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(Officer of the Order of Australia)
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Abbreviations

ABS	Australian Bureau of Statistics
ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP)
ADAC	African Diaspora Association of Canada
ADFP	Africa Diaspora Fellowship Programme
ADM	African Diaspora Marketplace
AHEAD	Association for Higher Education and Development
AIANA	Association of Indian Americans of North America
AIMS	African Institute of Mathematical Sciences
ANC	African National Congress
APD	Air Passenger Duty
ATM	automatic teller machine
BHRS	Bangladesh Household Remittance Survey
BMET	Bureau of Manpower Employment and Training
BRAC	Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee
BSIA	Balsillie School of International Affairs
BSP	Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
CAFSACK	Canadian Friends of the South African Chevrah Kadisha
CALD	culturally and linguistically diverse
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CCASA	Canadian Chinese Association (South Africa)
CFO	Commission on Filipinos Overseas
CGMD	Coordination Générale des Migrants pour le Développement
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIDESAL	Création d'incubateurs de diasporas des savoirs pour l'Amérique Latine
CIGI	Centre for International Governance Innovation
CODEV	Cooperation and Development Center
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DIAC	Department of Immigration and Citizenship
DIBP	Department of Immigration and Border Protection
DKN	Diaspora Knowledge Networks

DZP	Dispensation of Zimbabweans Project
EADPD	European-wide African Diaspora Platform for Development
EPFL	École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne
EU	European Union
FDI	foreign direct investment
FORIM	Forum des Organisations de Solidarité Internationale issues des Migrations
GAP	Get Ahead Project
GDP	gross domestic product
GERD	gross domestic expenditure on research and experimental development
GFDC	Global Filipino Diaspora Council
GFMD	Global Forum on Migration and Development
GIZ	German Federal Enterprise for International Cooperation
HTAs	Hometown Associations
ICMPD	International Centre for Migration Policy Development
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
IdEA	International diaspora Engagement Alliance
IDRC	International Development Research Centre
IDRF	International Development and Relief Foundation
IDSK	Institute of Development Studies Kolkata
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IIT	Indian Institute of Technology
ILO	International Labour Office
IMDS	International Migration and Diaspora Studies
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMRC	International Migration Research Centre
IOM	International Organization for Migration
JMDI	Joint Migration and Development Initiative
JNU	Jawaharlal Nehru University
KAPIT	KA Kaalamang Pinansyal Tungo Sa Kaunlaran
KNOMAD	Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development
LINKAPIL	Lingkod sa Kapwa Pilipino or Link to Philippine Development
LSIA	Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants in Australia
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MFI	Micro-Finance Institute
MLF	Mthwakazi Liberation Front
MLPA	Money Laundering Prevention Act
MOIA	Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs
MPI	Migration Policy Institute
MTOs	money transfer operators
NBR	National Board of Revenue
NCCT	National Council of Canadian Tamils
NCMF	Nelson Mandela Children's Fund-Canada

NEDA	National Economic Development Authority
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NHS	National Household Survey
NITI	National Institution for Transforming India
NMCF	Nelson Mandela Children's Fund
NORKA	Non-Resident Keralites Affairs
NRBs	Non-Resident Bangladeshis
NRIs	Non-Resident Indians
NSDC	National Skills Development Corporation
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OHF	Oakville Hospital Foundation
PDP	Philippine Development Plan
PIOs	persons of Indian origin
PKB	Probashi Kallyan Bank
PNPs	Provincial Nominee Programmes
POEA	Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
PSOs	Philippine Schools Overseas
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
ReDC	Remittance for Development Council
RSPs	remittance service providers
SADC	South African Development Community
SAJAC	South African Jewish Association of Canada
SAMP	Southern African Migration Program
SANSA	South African Network of Skills Abroad
SARA	South African Rainbow Association
SLWB	Sri Lankans Without Borders
SNIS	Swiss Network for International Studies
SSI	Supplemental Security Income
TGTE	Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam
TSCd	Tamil Sovereignty Cognition declaration
TULF	Tamil United Liberation Front
TYO	Tamil Youth Organization
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UCT	University of Cape Town
UJA	United Jewish Appeal
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VFR	visiting friends and relatives
WTM	World Tamil Movement
ZIPOVA	Zimbabwe Political Victims Association

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Chapter 1
Introduction: Disaggregating Diasporas

Abel Chikanda, Jonathan Crush, and Margaret Walton-Roberts

Introduction

Over the last decade there has been a lively global debate promoting migration as a novel opportunity for increased economic and social development in migrant sending countries (Agunias and Newland 2012; Bakewell 2009; Barré et al. 2003; Crush et al. 2013; Mercer et al. 2008; Tejada and Bolay 2010). Hein de Haas (2012) argues that discussion of the relationship between migration and development actually dates as far back as 1945. Since then, perceptions of the relationship have swung back and forth between unbridled optimism and deep pessimism (de Haas 2010). Thinking and theorizing about the relationship between migration and development has a much longer historical pedigree, however. Policy debates about whether migration contributed to or undermined the modernist project of development are

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deeply rooted in European colonial rule in Africa and Asia. On the research side, the work of the Anglo-German geographer, Ernst Ravenstein, in the late nineteenth century remains one of the iconic early explorations of the relationship between migration and development (Crush 2015a).

By the 1980s and 1990s, migration was generally viewed either as an undesirable consequence of the failure of development or as a mechanism for the extraction of wealth and talent from the South (Amin 1974; Stichter 1985). As a result, Massey et al. (1998: 272) could conclude that "migration undermines the prospects for local economic development and yields a state of stagnation and dependency." In recent years, the policy and research pendulum has swung again. While the research community is now becoming increasingly sceptical and critical (Bronden 2012; de Haas 2012; Mullings and Pellerin 2013; Skeldon 2012; Trotz and Mullings 2013), most governments and international organizations remain bullish about the linkages between migration and development. The new twenty-first century optimism arose, in part, because of the "discovery" of the magnitude of migrant remittances and their potential for stimulating economic growth and development in countries of the South (Brønden 2012).

Remittances were labelled the "new development mantra" by Kapur (2005) while Raghuram (2009: 105) observed that they had become the "lodestar around which the migration and development industry is congregating." Data from the World Bank shows that remittances to developing countries reached USD404 billion in 2013, and are projected to rise further to USD454 billion in 2015 (World Bank 2014). In 2013, remittances were more than three times larger than official development assistance (ODA) and, excluding China, significantly exceeded foreign direct investment flows to developing countries. Remittances have been shown to reduce the level, depth and severity of poverty (Adams 2006). A macroeconomic study by Adams and Page (2005), for example, showed that a 10 % increase in per capita official international remittances leads, on average, to a 3.5 % decline in the share of people living in poverty.

Migration and development optimism increasingly extends beyond the issue of remittances to include related subjects captured in such positive phrases as "the triple win of circular migration", "mobility partnerships", the "return of qualified skilled nationals" and the "engagement of diasporas in development". Migration is no longer seen by many as a loss of human capital investment that ultimately results in a brain drain. Instead, migrants are "heroes of development" whose activities produce transformative impacts on both migrant sending and receiving societies (Castles and Delgado Wise 2007: 3). Central to the new discourse about migration and development is the role accorded to diasporas. Migrant diasporas – seen as people who live outside their countries of birth but maintain and create networks and connections with the home country and other parts of the world – are now viewed as key development resources. While remittances are recognized as the most visible measure of diaspora ties with their countries of origin (Guarnizo 2003; Sørensen 2004), there have been increasing calls to go "beyond remittances" by addressing other aspects of the social, cultural and political role of diasporas in the development process (McKenzie 2006; Newland and Patrick 2004).

The potential role of diasporas in facilitating development has attracted the attention of governments, regional bodies and international organizations. As Gamlen (2014) has noted, many states have established diaspora institutions or formal government offices dedicated to their diasporas. In 1980, only a few states had such institutions; now, over half have established them. Reasons include a "tapping explanation focused on states' pursuit of material resources through engaging diasporas, and an embracing explanation focused on state efforts to re-incorporate 'lost' members of the nation" (Gamlen 2014: S183). Clearly, diasporas are being embraced to further liberal state building. States, in turn, see a potential opportunity to relinquish some of their responsibility to deliver development to other actors.

In an effort to identify the knowledge gaps, conceptual challenges and governance dilemmas of diaspora engagement, the editors convened an international conference on Diasporas, Development and Governance in the Global South at the Balsillie School of International Affairs in May 2013. The wide-ranging discussions by leading researchers in the field form the foundation for this volume. This introduction attempts to capture something of the richness and complexity of the debate while the chapters that follow are based on presentations delivered at the conference. Together, the conference and this book highlight important themes to inform future research and policy perspectives on the relationship between diasporas, development and governance. Here, we identify five of the themes that emerged at the conference and are addressed in this volume.

Governing Diasporas

Unlike other cross-boundary issues such as finance, trade and the environment, global migration is a relative newcomer to the global governance literature and is characterized by institutional actors and discourses that often work at cross-purposes (Betts 2011; Gamlen 2013; Gamlen and Marsh 2012; Kalm 2008; Koser 2010; Newland 2010). Global migration governance differs sharply from other issues in that the governed are mainly mobile people, yet the focus in the literature tends to be on how states jealously guard the right to control the entry of persons to their territory (Castles 2004; Guirdaudon 2000). States generate mobile classes of persons who can access their territories based on wealth, lineage and economic output, while tightly restricting access by less skilled labour, which ensures an "immobile class" who retain fewer rights (Castles 2011; Walia 2010). Sending states, on the other hand, benefit from their mobile workers through circular migration, remitting, trade and philanthropy (Bakewell 2011; de Haas 2010; Gamlen 2008; Levatino and Pécoud 2012).

Governance issues run like a thread through most of the chapters in this volume. Whether it be states reaching out to diasporas, diasporas selectively engaging with state initiatives, diasporas avoiding states altogether and pursuing their own initiatives, or diasporas so internally divided along political and other grounds that a coherent unified response is all but impossible, this volume shows the variety and

complexity of issues that are subsumed under the general heading of "diaspora engagement". The first two chapters in this volume examine concrete examples of diaspora engagement by governments at very different scales, multilateral and individual. While there is an element of following the herd in the current global state interest in diasporas, the first chapter by Irena Omelaniuk shows how diaspora engagement has been progressively articulated and concretized at the multilateral level as well. In its few short years of existence, the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) has "recognized diasporas as key actors in migration and development, and called for public-private partnerships to engage with them as central planks of any national or regional development strategy." Tracing the evolution of discussions about diasporas from Brussels in 2006 through to Stockholm in 2014, she concludes with the pertinent question of whether the informal collaboration and consensus building of the GFMD might signal the emergence of a coherent global agenda for migration and development, "including for (and with) interested members of diasporas." Even though significant strides have been made in understanding the potential and obstacles to diaspora engagement in development, information on the issue remains incomplete and fragmentary.

One of the few national governments with a coherent strategy for engaging the diaspora is the Philippines. In her chapter in this volume, Secretary Imelda Nicolas discusses this experience at length and from her position as chairperson of the Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO), a cabinet-level secretary position under the Office of the President of the Philippines. She suggests that there is no other country in the South that is more strategically positioned than the Philippines to reap the potential development benefits of international migration with 10 % of the country's population living abroad in over 200 countries. Her chapter discusses a wide range of government-led diaspora engagements and reflects on their effectiveness. She concludes that for all the progress that has been made there is a need for greater institutionalization of various initiatives at all levels of government. Greater policy coherence and effective coordination amongst relevant government agencies is particularly needed.

Much more analysis is needed of how sending and receiving states actually influence the diaspora-development process (Hugo 2013). We need to understand how diasporic engagement both informs and is informed by sending and receiving nations' governance mechanisms. What partnerships and institutional frameworks can optimize this engagement and maximize returns from it? National policies may contradict diaspora development processes; immigration regulations are one key example. Initiatives to engage with diasporas are at the centre of the emerging international governance framework for migration and development, and actively promoted in forums such as the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD). While multilateral action suggests attention is being directed at diasporas, their development potential can sometimes be invisible to states and, in many cases, the private sector plays a more important role in engaging diasporas (Leclerc and Meyer 2007).

Even supranational organizations appear more organized in their diasporic engagement than states, as evidenced in the Joint Migration and Development

Initiative (JMDI), the World Bank's "Knowledge for Development" (K4D) programme (Kuznetsov 2006) and, more recently, the Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD). Governments in the Global North are encouraging diasporas in their own domain to engage with the South, mostly to promote trade and investment links. The International Diaspora Engagement Alliance (IdEA), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID's) Global Diaspora Alliance, and the Global Diaspora Forum are prime examples of such initiatives. Some governments are now reaching out to their diasporas (de Haas 2006; Hugo 2006; Ionescu 2006; Kunz 2008; Mercer et al. 2008; Nurse 2006), and the IOM and the Migration Policy Institute recently launched the first diaspora engagement toolkit for governments (Agunias and Newland 2012).

At a policy level the option for countries of origin to take advantage of their foreign-based skilled diasporas to promote state development has been termed "the diaspora option" (Meyer 2001; de Haas 2006; Merz et al. 2009). The diaspora option enables the transfer of knowledge, skills and further financial and social capital. Recent studies identify the central role played by diasporas in innovative technology transfer and knowledge spill over, scientific cooperation, transnational diaspora networks, business and investments links and eventual return to the home country (Agunias and Newland 2012; CODEV-EFPL et al. 2013; Hollanders and Soete 2010; Katseli et al. 2006; Lowell and Gerova 2004).

Factions and Fissions

Much of the policy dialogue on diasporas in development assumes that they are cohesive and homogenous groups that differ only in the length of time they have been away and in the intensity of their linkages with their countries of origin. In contrast, the chapters in this volume explore the heterogeneity and divisions that often exist within diaspora groups and which, in turn, affect the ways in which they interact with those countries. Geography has always been a powerful source of separation and fragmentation within diasporas. While migrant social networks tend to ensure that migrants cluster in certain cities and neighbourhoods, there are often powerful countervailing forces of dispersal at work in modern economies, including the geography of employment opportunity. To speak of a single African diaspora in Canada, for example, is inherently problematical when migrants from over 50 countries are widely dispersed over the 8,000 km between Victoria on the west coast and St John's on the east. The constraints of distance are, of course, being reworked in the internet age and it is notable not only how many diaspora groupings have sprung up on social media sites but how their membership is extremely spatially dispersed (Bernal 2006; Crouch 2011; Crush et al. 2012; Mano and Willems 2010).

Geography is certainly not the only source of fragmentation and heterogeneity. Class, race, ethnicity, religion, political affiliation and social status have all acted as potential lines of cleavage at certain times and in particular places. While this volume cannot explore all of the fissures that exist, several of the chapters provide

important insights into the social and cultural heterogeneity of diasporas. There is considerable diversity and division within the diaspora especially along lines of religious affiliation and political factionalism. Three chapters on various diaspora formations shed further light on the nature of heterogeneity. In their chapter on the ethnically-homogenous Tamil diaspora in Canada, Amarnath Amarasingam and Ahila Poologaindran argue that there is considerable "organizational rivalry and infighting between diaspora groups in Canada and around the world." As a result, it is rare to see individuals from rival groups attending each other's events or working together for common objectives. In her chapter, Sujata Ramachandran examines diaspora philanthropy amongst South Africans abroad and finds that the racial demarcations and political affiliations of the apartheid past intrude into the present and generate considerable barriers to any notion of a common South African diaspora identity and set of engagement practices. Finally, Huzan Dordi and Margaret Walton-Roberts question the very idea of an "Indian" diaspora given that "the more salient social, economic and political diaspora processes are nested at other scales and sources of affiliation and are distinctly mediated through different axes and intersections of identity." Rather than characterizing the Indian diaspora as a coherent homogenous whole, they disaggregate the diaspora along the four axes of region of origin, gender, caste and religion.

To argue that diaspora communities are not homogenous entities is, of course, nothing new. The problem is rather that the current migration and development policy discourse treats them as if they are. Governments seem to have bought into the fiction that they have single, undifferentiated diasporas with which they can partner. The heterogeneity and social divisions that exist within diaspora groups are therefore important to acknowledge and assess. Migrant transnational engagement hinges on the emotional and social bonds migrants maintain with their communities of origin, though they rarely identify with the abstract notion of the nation-state. Other aspects of identity, including region, locality, ethnicity, religion, caste, class, clan and kinship, amongst others, strongly influence and sometimes constrain these relationships. Large-scale emigration produced by fraught colonial histories, and political and economic instability in the postcolonial period, underscore the complicated and ambivalent relationship between immigrants and the governments of their countries of origin.

These divisions and fractures are important because they influence how diasporas engage with both sending and receiving states, and if they engage at all. Certainly not all emigrants strongly identify themselves as diaspora communities or want to align themselves with their areas of origin (Crush et al. 2013). All of the chapters referred to above take their analysis of diaspora heterogeneity a step further to ask how this impacts on the way in which different factions decide to "engage". Amarasingam and Poologaindran show that the rivalry and factionalism within the Tamil diaspora relates, in part, to fundamental disagreements about whether and how to engage in the post-war reconstruction of Sri Lanka. Most wish to avoid working directly with the Sri Lankan government (a mutual antipathy in fact) but they differ fundamentally on the issue of assistance to Tamil communities, which might involve collaboration with what they see as an army of occupation.

Ramachandran argues that a fundamental distrust of the African National Congress-run South African government has prompted wealthy white philanthropists to work either with civil society organizations outside state structures or to “turn inwards” and direct their giving to Canadian causes. Finally, Dordi and Walton-Roberts suggest that while the Indian central government has recently reached out to diaspora associations, these associations had already coalesced around state and regional based affiliations and governments within India. Others, such as elements of the Sikh diaspora in Canada, have an ambivalent relationship with the Indian central government.

Diasporic Economies

The large research literature on remittance impacts has recently begun to overlap with the emerging policy discussions on diaspora engagement. Remittances are certainly the most obvious indicator of an individual’s continued linkages with the country of origin. But study after study has demonstrated that remittances are primarily private transactions and not motivated in any significant way by subscription to any grand state-led development plan or idea. States have sought, on occasion, to “capture” these private flows with some success in the case of the Mexican 3x1 remittance matching programme and with abject failure in the case of the Zimbabwean Homelink programme (Aparicio and Meseguer 2012; Maphosa 2007). The nub of the debate on remittance impacts is whether these private household-to-household transnational transfers of cash and goods have any significant impact on broader national and regional economic and social development indicators. A collection of essays on diaspora engagement certainly needs to move beyond remittances but it also needs to assess whether diaspora remitting does stimulate productive investment in any significant manner.

Much of the literature remains sceptical although the Bangladesh case does provide some grounds for optimism. In his chapter in this collection, Mohammad Moniruzzaman advances the concept of “remittance governance”, defined as “a process aimed at ensuring the proper functioning of remittance markets (involving) designing and implementing policies to create a favourable investment climate, reducing transaction costs, improving financial intermediation, devising investment instruments, promoting financial inclusion, (and) assuring the active involvement of state and non-state actors, private sectors and financial institutions to manage programmes and policies to pursue socio-economic development.” He further suggests that good remittance governance can turn remittances into investment even when they are directed by emotional connections and commitments to the homeland.

The call to move “beyond remittances” has led, in part, to a new focus on diaspora entrepreneurship. In making the “business case for migration”, for example, the World Economic Forum (2013) profiled the business and investment activities of migrant diasporas. Diasporas build bridges between their sending and receiving countries through enhanced trade, investment and business links (Lodigiani 2009).

Diaspora bonds have provided a secure and stable source of external finance for countries like India and are vital to national development, especially in times of crisis (Chander 2001; Ketkar and Ratha 2010). Some see in these developments the shadowy hand of neoliberalism (Mullings 2012; Mullings and Pellerin 2013). Others view this as a positive sign, arguing that direct foreign investment with an emotional attachment to the country of birth is likely to have positive outcomes (Newland and Tanaka 2010). Diaspora entrepreneurs are seen as potential "pioneer investors", especially when major capital markets regard these economies as too risky (Kuznetsov 2006).

Members of the diaspora who have been particularly successful economically are certainly positioned to do much more than send remittances to family members in their countries of origin. Diaspora entrepreneurial activities of note include "nostalgia trade" (which meets the demand of diasporas for products from their country of origin) and "diaspora-led import/export businesses", which have a more diverse product base and clientele (Wong and Ng 2002). The extent of global diaspora entrepreneurship and investment is not known with any certainty, although the cases of China and India are well-documented (Bajpai and Dasgupta 2004; Guha and Ray 2000; Roy and Banerjee 2007; Smart and Hsu 2004; Tsai 2010; Zhu 2007). A study in 2001, for example, showed that the diaspora provided an estimated 70 % of FDI in China in the 1990s (Devan and Tewari 2001). The Indian diaspora is estimated to have invested USD2.6 billion out of USD10 billion of FDI between 1991 and 2001 (Yingqi and Balasubramanyam 2006). More recently, a study of diasporas in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) found that a one percent increase in migration from a particular country leads to a 0.1–0.25 % increase in FDI in that country (Gormsen and Pytlikova 2012).

Not a great deal is known about what motivates diaspora individuals and groups to invest in their countries of origin and why levels of investment and entrepreneurial engagement differ considerably from country to country (Galetto 2011). Two models have been proposed to try to understand the factors that influence the level and type of engagement by diaspora investors and entrepreneurs. The first focusses almost exclusively on the availability (or absence) of investment opportunities in countries of origin and argues that it is the interaction among factors that creates the conditions for investment (Galetto 2011: 301). This model identifies four basic factors: the earning capacity of the migrant and the amount of money remitted; a minimum level of local development; suitable investment opportunities; and intra-household arrangements that facilitate the adoption of new investment opportunities. Each factor is, in turn, influenced by a set of sub-factors in countries of origin and destination. A second psycho-social model focusses more on the decision making of the potential entrepreneur investor, arguing that there are three specific categories likely to impact on the motivation to engage: financial, social and emotional (Nielsen and Riddle 2007). The model also tries to take into account cultural and structural variables that might affect motivations to invest. Both models help to identify factors that interact and impact on diaspora entrepreneurial engagement. Other important variables that need to be taken into account include the reasons for leaving the country of origin; the opportunities for creating wealth and

raising capital in the country of destination; the facilitating role of diaspora organizations; the degree of personal and community identification with, or alienation from, the political system of the country of origin; and financial and other incentives for investment put in place by origin governments (Nielsen and Riddle 2008; Riddle et al. 2008).

Three of the chapters in this volume contribute directly to our understanding of diasporic economic activity beyond remittances. In her chapter on the Caribbean diaspora, Indiana Minto-Coy argues that the diaspora represents a key source of external investment, as well as a vehicle for innovation and creative adaptation in an increasingly challenging global economy. She examines some of the obstacles facing diaspora investors. However, there is also a "pervasive but problematic" idea that diasporic engagement is a unidirectional endeavour involving the diaspora "giving" to the home country. To illustrate the point, she examines the case of Caribbean businesses that have had notable market success outside the region precisely by tapping into the emotional connections and purchasing power of the diaspora market.

Keith Nurse, in his chapter, points to the sizeable contribution that diasporic communities make to the Caribbean in terms of financial transfers, trade, tourism, travel, telecommunications, new media and the creative economy. His analysis focuses on the growth and impact of diasporic tourism to the Caribbean and demonstrates that the diaspora has emerged as a major market in the region's primary economic sector. This form of diasporic engagement has considerable development impacts throughout the island economies and occurs largely outside the purview of national governments that tend to privilege more conventional, non-diasporic tourism.

Finally, Graeme Hugo charts the complex and changing forms of migration between Asia and Australia and the ways in which migrant transnational connections have changed over time and vary with the immigration categories of Australian policy. Contemporary Australia's skills-based immigration policy has produced a diaspora that is "less likely to be engaged in sending money home for the livelihood needs of their families" but with strong potential to be associated with "knowledge transfer/exchange, trade and other linkages beyond family relationships." Already, the Chinese and Vietnamese diaspora in Australia have been major investors in those countries even though Australia itself has no official policy to support diaspora engagement.

Networked Diasporas

The very concept of scientific diasporas refers to networks of emigrated scientists and engineers involved in the circulation of knowledge via transnational cooperative links with their home country (Barré et al. 2003; Tejada and Bolay 2010). The transnational practices of scientific diasporas are only possible when adequate scientific and technological infrastructure is in place, meaning that certain policies

determine the state's ability to benefit from their scientific diasporas (Chikanda and Dodson 2015; Tejada et al. 2013). The inclusion of students – "the semi-finished human capital" (Khadria 2003) – within the context of skilled migration is important given that student migration is often a precursor to labour migration (Kumar et al. 2009). International student migration is regarded as a sub-class of talent mobility within a globalizing knowledge economy in which a highly educated workforce is seen as a prerequisite for sustained growth (Mosneaga 2014). The adaptation of labour migration policies is part of a destination country's strategy to attract skilled migrants in the global competition for talent (Brücker et al. 2012; Kuptsch 2006; Tejada et al. 2014). However, research highlights inconsistent policy outcomes resulting from tensions between the different agendas of higher education globalization, talent attraction and migration (Mosneaga 2014).

Education and training play a pivotal role in the development of a country and are powerful tools for economic growth. With the current world trend of knowledge-based economies, higher education, specialized knowledge and a skilled workforce are seen as essential. The migration of highly skilled persons is a dominant characteristic of international migration today (Docquier and Rapoport 2012; Özden et al. 2011) and is an effect of the transformation of countries into knowledge-based economies, policy schemes facilitating the mobility of the highly skilled, and the internationalization of higher education (Tejada et al. 2014). While the emigration of skilled professionals from developing to industrialized economies has long been controversial, the main focus of attention is now directed towards the positive effects of migration, with migrants being seen as potential development leverage tools who act as bridges between home and host countries (de Haas 2006; Katseli et al. 2006; Lowell and Gerova 2004; Tejada 2012, Walton- Roberts 2010).

A number of the chapters in this volume point to the sea change in diaspora links with countries of origin brought about by information technology and cheap mass travel. On the one hand, this makes face-to-face contact (actual and virtual) much more common and intensive, strengthening and reinforcing identification with countries of origin. On the other, it has given considerable impetus to networking within and across diasporas and with interest groups in the home country. The emergence of national and transnational diaspora knowledge networks (DKN) has been a major feature of diasporic exchange over the last decade (Biao 2005; Meyer 2001; Meyer and Wattiaux 2006). DKNs have already played a critical and highly visible role in accelerating technology exchange and FDI in China, India, Israel and the United States (Kuznetsov and Sabel 2006). Meyer and Wattiaux (2006: 8) suggest that DKNs can make a number of other important contributions including the exchange of scientific, technical, administrative or political information; specialist knowledge transfer; "scientific or technological diplomacy"; joint projects; training and mentoring; temporary work assignments and ad hoc consultations. In practice, considerable knowledge gaps exist about the numbers, formation, activities, durability and impacts of DKNs (Barnard and Pendock 2013; Mahroum and de Guchteneire 2006). For example, it is difficult to establish exact trends in the formation of DKNs at the global level. Attempts to enumerate these networks at various times illustrate this complexity (Meyer 2006). In 2006, the number of DKNs in

Latin America, Asia and Africa was said to be 158 in one study, and 191 in another (Meyer and Wattiaux 2006; Tobin and Sallee 2006).

Three of the chapters in this volume add to the emerging knowledge base about DKNs. The first, by Wisdom Tettey, argues that the capacity of Africa's universities to engage in the scientific production of knowledge has been undermined by out-migration, amongst other things. In the context of increasingly unfavourable conditions for scholarly capacity building and innovation, he argues that the mobilization of diaspora intellectual talent through the utilization of communication technologies is essential (Lewin and Zhong 2013). Focusing on efforts by the Ghanaian diaspora abroad to strengthen Ghana's university research and teaching capacity, Tettey provides us with a biography and evaluation of the DKN, *Network.* He emphasizes the material challenges of network organization and sustenance and notes that in the absence of a reliable resource base, "passion and enthusiasm" are not enough to guarantee sustainability or underwrite scaling up.

In contrast to Ghana, as Gabriela Tejeda points out in her chapter on highly-skilled Indian migrants in Europe, Indian universities are a hive of productive research activity, innovation and knowledge creation. Not only does this provide a conducive environment for return migration but it facilitates scientific cooperation and knowledge transfer between those who remain in Europe and scientists and others in India. In this way networking is not just something that happens "out there" in the diaspora but integrates local scientists and other academics into diaspora-led DKNs. The chapter by Jean-Baptiste Meyer, Fan Wang Miao and Yue Zhao takes this one step further in a novel analysis of international networking and collaboration by scientists in three Latin American countries – Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay – with members of the diaspora living and working in other countries. In this case, the explicit focus is on connectivities between members of the diaspora and former diaspora members who have engaged in return migration. Proponents of return migration implicitly assume that return represents a one-off transfer of skills, knowledge and assets. Meyer et al's analysis suggests that return does not mean a severing of ties with the diaspora but active and ongoing engagement with colleagues and collaborators still in the diaspora.

New Diaspora Spatialities

The global migration and development policy debate has tended to reproduce some of the core assumptions of development discourse; that is, that development is something that only occurs in the global South and that it is to be stimulated by outside actors, donors, banks, foundations, governments in the North and international agencies. The key question, then, has become whether migration from the South to the North undermines development and whether it can be turned to the advantage of the South through remitting, investment and, of course, diaspora engagement. This bipolar world, in which countries either receive or send migrants, does scant justice to the new realities of mobility in a globalized world and has the

unfortunate effect of focusing only on the diasporic activities, organizations and engagements of diasporas from the South in the North. As a consequence, South-South diasporas have received very little research and policy focus, and policymakers have ignored their own diasporas in the South (Anich et al. 2014; Chikanda and Crush 2014).

The African Union definition of diasporas explicitly applies the label only to Africans living outside the continent. In some countries the word “diaspora” is reserved for North-South migrants while those from the same country who move to countries in the global South are not regarded as part of a diaspora (Crush 2011). The Migration Observatory of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of States has attempted to raise the general profile of South-South migration and the role of diasporas in the South in particular (Crush 2015b; Kinuthia 2013; Nalane et al. 2012; Olatuyi et al. 2013). However, having successfully completed a research programme in 12 pilot countries, the Migration Observatory has now been decommissioned and will receive no further EU support.

South-South migration is increasingly important in many regions of the South and makes up a growing share of the global migration stock. Highly skilled migrants who move to other countries in the South are likely to find suitable employment that utilizes their skills and qualifications in contrast to the North where significant brain waste occurs amongst new immigrants. Return migration may also be a lot more feasible in the context of South-South migration and research has shown that South-South migrants sometimes make larger financial investments in their home country than South-North migrants. The chapter by Jonathan Crush, Abel Chikanda and Godfrey Tawodzera in this volume shows that the dominant view is informed by the perception that those who move to the North are skilled and permanent migrants while those who move to the South are usually unskilled and temporary migrants. Consequently, South-North migration is seen as having a much higher developmental value than South-South migration. They take these themes in relation to mixed migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa; a movement that has created a sizeable diaspora in the latter country in little more than a decade. Geographical proximity ensures close and frequent contact, including regular return visits, but Zimbabweans in South Africa are increasingly self-identifying as a diaspora and forming diaspora associations and organizations.

Another neglected diaspora spatiality concerns migrants from the global North who work and/or settle in the South. Some research has been undertaken on the nature of these diasporas, notably those from European countries such as Ireland, Portugal and Italy, as well as other countries including Australia and New Zealand (Gamlen 2010; Hugo 2006; Kenny 2003; Pozzetta et al. 1992; Teixeira and da Rosa 2009; Tobin and Sallee 2006). However, this work is generally unrepresented on the global migration and development agenda, primarily because it does not fit well with the framing narrative of South-North migration and development. Interestingly, the large global workforce of “aid workers” and multi-national company employees from the North, as well as expatriates settling more permanently in the South, are rarely seen in diasporic terms in the global migration and development debate or as offering potential for forms of reverse diaspora engagement. A corrective to this

dominant view can be seen in the chapter by Susanna Groves on US migrants abroad. Groves's main objective is to unpick the "jumble" of US emigration policies and to inform the current debate surrounding the rights and obligations of non-resident US citizens. Estimates of the size of the US diaspora range from two to seven million scattered in 100 different countries. She argues that this extremely diverse diaspora needs to be recognized for its positive economic impact on the US "by building transnational social and business ties, helping the trade balance, transferring skills and technologies, and serving as people-to-people diplomats." The US is certainly not the only government to ignore the potential of its own diaspora as the final section of this Introduction suggests.

In conclusion, in order for diasporas to contribute to development, the macro structures of stable social and economic infrastructure need to be in place. Rather than seeing this as justification for dismissing the role of migrants as development agents (de Haas 2012), we contend that we need to comprehend the conditions that allow for diaspora groups to succeed in development agendas. What is needed to create the virtuous cycle of development and migration, what stops diaspora groups from effectively contributing? How are diaspora groups embedded into the state processes of development in both sending and receiving states? Can the receiving and sending countries find a common ground for migration policy and the resulting diaspora engagement?

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Chapter 2
The Global Forum on Migration and Development and Diaspora Engagement

Irena Omelaniuk

Introduction

Over the last two decades, there has been a transformation in thinking about diasporas and the role they might play in enriching the societies and economies they come from and move to (IOM 2013; GFMD 2012a, b, c, d). Multilateral fora such as the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) have played a part in catalysing this change. The GFMD is one of many international and inter-agency frameworks dealing with migration and development, but it is the largest, most multilateral space in which to explore good governance around diaspora issues and to strengthen the connections among a set of increasingly diverse players (de Haas 2012; Newland 2010; Omelaniuk 2012). As an informal, non-binding, state-led dialogue forum, the GFMD's greatest value is in convening the widest range of migration and development stakeholders across public/private, developing/developed, origin/destination country boundaries. As such, it is a process for exchanging and showcasing ideas and good practices and disseminating information and knowledge into the furthest corners of government, civil society, business, and migrant and diaspora communities. While not a formal standard-bearer, the Forum can promote consensus-building around internationally agreed principles, in particular when these have been validated by effective practice.

Diasporas have been a recurrent theme at the GFMD since its inaugural meeting in 2007 in Brussels. From a narrow focus on remittances and financial contributions of diaspora members in 2007, the Forum had evolved by 2012 a more nuanced debate about diaspora partnerships, capacities and governance. It had also broadened its participation to include diaspora entrepreneurs, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), banks, finance sector representatives, women's organizations, the

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World Economic Forum, development agencies and international organizations. Public-private partnerships were being explored and the GFMD had also discussed the diaspora in the context of South-South migration and deepening regional integration. This chapter examines how the GFMD has dealt with diaspora issues in a systematic and incremental way since 2007, and has raised global awareness of the many contributions diasporas can bring to development. Despite its informal, non-binding status, the Forum may be moving the world closer to a coherent global agenda on migration and development that includes and engages diasporas at all points on the mobility continuum.

Dealing with Diaspora Issues at the GFMD

From its beginnings, the GFMD recognized diasporas as key actors in migration and development. The diaspora discourse in the Forum has evolved from a largely instrumentalist preoccupation with remittances and other economic contributions to countries of origin to a more nuanced and inclusive debate about policy and governance "beyond remittances." Policy tools have been developed on the margins of the Forum to better guide and structure the global debate, notably a handbook for engaging diasporas in development (Agunias and Newland 2012). Fundamental questions have been raised about the role of government in enabling diaspora groups as agents of development, and the role of the private sector and civil society in helping them help themselves.

Brussels (2007)

The inaugural GFMD meeting in Brussels saw the first truly global debate among governments on diasporas as emerging transnational players for development. Remittances were the first point of entry, although this was broadened to include "remittances of knowledge, skills and know-how" and the roles that countries of origin and destination might play in leveraging these to everyone's benefit (GFMD 2008a: 103). The diaspora theme was subsumed under a roundtable on "Remittances and Other Diaspora Resources: Increasing their Net Volume and Development Impact." The roundtable session on "Working with the Diaspora for Development" defined diasporas very broadly, as "individuals originating from one country, living outside this country, irrespective of their citizenship or nationality, who, individually or collectively, are or could be willing to contribute to the development of this country. Descendants of these individuals are also included in this definition" (GFMD 2008a: 82). This working definition served the Forum for several years.

At the Mauritius GFMD in 2012, the Common Space adopted a broader definition of diaspora to include "any migrant living abroad temporarily or permanently, who has maintained ties to the country/community of origin" (GFMD 2012a: 17).

This expanded the earlier focus on individuals making contributions to the development of the country of origin to include the maintenance of all kinds of ties with that country. It also explicitly suggested that temporary migrants should be included in the discussion. To ensure that the definition does not limit itself to current migrants, the 2014 Forum re-emphasized the multi-generational membership, using the definition provided in the Handbook compiled for the GFMD, which describes diaspora as "emigrants and their descendants, who live outside the country of their birth or ancestry, either on a temporary or permanent basis, yet still maintain affective and material ties to their countries of origin" (Agunias and Newland 2012: 15).

GFMD 2007 had sought to understand and strengthen relations between countries of origin and their diasporas and link diaspora initiatives more closely to national development planning and poverty reduction strategies (GFMD 2008a). Some major countries of origin such as Mexico, Morocco and the Philippines were already providing institutional support for their diasporas abroad, and there was a growing academic debate about the "emigration state" and reconfigurations of national boundaries in a transnational world (Gamlen 2008, 2011). The GFMD looked at the practicalities of both origin and host countries taking responsibility for creating enabling conditions for diaspora members to invest their assets in the country of origin. Countries of destination could offer more flexible migration conditions, such as multiple-entry visas, and better integrate diaspora communities into their society. Countries of origin could create incentives such as tax breaks, dual citizenship and start-up support for returnees and their families. Jointly, the two should negotiate portable social security for diaspora members. Many of these strategies could be conveniently factored into existing bilateral labour migration agreements.

The Brussels Forum aimed the debate on diasporas somewhat narrowly at governments. Notably, there was virtually no diaspora engagement in the Government Days of this first Forum (with only one diaspora delegate on the podium as a discussant). The Forum did issue a general call to governments to better identify their diaspora partners; enhance links between the diaspora and their country of origin; strengthen their internal institutional and coordination mechanisms around the diaspora; establish triangular partnerships among diaspora home and host countries; raise private sector awareness; and create an all-round "enabling environment" for diaspora activities. These became recurrent themes and objectives at subsequent GFMDs. As a voluntary process, the Forum had no mandate to follow up and monitor whether partnerships were forged or encouraged by the Brussels discussions.

Manila (2008)

The diaspora focus shifted somewhat in 2008, when the GFMD in Manila chose as its overarching theme "Protecting and Empowering Migrants for Development" (GFMD 2008b). An entire roundtable session was dedicated to strengthening migrant and diaspora contributions to development within the larger frame of social

protection and empowerment, particularly in the host countries. Strategies that combined domestic institution-building in the country of origin with more secure legal status and rights in the host country, and incentives to encourage diaspora investment in development in both countries, were seen as creating the most enabling environment for this.

One of the outcomes of GFMD 2008 was a call to governments to consider issuing diaspora bonds to tap diaspora wealth for macro-economic development (GFMD 2008b). The issuance of diaspora bonds by countries of origin could be accompanied by policies in origin and host countries to give more legal and financial status to diasporas, strengthen their ties to both countries and facilitate mobility between them; for example, through dual citizenship, overseas voting rights, resident reentry entitlements, and portable social security and other benefits. Four years later, the preparatory high-level meeting and the Common Space and roundtable sessions at the Forum summit, in Mauritius, gave broad acknowledgment to diaspora bonds as vehicles for channelling diaspora funds into national development projects (GFMD 2012a).

Also in 2008, governments recognized that the Forum could only sustain its relevance if it began to compile the collective wisdom and policy lessons learned in the form of handbooks, catalogues and other more enduring reference tools for policy makers. There was a recommendation that the GFMD should prepare a catalogue of good practices to support and empower migrants and diasporas as agents of development. Diaspora members should also be able to have access to "banks" of development projects, which they could consider supporting.

Athens (2009)

In Athens, a roundtable session was again dedicated to diaspora issues, this time in the context of discussions on "How to Make the Migration-Development Nexus Work for the Achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)." The session acknowledged that diaspora engagement can take many forms, but that some diaspora activities were more likely to make an impact on the poverty, health, education, and employment opportunities of families and communities back home. These included, in particular, remittances, diaspora bonds, business investments, charitable contributions, and the transfer of skills and expertise in sectors key to national development. In light of the growing complexity and range of issues around diasporas and development, the 2009 roundtable structured itself around a road map listing five steps for governments to engage diasporas: (i) identify your goals and capacities, (ii) know your diaspora, (iii) build trust, (iv) mobilize stakeholders (government, diaspora, civil society), and (v) engage the diaspora in development projects (GFMD 2009).

Governments recognized that the relationship between diasporas and their countries of origin is complex, and any strategy to develop partnerships should account for the specificities of the country, the diaspora and the current relations between

origin and host country. The strategy chosen would need to fit the overall goals of the country. For example, if the goal is to strengthen the national balance of payments, the policy and supportive instruments are likely to focus on remittances, business investments and, perhaps, capital markets. If the goal is to improve the country's competitiveness, diaspora policy is more likely to target the knowledge and skills that members of the diaspora can channel to the home country. If the goal is to increase skills development and create employment, the transfer of diaspora skills, technology and experience, combined with trans-local business ventures, may be the best approach.

The Forum identified a lack of trust between many governments and their country's diaspora as a common obstacle to mobilizing diaspora successfully for development. Partnerships were important, but were possible only where there was mutual trust, where the diaspora was well understood, and where the objectives of diaspora engagement were clearly articulated.

By 2009, many governments understood that they needed an institutional framework at the national level to communicate with their diaspora, coordinate policies, and provide support and follow-up for engagement. Governments showcased some functional models of ministries, departments and other units dedicated to servicing diaspora communities. These included the Senegal Ministry of Foreign Affairs' assumption of responsibility for Senegalese Abroad, India's Ministry for Overseas Indian Affairs, Mali's Ministry of Malians Abroad and African Integration, the Mexican Foreign Ministry's Institute for Mexicans Abroad, El Salvador's Vice-Ministry for Salvadorans Abroad, Armenia's Ministry of the Diaspora, Haiti's Ministry of Haitians Living Abroad, and a range of other sub-ministerial or special institutions, including consular support structures abroad, such as offered by the Philippines or Morocco.

A number of governments had developed effective internet-based networks or digital links with their respective diasporas. Novel forms of diaspora engagement were explored, such as the introduction of new technologies, or strengthening civil society institutions through volunteerism and private philanthropy; as well as advocacy in the host country for development support to the country or community of origin through, for example, trade agreements, debt relief or increased foreign assistance. Countries with large expatriate communities abroad, such as Armenia, India, Jamaica and the Philippines, staged events, conferences, fairs, games and other celebratory strategies to attract their diasporas and mobilize them towards greater development contributions.

A notable advance from previous GFMD meetings was the fact that the roundtable on diasporas took account of recommendations that came from the parallel Civil Society Days process. These included a call to governments to lower barriers to the formal establishment of migrant or diaspora organizations, and to collaborate across borders to build the capacity of diaspora organizations. They also called on civil society organizations, including research bodies, to add diasporas to their migration and development-related work. The Civil Society Days noted the potential of diasporas abroad to create "communicative opportunities" for migrants' rights groups (Rother 2011; Piper and Rother 2012).

The 2009 Forum looked at the practicalities of how to build the capacity of both government institutions and diaspora organizations (which frequently lack the experience and skills to organize themselves), to network with partners, and to manage projects or businesses. Importantly, it considered the limitations on the use of government development aid to build capacities of diaspora organizations in host countries, and shifted the emphasis to networking and partnerships at local and regional levels.

The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) (since collapsed into a government department) demonstrated some techniques for host countries to mobilize diaspora groups for development in their countries of origin. These included funding development projects executed by diaspora groups such as the Association of Haitian-Canadian Engineers and Scientists. To overcome the lack of relevant experience of diaspora organizations, CIDA created tripartite partnerships among the diaspora, Canadian development NGOs and NGOs in the country of origin. Linking diaspora organizations to Canadian NGOs with solid country experience had enabled these organizations to gain the knowledge and expertise to seek donor funds and work independently. CIDA's experience showed that many Haitian diaspora groups, after working with Canadian civil society organizations for years, now approached the agency for funding to execute development projects in Haiti on their own.

The 2009 Forum resulted in the practical handbook for policymakers and practitioners on Developing a Road Map for Engaging Diasporas in Development, compiled jointly by IOM and the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) and based on the road map discussed in the roundtable (Agunias and Newland 2012). The Handbook collected the lessons learned from the GFMD and the experiences of many governments already working with their diasporas, and offered guidelines for engaging diasporas in development activities.

Forum participants also agreed that diasporas should be included in migration profiles, which were becoming a development tool of interest. First proposed by the European Commission in 2005, and subsequently prepared and standardized for a large number of countries by IOM, the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) and others, migration profiles are national migration situation reports in aid of evidence-based policy-making. The profiles offer a framework for regular reporting on migration issues, and a basis for policy impact assessments, and the process of preparing the reports could help build capacity of governments to undertake this type of analysis. Other areas of agreement included strengthening the capacities of diaspora organizations and institutions working with diasporas to increase their input into development, involving diaspora organizations more in development planning by both host countries and countries of origin, and encouraging research and data on the contributions of migrants and diasporas to the well-being of host countries. At a working session on the GFMD's web-based Platform for Partnership, the proposal for a handbook on engaging diasporas in development activities was presented (GFMD 2010).

Puerto Vallarta (2010)

There was no dedicated roundtable or discussion session on diasporas in the Mexican GFMD, largely because in selecting the overall summit theme, "Partnerships for Migration and Human Development: Shared Prosperity – Shared Responsibility," the Chair prioritized previously marginalized issues of gender, family, irregular migration and climate change as the themes for the roundtables. However, Mexico opened the door to greater diaspora participation in the Forum by introducing a Common Space for state-civil society interaction in the general plenary debate at the beginning of the summit. Civil society and governments also shared responsibility for preparing background documents and sessions for the summit meeting. All this marked an important departure from simply permitting a few select civil society representatives to report in plenary on the outcomes of their separate event. The Common Space became a fixture in the GFMD for the next 3 years.

The Common Space session on "Migration for Human Development – Enhancing Partnerships" featured the Ethiopian Expatriates Affairs Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as a panellist. Partnerships between migrants/diasporas and their home countries/communities were highlighted for their potential in achieving development outcomes. Ethiopia demonstrated how hometown associations abroad help build clinics, schools, libraries, and other community facilities, in partnership with the government, which provides the staff to support their efforts (GFMD 2010: 17).

The Mexico Forum gave recognition to the fact that in today's highly mobile world, people do not leave behind their culture or family. New approaches to integration abroad, in which both hosting and sending countries could assist, were needed. In the roundtable on "Reducing the Costs of Migration and Maximizing Human Development," support for their migrants abroad by countries of origin such as Mexico and the Philippines was discussed. In the case of Mexico, for example, where the majority of expatriates in the US are long-term undocumented residents in irregular migration status, the government collaborates with hundreds of migrant associations, churches, universities, health clinics and others in the US to ensure adequate health care, skills recognition and information for its expatriates. The Diaspora Handbook, by now completed, was again showcased as a useful tool for policy makers during the working session on the GFMD Platform for Partnership.

Geneva (2011)

A predominant focus of the Swiss Forum was on labour mobility, and the policy and institutional coherence that could foster safe, empowering mobility for migrants, diasporas, families and communities. There was no specific roundtable dedicated to diasporas, but they were an underlying concern in the thematic cluster and working

session on “Engaging the Private Sector in Labour Market Planning,” which recommended *inter alia* that destination countries could increase awareness of diasporas as potential investors in their countries of origin; for example, with the help of government grants or credits (risk capital) (GFMD 2011). In many ways, the 2011 Forum’s renewed focus on the private sector, and how to involve business more in both the Forum and migration and development generally, paved the way for a deeper dialogue on diaspora enterprises.

Diasporas also featured in one of the preparatory thematic meetings in Morocco on “The Contribution of Migrant Associations to Development.” The meeting reconfirmed that migrant associations can bring multiple contributions to community development through their knowledge of local realities and needs, long-term commitment, and respect for traditional values. Given the locality-specific nature of migrant associations’ engagement with their home communities, their contribution could be maximized through decentralized development mechanisms. However, such contributions would still need to feed coherently into national or regional development plans. The 2011 Forum reinforced earlier suggestions to include diasporas in country migration profiles.

Port Louis (2012)

The Global Forum in Mauritius took up the diaspora theme both in a roundtable on “Supporting Migrants and Diaspora as Agents of Socio-economic Change” and in a Common Space session on “Diaspora Alliances and Partnerships for Development” (GFMD 2012a, b). The objective of the Common Space, first introduced by the Mexican GFMD Chair in 2010, was to examine and expand areas of common ground across sectors, connect different perspectives and strengthen public-private sector collaboration on cross-border business, investments and other entrepreneurial ventures (GFMD 2012c). A key focus was on transnational business and small and medium-sized enterprise building, and private sector development through the agency of diasporas.

Learning from earlier meetings, the Mauritius Forum included diaspora representatives from both the private sector and civil society as dialogue partners alongside development agencies and government ministries dedicated to diasporas. It also substantively addressed diasporas in the South-South migration context for the first time. Preparatory discussions among African and other GFMD partners considered the creation of a Regional Migrant and Diaspora Engagement Facility to strengthen government-diaspora dynamics within the broader frame of regional integration (GFMD 2012d).

In both the open Common Space debate and the government roundtable discussions, members of diasporas were seen as potential agents of socio-economic change who could remove barriers to doing business, expand trade, and foster cultural and educational exchanges across borders, all of which can stimulate development and growth. There was evidence that diasporas in the private sector are

increasingly joining forces to invest in business opportunities in countries of origin, promote business-to-business ventures between countries, and broker partnerships with government, private sector, civil society and international organizations to underpin such ventures.

The Common Space panel included El Salvador's Vice-Foreign Minister for Salvadorans Living Abroad, and the Philippines' Commission on Filipinos Overseas alongside public and private sector diaspora enterprises. The panel sought to answer two questions that had preoccupied the Forum since 2007: first, what are some effective models of diaspora partnerships for development with governments, business, NGOs and international organizations? And second, what are the obstacles to effective diaspora engagement with their countries of origin? The Common Space showcased successful private and public diaspora alliances and partnerships to grow small and medium-enterprise activity in countries of origin. Governments were seen as key to ensuring the enabling policy environment for such diaspora actions; but they needed champions at the appropriate political level to take this forward.

Destination countries including Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the US reported that they were factoring migration and diasporas into their foreign development policies in a different way. Germany's approach to diasporas, for example, had shifted from development-dependent to development-partnering. Diasporas were no longer seen solely as "knowledge or cultural agents/brokers" who should be returned and placed in development cooperation programmes back home, but more as stakeholders and development partners in both the country of origin and destination. Technical and funding support could come from a variety of government and other sources, ranging from the German Federal Enterprise for International Cooperation (GIZ) to USAID, and not necessarily directly from official development aid. Development agencies with a field presence around the world could help connect diasporas with development aid-supported programmes (USAID and MPI 2010).

To support this new orientation, the US and European governments have helped establish diaspora platforms and networks, devised web-based information, training and capacity-building tools, and set up grant-matching competitions in support of diasporas. Examples include diaspora platforms such as FORIM (Forum des Organisations de Solidarité internationale issues des Migrations) in France and the European Network of Diaspora Organizations; grant-matching competitions such as the African Diaspora Marketplace (ADM) and a US-based business plan competition for the Sub-Saharan Africa diaspora; diaspora training tools such as the German MITOS toolkit; government-supported diaspora programmes such as the SEVA Network Foundation in the Netherlands; and for-profit and not-for-profit diaspora-based facilities such as the Diaspora Business Centre and AFFORD UK. To foster more effective networking and channel combined diaspora energies towards sustainable development in Africa, the European Commission funded the European-Wide African Diaspora Platform for Development (EADPD), implemented in 2011 by five major consortium partners: the African Diaspora Policy Centre (ADPC) in the Netherlands, AFFORD, FORIM, Coordination Générale des Migrants pour le Développement (CGMD) and the ICMPD in Belgium (GFMD 2012b).

The roundtable on diasporas found that the most sustainable development-related projects were possible at local levels, where diaspora initiatives have the most immediate impact, and also between communities across borders. Examples included USAID's remittance-backed housing loans in countries such as El Salvador, or the Ghanacoop initiative out of Modena, Italy, where the Ghanaian diaspora partnered with local government and a local cooperative credit institute to set up agrarian cooperatives in Ghana, which in turn trade their produce with the community in Italy and re-invest in local development projects. There are a myriad of small-scale trans-local business ventures like Ghanacoop in countries hosting large diaspora communities. What has eased the way for many of these initiatives is the devolution of budgetary responsibility to local governments to allow them to invest in small-scale local development projects. These have a developmental benefit for communities in both the country of origin and destination.

Local authorities are key players in the diaspora story, but had been missing from earlier GFMD discussions. They can be catalysts and enablers and ensure that diasporas are well connected with actual needs. When local authorities and communities are involved, there is greater scope for sustainability of the diaspora-backed project and its sustainable development impact. But local authorities often lack the capacity or authority (including financial) to broker or participate in partnerships with diasporas and others.

Regarding remittances and investments, while there was general agreement on the many ways in which diasporas can contribute to home development (World Bank 2011), including through diaspora bonds, a concern was raised at the roundtable about how to keep transaction costs low and ensure continuous engagement during economic downturns. Tax and customs concessions, portability of benefits, and affordable available housing for returning diaspora members, could also incentivize home-coming retirees to firm up their plans. Informal and cost-free money transfer schemes, such as the Kenyan model of mobile banking, M-PESA, can lower the cost of remittance transfers and ease the transaction process, and increase the incomes of rural households. M-PESA is said to have succeeded in Kenya and elsewhere because of its low cost, its political and business support, and its networking effects. M-PESA, which has expanded to countries including Afghanistan and India, is potentially important for Africa where remittance costs are higher than anywhere else.

Importantly, the 2012 Forum also saw a more nuanced discussion of non-financial services that governments could provide to diaspora investors and entrepreneurs. For example, a multi-stakeholder programme between France and South Mediterranean countries has been supporting scientific diaspora partnerships to create business ventures back home. A key lesson from the 2012 discussion was that entrepreneurship is a long-term undertaking requiring sustained investment. Expectations need to be managed and persons not naturally inclined to conduct business may require coaching and assistance. The success of any such programme depends on a strong country-of-origin counterpart and network.

The Forum in 2012 thus reinforced the earlier GFMD mantra that diaspora care is the responsibility of both countries of origin and destination. Diasporas were clearly integral to the larger GFMD effort to foster migration policies that eased constraints on mobility. More flexible re-entry visas, integration and reintegration programmes, skills recognition, dual citizenship, matching skills development with jobs, portable social security and so on are good for those who want to move and for those who have already moved. Flexible migration policies could enable countries of origin to minimize their brain drain through greater mobility of their skilled people and the recruitment of those who might return to help with development.

