

Edited by
BETTINA BRUNS,
DORIT HAPP AND
HELGA ZICHNER

EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

Geopolitics Between Integration and Security

New Geographies of Europe

This series explores the production and reshaping of space from a comparative and interdisciplinary perspective. By drawing on contemporary research from across the social sciences, it offers novel insights into ongoing spatial developments within and between the various regions of Europe. It also seeks to introduce new geographies at the edges of the European Union and the interplay with bordering areas at the Mediterranean, African and eastern Asian interfaces of the EU. As a result, this series acts as an important forum for themes of pan-European interest and beyond. The New Geographies of Europe series welcomes proposals for monographs and edited volumes taking a comparative and interdisciplinary approach to spatial phenomena in Europe. Contributions are especially welcome where the focus is upon novel spatial phenomena, path-dependent processes of socio-economic change or policy responses at various levels throughout Europe. Suggestions for topics also include the relationship between the state and citizens, the idea of fragile democracies, the economics of regional separation, the deconstruction of the idea of Europe, the comparative assessment of European planning models, new migration streams, and the European labour market.

More information about this series at
http://www.springer.com/series/14740

Bettina Bruns • Dorit Happ • Helga Zichner
Editors

European Neighbourhood Policy

Geopolitics Between Integration and Security

palgrave
macmillan

Editors
Bettina Bruns
Leibniz Institute for Regional Geography
Leipzig, Germany

Helga Zichner
Leibniz Institute for Regional Geography
Leipzig, Germany

Dorit Happ
Leibniz Institute for Regional Geography
Leipzig, Germany

New Geographies of Europe
ISBN 978-1-137-48565-6 ISBN 978-1-349-69504-1 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-69504-1

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016951099

Cover illustration: © moodboard / Alamy Stock Photo

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature
The registered company is Macmillan Publishers Ltd. London

Acknowledgments

This volume is the result of an international workshop which took place at the Leibniz Institute for Regional Geography in November 2013. The workshop was held as part of the project 'Within the ring of secure neighbors. Regional and local effects of the extra-territorial involvement of the European Union in Belarus, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova', which is funded by the Volkswagen Foundation.

The editors are grateful to Anna Nechaeva for her unstinting help with the book. They also wish to thank the editing team at Palgrave Macmillan for their cooperation and the smooth operation of the whole publishing process.

Contents

Notes on Contributors

Liubov Akulenko has been European Program Director in the NGO 'Centre UA' (Ukraine) since 2010. During recent years, she has managed several projects related to European integration issues, including the 'Stronger together' information campaign (2014–ongoing), 'Catch the European Wave and switch on Ukraine' (2013–2014), 'Association agreement through visualization object glass' (2013), 'Ukraine's EU integration policy platform' (2011–2012) and 'Support of civic expert council within the Ukrainian part of EU–Ukraine Cooperation committee' (2010–2011). Between 2007 and 2010, she was a researcher at the Department of European Integration in the National Academy for Public Administration of the President of Ukraine, where she defended her PhD dissertation titled 'Application of Co-operation Mechanisms in European Neighborhood Policy'.

Bettina Bruns is currently a Schumpeter Fellow at the Leibniz Institute for Regional Geography in Leipzig, Germany, and head of the project '"Within the ring of secure neighbors"—regional and local effects of the extra-territorial involvement of the European Union in Belarus, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova'. Prior to this, she was a research assistant at the same institute. Her research interests include borders, informal economies and ethnographic methods. She holds a Diploma in Cultural Studies from the European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder) and a PhD from the Faculty of Sociology of the University of Bielefeld.

Stefanie Dreiack is a research associate at the Chair of International Relations at the University of Leipzig. Her research and teaching combine her interests in European Union studies and sociological approaches. Empirically, she is mainly interested in the Western Balkan region. Her latest work related to organizational learning in the European Union police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia.

Micha Fiedlschuster is a junior researcher and PhD candidate in the research training group Critical Junctures of Globalization, which is funded by the German Research Council and located at the Centre for Area Studies at Leipzig University.

Dorit Happ is a researcher and PhD student at the Leibniz Institute for Regional Geography in Leipzig. Her research focuses on delineating the effects of the EU's external policy on local structures, and cooperation in the eastern neighbourhood, in general, and Belarus and Ukraine, in particular. In 2006, she received her Bachelor's degree from the University of Erfurt. As her main area of interest is eastern Europe, she studied cultural and political science in Moscow and in Prague. Subsequently, in 2009 she completed her Master's degree in East European Studies at the Free University in Berlin. Following graduation, Happ held a lectureship from the Robert Bosch Foundation and taught from 2010–2011 at the Brest State Technical University in Belarus.

Tetiana Kostiuchenko has been a senior lecturer in the Sociology Department of the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Ukraine since 2011. Between 2012 and 2015, Kostiuchenko also worked as a researcher in projects focused on the perception of European integration in Ukraine. In 2014–2015, she conducted qualitative and quantitative surveys (small-scale polls, focus groups, content analysis of online media) on the perception of various implementation measures of the Association Agreement among small and medium-sized businesses in Ukraine and on the perception of EU integration in the south and east of Ukraine. Her dissertation is focused on the structure and particularities of the political elite network in Ukraine in 2007–2010.

Lena Laube is a sociologist and holds a PhD from the University of Bremen. Since 2013, she has been working as a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Bonn, Forum Internationale Wissenschaft, Department for Comparative Research on Democracies. Her main research interests include border and migration studies, political sociology and network analysis. Her most recent

articles are Roos, C. and Laube, L. (2014) 'Liberal cosmopolitan norms and the border: Local actors' critique on the governance of global processes', *Ethnicities*; and Mau, S., Gülzau, F., Laube, L. and Zaun, N. (2015) 'The global mobility divide. How visa policies have evolved over time', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*.

Andrey Makarychev is Professor of Government and Politics, University of Tartu. His areas of expertise are Russian foreign policy, the EU–Russia common neighborhood, regionalism in Europe and security studies. He has published multiple articles in *Problems of Post-Communism*, *European Urban and Regional Studies*, *International Spectator*, *Europe–Asia Studies* and other international peer-reviewed journals, as well as books and edited volumes with Palgrave Macmillan, Routledge, Columbia University Press and other publishers. He teaches courses on Foreign Policy Analysis, Globalization, and Post-Soviet Integration.

Iryna Matsevich-Dukhan is Associate Professor of Philosophy, Chair of the Humanities Department at the Belarusian State Academy of Arts. Her areas of specialization are social philosophy and aesthetics. Her articles have appeared in various peer-reviewed journals such as *Topos, Philosophy and Social Sciences, International Journal of Interdisciplinary Social Sciences* and others. Iryna has recently published the foreword to the translation of Emil Lask's *Philosophy of Law*. She is the author of the book *The Challenges of Creativity: Cultural Industries and Cultural Policy in Europe* (2010) and is currently writing a book on the concept of creative industries.

Frank Meyer is a junior researcher at the Leibniz Institute for Regional Geography in Leipzig, Germany. He received his diploma in Geography in 2010 from the University of Leipzig with a thesis on political speeches about the EU's external border. His research interests focus on discourse theory and theoretical aspects of human geography, as well as on peripheralization. He is currently engaged in a research project regarding the subjective perception of shrinkage-related discourses in eastern Germany and the changes these discourses inflict on the practices of the inhabitants of the respective regions.

Andreas Müller is a research officer and policy analyst for the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees in Nuremberg. He studied sociology, political science and journalism at the University of Leipzig. He obtained his PhD from the University of Bremen. His doctoral thesis analyzed the tensions which

emerged in the intra-European cooperation on migration control and how these tensions affected the external EU borders.

Vladislav Saran is a junior researcher at the Institute of Juridical and Political Research, Academy of Sciences of Moldova in Chisinau. He has participated in several national and international seminars and conferences in Vienna, Antalya, Sibiu, Iasi and Chisinau. His research focuses on Moldova–EU migration phenomena, academic mobility, 'brain drain' and various aspects of Moldova's European integration. He deals with the analysis of circular migration, EU migration policy, European programs that promote formal and informal education and mobility among students, and Moldova in the context of EU foreign policy.

Alexandra Yatsyk is the Director of the Center for Cultural Studies of Post-Socialism and an associate professor in the Journalism Department at Kazan Federal University. She has been a guest lecturer at the University of Tampere (2014), a lecturer on the International M.A. Program on Russian Studies at European University of Saint Petersburg (2014, 2015), and a visiting fellow at the University of Tartu (2014, 2015) and at the Center for Urban History of East Central Europe in Lviv (2013, 2014). Her research interests include Russian popular culture, representations of post-Soviet national identities, sports and cultural mega-events, and biopolitics.

Helga Zichner is a research assistant at the Leibniz Institute for Regional Geography in Leipzig, Germany. She studied cultural sciences at the European University in Frankfurt (Oder), finishing her faculty with a thesis on civil society issues in Romania. She started working at the Leibniz Institute in 2008 on a project focusing on the impact of the new external borders of the EU on the daily lives of stakeholders in the affected border regions. Currently, she is working on a project that deals with the local effects of the policies the EU addresses to its direct neighborhood, carrying out case studies in Moldova in different fields of the EU's extra-territorial policies. She is interested in how to trickle down big political approaches to the members of societies and in connected questions regarding the embedding, effectiveness and social consequences of these processes.

Abbreviations

AA	Association Agreement
AFSJ	Area of freedom, security and justice
BIH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
CEE	Central and Eastern Europe
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CONCORD	European NGO Confederation for Relief and Development
CRRC	Caucasus Research Resource Centers
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CSO	Civil Society Organizations
CSO & LA	Civil Society Organizations and Local Luthorities
DCFTA	Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area
DG	Directorate-General
EaP	Eastern Partnership
EaP CSF	Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum
EEAS	European External Action Service
EED	European Endowment for Democracy
EIDHR	The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
EM	Erasmus Mundus
ENoP	European Network of Political Foundations
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
ENPI	European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument

ERICarts	European Institute for Comparative Cultural Research
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
ESSnet-Culture	European Statistical System Network on Culture
EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Union Force
EUMM	European Union Monitoring Mission
EUPM	European Union Police Mission
FDI	Foreign direct investment
FIFA	Fédération Internationale de Football Association
FRONTEX	European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GDP	Gross domestic product
GIZ	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
GSP	Generalized System of Preferences
HE	Higher education
HEI	Higher education institutions
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IRF	International Renaissance Foundation
IRI	International Republican Institute
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs
JLS	Justice, liberty, security
KIIS	Kiev International Institute of Sociology
LIP	Local Integration Project
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCSFs	Neighbourhood Civil Society Facilities
n.d.	Not dated
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NSA&LA	Non-state actors and local authorities
OIC	Organization of Islamic Cooperation
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OSF	Open Society Foundations
PCA	Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
resp.	Respectively
RMCBU	Regional Monitoring and Capacity Building Unit

RPP	Regional Protection Programme
SAA	Stabilization and Association Agreement
SECI	Southeast European Cooperative Initiative
SEE	Southeast Europe
UEFA	Union of European Football Associations
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
WEU	Western European Union
WNIS	Western Newly Independent States
WTO	World Trade Organization

List of Figures

List of Tables

1

Introduction

Bettina Bruns, Dorit Happ and Helga Zichner

The EU and Its Neighbors

Near the end of November 2013, the then Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych refused to sign the negotiated Association Agreement between his country and the EU at the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius, seeking closer cooperation with Russia instead. His refusal, due to strong pressure from Russia, led to massive public protests on Kyiv Independence Square (Maidan Nezalezhnosti), the events becoming known as Euromaidan. The demonstrations were soon answered by brutal reactions from the state, leading to further complex and violent events. These uprisings were followed by Russia's annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and the military conflict in eastern Ukraine, which continues at the time of writing. Ukraine's position between the European Union and Russia has ultimately become clearly evident and very problematic.

B. Bruns (✉) • D. Happ • H. Zichner
Leibniz Institute for Regional Geography, Leipzig, Germany

B. Bruns et al. (eds.), *European Neighbourhood Policy,*
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-69504-1_1

That the Ukraine conflict broke out has a great deal to do with how two large political entities, the EU and Russia, perceive their neighbors: Who is a neighbor for whom and what role do they play in terms of the geopolitical positioning of each power? These questions (discussed, for example, in the volumes edited by Freire & Kanet, 2012, and Korosteleva, 2011) will not be dealt with in this book.

However, the fact that the EU appears in its neighborhood as a geopolitical player is the backdrop against which the questions we ask gain in importance.

How can we conduct empirical research on EU's extra-territorialization? What does empirical research, especially research adopting a micro perspective, reveal about the links between extra-territorialization and security? How does the specific situation in a country impact on the implementation of the extra-territorial engagement?

Our focus is the complexities with which some of the EU's closest neighbors currently struggle and we are especially interested in the viewpoints that exist in the third countries involved. In order to make plain our interest, first, we will reflect on several central notions: neighbors, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and how to frame them in a scientific manner. To this end, we propose the notion of extra-territorial engagement with which the complex interplay between security and integration efforts on the part of the EU can be grasped in a fruitful way. So, in order to address some of the complexities created by how the EU imagines its relations with these countries, we need to remember the point at which the EU began to think in terms of 'neighbors' at all. As possibly superficial but still telling evidence that a change in this respect has taken place, let us take a look at the use of the word 'neighbor': While it appears only twice in the text of the European Security Strategy (see European Council, 2003), it appears over one hundred times in the ENP strategy paper (see European Commission, 2004), launched to support the Security Strategy. To the east, it is only since the enlargement rounds of 2004 and 2007 that the EU has shared borders directly with countries which are not viewed as prospective members, as the former institutional integration is replaced with an offer of cooperation with neighbors. This

means that the EU had to come up with another set of instruments and concepts suitable for a situation in which beyond its borders lay countries that would remain outsiders to the EU. This was a new situation since, until then, integration had been 'the European response to every major shift in the geopolitical constellation of Europe' (Tassinari, 2009, p. 4). The strategy of integration, however, works as a means to deal with an outsider only for as long as the countries are not yet members. As Tassinari reminds us: 'Enlargement really fulfills the European mission when it ceases to be a foreign policy and becomes a "domestic" European matter' (ibid., emphasis in original). Against this backdrop, we understand the ENP as an effort to order relations with those who will remain outside.

While, in the case of enlargement, the goal is clear (membership), this is more complicated to circumscribe in the case of the ENP (in any event, not membership). Rather, in order to frame its relations with the neighborhood the EU had to start from scratch, including finding out about (reciprocal) expectations on each side. It was therefore no coincidence that, one year before the big-bang enlargement in 2004, the EU introduced the ENP, which channels its external relations with the newly discovered neighborhood; with the accession of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007 and Croatia in 2013, the preliminary enlargement process came to an end. Consequently, relations with adjacent countries then had to be put on a different footing. Founding the ENP, the EU 'produced' this neighborhood – or, as Kuus emblematically put it: 'a place had been crafted out of space by EU institutions' (Kuus, 2014, p. 16), a space which was turned 'into a "neighbourhood" as a specific kind of place to be managed through a particular set of policy instruments' (Kuus, 2014, p. 114) (Fig. 1.1).

This process implies the EU's intention to exert influence to a certain extent on the neighboring countries of the EU. In contrast to countries facing the prospect of membership during the enlargement process, whereby the EU demands full adoption of its *acquis communautaire*, its leverage with neighbors with no prospects of membership is generally assumed to be much lower (Kelley, 2006, p. 41; Tassinari, 2009, p. 104; Langbein & Börzel, 2013, pp. 572–573; Tassinari, 2009, p. 104). However, the EU still tries to influence these countries in diverse policy fields, including domains of



Fig. 1.1 The EU and its neighbourhoods

soft power policies such as education, culture and the fostering of non-governmental actors, as well as hard power issues such as migration and security-related issues.

According to Kuus EU neighboring countries were congealed into one distinct object of EU decision-making by the founding of the ENP (see Kuus, 2014, pp. 16–17), thereby turning them into a specific manageable (or even governable) category of outsider.

The case studies in our volume represent two of these country-groups/regional categories. Within the ENP, a regional subgroup—namely, the 'Western Newly Independent States' (WNIS), comprising Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova—is the target group of specific and customized

EU-driven projects and measures. These countries are supposed to 'share a similar geo-political background' (UNHCR, 2005, p. 1). The general assumption on which actors such as the EU or international organizations build their (political) approaches seems to be that the countries in question are confronted with similar problems, for example, when it comes to migration and asylum management (see UNHCR, 2005, p. 1). While this may be the case, the three countries are very different in terms of their standing towards the EU: While Ukraine and Moldova each signed an Association Agreement with the EU in 2014, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between Belarus and the EU was never ratified, which means there is no legal basis for relations between Belarus and the EU. By throwing Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova into one pot, the EU creates an unclear spatial homogeniety and at the same time manifests a category of neighbors having to stay outside the Union, since there is no prospect of membership either for WNIS or for other ENP countries.

Another example of the production of assumed homogeneous spatial entities neighboring the EU is the 'Western Balkan' region. This term denotes the southeast European countries that represent the next strategic enlargement target of the EU after the admission of Romania and Bulgaria (see Ratiu, 2010, p. 135). It was first introduced during an EU summit in 1998 and is mainly used as a rather technical term by EU institutions and in social research (see Ratiu, 2010, p. 135). However, its use is problematic for several reasons. First, the term 'Balkan' has a negative connotation, except for its use in Bulgaria, Albania and Macedonia (see Jordan, 2005, p. 164). Croatia saw itself as located in Central Europe long before its accession to the EU and, at the same time, distanced itself from an identity as a 'crisis Balkan region' (Jordan, 2005, p. 164). Second, the term 'Western Balkan' comprises countries with very different degrees of integration with the EU. Theoretically, all Western Balkan states do have a prospect of membership and, therefore, belong to that group of countries that might change their status from being outsiders in relation to the EU to insiders, even if this necessitates taking a long-term perspective. In the case of Kosovo, however, we have a situation in which not even all EU member states recognize the country. Its citizens need a Schengen visa in order to enter the EU. At the other end of the scale, we have Croatia, which has belonged to the European Union since 2013.

To sum up, the identities of 'Western Balkans' and 'WNIS' are constructs which produce a specific spatial order in to simplify the EU's neighborhood. The case studies gathered in this volume will show that the quite uniform character of these constructs neither corresponds to the often undecided policy of the EU towards these countries, nor reflects the (diverse) expectations and self-perceptions of the countries addressed. With categorizations such as those presented, the EU creates specific geopolitical regionalizations—in other words, it practices a political construction of regions (see Tassinari, 2005, p. 12). This is in line with the critical definition of geopolitics following Ó Tuathail and Agnew, who understand the concept as a 'discursive practice spatializing international politics to represent it as a world of particular types of places, peoples, dramas' (Ó Tuathail & Agnew, 1992 in Guzzini, 2012, p. 41): The 'particular types of places' thus produced are mainly characterized by their respective relation with the EU. Tassinari has developed a distribution of Europe's concentric circles, measuring institutional and administrative 'distance' on the basis of the degree of integration a country or region has with the EU (see Tassinari, 2005, p. 3). Circle 1 would be the EU core, consisting of the 'old' member states; only circle 5 contains candidate countries, and circle 6 contains the EU neighbors with no prospect of membership. 'They [the countries that are not integrated, circle 6] are cut out by the institutional barrier, although they are increasingly influenced by policies made in Brussels. For current or prospective candidate countries, 'circle no. 5', there are reasonable expectations to cross the institutional barrier at some point' (Tassinari, 2005, p. 4).

Independent of the 'type of neighbor' they represent according to the EU's categories, the third states located close to the EU play a vital role for the EU when it comes to security issues and the maintenance of inner stability and prosperity.

Extra-territorial Engagement as a Common Denominator

For each of these 'types of neighbor', the EU has in mind a certain political offer, a vision of how these regions should be so that they conform to the EU's own interests. Against this background, we decided to use the

term 'extra-territorial engagement' in order to grasp the EU's approaches to its diverse neighborhood.

The term 'extra-territorialization' was originally used to describe the relocation or outsourcing of migration control to neighbor states of the EU (Rijpma & Cremona, 2007, p. 11; Zeilinger, 2012, p. 63), meaning that third countries are involved in EU policies through certain agreements (Cardwell, 2009, p. 160). However, the notion of extra-territorialization can be broadened to include measures of different policy fields aiming at influencing the domestic policies of a third state for internal EU security reasons (see Wichmann, 2007; see also Bruns & Happ, Chap. 7, Laube & Müller, Chap. 3, and Makarychev & Yatsyk, Chap. 5, all in this volume). From our point of view, it does not make sense to restrict the notion to one domain (that of migration); on the contrary, it can be applied fruitfully to other policy fields. The reason for this is that extra-territoriality captures especially well the two-sidedness of EU activities beyond its borders.

Etymologically, the term is composed of two parts: 'Extra', which means simply 'outside'; and 'territory', which stems from a Latin loan word defining a political entity, a dominion—for example, a city or a sovereign state. While, from a scientific point of view, these territorial entities can be seen as socially constructed, they do have a political and strategic meaning in practice. Thus, turning to the term 'territorialization', we understand it, first, as an active process of producing and shaping a territory. The concept of 'territoriality' helps to reveal what this process of construction looks like. It can be seen as the prevalent principle of political power, as well as the outcome of specific socio-technical practices (see Painter, 2010). According to Sack, it can be defined as 'an attempt to affect, influence, or *control* actions and interactions (of people, things, and relationships) by asserting and attempting to enforce *control* over a geographic area' (Sack, 1983, p. 55 in Rios & Adiv, 2010, p. 7, own emphasis). In this sense, we understand the EU's extra-territorial engagement as a spatial-strategic means to control socio-spatial relations on multiple scales in sovereign states outside the EU. We are aware that there exist other concepts covering the EU's relations with its neighbors; for example, 'external governance', stemming from political sciences and being defined by Lavenex as 'the extension of rules and policies beyond formal membership' (Lavenex, 2004; see Laube & Müller, Chap. 3 in this volume; Makarychev & Yatsyk, Chap. 5 in this volume).

In contrast, 'transborder governance' has been defined as a specific form of governance which reaches beyond the EU's external borders and creates particular outcomes in other countries (see Stadtmüller & Bachmann, 2012, p. 2 f.). Similar to extra-territorialization, these two further concepts also share the idea of extending rules beyond a certain territory. In contrast to the term 'extra-territorialization', however, the starting point of the concept of external/transborder governance is institutional systems of rules and their transfer. Therefore, it is the clear spatial reference in the notion of extra-territorial engagement that led us to choose it as a common reference point here.

In practice, extra-territorial engagement does have different, even ambivalent, shapes. On the one hand, some of these activities are directed towards an advanced degree of integration of the addressed neighboring countries, which we will focus on in due course. On the other hand, some of the EU's measures of extra-territorial engagement somewhat reinforce the outsider status of the countries and determine their exclusion. The contributions all deal with specific aspects of the EU's extra-territorial engagement. Without necessarily referring explicitly to the precise notion, some authors stress the exclusive side of the matter more strongly (such as Meyer, Matsevich-Dukhan), while others focus on integrative aspects (Fiedlschuster, Kostiuchenko & Akulenko, Laube & Müller). A third group of contributions primarily traces back the concomitance of these ambiguous tendencies (Bruns & Happ, Dreiack, Makarychev & Yatsyk, Zichner & Saran).

Integration and Security

As the volume's title suggests, the aim of the ENP is to produce integrative effects as a means to enhance the overall security situation of the EU. In terms of relations with its neighbors, this entails a delicate dilemma, however; countries may get closer to the EU but still be left outside. It is, as some call it, a policy of keeping them at arm's length (see Gromadzki, 2007, p. 129; Balfour, 2012, p. 59), resulting from the twofold desire of achieving greater security by not offering too much integration. Tassinari concludes: 'the European approach towards its current

neighbors actually separates security from integration' (Tassinari, 2009, p. 4).

Concerning the integrative side of the coin of the EU's extra-territorial engagement, we can trace more or less subtle efforts to align the countries in diverse ways, especially in domains that superficially appear to be less political—not only through education, culture, sports or by the non-governmental organization (NGO) sector trying to spread certain rules, but also with values, knowledge and practices. These different approaches, simultaneously inclusionist and exclusionist, point to the two overall and intertwined interests the EU is pursuing when shaping relations with its neighbors: integration and security.

All this has to be regarded in the context of the eastern enlargement rounds, followed by the gradual extension of the Schengen area and the associated abolition of internal border controls. Under these circumstances, a new regime of external relations of the EU has been developed which consists of a variety of programs and measures having in common a strong focus on security. The production of a 'secure Europe' (European Council, 2003) takes place within the hegemonic concept of the 'area of freedom, security and justice' (European Council, 2003) which was developed within the Treaty of Amsterdam (European Communities, 1997). The concept 'area of freedom, security and justice' includes cooperation of police and law enforcement authorities and policy issues in the field of border controls, asylum and immigration. Especially since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, as well as those in Madrid (2004) and London (2005), and in the context of a growing numbers of immigrants, the focus on security has grown even stronger.

The European Security Strategy, also adopted by the Council in 2003, is regarded as an instrument to strengthen internal cohesion in order to identify security challenges in a preventive way. It explicitly includes the EU's neighbors in this task: 'Building security in the EU's neighbourhood […] is prioritised' (European Union External Action, n.d.), not necessarily as equal partners but, rather, as the terrain on which certain measures should be carried out.

Since 2009, the ENP has been complemented by the Eastern Partnership (EaP). In both programs, too, security is a top priority theme: 'We have acquired new neighbours and have come closer to old ones. These circumstances have created both opportunities and challenges. The

European Neighbourhood Policy is a response to this new situation. It will also support efforts to realise the objectives of the European Security Strategy' (European Commission, 2004, p. 2). Under this umbrella, numerous programs and initiatives in the neighbor states are carried out, and the EU aims to exercise significant influence in the third states and their societies. Being confronted with and challenged by the engagement of the EU in their territories, third countries have to position themselves towards the external action of the EU in various political and administrative spheres.

The chain of argumentation employed by the EU in striving to reorder its relations with new neighbors can be summed up as follows: The EU's security focus was intensified in the course of the subsequent enlargement rounds because the integration of Eastern European countries into the EU moved the EU geographically closer to those regions of the world from which (potential) risks (potentially) originate. Moving the external borders eastward in the framework of the last rounds of EU enlargements not only meant geographical relocation, but also altered their meaning and function (Zichner & Bruns, 2011, p. 81). Thus, the EU supposes that the security within the EU can only be safeguarded if the security in the close neighborhood can be guaranteed, too.

In sum, we can state that the enlargement process brought with it many consequences, including for those countries which, while not becoming EU members, became new EU neighbors. This is so due to the high priority the EU put on security measures accompanying the enlargement. While many of these security considerations are manifest in the Schengen border regime, other security measures are being carried out directly in the neighboring third states. Through initiatives that are executed beyond the EU's external borders, the EU is becoming an extra-territorial actor that is trying to involve the third countries in the implementation of such projects.

Inclusion and Exclusion

Due to the interdependence of internal and external EU (security) policies, the neighboring countries are faced with ambiguous treatment on the part of the EU. On the one hand, it is the increasing geographical

proximity to third states resulting from the enlargement process which makes the EU worry about its internal security: 'The integration of acceding states increases our security but also brings the EU closer to troubled areas' (European Council, 2003, p. 8). From this perspective, the EU retains its identity as a secure area in contrast to the surrounding environs, perceived as troubled and, thus, insecure. The implementation of the Schengen border regime is also a measure to keep its neighbors at a distance and fosters an exclusion of neighboring third states. This also means that the EU upholds a clear distinction between inside (EU) and outside (non-EU), yet the buffer between the EU and 'troubled' areas threatens to shrink in the event of failure to build 'a ring of well governed countries' (European Council, 2003, p. 8)—in other words, 'secure' third states—around the EU.

On the other hand, by building the 'ring of well governed countries' or 'ring of friends' (Prodi, 2002), the EU is attempting to integrate its neighbor states with the goal of avoiding 'new dividing lines' (see European Commission, 2003, p. 4) by offering, for example, visa facilities for single countries, or by supporting capacity and infrastructure building projects in the third states. All these examples are in line with the general intention of the EU to promote prosperity, which is also seen by the EU as constitutive for the production of security outside its borders (see Council of the European Union, 2008, p. 2).

This two-sidedness is part of the ambiguity inherent in the EU's external policy and results in what Campain labels the 'Internal/External Security Paradox' (Campain, 2012, p. 122; see also Browning, 2002) with which the third states involved have to deal. They are in a difficult position in the framework of the ENP as they are presented as 'outsiders who are treated as such by the EU but who are nonetheless expected to comply with EU international standards' (Kuus, 2014, p. 116).

Given the current nature of the topic and the increasing emphasis that has been put on extra-territorial measures in the last decade, surprisingly little has been known about the perspectives of neighboring countries where the EU carries out its external policies/governance. They are often presented as mere addressees of certain EU-driven programs and actions, perceived as a 'them' managed by 'us', the EU (Kuus, 2014, p. 116). To balance this oversight, the focus in this volume lies on the dynamics and processes in the neighboring states affected by the EU's extra-territorial

measures. The question is how 'places, countries, and regions are brought into the EU's orbit; the ways in which they are made "to work" for Europe' (Bialasiewicz, 2011, p. 2), but seen from the perspectives of these places that are not members of the EU.

Focus on the Neighbors

The EU's extra-territorial engagement takes place simultaneously on different spatial scales, such as local, regional and national. They include top-down as well as bottom-up processes. By the latter, we do not mean that third countries may shape the ENP according to their own ideas; rather, we refer to the role of neighboring states as co-designers of the concrete realization of single projects which were created and decided on by the EU (see also Horky-Hluchan & Kratchovil, 2014, pp. 252–270). By offering several case studies based on intensive fieldwork in different countries, the present volume seeks to shed light on these various processes. It explores the current diverse relations and fields of politics between the EU and the so-called third states. The shared focus of the contributions is on the strategies through which the EU tries to influence internal politics in third states, but seen from the perspective of those third states themselves. This approach is complemented by a critical assessment of EU interests lying behind its extra-territorial strategies. The combination of both perspectives (those of third states and the EU) creates the distinctive nature of the book. Within an interdisciplinary concept, analyses do not restrict themselves to the national scale, but explicitly consider local and regional spatialities and scalarities. The intermingling of different scales within extra-territorial measures in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries and Western Balkan countries receives particular attention and represents a unique feature of the book.

With CEE countries and the Western Balkans, the book focuses on third states which are confronted with very different EU policies. While eastern neighbors do not enjoy a significant prospect of membership, the Western Balkans are the target of enlargement policy, Croatia being the most recent example. When it comes to the EU's external dimension regarding these two regions, Eastern European and Balkan neighbors

of the EU have in common, despite these differences, that they all are addressed by the EU's external security policy and that they constitute the EU's direct neighborhood, yet have highly diverse relationships with the EU.

The volume offers an in-depth analysis at a micro level of the consequences of the EU's extra-territorial engagement. We neither focus on an evaluation of the policies themselves (as do Ratka & Spaiser, 2012), nor treat the topic on a national scale, as the contributions from political sciences do, leaving the micro level behind (see Biscop & Whitman, 2013). In contrast to the volume of Stadtmüller & Bachmann (2012), who put borders at the center of their focus, we concentrate on the local micro level, paying attention to the various perspectives of the concerned single actors in third states in order to demonstrate the concrete effects of the EU's extra-territorial engagement in the everyday life of citizens in third states and in developments at the regional level.

Our volume thus contributes to the discussion about the EU's extra-territorial engagement in its newly created neighborhood in different policy fields. Each chapter refers to the notion of the extra-territorial engagement of the EU, from either a theoretical or empirical approach. The book is structured as follows: The chapters written by Meyer, Laube and Müller, and Fiedlschuster introduce the topic by looking at various policy fields with no particular geographic focus. The chapters written by Makarychev and Yatsyk, Kostiuchenko and Akulenko, Bruns and Happ, and Dreiack deal with case studies related to hard policy fields such as sovereignty, borders and security. The focus in the chapters written by Zichner and Saran, and Matsevich-Dukhan is on soft policy fields.

The contributions will deal with various aspects of the EU's extra-territorial engagement and the different shades of 'in-betweenness' (and the perceptions thereof) originated by it.

Frank Meyer discusses the relations between the EU and its neighbor states, taking into account the political rhetoric from 1995 to 2014. Carrying out a discourse analysis of relevant political speeches presented by responsible commissioners, he traces back the discursive representation between the EU and its neighbors. Specifically, he reconstructs the concept of 'the area of freedom, security and justice', introduced with the Treaty of Amsterdam by the EU in 1999. The abolition of internal border

controls within the EU went hand in hand with strengthening the controls at the external EU borders. The author demonstrates, in this respect, the use of specific semantic strategies by the EU in order to legitimize its strict border regime. He comes to the general conclusion that political decisions are often not sustained by arguments with regard to content and reflecting possible alternative views, but rather out of the necessity to decide. This entails a securitization of migration issues.

In their chapter, *Lena Laube* and *Andreas Müller* present a categorization of different forms of extra-territorial migration control. Applying a principal–agent perspective as the theoretical background, they discuss various types of delegation of migration control—namely, intra-state, inter-state, delegation in the EU and delegation to private actors—which stand for differing degrees of the displacement of control techniques from their original location.

They show how the extra-territorialization of migration control contributes to the development of a smart border, as potential migrants are checked very early, providing a selective filter system in order to reject unwanted migrants and permit the entry of sought-after migrants. However, the delegation of migration control comes at a cost for the delegating state (the principal), as it gives away its own control and leaves decisions to its 'agent'. Thus, the system of extra-territorial migration control is vulnerable, since it depends heavily on the political stability of neighboring states.

In his contribution, *Micha Fiedlschuster* assesses the strategy change within EU democracy promotion in the light of past and current events, such as the uprisings in North Africa in 2011, including ENP member states. Although support for civil society organizations was already in existence, the EU had predominantly followed a 'top-down' approach, which focused on government reforms and state capacity-building. This changed considerably with the EaP in 2008 and the revision of the ENP in 2011. Both policies attribute a stronger role to civil society in democratization processes. Analyzing EU documents that define the EU's relationship with civil society in external and internal affairs, Fiedlschuster's argument is that the EU, in fact, responds to a changing neighborhood, but the character of the response reflects the internal development of the relationship between the EU and civil society. This internal relation-

ship—in particular, through the criteria for cooperation required from civil society organizations—is projected to the outside. The blurring between an 'inside' and 'outside' that already takes place at the economic and political-administrative level is extended to the social level.

Andrey Makarychev and *Alexandra Yatsyk* look at practices of governance conducted by Germany and Poland with regard to Ukraine as a co-host of the 2012 UEFA European Championship. They stress the ambiguity of inclusive and exclusionary policies simultaneously followed by EU actors with reference to Ukraine and conceptualize these approaches, differentiating between the mechanisms of sovereign power and governmentality introduced by Foucault. This allows the authors to consider different scales of policy strategies in their analysis: that at national level, as well as sub-state actors, such as, in this case, UEFA and GIZ. They come to the conclusion that the EU was 'unable to effectively use their policy tools in dealing with the authoritarian regime in Kyiv' (Makarychev & Yatsyk, Chap. 5 in this volume; see also Kudelia, 2013) and foresee an uncertain future for Ukraine with regard to relations with its neighbors.

In *Tetiana Kostiuchenko* and *Liubov Akulenko*'s chapter, we shift the focus a little more strongly to the question of how local actors and the public at large perceive the policies and their local consequences. The authors compare public attitudes towards EU integration in Ukraine and Georgia over the past few years (2002–2014) and the respective governmental efforts with regard to the European integration process in those two states. Following their non-violent revolutions in 2004, the governments of both countries have declared a strong intention to become more 'European'—specifically, to reform legislation; to adopt EU standards in relation to their economies, politics and civil society; and to ensure the rule of law. The empirical part of the chapter presents public opinion survey data regarding European integration during 2012–2014, material collected partly during the dramatic events that have become known as Euromaidan. These data are compared with the legislative initiatives and non-governmental activities within the EaP framework and the implementation of the Association Agreement (AA). The authors stress that public attitudes towards EU integration in both countries do change and are not stable; hence, they demand better communication between governments and the population

with the help of long-term awareness campaigns and the further institutional and legal implementation of EU standards in Ukraine and Georgia.

In their chapter, *Bettina Bruns* and *Dorit Happ* focus on the perspectives of the EU's eastern neighbors Ukraine and Belarus with regard to communication and cooperation with the EU. They start from the hypothesis that the EU carries out extra-territorial actions in different policy fields on the territory of its neighbor states in order to maintain its inner security. Against this background, the authors are especially interested in the ways the neighboring countries involved position themselves towards the EU's extra-territorial engagement. In what way do practitioners in Belarus and Ukraine perceive the implementation of EU-driven projects and the power relations therein? Findings indicate that the local executors in Belarus and Ukraine are well aware of the security-related motivation of the EU to engage in its neighborhood. They perceive their countries' relations with the EU as top-down. Furthermore, being involved in enhancing the EU's inner security, they risk their own due to their position between the EU and Russia.

Stefanie Dreiack starts her contribution with the observation that relations between the EU and the Western Balkans are ambivalent. In this case, the ambiguity might be interpreted as being less subtle than in other cases presented in the volume, because the Western Balkans, indeed, partly fall under the enlargement policy, while being treated as a region with no such prospect when it comes to aspects connected to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). While, on the one hand, projects dealing with enlargement policy aim at preparing a future EU member, those which fall under the topic of the CFSP, on the other hand, treat the countries as outsiders. With both policies, the EU approaches the countries in a top-down way and, additionally, they are entangled and yet, in a particular way, interdependent. Regional cooperation is one of the key examples for this interdependency: Deeper regional cooperation of the Western Balkan countries in security, economic and environmental aspects is one of the conditions for EU integration. Dreiack analyzes enlargement policy and security policy under the umbrella of CFSP in Bosnia and Herzegovina and also Macedonia, as well as their engagement in regional security cooperation. The author describes how the internal politics of the Western Balkan states and domestic security aspects foster or hinder engagement

in regional cooperation. She concludes that regional security cooperation is not disappearing at all but, rather, is a long-term project which is highly connected to internal security aspects of the Western Balkan states and the support of the European Union.

In their contribution, *Helga Zichner* and *Vladislav Saran* discuss the EU's extra-territorial education policy. Drawing on the example of Moldova, they are interested in the connection between the promotion of the program Erasmus Mundus, which enables students from non-EU countries to study at a university within the Union, and the massive emigration of the highly skilled in Moldova, which leads to a serious brain drain in the country. They discover a dilemma: By trying to avoid 'new dividing lines' (European Commission, 2003, p. 4)—for example, by installing Erasmus Mundus—the EU tries to support development and raise the standards of third countries in the field of higher education. Doing so, however, leads to the threat of the reverse happening: Skilled students decide to stay in the EU instead of returning to their home countries. Therefore, the authors conclude that Erasmus Mundus risks contributing to the brain drain in Moldova, rather than bringing the country closer to the EU. In order to achieve a more thorough integration of Moldova, they demand more well-balanced initiatives, making Moldova more attractive and EU integration more perceptible in the country.

Finally, *Iryna Matsevich-Dukhan*'s case study on Belarus deals with one of the most reluctant participants of the ENP. The geopolitical course of Belarus is oriented more strongly towards Russia than that of Moldova or, currently, Ukraine—expressed, for example, in the membership of Belarus in the Eurasian Union. It has not signed the Association Agreement and it is not participating actively in the EaP. Since the chances to influence Belarus in terms of 'hard politics' seem limited due to a lack of interest on the part of Belarus, it is interesting to see how the EU still tries to establish its presence there. With this last contribution we turn to another field in which the EU engages, one that, at first sight, is less politicized—namely, cultural policies. As we mentioned before, intermingling in cultural affairs represents one of the weaker leverages but, at the same time, this presupposes more overlapping in ideational ways. While culture is often associated with the idea of cross-cultural bridge-building and dialogue,

Matsevich-Dukhan starts with the observation that the EU's visibility strategy in the cultural field might lead to a neglect of Belarusian cultural actors. As the EU's cultural policy makes visible only a specific class of cultural actor, due to economic reductionism, Matsevich-Dukhan problematizes that this might lead to an exclusion of certain Belarusian cultural actors. This strategy of visibility is tightly connected with the endeavor to build a network of creative actors in neighboring countries as potential contributors to the EU's innovative development. The delineation of creative industries and their chief actors has led to the emergence of the concept 'creative Europe'. One of its defining features is the convergence between the fields of economy and culture. The corresponding political programs on creative industries construct a language which privatizes the whole dominion of culture and which is not comprehensible from the perspective of third countries. Against this background, the chapter asks what is to be done to find an appropriate language for describing the Belarusian cultural space as a European one beyond the concept of creative industries. It is argued, in answer to this question, that a preliminary methodological study of mapping procedures should be conducted, in the sense of producing different types of signs and symbols. By analyzing their implications—for example, the key categories of the European cultural statistics—it is possible to contribute to the quest for a relevant and appropriate terminology in Belarusian cultural policy studies.

References

Balfour, R. (2012). *Human rights and democracy in EU foreign policy. The cases of Ukraine and Egypt*. London, New York: Routledge.

Bialasiewicz, L. (2011). Introduction. Europe in the World? In L. Bialasiewicz (Ed.), *Europe in the World. EU geopolitics and the making of European space* (pp. 1–16). Farnham, Burlington: Ashgate.

Biscop, S. & Whitman, R. G. (2013). *The Routledge handbook of European security*. London: Routledge Reterieved August 04, 2015 from http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/july/tradoc_117717.pdf.

Browning, C. S. (2002). *The internal/external security paradox and the reconstruction of boundaries in the Baltic: The case of Kaliningrad*. COPRI working papers, 21.

Campain, M. (2012). Avoiding new dividing lines? EU external governance and the Eastern neighbours. In E. Stadtmüller & K. Bachmann (Eds.), *The EU's shifting borders. Theoretical approaches and policy implications in the new neighbourhood* (pp. 120–136). New York, London: Routledge.

