show, the logic of primordial autochthony is not operating in an entirely automatic fashion. It can either be activated to exclude aliens, or can stay dimmed or ignored as well, if the presence of non-EU allochthons looks profitable.

Within the present setting of power relations, the ideology of multiculturalism is mostly working to the advantage of native groups or so-called national minorities, and of the socioeconomic stronger allochthons. Allochthonous people with a low socioeconomic position are disadvantaged across the board. The higher the socioeconomic position of the allochthons, the more of their language and culture they are able to preserve in the receiving country. This especially applies to the education of their children, and, hence, to the continuation or the fading of their cultural heritage. Additionally, a "high" sub-culture"—the culture of people with an advanced education—

has much more chances to survive on foreign soil than a labourer's subculture. Here is still another concurrent logic at work: not all cultures and subcultures are equally good in dealing with the external non-man made world, as Hannerz aptly put it (Hannerz, 1992). Cultures which include advanced sciences and technology are fitter survivors in a world of so-called global competition.

References

Billiet, J., Carton, A. and Huys, R. (1990) *Onbekend of onbemind? Een sociologisch onderzoek naar de houding van de Belgen tegenover de migranten.* Leuven: Sociologisch Onderzoeksinstituut.

Burelle, A. (1995) *Le mal canadien. Essai sur le diagnostic et esquisse d' une thérapie.* Quebec: Fides.

Cammaert, M.-F. (1985) *Migranten en thuisblijvers: Een confrontatie. De leefwereld van Marokkaanse Berbervrouwen.* Leuven: Leuven University Press/Assen: Van Gorcum.

Coon Come, M. (1996) Remarks. Canada seminar. Harvard University.

Expanding opportunity for Aboriginal Peoples. Www: Liberal Party of Canada.

Foblets, M.-C. (1994) Les familles maghrébines et la justice en Belgique. *Antropologie juridique et immigration.* Paris: Karthala.

Gans, H. (1979) "Symbolic ethnicity". In: *Ethnic and Racial Studies,* 2 (1): 1–20.

Hannerz, U. (1992) *Cultural complexity: Studies in the social organization of meaning.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Hermans, P. (1994) *Opgroeien als Marokkaan in Brussel.* Brussels: Cultuur en Migratie.

Hollinger, D. (1995) *Postethnic America: Beyond multiculturalism.* New York: Basic Books.

Kymlicka, W. (1996) *Multicultural citizenship.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Le comité d'appui aux Premières Nations (1990) Le Québec peut-il se définir sans les Premières Nations? Mémoire présenté à la Commission sur l'avenir politique et constitutionnel du Québec.

Leman, J. (1993) "Hoe de scholenslag winnen? Beleidsperspectieven inzake onderwijs aan allochtonen in de Vlaamse Gemeenschap." *Tijdschrift voor Onderwijs en Onderwijsbeleid:* 151–161.

—— (ed.) (1995) *Sans documents. Les immigrés de l'ombre. Latino-américains, Polonais et Nigérians clandestins.* Brussels: De Boeck Université.

Miller, D. (1995) *On nationality.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

"Oné-Onti" Gros-Louis, M. (1990) Mémoire présenté à la Commission sur l'avenir politique et constitutionnel du Québec. Wendake.

Pang, C. (1995) Controlled internationalization: The case of Kikokushijo from Belgium. In: Roosens, E. (guest ed.) *Rethinking culture, "multicultural society" and the school.* Oxford: Pergamon: 45–56.

Rapport communautaire sur l'éducation interculturelle et Communauté française de Belgique. (1992) Brussel: Secrétariat du Ministère de l'Education de la Communauté française.

Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples. Ottawa: Canada Communication Group, 1996, 5 volumes.

Roosens, E. (1989) *Creating ethnicity: The process of ethnogenesis.* Newbury Park (Cal.)/London/New Delhi: Sage Publications.

—— (ed.) (1992) *The insertion of allochthonous youngsters in Belgian society.* Berlin: Migration.

—— et al. (1993) *Beelden van immigrantenkinderen bij leraren.* Brussel: Diensten voor Programmatie van het Wetenschapsbeleid.

—— (1994a) "The primordial nature of origins in migrant ethnicity." In: Vermeulen, H. and Govers, C. (eds.), *The anthropology of ethnicity: Beyond 'Ethnic groups and boundaries'.* Amsterdam, Het Spinhuis: 81–104.

—— (1994b) "A native Belgian's view on immigration." In: Cornelius, W., Martin, P. and Hollifield, J., *Controlling immigration: A global perspective.* Stanford: Stanford University Press: 269–271.

—— (guest ed.) (1995) *Rethinking culture, "multicultural society" and the school.* Oxford: Pergamon (*International Journal of Education Research*, 1995, 1).

Schola Europaea 1953–1993. Brussels: Schola Europaea, 1993.

Sioui, E. (1994) *Les Wendats. Une civilisation méconnue.* Quebec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval.

Soysal, Y. (1994) *Limits of citizenship: Migrants and postnational membership in Europe.* Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Stolcke, V. (1995) "Talking culture: New boundaries, new rhetorics of exclusion in Europe". *Current Anthropology*, 36,1, Febr. 1995: 1–24.

Suarez-Orozco, M. (1994) "Anxious neighbors: Belgium and its immigrant minorities." In: Cornelius, W., Martin, P. and Hollifield, J., *Controlling immigration: A global perspective.* Stanford: Stanford University Press: 237–268.

Swyngedouw, M. (1991) "Het Vlaams Blok in Antwerpen. Een analyse van de verkiezingsuitslagen sinds 1985". In: De Schampelheire, H. and Thanassekos, Y. (eds.) (1991) *L'extrême droite en Europe de l'ouest.* Brussels: VUBPress: 93–114.

Taylor, C. (1994) "The politics of recognition". In: A. Gutman (ed.), *Multiculturalism.* Princeton: Princeton University Press: 25–73.

Timmerman, C. (1995) "Cultural practices and ethnicity: Diversifications among Turkish young women". In: E. Roosens (guest ed.), *Rethinking culture, "multicultural society" and the school.* Oxford: Pergamon (*International Journal of Education Research*, 1995, 1): 23–32.

—— (1996) *Onderwijs als diacriticum. Socioculturele praxis en etniciteitsbeleving bij jonge Turkse vrouwen; drie perspectieven.* Leuven: Department of Anthropology, doctoral dissertation.

Van der Haegen, H. et al. (1996) *Bruxelles multiculturel.* Brussel: Le Secrétaire d'Etat flamand chargé de la recherche scientifique non-économique de la Région de Bruxelles-Capitale.

Vaugeois, D. (1995) *La fin des alliances franco-indiennes. Enquête sur le sauf-conduit de 1760 devenu un traité en 1990.* Quebec: Boréal/Septentrion.

Verlinden P. (1991) "Morfologie van extreem rechts binnen het Vlaams-Nationalisme". In: De Schampheleire, H. and Thanassekos, Y. (eds.) *L'extrême droite en Europe de l'ouest*, Brussels, VUB Press: 235–245.

Viaene, W. (1996) *Stimuleren van Nederlandstalige zelforganisaties van migranten in het Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest* (Rapport). Brussels: Intercultureel Centrum voor Migranten.

Wils, L. (1994) *Vlaanderen, België, Groot-Nederland. Mythe en geschiedenis.* Leuven: Davidsfonds.

10. NATIONALISM IN EUROPE: DECLINE IN THE WEST, REVIVAL IN THE EAST

Mattei Dogan

ABSTRACT

One can distinguish two Europes, especially from the point of view of national construction, stability of frontiers, national integration, maturity of the nation-state and nationalistic feelings. Six contrasts between Eastern Europe and Western Europe are considered: 1) New States with disputed frontiers versus old states with recognized frontiers; 2) Conflicting ethnic intermingling versus consensual pluralism; 3) National churches versus secularization of the State; 4) Hostile confinement versus multiple exchanges; 5) Reciprocal mistrust between immediate neighbors, versus mutual trust; 6) National armies versus supranational armies. Ethnonationalism but not racism in the East.

Nationalism had been perceived by many historians of the nineteenth century as the maturation of the modern nation-state.[1] A substantial empirical evidence covering eighteen Western European countries shows that in these advanced post-industrial societies a decline of nationalist feelings and a weakening of the image of the nation-state have been observed during the last two decades (European Values, 1981, World Values, 1991, Eurobarometer, 1973–1997 and survey research in various countries).[2] In each Western European country the nationalistic attitudes within Western Europe are in a phase of erosion, in the sense that the trait no longer appears as a basic characteristic of the civic culture.

Six indicators are particularly significant: mitigated national pride, low level of confidence in the army, unwillingness to fight for the country in case of war, mutual confidence among Western European Nations, the blossoming of an European consciousness, and rise of individualism. Moreover, an intergenerational dynamic of the decline of nationalism is visible in empirical research.

Nationalism is still the most significant political value in the contemporary world, but not in Western Europe. This major exception can be explained in terms of asynchronism.

---

[1] Edward, A. Tiryakian, "The Wild Cards of Modernity" *Daedelus*, 126, Spring (1997), pp. 147–181.

[2] Eurobarometer, *Public Opinion in the European Community*, (1971–1997), Nos 1–46. Eurobarometer, *Special Issue on Racism and Xenophobia* (1989), November, Eurobarometer, *Special Issue on Trust in other Nationalitie*, (1980), December.

1. *Asynchronism of Nationalisms*

Nations are located not only in space but also in time. Given the great variety of nationalisms, it is hard to encapsulate them in a single definition. An asynchronic view would help us better to understand the originality of Western and Eastern Europes in the world today.

Nationalism as a doctrine was generated in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century. It is a product of European thought. It occurred at a specific period in European history and was later propagated throughout the entire world with the exception of the democratic "melting pots".

As Anthony Birch emphasizes, most of the present countries do not correspond to the ideal model described by theorists of nationalism. Most of the Third World states have artificial boundaries established by their former colonial rulers. Too often these boundaries divide ethnic groups. As a result, "most African states south of the Sahara could be described as multi-tribal in character, since tribal identities and loyalties are still more important than national identities and loyalties".[3]

Most of the 170 independent countries are currently at the stage of national construction or consolidation, a phase in which Western European countries found themselves six or seven generations ago. Thus, it is not surprising to observe a decline of nationalism in Western old Europe at the moment when nationalism is the dominant ideology in most other countries in the world. This asynchronism could be explained by the fact that nations, like individuals, do not have the same age, either in terms of national maturation or socio-economic development. At the moment when most countries in the Third World are discovering nationalistic values, these same values are fading in Western Europe. The countries of Western Europe and those of Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Eastern Europe coexist sociologically in a diachronic manner. As this century draws to a close, Western Europe is not only a geographical reality but also a temporal category, a phase in world history.

In a temporal dimension we can distinguish five varieties of countries: First, there are those countries whose people are still loyal to their primordial ties and have not yet acquired a national feeling. They are in a pre-nationalistic phase. Most of them belong to the category of the poorest of the poorer countries, the so-called Fourth World. The second type consists of the modernizing countries, the richest among the poor countries. Almost all are relatively young nations that achieved their national independence only recently. These are the most nationalistic. It took a long time

[3] Anthony Birch, *Nationalism and National Integration*, London, Unuwin-Hyman (1989).

for Britain, France and Spain to mature. Can the long experience of centuries be compressed into one generation?

The third type is clearly located in time and space: today in Western Europe, where the national maturity is followed by a post-nationalistic *Weltanschauung*. The fourth type includes a few countries where the roots of nationhood are not based on "ancestral soil" and where patriotism has consequently taken a novel form, as in Canada or Australia. The fifth type is characterized by a resurrection of nationalism after a long period of foreign subjugation, as in Eastern Europe. As G. Csepeli and A. Orkeny write, by the end of twentieth century, the nations of Eastern Europe had only caught up to late nineteenth-century Western Europe.[4]

This asynchronism is visible also in many other domains. According to demographic indicators (particularly birth rate, infant mortality, life expectancy, ratio of old people to young people), Europe is ahead of Third World countries by several generations.[5]

2. *The American case in a European perspective*

Hans Kohn[6] distinguishes between the nationalism corresponding to a "closed society," which "stresses the nation's autochthonous character, the common origins (race, blood) and rootedness in the ancestral soil," and the nationalism of the "open society," which reflects "a nation of fellow citizens irrespective of race or ethnic descent" and "finds its ideal image in a future that will build bridges over the separations of the past. The open nationalism stresses the free self-determination of the individual; the closed nationalism, biological or historical determinism". This dichotomy seems appropriate for stressing the historical difference between nationalism on each side of the Atlantic. The United States is a multiethnic society with a heterogeneous culture lacking common traditional roots. This country does not invoke "common ancestry", "common descent," "common blood," a "mythical father" or an atavistic feeling. The American society had been at a certain moment, for the white population, a "melting pot". Its ethnic diversity was continuously renewed. "Ethnic, cultural or historical criteria of the identity

---

[4] György Csepeli and Antal Orkeny, "The Changing Facets of Hungarian Nationalism", *Social Research*, 63, 1, Spring (1996), p. 261.

[5] Mattei Dogan, "Comparing the Decline of Nationalisms in Western Europe: The Generational Dynamic", *International Social Science Journal*, 136, May (1993), pp. 177–198.

[6] Hans Kohn, "Nationalism", *International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, (New York, Macmillan, 1968).

of descent can no longer be constitutive for the formation of a nation in an ethnically heterogeneous society".[7]

In the 1980s for four out of every ten Americans at least one of their grandparents was born outside the United States.[8] In Europe, such a mixing is significant for only a few countries that have experienced an important influx of immigrants during several generations. France—the first western country in modern history to have known a decline in birth-rate—has received several waves of immigrants of European origin since the beginning of the century: Italians, Poles, Spaniards, Portuguese, Hungarians, Greeks, Armenians and others. Many national cataclysms around the world have left a layer of refugees in France. How many contemporary French citizens have at least one grandparent of foreign ancestry? An evaluation can be attempted, taking into consideration the available statistics on naturalizations during the last century. Including the more recent immigrants of non-European origin, particularly those from Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Vietnam, it appears that one out of every five French citizens is to some degree of "foreign stock".[9] This is a much lower proportion than that found in the US population. The French school system has facilitated the assimilation of millions of sons and daughters of these "foreigners". The number of immigrants has been less important for other European countries.

When asked to give the reasons for their national pride, Americans are the only ones among Western peoples to rank "freedom and liberty" highest, and not historical reasons: 71 percent of respondents mentioned freedom or liberty as the source of their greatest national pride.[10]

In most cases exacerbated nationalism is directed against a neighboring nation. Most wars occur between contiguous countries about territorial disputes. The United States has only two contiguous neighbors. The northern neighbor has become, from many viewpoints, like the fifty-first American state. This border is permeable because Canadians, with the exception of those living in Quebec, are anglophones. For the southern neighbor, California is clearly not a kind of Alsace-Lorraine, even though Mexican-Spanish is slowly becoming the second official language in Southern California.

According to all available empirical evidence in the United-States nation-

---

[7] M. Rainer Lepsuis, "The Nation and Nationalism in Germany", *Social Research*, 52, 1 (1985), pp. 43–64.

[8] Everett C. Ladd, "Examining the American Idea of Nation", *Paper at the Congress of the International Political Science Association*, (1995).

[9] Michèle Tribalat, "Combien sont les Français d'origine étrangère", *Economie et Statistique*, 242, April (1991), pp. 17–29.

[10] Frederick Turner and Everett C. Ladd, "Nationalism, Leadership and the American Creed", *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* (1986) XIII, 2, pp. 118–198.

alistic values are not in a process of erosion. There are objective reasons for this. Among them, one could mention the size of the country, its sustained economic growth, its achievements in many domains, its successes in world affairs (the American army has saved European democracies on three occasions: during the First and Second World Wars and during the Cold War, by opening the atomic umbrella). But this country has experienced more than most Western European countries during the last twenty five years an erosion of trust in political institutions and even of the mutual trust among people.[11]

For some observers, one among the many reasons for this decline of mutual trust is increasing ethnic and racial heterogeneity. If, as president Clinton has suggested in San Diego in June 1997, the United States will become "the first multiracial democracy", new tensions may appear between the various segments of such a society. The rhetoric of such tensions does not use a nationalistic vocabulary. It is based on ethnic and racial cleavages.

3. *Blurring demarcation between Eastern and Western Europe*

Where is the line of demarcation today between Eastern and Western Europe? This line does not coincide with the former "iron curtain". We can ask about several countries. Considering its old democratic experience and the structure of its economy, the Czech Republic could be included in the West. The same questions can be said about Slovenia, which shows more analogies to its Western neighbors than to the other republics of ex-Yugoslavia. Ireland, in spite of its Atlantic rim, is by its social structure and religious culture nearer to Poland than to Britain. Greece, in spite of its membership in the European Community, is from various points of view closer to Eastern Europe. Whether we accept such adjustments or not, the central ideas presented here are not affected: it is sufficient to admit some exceptions.

A second line of demarcation can be traced, one which marks the eastern border of Eastern Europe. Should we include the Ukraine and Belarus within Eastern Europe or should we leave them outside? The principal criteria may to be the size of the country. In spite of multiple amputations, Russia remains a mastodon. It is not a country of European dimensions. It is a continent, the largest country on the planet, which constitutes a whole

[11] Mattei Dogan, "Erosion of Confidence in Advanced Democracies" *Studies in Comparative International Development*, Fall (1997) Vol. 32, 3, 3–29.

in itself, similar to China, India or the United States. The size of their country could be a reason for national pride for the Russians. As some Russian geographers admit, we could consider the western frontier of Russia to be the eastern limit of Eastern Europe.

Admitting that there are two Europes, we count eighteen countries in the West, including Iceland and Malta, and 24 countries in the East, including Cyprus and Moldova. In the light of this partition, internal diversity in each half of Europe remains in the shadow. Of course there are also regional differences within Western European countries. But there is no incompatibility between the revival of Catalan identity, for instance, and the decline of nationalism in the whole of Spain. On the contrary, it is precisely among these regions that one can observe the greatest European fervor.