Recommendations to government policy makers in 2012 harked back to earlier GFMD calls for more targeted surveys and mapping of diasporas, their capacities and savings and investment potential and interest. Diaspora groups should be supported in building bridges, networks and partnerships across borders; public and private sectors needed to establish the conditions and incentives to stimulate investments back home; and communication and coordination among all stakeholders, particularly central and local governments, and embassies and consulates abroad, still needed strengthening. An extensive compendium of good practices compiled by the World Bank, International Organization for Migration (IOM) and International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) as an Annex for the roundtable on diasporas as agents of socio-economic change was considered a useful reference and policy guide, which could be showcased on the GFMD website (GFMD 2012b).

Stockholm (2014)

The Swedish Chair's Programme Document for the 2014 GFMD sought to continue the efforts of earlier years by dedicating a roundtable to "Facilitating Positive Development Impacts of Diaspora Engagement in Skills Transfers, Investments and Trade between Countries of Residence and Origin". The roundtable located the diaspora debate within the broader context of "Migration as an Enabler for Inclusive Economic Development," and focused on what the Chair perceived as underexplored areas such as investments and trade. The discussion aimed at viable measures by governments, private sector, civil society and diaspora groups themselves to strengthen the development contributions of diasporas (GFMD 2014).

GFMD 2014 reaffirmed the importance of government outreach to diaspora skills and investment through appropriate legal and institutional frameworks that officially recognize members of the diaspora as an integral part of national development plans and support private engagement of diasporas for development. Countries of origin could establish government diaspora institutions dedicated to diaspora issues; and host countries could create dialogue or consultation platforms and engage diaspora groups in development cooperation projects, knowledge transfer through twinning projects and virtual return, or investment and trade promotion.

Is the GFMD an Appropriate Forum for Diaspora Engagement?

Since 2007, all GFMD discussions have recognized that both countries of origin and host countries have a role to play to support and empower diasporas for improved development outcomes. But a lack of capacity, resources, knowledge and political will in many countries and communities can limit the extent and impact of their engagement. As demonstrated at the Mauritian Forum in 2012, many of these shortcomings can be overcome by the individual and collective actions of the private sector, philanthropic and non-profit organizations, international agencies and diaspora members (Faist 2008). The red thread through all of this, from the first GFMD mention of diasporas in 2007 to 2014, is the importance of efficient coordination mechanisms, trust-building and sharing of lessons learned. The GFMD can act as a broker among all players in this field.

It is difficult to assess if and how the GFMD has made a difference to the actual behaviour of diasporas, and of governments and other partners interested in engaging them more on development-related issues. In the context of global governance of migration, the Global Forum is only one player among many, albeit the largest, most international player; and one that has been able to convene discussion among all stakeholders across many divides in a non-confrontational way, due to its informal, non-binding character. Without a doubt, the GFMD has firmly located diaspora issues in the global narrative on development and the global governance of migration and development.

The GFMD has brought to international attention some of the good practices initiated by governments; for example, the ministries, councils, committees and other units established within governments dedicated to the diaspora community abroad. It has demonstrated how governments can lower the regulatory and policy obstacles for diaspora engagement in development, and provide essential protections, such as regulatory controls and consumer protection in the case of mobile banking. Perhaps more importantly, the GFMD has demonstrated the complex range of initiatives undertaken by members of diasporas, as NGOs, entrepreneurs, businesses, investors, often partnering with government, communities, private sector and each other. It has also considered the complementarities between self-reliant diasporas and flanking support by governments and other partners.

The Forum is increasingly gathering evidence and guidance material for policy makers and practitioners on the connections between diasporas and development. The Forum's web-based Platform for Partnership displays a range of diaspora-related programmes, projects, and tools that policymakers and practitioners can select from. The various elements of this toolkit will increasingly be drawn from all the diaspora stakeholders – governments, international expert organizations, diaspora organizations and the private sector – and should serve their common interests through evidence-based policy-making. As important as its substantive achievements

are the questions that the Forum has raised, at least implicitly, about its own relevance for diasporas. As a non-binding, dialogue-oriented, non-operational, government-oriented platform for dialogue, what can it offer diasporas? The same question has also exercised the private sector, whose meagre participation in the Forum has been a source of concern.

In the evolution of the GFMD discussion on diasporas, a critical lesson is that there are limits to what governments can and want to do, particularly in regard to migration, and by extension their expatriate communities abroad. Among the most common obstacles to mobilizing diaspora support for development are the limits placed on the use of development aid funding in the host country for diasporas that reside there, and resistance to the possibility of using public funding to support private sector and business development. In 2012, there was a dynamic debate about how support to diasporas could serve as an aid-effectiveness strategy. Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the US have addressed this through a variety of strategies to build capacities and train diasporas, create tripartite partnerships among diaspora groups, development NGOs in the destination country, and NGOs in the origin country; and support business plan competitions for diaspora members hoping to generate job opportunities for development.

Conclusion

The advantages of bringing diaspora issues to such a large, mixed assembly of global public and private sector players are clear. With knowledge and a growing recognition of the mutual benefits of good practices comes a greater willingness and capacity to champion changes back home. For example, empowering diasporas to provide specialized skills and job training schemes in migrants' countries of origin through temporary or permanent return, or through e-skilling, can benefit both home and host communities. This can result in a reorientation of traditional development policy and budgeting arrangements in countries of origin and destination.

While the GFMD has no formal mandate or goal to build consensus on migration and development issues, the very process of collaboratively selecting its themes, exploring migration and development interactions, identifying good practices, and recommending further actions to deepen knowledge, good practice and positive outcomes is a step towards building consensus. Every good practice or recommendation agreed by a group of GFMD partners is a form of consensus achieved. It remains to be seen if the Forum can take this collaboration and consensus building to the next level of setting a coherent global agenda for migration and development, including for (and with) interested members of diasporas.

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Chapter 3
Engaging the Global Filipino Diaspora: Achieving Inclusive Growth

Imelda M. Nicolas

Introduction

The Philippines' international migration history spans the period from the first batch of Filipino workers to Hawaii in 1906 to the current figure of around 10.5 million Filipinos overseas. In December 2013, 48 % were permanent migrants, 41 % were temporary migrants, and 11 % were migrants in irregular situations (CFO 2015). The international migration phenomenon has therefore been a defining and life-changing experience for decades for many Filipinos and the families they leave behind. It has also carved out and established migration corridors between the Philippines and countries of destination in North America, the Middle East, East and Southeast Asia, Oceania and Europe, making the Filipino presence, skills, talents and services truly global.

The existing literature on contemporary international migration from the Philippines has identified a number of key characteristics of the phenomenon including its massive scale and broad geographical spread, inter-generational character, diverse profile and varied migrant experiences overseas (IOM 2013). This complexity necessitates a re-thinking and re-imagining of the Philippine government's approach to addressing the vulnerabilities of migrants and their families and maximizing migration's positive impact at the individual, family, community, sub-national and national levels. This process demands a more deliberate and systematic engagement with the Filipino diaspora (CFO 2013a, b).

In 2011, Philippine President Benigno S. Aquino III articulated his administration's position in a 16-point Social Contract with the Filipino People. The president was clear about the need for a transformational approach to Filipino migration:

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> From a government that treats its people as an export commodity and a means to earn foreign exchange, disregarding the social cost to Filipino families to … a government that creates jobs at home, so that working abroad will be a choice rather than a necessity; and when its citizens do choose to become Overseas Filipino Workers, their welfare and protection will still be the government's priority (NEDA 2011, p. 398).

This major policy statement recognized and addressed the perils that many Filipino migrants confront in the pursuit of a better quality of life for themselves and their families. At the same time, it recognized that with inclusive and sustainable development, the decision to work and/or live overseas would become a matter of genuine choice and an exercise of the right to mobility. This requires a balance between generating as many competitive and gratifying domestic jobs as possible and managing migration to reduce its costs, maximize its benefits, and promote the rights, welfare and well-being of overseas Filipinos and their families.

The Current Economic Situation

The economic environment in the Philippines seems to be improving after decades of lagging behind its neighbours in Southeast Asia. Moody's tagged the Philippines as a "rising star" after it posted a 6.6 % growth rate in 2012, and forecasts possible growth rates of 8 % in 2016 (Remo 2013). The Philippines climbed in ranking in the latest 2014–2015 Global Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum, ranking No. 52 out of 144 countries and is the "most improved country overall" in terms of the global competitiveness index in the last 4 years (World Economic Forum 2015). This situation is primarily due to a number of factors including the government's anti-corruption drive, a growth in spending for social protection programmes and infrastructure, the increasing participation of the private sector and international investors in the country's economic activities, and strong household consumption, fuelled to a large degree by remittances from overseas Filipino migrants.

At the end of 2013, however, a spate of natural disasters threatened to derail the Philippines' positive growth prospects. In October 15 2013, the provinces of Bohol and Cebu in Central Visayas were rocked by a magnitude 7.2 earthquake that claimed over 200 lives and left houses, buildings, historical churches and other infrastructure in ruins. Three weeks later, the Visayas islands were hit by Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda, which wiped out entire cities, towns and villages in the provinces of Samar and Leyte, and caused widespread destruction in the provinces of Cebu, Aklan, Iloilo and Palawan. The typhoon claimed more than 6,000 lives and total estimated damage and loss to infrastructure, agriculture, health, housing, industry and services amounting to PHP590 billion (approximately USD13.6 billion). The National Economic Development Authority (NEDA 2013), the government's planning body, estimated that PHP361 billion would be needed for the rebuilding of villages, towns, cities and provinces devastated by the typhoon, and to help the education and health services, agriculture, industry and services, and social protection sectors recover from the devastation.

Despite an impressive record of economic growth, which may be tempered by the effects of calamities and natural disasters, the Philippines, like many countries in the developing world, faces the challenge of achieving inclusive and sustainable growth in today's knowledge-based economy. The country's competitiveness, productivity and growth depend largely on its ability to acquire and utilize new knowledge and constantly upgrade the skills of its workforce. Within the developing world, there is arguably no other country more strategically positioned than the Philippines to reap the potential development benefits of international migration. The Philippines has one of the largest and most dispersed emigrant populations in the world with 10 % of its total population working and/or living in over 200 countries.

Overseas Filipino Remittances

Remittances are the most visible contribution of overseas Filipinos to their families back home, their communities of origin and the national economy (CFO 2013a). Remittances from overseas Filipinos amounted to USD24 billion in 2012 (Fig. 3.1), making the Philippines the third most important remittance-receiving country behind India and China (World Bank 2014). This represents more than a threefold increase over the USD7 billion recorded in 2000. In 2012, this was 40 % higher than official development assistance (ODA) and 1,500 % higher than foreign direct investments (FDI) to the Philippines.

Following the spate of natural disasters in the Philippines in 2013, remittances are expected to have increased as Filipino migrants traditionally tend to send more money to their families back home in times of calamity. During the 1990 earthquake that struck Central and Northern Luzon and the eruption of Mount Pinatubo in 1991, for example, donations from overseas Filipinos through the Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO) diaspora philanthropy conduit known as LINKAPIL (*Lingkod sa Kapwa Pilipino* or Link to Philippine Development) reached PHP146,566,789 and PHP116,960,448 respectively. During these disasters, various other Filipino associations mobilized resources, engaged in fund-raising activities, and shared their skills, knowledge and expertise to provide a range of assistance and services to Filipinos back home.

A report on remittances for development by the International Organization for Migration and Small Enterprises Research and Development Foundation cited the following ways in which remittances of Filipinos overseas contribute to development in the country: (i) Filipino families and households have an improved quality of life through increased consumption, savings and investment, thus helping to address poverty at the grassroots level; (ii) remittances provide the opportunity for migrants and their families to save, thus improving local capital markets; (iii) Filipino migrants and their families invest remittances in houses, lands and other physical assets; (iv) remittances spur the involvement of families left behind in creating micro-enterprises; (v) Filipino migrants and their families put additional



Fig. 3.1 Remittances flow to the Philippines, 2000–2012 (Source: World Bank 2014)

resources into education and health; (vi) remittances lead to increased consumer spending and demand for goods and services; and (vii) remittances provide funds for social, cultural and infrastructure development projects (IOM 2012).

Diaspora Contributions to National Development

An increasing number of migrant-sending countries are developing innovative strategies to tap migration's potentially positive contribution to the development agenda. These states are actively engaging their diasporas (including descendants) living and/or working abroad who have maintained strong sentimental and material links with their countries of origin. One of the earliest signs of recognition by the Philippine government of the potential for engaging diaspora Filipinos came more than three decades ago with the establishment of the Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO) in 1980. The CFO is a government agency under the Office of the President of the Philippines that is mandated to provide advice and assistance to the president, the cabinet and the Philippine Congress in the formulation of policies and measures affecting Filipinos overseas and to maintain and strengthen their links with the country.

In the late 1980s, CFO institutionalized LINKAPIL, one of the pioneer government programmes that established a conduit for development support from overseas Filipino communities. Assistance offered through this programme includes scholarships for micro-enterprise development, health and welfare assistance through medical and surgical missions to underserved areas and to communities hit by calamities, feeding programmes for children, and small-scale infrastructure support such as school buildings and water systems. Between 1990 and 2014, total donations through LINKAPIL amounted to PHP3.05 billion, with 75 % going to health-

related/medical missions, and the rest going to calamity relief assistance, education and scholarships, infrastructure, skills transfer and livelihood projects (CFO 2015).

A study of migrant donations in 2012 used LINKAPIL data and made a number of important findings (Licuanan et al. 2012). First, larger Filipino populations in overseas communities are the biggest donors to the programme. The overwhelming majority of donations (91 %) come from Filipino migrants in the US. Second, the better the economic standing of Filipinos overseas, the more they donate. The biggest donors are Filipino migrants with fairly stable employment status and higher levels of income, providing them with job security and buffer resources. Third, hometown affinities greatly influence Filipino donations. Migrants tend to direct their philanthropic initiatives to their provinces of origin. Since most migrants come from more developed provinces, this means that less developed areas are left behind in terms of development donations. In order to channel diaspora donations to areas without a significant rate of migration, CFO has established partnerships with agencies and organizations that provide data on poverty incidence such as education and literacy, health and nutrition, housing, income and employment, water and sanitation, and peace and order. The idea is to encourage and facilitate needs-based donations.

Diaspora contributions take many other forms. For example, overseas Filipinos have filled critical resource and knowledge gaps as practitioners and professionals during permanent, temporary and/or “virtual” return visits. For over three decades, overseas Filipinos working in the science and technology sectors have been at the core of the *Balik* (return) scientist programme of the Department of Science and Technology which is aimed at facilitating temporary return and the sharing of expertise acquired overseas. The Department of Foreign Affairs also managed a programme called Technology Transfer through Expatriate Nationals between 1988 and 1994 as well as the Science and Technology Advisory Council. Many overseas Filipinos who are outstanding in their respective fields have given back to the country of their own initiative or by utilizing their personal and professional social networks.

Overseas Filipinos are a major potential source of direct investment in critical industries, and often act as “first movers” who open the way for other investors. They are also excellent intermediaries, who can facilitate the integration of the Philippines into the global economy. Characterized as “cultural interpreters” and “reputational intermediaries” (Agunias and Newland 2012), diasporas can connect the Philippines to potential foreign investors and lobby in their destination countries for more favourable trade and labour flows. In business activities that span the Philippines and destination countries, they are instrumental in developing export markets and other trade ties, supply chains, and technology transfer.

The diaspora contribution extends beyond the economy and into the political and social sphere. The ideas, practices, identities and social capital that migrants remit – so-called social and political remittances – have the potential to alter behaviours within the Philippines and positively transform notions on critical issues such as governance, election of national officials, gender relations and democracy. They can also positively influence political and economic relationships between the

Philippines and destination countries. The human capital, networks, skills and ideas acquired abroad are potentially useful to development in the Philippines when migrants return. The value of Filipinos in the diaspora thus extends beyond the money they send home, a fact that is frequently overlooked in policy discussions on migration and development.

Diaspora Engagement Initiatives

The Philippine Development Plan (PDP) 2011–2016, which is the Aquino government's blueprint for development, makes 60 separate mentions of migration-related issues. The Commission on Filipinos Overseas and National Economic Development Authority made a commitment to further integrate migration and development in the 2013 mid-term review and update the PDP with particular reference to the critical role of overseas Filipinos in the country's development. The mid-term update contains 15 additional mentions in eight out of the ten chapters on the role of overseas Filipinos in national development. The Philippines is also stepping up its response to the challenge of harnessing the contributions of the Filipino diaspora to achieve inclusive growth and sustainable development. The various Philippine migration and development-related government agencies, along with stakeholders from civil society, the private sector and academia, are developing programmes and projects, tools and mechanisms to reach out to Filipinos in the diaspora.

The CFO has provided a venue for Filipinos overseas to come together and re-engage with development initiatives in the Philippines. It laid down 10 areas in the form of a menu of engagements that overseas Filipinos could choose from depending on their skills, experiences, expertise, resources and inclination. This programme is called "Diaspora to Development" or D2D. The ten areas of engagement are as follows:

- Business Advisory Circle, which is a matching and linkage programme that assists overseas Filipino set up business partnerships in the country;
- The *Alay Dunong* programme systematizes and strengthens skills and technology exchange/transfer between overseas Filipinos and the Philippines in fields such as science and technology, engineering, and arts and culture;
- Diaspora Philanthropy, which focuses primarily on facilitating donations in cash or in kind for development projects especially through LINKAPIL;
- Diaspora Investment is a programme where new financial instruments are developed and promoted for overseas Filipinos to invest in;
- *Balik-Turo* (Teach-Share)/Educational Exchange is a professional and vocational education exchange programme that encourages the return of academics and professionals to teach, mentor, provide training and work with partner schools in the country;
- Tourism Initiatives focuses on supporting the drive for *balikbayan* tourism by encouraging migrant investments in small tourism enterprises, like local bed-

and-breakfast and other tourism-related services, such as medical tourism and health and wellness programmes;

- The Global Legal Assistance and Advocacy Programme mobilizes the support of overseas and local Filipino lawyers and legal experts to provide assistance and advice to overseas Filipinos in distress and promotes and supports issues of global interest to overseas Filipinos;
- Medical Mission Coordination facilitates the conduct of medical missions sponsored and organized by overseas Filipinos in areas requiring these interventions. This is done in coordination with the Department of Health and the Professional Regulation Commission;
- Arts and Culture Exchange promotes and facilitates the exchange of artistic and cultural workers and programmes between the Philippines and Filipino communities abroad; and
- Return and Reintegration focuses on providing information to returning overseas Filipinos and retirees as well as services to facilitate their successful reintegration into local life.

Global Summits of Filipinos in the Diaspora

In 2011, the CFO convened the first Global Summit of Filipinos in the Diaspora to bring together outstanding Filipinos and community leaders worldwide and launch the D2D programme. One of the results of the summit was the participants' decision to form the Global Filipino Diaspora Council (GFDC), which is the first global network of overseas Filipinos from 25 countries. In February 2013, the CFO, GFDC and the US Pinoys for Good Governance convened the 2nd Global Summit of Filipinos in the Diaspora. The summit was attended by 600 participants including Filipino community leaders from all over the world, representatives from Philippine government agencies and Philippine-based civil society organizations. This summit aimed to track the progress of the goals set in the first summit and highlight the best practices of Filipino diaspora engagement. The event included participation in the celebration of the 27th anniversary of the EDSA People Power Revolution, plenary sessions and workshops based on the D2D framework. In February 2015, the CFO together with its former diaspora partners organized the 3rd Global Summit of Filipinos in the Diaspora. The Summit which carried the theme: "Vision and Action for the Diaspora, 2015 and Beyond", was able to come up with a vision and strategic action plan for Filipino diaspora communities per region for 2015 and beyond.

Between the first two summits, a European conference called Diaspora to Dialogue was organized in Rome by overseas Filipino communities in Europe with the support of the Philippine embassy in Italy and Europe-based multi-lateral organizations. The conference participants decided to organize themselves and form the European Network of Filipinos in the Diaspora. Since then, the core group that attended the Rome conference has echoed the Diaspora to Dialogue theme and organized networks in at least ten European countries.

Table 3.1 Number of Filipino nurses who left the Philippines from 2009 to 2013

Year	Temporary nurse migrants (POEA)	Permanent nurse migrants (CFO)
2009	13,014	943
2010	12,082	1,258
2011	17,236	1,827
2012	15,655	2,486
2013	16,404	2,081

Sources: Philippine overseas employment administration and CFO

Table 3.2 Top five destination countries of Filipino nurse migrants, 2009–2013

Country	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Total
United States	666	478	760	1,341	1,361	4,606
Canada	212	692	965	987	539	3,395
Australia	27	25	39	67	78	236
New Zealand	10	17	16	26	53	122
United Kingdom	6	8	10	11	13	48

Source: CFO

Following the path laid out by the global and regional summits of Filipinos in the diaspora, Filipino nurses convened the 1st Global Summit of Filipino Nurses in January 2014 in Manila with the theme, "Filipino Nurses World-wide: Unite for Global Health and Nation Building". It gathered over 100 Philippine-based and overseas Filipino nurses' organizations and other stakesholders in a bid to forge an international network and tackle issues affecting nurses globally. Topics discussed included workforce planning of the Philippines for healthcare providers, the role of the nurses' diaspora in nation building, the status of nursing education in the Philippines, and a programme of action for higher education in the Philippines. The highlight of the summit was the signing of a memorandum of agreement among the convenors, the CFO and the international nursing community and professional groups, that will create a central database of nursing-related information. Data from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) and the CFO indicates the number of Filipino nurses who left the Philippines increased steadily between 2009 and 2013 (Table 3.1). The top five destination countries of Filipino nurses who left as permanent migrants were the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the UK (Table 3.2).

Government Initiatives to Promote Engagement

BaLinkBayan

In an increasingly inter-connected world, a new initiative of the CFO is to reach out to the diaspora through the *BaLinkBayan*, the overseas Filipinos' one-stop online portal for diaspora engagement. The word is a combination of the Filipino word

"*balikbayan*" (meaning Filipino migrant coming back to the Philippines) and "link" with its internet connotation. *BaLinkBayan* offers an integrated platform for overseas Filipinos to re-engage with the Philippines through the D2D programme. With the support of government agencies such as the departments of trade and industry, agriculture, agrarian reform, tourism, health, education, environment and natural resources, the *BaLinkBayan* showcases investments, businesses, products, philanthropic activities, volunteer work such as medical missions, and home-grown technologies throughout the country. It facilitates Filipino diaspora investments, donations and volunteer opportunities, access to other online government services, and will pilot local level transactional services such as online business registration and payment of property taxes. The online portal was launched in 2013 and a stakeholders' meeting was convened among national government agency and local government unit partners to define priorities to maximize its use by the Filipino diaspora. These included social marketing initiatives as well as launching local level transactional services in the province of Ilocos Norte (historically a major home province of Filipinos in the US) and the city of Naga.

YouLeaD (Youth Leaders in the Diaspora)

YouLeaD (Youth Leaders in the Diaspora) programme. The CFO is reaching out to second and third generation overseas Filipinos through its Youth Leaders in the Diaspora (or YouLeaD) programme. Projects include study tours (*Lakbay-Aral*) of the various regions of the country to re-introduce them to the culture, history and heritage of their parents and grandparents.

Financial Literacy Programmes

In line with the national development goal of financial inclusion, CFO has developed its own financial literacy module called *Kaalamang Pinansyal Tungo Sa Kaunlaran* or KAPIT KA! (Hold On!) to help overseas Filipinos and the families left behind to develop or enhance personal strategies, skills and knowledge in attaining financial freedom. A recent World Bank study shows that the most effective financial literacy trainings are those conducted with both the migrants themselves and their families left behind, even if done separately (Doi et al. 2012). Shorter versions of the module are incorporated into the CFO website, the commission's predeparture orientation seminars, its nation-wide and annual community education programmes in at least 20 provinces every year, and during immersion trips in countries where there are significant Filipino communities.

In October 2013, the CFO, in collaboration with the United Nations Development Programme and with the support of the Western Union Foundation, launched a campaign entitled Peso Sense. The campaign aims to promote productive expenditure

and entrepreneurship among the beneficiaries of remittances from Filipinos overseas, focusing on children and youth, young professionals, homemakers, entrepreneurs and retirees.

Kiddie Katapat Savings Programme

Inspired by the movement started by Child and Youth Finance International to give 100 million children in 100 countries financial access and financial education by 2015, the CFO, together with the Land Bank of the Philippines, initiated the *Kiddie Katapat Savings Programme*. The programme is designed to equip Filipino children and youth, both in the Philippines and abroad, with the basic knowledge and habit of saving and preparing for their future. With the approval of the Central Bank of the Philippines, dependants of overseas Filipinos who are 7 years old and older are allowed to open and maintain their own ATM savings account for an initial deposit and minimum balance of PHP100 (approximately USD2.50). In turn, the CFO and the Land Bank encourage parents, siblings or guardians who are overseas to match the amount saved by their dependants. The programme was launched in 42 Philippine Schools Overseas (PSOs) during a conference held in Manila in May 2013. PSOs are private educational institutions operating outside the Philippines that have adopted the Philippine curriculum.

Overseas Filipinos Remittances for Development

Another innovative undertaking by the CFO is the Overseas Filipinos Remittances for Development "Building a Future Back Home" (or OF-RED) project. Partners include the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Western Union Foundation and NEDA. Programmes at the sub-national and local levels are developed with the support of local government units to facilitate the use of remittances for productive and job-creating investment and the use of conduits for these remittances in cooperatives, rural banks, microfinance institutions and social enterprises.

In Ilocos Norte, one of the sites where the project was implemented, this has led to the creation of the Provincial Migration and Development Council, the passage of local ordinances supporting diaspora investment and philanthropy, and local government support for migrant-owned and managed enterprises. In 2012, a Collective Remittance Fund was set up to finance the credit needs of migrant-owned enterprises in the area. The fund came about when the provincial government of Ilocos Norte, the Western Union Foundation and the Cooperative Bank of Ilocos Norte, which is also the depository bank, pooled PHP1 million each to jumpstart the fund. In 2013, 46 loan applications were filed. Of these, 14 were approved amounting to PHP1.28 million. Loans went to fund micro-enterprises such as dragon fruit planting, bagnet

making, rice trading, hog breeding and sari-sari (retail) stores. Overseas-based Ilocanos will be enjoined to donate to the fund largely through a website-based campaign.

Remittances for Development Council

A major outcome of the OF-RED at national level has been the creation of a multi-stakeholder Remittance for Development Council (ReDC). This serves as a consultative forum for all remittance-related stakeholders including the Central Bank of the Philippines (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, BSP), private banks and non-banks, migration-related government agencies, migrant organizations, academe and multilateral institutions. The forum is designed to discuss issues and concerns about remittances as well as being an advisory and policy-recommending body for the channelling of remittances for development. Its aims include recommending measures to create an environment for more sustainable investments and businesses for overseas Filipinos, advocating for policies and measures to reduce remittance fees, collaborating with organizations that provide financial education/literacy for overseas Filipinos and their families left behind, and encouraging research groups to undertake remittance-related studies. A draft executive order for the institutionalization of ReDC has been endorsed by the Philippine Cabinet Cluster on Human Development and Poverty Reduction as well as by the BSP and, at the time of writing, was pending with the Office of the President of the Philippines.

Presidential Awards for Outstanding Overseas Filipinos and Organizations

The Presidential Awards for Filipino Individuals and Organizations Overseas is a biennial awards system to give recognition to Filipinos and other individuals or organizations which contribute to Philippine development initiatives, or promote the interests of overseas Filipino communities. The awards are also given to overseas Filipinos who have distinguished themselves in their field of work or profession and thereby bring honour to the Filipino nation. A category in the awards is also reserved for foreign individuals or organizations for their exceptional contribution to the Philippines and for advancing the cause of overseas Filipino communities. The awards have been bestowed upon 435 Filipino individuals and organizations from 48 countries and territories since 1991.

Social Security System

Since 1995, the Social Security System has opened its membership to overseas Filipino workers. Workers are entitled to the benefits (sickness, maternity, disability, retirement, and death and funeral) and loan (salary, housing, house repair/improvement) entitlements of any regular social security system member as long as they meet specified requirements (such as number and duration of contributions made). In 2001, a voluntary provident fund called the Flexi-fund Programme for Overseas Filipino Workers was developed and a certain percentage of the overseas income can be added to this fund to maximize the returns on their Flexi-fund contributions.

Home Development Mutual Fund

Membership to the Home Development Mutual Fund (or Pag-IBIG Fund) has been made mandatory for all overseas Filipinos under the Republic Act 9679 or the Home Development Mutual Fund Law of 2009. Their contribution to the Pag-IBIG Fund entitles overseas Filipinos to access various loan programmes for housing, multipurpose and calamity loans, as well as provident savings. A voluntary savings scheme for Filipinos abroad preceded this.

Medicare

Since 2005, the Overseas Workers Programme has been a regular membership category of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (or PhilHealth). This covers health care costs for all legal and documented land-based overseas Filipino workers and their dependants.

Legislative Initiatives

The Philippine Congress has enacted various laws to enable overseas Filipinos to involve themselves in the affairs of the state. The most significant of these are:

1. *Republic Act No. 10590 or the Overseas Voting Act of 2013*, On May 27, 2013, RA 10590 was signed into law, amending the previous Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 or Republic Act No. 9189. The original law intended to provide equal opportunity to all qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad in the exercise of their right to participate in the election of President, Vice-President, Senators and Party-List Representatives. RA10590 aims to increase voter turnout

and participation among overseas Filipinos by lifting the previous requirement that Filipino immigrants had to return to the Philippines within 3 years before they were allowed to vote. Dual citizens are also allowed to vote as long as they retain their Filipino citizenship. With the passage of this Act, voter participation among overseas Filipinos is expected to surpass the 24 % and 16 % (of 975,263 registered voters) turnout for the 2010 Presidential elections and the May 2013 general elections respectively.

2. *Republic Act No. 9225 or Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003* provides for the re-acquisition of their Filipino citizenship by natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Filipino citizenship through naturalization in a foreign country by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. The law also specifies the civil, political and economic rights and liabilities of dual citizenship.
3. *Republic Act No. 6768 or Balikbayan Law of 1990 (as amended by RA 9174)* was enacted to encourage overseas Filipinos to visit the Philippines as a *balikbayan* or returning migrant. The law was amended by *Republic Act No. 9174*, which provides additional benefits to enable *balikbayans* to become economically self-reliant on their return. Under the law, a *balikbayan* is defined as either a former Filipino citizen holding a foreign passport, including spouses and children travelling with them; or Filipinos who have been continuously out of the Philippines for at least 1 year; or Overseas Filipino Workers. As a *balikbayan*, the returning migrant is entitled to travel tax exemption, visa-free entry to the Philippines for a period of 1 year for foreign passport holders, duty-free and *kabuhayan* (livelihood) shopping privileges, use of accredited transportation facilities upon arrival, and entrepreneurial training and livelihood skills programmes and marketing assistance.

Non-Governmental Organizations' Programmes

Civil society organizations and the private sector have developed innovative ways to engage with and mobilize diaspora remittances and resources, especially for local economic development. The innovations of civil society organizations and microfinancial institutions working with migrants and their families include (i) financial literacy and entrepreneurship training in North America for migrants and their families back home; (ii) individual and collective savings mobilization schemes targeting the migrants themselves and their families back home including their children; (iii) investments in products of already established industries or programmes of micro-finance institutions; (v) twinning arrangements with hometowns in the Philippines and areas in countries of destination; (vi) linking migrant capital with social enterprises and (vii) business and enterprise development services for Filipino migrants.

Conclusion

International migration affects the majority of Filipino families and communities. It influences the way most Filipinos go about their daily lives and the choices they make for themselves and their families. While the Philippines is far ahead of many other migrant-sending countries in the development of initiatives to engage with its diaspora, a great deal remains to be done. Even with the plethora of initiatives over the past three decades discussed in this chapter, it is evident that understanding and knowledge of the phenomenon of migration needs to be further developed and translated into a concrete policy framework for deliberate, systematic and coherent diaspora engagement.

To systematically engage the Filipino diaspora in national and local development, greater institutionalization of these various initiatives needs to happen at all levels of government. Greater policy coherence and effective coordination especially among relevant government agencies is needed, as is the generation and harmonization of data among the agencies in relation to Filipino diaspora communities around the world. The Philippines needs to go beyond the policy confines and spaces of traditional migration-related agencies and officials to involve development planners and other policy sectors and actors to expand the policy and programme options for the Filipino diaspora.

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Chapter 4
Diaspora, Development, and Intra-community Politics: Sri Lankan Tamils in Canada and Post-War Debates

Amarnath Amarasingam and Ahila Poologaindran

Introduction

Diaspora communities are often portrayed in the literature either as peacemakers or troublemakers (Pirkkalainen and Abdile 2009; Lyon and Ucarer 2001). In a widely cited comment on diaspora activism, for example, Benedict Anderson criticized "long-distance nationalists" for perpetuating, from the safety and comfort of their new homeland, conflict and divisiveness in the country they leave behind (Geislerova 2007). Long-distance nationalists, according to Anderson (1992), do not suffer the consequences of their actions and activism. They enjoy the satisfaction of "fighting for the people back home" while having to experience virtually none of the economic, social, or political backlash from the state (Vimalarajah and Cheran 2010). Much of the emphasis has therefore been on whether they negatively interfere with peace negotiations, pursue radical agendas, and perpetuate or further complicate what is already a sensitive conflict in the country of origin.

While diasporas are an important element of contemporary global politics (Adamson and Demetriou 2007; Koinova 2010; Sheffer 2003; Weinar 2010), the nature of their role has been the subject of much debate (Hoffman et al. 2007; Purdy 2003). The Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora, for example, has been criticized for helping to perpetuate conflict in Sri Lanka and for "blindly" supporting and raising money for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE, or Tamil Tigers) (Collier 2000; HRW 2006), who have waged war against the Sri Lankan government to achieve a separate state of Tamil Eelam since the 1980s. According to reports by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the LTTE received anywhere between USD1 million

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per month to USD2 million per year from the Canadian Tamil diaspora (Bell 2004: 27; Fair 2005; Hoffman et al. 2007; HRW 2006; Romanick 2006; Zimmermann and Rosenau 2009). In addition to fundraising, diaspora leaders have long been accused of engaging in sophisticated propaganda campaigns, "radicalizing" Tamil youth abroad, and lobbying for the Tigers. As Chalk (1999) observed, through "front organizations," like the World Tamil Movement in Canada, the LTTE conducted an international propaganda campaign that was far more sophisticated than anything the Colombo government was able to put together (Purdy 2003).

Research conducted on second-generation youth further complicates the issue. When members of the Canadian Tamil diaspora took to the streets in protests from January to May 2009 at the end of the civil war in Sri Lanka, the media, as well as political leaders, seemed confused by how many of these young people – born in Canada and never having visited Sri Lanka – were in tears and chanting slogans loudly on the streets of Toronto, Ottawa, and other Canadian cities (Amarasingam 2013). Many Tamil youth in Canada are certainly deeply concerned about the plight of the Tamil community in Sri Lanka, but acknowledge that they are somewhat confused about how to help, about the kind of impact they could have from Canada, and about what role the diaspora should play in the post-war context.

In contrast to the emphasis on the destructive political role played by diasporas in their countries of origin, there have been recent attempts to see the diaspora and its resources as a force for peace-building, the promotion of human rights and economic and social development (Cochrane et al. 2009; Hoehne et al. 2010; Kleist 2008; Mosaic Institute 2011). An important element of ongoing discussions in the Tamil community in Canada relates to the question of development, and the diaspora's role. However, researchers need to pay closer attention to the multiple levels at which these discussions take place. On one level, the Sri Lankan government regards the diaspora with great suspicion, as members of these communities had been heavily involved in supporting and funding the LTTE since the mid-1980s. The current regime under President Mahinda Rajapaksa continues to accuse the diaspora of being the "LTTE rump" and all critical overtures made by the diaspora towards Sri Lanka are viewed as security threats. Many members of the diaspora, in turn, accuse the current regime of war crimes and genocide, pointing not only to the bloody conclusion of the civil war in 2009, but also to decades-old practices of institutional discrimination designed to "eliminate" Tamil identity on the island. In other words, the context in which the Tamil diaspora has interacted with the Sri Lankan state throughout and after the war has meant that ethical dilemmas have arisen around development initiatives.

At another level, an important issue affecting the Tamil diaspora and the possibility of humanitarian development has less to do with events in Sri Lanka and more to do with the internal politics of the diaspora itself. Much of the research literature on diasporas and development, while acknowledging that diasporas are not homogeneous entities, fails to understand the nature of diaspora politics. Indeed, a fair amount of work with respect to post-war development efforts in Sri Lanka has been undertaken, perhaps counter-intuitively, by people who are largely unaffiliated with Tamil diaspora organizations in Canada. These individuals are somewhat exasperated

by the post-war leadership struggles and petty bickering that has characterized Tamil diaspora politics over the years. The complexity and plurality of opinions in the Tamil diaspora have led to a fragmenting of efforts to provide development assistance in post-war Sri Lanka. These levels of interaction are examined in more depth in this chapter.

Contextualizing Development: The Government vs. the Diaspora

Sri Lanka's significant ethnic and religious diversity lies at the centre of its social and political history. Of the roughly 20 million people in Sri Lanka, the Sinhalese comprise the majority ethnic group (74 % of the population) who mostly identify as Buddhists. The Tamil community in Sri Lanka is made up of Sri Lankan Tamils (12.6 %) and Indian Tamils (5.6 %) most of whom are Hindu, with a significant number of Christians (mostly Catholic). The Muslims of Sri Lanka make up about 7 % of the population (De Silva 1997; McGilvray 2008). Smaller ethnic groups consist of the Burghers (0.4 %), who are descendents of European settlers, and the Veddas, the indigenous peoples of Sri Lanka.

For over 400 years, all or parts of Sri Lanka (Ceylon) fell under the control of successive European powers: the Portuguese (1505–1658), the Dutch (1658–1796), and the British (1796–1948). While talk of independence began in the early twentieth century, it was delayed by the outbreak of the Second World War. The transfer of rule from the British colonial power was formalized with the Ceylon Independence Act of 1947. Ethnic tensions, which had become an intimate part of Sri Lankan society throughout the twentieth century, were for the most part about language and access to government services in the post-colonial period (Tambiah 1986; Wilson 1988). These tensions eventually spilled over into full-scale violence in the 1970s, increasingly coloured with Tamil demands for autonomy and territorial rights.

While scholars continue to debate the starting point of ethnic tensions in Sri Lanka, 1956 is often singled out as the year in which those in power made decisions that would radically alter the nature of ethnic relations for decades to come. Shortly after the 1956 election victory, Prime Minister S.W.R.D Bandaranaike proposed the Official Language Act declaring Sinhala the only official language in Sri Lanka. This piece of legislation would prove to be a long-running symbol of Sinhala nationalism, and would confirm to many Tamils that the Sinhalese leadership could not be trusted to uphold the rights of minority populations. As DeVotta (2004: 73) has argued, "the Official Language Act of 1956 was unfortunately not a law designed for the common good. On the contrary, its goal was to enhance the majority community's socio-economic possibilities, while imposing relative deprivation on the minorities" (DeVotta 2002, 2005).

There was immediate backlash against the Language Act from Sri Lankan Tamils, represented by the Federal Party, who argued that the legislation placed

their language, culture and economic position in jeopardy. The Federal Party launched a *satyagraha* (non-violent protest) in June 1956, during which around 200 Tamils assembled on Colombo's Galle Face Green across from parliament. They were soon attacked by Sinhala protesters, who beat them and pelted them with stones, wounding many. Prime Minister Bandaranaike, perhaps taken aback by the violence, spoke to the Sinhalese crowd outside parliament, telling them, "I will give you the Sinhalese language. Give me one thing. Co-operate with me and go home peacefully" (DeVotta 2004: 83). But the Sinhalese counter-protesters did not stop there. Large-scale anti-Tamil riots spread across the city and to other parts of the island, leading to over 100 deaths in the Eastern Province. The year 1956 was significant for two other reasons: first, it was the year of the Buddha *Jayanti*, the 2,500th anniversary of Buddha's entry into *parinibbana*. The event, celebrated in May 1956, further solidified the bond between Sinhala nationalists and strict religious elements in society. Second, the Buddhist Committee of the Enquiry, arguing that Buddhism needed to be restored to its rightful place, published *The Betrayal of Buddhism*, a report stating that Buddhism had suffered greatly under British rule and little had changed.

Matters deteriorated in May 1972 when Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike and the United Front used their overwhelming parliamentary majority to introduce a new constitution. Opposition parties and minority populations in Sri Lanka were disturbed by the concentration of power instituted by the constitution as well as the absence of safeguards for minority groups. The new constitution declared Sri Lanka to be a "unitary state," gave Buddhism a "foremost place" in the country, and made it the state's duty to "protect and foster Buddhism." It also reaffirmed Sinhala as the official language of Sri Lanka. According to DeVotta (2004: 134), Bandaranaike's time in office "must rank as the most damaging rule the island has experienced, both economically and ethnically." Prior to 1972, "Tamils in general were more inclined to blame unscrupulous politicians (both Sinhalese and their own), not the constitution. The United Front's 1972 Constitution, however, was clearly a document written by the majority community for the majority community. It had taken Sri Lanka less than 25 years after independence to regress from a liberal democracy to a near ethnocracy" (DeVotta 2004: 135). Many of these seismic shifts spurred on ethnic conflict and remain important signposts for the diaspora in their activism against the Sri Lankan government. They also colour discussions about the role of the diaspora in development efforts.

Perhaps the single most important issue aggravating ethnic tensions, and which led many Tamil youth to throw their support behind militant movements, was university admissions. As de Silva (1998: 130, 132) argues, while other policy changes would do more in the long run to cause divisions between the Tamils and the Sinhalese, "none did more in radicalizing the politics of the Tamil areas in the north, and in particular the Jaffna peninsula, than this … for they regarded it as an iniquitous system deliberately devised to place obstacles before them." In the 1960s, students were educated in one of three languages: Sinhala, Tamil or English. There existed, then, three different sets of entrance exams, evaluated by three sets of examiners. In the late 1970s, critics falsely alleged that Tamil students, who held a

disproportionate percentage of seats in universities, benefited from the favouritism of Tamil language examiners. To balance this perceived bias, a language-based system of standardization was introduced in which the scores of Sinhalese students were artificially raised. Ethnicity would thus begin to trump merit in determining entrance into higher education. The district quota system, introduced in 1974, made the message even clearer: under the new system, candidates from what the Education Ministry deemed "backward" districts – predominantly home to large Kandyan and Muslim communities – were given priority for admission (Richardson 2005). The district quotas had a significant impact on the number of Tamils admitted to university science programmes, dropping by as much as a third in a single year (de Silva 1978).

While there were several violent incidents in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, it is the events of July 1983 that continue to resonate with many in the diaspora as a primary example of why the government of Sri Lanka cannot be worked with or trusted. This became known as Black July 1983 (Richardson 2005; Tambiah 1986; Piyadasa 1984). After the LTTE launched an attack that killed 13 Sri Lankan soldiers in the north of the island, plans were made to transfer their bodies to the capital city of Colombo. However, the transporting of the bodies from Jaffna to Colombo on July 24 was delayed by several hours and the funeral was cancelled. In the meantime, a large group of people had gathered at the Borella cemetery. The crowd grew agitated and around 10 p.m. violence erupted and continued for a week. Hundreds of Tamil and Indian businesses were burned, homes were destroyed, and many were beaten, shot or burned alive in their houses or vehicles. Many women were raped or forced to exhibit themselves in front of heckling crowds. Estimates of the number of people killed during Black July range from 200 to 2,000, mostly Tamil. In addition, some 100,000 Tamils fled to refugee camps after their homes, vehicles, shops and belongings were destroyed. Around 30,000 people lost their jobs due to their work sites being damaged.

After Black July, there was a marked increase in membership among all Tamil militant groups in Sri Lanka. The Sri Lankan government's response to the pogrom not only internationalized the conflict, but ensured that Tamil militancy would replace parliamentary politics for decades to come (Lyon 1999). As Wilson (2000: 113) notes, "President Jayewardene was unequal to the task. At first he seemed numbed and unable to confront the crisis, but he then proceeded from blunder to blunder. He appeared on television on 26 July 1983 with the purpose of assuaging the fears and hysteria of the Sinhalese people, but he did not utter a word of regret to the large number of Tamils who had suffered from Sinhalese thuggery masked by nationalist zeal." Jayewardene's "ultimate blunder" was the passing of the Sixth Amendment in August 1983.

This Amendment outlawed support for a separate state within Sri Lanka and required all members of parliament to take an oath of allegiance "to the unitary state of Sri Lanka." The Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), which was committed to a separate state, refused to take the oath. As Bandarage (2009: 110–111) points out, "The TULF was committed to separatism, but it was also the main opposition party in parliament and the only democratic political voice of the Tamils." By refusing to

take the oath of allegiance, the TULF was effectively no longer able to function within the Sri Lankan polity. The vacuum left by its departure from parliamentary politics was soon filled by Tamil militant groups, particularly the LTTE, which would launch a war against the Sri Lankan government for the establishment of a separate state on the island.

The events of Black July led large numbers of Tamils from Sri Lanka to migrate to other parts of the world, effectively giving birth to a new diaspora. Many would arrive in Canada. This wave of post-1983 migration of Sri Lankan Tamils, however, was distinct from earlier migration of Sri Lankans to Canada, many of whom were economic migrants. Fleeing from a brutal civil war and seeking refugee status, tens of thousands of Tamils settled in large metropolitan cities such as Toronto and Montreal throughout the 1980s and 1990s. While many of the early diaspora organizations dealt with settlement issues, in subsequent years members of the burgeoning diaspora in Canada and around the world made concerted efforts to provide ideological support and fundraising for the Tigers in Sri Lanka. The main organization in Canada accused of being a front for the LTTE was the World Tamil Movement (WTM), founded in 1986.

Although the Canadian government's stance on the LTTE began to change following the Tiger's April 1995 decision to withdraw from peace talks, it was not until April 2006 that the LTTE was officially proscribed as a terrorist organization in Canada (Stackhouse 1995). One year later, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) raided the offices of WTM and hauled away several boxes of documents. The RCMP investigation, known as Project Osaluki, was one of numerous probes launched in the United States, France and the United Kingdom to weaken diaspora networks engaged in fundraising for the LTTE. Following the raid and ensuing investigation, the WTM was also banned as a terrorist organization in June 2008 for its role as a "known and leading front organization for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam" (Public Safety Canada 2008).

As diaspora organizations faced scrutiny abroad, the tide of the war began to shift in favour of President Mahinda Rajapaksa. The newly elected Sinhala-dominated government was determined to annihilate the LTTE. As the military onslaught began, the Tamil diaspora around the world began to stage what would be months-long protests calling for international intervention and a negotiated ceasefire. Tens of thousands of Sri Lankan Tamils – young and old – took part in these protests, blocking streets by day and holding candle-light vigils at night. When asked about their motivation for standing outside in freezing cold weather, many noted that they feared for the safety of family and friends living in Sri Lanka.

These fears were not unfounded. With journalists barred from entering the front lines, and international organizations, including the United Nations, evacuated from the war zones, the Sri Lankan military launched sustained attacks on Tiger strongholds. In January 2009, Kilinochchi, the administrative capital of the Tiger-controlled areas of the island, fell to the government troops. From January to April, Puthukkudiyiruppu and its surrounding areas became the main theatre of the conflict. The government was committed to destroying the LTTE and was willing to tolerate the deaths of thousands of civilians to accomplish this. The LTTE was

similarly willing to tolerate civilian casualties in the hope that a humanitarian crisis mixed with pressure from the diaspora would produce a ceasefire and give them room to breathe.

On 8 May 2009, the government declared a third and final No Fire Zone in Mullivaikkal which, while only a few square kilometres in size, contained tens of thousands of civilians. The last 10 days of the conflict were a period of intense shelling, resulting in major civilian losses. On May 16, as the Sri Lankan army took the last of the central positions, General Sarath Fonseka declared victory.

The history of interaction between the diaspora and the government of Sri Lanka is fraught with conflict and disagreement. From the structural discrimination of the 1950s–1970s to the pogrom of 1983, the Tamil community, out of which the diaspora was born, felt excluded and criminalized. Similarly, the rise of the LTTE and the diaspora's subsequent support for the rebel movement only heightened the suspicion with which the government would come to view the diaspora. Unsurprisingly, the bloody conclusion to the civil war in Sri Lanka exacerbated the already tense relationship between the diaspora and the government. Immediately following the end of military hostilities, the call for an international inquiry into the government's conduct began in earnest. A slew of organizations based in Canada and other countries demanded accountability and justice for those killed in the final months. Tamils Against Genocide, based in the United Kingdom, and the Canadian Tamil Congress have lobbied the international community to support an independent inquiry into the war's final stages.

The Sri Lankan government, by way of response, has tended to securitize diaspora activism and view it through the lens of terrorism. For example, on 10 January 2012, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, President Mahinda Rajapaksa's brother and Secretary of the Defence and Urban Development Ministry, delivered a lecture to the Sri Lanka Foundation Institute and Associated Newspapers of Ceylon Limited. The president's brother, arguably the second most powerful man in the country, began his lecture by stating that Sri Lanka still faced several threats following the end of war with the Tigers. The first threat mentioned and discussed at length by Rajapaksa was the "reorganization of the LTTE in the international arena" (Rajapaksa 2012). Mentioning several Tamil diaspora groups by name, he argued that even after the defeat of the LTTE, "the rump of the LTTE's global establishment is still active." Rajapaksa argued, for example, that the "unwavering intent" of LTTE-linked groups overseas "is the division of Sri Lanka and the establishment of a separate state." He went on: "Most of them say they engage only in political activism and not violence. Almost all of them pretend to have a democratic face. But make no mistake. The Tiger has not changed its stripes" (Rajapaksa 2012).

In April 2014, the government of Sri Lanka proscribed as "terrorist fronts" 16 organizations and released the names of more than 400 individuals who were banned from entering the country (Jeyaraj 2014). The timing of the proscription, occurring concurrently with the 25th session of the United Nations Human Rights Council, signalled to many that the government decision was, as HRW (2014) stated, "aimed at restricting peaceful activism by the country's Tamil minority" against the government. This decision made it difficult for Tamil political parties on the island to

receive support and funding from abroad and impossible for many diaspora activists associated with these banned organizations to visit family and friends in the country. It also made it dangerous for NGO groups and aid workers to receive support, financial or other, from diaspora organizations with a vested interest in the country (HRW 2014).

With members of the diaspora accusing the government of war crimes, and the government in turn labelling diaspora activism as the continuation of "terrorism", there is effectively little room for diasporic activity in development projects. The history of ethnic tensions, recurrent episodes of communal violence, and the persecutory environment that gave birth to the diaspora around the world effectively constrains interaction between the diaspora and the government. What is more, the ways in which the Rajapaksa government carried out the final assault on the Tigers – ignoring human rights organizations, ejecting media personnel and showing little regard for the plight of civilians – ultimately laid the groundwork for future lobbying efforts and sustained resistance by both pro- and anti-LTTE elements in the Tamil diaspora.

The historical trajectory and narrative of the relationship between the government of Sri Lanka and the Tamil diaspora dictates the diaspora's willingness and ability to contribute to the post-war development of the island. Though there is evidence of conventional development efforts, such as economic remittances and donations to local organizations, the Tamil diaspora also helped sustain the civil war in Sri Lanka through its financial contributions. With the end of the war, the diaspora continues to put pressure on the government to allow an independent international inquiry. In response, the government continues to use a "with us or against us" rhetoric to maintain a militarized island, particularly in the former war zones of the north and east. In particular, it has blurred the roles of military and development. However, as will be clear in the second half of the chapter, the lack of development efforts on the part of the Tamil diaspora cannot solely be explained by the relationship between the state and diaspora. Rather, the intra-organizational dynamics in the diaspora also contribute to the ways in which community members relate to development efforts in Sri Lanka.

The Tamil Diaspora and Intra-community Disputes

As the Tamil diaspora case illustrates, the context in which a particular diaspora community is born can be enormously influential in determining whether development efforts will be initiated and sustained. The civil war in Sri Lanka, the diaspora's fundraising and ideological support for the rebel movement in the country, and the humanitarian catastrophe that characterized the end of the war are key to understanding, as well as predicting, how members of the diaspora and the government will interact. The second half of the chapter examines an equally important impediment to the diaspora's involvement in development initiatives – one that is often neglected by scholars. This hurdle has less to do with the diaspora's relationship

with the Sri Lankan government and more to do with the community's relationship with itself.

There are at least two particular issues and debates that have impacted the diaspora and its commitment to economic and social development in Sri Lanka. First, there is a vibrant debate within the diaspora about whether it is ethically defensible to help Tamil people in the former war zones, given that this would require working with the government and the military presence in the north and east of the country. This debate, however, takes place within the context of a general desire to do something for the people in Sri Lanka. As a Tamil woman interviewed for this study noted, her decision to pursue medicine was shaped and driven by her desire to help people in Sri Lanka:

> Ultimately the things that I work for, the success, whatever it is, that I'm able to achieve in my life, a huge part of that would go back, it would contribute back to the individuals in whatever form that I can. So if I, when I was a really young kid, the first thing, if anyone ever asked me what do you want to be when you grow up, I'd always say, a doctor. And the reason that I said that was because I always wanted to take those skills and go back to help people in Sri Lanka. So that's something I've always had in the back of my mind. And growing up through, this war is longer than I am, so I guess that's something that's always been there in the background of my entire life. You go to a family party and my uncle and my dad are sitting around talking about it. So it's a thing that's always in the background.

For respondents like these, it is not enough to be "armchair activists" in Canada. Rather, a big part of what the Tamil diaspora can do is to put their education, finances and skills to good use. Others argue that, even if living and working in Sri Lanka is not feasible, it is necessary to get a sense of what the people in Sri Lanka actually want from the diaspora communities who presume to speak for them. Many argue that any solution should come from Tamils in Sri Lanka itself, with diaspora Tamils providing a strong supporting role.

As noted, the desire to help is coloured by the question of how to "do work" in the north and east of Sri Lanka given the presence of the military. As de Chickera (2012) recently asked, "if you really are trying to promote reconciliation, but you know there is no space to do so, and the only space available is to engage in 'humanitarian' activities on government terms, do you engage or do you desist?" He notes that many humanitarian organizations have wrestled with this question in the past. In the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, he notes, Doctors Without Borders pulled out of the Goma refugee camp (in what is now the Democratic Republic of Congo) because it was in effect being run by Hutu genocidaires who were channelling aid into the hands of the *Interahamwe* militia (de Chickera 2012). Doctors Without Borders made the argument that "humanitarian aid which actually enhances an unjust status quo does more harm than good – and if you do not have the power to prevent the abuse of such aid, you do less harm by pulling out, than you would by staying" (de Chickera 2012). Their decision to pull out of the Goma camp was heavily debated in humanitarian circles and almost led to a split within the organization.

A similar debate is taking place within the Tamil diaspora. While there is much interest in providing aid, financially helping organizations on the ground, and going

to Sri Lanka and volunteering time and energy (especially among many youth), the possibility of doing more harm than good disturbs some. The Sri Lankan government's heavy military presence in the north and east of Sri Lanka continues with 16 out of 19 army divisions stationed in Tamil-dominated areas (ICG 2012). The military does seem to have been on a kind of charm offensive in recent years, attending weddings and birthday parties, as well as charitable events, to create the impression that their presence in these areas is not only benevolent, but widely welcomed by the Tamil people. As a result, organizations working within this context have been criticized for helping the military normalize its presence in Tamil areas. As de Chickera (2012) notes, a common criticism is as follows: "why question the little good we are doing just because it is not capable of changing all that is evil?" However, de Chickera (2012) argues that "a single candle sometimes gives the impression of light, when the world is actually growing darker." The debate continues in humanitarian circles as well as the diaspora about whether this "single candle" is doing more harm than good.