Cardwell, P. J. (2009). *EU external relations and systems of governance. The CFSP, Euro-mediterranean partnership and migration*. Abingdon, New York: Routledge.

Council of the European Union (2008). *Report on the implementation of the European security strategy—Providing security in a changing world*. 17104/08, Brussels. Retrieved April 15, 2015 from http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-17104-2008-INIT/en/pdf.

European Commission (2003). *Wider Europe—Neighbourhood*: *A new framework for relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours*. COM (2003) 104 final, Brussels, 11 March.

European Commission (2004). *European Neighbourhood Policy—Strategy paper*. Com (2004) 373 final, Brussels, 12 May. Retrieved May 11, 2011 from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52004DC0373&from=EN

European Communities (1997). Treaty of Amsterdam amending the treaty on European Union, the treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts. *Official Journal of the European Communities*, *C340*.

European Council (2003). *A secure Europe in a better world. European Security Strategy*, Brussels, 12 December. Retrieved June 20, 2015 from https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf.

European Union External Action (n.d.). *About CSDP–European Security Strategy*. Retrieved August 04, 2015 from http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/security-strategy-for-europe/index_en.htm.

Freire, M. R. & Kanet, R. E. (Eds.) (2012). *Russia and its near neighbours. Identity, interests and foreign policy*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Gromadzki, G. (2007). How to deal with troublesome neighbours? In J. Varwick & K. O. Lang (Eds.), *European Neighbourhood Policy. Challenges for the EU-policy towards the new neighbours* (pp. 129–138). Opladen: Barbara Budrich.

Guzzini, S. (2012). *The return of geopolitics in Europe? Social mechanisms and foreign policy identity crises*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Horky-Hluchan, O. & Kratchovil, P. (2014). Nothing is imposed in this policy! The construction and constriction of the European Neighbourhood. *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, *39*(4), 252–270.

Jordan, P. (2005). Großgliederung Europas nach kulturräumlichen Kriterien. *Europa Regional*, *13*(4), 162–173.

Kelley, J. (2006). New wine in old wineskins: Promoting political reforms through the new European nieghbourhood policy. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, *44*(1), 29–55.

Korosteleva, E. (Ed.) (2011). *Eastern partnership: A new opportunity for the neighbours*. London: Routledge.

Kudelia, S. (2013). When external leverage fails. *Problems of Post-Communism*, *60*(1), 29–42.

Kuus, M. (2014). *Geopolitics and expertise. Knowledge and authority in European diplomacy*. Chichester: Wiley Blackwell.

Langbein, J. & Börzel, T. A. (2013). Introduction: Explaining policy change in the European Union's Eastern neighbourhood. *Europe-Asia Studies*, *65*(4), 571–580.

Lavenex, S. (2004). EU external governance in 'wider Europe'. *Journal of European Public Policy*, *11*(4), 680–700.

Ó Tuathail, G. & Agnew, J. (1992). Geopolitics and discourse. Practical geopolitical reasoning in American foreign policy. *Political Geography*, *11*(2), 190–204.

Painter, J. (2010). Rethinking territory. *Antipode*, *42*(5), 1090–1118.

Prodi, R. (2002). Speech: A wider Europe—A proximity policy as the key to stability. 'Peace, security and stability. International dialogue and the role of the EU'. Sixth ECSA-World Conference. Jean Monnet Project. Brussels, 5–6 December 2002. Retrieved August 05, 2015 from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-02-619_en.htm.

Ratka, E. & Spaiser, O. (Eds.) (2012). *Understanding European Neighbourhood Policy. Concepts, actors, perceptions*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.

Ratiu, C. (2010). Balkangovernance. In G. Simonis & H. Elbers (Eds.), *Externe EU-governance* (pp. 135–162). Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

Rijpma, J. J., & Cremona, M. (2007). *The extra-territorialisation of EU migration policies and the rule of law*. EUI working paper. Law, no. 01/2007/. Retrieved August 4, 2015 from http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/6690/LAW_2007_01.pdf?sequence=1.

Rios, M. & Adiv, N. (2010). *Geographies of diaspora. A review*. Davis, CA: UC David Center for Regional Change.

Sack, R. (1983). Human territoriality: A theory. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, *73*(1), 55–74.

Stadtmüller, E. & Bachmann, K. (2012). *The EU's shifting borders. Theoretical approaches and policy implications in the new neighbourhood*. New York, London: Routledge.

Tassinari, F. (2005). Security and integration in the EU neighbourhood. The case for regionalism. *CEPS working document 226*.

Tassinari, F. (2009). *Why Europe fears its neighbours*. Santa Barbara: Praeger Security International.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2005). *UNHCR regional operations plan 2006—Western Newly Independent States*: *Belarus*, *Moldova*, *Ukraine*. Retrieved 31 August 2015 from http://www.refworld.org/docid/433a5dd12.html.

Wichmann, N. (2007). The intersection between justice and home affairs and the European Neighbourhood Policy: Taking stock of the logic, objectives and practices. CEPS working document; No. 275; Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies. Retrieved February 15, 2014 from http://www.ceps.eu/ (homepage).

Zeilinger, B. (2012). The EU's external policy towards Eastern Europe on migration issues. In E. Stadtmüller & K. Bachmann (Eds.), *The EU's shifting borders. Theoretical approaches and policy implications in the new neighbourhood* (pp. 60–79). London: Routledge.

Zichner, H. & Bruns, B. (2011). Within a "ring of secure third countries": Regional and local effects of the extraterritorial engagement of the European Union in Belarus, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova. *Leaders of the Borders, Borders of the Leaders. Eurolimes*, *11*, 78–89.

2

Scale Up, Harry! Discursive Transition (and Continuity) in the EU's 'Area of Freedom, Security and Justice' between 1995 and 2014

Frank Meyer

Introduction: Transition(s) of European Values and European Identities

Incidents of geopolitical turmoil have repeatedly resulted in European and national media uproar about a possible *true* nature of the European Union, its task, its benefits, its identity and, especially, its relation to what is commonly considered Europe. Undoubtedly, being a member of the European Union often seems to be desirable for national states. Nevertheless, the identification and legitimization of what has been labeled 'European' seems to be a never-ending story of contestation on multiple hierarchical levels and in multiple societal contexts. It does not depend on the premise of being able to find the 'true' meaning of the term but, rather, on the premise of being able to justify a certain political-normative (and often national) rationale.

F. Meyer (✉)
Leibniz Institute for Regional Geography, Leipzig, Germany

B. Bruns et al. (eds.), *European Neighbourhood Policy*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-69504-1_2

Either implicitly or explicitly articulated topoi for the often proclaimed European common values are freedom of religion, democracy, human rights and tolerance (see Quenzel, 2005, p. 269), as well as secularism, civil society, individual autonomy and equal rights (see Feichtinger, 2007, p. 21). Despite their importance within the political sphere, it has been argued in political sciences, as well as in political geography, that such terms can be described more profoundly as utilities in order to rhetorically homogenize a more complex socio-political space. They can be seen as semantic tools by which collective identities are not only symbolized, but also constructed (see Laclau & Zac, 1994, p. 37) in the process of manufacturing a community using a corresponding political identity.

Although the discussion of what and who belongs to Europe is not new, the past decades have brought forth the possibility of witnessing its practical and everyday implications at the margins of the European Union beyond contingent political statements. Following the introduction of a European common market and accompanying the EU's fourth expansion in 1995, as well as the fifth and sixth expansions in Eastern Europe in 2004 and 2007, the respective European Commission strived for the construction of a common external border as a complementary instrument for abandoning internal border controls between the member states of the Schengen agreement. In 1998, an action plan supplementing the treaty of Amsterdam was drafted elaborating *the* main signifier for the policy area of Justice and Home Affairs: the 'Area of Freedom, Security and Justice' (AFSJ) (see Gusy & Schewe, 2004, p. 342). However, despite being a rather general term, this proclamation, as well as subsequent political acts, has led to consequences felt within the EU by its citizens, as well as outside, for example, by refugees along the EU's external borders at sea or on land. Additionally, the recent exertion of political and judicial influence beyond the EU's external borders amplifies the issues at stake: Being pervaded by logics of exclusion, the concept of an 'Area of Freedom, Security and Justice' contradicts its rhetorically backed humanitarian nature. Therefore, extending its territorial scope runs the risk of magnifying its positive as well as its negative effects.

In my contribution, I aim at tracing the concept of the AFSJ and other concepts along the history of the European Commission's Department for Justice and Home Affairs since 1995 until the recent end of the

second European Commission under José Manuel Barroso in 2014. I will make use of a discourse analysis of political speeches held by the respective Commissioners. Hereby, I will demonstrate the use of specific semantic strategies within the realm of legitimizing the border regime of the European Union. I intentionally avoid proclaiming alternative ways of political articulation. Rather, the illuminated strategies will be commented on as the chapter aims at informing readers about the mechanisms of creating legitimization. In the section titled 'The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice', I will sketch out the institutional and organizational development of the European Union around the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice between 1995 and 2014. The section titled 'Methodology' will focus on methodological aspects of the analysis. In the section titled '"Selling" the "Area of Freedom, Security and Justice"', I will describe the findings of the analysis in detail.

The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice

The AFSJ served as a political goal for the European Union enabled by the successful implementation of the Schengen Agreement of 1985 (see European Communities, 2000). It aimed at abolishing internal border controls between the Schengen member states and, in turn, constructing a common external border hand in hand with homogenized border controls. After the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 (see European Communities, 1992) and the integration of security-related policies into the framework of the European Union, 'European' values and the Copenhagen criteria of accession (see European Council, 1993) became frequent references by European politicians when talking about the future development of the EU. After the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 and its proclamation of an 'Area of Freedom, Security and Justice' (see European Communities, 1997), the European Council and the European Commission completed an action plan in December 1998 (see European Communities, 1999) that further elaborated the concept of an AFSJ as a political goal for the European Union. The coordination of law enforcement authorities with regard to several policy areas was *the* main aim (see Gusy & Schewe, 2004, p. 344). This political goal was to be further pursued with the

help of the Tampere Programme between 1999 and 2004 (see European Council, 1999) and the Hague Programme between 2005 and 2010 (see European Commission, 2005). Given its importance for the future development of the European Union—as seen by European politicians—the affected policy issues were numerous and ranged from freedom of travel, visas, external borders, immigration, asylum and judicial cooperation to citizenship, data protection, fundamental laws, cooperation of law enforcement authorities and crime prevention.

Within this program, empty signifiers—universal terms that seem to reject a proper inter-subjective definition—such as freedom, security and justice became nodal points of security-related policy-making to which other concepts could be related. In this context, 'othering'—the practice of identifying an external, potentially foreign and threatening entity, and using it as part of one's rationale—became a common practice in European integration and in the management of migration (see Geisen, Plug & van Houtum, 2008, p. 82 f.). Walters notes that these threats were seldom geopolitical but, rather, 'social threats' (see Walters, 2002, p. 570): Not attacks on specific individuals, but risks for the 'easy living' within the EU were seen to be possible (see van Houtum & Pijpers, 2007, p. 304).

'The border' in this context serves as a source for information that is to be gathered by electronic information systems in the course of applying for an EU visa (see Andreas, 2003, p. 107). This 'electronic border filter' helps to identify low-risk travelers and those suspected of posing a risk for the European Union (see Belina & Miggelbrink, 2013). Given the transformation from a military to a police or security border (see Andreas, 2003), security and migration (and thus: belonging) became permanently associated with each other (see Huysmans, 2000, p. 770). Currently, the assemblage of the border regime—'the machine with an assortment of technologies, simple and complex, new and old' (Walters, 2002, p. 572)—consists not only of (1) the border itself, but also (2) multiple institutions responsible for visa applications and (3) delocalized controls within the border regions of the EU member states (see also Laube & Müller, Chap. 3 this volume). Nevertheless, the practices and regulations of bordering—as an 'inchoate process of bounding' (Jones, 2009,

p. 180)—had been, have been and will have to be continuously adapted to practices of their subversion (and vice versa).

Given the ubiquitous controls for immigrants entering the EU and the importance of the Tampere and Hague Programmes for the development of the European Union since 1999, it seems obvious that these profound changes have been reflected in the political statements by European and national politicians. Rhetoric has played a crucial role in 'selling' these policies to the people(s) of Europe. Given the principal democratic nature of its member states and—since the EU treaties of the 1990s—the increasingly democratic nature of the European Union itself, citizens had to be convinced of the necessity of certain measures (such as intensified security checks at airports). In this respect, my analysis draws heavily on Ernesto Laclau's (1990) approach of deconstructing hegemonic political discourses, as the AFSJ has always been connected with an understanding of what is and should be present within and beyond the EU's borders. *Therefore, the main question is how the EU's relation to itself and its neighbors has been represented in the political discourse during these fundamental political and institutional changes between 1995 and 2014.* Given the geopolitical and financial turmoil surrounding the European Union especially since 2008, a special focus will lie on the term in office of the Barroso II Commission. The aim of the analysis is threefold: first, the way the respective European Commissioners view the European Union in Europe and its neighborhood will be dissected. Second, the Commissioners' views of the EU's citizens and their intentions will be elaborated. A third focus lies in how the respective European Commissioners characterize foreigners willing to transgress the EU's (ideological) borders.

Methodology

In general, I will be able to provide insights into the creative construction of political statements by isolating certain semantics, and by demonstrating and contextualizing their repetitive use and alleged intention. The text corpus consists of 156 political speeches from specific European Commissioners in charge of implementing the concept of an 'Area of Freedom, Security and Justice' and, thus, the demarcation of what

belongs to Europe and what does not—which, at the same time, constitutes the limits of the analysis. Given the expansion of the EU and the rule to award each member state one Commissioner, the departments of the European Commission—the Directorates-General (DGs)—are institutions with temporary importance, yet powerful enough to initiate legislative processes in the European Union and to make executive decisions.

The analysis focuses on the documental type of 'political speech', as it represents a transcription of the political discourse of several European Commissioners (see Table 2.1).

The speeches were analyzed using the Software MaxQDA, which supports the organization of a large number of documents and enables a comprehensible coding process according to either deductive or inductive categories. From an interpretative point of view, certain discursive logics were identified based on the post-structuralist discourse analysis of Ernesto Laclau (1990). In essence, those statements articulating similarities between differential positions—often by using empty signifiers (see Laclau, 1996)—are of interest. Analogically, those statements expressing differences between political positions, sometimes antagonisms, were also taken into account. Laclau's late works on populism concentrate on the role of tropes—especially on metaphor, synecdoche and metonymy (see Laclau, 2005). Nevertheless, scholars have complained about the lack of

Table 2.1 Commissioners analyzed, their terms in office, their respective DG and the Commission within which they were active

Time period	Commission	Commissioner	Directorate-General
1995–1999	Prodi	Anita Gradin	Immigration, Home Affairs and Justice
1999–2004	Santer	António Vitorino	Justice and Home Affairs
2004–2008	Barroso I	Franco Frattini	Justice, Freedom and Security
2008–2010	Barroso I	Jacques Barrot	Justice, Freedom and Security
2010–2014	Barroso II	Cecilia Malmström	Home Affairs
2010–2014	Barroso II	Štefan Füle	Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy
2010–2014	Barroso II	Viviane Reding	Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship

a systematic account (see Kaplan, 2010), as well as the methodological ambiguity implied in his concept. Furthermore, a systematic elaboration of his work by other researchers has, so far, concentrated especially a on either the discursive strategies (see Nonhoff, 2006) or the specific political, social and phantasmatic logics (see Glynos & Howarth, 2007). In general, my account concentrates on specific political logics of equivalence and difference between different discursive positions without relying on popular rhetorical figures: Statements on what and who belongs to the European Union are considered, as well as statements about its borders, both material and ideological.

'Selling' the 'Area of Freedom, Security and Justice'[1]

Introducing the 'Area of Freedom, Security and Justice'

The terms in office of Anita Gradin and António Vitorino were dominated on the one hand by actions resulting from the Treaty of Maastricht, which introduced the common Foreign and Security Policy and the Collaboration in Justice and Home Affairs, and on the other hand by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, which introduced the concept of the AFSJ. Therefore, one can find frequent statements establishing and justifying the European Union not just as a supra-national actor beyond the nation state, but rather as a community with 'shared responsibilities' in governing the Union (Gradin, 21 Apr. 1997), seen as only being able to exist in solidarity.

One characteristic of Gradin's term as Commissioner is the frequent accentuation of common problems and, hence, a need for cooperation (Gradin, 20 Jan. 1998). In Vitorino's term, this was refined by introducing the term 'the global nature of threats' that needed to be tackled in cooperation (Vitorino, 24 Jan. 2001), while still mentioning

[1] Each political speech will be referenced as follows: Commissioner, day/month/year, according to the relevant information within the RAPID database for press releases of the EU.

the sharing of burdens and solidarity (Vitorino, 6 Apr. 2000). In relation to the key terms of the AFSJ, Gradin utilized an extended set of nuances—peace, stability and democracy—although they were never repeated in a formulaic manner (Gradin, 16 Dec. 1997). In the course of Vitorino's term in office, he, on the contrary, developed several often repeated patterns revolving around the idea of 'work together/enhance security' (Vitorino, 16 Feb. 2004). More and more, 'common' values and 'common' strategies gained in importance. The EU was primarily considered as something *to be established* as a supra-national actor in foreign and security policy.

These acts branded the policy area of 'Justice and Home Affairs', created in 1995, by labeling it as being of special importance (Gradin, 21 Jan. 1997) regarding issues such as drug trafficking, money laundering (Gradin, 13 Nov. 1997), organized crime and corruption (Gradin, 16 Dec. 1997), as well as migration and refugees (Gradin, 20 Jan. 1998). Vitorino continued to mention the importance of these aspects while emphasizing the need to fight them with coordination and in cooperation (Vitorino, 24 Jan. 2001) as well as the need for a common European asylum system (Vitorino, 6 Apr. 2000).

Citizens were ascribed an active role in demanding certain security-related acts as they were proclaimed to 'worry' (Gradin, 20 Nov. 1997). As a result, the EU had to 'provide citizens with [...] security' (Vitorino, 25 Feb. 2000). Nevertheless, direct references to citizens' needs remained rare.

The topic of people transgressing European borders was often mentioned. Gradin coined immigration a 'mass influx of people' on multiple occasions (e.g. Gradin, 18 Jun. 1996), which, at that time, consisted, for example, of refugees from the armed conflicts in the Balkan region between 1991 and 1999. A change can be witnessed in Vitorino's term insofar as immigration increasingly becomes supplemented with the term 'illegal' (Vitorino, 9 Jul. 2001). In 2000, a parallel discourse about the trafficking of humans and the exploitation of women and children developed (Vitorino, 20 Jul. 2000). The reason for this can be considered to have been a gruesome discovery in June 2000 in Dover, where British customs officers found the corpses of 58 Chinese immigrants in

a lorry. Yet, despite the presence of these victims of trafficking in the media, the discursive practices soon changed towards associating 'illegal' with 'threat', following the terrorist attacks in New York in September 2001 as the EU aligned itself with the USA in the fight against terrorism (Vitorino, 16 Sep. 2002).

In sum, Anita Gradin's term in office was dominated by the will to establish an understanding of how European security politics could work and what their impact would be. Given the fact that the whole European Commission under Jacques Santer faced corruption allegations and therefore resigned in 1999, this became overshadowed by the need to give an account of fraud within the Commission and possible consequences in the final months of her term. In contrast, António Vitorino, especially in the wake of the official introduction of the AFSJ in 1997 and the terrorist attacks of September 2001 in New York, used a more systematic approach: He developed a common phrasing for promoting his views and measures.

Enemies at the Gates

Following the establishment of the concept of an 'Area of Freedom, Security and Justice' in the political discourse, Franco Frattini's term in office was dominated by the popular antagonisms of this geopolitical era: Terrorism and organized crime were to be tackled and efforts to fight both led the way to a more centralized security policy within the European Union and to a European Security and Neighbourhood Strategy. The main instruments used were external antagonisms in order to elaborate the identity of the EU: 'Common threats' (Frattini, 18 Oct. 2007) were suspected to be closing in on the EU, threatening the very foundations of its society.

In the course of his term, the Schengen Border Code, a landmark regulation for the European external border, came into effect. Privacy-invading political measures were also executed, increasing the need to address related concerns about their adequacy by defining for whom these measures were of benefit (Frattini, 25 Jan. 2005). Often, this included the representation of what Europe was supposed to be about, although these

definitions were seldom congruent. In this context, Europe was defined in terms of certain 'fundamental' values, such as stability (Frattini, 14 Jul. 2005) and common culture (Frattini, 2 Sep. 2005), as well as 'tolerance' and certain 'freedoms' (Frattini, 24 Nov. 2005) for citizens.

What exactly were these citizens thought to expect? Their 'right to security' was proclaimed to be the main guideline for the Commission's work and was said to be the precondition for any political action taken (Frattini, 18 Oct. 2007): 'Without security, we cannot enjoy other civil liberties. To be secure is a basic human right' (Frattini, 24 Nov. 2005). Based on this claim, it became common to paradoxically state that citizens expect the policy-makers to take certain, even freedom-limiting, measures in order to be protected against terrorists.

Those 'terrorists' were *the* main security concern addressed in Frattini's speeches: Of course, the annual anniversaries of the terrorist attacks in New York in September 2001, as well as those of the Madrid bombings in 2004 (Frattini, 9 Mar. 2005) and the London bombings in 2005 (Frattini, 6 Jul. 2006), saw an excessive use of metaphors:

> The culture of death has carried off many of our fellow-citizens, and many defenders of peace; it has sought to terrify us, and in so doing not just to tear us away from the affection of family and friends but to rob us of the very soul of our life as free and equal people, which calls us to dialogue and shared living in respect for differences and reciprocity. [...] And on top of the physical fear, on top of the more and more frequent checks and controls, there is intimidation and moral violence against the most precious prize we have won in the past: the freedom of expression, the freedom to criticize. (Frattini, 11 Sep. 2006)

Terrorists, whose radicalization (Frattini, 24 Nov. 2005) and recruitment was to be impeded (Frattini, 7 Apr. 2005), were seen as criminals that do not respect the right to live free and secure (Frattini, 3 Feb. 2005). Terrorism was said to cross borders and have a 'global nature' (Frattini, 7 Apr. 2005), thus enabling the Commissioner to claim more responsibilities for European institutions because national agencies were asserted to be overwhelmed with the task of fighting terror. In the course of Frattini's term, this notion became even more radical: Terrorists were

increasingly supposed to be 'willing to attack wherever and whenever they think they will get maximum results' (Frattini, 13 Jul. 2007). An attack on 'critical' infrastructures was a particular concern (Frattini, 6 Jul. 2006) as terrorists were seen as capable of handling sophisticated technology; this, in turn, led to them being equated with organized crime: 'While we must never let down our defences to fight terrorism, we should be equally vigilant to combat organized crime groups who benefit from modern technology, increasing mobility and open borders' (Frattini, 30 Jul. 2007). Both were said to destroy the 'social, economic, political and cultural development of societies' (Frattini, 18 Oct. 2007). The description of these threats seldom avoided metaphors: Frattini used terms such as 'evil of trafficking' (Frattini, 2 Dec. 2005), 'tyranny' (Frattini, 27 Jun. 2006), 'world of intolerance' (Frattini, 11 Sep. 2006)—in line with contemporary phrasings by George W. Bush.

Being responsible for border management led Frattini to a haunting logic: 'Threats to European Union citizens often come from outside the EU's borders' (Frattini, 30 Jul. 2007). This, in turn, advocated the rationale that the strengthening of external border authorities would eventually lead the EU to be predominantly safe from any threats, although this 'gruelling network of terror' (Frattini, 24 Nov. 2005) was 'ever changing' (Frattini, 12 Mar. 2008), and was therefore considered to require a constant effort by the EU and its allies.

Given the introduction of penetrative technologies of monitoring travelers and citizens, these efforts triggered frequent debates about the relation between freedom and security (Frattini, 14 Jul. 2005). Yet, Frattini soon chose to prioritize security politics:

> The fight against terrorism has sorely tested the delicate balance between safety and rights, and faces us all with a fearful moral dilemma we are often afraid even to mention: the question whether the absolute defence of rights against the rationale of security might not lead to the sacrifice of human lives, of the lives of innocent and defenceless men and women in the street. (Frattini, 11 Sep. 2006)

In sum, Frattini located the EU face to face with international terrorism and global crime networks: Even decreasing numbers of attempted

and successful terrorist attacks until the end of his term (Europol, 2008, 2009) did not stop the instrumental use of an external threat in order to enhance the EU's security-related capabilities. But numbers were seldom explicated. Instead, the quality of the threat—continuously changing and complex—became an important cornerstone of Frattini's rationale. Barrot, who inherited Frattini's office in 2008, only partially followed Frattini's course: He openly spoke out against xenophobia and frequently accentuated the need to increase the efficiency of cooperation within the European Union.

Upscaling in the Age of Contestation

During Cecilia Malmström's term, the former Directorate-General for Justice and Home Affairs was renamed the Directorate-General for Home Affairs, while some of its political responsibilities were incorporated into the DG for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy (run by Štefan Füle) and the DG for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship (run by Viviane Reding). Given this restructuring of responsibilities and the aim of this chapter, this section will also take Cecilia Malmström's speeches into account, as well as those of Štefan Füle, Viviane Reding and Catherine Ashton as the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

The main topics in this era revolved around the contested position of the European Union, continuously plagued by the effects of the economic crisis of 2008. Stemming from this, the possibility of its breakup due to economic and currency pressures was debated. The Greek debt issues especially have put considerable strain on inter-governmental relations. In addition, despite the fact that the 'Arab Spring' revolutions provided the DG for opportunities for democratic movements in the neighborhood of the EU, many refugees from these now politically unstable regions headed towards the European Union. Lately, Russia's annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in the Ukraine has raised doubts concerning the EU's potential to guarantee the security of its eastern member states.

Success and Continuous Effort

Given these challenges, the proclamation of the European Union's successes had become a very popular tool. This was meant to counter doubts over the EU's ability to withstand the pressures that were feared to threaten its existence as a supra-national European entity. Therefore, the Commissioners repeatedly stressed its historic importance as a 'project of peace, stability and prosperity, born from the ashes of World War II' (Füle, 11 Apr. 2014), as well as its current significance: 'Schengen is one of the most tangible achievements of the European Union and one of those most cherished by European citizens' (Malmström, 11 Mar. 2014). Often, the 'mutual benefits' for each member state and every citizen were claimed (Füle, 14 May 2013), as well as the knowledge the EU transfers to its neighbors 'with more and more third countries seeking its expertise' (Malmström, 17 Jun. 2014). It is this focus on the outwardly directed political processes of the EU in the context of association, accession and partnership agreements with which the Commissioners tried to argue for a continued relevance of the EU: 'We have consolidated democracy in countries that experienced authoritarian dictatorships, reinforced the rule of law and respect for fundamental rights and we have promoted market economies' (Füle, 30 Nov. 2010).

Border controls and neighborhood policy were seen to be intrinsically connected: A 'ring of friends' with a certain standard of prosperity would work as a buffer against immigrants (Kempe, 2007, p. 62). Its neighborhood was said to be seeking membership in the EU and its assistance in adapting to democratic values (Füle, 29 Sep. 2011). This shows that the EU did not proclaim itself as the *actor* but, rather, as a *medium* through which the inherent wishes of its neighboring societies could come to reality: 'They wish to share our values' (Füle, 30 Nov. 2011). This equalizes the economic benefits of an EU membership with ideological congruence and value-related universality. In this process, some comments of citizens were over-interpreted, such as in the case of Catherine Ashton's elaboration on one Benghazi citizen's comment, 'What we want is democracy as a lifestyle'. Ashton concludes:

> What she meant was of course, that you need to build the institutions around a democratic framework, an independent judiciary, an administration that delivers impartially, voluntary organizations thriving and supporting people, the building of political parties, support for human rights and of course the rule of law. (Ashton, 25 May 2011)

In consequence, the EU has portrayed itself as a 'magnetic soft power' (Füle, 30 Nov. 2010), attracting any freedom- and democracy-seeking peoples beyond its borders. Nevertheless, the EU did not refrain from stressing that the desired transition to democracy has its conditions:

> Genuinely free and fair elections; freedom of assembly and of expression, including a free press and media; independent judiciary and the right to a fair trial; fight against corruption and democratic control over security and armed forces. (Füle, 25 May 2011)

The EU being the 'cradle of democracy' (Malmström, 13 Sep. 2013) within a world full of conflicts, its enlargement was depicted as neither a geostrategic nor an economic move. As a 'community of values' (Füle, 6 Dec. 2010), the EU was proclaimed to provide a 'credible' enlargement (Füle, 11 Apr. 2014) based on values 'namely liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law' (Füle, 25 Jul. 2013), as well as solidarity. This solidarity, and the realization of a value-based as well as a fiscal community, can geographically be described as a further scalar re-configuration of the former inter-governmental relations in Europe. Scale, in this context, refers to the notion that certain levels of power and responsibility exist within socio-political hierarchies. Under the impression of the 'Arab Spring' and the resulting numbers of refugees entering Europe (Malmström, 24 Mar. 2014), the aforementioned processes represent attempts to upscale responsibilities towards a supra-national body governing, for example, the asylum system.

The Flock Gets What the Flock Expects

The aforementioned findings about how the EU views itself as a catalyst supporting its neighbors in their desire to implement democracy can be interpreted as a territorial—outwardly directed—logic. Also, a comple-

mentary scalar logic can be witnessed: Having celebrated the European Year of Citizens in 2013 with the aim of accentuating the benefits of the EU for its citizens (Reding, 5 Oct. 2010), it of course legitimized itself and its actions by referring to the needs and wishes of its citizens. In this regard, 'the citizens' serve as one instance (among others) with which the process of upscaling formerly national responsibilities is laundered.

Similar to the former Commissioners, the European citizens were seen to be complaining frequently about security issues (Malmström, 25 May 2010) and were said to be worried about terrorism (Malmström, 19 Apr. 2011), which is why their protection from threats was reiterated. The citizens' worries were seen as the heart of any measure supporting an AFSJ, which was proclaimed a 'quantum leap' (Reding, 24 May 2013): The 'new vision' was to strengthen the relation between the EU and its citizens (Reding, 5 Oct. 2010). Yet, the need to 'demonstrate' the benefits of 'Europe' to its citizens was stressed as the elections for the European Parliament lacked, and still lack, proper voter participation. Though 'they are a prime occasion for European citizens to make their voices heard' (Reding, 24 May 2013), the fact that the elections mobilized only about 43 % of European citizens did not trigger doubts about policy contents. Instead, the Commissioners argued on the level of communication strategies: If the EU only had relevance through the ability to address the needs and wants of its citizens, but the citizens were, in turn, not willing to acknowledge the EU's importance, the problem would have to be located in the EU's ability to communicate its actions properly. The consequence: One would have to 'inform our citizens about reality and about the policies needed' (Malmström, 30 Apr. 2012). Given the very real benefits of the EU for its citizens (such as freedom of movement and internal peace), it would be too far-fetched to reduce the citizens' role to that of a tool to legitimize EU actions. However, the EU virtually excludes opinions that deviate from its own positions by labeling them uninformed without acknowledging the possibility of legitimate criticisms.

The Enemy Within?

Regarding the description of what lies beyond its (ideological) borders, a profound change can be noticed after 2009: Threats to the EU are

rarely located outside its border. Although the conflicts within certain states or with organizations were seen to have ramifications for the EU due to possible threats penetrating it, an explicit forcing causality between 'the external' and 'threat' was hardly present. However, due to the large number of migrants traveling *from* Europe *to* the Near East from 2013 onwards, often bearing the citizenship of a European nation state and willing voluntarily to engage in armed hostilities, it soon became a frequent talking point: 'Often triggered by extremist propaganda or by recruiters, Europeans travel abroad to train and to fight in combat zones, becoming more radicalized in the process' (Malmström, 15 Jan. 2014). In the follow-up, fears of disintegration from the inside were triggered.

Simplistic logical connections between 'the external' and 'threat' also vanished with regard to other topics: The fight against the trafficking of drugs, firearms and humans was still mentioned in the context of evaluating certain external border measures. However, Jacques Barrot's statements against xenophobia (Barrot, 30 Mar. 2009) seemed to have influenced the Commission insofar as no association of 'threat' and 'external border' was made. Instead, it was stated that more than 60 % of the victims of human trafficking stem from member states of the EU itself (Malmström, 31 May 2013). Malmström also stressed that the attack on a Jewish museum in Brussels in 2014 had been carried out by a 'French-born' who had returned from fighting in Syria (Malmström, 17 Jun. 2014). In this regard, cases of 'violent extremism' by Europeans against Europeans were acknowledged (such as in Oslo and Utøya in 2011). More and more, the external enemy was replaced by a ubiquitous enemy within.

Besides the fact that external localizations of threats became infrequent, a different logic became popular as 'lone individuals' were seen to be increasingly responsible for terrorist attacks (Malmström, 9 Sep. 2011): The EU started to specify threats not only territorially but on different scales—often those scales not occupied by itself. This went hand in hand with the reinterpretation of organized crime: The locally witnessed everyday crime was explicitly regarded as a manifestation of global networks of organized crime, willing and able to disrupt European society (Malmström, 22 Nov. 2010). As a consequence, threats were said to be more complex, but common to all states, which is why only com-

mon policies were seen to be useful to counter them (Malmström, 23 Nov. 2010). This scalar logic of threats—not states and supra-national organizations, but lone individuals and international criminal organizations—did not replace formerly territorial threats. They are operationalizations of the proclaimed 'complexity' of threats, resisting the urge to locate them territorially and enabling claims for further cooperation.

So, what had changed in contrast to the location of threats beyond the external border? The relations with the 'neighborhood' had improved, hence the need to avoid political aggravation by identifying neighboring countries as the source of a threat. Second, threats were not located in territorial terms but, rather, in scalar terms: The EU saw itself opposed to threats from national populists, lone individuals and global crime networks. Third, the national scale was further discursively weakened as these big threats were labeled too big to be handled alone, stressing solidarity among member states and the need to further upscale security and asylum-related policies towards a European government. With this in mind, it cannot be ignored that Viviane Reding outspokenly discussed the concept of a 'United States of Europe' during her term in office (Reding, 8 Nov. 2012), and that Jean-Claude Juncker, an explicit advocate of a federally structured Europe, was elected the new president of the European Commission in 2014.

Institutions, Scales, Articulatory Strategies

To sum up very briefly, it was shown that Anita Gradin's era, until 1999, was dominated by the will to establish the concept of an 'Area of Freedom, Security and Justice' within the everyday communication of and about the EU. Until 2004, António Vitorino developed a more homogeneous set of phrasings, revolving around evaluations of specific threats. Franco Frattini made further use of 'external threats', in order to justify a bias in the discussion about balancing security and freedoms. Jacques Barrot, until 2010, followed the mission of supporting further enhanced cooperation within the European Union. Cecilia Malmström, Štefan Füle and Viviane Reding, as well as Catherine Ashton, tried to overcome the struggles over and within the EU by refining established articu-

latory strategies in order to legitimize a further upscaling of formerly national responsibilities.

But how was this legitimacy created? In order to legitimize her actions and intentions, Malmström provided an analogy for the claim that certain choices *just* have to be made:

> I'm reading all the Harry Potter books for my children. They are not only exciting; at times they provide serious food for thought. The professor at the school, Albus Dumbledore, at one occasion looks at Harry Potter and says 'It is our choices, Harry, that show what we truly are, far more than our abilities.' And to me, this captures the debate on intelligence gathering and the wider issue of how we deal with security, but also data protection and privacy. It is the choices that show what we truly are, far more than our abilities. (Malmström, 31 Jan. 2014)

She then expressed her distaste for everything being universally monitored. She went on by stating that, in the future, security policies and privacy would eventually be balanced in a proper manner, ultimately finishing with: 'This way we ensure effective security that is achieved not at the expense of freedom and fundamental rights, but based on them'. Essentially, the example did not provide any rationale *why* something is to be done but, instead, stated the need *that* something has to be done. This insight corresponds with widely shared notions that contemporary politics, in the age of post-democracy, too often avoid reflecting alternative views on what could be done (Rancière, 1997, p. 121). Complementarily, *what* has to be done is justified by creatively composing 'challenges', 'threats' and 'expectations'.

So, what can be concluded from the analysis: I aimed at dissecting hegemonic political discourses in order to illuminate the creative construction of legitimacy, reason and decision that always lies beneath every political articulation. As mentioned in the beginning, I aimed at collecting, dissecting and commenting on the articulatory strategies related to the establishment of a specific border regime with which the European Union has discursively located itself within Europe. Personally, I consider this grippingly emotional topic to be a matter of diagnosis and information, rather than an opportunity to provide alternative views. I generally encourage readers to look beyond the curtain of political articu-

lations and understand how specific mechanisms serve the legitimization of political actions.

Cited Political Speeches

Ashton, Catherine (2011-05-25): A new and ambitious European neighbourhood policy. Brussels.

Barrot, Jacques (2009-03-30): Racism and antisemitism have no place in the EU, nor elsewhere in the world. Brussels.

Frattini, Franco (2005-01-25): Opening of the public hearing. Brussels.

Frattini, Franco (2005-02-03): Towards an EU strategy for collective security—Can governments respond to global terrorism with a collective policy? Brussels.

Frattini, Franco (2005-03-09): Presentation of the Commission's 'memorial report dedicated to the victims of terrorism' and the EU action against terrorism. Brussels.

Frattini, Franco (2005-04-07): There is no contradiction between granting people more security and respecting the fundamental rights. Helsinki.

Frattini, Franco (2005-07-14): The Hague Programme: A partnership for the European renewal in the field of freedom, security and justice. Brussels.

Frattini, Franco (2005-09-02): The fight against terrorism. Vilnius.

Frattini, Franco (2005-11-24): EU JHA committees conference on 'responses to the threat of terrorism and effects on communities'. London.

Frattini, Franco (2005-12-02): EU and the Western Balkans: Visa, asylum and immigration. Brussels.

Frattini, Franco (2006-06-27): Protection of fundamental rights in Europe—First lessons drawn from 'rendition'—Debate. Strasbourg.

Frattini, Franco (2006-07-06): A year after London attacks. Brussels.

Frattini, Franco (2006-09-11): Declaration. Brussels.

Frattini, Franco (2007-07-13): Closing speech. Rome.

Frattini, Franco (2007-07-30): How the JLS policies influence EU's external action, some examples: Migration, terrorism and trans-national organized crime. Budapest.

Frattini, Franco (2007-10-18): The external dimension of security, in particular the fight against terrorism. Brussels.

Frattini, Franco (2008-03-12): Providing Europe with the tools to bring its border management into the 21st century. Brno.

Füle, Štefan (2010-11-30): The EU: a force for peace, stability and prosperity in wider Europe. New York.
Füle, Štefan (2010-12-06): The European Union and Eastern Europe: Post-crisis rapprochement? Warsaw.
Füle, Štefan (2011-05-25): Presentation of the European neighbourhood policy review to the European Parliament. Brussels.
Füle, Štefan (2011-09-29): Speech at the Eastern Partnership Conference 'Towards a European community of democracy, prosperity and a stronger civil society'. Warsaw.
Füle, Štefan (2011-11-30): Friends of Europe: 20 year a scorecard. Brussels.
Füle, Štefan (2013-05-14): Copenhagen accession criteria: 20 years that changed Europe. Copenhagen.
Füle, Štefan (2013-07-25): European neighbourhood policy—Priorities and directions for change. Warsaw.
Füle, Štefan (2014-04-11): New Europe and enlargement in a new political context. Prague.
Gradin, Anita (1996-06-18): Speech at the 39 Nation Council of Europe's ministers responsible for migrations affairs. Warsaw.
Gradin, Anita (1997-01-21): Speech at the European Parliament Committee on civil liberties and internal affairs. Brussels.
Gradin, Anita (1997-04-21): Speech at the Civil Liberties Committee. Brussels.
Gradin, Anita (1997-11-13): Drug policies in Europe. Bangkok.
Gradin, Anita (1997-11-20): Third pillar priorities. Strasbourg.
Gradin, Anita (1997-12-16): The European Parliament's annual debate on the Third Pillar. Strasbourg.
Gradin, Anita (1998-01-20): Commission's work programme in the field of justice and home affairs in 1998. Brussels.
Malmström, Cecilia (2010-05-25): European day for border guards. Warsaw.
Malmström, Cecilia (2010-11-22): Internal security strategy in action. Brussels.
Malmström, Cecilia (2010-11-23): Speech at the Belgian Presidency Conference on research development and innovation for a more secure Europe. Oostende.
Malmström, Cecilia (2011-04-19): Trust and actions—The two main ingredients for enhancing the EU's role in the fight against terrorism. London.
Malmström, Cecilia (2011-09-09): Europe needs to step up its efforts to fight violent extremism. Brussels.
Malmström, Cecilia (2012-04-30): Responding to the Arab Spring and rising populism: The challenges of building a European migration and asylum policy. Boston.

Malmström, Cecilia (2013-05-31): EU civil society joins the fight against human trafficking. Brussels.
Malmström, Cecilia (2014-01-15): Strengthening the EU's response to radicalisation and violent extremism. Brussels.
Malmström, Cecilia (2014-01-31): Rebooting trust? Freedom vs. security in cyberspace. Munich.
Malmström, Cecilia (2014-03-11): The future of home affairs: an open and secure Europe. Strasbourg.
Malmström, Cecilia (2014-03-24): Common European asylum system: Challenges and perspectives. Sofia.
Malmström, Cecilia (2014-06-17): Strengthening the EU's response to violent extremism: From ideas to action. Brussels.
Reding, Viviane (2010-10-05): Das Stockholmer Programm—welche Prioritäten für die Schaffung eines Europas der Bürger? Brussels.
Reding, Viviane (2012-11-08): Why we need a United States of Europe now. Passau.
Reding, Viviane (2013-05-24): From vision to action: Putting citizens at the heart of Europe. Luxembourg.
Vitorino, António (2000-02-25): Welcome address at the inter-institutional conference on drugs policies in Europe. Brussels.
Vitorino, António (2000-04-06): Common European asylum system. Hague.
Vitorino, António (2000-07-20): Speech at the conference on the fight against the channels of illegal immigration. Paris.
Vitorino, António (2001-01-24): Strategies of the EU and the US in combating transnational organized crime. Gent.
Vitorino, António (2001-07-09): Migratory flows and the European labour market: Towards a community immigration policy. London.
Vitorino, António (2002-09-16): Speech at the 'Justice en Mouvement' Conference. Brussels.
Vitorino, António (2004-02-16): Security in an enlarged European Union—What has to be coordinated and how? Bad Godesberg.