We will consider eight contrasts. The first two are generally well-known and we will skip them. First, the gaps in the standards of living as measured by per capita GNP. Second, the phenomenon of the "freezing" of a national culture under a totalitarian dictatorship which lasted from 45 to 70 years, according to the country, as opposed to the pluralist culture of Western Europe. It is true that Spain and Portugal also had totalitarian regimes, but the Franco regime beginning in the fifties softened to such an extent that sociologists, such as Juan Linz, called it a "one-party authoritarian system". Totalitarianism characterized Spain for only some twelve years. In Portugal the regime also progressively softened. Let us look now at the six other contrasts.

4. *New states with disputed frontiers versus old states with recognized frontiers*

Eastern Europe is a region of young states, born after centuries of servitude, on the ruins of four empires: Turkish, Czarist, Austrian and German. Among the twenty-four independent nations in 1997, with twenty two tongues and dozens of dialects, only three can pride themselves on having been independent at the beginning of the century: Greece, since 1830, and Romania and Serbia since 1878. Two other nations became independent just before the First World War: Bulgaria, in 1908 and Albania, in 1912. Three others in 1919: Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Of these eight countries, seven were to become "satellites", after having enjoyed independence for less than one generation. Three other new states born in 1918, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, succumbed in 1940. The implosion of the Soviet Union in 1989 permitted the resurrection of these three countries and access to independence by three other countries: Ukraine, Belarus and

Moldova. In the beginning of the 1990s, Czechoslovakia broke into two states and Yugoslavia into five pieces, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia, and Bosnia. Poland has now four new neighbors, Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, and Russia (through the former Kaliningrad enclave).

In other words, among the independent states of Eastern Europe, nineteen were not fully sovereign in 1989 on the eve of the Soviet implosion. They were occupied or controlled. The exceptions were Greece, Albania, Cyprus and the former Yugoslavia. Some of these new states have only recently printed national stamps, and two of them do not yet have definitive names, the Czech Republic and Macedonia. All of these new states are mobilizing armies of historians in order to attest to their national ancestry and territorial rights. Ukraine and Belarus must rewrite their national histories from the depths of their collective memories.

The current territory of Belarus, for instance, fell to Mongols in the thirteenth century and became part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the fourteenth. The Grand Duchy merged with Poland in 1569, creating the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and subjugating Belarus. In the eighteenth century Belarus was divided during the three partitions of Poland, and later was incorporated into the Russian empire, before becoming a Soviet republic. It recovered its national independence by miracle after seven centuries, when the Soviet Union imploded.

During many generations Ukraine had not been an independent nation. In the 1990s it is perceived as "patchwork of nationalities". Ethnic-regional cleavages are the most important fracturing forces, particularly the concentration of Russian-speaking population in the eastern part of the country. The original inhabitants of the region, the Tartars, were brutally deported by Stalin in 1994. They have returned, claiming disposed properties. The situation is even more confused in the former Soviet Union. According to some geographers, in 1991 out of 23 borders within the Community of Independent States, only three were not disputed.

The nationalism manifested by these young states in Eastern Europe is like a juvenile acne. It is a natural phenomenon not well understood by Western observers.

In contrast, in the other half of Europe most states have existed for many centuries. There are few exceptions: Norway, recognized as independent in 1905, Ireland, Finland, and two small islands, Malta and Iceland. It is true that Germany and Italy have also achieved their national unification very late, in 1866 and 1870, but we must not confuse the unification of independent states with national independence. In 1870, Prussia was already an old state, and the various states which were to make up Italy were already

sovereign. The age of the nation-state is a determining factor in the upward or downward direction of nationalism.

New states mean new frontiers, contested in many places by their neighbors. Of the twenty four Eastern European states, only four have all their frontiers recognized by their immediate neighbors. All Poland's frontiers have been the object of litigation. Greece must face claims from her neighbors, particularly Albania and Bulgaria. Cyprus is divided by a recent internal frontier. In May 1993, the Hungarian parliament ratified a Ukrainian-Hungarian treaty recognizing the frontiers between these two countries. A similar agreement was concluded between Romania and Hungary in 1996. But all of the problems of the Hungarian minorities in several of these countries have not yet been fully resolved. Moldova seems to be a temporary buffer between Romania and Ukraine. The destiny of Moldova is not yet known. It may become part of Romania. The frontiers between the former Yugoslavian states are still contested.

This situation in Eastern Europe contrasts to the old frontiers of the Western European states. It is inconceivable today that a war could break out anywhere within the European Community, except possibly in Northern Ireland. Regional autonomy within existing nations (Catalonia, in the Basque area, and Corsica) is a different matter, as is local autonomy in some Italian regions.

5. *Conflicting ethnic intermingling versus consensual pluralism*

Whether recognized or concealed, disputes on contested borders are often related to the problems of ethnic intermingling. In Eastern Europe ethnic conflicts are generated in most cases by an amalgam of language and religion. In Western Europe today religion alone is no longer a source of conflict, even if in the rest of the world, including Eastern Europe and, paradoxically, the United States, religion is still a major factor of political unrest. A millennium after Charlemagne, Western Europe is religiously pacified, partly because it has also been largely "deconfessionalized".[12]

On the contrary, in Eastern Europe religion still impregnates the national culture. In many cases religion is reinforced by language. Together they build strong ethnic identities. People are predetermined from childhood by two primordial roots which have a cumulative effect in engendering a kind

[12] Mattei Dogan, "The Decline of Religious Beliefs in Western Europe", *International Social Science Journal*, 145, September (1995), pp. 405–418.

of ethnic isolation. In Transylvannia some people speak Hungarian and are at the same time Catholic. Others speak Romanian and are Orthodox. Mixed marriages are rare, people intermix but they do not really meet because of the double barriers of religion and language. Debates in the social sciences about ethnic conflicts are somewhat confused because scholars do not pay sufficient attention to the cumulative effects of language and religion.

In some cases the uniqueness of the language generates a feeling of loneliness: "The linguistic uniqueness of Hungarians was a basis for their feelings of loneliness, dispair, anxiety, and guilt".[13] In this case the language separates Catholics from other Catholics.

It is possible to distinguish four kinds of ethnic ecology: cleavage, containment, intermingling and dispersion. We are in the presence of a cleavage when two ethnic groups are concentrated in territories between which it is possible to draw a boundary. This is the case of the separation between the Czech region and Slovakia, or between the Greek and Turkish part of Cyprus. Such territorial cleavages can also be observed in Switzerland.

We can speak about containment when one ethnic group, in majority in its own territory, is encircled by another, much more numerous. This is the case of the Hungarian minority in the southeast of Transylvania in the heart of Romania. A famous case of containment is the Armenian High-Karabakh, a region isolated among the population of Azerbaijan. In the case of such containment territorial partition is impossible.

Ethnic intermingling results from the difficulty or the impossibility of drawing a recognizable border. This is the case in Bosnia and Macedonia, where ethnic pockets are inextricably intermixed (entire villages, districts of large cities or small cities). This resulted in part from Turkish invasions and forced conversions. In the Balkans the current ethnic geography has old historical roots. In the former Czechoslovakia there is clear territorial division permitting a peaceful separation, but in the former Yugoslavia an extended intermingling makes a peaceful solution difficult.

The fourth type of ethnic ecology, dispersion (diaspora), refers to individuals and not to communities. Here, we are dealing with people originally from an independent nation, but who have emigrated to another independent nation while maintaining their language, religion or ethnic traditions. That is the case of the 25,000,000 Russians who, today, live outside Russia. In the Ukraine, 17% of the population are not ethnically Ukrainians; in Belarus, 20% of the population have other ethnic roots; in

[13] Csepeli and Orkeny, ibid. p. 252.

Lithuania, 48%; In Latvia, 20%; in Moldova, 35%. Among the 24 Eastern European countries, 18 include ethnic minorities numerically important (see Table). There are two exceptions: Poland and the Czech Republic, which merit particular attention.

The current territory of Poland is only partially an ancestral territory. In 1945, it slid from east to west, losing immense territories in the east and gaining others in the west. Before the war it included three large ethnic minorities: Belarusan, German and Jewish, totaling about eight million people. After the Holocaust, the forced transfers of population, and voluntary emigration, there remained only a few thousand individuals from the last two minorities who were strongly "polonized": the price paid for this involuntary ethnic homogenization was the massacre or forced departure of one-third of the population that had lived in the country in 1939.

Before the war Czechoslovakia was an extreme example of a multinational country, one of the richest in the world, and an exemplary democracy with a government of five parties (the Petka). The funeral eulogy of the defunct Czechoslovakia was pronounced by the then prime minister Petr Pithart, who described how the Czech Republic was "involuntarily" divided: "For the first time in more than one thousand years the Czechs will no longer live in a multinational state. For me, the Czech identity is unthinkable without the 700 years of history with the Germans. It is unthinkable without the Jews and the Ruthenes... The war got rid of the Germans, we lost the Jews in the Holocaust, we abandoned Ruthenia to Stalin without reacting and now, in three years, we have abandoned our weapons to the Slovaks".

Of the four kinds of ethnic ecology that can be observed in Eastern Europe, two, intermingling and containment, cannot be found in Western Europe. Moreover, the amalgam between language and religion is exceptional. The Walloons and the Flemish are both Catholic. In the Netherlands, the various religious communities speak the same language, In Austria, good Catholics and anticlerical people communicate in German. In Switzerland, linguistic distribution and religious distribution do not coincide. In Belgium ethnolinguistic cleavage has resulted in territorial federalism and in a linguistic proportionalism in the governmental sphere. The same proportionalism has been adopted in Switzerland. In the Netherlands, where individual confessional affiliation is dispersed over the entire territory, it is the religious proportionality which is the basic criterion. In Austria, where neither the language nor the confessional affiliation is the dividing factor but rather the religious beliefs, pluralism is contained in the parties. Everywhere in Western Europe, electoral systems favor political pluralism and a search for solutions by consensus. The absence of the double barriers has facilitated the adoption of consensual solutions in these countries.

The difference between Eastern and Western Europe is in a sense transitory: the East is behind by a generation or more, but growing urbanization, the reduction of the agricultural population, mobility of population, and trade are reducing the gap.

6. *National churches versus secularization of the State*

The secularization of society is a major theme in modernization theories. In Western Europe, with the exception of Ireland, the separation of church and state has long been a *fait accompli.* This separation in the West contrasts with the symbiosis of church and state in Eastern Europe. Such a symbiosis in the East can be explained by the history of these long time oppressed nations which have found in religion a double salutary refuge: against imperialism or foreign colonization and against totalitarian indoctrination. In Eastern Europe, nationalism had always been intimately related to religion.

Today in Western Europe nationalism is no longer nourished by religion; the churches are no longer the network of nationalist movements, even if it remains true that Spanish culture centuries ago was shaped by the Catholic Church, and even if the bloody battles of the Thirty Years' War resulted in a multitude of German political entities born out of religious strife. Only in a few regions of Western Europe are the primordial ties still strong, the Basque region being the most famous. No doubt, even in the West the altar has favored nationalist movements in the past, as in Spain and Portugal, but with few exceptions, like Ireland, and Ulster more in internal policies than in fights for national independence.

By contrast, in Eastern Europe, churches have been historically the fortresses of national survival, and this religious impregnation is still visible and nationalism is still intimately related to religion, as many social scientists testify. For the majority of Poles, Catholicism has become the core of their national identity. The convergence of religious and national consciousness nursed both Catholicism and nationalism. Over centuries past, Catholicism became a national necessity in Poland and fidelity to the church became synonymous with faithfulness to the nation. This nexus characterized the Solidarnost movement in the 1980s.

Bulgarian nationalism was born, bred, nursed, and sustained for eleven hundred years by the National Orthodox Church. Patriarchs, bishops, and priests have served this cause under tsars and sultans for centuries. Priests, but not bishops, continued to serve this cause during the communist dictatorship. It is widely held that nationalism and the Catholic Church in Lithuania are intimately related, that their interests are virtually indistinguishable, and that

Lithuanian nationalist activity was to a large degree the defense of the church and religious rights against the repressive policies of the Soviet regime. The linkage of Catholicism and nationalism is manifest in the church's protection of the interests of Croats in Croatia, the interests of Slovenes in Slovenia, and the interests of Croats in Bosnia.

In Hungary before the war, the Catholic church assumed the official functions of education and health, controlling most of the school systems and the hospitals. The Church's hospital system owned a half million hectares of cultivable land. All bishops were, by right, members of parliament. Until the eve the Second World War, one could observe a post-medieval imprint on Hungarian institutions.

Greece was not until recently a secular state. Orthodoxy was part of the national identity. Before 1992, it was impossible to have a civil marriage in Greece. The Church played the role of registrar for births, marriages, and deaths, even for agnostic people. In 1996, the government proposed a reform of the civil code, but due to pressure from the Holy Synod it retreated from this position and accepted that religious marriages have also legal status.

The Ukrainian Autocephalic Church was always considered the cradle of national renaissance, and the Russian Orthodox Church has long been perceived as an agent of Russification, rather than evangelization. The slogan, "An independent church is the foundation of an independent nation" is widely spread today in Ukraine.

Even historically in Western Europe the Church had also sustained nationalist and conservative movements. But today, churches as institutions no longer nourish nationalism, and they have ceased to hatch nationalist movements. Moreover, in several Western countries national unification was achieved against the will of the Church and of the high clergy, Italy being the most notable example.

Because of these religious roots and the geo-historical context, nationalism in Eastern Europe is of a different kind than that in Western Europe. What can be said about the erosion of nationalism in the West cannot be extrapolated to the East. The fundamental fact to be underscored is that in Eastern Europe, the Church has traditionally played the role of the keeper of national identity, and in more recent times, the role of resistance to totalitarian dictatorship. Now that these Eastern European countries are no longer under Marxist-Leninist ideology, and have recovered their national independence, it is quite probable that the religious-national symbiosis will progressively weaken, and that national consciousness will be progressively secularized.

7. *Hostile confinement versus multiple exchanges*

The theory of transactional flow formulated by Karl Deutsch[14] and the application of cybernetic models to international relations have shown how an aggregate of isolated nations is transformed into a coherent whole. Such a process implies exchanges in various domains and a system of communication which reinforces the interdependence of the constituent parties. The essential notion to be retained is the degree of interdependence of the states in a given region, primarily at the economic level. Statistics concerning transportation of people give significant indications about the degree of regional integration. Air traffic and railway traffic are much heavier between Western and Eastern countries than among the Eastern countries themselves. It is difficult to travel from north to south within Eastern Europe. To go from Warsaw to Bucharest, it is better to go via Vienna. Few people cross the Danube between Romania and Bulgaria or the frontier between Bulgaria and Greece. A trip from Athens to Riga risks being longer than a trip from London to Sydney.

Until very recently there were few cultural encounters between Hungarians, Romanians, Poles, Bulgarians or Greeks. Scholars in these countries more often met in the West. Certainly, radio and television are received in the capitals of Eastern Europe, but they are not practical because of the linguistic cacophony. When Poles and Hungarians meet, they talk in English or French. There is relatively little cooperation between scientists from these countries and very few academic exchanges. The Orthodox churches are autocephalous, ignoring each other superbly. The works of writers and artists are not known in the contiguous countries in advance of their being discovered in the West. Bulgarians are informed about Hungary through the Western mass media, and vice versa. Kafka yesterday or Kadaré recently were first discovered in the West. Hungarian newspapers are not available in Bratislava nor Slovak newspapers in Budapest. A large number of Western newspapers and weekly magazines are available in Prague or Warsaw, but there is no exchange of printed media in Czech or Polish between these two capitals. Statistics on telephone traffic show the poor communications among the Eastern European countries. Recently the frontiers have been opened, favoring tourism between neighboring countries, particularly Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, but tourism between these adjacent countries remains modest. Slovenia communicates much more with the West than with her Eastern neighbors. When the Romanian government sent a military contingent in April 1997 to join West Europeans in Albania

[14] Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication*. (1953) M.I.T. Press.

it was one of the first efforts in international cooperation between these countries in a long time.

The economies of Eastern European countries are complementary in few domains, and this is the main obstacle. There is not a system of exchanges and communication which could make an integrated region. Each country currently lives in isolation of the immediate neighbours communicating only with far away Western countries. There is no a feeling of community of interests between immediate neighbors. Each one protects its own borders. The relationship of Romania and Moldova is an exceptional case, explainable by common language and history. In such confinement, political consciousness of belonging to the same region cannot germinate. Even in the past, there were few attempts to integrate these countries politically. Before World War II, the *Petite Entente* between Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia extinguished itself rapidly. During the Soviet hegemony the "satellites" never succeeded in synchronizing their liberation movements. Even now there were revolts in Berlin, Budapest, Prague, Gdansk, and elsewhere, but not at the same time, until in 1989 when Soviet power melted. Until then Eastern Europe as such had never played an important role in world politics. There is no an Eastern European bloc in the United Nations. Each country retreats into its own shell. Nevertheless, all these countries together represent a power potential totaling a population of 150 million people.

Conversely, in the West European consciousness has made enormous progress in the last decades. Several surveys have shown the rapid "Europeanization" of national cultures. Today, people, ideas, and goods circulate freely within the European Community. During the last forty years, more Europeans have crossed the intra-European borders than during the previous eight centuries. Dozens of millions of vacationers migrate from the north to the south every summer. Television ignores national boundaries. Eurovision is a reality. The French/German television channel has become a cultural power. In spite of linguistic diversity, Western cultures are becoming less and less national and more and more eclectic, especially among young people. This mixing of cultures does not happen equally everywhere. In recent years, the majority of Germans have taken vacations in another European country. Every year, Spain and Italy receive a number of European tourists greater than their adult populations. The resorts of Constanta and Varna and the Dalmatian coast do not draw tourists from other Eastern European countries as much as the Greek beaches do from Western Europe. This blossoming of a supranational consciousness in Western Europe contrasts with the confinement of the Eastern European countries.