A second issue that has affected the diaspora's involvement in economic and social development in Sri Lanka is organizational rivalry and infighting between diaspora groups in Canada and around the world. While common sense might dictate, for example, that the mobilized segment of the Tamil diaspora, consisting of dozens of organizations, would take the lead on issues of post-war development, the opposite has in fact occurred. Leadership rivalries between a variety of organizations has precluded joint development ventures in Sri Lanka. Since the end of the civil war in May 2009, several new organizations have emerged, and many older groups still persist. To give just a few examples, organizations like the Canadian Tamil Congress continue to advocate for justice and accountability in Sri Lanka while taking a lead role on the issue of immigration and asylum seekers from Sri Lanka in Canada. Their annual walk-a-thons have raised tens of thousands of dollars for a variety of organizations and charities including Amnesty International and Toronto's Sick Kids hospital. However, members of a new organization, which began in June 2010, known as the National Council of Canadian Tamils (or NCCT), rarely attend events organized by the Canadian Tamil Congress. The Canadian Tamil Congress organizes a blood drive and the NCCT organizes its own competing blood drive. While there are important political differences between the two organizations with respect to Tamil rights in Sri Lanka, much of the rivalry seems to revolve around the leadership and their attempts to be the premier organization advocating for Tamil rights in Canada and Sri Lanka.

Two other organizations that arose after the end of the war are the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE), which maintains a commitment to achieving a separate state of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka, and Sri Lankans Without Borders (SLWB), which advocates for dialogue and reconciliation within a united Sri Lanka. Needless to say, it is very rare to see individuals from these respective organizations attending each other's events or working together for common objectives. The TGTE announced its Tamil Eelam Freedom Charter in May 2013, setting out the organization's aims and principles, which were not acknowledged by members of competing organizations.

SLWB was awarded over CAD250,000 by Citizenship and Immigration Canada in July 2011 to support its mandate to "promote dialogue, reconciliation, and peace in the diaspora community in Canada." Although a small organization, composed of a core group of 12 board members, it boasts a broader network of several hundred supporters. The group has organized many events that have rarely been a part of Tamil or Sri Lankan diaspora politics. For instance, on 23 June 2012, SLWB organized an educational and dialogue event with the Sri Lanka Islamic Foundation of Ontario. Surprisingly, even though the Tamil community had been in Canada in large numbers since the 1980s, and the Sri Lankan Muslim community, while small, began to arrive in Canada throughout the 1990s, this was one of the first events where both communities sat in the same room together. However, not a single member of any other Tamil diaspora organization attended the event.

Many members of the Tamil diaspora have criticised SLWB for using the language of reconciliation to gloss over serious human rights violations. The organization has generally been branded as naïve for placing reconciliation before the need for truth, justice, and accountability. A similar critique often levelled against the group has been that it often fails to present itself to the diaspora community with a clear focus or end goal. In other words, many members of the group repeatedly insist that all viewpoints are welcome within the organization, which makes it difficult to discern the group's actual viewpoint. More recently, in conversations with group members themselves, some admitted that the kind of strict separatism advocated by the LTTE, for instance, would not be something that they would support. According to many members of SLWB, issues of devolution and power-sharing, as well as justice and accountability, should be debated openly, but these conversations should ideally occur within the broader framework of a unified state.

On the other side of the political spectrum, in a more recent development, the NCCT and the Tamil Youth Organization (TYO), an umbrella organization for campus groups in Canada, have organized several conferences and meetings to express their commitment to the self-determination of the Tamil people in Sri Lanka. The NCCT and TYO organized an Eelam Tamil Youth conference in 2012 at Toronto City Hall, where they pledged to "continue the struggle for Tamil sovereignty." At the conference, the students expressed their commitment to the Tamil Sovereignty Cognition declaration (TSCd) released in November 2011, which attempts to carve out a strong position for the continued commitment to the self-determination of the Tamil people.

The TSCd is largely a response to a specific strand of discourse that has arisen in the diaspora since the end of the war, namely the argument for reconciliation. Many Tamil youth, including members of TYO, see such arguments as naïve attempts by individuals in Sri Lanka and the diaspora to draw attention away from what should be on the agenda: truth, justice, accountability and sovereignty. As the TSCd states:

> We the undersigned declare that all outside players should stop insisting on finding solutions only within a united Sri Lanka. We declare that it is time for the international players to drop pretensions of 'domestic' solutions and vigorously engage in a transparent international mechanism to approach the Sri Lanka-Tamil Eelam conflict as a question between nations and to bring in lasting peace and justice to the crisis in the island, in order to

> facilitate the two nations in conflict to co-exist peacefully with full control of their respective sovereignties (TamilNet 2011).

Reaffirming its commitment to the TSCd, the conference organized by the NCCT and TYO brought together representatives from 14 Tamil student associations in high schools, colleges, and universities in Canada. At the end of the conference, the representatives passed nine resolutions. While these resolutions reiterated much of what is already present in the TSCd, there were two additions that relate to the nature of organizational rivalry and competition and these will influence the diaspora's role in development: "(a) we reject the territorial integrity of the Sri Lankan state that occupies Tamil Eelam and we reject the imposition of the 'Sri Lankan' identity, politically and culturally on the Eelam Tamils and (b) we will boycott any Tamil Diaspora organization that compromise the principles of Homeland, Nation and Self Determination and therefore lends legitimacy to the unitary state of Sri Lanka."

Because of this organizational rivalry, these diaspora groups have not been able to provide an avenue through which individuals interested in engaging in meaningful development can engage with Sri Lanka. Some of these internal debates and arguments are certainly healthy and necessary, grounded as they are in the disturbing militaristic realities of post-war Sri Lanka. To be sure, militarization does not mean the mere presence of the military in the north and east. Rather, it persists in a more sustained manner. Aside from producing anxieties about security, militarization now has an economic dimension as well. For example, the military has been involved with a variety of economic initiatives in the country, from conducting whale-watching tours to farming. The military is also often accused of flooding the market with their own goods at reduced prices since they have virtually no overhead costs. Given these realities, the diaspora's reluctance to fully engage the government on issues of development is perhaps understandable.

Conclusion

The possibilities for development contributions from the Sri Lankan diaspora are many: philanthropy, economic remittances and investment, skills transfer, and political influence. The global Tamil community possesses the three elements that Esman (1986) notes foster diaspora contributions to homeland development: access to resources, an inclination to "maintain solidarity and exert group influence" on political developments in Sri Lanka, and a conducive "opportunity structure" in countries such as Canada and the United Kingdom. Though resources are abundant and interest in homeland issues is strong, the current political structure partially explains why the Tamil diaspora hesitates to engage more deeply in development efforts. The war in Sri Lanka was one of the most brutal conflicts in recent memory. The golden opportunity that existed for truth, justice and perhaps even reconciliation, has largely been squandered by the current government. Minority concerns remain in

the foreground and are further complicated by issues of displacement, militarization, colonization and Sinhalization of Tamil areas, as well as a culture of impunity that pervades the island.

We have argued here, in sum, that the conditions of exit will determine the nature of diaspora engagement and the possibility of effective engagement between diasporas and their governments. However, cases like the Punjabi Sikh diaspora may complicate this thesis considerably. One might think that Khalistan separatism would preclude Punjabi Sikh diaspora activism, but the opposite is the case. While we have not approached this question comparatively in this chapter, it is arguable that in addition to conditions of exit, the protracted campaign of the LTTE, and its influence in defining the parameters of Tamil identity in Sri Lanka and the diaspora, are important factors to consider. They may explain the difference between how the Sikh diaspora and the Tamil diaspora have approached development issues. The governance of the Tamil community in Sri Lanka itself, largely through the political party known as the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), has been hampered by the government's securitization of the diaspora, even with the TNA expressing support for increased diaspora involvement in rebuilding efforts in the former war zones.

As this chapter has made clear, the historical peculiarities of this particular conflict, the context out of which diasporas are born, and the internal politics of the diasporas themselves all influence the ability and willingness of the diaspora community to contribute to development efforts in Sri Lanka. The plurality of voices and activities within the Tamil diaspora indicates that there are real moral debates taking place about the validity and ethics involved in assisting a country that has long isolated its ethnic kin. The state's persistent rhetorical demonization of the Tamil diaspora, including the banning of several organizations, indicates that the government views the diaspora primarily through the lens of security, and not development. Those affected most by this will continue to be those who need development most urgently.

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Chapter 5
Benevolent Funds: Philanthropic Practices of the South African Diaspora in Ontario, Canada

Sujata Ramachandran

Introduction

In the animated debate on the diaspora-development nexus, diaspora-led philanthropy is a new and relatively less understood dimension. Empirical studies on this topic are limited, restricted to a few countries with selected, cohesive diaspora communities (Geithner et al. 2004; Sidel 2008). The growth of new elite actors among large, established diasporas, including Indian and Chinese immigrants in the US, has highlighted the considerable philanthropic fundraising ability of such groups on an individual and collective basis (Kapur et al. 2004; Sidel 2004; Yin and Lan 2004; Young and Shih 2004). While research on diaspora-based philanthropy is growing slowly, it remains at a nascent stage for countries like Canada with sizeable diaspora and immigrant populations (Mehta and Johnson 2011; Shridhar 2011). There are large gaps in our understanding of who among the diaspora contributes, reasons for such giving, and specific transnational conditions under which such practices are facilitated and inhibited.

The available evidence suggests that the presence of a large, affluent diaspora, the emergence of new elite and non-elite actors, and new forms of giving may provide alternative avenues for socio-economic development, through the contribution of significant monetary and human resources (Newland et al. 2010). Diaspora giving can benefit "at-risk societies" with undemocratic regimes, featuring weak institutional accountability and governance structures (Brinkerhoff 2008). Philanthropic activities tied to religious norms and obligations are seen to provide additional opportunities for social welfare in countries of diaspora origin (Anand 2004; Dusenbery and Tatla 2009; Najam 2006).

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The potential of diaspora transnational engagement is, however, swathed in considerable optimism, smoothing over the limitations and problems attached. Such an approach takes for granted the collective involvement of diasporas and their long-lasting commitment to their country of birth. It assumes that all emigrants transition naturally into "diasporas", devoid of restrictions or controls. Difficult histories and vexed circumstances impeding the formation of cohesive diaspora collectivities, deep fissures and asymmetries within, and uncertain, complicated relationships with countries of origin are erased or simply ignored under such a scenario. Sizeable immigrant numbers and high levels of economic integration in the settlement country are presumed to convert into large-scale resources for origin countries in such conceptions.

This chapter critically interrogates the logic underpinning the assumption of clear-cut, assured relationships between diasporas and their countries of origin through a case of the South African diaspora in Ontario. It chronicles the convoluted conditions involved in the "making" and "unmaking" of the South African diaspora that have profoundly affected the creation and longevity of diaspora-based groups and, in turn, determined the philanthropic practices of groups and individuals. Through this analysis, a case is advanced for a deeper, more nuanced, engagement with the unacknowledged background and powerful social, political and economic relationships involved in the diaspora-development bond.

The analysis builds on SAMP's recent, detailed study of the South African diaspora in Canada and its largely pessimistic findings of a "disengaged" majority and "engaged" minority (Crush et al. 2013). That study reached the conclusion that a great number of South African immigrants were permanently unanchored from their country of birth, unconcerned about its future and disinclined to engage meaningfully with it (Crush et al. 2012). Their involvement with South Africa was reduced to regular visits and social interaction with relatives. Progressive disinvestment over time and feeble contribution to remittances were likewise recorded, despite the robust economic standing of many immigrants. Above all, the South African diaspora rendered a bleak, dystopian portrayal of their country of birth (Crush 2013). This grim representation was particularly marked amongst more recent arrivals who came to Canada after the establishment of a post-apartheid social order in 1994. The indifference and negativity expressed by this disengaged majority was tempered by the presence of a committed minority who presented a more positive, optimistic vision of South Africa and displayed greater connectedness to it through the purchase of property and investments in the country and charitable donations (Crush et al. 2013).

Consistent with the ruptured configurations documented by the SAMP study, a large number of South Africans in Canada do not participate in South Africa-oriented philanthropy. The chapter shows how fraught relations with South Africa and other South Africans have divided the location and beneficiaries of charitable-giving, with some of the largest, most conspicuous donations by the wealthiest South African immigrants being directed to Canadian institutions and social causes. A second strand of philanthropy is grounded in narrower "ethnic" identities, particularly those based on religious affinities. In a third distinct strand of

philanthropy, a pivotal role is assumed by a smaller set of engaged diaspora individuals. All of the key actors associated with this form of philanthropy left South Africa for Canada at the zenith of apartheid and some were very active in anti-apartheid solidarity work before 1990. The dominant character of charitable work in South Africa therefore tends to reproduce the traditional format of philanthropy in which key dedicated individuals, rather than social groups, are the main drivers of altruism and social giving.

The chapter is divided into three sections. The first provides an overview of the historical circumstances under which the emigration of South Africans and their acceptance in Canada occurred. The second section outlines the formation of the South African diaspora and the manner in which these conditions have affected relations within the community and occurrence of diaspora-based groups. The final section provides an assessment of the philanthropic practices of diaspora-based collectives and key individuals associated with them.

Immigration to Canada from South Africa

In their analysis of the African diaspora, Patterson and Kelly (2000: 11) argue that "diaspora" must be understood both as "process and condition." Diaspora formation is not necessarily the predictable outcome of dispersion through migration "no matter how the diaspora was created and how long it has been in existence" and, as a process, "it is always in the making … just as the diaspora is made, it can be unmade and scholars must explore the moments of its unmaking." They propose that the relationships that bind the diaspora together must be articulated and not assumed. The nature of diaspora identities is clearly rooted in historical circumstances and social processes, shaping diasporic consciousness, commitment and connections to their country of birth. These conditions and circumstances in the "making" and "unmaking" of the South African diaspora are examined below.

Migration from South Africa to Canada has a protracted history. Small numbers (128 in total) of South Africans were amongst the Canadian immigrant population as early as 1901 (Census Office 1902). Notably, South Africa was the only African country of birth included among Canada's immigrant population in 1921 (Dominion Bureau of Statistics 1924–1928). By then, there were some 1,760 South African immigrants residing in Canada. In 1923, only British subjects from South Africa were included in a restricted list of countries whose citizens could immigrate to Canada (Kelley and Trebilcock 2010). In the 1930s, acceptable immigrants were limited to wealthy, almost entirely "white" British subjects from South Africa who had adequate financial means to support themselves until they obtained employment, or owned sufficient capital to engage in farming in Canada (Hawkins 1991; Kelley and Trebilcock 2010). South Africans of African lineage were not considered as British subjects and were ineligible for immigration. The entry of other visible minorities such as Asians (Indians and Chinese) was, likewise, strictly monitored and controlled (Kalbach 1970).

The first half of the twentieth century coincided with the large-scale emigration of Europeans to rather than from South Africa. South Africa's preferred status in Canadian immigration policy therefore did not result in the arrival of large numbers (Stalker 1994; Marrow 2007). Even by 1961, South African immigrants constituted a minor presence in Canada, accounting for a meagre 0.2 % of the total population, 0.2 % of post-war immigrants, and 0.3 % of total immigrants between 1956 and 1961 (Kalbach 1970). In 1961, some 4,025 South African-born persons were residing in Canada (Dominion Bureau of Statistics 1962). Ontario was a principal destination, with 1,752 South Africans.

Despite the enlargement of the South African diaspora in Canada after the onset of apartheid in 1948, arrivals were skewed in favour of "white" South Africans of European ancestry with a predominance of those with "British" forebears. Between 1959 and 1964, black South Africans constituted on average less than 2 % of total immigrants from South Africa. In some years (such as 1960 and 1961), they were entirely absent. Similarly, South African Indians constituted only 2 % on average of total immigrants between 1956 and 1965. Visible minorities made up a 15 % share of entrants in 1966 although it is likely that some of those listed as "European" or "British" were "coloured" South Africans of mixed racial origin.

Political events in South Africa from the late 1940s onwards became increasingly important push factors in emigration from that country. Louw and Mersham's (2001) study of the South African diaspora in Perth, Australia, identifies four distinct waves of emigration from South Africa progressing from a "slow trickle" to an "exodus" around the end of apartheid. During the 1950s and 1960s, the first two waves consisted largely of "white Anglo-South Africans" uncomfortable with Afrikaner hegemony after the electoral victory of the National Party in 1948. The 1950s and 1960s saw the perceived "Afrikanerization of South Africa," which resulted in the migration of Anglo-South Africans to other Commonwealth countries, including Canada (Louw and Mersham 2001: 309). The formation of an independent Republic of South Africa in 1961 when it left the Commonwealth contributed to further out-migration to countries including Canada.

Political protests against the apartheid system after 1960 and the South African state's swift and brutal reprisals affected subsequent flows of South Africans of various racial groups to Canada. The Sharpeville massacre in 1960, when police opened fire on black citizens protesting the pass laws, witnessed the out-migration of more South Africans (Mulholland 1997; Magubane 2004). That year, some 718 South African emigrants arrived in Canada – almost double the annual average of the previous 5 years. The Rivonia Trial, when African National Congress (ANC) leaders like Nelson Mandela were convicted of treason and thousands of activists were arrested, saw another leap in emigration to Canada from 1964. In 1964, 638 South African-born persons arrived in Canada, a number that jumped to 1,492 in 1967. Many political activists from the banned ANC, Pan-African Congress and South African Communist Party were forced to leave South Africa and sought refuge in neighbouring countries (Bernstein 1994; Oitsile 2010). In the following years, some exiles moved further afield.

The numbers of South Africans immigrating to Canada rose steadily in the early 1970s when the deep global recession over oil prices, rapid inflation and falling price of gold created an economic slump in South Africa. South African arrivals surged following the Soweto Uprising in 1976 when high school students organized protests against Afrikaans as the enforced medium of instruction. In 1977, some 1,935 South African-born persons migrated to Canada (Department of Manpower and Immigration 1977). By 1977, there were 18,606 South Africans in Canada, of whom a majority were white, consisting largely of English-speakers and smaller numbers of Afrikaans-speakers and Jews (Meono 1981). Other South Africans in Toronto included 3,500–4,000 "Coloureds", 1,000–1,500 Indians and some 100–150 black South Africans.

Emigration from South Africa after 1976 took various forms. English-speaking entrepreneurs began to relocate their investments to other Western countries and more urban whites began to leave the country. They included young white males emigrating to circumvent conscription in the South African Defence Force. As the apartheid state intensified its repression from the mid-1970s, the population of political exiles swelled. An estimated 30,000–60,000 activists fled South Africa during the apartheid years (Wren 1991; Kuper 1994). Bernstein (1994) suggests that while not all exiles were political activists, the majority left under extremely difficult circumstances. However, the proportion of migrants accepted as refugees by Canada remained small; between 1983 and 1991, an average of 5 % of arrivals were refugees (Fig. 5.1).

Apartheid legislation, which stripped black South Africans of citizenship rights, placed stringent restrictions on formal mobility and created severe economic hardships, restricted the emigration of Africans. There were no large-scale flows to



Fig. 5.1 South African immigration to Canada by category of entry, 1980–2009

countries like Canada despite the extreme inequities and harsh realities of the apartheid system. Legal exit was also challenging for other visible minority, racialized groups. Meono's (1981) study of "non-white" South Africans in Toronto contends that only a few had claimed asylum in Canada and the great majority had arrived as skilled immigrants. These immigrants were often well-educated professionals, such as doctors and teachers, who had moved to neighbouring African countries in the 1950s, and later shifted to Canada. Other accounts, including Hope's (2011) narrative of transnational anti-apartheid activism of Canadian civil society organizations suggests that African refugees and political exiles began arriving in larger numbers after 1976. By 1978, the ANC had set up an office in Toronto and it is likely that some political exiles were able to seek refuge in Canada successfully through these diverse networks (Hope 2011). However, only 3 % of the South African diaspora population in Canada in the early 1990s consisted of black South Africans (Jansen 1999).

Flanking the trickle of refugees and exiles was the larger, more visible and constant inflow of skilled, highly educated and relatively well-to-do immigrants from South Africa. The educational and employment patterns of South African immigrants were exceptional, surpassing those of Canada-born residents (Hawthorne 2006). A small number of immigrants were exceptionally wealthy, with considerable access to finance and able to create new commercial enterprises or businesses in Canada as "entrepreneurs", "investors" and "self-employed persons." Between 1985 and 1996, 1,400 persons entered Canada as business immigrants or eight percent of the total. In 1993 alone, 10 South African investors with a minimum net worth of CAD500,000 arrived with their dependants (Employment and Immigration Canada 1990).

Ironically, the dismantling and eventual collapse of the apartheid regime after 1990 activated the strongest outward flows yet from South Africa to Canada. In 1994 alone, the year of the first democratic elections, 2,918 South Africans arrived in Canada as permanent residents. That year, South Africa was the top sending country for permanent residents to Canada, and South Africans constituted around 10 % of all long-term immigrant arrivals. Between 1990 and 1996, Canada was one of the major receiving countries of emigrating South Africans, constituting around 11 % of total outflows (Meyer et al. 2000). The average number of annual arrivals rose from 1,084 between 1982 and 1991 to 1,843 from 1992 to 2001. Juxtaposed to this outflow of South Africans was the return of exiles from various countries (Wren 1991), shrinking the size of the black South African population in Canada (Steyn and Grant 2007; Wren 1991). Some estimate that as many as 2,000 black South Africans set out from Canada for their home. A far smaller number of returning exiles were from other racial and ethnic groups.

Today, South Africans constitute the largest immigrant group from Sub-Saharan Africa in Canada. The latest National Household Survey (NHS) showed that in 2011 there were 43,465 South African-born people in Canada (Statistics Canada 2014). Of these, 40,555 were permanent residents and 2,265 were living with their family members as non-permanent, short-term residents on employment or study permits. Some 12,080 persons immigrated between 1991 and 2000 and another 11,235

Table 5.1 Geographical distribution of South African immigrants, 2011

Location	Total	Canadian citizens	Permanent residents
Canada	43,465	34,965	40,555
Provinces			
Ontario	19,305	16,505	18,405
British Columbia	13,625	10,960	12,815
Alberta	6,675	4,330	6,010
Other	3,860		
Ontario cities			
Toronto	13,575	11,890	13,125
Hamilton	1225	965	1,185
Ottawa-Gatineau (Ontario part)	730	610	630
London	525	400	475
Kitchener-Cambridge-Waterloo	470	380	440
Oshawa	415	340	405
St Catharines-Niagara	295	265	285
Windsor	225	160	180
Guelph	215	200	215

Source: National household survey, 2011

arrived between 2001 and 2011. The proportion of those arriving before the demise of apartheid was visibly smaller than the later arrivals (Fig. 5.1).

Ontario has been the principal destination for South African immigrants. Of the 15,860 South Africa-born who arrived before 1981, 9,050 (57 %) were in Ontario (Statistics Canada 2014). Recent incentives like the Provincial Nominee Programmes (PNPs) have dispersed newer arrivals to provinces such as Alberta and Saskatchewan (Kelly et al. 2011). In 2011, 45 % of all South African-born immigrants were still living in Ontario, with the highest concentration in Toronto, followed by Hamilton and Ottawa (Table 5.1). Smaller numbers reside in areas outside Toronto, like Newmarket, Oakville and Pickering.

Given the extended history of immigration from South Africa to Canada, some five generations of Canadians may be able to trace their birth and lineage to South Africa. If place of birth and ancestry were employed as the broad criteria for defining the South African diaspora, then the numerical strength of the diaspora would be considerably higher. The attachment and relationship of different generations to South Africa, and with other South Africans in Canada, has yet to be researched.

The Making of South African Diaspora(s)

Perhaps the most noticeable feature of the South African diaspora in Canada is the persistent divide along racial and ethnic lines. As one respondent presciently observed: “Which South African diaspora community are you talking about? The

community is so divided here. At least in South Africa they have learned to live together." Others noted that the divisions were similar to those in post-apartheid South Africa, with unyielding social distance between various racial groups. In many respects, the legacy of the past weighs heavily on the present even in the desegregated setting of Canada. Social connections remained awkward and there were few dealings between those with contrasting views about apartheid (Naidoo 1996). Jansen (1999) has noted that the relationship, such as it was, was almost entirely one of mutual distrust and suspicion. Only immigrants who had experience of intermingling with other groups in colleges, universities or a few workplaces in South Africa seemed able to transcend these deep barriers (Meono 1981).

In apartheid South Africa, every aspect of a person's legal, political, economic and social status and lived existence was controlled by their racial identity (Clark and Worger 2004; Freeman 1997). Individual and collective memories of "home" – which often provide the foundation for sentimental diasporic bonds – therefore differed considerably. While white South Africans commonly reminisce in a depoliticised manner about South Africa's climate, landscape and "lifestyle", black South Africans remember South Africa as deeply dehumanizing and oppressive. An anti-apartheid activist now residing in Toronto said that the only time he saw Cape Town before 1994 was when he was being transported to Robben Island for incarceration for his political activities. Another participant said that she was from Soweto rather than Johannesburg to underscore the racially circumscribed nature of belonging in the past.

To this day, unlike immigrants from other countries in Canada, there are no Hometown Associations (HTAs) representing South Africans from a particular locality, city or province. Apartheid and race in South Africa ensured that there would be no common group identity that could unite South Africans in Canada. As one respondent asked rhetorically: "What is common between a South African who lives in Thornhill versus another who lives in Oakville?" Jansen's (1999) account of South Africans in Canada in the mid-1990s noted that the only uncomplicated communal element among South African immigrants was food. Despite their shared national origin, there were (and largely continue to be) stark and insurmountable differences among South Africans in Ontario.

The presence in Ontario of elements supportive of the apartheid system before 1994, and vituperatively critical of the post-apartheid dispensation, hindered the withering away of these impermeable boundaries. A section of the South African diaspora endorsed as well as keenly promoted white supremacy until apartheid's formal demise. The Canada-South Africa Society, Canadian-South African Association of Ottawa and Protea Clubs are a few examples of diaspora-based groups engaged in publicity and networking that endorsed white rule in South Africa and reserved membership for white South Africans in places like Toronto and Ottawa (Diebel 1985; Saul 2010). These organizations benefited from the considerable backing for apartheid South Africa in the Canadian mainstream, as well as the Canadian state's ambiguous approach to apartheid until the mid-1980s (Freeman 1997; Pratt 1968; Saul 2010).

Those opposed to the apartheid regime found their South African identity extremely fraught. They avoided contact with South African state-based institutions such as consular services and the South African embassy in Ottawa. Other markers of South African identity, such as citizenship and passports, became a liability as opposition to apartheid gained momentum internationally. Some diaspora members preferred to align themselves with a narrower ethnic group rather than a broader South African identity. Such diaspora organizations that emerged during the 1970s included the South African Jewish Association of Canada (SAJAC), the Nirvana Society (created by Indian Hindus from South Africa) and the Canadian Chinese Association (South Africa) or CCASA.

Other South African immigrants sought, and still seek, to abandon the cumbersome burden of nationality and citizenship by recasting themselves as Canadians. Several of the respondents clearly eschewed a "South African" identity in favour of a Canadian identity. A founding member of one diaspora-based organization, for example, declared openly and somewhat contradictorily, that he considered himself to be Canadian, avoiding even the hyphenated tag of "South African-Canadian" or "Canadian-South African." Other participants used the term "ex-South African" to define their current identity and association with their country of birth. The social and economic integration of South African immigrants into Canada was facilitated by their remarkable professional achievements, and acquisition of Canadian citizenship and passports. A high proportion of South African immigrants have obtained Canadian citizenship and relinquished that of South Africa. The National Household Survey of 2011 (Statistics Canada 2014) showed that 83 % of permanent residents from South Africa had acquired Canadian citizenship and 73 % had renounced their South African citizenship.

In contrast to those supportive of the apartheid regime or wishing to distance themselves by disavowing a South African identity, a small group of South African immigrants – consisting largely of "coloured" and Indian exiles – formed the first Canadian chapter of the ANC in Toronto during the late 1960s, and organized public campaigns in the city to boycott South African goods (Hope 2011). Funding, equipment and other forms of support were provided by a smaller section of South African immigrants through the Forum Club and the Toronto-ANC committee to the Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College in Tanzania (Mogadime 1998). The South Peninsula High School alumni group raised funds for several local schools near Cape Town. The Desmond Tutu Fund collected donations for families of political detainees in addition to providing supporting programmes in selected township schools. Other diaspora individuals campaigned against the apartheid regime through groups such as Health Watch South Africa, Pan-African Congress and Black Consciousness Movement of Azania while others participated in Canadian anti-apartheid solidarity networks (Hope 2011).

The problematic dynamics of the apartheid era arguably exercised an unstable effect on the longevity and stability of diaspora groups after 1994. Broader formations with an explicitly "South African" identity saw uneven participation by different groups (Meono 1981). Old, now defunct, diaspora groups like the National Association of South Africans in Canada and the South African-Canada Association

had involved some, but not all, South African racial groups. Many of the existing diaspora groups and organizations lent initial token support for the formation of a unified, all-encompassing entity, like the Canadian Council of South Africans. But they had limited success functioning collectively and eliciting the extensive participation of all sections of the various South African communities in the Greater Toronto Area.

Other diaspora-based collectives in Ontario have faced related challenges and obstacles. First, membership in alumni groups associated with South African educational institutions, for example, have been skewed in favour of white South Africans; itself a reflection of the unequal access of racial groups to educational opportunities (Beck 2014; Bunting 2002). Second, the small size of certain racial groups among the South African immigrant population in Ontario has also contributed to this lopsided reality. Third, many newer immigrants who arrived after 1990 are highly dissatisfied with conditions in contemporary South Africa and have little interest in diaspora engagement (Crush et al. 2013). And fourth, the enthusiasm of older diaspora members who were opposed to apartheid has declined somewhat as the elation over apartheid's termination has been replaced by disappointment over the performance of successive ANC governments and the persistence of inequality and poverty in South Africa.

Some black and other "non-white" South Africans in Canada have forged new identities and solidarities with pan-African groups and organizations since the end of apartheid. One recent initiative is the African Diaspora Association of Canada (ADAC) which was co-founded in 2005 by South African and Ethiopian diaspora organizations – the South African Rainbow Association (SARA) of Ottawa and AHEAD (the Association for Higher Education and Development). ADAC seeks to unite all African diaspora associations or groups in Canada in order to mobilize resources for the benefit of all African countries. The term "African diaspora" as used by ADAC encompasses immigrants from Africa and those of African descent from geographical areas such as the Caribbean. Similarly, the South African founder of a Toronto-based philanthropic group indicated that she relied on the steady support of the broader African diaspora and other minority immigrants from Caribbean countries for various activities of her organization.

In spite of the enduring tensions and divisions documented above, a section of the diaspora has continued to be strongly connected to South Africa (Crush et al. 2013). Several of the key board members and functionaries of the now inoperative Nelson Mandela Children's Fund-Canada (NCMF), which was the most high-profile Canadian philanthropic organization involved with South Africa for well over a decade, were earlier involved with Canadian anti-apartheid solidarity networks in Ontario. In general, older immigrants who arrived before the 1990s are far more conspicuous in the cohort of engaged diaspora members than post-1990 arrivals from South Africa.

Philanthropic Practices of Diasporas

Following Tatla (2009: 32), philanthropy is understood here as "private giving for public causes" and "non-profit undertakings of a social welfare nature." Who among the South African diaspora in Ontario gives, to which institutions and projects, at what specific locations, and with what motivations are all to a great extent determined by the complicated histories, incongruent identities and interactions between Canada and South Africa. Four distinct forms of philanthropy can be identified with some overlap: Canada-centred philanthropy, faith-based philanthropy, South Africa-focused philanthropy and South-focused philanthropy.

Canada-Centred Philanthropy

The interests, choices and priorities of philanthropists define the social sectors and institutions that receive attention and funding (Illingworth et al. 2011; Young and Shih 2004). The largest financial contributions and sustained involvement by the wealthiest South African immigrants have been to Canadian causes through national and local charitable organizations. The most visible example has been the financial contributions of the Cockwell family to education, health and cultural projects in the Greater Toronto Area. Modest funds have been provided to the University of Cape Town through scholarships in nursing and athletics, but the largest part of the family's high-profile, public donations and philanthropic interests have been directed to Canadian organizations and institutions. Group Chairperson and Director of Brookfield Asset Management companies, Jack Cockwell, and his family have given well over CAD18 million to various Canadian organizations. By 2008, they had donated CAD11.5 million in lifetime contributions to Ryerson University, including a CAD5 million endowment to the Nursing School that was renamed after Cockwell's late mother Daphne Cockwell (Macleans 2008). Other notable gifts by this family include CAD5 million to the Royal Ontario Museum, more than CAD500,000 to the United Way and CAD250,000 to York University (Holloway 2006). The Brookfield Partners Foundation has also donated to various large and small community initiatives. The United Way has been a long-time national charity partner, receiving more than CAD2 million for its programmes through employee and matching grant contributions (United Way 2011). Other family-based charitable institutions that have donated to well-established Canadian organizations include the Kadey Family Charitable Trust and Stephen Pincus Charitable Foundation. Beneficiaries include the Canadian Cancer Society, United Way of Greater Toronto and Sick Kids Foundation.

Another form of Canada-centred philanthropy is directed towards local social projects in areas where immigrants reside. Here too, the most prominent engagement is by elite immigrants who have donated their own funds or leveraged additional monetary resources for selected projects through their social and corporate

networks. A case in point is Ian (a sibling of Jack Cockwell) and June Cockwell and their contributions to various endeavours in Oakville. Residents since 1982, they have designated "philanthropy in Oakville" as their main objective, despite acknowledging the "formative influences" of South Africa on their lives: "In our case, it seems you can leave Africa, but Africa never leaves you" (Cockwell 2014). They have been board members of several local organizations and contributed to their programmes. They have donated more than CAD10 million to the Oakville Hospital Foundation (OHF) through the Daphne and William Cockwell Oakville Hospital Fund and their family foundation Amarna (Inside Halton 2011, 2012; Oakville Hospital Foundation 2012). A former high-ranking executive of the Brookfield Asset Management Corporation, Ian Cockwell also helped raise CAD1 million through the Brookfield Foundation for the OHF (Oakville Hospital Foundation 2011). They have established an endowment fund aimed at local projects with the Oakville Community Foundation, which supports the activities of some 190 Canadian non-profit organizations (OCF 2012). June Cockwell is also the founder and coordinator of HIPPY Oakville, a charitable organization that provides a free pre-school programme for children from vulnerable families.

Faith-Based Philanthropy

The impact of religious values on patterns of social giving is well-established (Anand 2003; Dusenbury and Tatla 2010; Independent Sector 2002; Tobin 2009). Identities delineated through faith-based affinities and obligations have shaped another philanthropic trend associated with the South African diaspora in Ontario. Some of the most active forms of civic engagement are associated with the South African Jewish community in the Greater Toronto Area through organizations like SAJAC, Canadian Friends of the South African Chevrah Kadisha (CAFSACK) and Chai South Africa. Thanks to the generous patronage of wealthy South African Jewish benefactors in Ontario, SAJAC provides financial support for university or college-level education to disadvantaged Jewish students of South African descent in Canada. Assistance for broader Jewish causes and institutions in Canada such as the UJA Federation and United Jewish Appeal of Metropolitan Toronto is also noticeable. Family-based foundations such as the Kadey Family Charitable Trust and Stephen Pincus Foundation have donated on several occasions to these institutions. There is also evidence of assistance for programmes and institutions tied to the Jewish community in South Africa. For example, CAFSACK collects donations for the Johannesburg-based Chevrah Kadisha, the oldest religious welfare organization in South Africa. Another is the King David School Foundation, which solicits support from Canadian alumni of this Johannesburg-based private school for Jewish children. Or again, Chai South Africa collects donations for some 15 institutions serving the Jewish elderly and disabled in Cape Town, Johannesburg, Pretoria and other South African cities.

A different example of faith-based diaspora philanthropy is the International Development and Relief Foundation (IDRF). Diverse Muslim communities in Ontario, especially South African Muslim immigrants, have raised funds for various IDRF programmes, rooted in religious principles of *zakah* or *zakat* (voluntary contributions of share of income based on financial means), *fitrah* and *sadah* (donations given around Ramadan). In addition, faith-driven empathies have influenced the selection and choice of intermediaries for financial assistance. IDRF's current programmes include environmental conservation, maternal health, computer training for orphans, and water and sanitation projects in Botswana, Zambia and Tanzania.

South Africa-Focused Philanthropy

A diverse range of groups and organizations participate in South African projects, with varying intensity, regularity and objectives. A detailed analysis of these groups and forms of philanthropy is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, this form of giving has several noticeable characteristics including the role of key diaspora actors; the use of personal and professional networks for fundraising and selection of beneficiaries; and the strong engagement of non-diaspora Canadians. A profound connection with post-apartheid South Africa, firm commitment to its future, and confidence in state institutions are central elements in this type of philanthropy.

In collaboration with several Canadians from anti-apartheid solidarity networks, former ANC fundraiser-activist Zeib Jeeva founded the Nelson Mandela Children's Fund (NMCF)-Canada after Mandela's visit to Canada in 1998 (Siddiqui 2013; Friesen 2014). Until 2011, this high-profile organization designed programmes for Canadian school children and youth, and raised funds for NCMF's activities in South Africa. During the mid-1990s, Jeeva also helped to revitalize IDRF and direct its activities to projects in Southern Africa. Renowned physicist Neil Turok, head of the Perimeter Institute in Waterloo, set up the African Institute of Mathematical Sciences (AIMS) in Cape Town in 2003 in collaboration with six international universities to enhance African initiatives in mathematics and science training (Faruqui 2012; Phillips 2012; Ross 2012, 2014). AIMS has now expanded to three other locations (Cameroon, Ghana and Senegal) with sizeable donor funding.

Marcia and Henry Blumberg were awarded the Vice-Chancellor's Medal in 2011 to honour their longstanding and numerous contributions to the University of Cape Town (UCT) through the UCT Foundation (UCT Alumni News 2011). Besides expanding the foundation from an informal network to a formal charitable organization, they organized regular fundraising events for nearly 20 years to support student bursaries, health sciences, education outreach and theatre-based projects. In 2007, they established the Harry & Marcia Blumberg Law Prize, a bursary to aid undergraduate law students at UCT. They have also raised funds through their family-based Blumberg Foundation for an arts programme for children from deprived communities in the Barrydale farming area of Western Cape.

The respondents cited numerous, sometimes overlapping, reasons and catalysts for their involvement in giving to South Africa: altruism, supporting the work of friends, a professional background in fundraising along with past philanthropic work, and the expansion of social (and in some cases, business) networks through such practices. A private meeting with Nelson Mandela motivated South African-born Toronto restaurateur Peter Oliver to engage the Leacock Foundation in the Get Ahead Project (GAP) supporting schools in Queenstown and Whittlesea in South Africa's Eastern Cape province. Carole Adriaans and Sabra Desai said that the scarcity of "gender-focused" engagement provided the impetus for South African Women for Women and Zenzele development organizations. Others, like Mark Canes who is associated with the Canadian Southern African Network, saw engagement as "giving back" and as "gratitude for having received a good start in South Africa when millions could not in that country." A strong predisposition toward altruistic activities and continuing association with South Africa are shared underlying elements. In selected instances, social ties with the country were reinforced through their philanthropic activities. These diaspora members were largely optimistic in their assessment of South Africa, although mistrust of South African state institutions and the quality of governance is common. This affects their choice of beneficiaries.

The scale, visibility and success of these initiatives largely depend on the Canadian social-professional standing and reputation of the key diaspora individuals that lead and drive such groups. These individuals, rather than a broader section of the South African diaspora, are the strategic drivers of diaspora philanthropy. This form of individualized diaspora-based altruism differs markedly from other diasporas, where a significant segment contribute to philanthropic activities (Orozco 2003, 2007; Orozco and Garcia-Zenello 2009). For fundraising, these actors draw on their personal and professional networks within Canada rather than the broader South African immigrant community. A Canadian, non-diaspora component is therefore unusually prominent in South Africa-focused philanthropy, particularly in terms of financial contributions and fundraising. Pragmatism and convenience may well have guided the decision to rely on such networks, although several groups highlighted the difficulties of engaging other South Africans in Ontario to contribute. A non-diaspora group raising funds for a large Canadian philanthropic organization with social programmes in Southern Africa said that attempts to engage wealthy South African residents had been a dismal failure. Another noted: "We expected the most response from the South African community but we were very disappointed because they were the least interested in the project though we are not trying to say the obvious. There can be many reasons why people don't want to help out. There are lots of good causes and maybe people have really moved on and consider Canada to be their home now."

Conclusion

The emotional and social bonds that diasporas maintain with their countries of origin is the dominant idea underlying the diaspora and development nexus. However, this optimistic assumption discounts the often complicated relationship between diasporas and their countries of origin. Immigrant communities do not necessarily identify with the geographical contours of the nation-state or even characterize themselves as a "diaspora." The extended immigration histories of South Africans in Canada and the creation of this atypical diaspora in Ontario provide evidence of this intricate scenario.

South Africans who migrated to Canada were never a homogeneous group, separated by class, race and ethnic differences as well as attitudes towards apartheid. The continuation of this discriminatory regime until 1994, and recent arrivals who reject the post-apartheid order, have preserved these strains and fissures in diaspora-formation, disrupting the creation of a unified group based on a common South African identity. These disparities and dense relationships have also assumed significance in the philanthropic practices of South Africans immigrants in Canada. The potential of a wealthy cohort capable of donating and leveraging massive funding for South African social causes has not translated into reality.

Philanthropic engagement is neither absent nor insignificant within the South African diaspora in Ontario but is often channelled to beneficiaries in Canada itself. However, the role of a smaller cohort still connected to their country of birth is vital in philanthropic engagement with South Africa. In some cases, we see the presence and influence of former political exiles and anti-apartheid activists. In others, those with a strong interest in philanthropy have utilized their social and professional networks to contribute to worthy causes, often through intermediaries. The non-diaspora Canadian component is often much stronger than the collective involvement of South Africans. The absence from philanthropy of newer immigrants and second and third generation immigrant South Africans poses a formidable challenge to the future of South Africa-directed diaspora philanthropy in Ontario.

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Chapter 6
Unpacking the (Diasporic) Nation: The Regionalized and Religious Identities of the 'Indian' Diaspora

Huzan Dordi and Margaret Walton-Roberts

Introduction

From India's independence in 1947 to the 1980s, the Indian government appeared averse to interacting with the Indian diaspora. India's first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, was ambivalent towards Indians residing overseas, in part due to his sentiment that loyalty should be directed to the home rather than the host society (Dickinson and Bailey 2007; Kapur 2010; Pillai 1969; Tharoor 2007). In the 1980s, however, the former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi felt that utilizing the financial resources and expertise of Indians residing in the developed world could be an asset in realizing his vision of a strong and technologically emerging India (Sharma 2012). Despite seeking the help of overseas Indian technocrats like Sam Pitroda (a US citizen who was commissioned by Rajiv Gandhi in 1987 to help develop India's telecommunications policy), the Indian government's formal engagement with the diaspora remained limited until the early 1990s.

At that time, India faced a financial crisis precipitated by the Gulf War of 1990–1991, the related increase in oil prices, significant costs to repatriate thousands of Indian workers in the Gulf, and the loss of their financial remittances. This drained the Indian exchequer of foreign reserves, and revealed to India the increasing economic importance of its diaspora (Ganguly 2003; Kapur 2010; Khadria 2008). This crisis resulted in the central government's decision to liberalize its economy. India

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thus emerged from the clutches of a socialist economy with its market pried open, a hefty loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), an embittered public and a realization that the nation's diaspora might be a lifesaver for the anaemic Indian economy (Lee 2010; Pandey et al. 2004).

Compared to China's highly effective diaspora engagement in terms of promoting direct investment, the Indian government has arguably yet to realize the full potential of its diaspora (Lee 2010). India benefits immensely from the diaspora's remittances (USD72 billion received in 2013, making India the largest remittance receiving nation followed by China), and from knowledge and business transfers (Sharma 2012; Saxienian 2006). In financial terms, India has indeed created special designations for members of its diaspora in the tax code, creating the designation Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) (Edwards 2008). There have also been developments in citizenship law to create pseudo dual citizenship type affiliation for NRIs and Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs), in an effort to incorporate migrants and the second generation into India's sphere of interest (Rygiel and Walton-Roberts 2015). Recently, the government also introduced the much awaited "visa-on-arrival" system for citizens of 43 countries, including the UK and the US (PTI 2013).

Since the turn of the century the diaspora has become a fixed item on India's development agenda, moving from an object of historical and cultural marginality to a vital economic and political actor that the Indian government can utilize to enhance national interests. In 2001 this interest in the diaspora gained official mandate through the formation of a High Level Commission into the Diaspora in 2001 (Government of India 2001), and in 2004 a Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA); developments suggestive of an era of "diaspora diplomacy" (Rana 2009). In 2015 the Government of India replaced the 60-year-old Planning Commission for the NITI Aayog (National Institution for Transforming India), and one of NITI's objectives indicates how central the Indian diaspora population has become to the goals of the state: "Incorporate the significant geo-economic and geo-political strength of the Non-Resident Indian Community" (Prime Minister of India 2015). Such developments indicate how the diaspora and the state now share a symbiotic relationship in which the diaspora performs as an extension of the state in terms of economic, political and cultural activities (Walton-Roberts 2003; Gamlen 2008).

This chapter assesses diaspora engagement in the case of India by problematizing the very idea of an "Indian" diaspora. We maintain that in order to appropriately conceptualize how and why national governments interact with their diasporas, it is necessary to challenge an undifferentiated view of the diaspora as merely an extension of some singular national unit, when in fact the more salient social, economic and political diaspora processes are nested at other scales and sources of affiliation and are mediated through different axes and intersections of identity. Diasporas have been examined as both essentialized and bounded to a specific state or ethnic identity, or unbounded and fluid or nomadic amalgams. Rather than adopting this binary distinction of bound/unbound, essential/fluid, Mavroudi (2007: 467) argues that we need to understand diaspora as a process, one "that is able to examine the dynamic negotiations of collective, strategic and politicised identities based around

constructions of ‘sameness’ and the homeland, as well as individual identities that are malleable, hybrid and multiple.”

This approach suggests that we understand diaspora as a continuum running between essentialized and fluid. In this chapter we highlight some important issues that contribute to the fluid and flexible dimensions of diaspora because it is our view that this aspect of diasporas has not been given significant attention within the diaspora-development debate. These distinctions are relevant to policy effectiveness in diaspora engagement. To that end, we begin with an overview of the country’s complex migration history, which is itself a temporal process of diaspora formation, and we illustrate the practical relevance of temporal processes by highlighting the case of Punjab. We then explore four further axes of difference that we consider important for understanding diaspora formation (region, gender, caste and religion) and consider how these differences inform diasporic engagement policies in the case of India.

Phases of Diaspora Formation

According to the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, India has the second-largest diaspora in the world after China, estimated at 22 million people (Murti 2013) (see Fig. 6.1). The overseas Indian community is the result of different waves of migration over hundreds of years, driven by a complex variety of forces: mercantilism, colonialism and globalization. The British and Portuguese period of colonization instigated more limited inward migration of Europeans but, more significantly, it



Fig. 6.1 Global distribution of the Indian Diaspora (Source: Based on Ministry of Indian Overseas Affairs Data on Indians Overseas as of 2012. Cartography courtesy of Pam Schaus Wilfrid Laurier University)

initiated a substantial outward migratory process to other parts of the colonial empire (Cohen 1995). For a century from the 1830s, over 1 million contract and indentured labourers migrated from India to 19 colonies and plantations, including Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, South Africa, Mauritius, Fiji and Suriname (UNESCO nd). These societies are today complex cultural communities that the Indian "emigrant state" (Gamlen 2008) recently inventoried in order to register the networks and capacities they might offer the "homeland" (Government of India 2001). Indian traders and professionals also immigrated to other parts of the British Empire, including Kenya and Uganda, under the free passage system (Sharma 2012), creating another node of connectivity to both India and sites of onward migration such as the UK (Bhachu 1996). During the 1900s, the emerging legal immigration frameworks of Australia, North America and Europe were fundamentally racist in character in their determination to link race to nation (Mongia 1999), yet colonial connections did lead to the formation of Indian communities globally (Madhavan 1985).

Post-colonial migrations marked another important juncture in understanding the diversity of the global Indian diaspora. After India's independence in 1947, many Indians (and Pakistanis) immigrated to western nations, particularly the UK and the US. As India was a member of the British Commonwealth, Indians were able to emigrate there. Since the 1960s, the labour class has given way to a group of highly skilled Indian immigrants who have taken advantage of many OECD countries' liberalized immigration policies (Oommen 1989). The oil boom in the 1970s also led to a large-scale immigration of Indians to Middle Eastern countries such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain (Khadria 2008). In the past 20 years, India has experienced the emigration of an increasingly skilled and professional class of migrant that has responded to competition among receiving nations for skilled professionals (Tharoor 2007; Kapur 2010). A new class of highly-mobile Indian professionals working in the service and IT industries has also developed, evidenced in the fact that Indians are the top recipients of the US's temporary H-1B visas each year (Chan 2013).

This interest in skilled labour is also evident in the case of international students, the "semi-finished human capital" that is being integrated into several high income nations' labour markets as a ready pool of workers (Khadria 2001). The current international migration system with its focus on skilled migrants can even be seen to inform Indian domestic policy making. The recently formed National Skills Development Corporation (NSDC) in India will oversee and promote private sector initiatives in skills development training in order to train 500 million people by 2022 (NSDC 2010). The rhetoric of this Indian policy direction suggests earlier concerns with brain drain and the loss of skilled migrants has shifted to a more active embrace of the potential benefits of servicing the demand for skilled labour overseas, by effectively choosing to "cater to the skill deficits in other ageing economies, thereby effectively leveraging India's competitive advantage and harnessing the country's edge in having a higher proportion of the population comprising of young people" (Ramachandran 2009). In this regard, the new phase of migration from India might be a more conscious labour export model, but in achieving that

goal the central state will also nurture and build its diasporic community linkages to create networks to build skills capacity in India. The degree to which such diaspora linkages interact with global processes of neoliberal market-led development raises important questions, and one of them is what influence will the regional characteristics of the Indian diaspora play?

Region or Nation: Multiple or Overlapping Allegiances?

The makeup of the contemporary Indian diaspora is as diverse as India itself. Indians now emigrate from a land of 29 states and eight union territories, with each exhibiting different histories, customs, traditions and languages. However, out-migration is not evenly spread across India, and certain regions have developed distinct and robust migration networks or cultures of migration that draw upon different social groups unevenly (Madhavan 1985; Walton-Roberts 2004). Depending on the social context, migrants might associate themselves with the region of the country from which they emigrated before they identify as Indian. We examine regional difference within the diaspora because spatial differences shape where diasporic investment is focused, the social groups that form around collective investments and which institutions are best placed to activate and engage the diaspora and scale-up any successful initiatives (Bhat and Laxmi Narayan 2010; Sahoo and Bhat 2005; Walton-Roberts 2011).

While there is merit in sketching a national overview of diaspora formation, it is at the regional level that we can fully appreciate how India's diasporas were formed, what factors framed their exit from the country, and how those communities might remain connected with their local and national sites of origin through polices of engagement. Regional state-based associations and governments started to coalesce around the diaspora long before the Indian central government began targeting their financial and social potential. Indeed, when the central government began in earnest to make the case for formal diaspora engagement through its High Level Commission on the Indian Diaspora (Government of India 2001), it took the lead from already established regional (sometimes transnational) diasporic organizations. The Telugu diaspora, for example, started the Andhra Maha Sabha in 1994 in Durban (Bhat and Laxmi Narayan 2010). Kerala's Non-Resident Keralites Affairs Department (NORKA) was set up by the Government of Kerala in 1996 (Norka Roots nd). Punjab also developed its official Non-Resident Indian Sabha Punjab in 1996 (Mehra 2010), and the Gujarati diaspora is well known for its vibrant transnational networks (Bhat and Laxmi Narayan 2010). For example *Chalo Gujarat* ('on to' or 'let's go' Gujarat) is an annual conference organized by the Association of Indian Americans of North America (AIANA) in a city with a significant Gujarati population (Bhatia 2012).

Such gatherings present the opportunity for diaspora entrepreneurs, investors, actors and artists to gather under one roof and forge links and networks. The most recent example of this powerful diaspora influence relates to the election of the

government of Narendra Modi. The Bharatiya Janata Party-led National Democratic Alliance won a decisive victory in 2014 over the Congress, heralding a new era in Indian politics. It was widely understood that the Gujarati NRI community was a major backer of Modi for Prime Minister (De Sarkar 2014). Working with political parties and government officials in Europe and the US, predominantly Gujarati immigrants drew on the enormous financial power of Gujarati and other NRI businesses to place their clout behind Modi (News Wala 2014; De Sarkar 2014).

The cultural familiarity of specific diaspora groups is therefore not so much an abstract Indic entity, but spatially and socially grounded in regional attachments (Walton-Roberts 2011). Diasporas with a profound sense of regional identity give back to India not based on an affiliation to the country, but rather to community or the *pind* (village/community) (Walton-Roberts 2003), or city (Blunt and Bonnerjee 2013). Community (territorially and otherwise constructed) assumes priority over the state, or the country. This is evident for the overseas Sikh/Punjabi population, and the Keralite diaspora, who use *nadu* (community/place of residence) as a way of drawing sentimental value "back-home" (Osella and Osella 2008). For Keralites the concept of *nadu* is very narrow; it does not evoke feelings of attachment towards India or even Kerala, but the specific village, town or city they call home. For Keralites cities like Dubai and Riyadh are often culturally closer to them than New Delhi due to the diasporic populations that reside there. As Osella and Osella (2008) state, the Indian nation-state is a matter of formal structures (visas, residency and regulations) rather than cultural affiliation and identity. As a result, the Keralite diaspora is more likely to concern itself with the policies and regulations of Kerala and their extended transnational enclaves before that of New Delhi. Each regional diaspora has been formed through a multitude of spatial and temporal processes. To that end, we explore the case of Punjab in more detail to illustrate how the regional context of diaspora formations might inform the nature of diasporic engagement.

Punjab in the north west of India is a region defined by a well-developed migration culture. Punjabis, together with Gujaratis and Keralites, are seen as archetypal Indian migrants who have ventured overseas in pursuit of opportunity and their migration opportunities shape and are shaped by their cultural identities (Madhavan 1985; Kurien 2002). Traditionally, emigration from the state of Punjab has been disproportionally drawn from *Jat* Sikh communities in central Punjab that have settled in major urban centres and suburbs in specific countries of destination such as the UK, US and Canada (Ballard and Ballard 1977; Mitra 2012; Walton-Roberts 2003). The emergence of this pattern of migration out of a specific part of Punjab can be partially understood by tracing the role of British colonialism in the integration of the region into the world economy through the rise of western education, improved transportation and intensification of agriculture (Talbot and Thandi 2004).