References

Andreas, P. (2003). Redrawing the line. Borders and security in the twenty-first century. *International Security*, *28*(2), 78–111.

Belina, B. & Miggelbrink, J. (2013). Risk as a technology of power: FRONTEX as an example of the de-politicization of EU migration regimes. In D. Müller-Mahn (Ed.), *The spatial dimension of risk: How geography shapes the emergence of riskscapes* (pp. 124–136). London: Routledge.

European Commission (2005). The Hague Programme: Ten priorities for the next five years. The Partnership for European renewal in the field of Freedom, Security and Justice. *Official Journal of the European Union*, *C236*.

European Communities (1992). Treaty on European Union, signed at Maastricht von 7 February 1992. *Official Journal of the European Union*, *C191*.

European Communities (1997). Treaty of Amsterdam amending the treaty on European Union, the treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts. *Official Journal of the European Communities*, *C340*.

European Communities (1999). Action plan of the council and the commission on how best to implement the provisions of the treaty of Amsterdam on an area of freedom, security and justice. *Official Journal of the European Communities*, *C19*.

European Communities (2000). The Schengen acquis. *Official Journal of the European Communities*, *L239*.

European Council (1993). *Conclusion of the Presidency Copenhagen European Council*. Retrieved November 17, 2014 from https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/72921.pdf.

European Council (1999). *Presidency conclusion Tampere European Council 15 and 16 October 1999*. Retrieved November 17, 2014 from https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00200-r1.en9.htm.

Europol (2008). *TE-SAT 2008: EU terrorism situation and trend report*. Den Haag: Europol.

Europol (2009). *TE-SAT 2009: EU terrorism situation and trend report*. Den Haag: Europol.

Feichtinger, J. (2007). Europa, quo vadis? Zur Erfindung eines Kontinents zwischen transnationalem Anspruch und nationaler Wirklichkeit. In M. Csáky & J. Feichtinger (Eds.), *Europa—geeint durch Werte? Die europäische Wertedebatte auf dem Prüfstand der Geschichte* (pp. 19–44). Bielefeld: Transcript.

Geisen, T., Plug, R., & van Houtum, H. (2008). (B)ordering and othering migrants by the European Union. In A. L. van Naersson & M. van der Velde (Eds.), *Migration in a New Europe: People, borders and trajectories in an enlarged European Union* (pp. 75–86). International Geographical Union: Rome.

Glynos, J. & Howarth, D. (2007). *Logics of critical explanation in social and political theory*. London: Routledge.

Gusy, C. & Schewe, C. S. (2004). Die Rechts- und Asylpolitik der Europäischen Union. In W. Weidenfeld (Ed.), *Die Europäische Union. Politisches system und Politikbereiche* (pp. 342–358). Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung.

Huysmans, J. (2000). The European Union and the securitization of migration. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, *38*(5), 751–777.

Jones, R. (2009). Categories, borders and boundaries. *Progress in human Geography, 33*(2),174 –189.

Kaplan, M. (2010). The rhetoric of hegemony: Laclau, radical democracy, and the rule of tropes. *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, *43*(3), 253–283.

Kempe, I. (2007). Zwischen Anspruch und Realität. Die Europäische Nachbarschaftspolitik. *Osteuropa*, *57*(2-3), 57–68.

Laclau, E. (1990). *New reflections on the revolution of our time*. In E. Laclau (Ed.), *New reflections on the revolution of our time* (pp. 3–88). Verso: London, New York.

Laclau, E. (1996). Why do empty signifiers matter to politics? In E. Laclau (Ed.), *Emancipation(s)* (pp. 36–46). London, New York: Verso.

Laclau, E. (2005). *On populist reason*. London, New York: Verso.

Laclau, E. & Zac, L. (1994). Minding the gap: The subject of politics. In E. Laclau (Ed.), *The making if political identities* (pp. 11–39). Verso: London, New York.

Nonhoff, M. (2006). *Politischer Diskurs und Hegemonie. Das Projekt 'Soziale Marktwirtschaft'*. Bielefeld: Transcript.

Quenzel, G. (2005). *Konstruktionen von Europa. Die europäische Identität und die Kulturpolitik der Europäischen Union*. Bielefeld: Transcript.

Rancière, J. (1997). Demokratie und Postdemokratie. In A. Badiou, J. Rancière, R. Riha, & J. Sumic (Eds.), *Politik der Wahrheit* (pp. 97–122). Wien: Turia + Kant.

van Houtum, H. & Pijpers, R. (2007). The European Union as a gated community: The two-faced border and immigration regime of the EU. *Antipode*, *39*(2), 291–309.

Walters, W. (2002). Mapping Schengenland: Denaturalizing the border. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, *20*(5), 561–580.

3

Extra-territorial Migration Control from a Principal–Agent Perspective: Actors, Mechanisms and Delegation Costs

Lena Laube and Andreas Müller

Introduction

When the Arab Spring changed the political and societal landscape of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, many young migrants took the chance to leave their countries. They headed north to the island of Lampedusa, to Greece, Italy and other places along Europe's shores (see Friese, 2014). Although welcoming the political change at that time, European governments began to fear the impact these upheavals in the Arab world would have on the states of the European Union. Thus, it became obvious that, up to that time and thanks to the cooperation between the South European EU member states and the North African Mediterranean countries, border control tasks had been successfully delegated. Because of increased border crossings to the Schengen area, France first closed its borders to Italy for a couple of weeks in 2011, and even Denmark and Austria took

L. Laube (✉) • A. Müller
University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany

B. Bruns et al. (eds.), *European Neighbourhood Policy*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-69504-1_3

the chance and reinforced their border controls towards the respective Southern countries of Germany and Italy.

For years, the North African states had served as a buffer zone and were supposed to stop migrants on their way to the EU. With the breakdown of these states, an important instance of EU migration control ceased to exist and refugees started to arrive in greater numbers at the Mediterranean shores. Since 2015, the large number of refugees taking the 'Balkan route' to Western Europe has attracted great interest in the media. Again, the temporary collapse of delegated border control enabled these migratory movements.

This chapter will shed light on these developments not only by arguing that the neighboring countries are a cornerstone in the EU's attempt to control migration, but also by providing a theoretical rationale for the underlying logic of such controls.[1] As with all types of migration controls, such *extra-territorial* controls aim at differentiating between desired and unwanted migrants. In line with the introductory part of this volume, we define extra-territorial migration control as a spatial-strategic means by a country of destination to control migratory movements outside its territory. However, by exerting migration controls extra-territorially, travelers cannot claim any rights against this country. The chapter will show the conditions for exerting extra-territorial controls, as well as the price wealthy states are willing to pay in order to establish such procedures.

In order to shift controls to extra-territorial places, states have to cooperate with their neighboring countries or the countries of origin. Thus, the cooperation concerning migration controls between the EU and the North African states serves as only one example of a common policy trend that can also be witnessed in the USA and Australia, or between Central European EU member states and the EU's eastern neighbors (see Hyndman & Mountz, 2008; Laube, 2013; Mau, Brabandt, Laube & Roos, 2012; Müller, 2014). This trend towards extra-territorial migration

[1] In the following, several case studies on European and North American countries will shed light on the identified types of delegation. Altogether, between 2008 and 2013, 68 qualitative expert interviews have been conducted in Germany, Poland, Finland, Ukraine and Austria, as well as in the USA, mainly by the authors themselves, while working at University of Bremen. For conducting interviews in Finland and the USA, the authors wish to thank Christof Roos (Vrije Universiteit Brussels).

control can, for example, be found in admission policies that are in place in the countries of origin, namely in embassies or at the airport of departure. Visa procedures and control of travel documents before boarding a plane or ship serve as extra-territorial entry controls. Moreover, readmission agreements with the countries of origin or transit, as well as financial incentives for countries of origin, are supposed to ensure third states take part in border control tasks.

Despite their diversity, these policy instruments have two things in common: Actors other than the migration authorities of the destination country take over control tasks. As a result, control takes place beyond the national territory. Previous studies have already emphasized that liberal states are motivated to gain a higher degree of border security by relocating migration controls to places where they themselves have no obligations with regard to refugee and human rights (see Guiraudon, 2006; Joppke, 1998). Moreover, it has been shown that public authorities regard extra-territorial controls as more effective, since an increased number of cross-border movements can be regulated before people crowd at the border checkpoints (see Laube, 2013, p. 255). However, apart from the benefits mentioned, disadvantages for destination countries may occur. Above all, the need to cooperate with other actors will bear political and financial costs.

To relocate migration control tasks, states use different forms of delegation. Agents to whom tasks are delegated differ, as do the conditions of relocation. In the literature of border and migration policy, a conceptual debate with regard to the phenomenon of extra-territorial control that looks at both the benefits and emerging political costs is lacking (see Geiger & Pecoud, 2013; Guiraudon, 2006; Mau et al., 2012).

In order to close this conceptual gap, this chapter identifies and examines four types of delegation (intra-state, inter-state, delegation in the EU and delegation to private actors), which all serve the goal of extra-territorializing controls. As soon as a destination country enforces access controls beyond that country's territory, it will depend on other actors with authority in these extra-territorial places. Theoretically, we resort to the 'Principal–Agent approach' in order to highlight the dynamics and logics of various types of delegation to other public or private actors.

Delegation of Control: A Principal–Agent Perspective

We propose to conceptualize the relocation of migration controls as a transfer or delegation of state tasks from the originating migration authorities of the destination country to other authorities—either of the same country, or of a transit country, or even to private actors. The principal–agent approach provides us with useful concepts for understanding the dynamics and originated from economics and subsequently have been transferred to and adapted by political science and sociology. Consequently, the present section will, first, reconstruct the basic premises of the principal–agent approach and then discuss the adaptations made by the social sciences. Finally, the section will provide a short review on how far scholars have taken principal–agent approaches onboard in research on migration controls.

From this theoretical perspective, the principal is the actor who, in order to realize his interests, delegates tasks to another actor, who would then be the agent. An advantage of the agent over the principal in terms of information is generally seen as a prerequisite for the delegation of tasks between actors. For example, authorities in countries of transit make contact with migrants earlier and might hold better knowledge of their migratory routes, motives and numbers. The principal will only opt for delegation if he or she assumes that the agent can fulfill the delegated tasks better than he or she can. Generally, the potentially diverging interests that principal and agents pursue in their interactions can amount to negative effects of a delegation of tasks (see Tallberg, 2002, p. 28).

Consequently, the principal faces the difficulty of making sure that the actions taken by the agent only deviate from his or her standards within acceptable limits. This independent pursuit of interests by the agent is called ‘shirking’. To prevent shirking, two options for action are available to the principal: First, incentives for compliance can be created by guaranteeing that the agent will have his or her share in the profit obtained (see Ross, 1973). Second, the principal can invest in the supervision of the agent. Often, this is done by engaging a new agent to keep a watch on the

first. This strategy results in complex delegation patterns. The principal will choose delegation when his or her benefit exceeds the sum of incentives for the agent and the costs for his or her surveillance, as well as the tolerated shirking. Since the mid-1970s, the concepts of the principal–agent approach have also been applied by social scientists who wanted to examine the different forms of delegation between political actors, for example, from parliaments to the executive, or from national governments to international organizations. In contrast to the original version of the concept used in economics, the question of control and surveillance of the agents became more important. Yet, the problem arises, as the involved parties are not interested in maximizing economic surplus, that the principal's gains are usually not transferable to the agent. Accordingly, instead of incentive-based systems for the prevention of shirking, other mechanisms were studied that help to restrict the agents' ability to pursue their own objectives.

Research in political science has identified a number of mechanisms supposed to prevent agents' interests and autonomy from undermining the aims of principals. One can distinguish between 'ex ante' and 'ex post' types of control. The first take effect when authorities are newly created and designed to keep down the agent's scope of action. These tasks, however, do not relate to the surveillance of the agent during his current activity. Ex post control mechanisms can follow two different logics. Whereas the so-called 'police patrol' allows for permanent control of the agent, the control type termed 'fire alarm' is based on the assumption that third parties which suffer from the negative impact triggered by the agent's act will contact the principal. That way third parties undertake the supervisory functions due to their concern. Here, a good example is the complaints of voters to their congressmen in the U.S. Congress about the measures of federal authorities (see McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984).

Principals, however, do not always find themselves in a position to decide freely on control mechanisms, as certain types of delegation require certain types of control. In particular, this is the case with principal–agent relationships aimed at enabling credible self-commitments, as here it is necessary that the agent's actions cannot be overruled by the principal's decisions (see Tallberg, 2002). Concerning this form of delegation, the

principal is not able to exert its most important sanctioning option, the revision of the agent's decision.

In contrast to this, sociological approaches can do with many fewer assumptions: According to Shapiro (2005), a principal–agent relationship exists whenever somebody becomes active at the behest of another person, although this does not necessarily have to be unidirectional. Hence, sociological approaches show a lower explanatory power than political science or economic approaches, but they are better suited, as an analytical framework, to react to changing relationships of interaction. The following examination of the delegation of tasks in the framework of extra-territorial migration control draws on the sociological perspective. Primarily, we consider the principal–agent perspective to be an analytical framework.

As far as the field of migration politics is concerned, the principal–agent perspective has predominantly been used in order to analyze privatization efforts with which public authorities delegate control tasks to private actors. Therefore, scholars have analyzed developments in which employers, inviting research facilities or transport companies are held liable in the event that foreign nationals overstay their permit of residence, or enter a country illegally (see Kraakmann, 1986; Vogel, 2000). Hereby, the focus is mainly with the principals' interests in delegating controls, while agents' perspectives, as well as the conditions for successful delegation, are not the center of attention. The interests and motives for transport companies and research facilities entering into cooperation with the respective immigration authorities are not analyzed, nor is the extent to which these organizations fulfill the delegated tasks.

However, the conceptual analysis of the whole phenomenon of extra-territorial migration controls can benefit from understanding the shift of control as a delegation from a principal to an agent. We aim at identifying the motives that drive destination countries to delegate controls to an agent capable of performing extra-territorial control measures, as well as the costs that arise for the country that delegates controls. Since we assume that the delegation of control tasks comes with some kind of risk for the destination country, it will also be important to look at the measures that are taken to ensure that the shifted control is still conducted in the interests of the destination country.

Extra-territorial Migration and its Forms of Delegation

The principal–agent approach serves as the analytical basis to describe different types of delegation by reference to the following dimensions: (1) Who delegates tasks to whom? (2) What are the motives for delegating control tasks? (3) How does the principal ensure that the agent fulfills his or her tasks in accordance with his or her interests? (4) What costs and risks arise? Moreover, (5) what is the functional logic behind the delegation of these control tasks?

By means of these analytical criteria, we distinguish four types of control shift in the field of extra-territorial migration control. All of these types follow different delegation logics and show different mechanisms for the surveillance of agents by the respective country of destination (see Table 3.1). Their commonality, on the other hand, lies in the nature of the principal—usually the ministry of the interior of destination countries—and the extra-territorial location of controls.

In the following, empirical examples will reflect the delegation logics and costs of these four types and, hence, lead to an assessment about which forms of extra-territorial control are predestined for principal–agent analysis. It will show whether this approach allows for integrating the perspective of the destination country and the actor that carries out extra-territorial control.

Table 3.1 Types of delegation in extra-territorial migration control

	Type A	Type B	Type C	Type D
From principal	Ministries of interior	Destination country	EU destination countries, core	Destination countries
To agent	Embassy staff	Transit or sending countries	EU transit countries, periphery	Private companies
In the framework of/based on	A national visa procedure	Bilateral cooperation	Schengen cooperation	Legal obligation
Mode of delegation	Intra-state	Inter-state, cross-national	Inter-state, supra-national	Privatization

Intra-state Delegation: Visa Issuance in the Embassies (Type A)

The objective of the visa procedure is the early verification of people intending to enter the country (see Bigo & Guild, 2005; Guild & Bigo, 2010; Meloni, 2006). In this way, the selection of 'desirable people' is possible before departure. The authorities in charge of migration policy usually have no branch offices abroad and, consequently, are not able to assess a traveler's eligibility to enter the respective country of destination before arrival. Therefore, by establishing the visa procedure, they delegate a specific migration control task to other representations, which are part of the foreign ministry and thus of a different authority. The common consular instructions to the embassies of all Schengen member states are phrased as follows:

> The diplomatic mission or consular post shall assume full responsibility in assessing whether there is an immigration risk. The purpose of examining applications is to detect those applicants who are seeking to immigrate to the territory of the Contracting Parties and set themselves up there, using grounds such as tourism, studies, business or family visits as a pretext. (Council of the European Union, 2002)

More precisely, delegating the visa procedure to the embassies requires a twofold act of delegation: First, the ministry of the interior delegates a certain task of migration policy to the ministry of foreign affairs which, second, delegates the issuance (or refusal) of visas to its subordinate offices, the diplomatic posts (embassies, consulates).

Documents provided by the applicant serve as a basis for the assessment of whether someone can be deemed likely to overstay his or her visa. One requirement is the proof of sufficient financial means to make sure the applicant will not be dependent on state benefits. The evidence of the applicant's intention to return requires special expertise of the embassy staff in the country of origin and the assessment of family ties, job position and so forth. In addition, any violation of migration law and any criminal acts are assessed (see Hildebrandt & Nanz, 1999; Interview with a civil servant at the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008). The presumption of innocence does not apply (see Mau et al., 2012, p. 92). In a visa application process, the onus usually lies with the applicant.

The question as to whether a person would be allowed to stay for a longer term, and the duration of such stay, was formerly decided after arrival by the authorities of the ministry of the interior, or more precisely the subordinate foreigners' registration office (see Laube & Roos, 2011). With the responsibility for the granting of entry and residence permits, the foreign ministry's offices serve as agents for the authorities of the interior. In the country of origin, members of embassy staff are in direct contact with the people wishing to immigrate and thus gain more knowledge of the relevant national context, which enables them to pass comprehensive judgment on the matter in a more effective way. Moreover, documents can be checked in situ rather than having to be sent from one country to another, which requires quite some time for countries in Asia or Africa.

Nowadays, the application for entry permits of any kind takes place in embassies. Only in exceptional cases are documents granted by border officials. However, they can never be granted after entering the country.

The delegation of issuing entry permits from the ministry of the interior and its subordinate authorities (principal) to the staff of embassies and consulates (agents) of the interior enabled the spatial relocation of control. As a result, departments expect a more efficient decision-making process (motive for delegation). Only in cases of dispute will the process be submitted to the Court of Appeal, which is then once more under the control of the federal ministry (mechanisms of control). This would be the procedure followed in Austria and for many other EU member states, too.

The first type of delegation is, thus, an allocation of tasks from one authority of the destination country to another authority of the same country. Generally, ministries of the interior are expected to be more interested in internal security than foreign ministries. The latter, however, are more prone towards good external relations and international exchange.

The domestic conflict of interest regarding foreigners' admission has also been pointed out by a ministry official from the Austrian Department of the Interior:

> I think this is the same for almost all states: Ministries of the Interior tend to handle visa policy in a rather restrictive way. […] Departments of Foreign affairs, however, tend to consider diplomatic and economic relations as highly relevant and try to put visa policy on a level with visa freedom. (Interview with a civil servant at the Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior, 2008)

Such a conflict of interests is not a rare situation; the same conflict of interests between the ministry of the interior (principal) and the missions abroad (agent) has been shown for Finland (see Laube & Roos, 2010). In Germany, the protection of domestic interests in the visa policy process is ensured on a more institutional level than in Austria. This is achieved through the constant participation of the German authorities responsible for the entry of foreigners in the approval process of long-term residence permits.

Decisions on tourist visas that are only valid for three months are not regularly supervised by the authorities responsible for the entry of foreigners. Even so, consular posts are obliged to hand in a report on the number of (permitted) visas and applications, as well as to give notification of any special cases. The German visa policy affair in 2004/2005 (Foreign Minister: Joschka Fischer) illustrated what happens when there is a breach of the basic principles of visa issuance by the embassy staff. Ex post controls, operating on the 'fire alarm' principle, are common. It was only after liberal visa malpractice in embassies in Ukraine became public that investigations were initiated in order to record a lax procedure on entry permits. In extreme cases, the delegation of tasks will therefore lead to an 'agency loss' in the ministries of the interior, especially given that they cannot prevent corruption—namely, members of the embassy issuing visas for a bribe. However, a more common form of agency loss consists of foreign policy objectives becoming more important in the issuance of visas than principles relating to migration control.

In sum, intra-state delegation (Type A) can fruitfully be described through the instrument of the principal–agent approach. This type of delegation follows the lead of involving expertise on the specific country context in order to prepare decisions that are more efficient.

Cross-National Delegation: Cooperation with Transit States (Type B)

Since the early 1990s, there has been an increase in cooperation efforts on an international level—not only in the EU—which aim at the involvement of countries of transit in the control of migration movements (see

Lavenex, 2006). Transit countries are supposed to contribute to the early prevention of 'unwanted' transit migration and thus support the control efforts undertaken by the countries of origin. This form of involvement in the control paradigm of European countries was of major significance for cooperation on the migration policy of Italy with Tunisia and Libya before the fall of the respective authoritarian regimes. In a similar way, Germany promoted aid for Polish frontier protection after 1990 with the aim of reducing transit migration. Poland, in turn, is currently pushing for the transformation of Ukrainian frontier protection. Furthermore, transit states neighboring to the EU are supposed to guarantee refugee protection standards, as well as to implement fundamental principles in accordance with the Geneva Convention on Refugees. By these means, destination countries such as Germany, Italy or Austria hope for a decrease in numbers of asylum claims, since refugees might stay in the EU periphery. The transformation of Central European states into so-called 'safe third countries' in the course of the 1990s came closest to this goal (see Lavenex, 1999). In addition, the implementation of effective refugee protection in the transit country facilitates deportations, as these are less often subject to appeal before a court. The support of transit states is thus conducive to the creation of a 'cordon sanitaire' around the countries of destination (see Jileva, 2002, p. 84; Wallace, 1996). This form of delegation and relocation enables each destination country to pass on its obligations concerning humanitarian aid without suspending its own asylum system, which would not be possible due to the resistance of national courts (cf. Joppke, 1999).

Here, the main objective of delegation is preventing undesired migrants from entering the territory of the principal. For that reason, transit states have to change their migration laws in a way that allows a distinction between legal and illegal migration. The support of operative capacities at the border then guarantees the enforcement of this distinction on the ground. The delegation of control tasks may also extend to the visa policy of transit states, as seen in Ukraine. Here, the EU expects a harmonization of the visa policy so that people who need a visa to enter EU member states also need one to enter Ukraine (Interview with a civil servant at the European Commission, DG JLS, Brussels, 2010). This hampers entry into Ukraine and, hence, the continuation of the journey to the

external borders of the EU. This type of delegation differs from a typical principal–agent relation, as postulated by political science, as there is no hierarchical relationship between principals and agents but merely international cooperation in the field of migration policy. Accordingly, the agent is not constituted by an act of delegation; rather, the realization of an agreement between two sovereign states allocates the roles of principal and agent. This changes the opportunities to control an agent's behavior, as well as the underlying relation as a whole.

Usually, a principal has no opportunity to revise the acts of an agent. Accordingly, the EU cannot force Ukraine to deport a migrant simply due to the fear that the migrant might continue his or her journey towards the EU. What remains are less coercive measures. For example, the EU requires Ukraine to introduce forgery-proof travel documents and visas and to provide the necessary financial means for obtaining the technical equipment. In this way, the EU implements security and control standards on a technical level and is thus able to forestall the independent political will of the agent.

The surveillance of agents generally follows the mode of a fire alarm. The fulfillment of tasks itself is not being monitored but, rather, the impact of migration and border control policies in the transit country on migration flows to the destination country. The level of cooperation also shows at the border when deportation or direct teamwork is taking place. Transit states that agree to sign readmission agreements—with regard not only to their own citizens, but also to non-nationals—reveal a high degree of willingness to cooperate. The smooth readmission of irregular migrants who were apprehended at the border serves as an additional proof for the fulfillment of tasks by the agent. The costs of this delegation of control derive from the fact that the principal has no direct influence on the operative dimension of border control as conducted by the agent, since these are official acts of a sovereign state.

The costs, then, depend on the type of political exchange offer. Incentive structures are required for the delegation of migration control. The transfer of migration control measures is, thus, based on a political exchange offer to transit states (see Vobruba, 2004).

Different forms of reward for states willing to cooperate have emerged (see Mau et al., 2012, p. 103). Most common in this context is the sup-

port for modernization of their security system, for instance, by supplying the transit states with surveillance technologies or other instruments and by training security forces (see Interview with a civil servant at the Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior, 2008). Accordingly, the Federal German Border Force made a substantial financial contribution to the reformation and modernization of the Polish border guard forces in the 1990s (see Aniol, 1996). In Ukraine, the support also included the supply of X-ray equipment for border security measures, as well as EU-financed accommodation centers for irregular migrants in order to modernize Ukrainian border protection (see Müller, 2014). In Morocco, a large-scale system of border protection was developed with Spanish assistance in 2002 and, in Libya, security forces have been trained with the help of Italy since 2003 (see Lutterbeck, 2006, p. 70). Moreover, transit states receive political profits for their cooperation. Libya was rewarded for its cooperation with the end of political isolation in the 2000s. Ukraine received visa facilitation in return for the signing of a readmission agreement. Until the beginning of the conflict in eastern Ukraine, there was even a debate about the abolishment of visa requirements for Ukrainian citizens entering the EU.

By this, we can see how a selective opening up of borders is bound to the transfer of exclusionary tasks (cf. Eigmüller & Vobruba, 2009).

Authoritarian regimes often expect support for the development of security forces, as well as allies and advocates, in Western countries in return for their cooperation in migration policy. States that are more democratic instead demand an opening up of borders and higher mobility opportunities for their own citizens, as proven most recently by the Tunisian transitional government (see Braun, 2011). In correspondence regarding this preference, the EU Commission stated:

> If we want to engage with them [the EU's neighboring countries] seriously, everything goes through the mobility question. (Interview with a civil servant at the European Commission, DG Relex, Brussels, 2009)

Currently, facilitating the issuance of visas and abolishing the visa requirement are the EU's best incentives vis-à-vis transit states in return for the delegation of migration control tasks. 'Agency loss' can thus occur

as a conflict between the aim of control delegation to transit states and the costs of eased access to the EU for citizens from these transit states. The delegation of exclusion tasks to transit countries results in a reduced ability to control immigration from the citizens of these transit countries by visa policy.

Consequently, the probability of selective border openings is higher for those countries whose role as a transit state is more relevant than their migration potential.

Since, in the case of inter-state delegation, the two countries meet as formally equal partners, the monitoring of task fulfillments is restricted to a certain degree. Even so, the costs of delegation and the way of functioning can be conceptualized from the perspective of a principal–agent constellation. In contrast to all other bilateral agreements, we only find this type of delegation when one country takes measures on behalf of another country in a non-reciprocal way and thereby becomes the agent.

Supra-national Delegation: The Schengen Border Regime (Type C)

The border policy cooperation among the Schengen states provides a special third case of inter-state delegation. Once again, sovereign states delegate border control tasks to other sovereign states but, here, the supra-national level enables a special form of supervision between the principals and the agents, deserving a separate consideration.

Against the background of persistent national states and national migration policies in the EU, the Schengen area appears as an extra-territorial form of migration control. While EU member states abolished internal border controls, national territories persist, and labor market policies and migration policies are still limited to these national territories (see Müller, 2013). While the sovereign states decide on residence or working permits, the exercise of admission control to the Schengen area is de facto limited to a few international airports and the EU's external borders. At these checkpoints, border officials examine visas and passports and, given the documents are valid, admit travelers to the internally

open mobility area. That way, from the perspective of certain member states, migration control mainly takes place extra-territorially since control measures are being conducted beyond their territory, at the borders of other member states.

In the case of the Schengen border regime, we regard countries that do not fulfill control tasks themselves as principals, whereas the peripheral countries responsible for the border control measures at the borders of the Schengen area act as their agents. Through the abolition of internal border controls, the relation of principal and agent changes substantially: Here, agency loss means that the principals give up the opportunity to refuse access to unwanted migrants themselves. Instead, they have to trust the peripheral countries to police the external borders effectively, as is constantly emphasized in Council and Commission documents (see Council of the European Union, 2002; European Commission, 2002). Furthermore, a common visa policy has been established which determines a list of countries whose citizens are required to obtain a visa before crossing a Schengen border (see Council of the European Union, 2001). In concrete terms, the Schengen states have to trust those states issuing Schengen visas to third country nationals to follow the rules of the Schengen Acquis (see Interview with a civil servant at the Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior, 2009; Mau et al., 2012).

A Schengen visa issued for a third country national allows entry into the issuing state, as well as into all other EU member states. Therefore, the other states transfer to the issuing state the task of checking the necessary entry requirements for a visa applicant. Due to the freedom of movement within the EU, the degree of dependency by the principal on the agent, as well as the extent of possible agency loss, is much higher within supra-national delegation than for the inter-state cooperation with transit states (Type B).

This is aggravated by the fact that the core and peripheral states may have different interests concerning the permeability of the external EU border, as we can see by looking at Poland and Germany. With regard to its foreign policy and its economy, Poland is more interested in a somewhat open border to its eastern neighbors. This is, however, in conflict with the idea underlying the Schengen regulations for border security. At the same time, Poland bears a relevant share of the organizational costs

for border protection due to its long external EU border with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Germany is, in contrast, much more interested in a restrictive visa policy and in a well-secured EU border, so that asylum seekers have to make an application directly at the external Polish border and cannot continue their journey to Germany. This constellation adds to a conflict of interest between the principal and the agent. Or, to put it in the skeptical words of a representative of the EU Commission:

> The German policemen and politicians will probably not believe that Poland is efficiently controlling its external borders. (Interview with a civil servant at the European Commission, DG JLS, 2010)

The EU needs to safeguard the cooperation of core and peripheral states by a mechanism which guarantees that peripheral states act according to their responsibilities and that the interests of the core states are met. The Schengen Evaluation represents, historically, the first form of such a guarantee for cooperation whereby Schengen states have to face the examination of their border control systems by other EU member states. Besides juridical and police cooperation between member states, the ability to guarantee a high level of border security plays an important role in this examination.

Prior to EU enlargement to the east, the Schengen Acquis was transferred to the domain of European Community Law under the title Area of Freedom, Security and Justice so that, also in this policy area, the EU Commission and the European Court of Justice are able to create and enforce binding law. The Commission made use of this process in order to achieve statutory regulation of the cooperation between the member states in the field of migration and border policy. With the establishment of the EU border protection agency FRONTEX, the EU developed operative and intelligence capacities accompanying the delegation of controls to the new member states on a pan-European level. Constantly, new directives concerning external border control limit the room for maneuver of the peripheral states and increase the reliability of expectations for the other states. If the peripheral countries do not fulfill the control standards of the common border regime, they face sanctions at EU level.

With the transfer of inter-state cooperation into the domain of community legislation, a further act of delegation takes place: The core states do not supervise the agents solely themselves; instead, they delegate this task to the tandem of the EU Commission and European Court of Justice. For this form of reliability of expectations through codification, the member states do, however, pay a high price: The EU Commission has been given new responsibilities in the area of internal security and migration. Aiming at a decrease of the potential loss of control at the external border by other states, the member states risk a loss of control in the field of internal security vis-à-vis the Commission.

The supra-national delegation creates the roles of principal and agent by the relocation of control tasks to the EU external border. The EU adopted a superior institutional structure in order to guarantee the reliability of expectations with regard to the fulfillment of the delegated tasks.

Privatization (Type D)

The fourth and last type of delegation consists of the transfer to private actors, such as airlines and other transport companies, as well as the delegation of tasks to private 'visa agencies'.

Airlines are involved for the purpose of migration control, as they can make contact with travelers before arrival at the border of the country of destination. Thus, they have the chance to conduct control measures at places where the country of destination itself does not have any authority (see Guiraudon & Lahav, 2000). Otherwise, these control measures would not take place until arrival in the country of destination, or at the border by the local border officials. This delegation leads to the control of entry documents such as passports and visas before passengers board an airplane or ship. To make sure that these control tasks are carried out, the countries of destination impose sanctions on those companies that enable passengers to enter the country without any valid travel documents (see Cruz, 1995). Furthermore, the companies may have to bear the costs for the return of passengers that entered the country illegally. In this way, transport companies act on behalf of the county of destination by only transporting people who fulfill the entry requirements.

The destination country, as the principal, forces the agent to make sure that all entry requirements are fulfilled. Since airlines require governmental landing permissions, the destination countries do, however, have a scope of influence on transport companies. The country takes advantage of this need to cooperate on behalf of the private actor. Even so, control takes place ex post. When a passenger is caught while crossing the border without valid travel documents, a third party—namely, the airline—is penalized. Thus, responsibility is externalized (see Scholten & Minderhout, 2008).

The costs for this type of delegation are lower than for the other types. For this last type, the destination country establishes an additional instance of migration control without lifting genuine border controls, unlike the delegation of migration control in the Schengen area. There is no risk of agency loss, and costs only amount to the administrative expenditure as soon as airlines have to be sanctioned. Thus, countries facing a significant number of illegal immigrants are likely to introduce this measure. A comparison between Austria and Finland supports this assumption. Austria had already introduced this type of delegation in the beginning of the 1990s, whereas Finland only introduced sanctions as part of the Aliens Act to comply with the relevant EU Directive in 2001 (see Laube, 2013, p. 172).

The delegation of control tasks to private actors makes use of the private actors' expertise, as well as their opportunity to make early contact with people crossing borders. Intervention is only possible ex post in the event of a company's misconduct.

The principal–agent approach once again enables the examination of the costs and aims of delegation for this fourth type, the privatization of migration control. Contrary to a typical principle–agent constellation, a complete delegation of tasks does not take place. Though the private actors do act in the interests of the countries of destination, the latter still uphold their territorial means of control. Controls by private actors are rather a supplement to, rather than a substitute for, their own border control efforts.

Conclusion

The principal–agent approach turned out to be a good analytical tool with which to examine the phenomenon of the extra-territorialization of migration controls in liberal states. We identified four types of delegation of control tasks to state or private actors (see Table 3.1), which contributes to the understanding of delegation proceedings in migration politics. The different forms of delegation are an integral component of the recent control strategies of liberal states not only in Europe, but also in North America and Oceania. Domestic or intra-state (type A), inter-state (type B) and supra-national (type C) delegation aim at relocating migration control to the home and transit countries of potential migrants. The inclusion of private companies (type D), which are supposed to check travelers' documents in the interests of the destination countries even before entry into the country is permitted, proceeds on a similar footing. Therefore, the extra-territorialization of migration control contributes to the development of 'smart borders' (Salter, 2004). Potential migrants are checked early and some receive, together with the visa, a 'certificate of innocuousness' in order to ensure a more selective (mode of) control at the border later on. Anyone who arrives there has normally already passed through certain checks. The destination country has achieved its aim of delegation if 'unwanted' migrants have already been rejected extra-territorially. This superior goal of migration control links all four types of delegation.

Concerning the logic of the delegation types, we see differences emerge. The intention to make up for a shortfall in expertise by delegating migration policy tasks, and therefore facilitating more efficient decision-making, can be found when we look at typical visa procedures and, thus, at the internal delegation as well as, to a certain extent, at the cooperation with private actors (types A and D). However, there is a spatial dimension at work, as the delegating state not only obtains additional knowledge, but also develops the opportunity to access travelers beyond its territory and impede their mobility. In this way, the principal aims at extending his or her rules (on access) to places beyond his or her own territory.

Not least, mobility controls can be exerted where the controlled person cannot claim any rights vis-à-vis the principal. Thus, the extra-territorialization of migration control provides an opportunity to restrict territorial access to the right of asylum effectively without changing asylum legislation itself (see Guiraudon, 2006; Joppke, 1998). This aspect plays an important role in implementing extra-territorial forms of control and could broaden the discussion about delegation processes in other policy fields.

Furthermore, according to delegation types B and C, other states are supposed to undertake tasks of migration control by forming their own effective border protection systems. From the initial example of the North African states, we argued that these calculations do not necessarily pay off. In this policy field, the destination countries enter into a dependence on transit countries, as well as other EU member states. Political transformation in these countries may change the conditions for cooperation very quickly. As the 'refugee crisis' in 2015 has shown, the system of extra-territorial migration control is vulnerable if the control capacity in the neighboring countries breaks down. What remains is the need to explain the delegation and its costs to one's own electorate (see Laube, 2013).

To sum this up, the extra-territorialization of migration control—which, among experts, has widely been described as improvement of border security—comes at a price because of the delegation to other actors. The case studies have shown that, for extra-territorial control within the framework of visa procedures, the loss of control remains limited. This is because the coordination between the interior and foreign ministries is relatively easy, and this delegation takes place within a stable institutional framework. In contrast, the visa procedure alone cannot prevent refugees from traveling to the border and seeking asylum. This requires cooperation with transit states and, therefore, new forms of delegation. Along with this inter-state and supra-national delegation of tasks, new problems emerge. Here, agents have a much higher degree of flexibility regarding the way of carrying out migration controls. Following from that, the political price is higher since diplomatic concessions, such as the facilitation of mobility, may be necessary. This, again, would reduce the state's capacity to control migration effectively. In the special case of

intergovernmental cooperation in the Schengen area, a total transfer of control activities to agents is taking place. The formation of supranational law aims at ensuring that agents fulfill their tasks. However, since the system of open borders within the Schengen area depends on the peripheral states' ability to secure the external borders, overloading agents threatens to undermine the stability of the entire Schengen area.

Nevertheless, European states most strongly pushed for the comparatively far-reaching delegation of tasks to other states within and outside the EU over the last two decades even if in these cases the behavior of the agents is not under the control of the principals. This effort can only result from the fact that passing on humanitarian responsibility for asylum seekers and migrants to other state actors enjoys priority.

References

Aniol, W. (1996). *Poland's migration and ethnic policies. European and German influences*. Warsaw: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

Bigo, D. & Guild, E. (2005). Policing at a distance: Schengen visa policies. In D. Bigo & E. Guild (Eds.), *Controlling frontiers: Free movement into and within Europe*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Braun, M. (2011). Flüchtlingsdrama auf Lampedusa. taz.de, 28 March. Retrieved September 10, 2015 from https://www.taz.de/!5123899/.

Council of the European Union (2001). Council Regulation No (EC) 539/2001 of 15 March 2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement. *Official Journal of the European Communities* L81. Brussels.

Council of the European Union (2002). Common consular instructions on visas for the diplomatic missions and consular posts. *Official Journal of the European Communities* C 313/11. Brussels.

Cruz, A. (1995). *Shifting responsibility. Carriers' liability in the Member States of the European Union and North America*. Oakhill: Trentham Books.

Eigmüller, M. & Vobruba, G. (2009). Selektive Grenzöffnung im Rahmen der Europäischen Nachbarschaftspolitik. In M. H. W. Möllers & R. C. Van Ooyen (Eds.), *Jahrbuch Öffentliche Sicherheit 2008/2009* (pp. 493–503). Verlag für Polizeiwissenschaft: Frankfurt am Main.

European Commission (2002). *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament—Towards integrated management of the external borders of the member states of the European Union*. COM (2002) 233 final, Brussels, 7 May.

Friese, H. (2014). *Grenzen der Gastfreundschaft: Die Bootsflüchtlinge von Lampedusa und die europäische Frage*. Bielefeld: Transcript.

Geiger, M. & Pecoud, A. (Eds.) (2013). *Disciplining the transnational mobility of people*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Guild, E. & Bigo, D. (2010). The transformation of European Border Controls. In B. Ryan & V. Mitsilegas (Eds.), *Extraterritorial immigration control. Legal challenges* (pp. 257–278). Leiden: Martin Nijhoff.

Guiraudon, V. (2006). Enlisting third parties in border control: A comparative study of its causes and consequences. In M. Caparini & O. Marenin (Eds.), *Border and security governance. Managing borders in a globalised world* (pp. 79–96). Wien: LIT Verlag.

Guiraudon, V. & Lahav, G. (2000). A reappraisal of the state sovereignty debate. The case of migration control. *Comparative European Politics*, *33*, 163–195.

Hildebrandt, A. & Nanz, K.-P. (1999). *Visumpraxis. Vorraussetzungen, Zuständigkeiten und Verfahren der Visumerteilung in den Staaten des Schengener Abkommens*. Starnberg: R. S. Schulz GmbH.

Hyndman, J. & Mountz, A. (2008). Another brick in the wall? Neo-refoulement and the externalization of asylum by Australia and Europe. *Government and Opposition*, *43*, 249–269.

Jileva, E. (2002). Larger than the European Union: The emerging EU migration regime and enlargement. In S. Lavenex & E. M. Uçarer (Eds.), *Migration and the externalities of European integration* (pp. 75–90). Lanham: Lexington.

Joppke, C. (1998). Why liberal states accept unwanted immigration. *World Politics*, *50*, 266–293.

Joppke, C. (1999). *Immigration and the Nation-State: The United States, Germany, and Great Britain*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kraakmann, R. H. (1986). Gatekeepers: The anatomy of a third-party enforcement strategy. *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*, *2*, 53–104.