8. *Reciprocal mistrust between neighbors versus mutual trust*

Mutual trust between Western European countries contrasts with the mistrust that prevails in Eastern Europe. In a survey conducted in 1990, a majority of Poles declared that they did not trust the Russians (69%), Belarusans (63%), Romanians (64%) Bulgarians (56%) or Czechs (61%); only 2% of the Poles declared that they trusted the Russians, Ukrainians, or Belarusans. For 10% of the Poles the Americans, British, Italians, and Swiss are the only people "worthy of trust". Collective memory remains alive fifty years after the end of the War: 70% of the Poles mistrust the Germans.[15] Clearly, the majority of Poles have the feeling of living in a hostile environment, which only encourages nationalist attitudes. In 1990 the Czechs also believed that they were in a hostile environment, since 62% didn't trust the Russians, 77%, the Poles and the Romanians, 67%, the Hungarians, and 64%, the Bulgarians, while only 44% were suspicious of the Germans. At that time, before the separation of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, a strong minority of Czechs stated that they mistrusted the Slovaks.[16]

How do we explain such mistrust between the countries of Eastern Europe? First, there is the collective memory of each nation. Genocide and atrocities cannot be forgotten: More than two generations ago, the massacres of Armenians by Turks occured; the genocide of Jews during the second World War is present in the memory of all Europeans; in 1940 ten thousand Polish officers were killed at Katyn by Soviet authorities; in more recent years Serbs and Croats procedeed to mutual "ethnic purification"—the list is long. Recent territorial conflicts and contested frontiers nourish the reciprocal mistrust.

National folklore is also a vector of stereotypes and xenophobia. In folklore passed down to children, the role of the bad guy is always incarnated in someone from a neighboring country. Manuals and school books maintain this distrust. They transmit a xenophobic mentality from one generation to another. These stereotypes are molded into children's vulnerable minds. Between the two wars, in most Eastern European countries, in the schools children were taught to regard neighbouring nations as culturally and morally inferior to their own. For decades, nothing was done to promote mutual knowledge and understanding between neighbours.

A comparative analysis of the content of school books used in the East and the West yesterday and today would reveal a very different process of socialization. Today, manuals used in Germany, France, Italy, and Spain

[15] Eurobarometer, December (1990) p. 47.
[16] Eurobarometer, December (1990) p. A. 47.

and almost everywhere in Western Europe (except possibly Greece) are cleansed of any visible xenophobia.

In the East each country is considered by most of its neighbors as a potential enemy. This aversion is ancestral. The most hated country in Poland and Romania is Russia, white or red. Most Romanians peasants believe that their country is encircled by enemies, with the exception of Serbia. They particularly detest Ukrainians, described in the Romanian folklore as people who "have heads as round as apples". The Greeks also see themselves surrounded by enemies: the Turks in the east, the Bulgarians and Albanians in the north. The reciprocal hate between Serbs and Croats, fueled by the recent atrocities, will remain in the collective memory for generations.

Mutual ignorance, as between Poland and Romania, is a relatively favorable situation. There are nevertheless a few exceptions. Poland and Hungary, due to their similar national destinies, have maintained cordial relations for a long time, but they have no common frontiers. The three Baltic countries feel a solidarity resulting from their common national destinies. We do not yet know what the relationship will be between Ukraine and Belarus.

In Eastern Europe in most cases, national integrity has been achieved by wars between neighbors. The heritage is heavy in territorial claims. Obviously, a country that has no confidence in its neighbors can only be nationalistic.

Sterotypes and prejudices survived during the communist regime. In Bulgaria, in 1992, for instance one every of two Christian Bulgarians considered the Turkish minority as "a threat to the national security". Gypsies were even less tolerated: 72% of the Bulgarians were in favor of "a segregation of Gypsies in the place of living", and 90% believed that they have "criminal proclivities"; 48% of Bulgarians were not willing to hire a Turk and 30%, to be hired by a Turk.[17] In Hungary, surveys conducted in the 1980s and 1990s have shown that stereotypes concerning the neighboring nations were all negative except toward the Austrians.[18] At the same moment (spring 1990) the absolute majority in each of the twelve countries of the European Union expressed a feeling of trust toward the other nations of Western Europe. The level of trust has increased between 1976 and 1990. The most spectacular trend is the growth of mutual trust between France and Germany during the last four decades.[19]

---

[17] Dimitrina Dimitrova "The World of Work", in Nikolai Genov, ed. *Sociology in a Society in Transition*, Sofia, Bulgarian Sociological Association (1994) p. 71.

[18] Csepeli and Orkeny, idem, p. 270.

[19] Mattei Dogan, op. cit. 1993, p. 196.

9. *National armies versus supranational armies*

Are you willing to fight for your own country? Under what conditions? To defend the country or an ideology? Against which enemy? With what chances of survival? Some empirical data are available to reply to these questions. Even if the threat of the Red Army has disappeared, in almost all Western European countries a significant part of the population does not have complete confidence in the capacity of its national army to defend the nation, particularly in the event of a thermonuclear war.[20] We do not have comparable empirical data for the Eastern European countries. But even if they were available, a comparison between the two Europes would not be valid because the circumstances are not the same.

In Eastern Europe the potential enemy could not be a superpower but a next-door neighbor of modest size. The objective would be the defense of a frontier and not a planetary ambition. The potential army would be a small army which would have to fight against another small army. Conversely, in Western Europe a war between neighboring countries is unthinkable (except in Northern Ireland), because no country has territorial claims, whereas in the East, precisely these types of claims are possible reasons for local armed conflict. The missions of national armies are simply not the same on both sides of Europe. In Western Europe most countries are moving toward a supranational professional army, which presumably will not have any role to play in the maintenance of frontiers within the European Community: an integrated European army is already envisioned. But the army maintains its importance in the East, continuing to nourish nationalist reflexes. Romania, Hungary, Croatia, Estonia, and Greece still need a good national army. But what would be the use of a Portuguese, Dutch, or Danish army, if not as a part of a multinational European army?

10. *Ethnonationalism but not racism in the East*

In Eastern Europe, nationalism has no racist overtones. In spite of the diversity of their ancestries, sometimes mythological, the twenty-four nations in that region are only distinguished by language, religion, and folklore—even if the proportion of people with blond hair in Poland is higher than in Bulgaria, and even if the Croats are taller than the Ukrainians. The willingness

[20] Jean Stoetzel, "Defeatism in Western Europe: Reluctance to Fight for the Country, in Mattei Dogan, ed., *Comparing Pluralist Democracies: Stains on Legitimacy*, (Boulder, Co., Westview Press 1988), pp. 169–180.

to assimilate ethnic minorities is symptomatic: Romania has tried until recently to "romanize" the Hungarians in Transylvania, with little success, however. Slovakia has made the usage of Hungarian first names difficult. In 1984 all the names of Bulgarian Muslims were changed into Bulgarian. This resulted in a confrontation between the Turkish minority and the government, and many Bulgarian have emigrated to Turkey. The right to have a Turkish name was recognized in 1990. The Serbs wanted the Bosnian Muslims to renounce their religion. It has been made difficult everywhere to teach the minority language. But religious freedom is respected. This policy of assimilation pursued by national governments shows that nationalism has no racist basis, as is the case elsewhere in the world. All the nations of Eastern Europe are white. There is no real racial diversity in that region, and here appears a new contrast with Western Europe and the United States which now have millions of immigrants of non-European and non-Mediterranean stocks, particularly in Britain.

In the process of integration and assimilation, the most significant stage is that of mixed marriages. Retaining this criterion, assimilation has only modestly reached this stage: in 1990 there were less than 6% of mixed marriages between Czechs and Slovaks and perhaps no more in Transylvania between Romanians and Hungarians. Ex-Yugoslavia is a true laboratory for social sciences. In a survey conducted in 1966, and repeated in 1990, people have been asked in each of the ex-Yugoslavian states, whether they would find it acceptable to marry a person of another nationality. In Serbia, only 35% of the people responded that they do not reject *a priori* a marriage with a Croat, and 39%, with a Slovenian. But in Croatia, only 10% have found it acceptable to marry a Serb, and only 8%, a Macedonian. This is an astonishing finding after half of a century of common experience in a "socialist federation" which had done so much to reduce the traditional vertical cleavages.

Most of the nations of Eastern Europe had been without self-government during their long history, swinging back and forth between empires. In the twentieth century their national destiny was decided in Versailles, Trianon, Munich, and Yalta. Sociologists and economists have revised the history of Latin America, by forging the theory of "dependence". An application of this theory to Eastern Europe might bring a clarifying interpretation.

The history of these contiguous countries has often been marked by similar upheavals. Most of them achieved national independence at the same time, in 1918–1919. Together they fell under Soviet rule in 1945. Certainly, they did not succeed in coordinating their revolts while under Soviet hegemony; in revenge, they freed themselves in 1989–1991, as if a kind of good virus had been propagated by radio and television.

In spite of this geo-historical conditioning, today these countries do not represent a commonwealth but an aggregate of countries with disputable and disputed frontiers. Liberated recently, they find themselves in a new nationalist phase of their development. They manifest a nationalism of proximity and neighborhood. At the same time, they aspire, as shown by many surveys, to a fusion with Western Europe. They mistrust their immediate neighbors, but they trust those farther away in the West. Europe as a panacea is more popular in Poland, Romania, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Greece than in the core of Western Europe, particularly in Britain, France, Switzerland, Denmark.

The major causes of this failure of regional integration are the vertical cleavages (language, religion, ethnicity) and economic inequality between regions. The best example is Slovenia and Croatia, which did not accept sacrifices in favor of the economic development of Kosovo and Montenegro. Slovakia felt that it was the poor relative of Bohemia. The first to predict the dismemberment of the Soviet Union were, paradoxically, some Russian nationalist intellectuals who emphasized the low economic development of some of the Central Asian republics.

There is a foolproof way to create enormous difficulties for the European Community: a premature extension toward the East with the incorporation of a large number of countries with non-competitive economies. Considering the economic gaps between the two Europes, a European federation from Lisbon to Riga would imply, first of all, an economic transfer of industrial plants from the rich countries to the others and emigration of people from East to West. It is precisely these two issues, "delocalization" and immigration, that have met with the strongest opposition in public opinion in twelve countries of Western Europe.[21] The theory of "communicating vessels" is generous rhetoric but fallacious. Since Italians in the North were reluctant to accept sacrifices to help their brothers in the South, one needs a big dose of optimism in order to hope that the British and the French—some of whom have trouble locating the Vistula on the map and who confuse Bucharest and Budapest—will accept tightening their belts for far-away countries. The Western politicians who are advocating such generosity, which is laudable from a political point of view risk being punished by their tax-paying voters, because people do not look as far ahead as do the political and intellectual elite.

In the East, disenchantment could be even more rapid because the opening of frontiers would offer new markets to competitive industries in the West,

[21] Eurobarometer, 38, (1992) and Eurobarometer, Les Préoccupations des Européens, (1993).

without helping the Eastern European economies. President Mitterrand declared in September 1994: "If the ex-Communist countries would enter the Common Market now they would be devoured by foreign capitals", but he did not mention the risk of a massive "delocalization" of industry in search of low salaries, which undoubtedly would engender reactions in the West.

During centuries it has been a national misfortune for Eastern European nations to have Russia as a neighbor, whether Czarist or Soviet. Their felings are reflected in their national folklores. After having gravitated around the Red Star, will the former "satellites", which together represent an enormous potential, progressively create a new independent constellation?

Ethnic minorities in Eastern-Central Europe

Estimation:	*Mini*	*Maxi*
Bosnia	49%	55%
Latvia	43%	47%
Estonia	32%	38%
Moldova	32%	35%
Macedonia	30%	34%
Serbia	26%	31%
Montenegro	25%	30%
Ukraine	25%	27%
Cyprus	23%	24%
Belarus	18%	21%
Czech Republic	18%	18%
Lithuania	18%	20%
Bulgaria	17%	26%
Slovakia	14%	22%
Croatia	14%	16%
Romania	11%	17%
Slovenia	6%	8%
Greece	5%	14%
Hungary	3%	13%
Albania	2%	6%
Poland	2%	3%

Source: Institute of International Sociology, Gorizia, 1996

11. A SPECULATION ON SOME FEATURES OF JAPANESE PRODUCTION PRACTICES: 8 POINTS OF DISCUSSION

Masayuki Munakata

1. *Focussed Sector*

Among economic activities in Japan the production sector is most worth observing in terms of international competitiveness or international comparison. Especially the mass production sector has shown itself as the main driving force of Japanese economy after the Second World War—from steel, auto and electronics to piano manufacturing—and drawn keen attention and interest from the industrial and academic world. We choose this sector for the focus of our observation to make clear features of a Japanese way in comparison with those in western and in other Asian countries. The so-called "Japan model", "Japanese type" of production system or "lean production" conception is basically formed by analyzing the experiences of the Japanese mass production industries, especially the automobile industry, as symbolically shown in the terminology of "Toyotism" or "JIT/TQC" (Schonberger, 1984; Shimokawa et al., 1997).

2. *Viewpoint*

We grasp the production system basically as composed of technological, sociological and economic aspects: that is, we understand that any production system realizes its economic rationality by combining in a special mode a technological logic with a specific societal relationship as a reflection of the social settings of countries, so that we find various possibilities and manners of realizing economic rationality other than, or at least as the variations of, the apparently universal "one best way" (Appelbaum/Batt, 1994; Ortmann, 1995).

3. *History*

From the last half of the 19th century until recent times the fundamental Japanese industrial strategy has been to learn the essentials of western

technologies as genuinely as possible and embed them in our social context in a manner to realize their highest economic advantages at any social costs, that is, even if this strategy and the following mobilization of the people could disturb the established societal order and stability within society. The highest value has been placed on "catch up" rather than "keep order". You can easily witness cases exemplifying this common inclination in the history of our industrial progress, from the introduction of "scientific management" in the 1910's, "mass production and quality control techniques" in the 1950's, to "micro electronics" in the 1970's and 1980's.

4. *Technological System Features*

The essential technological feature of Japanese production system and practices is to be found in the "quest for perfection" (Womack, et al., 1990) in process technology for manufacturing products of well-balanced but not unique design or technological specialty. In this sense, we may follow more genuinely than western people the so-called "machine principle" (Reuleaux, 1875), a symbol of western modernity which indicates the exclusion of all elements of disturbance from the system. Prerequisites for this ideal are a high level of machine tool technology, thorough standardization, and strict process analysis, planning and control, as F.W. Taylor and H. Ford had told us so energetically and repeatedly more than a half century ago (Taylor, 1903, 1911; Ford, 1926). Especially the experiences before and during the Second World War taught us the keen necessity of re-learning more completely the lessons from the classics, which became the common target and backbone of restoration and development since then. Even flexibility in production, or "Japanese-type flexible mass production" with her swift die change and mixed flow line, is based on the results of further standardization and mechanization.

5. *Human Side of the System*

You can not expect to realize the technological "machine principle" by merely applying the societal "machine principle" in production practices, as in the cases of western ways of so-called "Taylorism" or "Fordism" in their present terminology. The logic of its impossibility is to be found in essence in the "uncertainties" necessarily arising in the real process of production. Its possibility increases as the degree of technological level, flexibility and complexity of the system advance (Munakata, 1989, 1993; Thomas, 1994).

The Japanese way to cope with this issue on the human side of the system is to follow basically the principles of specialization and division of labour in technological and human functions of production but not to combine the specialized production function with a fixed or "mechanistic" staffing of personnel. Our way is to combine it with human organization which permits more flexible and free mobilization, and exploitation of qualitative, creative abilities of human resources of all ranks as well as quantitative energies from them. The quest for perfection in the production process with perpetual "kaizen" (improvement) toward a "zero defect" ideal is otherwise almost unexpected. The result is a sort of special unification of the so-called "mechanistic" and "organic" types of system or organization in the western social context (Burns/Stalker, 1961). In this manner, you can expect ideally to maintain mechanical factory orders and production while at the same time utilizing with less limitation the organic ability of the people even on the shop floor for more creative and qualitative functions for the system. In the social context of the traditional western world, this is only expected and permitted by the upper rank staffs, managers and specialists or experts. Here you can see a sort of unification of two basic factors of societal system, that is, requirements for social order and those for exploitation and utilization of full human abilities. Their relation has been often grasped as a "trade-off" or "dilemma" in the western context as shown in the confrontation of "Taylorism" and a "Socio-technical Approach". The former approach implies that some limitation of flexible deployment and qualitative utilization of human resources is unavoidable for the sake of keeping the production and class order. The latter implies that a sort of political autonomy is to be given to the shop floor people in order to expect the utilization of their creative abilities and "learning effect" (Berggren, 1991).

6. *Societal Characteristics*

The special unification found in the Japanese way may be of little use in terms of economic rationality if it results in excessive and additional production costs for industry and firm. There exits in the Japanese macro and micro societal system a mechanism to restrain the realization of this sort of "danger". Two interrelated system elements are especially to be taken into consideration: (a) the in essence closed nature of the system and (b) the only "functionally", not "substantially", formed hierarchy within the system. The former element compels people to accept this mode of practice by narrowing the alternatives they have in their working lives for equal conditions. The latter element gives people greater opportunities and motivations

for advancing up the social ladder in the system by their own initiatives, and competitive and collaborative abilities with one another on a relatively equal footing. The functionally precisely formed and effective, and in "substance" not solid or specific but rather fluid class nature of the Japanese society, makes it possible. It gives our micro and macro system a dual character. The opportunity for full development of human abilities for most people, on the one hand, and the menace of limitless exploitation of human resources for the sake of industry, on the other, are central to explaining the rise of international "human and inhuman controversy" in "Japanese Management".

7. *The "Japan Model" and Types of Nation-State*

If this sort of structural and behavioral nature of Japanese production practice and system has any theoretical implications in terms of comparative production system and production system perspectives as a "Japan Model", it may be necessary to indicate some operational parameters or variables to explain its genesis or formation. We need to place the relative significance of the model and the position into the various possibilities of system designs or "system models" in the present era of global competition. In this respect a lot of discussion and reasoning is possible, from historical to religious and cultural viewpoints often connected to issues of east-west comparison. I only point out that the societal nature of the micro system has some relation to the way and nature of the formation of social order, and this mode in turn has some correlation to basic types of the modern nation-state.

As classic studies on "nationalism" tell us, two basic components of the ideal of modern nation-state are the border formation (and mutual sanctions); and cultural integration (esp. language) (Lemberg, 1964). When we make a two dimensional matrix in respect to basic types of modern nation-state according to the mode of formation (x: predetermined = P/artificial = A), (y: predetermined = p/artificial = a), Japanese peculiarity lies in her belonging to (P.p) type. In a sense we may say that we had established the basic configuration of nation-state long before the modern era of nation-state formation in the western world, relatively free from the societal issues of "western modernity" (Toulmin, 1990). The historical and societal meanings and implications involved in this type may shed at least some light on the variables specific of Japan's production system. We only mention the relatively low grade of necessity for maintaining the "substantial" class order or hierarchy to keep fundamental social stability and for identifying her nationhood and citizenship (Brubaker, 1992); the tolerance for high mobil-

ity of people among ranks; and the high information flow based on the implicit creditability and reliance people have generally within the national society. Our very simple and formal classification may form a rough check point to grasp national features for the international comparison of social aspects of economic behavior.