Beginning in the nineteenth century, three processes in particular contributed to the formation of a culture of migration for *Jat* Sikhs: canal colony construction, preferential land grants to *Jat* Sikhs, and the overrepresentation of Sikhs in the colonial military. The development of canal colonies in west Punjab began in 1886 as an attempt to irrigate high bar lands between the numerous rivers of the state, and led to substantial migration and "profound demographic changes" (Tatla 2004).

Increased agricultural production led to a rise in income in the canal colonies, so that by the turn of the nineteenth century agriculturalist families were able to afford to send family members overseas, but they also needed to maintain higher levels of income in order to protect land holdings. The British also exercised their preference to disproportionality enlist Sikhs into the colonial army because Sikhs were perceived as a "natural" militia "race" (Fox 1985; Walton-Roberts 2011). Military recruitment and preferential land grants reinforced each other as native cavalry regiments took advantage of colonial land grants (Buck 1906: 65). Enlisting in the Indian army provided opportunities for overseas migration (Sharma 1997). Many Sikh migrants gained employment as security personnel in colonial outposts such as Hong Kong and Shanghai, having secured these positions through their British military connections (Bhatti 2007). These networks were an important social resource the *Jat* landowning classes were able to use and reproduce due to their privileged position within the British colonial system (Ali 1988; Fox 1985; Tatla 1995).

The use of social resources to engage in migration became a vital factor in diasporic reproduction, as kith and kin sought the means by which to support each other's migration overseas. Such resources became increasingly important for Punjabi migrants because, by the turn of the twentieth century, the Canadian state had attempted to severely limit the growth of the Sikh community that had begun to settle there (Mongia 1999). During the interwar period, Canada prevented practically all immigration from India. However, the dominant pattern of migration from the 1970s until the late 1990s was community consolidation through family class migration to the larger metropolitan regions of western and central Canada (Walton-Roberts 2003). Access to Canadian immigration channels through family and spousal sponsorship represents a powerful form of social capital for those originally from Punjab (Walton-Roberts 2004). A similar process has been identified in the UK by the Ballards (1977), and Roger Ballard (2004). Diasporas can mobilize their social resources along lines of difference, and the historical and geographical formation of diasporas thus frames state-diaspora engagement with important consequences.

Distinct regional diaspora formations might be considered a disadvantage or mode of disengagement when it comes to building effective diplomatic or commercial links between immigrant sending and receiving states, especially if the diasporic community translates national issues through a specific regional lens that might exclude other regions of commercial significance (Walton-Roberts 2011). Diplomatically, the large Sikh population in Canada has also created challenges for India-Canada relations due to security issues linked to Khalistani separatists (Tatla 1999). Indeed this politics of homeland becomes reimagined in diaspora, so much so that it creates a whole new political terrain in diaspora that can push back at both the source and destination countries in its desires to remake the homeland (Gayer 2002). This "voice after exit" influence can destabilize international relations and curtail positive development-orientated diasporic engagement with the homeland (Newland 2010).

The depth of diasporic identification with the home region is also important to gauge because it has been found to inform patterns of philanthropic activity by Indian migrants (Dusenbery and Tatla 2009). For example, diasporic activities pro-

foundly influence the landscape in Punjab's villages through investments in infrastructure and health and education provision (Walton-Roberts 2003, 2004, 2005, 2009). Urban centres can also be remade through diasporic investment in real estate development (Bose 2007), or in rural centres through family disputes over land ownership (Walton-Roberts 2003; Taylor 2014). In both cases diaspora members act as powerful symbolic if not material channels for the globalization of property markets. Diasporic transformation of villages is aesthetically evident, since many villages in the migrant sending villages of the Doaba region ostentatiously display connectivity with overseas sites of settlement through water-towers in the shape of aeroplanes or kangaroos, and village gates that name prominent village families and their overseas locations (Taylor 2014; Walton-Roberts 2003; Sahoo and Bhat 2005). A great amount of diasporic donations are also aimed at religious places of worship (Dusenbery and Tatla 2009).

For the Sikh diaspora, localized philanthropic activity can express a longing for the homeland. Times change though, and the latest round of historical transformations in India linked to economic liberalization have arguably generated a new form of diasporic engagement for both the state and the diaspora that may erase or reduce these legacies of separatism in order to generate new identities aimed at economic opportunity (Singh and Singh 2014). In effect, temporal change encourages new diaspora processes to emerge, but such transitions do not simply layer smoothly one upon the other; rather the interfaces may be fractured and jagged, marked by differences within the diaspora.

Gender: Patriarchy Re-packaged

The identity of a migrant within the diasporic context is linked to the retention and transformation of cultural practices. This negotiation and re-negotiation of culture, family and community constructs different migrant identities (Samuel 2013). Indians, just like other immigrant groups, have to oscillate between the forced or perceived need to assimilate and the need to preserve "tradition". Women often face the additional difficulty of maintaining community cultural traditions, while also integrating into sites of settlement. They have to navigate between heritage, upbringing and the lifestyle of the host country, thereby traversing radically contradictory social settings and having contested identities.

The patriarchal and regressive practices of female feticide, insistence on a male child, dowry, and gender-based violence have been examined in the Indian diaspora (Costa-Pinto 2007). The issue of sex-selective abortions is a gendered practice that is also evident in diaspora (Fair 1996; Vogel 2012). Aulakh (2007) argues that the South Asian community's "obsession with boys is the same here [in Canada] as well…people have moved from India to Canada, but the mentality remains the same." By analyzing the census data of South Asian immigrant populations, Vogel discovers an unnaturally high rate of male births (Vogel 2012). Rather than the practice of feticide and sex-selective abortions coming to an end, this has been adjusted

in a Canadian context, where there is a cottage industry of pseudo medical advice for women who wish to have a male child (Aulakh 2009b). While migrating to a western country often warrants an altering of gender roles within the family, the strength of patriarchal laws and customs makes sure that those gender roles are adjusted to the whim of those in power (Virdi 2013). In one highly publicized case, Amandeep Kaur Dhillon, a 22-year-old Sikh woman, was killed by her father-in-law for flouting the norms of the family (Aulakh 2009a; Mandel 2009). Dowries and related issues do not subside simply because a family migrates from India to Canada.

There have been cases where civil society and diaspora groups have attempted to curtail patriarchy through legislative change (Walton-Roberts 2004), but processes tend to run ahead of the ability to limit negative gendered consequences. For example, transnational marriages have certainly advanced much more rapidly than the (transnational) legal framework has to control them. This is a significant area where the diaspora can promote some kind of effective bi-national dialogue to address transnational social justice issues, but the lack of activity is noticeable by its absence. In its place, law makers and police officials in national systems are left to figure out what to do about transnational violations of gender rights, be it through cases of marriage fraud, patriarchal murders or sex selection. The transnational translation of human rights issues is a complex process (Rajaram and Zararia 2009). While the Indian government has made inroads in regards to certain forms of diaspora connection, it has made fewer advances in discussing salient issues of transnational patriarchy and gender violence.

Caste and Religion

As the Indian diaspora grew in numbers, so did the bifurcations between members in regards to caste, creed and colour. As identity (both religious and ethnic) becomes increasingly important, caste becomes more valuable and therefore more entrenched in diasporic society. To understand the fluidity of overseas Indians through caste, it is important to comprehend the idea of caste – one that is an important mechanism of social capital abroad, but also synonymous with human-rights violations and nepotism. The Indian diaspora considers caste and creed based institutions as legitimate ways of networking with a similar kind of Indian while exploring financial, social and cultural opportunities. Institutions like the Iowa Malayalam Association, Patidar Samaj, Texas Brahman Association, Gujarati Samaj of Austin, and New Jersey Tamil Sangam are examples of caste-based associations.

Within the diaspora, historically, divisions of caste were not commonplace, as newly-arrived immigrants formed relatively small communities, where issues of religion, caste and class were largely ignored in order to survive in an alien culture (van der Gaag 2005). Over time, as the Indian diaspora grew in number and felt more settled in society, divisions of caste started to appear and become more concrete. Several sub-groups, castes and sub-castes started to develop *samaj* and *sabhas* as a familiar place for co-caste groups to gather (van der Gaag 2005). These

samaj and *sabhas* became a meeting ground exclusive to people belonging to a certain caste. Functions and conferences would be hosted where people belonging to the same caste would network and exchange ideas (van der Gaag 2005). Being included (or excluded) in these institutions propagated (or hampered) employment opportunities and chances to move upwards in the social sphere.

Several caste-based groups, such as the Brahmin Society of America, the Rajput Association of America and Patidar Samaj, continue to exist in the United States. In Atlanta, the Patidar Samaj of Gujarat held a meeting that drew 4,000 people and resulted in 100 marriages (van der Gaag 2005). Diaspora members are also inclined to employ and conduct business with people of their own caste, rather than people of other castes. These associations have often tried to reach out to India by inviting influential business executives, politicians and artists to attend and endorse their functions (Asian Media USA 2012). The role of the Indian government in connecting with such caste-based institutions has yet to be assessed, but it does suggest that these cultural forms of identity may frame state-diaspora interaction and structure the development outcomes of diaspora engagement in ways that segment and differentiate possible outcomes. Such transnational caste influences need to be examined both at the elite and subaltern level, reflecting power broking processes already at work domestically within India (Doron 2010).

While caste is seen as an important juncture of social networking, it has also been used to exclude and discriminate. India has often faced issues with caste-based discrimination and violence, and there is evidence of caste-based discrimination in the diaspora. Untouchables and Dalits residing overseas have reported facing immense prejudice and bigotry, and growing evidence of casteism led the UK to develop legislation that prohibits any discrimination on the grounds of caste (Ghildiyal 2013; Mukherji 2013). Caste and casteism therefore remain evident in the Indian diaspora. Devotees visiting temples are often asked about their "lineage", and entering the wrong temple is frowned upon (van der Gaag 2005). Well cited examples exist in the UK where the promotion of an Indian of a lower-class caste might be protested against by higher-class Hindus repelled at the idea of taking orders from a Dalit (Mukherji 2013). Consider the case of a British-born Dalit solicitor who was subjected to harassment and abuse from his higher-class colleagues (Ghosh 2013). Caste remains an important factor in the marriage process within the diaspora (Tuxen 2013). In the US, only 25 % of weddings take place across caste barriers (van der Gaag 2005).

The Indian government has long argued that discrimination based on race and caste is dissimilar. However, recently, the government admitted the presence of casteism as the country's "hidden apartheid" (Antaleva 2012; Mayrell 2012; Stackhouse 1999). After years of denying caste as a problem, it acknowledged that casteism is a deep-rooted problem in the country (Rajagopal 2007). The UK's recent push to amend the UK Equality Act to include caste-based discrimination has undercut India's long-held claim that caste prejudice was its internal matter, which it did not deem fit to discuss at international venues like the United Nations (Ghildiyal 2013). The Indian government, which is mostly comprised of politicians belonging to the higher castes, still vehemently resists any foreign intervention into caste-based

issues (Antelava 2012). For fear of upsetting the higher-class diaspora, India does not chide or blame its diaspora when instances of caste-based discrimination are uncovered (Antelava 2012). The interaction and engagement between the state and the diaspora in the matter of caste-based discrimination and violence is thus a key site for examining how diaspora engagement can act as a channel in reframing "internal" social problems as transnational or diasporic problems.

India contains an eclectic mix of religions and so, as a result, does the Indian diaspora. In certain cases, it is possible to talk of a person emigrating from India as part of the Indian diaspora, but also as part of the diaspora of his or her religion, such as the Hindu, Sikh or Jain diaspora. Both Tatla (1999) and Axel (2001) write about the Sikh diaspora as distinct from an Indian diaspora, while Vertovec (2000) and Biswas (2004) write about the Hindu diaspora. To further illustrate and examine this point we explore the Sikh-Canadian diaspora.

The Sikhs initially travelled to Canada as labourers and were given menial, dangerous jobs. By 1908, 5,000 Sikhs had migrated mostly to Western Canada, where they faced intense discrimination (O'Connell 2000). After India's independence in 1947, and the removal of racial barriers to immigration in Canada in 1948, Sikhs continued to immigrate in meagre numbers. While some Sikh-Canadians associate themselves with India the country, others identify more with their religion and region of origin (the Punjab) and even their *pind* (Tatla 1999; Walton-Roberts 2011). As mentioned earlier, many Sikhs who affiliate themselves with the diaspora feel apathy towards their connection with India and the Indian state due to issues linked to Khalistan and the fight for a Sikh independent homeland (Tatla 1999). While Canadian Sikhs might identify with certain cultural practices (religion and language) which emerged in India, they do not necessarily identify with the country. Instead, a complex form of diasporic imaginary may emerge that reflects forms of state-based violence active at the time of migrant exit (Axel 2002).

Several first and second-generation Sikh Canadians harbour resentment towards the Indian state for its brutal crackdown on Sikhs fighting for an independent Khalistan (O'Connell 2000). Many Sikhs were opposed to or apathetic towards the Khalistani movement until the government's attack on the Golden Temple in 1984. The subsequent anti-Sikh riots turned many Sikhs against the Indian state. The assault on the Temple, in particular, was interpreted as an act of sacrilege against the Sikh religion (Puri et al. 1999). As a result, many in the diaspora refused to identify themselves as Indians, and emphasized their Sikh identity (Johnston 2005). Moreover, many Sikhs showed no interest in any positive actions by the Indian government for they were gradually disengaging themselves from the identity of being "Indian".

As their political and economic clout has increased in Canada, the Sikhs have appealed to the Canadian government on numerous occasions to take a stand against brutalities committed by the Indian state towards Sikhs. In May 2010, two MPs, Sukh Dhaliwal and Andrew Kania (who represent the Punjabi-dominated constituencies in Surrey and Brampton), introduced an "anti-India" petition in the House of Commons (Singh 2008). This act would mean that Sikh-Canadians would no longer

have to place their official origin as Indians, but as Punjabis or Sikhs, which would be a distinct move away from belonging to India.

Therefore, the Sikh diaspora strives to portray itself as Sikh, not as members of the Indian diaspora, albeit much to the chagrin of the Indian government. While Sikh Canadians might not associate themselves with India, they do associate themselves with the region/village/city in which they were born, or resided, and this territorial association continues to frame the nature of diasporic engagement with the "homeland". Sikhs engage in philanthropy whereby they donate capital and build schools and temples in the Punjab. Echoing back to the idea of the *pind*, Sikhs relate more to the village, city or region in which they grew up, rather than "India" (Walton-Roberts 2003; Dusenbery and Tatla 2009). Since many Sikhs living overseas maintain little connection to India, they are mostly apathetic or resistant to any overtures made by the Indian government, but hometown associations and the like are important points of transmission for development funds.

The Indian government is unlikely to achieve working relations with Sikh-Canadians without laying to rest the issue of Khalistan. While India does not face episodes of terror from militants raised in Canada and Britain as it once did, Sikh affiliation with Khalistan and distaste for the Indian government is still evident within the diaspora in Canada and, in some cases, has found resonance with the second generation (Nijhawan 2014). The movement may have become dormant in India, but it was kept alive internationally within parts of the Punjabi diaspora. As KPS Gill, the chief of Punjab Police who led counter-militancy operations in the 1980s, claimed, "The change in mindset, has not been transmitted to the diaspora" (Nolen and Stueck 2012).

Conclusion

The aim of this chapter has been to provide an overview of India's diaspora formation indicating some of the social and spatial complexities that frame our understanding of how diasporas might be engaged by the sending (and receiving) government. The Indian government has often sought the support of its 25-million-strong diaspora to attract investment, trade and political influence. Several authors have approached the Indian diaspora through a single lens – that of a distinct group of people shaped by similar cultures, traditions and history. However, like India, the diaspora is culturally and traditionally diverse. Therefore, rather than characterizing the Indian diaspora as a coherent homogenous whole, this chapter aims to bifurcate the diasporic formation along four axes – region, gender, caste and religion.

The chapter began by highlighting the emergence of the Indian diaspora as the second-largest diaspora in the world. We offered a brief history of the Indian diaspora through various forces like mercantilism, colonialism and post-colonialism, and globalization. By highlighting the tradition of Indian emigration we signalled the diversity of robust migration networks using the overlapping categories of region, gender, caste and religion. Regional differences within the Indian diaspora are one of the major factors that frame where and how diasporic investment and

philanthropy is focused. While the Indian central government has more recently reached out to diaspora associations, these associations had already coalesced alongside state and regional based affiliations and governments before they aligned with national ones.

Gender is an important and under-examined dimension of diaspora. The identity of diaspora communities in the India case is linked to the retention and transformation of cultural practices, which often stand upon the negotiation of culture, family and community constructs (Samuel 2013). We argue that patriarchal practices become transnational in the formation of diaspora communities, and some cultural norms may articulate to fit the sending country context. Key examples in the Indian context are dowries, domestic organization and female feticide, and exploration of these issues is deeply complicated and subject to sensitive debate regarding cultural racism and stereotyping (Terman 2010). There is a need for the diaspora to lead transnational social activism and forge more effective engagement between diaspora communities and sending and receiving states. The complex legislative context for transborder marriage alone demands much greater academic and social activism (Shandilya and Tiwari 2013; Lodhia 2010).

The third segment in this chapter discusses the emergence of caste and caste-based associations in the Indian diaspora. We stress that caste is often seen by the diaspora as an important and legitimate mechanism of social capital, while others see it as an old and prejudiced practice that has tagged along with overseas Indians. Several castes and sub-castes developed associations to provide a venue for people (of the same caste) to network and exchange ideas. These institutions vie to connect with the Indian state (and region) by inviting politicians, business executives and artists to publicize and endorse their associations. Caste has become a transnational issue though, now that countries such as the UK have included it as legitimate context for discrimination. How this process might "speak back" to the sending nation in terms of changing social practices and legislation is another area ripe for further analysis in terms of state-diaspora engagement.

The last segment of this chapter – religion – used the case of Sikh-Canadians to illustrate how cultural identities play a powerful role in shaping state-diaspora relations. While Sikhs have been immigrating to Canada from India for over 100 years, the tensions between the Indian government and those supporting the cause of Khalistan have framed diplomatic and community relations. While Sikhs emigrated from India, many refuse to be classified as Indian, addressing themselves as Sikh (a distinct and separate identity) citing tensions with the Indian government over the issue of Khalistan and the subsequent 1984 riots. The Sikhs have been shown to associate more with the *pind* (the region in which they resided before emigrating from India) than the country itself, and are more likely to conduct philanthropic activities in their respective *pinds*.

It is only in the last three decades that the Indian government has formally cultivated relations with its diaspora. While informal associations between overseas Indians and state governments existed before, the central government was late in catching on. The Indian government has come a long way from ignoring the diaspora to making it an integral part of its development agenda, and in the process there are multiple avenues for more detailed academic, policy and social activism work to occur.

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Chapter 7
Governing the Remittance Landscape for Development: Policies and Actors in Bangladesh

Mohammad Moniruzzaman

Introduction

Despite a number of economic and financial crises and a series of economic downturns, international migration continues to rise. The transfer of money and goods back home by migrant workers in the form of remittances, has a profound influence on many middle- and low-income countries. Despite sluggish economic growth globally, developing countries received USD436 billion in remittances in 2014 (World Bank 2015a). These financial flows are predominantly going to low- and lower-middle-income countries (Table 7.1). There has been much policy debate about global migration governance, such as regulation of recruitment agencies – the intermediaries involved with migration – and regulatory frameworks to combat undocumented migration, migrant exploitation and trafficking. However, remittance governance issues rarely enter into the discussion, even though remittances are a critical component of the migration and development agenda.

Remittances have reshaped the landscape of global development finance by allowing poorer households to obtain higher living standards, contributing to poverty reduction, and easing foreign exchange constraints without incurring any indebtedness. Therefore, identifying how some forms of remittance governance can contribute to maximizing and sustaining development is an issue of significant policy interest. Remittance governance is currently driven by two issues: the functioning of stringent policies and financial regulations to combat terrorism financing and money laundering at global level; and policy initiatives to increase the flow of remittances and channel remittances from the informal financial system to the formal banking system (El-Qorchi et al. 2003; Lindley 2009; Passas 2006; Passas and Maimbo 2007). However, this does not adequately capture the full relevance of

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Table 7.1 Regional distribution of global remittances

Region	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
All developing countries	235	289	324	303	334	373	403	418
East Asia and the Pacific	58	71	85	79	95	106	107	113
Europe and Central Asia	37	51	45	32	32	38	46	52
Latin America and Caribbean	59	63	64	55	56	59	60	61
Middle-East and North Africa	26	31	36	34	40	43	49	49
South Asia	43	54	72	75	82	97	108	111
Sub-Saharan Africa	13	19	22	28	29	30	32	32
Low-income countries	20	25	22	21	24	28	31	33
Middle-income countries	215	265	302	281	310	345	372	385
High-income countries	76	86	133	115	120	133	130	139
World	317	385	457	418	454	506	533	557

Source: World Bank (2015a)

remittance governance to development issues, since policy intervention in order to turn remittances into productive investments hardly enters the remittance governance discussion.

Remittance governance should be conceptualized and understood as a process aimed at ensuring the proper functioning of remittance markets. It should involve designing and implementing policies to create a favourable investment climate, reducing transaction costs, improving financial intermediation, devising investment instruments, promoting financial inclusion, assuring the active involvement of state and non-state actors, the private sector and financial institutions to manage programmes and policies to pursue socio-economic development.

Drawing on the case of Bangladesh, one of the world's top ten major emigration and remittance receiving countries, this chapter examines remittance governance and demonstrates why policy efforts should focus on how to direct individual and collective remittances toward more productive investment through the promotion of financial inclusion for marginal groups. This chapter will also highlight some of the effective practices currently in place in Bangladesh that can be applied in other developing countries.

Why Remittance Governance?

There is a general consensus that remittances can exert a significant positive impact on development if the receiving countries' policies and institutions create the incentives to promote investment (Bobeva 2005; Iskander 2010; Natalia et al. 2009;

Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz 2009). Therefore, targeted policies to turn remittances into productive investment can influence their development potential. Migrants' remitting and investment decisions are influenced by a complex array of factors, such as altruism, return intentions, philanthropic motivation and emotional linkages to home countries. Policy interventions such as sound fiscal policy, liberal exchange rate and taxation policy can turn remittances into investment even when they are motivated by emotional connections and commitments to the homeland. As migrants are not usually professional investors or entrepreneurs, policy intervention should be innovative enough to provide a wide range of business support services, including adequate counselling. There are at least five ways remittance governance can leverage these flows for socio-economic development: reduced costs, financial inclusion of the marginalized, mainstreaming remittances into development finance, governing service providers in home and host countries, and policy coherence.

Reduced Costs

Remittances are largely small transactions made by mostly low-income migrants in destination countries. The costs associated with remittance transfers are a burden for migrants and act as a drag on their development potential. The urgency of initiatives to bring down costs is emphasized repeatedly in global forums, such as in the G8 Declarations at the Sea Island summit in 2004, Heiligendamm summit in 2007, Hokkaido and Tokyo summit in 2008, L'Aqulia summit in 2009 as well as the G-20 Declaration of Cannes in 2011. Despite these efforts, remittance costs remain high in many remittance corridors, which is a significant problem considering that cutting five percentage points could save more than USD16 billion dollars of migrants' hard-earned income (World Bank 2015b).

In the remittance market, minimal competition, poor technological support for payment and settlement systems, and excessive regulatory and compliance requirements are some of the reasons for high transfer costs (World Bank 2006). The development community has sought reductions in the transfer costs of remittances by promoting technological improvements to increase speed and convenience, and an increase in competitive and efficient markets. Reducing costs by developing financial infrastructure and facilitating more efficient transfer systems appears the most promising area for policy intervention. Other policy initiatives and regulatory reforms that offer promise include licensing liberalization, lowering capital requirements on remittance service providers (RSPs), increasing the participation of low-cost postal systems and other state-owned distribution alternatives, and allowing grassroot-level micro-finance institutions to become involved in payment services (World Bank 2006).

Financial Inclusion of the Marginalized

There is a growing recognition that financial development is an important condition for fostering investment, economic growth and poverty alleviation (Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz 2009; Levine 1997; Levine et al. 2000). Therefore "financial inclusion" as a strategy for financial development has garnered considerable attention globally. Migrant remittances are often the only financial transactions made by millions of households who have limited access to formal banking services. Research suggests that remittances can contribute to financial development through three channels: first, by increasing "financial literacy" in remittance-receiving communities, thereby promoting households' demand for and use of financial products, schemes and other services such as housing and consumer loans and insurance; secondly, by increasing the aggregate level of deposits and credit intermediated by banks, increasing the supply of loanable funds to the financial sector and thereby promoting greater financial inclusion; and, thirdly, by increasing funds in the capital market and through stock market capitalization (Aggarwal et al. 2011; Billmeier and Massa 2009; Brown et al. 2013; Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz 2009; Gupta et al. 2009; Terrazas 2010).

Remittances may foster economic growth through improved financial inclusion, but this cannot be achieved through laissez-faire practices without active policy intervention. The state is the most influential actor in enabling market-friendly institutional environments for financial development (Beck and Honohan 2008; World Bank 2013). Financial inclusion through remittances can be improved through public policies that encourage the expansion of rural banking networks, allowing domestic origin country banks to operate overseas, and facilitating the provision of remittance services by micro-finance institutions and more private sector financial institutions.

Mainstreaming Remittances into Development Finance

Migrant remittances are less volatile and sensitive to fluctuations of the global financial market than other forms of financial flows such as foreign direct investment, public debt and portfolio equity and overseas development assistance. During the last financial crisis remittances were remarkably resilient compared to the one-third drop in direct investment and the almost total collapse of private portfolio flows (Ratha 2009). Remittances helped many recipient countries to build up solid international reserves, offset trade deficits and reduce current account deficits. The recent surge in remittances, despite the sluggish growth of the global economy, has proved the welfare responsive nature of remittances during periods of economic crisis. Remittances are a shock absorber that serve as a hedge against macroeconomic crisis when development finance becomes volatile and disruptive, harming domestic liquidity, depressing currencies and complicating national foreign debt burdens.

While remittances have increased, overseas development assistance is declining globally and foreign direct investment is concentrated in countries such as China, Mexico, India and Brazil. These larger economic powers have some advantages compared to small economies in terms of their access to the market, their natural resource endowments, and vast supplies of low-cost labour. Capital-scarce developing countries, on the other hand, are highly exposed to the volatility of international capital markets. Given the chronic deficit of capital, remittances can be an attractive development strategy for developing countries, compensating for capital market volatility and supporting the receiving country with liquidity without creating liabilities. As remittances are unrequited transfers, they can substitute for development finance and insulate countries from global market fluctuations (Ebeke and Drabo 2010; Ebeke 2012; Grabel 2009; Kapur and Singer 2006; Shabbaz et al. 2008). While remittances are private transfers, appropriate policy interventions can influence remittance recipients' motivation to utilize them for investment in education, healthcare, and better housing. Innovative partnership schemes with home town associations can also support infrastructure projects such as health clinics, educational institutions and wider neighbourhood improvements.

Governing Service Providers in Home and Host Countries

Remittances are earned and saved in one region and spent in another. Therefore, remittance governance is a complex phenomenon that spans borders. Remittance Service providers (or RSPs) collect funds, mostly small amounts from migrants' globally, and transfer these to the migrants' home countries with fees. With some national variability, the fees are up to 20 % of the amount sent. Governance challenges in migrants' host countries where the remittances originate, and in the home countries where the payment system works, are significant. Migrants' consider the reliability, cost and convenience of payment systems at the recipients' end as well as the cost of remittance services on their side when making the decision to remit (Hernández-Coss 2005). Financial institutions and markets for remittances operate transnationally, while policy initiatives to attract and convert remittances into investments remain mostly national. Policy intervention can shape the market structure in the host country in such a way that migrants' can choose from a variety of safe and reliable remittance services. Although remittances are not subject to full control by any one government, states are key actors in formulating and adopting innovative strategies (Iskander 2010).

Policy Coherence

Many developing countries have developed policies to facilitate migration. These policies mostly aim to protect migrant workers by curbing recruitment abuses, regulating recruitment agencies and intermediaries, and setting standards for employment contracts and welfare services for migrants (Kuptsch 2006). In some countries, policies and mechanisms to curb recruitment are relatively advanced, while remittance governance policies are largely under-developed. This indicates the urgency for policies targeted at establishing a more liberalized remittance regime, for setting standards and developing infrastructure, and for designing remittance-linked products and programmes. To fulfil these objectives, prudent remittance policies are required and should be linked with migration policy, broader financial and institutional policies, as well as being embedded within national development strategies.

An opportunity and challenge for governments is to create flexible policies that manage migration and remittance services, both of which are complex and dynamic. One policy response to the phenomenon of increasingly large, wealthy and investment-oriented diaspora communities interested in home country development is the implementation of policies aimed at making the financial environment attractive. Such policy initiatives must be part of an effort to promote good economic governance structures more broadly.

The Remittance Landscape in Bangladesh

Labour market slack is a chronic problem for the Bangladesh economy. Thus, in a crude sense, exporting labour in exchange for overseas remittances has become a key source of foreign currency for the country. Over time, the country's dependence on remittances over aid has increased, which is widely considered a sign of migration's relative importance as a source of development finance (Fig. 7.1). In 1976, Bangladesh received only USD24 million through official channels. This figure increased to USD15 billion in 2014 (World Bank 2013). The share of remittances to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has also grown significantly, from 1 % in 1978 to more than 5 % in 1983, and more than 10 % in 2014. However, if the unrecorded flows of remittances were considered, the contribution to GDP would be even higher.

The remittance market in Bangladesh consists of official and unofficial RSPs such as commercial banks, money transfer operators (MTOs), foreign exchange houses, specialized banks, a wide range of commercial agents and financial institutions as well as the regulatory framework governing the remittance products. Like other remittance-receiving countries, state and non-state actors interact to shape the remittance market in Bangladesh. This section of the chapter describes this broader landscape.



Fig. 7.1 Flows of remittances, ODA and FDI to Bangladesh

Key Players in Remittance Governance

As the core regulatory body for the monetary and financial system, Bangladesh Bank, the central bank of the country, is also the key actor in remittance governance. The bank's foreign currency department supervises the operation of the overall remittances market. It is also engaged in formulating policies, setting guidelines, providing instructions and issuing circulars that require bank and non-bank financial institutions to meet service requirements. Private commercial banks, nationalized commercial banks and specialized financial institutions are the major RSPs. The banking sector has the highest (73 %) share in the remittance market (IOM 2009). A total of 47 banks have a wide network with 7,246 branches operating in the country. Initiatives for financial sector reform in the early 1990s liberalized the banking sector to permit the entry of new private banks and foreign banks, which led to greater competition (Ahamed 2012). The sector has witnessed significant changes over the last two decades in the expansion of retail locations, which has facilitated remittance service provision to more areas (Table 7.2).

The adoption of new technology and banking services by some of the large Micro-Finance Institutions (MFIs) has further reduced service delivery costs. These have influenced concentration and competition in the remittance market. Another policy initiative to allow nationalized commercial banks and private commercial banks to establish foreign branches and exchange houses in major migrant destination countries has also shaped the competition and payment system. Moreover, all the commercial private banks as well as nationalized commercial banks have made agreements with foreign banks and Western Union to smooth the transfer of remittances. Commercial banks are increasingly interested in targeting remittance services not only to capture financial flows, but also to utilize remittance channels for other financial services. However, despite these changes, the World Bank reports that only 3 % of accounts are used to receive remittances in Bangladesh (World

Table 7.2 Growth of financial institutions offering remittance services, 1975–2013

Banks	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2008	2013
Nationalized commercial banks	6 (1,442)	6 (3,375)	4 (3,346)	4 (3,545)	4 (3,611)	4 (3,616)	4 (3,393)	4 (3,386)	4 (3,449)
Specialized banks	2 (155)	2 (426)	2 (944)	3 (1,145)	5 (1,164)	5 (1,185)	5 (1,340)	5 (1,362)	4 (1,417)
Private commercial banks	–	–	8 (632)	10 (827)	13 (1,016)	27 (1,231)	30 (1,638)	30 (2,082)	30 (3,130)
Foreign banks	4 (14)	6 (19)	7 (21)	7 (22)	9 (22)	13 (33)	10 (41)	9 (56)	9 (63)
Specialized banks for migrant welfare	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1 (28)
Total	**12 (1,611)**	**14 (3,820)**	**21 (4,943)**	**24 (5,539)**	**31 (5,813)**	**49 (6,412)**	**49 (6,412)**	**48 (6,886)**	**47 (8,059)**

Source: Bangladesh Bank Bulletin reports
Note: Number of branches in brackets

Bank 2011). This suggests that, although the banking sector has been making changes to enhance remittance services, it has not been successful in attracting clients for regular products and other banking services.

Money Transfer Operators and Other Informal Channels

MTOs are specialized fund transfer agencies and have established an expansive network of agents, alliances and partnerships with banks in Bangladesh. For accessibility, convenience, network coverage and speed of transfer, Western Union and MoneyGram are widely used RSPs in the country. Despite relatively high service costs, MTOs are popular in the remittance market globally because, as non-depository institutions, they provide anonymity to the remitter and, unlike formal banking institutions, do not gather significant personal information from the customer. Therefore, remitters often feel more comfortable using these services, especially if their legal status in the destination country is not secure (Hernández-Coss 2005). In Bangladesh, despite the wide network of Western Union and MoneyGram (12,000 and 4,000 branches respectively), their market share is significantly lower than that of the banking sector. Existing data shows that 8 % of migrants remit money through MTOs (IOM 2009). Two possible reasons might be the low cost of remittance services at other nationalized banks and the extension of the services of the nationalized commercial banks to the migrant's country of settlement.

Despite the wide range of service options in the formal system, informal transfer agents, community-based arrangements (such as transfer through friends and relatives), in-kind remittances, *hawala* and *hundi* are popular outside the regulated financial domain. As in other south Asian countries, the *hundi* system operates in Bangladesh outside the formal banking system with little or no paper trail. Through this process, a payment is made by the migrants in their destination countries and usually within 24 h the recipients receive the money in local currency in their home countries through a local agent. These are popular transfer systems outside of the traditional banking system because of lower costs, potential anonymity of the remitter and receiver, and speed and convenience.

State and Non-state Actors, Public Policy and Regulatory Frameworks

A number of institutions such as the Ministry of Expatriates' Welfare and Overseas Employment, Bureau of Manpower, Employment and Training (BMET), Ministry of Finance, National Board of Revenue (NBR) are directly and indirectly engaged in remittance governance in Bangladesh. The Bangladesh government established the Ministry of Expatriates' Welfare and Overseas Employment as a separate

ministry in 2001. The ministry works for the welfare of migrants overseas. The BMET, a division of the Ministry of Overseas Employment and Expatriate Welfare, develops and designs new policies and procedures to monitor the functions of recruiting agencies. It also works to ensure welfare for overseas employees, assist migrants to secure their pay and compensation from overseas employers, compensates them in case of death, illness, or other problems encountered overseas. The Ministry of Finance, as well as NBR, plays a role in remittance governance. The Ministry's Bank and Financial Institutions division deals with legal and policy issues related to banks, non-bank financial institutions, capital markets and the micro-credit sector. Some other non-state actors and development NGOs are involved with migration and remittance governance through awareness-building campaigns to promote safe migration and remittance transfers, as well as in an advocacy role regarding migrant rights.

Several policy instruments are used to govern remittances in Bangladesh (Table 7.3). These regulatory instruments are largely ineffective in channelling remittances towards development. None of the policy instruments articulate specifically the strategies of an efficient and safe payment system, the utilization of state-owned financial infrastructure to provide the lowest possible price, broad access to payment services, appropriate and innovative investment instruments, and the inclusion of remittance governance issues in development planning.

Remittance Governance in Bangladesh

In Bangladesh, international migration and remittances have become a critical component of the development agenda. However, as this chapter has argued, there is a dearth of market-based economic policy tools and fiscal mechanisms specifically targeted at remittance governance. Some governance initiatives have achieved success in channelling remittances to the formal banking domain, reducing costs, promoting greater financial inclusion through low-cost mobile banking services, and engaging micro-finance institutions and these need to be highlighted.

Success in Cost Reduction

Remittances are cost sensitive and migrants will choose alternative informal channels when remittance costs are too high in formal channels (Aycinena et al. 2011; Freund and Spatafora 2008; Gibson et al. 2005). Even in the case of "charity" and "collective remittances", people tend to donate more when the cost of donating declines (Bakija et al. 2003; Cordes 2001; Glenday et al. 1986). More developed financial systems, less volatile exchange rates, liberal fiscal policy, good governance and flexibility in depository requirements are all factors that promote greater competition in the remittance market and lower the cost of remittance services (Freund

Table 7.3 Policy instruments on remittance governance in Bangladesh

Year of enactment	Policy instrument	Key components	Gaps
1947 (modified up to 1996)	The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947	Regulatory instrument to manage all kinds of foreign currency	Excessive restriction in buying, selling, conversion, possession of foreign currency by any person other than an authorized dealer
		Regulates dealings in foreign exchange, licensing, code of practice, the import and export of currency and bullion	No specific articulation of migrants' remittances
			Excessive regulatory and compliance requirement and not a market based approach
			No articulation on remittance market, competition among RSPs) and MTOs, payment and settlement system, and no guidelines to reduce remittance costs
2002	Wage Earners Welfare Fund Policy 2002	Guidelines to establish welfare fund using resources from migrants' subscriptions, levies on licenses of recruiting agencies, surcharges and the fees collected through the missions abroad and personal and institutional contributions	More focus on creation of welfare fund, not on the strategies to help remittance-receiving families for income generating activities
		Utilisation of funds for emergency assistance e.g. death and disability, assistance in forced repatriation, contract violation, pre-departure training, and assistance to migrants' families	Inadequate consideration of gender and groups in vulnerable settings
			Falls short in devising strategies to broaden access to the financial system

(continued)

Table 7.3 (continued)

Year of enactment	Policy instrument	Key components	Gaps
2006	Commercially Important Person (Non-Resident Bangladeshi) Selection Policy 2006	Outlines the special privileges for the migrants who send remittances above ceiling including priority in reserving seats in airlines, public transit, using special lounge and handling facility at the airport, priority in getting facility at government hospitals and invitation to different national programmes	Excessive focus on privileges, not on creating good investment environment for non-resident entrepreneurs
			No guidelines on facilitation to support business creation, leverage remittances in enterprise, creation of public institutions to provide services to CIP investors, favourable interest rates or reduced import duties to channel remittances to productive investment
2006	Foreign Employment Policy 2006	Overall migration management such as exploring overseas labour markets, setting standards for employment contracts and working conditions, wage protection, welfare services, reintegration of return migrants, strengthening institutional capacity and coordination among different public institutions and recruiting agencies	Emphasizes channelling remittances from informal ways to the banking system, without any clear goals and strategies to create competitive environment among RSPs and reduce service cost in formal channels
		Awareness building through information campaign for productive use of remittances in saving schemes, bonds and instruments	Entrance and capital requirements for newcomer RSPs, safe payment system etc. are not addressed
			Does not articulate the necessity for performance evaluation of different investment opportunities, instruments and bonds

(continued)

Table 7.3 (continued)

Year of enactment	Policy instrument	Key components	Gaps
2008	Special Privilege for Expatriate Bangladeshi Remitters Policy 2008	Privileges for remittance sender above ceiling e.g. education for migrants' children, priority in state-owned housing projects, priority in reserving seats in airlines, public transit, using the special lounge and handling facility at the airport, priority at government hospitals and invitation to different national programmes in foreign mission	Strategies and goals are not specified to create favourable investment climate, expand savings and investment opportunities
			No strategies to make migrant households' access easier to the financial universe.
2009 (Amended in 2013)	Anti Terrorism Act 2009,	Procedures to detect and prevent terrorist financing, monitoring suspicious domestic and international transactions, recording and reporting transaction, governing financial crimes, penalties for non-compliance	Over-surveillance and reporting requirements can be a barrier for entrance of the newcomer RSPs and hinder the competitive market environment
	Anti Terrorism (Amendment) Act 2013.		No articulation of strategies for efficient and safe remittance payment system, utilization of state owned financial infrastructure for payment services to reduce the cost
2012	Money Laundering Prevention Act (MLPA), 2012	Transaction surveillance and compliance monitoring, detection of suspicious transactions, investigation and trial, financial intelligence of central bank, suspicious transaction report	Stringent regulation, compliance requirements are burdensome and can drive out small scale RSPs. No strategy to design fiscal regimes to encourage new RSPs to enter into the market
			No guidance to improve the efficiency of remittance market and state-owned distribution alternatives

(continued)

Table 7.3 (continued)

Year of enactment	Policy instrument	Key components	Gaps
2013	Overseas Employment and Migration Act 2013.	Licensing, controlling and regulating recruitment agencies and employment intermediaries	Extensive focus on curbing abuse of recruiting agencies, not on RSPs and MTOs
		Guidelines for setting standards for employment contracts, working conditions, wage protection, welfare services for migrants, establishment of labour attaché in foreign missions, penalties for non-compliance with license conditions	No measures to foster competition, reduce the cost or provide safe and efficient payment system infrastructure

and Spatafora 2008). The reduction of transfer costs should therefore be one of the core objectives of remittance governance.

The presence of low-cost public payment infrastructure, networks of nationalized commercial and private commercial banks, extensive networks of MFIs and their market penetration, the extension of remittance services to the migrant's host country through domestic bank branches, and special arrangements with foreign banks have helped to foster cheaper, faster and more secure ways to send remittances to Bangladesh. Some of the remittance corridors in Bangladesh are the least costly in the world. For example, Singapore-Bangladesh is the world's cheapest corridor (World Bank 2015b). State-owned commercial banks have opened overseas branches and remittance counters in major remittance source countries to provide remittance services. Relaxation of the policy framework regulating these activities has had a significant effect on remittance costs in Bangladesh (Table 7.4). To make services convenient and inexpensive, overseas branches of the nationalized commercial banks use phone and ATM-based technologies that do not require the physical presence of the remitter in the branch. For example, Sonali Bank, offers this service through their London branch. These initiatives have created competition in the remittance market. While global MTOs such as Western Union and MoneyGram operate in Bangladesh with their extensive payment networks, their market share is not significant due to their high cost compared to nationalized commercial banks and other financial institutions.

Bringing Millions from the Unbanked to the Financial World

Migrants generally prefer informal transfer methods to avoid high transaction costs, exchange rate uncertainty and to maintain anonymity in light of their legal status in the host country. In many global remittance corridors, informal transfer systems are

Table 7.4 Comparative cost of remittance transfers to Bangladesh (in USD)

Remittance corridor	Western Union	MoneyGram	Nationalized commercial banks/service counter/exchange houses
US-Bangladesh	12.00	11.00	5.00
UK-Bangladesh	10.00	16.50	8.00
Canada-Bangladesh	20.00	–	5.00
Saudi Arabia-Bangladesh	6.70	6.00	4.00
Singapore-Bangladesh	4.50	4.50	3.80
Malaysia-Bangladesh	4.00	4.50	3.00
Kuwait-Bangladesh	3.60	3.60	3.00
UAE-Bangladesh	4.08	4.08	4.00

Note: Data collected using online price estimator of the MTOs, by contacting individual agents of banks' exchange houses within each corridor in January 2014. Transfer fee is calculated for first USD500

more reliable, accessible and convenient. Although, the distinction between formal and informal channels is questionable in terms of eventual impact 'on the ground', the informal remittance transfer system is clearly connected to financial exclusion (De Goede 2003; Pieke et al. 2007). Many countries have adopted a restrictive approach to informal remittance transfer processes including tightening regulatory scrutiny, but this approach fails if it does not also create low-cost alternative options. In Bangladesh, remittance governance initiatives are mostly aimed at channelling informal flows to the formal banking domain. The country has achieved remarkable success in banking these unbanked remittances. World Bank Global Economic prospects reported 54 % of remittances in Bangladesh in 2006 were informal (World Bank 2006), but more representative, large-scale remittance household survey data shows that less than 20 % of remittances come through informal channels (IOM 2009).

The reasons for this achievement include the comprehensive approach of the government of Bangladesh, which does include restrictive policies but also incentive schemes in cost reduction initiatives. Also, the role of micro-finance institutions (MFIs) and community-level development NGOs in achieving social mobilization and awareness-building programmes is important. While these initiatives have been successful in channelling remittances into the formal banking system, there is no evidence this has increased household demand for and use of other financial products and services such as housing and consumer loans, insurance and credit. It is also not clear how success in channelling remittances to formal banking systems influences their wider development impact in terms of extending credit to marginalized groups. Harnessing remittances for savings, investment and capitalization should ideally be the priority of remittance governance but such initiatives are largely absent in Bangladesh.

The Role of MFIs and Development NGOs

Since remittances are private transfers, there is a growing recognition that the active involvement of local level micro-finance institutions, development NGOs, business and the government is necessary to harness fully the development potential of remittances (Bobeva 2005; Stiegler 2009). Bangladeshi micro-credit institutions and development NGOs have shifted their activities from social mobilization to more targeted service delivery such as health and sanitation, and informal education. MFIs and community-level development NGOs are becoming increasingly involved in remittance governance in Bangladesh.

While the majority of MFIs still do not offer direct remittance services due to regulatory restrictions, micro-finance institutions such as the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), which is the world's largest development NGO, is providing remittance services through its sister concern, BRAC Bank. BRAC uses its local offices as payout locations and *probashi* (expatriate) banking has become one of the largest networks for remittance services in Bangladesh. MFIs have some advantages in competing with mainstream service provider banks and MTOs in terms of their extensive geographical presence and payout locations in rural areas. Moreover, they have created a wide range of business opportunities for remittance-receiving households. For example, Probashi Biniyog is a scheme tailored to capitalize on migrants' remittances for investment in the Bangladeshi capital market and stock exchange through a beneficiary owner's account where the bank provides a custodian service to the migrant.

The Remittance Partnership Project is aimed at producing a measurable impact on price, speed and growth of remittances in Bangladesh. A large number of MFIs and development NGOs are working to turn remittances into investment, and influence the expenditure of remittances in investment goods such as education and healthcare. They are exploiting their extensive community networks for enterprise development, business development services and income-generating activities through their training and development intervention and group-based community approaches to investment. The micro-credit regulatory authority of Bangladesh reports that 576 MFIs mobilize savings through their 18,066 branches, mostly in rural areas (MRA 2012). Relaxation of regulatory restrictions could potentially allow these MFIs and their extensive networks to provide direct low-cost remittance services and mobilize savings in underserved areas, thereby fostering deeper financial inclusion.

Diaspora-Led Commercial and Specialized Banking

Some recent policy initiatives can be deemed unique for remittance governance in Bangladesh. Probashi Kallyan Bank (PKB) a specialized welfare bank in the public sector, caters for the needs and welfare of migrant workers and engages the migrant

diaspora community in development. International migration is a costly venture and a debt-inducing process. Households exploit their limited resources, often sell their land and depend on high-cost loans from traditional banks and MFIs to finance the migration process (IOM 2009). PKB facilitates the migration process by financing migration expenses through low-cost loans and rehabilitation of migrant workers in the event of repatriation. Other financial products and schemes, such as loans designed to finance "productive projects" by return migrants, aim to create employment and spur community development.

Many developing countries now prioritize engagement with their diaspora community to create business and jobs, stimulate innovation and use large-scale remittances for entrepreneurship. However, in most cases little success has been achieved as the approaches and mechanisms do not give diaspora communities direct control over the use of their funds, unlike remittances, bonds and other savings and investment schemes (Ionescu 2006; Lin 2010; Newland and Tanaka 2010). Some diaspora-led investment initiatives could enable the diaspora community to control their investment. The central bank has recently liberalized its policy to attract non-resident Bangladeshi (NRB) to invest in the banking sector. It has already permitted six NRB banks to bring together successful and entrepreneurial diasporas from around the world. Recently, two NRB banks, with the sponsorship of highly successful Bangladeshi diaspora in mostly North America and Europe, have started their own banking services in Bangladesh. The central bank set a minimum requirement of at least a 50 % share from non-resident Bangladeshi for such initiatives. This approach has been successful in channelling capital, skills and business experiences from the diaspora community to their home country.

Remittance-Linked Financial Services

Bangladesh Bank has designed remittance-linked financial instruments, foreign-currency denominated bonds, saving schemes such as non-resident foreign currency accounts, wage earners' development bonds, non-resident investors' *taka* accounts and US dollar premium bonds to attract remittances through formal channels. Incentives such as interest above market rates, tax exemption on the interest and repatriation facilities are offered with these schemes. Remittances are mostly spent on livelihood needs and services such as education and healthcare, which means that households prefer flexible saving schemes with convenient access to interest. At present, savings and investment schemes are considered inconvenient and inflexible in terms of accessibility. Nationalized commercial banks and other private commercial banks try to market these products in migrant host countries through their overseas branches and embassies. However, evaluations have not been done and so there is no robust data on the performance of these bonds and saving schemes. Remittances transferred through official channels are fully exempt from tax. A quota has been allocated for NRBs in government housing projects and priority is

granted in state-owned healthcare services and education facilities. The government also honours NRBs who send remittances to the country above a specified amount.

Mobile Banking and Settlement Services

In terms of cost and efficiency, technological innovations make remittance services cheaper. Therefore, technological innovation and related infrastructural development are priorities in remittance governance. Unlike many other developing countries, Bangladesh has made progress in expanding remittance services through mobile banking. It is often argued that the technology required to set up payment infrastructure for remittance services is not expensive. Existing mobile phone encryption technology and networks provide a backbone to extend financial services to the unbanked. However, the legal and regulatory framework is still restrictive in Bangladesh. Only the bank-led model is allowed to provide remittance services. MFIs, notably BRAC and some other commercial banks, have exploited the opportunity of extensive mobile network coverage (110 million phones) to expedite faster remittance delivery across the country. Bangladesh Bank has provided 10 licences to banks to offer the full range of mobile financial services. The bKash service of BRAC Bank and Dutch Bangla Bank serves nearly 5 million mobile accounts and has more than 9,000 agents. State-owned postal services in Bangladesh also have extensive networks including in rural areas and low-cost electronic money transfer services, which have become very successful. Surprisingly this facility is underutilized for international remittance transfer in Bangladesh.

Conclusion

Bangladesh has been to the fore in developing innovative approaches, mechanisms and practices to engage migrants and the diaspora community in development. Some of these successes can be a rich source of ideas for other remittance-dependent countries. Remittance governance is still heavily invested in surveillance. Remittance management should not be viewed as a matter of controlling informal channels alone but should entail all stages of the process, from transfer mechanisms to investment schemes, and diaspora entrepreneurship. Policies, governance and knowledge about management mechanisms of global migration have reached a stage of maturity. However, understanding of the dynamics of remittance governance is still inadequate. More research is needed to further our understanding of the complexities of remittance governance as well as to design and evaluate policy interventions.

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Chapter 8
Diaspora Engagement for Development in the Caribbean

Indianna D. Minto-Coy

Introduction

The Caribbean has been intricately shaped by the forces of migration. The result is a sizeable diaspora residing largely in the US, the UK and Canada. The diaspora has always been a key source of innovation and developmental support for the region. Nevertheless, partnership and engagement between the diaspora and governments in the region has for the most part been muted with little formal acknowledgement of, or support for, this group. This approach has gradually shifted over the last two decades as more governments move to activate the diaspora's latent potential to promote homeland development. National policies now tend to acknowledge a role for the diaspora in various sector policies, while some have designed an actual diaspora policy and practice, for example by formally communicating with and assisting in the formation of diaspora networks. This shift has been informed by the increasingly significant levels of remittances and, even more recently, a growing recognition of the need for deeper engagement beyond remitting.

This chapter outlines and critically assesses the various ways in which the Caribbean diaspora has been engaged as a development partner and the evolution of these approaches. It assesses some of the emerging trends, including state efforts to shape the diasporic economy and the influence of global diasporic engagement on the region. The chapter argues that ongoing efforts to encourage diaspora involvement in the development of the Caribbean are, paradoxically, both encouraging and disappointing. This is especially so with regards to governance and trust, which remain key challenges to activating the full potential of the diaspora. Given the current realities of the region, including its declining competitiveness in traded commodities and services (World Bank 2009a, b), its ongoing search for paths to

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development, the diaspora increasingly represents a key market and source of external investment, as well as a vehicle for innovation and creative adaptation in an increasingly challenging global economy. Diasporic engagement via the diasporic economy offers to the Caribbean and other small and developing states, a means by which they can creatively and proactively insert themselves into the global economy. Indeed, it would not be far-fetched to assert that diasporic engagement and the diasporic economy is the new frontier in global competitiveness for small states (Minto-Coy 2013). In this way, the diaspora has a critical role to play in regional development, including as networkers, investors, co-creators, markets and promoters.

The chapter is organized as follows: the first section gives a brief historical overview of migration, the processes that have given rise to the region's sizeable diaspora and the pertinent features of this group. The second section reviews the relationship between government and the diaspora in terms of the silent partnership that formerly existed between the two and the evolution to more active and formal arrangements. The third section of the chapter discusses the role of the private sector as an important facilitator and beneficiary of the diaspora's engagement with the Caribbean region, and vice-versa, a key point that tends to be underplayed given the emphasis on government-diaspora engagement. This is followed by a discussion of some of the existing challenges to increasing the scope and breadth of private sector diasporic engagement.

The Caribbean Diaspora

Emergence and Consolidation

Migration has been a fundamental feature of Caribbean life for hundreds of years. The migratory experiences associated with colonialism, the sugar trade, slavery and indentureship marked the emergence of the region at the nexus of international trade prior to the 1900s. In the twentieth century, Caribbean nationals began moving to Latin America, the UK and then in larger numbers to the US and, more recently, Canada. Emigration from the region remains substantial and is currently around seven times the volume of immigration. Emigration has been informed largely by the search for better economic opportunities. As Caribbean economies continue to be laggards in global performance, emigration will probably continue to be a key feature of the region.

Migration has moulded two distinctive features of Caribbean society. Firstly, there is significant diversity within the region with national institutions, language, religion and cultures marked by historical ties to Britain, Spain, France and the Netherlands. This diversity has led some to question whether one can speak of a singular "Caribbean diaspora" (Minto 2009a; Olwig 2007; Reis 2007). This chapter employs the term "Caribbean diaspora" to include first, second and third generation

emigrants from all islands washed by the Caribbean Sea, as well as Guyana and Belize. This definition is admittedly limiting in a context where Caribbean states are seeking broad incorporation through practical and emotional linkages, which may extend to the fourth generation and beyond. The second distinctive feature of Caribbean society is the sizeable diaspora residing in major countries and cities of the Global North. Proportionately speaking, the Caribbean has one of the largest diasporas globally (Foner 1998; Lapointe 2004; Nurse 2004; Reis 2007). The actual size of the diaspora remains unknown with data remaining sparse and inconclusive. For instance, estimates in the early part of the twenty-first century were that over five million persons have emigrated from the region and are living abroad (Crush 2013: 8; ECLAC 2006). Almost a decade later, and taking into account the reality of undocumented migration, the number is probably higher. Nevertheless, known numbers and history allow the conclusion that the Caribbean has been more deeply affected by migration than any other region.