Laube, L. (2013). *Grenzkontrollen jenseits nationaler Territorien. Die Steuerung globaler Mobilität durch liberale Staaten*. Campus: Frankfurt am Main.

Laube, L. & Roos, C. (2010). "A border for the people"? Narratives on changing eastern borders in Finland and Austria. *Journal of Borderland Studies*, *25*(3-4), 31–49.

Laube, L., & Roos, C. (2011). *Border and immigration control. Two converging logics*? *A comparison between EU countries and the U.S*. Paper prepared for the 6th ECRP General Conference, Reykjavik.

Lavenex, S. (1999). *Safe third-countries. Extending EU asylum and immigration policies to Central and Eastern Europe*. Budapest and New York: Central European University Press.

Lavenex, S. (2006). Shifting up and out: The foreign policy of the European immigration control. *West European Politics*, *29*(2), 329–350.

Lutterbeck, D. (2006). Policing migration in the Mediterranean. *Mediterranean Politics*, *11*(1), 59–82.

Mau, S., Brabandt, H., Laube, L., & Roos, C. (2012). *Liberal states and freedom of movement. Selective borders, unequal mobility*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

McCubbins, M. D. & Schwartz, T. (1984). Congressional oversight overlooked: Police patrols versus fire alarms. *American Journal of Politcal Science*, *28*(1), 165–179.

Meloni, A. (2006). *Visa policy within the European Union structure*. Berlin: Springer.

Müller, A. (2013). Territorial borders as institutions. Functional change and the spatial division of authority. *European Societies*, *15*(3), 353–372.

Müller, A. (2014). *Governing mobility beyond the state. Centre, periphery and the EU's external borders*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Ross, S. A. (1973). The economic theory of agency: The principal's problem. *The American Economic Review*, *63*(2), 134–139.

Salter, M. B. (2004). Passports, mobility, and security: How smart can the border be? *International Studies Perspectives*, *5*, 71–91.

Scholten, S. & Minderhout, P. (2008). Regulating immigration control: Carrier sanctions in the Netherlands. *European Journal of Migration and Law*, *10*, 123–147.

Shapiro, S. P. (2005). Agency theory. *Annual Review of Sociology*, *31*, 263–284.

Tallberg, J. (2002). Delegation to supranational institutions: Why, how, and with what consequences? *West European Politics*, *25*, 23–46.

Vobruba, G. (2004). Grenzen des Projekts Europa. Von der Expansionsdynamik zur abgestuften Integration. *Osteuropa*, *54*, 61–74.

Vogel, D. (2000). Migration control in Germany and the United States. *International Migration Review*, *34*, 390–422.

Wallace, C. (1996). The Eastern frontier of western Europe: Mobility in the buffer zone. *New Community*, *22*, 259–286.

4

Democratizing EU Democracy Assistance? The EU's Perspective on Civil Society

Micha Fiedlschuster

A year after the uprisings of 2011 in North Africa, the European Commission (henceforth 'the Commission') proposed a new strategy for its cooperation with civil society in its external relations. In the first EU document on foreign policy that describes civil society as 'an asset in itself', the Commission states: 'An empowered civil society is a crucial component of any democratic system and is an asset in itself. It represents and fosters pluralism and can contribute to more effective policies, equitable and sustainable development and inclusive growth' (European Commission, 2012, p. 3).

On first sight, the EU seems to respond to the civil society-driven regime changes in the south with an ambitious new strategy, which acknowledges the efforts of local civil society groups in democratizing their political systems from the 'bottom-up'. However, the bureaucracy in Brussels is not known for swift changes and, indeed, the revision of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) had started already in 2010 (see European

M. Fiedlschuster (✉)
Leipzig University, Germany

B. Bruns et al. (eds.), *European Neighbourhood Policy*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-69504-1_4

Commission, 2011a, p. 1). This process coincided with the dramatic change of the political landscape in the Southern Mediterranean.

My aim is to assess the quality and trajectory of the strategy change of the EU for its neighborhood.[1] Is the EU, indeed, taking a course towards a bottom-up approach in democracy assistance, as some analysts have suggested (see Shapovalova & Youngs, 2012)? Is it likely that civil society organizations (CSOs) wield influence in the EU's external action? To what extent is the new strategy influenced by the changing neighborhood, and to what extent have internal developments in EU policy-making affected the policies? On the basis of a policy analysis and interviews with EU officials,[2] I argue that the EU, in fact, responded to a changing neighborhood, but the character of the response reflects the internal development of the relationship between the Commission and CSOs. This internal relationship—in particular, the expectations for cooperation with civil society—is projected to the outside. The blurring between an 'inside' and 'outside' that already takes place at the economic and political-administrative level between the EU and its neighboring countries is extended to the social level.

My argument contributes to the analysis of the EU's extra-territorial engagement. The editors of this volume conceptualize extra-territorial engagement as the EU's spatial-strategic means to exert control over territory beyond its borders in order to pursue its own foreign policy interests (see p. 7). The projection of the relationship between state authorities and CSOs to the neighborhood accounts for one example of how the EU expects its neighbors to adopt its own governance model but without offering substantial inclusion in return and, hence, manifests these countries as outsiders to the EU.

For what follows, a note on the distinction between 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' approaches in democracy assistance is helpful. In the case of the former, the political elite of a country is pressured by an external

[1] Although some of the policy changes affect the EU's worldwide engagement in democracy assistance, for matters of feasibility I confine my analysis to the eastern and southern neighborhood.

[2] This research is based on my PhD project in which I analyze concepts of democracy in EU democracy assistance and the World Social Forum. For the research presented here, nine interviews were conducted in Brussels in March 2014 with EU officials and representatives of CSOs.

actor to implement reforms.[3] Approaches of the latter kind set their hope in the local civil society, which either pressures the government towards reforms or works towards toppling the regime.[4] Analytical difficulties arise here about whether CSOs can be unambiguously located in the 'bottom-up' approach. In countries where an official opposition is unfeasible, the formerly ruling elite often re-organizes through CSOs. These CSOs hardly conform to the EU's idea of a civil society (see the next section) but, rather, they harbor the political opposition in the 'waiting line'. Elite-formation through the funding of CSOs by external actors is another problematic case. Both examples are better analyzed as a form of elite-driven democratization. Apart from these analytical difficulties, the distinction between top-down and bottom-up approaches is important for understanding developments in EU democracy assistance.

The EU was, for a long time, known for its predominantly 'top-down' approach towards democratization (see Huber, 2008). EU development programs have largely focused on state institutions and election monitoring. This is probably one reason why the EU's relationship with civil society in external relations was seldom an explicit focus in the literature prior to 2011 (see Jünemann, 2002; Kurki, 2011). Even the EU's flagship of 'bottom-up' democratization—the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)—can be criticized for focusing predominantly on the promotion of human rights and less on democratization. Overall, the strategy of the EU has been judged ineffective and insufficient for both neighborhood regions (see Huber, 2008; Shapovalova & Youngs, 2012). Against the backdrop of these criticisms, some analysts point out that the EU is undergoing a learning process and that some progress—with regard to the inclusion of civil society, in particular—has been made (see Börzel & Risse, 2004). While the 'top-down' approach of the EU unquestionably still exists, it has acquired a 'bottom-up' dimension. My contribution to the field of democracy assistance is to scrutinize the development and character of this dimension.

[3] Spain, Greece and Portugal are often cited as examples of an elite-driven democratization process.

[4] The resurgence of civil society in Eastern Europe and Latin America in the 1980s serves as an example here.

I apply the term democracy *assistance* and *support* instead of democracy *promotion*. Democracy *promotion* denotes all means employed by external actors that are geared towards regime change (see Schmitter & Brouwer, 1999). The term is today widely associated with the US-led interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. The term democracy *assistance* is limited to measures that serve the consolidation of democratization processes in newly established democracies or semi-democratic countries (see Bicchi, 2009; Huber, 2008), which more accurately describes the EU's action in this field. EU policy-makers prefer the wording democracy *support*, in order to set their work apart from US democracy *promotion*.

In the next section, I will elaborate on the role of CSOs in the EU's internal policy-making process. In addition, the section will carve out the EU's definition of CSOs. In the third section, I will examine the policy framework of EU democracy assistance in the eastern and southern neighborhood. I will pay greater attention to the eastern neighborhood, because the policy innovations regarding civil society were developed there first and subsequently transferred to the southern neighborhood in 2011. In the conclusion, I will provide an outlook for future research on this topic.

CSOs in EU Policy-making

The aim of this section is to demonstrate that the precursor of the prominent role of CSOs in the revision of the ENP in 2011 and other foreign policy documents of that time was the internal development of the Commission's relationship with CSOs.[5] Usually, research on the EU's external democracy assistance limits its interest in the EU's internal affairs to the policy-making process concerning foreign affairs. However, this limitation results in a research gap, because these policies often bear important features of internal policies. In particular, the notion of good (European) governance and the relationship of EU institutions and CSOs have been projected to the outside.[6]

[5] For matters of clarity, I focus on the Commission leaving aside the other branches of the EU.

[6] The Commission's concept of European governance comprises five principles: openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence (European Commission, 2001).

Central here is the White Paper on European Governance (European Commission, 2001), which represents a landmark in the design of the relationship between CSOs and the Commission. The White Paper mainstreams the inclusion of CSOs throughout the work of the Commission and carves out the potential political role of CSOs. Kohler-Koch and Buth (2009, pp. 3–4) extract the following common features in the Commission's perception of CSOs: They are voluntary associations; not-for-profit; act independently and in public; some of them serve the public good and do not act out of self-interest. The examples given by the Commission (European Commission, 2001, p. 14) show a clear focus on organized forms of civil society: trade unions, employer's organizations, non-governmental organizations, charities and similar organizations. In general, the Commission stipulates that CSOs 'are the principal structures of society outside of government and public administration' (European Commission, 2002, p. 6).

Alongside this broad definition, the Commission has put forward a growing catalog of functions of CSOs. Previous to the White Paper, CSOs were almost exclusively seen as social service providers. Afterwards, Freise (2008, p. 17) identified additional tasks associated with civil society. Among others, these tasks range from tackling the democratic deficit of the Commission over giving voice to marginalized groups to providing expertise in the policy-making process. This is a major shift, because CSOs were assigned a political role: Their inclusion in the policy-making process appreciated them as a form of interest representation (see Ruzza, 2004, pp. 5–6). In sum, the Commission (European Commission, 2001, p. 14) ascribes a double function to civil society: It 'plays an important role in giving voice to the concerns of citizens and delivering services that meet people's needs'.

The focus on the linkage of CSOs with citizens' concerns meets the self-perception of CSOs who collaborate with the Commission. These CSOs describe themselves as rights- and value-based organizations that represent public interests, have firmly established links with citizens and give voice to weak interests (see Kohler-Koch & Buth, 2009, p. 5). In principle, these normative aspirations set them apart from lobby groups in Brussels, who are usually lacking these features.

Analysts are biased as to how far CSOs are able to use their political role and distinction from lobby groups to generate an impact on policies. Ruzza (2004) has shown that CSOs had an impact in the areas of anti-racism and environmental policies. At the same time, Ruzza and also Irrera (2010) point out that CSOs face a range of obstacles. The impact of CSOs is not only dependent on their formal inclusion; other factors play a role as well. This can partly be explained by the precise meaning given to participation, involvement and consultation in the White Paper.

The Commission frames participation of CSOs predominantly in terms of providing expertise. In practice, this reduces CSOs to nothing more than lobby groups. In fact, both actors work in the same environment and have to compete for influence. This goes to the detriment of the democratic quality of the consultation process, because expertise may trump representativeness (cf. Ruzza, 2004, p. 46). In other words, the opinion of a CSO that claims to represent the interest of a significant portion of the population may not get heard if it is not contributing expertise. This is a significant limitation on the democratic quality of the evoked political role of CSOs.

As well as the character of participation being limited, so is its scope. The work of Irrera (2010, p. 192) tells us that CSOs are not included by default, because 'participation must be initiated by the institutions'. Ruzza (2004, p. 45) likewise reports that CSOs have criticized the limitation and insufficiency of the consultation process. A study of the EU Civil Society Contact Group asserts that cooperation with CSOs is often needs-driven: 'Consultations are often conducted when institutions have a natural interest to consult with them or are lacking expertise […]. As a consequence, dialogue on the most controversial issues […] seems to be avoided' (Fazi & Smith, 2006, p. 42). Aside from that, the scope of inclusion is restricted, because 'participation remains relegated to the advisory stage and not on the decisional one' (Irrera, 2010, p. 192). As the author rightly points out, the key word is 'consultation', which means *assisting* EU institutions in arbitrating 'between competing claims and priorities' (see European Commission, 2001, p. 15; Irrera, 2010, p. 193). Despite the Commission's commitment to an open process, Commissioners and the EU bureaucracy possess considerable flexibility in regard to their cooperation with CSOs.

The Europeanization of politics and the inclusion of CSOs in European governance shows a range of direct and indirect impacts on organized civil society. I will point out three of them which I consider most relevant for a discussion of EU democracy assistance. First, the increasing transfer of competences from the member states to the EU fosters networked coalitions of CSOs, who need to acquire the appropriate skills and means for collaboration among themselves and for effective lobbying (Ruzza, 2004, p. 11). For matters of efficient cooperation, the Commission sometimes encourages the creation of European-wide networks. In the case of democracy assistance, the establishment of CONCORD (the European NGO confederation for relief and development)[7] and ENoP (the European Network of Political Foundations) are two prominent examples, whose creation was both welcomed and financially supported by the Commission. Furthermore, Kohler-Koch and Buth (2009, pp. 21–22) have shown that, due to the pressure of professionalization, CSO networks tend to lose their connection with the base at the local level. These organizations are faced with the dilemma that 'the more they succeed in having their voice heard, the less they function as democratic transmission belts' (Kohler-Koch & Buth, 2009, n. pag.). The overall problem is that some sectors of civil society are more willing and/or capable to adapt to Brussels' political environment than others, who are, in turn, likely to become marginalized.

Second, the EU influences organized civil society more directly through funding and cooperation modalities. EU funding for CSOs is a double-edged matter: on the one hand, many CSOs would not exist without public funding. On the other hand, EU officials may use funding modalities to wield influence over CSOs. Financial support can be used for introducing market logic among CSOs. The application procedure for grants is competitive, flexible and oriented towards cost-efficiency (for the case of democracy assistance, see Kurki, 2011). Those CSOs who either are lacking the skills for competition, or reject it on an

[7] As one EU official put it: 'Here, for example, if we want to consult with the civil society on our regional strategy for the coming years for the Southern Mediterranean, we can go to CONCORD, we can discuss with them. We know that […], they are representing millions of citizens of the EU. So their opinions, their comments can easily be integrated into our documents' (Interview with EuropeAid official 01, Brussels, 2014).

ideological basis, find it more difficult to garner support for their issues (cf. Ruzza, 2004, p. 7).

Third, a condition for access to the policy-making process is conformity with good governance principles. In the words of the Commission (European Commission, 2001, p. 15): 'With better involvement comes greater responsibility. Civil society must itself follow the principles of good governance.' Although this condition had not been well elaborated in the White Paper in 2001, and its implementation was half-hearted, good governance became part and parcel of democracy assistance a few years later. This can be deemed problematic, because it threatens the autonomy of civil society as a self-organized sphere.

In sum, the Commission wields substantial direct and indirect influence on CSOs in the EU as a consequence of the framework of (good) European governance. This fact does not necessarily imply that the Commission governs the landscape of EU civil society. Nevertheless, it is problematic considering the Commission's own normative basis of political liberalism, which stresses the independence of civil society from the state sphere. This becomes even more problematic in the realm of foreign affairs in which the Commission influences the character of a civil society that is located outside of the EU.

Change and Continuity in the Support for Civil Society in the EU's Neighborhood

After a considerable period of almost no engagement in democracy assistance until the end of the Cold War (see Smith, 2003, p. 126), the EU pursued a predominantly 'top-down' approach in the 1990s. First and foremost, the EU supported the building of state capacity through its large-budget development and cooperation programs. Several studies have shown that democratization is only one goal of EU foreign policy and that security, as well as economic interests, often prevail (for example, Jünemann, 2007). The poor standing of democratization had significant effects on cooperation with civil society. For example, the agenda for an exchange on the level of civil society in the Euro-Mediterranean

Partnership remained vague and lost political relevance over time (see Youngs, 2001, p. 56). Furthermore, EU democracy assistance barely had an influence on the genesis of the Arab Spring (for example, Peters, 2012). In principle, the support for civil society in EU foreign policy remained marginal and almost limited to the activities of the EIDHR, which provides grants to CSOs. The cooperation with civil society was not a priority of EU development aid for a long time.

The EU's strategy towards its neighbors has gradually changed. Partly due to the so-called colored revolutions in Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004), the EU had reasons to pursue a more ambitious approach in the east first (see Gromadzki, 2011). Conditionality of democratic reforms has been gradually strengthened in the east with the ENP since 2005 and the establishment of the EaP (Eastern Partnership) in 2008. Central to the ENP is that partner governments 'commit themselves to approximate their domestic policies and legislation to the EU *acquis*' (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011, p. 896). As the research of Lavenex and Schimmelfennig suggests, the support of civil society was rather indirect: The adoption of democratic governance principles and liberal norms that are vested in the EU *acquis* may increase the channels of influence for CSOs. Although an ENP strategy paper in 2006 already demanded that partner governments should be encouraged 'to allow appropriate participation by civil society representatives as stakeholders in the reform process', concrete steps remained unspecified and CSOs were predominantly framed as vehicles for 'people to people contacts' (European Commission, 2006, pp. 6–8). The actual recognition of CSOs as potential political actors started with the EaP. In the latter, greater attention to CSOs has been institutionalized. For that reason, I will, first, discuss the EaP, which refers to the eastern neighborhood alone. Second, I will elaborate on the revised ENP in 2011, which is applied equally to the east and south.

The EaP: Promoting a Political Role for CSOs

Balfour (2011, p. 29) pinpoints that the EaP 'adds a multilateral framework that was missing in the ENP'. The EaP is a route towards Association

Agreements, which do not result in an EU membership but in a closer economic and political relationship.[8] In addition to a far-reaching harmonization with EU legislation and market-oriented reforms, the EaP requests 'a sufficient level of progress in terms of democracy' (European Commission, 2008, p. 4).

The stimulation of democratization through political conditionality is not a novelty in cooperation agreements, but civil society is given greater weight in two ways. First, the EaP framework stresses the watchdog role of CSOs by stipulating that democratic reforms 'require stronger participation of civil society to enhance oversight of public services' (European Commission, 2008, p. 11). Second, CSOs are, to a certain degree, included as stakeholders in the negotiation process of EU officials and the authorities of the EaP countries. In a nutshell, the Commission recognizes CSOs as potential political actors just as it does in the EU's internal affairs. The following quote from an EU official who is working in the southern neighborhood is exemplary for a shift in perspective that has its origin in the EaP (and the EU's internal affairs):

> A civil society organization was seen traditionally […] as a service provider […]. So, we are now moving from this traditional approach […] to a bigger participation in the daily life of a country, where civil society—as we have it in Europe—[…] is making their points, is demanding, is controlling what the government is doing, is acting as a watchdog on how the policies are being implemented. (Interview with EuropeAid official 01, Brussels, 2014)

Let us elaborate in more detail how CSOs are expected to perform a watchdog role in the EaP. Considering the EU's normative basis of political liberalism, the characterization of CSOs as watchdogs is nothing unusual. From this perspective, CSOs are checking government excesses; they are holding officials accountable to the public and so on. However, the watchdog idea in the EaP seems to be mingled with the expectation that CSOs monitor the progress of the EaP countries in terms of their convergence towards the EU *acquis*. The European Integration Index

[8] The EaP comprises Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.

(EaP Index) is a case in point here. The index is published by a group of CSOs in cooperation with the EaP Civil Society Forum (on the forum, see below).[9] The EaP index measures the partnering countries' progress in their convergence with EU values and standards (Eastern Partnership Index, 2012). Each country is attributed a value on a scale from 'zero' to 'one' in which 'one' suggests a congruence with the EU's benchmarks. Significantly, the civil society-driven EaP Index adopts exactly the same position on democracy, governance and so on as defined by the EU. A critical engagement with the EU's benchmarks and definitions remains absent. Civil society-driven initiatives such as these call into question the EU's repeatedly proposed imperative of not imposing a particular—if not to say its own—model in democracy assistance (for example, European Commission, 2011a, pp. 2–3; European Commission, 2011b, p. 13). Even though CSOs acquire a political role here, some of them essentially remain service providers in the sense of auditing the EaP countries. This auditing can be used by EU officials for pressuring governments to implement reforms. As long as the reference of reform is the EU *acquis*, it is difficult to speak of a 'bottom-up' and home-grown democratization process in this case.

The second enhancement of civil society is the inclusion of CSOs in the EaP's multilateral framework. Central here is the EaP Civil Society Forum (EaP CSF), which has taken place since 2009 and gathers around 200 representatives of CSOs, EU officials and officials of the EaP partner countries. The goal of the EaP CSF is 'to promote contacts among CSOs and facilitate their dialogue with public authorities' (European Commission, 2008, p. 14). Accordingly, the EaP CSF seeks active inclusion in the negotiation process and offers advice to the thematic platforms and ministerial meetings of the EaP. The significance of the EaP CSF is that the EU acknowledges CSOs as (potential and tentative) political partners in *multilateral* negotiation processes.

Policy analysts recognize the importance of the EaP CSF, but remain doubtful about its actual capabilities. One reservation about the prospects of the forum is that the consultation with CSOs 'tends to be treated as a necessary formality; CSOs are frustrated that their opinions are not taken

[9] The project itself is not funded by the EU but, rather, by the Open Society Foundations.

seriously' (Lada, 2011, p. 2). Taking into account the poor record of democratization of EaP partner countries, Balfour (2011, p. 37) foresees that governments will likely be blocking the inclusion of CSOs on topics concerning democracy. Keeping CSOs outside is possible, because their participation in negotiations requires an invitation by the participating authorities. This leaves the impression that CSOs remain second-order partners in the EaP. This prognosis is basically confirmed by Kostanyan's assessment in the fifth year of the forum which states that the policy impact of the forum remains 'modest' (Kostanyan, 2014, p. 22). The limited scope of inclusion that I have pointed out for the internal EU policy-making process seems to be replicated here.

To what extent can the EaP CSF actually be a vehicle for citizens' concerns? Kostanyan (2014, p. 5) points out in this respect the weak link between citizens and organized civil society in many countries in Eastern Europe. Due to this, CSOs are often donor-driven and usually the same large-scale CSOs benefit most from transnational spaces such as the EaP CSF (see also Lada, 2011, p. 2). Whereas CSO networks within the EU tend to lose their linkages with their base over time, these links often were never strong from the beginning in the eastern neighborhood. If the CSOs in the forum fail to remedy this deficit, then, first, the EaP CSF can hardly be seen as part of a 'bottom-up' democratization strategy. Second, it questions the extent to which the EaP CSF can effectively claim to represent citizens' interests in negotiation processes with governments. EaP governments likely will perceive CSO representatives not as partners but, rather, as the political opposition in the next elections. These two issues signify severe obstacles for the EaP CSF to fulfilling its purpose in practice.

On the positive side, the EaP CSF has established itself as a viable structure for (transnational) socialization among CSOs (Kostanyan, 2014, pp. 21–22). Furthermore, the EaP CSF is a success on the part of organized civil society, who demanded to be treated as a stakeholder in the process. Overall, CSOs have undergone a remarkable upgrade in the ENP following the introduction of the EaP.

The Revised ENP: Defining CSOs as Key Partners

This trajectory (and its limitations) has continued with the revision of the ENP in 2011. The most innovative aspect of the revision of the ENP in respect of democracy assistance is the proposal for a partnership with societies (European Commission, 2011a, p. 4). Civil society is now granted a central role in bringing forward reforms. Three measures were taken in support of civil society: the establishment of Neighbourhood Civil Society Facilities (NCSFs), the reform of the thematic program Non-state Actors and Local Authorities (NSA&LA) and the creation of the European Endowment for Democracy (EED).

First, the NCSFs were established to develop the advocacy capacity of CSOs: 'their ability to monitor reform and their role in implementing and evaluating EU programs' (European Commission, 2011a, p. 4). The priority of the facilities on capacity-building remedies a deficit in the portfolio of EU democracy assistance. As Shapovalova and Youngs (2012, p. 13) observe, 'EU tools largely focused on vulnerable groups' rights promotion and sustainable development rather than strengthening of civil society organizations' capacities to represent societal interests and participate in policy-making channels.' This is part of the shift in perspective regarding CSOs from service providers to political actors, which needs to be communicated not only to CSOs, but also to EU staff and foreign authorities. An EU official elaborated on this:

> In parallel [with capacity-building of CSOs] we need to work a lot with the policy-makers to change their mentalities [...]. The same goes for the EU-Delegations: […] The Delegation will have to make sure that […] the civil society […] is involved in the monitoring, […] and even in the process of evaluating the results and the impact of [sic!] the given program has […] made. This is a new task and a new approach [...]. [A]ny single project manager or task manager in the EU delegations […] will have to integrate civil society as a normal stakeholder […] same as they involve ministries […]. (Interview with EuropeAid official 01, Brussels, 2014)[10]

[10] In sum, four interview partners explicitly signaled that a serious policy shift was under way as described here.

Asked about how CSOs react to this new strategy, the answer was that their response is 'quite positive'. But the EU official added that there is a deficit on the side of civil society:

> I am keen to engage with civil society, but I don't know who to talk to. If I organize a meeting to discuss our new strategies on job promotion and I get three NGOs today and I organize a second round in one month and I get three different NGOs and each one of them is telling me different ideas and different priorities. It will be difficult as well for the governments to take something from these debates. The one thing that we tell civil society is that they need to organize themselves better. (Interview with EuropeAid official 01, Brussels, 2014)

Although the EU official stressed during the interview that nothing should be imposed on CSOs, the demand for an organized civil society reminds one of the Commission's request in the early 2000s for a networked civil society at home. Currently, it is not possible to judge the effects of the strategy change on the ground. The EU delegations are supposed to draft country roadmaps for engagement with CSOs: These documents 'should identify long term objectives of EU cooperation with CSOs and encompass dialogue as well as operational support, identifying appropriate working modalities' (European Commission, 2012, p. 9).

Since these roadmaps are not publicly available at the time of writing, I leave it for future research to determine which type of CSO is the preferred partner and which criteria need to be met. However, one priority of the Commission is that CSOs deliver expertise to the ENP process. Furthermore, the Commission requests that CSOs apply good governance principles (see European Commission, 2012, p. 6). If these two aspects dominate in the roadmaps, then it is likely that we will see a similar development as that in the internal affairs of the EU: Those CSOs who provide expertise will find it easier to be heard, but they are less likely to be representative of citizens' concerns.

Second, the thematic program NSA&LA had already been introduced in 2007, but the role of civil society has been re-framed following the Arab Spring. It was re-named Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities (CSO&LA) in 2014 and the Commission (European

Commission, 2014) allocated almost €2 billion to the program for the period to 2020. The program provides grants to CSOs and local authorities in order to strengthen their development capacities. Referring to the old NSA&LA, Shapovalova and Youngs (2012, p. 4) argue that it only marginally supports democracy and 'its primary focus is on the facilitation of social and economic development'. This is still true, but the program now reflects the Commission's changed position on CSOs (see European Commission, 2014, pp. 3–5). It acknowledges CSOs as a source of democratic ownership of policies and recognizes 'CSOs' "right of initiative" to identify and respond to emerging needs, to put forward visions and ideas' (see European Commission, 2014, p. 11). Apart from that, the program reflects the Commission's view that CSOs can contribute to good governance and that they should improve their representative and internal governance (European Commission, 2014, pp. 7 and 12). In sum, the guidelines of the program read very progressively and it has the potential of being a vehicle for 'bottom-up' processes, if the program adheres to its promises and if local authorities play along and do not block dissenting CSOs.

Third, the EED is the latest innovation in EU democracy assistance. It has been in operation since 2012 and is certainly the odd one out in the family: It was founded as an NGO and is, hence, not an official instrument of the EU (however, its board of governors is dominated by representatives of EU institutions). As such, it is not bound to the strict regulations of EU bureaucracy, which results in greater flexibility, as a staff member of the EED confirms: 'We say that it is essential that we talk to the people who apply, that we guide them, that we coach them' (Interview with EED Communication Officer, Brussels, 2014).[11] Before a decision is taken, program officers pursue 'the recommendations that were given by the applicants themselves and they have a very long consultation process with other actors in the field' (Interview with EED Communication Officer, Brussels, 2014). This personalized consultation process is chosen to allow for deeper engagement with civil society on the ground, which is particularly important since the EED can support

[11] The EIDHR, for example, is not allowed to consult CSOs individually for reasons of equal treatment.

individuals and non-registered groups. This is the EED's added value in comparison with official EU instruments, which can only assist this section of civil society in a very limited way.

The objective of the EED is to 'foster and encourage democratization and deep and sustainable democracy in countries in political transition and in societies struggling for democratization' (EED, 2013, p. 1). After years of controversy about the need for the EED, the Arab Spring and protests in Belarus constituted the tipping point in favor of its establishment, because the EU was lacking means with which to offer swift assistance to pro-democratic actors (cf. Leininger & Richter, 2012). Whereas the NCSF and CSO&LA promote a cooperative relationship between CSOs and partner governments, the EED is willing to support CSOs who seek to challenge their government.

The need for such a confrontational approach in EU democracy assistance is still controversial. Some see the EED's flexible and unbureaucratic funding practice as a welcome complement to their work (Interview with EuropeAid official 01, Brussels, 2014). Others doubt that the EED actually yields an added value: 'Would you not have achieved the same result […], if we had given the same money immediately to the German foundations?' (Interview with EU official in the EP, Brussels, 2014). Another EU official likewise mentioned that the EED has, so far, not shown that it funds different entities other than through official EU instruments (Interview with EuropeAid official 02, Brussels, 2014). In fact, the EED has put itself in a dilemma: On the one hand, it has raised the high expectation that it would support pro-democratic groups who engage in contentious politics. On the other hand, the EED does not want to fund protest; as an interview partner explained: 'We had a very simple request to support some of the protesters with the costs of living on Maidan [Ukraine], so the tents and all of that. There we took a very conscious decision not to support it, because we shouldn't be paying people to go on the street to protest. That's not our role' (Interview with EED Communication Officer, Brussels, 2014). It is understandable that the EED wants to prevent accusations of being a foreign agitator. However, for the sake of justifying its existence in the future, it needs to develop a genuinely different approach from that of its counterparts in official EU democracy assistance.

It is likely that, once such an approach exists, the Commission and the EU member states will not be prepared to support it. From the beginning, the EED has had insufficient funds for its work, because many EU member states are reluctant to contribute money. The insecure future of the EED can be taken as an indicator that the Commission still hesitates to support 'bottom-up' processes of democratization which are geared towards regime change.

In sum, the development and progress of EU policies that I have described here indicate a turn to a 'bottom-up' strategy in EU democracy assistance. Central in this respect is the shift towards increasingly considering CSOs as potential political partners. Notwithstanding the innovative character of recent developments (2008–2011), evoking the political role of civil society mirrors the internal relationship of the Commission with CSOs. The EU's response to a changing neighborhood driven by civil society is blended with its already existing position on the role of CSOs in policy-making processes. Rather than presenting a qualitative shift, what we observe is a re-alignment of the EU's position to a new political context in the region with EU-typical solutions that are already in existence.

Conclusion

The increased attention to CSOs in democratization represents a remarkable shift in the EU's approach. Although the large bulk of development aid is still delivered to governments for the building of state capacity, EU officials in Brussels and abroad have to take the concerns of civil society seriously. Can we speak of a 'democratization' of EU democracy assistance? Indeed, the EU broadens its elite-driven approach with a substantial 'bottom-up' perspective. However, this 'democratization process' of EU policies comes with qualifications, due to the fact that the Commission promotes its internal model to the outside. This circumstance limits the possible scope of a home-grown and 'bottom-up' approach which the EU promises in the revised ENP. To avoid misunderstandings, my interview partners were quite progressive in terms of the inclusion of CSOs. However, there was also much enthusiasm in the

early 2000s when the Commission proposed the inclusion of CSOs in European governance. By now, research has shown that the 'democratization' of the Commission's work has its limits. Likewise, the strategy turn in EU democracy assistance should be put into perspective.

The shift in perspective on CSOs from their role as service providers to political actors has been projected step by step to the outside. Particularly important correlations are the expectation that CSOs contribute expertise, the limited scope of their actual inclusion and the request to apply good governance principles internally. Whereas the driving motif in the internal dimension was the Commission's deficit of democratic legitimacy, one of the central elements in the external dimension is the willingness to increase the pressure on governments from the 'bottom-up'. In line with this latter motif is an important deviation from the internal relationship: The EaP and ENP, more or less explicitly, attribute a monitoring function to CSOs. The inclusion of CSOs has, without doubt, the potential to bring democracy assistance closer to the needs of societies. However, the EU's rhetoric of a partnership with societies and a home-grown reform process will be called into question, if future research reveals that EU officials overstretch the monitoring function. Identifying the EU's approach as either 'bottom-up' or 'top-down' may turn out to be inappropriate categories by which to describe what is at stake here. A more appropriate characterization might have to stress the flexibility of the EU's strategy in its persistent intention to wield influence in its neighborhood.

Of course, I do not claim general relevance for my observations. The implementation of EU policies is always country-specific: The degree of consultation of civil society depends on the (geo-)political context of the country and the priorities of the staff in the EU delegation. A comprehensive picture would require in-depth case studies in the neighborhood. Nevertheless, the EU policies discussed here set the trajectory of EU democracy assistance at the country level. An EU official has described the Commission's current view on civil society as 'quite avant-garde' (Interview with EuropeAid official 03, Brussels, 2014) but this could well remain an exception in the history of EU foreign policy. The Commission may roll back its enthusiastic support for civil society as a consequence of the major geopolitical crisis between the EU and Russia over the future of Ukraine in 2014. EU policy-makers may judge that openly supporting

anti-government protesters and pressuring governments through CSOs is not worth the risk.

References

Balfour, R. (2011). Debating the eastern partnership: Perspectives from the European Union. *Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft*, *3*, 29–40.

Bicchi, F. (2009). Democracy assistance in the Mediterranean: An overview. *Mediterranean Politics*, *14*, 61–78.

Börzel, T., & Risse, T. (2004). *One size fits all! EU policies for the promotion of human rights, democracy and the rule of law*. Workshop on democracy promotion. Stanford, CA: Stanford University.

Eastern Partnership Index (2012). What is the EaP Index? Retrieved February 8, 2014 from http://www.eap-index.eu (homepage).

EED (2013). *Statutes: European endowment for democracy*. Brussels: European Endowment for Democracy.

European Commission (2001). *European governance—A white paper*. COM (2001) 428 final. Brussels, 25 July.

European Commission (2002). *Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue—General principles and minimum standards for consultation of interested parties by the commission*. COM (2002) 704 final. Brussels, 11 December.

European Commission (2006). *On strengthening the Eastern neighbourhood policy.* COM (2006) 726 final, Brussels, 4 December.

European Commission (2008). *Eastern partnership*. COM (2008) 823 final, Brussels, 3 December.

European Commission (2011a). *A new response to a changing Neighbourhood*. COM (2011) 303 final, Brussels, 25 May.

European Commission (2011b). *A partnership for democracy and shared prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean*. COM (2011) 200 final, Brussels, 8 March.

European Commission (2012). *The roots of democracy and sustainable development: Europe's engagement with civil society in external relations*. COM (2012) 492 final, Brussels, 1 December.

European Commission (2014). *Multiannual indicative programme for the thematic programme 'civil society organisations and local authorities' for the period 2014-2020*. C (2014) 4865 final, Brussels, 15 July.

Fazi, E. & Smith, J. (2006). *Civil dialogue: Making it work better*. Brussels: Civil Society Contact Group.

Freise, M. (2008). Was meint Brüssel eigentlich, wenn von Zivilgesellschaft die Rede ist? *Forschungsjournal Neue Soziale Bewegungen*, *21*(2), 16–28.

Gromadzki, G. (2011). An urgent challenge for today's Europe: The eastern partnership. *Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft*, *3*, 11–28.

Huber, D. (2008). Democracy assistance in the Middle East and North Africa: A comparison of US and EU policies. *Mediterranean Politics*, *13*, 43–62.

Irrera, D. (2010). The European Union and civil society. In D. Preda & D. Pasquinucci (Eds.), *The road Europe travelled along: The evolution of the EEC/EU institutions and policies* (pp. 183–200). Brussels: Peter Lang.

Jünemann, A. (2002). From the bottom to the top: Civil society and transnational non-governmental organizations in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. *Democratization*, *9*(1), 87–105.

Jünemann, A. (2007). Realpolitisches Nutzenkalkül oder konstruktivistischer Rollenkonflikt? Erklärungsansätze für die Inkohärenz europäischer Demokratieförderung im südlichen Mittelmeerraum. In A. Jünemann & M. Knodt (Eds.), *European external democracy promotion* (pp. 295–316). Nomos: Baden-Baden.

Kohler-Koch, B., & Buth, V. (2009). *Civil society in EU governance: Lobby groups like any other?* TranState working papers, no. 108.

Kostanyan, H. (2014). *The civil society forum of the eastern partnership four years on: Progress, challenges, and prospects*. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies.

Kurki, M. (2011). Governmentality and EU democracy promotion: The European instrument for democracy and human rights and the construction of democratic civil societies. *International Political Sociology*, *5*(4), 349–366.

Lada, A. (2011). Towards a stronger role for civil society in the Eastern Partnership. *Policy Brief*, July 2011. Brussels: European Policy Centre.

Lavenex, S. & Schimmelfennig, F. (2011). EU democracy promotion in the neighbourhood: From leverage to governance? *Democratization*, *18*(4), 885–909.

Leininger, J., & Richter, S. (2012). Flexible und unbürokratische Demokratieförderung durch die EU? *SWP aktuell*, no. 46, August 2012.

Peters, J. (Ed.) (2012). *The European Union and the Arab Spring: Promoting democracy and human rights in the Middle East*. Lanham: Lexington Books.

Ruzza, C. (2004). *Europe and civil society: Movement coalitions and European governance*. Manchester, New York: Manchester University Press.

Schmitter, P. C., & Brouwer, I. (1999). *Conceptualizing, researching and evaluating democracy promotion and protection*. EUI working paper series, no. 99/9.

Shapovalova, N., & Youngs, R. (2012). *EU democracy promotion in the Eastern neighbourhood: A turn to civil society?* Working paper 115. Madrid: FRIDE.

Smith, K. (2003). *European Union foreign policy in a changing world*. Oxford: Polity.

Youngs, R. (2001). *The European Union and the promotion of democracy*. New York: Oxford University Press.

5

Both In-Between and Out: National Sovereignty and Cross-Border Governmentality in Euro 2012 in Lviv

Andrey Makarychev and Alexandra Yatsyk

This chapter addresses a collision of different policies and strategies initiated, pursued and implemented by EU member states towards Ukraine as a co-host of the 2012 UEFA European Championship. Two countries are of particular interest for this study—Poland, as the co-organizer of this mega-event, and Germany, as the most powerful European country that engaged most actively with Ukraine on many policy lines.

In Ukraine, our main focus is Lviv, the western-most of the four cities that hosted the championship. Being one of the most distinctive urban centers in Ukraine, Lviv is located at the intersection of different cul-

A. Makarychev (✉)
Professor of the Johan Skytte Institute for Political Studies, University of Tartu, Estonia

A. Yatsyk
Head of the Center for Cultural Studies of Post-Socialism, Kazan Federal University, Russia

B. Bruns et al. (eds.), *European Neighbourhood Policy*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-69504-1_5

tural traditions and divergent policies of EU actors that contain elements of extra-territorial engagement—border-locking and border-unlocking, inclusion and exclusion, engagement and disengagement. On the one hand, due to its geographical location, Lviv is a frontrunner of Ukraine's ongoing Europeanization—a process of moving closer to European normative order, which reached its highest point in the Ukraine–European Union Association Agreement (AA) signed in 2014. Yet, on the other hand, Ukraine in general, and Lviv in particular, are objects of exclusionary policies based on the multiplicity of European reactions to cases as different as the Yulia Timoshenko affair, corruption, electoral fraud, racist attitudes among football fans and other issues that complicate the acceptance of Ukraine in Europe.

A contradiction between these two policy trends cannot be properly resolved through traditional approaches to political science and international relations that treat states as more or less well-established actors possessing consistent identities and coherent interests. In this chapter, we treat duality and ambiguity of EU member states' policies towards Ukraine not as deviations from the alleged standards of governance, or symptoms of bad quality of governance of the EU; rather, we treat them as manifestations of the 'disjunctive nature of power' (Widder, 2004, p. 417) and point to the impossibility of reducing 'the exercise of power to a single logic' (Rosenow, 2009, p. 517). More specifically, our analysis elucidates a rift between two modalities of European practice of extra-territorial governance. Based on the vocabulary of Michel Foucault, one can be conceptualized as mechanisms of sovereign power grounded in the re-actualization of national identities and concomitant practices of state-to-state diplomacy. Another modality can be dubbed, in Foucauldian terms, governmentality—a concept mainly applied to the analysis of administrative and managerial toolkits at a micro-political level. It is our intention in this chapter to use this concept for analyzing a more complex social milieu that stretches beyond nation state borders and includes international and subnational actors. Both sovereignty and governmentality contain logics of inclusion and exclusion that are differently manifested and executed through practices of extra-territorial engagement.

The analytical distinction between these two concepts helps to address the controversies and inconsistencies in Germany's policies towards Ukraine in the context of the Euro 2012 tournament. We show that the Euro 2012 project became part of policy strategies that develop on two levels. On the one hand, there are political frameworks constitutive of key actors' identities and shaping their relations with each other. These actors are primarily nation states—Poland and Ukraine as co-hosts of Euro 2012, and Germany as the main driving force for change in Central and Eastern Europe. On the other hand, there is a second layer of interaction that involves non-state and sub-state actors. At this level, communication is predominantly grounded in technical projects aimed at the transfer of best practices and stimulating spillover effects. This combination of diverse strategies constitutes an interesting research puzzle that inspired this study.