8. *Perspectives*

The special mode of integration of technological, societal and economic aspects in the Japanese production system may explain at least some part of international competitiveness of the Japanese industry. The logic and principles extracted from our production experiences often grasped as the "Japan Model" may have some implications and contributions for the transformation and improvement of industrial practices in other countries, east and west. But in fields of economic activities other than production or manufacturing, where more than "industrious" and collaborative attitudes towards skill and technology is needed, such as commerce, finance or even public administration, the reversal side of the "Japanese" coin could come to the front. It could result in neither rational nor effective economic behavior, as you see in recent scandals and difficulties in our financial sector. In an age of globalization and international "mega" competition, the universal adaptability of the Japanese system with her closed and only "functional" flexibility within this framework is to be reconsidered as well.

References

Appelbaum, E./R. Batt, *The New American Workplace*, NY 1994.

Berggren, Von Ford zu Volvo: *Automobilherstellung in Sweden*, Berlin/Heidelberg/NY 1991 (*The Volvo Experience: Alternatives to Lean Production in the Swedisch Auto Industry*, NY 1992).

Brubaker, R., *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, Cambridge/London 1992.

Burns, T./G.M. Stalker, *The Management of Innovation*, London 1961.

Ford, H., *Today and Tomorrow*, NY & London 1926.

Lemberg, E., *Nationalismus, 1: Psychologie und Geschichte; 2. Soziologie und Politische Paedagogik*, Muenchen 1964.

Munakata, M., 技術の理論 (Gijyutu no Riron: Genndai Kougyokeiei Monndai eno Gijyutu-ronteki Sekkin; *A Theory of Technology: A Technological Approach to Contemporary Issues of Industrial Management*), Tokyo 1989.

——, "Social Innovation as a Condition for Technological Progress", Pleitner, H.J. ed., *Small and Medium-sized Enterprises on their Way into the Next Century*, St. Gallen 1993.

——, "Das Japanische Produktionssytem im Kontext des Internationalen Vergleichs", *The Annals of the School of Business Administration*, Kobe University, No. 39, 1995.

——, "The End of 'Mass Production System' and Changes in Working Practices", Hasegawa, H./G.D. Hook, ed., *Japanese Business Management: Restructuring for Low Growth and Globalization*, London/NY 1998.

Ortmann, G., *Formen der Produktion: Organisation und Rekursivitaet*, Opladen 1995.
Schonberger, R., *Japanese Manufacturing Techniques: Nine Hidden Lessons in Simplicity*, NY/London 1982.
Shimokawa, K./U. Juergens/Fujimoto, T. ed., *Transforming Automobile Assembly: Experiences in Automation and Work Organization*, Berlin/Heidelberg/NY 1997.
Taylor, F.W., "Shop Management" 1903, "Principles of Scientific Management" 1911, in *Scientific Management* NY/London 1947.
Reuleaux, F., *Theoretische Kinematik: Grundzuege einer Theorie des Maschinenwesens*, Braunschweig 1875.
Thomas, R.J., *What Machines Can't Do: Politics and Technology in the Industrial Enterprises*, Berkeley/Los Angels/London 1994.
Toulmin, S., *Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity*, NY 1990.
Womack, J.P., et al., *The Machine That Changed the World*, NY 1990.

12. LAW AND LIBERTY, CAPITALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN CHINA AND THE WEST

Erich Weede

ABSTRACT

In the last five hundred years the West overtook China scientifically, technologically and, most importantly, economically. The Western miracle consisted of overcoming mass poverty for the first time in human history. Why did the West overtake the great Asian civilizations that were more advanced than Europe in the middle ages? Here, it is argued that Western disunity is the root cause of Western achievements. Rivalry between European princes and rulers forced them to respect the property rights of producers and merchants, to establish something like the rule of law, and to concede ever more liberty to subjects who later became citizens. Safe property rights, limited government and decentralized decision-making provided the political background conditions for capitalism and economic growth in the West. By contrast, China suffered the economic consequences of political unity, arbitrary government and insecure property rights. Even the reascent of China in recent decades may be explained by political fragmentation. The first Chinese province to overcome mass poverty has been Taiwan, which never was subordinated to the PRC's government. As long as the central government monopolized economic decision-making instead of sharing it with provinces competing for capital and investment, the Chinese economy performed poorly. Since much economic decision-making has been delegated to lower levels of authority, something like market-preserving competition or even 'federalism' has come into existence. A flourishing economy on the Chinese mainland may eventually push China towards democratization, as a flourishing economy did in the past on the Chinese island of Taiwan.

1. *Law and Liberty, Property Rights and Capitalism*

For a quarter of a millennium Westerners have ruled the world. The global dominance of the West has been exceptional. Five hundred years ago, Ming China, Mughal India and Ottoman Turkey were at least as advanced as the West economically, militarily, scientifically, and technologically. Three hundred years ago, Mughal India began its decline, but the Turks were still close to the gates of Vienna, and China was still quite safe from Western encroachments. How and why could the West ever overtake the great civilizations of Asia?

The main distinction between all of the great Asian civilizations and the West in the past five hundred years is that the great Asian empires were huge, comparable in size to Western Europe at least (where Western Europe refers to the Catholic *and* Protestant parts of Europe, but excluding the Greek and Russian varieties of Christendom). Most West European "states" were comparable in size to Chinese provinces or districts, not to China as a whole. *The* distinguishing characteristic between Western Europe on the one hand, and the great Asian civilizations of China, India, and Turkey on

the other hand is the fact that Western civilization was always disunited and politically fragmented, whereas the great Asian civilizations unified vast territories politically and militarily.

The most obvious component of Western disunity and political fragmentation was the existence of a multitude of effectively sovereign states, capable of waging war against each other. There also was the legacy of the middle ages and the Protestant reformation: fairly autonomous towns; a political voice for *some* merchants, artisans and educated men without nobel pedigree in royal councils, parliaments, and courts; competing churches and denominations, i.e., spiritual pluralism at the European, if not state level. Political fragmentation in Western Europe promoted political competition between elites. This competition between ruling elites in Europe was never ultimately settled in favour of any contender. But it was the most important determinant of the limitation of arbitrary government in Europe and of the slow process of the West European "invention" of the rule of law.

The rule of law is important because it generates predictability. This in itself is important for economic development. Moreover, Western law dispersed property rights widely in society. Whereas Chinese emperors claimed to be the ultimate owner of all land, whereas such claims served to undermine the safety of property rights in China, West European gentry and peasants held fairly safe property rights. Similarly, while Chinese merchants had to suffer arbitrary taxation and even confiscation, West European rulers had to compete for merchant capital and talent to enrich their domains of authority. Even the lot of the lowest strata of society in Western Europe was less miserable than in China or elsewhere in Asia because the property rights of people in their own labor power was respected earlier and to a greater degree in Western Europe than elsewhere. Of course, exit opportunities for peasants—in the middle ages from countryside to towns, from one principality to another, and later to the Americas—played some role in forcing European authorities to respect the rights of ordinary men. The need to recruit fighters for the European wars from all strata and classes reinforced this emergent respect for ordinary men. Women's rights are a different matter. By and large, there was less respect for women's rights than for men's rights. But again the situation was worse in Asia than in Europe.

Recognition of widely dispersed property rights, whether in land, capital goods, merchandise, or labor power, has been a determinant of the European miracle. Safe property rights provide incentives for resource owners to use their assets productively. For peasants, artisans and workers this implies an incentive to work hard. Dispersed property rights imply decentralized decision-making, i.e., lots of people are free to make their own decisions, on

their own account. Dispersed private property rights and the rule of law make individual liberty and social cooperation compatible. Everybody has an incentive to put his resources to good use. Only those who produce what others want do well in the market. Therefore, everybody in a competitive economy faces an incentive to become useful to others. Moreover, everybody enjoys the liberty to do what he knows best. As we can learn from the Austrian Nobel laureate Hayek, decentralized decision-making is the only way to mobilize the widely dispersed knowledge of society. West European and North American societies pioneered the empowerment of ordinary people by granting them property rights and liberty, and by making them bear the consequences of their decisions. By contrast to the West, Confucianism legitimized the subordination of peasants under an educated and office-holding elite and the discrimination of traders. Certainly, there was no law in China which effectively protected peasants or traders from their superiors.

Individual rather than government decision-making is the engine of innovation. Until the fifteenth century Chinese navigators explored the Indian and Pacific oceans. Then they were stopped by imperial decree. Thereafter, Europeans could take over and begin their age of exploration. None of the European rulers had the power to stop exploration. Whereas government decisions could hold China back for centuries, European rulers enjoyed less decision-latitude. Most policy errors in Europe affected fairly small territories rather than an entire civilization. Europeans were not less error-prone than Asians, but European rulers had not enough power to commit errors on a truly grand or continental scale. Innovation from below could not be suppressed. Wise rulers even welcomed it. *Somewhere* in Europe innovation was always tolerated.

Political fragmentation and disunity are important for another reason. In huge empires the authorities have some chance of controlling prices, of enforcing so-called just prices. Almost everywhere just prices are traditional prices. By definition, such prices cannot rapidly respond to changes in demand and supply. Therefore, they cannot reflect scarcity, and cannot guide efficient resource allocation. Political fragmentation and disunity in Europe made it ever more difficult for authorities to enforce just prices. This political weakness overcame irrational pricing and ultimately contributed to economic strength.

My sketch on the European miracle claims that European disunity in contrast to the huge Asian empires, like China, promoted the rule of law, dispersed property rights, innovation, and scarcity prices. These characteristics, in turn, promoted economic growth by fostering hard work, use and accumulation of information, and efficient resource allocation. Western capitalism

and markets for the first time overcame mass poverty. By contrast, mass poverty in Asia persists to the present day, most of all in India and Bangladesh, but even in China the last episode of mass starvation (1959–61) happened only a single generation ago. In North Korea we witness another famine generated by too strong a government.

Adherents of government guidance of economies frequently point to the beneficial consequences of strong governments in Japan, South Korea, or Taiwan. Admittedly, the governments of these states engaged in industrial policies which, by and large, did less harm than elsewhere. Why? First, it is much easier for late-comers in economic development to conduct a successful industrial policy than for the pioneers. Since Japan has caught up with US in the 1990s, the superiority of the Japanese model of guided capitalism over American style "laissez faire" is no longer obvious. Second, strong governments in East Asia suffered *and* benefited from national security constraints that prevented them from preying upon workers and peasants, producers and merchants, as ruling classes in much of Latin America or post-colonial Africa could afford to do. Government and ruling classes in East Asian miracle economies knew that their national independence, tenure of office and privileges had to be build on prosperous economies and strong armies. Third, the governments of East Asian miracle economies were prevented from some popular economic policy errors by their weakness in the world. This is illustrated by Meiji-Japan which was bound by treaties not to levy high customs duties on imports from the West. This is also illustrated by the small size of the Korean and Taiwanese economies in the 1950s or 1960s which soon dissuaded governments from inward looking industrialization and pushed them toward export-orientation and the pursuit of comparative advantage. Since Korean or Taiwanese exporters had to submit to competition on global markets, they had no choice but to become efficient (or to fail). While being subject to competition is always inconvenient, the long-run consequences of not being subject to it are stagnation and decay.

One may argue against my analysis of the Western experience by pointing to recent events in Mainland China. Since the late 1970s and Deng Xiaoping's reforms, the Chinese economy grows rapidly. But private property rights remain precarious and unsafe. The rule of law is at most a distant aspiration. In my view, the delegation of much economic decision-making from the central government in Beijing to provincial and even local leaderships generated a functional equivalent to safe property rights. Local leaders have to compete for capital and entrepreneurs. If they do not respect the property rights of investors, investors will turn to better administered provinces, cities and counties. As in European history, political fragmentation and decentraliza-

tion constrain the political leadership to treat capitalists, investors and merchants well. Constraints on politicians are the root cause of economic growth.

2. *Capitalism and Democracy*

Some degree of rule of law, of safe property rights, and of individual liberty for broad categories of people preceeded capitalism in the West and were a prerequisite for its development. But capitalism itself preceeded democracy, as we currently understand the term. While England experienced representative government at least since 1689, only at the end of World War I voting rights were extended to most of the adult population. Thus, British capitalism preceded full democracy in Britain. The temporal precedence of capitalism before democracy is even clearer in Germany. France is a more complicated case because of political instability and regime changes from more to less democratic regimes and back in the 19th century. Even in America we observe the temporal precedence of capitalism before democracy. Private property, some reasonable degree of rule of law, and production for the market existed under British colonial rule, i.e., before independence and the introduction of democracy.

In Asia, the same pattern of capitalist development *before* democracy holds. Japan began a vigorous process of capitalist development immediately after the Meiji Restoration, but democracy grew deep roots only after the defeat in World War II. Taiwan and South Korea became successful players on global markets first, but only in the late 1980s the process of democratization gathered some speed. Since 1979 Mainland China has reintroduced something remotely similar to dispersed private property rights. China still has far to go before the rule of law is established, before private property rights are as safe as they were in Europe two or three hundred years ago. But the toleration of creeping capitalism by a nominally still communist government has started another economic miracle. While capitalism is increasingly tolerated in China, democracy is not yet. Most of the successful transitions from poverty and subsistence production to capitalism, growth, and wealth have occurred under still authoritarian governments. Ordinary subjects were free to make their own decision in economies, before they were allowed to participate in public decision-making by casting ballots and electing or rejecting their rulers.

There are some great nations which deviated from the standard pattern of capitalist development first, democratization later: Russia or the Soviet Union and India. Under Communism before Gorbachev, the Soviet Union was neither capitalist nor democratic. Gorbachev was more successful in

promoting democracy—the process of democratization strongly contributed to the dissolution of the Soviet Union—than in promoting the rule of law, property rights, and decentralized economic decision-making. Yeltsin continued these policies. Russians now have a say in electing their leaders, but the economy still is in transition. It is hard to imagine, how democracy in Russia can survive for long, if living standards do not pick up.

India is another great experiment in democracy before capitalism. The founding generation of independent India was committed to democracy, but under the influence of (British) Fabian socialism. So, there was no commitment to decentralized decision-making or to letting prices reflect global scarcities rather than government fiat. Miraculously, Indian democracy survives to this day, but the economic gap between India on the one hand and Taiwan or South Korea on the other hand has always widened since the 1960s. Since 1979, even nominally still Communist China decisively outperforms India.

Only capitalism can overcome mass poverty. The secret of capitalism is its simultaneous minimization of political decision-making, i.e., of the need to apply coercion or to rely on consent. By its nature, coercion kills the incentive to work hard, to serve customers, to cut costs, to innovate. The only "innovation" forced labor is interested in is better ways of shirking. (And I do *not* blame forced labor for shirking!) Consent sounds much better than coercion, but suffers from a number of shortcomings. In large groups, it is either inapplicable because full consent will never be achieved or it reverts to some degree of coercion, at best coerced submission of minorities under majorities. Moreover, the requirement of consent kills innovation. Where new ideas presuppose almost universal acceptance, before they can be adopted, progress is effectively ruled out. Innovation requires majorities to tolerate experimentation by minorities.

Capitalism needs little coercion. It relies on freely entered contracts to cooperate in production or to exchange. In principle, coercion is needed only to safeguard property rights and to enforce voluntarily agreed upon contracts. The role of consent is similarly restricted. If two actors want to trade goods with each other at prices they can agree upon, or if an employer and a worker agree on the terms of employment, nobody else's consent is required. Neither bystanders (including unions), nor government should even be asked (unless there are significant externalities). The minimization of coercion and consent requirements in commerce and industry permits a maximum of liberty, a maximum of individual and innovative efforts to improve their own welfare by serving others (i.e., customers) ever more efficiently.

Wheras capitalism is built on individual liberty and individual decision-making, democracy is built on participation in collective decision-making.

Democracy is obviously preferable to despotism. Compared to individual decision-making and private contracting in markets, however, any collective decision-making, including democratic government, is a rather poor second best. Nowhere in the West or in Asia it is possible to express the intensity of one's preferences by voting. The weight of one's vote is the same, whether or not one cares for the outcome. Moreover, mass democracy fosters rational ignorance. If one's vote is one in millions or tens of millions, it is unlikely that one's vote is decisive in producing a better government or better policies. Thus, there is little reason for a rational or utility-maximizing voter to be well informed in casting his vote. While suffering the consequences of one's actions in the market generates responsibility in the private economy, the extremely tenuous link between individual voting and policies in mass democracies undermines responsibility in politics.

Given rational ignorance among most voters, politicians and bureaucrats are no longer constrained to serve majority or public interests. Take agriculture as an example. Everybody consumes food, but only a small minority of the population in industrial societies produces food. Nevertheless, the agricultural policies of almost all industrial democracies serve the interests of the tiny minority of producers much better than the interests of the overwhelming majority of consumers. Why are farmers subsidized at the taxpayer's expense and protected from foreign competition at the consumer's expense? The main reason is the difference in attentiveness of farmers and other voters to agricultural policies. Farmers will cast their vote in order to gain protection and subsidies. Consumers and taxpayers tend to be rationally ignorant. Therefore, rational politicans will respond to farmer demands, but neglect consumer and taxpayer interests.

Agriculture is merely an example of a much wider problem. By and large, politicians in democracies do not and cannot respond to individual interests weighted by numbers. Instead, policies respond to organized interests, but overlook unorganized interests. Politicians respond to attentive and informed interests, but overlook others. Democratic government tends to become the arena of a distributional struggle, where interest groups attempt to capture parties and governments.

Unfortunately, redistribution is a negative sum game. Of course, there are some winners. But the sum of all losers loses more than the sum of all winners wins. The more the government interferes with the economy, the more profits and income depend on government favor rather than on one's capability to serve customers better than others do. Rational actors respond to such a structure of incentives by investing ever more time, effort, and resources in the political redistribution game and ever less effort in directly productive work. This is the road to economic decline. By and large, the

older English-speaking democracies were ahead of younger democracies, like Germany and Japan, on this downward path of development until the 1980s. In the older democracies, like Britain or the United States, interest groups had had plenty of time to organize and to pressure for redistributive, but inefficient policies. Since Reagan and Thatcher at least tried to roll back the state, taxation and red tape, some English-speaking countries improved their performance, whereas much of Continental Europe accelerated its comparative decline.