An interesting recent development has been the movement of skilled (and unskilled) nationals within the Caribbean itself, with the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) introducing various rules and regulations to facilitate movement across the region. The 1996 Free Movement Protocol became a part of the revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (that founded CARICOM) in 2001 and allows for the unfettered movement of nationals across the region (Kairi Consultants 2013). The general global pattern of migration from poorer to more economically successful economies is reproduced within the Caribbean basin. For instance, Barbados, the Bahamas, and Trinidad and Tobago are top destinations for migrants from the wider English-speaking region, as is the Dominican Republic for those from Haiti. South-South migration also features in the wider Latin American and Caribbean region, with Venezuelans moving to Trinidad in response to the political crisis in that country (Reis 2007: 11).

Some of the same issues relating to migrant rights and access in North-South debates have also surfaced in intra-regional migration. These include the absence of health, education and other social supports for migrant communities, and concerns over migrant abuse. The recent case of the Dominican Republic, for example, raises concerns regarding citizenship rights. In 2013, the Constitutional Court passed a law allowing for persons of Haitian parentage to be stripped of Dominican Republic citizenship even though they were born there (García 2013; Jamaica Observer 2014a). The ruling applied retroactively to persons born in the Dominican Republic after 1929. The implications are profound and far-reaching for the diaspora. Among these is the fact that persons in the diaspora who previously would have counted themselves among the Dominican diaspora may now find themselves stateless (particularly where they do not have US citizenship). Furthermore, the base support for politicians from the Dominican Republic who courted the diaspora in the past could be affected (Farrington 2013), while there are also negative implications for group cohesion, belonging and, in essence, the transnationality that typifies the migration and diaspora movement. The law and some of the debates that followed underline the point that discussions on migration and engaging diasporas can be highly fractious.

Demography of the Caribbean Diaspora

Traditionally, the diaspora has comprised a mix of the skilled and the unskilled. Governments often encouraged migration as a way of reducing unemployment especially among the unskilled (Palmer 1990; Minto 2009a). However, little could be done to prevent the exit of the skilled: 80 % of the total university-educated population of the Caribbean is estimated to have emigrated. For Jamaica and Grenada, the figure is 85 %, for Guyana 89 % and for St Vincent and Haiti 84 % (Adams and Page 2003). The corresponding figure for Mexico and South America is only 15–20 % (Fajnzylber and López 2008: 6–7). In fact, the ratio of skilled to unskilled Caribbean migrants has increased as more industrialized countries reform their immigration programmes to selectively attract the most skilled and educated from the region (Minto 2009a: 11).

A key demographic feature of Caribbean migration is the relatively young age of migrants – around 25–40 years – who tend to come from more economically active groups. Coupled with the migration of the most skilled, heavy expenditures on education appear, on the face of it, to constitute a loss of investment and potential return (Minto-Coy 2010a: 48). Another feature of migration from countries such as Trinidad and Tobago, the Dominican Republic and Jamaica is the growth in women's migration (Nurse 2004). The large-scale emigration of skilled migrants and the concomitant growth of the global Caribbean diaspora is a prime example of brain drain. The extent of the brain drain has been documented in the areas of health and education where teachers and nurses have been actively courted by the US, UK and Canada (World Bank 2009c; Reis 2007; Wyss 2004). For example, an estimated 21,000 health workers who were trained in the region are now in the diaspora (World Bank 2009c: 22). By comparison, only 7,800 health workers have remained in the region, resulting in personnel shortages. In Jamaica, the gaps in the teaching profession have led to the import of teachers from India and Cuba. Serious health professional shortages have also been reported in Trinidad and Tobago (Reis 2007: 10). The experiences of the Caribbean mirror those of Africa where the migration of health professionals has had a negative impact on that continent (Crush et al. 2012: 2).

While there is considerable Caribbean evidence to support the brain drain thesis, there is also ample support for countervailing arguments about the "brain gain" and the positive role of the diaspora. Thomas-Hope (1998) describes return-migration programmes in Jamaica, which saw a number of professionals returning from the diaspora to work in the country. The emigration of the most skilled also suggests the possibility that the region might benefit from greater emphasis on creating knowledge networks and other positive means of engagement through more strategic action from policy makers and the diaspora itself. Nevertheless, the diaspora has consistently been a key ally to the region and its governments. Diasporas have assisted governments both directly and indirectly in providing opportunities and resources for citizens and in coping with the consequences of poor governance across the region. This may be seen in a number of ways that can be identified as

traditional forms of diaspora engagement that represent a form of "silent partnership".

The 'Silent Partnership' Between Diasporas and the State

Regardless of the debate over brain drain or gain, migration has historically served a number of functions, which are illustrative of traditional forms of engagement between diasporas and the region. The traditional relationship between the diaspora and governments in the region is best described as a silent partnership (Minto 2009a; Minto-Coy 2011): silent because of the absence of a formal or consistent dialogue, approach or policy on diaspora and migration and the lack of official acknowledgement of the role of this group in national and regional development. The notion of engagement as a silent partnership underscores the point that diaspora engagement with their countries of origin long predates the policy attention that is currently being paid to this group by policy makers, the international development community and other actors. It also implies the indirect and implicit (but largely unacknowledged in formal policy discourse) roles that the diaspora has played in the Caribbean.

Traditionally, migration has helped to temper unemployment and provide opportunities for upward social mobility and sustainable livelihoods. The departure of migrants to join the diaspora has helped to lessen social dislocation and the discontent that may have arisen from government failure to provide sufficient opportunities for citizens. For instance, Nurse (2004) points out that for smaller territories such as Grenada, and St Kitts and Nevis, annual labour migration accounts for around 12 % of the total population. Migration has therefore offered nationals the ability to fulfil their aspirations elsewhere and, in so doing, reduce claims on resource-constrained governments.

Migration has also offered a means of coping with upheavals brought about by political and ideological divides, as well as crime. Jamaica, Cuba, Haiti and Trinidad and Tobago are all notable examples. It is no coincidence that some of the countries that have featured most prominently in the discourse on diasporas and development are those that have faced these challenges most directly. Diasporas have played a visible developmental role in the area of social philanthropy, including disaster relief and donations to churches, health and educational institutions. Much of this philanthropy has taken place via alumni associations or sister organizations based in the diaspora. For instance, the diaspora is responsible for 132 health missions providing free health care in underserved communities across Jamaica (JDI 2012).

The constant budgetary strains experienced by governments have meant that diaspora contributions have helped to sustain health, education and other vital services. Ying and Manderson (2013), for instance, estimate that collectively Jamaica received over USD7.5 million in contributions in healthcare and a little over USD1 million in education from its diaspora between 2008 and 2012. Individual level support given to families and communities has also been critical in helping in the

provision of critical infrastructure and services to citizens with positive consequences for community empowerment, poverty alleviation and household incomes (Dade 2006). Contributions have also taken the form of the transfer of consumer goods and commodities to the region, contributing to what has been termed “barrel children” and a set of cultural and behavioural attributes (Crawford-Brown and Rattray 1994; Crawford 2003; Bakker et al. 2009). Such benevolence is seen as a contribution to families and communities, to some extent justifying and compensating for the departure of parents and children.

Migrant remittances have traditionally been at the core of diasporic engagement with the region (Fig. 8.1). Remittances are used to meet a range of needs and responsibilities from daily subsistence to investments. Investments and business creation through remittances make the remittance system more sustainable. Remittance-fuelled consumption can have multiplier effects on local economies through its positive effect on society and local businesses and by facilitating access to health and education (Dade and Unheim 2007: 30). Remittances also have an impact in helping to cope with balance of payments imbalances through the receipt of vital foreign exchange. This was especially evident during the global financial crisis (Minto-Coy 2010b). The IOM has noted that this, “confirms the view that sending remittances to relatives is seen by emigrants to be a moral obligation which intensifies during periods of hardship rather than a response to economic investment opportunity” (IOM 2012: 35). The poverty reducing and coping effect of migrant remittances cannot be underestimated, especially in countries such as Haiti with an 80 % poverty rate and declining value of exports.

Various diaspora groups have helped to introduce efficiencies in various sectors by passing on techniques and innovations from developed countries. This role is particularly evident in areas such as health and education where the diaspora has helped to modernize methods and equipment, as well as meet gaps in provision of these vital services (Ying and Manderson 2013: 5; Minto 2009b: 11, see especially



Fig. 8.1 Remittance flows to the CARICOM region (including Haiti and the Dominican Republic), 1999–2013 (Note: No data available for The Bahamas and Montserrat. Source: World Bank)

note 26). Such support has been possible through the mobilization of the diaspora's knowledge, capital and ties in their destination countries.

The relationship between Caribbean societies and their diasporas has been influenced by specific cultural contexts and environmental conditions. For instance, the emphasis on disaster relief evolved as a direct response to the geographical and climatic conditions of a region prone to natural disasters such as hurricanes, storms and earthquakes. Culturally, the strong ties with high schools and their historically religious orientation have given rise to the growth of philanthropy through alumni and church organizations.

Instances of antagonism between diasporas and states are not unheard of. A ready example of this can be found in the Cuban diaspora in the US, one of the most active lobbyists against the Cuban government, which has sought to influence US policy against Cuba (Dominguez 2006: 3 & 8; Minto 2009a: 13). The value of the diaspora has also been obscured by the brain drain debate. Migrants and the diaspora have sometimes been characterized as traitors who have defected from their homelands for greener pastures and hence lost the right to speak about or be engaged at home. Such representations of the diaspora experience were common in early cultural or sociological accounts and are captured in the fictional and semi-biographical accounts of Caribbean authors such as George Lamming and Dereck Walcott (Baugh 2012; Elhawayi 2013; Lamming 1953). Here migration is framed as an exilic experience with resulting tensions between the native and adopted homelands.

Moving to Greater Engagement

The official silence surrounding diaspora engagement has shifted over the last two decades. More active and deliberate partnerships have been sought and established between the diaspora and governments, making the diaspora a more visible and vocal development partner. An increasing number of governments have taken steps to activate the latent potential of this group to make a deeper and more long lasting impact on development in the region. The tensions between "home" and "foreign" have become less pronounced. Globalization, combined with changes within the diaspora itself, has led to the internationalization of the Caribbean and greater interest in and acceptance of formal diasporic engagement for development.

The evolution of a more active partnership with the diaspora is certainly not unique to the Caribbean. Shifts in strategies, approaches and the very discourse around diasporic engagement are a global phenomenon (Agunias and Newland 2012; Baubock and Faist 2010; Brinkerhoff 2008; Chamberlain 1998; Crush 2013; Meyer et al. 1997; Mountford 1997; Plaza and Ratha 2011; Sheffer 2003; Sinatti and Horst 2014). A shift from a preoccupation with the brain drain to discussions of brain gain and brain circulation has occurred amongst practitioners, advisers and researchers (Minto 2009a). There is also an emerging consensus on the best measures for engaging diasporas in the Global South, including the Caribbean.

The internationalization of diaspora engagement has provided lessons for particular countries and regions. Key here is the example of countries such as India and Ireland that have successfully engaged their diasporas in national development (Minto 2009a, b; Saxenian 1999, 2002; Solimano 2001). These lessons have been reviewed with the intention of borrowing and adapting them to the Caribbean. For instance, direct mention is made of the Indian and Chinese experience in Jamaica's national development plan – Vision 2030 (PIOJ 2009: 142). In addition, the growing involvement of the international development community in framing and guiding diaspora engagement has encouraged learning from the global experience. These interventions underscore the diaspora option as a viable route to development (Meyer et al. 1997; Zweig et al. 2008).

Within the Caribbean, several economic factors help to explain the shift to diaspora engagement. In general, the Caribbean has fared relatively well economically compared to other lower-income countries. However, this belies the reality of many individual countries. While the economies of Barbados, the Bahamas and Trinidad and Tobago have performed well in recent years, the fortunes of others such as Haiti and Jamaica continue to wane. But all have been threatened by successive global food, energy and financial crises and by the declining competitiveness of key sectors such as tourism (World Bank 2009a, b). Additional challenges include a declining share of global trade, the loss of trade protections and reduced attractiveness to foreign investors. As the region's economic fortunes have waned, governments have turned to the diaspora as an alternative source of economic renewal, investment capital and knowledge for growth and improved productivity.

The main reasons for increased diaspora engagement are external to the diaspora insofar as they are driven by governments, international development partners and ideological trends. This is not to suggest that the diaspora has been passive with regard to engagement, since some of the motivation for increased involvement has originated from activities and developments within diaspora communities (Minto 2009a: 5). The region's transnational citizens are also now more able to mobilize and connect with each other across different countries. For example, the Dominica Academy of Arts and Science has members residing in China, the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States. Country-based diaspora groups engage in collective learning and coordination, and there is greater awareness within the diaspora of what is possible and how they can mobilize for maximum effect. Calls for voting rights, for example, provide clear evidence of the increased levels of activism within the diaspora. As governments learn about the versatility of diasporic engagement from the international experience, so does the diaspora. The Caribbean diaspora is also actively seeking opportunities for the creation of knowledge networks, brain circulation, investments for growth and poverty alleviation, and increased political and social involvement in governance at home.

Diaspora groups are also engaging governments and development partners in the countries in which they reside with the aim of affecting policies towards their countries of origin. This is an important development given that, with the exception of the Cuban diaspora, there has not been much political activism on behalf of the region (Minto 2009a). The Haitian diaspora stands out here. As this group has

become more organized, they have emerged in representative politics in locations such as Miami. The increased visibility of Haitians rebounds to the benefit of Haiti as well as new Haitians arrivals who are able to identify country-based networks, support and representation. The value of these connections is seen in the response to the 2010 earthquake in Haiti (Esnard and Sapat 2011; Minto-Coy 2011).

Emerging Strategies for Engaging the Diaspora: The Role of Government

Governments across the Caribbean are now taking definitive steps to engage the diaspora. Diasporas increasingly feature in policy discourse across the region where they are variously described as “major stakeholders”, “facilitators” and “beneficiaries of development”. A number of countries are at various stages in the development of national migration and/or diaspora policies. They include St Lucia, Dominica, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago. The stated aim of governments is to “mainstream” diaspora and related migration issues. The main principle is the formalization of engagement, which suggests a top-down approach with government leading the process. Given the historical context of mistrust between government and the diaspora, the benefits of such an approach are yet to be seen.

Some national development plans already address the diaspora’s developmental role. For example, the long-term national development plan of the government of Jamaica was not only developed in consultation with the diaspora but also makes several references to this group. Among the listed outcomes is to “expand the involvement of the Jamaican diaspora in national development” (PIOJ 2009: xxviii). Additionally, “[t]his group represents a major resource that can play a strategic role in the long-term economic development of our island”. These views are further underscored in the 2012–2015 Medium-Term Socio-Economic Policy Framework, which is replete with references to the diaspora’s role in national development (GoJ 2013).

Governments have also started convening conferences and other consultations to network and discuss issues of joint interest with the diaspora. Ministries or departments focusing on the diaspora have been created, including in St Kitts and Nevis. Haiti is one of the regional pioneers, being the first to introduce a special government arm (United Haitians Living Abroad) for the diaspora (Minto 2009a: 16). Governments are also seeking ways to engage the diaspora as a source of investment capital and business development. Suriname, for example, has introduced a novel form of support for diaspora investments through a programme called IntEnt. Business support and mentorship are provided to diaspora members who wish to establish businesses and relocate to Suriname.

Diaspora diplomacy has begun to feature in Caribbean strategies for international relations. For instance, between 2009 and 2014 the region enlisted the diaspora and their communities and business partners in the UK to lobby against the Air Passenger Duty (APD). Sustained lobbying ended with the abolition of some bands

of the APD in 2014 (Jamaica Observer 2014b). The experience demonstrated the bolstering effect of the diaspora and what could be accomplished through united lobbying. Diaspora diplomacy also involves diaspora members in international marketing and lobbying as well as representing Caribbean countries abroad. For example, activist members of the diaspora with contacts and influence are helping small states to navigate the corridors of global power.

At the level of regional governance, CARICOM has awakened to the potential of the diaspora. In 2007, the "Caribbean Conference on the Diaspora: A 2020 Vision" marked the beginning of a regional effort to address the diaspora's role in regional development and to discuss how regional action could address the flow of skills out of the Caribbean (Minto 2009a). Successive policy documents from CARICOM also demonstrate increased recognition of the role of the diaspora in different development areas, including information and communications technology. However, the problems that bedevil wider efforts at regionalism have become evident in this arena as well. These include the difficulty of achieving concerted action and resolving conflicts between national and regional interests (Girvan 2011; O'Brien 2011). Although discussions and some actions are now taking place nationally, regionally and internationally, there is a distinct lack of integration between these different levels. Furthermore, opportunities for lesson-learning from each country's experience are being overlooked given the unilateral way in which most governments approach their diasporas.

Although it may be difficult to speak of a single Caribbean diaspora or identity in a political sense, it is more feasible to do so economically and culturally. Businesses across the region and in the diaspora are increasingly recognizing this reality. The point is significant because discussions on diasporas and development generally tend to privilege the government-diaspora relationship. For instance, the inclusion of the diaspora's role in national development plans implies that engagement is something that has to be accomplished at the political and policy levels by bureaucrats. This orientation is consistent with the involvement of the international development community and their role as informers and funders of public policy in the Caribbean. There remains a perception that it is only government that can realize the goal of deepening engagement. But this obscures the role of other groups including the private sector.

The Diasporic Economy: Beyond Government

Caribbean music, food and cultural practices have found global renown through the diaspora acting as brand ambassadors for the region with benefits accruing to businesses through sales and marketing. For example, McKenzie (2012) details the role of the Jamaican diaspora in the internationalization of reggae music and other aspects of Jamaican cultural and creative industries and, in so doing, playing a role in the income-generating and other commercial activities of those working in the music industry.

Orozco's (2003) model of the diasporic economy provides a general way of understanding diaspora private sector involvement in the Caribbean (Fig. 8.2). The model comprises five "T's": telecommunications, trade, transfers (in the form of remittances), tourism and transport. This provides a framework for assessing the possibilities for future private sector diaspora engagement. Take, for example, the case of Jamaica. With regard to diaspora transfers, the 2012 *Situational Analysis for Diaspora Engagement and Policy* notes that remittances represent 17 % of the country's GDP (JDI 2012). The diaspora also makes a significant contribution in the area of tourism. Diaspora tourism is Jamaica's main foreign exchange earner, comprising an estimated 11–15 % of the island's visitors. This figure is likely to be even higher since many diaspora Jamaicans do not indicate that they reside overseas upon their return to the island. The number of visitors from the diaspora has not only contributed to tourism receipts but has assisted in the development and support of local transport, entertainment, and the sporting, creative and cultural industries.

In the area of telecommunications and other information and communications technology (ICT), the first contact that most residents of Jamaica have had with this has been through the diaspora (Minto-Coy 2011). The diaspora's role in maintaining the fortunes of the former monopoly telecommunications operator (Cable and Wireless, now Lime) and discounting the cost of local telecommunications has been documented elsewhere (Minto 2009b). Gueron and Spevacek (2008) have suggested that there are major gains to be made from the diaspora's involvement in ICT, a worthy consideration in light of national and regional ambitions to create knowledge economies. Future plans include the creation of a single ICT space across CARICOM. To date, however, most ICT engagement has been through the efforts of individual members of the diaspora, who have faced a number of challenges in investing and starting businesses locally (Minto-Coy 2011).

Fig. 8.2 Elements of the diasporic economy (Source: Minto-Coy 2011; adapted from Orozco 2003)

One of the most interesting aspects of economic engagement and the diasporic economy is that some of the most successful and innovative enterprises within the region have achieved success by building their business models around the diaspora and providing goods and services to the diaspora in the global marketplace. Private enterprises such as the Jamaica National Building Society (finance), Digicel (telecommunications), Grace Kennedy (food) and LaParkan (shipping) are all fully operational in the diaspora context. Some firms have also realized opportunities for expansion and diversification based on niches identified in this market. Grace Kennedy, for instance, started out as a company retailing Jamaican food and has now expanded into financial services, among others. LaParkan has expanded from shipping into tourism. Some companies that started as national brands have transformed into regional and global brands through exporting to diaspora markets. In so doing, they have begun to transcend purely national diaspora markets in order to appeal to a wider Caribbean and related diaspora market. The diasporic economy therefore offers an opportunity for Caribbean states to develop a competitive advantage and insert themselves proactively into the global economy.

Another aspect of the diasporic economy concerns the roles played by members of the diaspora, as market, marketer, collaborator, investor and co-creator (Fig. 8.3). Firms and individual entrepreneurs operating in the diasporic economy have successfully navigated their way into other markets with the diaspora acting as the first point of contact or as marketer for their offerings. These include businesses based in the Caribbean as well as those owned and operated by members of the diaspora. In the area of financial services, for instance, the Jamaica National Building Society now offers remitting services to other Caribbean islands, as well as to Ghana. Cultural and creative sectors have also benefited with the diaspora contributing to the spread and popularity of Caribbean music.

Fig. 8.3 Model of diasporic engagement (Source: Minto-Coy 2012)

The diasporic economy not only offers opportunities for businesses in the region, but in the diaspora itself. An excellent case in point is Golden Krust Caribbean Bakery and Grill, the largest Caribbean food franchise in the US, started by a member of the Jamaican diaspora. The business started with the realization that there was a gap in the Caribbean (specifically Jamaican) cuisine market in the Bronx in New York – an area populated by many Jamaicans and other Caribbean migrants (Gant 2005). The first restaurant was opened in 1989 and by 2013 there were 110 franchises, many located near hospitals and other areas where Jamaicans and other Caribbean nationals are employed. In its bid to extend its appeal, the chain rebranded itself as a Caribbean eatery (as opposed to a Jamaican restaurant). Its clientele has expanded over the years to include other ethnic groups and not just members of the diaspora. The chain has become a supplier to schools in New York and branched out by moving into the communities from which its original store received most of its customers (Field 2011; Gant 2005). This is an example of the gate-opening function of the diaspora, which acts as a marketer and advertiser of regional products and services.

The diasporic economy is characterized by the creation of business networks and information and skills exchange between countries of residence and/or citizenship and the Caribbean. For instance, Grace Kennedy's entry into Ghana was facilitated by a member of the diaspora. In this way, the diaspora can act as key informants about business opportunities and as network brokers and marketers for businesses regionally and globally. This networking effect extends to the diaspora creating entrepreneurial business options for other members of the diaspora. For instance, many of the Golden Krust franchises were started by Jamaican nurses (Kramer 2004), which offered them an avenue to become independent business owners. Golden Krust has also brought opportunities for local businesses to engage with counterparts in the diaspora to facilitate market access and penetration for Jamaican products and services. For example, Golden Krust's partnership with Jamaican soft drink maker, Bigga, has allowed the latter to break into a very competitive market in the US. Golden Krust is also assisting Jamaica's trade agenda by sourcing some of its main ingredients (for example, fresh seasonings) directly from Jamaica. These examples show the diaspora as an influential and decisive actor in the internationalization of small and medium-sized firms based in the Caribbean, as well as a source for entrepreneurial growth and economic diversification by facilitating market entry and access as well as growth in the international marketplace.

A Future for Diasporic Engagement in the Caribbean?

While the prospects for a more effective diasporic economy are promising, several challenges remain. First, the well-known challenges to operating businesses in the Caribbean need to be addressed, including difficulties in accessing financing and opening bank accounts, and getting timely and accurate information to make informed decisions. Second, information gaps in the kinds of instruments and

incentives that would attract diaspora savings and investments need to be addressed. This is important since engagement cannot be based solely on sentimentality and goodwill. Included here are mechanisms to facilitate the engagement of those who wish to invest in ways that go beyond intra-family remittances. Such considerations are also necessary if engagement is to be formalized and scaled-up. Further information gaps relate to the lack of a central repository for information on jobs, consultancies, and investment and partnership opportunities in Caribbean countries.

Third, there is a need to engage the diaspora more strategically and purposefully in the foreign and developmental policies of the region. A diasporic export strategy, for instance, presents options for small Caribbean states that are finding it increasingly difficult to compete globally. Indeed, in the ongoing search for competitive advantage, diasporic engagement may be one of the few areas in which the region may be able to compete globally. A starting point here is an acknowledgement that most interactions between the diaspora and countries of origin exist within the private sphere. It is therefore important that engagement, as constructed through national/regional developmental goals, is not imposed upon the diaspora. For example, communications and remittances are private flows and transfers and decisions made by members of the diaspora regarding travel and investment are private decisions. It is important that the diaspora retain ownership and direction over their contributions.

Finally, there is a need to rethink the stage at which engagement actually begins. While departure or travel outside the country of origin is what gives rise to the diaspora, engagement has to begin before departure if more meaningful action is to be achieved. The region's reality as a net exporter of labour and human capital and its sustained economic stagnation suggests that the size of the diaspora will continue to expand. As such, there is a need for proactive engagement with the peoples of the region even before they migrate about the options for maintaining connections and contributing. This engagement could be in the form of structured departure programmes that provide information on how citizens can protect their rights after migrating, key contacts in their destinations and investment options at home.

In addition to these challenges, diasporic engagement in the Caribbean needs to be more attuned to global migration realities. First, greater attention needs to be paid to South-South and inter-regional migration. As the North becomes more difficult to access, due to increased travel and residence restrictions, the importance of South-South migration is growing. Caribbean governments need to recognize this phenomenon and foster links with their growing diasporas in the South. The Barbadian government, for example, has indicated its awareness of the options by making efforts to engage its diaspora in Panama in order to broker business ties with that country.

Second, the idea that diasporic engagement and contributions to development are a unidirectional endeavour involving the diaspora "giving" to the country of origin is pervasive but problematic. While the discourse on diasporic engagement is evolving, there is a need for greater appreciation of the dynamic and multi-directional nature of the flows and how this can benefit the region as well as the diaspora itself. Governments in the region need to advocate on behalf of their citizens abroad and

demonstrate how they can grow and contribute to their origin and destination countries. Implicit here is the assumption of a symbiotic and mutually beneficial relationship where governments help to advance the prospects of their diasporas abroad and, in so doing, increase their ability and desire to contribute to the development of the Caribbean.

Third, there needs to be more focus on the rights and protections that are afforded to the diaspora in their countries of origin. This includes the benefits of citizenship, including the right to vote and the transferability of benefits, particularly for those who wish to return to the region. Dual citizenship affords the diaspora a number of benefits and incentives for living, working and investing in the region. However, the diaspora generally remains unaware of these benefits, though they can be key in achieving the kind of symbiotic relationship that should characterize diaspora engagement. Of course, the experience of the Dominican Republic adds another perspective here, since the changes mentioned earlier will in essence deny the right of return and limit opportunities for engagement and access for those in the diaspora who are affected by the Court's ruling. The larger point from the variety of experiences in the region is that, while there are many areas of commonality and consistency in policy development, there is still unevenness in the development of discourse and practices.

Finally, the proposed models of the diasporic economy and diasporic engagement set the scene for innovation and entrepreneurial engagement between the private sector and the diaspora. While policy and government action generally are important in shaping diaspora engagement in the Caribbean, the region's diaspora has long been engaged by the private sector. The diaspora has and can fulfil the roles of marketers, markets, collaborators and investors in their engagement with the private sector and Caribbean countries. While governments are moving in the direction of greater economic engagement with the diaspora, private sector has long been a relevant and active player in the internationalization of Caribbean businesses. There is certainly a need for greater coordination across the different sectors of the diasporic economy to facilitate learning and sharing of best practices. A related point is that engagement does not start with policy though it can shape and scale up successful models of engagement. As such, the role of policy is to support, extend and encourage engagement and not dampen enthusiasm and breed mistrust.

Conclusion

This chapter has sought to provide a critical review of diasporic engagement in the Caribbean. Migration has been a defining feature of Caribbean societies and this is likely to remain the case in the future. The diaspora is one of the region's longstanding development partners. However, the relationship between the region and its diaspora has been in a state of flux, moving from what is described as a silent partnership into a more formalized and active partnership. This can be seen, for instance, in recent efforts to introduce diaspora policies and government units focusing on the diaspora.

While the new discourse on engaging the diaspora has tended to focus on the role of government and policy, instances of innovation and entrepreneurship are increasingly becoming evident in what is termed the diasporic economy. The diasporic economy has been the scene for much advancement in engagement with the private sector (both in the region and the diaspora). In fact, while governments are waking up to the potential of the diaspora in development efforts, the private sector has long been engaged with and in the diaspora. Engagement here has seen the diaspora fulfilling a number of roles, including as investors, marketers and markets for Caribbean goods and culture with positive implications for innovation, entrepreneurial success and the internationalization of Caribbean small firms.

The Caribbean experience certainly offers a template for studying the role of diasporas in helping small and developing states to participate more actively in globalization through increased access to international markets and in a way that defies the fixed limits of physical size. The Caribbean experience is also important given its illustration of the variety of ways in which governments can engage their diasporas more actively, as well as some of the challenges involved in diaspora governance and in scaling up this relationship. As such, the area of diasporic engagement in the Caribbean remains a fruitful ground for further research, particularly as it relates to the diasporic economy, assessing the role of policy in facilitating a variety of ways of engagement and the role of the diaspora in the growth and internationalization of businesses in small states.

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Chapter 9
The Diasporic Economy, Trade and the Tourism Industry in the Caribbean

Keith Nurse

Introduction

The ability of small developing states to activate and benefit from the diasporic economy and trade constitutes the new frontier in global competitiveness, innovation and entrepreneurship for this group of countries (The Economist 2011). Tapping into the diasporic economy has the potential to further diversify and reposition small economies like those in the Caribbean that have historically specialized in the export of low value added raw materials, commodities, manufacturing and services that have declining terms of trade and fetch low (and volatile) prices in global markets. The diasporic economy also has a dynamic impact on the wider economy in the sending countries in terms of the synergistic relationship to what Orozco et al. (2005) call the 5Ts: financial transfers, trade in goods, transportation, telecommunications and tourism.

The focus in this chapter is on the tourism sector, which is the largest earner of foreign exchange and employs more people than any other economic sector in the Caribbean. The diasporic economy has emerged in the last two decades to rival the tourism sector in terms of foreign exchange earnings in several Caribbean countries. As such, a study of diasporic tourism brings together the two main drivers of the contemporary Caribbean economy. Studies of the relationship between diasporas and tourism have largely focused on the migrants and tourists, their motivations for travel and the production and consumption of identities (Coles and Timothy 2004). This chapter takes a different approach by examining the marketplace for diasporic tourism and the associated economic and trade flows.

In this regard, the chapter examines the key dimensions of the diasporic economy, trade and entrepreneurship and their impact on the tourism sector. The case of the Caribbean, one of the most tourism-dependent regions in the world, is used to

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illustrate the development impact of these flows from a trade perspective. The main objective is to map existing economic and trade flows generated by the diasporic economy and to identify the key areas of innovation that are helping to diversify the tourism sector in the Caribbean.

The Diasporic Economy

The Caribbean region has one of the highest migration rates in the world and, for many years, the exodus of its highly skilled labour force has been seen as a loss, a "brain drain". The data is striking with Suriname, Guyana and Jamaica accounting for the highest brain drain rates within the Caribbean region of 90 %, 86 % and 83 % respectively (Fig. 9.1). The number of tertiary-educated migrants from the Caribbean is such that key sectors like health, education, and science and technology have been negatively affected by the quantum of highly trained labour that has emigrated (Nurse and Jones 2010). Indeed, it has been argued that the inflows from remittances are trumped by the losses due to skilled migration (Mishra 2006).

The growth of a global Caribbean diaspora in the last few decades has led to a new development context with economic flows such as financial transfers (remittances) playing a critical role in poverty reduction, enterprise development and the securitization of debt (Nurse 2004). In many developing countries, remittances now exceed traditional modes of external inflows like foreign aid, foreign direct investmentand external borrowing (Ratha and Plaza 2011). This is particularly true for small developing states that have large diasporic communities and high levels of



Fig. 9.1 Brain drain rates in the Caribbean, 1990 and 2000 (Source: Docquier and Marfouq 2004)



Fig. 9.2 Remittances as a share of GDP in the Caribbean, 2013 (Source: World Bank 2014)

exposure to the diasporic economy. For example, in 2005/2006, one-third of people born in Jamaica were living in OECD countries, and more than 20 % of the population originating from Cape Verde, Trinidad and Tobago, Malta and Fiji were also in the OECD area (OECD 2012).

One of the major impacts of diasporas on the Caribbean economy is in the remittances field. Figure 9.2 provides data for remittances as a share of GDP for several Caribbean territories. It shows that some countries, such as Haiti, Guyana and Jamaica, are heavily dependent on remittances with GDP shares estimated at 20 %, 16 % and 15 %, respectively. This places these countries among the top remittance-receiving countries in the developing world. It also shows that there is a strong correlation between levels of poverty and size of the diasporic community. Other countries, such as the Dominican Republic, St Kitts and Nevis, Belize, St Vincent and the Grenadines and Grenada, have remittance-to-GDP shares of 3–6 %.

The diasporic economy is much broader than labour mobility and financial transfers, however. It includes the economic impact of trade in goods targeted at niche, ethnic or diasporic at markets; services such as tourism, shipping, telecoms and media along with the monetization of intellectual property through the creative industries; and tapping into networks of trade, scientific and professional diasporas through return migration and the mobility of professional services (Baldacchino 2006; Blouin and Debnath 2011; Jackson 2011; Minto-Coy 2011). There are significant growth opportunities given the sizeable contribution that diasporic communities make to financial transfers, trade, tourism, travel, telecommunications, new media and the creative economy.

Diasporas, Trade and Entrepreneurship

While the literature on trade and migration is inconclusive and the relationship not yet fully understood (Bowen and Wu 2013), the research suggests that there is a positive relationship between bilateral migration and bilateral trade. In a study of the effect of immigration on US trade flows, for example, Mundra (2005) points out that immigrants demand goods and services from their home countries; introduce new products and services to the host countries; introduce new products and services from their host countries to their home countries; and impact on business development through the circulation of knowledge and ideas. Similarly, in an examination of the relationship between immigration, transnationalism and US bilateral trade, Light et al. (2002) conclude that there is an independent expansion of American foreign trade. Where their study digresses from other literature is that the variables investigated resulted in an expansion of exports but did not affect US-aggregated imports. The proposed disparity between imports and exports arises predominantly because of the size of the US market and dominance of English as a business language, relieving native monolingual US citizens of the need to learn an alternative language. Bowen and Wu (2013) conclude that trade and immigration are complements. However, this relationship is hinged on immigration policies and the nature of an immigrant's employment, which have significant implications on how immigration affects trade and production.

Immigrant populations operate in transnational spaces and consequently are uniquely positioned to capitalize on the economic opportunities of both sending and receiving countries. As Jansen and Piermatini (2009) argue:

> Migrants can play a role in reducing information costs. They are in a privileged position to provide information about distribution networks and about demand in their home countries to host country exporters. They are also in a privileged position to provide the same type of information on the host country to home country exporters. In addition, they can provide understanding about culturally derived negotiating norms, thus reducing negotiating costs between the two sides.

Many developing countries have seized the opportunities embodied in these flows and have reaped huge rewards through strategic diaspora engagement programmes. For example, countries such as the People's Republic of China, India, Israel, Mexico and El Salvador have targeted their diasporic communities for trade, investment and technology transfer (Kuznetsov 2006). Saxenian (2004) suggests that the entrepreneurial talents of the Indian diaspora acted in the capacity of middlemen, creating and fostering relationships with US-owned companies to access India's software expertise. As a result of the Indian diaspora contributing to the development of information technology by investing in human capital, knowledge transfers and support of new business enterprises, the country is now one of the movers and shakers of technological innovation. It is also argued that the presence of diaspora investors and entrepreneurs in the country-of-origin's economy also may contribute to the internationalization of domestic firms by enhancing local firms' transnational social capital (Riddle and Nielsen 2011). Similar opportunities

are available to small states like those in the Caribbean as they tend to have relatively large diasporic communities that offer the opportunity to deepen the linkages between small states and global cities (Terrazas 2010).

There is an emerging consensus in development circles that the migration and development nexus is a critical resource for inclusive development (GFMD 2013: 3). Diasporic entrepreneurship is considered to be an important element of unlocking this developmental potential. For example, analysts at the Migration Policy Institute argue that:

> Development practitioners and policymakers are beginning to examine the role of diaspora entrepreneurs in gearing investments toward their home countries, thereby creating jobs, spurring innovation, and fostering networks. Compared with remittances or diaspora bonds, entrepreneurial investments give diaspora members more direct control over the use of their funds. Given their ties to their countries of origin, diaspora members are often more willing than nondiaspora investors to risk starting or engaging in business activities in high-risk or emerging markets. Moreover, their knowledge of the local political, economic, and cultural environment, as well as their personal connections and linguistic abilities, may give members of diasporas a "first mover" advantage over others when investing in or starting businesses in their countries of origin (Newland and Tanaka 2010).

The diasporic economy and market can be considered strategic resources in that firms that can tap into these markets are able to transcend the limitations of size, which is a structural constraint in small economies. It is also important to note that the diasporic market often offers a bridge into mainstream markets thus allowing for market presence and the establishment of firms abroad. Diasporic entrepreneurs also tend to have a network base (e.g. hub-to-hub ties) that spans both the sending and receiving countries and as such are often able to overcome the hurdles of doing business or trade between the two jurisdictions. The benefits of such networking tend to be pronounced where the business, trade and financing institutions are weak and hence the barriers to running a successful business are higher. Successful diasporic entrepreneurs therefore act as institutional influencers in that they are able to transform institutional arrangements in the home country (Kuznetsov 2006).

Diasporic Tourism in the Caribbean

Tourism is the mainstay of most Caribbean economies, having surpassed the traditional agro-based and natural-resource-based export economy in terms of contribution to GDP, foreign exchange earnings and employment. A large share of the growth in Caribbean tourism is attributed to the significant increase in cruise ship arrivals and the rapid spread of "all-inclusive" resorts. Both of these tourism products provide for higher levels of quality control within a framework of vertical integration. The downside is that they allow for increased external control, foreign exchange leakages and lower levels of local value added (Nurse 2004). In addition, the growth in Caribbean tourism in the 1990s is directly related to rapid expansion in Cuba and the Dominican Republic. In comparison, growth in arrivals has been much slower in the Commonwealth Caribbean and the Dutch and French West Indies.

These observations signal that the regional tourism industry is losing its competitiveness and its developmental impact is being eroded. It is also recognized that tourists are looking for more than just "sun, sand and sea" as exemplified in the shift away from high-impact mass tourism towards more environment-friendly and community-oriented travel options such as eco-tourism, adventure tourism and cultural, heritage and festival tourism. In this vein, diasporic tourism has emerged as a major source of visitors and a basis for further diversification of the tourism sector. Diasporic tourism involves the travel of diasporas to their homelands or regions as visitors for vacation, business, health or leisure activities like cultural, festival and heritage tourism. In trade and services terms this is referred to as consumption abroad (Mode 2) where the consumer moves to consume the service. While some research has been done in this area, this type of tourist is mostly neglected in tourism studies (Coles & Timothy 2004; Duval 2003; Stephenson 2002).

A focus on diasporic tourism can bring several benefits. Agunias and Newland (2012: 215), for example, argue that "diaspora populations can play a unique and important role in opening markets for new tourism destinations as well as markets for goods produced in and associated with the cultures of their countries of origin. Tourists from the diaspora are more likely than other international travellers to have or make connections with the local economy." Diasporic tourism can facilitate developing countries as well as small and medium tourism enterprises to gain a larger share of global value added and to diversify the sector beyond traditional target markets. Diasporic tourists tend to have a profile similar to that of cultural tourists in that they invest more in indigenous goods and services. Consequently, diasporic tourism may allow for higher levels of capital (profit) retention within the regional economy compared with traditional mass tourism, all-inclusive hotels and cruise ships.

Many studies have argued that within the tourism sector, diasporic tourism and visiting friends and relatives (VFR) are unimportant compared to traditional tourists, largely because their daily expenditure is less (Bull 1995; Seaton and Palmer 1997). They supposedly spend nothing on accommodation and food and participate in few "tourism activities" and other services. As a result of this perception, diasporic tourism and VFR are often neglected and provide little incentives for marketing strategies and campaigns. However, this perception is unfounded and does not adequately reflect the facts of expenditure. A lower level of average daily spending is compensated by the duration of visit and, hence, spending over a longer period (Backer 2009). In many categories VFR tourists outspend non-VFR tourists (Backer 2009). In addition, diasporic tourism when enhanced by ICTs can generate further investment, exports and employment and create greater opportunities for economic inclusion, especially for small- and medium-sized tourism enterprises as well as marginalized groups that often find themselves on the periphery of the formal tourism sector and on the wrong side of the digital divide. In this regard, the link between diasporic tourism and diasporic investment is germane to the expansion of trade in services.

The Caribbean is a good case study because its diaspora is large relative to the Caribbean population based in the respective countries of origin. The diaspora

communities of four Caribbean countries account for a significant percentage of the total population of various global cities. The Jamaican and Guyanese diaspora account for 4 % and 3 % of the population of Greater London and Toronto respectively. The Suriname diaspora accounts for 2 % of the total population of several major cities in the Netherlands (Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague). In the case of the Dominican Republic, its diaspora population accounts for 9 % of the total immigrant population of New York City, which is even larger than the Chinese population (excluding Hong Kong and Taiwan) in metropolitan New York.

There are several distinct types of diasporic tourism based on motivations for travel (Fig. 9.3). Vacation tourists tend to be the largest category. People travel to visit family and friends and often stay with family members but also at hotels, villas and guesthouses (Newland and Taylor 2010). Most countries collect data on this category under the banner of VFR and this is often used as a proxy for diasporic tourism. However, VFR data does not necessarily capture other forms of diasporic travel such as heritage tourism, which is driven by tourists who wish to discover their ancestry and lineage (Jordan and Jolliffe 2013). There is also business tourism, which encompasses nationals who live and work abroad who have invested or plan to invest in real estate and commercial activities in their country of origin (Newland and Taylor 2010). Festival tourism tends to be another key motive as migrants travel back for festivals, events, family gatherings (such as weddings and funerals) and religious holidays (Nurse 2003). Another motive is medical tourism, which can take several forms, including visitors returning to their homelands for medical and healthcare services, including surgery and post-operative care (Connell 2011).

The mapping of diasporic tourism has inherent challenges. The first is that it is difficult to capture data on the entry and exit of diasporic tourists because of the prevalence of dual nationality in many Caribbean countries. As such, many persons shown in the travel data as foreigners are actually from the diaspora. Second, many

Fig. 9.3 Typology of diasporic tourism

diasporic tourists are treated as synonymous with VFR who largely stay in family homes and so operate outside of the hotel and hospitality sector. Consequently, this target group is often viewed as a form of ethnic or nostalgic tourism and not as "true" tourists. In short, diasporic tourism suffers from a paradigmatic blind spot that stymies investment in most tourism agencies in the Caribbean. This is starting to change, however. Tourism officials in Guyana, for example, recently launched an initiative targeting the diaspora. As the Director of the Guyanese Tourism Authority has stated:

> We attribute this increase in arrivals to the re-discover home initiative where we are proactively and aggressively encouraging Guyanese living abroad to come back home to spend time in Guyana for their vacation or leisure, to retire to invest or to volunteer and the response has been terrific so far (Caribbean360 2012).

This initiative should not come as a surprise because, among the countries for which there is data, Guyana has the highest level of diasporic tourism. Tourists from the Guyanese diaspora account for an estimated 66 % of the total tourist arrivals in that country. The importance of diasporic tourism in Suriname is also noteworthy, accounting for 62 % of arrivals. While the rates for the Dominican Republic and Jamaica are lower, diasporic tourists are still very important for these economies. Tourists from the diaspora are estimated to account for as much as 45 % of the total number of tourists arriving at the Santo Domingo airport in the Dominican Republic, while the equivalent figure for Jamaica is estimated to be 30–35 % (Hume 2011; Mortley 2011; Nurse 2011). Diasporic tourism has clear patterns and trends. One of the key indicators is frequency of travel, which varies by country (Table 9.1). In the case of both Jamaica and the Dominican Republic close to 70 % of the diaspora travel home once a year or more. For Ecuador the figure is 62 % and for Guyana close to 45 %.

One of the interesting aspects of diasporic tourism is the extent to which the related economic activities are synergistic and generate multiplier effects throughout the wider economy. This broad impact relates to the fact that diasporic tourists have different characteristics and travel patterns from tourists with no linkages to the destination. Diasporic tourists tend to stay longer than other tourists as well as make short visits for events and festivals. They are often remitters as well and may have transferred monies to locally-based family before departure. They may have forwarded barrels of goods via a freighting company to arrive days before their

Table 9.1 Frequency of travel to country of origin (%)

Country of origin	3 times or more a year	Twice a year	Once a year	Once every 2 years	Once every 3 years	Travel little	Never travelled
Ecuador	10.0	12.2	39.2	35.1	4.1	9.5	0
Dominican Rep.	11.6	24.5	33.3	10.9	3.4	16.3	0
Guyana	5.8	12.1	26.7	18.4	10.7	26.2	0
Jamaica	4.5	24.0	40.0	14.0	1.5	8.0	8.0

Source: Data from Orozco et al. (2005)

arrival. They also tend to spend more on local goods and services compared with the average vacation tourist. For example, diasporic tourism is known to generate business for the freighting sector because many visitors make local purchases, such as nostalgic goods, in excess of the baggage limits of the airlines.

Diasporic tourists are also more likely to purchase a local mobile phone or a SIM card that they use on several visits. The creative industries are known to benefit from diasporic tourism in that sales of books, paintings, DVDs, CDs, fashion, craft and so on tend to peak when there is a major festival that attracts diasporic tourists. The heritage tourism sector also benefits from the inflow of diasporic tourists (Nurse 2003; 2008). The diasporic tourism economy therefore has a far wider impact than the hotel and hospitality sector. Indeed, the impact on the travel and freight industries, telecoms, creative industries, financial transfer and the nostalgic goods sector tends to be very significant (Fig. 9.4). However, these linkages tend not to be captured in the existing data frameworks.

Another key benefit associated with diasporic tourism is that enhanced tourism flows serve as a conduit for trade. For example, international flights to several Caribbean countries would be more expensive if there were no diasporic tourists. Various airlines would either have abandoned these routes or increased their fares. Adlung (2007: 3) argues that trade in services provides a platform for the facilitation of other services and goods:

> Transport and communication services are the conduits through which individual economies interact. Their efficiency is a core determinant of domestic producers' ability to compete on, and receive inputs from, international markets. Equipped with better transport and communication links, companies are able to respond more immediately to locational differences in factor prices and technologies.

While there is no hard data to measure the conduit effect, it is evident from the scale of the diasporic tourism phenomenon in several Caribbean countries that the boost to global competitiveness and poverty reduction is significant.



Fig. 9.4 Typology of diasporic tourism linkages

Conclusion

This chapter argues that greater attention and focus on diasporic tourism is an important addition to the range of target markets and categories in the global tourism industry. It shows that diasporic tourism is having a direct impact in terms of arrivals and visitor expenditures as well as indirect impacts such as telecom services, sales of nostalgic goods and services, and purchases from the creative industries. The growth of diasporic tourism has allowed for economic diversification within and outside of traditional exports. Tapping into these markets is an innovation for the tourism sector and the wider trade in services (Tacsir 2011). Innovations are also generated in the ancillary sectors like telecoms through the demand for mobile services. The chapter illustrates that diasporic tourism presents an important opportunity to create a more sustainable and inclusive form of tourism. However, it is clear that there still exists a paradigmatic blind spot among tourism and migration-related sector agencies. In short, governments and other key stakeholders in the Caribbean need to be more assertive to tap the potential that the diasporic economy presents.

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Chapter 10
Diasporas, Development and Engagement in Australia's Asian Century

Graeme Hugo

Introduction

Over the last two decades, Australia has been in the top ten nations globally with the highest net migration gains (United Nations 2013a). With 26 % of its population foreign-born, another 19 % Australia-born with a foreign-born parent and over one million temporary residents, Australia is truly a "nation of immigrants" (Hugo 2014). Moreover, with a substantial proportion of its migrant intake over the last decade coming from Asia, Africa and the Pacific, there is considerable potential for the development of transnational linkages with economically poorer nations. Most of the global discourse on diasporas and their potential for facilitating development and reducing poverty in their countries of origin has focused on diaspora communities in Europe and North America. Yet Australia has some of the world's largest and most active diaspora communities and this chapter seeks to investigate their nature, dynamics and potential.

The first part of the chapter argues that there are several distinctive aspects of Australian immigration that influence the nature of diaspora engagement in development. These include, firstly, the fact that Australia's migration relationship with origin countries is circular rather than linear. Secondly, the immigration programme is very selective of the highly skilled and this has an influence on the nature of diaspora engagement. Indeed there are differences between visa categories in this respect. A third issue relates to Australia having a national settlement policy based on multiculturalism and the maintenance of cultural identity which, potentially at least, can influence the degree and nature of diaspora engagement.

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The first part of the chapter assesses the available evidence on the extent and nature of diaspora engagement. It shows how this has changed dramatically over the post-World War II period with the development of modern forms of media and communication and cheapening of international travel, which have allowed immigrants to maintain more extensive and intimate relationships with their countries of origin. The extent and nature of diaspora engagement varies considerably between different visa categories. For example, despite generally having lower incomes than other groups, refugee-humanitarian immigrants tend to remit more. There are also considerable differences between birthplace groups and their relationship with their country of origin. For example, the China-born show a much stronger tendency for return migration than the other major Asian origin group – the India-born. Diaspora engagement is investigated through several dimensions. Australian international migration data allows the extent of return migration – both permanent and temporary – to be examined. Official remittance data in Australia is very limited but a number of case studies have demonstrated the significance of remittances for several groups. In addition the extent of engagement through the development of migrant associations and other formal and informal linkages is examined.

The final part of the chapter addresses policy issues. In particular, Australia's official settlement policy of multiculturalism is examined. At least potentially, this would seem supportive of diaspora development and engagement. However, in Australia the official policy is more about equity, access to services and adjustment, and less about cultural maintenance than elsewhere. Hence, official state support of diaspora activity is limited and it is mainly informal mechanisms encouraging this engagement. There is, however, the beginning of a discussion about the role of diasporas in economic development. Many of Australia's immigrants are from Asia and the Pacific so there is potential for diaspora engagement aimed at facilitating development in these origin countries.

The Changing Immigration Context

Australia's population in March 2014 was 23,425,741 and is growing at a rate of 1.7 % per annum – greater than the rate of global population growth and one of the fastest among OECD nations. Some 60 % of the annual population growth is attributable to net migration gain (ABS 2014). Australia has experienced an extended period of economic growth since the recession of 1990–1991. In recent years a mining boom, fuelled by the industrial expansion of China, has been an important element. However, the tightening of the labour market is also partly a function of ageing of the population. The unemployment rate in September 2012 was 5.3 % but it has been below 5 % for much of the last decade.

With half of Australia's total population having been in the country for a generation or less, the potential for developing diasporic linkages with other nations is substantial. There are, however, some distinctive characteristics of Australian immigration that have influenced the nature of the diaspora. Over the post-war period more than 8 million immigrants have settled in Australia, including around 800,000

former refugees. Without post-war net migration gains, Australia's current population would be more than 10 million lower, at around 13 million. Since the mid-1990s there has been substantial temporary migration made up mainly of skilled workers, international students and working holiday makers. As of 31 March 2014 there were 1,142,560 persons temporarily in Australia. They also have the potential to develop linkages between Australia and their countries of origin, especially since a third of the national immigration intake is made up of temporary residents in the process of changing their status to permanent residence.

The annual number of immigrants to Australia has fluctuated over time (Fig. 10.1). Permanent migration has been a substantial contributor to national population growth over the post-World War II period, accounting for around half of all growth. However, the contribution has been much more than numerical. The global origins of immigrants has also been transformed and with it the makeup of Australian society. In 1947, less than one in 10 Australians were overseas-born and over 97 % were of Anglo-Celtic ethnicity. Australia was mono-cultural and strongly opposed to increasing ethnic diversity. However, contemporary Australia is emphatically multicultural with 36 % having non-English-speaking ancestry and 11 % Asian ancestry (Table 10.1). The transformation of the make-up of Australian immigrant settlement from Europe early in the post-war period to the dominance of Asia is evident in Figs. 10.2 and 10.3. This shows the countries of origin of immigrants in 1970 and 2010–2011.



Fig. 10.1 Immigrant arrivals in Australia by region of last residence, 1947–1996 and permanent additions by region of birth, 1997–2013 (Note: Includes permanent arrivals up to 1997. Thereafter the figure includes 'onshore' immigrants who have successfully applied for permanent resident status. Source: DIBP data)

Table 10.1 Indicators of Australian diversity, 2011

Indicator	Percent
Born overseas	26.1
Born overseas in CALD country	16.6
Australia-born with an overseas-born parent	18.8
Speaks language other than English at home	19.2
Ancestry (multiple response) in a CALD country	35.8
Asia-born	8.1
Ancestry (multiple response) Asian country	10.8
Speaking an Asian language at home	8.5
Non-Christian religion	22.3
Indigenous population	2.6
No. of birthplace groups with 10,000+	67
No. of birthplace groups with 1,000+	133
No. of indigenous persons	548,369

Source: ABS 2011 census



Fig. 10.2 Changing origin of immigrants to Australia: birthplace of immigrants, 1970



Fig. 10.3 Changing origin of immigrants to Australia: birthplace of immigrants, 2010–2011 (Source: Department of Immigration 1972; DIBP unpublished data)

Contemporary Asia is the most dynamic global economic region with a share of the global economy increasing from 23 % in 1990 to 29 % in 2013 and a projected 31 % in 2019 (International Monetary Fund 2014). An Australian Government (2012) report entitled *Australia in the Asian Century* argues that Australia's engagement with the dynamic Asian region is fundamental to the nation's future prosperity, sustainability and security, and "to seize these opportunities, Australia must create deeper connections with Asia to broaden the flow of ideas and acquire new knowledge and capabilities" (Australian Government 2012: 8). However, the report makes no mention of the role that diasporas of Asian countries in Australia may play in such a policy. The scale, diversity and complexity of population movements between Asian countries and Australia is "hardwiring" Australia into the region as well as offering a range of possibilities for enhancing its connections to the booming economies of Asia.

Several features of Australia's contemporary pattern of migration have implications for the development of diaspora activity. The first of these relates to the fact that over the last two decades Australia's immigration programme has become increasingly focused on skills acquisition. Immigrants in skilled categories increased from 29 % in 1993–1994 to 70 % in 2005-2006 (Fig. 10.4). This was driven by a strong imperative within government for immigration to contribute towards the increasing productivity and skills profile of the national population (Birrell et al. 2006; Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia 2004).

The implications for diaspora engagement include the fact that most migrants are drawn from relatively well-off families so that the diaspora in Australia is less likely



Fig. 10.4 Share of skill and family streams, 1984–1985 to 2013–2014 (Source: DIBP 2013, 5; DIBP 2014)

to be engaged in sending money home for the livelihood needs of their families. There is also a strong potential for the diaspora to be associated with knowledge transfer/exchange, trade and other linkages beyond family relationships. This differentiates Australia's Asian diaspora both from that in many other OECD destinations and from its own immigrant population in the past.

Another element to be considered is the geographical isolation and island nature of Australia. The friction of distance has had a strong influence on the development of diaspora linkages, especially in the early post-war years. In the first four post-WWII decades, immigrants from Europe had very limited opportunities to visit or interact with their countries of origin. The prohibitive cost of international travel meant that visits home occurred once a decade or even less frequently, while letters were the main form of communication. Costly telephone calls were reserved for crisis situations. News from home came several days late in the foreign language press. This has all been transformed for immigrants of the last two decades. The massive reductions in time and money costs of travel have facilitated annual, or even more frequent, trips home while email, Skype and cheap international telephone calls mean that migrants can have regular and close contact with relatives, friends and business colleagues.