The authors combine political and sociological insights for inscribing the policies of European actors in local contexts and uncovering the perceptions of these policies in Lviv. Our data consist of 25 in-depth expert interviews conducted in 2013–2014 with Lviv-based policy experts, municipal servants, cultural managers, journalists, intellectuals, artists and entrepreneurs either involved in the organization of Euro 2012 or experienced in other EU–Ukraine projects during recent years. This project was supported by the Center for Urban History of East Central Europe, Lviv, Ukraine (2013–2014).

The chapter contains five sections. The first presents the case of Euro 2012 as opening up new research perspectives that shed light on many issues pertaining to the sociology of international relations. The second briefly introduces the distinction between sovereign power and governmentality that is the key to analyzing forms of extra-territorial engagement. In the two subsequent sections, we focus on and compare other strategies of sovereign power and governmentality as pursued by Germany through different governmental and non-governmental institutions. In the final part, we shift attention to the dominant perceptions of the EU, Germany and Poland in Lviv.

Sovereign Power and Governmentality

To explain immanent elements of the matters mentioned above, we need to take a closer look at the concepts of sovereignty and governmentality, and their practical implications.

Sovereign power is based on unity, centralization, hierarchy and supreme authority capable of acting autonomously, stemming from the dominant understanding of national interests. It might be coercive and punitive ('power over lives and deaths'), and grounded in a territorial and geopolitical thinking (see Singer & Weir, 2006). Sovereignty, thus, is closely connotative with national identities and political strategies developed on their basis. In the European context—and, in particular, in Germany—the concept of the sovereign nation state was, in many respects, challenged by the supra-national model of the EU, yet retains its force as a counter-balance to the allegedly detrimental effects of the renouncement of the nation state as the pivotal source of policy-making. Sports mega-events might be important elements of publicly articulating and exposing the allegiance to the nation state symbols, as the FIFA World Cup hosted by Germany in 2006 demonstrated.

Of course, debates on sovereignty are very contextual and in each country have to be deployed in different political frameworks. The crisis of the Eurozone and the troubles with developing a single EU foreign and security policy strengthen the arguments for a more active engagement of German diplomacy with major international issues, which is especially the case of the crisis in Russia–Ukraine relations. Poland, which is deeply integrated with major European and trans-Atlantic institutions (the EU and NATO, respectively), nevertheless prefers to keep a certain sovereign distance from the Eurozone, and seeks a greater role for Central European countries (the Visegrad Group) in energy and security fields. Poland is also a co-author—along with Sweden—of the Eastern Partnership (EaP), a policy that combines a nation state-based vision of and initiative towards Eastern Europe with EU policy mechanisms and resources. As for Ukraine as a major EaP country, the crisis in relations between Moscow and Kyiv only strengthened the valorization of Ukraine's association with the EU (and, hypothetically, NATO) as a means of protecting this country's sovereignty against the

threats emanating from Russia. As we see, in each of the three countries sovereignty can be a matter of political contestation.

Governmentality, on the contrary, is a de-politicized and mostly technocratic form of power. It conceptualizes power as being operational 'through the modality of freedom' (Neumann & Sending, 2007, p. 693). Governmentality is grounded in tactics of 'good governance at a distance' (and thus is trans-territorial) and aimed at rationally managing and regulating populations (not elites) on the basis of gradually emerging common rules (see Selby, 2007). The governmentality approach embraces institutional practices and normative discourses that target the population by shaping people's conduct on the basis of respect for their rights and autonomy. Unlike sovereignty, governmentality aims at stimulating free conduct and self-awareness of individuals that are incited to act rationally and responsibly. Yet 'in order to act freely, the subject must first be shaped, guided and moulded into one capable of responsibly exercising that freedom' (see Dean, 1999, p.165), which explains why governmentality techniques invest considerable effort in creating structural preconditions for positive change. 'Instead of direct governance, the state steps back and encourages people to become more active, enterprising and responsible for their own decisions' and life choices (Joseph, 2009, p. 415). The concept of 'sports for development' is harmonious with the governmentality approach in exerting a positive influence on socialization, public health, the social inclusion of the disadvantaged, the economic development of regions, and fostering intercultural exchanges (see Lyras & Peachey, 2011).

Against this backdrop, civil society and self-associating local groups are viewed as the most important agents of change. The power of governmentality lies in the ability to mobilize and strengthen these agents through 'technologies of enactment'. Their 'implementation requires both shaping the personal conduct of individuals so that they become civil and productive members of society, and regulating macrostructures such as the economy so that they improve the life and capabilities of the population' (Merlingen, 2006, p. 183). The norms of good governance that governmentality is based on 'are not imposed but are applied using a complex process of assessment, compliance' (Merlingen, 2006, p. 422), monitoring, regulation and so on.

Therefore, promoting rational self-conduct is the kernel of governmentality. This is how the EU intended to act towards Ukraine—not imposing its power, but helping Ukraine to constitute its ability to act independently through optimizing its resources (see Dîrdală, 2013). This strategy of governmentality is effectuated on both the micro level (with urban policies of GIZ as a case in point to be described in this chapter) and the diplomatic level (where independence means avoiding external pressure from Russia). In this respect, one may claim that both the Ukrainian population and the Ukrainian state are subjected to different strategies of European governmentality.

However, the question of whether governmentality works beyond the liberal West remains open for those who claim that this technique of governance 'fails in many parts of the world because it is unable to operate effectively outside of the social conditions of advanced liberal capitalism' (Joseph, 2009, p. 425). The case of Ukraine certainly adds new food for thought in this regard as an example of a country that was the object of governmentality policies of European actors—which policies, however, did not reify its European aspirations and were unable to prevent the bloody conflict in the eastern part of the country.

It has to be noted that non-sovereign forms of power, including governmentality, are not necessarily direct opposites to sovereign strategies. They might not only co-exist, but also mutually condition and reinforce each other (Singer & Weir, 2006, p. 458). The state reinvents itself by adapting techniques and practices of governing (see Tellmann, 2009).

National Identities and Political Strategies: The Case of Euro 2012

From a political perspective, Euro 2012 was originally designed as a debordering project aimed at demonstrating the opportunities for co-hosting a mega-event by an EU member state (Poland) and its neighbor eager to move closer to the European normative order (Ukraine). Ukraine, which was identified with the 'Orange Revolution', and Poland, which could serve as an example in a successful 'return to the West', were expected to

be a good match. In December 2010, the Ukrainian Football Association Chief Grigory Surkis said that Poland and Ukraine 'share the same ideas' (see Keating, 2012), though these ideas were never made explicit.

Euro 2012 was a good chance for Ukraine to show the vitality of its national statehood as being closely embedded in the European context (see Hougaard, 2012). Ukraine and Poland, working together, were expected to prove themselves as efficient and modern states (see Heintz, 2012). It is within this semantic framework that the transformative potential of this sporting event shall be interpreted.

Yet, this politically inclusive logic was counter-balanced by a different type of discursive attitude to Ukraine as a country that, so far, has had problems with being considered a fully fledged European nation. In early 2012, the sharpening of the normative agenda in EU–Ukraine relations (in particular, the debate on the Yulia Timoshenko imprisonment) was ultimately conducive to the political boycotting of Ukraine by a number of European governments, the first of which was Germany. Ultimately, key EU policy-makers (EU Commission President José Manuel Barroso, EU Justice Commissioner Viviane Reding, EU Sports Commissioner Androulla Vassiliou and others) did not show up at Euro 2012. Due to the divisive issues of democracy and human rights, Ukraine was largely portrayed in the European media as drifting away from European standards and governed by a corrupt and undemocratic regime. This fortified the symbolic and political contrast between Ukraine and Poland.

Apart from obvious political connotations, this turn in the dominating public discourses on Ukraine was intertwined with a variety of cultural narratives represented in documentaries (see *The Other Chelsea: A Story from Donetsk*, 2010, directed by Jakob Preuss), the mass media and social networks. Euro 2012 has added a new dimension to the imagery of Ukraine as a country severely constrained both politically and economically in its European drive.

German Policy towards Euro 2012

In the framework of Euro 2012, Germany played different roles, which can be analyzed from both sovereignty and governmentality perspectives.

The latter refers to Germany as a pragmatic investor and a source of transferrable experience to Ukraine (see Handl & Paterson, 2013). As for approaches grounded in a specific understanding of sovereign power, their most interesting element is the German discourse on the boycott of the Ukrainian part of Euro 2012. There were several logics that shaped the German policy in this respect.

One of them can be grasped as based on a peculiar interpretation of body politics. The idea of boycotting Euro 2012 was publicly articulated as a response to Yulia Timoshenko's daughter's plea 'to save the life' of her mother who, while in prison, was physically maltreated.

Evgenia Timoshenko portrayed her mother as the epitome of fundamental political issues that were at stake: 'If she dies, democracy dies with her' (see Connolly, 2012). This argument became a key driver for the pro-boycott position in Germany. Comparisons with the 1978 World Cup in Argentina were justified by the repressive nature of the two regimes, which made German environment minister Norbert Roettgen assume that Ukrainian 'dictatorship' must not be allowed to exploit Euro 2012, and that EU leaders should not give Kyiv 'legitimacy for the torture' (see New Europe, 2012).

By the same token, the debate that commenced as focused on body politics touched on issues of national identities by implying a strong opposition between the European Self and the Ukrainian Other. In particular, graffiti with Celtic crosses and displays of swastika flags were reported among the ultras of FC Karpaty in Lviv (see Radley, 2012). Ultimately, in September 2013, FIFA confirmed the occurrence of several racist and discriminatory incidents perpetrated by local supporters during a match played in Lviv—in particular, the displaying of neo-Nazi banners and the making of 'monkey noises and gestures', as well as the giving of Nazi salutes. FIFA decided that the representative team from Ukraine would be banned from playing in the Arena Lviv stadium for the whole duration of the preliminary competition for the 2018 FIFA World Cup (see FIFA.com, 2013).

The political boycott of Euro 2012 was expected to prove that Ukraine cannot build an authoritarian system and turn a blind eye to racist displays without burning bridges with the EU, and that there is a cost for violating basic European norms and values. Since the Yanukovych government has

passed laws enshrining accession to the EU as the country's top foreign policy goal, it allegedly gave the EU leverage to seek a change of behavior, with Euro 2012 as a good starting point (see Valasek, 2012).

In particular, some boycott campaigners claimed that a transfer of games from Ukraine to another European country would be a right political signal to the undemocratic government in Kyiv and could generate domestic pressure against Yanukovych (see SportWitness, 2012). Following bombings in Dnipropetrovsk which left 27 people injured, Spanish Football Federation president Angel Maria Villar reportedly told UEFA that Spain, if required, would step in to host the tournament (see TheSoccerRoom, 2012). There had already been a meeting more than a year before the tournament during which the German Football Association and Germany's interior minister met to discuss a Plan B for a crisis situation (see 'Calls grow to relocate Euro 2012 from Ukraine', 2012).

The political logic of all parties involved in the debate was sustained by positioning Ukraine at a historical crossroads, which explicates its sensitivity to external pressure. It was illustrative that both the German government and its opponents used this type of logic, but with drastically different conclusions: For Angela Merkel and her supporters, the boycotting campaign could be instrumental in pushing Kyiv closer to European normative landmarks, while for their opponents, the pressure from the EU could only drive Yanukovych into the hands of Russia (see Rattiman, 2012). Having challenged the position taken by Angela Merkel, a number of high-profile figures such as Michael Vesper, the general director of the German Olympic Committee, and Joachim Löw, the coach of the German national football team, suggested that attendance would be a better instrument through which to foster changes in Ukraine (see Allmeling, 2012).

Poland: Co-hosting Euro 2012

Euro 2012 was a strong challenge to Poland, which had to find a delicate balance between close engagement with Ukraine and keeping its own identity as a member of the EU (see Longhurst, 2013).

Since joining the EU, Poland had been consistently trying to raise its policy profile by playing the role of a country with greater experience and

expertise in eastern policy. Yet, Poland's intentions to become a useful EU member were not always met with due sympathy in the EU: Thus, the Polish idea of the Eastern Dimension (a program modeled after the Finland-designed Northern Dimension), as well as Polish proposals on 'energy solidarity' vis-à-vis Russia, were declined. Besides, due to its support for the USA during the Iraq war, Poland's reputation and reliability in 'old European' countries—France and Germany—has been questioned. All this explains the intricacies of Poland's relations with EU member states.

The strategy of politically ostracizing the Yanukovych regime met a fierce counter-reaction from Poland. As a co-organizer of Euro 2012, the latter had every reason to deem that the appeals to boycott Ukraine were tantamount to undermining the cooperative spirit of the whole project. In spite of all the negative effects of the Timoshenko imprisonment, the Polish government was critical of German policy and called for the maintaining of dialogue with Kyiv.

Polish critics of the pro-boycott propositions were keen on deploying the Euro 2012 issue in a wider temporal context. By using historical analogies, they claimed that the Cold War experience of boycotting the Olympics (Moscow in 1980 and Los Angeles in 1984) failed to achieve political goals. By looking to the nearest future, they asked whether Germany was ready to take the same normative stand towards Russia as the host of the 2014 Sochi Olympics and Belarus as the host of the 2014 World Ice Hockey Cup (see Coalson, 2012). The very assumption that Germany might selectively use the boycotting strategy puts it in the same position as the Ukrainian government, which was accused of practicing selective justice. It is noteworthy that a year after Euro 2012, with the domestic conflict in Ukraine and a crisis in Ukrainian–Russian relations, Poland's and Germany's policies again diverged: Warsaw called on the EU to take a unified position in support of Ukrainian independence and integrity, while Berlin's priority was to avoid both irritating Moscow and making excessive commitments to Kyiv. This illustrates the resilience of sovereign diplomacies within the EU and the subsequent political conflicts that it might entail. The pursuance of nation state-based policies toward a non-EU neighbor is prone to political disagreements between the allies.

Governmentality, De-bordering and the Construction of New Spaces of Inclusion

There were two kinds of practice of governmentality that impacted on Euro 2012—policies of UEFA and projects supported by German foundations, foremost GIZ (Society for International Cooperation). Obviously, these institutions had different status and roles in the framework of Euro 2012. UEFA had at its disposal some instruments of indirect control over Ukrainian authorities during the preparation and hosting of the tournament, while GIZ operated through its ongoing projects, working mostly on the micro level with civil society. With all dissimilarities in mind, both UEFA and GIZ were sources of administrative practices and regulations, and both can be analyzed through the prism of the idea of governmentality.

UEFA

UEFA's policy towards Ukraine represented an intricate combination of different strategies—political and administrative, as well as inclusive and exclusive.

According to the head of UEFA, Michel Platini, the very decision to hold the championship in Poland and Ukraine was largely political, since technically the Italian bid was of a higher standard. For some commentators, the organization of the championship in Ukraine was a sign of Europe's goodwill (see NewEurope, 2012), which only corroborated the hierarchical context of this decision. Yet, the logic behind the decision taken in 2007 was to open up the co-hosts 'for other political realities' and 'open doors to the East' (Censor.Net, 2011)—arguments that correlate with the German *Ostpolitik*, as well as the EU-supported Eastern Partnership (EaP) program announced in 2008 and promoted by Poland. In this context, Platini assumed that, in terms of its infrastructural conditions, Ukraine lagged far behind the most developed European countries (Germany, France, the UK and Italy) and thus shared similar problems with a different category of mega-events hosts—less developed economies such as Brazil and South Africa. The very placement of Ukraine (along with

Poland) in one category with these countries suggested that the co-hosts of Euro 2012 were supposed to adopt the standards and practices of more experienced football countries.

The co-hosts of Euro 2012 came up with their own interpretations of the UEFA decision. For example, Grigory Surkis, the head of the Ukrainian Football Association, dubbed it 'a historical choice' that would allow Ukraine fully to reap the fruits of its independence (Korrespondent.net, 2007). His Polish counterpart, Michał Listkiewicz, added that the UEFA decision was a 'victory for all Eastern Europe'.

In the meantime, Platini mentioned that the 'financial situation in Poland was much better […]. It was Ukraine that we have discussed repeatedly. At that time this country faced domestic political troubles, and we did not feel support from the government' (Metro, 2011).On one particular occasion, he confessed that UEFA wanted to acknowledge that including Ukraine was a mistake and to drop Ukraine from the event. The then president, Viktor Yanukovych, also admitted that Platini had once commented to him that 'Ukraine has no chances' of hosting the tournament (NovostiUA, 2012).

The Yulia Timoshenko controversy re-ignited Ukraine-skeptic attitudes in Europe. A group of European politicians signed an open letter to Platini suggesting that he ought publicly to raise issues of political repression and injustice in Ukraine (see UkrInformNews, 2012). The German ombudsman Markus Lening put the whole issue in a human rights context and accused Platini of refusing to engage directly in pressurizing the Ukrainian government over the Timoshenko affair (see UaWorld, 2012). These debates were paralleled by an appeal for boycotting Euro 2012 that came from the Ukrainian women's group FEMEN, which staged a topless protest against what they said were UEFA's plans to turn economically weak Ukraine into a destination for sex tourists from around the globe (see the television channel Russia Today, 2011).

The inevitable politicization of the Euro 2012 project was due to the ongoing process of initiating the AA between the EU and Ukraine. Many in the EU were eager to use this important document as leverage to force the Yanukovych regime to relinquish political practices incompatible with the European normative order.

However, UEFA's engagement with political discourses was rather limited:

> UEFA never gets involved in politics […] We're not going to be politicians. We're never going to talk about religious politics; 'we're never going to talk about racial politics', Platini said. (Rainbow, 2012)

Indeed, most of UEFA's practical interventions were technical rather than political. Thus, Platini called the Ukrainian authorities to intervene in order to keep hotel prices in host cities reasonably low. In Poland, he demanded that a better substitute be found for the turf pitch in all stadia (see Kartashov, 2012).

In the meantime, UEFA did have its say in easing certain regulatory practices. A good example was UEFA's lobbying for a visa-facilitation agreement between the two co-hosts. In this context, Platini referred to a positive experience of the Moscow-hosted Champions League final when the Russian government allowed visa-free travel for all tourists with a valid ticket for the game (see Football.ua, 2012).

Ultimately, UEFA gave a very high assessment to Euro 2012. In the words of Platini, due to 2012 Ukraine made a 30-year breakthrough in developing its infrastructure and economy (see ProSport, 2012). Yet, in Europe, the success of Euro 2012, even in technical terms, appears debatable (see Riach, 2012).

It reveals a wider problem that Euro 2012 left behind—where the boundaries of Europe lie, and whether Euro 2012 was instrumental not only in technically liaising Ukraine with Europe, but also in repositioning Ukraine as a part of the wider European market and a fully fledged member of the European social, political and cultural milieu.

GIZ

The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) is a German agency funded by the government which operates worldwide. As a federal organization, GIZ implements the international policies of the German government, promoting projects conceptually focused on human rights, sustainable development and civil society. Ukraine is considered an important part of GIZ's European program, with 20 locations in the country and more than 90 national and international staff (GIZ, 2015).

Despite the appeals of many German politicians to boycott Euro 2012 in Ukraine, GIZ established itself as one of the most involved actors assisting Ukraine in preparing for the tournament. Providing advisory services in urban development, the GIZ policy towards Euro 2012 was aimed at sharing the German experience of hosting mega-events in terms of improving public transportation, location marketing and tourism promotion. It is noteworthy that, in 2012, GIZ assisted in bringing the European Cultural Festival 'The Night of Industrial Heritage'—which had previously only taken place in Europe—to the cities of Donetsk and Lugansk (see Zmina, 2012) which, only two years later, became the most notorious centers of pro-Russian armed rebellion against the central authorities in Kyiv.

A visitor opinion poll conducted by GIZ after Euro 2012 demonstrated a high level of satisfaction with security during the event, with the attractiveness of the host cities for tourists and with transportation. Lviv was placed at the top among hosts in terms of security (67 %), comfort (83 %), service (86 %) and fan zone management (66 %). Most Euro 2012 attendants wished to come back to Lviv again (68 %) (see Zasadnyy, 2012).

Lviv's European identity and its openness to European practices of governance have also been highlighted by an employee of the GIZ office in Lviv who is in charge of the old building renovation program. The readiness of the city administration to share a cooperative experience was referred to as a key to success. Yet, the intention of the public authorities to change the city's urban milieu was not sufficient for developing the GIZ-administered projects, since major roles have to be played by local NGOs and the residents themselves:

> When we started, we drafted a big questionnaire about the urban renewal […]. Our approach was that actually not the city administration, but you and us should do something […]. So we tried to turn their lenses to start seeing their own environment and their own chances as well […] We set up such an instrument as a co-financing support program […] Co-financing always means responsibility sharing. (Interview with a head of the GIZ office, Lviv, 2014)

This kind of work—bent on self-improvement and changing people's vision—is considered as the core of the GIZ-promoted rationality conducive to improving the quality of everyday life. To share responsibility in European terms also means to care about the neighborhood, to share experiences with others and to transfer them through routine practices of everyday life. It was through the governmentality toolkits—policy learning, transfer of best practices, citizen empowerment and enactment—that Lviv promoted its strategy of transforming the city from a peripheral status to a frontrunner of Europeanization and inclusion in the domain of European norms.

Euro 2012 as Seen from Lviv

For Ukraine, Euro 2012 was an important element of the country's strategy for a European future that boiled down to the concept of normalization. In 2012, the then Foreign Ministry spokesman, Oleg Voloshyn, suggested that 'ordinary fans have discovered that Ukraine was a pleasant and normal European country' (Harding, 2012). This strategy of reconnecting with Europe was of particular importance to Lviv, the westernmost city in Ukraine.

Lviv is an illuminating example of a border-located urban and regional identity that embodies an authentic territorial spirit grounded in a strong European cultural legacy that simultaneously proclaims its 'Ukrainianness'. This both external and inner borderland positioning was the basic point for the place-making strategy of Lviv's Euro 2012 PR campaign that promoted it as an 'open' space ('*Lviv open to the world*') (Zasadnyy, Vilyra, Zubachuk et al., 2012), with a modernized Ukrainian identity symbolically 'approved' by Europe. Europe was a key reference point for branding Lviv as a peculiar European city of Ukraine ('*Another Ukraine*' and '*The last unknown treasure of Europe*') (see Zasadnyy et al., 2012).

In the meantime, our interviews unveiled the practical absence of the EU—often associated with Europe as a whole—as a political subject in the local narratives. As a top staff member of the Ukrainian Catholic University in Lviv, a former Ukrainian dissident and a Soviet-era political prisoner, mentioned in June 2014:

> There is much dissatisfaction here about Europe [...]. This is because we think that Europe can't imagine that sometimes you need to pay a price for your values. My message to Europe is that you should not compromise your values for energy or even military security, since you run the risk to lose all. Yet on the other hand, there are mechanisms that neighbors can use to influence Europe. It remains attractive, even if by no means it is a club of altruists.

Against this blend of uncertainty and skepticism, Europe is mostly reduced to two countries—Germany and Poland. *Germany* is viewed in mostly positive tones, despite the country's campaign for politically boycotting Euro 2012. *Poland* is perceived as a country that can share a great deal with Ukraine in terms of everyday practices of governance, and even as a 'window to Europe'. The two countries went through a period of mutual rapprochement and pacification of their relations in the 1990s. On the one hand, there is a strong gravitation towards Poland as a successful example of integration with European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. On the other hand, there are many historical issues that still remain sensitive.

Pragmatic interests are also part of bilateral relations. Thus, according to the chief manager of Euro 2012 in Lviv, 'the German fans were advised not to stay overnight in Ukraine, the Polish strategy was to offer them an alternative—a cheaper lodging to be paid in Euro; this is how the Poles took advantage of their border location' (September, 2013).

This explains why identification with Poland as a full member of European and Euro-Atlantic institutions was not a key priority for Lviv:

> I don't think that the Euro 2012 has boosted the feelings of togetherness with Poland. Initially it could be the case, when Poland gave us its hand and assumed that we can be together in Europe. But then practical issues grew high on the agenda—who is more ready and so on. Poland was less and less talked about; instead people here tried to convince Europe of their European identity. (Interview with a top staff of the Ukrainian Catholic University in Lviv, 2014)

In a more practical sense, the Lviv organizers of Euro 2012 reacted to the negative campaign in the European media against Ukraine by launching an additional project aimed at reaching the countries whose teams were to play in the city. Representatives of national teams, fan

clubs and the media were taken to Lviv to show that it corresponds to the most important elements of the 'normal' European city—comfort, safety, hospitality, multi-language environment and quality cuisine.

Interestingly, our respondents in Lviv mentioned the Ukrainian capital mostly as a negative reference point, which betrays the complex structure of Lviv's identity discourse. On the one hand, the city tries to underpin its Ukrainian identity as opposed to not always amicable Western partners; on the other hand, it might seek solidarity with an external power in an attempt to distance itself symbolically from the rest of Ukraine:

> Ukrainian identity in Lviv is competitive […] We are open to the world and eager to show how cool our identity is […] Yet after the decision on the Euro 2012 was taken in 2007, the first two or three years the whole Ukraine was doing its best to kick Lviv out of the group of host cities. This all dates back to the 1990s, with Lviv being treated as an 'alien body', too European for Kyiv, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk and so on. We stayed on the list only thanks to the Poles who said that without Lviv there is nothing to talk about whatsoever. (Interview with an expert of the Ukrainian Galician Society, Lviv, 2014)

To conclude this section, we should note that many of our informants were inclined to accept European practices of governance and governmentality (as exemplified by joint projects with German and Polish colleagues), rather than sovereign policies of European countries that are viewed as conflictual, and even imposing, due to their negative historical connotations. In this light, Poland is perceived as a good partner for micro-political projects and pragmatic exchanges, rather than for borrowing innovations or learning. Germany is valorized as a source of transferable practices of good governance, and definitely not for its politically ambiguous position regarding Ukraine's prospects in the West.

Conclusion: Euro 2012 from a Perspective of the Ukraine Crisis

Before Euro 2012, many analysts wondered whether this mega-event would be a catalyst for the reawakening of Ukraine's European self-assertiveness and the boosting of its resources for further integration

with the EU (see Cooper, 2012). The political events that happened after 2012—the Euromaidan revolt that began in November 2013, the de-throning of Viktor Yanukovych, and the Russian policy of annexing Crimea and supporting the military rebellion in eastern Ukraine—give a picture of a deeply divided country whose future, as well as relations with its neighbors, are far from certain.

Ukraine, indeed, faced tremendous difficulties in properly instrumentalizing the positive momentum generated by Euro 2012. In 2013, Lviv was punished by FIFA for the racist behavior of local football fans and has been banned from international games until 2018. Due to hostilities in eastern Ukraine, the 2015 European basketball championship was moved from Ukraine to a different country, and Lviv's bid for the Olympic Games in 2022 was cancelled for financial reasons. As a Ukrainian football writer assumes, after the championship Lviv faces troubles: 'The town's team, FC Karpaty, is unhappy with how much the Arena Lviv has cost and has only played a few games there. They are now playing at their old stadium, even citing bad luck as one of the reasons for not playing at Arena Lviv. As a result, the 35 000-capacity arena that was built specifically for Euro 2012 is vacant and loaded with debts' (Boyko, 2013).

Yet, Euro 2012 was also a problem-raising story for the EU and its member states, which were proved unable to use their policy tools effectively in dealing with the authoritarian regime in Kyiv (see Kudelia, 2013). The concept of European unity towards Ukraine was a test case in 2011–2012, and it still remains the key issue for EU policies in Eastern Europe. Ukraine-skeptic arguments that were aired in many European countries before Euro 2012 were, one year later, reiterated in the completely new political and security situation of the growing domestic tensions and the open conflict between Moscow and Kyiv. The EU prospects for Ukraine are limited to the AA signed in 2014, which only actualizes the significance of other forms of institutional, economic, societal and cultural inclusion in Europe not necessarily based on the prospects of EU membership.

References

Allmeling, A. (2012). Calls for Euro 2012 boycott increase in Germany. *Deutsche Welle*, 29 April. Retrieved November 3, 2014 from http://www.dw.de/calls-for-Euro 2012-boycott-increase-in-germany/a-15917429.

Boyko, I. (2013). Euro 2012 one year on—Was it worth it for Ukraine? *The Guardian*, 30 July. Retrieved November 3, 2014 from http://www.theguardian.com/football/blog/2013/jul/30/Euro 2012-ukraine-one-year-on.

Calls grow to relocate Euro 2012 from Ukraine (2012). What to do while in Ukraine. Retrieved November 3, 2014 from http://nlru.blogspot.ru/2012/05/calls-grow-to-relocate-Euro 2012-from.html.

Censor.Net (2011). 'Платини: проведение Евро в Украине—это хорошее решение' (Platini: Euro in Ukraine is a good decision). *CensorNet*, 4 March. Retrieved November 3, 2014 from http://censor.net.ua/news/158946/provedenie_evro2012_v_ukraine__eto_horoshee_reshenie_lyudi_budut_dovolny__platini.

Coalson, R. (2012). EU calls for Euro 2012 boycott leave Poland in the lurch. *Radio Free Europe*, 4 May. Retrieved November 3, 2014 from http://www.rferl.org/content/euro_2012_football_soccer_ukraine_poland_eu_boycott/24570012.html.

Connolly, K. (2012). Angela Merkel plans Euro 2012 boycott if Yulia Tymoshenko kept in jail. *The Guardian*, 29 April. Retrieved November 3, 2014 from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/apr/29/angela-merkel-boycott-Euro 2012-yulia-tymoshenko.

Cooper, A. (2012). Euro 2012 moves beyond football with boycott challenge on Ukraine. *GIGI*, 14 May. Retrieved November 4, 2014 from http://www.cigionline.org/blogs/worlds-of-global-governance/Euro2012-moves-beyond-football-boycott-challenge-ukraine.

Dean, M. (1999). *Governmentality: power and rule in modern society*. London: Sage.

Dîrdală, L.-D. (2013). After Vilnius: The European Union's smart power and the Eastern Neighbourhood. *Eastern Journal of European Studies*, *4*(2), 123–136.

FIFA.com (2013). Sanctions of the FIFA Disciplinary Committee against Ukraine and Peru. *FIFA.com*, 27 September. Retrieved November 3, 2014 from http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/euro2012/article-2149548/Euro-2012-Alex-Oxlade-Chamberlains-family-fear-racism.html.

Football.Ua (2012). 'Платини: Украина и Польша должны решить вопрос визового въезда' (Platini: Ukraine and Poland has to solve the problem of visa regime). *Football. Ua*, 20 January. Retrieved November 4, 2014 from http://2012.football.ua/news/view/144681.html.

GIZ (2015). Ukraine. *GIZ web portal*. Retrieved June 25, 2015 from http://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/302.html.

Handl, V. & Paterson, W. E. (2013). The continuing relevance of Germany's engine for CEE and the EU. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, *46*(3), 327–337.

Harding, L. (2012). Ukraine may discover Euro 2012 politics is a game of two halves. *The Guardian*, 14 June. Retrieved November 4, 2014 from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jun/14/ukraine-Euro 2012-politics-two-halves.

Heintz, J. (2012). Boycott of Ukraine during Euro 2012 carries risks. *Fox News*, 11 May. Retrieved November 3, 2014 from http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/05/11/boycott-ukraine-during-Euro 2012-carries-risks.

Hougaard, A.G. (2012). The discussion about Euro 2012 is sweeping the globe: Boycott or not to boycott? In *Global analysis 2012*. Retrieved November 3, 2014 from http://globalanalysis2012.blogspot.ru/2012/11/the-discussion-about-Euro 2012-is.html.

Joseph, J. (2009). Governmentality of what? Populations, states and international organisations. *Global Society*, *23*(4), 413–427.

Kartashov, A. (2012). Pol'skie polia trebuyut zameny. (Польские поля требуют замены). *Gazeta.ru*, 13 April. Retrieved November 4, 2014 from http://www.gazeta.ru/sport/2012/04/12/a_4344489.shtml.

Keating, J. (2012). European leaders consider Euro Cup boycott over Tymoshenko. *Foreign Policy*. Retrieved November 3, 2014 from http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/05/01/european_leaders_consider_euro_cup_boycott_over_tymoshenko.

Korrespondent.net (2007). Суркис: УЕФА сделала исторический выбор. (Surkis: UEFA made the historical choice), *Korrespondent.net*, 18 April. Retrieved November 4, 2014 from http://korrespondent.net/sport/football/186978-surkis-uefa-sdelala-istoricheskij-vybor.

Kudelia, S. (2013). When external leverage fails. *Problems of Post-Communism*, *60*(1), 29–42.

Longhurst, K. (2013). Where from, where to? New and old configurations in Poland's foreign and security policy priorities. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, *46*(3), 363–372.

Lyras, A. & Peachey, W. J. (2011). Integrating sport-for-development theory and praxis. *Sport Management Review*, *14*(4), 311–326.

Merlingen, M. (2006). Foucault and world politics: Promises and challenges of extending governmentality theory to the European and beyond. *Millennium—Journal of International Studies*, *35*(1), 181–196.

Metro (2011). Мишель Платини: Евро 2012—большое приключение' (Michel Platini: Euro 2012—A big adventure), *Metro*, 4 December. http://www.metronews.ru/novosti/mishel-platini-evro-2012-bol-shoe-prikljuchenie/Tpokld—DMBvFyTPjRlQ.

Neumann, I. B. & Sending, O. J. (2007). "The International" as governmentality. *Millennium—Journal of International Studies*, *35*(3), 677–701.

New Europe (2012). European leaders to boycott Ukrainian part of Euro 2012 over Tymoshenko. *New Europe*, 30 April. Retrieved November 3, 2014 from http://www.neurope.eu/article/european-leaders-boycott-ukrainian-part-Euro-2012-over-tymoshenko.

NovostiUA (2012). 'Якукович: мир изменит свое отношение к Украине после Евро-2012' (Yanukovich: The world will change its relation to Ukraine after Euro-2012), *Novosti UA*, 21 May 2012. Retrieved November 4, 2014 from http://novostiua.net/main/8355-yanukovich-mir-izmenit-svoe-mnenie-ob-ukraine-posle-evro-2012.html.

ProSport (2012). Платини о Евро-2012 в Украине: тяжелые роды дарят прекрасных детей' (Platini about Euro-2012 in Ukraine: Difficult maternity gibes beautiful children), *ProSport*, 20 March. Retrieved November 4, 2014 from http://prosport-ru.tsn.ua/sport/platini-o-evro-2012-v-ukraine-tyazhelye-rody-daryat-prekrasnyh-detey.html.

Radley, P. (2012). 'Euro 2012: Reality of life in Ukraine', *The National Sport*, 29 June. Retrieved November 3, 2014 from http://www.thenational.ae/sport/football/Euro-2012-reality-of-life-in-ukraine#page3.

Rainbow, J. (2012). 'Platini sidesteps the political football as Euro 2012 party begins', *World Soccer*, 7 June. Retrieved November 4, 2014 from http://www.worldsoccer.com/columnists/keir-radnedge/platini-sidesteps-the-political-football-as- Euro 2012-party-begins.

Rattiman, A. (2012). Poland: Euro2012 boycott based on ulterior motives. *EUobserver*, 3 May. Retrieved November 3, 2014 from http://euobserver.com/foreign/116124.

Riach, J. (2012). Euro 2020 to be hosted across Europe, Uefa announces. *The Guardian*, 6 December. Retrieved November 4, 2014 from http://www.theguardian.com/football/2012/dec/06/euro-2020-across-europe-uefa.

Rosenow, D. (2009). Decentring global power: The merits of a Foucauldian approach to international relations. *Global Society*, *23*(4), 497–517.

Russia Today (2011). Topless protests slam Ukraine's future as global football bordello. *Russia Today*. Retrieved November 4, 2014 from http://rt.com/sport/football/topless-femen-platini-ukraine-euro2012-prostitution-489/.

Selby, J. (2007). Engaging foucault: Discourse, liberal governance and the limits of Foucauldian IR. *International Relations*, *21*(3), 324–345.

Singer, B. C. J. & Weir, L. (2006). Politics and sovereign power: Considerations on Foucault. *European Journal of Social Theory*, *9*(4), 443–465.

SportWitness (2012). Germans want Euro 2012 moved from Ukraine to their country, or they'll boycott it. *Sport Witness*, 1 May. Retrieved November 3, 2014 from http://sportwitness.ning.com/forum/topics/germans-want-Euro 2012-moved-from-ukraine-to-their-country-or-the.

Tellmann, U. (2009). Foucault and the invisible economy. *Foucault Studies*, *6*, 5–24.

The Soccer Room (2012). Call for Euro 2012 boycott getting louder and louder. *The Soccer Room*, 1 May. Retrieved November 3, 2014 from http://thesoccer-room.com/call-for-Euro 2012-boycott-getting-louder-and-louder.

UaWorld (2012). 'Маркус Ленинг: Платини должно быть стыдно' (Marcus Lening: Platini has to be ashamed), *UaWorld*, 23 April. Retrieved 17 October 2014 from http://uaworld.org/politics/markus-lening-platini-dolzhno-byt-stydno.html.

UkrInformNews (2012). European politicians ask Platini to talk more about political persecution in Ukraine. *UkrInform News Agency*, 12 March. Retrieved November 4, 2014 from http://www.ukrinform.ua/eng/news/european_politicians_ask_platini_to_talk_more_about_political_persecution_in_ukraine.

Valasek, T. (2012). Soccer boycott could kick Ukraine toward reform. *Bloomberg View*, 10 May. Retrieved November 3, 2014 from http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2012-05-10/soccer-boycott-could-kick-ukraine-toward-reform.

Widder, N. (2004). Foucault and power revisited. *European Journal of Political Theory*, *3*(4), 411–432.

Zasadnyy O. (2012). *EURO 2012*: *Ochjukovannja ta resultatyu*. Lviv. Retrieved November 3, 2014 from http://congress.lviv.ua/en/forum-2012/presentations/.

Zasadnyy, O., Vilyra, O., Zubachuk, R. et al. (2012). *UEFA EURO 2012 in Lviv*: *Best practices in event management*. Lviv.

Zmina (2012). 'Ночь индустриальной культуры. Вторая смена' (Night of industrial culture. Late shift). *The project Zmina official web site*. Retrieved November 4, 2014 from http://www.zmina.dontourism.com.ua/project.

6

The EaP Achievements in Ukraine and Georgia: Public Opinion vs. Institutional Changes

Tetiana Kostiuchenko and Liubov Akulenko

Research Framework

The Eastern Partnership (EaP) initiative with the eastern neighbors of the European Union, including Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Belarus, was introduced by Polish and Swedish diplomats in June 2008 and published in a communiqué of the European Commission in December 2008. Since then, there has been a launch of a qualitatively new form of cooperation for all sides, officially starting in May 2009 with the EaP Summit in Prague. The EaP initiative aims to 'create necessary conditions for the facilitation of political association and further economic integration between the European Union and interested country partners'.[1] Within the EaP initiative, the eastern

[1] Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/er/107589.pdf.

T. Kostiuchenko (✉) • L. Akulenko
National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Kyiv, UK

B. Bruns et al. (eds.), *European Neighbourhood Policy*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-69504-1_6

neighbors of the EU formed a so-called 'own club' in order to strengthen the neighborhood policy of the EU. Geopolitical claims about EU integration were based on the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and its financial component—the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI).

In line with the introduction, we consider the EaP and the ENP as extra-territorial measures of the EU which allow the transfer of EU standards into third countries, such as Ukraine and Georgia. Therefore, we concentrate on the integrating effects the implementation of the EaP and ENP may have with regard to Georgia's and Ukraine's relations towards the EU.

The overall differentiation of the eastern 'bloc' of EU neighbor states is believed to be an important step from a geopolitical perspective. A realistic view of the EaP reveals that the eastern neighbors of the EU were offered support in political, institutional and economic reforms based on EU standards, along with easier trade procedures—through the Association Agreements (AA), including the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) program and the liberalization of visa procedures.

The EaP mechanisms act on different levels and include meetings of the country heads and governments of the EU member states and partner states, meetings of foreign affairs ministers, multilateral thematic platforms of senior authorities, the Eastern Partnership Forum, the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly and groups of EaP friends. They allow for better visibility of the eastern region. We will not evaluate such aspects of the EaP initiative as its funding was claimed insufficient by some experts. However, it should be mentioned that, during 2010–2013, partner countries received about €350 million in support from the EU, in addition to the €250 million re-directed from the eastern regional program of the ENPI to the multilateral projects of the EaP.

Some experts consider the gap between geopolitical and instrumental dimensions of the EaP to be the reason for the inadequate assessment of the initiative. As indicated by the European Commission when reconsidering the ENP in May 2011, 'there were more achievements in the economic sphere, specifically in trade and legislative adoption than in democratic

governance'.[2] The overall progress of European integration requires complex measures—from the assessment of governmental and non-governmental activities to the public support of European integration among the population. However, some authors claim that non-violent protests that occurred in some post-Soviet states created both opportunities and constraints for their people to overcome their post-Soviet heritage and to proceed with their movement towards modernized economic, political and social orders (see Gallina, 2009). Recent publications are mainly focused on the policies transformation and legal aspects of the EaP, and the negotiations regarding signing the Association Agreement between EaP states and the EU (see Kaminska, 2014; Šiškova, 2014). Some authors draw rather skeptical conclusions about the efficiency of the EaP initiative for the post-Soviet public (see Stegniy, 2014). We believe that, in order to draw a conclusion on EaP effects on the transformations in Georgia and Ukraine with regard to European integration, it is necessary to compare both public opinion and legislative changes.