Responsiveness to interest groups and redistributive policies are not the only dilemmas of the contemporary West. They are related to the size of government which can be crudely measured by general government expenditure as a share of GDP or GNP. The larger the share of government, the smaller the size of the competitive private economy, the slower economic growth rates. There is a major difference between America and Continental Europe in government size. European government is bloated, America's is lean. That is why Europe in comparison to America is in decline.

3. *Asian and Western Prospects*

The comparative economic history of Western Europe (and its American offspring) and East Asia may be summarized in stark terms: The West succeeded first in limiting arbitrary government interference with the economy, it first empowered merchants and producers, it first provided the proper incentives to work hard, to use knowledge, to innovate. The West did not plan to overcome mass poverty by some clever design. Instead efficient economic policies evolved because of political fragmentation and the comparative weakness of Western ruling classes. Therefore, the West raced ahead of East Asia for at least three hundred years.

While prosperity promotes democracy, the reverse is unfortunately not true. Most successful capitalist countries are by now democracies. But democratic governments respond to distributional coalitions, increase budgets and deficits, interfere with market prices, competition and free trade. The increasing diversion of effort from production to redistribution promotes decline. East Asia is not yet significantly affected by this Western disease. Of course, there is some redistribution by politics in Asia. As in Europe, such redistribution tends to be regressive. Always it tends to interfere with growth. But in most of East Asia, mass participation in the negative sum game of redistribution has not yet arrived. Success in the market is less effectively deterred by taxation, and failure is less lavishly rewarded by welfare pay-

ments in East Asia than in Europe. That is why East Asia is destined to grow faster than the West for some decades to come. Where Asian governments protect producers from the consequences of their mistakes, as in the state-owned enterprises of the PRC, they get the usual dismal results. The twenty-first century will no longer be an age of Western supremacy. Conceiveably, it becomes an age of East Asian supremacy. Given the numerical weight of China in East Asia, East Asian supremacy, of course, is just another name for Chinese supremacy, if China should succeed in its transition to capitalism and prosperity.

This paper is a summary of some of the main ideas of a book: Erich Weede. 1996. *Economic Development, Social Order, and World Politics* (with special emphasis on War, Freedom, the Rise and Decline of the West, and the Future of East Asia). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. More recently, these ideas have been elaborated in much more detail in another book: Erich Weede. 2000. *Asien und der Westen: Politische und kulturelle Determinanten der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung.* Baden-Baden: Nomos.

13. PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS LIMITING INSTITUTIONAL REHABILITATION

Gisela Trommsdorff*

ABSTRACT

The understanding of whether and what kind of institutional rehabilitation is needed depends (a) on the method used, and (b) on the objectives (values, goals etc.) of such analyses. The results of such analyses of dysfunctional or functional elements depend on the frame of reference. The best methods used for diagnosis are not very effective if the data are not interpreted in a broader frame of reference, e.g. in relation to other institutions and, more important, in relation to the social and economic problems at hand. Furthermore, social change implies difficulties. The understanding of the problems at hand is especially difficult in times of rapid socio-economic change since the people involved in such diagnosis have been socialized in the systems which are undergoing change. Another problem of institutional rehabilitation lies in the transformation of the diagnosis into practice. Are the policies chosen in the way that they are taking into account the problems of the present situation and its embeddedness in a global situation, plus its embeddedness in future development and change?

Finally, any institutional change will be ineffective if the needs and goals of the individual persons who have to make the institutions work do not match with the institutional goals and constraints. Not only the question of accepting certain institutions and changes of institutions is relevant here. The question rather is how far do individual goals and abilities fit with institutional resources and constraints. The goodness of fit must, again, be seen in the context of change; (a) in the context of socio-economic and institutional changes and (b) in the context of changes of the individual person during his or her life course. Institutional change will not successfully achieve the level of institutional rehabilitation if individual persons could identify with such changes and cannot match their own interests with the goals for such changes. Thus, the goodness of fit between individuals and their qualification and goals on the one side and institutional resources and constraints on the other side in the process of socio-economic change are to be taken into account.

Introduction

Complaints about societal decay abound; they correlate with complaints about institutional decay (e.g., decay of the party system, educational institutions) and the call for institutional rehabilitation. The purpose of the present contribution is to study some of the psychological conditions that limit institutional rehabilitation.

It is not attempted here to explain institutional malfunctions and limitations of institutional rehabilitation by reducing institutions to individual actors.

---

* Prof. Dr. Gisela Trommsdorff holds the chair for Developmental and Cross-Cultural Psychology at the University of Konstanz. She is a member of several scientific boards and co-editor of several national and international journals. Currently the main emphasis of her research is in socio-emotional development and the value of children and family in different cultures.

Rather, the view taken here is that institutions and individual actors are part of a socio-cultural and economic system, both interacting with each other as well as with other aspects of this system. Accordingly, it is assumed that institutional malfunction and limits of institutional rehabilitation depend on the way macro-, meso-, and micro-levels of the society interact and on the way intermediate processes of individual and interpersonal actions connect these levels. Thus, a multi-level approach for the understanding of social phenomena is suggested by focusing on individual actors in interaction with their institutionalized environment.

Social scientists are usually less interested in the role of individual actors in institutions and the psychological processes involved in individual behavior. On the other hand, psychologists usually ignore the specific quality of social contexts, including social institutions, and its influence on the behavior of individuals.

The individual level is of interest here since social institutions cannot function without the participation of individuals supporting the goals of the institution and investing in achieving these goals. Individuals' support and investment will decline in the event of a mismatch between individual expectations and perceived performance of the institutions. Such discrepancies will induce cognitive and motivational processes in the person which may result in dissatisfaction and frustration. This, in turn, may induce behavioral changes on the intra-individual level, e.g., decreasing achievement, motivation and loyalty. Opposition to institutional goals may shift to deviant behavior (corruption, cheating) or disengagement (retreat and anomie). On the level of interindividual relations, this may contribute to a decline in social consensus and greater interpersonal conflict. This is a basis for and a consequence of institutional malfunction and also for limits of institutional rehabilitation. In contrast, the success of effective institutional rehabilitation is based on individual mobilization and support and on interindividual cooperation matching institutional demands. Accordingly, measures for rehabilitation should focus on both—institutional goals and structures as well as individual goals and behavior—while taking into account that institutions are always part of a broader system. Chances of rehabilitation of institutions increase when the goals and structure of the institution match the goals and abilities of the individual members in the institution (see Figure 1). In the following, first some problems of diagnosis of decay are discussed; then we focus on individuals and on interactions between individuals and institutions as constraints on institutional rehabilitation; finally, some cultural factors limiting rehabilitation are studied.



Figure 1. Interrelations between Institutions and Individual Actors

1. *Where rehabilitation starts: Diagnosis*

Rehabilitation means that actions are taken to improve a system (organism) that does not function well. Before policies of rehabilitation are applied, a valid diagnosis should be carried out in order to clarify indicators of institutional decay and remedies for institutional rehabilitation. Such a diagnosis consists of several steps and is related to several problems.

(1) What are the goals of a valid diagnosis, and which problems have to be dealt with? *First*, in order to specify failures of an institution it is necessary to describe the present situation, including the goals of these institutions and the assumed areas of malfunction. The diagnosis should also specify how the broader system matches goals and outcomes of the institutions and how the institutions match the needs and qualifications of individuals. *Second*, besides description of the situation, a valid diagnosis should specify the causes to which malfunctioning is to be attributed.

There are, however, several difficulties in arriving at a valid diagnosis of dysfunctions. A more difficult problem is a valid analyses of the relevant conditions contributing to this malfunctioning. When a diagnosis is based on reliable judgments, the question of validity is not yet solved. A consensual diagnosis may be reliable but not necessarily valid. For example, not many people disagree about the dysfunctional state of the German welfare or educational system. However, as one can see from public statements, there is considerable disagreement about which aspects of such institutions are dysfunctional and what the reasons for such dysfunctions are, not to mention remedies for changing the present situation. Usually, such discrepancy between opinions is related to differences in value orientations, goals and interests.

Indicators of decay can be interpreted as indicators of efficient functioning, depending on the underlying value orientation and interests. Especially in times of social change, discrepancies between individual judgments should occur with respect to diagnosis of decay or efficient functioning. To give an example, in Europe we can presently observe significant value changes: loss of utopia and dissolution of ideologies, a decay of charisma and leadership, a decay of values such as social solidarity, achievement, and responsibility; and, at the same time, we can observe an increase in hedonism and secularization. This value change is carried on by individuals and their subjective beliefs and interaction styles. Thus, this value change will also affect institutional change. Institutions and individuals can gain or lose from such value change depending on the value orientation, the level of aspiration, the level of comparison, or the perspective taken. In a pluralistic society it will be difficult to achieve consensus on judgments of institutional functioning. It may be easier to gain consensus when diagnosing institutional decay. Whether this assumption holds and how this can be explained (e.g., negativity bias with respect to institutions in general) remains to be answered by empirical studies.

Since any diagnosis of institutional malfunctions is based on more or less complex judgments, one cannot exclude the possible effect of underlying

and hidden subjective beliefs and interests on these judgments. Besides problems of motivation underlying the evaluation process, a diagnosis may start from too high a level of aspiration or be based on one-sided pessimistic estimates of expected future outcomes (including misjudgment of winners and losers) of institutional decay. Therefore, a valid diagnosis has to be checked with respect to the effect of biased information processing related to subjective beliefs and interests. This precaution will be even more important when a valid evaluation of strategies for rehabilitation is worked out later on.

One indicator of institutional functioning or decay is whether the institution itself provides the basis to carry out a valid diagnosis of the given situation and to transform the results of the diagnosis into strategies for rehabilitation. For example, the decay of certain institutions, especially the economic system in East Germany, was not adequately analyzed before the collapse occurred. The collapse was not anticipated either by insiders or outsiders. This may be an example of the unwillingness of the elite to carry out a valid diagnosis in order to maintain power. Here, one can see that the act of diagnosing problems and the act of pointing out the necessity of rehabilitation may itself be used as an instrument not to improve but to harm the institution.

(2) From a psychological perspective, a diagnosis of decay must focus on the individual actors involved in these institutions either as members or clients. Here, theoretical assumptions on person-environment relations become relevant. A valid diagnosis has to include psychological aspects of individuals and their proximate environment, focusing on individual motivation and abilities on the one hand, and on situational resources and constraints, or institutionalized structures and goals, on the other hand. A specification of person-environment relations can clarify some causes for and consequences of institutions' malfunctioning on the individual and interpersonal level, e.g., a lack of cooperation, a prevalence of hostility and conflict between members of the institutions. Such studies are not easy to do since they deal with interactions and processes on a micro-level which may be embedded in changing socio-economic contexts on a macro-level.

(3) The diagnosis has to be complemented by a "valid" description of whether or not and how a transformation of the present state into the desired state can be achieved. Even if a diagnosis of malfunctions is valid, we have to ask whether this entails a need for rehabilitation. The answer again depends on the criteria for assessing gains or losses of malfunction and rehabilitation. It could very well be argued that a rehabilitation of the church or the

educational system is not advisable (another question would be if it was feasible). Such a judgment has again to take into account individual needs and resources, the context of other cultural and societal phenomena, and the interaction between both. This requires the use of multi-method and multi-level methods and an extension of perspective into the future.

2. *Constraints on institutional rehabilitation on the individual level*

A valid diagnosis is only one step on the way to institutional rehabilitation. There are more steps to be taken in order to achieve rehabilitation. In the following, we will focus on psychological phenomena, one of the conditions for limited institutional rehabilitation. Some of these psychological phenomena are universal and presumably effective any time under any institutional and situational conditions. In the following, some cognitive and motivational factors are discussed which can function as constraints on institutional rehabilitation.

2.1 *Cognitive and motivational constraints*

The degree of rationality of individual behavior is often overestimated. An individual does not follow principles of mechanical rationality, but usually bases his/her actions on "subjective rationality" ("bounded rationality") which is related to certain cognitive shortcomings, to motivational and affective factors, and to social conditions.

Human beings are not scientists; we normally act on the basis of naive subjective theories which are part of the socio-cultural environment in which we have been socialized. We only have limited cognitive abilities to process information, to understand the world, and to understand how certain problems can be solved. Cognitive abilities develop in the process of individual development, and they are activated under certain situational conditions. People's intuitive heuristics normally works well even though some fundamental "errors" are part of such heuristics (cf. Janis, 1996; Kahneman & Tversky, 1996):

- relative underestimation (or overestimation) of risk;
- limitations in understanding complex systems and interrelations between elements of these systems;
- limitations in causal thinking: people usually have difficulty understanding that multiple causes have to be taken into account to explain certain

effects in a complex system; they also have difficulty understanding that causal relations in social systems are not usually unidirectional and have reciprocal effects;
- limitations in understanding changing processes: people have difficulty understanding that a certain event is only part of a process in a continuous chain of events which differs in its functional importance depending on the time and length of its occurrence;
- limitations in the ability to foresee changes: the near future is usually more relevant than the far future; therefore, the long-term effects, e.g. of present political actions, are not usually taken into account to a sufficient extent;
- furthermore, culture-specific effects on cognitive errors (e.g., attribution bias; reasoning about contradictions) (Trommsdorff, in press) have to be taken into account.

Cognitive training can only reduce the limitations in risk estimation or multidimensional thinking to a certain degree. These limitations are typical in the thinking and behavior of naive actors and also of expert members of institutions, and they can induce institutional malfunctions and also limitations of institutional rehabilitation. The scientific approach to the study of (the rehabilitation of) institutions may itself be subject to such shortcomings. At least it cannot ignore such errors as normal characteristics of people's planning, problem-solving, and acting in an institution.

These cognitive shortcomings are related to motivational and affective dynamics in human thinking and behavior. Therefore, it is useful to analyze whether specific motivational conditions contribute to limitations of institutional rehabilitation. Well-known phenomena include the preference for immediate rewards instead of delay of gratification. This contrasts with rehabilitation strategies that often require the motivation to delay (individual) gratification in order to accumulate resources over time (which can be shared with the individual members later on). Other motivational constraints can be seen, e.g., in the "individualistic" preference for maximizing individual outcomes while institutional rehabilitation requires a "collectivistic" orientation accepting the interdependence of goals and the necessity to refrain from egoistic goal pursuit.

Both the cognitive and motivational conditions of individual action are affected by the individual's socialization in a certain cohort and socio-cultural and economic context and by the individual's socio-emotional and cognitive development. Depending on individual biography and given social and individual resources, the person evaluates his/her relation to the envi-

ronment, defines his/her goals (which are embedded in a certain motivation system), and acts in a given situation (see Figure 2).

2.2 *Person-institution relations as constraints*

Other psychological phenomena only occur in certain person-environment relations, e.g., the subjective perception of institutional malfunction, related disappointment of frustration, and the activation of certain behavior. Here, the interplay between person and environment, or more precisely, between person and institution are relevant.

What are the psychological processes when people are involved in institutional rehabilitation? From a motivational theoretical framework, a person's behavior is structured around his/her dominant goals which are part of his/her identity (Cantor, Norem, Niedenthal, Langston, & Brower, 1987). These goals ("current concerns," "personal projects") represent what one wants to obtain or to preserve. In periods of institutional rehabilitation these individual goals and ways of achieving these goals may be negatively affected. Any experience of frustration of important individual goals will induce negative emotions and activate psychological processes which allow problem solving and coping in line with one's personal goals and need fulfillment.

Depending on the conflict between individual goals and institutionalized goals (or goals for institutional rehabilitation), an individual's motivation to support and foster such rehabilitation procedures can be increased or decreased. Individual action can even become a major obstacle to the achievement of institutional rehabilitation. This is the case when the relation between the individual and the institution is problematic in one of the following ways: (a) individual and institutional goals do not match; (b) individual abilities and motivations to achieve institutional goals do not match as regards the inputs required for institutional rehabilitation; (c) the institution does not provide the necessary means for the individual to achieve his/her goals.

3. *Interactions between person and institution*

Next, some examples are discussed that describe how institutionalized and individual constraints interact and can be the basis for failure for institutional rehabilitation—e.g., the rehabilitation of the elite, of political programs, of political decision making.



Figure 2. Transformation of Institutions in Time of Social Change

3.1 *Institutionalized constraints on individual mobilization and institutional rehabilitation*

Institutional decay and failure of rehabilitation may result from institutionalized structures which constrain the mobilization of individual resources. In the following, some examples are given.

(a) The Russian situation demonstrates that socio-economic recovery, including the development of an elite, is blocked by the establishment. The establishment holds power on the basis of past position and party-based social network but less on the basis of democratic decision making, competition and achievement. Individual success is often based on implicit rules including corruption. Disappointed expectations of enjoying democracy and an efficient new system leaves a frustrated intelligentsia in search of a new utopia or actually leaving the country. This frustrated new generation feels handicapped in overcoming the quasi-institutionalized egoistic accumulation of power. Goals for rehabilitation focus on changing the present economic and social situation, but, the perceived lack of control may foster passive compliance.

(b) The present situation in Germany demonstrates that constructive political decision making and action is blocked by the institutionalized control of power. Such control was established by the constitution after the Second World War in order to prevent a misuse of power. However, this has become an institutionalized way of preventing political action. The institutionalized blocking of major decision making by legalized action can be seen as a misuse of this control of power or as an indicator of decay in the party system. Furthermore, even the institutionalized control of power in Germany does not necessarily function effectively as current scandals of corruption, illegal personal profit or scandals of party financing demonstrate.

The advantage of an institutionalized control of power based on a democratic system is to secure a stable and predictable government. The disadvantage, however, is that major political changes are quite impossible, especially in a situation in which major changes are needed, e.g., when the economic, social, and political situation is in great need of a major transition. Such transition, however, may be hindered by institutionalized constraints. An example of party politics in Germany are inter-group processes of accusing the other party of being responsible for the present malfunctioning of institutions without taking responsibility and acting on institutional rehabilitation.