Another geographical feature of the Australian immigration system of relevance to diaspora is the fact that, unlike many destination countries, the immigrant community is made up of substantial numbers of different birthplace groups rather than being dominated by a single group. In Australia there are 67 birthplace groups with more than 10,000 people and 133 with more than 1,000.

A further dimension of Australia's immigration policy with implications for diaspora development relates to settlement. A watershed in Australian settlement policy was the release in 1978 of the Galbally Report on Migrant Services and Programmes. This advocated a shift in government policy from the "melting pot" assimilation emphasis that prevailed in the first three post-WWII decades toward multiculturalism. Among other things, the policy stipulated that "every person should be able to maintain his or her culture without prejudice or disadvantage" (Jupp 2001: 87). Cultural continuity has been one of the distinctive features of multiculturalism policy in other jurisdictions. Usually, this is seen in terms of language continuation, freedom to celebrate national festivals, form associations and so on, but rarely in terms of encouraging the maintenance of origin country linkages. Yet this would seem to be strongly consistent with the tenets of Australia's multiculturalism policy.

Cultural maintenance, at least implicitly, involves the opening up, and support of, channels of communication with the origin country. However, Australian multiculturalism policy and practice have placed less emphasis on cultural maintenance than has Canada's, for example, and focused more on the development of ethnic-specific welfare and ethnic media services. In post-WWII Australia, the development of ethnic and national associations and organizations as well as linkages with countries of origin has not been hindered in any way by policy but neither has it really been encouraged. Nevertheless, the development of diasporic linkages would seem to be strongly consistent with the officially adopted principles of multiculturalism (Jupp and Clyne 2011).

Finally, citizenship issues need to be considered. In the first post-WWII half century Australia had a bipartisan migration policy that strongly espoused permanent settlement and eschewed temporary migration. Accordingly, the passage to Australian citizenship was quick and relatively simple. However, it also meant that the country rejected dual citizenship. With the securitization of migration, the passage to citizenship has become longer and more difficult. In 2002, however, dual citizenship was introduced, a change that arguably occurred largely because of lobbying and pressure exerted by Australia's own expatriate diaspora (Hugo 2006). But it has opened up the opportunity for immigrants in Australia to retain their original citizenship as part of ongoing identification with their countries of origin.

Diaspora and Mobility Linkages

Return Migration

An important dimension of diaspora relationships is the post-immigration movements between origin and destination countries. These are important conduits of information, money, influence, goods and ideas. Little is known about post-immigration mobility with the country of origin generally because most nations do not gather such data. Australia is an exception. This section therefore examines patterns of movement between Australia and Asia and the involvement of diasporas

in those movements. Australian international movement data is uniquely suited to such an analysis because border registration points capture: (i) complete information on all moves into and out of the nation; (ii) complete information on both permanent and non-permanent moves; and (iii) since 1998, a personal identifier has been used so the movement patterns of individuals over time can be examined. Such comprehensive data collection is possible because of Australia's island geography and relative isolation in conjunction with high technology border surveillance systems. These factors facilitate a high level of government control over entry and exit; indeed, Australia has one of the most closely managed migration systems in the world. All persons, other than New Zealanders, are required to obtain a visa before entering Australia. Clandestine border crossing is miniscule and most undocumented migration consists of overstayers or persons breaching their visa conditions. A corollary of this close control is that complete and detailed information are collected on all movements into and out of the country (Productivity Commission 2010).

Why is this relevant to diasporas? While there are variations between origin countries in scale and intensity, an important part of diasporic relations is a dynamic flow of people in both directions. These movements are associated with a myriad economic, social, cultural and personal transactions between the migrants based in Australia and family, friends and professional colleagues in the other country. The Australian data demonstrates conclusively that there is a strong relationship between permanent migration and temporary population flows between nations. These temporary movements are both a symptom of, and a mechanism for, diasporic interaction with the origin country. The size of inflows of migrants to Australia is also strongly correlated with other important flows such as the numbers of immigrants from a country and the number of short-term visits between Australia and that country. There is also a positive association of both with trade flows.

The comprehensive nature of Australian data on international migration flows means that the complexity of the Asia-Australia migration system can be quantified in terms of both permanent and temporary movements. Since the abolition of the last vestiges of the infamous White Australia Policy in the 1950s, there has been an increase in permanent settlement of Asians in Australia (Table 10.2). However, the Australian data also allows us to identify the numbers who, after a period of residence, either return or move on to a third country. Between 1993–1994 and 2012–2013, for example, 915,411 Asians settled in Australia, but 170,276 returned to Asia. In addition, 136,454 Australia-born persons moved permanently to Asia. Hence, the net migration gain was 608,681; representing a migration efficiency percentage of 54.3; that is, it takes two immigrants to a get one net immigrant.

Permanent departures from Australia to Asia can divided into two main groups: (i) the foreign-born who mainly represent return migration and third-country migration of former immigrants (61 % of the migrants from Australia to Asia); and (ii) the Australia-born who are partly the Australia-born children of those returnees but also Australian citizens of long standing moving to an Asian country. The permanent outflow from Australia over the period from 1994 to 2006 is a third of the size of the inflow although there were significant variations in the extent of return migration to

Table 10.2 Asian permanent arrivals and departures from Australia, 1994–2006

Region of origin	Immigrant arrivals	Permanent departures overseas-born	Permanent departures Australia-born	Permanent departures	Permanent departures as percent of permanent arrivals
South Asia (inc. India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh)	79,833	1,504	973	2,477	3.1
Southeast Asia (inc. Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam)	191,422	28,521	28,783	57,304	29.9
Northeast Asia (inc Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea)	146,749	56,136	24,508	80,644	55.0
Total Asia	418,004	86,161	54,264	140,425	33.6

Source: DIAC overseas arrivals and departures, unpublished data

the regions of Northeast, Southeast and South Asia (Table 10.2). Perhaps the most striking figures are for South Asia, where rates of return are extremely low, especially for India (with 51.5 immigrants for every returnee). This may be partly due to the recent nature of much South Asian, and especially Indian, immigration, although it still contrasts greatly with China, another recent source of inflow.

Proportionately, the greatest levels of return migration were to Northeast Asia. There were 56,136 return migrants to these Asian countries between 1994 and 2006 – equivalent to 38 % of arrivals, suggesting a return rate of over one in three immigrants. Most important were Hong Kong returnees who are part of a wider pattern of circulation of migrants to and from Australia (Pe-Pua et al. 1996). It is also associated with significant numbers of Hong Kong residents taking out Australian citizenship before the 1997 handover to China and significant numbers subsequently returning (Skeldon 1994). A similar pattern has been observed in Canada (Ley and Kobayashi 2005).

There is substantial return migration from Australia to Japan as well, with many Japanese coming to Australia on long-term company transfers and returning home on completion of their assignment (Hugo 1994; Iguchi 2008). More surprising is the large proportion of immigrants from China and, to a lesser extent, South Korea who have returned from Australia. With 75,563 permanent arrivals between 1994 and 2006 the China-born were the largest Asian-Australian migration flow. However, the return flow is substantial and equivalent to 21 % of the inflow. For South Koreans it is 30 %. This clearly reflects considerable bilocality, with many immigrants of Chinese and South Korean origin maintaining work, family and housing in two countries and circulating between them (Hugo 2008a, b).

Levels of return migration were somewhat lower for Southeast Asia (at 15 % of the inflow) but not insignificant, especially in the case of Singapore, Indonesia,

Malaysia and Thailand. With Vietnam too, there has been a recent significant return flow. Immediately following reunification in Vietnam in 1975, there was considerable movement to Australia of forced migrants (Viviani 1996). At that time, the rate of return migration was very low (Hugo 1994). However, the *doi moi* economic reforms from the mid-1980s, and the subsequent opening of the Vietnamese economy, led an increasing number of Vietnamese-Australians to return to their birthplace to invest and set up businesses.

Not all permanent departures from Australia of the Asia-born return to their country of birth, adding a further element of complexity to diaspora linkages (Table 10.3). Of the 26,000 China-born Australian residents who indicated they were leaving Australia permanently, for example, only 57 % returned to China while around a quarter went to Hong Kong SAR. A similar pattern has been observed for the China-born leaving the United States and Canada (Zweig and Han 2007). In the case of India-born Australian residents, less than a quarter of those leaving Australia returned to India. This may reflect the tendency of Indian IT immigrants who study and settle in Australia and later migrate to the United States (Biao 2004). Their Australian permanent residence status serves as an insurance should they be unsuccessful in the US.

Table 10.3 Destinations of Asia-born residents leaving Australia, 1993–2007

Country of birth	Departures	Percentage returning to country of birth	Percentage moving to another country
China	25,919	57.4	42.6
India	3,631	22.0	78.0
Singapore	3,075	53.0	47.0
Hong Kong	20,700	84.6	15.4
Philippines	3,395	44.5	55.5
Malaysia	5,350	34.4	65.6
Vietnam	8,874	57.1	42.9
Indonesia	6,359	74.6	25.4
Taiwan	8,350	80.3	19.7
Burma	277	10.5	89.5
Cambodia	1,013	29.1	70.9
Laos	173	28.0	72.0
Thailand	2,517	74.8	25.2
Japan	2,864	77.8	22.2
South Korea	3,811	74.9	25.1
Bangladesh	228	25.4	74.6
Nepal	37	8.1	91.9
Pakistan	520	31.3	68.7
Sri Lanka	1,285	24.0	76.0
Afghanistan	254	12.2	87.8

Source: DIAC (unpublished data)

Temporary Migration

Australia receives temporary visitors on both a short term (staying less than a year) and long term (staying more than a year but intending to return) basis. Asia-born short-term visitors number more than two million annually. In 2012–2013, 2.6 million short-term visits were made by the Asia-born to Australia. Of these 52 % were for holidays and 19.7 % were to visit family and friends (Table 10.4). Significant numbers also nominated business, employment, education, exhibitions and conferences as the reason for travel.

Long-term temporary migrants from Asia are mainly students and 457s (temporary work permits) and many later transition into permanent residents (Fig. 10.5). The number of long-term temporary migrants has increased steadily since the early 1990s, reaching a peak of 400,000 in 2013. The proportion of Asia-born has also grown consistently and is now well above 50 %.

The intensity of short-term return visiting by two different types of Asia-born migrants living in Australia is shown in Table 10.5. The first category is Asia-born persons who settled permanently between 1998 and 2006. The average number of trips ranged from 5.1 for those from Taiwan to 1.6 for those from Pakistan. The second is Asia-born permanent residents who arrived in Australia before 1998. The average number of trips they made between 1995 and 2006 was obviously greater, varying between 5.0 (Pakistan) and 10.5 (Indonesia). Permanent Asian immigrants in Australia are thus engaged in regular visits to their countries of birth. Another group are temporary migrants (visitors) who also have very high averages, indicating that they too engage in intensive coming and going. Clearly, then, there are very active circuits of movement between Asia and Australia. These circuits are powerful conduits for the flow of money, goods and expertise back to origin countries. The intimacy of face-to-face contact between Asian Australians and family, friends and colleagues in their birthplace is made possible by cheaper and faster international travel. The proliferation of information and communications technology has meant that migrants can access local media at the same time as those in the country. Together with frequent contact by phone, email and Skype, it is now possible to develop and maintain diasporic linkages with an intensity and timeliness not previously possible.

Table 10.4 Asia-born short-term visitor arrivals by reason for travel, 2012–2013

Reason for travel	Short-term visitor arrivals	Percent
Holiday	1,352,844	52.0
Visiting friends/relatives	512,185	19.7
Education	247,201	9.5
Business	209,701	8.1
Employment	83,921	3.2
Convention/conference	77,212	3.0
Exhibition	6,273	0.2
Other	113,300	4.4
Total	2,602,639	100.0

Source: DIBP (unpublished data)



Fig. 10.5 Long-term visitor arrivals by birthplace, 1993–1994 to 2012–2013 (Source: DIBP unpublished data)

Table 10.5 Average number of short-term return trips from Australia, 1998–2006

Country of birth	Immigrants (1998–2006)	Immigrants (pre-1998)	Visitors
Indonesia	4.8	10.5	6.1
Malaysia	4.0	9.4	5.9
Singapore	3.7	10.2	6.4
China	2.4	6.2	4.4
Taiwan	5.1	8.7	5.8
India	1.9	5.7	3.7
Pakistan	1.6	5.0	3.5
Korea	2.5	7.5	3.7

Source: Special data set received by DIAC

Disaporas and Remittances

In Australia there has been little investigation of remittances, partly due to the lack of quality data. Official data on remittances actually shows a larger inflow than outflow for a number of reasons (Fig. 10.6). First, the increasing emphasis on attracting skilled migrants to Australia means that many migrants come from better-off groups



Fig. 10.6 Inflows and outflows of Australia remittances in USD millions, 1970–2010 (Source: World Bank remittances database)

in Asia which reduces the need for migrants to remit funds. Second, the inflow of funding from Asia to support higher education students in Australia is substantial. In 2013, international education activity contributed AUD15 billion in export income to the Australian economy, the largest services export industry after tourism. The main contributors were China (AUD4.0 billion), India (AUD1.3 billion), Vietnam (AUD0.9 billion), Korea and Malaysia (both AUD0.7 billion), Hong Kong, Thailand and Indonesia (all AUD0.5 billion) and Japan (AUD0.3 billion).

Third, until recently Australia eschewed temporary worker migration and focused almost totally on permanent immigration. For most of the post-World War II period, Australia's immigration programme favoured permanent settlement and the "reunion" of families in Australia. Ryan (2005) argues that this is the main explanation for low outflows of remittances from Australia. High levels of remittances tend to be associated with temporary migration whereby migrants leave their families in the origin country and those families are often almost totally dependent on remittances for their day-to-day existence.

The Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants in Australia (LSIA) does provide insights into the character of remitting. The survey canvassed two groups of migrants who had arrived in 1993–1995 and 1999–2000 respectively (Hugo 2004). The first group were initially interviewed within a few months of their arrival in Australia. Less than 8 % had sent remittances back to relatives, an understandable finding

given that it takes time for immigrants to become established. By the time they were interviewed a third time (in 1998–1999), 30 % had sent remittances back. Refugee-humanitarian migrants had the highest levels of remitting (at 45 %), despite the fact that they were the poorest group with the highest level of unemployment and greatest reliance on benefits (Cobb-Clarke and Khoo 2006; Richardson et al. 2001). Geographically, remitting was greatest amongst immigrants from regions with many low-income countries including South Asia (47 %), Southeast Asia (42 %), the Pacific, the Middle East (33 %) and Africa (32 %).

Two areas of the world dominate remittances sent out of Australia: Asia and Europe (especially the UK) (Fig. 10.7). Asian countries (China, India, Vietnam, Philippines and Republic of Korea) make up half of the top 10 recipients of remittances from Australia. Remittances from Australia to countries in the South are undoubtedly significant, although the historical emphasis on family settlement and more recent focus on skilled temporary migration has not been conducive to the initiation of large flows of money directly to families in poverty in migrant origin countries. Most migrants from the Pacific Islands are not skilled and although their numbers are relatively small, the remittances they send are substantial (Brown 2008; Connell and Brown 2004). Studies of groups arriving under the refugee-humanitarian programme from the Horn of Africa (Eritrea, Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia) also indicate substantial flows of remittances despite recent arrival in Australia and high levels of unemployment (Wege 2012).



Fig. 10.7 Remittances sent from Australia by country, 2012 (Source: World Bank remittances database)

Other Diasporic Linkages

The policy preoccupation with the effects of international migration on Australia itself has traditionally meant there has been a lack of interest in the impact on origin countries. However, this is changing and there is a new concern with migration's impact on the development of origin countries within both the Development Assistance and the Immigration aims of government. However, there are no Australian government policies or programmes that seek to enhance or support linkages between diasporas and their countries of origin, in contrast to countries like the Philippines that have a suite of organizations and structures to maintain and sustain linkages with their diaspora (Secretary Nicolas, Chap. 3 this volume).

Australia's Chinese and Vietnamese communities have undoubtedly been substantial contributors to the massive influx of investment into China and Vietnam in recent years. The increased availability of goods from Asia in Australia may be associated with the bridgehead markets established by diaspora communities and their involvement in trade. A number of nationality-based chambers of commerce have emerged in Australia to facilitate trade with Asian nations. In the state of South Australia, for example, 16 Asian countries are represented by diaspora members in the Council of International Trade and Commerce of South Australia whose objective is to facilitate trade between Australia and the home countries of immigrants.

One under-researched issue concerns the role of diasporas in knowledge transfer and the spread of ideas. There is considerable international interest in the emergence of networks of academics, researchers, scientists and technologists, and their role in the spread of knowledge and maintaining a country's competitive edge in global innovation and trade (Meyer and Brown 1999). The existence of scientific diasporas can provide a "brain gain option" through technology transfers, information spread and training for people in their home country (Barre et al. 2003; Meyer et al. 1997, 2001; Meyer 2001a, b). The potential of "virtual return" through the use of modern information and communication technology has led to a significant change in China's official policy towards the highly skilled in its diaspora (Biao 2006). Official policy has changed from *huiuo fuwu* (return and serve the motherland) to *weiguo fuwu* (serve the motherland) in recognition of the increasing ability of the diaspora to deliver benefits while abroad (Wescott 2005).

In this context, Hugo (2008b, 2010) has studied the high level of professional linkages maintained with India and China by Indian and Chinese-born academics and researchers in Australian universities. The potential for such channels of communication to facilitate knowledge transfer is substantial. While these scholars hold full-time academic positions in Australian universities, most are engaged in substantial and regular professional work in their country of origin. Two thirds of Chinese Australian academics have collaborative research projects with a correspondent in China. Most give academic papers, run courses and train graduate students in China as well as in Australia. They also visit frequently as well as maintain regular contact by phone and email.

Conclusion

Since WWII, Australia has had an evidence-driven Migration Programme. However, that evidence has related almost totally to the (mainly economic) effects of migration on Australia and not the consequences for sending countries. The role of diasporas in contributing positively to development in origin countries has long been appreciated (Cohen 2008). But it has been given new impetus by the massive increase in global mobility in combination with new technologies enabling visiting and other transnational contacts. A recent UN (2013b) survey of national population policies found that more than 50 % of countries now have formal policies to engage their diaspora. These countries and virtually all of the literature and policies concerning diasporas relate to sending nations (Agunias and Newland 2012). Yet it is increasingly being realized that cooperation between origin and destination countries can assist this process. Accordingly, it is appropriate to consider how destination country policy could play a role in enabling diaspora groups from elsewhere to develop effective linkages with their origin countries and use them for beneficial outcomes in relation to development and poverty reduction. For most destination countries, including Australia, this would represent a considerable conceptual leap.

If Australia were to facilitate linkages between immigrant communities and their origin countries, this would be consistent with a number of existing policies including: (i) the national policy of multiculturalism and especially cultural maintenance; (ii) Australian Development Assistance policy, which now formally recognizes the development potential of international migration for origin nations; and (iii) Australia's efforts to increase the strength and diversity of its Asian linkages, as evidenced by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade's growing interest in whether migrants to Australia promote trade to their home countries. Accordingly, this is an opportune time to examine the potential role of policy in destination countries and of migration partnerships between origin and destination countries in facilitating diaspora and diaspora linkages.

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Chapter 11
Regenerating Scholarly Capacity Through Diaspora Engagement: The Case of A Ghana Diaspora Knowledge Network

Wisdom J. Tettey

Introduction

As labour market globalization takes hold, many African countries are contending with the tension between transnational mobility and the erosion of skilled expertise in critical professions (Mahroum et al. 2006; Tettey 2003). Among the institutions that have borne the brunt of these developments are African universities and cognate institutions engaged in knowledge production and innovation. The expertise base has been eroded to the extent that "not enough teaching capacity is available to provide quality training for new generations of citizens" (Tettey 2006: 1). Reasons for this include inadequate and non-competitive salaries vis-à-vis local and international organizations, and lack of job satisfaction due to non-monetary factors (Tettey 2002). A review of available evidence across the African continent shows that there is a dearth of research capacity (NEPAD 2010). South Africa has a researcher density of 825 per million inhabitants and Senegal a researcher density of 635 per million inhabitants. At the other end of the spectrum are Mozambique (24.4), Uganda (25.4) and Ghana (27.1) (NEPAD 2010).

In addition to the pull factors that draw Africans to other countries, there are internal push factors that do not augur well for the development and retention of expertise. Part of the reason for this situation is the lack of requisite infrastructural and funding support necessary to enable enhanced research capacity. The consequence is very low research and development (R&D) intensity, measured as the ratio of gross domestic expenditure on research and experimental development (GERD) to gross domestic product (GDP). The consequent erosion of the capacity and competitiveness of African countries as locations for research and scholarship is brought into sharp relief by the fact that only Malawi, Uganda and South Africa

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scored an R&D intensity above 1 %. Most other countries score below 0.50 % (NEPAD 2010). This is way below the 1 % target set by the executive council of the African Union in its 2006 Khartoum Decision on Science and Technology. At the global level, Africa's share of GERD stagnated at 0.9 % between 2002 and 2007, while other developing regions ate into the share held by North America and Europe. Asia, for example, increased its share from 27.1 to 32 %, while Latin America and the Caribbean inched ahead from 2.8 to 3.0 % during the same period (UNESCO 2010). The period also saw Africa's share of world researchers stagnate at 2.2 %, compared to Asia's, which increased from 35.5 to 40.9 % (UNESCO 2010). The continent's share of global scientific publications was only 2.0 % in 2008.

African countries are constrained by the shallow pool of citizens with the highest possible qualifications in their areas of expertise. Available data indicate that PhD holders constitute 32 % and 26 % of R&D staff in South Africa and Senegal, respectively. Most other countries not only have significantly fewer doctoral degree holders, but a high proportion of staff with non-tertiary education (NEPAD 2010). The impact of these deficits is that the share of science emerging from Africa continues to decline and the institutions that exist are not productive enough to alter the situation (NEPAD 2010).

In the context of unfavourable conditions for scholarly capacity building and innovation within Africa, interest is growing in the mobilization of diaspora intellectual talent through the utilization of communication technologies (Lewin and Zhong 2013). According to UNESCO (2010), cheap and easy access to digital technologies has accelerated the diffusion of knowledge and technologies and facilitated international research networking. There is thus growing optimism that diaspora communities and their countries of origin can replicate the success of the transnational research partnerships that have resulted from the internationalization of science and strengthen the research collaborations made possible by these technologies. This optimism has provided an impetus for the development of new thinking in migration and development discourse.

A number of development actors, including governments and international organizations, have embraced the new thinking that the loss of highly qualified personnel through the 'brain drain' can be recouped and enhanced through a process of 'brain circulation' (de Lange 2013; Jacob and Meek 2013;). Consequently, there are growing efforts to synthesize the transnational mobility of knowledge and expertise, new communication technologies, and diaspora communities' commitment to development in their countries of origin into a catalytic nexus for mutually beneficial development outcomes (Crush et al. 2013; Grossman 2010; Plaza and Ratha 2011; Yang and Welch 2010). Among these efforts is the development of diaspora knowledge networks. As Mahroumi and Guchteneire (2006) note, international knowledge networks can include professional bodies, academic research groups and scientific communities that organize around a particular issue. The primary motivation for such networks is "to create and advance knowledge as well as to share, spread and, in some cases, use that knowledge to inform policy and apply to practice" (Mahroumi and Guchteneire 2006: 4). Diaspora knowledge networks (DKNs) are built primarily through collaboration among professionals in diaspora

communities and linkages with their counterparts in countries of origin. Meyer and Wattiaux (2006) suggest that many of these networks are making a valuable contribution.

Notwithstanding the enthusiasm and optimism that is driving the development of DKNs, there is still scepticism about their concrete impact and sustainability (Barnard and Pendock 2013). Mahroumi and Guchteneire (2006: 5), for example, note that the longevity of these networks is limited and question their effectiveness. Grossman (2010: 5) argues that "while the existence and continued proliferation of digital diaspora networks has been demonstrated … there has been little research that supports the premise that an ICT-enabled diaspora option is indeed a sustainable and viable approach to address the brain drain problem." In view of these contending perspectives on the efficacy of DKNs, understanding of the impact of these networks will surely benefit from robust comparative analysis of case studies. The case study approach provides the rigour necessary for drawing credible conclusions about the effectiveness, efficacy and challenges of DKNs, thereby offering insights that will facilitate their sustainability, transferability and replication in specific milieu.

This chapter explores the relative merits of the optimistic and sceptical perspectives on DKNs by evaluating one such network that seeks to shore up academic staff capacity in Ghanaian universities and to address challenges facing graduate education through scholarly and pedagogical collaborations. Staff capacity and graduate education are worthy of examination because they have significant implications for the quality and scale of human resource capacity necessary for training highly qualified personnel for the higher education sector. Requisite capacity is a *sine qua non* not only for regenerating those institutions but also for creating a robust national innovation system.

The chapter starts with a discussion of the rationale for the establishment of a Ghanaian diaspora network (hereafter referred to as *Network*), and then critically interrogates its performance. The generic term *Network* is used to protect the identity of the partners involved and to ensure that its future activities are not adversely affected by this analysis. Following a discussion of the objectives, accomplishments and challenges of the network, the chapter concludes with some recommendations and insights from the Ghanaian case study that are of relevance beyond this specific case.

Setting the Context

To understand the triggers for *Network*, it is important to interrogate the extent to which Ghanaian universities demonstrate the capacity to serve as sustainable incubators of high quality scholarship necessary for local development and global competitiveness. The motivation for the establishment of *Network* stemmed from studies undertaken between 2005 and 2010, which explored staff capacity and the development of the next generation of academics in Ghana (Tettey 2006, 2010). The studies

showed very clearly that Ghanaian institutions were finding it difficult to sustain their scholarly and teaching missions at requisite levels. In 2010, enrolment in the country's universities stood at a little over 100,000, with an academic staff complement of almost 2,800 (Tettey 2010). Ghana's National Council on Tertiary Education had set student-faculty ratios at 18:1, 10:1, and 8:1 for the Humanities, Sciences and Medicine, respectively (Tettey 2006). However, the average student-faculty ratio was 39:1, compared to 21:1 in Canada and fewer than 11:1 in Iceland, Japan, Norway and Sweden (OECD 2010: 382; Usher 2014). The resultant pressure on the limited number of academic staff was overwhelming. The ballooning of intakes into various institutions, without a commensurate increase in faculty, suggested that the pressure was unlikely to abate. At the University of Ghana, student enrolments tripled in the decade before 2008. Undergraduate enrolments were significantly higher than postgraduate enrolments, growing more than three times as fast – 219 % compared to 66 % (Tettey 2010).

One indicator of whether institutions could cope with mounting enrolment pressures is the age distribution of academic staff and the rate at which the proportion of retiring staff can be replenished or, preferably, outstripped by new hires. As many as 41 % were over 50 years old in 2006/2007, while only a quarter were 40 or younger (Tettey 2010). In the public universities, 44 % of staff were above 50, with only 21 % 40 or younger. Because public universities, which cater to the vast majority of students, have a mandatory retirement age of 60, it was clear that the following decade would be very challenging as 31 % were scheduled to retire. The fact that post-retirement contract faculty constituted 13 % and 9 % of the academic staff complement in public and private universities, respectively, clearly showed the difficulties of staff renewal. This highlights the imperative of cultivating a requisite number of newly qualified academics to sustain the mandate of these institutions effectively.

Only 28 % of academic staff at universities in Ghana had doctoral degrees in 2006/2007, with 60 % holding master's degrees and 12 % with qualifications below the master's level. The percentage of doctoral degree holders was 30 % in public universities and only 17 % in private universities. The low academic credentials of academic staff at private institutions certainly reduces their ability "to offer high quality graduate programmes in fields that are potential sources of the next generation of academics" (Tettey 2010: 32). Furthermore, only 4 % of the 106,723 students enrolled in Ghanaian universities in 2007 were registered in postgraduate programmes (Tettey 2010). Of these, many were enrolled in professional programmes that do not lead to an academic career. At the University of Ghana, for example, the majority of postgraduate students were enrolled in course-based Master's programmes, followed by those in thesis-based MPhil programmes. The proportion of students in course-based master's programmes increased from 52 % in 1999 to 55 % in 2007, while those in MPhil and doctoral programmes remained virtually unchanged (Tettey 2010: 34). Given that a thesis-based programme is a prerequisite for entry into the academy, this does not bode well for the production of future academics.

Origins and Objectives of Network

Ghanaian universities are thus facing a serious erosion of their capacity to meet their academic mission and to maintain requisite standards of performance. At the same time, as Zeleza (2013: 4) notes, "the African born academic diaspora in Canada and the United States constitute the sharp edge of Africa's unusually high rates of skilled labour migration, the highest in the world for a region with the world's lowest stock of skilled workers." In this context, attention turned to the mobilization of the academic diaspora to support and complement the available resources in Ghanaian institutions. *Network* was conceived in 2007 as a diaspora knowledge network to mobilize Ghanaian academics teaching in North American universities who are committed to scholarly collaboration with their compatriots in Ghana and to contributing to the enhancement of graduate education in Ghanaian universities.

The network was the result of informal discussions between a member of the academic diaspora and two champions of diaspora networks at an international development agency. Its aim was to use technology-enhanced interactions to pool diaspora and domestic intellectual capital to benefit institutions of higher education in Ghana. These discussions matured into a formal activity agreement between the development agency and the diaspora member's institution. The network has since grown to encompass not just Ghanaian academics in North America, but also their counterparts on other continents – both academics and other highly qualified professionals. Despite the integration of academics and non-academics in the network, it is constituted primarily as an epistemic community focused on enriching curricula, teaching and research at Ghanaian universities.

The objectives of *Network* include facilitation of joint graduate-level curriculum development and strengthening in areas that are critical to the country's needs. Another goal is the enhancement of thesis supervision and examination capacity by involving members of the diaspora in these processes. The purpose is to reduce the burden on existing faculty, improve the quality of the student-supervisor relationship that results from the smaller ratio, broaden the scope of issues about which students can undertake thesis research, and speed up the thesis examination process, which has been characterized by tardiness in submitting examiners' reports. Challenges related to these issues inhibit programme attractiveness for prospective students and create delays in completion for those who are enrolled. These problems create disenchantment among students towards graduate work, with repercussions for the institutions' ability to attract and retain faculty members. Because of difficulties that faculty and students face in accessing current literature and scholarship, the network sought to develop a database of publications relevant to scholarship being undertaken by members of the network – both for graduate student theses and faculty research. The database was to be updated regularly by diaspora members of the network, as well as local partners with the resources to do so, based on the needs of students, faculty members and research teams. Finally, the partners hoped to use the experiences from this undertaking to extend virtual home-diaspora knowledge networks to other tertiary institutions in Ghana, professional groups, and

state and non-state public policy institutions, all of which are contending with deficits in the calibre, number and range of expertise needed to operate effectively.

Cultivating Community and Facilitating Networking

The conceptual basis for *Network* mobilization is rooted in the four key elements of actor-network theory's translation process: problematization, interessement (or interposition), enrolment and mobilization (Callon 1986; Latour 2005; Meyer 2007). Working together, champions at one Ghanaian university, the development agency, and *Network*'s coordinator, articulated the aforementioned problems faced by Ghanaian institutions; generated interest and solicited participation from members of the diaspora and their compatriots in Ghana; and embarked on an enrolment campaign that led to mobilization of support for, and participation in, the activities of the network. In the diaspora, the project team used word-of-mouth campaigns; specially organized meetings at professional and academic meetings; meetings of diaspora groups, convened by the development agency; and email communication to Ghanaian academics who could be identified from search engines, personal networks, and databases that the development partner had developed through other initiatives involving the African diaspora. Word-of-mouth dissemination and recruitment were very significant tools for mobilization, as current members inform others of the existence of the network and encourage them to join. *Network*'s website was also a fundamental avenue for recruitment as prospective members saw what it stood for, noticed their own desires reflected in its objectives, and were able to make direct connections with it for information and sign-up. In fact, as a result of the word-of-mouth approach and web presence, membership expanded beyond the original scope of mobilizing the North American diaspora to include compatriots from other regions.

The initial efforts in Ghana focused on collaboration with one faculty at the partner institution, because of the personal interest and enthusiasm of one dean who embraced, supported and championed the initiative. Through face-to-face discussions as well as memos to department heads and directors, faculty members were made aware of the project, its rationale and objectives. They were encouraged to sign up for membership and to provide information about their scholarly interests and their graduate students and thesis topics. Subsequently, the scope of Ghanaian participation was expanded to include other faculties at the institution. To facilitate this expansion, the network leaders worked through the vice-chancellor to explain the significance of the network to deans and to seek their support for informing their heads of department and encouraging them to let their colleagues and graduate students sign up.

Network used various channels to ensure that graduate students were aware of the opportunities provided by the network and encouraged them to participate. Graduate student governance structures were used as conduits for disseminating

relevant information. Representatives of the partner development agency also met with several graduate students at a forum on campus to discuss the network. Based on recommendations from the university, it was decided to make the School of Graduate Studies the hub for the initiative and the dean of that school the project anchor. Because the scope of the project had expanded to encompass all graduate students at the university, it made sense to have the unit with responsibility for all graduate programmes take charge of the implementation and dissemination efforts involving the graduate student component of the project. Notwithstanding major efforts to include other units at the university, only the dean of the initial partner-faculty continued to show interest and commitment towards the initiative. Without decanal support from other faculties, it was difficult to galvanize academic staff and students and build wider momentum for the project. *Network*, therefore, worked largely in partnership with a single faculty to accomplish the objectives of the initiative, with the hope that success in that unit would beget interest elsewhere.

It is important to note the diversity of diaspora membership, as far as scholarly and professional expertise are concerned. There was strong interest in contributing to the network among compatriots from a variety of fields. Some specifically wanted to contribute to their alma mater, which was not necessarily the partner university in Ghana, and pushed for expansion of activities to include those institutions. In order not to erode this sense of commitment and miss out on the potential contributions of these individuals, *Network* welcomed this group and began to explore formal linkages with another institution, which had a relatively large group of alumni-academics. Logistical constraints, particularly internet connectivity problems and internal administrative challenges, hampered the development of a partnership equivalent to the one with the original institution.

To facilitate interactions, *Network* designed and ran a secure portal, made available by the coordinator's home institution. The portal hosts a database of members which, at its peak, contained the names of 184 academics and professionals and 313 graduate students. Of the academics and professionals, close to 70 were members of the Ghanaian diaspora from 49 institutions spread across the globe, but predominantly from North America. Membership of *Network* was thus dominated by graduate students (63 %), followed by their local supervisors (24 %) and members of the diaspora (13 %). Twenty percent of the total membership identified themselves as female. This included 22 % of the academics and professionals, 36 % of master's level students, and 21 % of students registered in doctoral programmes. The network leaders actively encouraged participation by female academics and students because of the gender gap in academic staff and graduate student complements in many African countries. The gender gap is important to address, both to include the widest range of academic talent and to cultivate mentors and role models for female graduate students. The database contains information on individuals' areas of expertise and activities in which they are available to participate. It is meant, among other things, to serve as a source from which Ghanaian universities may draw thesis examiners. The virtual platforms used by the portal allow these examiners to sit in on oral defences from locations outside Ghana.

Operation of the Network

Since its inception, *Network* has made some progress, principally as a result of diaspora members' commitment to give freely of their time and expertise to ensure that the goals of the initiative are achieved. Several members of the network have been called upon to serve as external examiners for graduate dissertations from the Ghanaian university. They have provided a dependable pool for expeditious examination of dissertations. Unfortunately, departments at the Ghanaian university have not taken advantage of the internal platform for oral examinations, because of inexperience in conducting exams by video conference. Admittedly, erratic electricity supply and poor bandwidth make this technology an unreliable and risky undertaking.

Network is sub-divided into disciplinary nodes to facilitate more focused interactions among people working in similar fields or areas of interest. Organizing the network this way makes it easier for prospective student members and academics to link up with the appropriate community of scholars. The disciplinary nodes currently represented in the *Network* include agriculture, archaeology, communication, geography, information studies, political science, psychology, social work, sociology, history, natural sciences, health and engineering. The nodes have leaders whose responsibility it is to assist the network's coordinator in monitoring activities, responding to specific queries pertaining to their fields, providing feedback on the health of the sub-group, and assigning students to appropriate academics.

Network has started populating a virtual library with material relevant to the thesis topics being undertaken by graduate students at the partner university in Ghana. Training sessions have been coordinated for members to familiarize themselves with the technologies being used on the network's platforms and the core activities needed to make the network functional, and to promote interactivity among students and faculty members. Interactivity is being managed largely through a *Blackboard* platform, which facilitates use for several purposes. Elluminate™, under licence from the network coordinator's home institution, has been used for video conferencing and discussions among members of the network and for management deliberations among relevant parties at the host institution, the Ghanaian university, and the partner development agency. *Network* plans to use this platform to facilitate discussion in the virtual classroom when the network matures to the point where it can run courses, organize virtual thesis defences, and coordinate other kinds of group-based activity. The "discussion board" on *Blackboard* provides a means for the network (or at least segments of it) to engage in discussions about particular theses, curriculum issues or general conversations around pertinent issues. All members have been assigned email addresses by the host institution to enable them to access the network and use the functions available on *Blackboard*. These addresses also allow Ghanaian students and faculty members, whose participation was initially constrained by lack of email addresses, to engage with their counterparts abroad and stay abreast of developments and relevant information. Access to a common email

server and secure platforms was also intended to address potential security risks with private email accounts and unreliable servers at the Ghanaian institution.

Network provided financial and technical support that helped to upgrade a computer laboratory at the Ghanaian university. This became a dedicated location from which students and faculty members could reliably access the network. This support was necessary to ensure that the facility had the bandwidth capacity needed to make the network functional for colleagues and students at the university. The equipment provided included 15 headsets and 25 webcams to facilitate interaction via *Elluminate*. These upgrades followed collaboration with the institution's IT department to determine appropriate interventions that could support the *Blackboard* platform.

With the technological issues resolved, students from the Ghanaian institution were matched with diaspora supervisors. These supervisors worked in tandem with local supervisors to provide relevant guidance to students as they went through the thesis proposal, field research and thesis writing stages. About 50 students have so far been directly matched with diaspora faculty members through the network's portal. Additionally, numerous informal relationships have developed between diaspora members, local supervisors and students, independent of the portal. Some diaspora members now engage directly with the university in a variety of ways as a result of the awareness raised by *Network*. These include roles as examiners and co-supervisors, facilitators for programmes between their institutions and the university and, in at least two cases, the establishment of scholarships to support students. Some units at the university are pursuing adjunct appointments and/or affiliate status for certain diaspora members of the network to enable them to participate more intimately in the development and running of new graduate programmes, particularly at the doctoral level.

As a result of contacts made through *Network*, various collaborative research projects have been fostered. A number of diaspora members have worked with their compatriots, including those in Ghana, to develop research projects that have broad implications for Ghanaian society. Ghana-based members provide local support for students of diaspora partners who are undertaking field research in Ghana. Ghanaian graduate student members also serve as research assistants to diaspora members working on projects in Ghana. These interactions provide great opportunities for fostering and strengthening international knowledge networks, for scholarly collaboration and enhancement of research capacity that directly benefits the Ghanaian academy and the larger society.

Challenges of Diaspora Knowledge Network Engagement

In a little over half a decade of activity, *Network* has had to contend with a number of challenges that affect its ability to realize its full potential as an efficacious instrument for scholarly collaboration and graduate education as well as its own medium- to long-term sustainability. A significant challenge is the difficulty of

getting departments and faculty members at the Ghanaian institution to seize the opportunity provided by the initiative. The lack of interest and support from colleagues at "home" creates frustration among members of the diaspora, dampening their passion and enthusiasm. It quickly became apparent that a number of faculty members in Ghana were unwilling to participate in the initiative because they could not see any direct pecuniary gains for themselves. They assumed that the diaspora members of the network were engaged in the project because of some financial reward, incentive or motivation, and thought that they deserved the same. When it became clear that the diaspora's efforts had no personal financial impetus that could be extended to them, interest soon fizzled among many of their compatriots in Ghana. This attitude is not entirely surprising in an environment where colleagues struggle to make ends meet and would rather spend their time and resources on activities that yield personal financial reward. Scholarly collaboration and its intellectual rewards were less compelling than the search for the immediate necessities of life.

The lack of interest went beyond financial considerations, however. These colleagues work in a climate of significantly dwindling state support, where teaching loads, student-faculty ratios and other responsibilities have increased. It, therefore, proved a challenge to nurture, let alone consolidate, the relationships within some clusters or dyads within the network because there appeared to be no motivation for participation on the part of some of the Ghana-based participants. The project was not considered important enough to invest their time and energy in. *Network*'s objective of creating an epistemic community, and nurturing the next generation of scholars, was not a high priority for them. Diaspora members who considered their compatriots in Ghana as the net beneficiaries of the partnership saw no need to overextend themselves to sustain a relationship where the perceived beneficiary had no interest.

Some of the challenges emerged from differences in cultural approaches to work, supervisory responsibility, and sensibilities about critique and relative distance from contemporary intellectual currents in the discipline or field. Diaspora members complain that some of their compatriots lack the work ethic necessary for meeting the standards of global academic competitiveness, do not exhibit the level of commitment and knowledge required to successfully mentor supervisees, and display a reactionary attitude to candid critique. On their part, Ghana-based academics accuse some of their diaspora colleagues of being arrogant and patronizing, displaying an attitude of entitlement, and under-appreciating the challenging contexts in which they work and live. *Network's* activities were thus severely hampered by the same attitudinal challenges that Zeleza (2013) identified in his broader study of African diaspora academics and their compatriots in their countries of origin.

With regard to thesis examinations, the Ghanaian university now has ready access to a database of willing experts who are familiar with working in an academic culture where deadlines for providing feedback on exams are generally adhered to, and who are willing to help address the current challenge of unheeded deadlines that lead to delays in assessments, and, hence, in completion times and lower graduation rates. The platform can allow doctoral supervisory committees to

engage with students more frequently, with greater benefits for quality of dissertations and speed of completion. However, many members of the network have become frustrated with poor administrative processes at the Ghanaian university. They have had to wait for extended periods – 6 months to over a year in some instances – to be reimbursed for personal expenses incurred in returning examined theses, as required by the institution. Some members of the network have suggested cost-effective ways of examining theses, using electronic reports and not having to courier examined thesis manuscripts back to the institution. However, these suggestions have not been accepted, with continuing cost implications, delays in reimbursements, frustration on the part of examiners, and disincentives to engagement.

Another challenge has to do with the slow, or absent, response among graduate students to contacts made by their assigned diaspora mentors. While unreliable connectivity can be partly blamed for this situation, a more troublesome reason is what appears to be a general attitude of nonchalance among some students towards graduate studies. The motivation for graduate studies for some appears to be less a desire for an academic career and more an avenue for professional mobility. They, therefore, find the expectations of diaspora supervisors and mentors to be too high and their critiques too daunting for the kinds of outcome that they seek from graduate studies. Furthermore, because several of the students combine their studies with other demands on their time, such as work, their studies tend to take a back seat. Some students drop out of programmes and disengage. Local supervisors have also failed to engender greater participation of graduate students in *Network*. Without strong encouragement to maintain linkages with diaspora members, and no mechanism for ensuring accountability, it is easy for students to disengage. The lack of familiarity among some members of the clusters and dyads within the network constrain collaboration. The likelihood of following through on commitments is diminished in situations where members have never met or do not have personal relationships with their colleagues that can elicit trust or a sense of accountability. As Mahroum et al. (2006: 8) have observed elsewhere, virtual connectivity cannot fully replace the face-to-face relationships that are central to collective learning specific to a “community of practice.”

While *Network* has made some modest gains in realizing its objectives with regard to the humanities and social sciences, its efforts to involve colleagues from the natural and applied sciences have been less successful. Diaspora colleagues in the humanities and social sciences see the mutuality of the benefits from collaboration because home-based partners, who are strongly embedded in the empirical context of scholarship, have valuable insights to contribute. Their counterparts in the natural and applied sciences, however, do not see the potential for similar returns. A key reason is the poor quality of the national innovation system in Ghana and the consequent non-attractiveness of natural and applied science research infrastructure and related low research productivity in the universities. Notwithstanding the desire of diaspora members in these fields to support the development of their disciplines in their country of origin, they have difficulty in finding areas of collaboration, with the requisite infrastructure, to generate the kind of scholarly and mentoring opportunities that will benefit their own scholarly activities. The vast difference in the

maturity of research cultures and architecture between their own institutions and the Ghanaian context therefore discourages involvement in *Network*. This is consistent with Arocena and Sutz's (2006: 57) observation that "weak National Innovation Systems have expulsive consequences for skilled people, hampering at the same time rearticulation prospects…Transnational Innovation Systems can be a fundamental tool for brain formation and brain rearticulation at local level, but only if they are strong enough to provide a home for creative people."

A significant additional impediment has been low bandwidth on the Ghanaian end. Despite the computer lab upgrades referred to previously, the current capacity is still very limited in terms of the volume and quality of interactions it is able to support, particularly at peak times. This is compounded by the inconvenience of going to a specific, non-proximate facility in order to engage. The issue of bandwidth capacity needs to be seriously addressed if this technology-mediated effort at mobilizing the human capital of the Ghanaian diaspora is to make a significant impact on the higher education sector in the country.

The ability of the network to populate the virtual library was constrained by copyright and intellectual property regulations. There are several ways to address this. As Ghanaian universities strengthen their bandwidth capacity and gain access to some of the major databases, students will be able to access material from their home institutions and may only need suggestions for appropriate references. Until these systems are fully in place, however, it may be helpful to explore agreements with institutions in the North to allow Ghanaian graduate students and faculty members to access external library resources. Similar agreements could be worked out with major journal publishers and operators of leading databases that allow sharing of material. To strengthen their hand in making these arrangements, it would be useful to work with some of the leading higher education organizations in the country/continent, including the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals, the National Council for Tertiary Education, and the Association of African Universities.

The initial experience of *Network* suggests that it will be more useful in future to focus on support for graduate student thesis supervision, mentoring, examination and sabbatical placements over the short- to medium-term, and defer work on curriculum development and course instruction to the medium- and long-term. Meanwhile, individual research collaborations can continue to be encouraged as self-directed, synergistic, organically-developed activities that emerge from mutuality of personal scholarly interests. This sequencing will allow relationships among diaspora and Ghanaian-based academics to solidify and for a certain level of comfort and trust to be established, before taking on more demanding tasks such as curriculum development. Moving some of these matters to the medium- and long-term will also enable *Network* to address how best to engage colleagues without overly burdening them.

There is no gainsaying the fact that some members of *Network*, both in Ghana and in the diaspora, are voluntarily taking on leadership responsibilities on top of their regular duties. There is therefore a limit to how far they can stretch their time and resources, without causing major burn-out and attrition in the number of those willing to help. Furthermore, as the initial support by the development agency part-

ner and the host institution runs out, the ability of the leadership to sustain operations diminishes. The long-term viability of the volunteer model is thus unsustainable, without a renewal of volunteer-champions and relief from other responsibilities through operational and other kinds of support. *Network*'s experience echoes findings from the Colombian cases where "productive collaboration from within transnational scientific networks is possible, but it also demonstrates the fragility of diaspora scientific networks" (Chapparro et al. 2006: 197).

The discourse around diaspora knowledge networks has to extend beyond affective appeals to address issues of compensation for volunteer-champions and others who take on significant responsibilities in these networks. Compensation can take the form of financial remuneration or course buy-outs at their home institutions, or through structured arrangements that recognize their contributions within the reward systems available at their institution. Sustained support from developing country governments and their development partners, through operational and infrastructure support, is key to continued success. As Marks (2006: 179) notes in relation to the South African Network of Skills Abroad (SANSA) network, the interest of the initial group of key players eventually waned, and the South African government department that took over operations failed to demonstrate satisfactory commitment (Brown 2003).

Network had hoped to undertake a thorough assessment of specific areas of activity, including the impact of the network on the quality of dissertations, thesis completion and graduation rates, length of time between thesis submission and submission of examiners' report by members of the network, and satisfaction of members with the way *Network* is currently operating. While *Network* recognizes the significance of undertaking such an assessment, it does not have the necessary financial resources to do so.

Conclusion

This chapter makes it clear that Ghanaians in the diaspora, like their counterparts from other parts of the continent, are committed to working with their compatriots at home to shore up professional capacity in a variety of sectors, and they are willing to do so with minimal or no financial recompense. While their commitment, along with that of some compatriots at home, is laudable, it is not sufficient for high impact transformative change to the higher education landscape. Overall, *Network* has made only incremental, though valuable, gains in relation to its objectives. Similar initiatives in countries such as the Philippines and Afghanistan also found that passion and enthusiasm were not enough to ensure sustainability (Brinkerhoff 2006). Thus, while such initiatives may start through "informal efforts and opportunistic links" (Larner 2007: 335), they need to be propped up by consistent, coordinated, collaborative institutional commitments that channel that enthusiasm and promise into efficacious ends. All parties have to play their part for these initiatives to succeed. Failure to do so will diminish the social capital that efforts such as

Network have been able to garner, extinguish the passion that has been generated, and erode the credibility of subsequent initiatives.

The absence of personal familiarity and relationships makes it difficult for a primarily technology-based DKN to be successful. In the context of the Indian software industry, Nanda and Khanna (2010: 1009) observe that "these networks are successful not just because of the expatriates who live abroad, but because some of the expatriates have returned back home and know how to effectively tap into the diaspora." It would, thus, be helpful to create more opportunities for face-to-face encounters between members of a DKN and with their counterparts in the country of origin (Fontes et al. 2013). Events could be organized alongside professional association meetings that bring together compatriots in particular fields. Meetings that are specific to a network can also provide a venue for such interactions. These could be supported through appropriate directives and support to the countries' missions abroad, with relevant accountability measures in place to ensure performance and secure compliance. The use of government and donor-supported initiatives, such as the Carnegie Foundation's Africa Diaspora Fellowship Programme (ADFP) (Carnegie Foundation 2014), and sabbatical appointments at home-country institutions, can also bring compatriots together in informal and professional contexts to build the social capital necessary for success.

The efforts of *Network* could be scaled up to encompass other sectors and institutions beyond those that were the focus of this project. Scaling up, however, requires resources and the exercise of genuine partnership with a variety of institutions that are interested in the same outcomes and are applying similar strategies. Instead of each agency or partnership re-inventing an initiative that ends up being short-lived, there should be a sustained network of collaboration among foundations, governments and multilateral agencies that see the value of diaspora mobilization for development. Programmes like ADFP, SANSA, the South African Diaspora Network, the South African Chairs Initiative, Nigeria's Linkages with Experts and Academics in the Diaspora Scheme, the National Diaspora Council of Kenya are all conceptually laudable. However, without integration into institutional strategic plans and/or a national developmental agenda, with support from appropriate authorities at the highest levels, they are unlikely to have a deep and lasting impact. Such integration and support ensures that all partners are on the same wave-length and that there is continuity that transcends individuals or transient generosity by development partners. In the words of Brinkerhoff (2012: 91), "even where a diaspora is viewed as a potential competitor or threat, governments will do well to strategically target segments of their diasporas" and create an enabling environment for workable partnerships. Other development partners should adopt similar strategic approaches for engaging the diaspora.

As African academies, such as the Ghana Academy of Arts and Sciences, begin to build a constituency of members in the diaspora, it will be valuable to use these memberships as formalized conduits for mobilizing the intellectual and professional expertise of their diaspora compatriots. Such formalized structures will enable a coordinated, de-personalized, institutionally supported approach to knowledge mobilization that enjoys credibility and promotes operational sustainability.

African universities could also pursue more deliberate commitments to diaspora engagement that are anchored in sustainable institutional planning, because "knowledge networks…hold possibilities for redefining what it means to be an academic in a global world" (Chen and Koyama 2013: 35). Furthermore, diaspora members of these networks need to go beyond their affective attachment to "home" (Kotabe et al. 2013; Mullings 2011), and develop the intercultural communication competence needed to work collaboratively with colleagues in countries of origin. They need to temper passion with the reality of the contexts in which their compatriots live and work, just as those compatriots need to appreciate and imbibe the key tenets of successful academic cultures within which the diaspora functions. This re-orientation in approaches to interaction will help to generate the cognitive affinities, attitudes and environments for meaningful partnerships and collaborations.

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Chapter 12
Knowledge Transfers Through Diaspora Transnationalism and Return Migration: A Case Study of Indian Skilled Migrants

Gabriela Tejada

Introduction

The current interest in academic research and policy discussions on the positive relationship between international skilled migration and development contrasts with the negative nationalist perspective of earlier brain drain/brain gain debates. These debates depicted skilled emigration as a definitive loss, and saw repatriation or compensation as the only way to balance the loss for countries of origin (Bhagwati 1976; Borjas 1987; Johnson 1967). More recently, new paradigms have emphasized the actual and potential positive impacts that skilled human capital can generate for countries of origin, with migrants contributing remotely through diverse channels of engagement such as knowledge and skills transfers, investment flows and entrepreneurial ventures, social and financial remittances, and diaspora networks (Agunias and Newland 2012; Boyle and Kitchin 2014; Kuznetsov 2013). Concurrent with this paradigm shift, return migration has attracted growing interest and is now seen as an important channel from which countries of origin can benefit. Return migration can potentially be a feedback effect of skilled migration because it can generate positive change in society, create employment and raise local productivity (Black and King 2004; Cassarino 2004; Dustman et al. 2011; King 2000).

Recent advances in thinking about international skilled migration have focused attention on the movement of human capital as a potential force for development (Docquier and Rapoport 2012; IOM 2013; OECD 2013a; Özden et al. 2011). The mobility of professionals between firms and countries has increasingly been recognized as a powerful source of knowledge transfer, of both technology and more subtle gains such as business practices and networks of contacts (Regets 2001). Within this "brain gain" approach, two main issues emerge. First, skilled migrants

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in host countries can remotely generate positive effects through knowledge transfers involving diaspora networks, business and entrepreneurial ventures, social and financial remittances, and scientific and academic collaborations. All have the potential to benefit home country communities and strengthen the transnational nature of migration (Portes 2001, 2003; Vertovec 2004). Second, if skilled migrants decide to return to their country of origin, they bring with them accumulated knowledge and technical skills which can be transferred to the local context. Skills losses are thus potentially offset by the knowledge and expertise return migrants transfer back with them (Dustman et al. 2011; Iredale et al. 2003; Kapur and McHale 2005; King 1986, 2000; Kumar et al. 2014). At the same time, the ability of migrants to transfer knowledge and skills is affected by contextual and structural determinants, institutional policies and how these skills are utilized in the local context (CODEV et al. 2013; Tejada et al. 2014a).