Our study seeks to explore and reveal the correspondence between the public attitude towards EU integration, on the one hand, and government efforts within the EaP framework, on the other. The latter is measured with the European Integration Index for Eastern Partnership Countries (EaP Index)—an instrument developed by third sector activists and analysts to evaluate and compare the progress of EaP activities in all six EaP states. In order to evaluate the achievements of governmental activities in the EaP framework and to compare them with public opinion dynamics, we take two cases of EaP countries—Ukraine and Georgia—and study various aspects of their European integration efforts. First, we analyze the results of public opinion polls on EU accession, European values and reforms implemented by the governments of these countries. Then, we provide an overview of the respective legislation initiatives within the EaP framework in both states, and we use the EaP Index as a tool to measure the correspondence of the national legislation and procedures coherence with European legal norms.

[2] 'Taking stock of the European Neighbourhood Policy', European Commission communication COM (2010) 207, May 12, 2010.

The reason for choosing Ukraine and Georgia is that they both experienced non-violent 'colored revolutions' (Georgian Rose Revolution in 2003, Ukrainian Orange Revolution in 2004), after which their authorities emphasized their strong intention to become more 'European', along with acquiring European values in the everyday life of the wider public. Additionally, 'colored revolutions' revealed the impact of civil society in making the post-Soviet national identity more oriented towards European values (see McFaul, 2005). Some authors emphasize the willingness of Eastern European states to be closer to, or even a part of, the European Union through the aim of joining a supra-national identity, which, in turn, leads to regional contestation and conflicts (see Steenbergen & Scott, 2004). Therefore, the integration of the former Soviet republics and enlargement rely on the intensity of a feeling of common identity among the public in these non-EU states towards the EU (see Franke, Gawrich, Melnykovska & Schweickert, 2010; Gawrich, Melnykovska & Schweickert, 2010; Melnykovska & Schweickert, 2008). If 'being European' means as much as 'being Ukrainian/Georgian' to the people, such mass public attitude could serve as one of two primary internal drivers of an integration process. The implementation of reforms by the government, political parties and other political elite actors is another internal driver which contributes to the compliance of state policies and legislation with European norms.

Public Opinion about the EU Integration in Ukraine and Georgia

In 2013, the EaP initiative could have resulted in the signing of Association Agreements by the presidents of Ukraine and Georgia during the EaP Summit in Vilnius on November 28–29, 2013. Instead, a few days prior to the summit, Ukraine experienced a radical change of the governmental political vector in favor of the Eurasian Union with Russia and the denial of any intentions of integrating with Europe. Such an unexpected change provoked thousands of people to express their opinions in protest, which took the form of mass gatherings in Kyiv's city center squares and lasted

from November 2013 untill February 2014. These mass protests were called Euromaidan,[3] although the shift of the integration vector from Europe to Russia proclaimed by the Ukrainian government provoked the initial week of protest. This issue became less central after students were beaten by the police during the night of November 30, 2013, bringing new issues into the focus of the protesters' agenda—lack of people's control under the government, corruption among authorities and other topics which, in a broader sense, are closely related to European/Western values such as the rule of law, the right of speech, the fight against corruption, fair elections and so on. However, before those mass protests took place, the government of the fourth Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovych, proclaimed the EU integration vector among its priorities. Both Ukraine and Georgia were intended to initialize the EU Association Agreement during the November 2013 EaP Summit. Concomitantly, governmental and non-governmental actors in both countries studied public opinion regarding European integration.

Ukraine

The issues related to the European integration of Ukraine had been the focus of researchers' attention since 2004 (here, survey data from 2002 to 2014 is used), and high demand in pro-European values caused political parties and their leaders to declare slogans and strategies among their

[3] The name 'Euromaidan' became widely used because the initial intention and reason for starting the protests was the decision of the government to stop the European integration process just before the EaP Summit in Vilnius in November 2013 and to begin accession to the 'Eurasian Union' instead. However, European integration did not remain the core reasoning of Euromaidan. Other reasons were mentioned by its active participants as the major ones to make them protest—for the details of the survey conducted in December 2013 among Euromaidan active participants, see the publication of the Democratic Initiatives Foundation, the think tank that conducted a survey together with KIIS, http://www.dif.org.ua/ua/publications/gromadska-dumka/evrorotestu.htm.

[4] The Orange Revolution in Ukraine was a peaceful uprising of the citizenry that began as a protest against the falsification of presidential election results, and evolved into a mass expression of discontent with the country's political leadership. In December 2004, street protests forced the incumbent regime to agree to hold a repeat vote and, in January 2005, Viktor Yushchenko, the opposition candidate, was elected as president. His opponent, Viktor Yanukovych, came to office a few years later, in 2010, being prime minister in 2006–2010 (with some breaks) during Yushchenko's presidency.

Table 6.1 Overall attitude towards the EU among Ukrainians, 2011 (%)

In general, what is your attitude towards the EU?	Feb. 2011 *N* = 2035	Nov. 2011 *N* = 2037
Very positive	24.9	21.2
Somewhat positive	44.1	39.8
Somewhat negative	8.5	14.6
Very negative	3.5	7.1
Difficult to say	19.1	17.3

priorities before the elections. Thus, in 2005–2007, after the Orange Revolution,[4] when the European integration was announced as a goal for the new government led by Viktor Yushchenko, some parties followed this direction, while the others chose the opposite course and started (or, rather, continued) to follow the path of Ukraine's integration to the east with the aim of joining the Eurasian Union (Melnykovska, Schweickert & Kostiuchenko, 2011). Therefore, public opinion polls conducted on a regular basis provided information to sociologists, political analysts and politicians about which of these two choices was preferred by the wider public—specifically, what were considered to be the weak and strong sides of each direction of integration, and how their perception might be transformed.

According to the surveys conducted by Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) during the last decade,[5] the general attitude towards the EU was somewhat positive among the vast majority of Ukrainians, ranging from 60 % to 70 % among the total population during 2011 (see Table 6.1). However, the support for integration with the EU among the Ukrainian population had fluctuated, growing from 34 % in 2005 to 58 % in 2007 and even to 65 % in 2009 (the peak of the 'Gas war' with Russia), then decreasing to 44 % in 2010 (Table 6.2). It remained relatively stable during 2012–2013.

Despite these fluctuations, the support of half of the population might seem to be relatively sufficient to persuade the government of the need to

[5] Several research institutions conducted public opinion polls on the EU integration issues. The KIIS databank provides comparable survey data for 2002–2013; some think tanks and non-governmental organizations also initiated opinion polls to define key directions for further activities within the EU-integration support growth among Ukrainians (i.e. NGO 'Centre UA' with the support of PACT/UNITER initiative by USAID).

Table 6.2 Support for Ukraine's membership in the EU by Ukrainians, 2005–2012 (%)

If there were a referendum tomorrow, would you vote for Ukraine's membership in the EU?	Dec. 2005 *N* = 2013	Oct. 2007 *N* = 1934	Jun. 2009 *N* = 2012	Feb. 2010 *N* = 2032	Feb. 2012 *N* = 2027	Sep. 2012 *N* = 1988
For EU membership	33.6	57.7	65.0	43.5	39.7	44.8
Against EU membership	39.1	24.8	17.7	26.2	33.2	30.1
Would not vote at all	8.3	5.6	5.5	6.7	6.8	6.6
Don't know	19.0	11.9	11.8	23.6	20.3	18.4

enhance the European integration efforts. Such an optimistic picture should be corrected, however, as a certain percentage of the Ukrainian population supported both integration vectors—pro-European and pro-Russian (so-called 'multi-vector'). If the question was asked as a single choice between the EU and the Custom Union/Eurasian Union led by Russia, the support for EU integration was 16 % in 2002, increased to 25 % in 2004, and to 30 % in 2008. Further dynamics demonstrate a slight decline—around a quarter of the whole population (25 %) was in

Table 6.3 Direction of Ukraine's development as seen by the Ukrainian population before the Orange Revolution (%)

How should Ukraine develop (which direction do you consider to be better)?	Jan. 2002 *N* = 2264	Feb. 2002 *N* = 2199	Nov. 2002 *N* = 2022
Ukraine should follow the West in its development, with a view to joining the EU	18.0	15.9	16.5
Ukraine should recover close friendship with Russia and Belarus, with a view to joining the union of Slavic states	45.9	47.5	42.5
Ukraine and Russia together should integrate into the EU	11.4	9.0	15.5
The future of Ukraine lies in preserving its complete independence and development following its own ways, which are different from those existing elsewhere in the world	15.7	18.6	18.1
Don't know/difficult to answer	8.9	8.9	7.4

Table 6.4 Direction of Ukraine's development as seen by Ukrainians after the Orange Revolution (%)

If there were a referendum as to whether Ukraine should join the European Union or the union with Russia and Belarus, or join neither of them, which option would you vote for?	Feb. 2006 *N* = 2016	Mar. 2006 *N* = 1996	Feb. 2008 *N* = 2043	Sep. 2008 *N* = 2069
Join the European Union	26.8	22.1	30.2	29.0
Join the union with Russia and Belarus	51.4	47.2	43.1	38.7
Do not join any of them	11.9	24.1	21.6	25.4
Don't know/difficult to answer	9.8	6.7	5.1	6.9

Table 6.5 Perception of Ukraine's integration options in 2009–2012 (%)

In your opinion, what union would be better for Ukrainians' living standards—with the EU or with Russia and Belarus?	Apr. 2009 *N* = 1977	Oct. 2009 *N* = 1996	Feb. 2012 *N* = 2026
Definitely with the European Union	14.6	12.1	14.5
Rather be in the European Union	10.8	12.3	14.6
Difficult to say, both perhaps are equally important	17.4	18.0	20.0
Rather be in the union with Russia and Belarus	22.7	29.7	22.9
Definitely be in the union with Russia and Belarus	31.4	25.1	21.2
No answer	3.1	2.7	6.8

favor of the EU integration in 2009, and slightly more (29 %) in 2012 (Tables 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5).

The surveys in 2014 show a positive change in the support rate in favor of EU integration—from 47 % in June 2014 up to 53 % in August 2014.[6] The perception of EU membership as a good prospect for Ukraine also increased, from 57 % in March 2014 to 67 % in August 2014.

Perceiving the European integration of Ukraine as a part of the European Union enlargement to the east, it is important to consider the attitude towards and awareness of this process among the Ukrainian population. Thus, in 2004, when ten new member states joined the EU, one in three Ukrainians (36 %) supposed that EU enlargement to the east would improve the economic situation in Ukraine. A decade later, in 2013, this figure was slightly lower (30 %). However, the percentage of those who supposed that EU enlargement would cause a deterioration of the economic situation in Ukraine rose from 16 % in 2004 to 21 % in 2013 (Table 6.6). This signal to the government and NGOs should have led to the launching of awareness campaigns to raise support for EU integration, and some efforts were made, for example, in autumn 2013 before the Vilnius Summit.

[6] Regular 'Omnibus' surveys by KIIS and by other research companies were conducted on nationally representative samples, excluding the Autonomous Republic of Crimea due to the annexation of its territory in March 2014 by the foreign military.

Table 6.6 Perception of the Eastern enlargement of the EU in Ukraine (%)

Do you think the eastern enlargement of the EU could influence the economic situation in Ukraine?[7]	Sep. 2004 *N* = 2004	Jun. 2013 *N* = 1270
The enlargement of the EU is going to *improve* the economic situation in the country	36.3	29.8
The enlargement of the EU is going to *deteriorate* the economic situation in the country	16.3	21.4
The enlargement of the EU is not going to have much influence, or any influence at all, on the economic situation in the country	22.0	17.4
Don't know	24.9	31.4
Refuse to answer	0.5	0.0

As shown by the Ukrainian sociologist Valeriy Khmelko (2006), the support for a particular integration choice is significantly affected by the subjective assessments of self-awareness about the EU among respondents. Thus, in December 2005 only 38 % of respondents indicated that they had sufficient knowledge about the EU to make a choice about whether Ukraine should join, whereas almost half (47 %) considered their knowledge to be insufficient. Overall, 60 % of the Ukrainian population did not express enough confidence in their own awareness about the EU to make a choice about Ukraine's future just after the Orange Revolution when the conditions for European integration efforts and awareness campaigns were more than favorable (Table 6.7).

When it comes to real opportunities for Ukrainians to see the EU states with their own eyes, it seems that these opportunities are very limited: Only 18 % of the population had a valid passport for traveling abroad (Table 6.8). Moreover, 92 % of Ukrainians did not visit any EU country during 2010–2013.[8] Among those countries that were visited during 2010–2013 by a visible share of Ukrainians were Poland (3 %), Germany (2 %), France, Hungary, Italy and the Czech Republic (1 % each).[9]

[7] This question was asked with regard to the accession of Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic to the EU in 2004.

[8] According to a GfK Ukraine survey for PACT/UNITER in June 2013 (*N* = 1270). The set of questions about EU integration was elaborated by the NGO Centre UA. Fieldwork was conducted in June 2013; 1270 respondents were surveyed in person; the sample is nationally representative.

[9] GfK Ukraine survey for PACT/UNITER.

Table 6.7 Assessment of self-awareness about the European Union when making a decision about Ukraine's accession to the EU, 2005 (%)

Do you think you know enough to make a decision about Ukraine's accession to the EU?	Dec. 2005 *N* = 2016
Yes, I know enough	37.7
No, I do not know enough	47.4
Don't know/Refuse to answer	14.8

Table 6.8 Opportunity to travel abroad with a valid passport among Ukrainians (%)

Do you have a valid passport for traveling abroad?	Feb. 2010 *N* = 2021
Yes	18.4
No	81.1
Don't know/Refuse to answer	0.5

Therefore, it was hardly possible to expect a stable, positive attitude towards EU integration or support for the Association Agreement to be displayed by the vast majority of Ukrainians before Euromaidan. There was no clear image of life within the EU and the outcomes of the EU association for Ukraine as a state and for every citizen, particularly due to the absence of personal experience of visiting the EU states among the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians. The picture is more optimistic for the border regions where the visa regime is less strict and residents cross the border on an almost daily basis.

Despite the lack of real experience of living in the EU, or traveling frequently and recently to the EU, among the majority of Ukrainians, people had certain expectations related to EU integration; those perceptions and attitudes are the key issues to work with for non-governmental actors and national authorities. The most positive hopes held by Ukrainians regarding EU integration are the improvement of living standards and the economy (16 %) and a visa-free regime (12 %), along with the improvement of law and order in the country (5 %). Approximately one in three Ukrainians (32 %) does not know what positive outcomes to expect from EU integration. However, negative expectations of price increases are more common (20 %), along with the fear of becoming dependent on the EU (6 %), worsening of the economic situation (6 %)

Table 6.9 Attitude towards the EU among Georgians (%)

In general, what is your perception of the EU?	Aug. 2009 *N* = 1683	Jul. 2011 *N* = 1818
Very positive	16.0	17.0
Somewhat positive	35.0	35.0
Neutral	36.0	38.0
Somewhat negative	3.0	4.0
Very negative	1.0	1.0
Difficult to say/Don't know	10.0	5.0

and unemployment (5 %). Again, approximately one in three Ukrainians does not know what negative outcomes to expect from EU integration.[10]

Georgia

In Georgia, public opinion surveys about EU integration issues were conducted by the Caucasus Research Resource Centers (CRRC),[11] the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI). This chapter contains data from surveys conducted during 2009–2013 and available for public use through the websites of the various organizations mentioned.

According to the surveys conducted by CRRC in August 2009 (first wave) and in July 2011 (second wave), the attitude toward the EU was somewhat positive among half of the Georgian population (51 %) with only 4 % having negative perceptions (Table 6.9).

However, one quarter of the respondents feared that EU integration could be a threat to Georgian traditions, and more than 20 % thought that the EU is a new form of empire. Still, almost half the respondents disagreed with these notions. Controversially, there is a considerable, optimistic perception of EU membership and EU integration in general related to the expectation that it would resolve major problems in the country (Table 6.10).

[10] GfK Ukraine survey for PACT/UNITER.

[11] The Caucasus Research Resource Centers (CRRC) is a program of the Eurasia Partnership Foundation supported by the Carnegie Corporation of New York. It is a network of resource, research and training centers established in 2003 in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia with the goal of strengthening social science research and public policy analysis in the region. More about CRRC

Table 6.10 Perceptions of the EU among Georgians, 2009 (%; *N* = 1683)

Perceptions about the EU. The EU…	Fully agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Fully disagree	Do not know
is a democratic organization	44.0	34.0	4.0	1.0	16.0
is a source of peace and security in Europe	38.0	38.0	5.0	1.0	18.0
supports democracy abroad	29.0	42.0	5.0	1.0	23.0
promotes economic development abroad	26.0	42.0	6.0	2.0	25.0
is ready to accept any European country	16.0	24.0	16.0	10.0	34.0
is a threat to Georgian traditions	7.0	17.0	28.0	20.0	27.0
is a new form of empire	7.0	11.0	20.0	26.0	35.0

Table 6.11 Perception of EU enlargement among Georgians (%)

How would you say EU enlargement since 2004 has affected Georgia's chances of joining the EU?	Aug. 2009 *N* = 1683	Jun. 2011 *N* = 1818
Decreased significantly	2.0	1.0
Somewhat decreased	5.0	2.0
Had no effect	15.0	16.0
Somewhat increased	22.0	29.0
Increased significantly	12.0	13.0
Don't know	45.0	39.0

In 2009, one in three Georgians believed that the chances of their country joining the EU had increased somewhat since 2004 following EU enlargement (34 %), and one in three Georgians would expect their country to join the EU within the next five years or sooner. In 2011, the proportion of optimists, regarding the chances of Georgia joining the EU since 2004 following enlargement, reached 41 % (Tables 6.11 and 6.12).

can be found at: http://www.crrccenters.org/; the public opinion polls' results can be found at: http://www.epfound.ge/english/current-programs-activities/european-integration/public-opinion-polls/public-opinion-polls-.html; and a further resource with online survey data is: http://caucasus-barometer.org/en/.

Table 6.12 Expectations about the probable timing of Georgia joining the EU (%)

When, if ever, do you think Georgia will actually join the EU?	Aug. 2009 *N* = 1683	Jun. 2011 *N* = 1818
In 5 years or less	30.0	33.0
In 5–10 years	20.0	18.0
In more than 10 years	10.0	9.0
Never	1.0	2.0
Don't know	38.0	37.0

Table 6.13 Direction of Georgia's development as seen by Georgians (%)

If there was a referendum tomorrow, would you vote for Georgia's membership in the EU?	Aug. 2009 *N* = 1683	Jun. 2011 *N* = 1818
Would vote for EU membership	79.0	80.0
Would vote against EU membership	2.0	3.0
Would not vote at all	5.0	5.0
Don't know	13.0	12.0

The overwhelming majority of the Georgian population would have voted for EU membership in 2009 if a referendum had been organized at the time of that survey, with only 2 % against EU membership. This support remained relatively stable in 2011 according to the second wave of the survey (Table 6.13).

In 2009,[12] Georgians expected that EU membership would bring a solution to the problems of national security and territorial integrity (65–68 % of respondents), which is a sensitive issue following the military conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008. The other positive expectations regarding EU integration were related to improvement in economic and political spheres: the number of jobs (64 % of Georgians expected improvement), freedom of speech (63 %), fairness of elections (62 %), pensions (62 %), independence of courts (59 %), quality of education (59 %) and property rights (57 %). Besides this, a decrease was expected in two principal issues in economic and political life—in poverty and in corruption (54 % each).

However, the majority of Georgians in 2009 supposed that their country was not yet ready for the EU in terms of available democratic institu-

[12] CRRC nationally representative survey in August 2009, *N* = 1683.

Table 6.14 The public perception of the Eastern Partnership program results for Georgia (%)

What will be the result of the program of 'Eastern Partnership' for Georgia?	Aug. 2009 *N* = 1683	Jul. 2011 *N* = 1818
Restoration of territorial integrity	17.0	19.0
EU membership	15.0	13.0
Political and economic integration with the EU	9.0	11.0
Improvement of relations with Russia	7.0	7.0
NATO membership	8.0	5.0
Difficult to say	43.0	45.0

tions (43 %), human rights protection (46 %), rule of law (47 %) and a competitive market economy (47 %).

Only 11 % of respondents in 2011 (compared with 9 % in 2009) expected economic integration from the EaP initiative, while about one third thought that the EaP was either an EU accession tool, or an initiative for the restoration of Georgia's territorial integrity. Another 45 % had no understanding of exactly what the EaP initiative is, which reflects the lack of information on the EaP initiative among Georgians, specifically the lack of communication of this initiative from the authorities or non-governmental actors to the population (Table 6.14).

In 2011, 66 % of respondents mentioned they would like to be given more information about the EU—relatively similar to the Ukraine's 2005 survey figure (62 %). In particular, the majority of Georgians wanted to know how the EU dealt with conflict resolution. Around 30 % were interested in the social protection system, rule of law and trade issues with the EU. Furthermore, EU salary rates (22 %), obtaining an EU visa (13 %), the job market (18 %), as well as educational and cultural programs (16 % and 8 %, respectively) were the main points of interest.[13]

All the above-mentioned positive attitudes and perceptions of Georgians towards EU integration remained stable until July 2014 when

[13] See https://www.ndi.org/Georgia_poll_2014.

[14] The survey data were collected during July–August 2014 in personal interviews with a nationwide representative sample of 3338 respondents. The survey was initiated by the NDI, funded by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) and conducted by CRRC Georgia.

the Georgian government signed an Association Agreement with the EU (July 27, 2014). And the overwhelming majority of Georgians (79 %) were aware of that event. Of respondents, 69 % supported that step.[14]

To summarize, public opinion has been more favorable towards European integration in Georgia than in Ukraine since the EU enlargement in 2004. In 2013, about one in three Ukrainians were not aware of positive or negative outcomes to expect from integration with the EU, and negative expectations were mostly related to price increases, worsening of the economic situation and unemployment. However, support for EU integration reached 67 % in August 2014 in Ukraine, possibly driven by the Euromaidan protests, comparable with the 69 % in Georgia, where people welcome the AA. Most expectations of EU integration among Georgians were positive regarding the spheres of national security, economy and welfare, fair justice and elections, and freedom of speech. Therefore, Georgians are better aware of the positive outcomes and opportunities than Ukrainians. A possible explanation could be a successful communication strategy of the Georgian government regarding EU integration targeted at a wider public.

Activities within the EaP Initiative

A range of activities were expected from the governments in Ukraine and Georgia, as well as from the other EaP states, to be introduced within European integration efforts and EaP roadmaps. Independent civil society experts who advocated the reforms related to European integration designed a tool called the European Integration Index for Eastern Partnership Countries (EaP Index). It was prepared by the International Renaissance Foundation (IRF) in partnership with the Open Society Foundations (OSF) and experts from think tanks and university institutions in EaP countries and the EU. The EaP Index has been used as a tool for civil society monitoring and has served as a speedometer of European integration for EaP countries since 2011. It was designed to evaluate the changes and progress of EaP states in various spheres of reforms.[15]

[15] For more details, please see the EaP Index website: http://www.eap-index.eu.

The comparison of EaP Index scores in 2012–2014 is given for Ukraine and Georgia with regard to the list of activities implemented in these two countries referring to European integration below. A brief description of governmental and non-governmental activities related to European integration is displayed first, to illustrate the efforts that enabled the experts to assess the extent and to measure the efficiency of the Eastern Partnership for six participating countries.

Ukraine

The list of projects within the EaP framework for Ukraine includes a range of activities started and implemented before the EaP launch. Such projects as 'Support of EaP and Central Asia cities participation in Mayors Agreement' and INOGATE were continued and expanded on in six eastern EU partner countries.[16] Multilateral EaP projects are related to various topics within the cooperation platforms. There are thematic EaP platforms on:

1. 'Democracy, proper governance and stability' with, for example, a program on integrated border management;
2. 'Economic integration and approach to the EU policy' with particular initiatives on environmental governance, small and medium business development, effective policy on entrepreneurial activities, and mobility of labor force between the EU and EaP states;
3. 'Energy security' with a focus on energy efficiency improvement;
4. 'People to people contacts', with cultural programs, youth-in-action programs, cultural heritage conservation, educational programs.

However, since the EaP launch in 2008, most of the reforms in Ukraine were rather declarative and did not change the system in line with European legislation. With the new government that came into office following the end of the Euromaidan protests in February 2014,

[16] INOGATE is the international energy cooperation program between the European Union and the EU neighboring states.

the changes were given greater visibility; however, they still need further enhancing and, moreover, communicating to the public.

Georgia

After proclaiming independence in 1991, Georgia actively cooperated with the EU. According to information from the Office of the State Minister of Georgia on EU Affairs,[17] several steps were achieved before the country joined the EaP initiative in 2009. Thus, the basic framework for the development of EU–Georgia relations was established after signing the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in Luxembourg in April 1996, which entered into force in 1999. In June 2004, the European Council decided to include Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia in the ENP, thus intensifying a new stage in EU–Georgia relations. In addition, Georgia has benefitted from a Generalized System of Trade Preferences (GSP) with the European Union since 1995. In 2005, the country was granted a three-year term on the EU Generalised System of Preferences (GSP and trade regime), supporting sustainable development and good governance. In November 2006, the EU's EaP Policy Action Plan Agreement was signed between the Government of Georgia and the European Commission.

The initiative on 'Partnership for Mobility' within the Georgia–EU cooperation was officially launched in February 2010. In June 2010, the EU–Georgia visa facilitation agreement was signed (which came into force in March 2011). In December 2010, the Common Aviation Area Agreement between the EU and its member states was signed by Georgian government representatives in Brussels. A presentation on the EU Integration Communication and Information Strategy of the Government of Georgia for the period 2014–2017 was held in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia in October 2013. Therefore, the Georgian government was more successful than that of Ukraine within the EaP initiative during 2004–2013 in terms of implemented reforms and visible changes, and developed a communication plan to promote EU integration among the wider public in their country; no such strategy exists in Ukraine.

[17] See http://www.eu-nato.gov.ge/en.

The Eastern Partnership Index for Georgia and Ukraine in 2012–2014

The overall EaP Index consists of three components, or dimensions, of European integration progress: *linkage*, *approximation* and *management*. Briefly, the linkage and approximation components are based on the multi-level and multi-sectoral nature of European integration, bilateral Action Plans/Association Agendas between the EU and EaP countries, and the EU's annual Progress Reports. The approximation component is aimed at assessing how closely institutions and policies in EaP countries resemble those typical of EU member states. The sections on democracy, rule of law and market economy not only constitute core conditions that the EU imposes on countries interested in closer relations with it, they are also uncontested political aims and legitimizing general principles in all EaP countries. These components partly use ratings and composite indicators produced by international agencies and other non-governmental organizations. The *management* component covers institutional structures for the coordination and management of European integration. The management component aims at assessing the level of commitment to European integration and the capacity to deal with the growing EU-related agenda in each EaP country, according to the EaP Index authors. Each of these three components consists of several sub-components, and the overall score for each component and sub-component might vary from zero to one, based on the expert survey answers with further scoring and weighting of the data.[18]

Comparison of Ukraine and Georgia with regard to the first component, linkage (Fig. 6.1), shows that Georgia was more successful than Ukraine in 2012–2014 in certain aspects of trade and economic integration (i.e. overcoming trade barriers, trade defense instruments) and in overall EU development aid. However, Ukraine obtained higher average scores for linkage during 2012–2014 due to its being in a better situation with respect to a range of other aspects, including political dialogue (i.e.

[18] For a detailed description of the methodology of EaP Index calculation, see the EaP Index website: http://www.eap-index.eu/methodology.



Fig. 6.1 The EaP Index for Georgia and Ukraine: linkage, 2012–2014

CFSP/ESDP cooperation), trade and economic integration (i.e. services, FDI), sectoral cooperation (i.e. freedom, security and justice, and integration with Trans-European transport network), and in the mobility of students and academic faculty.

In the second dimension of the EaP Index—approximation—Georgia's higher scores in 2012–2014 reveal better progress than that of Ukraine regarding a range of aspects, including deep and sustainable democracy (especially with elections, independent judiciary and fighting corruption), market economy (i.e. business climate, DCFTA) and sectoral approximation (i.e. in transport and environment sectors) (see Fig. 6.2).



Fig. 6.2 The EaP Index for Georgia and Ukraine: approximation, 2012–2014

The third dimension of the EaP Index—management—is given in Fig. 6.3. Georgia obtained significantly higher scores in 2012–2014 and revealed better progress than Ukraine within all sub-components of this dimension, which showed a significant improvement in 2014. The major growth of this indicator was driven by a massive awareness campaign about European integration, as well as legal approximation and institutional arrangements for European integration. The overall situation with the participation of civil society was consistently higher in Georgia than in Ukraine during 2012–2014.

Thus, both countries demonstrate some progress resulting from the EaP initiative in 2012–2014, although much more is to be achieved in various aspects, beginning with trade flows and transportation integration into the Trans-European network as well as the sector's transition to market economy, legislation approximation in energy and other spheres. These trans-



Fig. 6.3 The EaP Index for Georgia and Ukraine: management, 2012–2014

formations should be monitored by governmental and non-governmental actors to ensure the progress of the Association Agreements.[19] Moreover, success should be shared with the wider public to ensure 'elite–mass' collaboration in the achievement of the common goal.

Conclusion

To summarize, the cooperation between the EU and neighboring states within the EaP program received considerable support from European institutions during 2008–2014. The EaP initiative could be considered more successful in Georgia than in Ukraine. The argument for this statement is that the Georgian population expressed greater support for EU integration than the Ukrainian population starting with the 'colored

[19] In Ukraine, the civil society activists of the NGO Centre UA, European Program, have launched a specially designed instrument for such monitoring called the Agreement Navigator. Its purpose is to report on the efforts of the Ukrainian government to change national legislation in compliance with the Association Agreement demands. The progress can be traced online by the public: http://www.eurointegration.com.ua/navigator/.

revolutions' in 2003 and 2004, despite political changes in Ukraine having occurred following Euromaidan in 2013–2014. The governments of both Ukraine and Georgia signed Association Agreements with the EU in July 2014. However, it is still necessary to raise public awareness regarding the various aspects of EU integration (i.e. matters such as the change of legislation and living standards for every citizen) to show the opportunities and advantages of the Association Agreements for the population in Georgia and Ukraine. The overall support for EU integration in Ukraine and in Georgia has been increasing since 2004 and reached a high level in 2014 (over two thirds of the population in both countries expressed support for EU integration). However, public attitudes are not stable, as demonstrated with polls data. Stabilization requires more well-planned awareness campaigns with medium- and long-term objectives, rather than only short-term effects.

Furthermore, not all the steps expected from the governments of the EaP countries were implemented successfully in Georgia and Ukraine—problems persist with regard to institutional and legal dimensions in particular sectors, as well as with regard to ensuring stable support for European integration among the citizens of both countries. Government officials only partly rely on the data of public opinion polls regarding European integration issues to justify the need for reforms or willingness to implement the changes of legislation. Following the Georgian example, the Ukrainian government can improve the situation in terms of public support for reforms and an overall positive attitude towards European integration through ongoing communication of the gains (and risks) of reforms to the wider public. Furthermore, the public should have the tools with which to monitor the progress of implementing the Association Agreement, as it creates the framework for wider support for European integration. Awareness campaigns targeted at various sections of the population should explain the opportunities offered by EU integration to citizens in Georgia and Ukraine. Several recent initiatives from non-governmental organizations in Ukraine have focused on owners of small and medium-sized businesses who may have the opportunity to access EU markets. These target groups could become the grassroots advocacy actors for European integration in Georgia and Ukraine in the future.

References

Franke, A., Gawrich, A., Melnykovska, I., & Schweickert, R. (2010). The European Union's relations with Ukraine and Azerbaijan. *Post-Soviet Affairs*, *26*(2), 149–183.

Gallina, N. (2009). Ukraine knocking at the door? The EU-Ukriane relationship after the Orange revolution. In Andrej, N. Lushnycky, Mykola Riabchuk (Eds.), Ukraine on its meandering path between east and west. *Interdisciplinary studies on Central and Eastern Europe* (vol. 4, pp. 41–62).

Gawrich, A., Melnykovska, I., & Schweickert, R. (2010). Neighbourhood Europeanization through ENP: The case of Ukraine. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, *48*(5), 1209–1235.

Kaminska, J. (2014). *Poland and EU enlargement: Foreign policy in transformation*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Khmelko, V. Y. (2006). Attitude of Ukraine's citizens towards accession to the EU and NATO and the assessment of self-awareness regarding these organizations [Stavlennia hromadian Ukrainy do ii vstupu do Evrosoyuzu i NATO ta ihni otsinky svoyeyi obiznanosti stosovno tsyh orhanizatsij]. *Sociology: Theory, Methods and Marketing [Sociologiya: teoriya, metody i marketyng]*, *1*, 71–87.

McFaul, M. (2005). Transition from post-communism. *Journal of Democracy*, *16*(3), 5–19.

Melnykovska, I. & Schweickert, R. (2008). Bottom-up or top-down—What drives the convergence of Ukraine's institutions towards European standards? *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, *8*(4), 45–68.

Melnykovska, I., Schweickert, R., & Kostiuchenko, T. (2011). Balancing national uncertainty and foreign orientation: Identity building and the role of political parties in post-Orange Ukraine. *Europe-Asia Studies*, *63*(6), 1055–1072.

Šiškova, N. (2014). *From Eastern partnership to the association: A legal and political analysis*. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

Steenbergen, M. R. & Scott, D. (2004). Contesting Europe? The salience of European integration as a party issue. In G. Marks & G. M. R. Steenbergen (Eds.), *European integration and political conflict*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Stegniy, O. (2014). Ukraine and the Eastern partnership: Lost in translation? In E. Korosteleva (Ed.), *Eastern partnership: A new opportunity for the neighbours?* London: Routledge.

7

EU Extra-territorialization and Securitization: What Does It Mean for Ukraine and Belarus?

Bettina Bruns and Dorit Happ

Introduction

Striving to create a 'ring of friends' (European Commission, 2003, p. 4) around its territory, in 2003 the European Union set up the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The Eastern Partnership (EaP)—which is addressed to six countries, namely, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine—has been a key instrument of this policy since its foundation in 2008. The ENP as an extra-territorial strategy includes measures which are carried out outside ('extra') the EU's territorial dominion—namely, in neighboring countries. Popescu and Wilson state that the EU 'offers a degree of economic integration, financial assistance and fund political dialogue in exchange for reforms and democratization' (Popescu & Wilson, 2009, p. 13). Subsequently, the EU realizes its own security-related interests through this policy approach since the neighborhood is seen as a possible source of instability and, hence, can endanger the EU's internal status quo.

B. Bruns (✉) • D. Happ
Leibniz Institute for Regional Geography, Leipzig, Germany

B. Bruns et al. (eds.), *European Neighbourhood Policy*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-69504-1_7

Notwithstanding the EU's attempts to emphasize that the Association Agreements included in the ENP 'do not pose threats to Russia' (European Parliament, 2014), the EU's extra-territorial engagement causes—intentionally or not—a geopolitical competition with Russia, which is regarded as the 'second regional power in the east' (Lavenex, 2004, p. 695) from an EU perspective. In this context, Belarus and Ukraine are both objects of competitive foreign policies addressed to the shared neighborhood of the EU and Russia. The two countries react differently to these foreign policies, which manifests in their level of participation in the EaP. Belarus cooperates to a lesser extent than Ukraine in the EaP; it has not even signed an Action Plan in the ENP framework. In 2010, Belarus started the Customs Union with Russia and Kazakhstan; the current Eurasian Economic Union appears as a continuation of this economic association and geopolitical orientation. From the Belarusian perspective, loose cooperation with the EU appears to be one way to diversify its cooperation partners and, consequently, to counterbalance Russia's influence. Ukraine's foreign policy changed significantly as a result of the third Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius in November 2013. As a consequence of refusing to sign the Association Agreement, including the core element—a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA)—with the EU, the Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovych, faced massive pro-European protests, the so-called movement of the Euromaidan, which led to the resignation of the government, the dismissal of president Yanukovych and, finally, new presidential elections in May 2014. The newly elected president, Petro Poroshenko, and the European Union heads of state and government signed and ratified the Association Agreement in 2014. The Ukrainian parliament—the Verkhovna Rada—expressed the significance of this step in the resolution with the striking title 'On the European Choice of Ukraine': 'Ukraine's decision regarding the European future is decisive and final' (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2014). Belarus' affirmative attitude towards the new Ukrainian leadership and also Belarus' decision not to recognize the Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula illustrates, once again, the Belarusian 'game of balance': 'Lukashenko devised a strategy to retain his hold on power and secure financing [...] by remaining in the Russian camp and appearing anti-Western so as to play to Russia's imperial urge, while still engaging

in regular disruptive behavior towards Russia' (Kryvoi & Wilson, 2015, p. 3).

Against this geopolitical background, we elaborate on the neighboring states' points of view regarding the EU's engagement on their national territory. Analyzing the EU's extra-territorial activities as a mechanism of 'Othering'—constructing the neighbors and the EU as the Other—allows us to make clear the manner of cooperation and communication between the EU, on the one hand, and Belarus and Ukraine, on the other, in this process. How do these countries position themselves towards EU engagement on their territory?

Our assumption when dealing with this question is that there is a strong link between the EU's extra-territorial actions and its internal security in three different policy fields. We consider specific projects carried out in the areas of migration, education and the promotion of prosperity in Belarus and Ukraine in order to trace this link. We first give a theoretical overview of the terms 'extra-territorialization', 'security' and 'securitization'; in the second part of the chapter, we analyze our empirical data with the help of these concepts in order to show the link. In the third and final part of the chapter, the perspective of Ukrainian and Belarusian practitioners in these policy fields is discussed using the concept of 'Othering'.

Extra-territorialization

Originally, the term 'extra-territorialization' meant immigration control within a legal area situated beyond a certain national and legal territory (see Ryan, 2010, p. 3). It was first introduced in the social science literature by Rijpma and Cremona, who used it in relation to the policy field of migration and defined it as 'the means by which the EU attempts to push back the EU's external borders or rather to police them at distance in order to control unwanted migration flows' (Rijpma & Cremona, 2007, p. 10). They use the term to describe how the physical control of migration is located outside EU territory (Rijpma & Cremona, 2007, no page number). Doing so, they stand in line with other researchers such as Laube, who defines ex(tra)territorial border controls as spatially preceded instruments (see Laube & Roos, 2011). Geiger uses the term 'extra-territorialization' in

order to label the 'spatial delocation of migration governing activities' of the EU (Geiger, 2011, p. 21). Garlick (2006) discusses extra-territorial asylum processing. Zeilinger offers a broader conception of the term, but he still operationalizes it only in connection with migration when stating that extra-territorialization means the extension of internal policy objectives and regulation to third countries' domestic policy with regard to asylum and migration policy in the Tampere European Council 1999 (see Zeilinger, 2012, p. 63).

These authors have in common that they use the concept of extra-territorialization exclusively with respect to the area of border control and migration into the EU. Following this perspective, extra-territorialization seems to be a reaction by the EU only to threats grounded in irregular migration. When remembering that 'security elements play a pivotal role in the ENP' (Wichmann, 2007, p. 1) and that the ENP comprises a broad spectrum of issues, including irregular migration and border control, then it does not make sense to restrict the analysis using the concept of extra-territorialization to simply one policy area. Rather, the external dimension of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) addresses an entire spectrum of policy issues ranging from terrorism, drugs and crime to irregular migration (see Wichmann, 2007, p. 1) and border control. Therefore, very much we follow Wichmann in her proposal to extend the definition of extra-territorialization to the external EU management of all security threats (see Wichmann, 2007, p. 6). Within this frame, the ENP has a unifying objective; namely, to 'extra-territorialize' the management of security threats to neighboring countries by exporting its own rules and policy regulatory instruments to neighboring countries' legislation and to enhance cooperation in the respective policies (see Zeilinger, 2012, p. 64; see also Balzacq, 2008; Bigo & Guild, 2005; Wolff, Wichmann, & Mounier, 2009). We use the term 'extra-territorialization' for all measures comprising different policy fields that the EU implements outside its own territory in trying to influence politics of third countries with the aim to guarantee its internal security.

In detail, extra-territorialization can occur in different ways. Rijpma and Cremona identify three forms of extra-territorial EU action which they relate exclusively to the policy field of migration, but which can easily be applied to other policy fields, which we will do later in this chap-

ter. First, extra-territorialization includes actions taken by the EU itself and independently of non-member states, for example, EU visa policy or the rules on carrier sanctions. Second, it embraces external community action, for example, the conduct of joint operations with the agency Frontex, re-admission agreements, the establishment of regional protection centers in neighboring countries for refugees and asylum seekers, the determination of safe countries of origin. And, third, it comprises the promotion of the EU's own *acquis* to non-members and their adoption of it into their own legal order, for example, the implementation of the Schengen system in non-member countries (see Rijpma & Cremona, 2007, pp. 10–13).

Security and Securitization

Security plays a central role in the formation of the EU. The EU calls itself the 'area of freedom, security and justice' (European Communities, 1997) and sees itself as an internal and external security provider (see Delcour, 2010, p. 537). The EU also acts in accordance with strategic security interests when interacting with third countries: 'Security should be integrated in relevant strategic partnerships, and taken into account in the dialogue with our partners when programming EU funding in partnership agreements' (European Commission, 2010, p. 3).