(c) The effects of globalization can block the rehabilitation of institutions in our society, e.g., German companies get cheap labor abroad while the more expensive labor in one's own country is laid off. The German welfare system has to take care of the unemployed while companies avoid participating in supporting the welfare system by moving their companies to countries with lower taxes. While the welfare system and the taxpayers pay the costs, the companies enjoy the profits of globalization. The government cannot intervene. The institutionalized means of control and sanctions are very limited when capital and companies can move freely in the new global world. Here, the rules of justice are harmed while the values of competition and economic success have priority.

Another example of limits to the rehabilitation of national institutions lies in the fact that globalization can change the effectiveness of national institutions. This can presently be observed in conflicts between the national and European law system. Furthermore, institutionalized values may deteriorate and have little chance of rehabilitation when regulations on the national level are no longer effective due to interventions on the global level. To give an example, we can presently observe significant differences between nations with respect to pollution control. Why should one country invest in ecologically necessary technologies and behavior when other countries refrain from such investments and thereby increase the ecological problem for everyone? Rehabilitation of related institutions on the national level is not sufficient to solve a general world-wide problem. For such issues, a world institution is necessary. Here, limits of rehabilitation are related to the kind of the problem and its quality of interdependence in a broader system. This in turn has consequences for the individual motivation to engage in institutional rehabilitation.

3.2 *Psychological constraints on institutional rehabilitation: Decreased acceptance of norms and regulations*

The limits of rehabilitation can be seen in the deficiencies in matching the individual's motivation and abilities and the needs for institutional rehabilitation.

(a) There is wide agreement that individual misuses of resources of the welfare system is an indicator of institutional decay. Statistics show that about 50% of manual labor in Germany is done by moonlighters. Here, the interplay between institutionalized constraints and individual action feeds the following spiral: the legal working hour is costly on account of taxes which have to be deducted; therefore, it is unattractive to take a legal job while an illegal job makes sense. The relationship between institutionalized tax

deductions (which are necessary to pay for the system, including the welfare system) and the expenses for legal work can become dysfunctional. Such work relationships start to escape the control of the tax system and regress into personal relationships between private persons exchanging money for labor.

(b) It is a well-known fact that corruption is on the increase, especially in the construction business. For example, local officials who give a certain project to a construction firm can profit personally from this decision; at the same time, costs for the project will increase since the kickbacks have to be compensated for. Instead, the government (i.e., taxpayer) has to pay the extra costs. Official building inspectors, whose job it is to make sure that certain rules and standards are followed in construction style to preserve ecological niches, are another example. Officials can misuse their power by changing these rules to receive financial rewards. Even though corruption is not very typical and extreme in Germany in contrast to certain other countries, there are many such cases which come quite close to illegal acts of profiting from public property, as Scheuch and Scheuch (1992) have demonstrated in their fascinating case studies. Recently more cases of misuse of political office and political leaders obtaining personal privileges have been made public in Germany. The Christian Democratic party in Germany is presently undergoing a severe crisis due to recently discovered unconventional practices of financing party activities.

The sociological aspect of this phenomenon is that the misuse of an official role in order to gain personal profits indicates institutional decay. This decay, in turn, is based on individual behavior, for example, giving up one's professional ethic as a governmental official. One psychological aspect of this phenomenon is that those who are governmental officials no longer pursue the goals of the institution since they no longer identify with these goals and related regulations nor give priority to institutional goals instead of their personal goals. Another psychological aspect related to the consequences of such events is that such scandals do not support the individual's acceptance and trust in institutions, nor do they mobilize individual motivation to engage in citizenship and responsibility.

Does the deviant behavior of individual private persons and individual officials really indicate institutional decay? If individual deviance has social effects, one could operationalize this as an indicator of decay, but it does not specify the degree and quality of institutional decay. However, the psychological effect of perceiving other people behaving illegally and profiting at the expense of the public has implications for institutional decay. When several individuals engage in such illegal activities, several psychological mechanisms become activated.

Psychological reasons for engaging in behavior reducing chances for institutional rehabilitation are manifold. Several psychological theories can explain such behavior. For example, learning theory predicts modeling and imitation of successful deviance. The diffusion of illegal behavior thereby becomes normal and hinders institutional rehabilitation. Theories on distributive justice predict that once the belief in a just world is shaken, efforts of restructuring this belief are undertaken. Such efforts may result in a decrease in individual investments in institutional rehabilitation.

3.3 *Frustrated expectations as constraints on individual rehabilitation*

Let us have a closer look at the implications of this theory. A general psychological thesis is that the belief in a just world and a related need for justice regulate our behavior (Lerner & Lerner, 1981). However, whether people subjectively experience justice or not depends to a large degree on the way they evaluate their own investments and returns. Justice is experienced if the person believes that input and output match. One does not want to invest more than one receives. Also, one does not want others to earn more than they have invested. When experiencing injustice, activities are taken to reestablish justice. For example, one may quit one relationship and enter another where more justice is expected. The experience of injustice can activate a negative emotional state. For example, being the victim of injustice can affect one's self-concept negatively and can also activate hostile feelings against those responsible for an injustice. These feelings may motivate a person to harm this source or to reestablish justice by another means.

When individuals observe that the institution allows certain other individuals to increase their own benefits by breaking the rules this can result in imitation and diffusion of responsibility. Imitating the illegal behavior of others reduces one's feelings of guilt which otherwise would serve as internalized control and prevent such behavior. Furthermore, the intra-individual reorganization of one's belief in a just world can attach a new value of justice to illegal behavior and thus reduce the chance for institutional rehabilitation. People justify their own illegal behavior by claiming that everyone else is doing the same thing. In this manner, one's belief in a just world can be supported. Constraints of institutional rehabilitation may thus result from imitating the illegal behavior of others and creating a new informal individualized system of justice. The free-rider system follows a similar line of reasoning. When the institutionalized control system has lost its acceptance, individuals pursue individual goals at the cost of the public and build on constraints on institutional rehabilitation.

Once an institution is regarded as incompatible with the rules of justice, it will lose its legitimization and the individual person's illegal behavior is justified. Illegal acts do not induce guilt feelings since one can interpret the situation as compensation for past experiences of injustice. Accordingly, the subjective experience of injustice in one's individual relation to an institution could decrease loyalty and justify illegal behavior, thus contributing to the decay of person-institution relations and building constraints on institutional rehabilitation.

People may experience a feeling of injustice when reflecting on the German public health system. German tax payers contribute to the system by paying a considerable amount of money, but if they are not currently in need of medical care or social support, they do not receive the corresponding amount of care or support in return. The rationale underlying the institutionalized rule of the welfare system is that the input of the healthy person will benefit those in need of care at that time; of course, any given healthy person may develop a need at any point in time and thus unexpectedly profit from the welfare system. The calculation of each individual's input is based on a calculation of average risk, including the costs to make the system work. Any expectation of the individual that he/she should receive more than he/she invests (e.g., since some revenues should be paid back) is unrealistic. However, such expectations are often held and their frustration can induce a feeling of unjust treatment and the related motivation to reestablish justice by illegal means. The wish to counterbalance injustice by harming the institution may increase when a person believes that other people profit from the welfare system more than oneself without really deserving it. The experience of injustice is related to over- or underestimating balance of inputs and outputs.

In most western cultures, there is a tendency to underestimate the input of the other party and to overestimate one's own input (attribution bias) and also to feel entitled to certain outcomes without personal investment. Accordingly, the evaluation of "who deserves what" can be biased. Such bias is increased by in-group and out-group differentiation and by negative stereotyping of out-group members. When Germans feel that people from other countries live in Germany under much better economic conditions than "at home", but at the expense of the German welfare system and at the German taxpayer, hostile feelings may arise, not only towards the welfare system, but also towards foreigners.

A *collective* calculation of justice does not necessarily coincide with *individual* calculations of justice. People who follow their subjective view of individualized justice in contrast to a collective one withdraw a basic source of legitimacy for the system. When this attitude becomes a generalized belief

shared by other people, such social construction of injustice contributes to institutional decay and hinders institutional rehabilitation.

4. *Constraints on institutional rehabilitation in different cultures and in times of social change*

4.1 *Cultural differences: Individualistic and collectivistic interests*

It is not at all surprising that human beings strive for individual goals and pursue hedonistic values. People want a solid income, a satisfying lifestyle, and an accepted social status. The pursuit of such needs is only functional for the system if people are willing and able to organize their goals and related behavior in ways that are compatible with the goals of specific institutions.

Of course, there are not only *individual* but also *cultural* differences with respect to giving priority to individual goals or institutionalized demands and rules in the accommodation of personal interests (cf. Trommsdorff, 1999; in press). Cultural differences are obvious when comparing collectivistic and individualistic cultures with respect to the way public interests are preserved at the expense of individual needs. Individualistic as compared to collectivistic cultures differ, e.g., with respect to the preference of public vs. private goals or with respect to justice rules. In individualistic systems a preference for equity prevails, while in collectivistic societies a preference for equality (everyone should gain the same as everyone else) dominates. In individualistic societies, the preference for autonomy and independence contrasts significantly with the preference for accepting authority and institutionalized rules in collectivistic societies. If one's investment serves the interests of the group, e.g., one's family, foregoing individual gains do not mean personal disadvantage for people in collectivistic societies (Hofstede, 1980; Kim, Triandis, Kagitcibasi, Choi, & Yoon, 1994; Trommsdorff, 1999).

Here, value differences with respect to giving priority to one's own personal profit versus giving priority to the profit of the community come into play. In tribal cultures, individual and family profit are usually experienced as being the same. Therefore, corruption by promoting the interests of the family members or members of one's in-group is not unusual. The extension of a person's needs and goals—to oneself, to the in-group, or to an anonymous system—is thus an important mediating factor for accepting the frame for actions as provided by the institution.

Here lies another difficulty with regard to the realization of institutional change. In the modern industrialized and highly individualized western world,

people have learned to focus on their own needs and achieve an identity which is directed by hedonistic goal attainment. This orientation can be dysfunctional for certain institutions, especially in terms of fulfilling social needs or needs of social groups. These examples demonstrate that it is not sufficient to focus on a few psychological aspects in human behavior; one must also consider the culture-specific socialization experiences of the individuals who act in certain institutions, and the cultural background in which this socialization took place, focusing on the impact of macro-variables on individual behavior, especially in times of social change. To what extent do the goals of the institutions subjectively match the identity of the individuals engaged in these institutions (as members or as clients)?

4.2 *Social change and socialization as a means of promoting goodness of fit*

Since human behavior is guided by individual interests, appealing to these interests will improve the functioning of institutions. Of course, such appeals can be paired with a certain system of positive or negative sanctions. When these sanctions are internalized by the individual, the institution will save a lot of energy and costs for controlling individual behavior. Under certain conditions, internalized values and competence turn out not to be more effective. In times of social change, the individual may experience drastic failures of institutions and may look for a new way to match individual needs and institutionalized goals. In this case, new ways of appraisal and reappraisal, including problem solving and coping strategies, become necessary (see Figure 2).

An individual is usually socialized in a such a way as to assimilate institutionalized constraints and to accommodate institutionalized demands to a certain degree. This does not however, mean that individuals simply follow the rules of institutionalized demands. An individual learns to find ways of interpreting and changing such constraints according to his/her individual needs and goals which, again, are not completely independent of institutionalized constraints. However, the effects of socialization may also bring about constraints on institutional rehabilitation since routine, tradition, and established individual behavior patterns are preserved.

One example of the interdependence of institutions and individual behavior is the institutionalized transformations after the turnabout in East Germany. The institutions were completely replaced; however, the people were not necessarily replaced. Simply replacing institutions does not guarantee that the new institutions function in the intended way. People serving in these institutions can make the institutions function in ways that fit their belief systems and previous customs (Trommsdorff, 2000). To give other examples,

the institutionalization of democracy in Japan or in Singapore has produced completely different ways of democratic institution building as compared to Western societies due to the different culture-specific socialization of the people in these institutions. In turn, the introduction of the free market system in Eastern Europe has had the unexpected effects of increasing socio-economic inequality and corruption, again partly due to the different socialization experiences of the people.

The limits of institutional change and transformation may thus consist in the perpetuation of "traditional" ways of behavior in times of social change as can be seen in the Russian agriculture (Stahl-Rolf, 1999). The dominance of certain behavioral styles which have proved to be successful under different institutionalized conditions may therefore be another reason why individuals can (even unintentionally) block the rehabilitation and transformation of institutions. This also applies to necessary behavioral change in postmodern societies. Changes in institutions and related changes in people's behavior are not possible unless people are willing to give up established beliefs.

Institutional rehabilitation is in certain ways limited by processes on the individual level. However, these interact with phenomena on the institutional level which again interact with contextual phenomena. Therefore, the limitations of institutional rehabilitation cannot be studied by focusing on single variables such as individual motivation and behavior. One must view these variables in a broader context in order to understand their meaning and function.

5. *Conclusions and outlook*

It is obvious to many of us that new ways have to be found in order to deal with the accumulation of ecological, social, economic, and political problems in a global and future-oriented perspective. Such changes imply institutional changes and, furthermore, according to my previous thesis, changes in individual beliefs and behavior patterns.

Thinking in a global and a future-oriented perspective is not very customary or easy for most people. Future orientation requires a certain time perspective and a cognitive and motivational readiness to anticipate short- and long-term, latent and manifest future consequences of present behavior (Trommsdorff, 1994). This also entails taking uncertainty into account and dealing with responsibility beyond one's own present existence. Even though Western thinking allows for a linear time perspective and future-oriented delay of gratification, the demands with respect to a problem focused, innovative future orientation surpass what we are accustomed to in our every-

day life and usual planning behavior. Such cognitive and motivational shortcomings of individuals (Kahneman & Tversky, 1996), and even more so of social groups (cf. Janis, 1996), are serious obstacles for institutionalized rehabilitation.

Another obstacle lies in the human need to form an identity which is part of one's socialization experiences and as such is closely connected to one's immediate socio-cultural environment. One's personal identity is usually related to one's social identity and its regional, ethnic, or local roots. If one's social identity does not correspond to the demands of the institution, problems for both—the person and the institution—can be expected.

Even in a pluralistic and individualistic society, human beings do not simply function in a way that their identity is based on autonomy and separateness. In contrast, the basic human need for affiliation and social acceptance requires some emotional bonding and embeddedness in a social group, even in individualistic cultures (Trommsdorff, 1999). However, cross-cultural research has shown enormous cultural differences with respect to the degree of need for individuality and independence versus social orientation and interdependence.

Also, the related ability to accept multiple identities and multiple open in-groups instead of traditional in-group-out-group boundaries depends on one's culture-specific socialization (Trommsdorff, in press). The readiness to tolerate or even identify with different cultural groups depends on the extent of independence and interdependence in one's identity and the fluidity and range of in-group-out-group boundaries. However, it does not seem very realistic to expect people to achieve a "global identity," to accept global cultural encounters, and the global interplay of institutions which are related to such multiple imports and exports of cultural identity and which are necessary for transformation and rehabilitation of present institutions.

To conclude, whether and what kind of institutional rehabilitation is needed depends on the quality of the diagnosis, and therefore on the quality of the methods used. However, the best methods used for diagnoses are not very effective if the data are interpreted in a biased framework. In times of social change, more difficulties have to be dealt with in arriving at a valid diagnosis and a sound interpretation of the empirical data. Another problem of institutional rehabilitation lies in the transformation of the diagnosis into rehabilitation therapy. Do the policies chosen take into account the people's present abilities and motives and the institutions' problems, including their embeddedness in processes of global change and development?

Any institutional change will be ineffective if the needs and goals of the individuals who have to make the institutions work do not match the institutional goals and constraints. Not only the question of accepting certain

institutions and changes in institutions is relevant here. The question concerns the extent to which individual goals and abilities fit institutional resources and constraints now and in the future. The goodness of fit between the individual and the institution must, again, be seen in the context of change (a) in the context of socio-economic and institutional change, and (b) in the context of change in the individual during his/her life course. Institutional change will not reach the level of institutional rehabilitation if the individual does not identify with such changes and does not see his/her own interests in the goals of such changes. Thus, the fit between an individual's qualification and goals, on the one hand, and institutional resources and constraints, on the other, are to be taken into account in the process of socio-economic change.

Decreasing motivation and decreasing identification with the goals of an institution on the part of the members and the clients of that institution are the beginning of the system's decay and induce the need for institutional rehabilitation and social change. However, there are limitations in the "limitations of institutional rehabilitation" which are also tied to individual behavior. The individual's motivation and abilities not only restrict the efficiency of institutional changes, they may also be the basis of fundamental social change and related institutional change as can be seen in the historical case of the turnabout in East Germany. The people changed the system by abandoning it and initiating a peaceful revolution. In the case of the turnabout in East Germany, institutional rehabilitation has been enacted as a complete exchange of institutions. The effectiveness of such "treatment," however, depends on individual behavior and its social interconnectedness.

References

Cantor, N., Norem, J.K., Niedenthal, P.M., Langston, C.A., & Brower, A.M. (1987). Life tasks, self-concept ideals, and cognitive strategies in a life transition. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53*, 1178–1191.

Hofstede, G. (Ed.). (1980). *Culture's consequences: International differences in work-related values.* London: Sage.

Janis, I.L. (1996). Groupthink. In J. Billsberry (Ed.), *The effective manager: Perspectives and illustrations* (pp. 166–178). London: Sage.

Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1996). On the reality of cognitive illusions. *Psychological Review, 103*, 582–591.

Kim, U., Triandis, H.C., Kagitcibasi, C., Choi, S.-C., & Yoon, G. (1994). Introduction. In U. Kim, H.C. Triandis, C. Kagitcibasi, S.-C. Choi, & G. Yoon (Eds.), *Individualism and collectivism: Theory, method, and applications* (pp. 1–16). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Lerner, M.J., & Lerner, J.C. (Eds.). (1981). *The justice motive in social behavior.* New York: Plenum.

Markus, H.R., & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the self. Implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation. *Psychological Review, 98*, 224–253.

Scheuch, E. & Scheuch, U. (1992). *Cliquen, Klüngel und Karrieren* [Cliques, factions, and careers]. Reinbek: Rowohlt.

Stahl-Rolf, S.R. (1999). Gefangen in der Tradition: Wie kulturelle Eigenheiten die Reform der russischen Landwirtschaft behindern [Caught in tradition: How culture specifics impede the reform of Russian agriculture]. *Max Planck Forschung, 4*, 44–49.