Transnationalism has become a widely used analytical framework in recent studies on international migration. The transnational lens recognizes the rise of diasporas or migrant communities as new actors in development processes. In this view, skilled migrants arguably possess multiple affiliations and attachments to host and home countries (Glick-Schiller et al. 1992; Levitt and Glick-Schiller 2004; Portes 2001, 2003; Vertovec 2004). They are also seen as carriers of knowledge, skills and social capital, which the home countries can benefit from (Meyer 2001; Tejada 2012). For sending states, the possibility of establishing long-distance connections with overseas-based skilled migrants offers an alternative to the strategy of promoting physical return. Migrants are no longer simply regarded as holders of human capital that needs to be recuperated, but rather as facilitators of knowledge transfer from abroad (Kumar et al. 2014; Tejada 2012). The social practices and relations that link migrants to their countries of origin could either be a response to their affective capital and long-distance obligations and a conscious identification with those countries, or they might just be part of their ordinary life without any attachment to a sense of belonging or affiliation (Levitt 2001; Levitt and Glick-Schiller 2004).

India is a country that has arguably profited from the positive outcomes of skilled migration (Kapur 2010; Kapur and McHale 2005). Early studies of the effects of skilled migration from India emphasized the effects of human capital loss and the negative cost of public investment in higher education (Bhagwati 1976; Johnson 1967). More recent studies have focused on the benefits to India generated through financial remittances and flows of migrants' savings to the home country (Afram 2012; Guha 2011; Rajan 2012). Attention has now shifted to other types of beneficial outcomes resulting from transfers of knowledge, technical skills, expertise and social capital accrued by skilled Indians during their time abroad. Empirical evidence shows how Indian skilled professionals in the IT sector and the software industry have been involved in various forms of diaspora transnationalism, helping innovation and entrepreneurship ventures in the software industry and the IT sector in India (Kapur 2002, 2010; Nanda and Khanna 2010; Saxenian 2005; 2006). Foreign-based skilled Indians have been depicted as a transnational class of professionals influencing the economic progress of India and its integration into the world economy (Kapur 2010; Kapur and McHale 2005).

New research on the experiences of skilled Indians in their destination countries shows that their level of engagement with India is affected by individual characteristics as well as the structural and institutional context of the countries concerned (CODEV et al. 2013; Tejada et al. 2014a). At the individual level, socio-demographic characteristics, educational background and position in the host country are all influential factors. More generally, the living and working conditions in the host countries, the environments they are exposed to, and the opportunities offered in both the host country and in India significantly influence their ability to mobilize and engage in home country development.

Return migration represents another significant example of development leverage because it brings a human capital gain that might not have occurred had the migrants never left India (Regets 2001). Research into return migration has increased in recent years, with return skilled migration viewed as potentially beneficial for countries of origin due to the knowledge and skills that migrants bring back with them (Dustman et al. 2011; Iredale et al. 2003; Kapur and McHale 2005; King 1986, 2000; Kumar et al. 2014). Whether or how returnees have a development impact are questions often raised in the literature. Various empirical studies have observed that the individual migrant profile and patterns of migration, together with the socio-economic conditions and structural environment in the home country, determine the level of overseas knowledge and expertise shared on return (Black et al. 2003; Iredale et al. 2003; Siddiqui and Tejada 2014). Other influential factors include migrants' sector and type of professional activity, and the match between their qualifications and the labour market requirements in the home country (Biswas 2014; Chacko 2007; CODEV et al. 2013; Gmelch 1980; King 1986, 2000; Kumar et al. 2014). Furthermore, returnee contributions depend on the context of return (Cassarino 2004; De Haas 2008; Iredale et al. 2003; Kumar et al. 2014). The specific location that migrants return to is an important determining factor. CODEV et al. (2013) show that although Indian returnees might have greater impact in rural areas, their location preferences are guided by the better infrastructure and employment prospects available in urban areas. Thus adequate infrastructure and business and entrepreneurial supports enhance the capacity of return migrants to apply the skills and resources they have gained during their time abroad (Ammassari 2003; Black et al. 2003; Wiesbrock 2008). The receptiveness of community and work colleagues to new ideas is another important factor (Black et al. 2003; Black and King 2004; Gmelch 1980). A recent study on Indian returnee entrepreneurs shows that while they have the potential to transfer the technical and specialized expertise accumulated overseas, they struggle to deploy the soft skills acquired abroad including managerial know-how and professional culture (Biswas 2014).

The Indian government has recently started to acknowledge the value of skilled migrants' accumulated resources by implementing a number of initiatives intended to engage with the Indian diaspora and encourage return migration (Bharte and Sharma 2014; Elie et al. 2011; Khadria 2009, 2012). Against this background, this chapter examines the obstacles and enablers that influence migrant knowledge transfer through diaspora transnationalism and return migration in the Indian context. The chapter adopts a two-fold approach, focusing both on countries of origin and

countries of destination, and offers an empirical analysis of the main determinants and outcomes of actual and potential Indian skilled migrant knowledge and skills transfer. Skilled migration is seen here as encompassing both labour migration and third-level studies (tertiary education or education beyond high school) undertaken abroad. In addition to pursuing professional opportunities abroad, more and more Indians are emigrating as students. The two categories are often interconnected; for example, many people join the labour market in the destination country after completing their degree overseas, while others work and study at the same time.

The chapter is based on new empirical data collected through primary surveys and in-depth interviews with Indian skilled migrants in Europe and with returnees in India. The study found that Indian skilled professionals, scientists and students are contributing to their home country while they are abroad and after they return. These contributions are manifested in various channels of engagement including financial remittances and investments, social capital, knowledge transfer through diaspora interventions and physical return. The study focused on knowledge transfer through diaspora transnationalism and physical return to the home country. The chapter highlights the development aspirations of skilled Indians in Europe and illustrates the transnational actions they engage in to transfer knowledge and promote positive linkages. While Indian skilled professionals, students and researchers in Europe link their development aspirations to their return plans, and believe that Indian society can benefit from the knowledge and expertise they accumulate overseas, the reality is that they are faced with several obstacles within the local system in India. They also encounter difficulties when transferring the specialized knowledge and technical skills gained abroad after they return.

The chapter begins with a brief overview of the literature on the development impact of Indian skilled migration. Existing research into skilled migration from India is extensive and calls attention to the contributions of diaspora transnationalism and return migration (CODEV et al. 2013; Tejada et al. 2014a). This section is followed by a discussion of the relevance of the Indian case in terms of skilled migration and diasporic knowledge transfers. The discussion shows that the structural position and social embeddedness of Indian diasporas and returnees have increased the flow of ideas and have increasingly played a role in reshaping India's socio-economic policies (Kapur 2004). The chapter then presents the results of the study of Indian skilled migrants in order to understand the prevailing factors that influence their knowledge transfer efforts. The final section offers some specific policy recommendations for India.

Indian Skilled Migration

Skilled Migration from India to Europe

India has been a leading emigration country for the last two centuries. In mid-2013 it accounted for migrant stocks overseas of no fewer than 14 million (UN-DESA and OECD 2013). Moreover, Indians now represent the world's second largest

diaspora community after China, with an estimated migrant population around the 25 million mark, which includes both Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) and foreign Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs) distributed among 189 countries (Khadria 2007; MOIA 2012). Recent Indian emigration includes important flows of unskilled and semi-skilled workers to the Gulf countries in west Asia and the Middle East. Most skilled workers seek opportunities in North America, Europe and Australia where they are employed in the IT, engineering and health care sectors (Chanda and Sreenivasan 2006; Khadria 2007).

While the emigration of skilled Indians to industrialized countries has increased since the 1970s, a significant number of Indian IT professionals and engineers emigrated to North America and Europe during the 1990s. In recent years, industrialized countries in continental Europe have emerged as new destinations as a result of their transformation into knowledge-based economies and their participation in the global competition for talent (Buga and Meyer 2012; Mosneaga 2014). As part of the trend towards the selection of immigrants, particularly those with more skills, migration policies have been adapted to increase the stock of global talent, improve national competitiveness and compensate for skill shortages in specific economic sectors. The supply of Indian skilled labour to continental Europe is especially notable in IT, engineering, finance and management, pharmaceuticals, and the academic and research sectors (Brücker et al. 2012; CODEV et al. 2013; Tejada et al. 2014b; Wiesbrock and Hercog 2012).

In 2008, Indian nationals ranked third among non-EU immigrant flows to the EU-27 region with 93,000 arrivals, after Morocco and China. Data on stocks indicate that 2 % (512,000) of the total foreign population in the EU-27 region hailed from India (European Commission 2014). Moreover, UN-DESA and OECD (2013) estimates show that 60 % (or 2 million) out of a total of 3.4 million Indians living in OECD countries in 2011 had tertiary level education. This figure makes India the leading source of skilled migrants in OECD countries among developing countries, ahead of both China and the Philippines (with 1.7 million and 1.4 million respectively). Taken together, these three countries accounted for 20 % of all tertiary educated immigrants in OECD countries in 2010/2011 (UN-DESA and OECD 2013).

International Flows of Indian Students

The remarkable growth of international student migration from India is increasingly well-documented (OECD 2013a). As Khadria (2007) points out, the “academic gate” now represents a significant and particular set of actors amongst Indian skilled migrants. International exposure and overseas experience, including the opportunity to study abroad, are highly valued in India as part of the prevalent view that a foreign degree ensures better employment prospects at home (Hercog and Van de Laar 2013a, b; Mukherjee and Chanda 2012). Indian student migration has become more conspicuous in European destination countries as these countries adapt their labour migration policies to recruit those who are seen as providing the greatest economic benefit (OECD 2013a). Many European countries have adopted policies to

encourage international graduates to remain after their studies and work. For example, in Switzerland and France, international students are allowed to stay in the country for up to 6 months after completing their studies to look for employment, whilst in the Netherlands and Germany stays of up to 12 and 18 months respectively are permitted (OECD 2013a; CODEV et al. 2013; Tejada et al. 2014b).

India now ranks second worldwide after China as the main source country of international students. The UNESCO Institute of Statistics (2014) registered a substantial increase in the share of Indian students in the last decade, rising from 3 % in 2000 (53,000 students) to 5.6 % in 2010 (200,000 students). The share of Indian students among all foreign students enrolled in tertiary education in OECD countries rose from 4 % in 2001 to 6.5 % in 2011, with Indians becoming the second main group of international students from non-OECD countries, surpassed only by the Chinese (at 21 %) (OECD 2013b). While the main traditional destinations of Indian students are North America, the UK and Australia, increasing numbers have been moving in recent years to continental European nations such as Germany, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Denmark. The deficiencies of the Indian education system, in terms of coverage and quality, means that the opportunity to get an overseas education is restricted to a tiny group of privileged people, or what Amartya Sen refers to as “the first boys” (Drèze and Sen 2013; Sen 2005). As Sen (2005) points out, the Indian education regime lavishes attention on privileged students and overlooks general education, thereby undermining India’s development. This situation mirrors the broad social divisions in India where basic capabilities are unequally distributed by society and the state (Sen 2005: 10). Such inequities are part of a broader problem of economic and social inequality related to class, caste, gender and social privilege.

Scientific Infrastructure in India and Collaboration with Europe

A number of studies have shown how an adequate local scientific and technological infrastructure in the country of origin impacts on the level of knowledge and technology transfer possible from returned skilled migrants (Barré et al. 2003; CODEV et al. 2013; Kuznetsov 2013; Tejada et al. 2013). India is a major participant in global knowledge production within the science and technology fields and in terms of international scientific collaborations. According to the Indian National Institute of Science, Technology and Development, the country is the tenth most productive in terms of the number of scientific publications, with a global publication share of 2.32 % between 1996 and 2010 (Mehra and Pohit 2013). India’s share of global publications rose from 1.89 % between 1996 and 2000 to 2.78 % between 2006 and 2010, and it moved from 13th to 10th in the global publication ranking during the same period (Mehra and Pohit 2013). The areas with the highest scientific research publications output include the physical sciences, engineering sciences, life sciences and health sciences. Among non-OECD countries India ranked third (2.11 %)

after China (6.50 %) and Russia (2.33 %) in 2008 in the world production of scientific publications (Banerjee 2009).

With regard to cooperation in science and technology between Europe and India, the strategies that various European countries have implemented in recent years show how promoting bilateral collaboration with India has become a top priority. Various principles have shaped the implementation of such strategies. First, cooperation with India is seen as a win-win endeavour based on the formation of partnerships between equals. Second, human capital mobility should ideally benefit both India and the receiving countries, through the implementation of provisions that stimulate the exchange and circulation of students and researchers in both directions. Third, institutional provisions such as bilateral scientific programmes which promote collaboration in a complementary manner should ensure the pairing of research work with high-level international partners, and create mutual benefits for researchers and their institutions in both India and Europe (Bolay and Tejada 2014). Top-down incentive mechanisms, such as bilateral institutional programmes, as well as bottom-up transnational collaboration initiatives, driven by skilled Indians themselves, are important for encouraging knowledge transfer through cooperation and other forms of interactions that India can benefit from. However, an adequate host country environment is important with regard to effectively exploiting knowledge and skills from both the diaspora and from returnees.

Skilled Migrants and Indian Development

The rest of the chapter draws on a study of the experiences of Indian skilled migrants in Europe and their engagement in knowledge transfer with India. The data was collected in 2011 and 2012 using two survey questionnaires administered simultaneously in India and in Europe. By conducting research in both India and Europe, the study provided an opportunity to simultaneously observe the development impact on India of return skilled migration and the activities and potential of skilled diasporas in destination countries (CODEV et al. 2013; Tejada et al. 2014a). The Indian part of the research focused on skilled Indian returnees in six major cities in India: the Delhi-National Capital region, Kolkata, Hyderabad, Bangalore, Mumbai and Pune. The definition of "Indian return skilled migrant" used for the study was a past or present NRI or PIO who had stayed abroad for more than 6 months before returning to India, who was employed in India and who had at least a bachelor's degree. The European part of the research interviewed Indian students and skilled professionals who were first generation migrants living in four European countries: France, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland. These destination countries were selected on the strength of the growing number of Indian skilled professionals and students moving there.

Since there is no database in India that shows the total number of returnees to India and no reliable list of Indians living abroad, purposive and snowball sampling

techniques were used for data collection both in India and in Europe. The samples comprise 527 returnees in India and 835 Indian students and skilled professionals in the selected European destination countries. Because of their limited size, the samples are not representative of the entire Indian skilled migrant and return population. In addition, a total of 30 qualitative in-depth interviews were conducted to complement the survey analysis. Interviews in the countries of destination included 10 Indian professionals (10 interviews) and 7 postgraduate students (7 interviews). Six return migrants were interviewed in India. Additional interviews were also held in both Europe and India with 7 experts with specialist knowledge of international mobility between India and Europe.

Diaspora Engagement in Knowledge Transfer

The study showed that the desire of skilled Indian migrants to contribute to the development of India is quite strong, independent of their activity profiles (whether professionals working in the private sector, scientists and researchers working in academia, or students). Of the sample of Indian students and skilled professionals in Europe, 77 % considered development in India to be very important to them, while 20 % considered it to be somewhat important (Fig. 12.1). Only 1 % said it was of no importance to them.

Although any knowledge accumulated by migrants could potentially benefit the home country, it is not easy to measure the actual impact objectively. The Indian migrants in Europe were asked if they thought that their present activity could have an impact on socio-economic development in India, a question designed to understand skilled migrants' perceptions of the extent of their potential influence on the country. As many as 70 % of the respondents felt that their present activity could have an impact on the socio-economic development of India (Table 12.1). The 30 % who did not gave two main reasons. First, the nature of their activities did not

Fig. 12.1 Skilled Indians' interest in India's development



Table 12.1 Perception of whether current activity could impact on India's development

Activity:	Yes (%)	No (%)	N
In employment	64.4	35.7	216
In training and education[a]	74.8	25.2	405
Other[b]	61.3	38.7	75
Total	70.1	29.9	696

Source: Field survey in Europe, 2011–2012
[a]Includes persons on internships, MBA and PhD students as well as students with jobs
[b]Includes people involved in housework, self-employed, retired and unemployed people

provide any value for deployment in India, or had very little to do with the social realities of the Indian context. Second, they were reluctant to engage in any development action towards India because of various disappointing factors such as the political situation, the lengthy bureaucracy or the limited infrastructure. As one stated, "my present activity would not help in the development of India because it is too high-end research, and anyway the infrastructure does not exist. The red tape to establish it is excessive and I am not interested in trying to combat that."

Skilled Indians in training and education had more positive feelings about the likelihood of influencing India's development than professionals in paid employment (Table 12.1). The fact that more students believe that their accumulated education and skills could have a direct socio-economic effect in India may be a consequence of their emotional ties with the country. Also, students' younger age might result in greater concern and interest in their home country. However, student intentions and motivations may not be backed up with concrete actions because they may lack resources, whereas professionals in paid employment may be able to count on the support of social and intellectual networks, as well as the infrastructure and resources necessary to back their development intentions. This may indicate that life cycle optimism matters in terms of intentions while factual employment and established career matter in terms of execution. Also, as "semi-finished human capital" (Khadria 2003), students are still shaping their professional identities so they are not fully formed in terms of knowing how they can contribute with their skills and expertise.

Individual attributes certainly influence the development aspirations of Indian skilled migrants (Siddiqui and Tejada 2014; Tejada and Siddiqui 2014). A higher propensity and willingness to engage in India's development process is associated with disadvantaged identities related to gender, caste and religion. Skilled migrant women, Dalits and Muslims, in particular, have stronger development aspirations linked to a motivation to mitigate social inequality in India. This is a consequence of the comparisons they make between their experience of social disparity in India and the freedom and rights enjoyed abroad. Other factors that influence the motivation and aspirations of skilled migrants to use their foreign-acquired knowledge and skills for the benefit of India include their education, age and length of stay abroad. The higher the level of education, the greater the age and the longer the stay abroad, the greater their interest in home country development (Siddiqui and Tejada 2014; Tejada and Siddiqui 2014).

Skilled Indian migrants' development aspirations are also linked to their return plans. Those involved in academia and research in the destination countries believe that Indian society can benefit from their scientific networks and expertise. One PhD student in Switzerland, for example, noted that, "I want to return to India with all that I have gained during my studies here and give back the good part of education system here to India. I will use the experience and scientific contacts I made here for research back there". A postdoctoral researcher based in Germany observed that "if I go back and do this research in India, it could potentially help more students in my field to have a good exposure. Especially those brilliant ones who cannot afford to go out".

Migrants often strategically invest their resources and time in activities that are relevant to their private and professional future plans, including their future mobility plans. Whereas migrants used to send money back to their countries of origin as a form of social insurance (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2006), analogous behaviour can be anticipated from non-economic activities. In fact, if they intend to return to their home country, they are likely to attach greater importance to maintaining and strengthening ties with relatives, colleagues and acquaintances left behind. In turn, these preparations for return tend to have a greater development impact because, in the process, they mobilize resources to improve their chances for a successful return (Cassarino 2004). As Portes (2001) argues, transnational actions and links – such as the exchange of knowledge and ideas, regular visits to the home country and the transfer of financial remittances – ease migrants' re-adaptation to local society after they return and their access to information regulates the pace of adaptation (Sabates-Wheeler et al. 2009).

The evidence from skilled Indians living in Europe is that their transnational ties with India include knowledge transfer through a variety of practices. Skilled Indians in Europe believe in the possibility of being able to contribute from abroad through scientific cooperation and knowledge transfer, for example. As one Indian researcher said, "I am developing research collaborations with Indian scientists, which can help in technology transfer and knowledge sharing". Another said that "I can influence India from here in the form of direct contribution through scientific knowledge and technology transfer and by helping to educate and train young professionals". The personal, professional and scientific connections they maintain with their colleagues and community in India are mainly motivated by two goals: first, establishing collaborations of several types; and second, preparing for their future return. In other words, skilled Indians' transnational engagement is a dynamic process, expressing individual life plans, social expectations and professional prospects (Hercog and Tejada 2013).

Establishing collaborations in the form of scientific and academic exchanges with colleagues and the community left behind is a common form of knowledge transfer by skilled Indians in Europe (Tejada and Bolay 2010). Skilled Indian migrants are used to maintaining their ties with their former colleagues in India while they are abroad, and in some cases these contacts intensify over time. Through these connections, skilled Indians facilitate access to their own networks by their peers based in India. As providers of accumulated social capital, the benefits of

networks are indisputable. A skilled Indian returnee working at Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) Delhi put it this way, "Networking is always beneficial and equally important, whether it is Germany or India; the more you network, the more types of collaborations you have". In similar vein, a lecturer at the Bose Institute in Kolkata noted that, "students who go abroad and stay there keep in touch. I have had strong collaborations with some of them. We keep writing papers together".

Knowledge and Skills Transfer Upon Return

The majority of skilled Indian returnees interviewed for this study in India viewed their overseas experience as having an important effect on their personal development. They also believed that they had acquired attributes that could be usefully deployed in the local context to create benefits for their workplace and society at large. Amongst the benefits of overseas experience, knowledge and skills emerged as the most important in their current occupation. These were followed by hands-on experience and the networks established overseas. The financial capital accumulated overseas as well as their foreign qualifications were regarded as only of slight value (Fig. 12.2).

Respondents in the Indian survey were asked to give specific examples of how they used the skills, experience, knowledge and ideas they had gained overseas to contribute to their current company, institution or business. Compelling evidence of knowledge transfer emerged in the systematic communication between European and Indian professionals on various issues significant for India's development. The more explicit means by which skilled Indians said they apply their overseas skills and expertise included teaching and training, research and development, and changes in the work culture and environment (Fig. 12.3).



Fig. 12.2 Value of overseas experience to current occupation in India



Fig. 12.3 Returnees' use of skills, experience and knowledge gained overseas

The deployment of foreign-earned skills partially depends on the employment sector of returnees. For example, those in the research and academic sector said they apply their overseas skills and competencies in activities related to R&D or training. Those professionally employed in technical positions said they mainly apply them in the development of a work culture and environment that is more progressive, as well as in providing better services to their organization. The majority, independent to their sector of employment, thought that they were able to transfer their knowledge or expertise effectively in their work place. However, some returnees said they face obstacles in sharing and transferring their knowledge and expertise locally, such as resistance to change in the work culture, lack of suitable infrastructure and lengthy bureaucratic processes, all of which affect their efficiency at work. The contributions of return migrants are also heavily affected by the adjustment capabilities of the returnees and the structural support provided by the local institutional context.

Conclusion

The impact that skilled migration has on development as a result of knowledge transfer occurs through two main channels of engagement: diaspora transnationalism and physical return to the home country. Diaspora knowledge transfer strengthens the transnational nature of migration and has important implications for countries of origin. India represents a good example of this because of the strong presence of Indian skilled professionals and students in industrialized countries. The case of India shows how skilled professionals and students can transfer knowledge and expertise and compensate their home country for skills outflows while they are abroad, as well as after they return.

This study of skilled Indians in Europe offers evidence of two main types of factors influencing skilled migrants' transnational engagements: individual and con-

textual factors. On the one hand, individual factors, such as socio-demographic profile, educational background, and the activity and position in the host country, are all important variables. On the other, the living and working conditions in the host countries, the environments they are exposed to, and the opportunities offered in both the host and the home countries are significant factors influencing skilled migrants' ability to engage in home country development. Top-down incentive mechanisms such as bilateral institutional programmes, as well as bottom-up transnational collaboration initiatives driven by skilled Indian migrants themselves, are important in terms of encouraging knowledge transfer through cooperation and other forms of interaction. While the motivation to contribute to India's development is strong among the great majority of Indian skilled migrants, a stronger tendency for participation is associated with disadvantaged identities related to gender, caste and religion.

The development aspirations of Indian skilled migrants are linked to their return plans, and may materialize in actual return. As carriers of knowledge, innovative skills and suitable attitudes towards creativity, skilled migrant returnees frequently ease the transfer of knowledge and skills and encourage a work culture that is suitable for development. Skilled Indian returnees believe that Indian society can benefit from their accumulated resources and from their scientific and professional networks and expertise. However, knowledge transfer may not take place simply because someone returns, as returnees may not be able to convert their technical and specialized expertise due to local contextual and workplace barriers. While the majority of returnees have been able to transfer their knowledge or expertise to their work place, some faced important obstacles that limited such transfers.

Significant changes to India's workplace culture and structure are clearly necessary to facilitate and enable knowledge and expertise transfer from skilled migrants and translate it into development. If skilled migrants' expectations about their contribution are not satisfied, they could feel disillusioned, which may undermine their transnational connections or provoke eventual remigration. If this is the case, a receptive attitude both from the society at large and in the work place needs to be promoted. Institutional policies supporting effective diaspora and returnees' development engagement should be strengthened. While a number of measures have been put in place in recent years by the government of India in this direction, many remain unknown to Indian diaspora and returnees. Dissemination of the possible benefits generated from the transfer of skilled migrants' knowledge, scientific and professional competences, ideas and expertise in the local context could help to promote such policies.

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Chapter 13
Visualizing the Diaspora: New Options

Jean-Baptiste Meyer, Fan Wang Miao, and Yue Zhao

Introduction

How to reach expatriate members of a diaspora is a major challenge in diaspora studies and policy-making (Agunias and Newland 2012; Berthomière and Chivallon 2006; Garcia Flores et al. 2012). Once dispersed, the population often becomes largely invisible to social scientists and decision makers. To date, the most common way of tracking expatriates is through social/institutional networks including the websites of associations of migrant professionals, consular and diplomatic records, the alumni lists of higher education organizations, and the interpersonal contacts of expatriates, accessible through the "snowball effect" often used in field studies (Habti 2012; Pinto 2013). But nobody knows the extent to which these networks actually capture the magnitude and diversity of diasporas. Data collected by international agencies such as the OECD and World Bank provide a statistical overview of the location of diasporas (OECD 2012; World Bank 2012), but this data remains of limited use in terms of its ability to reach and connect with diasporas.

One of the major challenges in diaspora engagement is the exploration of new modes of access, in order to understand and mobilize them more effectively. This chapter relates some of the results of research conducted through the CIDESAL

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project (2009–2013), which explored new avenues for connecting with diasporas. The originality of the research lay in the use of an innovative source of data from an on-line database, the Web of Science (WoS). This chapter briefly explains the methodology developed for this purpose in relation to the scientific diaspora from Argentina, Colombia and Uruguay. The sample populations used for the survey are then described and characterized. Their movements form the subject of a spatial analysis including visual representations of the diaspora, through maps, figures and tables. The trajectories of returned and diaspora (settled abroad) migrants are then differentiated. In the last part of the chapter, lessons learned from the new methods and experimental instruments are discussed.

A New Source of Information

The survey "Mobility by the WoS" aimed to draw information from the Web of Science (Thomson Reuters) on the migration of the researchers and engineers whose publications are listed. This database assembles the addresses of the authors who published scientific works referenced on the Web of Science website (http://science.thomsonreuters.com/es/productos/wos/). We extracted the publications by the nationals of three countries under study (Argentina, Colombia and Uruguay) that were co-authored with nationals from other countries for the period 2000 to 2010. The logic behind this extraction was that cooperation between these three countries and the rest of the world, as reflected in the co-publication of research results, is associated with the migration of academics, previous or current. Place of work was derived from the institutional affiliation indicated on the publication.

A number of studies have observed significant correlations between the proportion of co-publications of authors from certain countries and the current or deferred presence of researchers in the foreign countries with whom they co-publish (Regets 2001; Agarwal et al. 2003; Lowell and Gerova 2004; Jin et al. 2007). Thus, for example, the co-publications of researchers in Uruguay and Germany frequently include authors who have returned to Uruguay after a stay in Germany, as well as Uruguayan authors who are living in Germany. Starting with a corpus of co-publications makes it possible to circumscribe a diaspora and potentially mobile population, rather than an unlimited and anonymous universe (the cyberworld) or networks that are predetermined by existing social actors, such as official consular records or members' lists of associations.

The correlation between the rate of co-production of knowledge and migration intensity has been deduced statistically but not exploited to identify, locate and contact particular individuals. This approach has several advantages: first, it consists of taking a random sample from a limited world – that of producers of scientific and technical results – guaranteeing the viability of the survey and neutrality of the sample; second, it affects a general population – research and development (R&D) authors – who are not pre-selected for their proven links with their country of origin nor for their membership in some thematic, geographical, professional or social

sub-group; and, third, it allows direct access to individuals and contact with them, opening up the possibility of a sustainable link and not a simple transitory exchange.

Study Methodology

A complete description and analysis of the new methodology employed in the study on which this chapter is based is provided in greater detail elsewhere (Meyer 2014). In brief, to locate migrant Argentine, Colombian and Uruguayan researchers and engineers, we first extracted all publications with home-based nationals and foreign co-authors. In the case of Argentina, there were over 66,000 co-publications between 2000 and 2009. The numbers for Colombia (12,554) and Uruguay (5576) were much lower but by no means insignificant (Table 13.1). This exercise produced email addresses for 37,000 corresponding authors. Each of the authors was emailed about the survey and they were also asked to forward the information to their co-authors. This method means that it is impossible to state with any accuracy how many of the 68,751 potential contacts actually received the invitation to participate. The questionnaire to which all potential respondents were directed was posted online.

All of the 1325 respondents to the survey had lived or were living outside their country of origin. They can therefore be divided into two main groups: return migrants and those still living in the diaspora. In the case of Argentina, the majority (nearly 60 %) were return migrants with only 40 % still living outside the country. In the case of the other two countries, the split between return migrants and diaspora members was relatively even.

A number of limiting factors in the survey should be mentioned. First, although it is now standard practice, not all publications systematically include email addresses, especially before 2005. Second, the corresponding authors were asked to contact their co-authors, thus closing off the possibility of verifying the contact at the end of the chain as well as sending a reminder message in case of no reply. Interestingly, then, the response rate for the corresponding authors was twice as high as for the co-authors, who were contacted indirectly. Third, about five times as

Table 13.1 Academic publications and migrant researchers

	Argentina	Colombia	Uruguay	Total
No. of co-publications, 2000–2009	66,256	12,554	5576	84,386
No. of corresponding authors	28,313	6047	2669	37,029
No. contacted	23,513	5049	2301	30,863
No. of co-authors	58,084	17,265	7122	82,471
No. potentially contacted (est.)	48,210	14,416	6125	68,751
No. of responses	795	392	128	1315
% of diaspora respondents	40.3	52.7	49.2	
% of return respondents	59.7	47.3	50.8	

many visits to the online questionnaire were recorded than the number of responses received. The reason for this is not clear but if these visitors could be mobilized after visiting, perhaps with a reminder message, then the number of respondents might have been significantly higher.

Tens of thousands of references and co-authors were identified. The final information yield (in terms of number of participants in relation to the numbers contacted) therefore seems low. Regarding the case of Argentina, it is possible to estimate the proportion of the diaspora that could be contacted by addressing these limiting factors. The Argentine R&D diaspora is estimated to number about 7000 people (Albornoz et al. 2002). The survey enumerated and documented precisely 320 or just under 5 %. If all the email addresses had been available, 2.3 times more authors could have been contacted. Moreover, the number of visits to the questionnaire was 5.65 times higher than the number of responses. If these factors had been controlled for, the potential for contacts and responses would have been 60 % of the estimated population. Taking into consideration the fact that the figure of 7000 includes unpublished scientists or those whose production has a low profile, this rate would be exceptionally high.

Professionals on the Move

In terms, first, of the demographic profile of the respondents, those from Argentina and Uruguay have a similar age profile: 66 % of the Argentine respondents and 65 % of the Uruguayan respondents were over 40 years old (Fig. 13.1). The average age of both groups was 45, compared with an average of 40 for the Colombian



Fig. 13.1 Age profile of respondents

group. The latter also had a larger proportion of younger scientists with 55 % under the age of 40 (compared with 33 % for Argentina and 35 % for Uruguay). The younger age profile of the Colombian researchers is due both to the different history of the country (no military dictatorships in the 1970s encouraging emigration) and an academic system that is younger than that of the Southern Cone.

The feminization of skilled migration, identified elsewhere, is evident here as well (OECD 2012). Overall, male researchers dominate in all three countries, comprising 70 % of those from Uruguay, 68 % of those from Colombia and 62 % of those from Argentina. However, the proportion of women decreases with age and the majority of women are in the younger age groups, as the age pyramid for Argentina clearly demonstrates (Fig. 13.2). By cross-tabulating the year of departure from Argentina with sex, the growing feminization of qualified out-migration is also apparent, with absolutely and proportionately greater numbers of females over time (Fig. 13.3).

During the period 2000–2005, the numbers of women migrants caught up with those of men. Statistics from later years (2005–2010) and those from Uruguay include a very small number, which made it difficult to take them into consideration statistically in a similar way.

The respondents are all highly educated, which is consistent with the fact that they are involved in research and development. In the case of Argentina and Uruguay, over half have a post-doctoral level of education and those without a doctorate are a small minority (Fig. 13.4). In the case of Colombia, those with doctorates represent a quarter of the study population. These differences are partly related to the younger age profile of Colombians but also to the educational systems of the countries. Argentina has offered doctoral training for many years and enjoys an international reputation. Graduates tend to leave the country to do post-doctoral training and research whereas doctoral training abroad is crucial for Colombia, since local doctoral programmes are non-existent or very new in many disciplines.



Fig. 13.2 Age pyramid for Argentina



Fig. 13.3 Gender and year of departure from Argentina



Fig. 13.4 Educational attainment by qualification and country

There are also slight gender differences: the male population is over-represented among those with the highest qualifications (post-doctoral in all three countries and also doctoral in Colombia and Uruguay) and the male population is slightly over-represented among the junior degrees (master's and bachelor's).

The respondents all belonged to four major professions – research, teaching (often combined with research), engineering and medical practice. Over and above academic research, their work involves activities in development and the application of knowledge to areas that are important for society. The proportion of respondents in each profession is relatively similar for each of the national samples, with Argentina and Colombia being most alike (Table 13.2). In each case, research and teaching made up nearly two-thirds of the respondents. However, a third of the Argentina and Colombia samples (and 27 % of the Uruguay sample) were practitioners (doctors and engineers).

Table 13.2 Professions of respondents by country

	Argentina	Colombia	Uruguay
Researcher	38.0	34.4	28.0
Teacher	25.2	24.5	37.3
Doctor	15.8	16.5	9.3
Engineer	15.1	17.6	17.3
Other	5.9	7.0	8.0

The two scientific disciplines cited most frequently by respondents were biology and health, which represent about 25 % and 20 % of the total respectively. Chemistry (10 %) and physics (5 %) were also significant. The greatest variation by country was in agro-food, with 13 % of respondents from Uruguay, 7 % for Argentina and 4 % for Colombia. Similarly, the social and human sciences, as well as economics and ecology, varied in importance from 9 % of respondents from Argentina and Uruguay and 21 % of respondents from Colombia. Mathematics was important for respondents from Uruguay, while materials and energy was important for respondents from Argentina. Electronics, as well as computer science, were of little importance for all three countries.

When members of the diaspora are compared with return migrants, an important difference can be observed between Argentina and Colombia. In the case of Columbia, the proportion of teachers is very high among those in the country and low in the diaspora. This reflects the institutional situation in Colombia where research, and therefore scientific production, are the function of universities (in which personnel perform both teaching and research). This also suggests that the diaspora is more likely to devote its skills exclusively to research because teaching requirements are less intensive abroad. In Argentina, engineers are far more important producers of scientific knowledge than they are abroad. This may indicate the higher status of expatriates in universities and the fact that most engineers who emigrate are practitioners rather than researchers. The health sector is significantly represented in the diaspora, as is materials and energy, whereas agro-food is significant for return migrants in Argentina. In Colombia, the importance of health is even more marked in the diaspora. The social sciences and ecology also stand out, whereas chemistry and economics are more important areas of work for respondents who have returned home.

Migrant Destinations

North America and Europe are the major destinations for skilled migrants from Argentina, Colombia and Uruguay (with around a third going to the US and about 15 % to Spain). Other relatively important European destinations include Germany, Switzerland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The main destinations in the South (so-called South-South migration) are Brazil and Mexico and, in the case of

Argentina and Colombia, Chile. There is also some movement between the three countries with a number of Colombians and Uruguayans in Argentina. Nearly two-thirds of respondents from Argentina went to one country and stayed there; only one-quarter went on to a second country and less than 10 % to a third or even fourth country. The proportion of Colombians and Uruguayans who stayed in only one country is the same as for the Argentine respondents. In the case of Colombians, the proportion who went to a second country is slightly higher (at 28 %). The overall tendency in all three countries is thus for migrants to settle in one country and operate there professionally and intellectually. Very few have lived in more than two countries.

As noted in Table 13.1, the survey respondents included both expatriates (those currently living abroad in the diaspora) and return migrants who now reside in one of the three countries. The proportion of respondents in the diaspora varied from 53 % in the case of Colombia, 49 % in the case of Uruguay and 40 % in the case of Argentina. The spatial distribution of the three diasporas is heavily oriented towards Europe and the United States. The largest proportion of the Argentine diaspora is in Europe (45 %) followed by the US (27 %) and Brazil (Fig. 13.5). Argentines are also found in smaller numbers in various other countries including Canada, Mexico, Chile and the Caribbean. In the case of Colombia, the diaspora is almost evenly split between Europe (38 %) and the United States (33 %) (Fig. 13.6). Other destinations with small Colombian diasporas include Canada, Mexico, Brazil and Argentina. The Uruguayan diaspora is not as widely distributed (Fig. 13.7). As with the other two countries, the major locations are the United States (33 %) and Europe (31 %).

When we compare return migrants with those in the diaspora, various differences become apparent. In the case of Argentina, the greatest number of returnees are from the US (35 %), followed by Spain (13 %), France (10 %) and Germany (9 %).



Fig. 13.5 Location of Argentine diaspora



Fig. 13.6 Location of Colombian diaspora



Fig. 13.7 Location of Uruguayan diaspora

Colombian return migrants also come mainly from the US (30 %) and Spain (19 %), followed by France and Mexico (both 10 %) and Brazil (8 %). Uruguayans who return do so mainly from the US (32 %), followed by Spain and Brazil (both 13 %) and then Sweden and the UK (both 11 %). With respect to all three countries, there is at least some return migration from every destination but the proportion of those who remain and those who return varies from country to country.

Comparing permanent settlement with return migration for each of the three countries reveals some important characteristics of each. In the case of Argentina,

for example, return migration is significantly more important for migrants who go to the United States and the United Kingdom (Fig. 13.8) and less so for those who go to countries including Brazil, Spain and Germany where there is greater permanent settlement. In the case of Colombia, return migration is relatively more important from Spain, France and Mexico but not from the US, suggesting that Colombians, unlike Argentines, are more likely to remain there permanently (Fig. 13.9). In the case of Uruguay, migrants to the three main destinations (US, Spain and Brazil) are all more likely to stay than return (Fig. 13.10). On the other hand, migration to all other destinations is more temporary than permanent.



Fig. 13.8 Permanent settlement abroad and return migration to Argentina



Fig. 13.9 Permanent settlement abroad and return migration to Colombia



Fig. 13.10 Permanent settlement abroad and return migration to Uruguay



Fig. 13.11 Number of years abroad – Argentina

Nearly two-thirds of the respondents had spent between 1 and 10 years abroad, but only a quarter had been away longer than that. The contrast in migration patterns was particularly marked between those who had returned to Argentina and those who stayed in the diaspora (Fig. 13.11). Over 90 % of the returnees stayed abroad for less than 10 years, whereas half of the diaspora have been abroad for longer than this and three-quarters have been away for more than 5 years. The group of refugees and political exiles from the period 1970 to 1980 is clearly evident in the 32 % in the diaspora who have been away for longer than 15 years. But this historical legacy does not explain other aspects of the diaspora profile. The relatively large numbers

of respondents in the diaspora who have been abroad for 5–10 years (29 %) and from 10 to 15 years (15 %) contrast with the relatively low numbers of respondents who have been abroad for less than 5 years (only 4 %). Given that this breakdown is almost the opposite for those who have returned, this suggests that there has been a shift in recent years from permanent settlement abroad towards more temporary circular migration.

In the case of the Colombians, the average time spent abroad is less than that of the Argentine respondents, but with a higher proportion of those who stayed abroad for 5–10 years (37 % versus 32 %) (Fig. 13.12). The proportion of those in the diaspora who have been away for more than 10 years is actually smaller (30 % versus 47 %). What this suggests is that permanent out-migration from Colombia is a more recent phenomenon. However, the Argentinian pattern of a shift from permanent to temporary migration is also evident in the case of Colombia with 50 % of returnees and 35 % of those in the diaspora having been away for less than 5 years.

Uruguay is the country where out-migration is by far the most permanent, with over 70 % of respondents having spent more than 5 years abroad (versus less than 60 % for respondents from Colombia and Argentina) (Fig. 13.13). For returnees to Uruguay, periods of migration were relatively short (45 % from 1 to 5 years). However, the proportion of migrants who returned after more than 15 years abroad is considerably higher than those of the two other countries (19 %, versus 4 % for Colombia and 3 % for Argentina). The impact of return programmes – implemented extensively after the dictatorship – is certainly an important explanatory factor.

The vast majority of respondents retain the nationality of the country from which they originate. For the Argentina sample, 91 % hold Argentine nationality. A third have one or two other nationalities (including, most prominently, Italian with 42 % of those with other nationalities) but also Spanish, American and Brazilian (all more



Fig. 13.12 Number of years abroad – Colombia



Fig. 13.13 Number of years abroad – Uruguay

than 5 % of those with other nationalities). Given that all of these destinations are more popular than Italy, the explanation for this lies in the fact that the Argentine population as a whole has ancestors from both of these countries, suggesting a dual nationality by descent rather than by acquisition during the course of migration. As regards Colombia, 93 % of the respondents are of Colombian nationality and only 18 % one (or more) other nationalities. Here, the most important other nationalities are American (14 %), Spanish (11 %), Mexican and Swiss (both 7 %) and Canadian (6 %). Finally, in the case of Uruguay, 96 % of respondents were of Uruguayan nationality. At the same time, Uruguayans were most likely to hold dual citizenship (at 38 %).

Diaspora Linkages

Very few of the people surveyed were employed by the same organization. Among respondents who have returned to their home country there is a high level of dispersion. In Colombia the average is three per institution and in Argentina it is four. However, the majority work at institutions where they are the only return migrant. This institutional dispersion is even higher in the diaspora. On average, there was only one respondent per institution. In the few cases where there were more than one, they did not necessarily know one another. Where they did, they were often members of the same professional association. For example, the four members of the Colombian diaspora employed at the Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne in Switzerland are all members of the Association Colombienne des Chercheurs en Suisse. There are thus very few opportunities for institutional platforms for diaspora engagement.

Table 13.3 Linkages with country of origin and membership in diaspora association

Country	Linkages (%)	Associations (%)	Total (N)
Argentina	80.2	7.7	575
Colombia	67.9	8.0	299
Uruguay	83.7	2.9	104

The majority of respondents maintained (for those who have returned) or maintain (for those still abroad) links with their home countries: 84 % of those from Uruguay, 80 % of those from Argentina and 68 % of those from Colombia. In contrast, the degree of involvement in diaspora associations is very low: 8 % of those from Argentina and Colombia and less than 3 % of those from Uruguay. This means that only a minority (about 10 %) retain(ed) their connections through formal collective action. The rest maintain(ed) individual links, mediated by items exchanged and not through formal membership in a diasporic association (Table 13.3).

The dispersal of the diaspora has several important implications. First, there is the digital problem of quantification. An early attempt to contact the diaspora using the memberships of formal networks inadvertently missed most of the expatriate research population. Second, there is a theoretical or conceptual problem, which is whether one should actually use the term "diaspora" to describe a nebula of components linked to the same country of origin but not inter-connected abroad. Third, there is the policy question of how and whether a country could interact with a dispersed population that has no spokesperson.

Conclusion

The research project on which this chapter is based – "Mobility by the WoS" – opens up new prospects for the study of the migration of highly qualified people for a number of reasons. First, previous surveys tended to access expatriates through networks that are institutional (consulates, embassies and ministries), organizational or associative (businesses and NGOs) or through internet links (social networks, websites, blogs). However, these modes of access involve tapping into pre-existing relationships and communities from which a diaspora structure is then inferred. By surveying a sample population of researchers and engineers (and others), who produce knowledge in their country of origin as well as abroad, no pre-existing structure or relationship is pre-judged. The population under study is thus larger and *a priori* has no special characteristics.

Second, this methodology opens up contact with a traditionally invisible segment of the diaspora and the migrant community. Given the largely individual choices that determine mobility (with regard to return as well as permanent settlement abroad), the relationships between migrants and their countries of origin are

difficult to trace and to mobilize, outside of limited programmes that affect a small number of individuals. Because the information is in the public domain, the systematic census conducted and contacts established through the Web of Science opens up a new communication channel, which migrants and those who wish to engage with them are free to use.

At the outset, it was not expected that the survey would distinguish between expatriates and returnees. However, because return migrants and expatriates are involved in scientific collaborations and publication, it is possible to isolate and compare the characteristics of two distinct populations. Naturally, permanent migrants could still one day return home and return migrants could one day go abroad again. However, most of the literature on diasporas tends to see them as permanent settlers outside their country of origin. With the three countries discussed in this chapter, it is clear that return migration is a significant element of the overall migration and diaspora experience.

The survey is certainly of interest for the original data that it provides, but the question remains as to how worthwhile this exercise is and whether the information gleaned is worth the efforts made to obtain it. The use of novel sources of information – such as the Web of Science – opens up new perspectives. It makes it possible to increase the coverage of the diaspora population considerably and to bring to light an otherwise invisible part of it. A broader lesson of the exercise is the crucial importance of research in setting up a diaspora policy. Without research, the foundations of the policy would be profoundly biased, taking into account only a small proportion of the potential population. One of the first things to do in setting up a system of enlightened governance is therefore to invest in the instruments that enable the most complete and precise access possible to all members of the diaspora. A methodology such as "Mobility by the WoS" makes it possible to increase the capacity to contact, know and mobilize the diaspora. The database of the Web of Science certainly lends itself well to building further links with the scientific diaspora. Some recent data mining techniques seem to open new avenues in this perspective (Meyer 2014).

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Chapter 14
The Making of a Southern Diaspora: South-South Migration and Zimbabweans in South Africa

Jonathan Crush, Abel Chikanda, and Godfrey Tawodzera

Introduction

Diasporas are increasingly viewed as a vital untapped development resource by governments in the global South. As a result, strategies and programmes for diaspora engagement in development are very much on the global migration and development agenda (Omelaniuk (Chap. 2), in this volume). However, debates about the actual and potential role of diasporas in development are characterized by a striking myopia that tends to view diasporas from the South as located primarily or exclusively in the global North. When governments in Asia, Africa and Latin America talk about diaspora engagement they are explicitly or implicitly thinking about reaching out to people from their own countries who are now resident in Europe, North America and Australasia. This view is also embedded in regional organizations such as the African Union, from which many governments on the continent

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take their cue. The AU has defined the African diaspora as the "sixth region" of Africa and confines the use of the term diaspora to those living outside the continent (African Union 2005).

Over the last decade, increasing research and policy attention has been devoted to South-South Migration (Anich et al. 2014; Castles and Delgado Wise 2008; Hujo and Piper 2010; Ratha and Shaw 2007). Given the importance of international migration within the South, this is a long overdue corrective. According to the Global Migrant Origin Database Version 4, out of the 175 million migrants globally, 100 million (or 57 %) originate from countries that can be broadly defined as the "South". Of the 100 million migrants from the global South, 48 million have moved to other countries in the South, while 52 million have moved to the North (Chikanda and Crush 2014). In the case of Africa, as many as 53 % of African migrants (or 13.2 million) live within the continent itself while an additional 12 % live in other regions of the South such as the Middle East (10 %) and Asia (1.3 %) (Chikanda and Crush 2014). Thus, more than 65 % of African migrants are located in the South and only 35 % in the North. The proportion of African migrants living in other developing countries is likely to be higher especially when considering the magnitude of undocumented migration and poor immigration record keeping in the South.

Perhaps the most striking feature of the new research literature and policy formulation around the governance of South-South migration is how infrequently the term "diaspora" is used to describe migrants within the global South. On the contrary, South-South migrants are overwhelmingly seen as short-term, temporary migrants who engage in circular migration between their countries of origin and destination. Given their impermanence and propensity to return home on a regular basis, there is certainly an argument to be made that these migrants should not be framed as a diaspora and that diaspora engagement initiatives are best targeted at those who have settled permanently or semi-permanently in other countries. However, even if this tighter definition of diaspora is accepted, we are still left with the question of whether there are forms of South-South migration that are more permanent in nature. Recent research in Africa is beginning to suggest that this might indeed be the case (Crush 2011; Fadayomi et al. 2014; Kinuthia 2013; Olatuyi et al. 2013).

The political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe over the past two decades has transformed the country from an immigrant-receiving country to a major global source of migrants and refugees (Hammar et al. 2010; McGregor and Primorac 2010). The Zimbabwean diaspora has become more diverse and global: it is scattered in over 100 countries and includes both skilled and unskilled, men and women, married and unmarried, families and individuals, young and old (Crush and Tevera 2010). Yet, while the term "diaspora" is frequently used to describe migrants from Zimbabwe in places such as the United Kingdom (Pasura 2008, 2012; McGregor and Pasura 2010; McGregor and Primorac 2010), it has generally not been applied to Zimbabweans who migrate to other countries in the South, especially South Africa. In part this is because the dominant discourse on migration and development views diasporas as a product of South-North migration. Historically, migration between Zimbabwe and South Africa has been seen as short-term, temporary, circular migration. There is strong evidence, however, that Zimbabweans are increas-

ingly settling in South Africa with no immediate or medium-term intention of return (Crush and Tevera 2010; Makina 2012). This transition is recent but it does provide an important opportunity to reframe the debate about diasporas in development by tracing the making of a new diaspora within the global South. This, in turn, has considerable implications for the self-identity of Zimbabweans in South Africa as well as notions of diaspora engagement and co-development of countries within the South.

Zimbabwean Migration to South Africa

Migration to South Africa has been the dominant form of movement from post-colonial Zimbabwe. Even though the actual volume of contemporary migration to South Africa is not fully known, available data shows that temporary movement from Zimbabwe to South Africa has grown rapidly (Fig. 14.1). The number of Zimbabweans entering South Africa legally and temporarily for various reasons rose from 255,988 in 1990 to 477,380 in 2000 and to 1,847,973 in 2012. In 2012, the majority (97 %) indicated holiday as their purpose of entry while other categories include transit (1.5 %), business (1 %) and study (0.6 %). In fact, the holiday makers from Zimbabwe are known to engage in a wide variety of income-generating activities in South Africa (Chiliya et al. 2012; Dlela 2006; Hungwe 2013; Jamela 2013; Muzvidziwa 2001; Tevera and Zinyama 2000; Zinyama 2000; Zinyama and Zanamwe 1998).

In the 1990s, growing unemployment and economic hardship caused by the implementation of a structural adjustment programme in Zimbabwe prompted some households to look elsewhere for economic livelihoods, either in the urban informal



Fig. 14.1 Legal entries of Zimbabweans into South Africa, 1980–2012 (Source: SSA, various reports)

economy or outside the country or both (Mupedziswa and Gumbo 1998; Zinyama 1990; Zinyama and Zanamwe 1998). Two types of movement between Zimbabwe and South Africa began to emerge: short-term, temporary and circular migration of the semi-skilled and unskilled; and longer-term migration of the highly skilled from the Zimbabwean health, education and private sectors. Temporary migrants comprised those who went to work or to look for work in South Africa and those (mainly women) who went to buy and/or sell goods in the informal economy (Tevera and Zinyama 2002). Both groups returned home regularly and remitted frequently. In 1997, 78,000 Zimbabwean "overstayers" were recorded in South Africa. The vast majority had been in the country for less than 2 years and fewer than 500 had been there for more than 5 years, confirming that most migrants did not overstay with the intention of remaining permanently in South Africa. The second emergent group of longer-term skilled migrants was identified in a 1999 study of the Zimbabwean health sector which noted that nurses and doctors were expressing their displeasure at the worsening living and working conditions by "voting with their feet" (Gaidzanwa 1999). By 2000, 51 % of all Zimbabwean-trained medical doctors were living abroad. South Africa was the most popular destination, accounting for 40 % of the 1662 Zimbabwean doctors in the diaspora (Clemens and Pettersson 2006). Overall, however, the numbers living permanently in South Africa were quite small.

The economic hardships of the 1990s in Zimbabwe were minor compared to what followed (Bracking 2005; Chan and Primorac 2007; Crush and Tevera 2010; Raftopoulos and Mlambo 2009; Styan 2007). After 2000, the country entered a sustained period of economic decline that had reached crisis proportions by 2008. Between 1998 and 2004, formal sector employment declined from 1.4 million to 998,000 (Raftopoulos 2009). At the height of the crisis, inflation was officially estimated at 231 million percent (Hanke 2008; Hanke and Kwok 2009). The country's chaotic land reform programme effectively destroyed the commercial agriculture export sector, the country's major foreign exchange earner, and led to the widespread displacement of Zimbabwean farm labourers and their families (Solidarity Peace Trust 2004). In 2005, the Zimbabwean government launched a campaign to destroy the informal economy on which many households had come to rely. Operation Murambatsvina destroyed urban-based livelihoods and informal businesses in many Zimbabwean towns and cities, providing an additional incentive to leave the country (Bracking 2005; Potts 2006; Pophiwa 2011). Another important driver of out-migration was the political violence that began as part of the land reform programme and later turned into an all-out assault on opponents of the Mugabe government (Howard-Hassman 2010). The Solidarity Peace Trust (2004) estimated that as many as 300,000 people were victims of human rights violations from 2000 to 2004.

Unsurprisingly, the numbers of Zimbabweans migrating to South Africa increased dramatically after 2000. In 2001, the South African Census recorded 130,090 Zimbabwe-born people in the country (a figure that included 54,294 whites who had left Zimbabwe after independence in 1980). A decade later, the 2011 Census counted a total of 515,824 adult Zimbabweans aged between 15 and 64 in South Africa (Budlender 2013). This increase occurred despite the best efforts of the South African government to control and stop the movement. Tough visa

Table 14.1 Deportations from South Africa, 1994–2008

	Deportations		
	Total deportees	Zimbabwean deportees	Zimbabwean deportees as % of total
1994	90,682	12,931	14.3
1995	157,075	17,549	11.2
1996	180,704	14,651	8.1
1997	176,349	21,673	12.3
1998	181,286	28,548	15.7
1999	183,861	42,769	23.3
2000	145,575	45,922	31.5
2001	156,123	47,697	30.6
2002	135,870	38,118	28.1
2003	164,808	55,753	33.8
2004	167,137	72,112	43.1
2005	209,988	97,433	46.4
2006	266,067	109,532	41.2
2007	312,733	204,827	65.5
2008	280,837	164,678	58.6
Total	2,809,095	974,193	34.7

Sources: Waller (2006); Department of Home Affairs (South Africa) Annual Reports

restrictions between 1996 and 2005 had the main effect of forcing migrants into clandestine channels and an unintended upsurge in irregular migration and the criminalization of ordinary migrants. Second, the South Africans embarked upon a draconian "arrest and deport" campaign that saw the number of Zimbabwean deportees rise from 13,000 in 1994 (or 14 % of the total) to 205,000 in 2007 (or two-thirds of the total) (Table 14.1). In total, between 1994 and 2008, nearly 1 million Zimbabweans were deported from South Africa.