What does security mean in this context? First, security defines a condition of 'freedom or protection from danger or worry' (Hornby, 1989, p. 1143). In contrast to the term 'safety', 'security' means the protection of an object against the environment, against malicious dangers and attacks. As Delcour observes, this definition already points to its subjective and constructed nature: '(…), there is no danger per se, but a perception of danger which differs across time and space and among policy actors' (Delcour, 2010, p. 536). What is labeled as a danger—and, therefore, a security threat—is thus defined by certain actors and is a result of 'a discourse through which power relations are exercised' (Ibrahim, 2005, p. 164). Following this constructivist critical perspective on security, we claim that the EU produces security and insecurity by processes

of socially constructing issues and by recognizing them as security threats (see Léonard, 2010, p. 235). Labeling certain issues as a threat to security is a social construction of this issue: In consequence, 'it is impossible to ever fully assess whether threats are "real" or not' (Léonard, 2010, p. 235). The described process of securitization may be carried out by speech acts such as expressions of politics, policies, news and so on, which was highlighted by representatives of the Copenhagen School. In other words: '[...], certain issues are transformed into matters of security, whereas they have been discussed under different prefixes' (Zichner & Bruns, 2011, p. 81). In addition, researchers have pointed out that securitization processes may also come to life through (bureaucratic) practices (see Bigo, 2002 and Huysmans, 2006, for examples in the area of migration). In sum, we perceive security as a practice (Jørgensen & Aarstad, 2013, p. 35). Practices are processes and nothing static. Security is thus something which has to be produced and maintained. In consequence, we assume that the EU securitizes certain issues in order to legitimate special extra-territorial measures for the protection of its inner security.

Extra-territorialization and Security

If one takes a look at EU documents on the EU's external dimension, the general connection between extra-territorial measures and internal security quickly becomes clear. The EaP as one element of the EU's external dimension is legitimated as follows: 'The Eastern Partnership foresees a real step change in relations with our Eastern neighbors, with a significant upgrading of political, economic and trade relations. The goal is to strengthen the prosperity and stability of these countries, and thus the security of the EU.' (Council of the European Union, 2008, p. 15). More concretely, the EU states: 'What happens in the countries in Eastern Europe and the southern Caucasus matters to the EU. As the EU has expanded, these countries have become closer neighbors, and their security, stability and prosperity increasingly affect the EU's' (Civil Society, 2015).

The matter of internal security is put to the fore, and not only is this valid with reference to the relation the EU evolves with third countries in the east, but it also seems to be characteristic of the EU's external dimension in general:

> The projection of the values underpinning the area of freedom, security and justice is essential in order to safeguard the internal security of the EU. Menaces such as terrorism, organized crime and drug trafficking also originate outside of the EU. It is thus crucial that the EU develops a strategy to engage with third countries worldwide. (European Commission, 2005, p. 3)

The orientation towards the matter of security thus results from the perception of a whole scenario of dangers residing outside the EU, potentially threatening or challenging the internal security of the EU. This quotation also points to the fact that security itself represents one of the central values from the point of view of EU foreign policy, which is also indicated in this quotation: 'The purpose of the Communication is to demonstrate how the external dimension of justice and home affairs contributes to the internal area of freedom, security and justice […] including sharing and promoting the *values of* freedom, *security* and justice in third countries' (European Commission, 2005, p. 4, our emphasis). In that way, the matter of security becomes charged with values and the accomplishment of other objectives is measured according to its contribution to the production of security. Following this perspective, the scholarly dispute as to whether the ENP is a security initiative or inspired by common values (see Wichmann, 2007, p. 1) is unnecessary, since there is no contradiction between these two poles: Security is, rather, one central value the EU wants to spread to its neighborhood. Our hypothesis is that, in order to achieve this aim, the EU acts extra-territorially, covering various policy fields. In the following, we want to show the link between internal security and extra-territorial measures with the help of three examples from the policy fields of migration, promotion of prosperity and education.

How Does the EU's Extra-territorialization Work?

Migration

Broadly speaking, in many EU documents, migration policy is categorized by rhetoric of opportunities and challenges (for example, see European Commission, 2013). 'Opportunities' are associated with the potential that brings people to the EU as members of the workforce and the potential of their creative minds, filling the demographic gap and so on. The 'challenges' refer to so-called illegal or irregular migration, using keywords such as visa-overstayers or human trafficking and what constitutes a threat to the EU's internal security: 'State failure affects our security through crime, illegal immigration and, most recently, piracy' (Council of the European Union, 2008, p. 2).

Many matters of immigration policy are in the realm of the European Commission's Directorate General (DG) for Justice and Home Affairs, whose key objective is the 'area of freedom, security and justice'. This shows that the interrelation between security and immigration is politically made manifest. With the establishment of the Schengen area, internal border controls were abolished and border checkpoints removed. At the same time, the controls of the external EU borders were intensified and they were fixed in the Schengen Implementation Agreement. The restrictions in external border regulations accompany the process of internal liberalization of the movement of people as compensatory measures. The aims of these mechanisms are not only to guarantee security inside the EU by mounting stricter and more intelligent control mechanisms for those desiring to enter the EU (see Andreas & Biersteker, 2003), but also to keep an eye on irregular movements inside the EU (Boswell, 2003, p. 622). In addition to the DG for Justice and Home Affairs, the matter of irregular migration is also closely aligned with EU foreign and development policies (see European Commission, 2013, p. 7). This is a crucial point because this has very much to do with the 'external dimension' of EU migration policy that is of interest here. Treating immigration and asylum predominantly as matters of responsibility for the DG for Justice and Home Affairs, preoccupied with the protection of EU citizens from various risk

scenarios, is characteristic in the sense that: 'It places the regulation of migration in an institutional framework that deals with the protection of internal security' (Huysmans, 2006, p. 68). Also, mixing regular and irregular migration matters as well as refugee and asylum issues together has to be criticized because it puts all migration matters into the light of potential criminality. This becomes especially obvious in the question of asylum since, in this case, one should assume that somebody is in need of protection, and the common framing contributes to the increasing connotation of security with immigration and asylum (see Huysmans, 2006, p. 69), which basically is a demonstrative example of the securitization of migration.

This attitude is operationalized through various EU-funded projects carried out in third states and aimed at strengthening local protection capacities and local integration of refugees. One of these initiatives, the Local Integration Project (LIP), is focused on the facilitation of the integration of recognized refugees by organizing vocational training, language courses, ensuring medical and psychological assistance, and providing them with very basic products of daily life. By paying for projects which will have the effect of increasing asylum capacities in the neighborhood, the EU ultimately decreases the number of asylum seekers within the EU. It is a way of reducing migration into the EU by changing the policies or the procedures in third countries.

Education

Education is strongly connected to the matter of stability in the EU discourse. The following quote demonstrates this: 'The reform and modernisation of learning systems is a sine qua non condition for the economic competitiveness and the social and political stability of partner countries' (European Commission, 2004, p. 19). As the question of stability is closely connected to that of security, the link seems to be easily traceable. Additionally, there is another aspect regarding education which becomes clear if we take into consideration what is said about the EU education program Tempus, which is addressed especially to the 'partner countries', among them those from Eastern Europe. The aim of

the Tempus program is 'to promote voluntary convergence of the higher education systems in the Partner Countries with EU developments in the field of higher education' (Education, Audiovisual and Cultural Executive Agency, 2013). The geographical approximation since the last enlargements will thus be accompanied by a kind of value-based approximation to the EU standards, considered as a way to produce stability and thus contribute to security. Within this process, returned Erasmus Mundus students are expected to act as multipliers for the EU, who spread certain EU-related values into their home countries and, in this way, support closer ties with the EU.

Finally, there is a third link between education and security, which takes precedence over good governance: 'The best protection of our security is a world of well-governed democratic states' (European Council, 2003, p. 10). 'It is in our interest that the countries on our borders are well-governed. The European Neighbourhood Policy, launched in 2004, supports this process' (Council of the European Union, 2008, p. 10). Well-governed states, in the EU's sense, need well-educated citizens and politicians who act according to the principles of good governance in line with EU principles and values. This is the aim of the EU's extra-territorial educational measures—such as, for example, Erasmus Mundus—which is shown in the following quotation. 'The aim of this program is […] building a capital of goodwill among those who have participated in the program' (European Parliament, 2003, p. 2). Participants of the program should act as ambassadors (see Zichner, 2013, p. 33) and disseminate EU values, norms or policy ideas like the ideals of democracy and respect for human rights (see European Parliament, 2003, p. 2) into their home countries. The origins of Erasmus Mundus date back to 2003, the same year the European Security Strategy (ESS) was developed and shortly before the publication of the Strategy Paper on the 'European Neighbourhood Policy' (European Commission, 2004) and the first eastern enlargement round, also in 2004. Hence, Zichner puts the establishment of Erasmus Mundus into the context of EU efforts to secure its neighborhood by 're-ordering the relations with countries that were to become the "new neighbors"' (Zichner, 2013, p. 33).

Promotion of Prosperity

In order to analyze the link between respective to welfare, especially poverty, and the security issue, it is helpful to go back to the ESS, in which poverty is mentioned as the first global challenge giving 'rise to pressing security concerns (see European Council, 2003, p. 2), since it often coincides with conflict and insecurity (see European Council, 2003, p. 2). Also in the report on the ESS, the EU makes a direct link between the promotion of prosperity and security: 'We have worked to build human security, by reducing poverty and inequality, promoting good governance and human rights, assisting development, and addressing the root causes of conflict and insecurity' (Council of the European Union, 2008, p. 3). In accordance with EU logic, a high standard of living and economic prosperity support political stability and the reduction of conflicts and disparities; this in turn has a positive effect on the EU's internal security.

In the same document, it is stated that a precondition for security and peace is sustainable development (see Council of the European Union, 2008, p. 8). One project which supports sustainable development in third countries within the ENP is related to waste management, which has as its overall objective: 'To reduce the risks arising from inappropriate management of wastes […], that thereby create environmental pollution hazards to the community and to natural resources, through co-operation with, and amongst, partner states in the region' (see European External Action Service, 2011, p. 158). These objectives will be reached by a strengthening of waste classification practices, raising public awareness on waste problems, and the inventorying of illegal waste disposal sites (see EU neighbourhood information center, n.d.). If we define waste management as an element of the promotion of prosperity and as part of the general improvement of living conditions, then this means, at the same time, that waste management belongs to the fight against poverty. And, ultimately, following the conviction and logic of the EU, less poverty may lead to greater security, inside and outside its territory.

The Construction of Otherness in EU's Extra-territorial Projects

In the following section, we elaborate on the respondents' imaginings about the EU motivation underlying concrete funded projects or/and the ENP in general, based on several interviews. In doing so, we follow Eder's idea that 'Europe produces stories about itself in the permanent confrontation with stories about the Other which again produces effects in the Other who produces his own stories by looking at the first as the Other' (Eder, 2009, p. 442). The EU, in order to constitute for itself a reference group, needs the Others. Thus, regarding the EU's external engagement, the ENP is designed with reference to its neighbors. In this respect, from the EU's perspective, as pointed out in several documents, its external engagement follows and promotes various values—among them democratic principles, human rights, sustainable development, good governance and so on. The integration of their promotion into the ENP agenda implicitly shows the EU's assumption that these values in particular are lacking in its neighboring countries. At the same time, reflecting on the second part of Eder's quote, the neighboring states also construct in a permanent reciprocal process themselves, and additionally the EU, as the Others.

After this short introduction, we will now present selected extracts from qualitative interviews with local experts in Belarus and Ukraine carried out in 2012. At the start of the interview the respondents were given the opportunity to choose the language of the conversation. In our case, all Belarusian and Ukrainian respondents preferred to be questioned in Russian. Furthermore, all interviewees included in the following analysis agreed to be recorded. Afterwards, the recorded interviews were transcribed and translated into English. As all respondents requested to remain anonymous, we specify neither names nor particular places. In order to preserve anonymity, all real names were substituted with fictitious first names. What we are allowed to disclose is that they are involved as experts in EU-funded projects in the education, urban development and migration sectors and, consequently, they received a certain amount of financial support in order to realize specific projects' measures.

Questioned about why, in her opinion, the EU is supporting projects such as an e-learning-oriented project, Iryna in Ukraine, who is involved as an expert, answers:

> Well, I am not the European Union. I can't answer that question. It seems to me, in the first place, that any society which has a certain level of living conditions wants other societies also to reach this level. Somebody who is successful and financially independent and so on, he doesn't want to see unhappy people around him or some homeless people. Also that means he wants to help the other to learn how to get out of this situation. That means, he wants, I think, that flowers are growing in his garden and that not only the road up to his house is in good condition but in general he wants to ride on good roads. (Interview with local expert in an e-learning project, Ukraine, 2012)

In this quote, the interviewee clearly recognizes the EU's intention to adjust and harmonize its neighbors. Furthermore, Iryna understands the EU as a role model for reforms and development regarding her own homeland.

Later on she emphasizes the point:

> Well, let's say, your own well-being will not be sustainable if everything around you is in a terrible condition. Therefore, you want that this area will also be sustainable and that it will be close to your way of thinking, to your way of life, to the way to live. Probably, this is the obvious motivation. Maybe there is also a secret motivation I don't understand, but for me this is how it is. (Interview with local expert in an e-learning project, Ukraine, 2012)

Once again, the respondent highlights the internal motivation of the EU's external strategies. With the help of extra-territorial engagement, the EU promotes its own standard of living as the standard to be pursued by the Others. In general, through presenting the EU as the dominant player, Iryna recognizes and reproduces asymmetric power relations where Ukraine appears only as a passive partner within the ENP. Finally, we take it as a sign of the weak comprehension of the EU engagement that Iryna brings up the point that there could be a secret motivation.

Oleg, in Ukraine, is the regional coordinator of an ecological project which is carried out in the border region of the EU. This region is characterized by a hilly landscape. He describes the project's objective; namely, the reduction of uncontrolled disposal of plastic bottles:

> Oleg: But there if people leave those bottles, as waste bins get progressively fewer, the higher up you are, those bottles roll down, they get into rivers, and you feel like they are everywhere those bottles, it's really bad for the image. And they swim to the EU.
> Interviewer: Across the border without a visa? [laughs]
> Oleg: No visa, yes. Even a dirty bottle can get there without a visa, but we can't even if we're clean. [laughs ironically] (Interview with local expert in ecological project, Ukraine, 2012)

First, just like Iryna, the respondent emphasizes the EU's internal motivation in respect of the project's implementation. The last comment shows the interviewee's feeling of being excluded from the EU. Although the experts are partially integrated through their participation in the EU-funded project and their study visits in the EU, the impression of being excluded is still noticeable.

In Belarus, the e-learning project in which Iryna, our first Ukrainian respondent, is engaged is managed by a university professor. Aleksandr shows us the computer lab in the university which is financed by EU projects he already acquired. He furthermore states with pride that his colleagues are jealous of the computers, which are only used by the students of the interviewed professor. Following the respondent's expressions, the EU's projects increase his reputation as he states that his colleagues are, in his words, 'jealous' (Interview with local expert in e-learning project, Belarus, 2012) due to the new technical devices with which he can provide his students. His colleagues were trying to take some of them for their own students, which he would not allow. The respondent also proudly tells the interviewers that almost all publications of the department he runs are published and printed with the financial help of the EU, as there is no money dedicated to this issue in the Belarusian state budget. Although the 65-year-old professor does not use any computer, and therefore seems to be a very inappropriate

coordinator of an e-learning project, he still seems to play a significant role in the implementation process. In this context, he highlights his personal contacts to the Belarusian Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Education and explains that, due to his well-established contacts, the project was officially registered within six months. This is a duration he estimates as very short in Belarus. Including a professor who is not related to the content of the project shows the importance of considering the local context regarding the practical aspects of the project's implementation. The respondent himself is interested in being recognized as the one who gained the financial support: He uses extra-territorial measures in order to increase his personal social capital and reputation among his colleagues. Furthermore, as he distinguishes between his own students who are allowed to use the computer lab and others who do not have his permission, he creates new dividing lines within the student community between those who are privileged and favored and those who are excluded. Thus, the ENP initiates not only otherness between the EU and the eastern neighbors, but also within societies in third countries.

The following extract is taken from a conversation with two local experts who are coordinators of an Erasmus Mundus project in Belarus:

> Marina: They [the EU] do not hide [their motivation].
> Natasha: Yes, everything is clearly written in their instructions, you can easily extract what they want. I think that any project manager before preparing the project in the first place just reads the strategy of the European Union in this area, or maybe the guidelines, or any documents, where they explain everything otherwise you cannot write any application. [laughs]
> Marina: They give us money only because we write as they want us to write. (Interview with local experts in Erasmus Mundus project, Belarus, 2012)

This quote refers back to the exchange of perception and ascription described in Eder's statement. In this situation, the participating countries are only reproducing the regulations and imaginings of the EU in order to gain projects and financial support. The quote also elaborates, indirectly, the asymmetric interdependence between the EU and third

countries where the EU sets the aims and the priorities of its external strategy, including its financial support and the projects' approval. Being well aware of that situation, the respondents, on the one hand, turn the described dependence to their favor by simply adopting and repeating EU regulations and imaginings (especially as there is no equivalent national project funding). On the other hand, as the interviewees apply this strategy of recurrence and reference, they do not reflect on their own needs and demands, which should be integrated as well. Consequently, the local experts' interests are excluded from the project's conception. Here, it becomes apparent that the ENP merely consists in the execution of administrative measures by NGOs and third states, instead of the promotion of an equal partnership between the EU and its eastern neighbors.

In the migration discourse, the internal security-related motivation of the ENP is clearly recognized. Kateryna in Ukraine, working in an NGO dedicated to the issues of refugees, states:

> I think that the EU is interested in supporting the migration office and the state in general in order to build up a system. It is well known that Ukraine, due to its geographic position, is a transit country and, if no reasonable conditions are achieved here, no one wants to stay. That means, refugees will face any hazard, at any rate, to try to get to Europe, where there are these conditions. […] The EU is aware that, first, you have to help the state, teach something, to impart best practice in order to establish a system. Only afterwards can you lay down requirements. Because otherwise, firstly, the refugees will become the problem of the EU itself [laughs] and secondly, yes secondly, the system will not appear from nowhere, but has to be built up. The problem is that the state lacks money and knowledge. […] The government budget is empty, that is obvious, […]. (Interview with local expert in migration project, Ukraine, 2012)

Within the migration discourse, the EU's self-interest regarding the extra-territorial engagement is even more evident. Ukraine should become the country of final destination instead of being a transit country for migrants on their way to the EU. Therefore, ultimately, the rationale underlying the support of refugees and the migration service in Ukraine is, from the respondent's point of view, not guided by humanistic principles but, rather, by the EU's own interests. Furthermore, just as the pre-

vious quote, this quote highlights the dependence of eastern neighbors on external funding and, consequently, refers to the unequal relationship between the EU and the addressed third countries.

Conclusions

As we have seen, there are commonalities in each considered policy field of extra-territorial EU measures: The EU tries to modify infrastructure, practices and dominant values and norms in third countries in order to guarantee its internal security. The local executors of the EU's extra-territorial projects in Ukraine and Belarus are aware of this underlying motivation behind EU actions in third countries. Several aspects regarding the EU's extra-territorial engagement were addressed by the interviews conducted in these countries. Interestingly, not only within the migration discourse, but also in education and urban development-oriented projects, integrated respondents recognize a security-related motivation in the EU. Furthermore, the respondents describe the passive role of their home countries, as receiver countries: They—from the interviewees' point of view—cannot influence the projects' conceptions. As the addressed countries lack or do not provide their own financial resources, their dependence on financial support given by the EU increases. As a result, pragmatic repetition is reflected by the respondents, rather than the acceptance and integration of imposed values. In consequence, the EU has not yet fulfilled its goals: Its projects may improve technical infrastructure and identify best practices in third countries, but its extra-territorial engagement has not led to a general intrinsic change of values and norms among important actors in third countries.

The interviewees' answers point to a rather indifferent attitude, without much enthusiasm towards the EU's engagement in third countries' territories. A factor which they did not mention in the interviews, but one which influences third countries' positions towards the EU very strongly, is the way their eastern neighbor Russia reacts to their cooperation with the Union.

The consequences of Ukraine's pro-European course are shown drastically in the Crimean crisis and the independent movement in the Donbass region—even if one does not comment on the role of Russia. This devel-

opment demonstrates the high risks eastern neighbors face, or could face, regarding their participation in the EU's foreign policy, such as destabilization and territorial vulnerability. Therefore, the EU's extra-territorial engagement appears as a potential threat to the security of the addressed countries themselves, which counteracts the EU's declared aims and convictions: 'A concept of internal security cannot exist without an external dimension, since internal security increasingly depends to a large extent on external security' (European Union, 2010, p. 29).

Since the EU has become more and more aware of the problematic 'in-between' position of its eastern neighbors, it is on its way to modifying the ENP, putting a new focus on the relations of its neighbors with their neighbors (see European Commission, 2015, p. 4). So, it will be interesting to see the direction extra-territorial EU measures will take in Ukraine and Belarus in the future, and how this will impact on the construction of Otherness.

References

Andreas, P. & Biersteker, T. J. (2003). *The rebordering of North America: Integration and exclusion in a new security context*. New York: Routledge.

Balzacq, T. (2008). *The external dimension of EU justice and home affairs: Tools, processes, outcomes*. CEPS working document, no. 303. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies. Retrieved March 10, 2015 from http://www.ceps.eu/book/external-dimension-eu-justice-and-home-affairs-tools-processes-outcomes.

Bigo, D. (2002). Security and immigration: Toward a critique of the governmentality of unease. *Alternatives*, *27*(Special Issue), 63–92.

Bigo, D. & Guild, E. (Eds.) (2005). *Controlling frontiers. Free movement into and within Europe*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Boswell, C. (2003). The 'external dimension' of EU immigration and asylum policy. *International Affairs*, *79*(3), 619–638.

Civil Society (2015). *Eastern partnership* (*EaP*). Retrieved December 11, 2015 from www.csdialogue.eu/about/eastern-partnership-eap.

Council of the European Union (2008). *Report on the implementation of the European security strategy—Providing security in a changing world*. 17104/08, Brussels. Retrieved April 15, 2015 from http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-17104-2008-INIT/en/pdf.

Delcour, L. (2010). The European Union, a security provider in the Eastern Neighbourhood? *European Security*, *19*(4), 535–549.

Eder, K. (2009). A theory of collective identity making sense of the debate on a 'European Identity'. *European Journal of Social Theory*, *12*, 427–447.

EU Neighbourhood Info Centre (n.d.). Eastern partnership culture programme. Retrieved December 10, 2015 from http://www.enpi-info.eu/maineast.php?id=286&id_type=10

Education, Audiovisual and Cultural Executive Agency (2013). Tempus IV (2007-2013): Overview of the Programme. Retrieved August 31, 2015 from http://eacea.ec.europe.en/tempus/programme/about_tempus_eu.php.

European Commission (2003). *Wider Europe—Neighbourhood*: *A new framework for relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours*. COM (2003) 104 final, Brussels, 11 March.

European Commission (2004). *European Neighbourhood Policy - Strategy paper*. Com (2004) 373 final, Brussels, 12 May. Retrieved April 10, 2015 from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52004DC0373&from=EN.

European Commission (2005). *A strategy on the external dimension of the area of freedom*, *security and justice*. COM (2005) 491 final Brussels, 12 October.

European Commission (2010). *The EU internal security strategy in action*: *Five steps towards a more secure Europe*. COM (2010) 673 final, Brussels, 22 November.

European Commission (2013). *The European Union explained*: *Migration and asylum*. Retrieved May 11, 2013 from http://europa.eu/pol/justice/flipbook/migration/en/files/migration-and-asylum_en.pdf.

European Commission (2015). *Joint consultation paper. Towards a new neighbourhood policy*. JOIN (2015) 6 final. Brussels, 4 March.

European Communities (1997). Treaty of Amsterdam amending the treaty on European Union, the treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts. *Official Journal of the European Communities*, *C340*.

European Council (2003). *A secure Europe in a better world. European Security Strategy*, Brussels, 12 December. Retrieved June 20, 2015 from https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf.

European External Action Service (2011). EU launches new project for improving waste governance in six ENPI east countries including Belarus. Retrieved May 10, 2016 from http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/belarus/press_corner/all_news/2009/20091217_01_en.htm

European Parliament (2014). *European Parliament resolution of 17 July 2014 on Ukraine* (2014/27178RSP)) Strasbourg. Retrieved December 11, 2015 from

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P8-TA-2014-0009.

European Parliament and Council (2003). *Decision no. 2317/2003/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 5 December 2003 establishing a programme for the enhancement of quality in higher education and the promotion of intercultural understanding through cooperation with third countries* (*Erasmus Mundus*) (2004–2008).

European Union (2010). *Internal security strategy for the European Union. Towards a European security model*, Luxemburg: Publications Office of the European Union. Retrieved February 10, 2014 from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/librairie/PDF/QC3010313ENC.pdf.

Garlick, M. (2006). The EU discussions on extraterritorial processing: Solution or conundrum? *International Journal of Refugee Law, 18*(3/4), 601–629.

Geiger, M. (2011). *Europäische Migrationspolitik und Raumproduktion. Internationale Regierungsorganisationen im Management von Migration in Albanien, Bosnien-Herzegowina und der Ukraine*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.

Hornby, A. S. (1989). *Oxford advanced learner's dictionary of current english*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Huysmans, J. (2006). *The politics of insecurity. Fear, migration and asylum in the EU*. Oxan, New York: Routledge.

Ibrahim, M. (2005). The securitization of migration: A racial discourse. *International Migration*, *43*(5), 163–187.

Jørgensen, K. E. & Aarstad, Å. K. (2013). Liberal, constructivist and critical studies of European security. In S. Biscop & R. Whitman (Eds.), *The Routledge handbook of European security* (pp. 28–37). Abingdon, New York: Routledge.

Kryvoi, Y. & Wilson, A. (2015). *From sanctions to summits. Belarus after the Ukraine crisis*. London: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR).

Laube, L., & Roos, C. (2011). *Border and immigration control. Two converging logics*? *A comparison between EU countries and the U.S*. Paper prepared for the 6th ECRP General Conference, Reykjavik.

Lavenex, S. (2004). EU external governance in 'wider Europe'. *Journal of European Public Policy*, *11*(4), 680–700.

Léonard, S. (2010). EU border security and migration into the European Union: FRONTEX and securitisation through practices. *European Security*, *19*(2), 231–254.

Popescu, N. & Wilson, A. (2009). *The limits of enlargement-lite. European and Russian power in the troubled neighbourhood*. London: European Council for Foreign Relations.

Rijpma, J. J., & Cremona, M. (2007). *The extra-territorialisation of EU migration policies and the rule of law*. EUI working paper. Law, no. 01/2007/. Retrieved August 4, 2015 from http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/6690/LAW_2007_01.pdf?sequence=1.

Ryan, B. (2010). Extraterritorial immigration control: What role for legal guarantees? In B. Ryan & V. Mitsilegas (Eds.), *Extraterritorial immigration control. Legal challenges* (pp. 3–37). Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff.

Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (2014). Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine: On the statement of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine 'On the European Choice of Ukraine'. 16 September 2014. Retrieved May 14, 2015 from http://rada.gov.ua/en/news/top_news/97809.html.

Wichmann, N. (2007). The intersection between justice and home affairs and the European Neighbourhood Policy: Taking stock of the logic, objectives and practices. CEPS working document; No. 275; Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies. Retrieved February 15, 2014 from http://www.ceps.eu/ (homepage).

Wolff, S., Wichmann, N., & Mounier, G. (2009). *The external dimension of justice and home affairs: A different security agenda for the European Union?* London: Routledge.

Zeilinger, B. (2012). The EU's external policy towards Eastern Europe on migration issues. In E. Stadtmüller & K. Bachmann (Eds.), *The EU's shifting borders. Theoretical approaches and policy implications in the new neighbourhood* (pp. 60–79). London: Routledge.

Zichner, H. & Bruns, B. (2011). Within a "ring of secure third countries": Regional and local effects of the extraterritorial engagement of the European Union in Belarus, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova. *Leaders of the Borders, Borders of the Leaders. Eurolimes*, *11*, 78–89.

Zichner, H. (2013). How to grow English lawn in Moldova? Reflecting on the reasons to establish and those to participate in the Erasmus Mundus Programme of the European Union. *Journal of Social Science Education*, *12*(4), 29–42.

8

The EU's Education Policy Abroad: The 'Power of Attraction' and the Case of Moldova

Helga Zichner and Vladislav Saran

This chapter has two roots: On the one hand, it is rooted in a research project dealing with the local effects the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is unfolding and the perception thereof in the countries directly neighboring the EU.[1] Part of that research focuses on projects in the field of education politics and, especially, on the exchange scheme Erasmus Mundus (EM). The other root of the chapter is the collaboration between the two authors, who had a similar research interest and undertook similar research in Moldova.[2] While, from the very start, Vlad embedded the topic Erasmus Mundus

[1] *Within a 'ring of secure third countries': regional and local effects of the extraterritorial engagement of the European Union in Belarus, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova*. Project conducted by Bettina Bruns at the Leibniz Institute for Regional Geography, Leipzig.

[2] Independently of one another, we each undertook qualitative interviews in 2012: Vlad in Chisinau and by email with students abroad, and Helga in Chisinau and other cities of Moldova, focusing on both students and program administrators.

H. Zichner (✉)
German Trade Union Federation, Kiel, Germany

V. Saran
Academy of Sciences of Moldova, Chisinau, Republic of Moldova

B. Bruns et al. (eds.), *European Neighbourhood Policy*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-69504-1_8

into the context of Moldovan emigration, Helga initially focused more on the processes that take place on the level of individuals and their perceptions. Both of us, however, inevitably came across the phenomenon of brain drain and, thus, to a problem that is affecting the country as a whole. In the case of external education policy, the notion of extra-territoriality takes another interesting turn: It shares as a common feature with other policies addressed to the outside that it aims at influencing and aligning domestic policies in a certain domain (here, education), but at the heart of the exchange scheme we analyze here, lies the individual mobility of academics. On the basis of Erasmus Mundus scholarships, academics leave their country for a certain amount of time—that is, they go extra-territorial and become insiders of an EU educational system for this period of time. The extra-territorial space for these individuals is, then, the EU. On their return, they are supposed to bring home certain insights or particular knowledge. This can be interpreted as a kind of additional promotion of the EU's external education policy from within, through the medium of non-extra-territorial actors—such as, for example, professors and students. Instead of analyzing the extent to which the EU is successful in following this strategy of public diplomacy, we want to combine in this chapter two perspectives on the Erasmus Mundus program: First, is that we see it in the light of the pressing problem of emigration from Moldova in more general terms and, second, in the light of the assessments of Erasmus Mundus given by 'practitioners' who are in charge of coordinating it at Moldovan universities. The underlying question both of us are concerned with is the extent to which an initiative such as EM potentially contributes to the emigration of the highly skilled and thus to the problem of brain drain. And to make it clear from the start, we are not able to answer this question, because emigration patterns so far are not sufficiently well researched.

What we think we can do is hint at an important inconsistency in EU education politics and at its implications. While the overall goal of the ENP is to prevent new 'dividing lines' (European Commission, 2003, p. 4) through promoting the development of these countries, by EM the EU tries to attract the best talents from all over the world, to enhance the attractiveness of its own sector of higher education (HE) and to fill gaps in the workforce (see Didelon & Richard, 2012; Hermans, 2007; Maassen & Musselin, 2009; Teodoro, 2013).

We will proceed by outlining the place education policy has on the agenda of the ENP in comparison with the career it has made in EU

internal politics. The argument is that, even if education is generally not treated as one of the highest priorities, it is nevertheless meaningful because it represents a resource for creating 'soft power'; this is important to convince people of the attractiveness of a political offer, or to 'shape the preferences of others' in general (Nye, 2004, p. 5). This is more difficult than the EU itself had envisioned, as is evident from current events in Ukraine and also from the turnout at the Moldovan parliamentary elections in which Socialists with a clear pro-Russian orientation won 21 % (for an overview, see BBC, 2014; Brett & Knott, 2014).

Then, we will look at the situation of HE in Moldova and how the process of Europeanization of this field is reflected in related documents and analyses by local experts. It will become clear that Moldova is dealing with several challenges at the same time: The massification of HE, the massive emigration of highly skilled workers and the permanent underfunding of HE institutions (HEI) which also impacts on their participation in international projects. Since the problem of brain drain is stressed by many authors, we will try to elaborate on the emigration of young and highly skilled people in an extra section, our endeavors being restricted, however, by the weak database.

Before coming to some conclusions, we try to sketch the potential contribution of EM to the problem of brain drain by drawing on studies about the mobility of students from third countries, based on available statistical data concerning Moldovan students having gone abroad with Erasmus Mundus. While some studies call for more participation, they also warn that EM may lead to further brain drain.

Education Policy in the European Neighbourhood Policy: The Significance of the People-to-People Approach

The aim of this section is to reach an estimation about the significance of the program EM which ran from 2004 until 2013 and which has been incorporated in the ERASMUS+ framework, the successor program launched in January 2014. By significance, we mean the role ascribed to it in the framework of policies addressing the neighborhood countries of the EU, especially

the ENP and the Eastern Partnership (EaP). First, we present a brief reconstruction of the profile education policy has made within the EU. Second, we will take a comparative look at certain EU documents in the context of ENP and EaP, and the references to education policies therein. We will consider how education is positioned on the internal and external agendas of the EU and the motives that drive the EU's approach to this domain.

Within the EU, education policy has basically been pushed from its peripheral place on the agenda (Maassen & Musselin, 2009, p. 4) to a central position during the development of the Lisbon strategy (aimed at making the EU the most competitive economic space in the world; see, for example, European Commission, 2005; Teodoro, 2013, p. 448). The intermingling of the EU in HE matters was justified mainly by economic arguments: Closer links between HE and the economy would enhance the EU's competitiveness (European Commission, 2006, p. 4). This target will be reached by enhancing the quality of HE in the EU in order to keep students in Europe and prevent them from migrating to the USA (Pépin, 2006, p. 246) while, at the same time, attracting a workforce from abroad.

Even if the process of Europeanization of educational matters had a reluctant start connected to sensitivities in this traditional domain of nation states, they are now increasingly shaped by the EU (see Corbett, 2003; Keeling, 2006; Lawn & Grek, 2012). This development was not only driven by economic considerations, but motivated also by identity politics at a time in which low turnouts in the elections for the European Parliament amounted to the question of whether the EU might have a 'democratic deficit' (Shore, 1993, pp. 783–785; see also Meyer, Chapter 1 in this volume, who mentions the persistence of the problem). In this context, the EU launched the internal exchange scheme ERASMUS, which is very representive of both the cultural and the economic rationales. ERASMUS served as 'human resource training' and 'as an aid in shaping the development of the European citizen […] by forging European consciousness' (both quotes from Papatsiba, 2009, p. 194). ERASMUS quickly became a flagship initiative for enhancing the visibility of and potential identification with the so-called European idea or, as Klose puts it, it has helped 'the emergence of a European identity and

"demos"' (2012, pp. 44–45) in general, and meanwhile 'the 3 millionth student went abroad with Erasmus'.[3]

Comparing this with the *external* dimension of the EU's education policy, we can state that the decisive difference appears to be its positioning on the agenda. In contrast to the centrality of education policy since the Lisbon Process, it is given a much lower ranking and is not listed among the flagship initiatives—among which, for example, are integrated border management, small and medium-sized enterprise initiatives, or energy markets and efficiency (see EEAS). Education pops up in paragraph 76 out of 80 in the EU/Moldova Action Plan (2005). Paragraph 76 is about 'Enhanc[ing] co-operation in the field of education, training and youth' within the chapter of 'People to people contacts'. Accordingly, in the latest progress report about the implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in the Republic of Moldova (European Commission, 2014), it is evaluated in the last chapter, entitled 'people-to-people contacts, education and health' (European Commission, 2014, p. 21).

Here, it is grouped together with objectives as diverse as youth programs, the inclusion of children with disabilities in educational institutions, and projects on public health and food safety (European Commission, 2014, pp. 21–23), which gives the impression that it is not only treated as a lower priority, but is also much less clearly defined than within the EU. Compared with the three million participants in ERASMUS, the low numbers of participants in EM do not come as a surprise. According to Manners and Whitman (2013, p. 192), between 2004 and 2012 altogether 14,000 people from all over the world have studied in EM master courses.

So, why write about EM at all, and its meanings and interpretations? Isn't it just a poor cover or a 'fig leaf' to lend the ENP a more 'human face' (ENPI-Info, 2014) that appears insignificant in comparison with the heavyweights in this policy, such as economic or energy issues?

We argue that one should look at a detail such as EM for at least two reasons. First, from the perspective of the EU itself, it is part of

[3] See http://ec.europa.eu/education/library/statistics/ay-12-13/facts-figures_en.pdf (accessed June 2, 2015).

the bigger project of reforming the educational sector in the neighborhood countries, which is said to be 'essential to consolidate democratic development, social stability and economic competitiveness' (European Commission, 2010, p. 18). It represents a way of addressing poverty in the country, one of the potential sources for insecurity mentioned in the European Security Strategy (European Council, 2003, p. 2). Second, recalling the layer of identity politics inherent in the ERASMUS program, one can look at EM through a similar lens, namely that of cultural or public diplomacy (see Jones, 2009–2010, p. 6; Manners & Whitman, 2013, pp. 192–193), which can be defined as 'how a nation's government or society engages with external audiences in ways that improve these foreign publics' perception of that nation' (Cross & Melissen, 2013, p. xvii; see also Cross, 2013). The EU itself lays an emphasis on the grassroots level of interaction between people from EU and non-EU countries and, herein, the construction of cultural commonalities plays a role. The EU's approach and the relevance of fostering contacts on the level of individuals in the Strategy Paper of the ENP reads like this:

> An effective means to achieve the ENP's main objectives is to connect the peoples of the Union and its neighbours […] the ENP will promote cultural, educational and more general societal links […]. (European Commission, 2004, p. 19)

If we view societal levels apart from high level politics as indispensable in order to realize the overall objectives, it is tempting to look at what happens there. Dealing with EM therefore almost imposes a micro-perspective because it is an instrument of individual mobility. This entails the opportunity to look at how change occurs and the roles the individual actors play—a perspective that is, however, not adopted very often (see Vukasović, 2014, p. 49). To take into account the micro level is important because the overall process of the 'Europeanization beyond Europe' (Schimmelfennig, 2015), of which EM represents a thin slice, is not only decided on the level of political leadership, but also needs to be grounded; or, as the EU puts it: Cooperation in the ENP consists also of 'turning these decisions into actions on the ground […] to bring about change and modernization' (ENPI-Info, 2013, p. 9).

All these efforts will contribute to one important goal: Preventing the emergence of new 'dividing lines' (European Commission, 2003, p. 4) by building up 'a partnership of equals sharing common values' (European Commission, 2012, p. 2), or by building up a 'capital of goodwill' among former participants from non-EU countries (European Parliament & Council, 2003, para. 10). While these quotes once more stress the cultural dimension of education policy abroad, it is important not to lose sight of the economic aspect. In an evaluation report about mobility in HE in the EU, it is strongly recommended that the exchange scheme EM should remain a brain gain program (Teichler, Ferencz, Wächter et al., 2011, p. 211). While this is understandable from the EU's point of view, the consequences implied for a country such as Moldova might prove very difficult because it already suffers from brain drain to the EU, to the USA, to Canada and also to Russia. In order to better understand the significance of Moldova's inclusion in HE projects in the EU, we will proceed by introducing the position of HE in Moldova.

The Situation of Higher Education in Moldova—On the Track of Europeanization?

Higher education can, directly and indirectly, provide progress for society. In an age where information and knowledge in general are the main factors of development, the importance of education is crucial. In Moldova, however, education has not yet become a major factor in developing creative personalities and the skills and abilities necessary for professional activity and for social and political satisfaction of the individual. The situation seems to be even worse, as suggested by the following quote:

> In the Republic of Moldova, the mass emigration of skilled human capital is a tough challenge that has hindered the advancement of science, research and innovation in the 20 years since independence. (Tejada, Varzari & Porcescu, 2013, p. 158.)

After starting a process of domestic education reform in the preceding years, Moldova additionally joined the Bologna Process in 2005 in

order to set the necessary changes under way. The main objectives of the Bologna Process include strengthening the competitiveness and attractiveness of the EU's HEI, and fostering student mobility and employability. In all this, quality assurance was an important element (Bologna, 2014). Yet, according to a policy brief from early 2012 (Ciurea, Berbeca, Lipcean & Gurin, 2012b), Moldova's progress in education reform was very limited due to how reforms were implemented: No external quality assurance agency was established, funding for universities was decreased despite the fact that student numbers had been on the rise for some time, curricula (formerly 4 + 1 years) were not substantially revised but pressed, by and large unchanged, into the new scheme (3 + 2 years). This resulted in a 'generalization at the expense of the depth of studies' (Ciurea et al., 2012b, p. 2) and many university colleagues complained that, since the Bologna Process, graduates of the first cycle (three years, instead of four) were worse prepared for their professional life than beforehand. Furthermore, Moldova did not introduce the third cycle (the postgraduate cycle) until very recently,[4] so that, practically, graduates who wished to continue their academic qualification according to the Bologna Process could not do so in Moldova.

Mobility is the basic concept in the Bologna Process. Students and teachers must be able to circulate and work freely. From the perspective of Moldovan education politics, too, academic mobility is a central asset that it strongly wants to promote. Here, surprisingly similar aims are associated with increased mobility, if compared with EM: From the perspective of the Ministry of Education, the political aspect of academic mobility through EU exchange schemes is to increase Moldova's image abroad, which can be interpreted as a kind of public diplomacy on the part of Moldova. A positive image is seen as beneficial for finding new partners that will help to facilitate Moldova's further EU integration (Sandu, 2013, p. 1).

Furthermore, scientific excellence in general will be fostered by intensifying academic exchange transnationally, presupposing that students,

[4] According to a press release by the Ministry of Education, the regulation regarding the introduction of doctoral education in line with the third-cycle Bologna model was approved in December 2014. See http://edu.gov.md/ro/evenimentele-saptaminii/guvernul-a-aprobat-astazi-regulamentul-cu-privire-la-studiile-de-doctorat-16521/ (accessed June 2, 2015).

postgraduates and staff do return to Moldova after their stay abroad. So, in general, Moldova is open to this process; it is participating officially, and a strategy to implement the process has been in place since 2004 (Bologna, 2004). However, a huge domestic problem seems to overshadow every effort: The difficult financial situation of the country is reflected also in the budget for educational matters (Ciurea, Berbeca, Lipcean & Gurin, 2012a, p. 10), in that no additional funding is promised in order to foster academic mobility: 'The participation […] is going to be realized within the financial limits envisioned in the annual budget for education' (Sandu, 2013, p. 2). According to another analysis (Ciurea et al., 2012b), universities have received even less money since the pro-European coalition came to power in 2009. In general, the share of HE in the overall budget for education policy grew more slowly than the budget for other areas of education (Ciurea et al., 2012b, pp. 1 and 4)—but it grew, even if from a very low level. More alarming is that, even if the overall budget for education has been increased to 9.2 % of the GDP—which is almost 5 % more than the EU average—this did not provide any significant economic or social impact (State Chancellery, 2013, p. 14).