Trommsdorff, G. (1994). Future time perspective and control orientation: Social conditions and consequences. In Z. Zaleski (Ed.), *Psychology of future orientation* (S. 39–62). Lublin, Poland: Wydawnictwo Towarzystwa Naukowego Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego.

—— (1999). Autonomie und Verbundenheit im kulturellen Vergleich von Sozialisationsbedingungen [Autonomy and attachment in the cross-cultural comparison of socialization conditions]. In H.R. Leu & L. Krappmann (Hrsg.), *Zwischen Autonomie und Verbundenheit* (S. 392–419). Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp.

—— (2000). Subjective experience of social change in individual development. In J. Bynner & R.K. Silbereisen (Eds.), *Adversity and challenge in life in the new Germany and in England* (pp. 87–122). Houndmills, England: Macmillan Press.

—— (in press). Kulturvergleichende Sozialpsychologie [Cross-cultural social psychology]. In D. Frey & M. Irle (Hrsg.), *Theorien der Sozialpsychologie* (2. vollst. überarb. Aufl.). Göttingen: Hogrefe.

14. SOCIAL REGRESSION AND THE DECLINE OF COMPETENCE

Friedrich Fürstenberg

ABSTRACT

The more society is transformed into a complex and multidimensional system of dependencies at practically all levels of social activity, the more situational competence (meaning the ability to handle problem situations) is needed for its maintenance. Its loss may initiate a process of involution, taking the shape of social regression. It is characterized by the appearance of former modes of action, organization, and orientation, indicating reduced complexity and a dissolution of the social fabric. There is ample evidence for such phenomena which will be discussed with reference to interaction and communication structures, formal organizations and frameworks for societal orientation. The functions of social regression as transitory survival pattern and as a prerequisite for planned or unavoidable change will be discussed as well as the possibility of a definite loss of culture. This leads to a final consideration of prerequisites for promoting situational competence at all levels of social action.

There can be no doubt that social decay has been a major concern of modern social thought. In the main, it has used history and analytical constructs to formulate critical comments on contemporary conditions with the underlying intention of staving off disaster. Modern societies, rely on "rational systems" for the exploitation of nature and the utilization of human resources, but these systems are "artificial" and therefore exposed to a special type of crisis: loss of situational competence, which might result in social regression. "Situational competence" means the ability to handle problems using personally and socially acceptable standards of performance. Social regression involves a relapse into less accepted, less integrated, less cultivated patterns of interaction as a consequence of not meeting a given situational challenge at a given level of aspiration.

I will present an empirical based structural analysis of social regression at micro- (interactional), meso- (organizational) and macro- (ideational) levels of society and then discuss how an adequate situational competence is established and possibly institutionalized.

Social Regression in Primary Interaction Structures

The micro-level of social phenomena is characterized by face-to-face interaction and communication. Situational competence at this level derives from two fundamental prerequisites: an action field structured by the various status positions of actors and the roles or behaviors appropriate to them. Social

structure is closely related to the generation of status. Therefore, any process of social regression ultimately can be traced to the decline in status structure, no matter whether it is a retreat from interaction, role dissolution or loss of identity and even anomie.

Status and situational competence are linked by positional requirements and claims. Thus, the individual is committed to recognize tasks and to participate in their fulfillment. If these tasks become burdens, increasingly unbearable and unintelligible, one might avoid them by withdrawing entirely from the demanding situations as a strategy of survival. Such cases are observable, for example, when status systems are used by political powers for extreme political exploitation—taxation is an instance—so that traditional bonds with the indigenous population a mafia-type clan formation or even conditions of vagrancy and robbery (the "Robin-Hood-phenomenon").

Status also may become obsolete through drastic changes in value orientations and norms or through changing functional requirements of institutions. This happened during the decline of feudalism and the abandonment of aristocracy. But status dissolution also occurs in modern society, for example, with the disappearance of certain professions as a consequence of technological and economic change. Individuals are groups so affected often are marked by social regression along with the loss of their relevant subcultures. Striking examples are given in studies of the effect of long-term unemployment.

Our main thesis is that loss of status is connected with a loss of situational competence and therefore tends to result in interaction and communication at socioculturally "lower" levels. The loss of situational competence in social interaction is often conceived as arising from deficient or faulty socialization. When individuals, for whatever reason, fail to internalize social and ethical norms, self-centeredness and anomic behavior can result. This view implies that an *individual* lack or incapacity is the principle explanatory factor. But the phenomenon of social regression refers to insufficient normative orientations and therefore to *structural* deficiencies which, in turn, make internalization increasingly inefficient in view of the situational challenges facing the individual. If there is no meaningful status, no rewarding role, no socially respected activity available, or if the given status obligations and claims do not match situational requirements, a withdrawal to less demanding positions, a regression to less complex interaction patterns will result.

Social Regression in Formal Organizational Structures

Goal-oriented cooperation and competition within and between "secondary groups" mark the meso-level of social phenomena. Cooperation is stabilized by organizing interaction processes, matching the interests of participants with the functional requirements for goal attainment. This is achieved by establishing a regulative framework for both procedures and their evaluation. Situational competence at the organizational level can be measured by such efficiency criteria as competitiveness, stability or growth. Deficiencies here may result in social regression, but a more common result is disintegration: the organization structure dissolves due to its inability to maintain an effective division of labor. The resulting breakdown of cooperation can affect both functional coordination and voluntary participation, the latter form being closely connected to the assignment and recognition of status.

With this, we can characterize social regression in organization structures more precisely. A *decline in functional coordination within* organizations usually implies a reduction in the division of labor and its productivity. If, due to a system defect, a man-machine-(computer) dialogue is disturbed, recourse may be taken to a series of phone calls or even a face-to-face conference. Often the return to a former level of the division of labor diminishes exchange relationships. In order to avoid the pitfalls of inefficient functional coordination, an organization relying on self-support is set up. In the example above, the inaccessibility of centralized data might lead to establishing a personal information file (card index) which grants more independence at the cost of slower work.

More fundamental are the effects of social regression through diminished functional coordination *among* organizations. The classical case is the disruption of economic structure due to wartime destruction or galloping inflation. At such times, functional coordination through monetary market exchange breaks down and people regress to direct barter of goods and services. Voluntary forms of this process may be found among religious and ideological sectarians who *retreat* to more self-sufficient and self-supportive rural life.

This also illustrates a decline in cooperation due to a *refusal* to participate voluntarily. A transitory phenomenon of this kind is the strike. In fact, the strike usually leads to a temporary social regression in intra- and inter-organization structures. The breakdown of cooperation spawns all kinds of self-help activities at lower performance levels.

More subtle forms of diminishing voluntary participation are task avoidance, willful deficiencies in role fulfillment, voluntary absenteeism, and separation

of organization members. Perhaps the most sensitive and early indicator of developments in this direction is a recurrent disturbance in communication patterns.

Major factors leading to a decline in both functional coordination and voluntary participation within organizations are a lack of resources and a lack of control over their application due to a breakdown in coercion or in commitment. In modern organizations physical coercion is replaced gradually by more elaborate means such as internalization of values, structuring of exchange processes, symbolic identification, and so on. The remaining antagonism between persons and groups with different stakes in defining organizational goals, deciding strategies and distributing outcomes, may be regulated within participative status structures. If this "democratic" transformation fails, regression into manipulation and coercion follows, with the effect of diminishing commitment. Cooperation, then, is reduced to rigid functional coordination. Individual strategies of flexible role adjustment according to interests and preconceived goals are increasingly replaced by strategies of role avoidance. The formal organization declines into sets of cliques and self-centered individuals.

Organizations have to survive in a more or less competitive environment of scarcity. Internal cooperation is their major social asset. Increasing competition and diminishing resources may become challenges that are too great for cooperative activities to overcome at a given level. In such a case, either innovation of new organization structures or regression to lower levels of situational competence will result.

Social Regression in Societal Orientation

It is at the macro-level that basic societal orientation for individuals, groups, and formal organizations is provided. Four major types may be distinguished: (1) an institutionalized (generally sanctioned) framework of procedures and role prescriptions forming a normative order; (2) sets of ideas, beliefs, and symbols as frames of reference for ethic orientations; (3) a stock of available knowledge with provisions for its maintenance and augmentation; and (4) semantic codes for meaningful communication, especially language.

1. The societal *normative framework* has two major aspects: conventions, based upon habits and customs, and law, based upon formal regulations. Both convention and law are the means by which social structures and processes become institutionalized. Social regression in this area of social phenomena appears as a setback in institutionalization. But cautious analysis is necessary. Conventions and laws may become obsolete in the course

of social change. This does not yet imply social regression, if they are replaced by more adequate and substantial forms of institutionalization. An example is the transformation of personal into functional authority. Even when norms are dissolving we must also apply the criterion of diminished situational competence because deregulation becomes socially regressive only when a given level of social interaction and organization can no longer be maintained. A typical example is the decontrol of drug traffic. Social control of drug consumption, then, is no longer regulated by general rules but by erratic exchange processes.

Social regression within the normative framework, therefore, results in arbitrary and erratic uses of power. This, however, does not justify the conclusion that an increase in social control is necessary to prevent social regression. Just the contrary may be the case, due to a functionally overburdened normative framework. A social "bond" is increasingly perceived as "bondage". Thus, a growth in formal institutionalization may become a handicap to equivalent improvement in internalization of norms.

2. Ethic orientation is rendered possible by *value based convictions and beliefs.* A wide range of these—from objectified forms such as universal religions and ideologies to subjective ideas and conceptions—generates a pluralistic structure of competing value orientations. Recent empirical studies suggest profound trends toward more individualized, even privatized forms, combined with a decline in the acceptance of obligations and an increase in self-centered orientations toward personal autonomy. Such observations do not necessarily hint at regression phenomena because modern life is segmented into highly organized rational action systems and emotional affiliations based in small groups. This segmentation, in turn, corresponds to a differentiation into business-like performance based upon contractual obligation and ego-involvement based upon voluntary attachment and devotion.

The crucial indicator is the decline in value-based orientation as a function of individual action and consensus in interaction. The resulting anomic state may lead to regression into orientation at lower levels and segments of social reality. An example would be the decline of social orientation from the societal to the clan level or the retreat from "public" to "private" virtues. In his *Fall of Public Man* Richard Sennett analyzes the Forest Hills conflict in New York City (301–08). Forest Hills is a middle-class, mostly Jewish section of the borough of Queens that was threatened with the building of a City-planned housing project and influx of lower-class blacks into the neighborhood. Sennett recounts how a community group that originally sought political goals eventually withdrew into their own communal refuge. In this case, a regression in value-based orientations was marked by a loss at a societal level. In the same book, Sennett gives ample evidence of de-

clining "public" virtues, such as value-based solidarity within the larger societal context—a feature of social movements—, being replaced by greater fraternity within small local circles. Society at large is no longer perceived as a horizon for convictions and beliefs. As a consequence, any conception of a societal ethos appears to be obsolete and increasingly an obstacle to gaining situational competence. Such a situation signals social regression much more than any shift in people's relative preferences for work or leisure, which is so much debated within the context of a possible end of society based on work roles and ethics.

3. While convictions and beliefs shape preferences, knowledge determines action. Practicable orientation in modern society is based upon realistic conceptions of the world provided by *knowledge derived from science and technology.* Modern science and technology have developed through a long process of rationalizing both experience and argumentation. Technology and specialized knowledge are only rational when its users take into consideration the interdependence of that particular knowledge with the whole system of rational interpretation. But the production and transfer of modern knowledge are only partly planned and systematic. Furthermore, the total amount of accessible knowledge is no longer available in manageable forms. Therefore, we can observe a trend toward regression into less complex structures of explanation, so-called models with a limited set of variables that facilitate technical applications in "systems" with limited dimensions. This efficient, partial control of reality is achieved at a cost of leaving the environment less intelligible. Thus, the larger orientation function of knowledge diminishes paradoxically and at the same time as the total amount of knowledge increases in an utterly unbalanced way through specialized applications.

In an effort to bridge the gap between scientific control of reality and understanding of its larger context, all kinds of reductionist simplifications may be tried: class-barriers may be abolished with better public education; unemployment may be overcome by deregulating industrial relations; cities may be humanized with appropriate architecture; the might of nations depends upon the controllable defense budget. All of these examples are marked by regressions into partial explanations that, in a second step, are presented with a claim to being more general or universal.

This regression in modern societal knowledge is exacerbated when a decline in its basic prerequisites takes place. Objectivity always is endangered by partisanship. Universality is threatened by the influence of status and power structures which control knowledge in order to maintain or achieve dominance. The result is that truly scientific handling of knowledge is compromised by prescientific influence in research, analysis, and argumentation.

4. Finally, I mentioned a fourth type of basic social orientation: semantic codes for *meaningful communication.* Among these, language, especially, supplies clear examples where we may watch processes of social regression at work as more elaborated codes are restricted and communicative competence diminishes. So far, social regression in meaningful communication appears to be a consequence of structural change rather than an independent phenomenon. But it is a subtle and early indicator of a loosened social bond.

Social Regression—A Transitory State

A panoramic view of regression phenomena reveals that they are widespread at all levels of social reality. Social regression can be imposed by pressures upon a complex, fragile context of once meaningful and efficient social activities. But there are also examples of voluntary strategies of social regression as a means of coping with situational challenges. These strategies may even be advanced ideologically. In fact, any revolutionary ideology proposes an initial, disruptive societal situation; in this situation an existing "negative" structure has to be reduced to a level from which societal reconstruction becomes possible based on a new "positive" image. In such a scheme, social regression is a means to an end; as such, it is a transitory phenomenon. In reality, however, it is by no means easy to regain or restore a lost level of interaction, communication, or organization.

Involuntary destruction leading to social regression may also be considered a transitory survival pattern. Within any modern sociocultural context productive activities by far out-number the chances of meaningful application. From an economic point of view, there is always a certain amount of sociocultural waste which may eventually become a hindrance when new challenges arise. This is obvious, for example, in the field of legislation. The same is true in college curricula, in fashion trends as a basis for mass production, and certainly in surplus armaments. In these cases, activities that continue at a given level eventually reduce competence in problem situations. Thus, reducing these activities and even regressing to earlier practices may re-establish situational competence and also release potentials for different, more meaningful activities. From this point of view, social regression is a rather normal phase within a circular process of social change.

Of course, social regression cannot be interpreted only by the way it functions to promote either planned or unavoidable social change. There is too much evidence that it may also signal a breakdown of social relations and social order, leading to a definite loss of culture at least for those directly concerned.

The Re-establishment of Situational Competence

The appearance of social regression calls for efforts to re-establish relevant situational competence. Rather than applying a social technology in a sort of crash course, situational competence results from a complex set of preconditions spanning both within the individuals and groups concerned and their more or less structured societal environment. This structured frame given, situational competence is achieved through continuous learning by matching knowledge and capability with perceived challenges. This requires motivation.

In the past, existent cultures provided such prerequisites by establishing and safeguarding status structures. Some trends in postmodern social thought are marked by the conviction that man can do without such status bonds and that individual rational choice might ultimately replace the social fabric, dissolved into ever-changing constellations. Such thinking already indicates a considerable degree of social regression.

References

Bernstein, Basil (ed.): *Sprachliche Kodes und soziale Kontrolle.* Düsseldorf: Schwann, 1975.

Dahrendorf, Ralf: "Vom Gesellschaftsvertrag zur Anomie". In: Rössner, Hans (ed.): *Rückblick in die Zukunft.* Berlin: Severin, 1981, 84–93.

Durkheim, Emile: *The Division of Labor in Society [1893].* Trans. George Simpson. New York: Macmillan, 1933.

Jahoda, Marie, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and Hans Zeisel: *Die Arbeitslosen von Marienthal.* Leipzig: Hirzel, 1933.

Klages, Helmut: *Die unruhige Gesellschaft.* München: Beck, 1975.

Luhmann, Niklas: *Zweckbegriff und Systemrationalität.* Tübingen: Mohr, 1968.

Merton, Robert K.: *Social Theory and Social Structure.* New York: Free Press, 1968.

Montesquieu, Charles Secondat Baron de la Brède: *Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains et de leur décadence [1734].* Paris: Garnier, n.d.

Rokeach, Milton: *The Nature of Human Values.* New York: Free Press, 1973.

Sennett, Richard: *The Fall of Public Man.* New York: Knopf, 1974.

Stark, Werner: *The Social Bond.* 5 vols. New York: Fordham UP, 1976–87.

Thurn, Hans Peter: *Abbau von Kultur: Dekulturation. Kultur und Gesellschaft. Sonderheft der Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie.* Opladen: Westdeutscher, 1986, 379–96.

15. CULTURAL DIVERSITY OR CULTURAL CONFUSION? THE VIEWPOINT OF DECENTRALIZATION AND NETWORK*

Takashi Usui

How do the decentralization and network correspond to the cultural diversity? Centralization, decentralization and network of the social system are contrastive and continuous to some extent, as shown in Table 1. Centralization corresponds generally to cultural uniformity and standardization. Both decentralization and network correspond generally to cultural diversity, although the former is more structured than the latter. To begin with, let me illustrate several examples of the relationship between decentralization and cultural diversity in Western countries.

Several Examples from Western Countries

As the cases of Switzerland, Canada, Belgium, Spain and Yugoslavia illustrate, cultural diversity, especially that of language and cultural autonomy, is related to decentralization. In Switzerland there are people who speak German, French, Italian and Roman, and the federal system of cantons corresponds to this linguistic autonomy. In Canada the federal system is said to be centrifugal (Iwasaki, 1985). But as long as French speaking Québec remains in Canada, the federal system is indispensable to guaranteeing the official position of the French language. In Belgium the new federal system is organized according to the principle of linguistic areas, namely Dutch, French, and German. In Spain both Catalonia and Basque had been suppressed during the Franco regime, but under today's policy of autonomous community (Comunidad Autonoma) the autonomy and coexistence of both provinces is now being supported. These examples from the field of languages illustrate the positive interrelationship between cultural diversity and

* This paper was presented to the Plenary Session of 33rd World Congress of Sociology, International Institute of Sociology, in Cologne, Germany, on July 11, 1997. With a few revisions, this was again presented to the Kyoto Conference of RC 07, Future Studies, of ISA (the International Sociological Association), Bukkyou University, on September 19, 1997. I am indebted to Mr. Peter Edwards, Ms. Chizuko Usui and Mr. Masahiro Tsushima for editorial help.

decentralization (especially federalism). But when cultural diversity causes conflict and reduces system integration, we can call the result "cultural confusion." To our regret, the case of old Yugoslavia, especially in Bosnia and Hercegovina, illustrates this process.