Zimbabwean migrants reacted by applying en masse for refugee status in South Africa. The number of refugee claimants rose from just four in 2001 to 149,453 in 2009 (Fig. 14.2). Holders of renewable asylum-seekers permits were allowed to remain legally in South Africa until their claims were adjudicated. The South African government took the position that Zimbabwe was not a "refugee-generating" country and successful refugee claims by Zimbabweans in South Africa (as a proportion of claims lodged) were easily the lowest in the world, falling from 5 % in 2006 to 0.1 % in 2009. However, the sheer number of applicants meant that the time between application and adjudication inevitably lengthened from months to years.

The mounting pressures on the refugee determination system and the costly failure of the deportation campaign forced the South African government into a new policy direction. First, it introduced a moratorium on the deportation of Zimbabweans, which lasted from 2009 to 2012. Second, it implemented an "immigration amnesty" for Zimbabweans in 2010 (Amit 2011). By the time the Dispensation of Zimbabweans Project (DZP) ended in mid-2011, a total of 294,511 Zimbabweans had applied for 4-year work, study, business or residence permits in South Africa, of which 242,731



Fig. 14.2 Asylum applications by Zimbabweans in South Africa, 2000–2010 (UNHCR (2012) UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database (accessed 20 June 2012, available on http: www.unhcr.org/statistics/populationdatabase))

were granted in exchange for surrendered asylum-seeker permits (Bezuidenhout and Johnson 2014). Before the expiry of the DZP permits on 31 December 2014, South Africa's Department of Home Affairs announced a new programme called the Zimbabwean Special Dispensation Permit of 2014 with a validity of 3 years. This permit is expected to provide a bridge to permanent residence status in the country (Bezuidenhout and Johnson 2014).

A 2010 survey of working-age Zimbabweans in two South African cities (Cape Town and Johannesburg) prior to the amnesty found that 52 % held asylum-seeker permits, 19 % held work permits and only 2 % had acquired permanent residence (Crush et al. 2012). A total of 61 % of migrants gave employment and work-related reasons for coming to South Africa and only 4 % gave the search for asylum as their primary reason. An additional 3 % mentioned personal and family safety, 2 % that there was "more peace" in South Africa, and 1 % that there was "more democracy" in South Africa. This amounts to only 10 % of respondents giving an asylum-related reason for coming to South Africa. This suggests that the refugee protection system was being tactically utilized to legitimise and/or extend their stay in the country. In a situation where there were simply no other options to remain legally in South Africa, this was unsurprising.

The New Diaspora

A defining characteristic of migration from Zimbabwe in the 1990s and early 2000s is that the vast majority engaged in circular migration, only spending short periods in South Africa, returning home frequently and showing very little inclination to

remain in South Africa for long. A 2005 SAMP survey of migrant-sending households in Zimbabwe found that a third returned to Zimbabwe from South Africa at least once a month and 50 % of migrants returned at least once every few months (Tevera et al. 2010). The 2010 SAMP survey of migrants who had gone to South Africa for the first time between 2005 and 2010 painted a very different picture. Less than 1 % returned once a month and only 9 % returned once every few months (Table 14.2). As many as 46 % had not been back to Zimbabwe since coming to South Africa, although only 3 % said they could not do so (primarily for political reasons). South Africa is therefore increasingly seen by many as a longer-term destination rather than a temporary place to earn quick money. Nearly half said that they wanted to remain in South Africa "for a few years" and another 21 % that they wanted to remain indefinitely or permanently. In other words, two-thirds of recent migrants viewed a long-term stay in South Africa as desirable.

Chetsanga's (2003) study of emigrant Zimbabwean professionals showed that 62.5 % were willing to return to Zimbabwe and settle permanently. Likewise, Makina (2010) and Bloch (2006) found that two-thirds of Zimbabweans abroad intended to return to settle permanently. But willingness to return has fallen ever since. A study of Zimbabwean emigrant doctors, for example, found the likelihood of returning was as low as 29 % (Chikanda 2010). Nearly half of the respondents (48 %) did not see themselves ever returning to Zimbabwe to either live or work. Or again, the majority of migrants in the 2010 SAMP survey are in no hurry to return to Zimbabwe. Only 11 % said that they wanted to return as soon as they could and 16 % that they wanted to return permanently in the following year (Table 14.3). As

Table 14.2 Frequency of return to Zimbabwe

	2005 (%)	2010 (%)
At least once a month	31	<1
Once every few months	19	9
Once or twice a year	26	28
Other	25	9
Not returned	0	46
Cannot return	0	3

Table 14.3 Length of time before returning permanently to Zimbabwe

	No.	%
As soon as possible	53	10.9
A few weeks	3	0.6
One month	5	1.0
A few months	24	4.9
Six months	10	2.0
One year	42	8.6
A few years	226	46.3
Never	29	5.9
Don't know	96	19.7
Total	488	100.0

many as 46 % said they would only return to Zimbabwe "in a few years." In addition, 45 % of the migrants said they wanted to become permanent residents of South Africa (and a quarter to become South African citizens).

Just because migrants want to remain in South Africa on a long-term basis, it does not mean that they will actually be able to do so as the obstacles to long-term or permanent residence in South Africa are many, especially for new migrants. However, the shifting policies of the South African government suggest that it has recognized the inevitability of having Zimbabweans in the country to stay and, furthermore, that it can benefit economically from their presence. At the same time, many Zimbabweans in South Africa continue to face discrimination and intolerance motivated by xenophobia (Crush and Tawodzera 2013, 2014a, b).

The new Zimbabwean diaspora in South Africa is increasingly diverse. First, the proportion of young migrants (aged 15–24) rose to 31 % in 2010. This fits with other evidence of considerable growth in accompanied and unaccompanied youth migration in recent years (Fritsch et al. 2010; Crush and Tawodzera 2013). Second, social networks are playing a much greater role in decisions about migration (Ryan 2011). Nearly half of the post-2005 Zimbabwean migrants had no immediate family members in South Africa prior to migrating. This had dropped to 26 % at the time of the interviews, indicating that many had immediate family members from Zimbabwe come to live with them after they moved to South Africa. Nearly one-quarter of the migrants reported that their spouse was with them in South Africa and 26 % had children with them.

Recent migrants occupy more menial jobs than previous rounds of migrants, which could indicate considerable de-skilling (or brain waste) (Bloch 2005; McGregor 2010). In 2005, over 40 % of migrants from Zimbabwe were in skilled and professional positions whereas only 15 % of the post-2005 group were employed in these types of positions (Table 14.4). Nearly a quarter (24 %) of the post-2005

Table 14.4 Changing occupational profile in South Africa

	2005 (%)	2010 (%)
Professional (e.g. lawyer, health, teaching)	35.3	14.1
Employer/manager	10.3	1.0
Service worker	9.5	12.6
Manual worker	9.8	23.8
Office worker	5.3	4.1
Domestic worker	2.4	8.4
Student	1.3	2.9
Security	0.7	4.1
Informal worker	20.3	14.3
Other	5.2	–
Never had a job in South Africa	–	14.1



Fig. 14.3 Frequency of remitting to Zimbabwe

group were engaged in manual work (compared to only 10 % in 2005), 13 % were in the service sector (9.5 % in 2005), 8 % were in domestic work (2 % in 2005) and 4 % were in the security industry (less than 1 % in 2005). Interestingly, participation of the informal sector fell from 20 % in 2005 to 14 % in 2010.

Does the transition from temporary circular migration to more permanent settlement impact on remitting behaviour to Zimbabwe? Remittances were the major source of income for most households during the time of the Zimbabwean crisis. As Styan (2007: 1173) noted at the height of the crisis, "Zimbabwe's economy limps along largely thanks to remittances…over half of the country's population is dependent on remittances." Bracking and Sachikonye (2010) found that over 50 % of households in Harare and Bulawayo were dependent on migrant remittances for basic consumables. Maphosa (2007) showed that remittances from South Africa made a significant contribution to the welfare of many households in the southern districts of Zimbabwe, improving standards of living, ensuring better access to health care and education and, to a lesser extent, boosting investment in productive activities. Makina (2012) estimated that Zimbabweans in South Africa remit as much as USD500 million per year, representing 10 % of the country's GDP.

The frequency of remitting certainly appears to have declined after 2005. Remitting continues, though not with the frequency or in the same amounts (Tevera et al. 2010). Nearly a quarter of the post-2005 migrants had not remitted any money to Zimbabwe. In 2005, 62 % of migrants remitted at least once a month (Fig. 14.3). Amongst the post-2005 group, only 27 % remitted this frequently. The fact that those in the post-2005 diaspora occupy lowlier jobs than their predecessors impacts on their incomes and remitting behaviour. Only 11 % of the migrants said they have no income at all but a quarter earn less than ZAR2,000 per month. Another 32 % earn between ZAR2,000 and ZAR5,000 per month. Only 14 % earn more than ZAR10,000 per month and 3 % more than ZAR20,000 per month.

Comparing the use of remittances in 2005 and 2010, however, there is considerable continuity (Table 14.5). Only food purchase was significantly more important in 2010 (from 65 to 87 % of households). However, food remains extremely

Table 14.5 Reason for remitting money to Zimbabwe

	2005 (% of migrants)	2010 (% of migrants)
To buy food	67.0	85.2
To meet other household expenses	–	57.9
To pay educational/school fees	48.5	49.2
To pay medical expenses	–	48.1
To buy clothes	49.1	47.5
To pay transportation costs	29.1	30.3
For agricultural inputs/equipment	26.8	21.3
To build, maintain or renovate their dwelling	49.5	19.7
For special events	16.5	16.9
To buy property	–	15.3
To start or run a business	–	11.2
To purchase livestock	–	9.6
For savings	16.2	8.2
Other reason	–	3.3

expensive in Zimbabwe in comparison to local incomes and in comparison to South Africa. Hence, it is not surprising to see food still being bought in South Africa and sent back to Zimbabwe by migrants. As many as 79 % of migrants said they had sent food to Zimbabwe in the previous year. In other words, the transition to greater permanence within the Zimbabwean diaspora in South Africa has not led to any significant shift in the uses to which remittances are put. They remain family resources and are used primarily for household consumption.

Diaspora Organizations and Identity

One of the major characteristics of diasporas globally is their habit of forming diaspora associations. Migrants and the diaspora associations they form in the destination country have gained much attention in development thinking because of their potential to promote development in their country of origin as well as attend to the welfare and rights of new migrants in the destination country (Owusu 2000; Mercer et al. 2009; Ozden 2006; Reynolds 2009). Research on African diaspora associations has tended to focus on East or West African migrants living outside the continent and little is known about the possible associational linkages of Africans within the continent itself (Bloch 2008; Mercer et al. 2009).

In the early phases of Zimbabwean migration to South Africa, diaspora associations were extremely rare. But as Zimbabweans began to settle in South Africa they started to organize themselves into groups and refer to them overtly as diaspora associations. Recent research has shown that several diaspora organizations have been formed by Zimbabweans in South Africa with different objectives (Table 14.6). Some attend to the welfare of vulnerable groups and others are cultural

Table 14.6 Key objectives of Zimbabwean diaspora organizations in South Africa

Organization	Formation date	Mission/focus
Refugee diaspora organizations		
Zimbabwe Refugee Association (Johannesburg)	2000s	Uphold human rights and welfare of Zimbabweans in Johannesburg
Zimbabwe Restoration (formerly Refugee) Association (Durban)	2000s	Originally to protect rights of refugees and now currently engaged in empowering members to reconstruct/develop a future Zimbabwe through skills-acquisition programmes
Zimbabwe Political Victims Association (ZIPOVA)	2003	Serve the full needs of Zimbabwean refugees as well as services and advocates for the development of the Zimbabwe Diaspora
Zimbabwe Exiles Forum	2003	Document the human rights violations visited upon Zimbabweans inside and outside the country
Professional organizations		
Doctors in the diaspora	2005	Deal with the problems of registration to practise and lobby for the free mobility of doctors within the South African Development Community (SADC) region
Zimbabwe Lawyers Association	2006	Lobby for the interests of Zimbabwean lawyers in South Africa and assist members to learn models of democracy to bring back to Zimbabwe
Association of Zimbabwe Journalists	2005	Assist Zimbabwean journalists living abroad to gain skills and build independent media
Cultural organizations		
Mthwakazi Forum	2005	Provide a debating forum for Zimbabweans on socio-political issues
Umbrella organizations		
Zimbabwe Civil Society Organization (CSO) Forum	2005	Promote civil society by uniting and strengthening the CSO sector to influence development policy and advocate for a new prosperous and democratic Zimbabwe
Global Zimbabwe Forum	2007	Create an international platform for all Zimbabweans in the diaspora
		Mobilize development funds
		Develop the human capital of the diaspora for the benefit of the development of a future Zimbabwe
		Prepare the diaspora to plan and influence the future of Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe Diaspora Development Chamber	2008	Facilitate development projects both in the diaspora and in Zimbabwe

Source: UNDP (2010)

organizations that deal with the many social issues facing migrants. Still others are overtly political and oppose the current regime in Zimbabwe in various ways. A few have adopted a strong development focus. They include the Zimbabwe Diaspora Development Chamber, which facilitates development projects in South Africa and Zimbabwe, and the Global Zimbabwe Forum, which amongst other functions prepares the diaspora to plan and influence the future of Zimbabwe (UNDP 2010).

On the political front, a number of diaspora groups have emerged in South Africa to contest the state of political affairs in Zimbabwe. This includes groups such as the Zimbabwe Exiles Forum, which mobilises Zimbabweans in South Africa to protest against abuses of power by the Zimbabwean government (Muzondidya 2011). Furthermore, the internet has opened opportunities for the South African diaspora to engage in long-distance activism through participation in online forums. This has been supported by the emergence of online newspapers such as ZimOnline, which operates from South Africa. Refugee diaspora associations have also formed to address the practical and material needs of Zimbabweans claiming asylum in South Africa or living as refugees. They include the Zimbabwe Exiles Forum and the Zimbabwe Political Victims Associations (Sisulu et al. 2007). However, their desire to achieve meaningful results has been hampered by a lack of resources.

Zimbabweans in South Africa have formed professional associations with differing objectives. Zimbabwe Teachers in South Africa (founded in 2012) comprises Zimbabwean nationals currently employed in South Africa's education system. The organization offers a platform for members to share their experiences of working in South Africa, where the work environment differs significantly from that of Zimbabwe. On the other hand, the Batanai-Bambanani Zimbabwean Association (formed in 2003) is made up of Zimbabweans mainly from the Johannesburg area and focuses on fundraising for good causes (Sisulu et al. 2007; Muzondidya 2010). Some of the organizations that have been formed in South Africa by the Zimbabwean diaspora have assumed multiple functions. A good example is the Zimbabwe Social Forum, which was formed in 2006 in Cape Town by parents in professional families. The forum not only offers networking opportunities for the families but enables their children to speak to each other in the native Zimbabwean languages of Shona and Ndebele (Muzondidya 2010).

The fact that Zimbabweans have formed diaspora groups does not mean that they have been able to speak with a unified voice, however. Rather, "essentialised expressions of identity have flourished in diaspora contexts, and the political divides at home have been imported" (McGregor and Primorac 2010: 13). In fact, diaspora politics between 2000 and 2008 reflected the ethnic and racial divides within the diaspora. A good example is the emergence of the Mthwakazi Liberation Front (MLF), an organization active in South Africa that advocates for the creation of a separate state in Zimbabwe's Matabeleland region (Muzondidya 2010). There is also the Flame Lily Foundation, which according to its mission statement "endeavours to promote, further and secure the interests of our members and former residents of Rhodesia/Zimbabwe living in South Africa." The group has an exclusively white membership. Political rivalry within the Zimbabwean opposition Movement

for Democratic Change (MDC), which led to its split in Zimbabwe, spread to South Africa resulting in the death of four party members (Sisulu et al. 2007).

Not surprisingly, Sisulu et al. (2007: 562) conclude that "(t)his amorphous diaspora, with its class and ethnic divisions, has failed to act in a concerted way to lobby for change in Zimbabwe." The class divisions within the Zimbabwean diaspora in South Africa are visible in the membership patterns of associations. For instance, Muzondidya (2010) shows that burial societies, such as the Johannesburg-based Masasane Burial Society (started in the 1980s), draw their membership from working-class Zimbabwean migrants. Professionals have formed alumni associations, such as the Marist Old Students Association that brings together former students of Marist Brothers Secondary School of Dete.

Several factors hinder the participation of Zimbabweans in diaspora associations in South Africa. First, a large number of Zimbabweans have uncertain or no legal status to live in South Africa. Participation in diaspora associations might therefore be seen as a public display of their Zimbabwean nationality, which might lead to their eventual deportation (Muzondidya 2010). Second, a number of Zimbabweans who fled the country because of political persecution, or who are opposed to the ruling party and Mugabe, would be unwilling to take part in diaspora organizations that have developmental goals as this might be akin to supporting a government that persecuted them or to which they have fundamental objections. Third, the Citizenship of Zimbabwe Amendment Act of 2001 practically stripped a large number of white Zimbabweans in the diaspora of their Zimbabwean citizenship. Therefore, without a legal claim to Zimbabwean citizenship, many of them see no reason to be involved in a country that has disowned them. Fourth, poverty among some sections of the Zimbabwean diaspora is an additional barrier to active engagement. As Sisulu et al. (2007) note, many do not even know where their next meal is coming from and lack the financial means to attend the public events and meetings. Finally, others simply claim that they are overwhelmed with work, which leaves them with little time to participate in the diaspora organizations.

Conclusion

South-North migration has conventionally been seen as having much greater developmental value and potential than South-South migration. This notion stems from the deep-rooted Eurocentric idea that development is something conferred on the South by the North (Anich et al. 2014) and the fact that many migrants who move to other countries in the South are unskilled and temporary workers, while those in the North are predominantly skilled emigrants. Yet there is no intrinsic reason why South-South migration should not have development impacts on both countries of origin and destination. Nor is there any reason why only skilled migrants should be considered as potential development partners worth engaging with.

This chapter accepts one commonplace argument in policy and research discourse on diasporas and development, and rejects another. It accepts that the concept of diaspora and therefore efforts at diaspora engagement should be limited to migrants who have moved permanently or semi-permanently to another country and preclude short-term, temporary, circular migrants. It rejects the argument of the AU and African governments that the geographical location of the African diaspora is limited to those who have migrated to the global North. South-South migration also creates diasporas who remain, to a greater or lesser degree, connected to and interested in people and events in their country of origin. This opens the way for a consideration of the formation and role of African diasporas within Africa.

The case of Zimbabwe is particularly interesting in this regard. The country has been a major global migrant source country for the last two decades as the economic and political crisis in a once well-managed state deepened. There is a common assumption that most recent migration from Zimbabwe has been driven by the need to survive. The title of the book *Zimbabwe's Exodus: Crisis, Migration, Survival* is emblematic of this perspective, although that volume argues that it is migration that has allowed people in Zimbabwe to survive (Crush and Tevera 2010). Claims have been made that Zimbabwean migration to South Africa is an example of a more general phenomenon known as "survival migration". The evidence for this argument is largely impressionistic and based on observation of groups of migrants who are living genuinely desperate lives on the margins of South African society.

Though their lives and status in South Africa remain precarious, they are carving out lives and livelihoods and building social networks in a hostile land. What we are witnessing, therefore, is the act of creation of a diaspora as migration shifts from being temporary and circular in nature to being more diverse and permanent or semi-permanent. The numbers of people involved are considerable and the final outcome still depends very much on whether the South Africa government turns its current extremely ambiguous and begrudging policies into an acceptance of the fact that many Zimbabweans are there to stay and are already contributing a great deal to the country's economy. However, just because a diaspora exists, as this volume demonstrates, it certainly does not mean that all are interested in contributing to the reconstruction and development of their country of origin. Indeed, under the current political dispensation in Zimbabwe, most members of the diaspora are likely to confine their engagements to family and personal matters and avoid engagement overtures from the Zimbabwean government. That said, Zimbabweans in South Africa increasingly identify with the notion that they are members of a diaspora and are starting to form associations and organize themselves to pursue a range of well-established diaspora activities. This trend is likely to intensify as their presence in South Africa is accepted and normalized. For now, there are still many reasons (including the threat of deportation) why many prefer to avoid organizations and activities that would make them a bigger target for xenophobic South African citizens and officials (Crush and Ramachandran 2014).

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Chapter 15
Americans Abroad: US Emigration Policy and Perspectives

Susanna Groves

Introduction

The United States is a self-described "nation of immigrants" and is home to more foreign-born people than any other country in the world. Except for American Indians and Alaska Natives, who make up 1.2 % of the US population, all Americans or their forbearers immigrated to the United States from elsewhere within the past 400 years, and the country's popular culture celebrates these immigrant-origin stories. Americans tend to be aware of these immigrants' motivations in large part because their families came to live in the United States for the same reasons. Close to 13 % of people in the United States were born elsewhere and 20.5 % speak a language other than English at home (US Bureau of the Census 2014a). In contrast, Americans have far less collective insight and experience with the other side of the equation: emigration. The United States has not experienced mass outward movement of its citizens or large-scale colonization, with the exception of the country's intra-North American territorial expansions.

Although emigration from the United States has not occurred in any great waves, it is nevertheless a significant and growing phenomenon, with as many as 2 % of all US citizens residing abroad. Outward migration from the United States contributes to a rising global trend in emigration from advanced economies, with one recent study finding that about 20 % of migrants around the world were born in developed countries, with 80 % settling in another advanced economy (di Bartolomeo and Salinari 2011). Many US citizens who live overseas are able to maintain close ties with friends and family at home and plan on moving back to the United States someday, while others decide to part ways formally with their country of origin.

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Numerous traditional migrant-sending countries have, or are in the process of, creating formalized sets of diaspora policy, but countries that are not as immediately economically-dependent on their emigrant populations have been slower to act. Since US citizens who move abroad are generally thought to do so out of choice, not necessity, the US government has long failed to consider outward migration situation requiring policy intervention. At this point, the US has but a patchwork of emigration policies and no comprehensive plan for addressing the particular needs and interests of American citizens abroad. The majority of Americans who live overseas are private citizens, but the laws and policies that apply to them abroad primarily address the needs, rights and duties of US government affiliates stationed internationally. Nevertheless, US citizens retain a broad range of political rights and access to benefit programmes while living abroad. Non-resident citizens are allowed to participate in federal elections and can transfer their US citizenship to children born abroad. However, this population also retains certain obligations of citizenship, including income and asset taxes and military service.

In an increasingly transnational world, the US government expects more from citizens who live abroad than ever before, and overseas Americans are organizing to better advocate for their political interests in the United States. The US government's recent attempt to increase tax collection on income earned abroad has fueled activism from citizens abroad stakeholder groups. Skyrocketing numbers of US citizenship renouncements together with greater attention regarding the plight of US children who were de facto deported from the United States with their non-citizen parents have also drawn the US public's attention to the political rights of non-resident US citizens, arguably more so than at any point in living memory. With calls for action mounting, reforming the United States' jumble of emigrant policies may be imminent. In light of these circumstances, this chapter offers a profile of the overseas population and an overview and analysis of current US emigrant policy with the intention of informing the current debate surrounding the rights and obligations of diasporic US citizens.

Profile of the American Overseas Population

More than 70 million Americans travel abroad annually and a record high number of Americans signaled their intent to travel overseas by holding a valid US passport: 117.4 million people, or about 37 % of the US population as of 2013 (US Department of State 2014b; US Bureau of the Census 2014b). The American overseas citizen population is scattered widely across the globe, with significant settlements in over 100 different countries. Regionally, the largest concentrations of non-resident US citizens are estimated to be in the Western Hemisphere, Europe, and Eurasia. Mexico, Canada, and the United Kingdom are thought to host the greatest numbers of American citizens outside the United States (Table 15.1). However, exactly how many Americans live overseas largely depends on who you ask. Estimates of the size of the US diaspora range from 2.4 to 7.6 million (Table 15.2). Analyzing the US overseas citizens population is complicated by several factors including its wide

Table 15.1 Estimates of the US overseas population by destination country

Rank	United Nations (2014)		World Bank (2010)		Fors Marsh Group LLC (2010)	
	Destination country	US citizen population size	Destination country	U.S. citizen population size	Destination country	US citizen population size
1	Mexico	848,576	Mexico	509,251	Mexico	1,109,974
2	Canada	316,649	Canada	291,652	Canada	365,514
3	United Kingdom	222,201	United Kingdom	183,183	United Kingdom	221,118
4	Germany	111,375	Germany	159,326	France	175,994
5	Australia	89,957	Australia	81,672	Israel	134,647
6	Israel	80,463	West Bank and Gaza	56,289	Germany	102,894
7	Republic of Korea	71,817	Japan	52,449	Australia	102,176
8	Italy	60,037	France	44,919	Japan	94,709
9	Japan	59,991	Philippines	44,788	Taiwan	82,598
10	France	53,010	Spain	38,712	India	79,562
11	Bangladesh	45,158	Ireland	36,802	Dominican Republic	79,530
12	China	42,655	Ecuador	36,695	Ecuador	77,226
13	Ecuador	39,038	Saudi Arabia	36,258	China	74,429
14	Spain	38,009	Korea, Rep.	34,147	Brazil	67,623
15	Switzerland	37,762	Netherlands	23,280	Philippines	68,449

Table 15.2 Estimates of overseas American population

Estimate	Source	Estimate year
7.6 million	US Department of State	2014
6.8 million	US Department of State	2013
4.3 million	Fors Marsh Group LLC	2010
3.0 million	United Nations	2013
2.4 million	World Bank	2010

global dispersion, the difficulty in capturing data on dual citizens who travel on a non-US passport, seasonal fluctuations in countries' American citizen populations, and the economic and institutional environments of many of the countries in which many non-resident US citizens reside. It is also challenging to reconcile various estimates about this population against each other because these data sources are frequently accompanied by scant documentation, use inconsistent definitions of the population of US citizens abroad, or employ problematic or unclear methodology (Fors Marsh Group 2014; US Government Accountability Office 2007). Moreover, comprehensive administrative data that could be used to estimate the overseas population is not available because no federal agency reports on emigrants or monitors the number of private US citizens who leave the country or live abroad.

The fact that the US government does not produce reliable estimates of the size of the US overseas population has become a source of contention for some non-resident American stakeholder groups. Private overseas citizens are not included in the US Bureau of the Census's population surveys, but seats in the US House of Representatives, Electoral College votes (determines presidential elections), and federal resources are allocated to states, counties, and municipalities based on the population size that the Bureau reports. Advocates for including the private overseas population in the official US population count argue that the current situation amounts to taxation without representation and that providing demographic data about the overseas population could be beneficial for a variety of policymaking and business purposes. In some cases, excluding counting overseas individuals from official census counts may have significant consequences for Congressional apportionment purposes.

The State of Utah filed a lawsuit against the Census Bureau, claiming that their state had unfairly lost a Congressional seat to North Carolina because the 2000 Census did not count the state's 11,000 Mormon missionaries and other private citizens abroad (Supreme Court of the United States 2002). According to a report by the Congressional Research Service, Utah would have gained a seat in Congress if its state census total included an additional 855 people. Although in 2002 the US Supreme Court ultimately rejected the state's lawsuit, the case nevertheless drew attention to overseas citizens' rights and was influential in pressuring the US Congress to appropriate funds for investigating the practicality of counting both private and federally affiliated US citizens residing abroad (US Government Accountability Office 2004a; Huckabee 2003).

Under the US Constitution and federal statutes, the Census Bureau has the discretion over whether to include Americans living abroad in its national surveys, but has thus far found this task impractical. In 2004 the Bureau ran a three-country pilot survey of overseas Americans, which the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) found to have cost USD 1,450 per returned overseas questionnaire versus the USD56 per household cost for US domestic responses. The GAO attributed the significant cost difference between surveying overseas and domestic households to lower response rates from Americans abroad, the complexity of managing distribution of questionnaires on a global scale, the higher cost of promoting participation overseas through mass media and other events, and contract management failures (US Government Accountability Office 2004a, b; Zelenak 2004). There are no publicly-reported efforts underway by the US Census Bureau to include overseas private citizens in the 2020 official population count.

In contrast to the imprecision that characterizes estimates of the population of US private overseas citizens, counts of US government officials stationed abroad are exact. Moreover, the federally affiliated population residing overseas and their dependents have been included in the congressional apportionment population since the 1970 decennial census (with the exception of 1980). As of the 2010 census, 1,042,523 federal employees and their dependants resided overseas (Table 15.3). The US Office of Personnel Management identified 40 government agencies as having overseas employees in 2010, although three agencies represent 99 % of the total

Table 15.3 US federally affiliated overseas population

	Number
Federal employees	**434,382**
Armed forces	410,696
Civilian	23,686
Dependents of federal employees	**608,141**
Armed forces	592,153
Civilian	15,988
Total	**1,042,523**

Source: US Department of Commerce

federally-affiliated overseas population: the Department of Defense, the Department of State and the Peace Corps. Members of the US Armed Forces and their dependents constituted 96 % of the total federally affiliated overseas population (Crook and Druetto 2012). However, the drawdown of US troops from Iraq and Afghanistan has reduced the number of US military personnel and their dependents abroad to 182,000 as of September 2014, when the largest concentrations of troops abroad were found in Japan, Germany, and the United Kingdom (US Department of State 2014a, b, c, d).

Although some diasporic Americans intend from the outset to settle permanently outside of the United States, many others are "accidental migrants" who first left the US for a limited stay but remained abroad for reasons other than those that prompted their move, such as career opportunities or romantic relationships. Many US citizens who live outside the country retain strong familial and cultural ties to the United States, contribute to the US economy, and regularly participate in the American political process (Klekowski von Koppenfels 2014). American citizens living overseas have established a vast array of cultural, political, and educational organizations to serve the expatriate community and act as global emissaries. These groups offer those living abroad an opportunity to socialize with other Americans and ease the transition into their new country, converse in their native language, and celebrate popular American holidays together – including Fourth of July, Halloween, and Thanksgiving. The Association of American Clubs, Alliance of American Organizations, and the Federation of American Women's Clubs Overseas function as multinational umbrella organizations for US emigrant groups across the globe. Some expatriate organizations like Democrats Abroad and Republicans Overseas are formed along US political party lines, while others are non-partisan representatives of overseas citizens' policy interests. The Association of American Residents Overseas, the American Citizens Abroad, and the Overseas Vote Foundation primarily serve as advocacy groups that lobby the US government on issues of concern to them, such as tax policy on foreign earnings and assets, the portability of government benefits, and overseas voting rights. There are many private sector-focused organizations that serve the emigrant community as well, including the American Chamber of Commerce Abroad, an association whose membership includes 115 different chapters spread across 102 countries (US Chamber of Commerce 2014).

The education of American children abroad also brings the overseas US community together and has created an opportunity for public-private collaboration. In an effort to make service abroad attractive to American citizens with school-age children by ensuring access to US-style primary and secondary schooling at the overseas posting – both for private, multi-national employers and the US government – the Overseas Schools Advisory Council facilitates collaboration between American companies and the US Department of State to provide assistance to a network of 196 schools located in 136 countries (US Department of State 2013).

The population of Americans resident overseas is diverse and varies considerably from country to country, as is true with many other immigrant groups. Some US overseas citizens are more visible and recognizably American, perhaps including those who move overseas on a short-term international assignment and reside in expatriate compounds, college students studying abroad, retirees in middle- and low-income countries who enjoy a comparatively high standard of living and do not intermingle with the host population, and "global nomads" who move from one country to the next in search of the next international opportunity. The United States' unrestricted *jus soli* and broad *jus sanguinis* citizenship attributions for non-US-born individuals results in a fairly large population who can claim dual citizenship (Klekowski von Koppenfels 2014). A sizeable share of overseas US citizens have never spent considerable lengths of time in the United States, having been born to short-term visitors to the country or naturalized or second-generation Americans who returned to their ancestral country.

Despite the enormous diversity in the overseas American population, generally speaking, private US citizens who move abroad are perceived to be members of the socio-economic elite in line with iconic expatriate figures such as Grace Kelly, Ernest Hemingway, and Queen Noor of Jordan. Along with the assumptions of emigrants' glamorous lifestyle comes suspicion over the population's motivations for leaving the United States. As *New York Times* reporter Elizabeth Olson commented: "By moving out of the country, Americans are often seen by stay-at-home counterparts, and by US officialdom, as somehow disloyal, unpatriotic, suspicious or, at worst, tax cheats who pay nothing for the privilege of US citizenship" (Olson 2004). While inevitably some in the overseas citizen population will embody such negative stereotypes, casting the characteristics of a few individuals on an entire population of migrants is short sighted. Among the US emigrant population are researchers and scientists whose work depends on being overseas; aid workers and educators; and people who want to learn a new language, pursue a job opportunity, or fall in love with someone of a different nationality.

The prevailing narrative of living abroad as a lifestyle choice reserved for wealthy Americans is further challenged by the tens of thousands of US-born and/or US-raised children of unauthorized immigrants who, out of necessity, are forced to migrate because their primary caregiver has been deported or faces removal. Over the past decade, about 500,000 young adults who grew up in the United States were deported or forced to return to Mexico, and another million US-born children whose parents were deported and speak little or no Spanish are currently enrolled in Mexican public schools (Perez 2014). School systems, particularly in Mexican bor-

der states, are struggling to meet the educational and linguistic needs of an influx of culturally American children (Cave 2012; Passel et al. 2012; Medrano 2013). The challenges that deportees' children face has stirred public debate in the US and stands at the centre of the comprehensive immigration reform debate. Although federal statutes governing the rights of children in parental deportation proceedings have yet to be added or adjusted, administrative changes improving minors' place within the deportation system have been instituted, including Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, which allows certain classes of undocumented young adults to avoid deportation, and the Parental Interest Directive that gives prosecutors greater discretion in immigration enforcement activities so as to avoid unnecessarily disrupting non-citizens' parental rights (United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 2013; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2013). Administrative interventions thus far have been aimed at preventing the de facto removal of US citizen and non-citizen children rather than helping them adapt to their new surroundings.

Unlike many traditional migrant-sending countries, the US economy does not heavily depend upon money that US citizens living overseas send to family and friends back home. The World Bank estimated that people in the United States received USD6.62 billion in remittances in 2013, which is a trivial amount when compared to the country's USD16.80 trillion GDP. Total remittance inflows to the United States are similar to countries with far smaller population sizes and economies, including Uzbekistan, Morocco, and South Korea. Remittance inflows to the United States paled in comparison with remittance inflows into significant migrant-sending countries such as India and China, which received USD69.97 billion and USD59.49 billion in 2013, respectively. While the United States received about four times as much in remittances as the United Kingdom did in 2013, when taking the countries' economies and population sizes into account, the United States is comparatively less dependent on remittances (World Bank 2014). The United States may not be especially reliant on the remittances that its residents receive from abroad, but the US diaspora boosts the economic growth of the United States by building transnational business relationships, facilitating the transfer of knowledge and skills, and lowering the country's international trade deficit.

Policy Framework

The basis for the US government's approach to US citizens abroad can be traced back to the nation's founding. The US Constitution was written in 1787 under the influence of the philosophical writings of John Locke, Thomas Jefferson, and others who argued that governments are obligated to protect their citizens' natural rights, namely by providing a guarantee to the individual freedom to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." In basing the US government-citizen relationship in such universalistic terms, the Constitution's architects constructed a compact with the American people unbound by space or time. The US government works to represent

Table 15.4 Civil rights and obligations of US overseas citizens

Duties	Civil rights and obligations
Taxation	
Federal income tax	Worldwide income is taxed, subject to certain exclusions
State income tax	Varies by state
Voting	
Voting in federal elections	Casting ballots by mail for federal elections (including presidential and congressional races and federal referendums)
Voting in state and local elections	Varies by state (including governorship, state house and senate, state and local referendums, mayor, city council, etc.)
Social welfare programmes	
Social security	Entitled to receive benefits, subject to certain exclusions
Supplemental Security Income (SSI)	Not entitled to benefits after residing outside the United States for 30 days
Medicare	No coverage, with limited exceptions for services incurred near US borders
Veterans' benefits	Entitled to receive benefits
Citizenship transfer	Children of US citizens entitled to citizenship, subject to birth registration and certain exclusions
Military service	Required to register for the US military draft and serve in the US armed forces if mandatory conscription is reinstated
Repatriation	US citizens destitute and stranded overseas qualify for a repatriation loan, subject to certain restrictions
Consular services	
Emergency services	Emergency assistance for US citizens who become crime victims, are arrested or detained, life is threatened, or die

and protect the interests and wellbeing of its overseas citizens not so much because they are abroad but because they are US citizens. As such, non-resident citizens have access to many of the same rights and obligations under federal programmes as their compatriots living in the United States (Table 15.4).

Broadly speaking, the United States takes a laissez-faire, neutral approach to emigration, engaging in few actions to actively encourage or discourage the practice and providing similar treatment to all citizens regardless of their place of residency. The benefits of US citizenship accessible to those overseas include the right to vote in federal elections, consular services and emergency protections, transfer of citizenship to children born abroad, and access to certain publicly provided social safety nets. Non-resident citizens must continue to fulfill certain obligations of citizenship, such as paying US taxes on certain categories of income and assets, registering for the military draft, and serving in the armed forces if mandatory conscription is reinstated. US federal laws and programmes have far greater impact on citizens living abroad than those enacted at the state and local level, with the exception of voting rights. This section of the chapter explores the legally mandated rights and duties of US citizens abroad.

Taxation

The United States is the only industrialized country that taxes all its citizens on income earned worldwide (Chisthti and Hipsman 2012). While federal income tax is universally assessed on all US citizens and permanent residents living abroad, American state and municipal income tax liability varies. Emigrants are generally eligible for the same federal tax deductions as people who live in the United States and may also apply for a number of additional deductions on their worldwide earnings that further lower their federal tax liability. For example, qualifying citizens and permanent residents can exclude the first USD97,600 of their foreign earnings from their income tax payments and certain relocation and housing expenses. Further, the US maintains tax treaties and conventions with 67 nations, entitling US citizens and permanent residents who are subject to these foreign countries' taxes with credits, exemptions, and rate reductions (Internal Revenue Service 2014). American citizens living in a US territory – including Puerto Rico, the Northern Marina Islands, the US Virgin Islands, Guam and American Samoa – are not required to pay federal income tax.

Historically, the US government has not strictly enforced taxes on foreign income. However, following a 2008 Senate report showing that tax evasion through offshore accounts cost the US Treasury Department USD100 billion annually, the Internal Revenue Service and the Department of Justice launched a concerted effort to prosecute offenders (US Congress 2008; Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs 2008). Additional federal legislation and regulations targeting offshore assets have also been introduced. Congress toughened tax non-compliance rules against US taxpayers with foreign accounts in March 2010, and in February 2011 the Treasury Department issued regulations requiring US citizens, permanent residents, and corporate entities to file annual reports on their foreign financial accounts if their aggregate value exceeds USD10,000 at any point during the calendar year being reported. As a result of these and other regulatory changes and strengthened enforcement efforts, over the last few years the US government has collected billions of dollars in taxes and penalties on previously undisclosed offshore assets (US Department of the Treasury 2014).

While such efforts have generated revenue for the US Treasury Department, they have been fiercely opposed by some prominent overseas citizens' advocacy groups that argue that the United States' policies are out of step with the rest of the world. Further, some contend that some banks abroad now refuse to do business with Americans living overseas because of the filing burden that holding their accounts creates (American Citizens Abroad 2013; The Association of Americans Resident Overseas 2013a, b). The number of US citizenship renunciations has grown in tandem with the federal government's increasingly aggressive efforts to collect taxes on overseas earnings and assets and tightened international banking regulations under the Dodd-Frank Act. Previously, only a few hundred people relinquished their US citizenship annually, but in 2009 US renunciations ticked up to 742 and the number has grown in every subsequent year to date. In 2013 alone, 3000 Americans forswore their US citizenship (Fig. 15.1) (Internal Revenue Service 1998–2014).



Fig. 15.1 US citizenship renouncements, 1999–2014

Writing in *The New York Times*, one US citizen living in London said that he was giving up his citizenship for tax purposes. He explained: "The [Internal Revenue Service] doesn't care about the distinction" between a New Yorker who has created "a shell entity in the Cayman Islands to evade taxes" and an American "who has spent most of his life overseas" and has built "a legitimate company[…]If America makes it so difficult to be American, I'll happily just be British" (Tepper 2014).

Renunciations by wealthy and prominent individuals have further drawn public attention to the issue of taxing overseas assets. Facebook co-founder Eduardo Saverin, for example, drew sharp criticism for having timed his renunciation in such a way that he did not incur a US capital gains tax liability for his share of the company's initial public offering (IPO) profits (estimated to be over USD3 billion), and Tina Turner, songwriter Denise Rich, and heiress Anna Getty faced similar levels of public scrutiny when they forswore theirs (Chisthi et al. 2012). Capturing the public's distaste for this citizenship renunciation trend, US Senator Chuck Schumer introduced the Abolishing Tax-Related Incentives for Offshore Tenancy (Ex-PATRIOT) Act to Congress in May 2012. If the Ex-PATRIOT Act had passed, it would have significantly increased the tax penalty levied against those whom the government believes gave up their US citizenship to reduce their tax burden and would make it more difficult for them to re-enter the country. Specifically, Senator Schumer's bill planned to levy a 30 % tax on all US-derived capital gains of anyone who expatriated for tax benefits and placed such persons on a US State Department and US Department of Homeland Security traveler watch list (US Congress 2012). Although the US Congress did not enact the Ex-PATRIOT Act, existing US laws financially penalize those who choose to expatriate regardless of their underlying motivations – including the USD450 expatriation filing fee and an exit tax on assets valued above a certain threshold – along with another unenforced legal provision codified in 1996 that formally bans those who expatriate for tax liability purposes from re-entering the country (Chisthi et al. 2012; US Supreme Court 1924; US Government Printing Office 2010a, b).

Voting Rights

American citizens aged 18 and older living overseas have the right to participate in federal elections, which include Presidential and Congressional races and national referendums. Americans resident abroad do not have designated elected representatives; instead their votes are included in the vote tally of the local US electoral district (also known as a precinct) in which the voter last resided (US Congress 1986; US Government Accountability Office 2004c). During the 2012 presidential race, local election officials reported that approximately 1 % of all registered voters cast their ballot from overseas or from a US-domestic military posting. This class of voters submitted 535,000 federal voter registrations applications in 2012, including 249,000 registrations from overseas civilians, and 279,000 completed by members of the armed forces (US Department of Defense Federal Voting Assistance Program 2013).

Under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, US citizens abroad have the right to cast an absentee ballot in their last state of residence regardless of the length of time they have spent overseas and even if they have no intention of ever returning to the United States. Currently 26 US states and territories also allow overseas voting in state, county or municipal elections. American citizens living in a US territory – including Puerto Rico, the Northern Marina Islands, the US Virgin Islands, Guam and American Samoa – are barred from voting in federal elections. To put US overseas voting rights in context, among the countries surveyed by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 33 % allowed non-resident citizens to vote for members of the legislature, 22 % in presidential elections, 17 % in referendums, and only 6 % permitted them to vote in sub-national elections (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2014).

Although US emigrants have the right to vote in federal elections, some of their children are unable to participate in US elections. Second-generation American emigrants who are US citizens but have never established domicile in the United States have no electoral precinct that they can personally claim as their home district and are effectively disenfranchised. However, 25 of the 50 states plus the District of Columbia have addressed this gap in federal law by passing legislation of their own permitting second-generation American emigrants to register and vote in their state or district if one of their parents is eligible to vote there, although the exact requirements vary by state (Department of Defense Federal Voting Assistance Program 2014). Further, implementation of overseas voting rights varies between US states. Since US election laws are legislated at the national, state and local levels, overseas citizens must contend with a patchwork of voting rules, systems, and eligibility requirements. Eligible overseas citizens register to participate in US national elections via the state or territory in which they last maintained residence and submit their completed ballots to the election bureau of their most recent municipality of domicile.

Under federal law, states must transmit ballots to their overseas voters at least 45 days before a federal election is held and provide an electronic means for overseas citizens to access a blank copy of their ballot. The manner in which citizens submit

their completed ballots varies with the laws of the US state or territory in which they are registered to vote. Most states and territories give overseas voters the option to submit their ballot by mail, electronically, or by turning it over to a US Embassy or Consulate (Coleman 2012). In the highly contentious Bush versus Gore presidential election of 2000, late-arriving overseas ballots in Florida could have potentially changed the state's results and, consequently, the election overall, which increased public awareness of this population of voters and the overseas voting programme more broadly (Dark 2003). Reforms have been made since the 2000 election that improve overseas voting access and processes, but advocates of overseas voters argue that additional changes are needed, particularly in terms of ballot delivery. For example, in its 2012 post-election survey, the Overseas Vote Foundation found that 22 % of military and overseas voter respondents who attempted to vote were unable to do so because they either did not receive a ballot or it arrived too late (Overseas Vote Foundation and U.S. Vote Foundation 2013).

Social Security, Medicaid and Veterans' Benefits

US federal law allows its citizens and other qualified individuals residing overseas to access some, but not all, federal welfare benefits – such as Social Security, veterans' benefits and Medicare – to which they would be otherwise entitled. Social Security is a cash transfer programme that can be accessed abroad by citizens and many eligible non-citizens who previously worked in the United States. Social Security provides a basic level of income for workers in their retirement and social insurance protection for the disabled and families whose principal wage earner dies. US citizens can continue to receive the Social Security payments to which they are entitled indefinitely while living outside of the United States, although there are some countries to which the US government will not transfer these benefit payments, including North Korea, Cambodia, Vietnam, Cuba and most areas that were in the former Soviet Union. Under certain conditions, these benefits are also available to non-citizens who previously worked in the United States and paid into the Social Security system but now live in a different country. Qualifying citizens of 132 countries are eligible to receive Social Security payments while living outside of the United States on an indefinite basis. Although there are certain other exceptions – primarily based on prior US military service – citizens of all other countries stop receiving Social Security payments after living outside of the United States for 6 months unless they legally return to the country and stay for a whole calendar month.

Social Security benefits collected overseas are calculated in US dollars and do not fluctuate with international exchange rates (Social Security Administration 2011). The current generation of retirees can begin accessing these benefits at age 62, receiving on average USD1294 per month. Social Security payments are based on lifetime earnings, and about one in every six Americans receives some form of Social Security payment, including almost all of the elderly. This cash benefit programme represents 24 % of the federal budget (Center on Budget and Policy

Priorities 2012, 2014). Depending on the country where they are employed, the person's age and income level, and the nature of their employment, US citizens' and residents' earnings from work conducted outside of the country may be subject to the same Social Security taxes as domestically earned wages (SSA 2011).

Regardless of a person's place of residence or citizenship, virtually all federal monetary benefits granted to veterans of the US armed services can be accessed while living overseas. Veterans residing abroad are also eligible for the same education benefits programmes, including those available under the Post-9/11 GI Bill and the Montgomery GI Bill, for which many veterans in the United States qualify. Generally speaking, medical treatment received outside the United States for service-related disabilities are reimbursable for qualified veterans who reside or travel overseas (US Department of Veterans Affairs 2013).

In contrast to Social Security payments and most forms of veterans' benefits, the US federal healthcare programme for the elderly and the disabled, Medicare, is generally not accessible abroad. Medicare is jointly funded by the federal government and states and is the country's second largest federal social welfare programme, costing USD498 billion in fiscal year 2013. It is available to US citizens and lawful permanent residents, funding health coverage for 48 million people who are over age 65 or have a disability (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 2014). Otherwise eligible beneficiaries practically have no access to this social welfare programme while living or travelling overseas nor can they be reimbursed for foreign medical expenses that are paid out-of-pocket. Qualitative research suggests that many American retirees who would like to emigrate on a part-time or a permanent basis choose not to because their Medicare coverage effectively ends at the US border (Dixon et al. 2006; Haims and Dick 2010; Peddicord 2013; Rigor 2013).

According to statute, Medicare services can only be used to pay for medical care administered in a foreign country under three narrowly defined sets of circumstances: if during a medical emergency a beneficiary is in the United States but the nearest foreign hospital is closer than the nearest US hospital; if a beneficiary suffers a medical emergency while travelling a direct route between Alaska and the United States and the nearest Canadian hospital is closer than the nearest US hospital; or if the home of a beneficiary who lives in the United States is closer to a foreign than a US hospital (US Department of Health and Human Services 2011). The constitutionality of Medicare's foreign exclusion was challenged in the 1986 court case *Milkson v. Secretary of Health and Human Services*, in which the plaintiff argued that the policy infringed on beneficiaries' right to travel abroad. The district court upheld the law, reasoning that administering medical services abroad would be unduly burdensome and Medicare funds should be spent within the United States.

Supplemental Security Income, which is a federal cash assistance programme for low-income people over the age of 65 who are blind or disabled, is also not available to people living abroad (US Government Accountability Office 2004c). US citizens abroad generally do not qualify for means-tested welfare benefits that are administered and partially funded at the state and local levels and available to citizens living

in the United States, including food stamps, unemployment insurance, and cash welfare.

Transfer of US Citizenship to Children Born Abroad

Children born to a US citizen parent outside the United States are often eligible for US citizenship at birth through the *jus sanguinis* principle, but citizenship is not automatically granted. A US citizen parent who wishes to pass along their citizenship to their foreign-born child must contact the local US Embassy or Consulate as soon after the birth as possible to formally document it and apply for the infant's US passport. A parents' ability to transfer their nationality to their non-US-born child statutorily depends on whether one or both of the parents are citizens, the citizen parent's previous residency in the United States, whether or not the child was born out of wedlock, and the child's age at the time of application. A separate set of rules governs the transfer of US citizenship to foreign-born adopted children. During the 2013 fiscal year, the US State Department's Bureau of Consular Affairs registered 68,314 overseas births to US citizen parents. That year, families in the US adopted 7094 foreign-born children (US Department of State 2014b). The Bureau can also provide US citizens who become engaged to or marry a foreign national while abroad information on how the individual might acquire an entry visa for their non-citizen future spouse or spouse (United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 2014; US Department of State 2014d).

Repatriation Assistance

The US Department of State provides monetary assistance to Americans who find themselves abroad, destitute, and with no other means of funding their return to the United States. Known as repatriation loans, they offer a last resort option for US citizens stranded abroad. These loans may only be used to cover the costs of the recipient's temporary sustenance while awaiting departure and direct return travel to the United States. US consular officers decide to issue a repatriation loan based on need and are prohibited from considering the applicants' creditworthiness or projected ability to repay the money in reaching a determination. Nevertheless, recipients are expected to repay the loan in full plus interest and any penalty charges that they may have incurred. Those who fall into default of payment are barred from being issued a US passport until they are able to meet the loan's terms (US Department of State 2014c). Americans who receive a repatriation loan are sometimes eligible for temporary and stabilizing financial assistance upon their return to the country from the Department of Health and Human Services' Office of Refugee Resettlement. The Department of State received USD964,000 in federal funding in the 2012 fiscal year to cover the costs of subsidizing and administering its

repatriation loan programme. During that year, the repatriation loan programme processed 1068 cases. The greatest number of cases involved Americans who sought assistance from within the Western Hemisphere (35 % or 375 cases), with the next most common region being Europe, accounting for 22 % of the year's caseload or 238 approved filings. The top departure countries in which US citizens received a repatriation loan in fiscal year 2012 were Mexico, Thailand, Germany, the United Kingdom and the Philippines (Office of Refugee Resettlement 2012).

Consular Services

The US Department of State operates 275 embassies, consulates and missions worldwide to promote the country's foreign policy and trade agenda and provide citizens abroad with emergency support. The Bureau of Consular Affairs assists citizens to navigate the legal hurdles presented by major life events abroad and offers a broad array of emergency services to Americans whose lives or well-being are in danger while travelling or living outside of the country. The fees that the Bureau collects from issuing passports and processing visas for non- citizens more than covers the cost of its operations; in the 2013 fiscal year the Bureau generated USD3.33 billion in consular revenue of which 80 % was retained by the Department of State and used to fund its other offices and programmes (US Department of State 2014b).

The Bureau of Consular Affairs' in-country staff is responsible for aiding Americans abroad to recover or replace a lost or stolen passport and assist them if they become victims of a crime or are arrested or detained. Consular employees work to locate missing Americans, stop parental abductions of US citizen children, and help Americans whose safety is threatened by a medical emergency or a natural or political disaster. In the event that an American civilian dies abroad, Bureau staff may be asked to inform the deceased's next-of-kin, help make arrangements for a local burial or the body's repatriation and, when necessary, assume responsibility for the deceased's estate. During the 2013 fiscal year, the Bureau's staff issued 38,342 emergency passports, made 9239 prison visits, provided assistance to the families of 11,058 US citizens who died while overseas, and handled 12,892 welfare or whereabouts inquiries (US Department of State 2014b).

Further, the Bureau releases travel alerts and warnings about elevated risks that US citizens might face, advising citizens abroad to register with the local US Embassy so that they can be easily contacted in the event of an impending emergency. Although the State Department cannot order US citizens to leave a country due to a crisis, its officials can offer varying degrees of support to those who choose to evacuate. In such situations, citizens typically leave on commercially available flights that they have arranged themselves. Diplomatic officials may intervene to help them move to safety by working to create greater availability of commercial flights, and in more serious crises, coordinating with the US Department of Defense to manage evacuations. However, the GAO recently found weaknesses in the US State and Defense Departments' plans to work effectively to coordinate large-scale evacuations of US citizens abroad, a challenge made all the greater by the lack of

information about the number of citizens living abroad. Although the State Department requires overseas posts to produce estimates of the number of private American citizens in country, the GAO's inquiry found that more three-quarters of posts described their last estimate as being, at best, "only somewhat accurate" (US Government Accountability Office 2007).

Conclusion

Americans living abroad make up a growing and diverse population scattered across the globe. The US government does not have a comprehensive policy framework for engaging this population, but it does come into contact with US citizens living abroad in multiple ways, including taxation, voting, social welfare benefits, and consular services. Beyond government measures, a diverse group of non-state actors helps Americans abroad maintain ties to the United States through cultural, political, and social events. Further, the US overseas population can have a positive economic impact on the United States by building transnational social and business ties, helping the trade balance, transferring skills and technologies, and serving as people-to-people diplomats.

The recent upsurge in US citizenship renouncements has grabbed headlines and shaped much of the public conversation around emigration, but in fact only a very small share of Americans abroad are relinquishing their ties to the United States. Instead, far more US citizens living abroad are taking the very American step of organizing for change. While the US government's ad hoc approach to emigration might have sufficed for most of the nation's history, it is proving to be an outdated model in today's interconnected world. The US government has embraced the opportunities that technology has presented to increase oversight on assets held by US citizens around the world and ferret out tax evasion on overseas assets, but it has not fully leveraged the efficiencies and cost savings that new technologies offer to expand the range of benefits available to overseas citizens, such as absentee voting online, including this population in official census counts, or removing the foreign exemption on Medicaid.

In contrast, US citizens and those with ties to America abroad have taken to the Internet, using it as a means to organize its scattered population and advocate on behalf of their shared interests and needs. For example, in 2008, the Democratic Party held the country's first-ever global presidential primary, and Democrats abroad elected delegates to the Party's 2008 and 2012 nominating conventions. Americans abroad stakeholder groups have been coming together annually for over a decade for a week-long advocacy mission in Washington, DC, and associations like Los Otros Dreamers are organizing young people around the world who have ties to the United States to reform US immigration laws. While success does not usually happen overnight, the seeds of change are starting to take root. The United States has long seen itself as a country of immigrants; perhaps it's time that it recognizes that it is also a country of emigrants.

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