What conditions prevent cultural confusion and maintain both cultural diversity and productive vitality? One possible method would be to articulate the system and formulate boundaries between sub-systems in order to prevent unnecessary confusion stemming from increasing diversity. But, actually, I wonder if this solution is universally available because the situation in every country is so different.

Diversity and Overdiversity

A decentralized system may facilitate various forms of diversity, but its positive effects are limited. The figure by De Gré (1946) which depicts relationships between concentrations of power and free institutions (Figure 1) is instructive in this regard. De Gré divides the stages of power concentration into five categories, from minimal to maximal. The greatest freedom is enjoyed at medial or "pluralist" stages whereas both maximal and minimal stages yield the least freedom. Too much decentralization disperses power too widely, thereby decreasing freedom and increasing confusion.

How can we distinguish productive decentralization from excessive decentralization, productive diversity from disorganizing diversity? De Gré's approach is again helpful, drawing attention to three characteristics of productive diversity. First, subsystems and subcultural systems are sufficiently articulated so that they maintain consistent meaning and uphold social norms. Second, subsystems and subcultural systems are sufficiently connected so that they are integrated into the larger social and cultural system and, in addition, contain network-type connections that span subsystems. Third, people can act according to comprehensive, yet flexible standards, thereby developing their unique characters and increasing their productivity. All three requirements are necessary to ensure productive diversity.

By contrast, there is a phase of disorganizing diversity during which the requirements of productive diversity are not met. First, when the institutional boundary is lost and the system is in a state of anomie, we find disorganizing diversity. Second, when subsystems and subcultural systems are not integrated into the larger system, we find system disorganization. Third, when people cannot select their own ways positively in the midst of enormous diversity, we find cultural confusion and disorganizing diversity. We can say more about this phase by looking at the boundary of the system.



Figure 1. Centralization of Power and Degree of Freedom (De Gré, 1946)

Diversity and Boundary

Niklas Luhmann proposes that the boundary of a system is a mechanism for reducing complexity (diversity). Since diversity is potentially endless, we divide the world into segments as we endeavor to articulate social "reality." In this process we focus on a categorical similarity in one particular segment of society. Given that diversity is logically endless, however, one can select any characteristic or type of difference as the basis for identifying a segment or category. After all, not only is every group different, but every member of each group is also different. Thus, everything in social life is ultimately different. But this limiting case thesis produces two entirely opposite effects. One is a supporting effect, namely to support each other in the system and to guarantee rights of minorities and the deprived. This is the first step to cultural pluralism. The other is an enervating effect, the most extreme case being separatism. "We are different, so let's separate."

Yet, in spite of all the potential differences, we can still perceive system integrity, the wholeness of a social system, at its border. The term "bounded system" means that diversity (complexity) is in fact being reduced at least somewhat, that some kind of uniformity is being established within a social system. This uniformity is the essence of institutionalization and cultural patterning. A decentralizing social system means that subsystems are being articulated and diversity is being facilitated at the border. A fully decentralized system may be effective in keeping the diversity of the system productive and in avoiding cultural confusion stemming from primary diversity.

A network also has a boundary, but one that is so flexible and shifting that a network appears to be "borderless." Let me point to one example from network analysis. E.M. Rogers and R.A. Rogers (1985) identify four types of networks (Figure 2), namely gatekeeper, liaison, opinion leader and cosmopolite. A gatekeeper selects information at the entrance to a particular system. A liaison combines one system with another one. A cosmopolite is a network located at the border between a particular system and its environment. Where these three types maintain and develop the boundary of the network system, the fourth type, an opinion leader, is located in the midst of a system.

These four types are taken from organizational analysis, but we can adopt a similar logic in exploring system boundaries at a more macro level. Among the constituent countries of the European Union, for example, physical and technical barriers are falling and custom duties and tax barriers are being abolished. Thus, the European Union is surely becoming a sort of borderless society. Yet, this new inter-state network now operates within a new border, namely one with non-EU countries in the region. In addition, the EU's constituent nation states still retain their borders to some extent. The

(1) Gatekeeper



(2) Liaison



(3) Opinion Leader



(4) Cosmopolite



Figure 2. Types of Networkers (Rogers and Rogers, 1985)

situation, therefore, is not borderless as such but rather one of a coexistence of both borders and borderlessness.

1. *Decentralization and Life World*

From Centralization to Decentralization

Sociologists today typically treat Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy as a centralized ruling system because he characterized it as *Monokratie*, that is a rule by one person. But they have also divided this ideal type into its many elements, including standardization, formalization, centralization and others. Many sociologists, including Peter Blau, have found decentralizing tendencies in bureaucratic organizations, therefore, even when their size and standardization were increasing. As a result, they now treat centralization and decentralization as a continuum. I believe there is also a continuum between decentralization and network.

Federal System, Decentralization and Organizational Paradigm

The most important indicator of decentralization is whether the state is organized in a federal form, a decentralized system. We typically find federalism in the areas of cultural and social welfare policy whereas a more centralized system typically prevails in the areas of diplomacy, defense, and monetary policy. We also find relatively unstable federal states in Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia and relatively stable ones in Germany and Switzerland. Belgium adopted a federal system in order to adjust to cultural pluralism and prevent cultural conflict, and more unitary states like Japan can learn from this example.

More generally, studies of decentralization in federal states may well yield a theory of cultural diversity. As ideal types, centralization and decentralization institutionalize opposite orientations which have been discussed in various ways such as unitary vs. pluralistic, centripetal vs. centrifugal, or bureaucratic vs. professional. Yet, they are more complementary than opposed. Centralization presupposes decentralization and decentralization presupposes centralization. Processes of centralization can usually be found where resources such as finance, personnel, information and so on are being gathered or accumulated. Processes of decentralization are usually found where problems of the life world (*Lebenswelt*) are being addressed.

In Arthur Benz's organizational paradigm (1985), he draws various contrasts between centralization and decentralization (Table 2), including the following seven:

Table 1. Centralization, Decentralization and Network

	formal vertical structure	structured	possibility of system disorganization	element (local components) centered
centralization	×	high	less	–
decentralization	×	middle	more	×
network	–	low	more	×

on-the-spot centered	uniformity standardization	diversity	satisfaction motivation	voluntarism
–	×	–	less	less
×	–	×	more	more
×	–	×	most	more

Table 2. Organizational Paradigm of Centralization and Decentralization

	centralization	*decentralization*
1 regulation of conflict	power	consensus
2 interorganizational relationship	hierarchical	cooperative
3 norms of action	standardization	problem-oriented
4 methodology of planning	deductive	inductive
5 interaction with lower level social systems	technocratic	participative
6 problem perception (cognition)	quantity-oriented	quality-oriented
7 perception of social reality	as hierarchically structured	as network
	as controllable	as not controllable

(A. Benz, 1985)

- power versus consensus concerning the regulation of conflict;
- hierarchical versus cooperative concerning interorganizational relationships;
- standardization versus problem-oriented concerning norms of action;
- deductive versus inductive concerning methodologies of planning;
- technocracy versus participative concerning interrelations with lower levels of a social system;

- quality oriented vs. quantity oriented concerning how problems are perceived; and
- hierarchically structured vs. network concerning how "social reality" is perceived.

Taking all seven contrasts together, we can say that they revolve around "control" versus "life world," and "standardized equality or uniformity" versus "liberty or diversity."

Nearness to the Citizen in Decentralization

We have just seen that decentralization tends to occur near the life world (*Lebensweltnähe*) and, thus, near the citizen (*Bürgernähe*), near the matters or affairs at hand (*Sachnähe*), and near the problem (*Problemnähe*). Two German scholars, Benz (1985) and Peter Schafer (1982), develop this point. According to Schäfer, in decentralizing processes of legislation, finance and planning, it is important to leave details undefined and, thus, to maintain *Bürgernähe* and *Sachnähe.* Yet the German federal system has become too centralized since the early 1970s due to the increasing use of federal planning and grants-in-aid. Local governments in Japan also depend on grants-in-aid from the central government. According to Benz, decentralization involves an inductive way of solving problems, thereby retaining a concern with quality of life issues and with establishing consensus through communication. These ways of thinking about decentralization are consistent with a focus on social networks because the latter essentially engage in gathering information on the spot.

2. *Network and On-The-Spot-Information*

Japanese scholars Imai Ken'ichi and Kaneko Ikuyou (1988) stress that one aspect of a "network" is the dynamic gathering of information. A network's on-the-spot-information binds its members together and can be a source of creative activity because of its synergetic effect. This is what happens at work sites as participants deal with matters and problems in everyday life. Such on-the-spot-information is the opposite of high level or centralized information, which is typically more abstract and ideal. Where the meaning of on-the-spot-information is molded in processes of interaction, more static information—such as numerical data, memoranda, and manuals—is a product of these processes. This is the reason why some scholars (such as J. Lipnack and J. Stamps, and Arthur Benz) identify networks with decentralization.

Table 3. Components and Extension of Network

Components of Network	*Extension of Network*				
	personal (kinship)	community	organization	national	global (regional)
personal (household)	1	2	3	4	5
community	–	6	7	8	9
organization	–	10	11	12	13
national	–	14	15	16	17

Components and Extension of Networks

Despite their nearness to the life-world, the scope of networks is not limited this narrowly. Rather it ranges across areas of different size, including those that are global. In contemporary society, systems of social networks are developing in various forms and performing various types of functions. With innovations in information technology in particular, networks seem increasingly borderless. Yet, however loosely they may be combined across areas, they nonetheless retain loose borders of one kind or another. In addition, however broadly they may extend, even global networks retain borders. We can call the widest range of a network's activity its "extension," and we can call its constituent parts its "components" or "elements" and its "actors."

There are various types of networks, of course, but we can classify them according to their extension and components. The main types of components can be individuals (including households), communities, organizations, nations, or other units. The main types of extension can be personal, communal, organizational, national, or global. By identifying how these factors are combined, we can classify networks in terms of how they correspond to the cells in Table 3. The following three examples illustrate the fruitfulness of this approach. First, if the components of networks are municipalities and if networks extend globally or regionally, we can call them "*glocal*" (that is, global + local) networks—as is sometimes done in Japan (cells 9 and 13). Second, if the components are nation-states and if networks extend globally or regionally, this represents a confederation of states, such as ASEAN (cell 17). Third, if the components are individual volunteers and if networks extend nationally or globally, they illustrate cells 4 and 5.

Conclusion: Adaptation to Diversity in Decentralization and Network

The process of *Sachnähe* that occurs in decentralization and the process of gathering on-the-spot-information in network are basically identical. Both rely on methodologies of problem-solving at specific sites. Both resist centralization in which information flows from the top down, or from center to periphery. Decentralization is a mechanism for adapting pragmatically to diversity. Networks and formal organizations complement each other. Aside from decentralizing, a system can adapt to diversity by gathering on-the-spot-information at various specific sites. We can expect future societies to adapt to diversity in creative ways by decentralizing and employing networks.

References

Benz, Arthur, *Föderalismus als dynamisches System*, 1985.
Blau, Peter and Schoenherr, Richard A., *The Structure of Organizations*, 1971.
De Gré, Gerard, "Freedom and Social Structure", *American Sociological Review*, 1946:11, 529–536, 1946.
Imai, Ken'ichi and Kaneko, Ikuyou, *Network Soshikiron* (Networking Organization, in Japanese), 1988.
Iwasaki, Mikiko, *Canada Renpousei no Seijibunseki* (Political Analysis of Canadian Federalism with Special Reference to Intergovernmental Grants, in Japanese), 1985.
Luhmann, Niklas, *Soziale Systeme*, 1984.
Luhmann, N., *The Differentiation of Society*, 1982.
Lipnack, J. and Stamps, J., *Networking*, 1982.
Rogers, E.M. and Rogers, R.A., *Sosiki Communication* (Communication in Organizations, Japanese edition translated by Uno, Yosiyasu and Hamada, Tomoko), 1985.
Schäfer, Peter, *Zentralisation und Dezentralisation*, 1982.
Scharpe, L.J. (ed.), *The Rise of Meso Government in Europe*, 1993.

This page intentionally left blank

LIST OF EDITORS AND CONTRIBUTORS

Editors

Erwin K. Scheuch (1928) is Emeritus Professor in Sociology at the University of Cologne (Germany). He was lecturer at Columbia University, Berkeley, Harvard and had guest professorships at Princeton, in Auckland, Paris, Stockholm, Berlin, China and Manchuria. He was the founder and director of the Kölner Institut für Angewandte Sozialforschung (Institute for Comparative Social Research), one of the major sociological institutes in Germany. From 1989 till 1997 he was vice-president and later president of the International Institute of Sociology. Professor Scheuch is a member of many academic organizations and wrote dozens of books about technologies of empirical research, mass communications, political sociology and social issues. His latest book was about the donation crisis in German political parties (Rowohlt, 2000).

David Sciulli is professor of sociology of Texas A&M University and most recently the author of *Corporate Power in Civil Society: An Application of Societal Constitutionalism* (NYU Press, forthcoming). His earlier publications include *Corporations Vs. Court: Private Power, Public Interests* (Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1999) and *Theory of Societal Constitutionalism: Foundations of a Non-Marxist Critical Theory* (Cambridge University Press, 1992).

Contributors

Margaret S. Archer is professor of sociology at the University of Warwick. She is the author of the trilogy *Culture and Agency* (CUP, 1989), *Realist Social Theory* (CUP, 1996) *and Being Human: the Problem of Agency* (CUP, forthcoming). She was President of the International Sociological Association (1986–90) and is a Councillor of the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences.

Raymond Boudon, born 1934, Professor at the University of Paris-Sorbonne, is member of the Institut de France, the Academia Europaea, the British Academy, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He has published: *Education, Opportunity and Social Inequality*, New York, Wiley, 1974; *The Unintended Consequences of Social Action*, London, Macmillan, 1982; *Theories of Social Change: a Critical Appraisal*, London, Basil Blackwell/Polity, 1986; *The Analysis of Ideology*,

London, Polity Press, 1989; *A Critical Dictionary of Sociology*, Chicago/London, The University of Chicago Press & Routledge, 1989 (with F. Bourricaud); *The Art of Self Persuasion*, London, Polity, 1994; *The Origin of Values*, Somerset NJ, Transaction (forthc. 2000).

William V. D'Antonio, Ph.D., Michigan State University; Professor Emeritus, University of Connecticut; Executive Officer, American Sociological Association, 1982–1991; Visiting Research Professor, Catholic Univeristy, 1993–; Co-Author and co-editor of nine books, articles in refereed journal, chapters in books; Past President of the International Institute of Sociology, and four other academic associations. Current research: The Religious Factor in the U.S. Congress.

Mattei Dogan is Director of Research at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique in Paris and Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles. He is chairman of the Comparative Sociology Committee of the International Sociology Association and also of the Committee on Political Elites of the International Political Science Association. His recent publications include: *Pathways to Power* (1989), *L'innovation dans les sciences sociales* (1991), *Comparing Nations* (1994).

Pierpaolo Donati is Full Professor of Advanced Sociology at the Faculty of Political Sciences of the University of Bologna, and Past-President of the Italian Sociological Association. He has published widely on many topics, particularly general theory, sociology of the family, citizenship and social policy. Amongst his recent books: *Relational Theory of Society* (Angeli, 1997), *Civil Society in Italy* (Mondadori, 1997), *Handbook of Family Sociology* (Laterza, 1998).

S.N. Eisenstadt (b. 1923) is Emeritus Professor at the Department of Sociology and Anthropology and the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace.

Dr. Dr. h.c. Friedrich Fürstenberg was born in Berlin 1930; 1953 Dr. rer. pol. Full professor of sociology; 1963–1966. Technical University in Clausthal; 1966–1981 Linz University; 1981–1986 Bochum University; since 1986 Bonn University. Areas of research: Industrial sociology (field studies in Europe, then USA and Japan), sociology of religion, theory of social structure.

Nikolai Genov is Professor at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences.

Masayuki Munakata (June 12, 1940, Osaka, Japan) is Professor of Industrial & Technology Management and Comparative Production System at the Graduate School of Business Administration, Kobe University. Doctor of Business Administration (Kobe University).

Eugeen Roosens is Professor of Anthropology and Head of the Department at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven and "professeur extraordinaire" at the UCL. He has been the P.P. Rubens Professor 1989–1990 at the University of California, Berkeley, and the holder of the National Francqui Chair 1997–1998 at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel. He is the author of *Creating ethnicity* (Sage, 1989) and *Eigen grond eerst?* (Acco, 1998).

Prof.dr. Gisela Trommsdorff holds the chair for Developmental and Cross-Cultural Psychology at the University of Konstanz. She is a member of several scientific boards and co-editor of several national and international journals. Currently the main emphasis of her research is in socio-emotional development and the value of children and family in different cultures.

Saskia Sassen is Professor of Sociology, The University of Chicago and Centennial Visiting Professor, London School of Economics. Her most recent books are *Guests and Aliens* (New York: New Press, 1999) and *Globalization and its Discontents* (New York: New Press, 1998). Her books have been translated into ten languages. Two of her books are appearing in 2000 in fully updated editions: *The Global City* (Princeton University Press) and *Cities in a World Economy* (Pine Forge/Sage). She continues work on two projects, "Cities and their Crossborder Networks" sponsored by the United Nations University, and "Governance and Accountability in a Global Economy." She is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a Visiting Fellow of the American Bar Foundation.

Takashi Usui is Professor of Sociology at Kanazawa University, Kanazawa City, Japan.

Erich Weede (b. 1942), is Professor of Sociology at the University of Bonn, Germany. In 1982/83 he was President of the Peace Science Society (International) and in 1985/86 Vice President (International) of the International Studies Association. In fall-winter 1986/87 he was Visiting Professor of International Relations at the Bologna Center of the Johns Hopkins University. He is a member of the editorial boards of *International Interactions* (USA), *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (USA), and *Pacific Focus* (Korea).