This situation closely corresponds to Kwiek's analysis, according to which, after 1989/90, the so-called transition countries have been confronted with a double challenge: They not only have to adapt to the new requirements of knowledge-based economies in the same way as all other countries, but have to come to terms with another challenge at the same time, namely, 'the process of shifting from elite to mass higher education under severe resource constraints' (Kwiek, 2004, p. 765). While the massification of HE was mastered by older EU member states more or less decades ago, starting in the late 1960s, it is taking place in Moldova under much more difficult circumstances: Numbers of students have doubled during the last two decades (Since Moldova's independence in 1991) (State Chancellery, 2013, p. 19).

On a national level, only about one fifth of young graduates aged between 15 and 29 years find a job in Moldova, and many of them soon quit their job due to low wages (State Chancellery, 2013, p. 14). Meager funding for universities results in widespread corruption among university staff, limited access to literature and problems such as insufficient heating of buildings during winter—thus derogating even basic working conditions.

Moldova itself is fighting with a serious problem of attraction: It needs to find ways to keep the young and well qualified in the country, or to attract them to return after periods of academic mobility abroad. According to the *National Development Strategy* (State Chancellery, 2013), eliminating corruption factors and stimulating real competition between HEI are prerequisites for improving the situation. Other aims are to orient the intellectual potential of graduates more strongly along the needs of the labor market and to reduce the emigration of young graduates by at least 50% by 2020.

Officially, then, Moldovan education policy is on the track of Europeanization. Its inclusion in the European Area of Higher Education is considered as a chance to improve the situation of HE in Moldova, which is necessary not only in order to participate in international projects, but also because Moldova needs skilled people in the country to contribute to Moldova's further Europeanization. The implementation of necessary measures suffers, however, from a lack of financial backup while emigration is further fueled by the persisting mismatch between HE and the needs of the labor market.

Trying to Grasp the Brain Drain Phenomenon in Moldova

Clearly, the problem of brain drain in Moldova is a response to the local economic and social situation. The global competition for talented people results in structurally similar scenarios within the EU and Moldova: In certain segments of the economy and the public services, such as health and education, there is no qualified workforce. Countries try to keep the highly and properly skilled in place, or to attract them from other places (where, however, they leave a sensitive gap, so the problem is merely shifted to another location). While, from a Moldovan perspective, the concern lies with the EU's 'magnetic power' (Burdelenii, 2011, p. 37), voices from within the EU worry about the competitiveness of the EU (Didelon & Richard, 2012, p. 230; Robertson, 2006, p. 12). As the flow usually goes from poorer to richer countries, Moldova counts as an

'exporting country' (Kwiek, 2004, p. 770), simultaneously representing the eastward shift of the whole phenomenon.

How pronounced the problem of emigration is even before young people set out to become skilled persons can be shown by only sporadic empirical evidence. During the closing festivities of a workshop with pupils at the Lyceum of the Moldovan Academy of Sciences,[5] a speaker on behalf of the International Organization for Migration appealed to them to think twice about the option to leave because Moldova needed them (minutes from memory, Chisinau, March 1, 2014). The number of high school graduates who commence their HE studies abroad, especially in neighboring Romania, are high: For the academic year 2014/15, Romania offered a total of 5000 scholarships to Moldovan citizens.[6] According to Tejada et al. (2013, p. 160), 56 % of those aged between 15 and 24 would leave permanently if they had the opportunity.

The quantification of brain drain remains difficult, nevertheless, due to the lack of regular and systematic statistical records; this seems to be a general problem since 'in all migration research less is known about emigrants than immigrants' (Findlay, 2001, p. 15). For Moldova, no data are collected concerning student migration (Poalelungi, 2011, p. 62; similarly, Ciurea et al., 2012a, p. 57; Tejada, 2013, p. 103), but there is one piece of data from the field of 'work & travel' programs, which are extremely popular in Moldova: Between 2008 and 2009, 10,000 students left on this basis, 20 % of whom did not come back (Poalelungi, 2011). If we further take into consideration that a proportion of them abandon HE altogether in order to earn a living abroad, this makes clear that the entire matter of migration of the highly skilled is not only one of brain drain but also of brain waste—altogether far from the idealized aim of 'brain circulation' benefitting all sides. But what can we say about interdependencies between the problem of brain drain and EM? What are the perspectives of those who are directly involved in its implementation?

[5] Conferinta stiintifico-practica pedagogica nationala: Migratia si consolidarea dialogului intercultural. March 1, 2014. Liceul Academiei de Stiinte a Moldovei.

[6] See http://diez.md/2014/07/02/romania-ofera-5000-de-burse-de-studii-cetatenilor-moldoveni-pentru-anul-academic-2014-15/.

Interpretations of Erasmus Mundus—Chances or Challenges?

Turning finally to EM, there are no concrete numbers concerning students who remain in the country of destination after their EM stay abroad. Comments by administrators from Moldova remained contradictory to a certain extent. While all the administrators we talked to claimed that the good thing about EM was that students must come back, neither our colleague who researched the topic in Ukraine and Belarus, nor those of us in Moldova, were ever shown any document that obliges students to return to their home institution. The program guide to EM and the available model contracts (learning agreements) do not contain any clauses carrying that sense, so the source of the conviction remains unclear to us. Ultimately, it seems to be only the visa that is limited to the period of stay for study purposes.

Broader research on student mobility indicates to the contrary that students, indeed, tend to settle where they have studied abroad (see Tejada, 2013, pp. 103 and 109 f. on 'probationary immigration'; similarly, Findlay, 2001). In line with this trend, an evaluation report about the Mobility Partnership EU–Moldova shows that the numbers of highly skilled leaving the country went up from 8 % to 12 % between 2000 and 2008 (Mobility Partnership, 2012, pp. 34–35). Slightly more specifically, another statistic indicates that, in 2011, 3606 Moldovan citizens were in the EU for study purposes; however, this figure does not include participants in EM or students in other parts of the world (Mobility Partnership, 2012, p. 39). In 2013, 172 scholarships were given to participants from Moldova for all types of mobility (joint masters; undergraduates; students pursuing masters, doctoral and postdoctoral degrees; and staff) (EU-Statistics, 2014, p. 80), the number remaining apparently stable for the last three years (2012–2014).

Conversely, the numbers for EM appear meager (compared with other available figures), leading some to the conclusion that: 'Unfortunately, we have to realize that student mobility is a process that is not escalating' (Ciurea et al., 2012b, p. 55). This resonates with what program administrators in Balti, Chisinau and Cahul told us: From their point of view, the

student interest was too low. Sometimes, numbers of applicants match exactly with the number of available scholarships, making any efforts 'to select the best candidates' according to criteria of academic quality futile (Interviews, Chisinau and Balti, 2012). Stakeholders in Moldova explain the low level of interest, in a self-critical way, as the result of widespread disinterest and lack of self-confidence on part of their students, but students report that, at least in some universities, the information is not spread sufficiently well, or those who are in charge do not encourage students sufficiently (see Zichner, 2013). Didelon and Richard, however, see the low numbers as symptomatic of the overall weak engagement on the part of the EU to build up closer cooperation between HEI in the EU and those of the neighbors (Didelon & Richard, 2012, p. 241, similar to Manners & Whitman cited above). For the academic year 2012/2013, for example, scholarships were registered for 268,143 Erasmus students, in contrast with 2023 Erasmus Mundus master students (for non-EU worldwide), out of which 7 were from Moldova.[7]

In fact, none of the interviewed program coordinators of three state universities in Moldova (Chisinau, Balti, Cahul) mentioned any negative aspects explicitly. Their complaints about the low interest hinted, however, in two directions: One is the hope of gaining from the external experiences on a broader level—students returning home are said to be changed, filled with energy and new ideas, which should be seen as an important asset, inspiring fellow students and lecturers (Interviews, Chisinau and Balti, 2012). The second direction is that by 'good' numbers participating, Moldova can improve its reputation in relation to partners from the EU:

> Every time we participate it is like a bit of prestige also for the institution to be participant in such a project. Every time you apply for such a project it is good because it increases your practical experience, a big experience because you get acquainted with different systems, not only the country, but also as an institution, learning how people handle this kind of projects.

[7] See *Erasmus Mundus Statistics,* http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/erasmus_mundus/results_compendia/statistics_2012_en.php (accessed August 31, 2015) and *Erasmus. Facts and figures,* http://ec.europa.eu/education/library/statistics/ay-12-13/facts-figures_en.pdf (accessed August 31, 2015).

> This is extraordinary. […] and this experience is somehow what matters. (Interview, Chisinau, 2012)

By being a good and reliable partner in EM consortia and by sending the best students (Interviews, Chisinau, Balti, Cahul, 2012), Moldovan universities themselves try to accumulate a specific capital of goodwill among EU partners. This is important, not only to further EM consortia, but also to increase scientific cooperation, especially if we take into account that, until 2012, inter-university cooperation at the level of lecturers outside EU-organized frameworks is said to have been insignificant (Ciurea et al., 2012a, p. 55). The challenge seems to be to spur on participation in exchange schemes, rather than to discuss this as a factor for brain drain. Given the low number of participants in relation to other forms of emigration, the potential loss may appear manageable at first sight.

However, during the interview in Cahul the phenomenon of non-return surfaced, especially with regard to masters students and doctoral students. The coordinator mentioned that these often did not return, offering a twofold explanation: On the one hand, students would prefer to stay abroad because in Cahul they cannot continue with their doctorate, given that the third cycle according to the Bologna Process has not yet been introduced. On the other hand, job opportunities abroad were clearly better; in that sense, student mobility seems to become an 'easy escape route to permanent brain drain' (Kwiek, 2004, p. 770). The coordinators in Balti mentioned that this was a recurring topic in discussions not only at their university, but also with colleagues from other HEI:

> Those who are annoyed by the fact that people leave have to understand that we have to make the country more attractive. And once it is attractive, then not only those who left will come back but also other foreigners will come here in order to live here. A young student wants to be a good computer scientist but here we do not allow him to grow, then he will go to Canada, because he wants to become successful. (Interview, Balti, 2012)

Interestingly, from the above quote it appears to be the task of Moldovan stakeholders to make the country more attractive in order to stop the highly skilled from emigrating. Others see the EU as also in

charge of doing something about brain drain: 'Few activities have been undertaken by EU-member states in the framework of the mobility partnership in order to tackle the problem of "brain drain"' (Mobility Partnership, 2012, p. 35). Looking back into the decisions establishing EM, we see that the problem of potential brain drain affecting third countries as a consequence of EM is mentioned: '[…] the Community should be mindful of the phenomenon commonly known as "the brain drain"' (European Parliament & Council, 2003, Art. 13). The equivalent paragraph in the 2008 decision illustrates more clearly how contradictory the aims of the EU are:

> Enhancing the quality of European higher education […] as well as contributing to the sustainable development of higher education in third countries whilst avoiding the brain drain […] are the objectives of a higher education cooperation programme […]. The most effective means of achieving those aims […] are partnerships with third countries at all levels of study, scholarships for the most talented students and projects to enhance the worldwide attractiveness of European higher education. In its evaluation of the programme, the Commission should pay particular attention to its potential brain drain effects. (European Parliament & Council, 2008, Art. 9)

The EU wants to do something for the development of third countries by recruiting their best students. As far as we have discovered, neither incentives for return seem to have been built into the exchange scheme, nor is a clear differentiation made between countries that are at greater risk than others of suffering from brain drain. The underlying crucial question has already been raised in connection with other branches of EU migration policies: 'Can active recruitment and the promotion of mobility really go together?' (Scholz, 2008, p. 2). Despite assertions that brain drain has to be taken into consideration, the phenomenon is increasingly debated under the label of brain exchange (Scholz, 2008, pp. 5–6), which supposedly benefits all sides.

We agree with those who problematize EM as potentially spurring the emigration of the highly skilled from vulnerable countries such as Moldova (Didelon & Richard, 2012, p. 242; Robertson, 2006, p. 13) and as stemming from two considerations. First, the whole sector of EU

HE is undergoing a process of reshaping according to economic necessity, so that ultimately it becomes somewhat of a tool for achieving change at global level, being less and less an instrument for personal development (Grinbergs & Jones, 2013, p. 352). Second, to Moldova even the lowest numbers of returning experts seem to matter. During a program led by the German Center for International Migration and Development from 2008 to 2011, *five* experts returned. This is, however, considered to be important because of the symbolic nature of their decision, potentially encouraging others to follow their example (Mobility Partnership, 2012, pp. 35–36).

While 'far reaching measures to implement effective protection are still lacking in practice' (Scholz, 2008, p. 6), Moldova has started some initiatives in order to maintain relations with its most talented countrymen abroad, one of them oriented explicitly towards its students. In January 2014, the inaugural 'Gala of Students Native from the Republic of Moldova' was launched, advertising rewards to the most successful students worldwide originating from Moldova. The awards ceremony was supported by the EU's Consolidation of Migration Management Capacities in Moldova Project.[8] From 21 countries worldwide, 205 students filled in the application for the best students of the year.[9] Even if commendable, the initiative came somewhat late; neighboring Romania had already been holding that kind of event for many years.[10] However, the inaugural event was perceived as a success for the simple reason that students could subsequently perceive the message that the Moldovan government appreciates that they represent their country of origin and that returning home should be a natural option at the end of their study abroad. For the second Gala—taking place under the slogan 'You are the one who tells the world about Moldova. Now it is time that Moldova speaks about you, at home!'[11]—the number of applications dropped to 147. From the perspective of attractiveness, the Gala can be seen as an effort to build up

[8] See http://www.legal-in.eu/en/archive/170-concluding-conference-of-the-eu-project-consolidation-of-migration-management-capacities-in-the-republic-of-moldova-wwwlegal-ineu (accessed December 14, 2015).

[9] See http://galastudentilor.md/ (accessed August 31, 2015).

[10] See http://gala.lsrs.ro/ (accessed August 31, 2015).

[11] See http://galastudentilor.md/ (accessed August 31, 2015).

resources by 'the way it [a country] handles its relations with *others*' (Nye, 2004, p. 8, our emphasis). The others in this case are former residents or their offspring and not in the least easy to convince to come back.

Conclusion

If we recall our legitimation for writing about EM—namely, that it is interesting because, for the EU, it is part of a kind of public diplomacy by which it wants to increase the support of its policies abroad—we can state that, interestingly, this turns out to be a two-way process: From the perspective of stakeholders in HE in Moldova, the participation in EM is very important for similar reasons, only *vice versa*. The participation of the most talented students is, first, a way to increase human capital for Moldova, in the event that they return after their stay abroad. They inspire fellow students; they 'import' so-called European values and good practices, given they are able to obtain a job in Moldova appropriate to their qualification. In that event, not only would Moldova gain, but also the EU, because returnees are held to be the promoters of further change towards more EU-like practices—at best, in combination with the sincere conviction of a set of ideals, which would be the desired capital of goodwill collected abroad and imported to Moldova.

In the event that students do not return, the EU still gains from a workforce qualified according to their own standards—perhaps also in capital of goodwill, this, however, not exported *in persona* to the countries where this 'capital' should work. Stakeholders in universities in Moldova hope that the students they send are of the best, thus increasing the reputation of Moldovan HEI abroad on the basis of which further cooperation with EU partner institutions becomes more promising.

While program administrators from three Moldovan universities are critical about their students' lack of interest in EM, other researchers see this as being in line with a generally low level of integration of certain third states in these initiatives, holding the EU as also responsible. Not only is the number of EM participants low, but so also is participation in research activities (Didelon & Richard, 2012). Academic exchange remains practically non-existent as long as Moldovan lecturers are invited

only on the level of internships (Ciurea et al., 2012a). Therefore, we cannot but tie in with those who call for greater engagement on the part of the EU in order for those countries to improve their situation.

Finally, even if Moldova (together with EU support) starts initiatives similar to the students' Gala, the emotional bond on which this campaign rests needs to be bolstered by something more substantial, as a comment on the Facebook site regarding the students' Gala suggests:

> We would like to come back home, but evidently home does not want us. Sarcastic. Yesterday, I sent my application for the Gala and optimistically I went to vote [in the parliamentary elections 2014]. Today is the day of Romania, and also today I learn that Moldova prefers Dodon. Sad.[12]

This very 'pro-European' voice is reproaching co-nationals for having voted for the wrong party, because of its pro-Russian nature, since Igor Dodon is head of the Socialists. It shows that the idea of building a capital of goodwill among non-EU citizens works out well for the EU while it fails to do the same for Moldova: Some feel rejected by the overall political climate in Moldova.

Returning, ultimately, to the dividing lines the EU wishes to prevent, the above examples show that this goal cannot be achieved by more or less one-sided initiatives addressing the attractiveness of the EU. Much more needs to be done in order to make Moldova more attractive and EU integration more perceptible when *in* Moldova. Otherwise, some of those who go abroad, whether with EM or other opportunities, will be linked with the EU, but decoupled from Moldova. EM (even if in comparatively low proportions) risks contributing to the brain drain in Moldova. Furthermore, however, the EU risks the loss of potential multipliers of its own values and ideas—exactly those who might also contribute to diminishing those very dividing lines.

[12] Elena Plugaru, 30 November 2014, on https://www.facebook.com/galastudentilor.md (accessed August 31, 2015).

References

BBC (2014). Moldova election: Pro-EU parties edge pro-Russian rivals. Retrieved February 10, 2015 from http://www.bbc.com (homepage).

Bologna (2014). Bologna process—European higher education area. Retrieved February 10, 2015 from http://www.ehea.info.

Brett, D., & Knott, E. (2014). The Moldovan elections of 2014 are more than about Putin or the EU: Corruption, poverty and parties. Retrieved February 10, 2015 from http://blogs.lse.ac.uk.

Burdelenii, E. (2011). In cautarea talentelor: Politica uniunii europene privind fenomenul 'exodul de creiere'. In V. Moraru (Ed.), *Brain drain. Cazul Republicii Moldova* (pp. 37–58). Chisinau: IIESP.

Ciurea, C., Berbeca, V., Lipcean, S., & Gurin, M. (2012a). *Sistemul de invatament superior din Republica Moldova in contextual procesului Bologna: 2005-2011*. Chisinau: Soros Moldova, IDIS Viitorul.

Ciurea, C., Berbeca, V., Lipcean, S., & Gurin, M. (2012b). *Policy brief. Higher education system in the Republic of Moldova in the context of the Bologna process: 2005-2011*. Chisinau: IDIS Viitorul, Soros Moldova.

Corbett, A. (2003). Ideas, institutions and policy entrepreneurs: Towards a new history of higher education in the European Community. *European Journal of Education*, *38*(3), 315–330.

Cross, M. K. (2013). Conceptualizing European public diplomacy. In M. K. Cross & J. Melissen (Eds.), *European public diplomacy. Soft power at work* (pp. 1–11). New York: Palgrave.

Cross, M. K. & Melissen, J. (2013). Introduction. In M. K. Cross & J. Melissen (Eds.), *European public diplomacy. Soft power at work* (pp. xvii–xxix). New York: Palgrave.

Didelon, C. & Richard, Y. (2012). The European Union in the flows of international students: Attractiveness and inconsistency. *International Review of Sociology—Revue Internationale de Sociologie*, *22*(2), 229–244.

ENPI-Info (2013). *Projects in action 2. EU regional cooperation through the eyes of journalists*. Retrieved December 15, 2014 from http://www.enpi-info.eu.

ENPI-Info (2014). *Projects in action 3*: *The human face of EU neighbourhood cooperation. EU regional cooperation through the eyes of journalists*. Retrieved December 15, 2014 from http://www.enpi-info.eu.

EU/Moldova Action Plan (2005). Retrieved December 14, 2015 from http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/action_plans/moldova_enp_ap_final_en.pdf.

European Commission (2003). *Wider Europe—Neighbourhood*: *A new framework for relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours*. COM (2003) 104 final, Brussels, 11 March.

European Commission (2004). *European Neighbourhood Policy—Strategy paper*. Com (2004) 373 final, Brussels, 12 May.

European Commission (2005). *Common actions for growth and employment*: *The community lisbon programme*. COM (2005) 330 final, Brussels, 20 July.

European Commission (2006). *Delivering on the Modernisation agenda for universities*: *Education*, *research and innovation*. COM (2006) 208 final, Brussels, 10 May.

European Commission (2010). *Republic of Moldova: National indicative programme 2011-2013*. Brussels: DG External Relations.

European Commission (2012). *Joint staff working document. Eastern Partnership roadmap 2012-13*: *The multilateral dimension*. SWD (2012) 108 final, Brussels, December 17.

European Commission (2014). *Joint staff working document. Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in the Republic of Moldova. Progress in 2013 and recommendations for action.* SWD (2014) 93 final, Brussels, 27 March. Retrieved December 18, 2014 from http://www.eeas.europa.eu/.

European Council (2003). *A secure Europe in a better world. European Security Strategy*, Brussels, 12 December. Retrieved June 20, 2015 from https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf.

European Parliament and Council (2003). *Decision no. 2317/2003/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 5 December 2003 establishing a programme for the enhancement of quality in higher education and the promotion of intercultural understanding through cooperation with third countries* (*Erasmus Mundus*) (2004–2008).

European Parliament and Council (2008). *Decision no. 1298/2008/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 establishing the Erasmus Mundus 2009-2013 action programme for the enhancement of quality in higher education and the promotion of intercultural understanding through cooperation with third countries.*

EU-Statistics (2014). *Joint staff working document. Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Statistical Annex. Accompanying the document*: *Joint communication to the European Parliament*, *the council*, *the European economic and social committee and the committee of the regions. Neighbourhood at the crossroads*: *Implementation of the ENP in 2013.* SWD (2014) 98 final, Brussels, 27 March. Retrieved February 10, 2015 from http://eeas.europa.eu.

Findlay, A. (2001). *From brain exchange to brain gain: Policy implications for the UK of recent trends in skilled migration from developing countries*. International migration papers 43. Geneva: ILO.

Grinbergs, C. J. & Jones, H. (2013). Erasmus Mundus SEN: The inclusive scholarship programme? *International Journal of Inclusive Education*, *17*(4), 349–363.

Hermans, J. (2007). High potentials. A CEO perspective. *Journal of Studies in International Education*, *11*(3/4), 510–521.

Jones, W. J. (2009–2010). European Soft Power: cultural diplomacy & higher education in Southeast Asia, Silpakorn University International Review, 9/10: 41–70

Keeling, R. (2006). The Bologna process and the Lisbon research agenda: The European commission's expanding role in higher education discourse. *European Journal of Education*, *41*(2), 203–223.

Klose, U. (2012). Learning for life? The new role of the Erasmus programme in the knowledge society. In B. Feyen & E. Krzaklewska (Eds.), *The ERASMUS phenomenon—Symbol of a new European generation?* (pp. 39–50). Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.

Kwiek, M. (2004). The emergent European educational policies under scrutiny: The Bologna process from a Central European perspective. *European Educational Research Journal*, *3*(4), 759–776.

Lawn, M. & Grek, S. (2012). *Europeanizing education: Governing a new policy space*. Oxford: Symposium Books.

Maassen, P. & Musselin, C. (2009). European integration and the Europeanisation of higher education. In A. Amaral, G. Naeve, C. Musselin, et al. (Eds.), *European integration and the governance of higher education and research* (pp. 3–14). Dordrecht, Heidelberg: Springer.

Manners, I. & Whitman, R. (2013). Normative power and the future of EU public diplomacy. In M. K. Cross & J. Melissen (Eds.), *European public diplomacy. Soft power at work* (pp. 183–204). New York: Palgrave.

Mobility Partnership (2012). *Parteneriat de Mobilitate Republica Moldova—Uniunea Europeana 2008-2011*: *Raport de evaluare* (*1*/*10*/*2012*) (Mobility partnership Moldova-EU 2008-2011: Evaluation report). Retrieved February 12, 2015 from http://www.mfa.gov.md/img/docs/raport-de-evaluare-pm_rm-ue.pdf.

Nye, J. (2004). *Soft power: The means to succeed in world politics*. New York: Public Affairs.

Papatsiba, V. (2009). European higher education policy and the formation of entrepreneurial students as future European citizens. *European Educational Research Journal*, *8*(2), 189–203.

Pépin, L. (2006). *The history of European cooperation in education and training. Europe in the making—An example*. Luxembourg: European Communities.

Poalelungi, O. (2011). 'Aspecte ale migratiei intelectuale din Republica Moldova' (Aspects of intellectual migration from Moldova). In V. Moraru (Ed.), *Brain drain. Cazul Republicii Moldova* (pp. 59–64). Chisinau: IIESP.

Robertson, S. L. (2006). The politics of constructing (a competitive) Europe(an) through internationalizing higher education: Strategy, structures, subjects. *Perspectives in Education*, *24*(4), 29–44.

Sandu, M. (2013). *Nota informativa la proiectul hotararii guvernului pentru aprobarea regulamentului-cadru cu privire la mobilitatea academica in invatamantul superior*, (informative note on the governmental decision concerning the approbation of the framework regulation for academic mobility in higher education). Retrieved February 10, 2015 from http://particip.gov.md/proiectview.php?!=ro&idd=1119.

Schimmelfennig, F. (2015). Europeanization beyond Europe. *Living reviews in European Governance*, *10*(1), 1–34 Retrieved September 7, 2015 from http://europeangovernance-livingreviews.org/Articles/lreg-2015-1/download/lreg-2015-1.pdf.

Scholz, A. (2008). *The EU Blue Card: Causing a new "brain drain"? European migration policies between economic needs and development commitments*. Working paper. Retrieved February 12, 2015 from http://migrationeducation.de/.

Shore, C. (1993). Inventing the people's Europe: Critical approaches to European community 'cultural policy'. *Man, New Series*, *28*(4), 779–800.

State Chancellery (2013). *National development strategy "Moldova 2020": Seven solutions for economic growth and poverty reduction* (approved by law nr. 166 of July 11th, 2012). Retrieved February 12, 2015 from http://www.cancelaria.gov.md/.

Strategia Bologna (2004). *Strategia invatamantului superior din Republica Moldova in contextul procesului Bologna* (Strategy for the higher education in the Republic of Moldova in the context of the Bologna process). Retrieved February 12, 2015 from http://www.usarb.md.

Teichler, U., Ferencz, I., Wächter, B., et al. (Eds.) (2011). *Mapping mobility in European higher education. Volume I: Overview and trends. A study produced for the Directorate General for education and culture of the European Commission*. Brussels: DG EAC.

Tejada, G. (2013). Skilled migration, transnational cooperation and contributions to development: Evidence from the Moldovan scientific diaspora. In

V. Varzari, G. Tejada, S. Porcescu, & J.-C. Bolay (Eds.), *Skilled migration and development practices*: *Republic of Moldova and the countries of South East Europe* (pp. 96–122). Lausanne: Ecole Polytecnique Federale de Lausanne. Retrieved February 12, 2015 from http://www.grupa484.org.rs/en/publications.

Tejada, G., Varzari, V., & Porcescu, S. (2013). Scientific diasporas, transnationalism and home-country development: Evidence from a study of skilled Moldovans abroad. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, *13*(2), 157–173.

Teodoro, A. (2013). The political construction of European education space. In R. F. Arnove, C. A. Torres, & S. Franz (Eds.), *Comparative education. The dialectic of the global and the local* (pp. 445–457). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Vukasović, M. (2014). How can and does Europe matter? In J. Brankovic, M. Kovacevic, P. Maassen, et al. (Eds.), *The re-institutionalization of higher education in the Western Balkans. The interplay between European ideas, domestic policies, and institutional practices* (pp. 19–60). Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.

Zichner, H. (2013). How to grow English lawn in Moldova? Reflecting on the reasons to establish and those to participate in the Erasmus Mundus Programme of the European Union. *Journal of Social Science Education*, *12*(4), 29–42.

9

The Western Balkans Inside, Outside and Between the European Union: About the Nexus Between Regional Cooperation, European Integration and Security Sector Reforms

Stefanie Dreiack

Traveling through the (Western) Balkan region as a researcher delving into the policy and politics of the European Union means encountering the presence of the EU across the region and even as a topic of discussion in all sections of society.[1] The EU is present there with political campaigns, youth projects, a large staff, several glazed buildings and a plethora of political conditions. The EU, therefore, is a major topic of political debates in magazines, and integration with the EU is the sole foreign policy aim of the Western Balkan countries. Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, envisions it as follows:

> Bosnia and Herzegovina foreign policy has been aimed at promoting and preserving the lasting peace, security and stable democratic and the entire development in the country, in other words, at the accession into contem-

[1] The EU created its own term for the countries with prospects of membership: the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia).

S. Dreiack (✉)
University of Leipzig, Germany

B. Bruns et al. (eds.), *European Neighbourhood Policy*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-69504-1_9

> porary European, political, economic and security integration flows. For the purpose of promoting its strategic interests, Bosnia and Herzegovina will conduct transparent foreign policy, in line with the following priorities: […] BIH inclusion into European integration processes; Participation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in multilateral activities, in particular, as part of the system of the United Nations (UN), the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and others and Promotion of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a partner in international economic relations, and promotion of the activities aiming at the admission of Bosnia and Herzegovina into the World Trade Organization (WTO) […]. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2003)

The aspirations of Croatia, Macedonia and Montenegro are quite similar.[2,3,4] Most of the ministries of foreign affairs in the Western Balkan region have an EU Directorate (Interview with Director of the Department for European Affairs,[5] 2010). After all, only Serbia considers regional cooperation almost as important as the EU integration process:

> The Government of the Republic of Serbia has set its European integration as one of the most important foreign policy objectives. The entire process of creation and promotion of contractual relations with the European Union is based primarily on securing political and other conditions for an unimpeded process of EU accession, including the establishment and promotion of regional cooperation in Western Balkans. These objectives are the main areas of activity of the European Union Sector of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, 2012)

That means national and regional spatial references in the region of the Western Balkans have been complemented by another important spatial

[2] See http://www.mvpei.gov.me/en/ministry/Foreign-Policy/ (accessed September 12, 2014).

[3] See http://www.mfa.gov.mk/?q=node/411 (accessed September 12, 2014).

[4] For Kosovo, close relations with the USA are most important. EU integration is the third priority after the recognition as an independent state and the relations with the USA. See http://www.mfa-ks.net/?page=2,98 (accessed September 12, 2014).

[5] Interview with Director of the Department for European Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Macedonia, in Skopje, 2010.

reference since the Thessaloniki Declaration of 2003, namely, the spatial reference to the EU. Is this just a process of 'adding', or more one of the ousting or overlapping of (political and/or security) space by the EU?[6] Maybe it is a little of each, because the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Croatia,[7] Macedonia,[8] Montenegro and Serbia) could be located inside, outside and 'between' the European Union. This assumption derived from the thesis that current developments in Western Balkan–EU relations stand for 'the production of new configurations of territoriality on both sub- and supra-national geographical scales' (Brenner, 1999). The relationship between the EU and the Western Balkans is ambivalent (see Scott, 2009a) because of the parallelism of sub-(regional) and supra-national spaces in the European context, and the assumption that space is a thing in flux and is variable, but territorially linked (see Brenner, 1999; Schroer, 2006, p. 187). Thus, references and attitudes to a certain space are changeable and dynamic, rather than static; they could be a matter of interdependence because some spaces lay conditions on one another, and considerable variation could exist between self-ascription and external ascription in the connection with a certain space. But, despite these changing variables in the concept of space, the point of departure remains the territory.

The nexus between regional cooperation, European integration and security sector reforms to which I refer in this study, underlines the ambivalent character of space. As will be shown in section 1, the focus of the EU's engagement in the Balkan region can be discerned in projects dealing with the enlargement policy, on the one hand, and those coming under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), on the other. The 'enlargement side' of the coin aims to make the Balkan countries 'insiders' in the long run. The 'CFSP side', the other side of the coin, intends to make those outside the EU in this region more secure. The concept of the EU's extra-territorial engagement as spatial-strategic can explain why both sides of the coin are mostly connected to the EU's top-down approaches, and are interlinked and, in a specific way, also interdependent. The main reason

[6] I refer to rational-institutionalism approaches in this study.

[7] See http://www.bsec-organization.org/Pages/homepage.aspx (accessed October 1, 2014).

[8] Officially known as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).

lies in the interest in controlling the Western Balkan territory beyond the EU's borders in order to maintain its internal security. Regional cooperation is one of the key examples of this interdependency:[9] Deeper regional cooperation of the Western Balkan countries in security, economic and environmental matters is one of the conditions for integration with the EU (see Pridham, 2007, p. 458; Stroh, 2003). Consequently, regional cooperation, on the one hand, which has a special place as a point of reference, and EU space, on the other, are entwined. But security cooperation, especially among the Western Balkan countries, remains underdeveloped. The central research question, which arises from section 1, is whether regional cooperation in security affairs among the Western Balkan states is declining. It is stated in section 2 that, on the basis of analyzing the enlargement and security policies under the CFSP in Bosnia and Herzegovina (2003–2012) and Macedonia (2001–2012), and the engagement in regional security cooperation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia,[10] the internal politics of the Western Balkan states and domestic security issues have the potential to either foster or hinder regional cooperation.

This is where we come full circle in section 3 and in the conclusion. It will be illustrated in the analysis that the EU does not only oust or overlap with the political and/or security space through the support of security sector reforms, or the financing and organization of regional cooperation initiatives. It also leads the Western Balkan countries, especially with the instruments of CSDP and security projects launched by the EU Commission, to a stable and sufficiently sustainable internal security situation to enable them to promote security and engage in long-term regional cooperation in this policy field.

This development could complement EU integration. Thus, *empirically* it will be shown that regional security cooperation is not faltering at all but, rather, is a long-term project linked to the internal security issues of the Western Balkan states and EU support. In this sense, the *theoretical* implication is that the Western Balkan space is not only inside and

[9] Concerning the regionalism approach, regional cooperation is defined as the formalization of economic, political and social relations between a group of countries, and the creation of formal regional institutional structures (see Hettne, 2000; Hettne, Inotai, & Sunkel, 1999).

[10] See http://www.secicenter.org/ (accessed October 1, 2014).

outside, but also 'in between' the European Union space because of the co-existence and interdependence of spaces—an argument which brings me to the description as hybrid in the conclusion.

The EU and the Western Balkans

After the collapse of Yugoslavia in the 1990s and the subsequent violent conflicts, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the international community tried to facilitate the creation of a secure space in the Balkan region from the outside. Security has been such an important issue because '[the] historical assessment of post-communist change in the Western Balkans, however, became associated with images of ethnic cleansing, civil war, mass refugee flows, and extensive wartime destruction' (Seroka, 2012, p. 494).

The Dayton Agreement (1995), negotiated mainly under pressure from the European states, the USA and Russia, was intended to guarantee that the different ethnic and political groups were able to co-exist peacefully. International actors stayed in the region to ensure a sustainable peace. In the late 1990s, in the main the OSCE, USA, NATO and the UN were present on the ground to monitor this task. Later, with the formulation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the EU, too, acquired the status of a security provider in the Balkan region (see Belloni, 2009; Calic, 2007; Merlingen, 2013).

The institutionalization of the CSDP began with the British–French summit of St. Malo in 1998 and the European Council meeting in Cologne in 1999. The CSDP emerged from the cooperation of the European states within the Western European Union (WEU), in existence since 1954. After the end of the Cold War, the Treaties of Maastricht (1992) and Amsterdam (1997) deepened security policy integration in the EU, the WEU and the CFSP. The WEU's fundamental work consists of the Petersburg tasks, such as humanitarian and rescue missions, peace-keeping and crisis management by combat forces (see European Union, 2008, Art. 17). Military capabilities were added after the European Councils of Cologne and Helsinki (see European Council, 1999). Regarding the institutionalization of the CSDP, it is important to recognize that the possible course

of action within the WEU was very limited. Effective crisis and conflict management was hindered due to lack of resources and institutional facilities. Therefore, NATO was the central player in this field.[11] After the end of the Cold War especially, the Yugoslav wars demonstrated that the EU was an ineffective crisis manager (see Regelsberger & Wessels, 1996, p. 29; Rummel, 1992).[12] Consequently, improvements became necessary to avoid marginalization as an international actor; in this way, the development of the CSDP is highly enmeshed in the history of the Western Balkans.

The first field missions within the framework of the CSDP were launched in Bosnia and Herzegovina (2003 police mission EUPM) and Macedonia (2003 military mission Concordia and police mission Proxima). Just as in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Macedonia, the civil-operational CSDP activities remain the jurisdiction of the police and rule of law in the Balkan region even today (see Gross, 2007). The CSDP evolved during the closing years. The first missions had many organizational problems, especially in the planning phase and in matters concerning communication at various levels of the EU. In this context, new bureaucratic systems and management structures were launched in Brussels—for example, the External Action Service. These processes enhanced the EU's crisis management capabilities (see Collantes-Celador & Juncos, 2011; Freire, 2008; Gross, 2007; Juncos, 2005; Merlingen, 2013; Piana, 2002).

The CSDP defined the Western Balkan states as *outsiders* because security interests outside the EU were represented within this framework. But, parallel to the institutionalization of policy in the fields of security and foreign relations in the CSDP framework, the EU Commission identified the prospect of European integration as the key to supporting peace and security in the Western Balkan region as well, though there was a contradiction between the CSDP and EU integration requiring the

[11] This argument still applies in some ways today. In the field of military capacities in crisis management, NATO is still in a leading position. In crisis management through civil strategies (police reform, law enforcement, monitoring), the EU is an equal partner compared with the UN and OSCE today.

[12] See http://ec.europa.eu/world/what/working_for_a_safer_world/index_de.htm (accessed April 28, 2014).

turning of the Western Balkan countries into EU *insiders* (see Belloni, 2009; Türkes & Gökgöz, 2006).

At the Santa Maria de Feira European Council 2000, the EU member states agreed on the prospect of EU integration for all the Western Balkan states.[13] Until today, the integration process has mainly been managed by the European Commission and the Delegations of the European Commission in the candidate countries. Croatia and Macedonia were the first Balkan nations to begin negotiations on a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) and it was Croatia that was the first from the region to join the EU in the summer of 2013.[14]

Interestingly, the motive behind the EU encouraging EU accession for the Western Balkan states was less one of cultural or historical closeness compared with the incorporation of Central and Eastern European countries in 2004 and 2007. Moreover, economic and political benefits were not important inducements for the EU in this case as they had been during the process of EU integration in the 1970s and 1980s. Instead, integration was, and is, used to promote regional security and to avoid insecurity on EU borders (see Collantes-Celador & Juncos, 2011). This is precisely why, unlike the situation in Central and Eastern Europe, security was such an important issue besides economic and political development and reforms in the SAA process and in EU integration negotiations. What followed was that the European Commission, as the manager and driver of the integration process, came to deal, and is still dealing, with security aspects just as the CSDP has done.

The involvement of security aspects in the CSDP and the EU expansion activities in relation to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia is shown here in brief. The EU's security engagement is closely connected with both countries: In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the first civilian mission of the EU (EUPM from 2003 to 2012) was launched, and with Concordia, in 2003, the EU undertook its first military mission in

[13] See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/fei1_en.htm (accessed October 4, 2014).

[14] It would be interesting to analyze whether the inclusion of Croatia in the EU split up the Western Balkan region, especially with regard to security questions. Without going too much into detail, a first (superficial) observation is that Croatia's EU integration process did not raise new tensions or frustration between the Western Balkan states.

Macedonia. Additionally, Macedonia was the first of the Western Balkan states to agree on a Stabilization and Association Process in 2001.

Security aspects, in line with European integration and the CFSP/CSDP, have been launched in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Macedonia in recent years (see Table 9.1).

The overview shows that the EU is deeply engaged in both countries, especially in dealing with their security aspects. What follows from this? The positive outcomes are that both countries have a relatively stable security situation after several years and that certain security aspects are among the most reformed in Europe (see Stavrevska, 2010, p. 7).

But, despite these positive outcomes, certain negative implications of the EU's security engagement in the Western Balkans have been discussed in the literature. Several authors have pointed to the bureaucratic problems that resulted from the double strategy—EU integration, on the one hand, and the CSDP, on the other—as coordination problems arose both for the Western Balkan countries and the EU as an organization over the jurisdiction of managing the initiatives (see Scharpf, 2003, p. 42). Are the security initiatives complementary, or are the EU Commission and the CSDP actually doing the same thing? Moreover, for the Western Balkan countries it is, at times, difficult to identify their appropriate counterpart for dealing with a problem and the people on the ground, as the EU is simply seen as one monolithic body. They do not differentiate between the Commission/enlargement and Council/CSDP (see Wöhlert, 2013). But, as far as the coordination problem is concerned, the EU is on the

Table 9.1 Security instruments

European Integration/EU Commission		CFSP	
BIH	Macedonia	BIH	Macedonia
Stabilization and Association Agreement 2008	Stabilization and Association Agreement 2001	EUPM (2003–2012)	Concordia (2003)
CARDS/IPA-Projects	PHARE/CARDS/IPA-Projects	EUFOR (since 2004)	Proxima (2003–2005)
Support of the Police Reform	EU-Candidate Country since 2005		EUPAT (2005–2006)

way to improving its engagement in security issues with the initiation of the External Action Service and the bestowing of dual functions of the Vice President of the European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in one person.

In this section, another research strand is added to the discussion of EU security initiatives in the Western Balkan region: regional cooperation. Some authors have wondered whether the external security engagement in the region undermines the development of internal security initiatives. Is there an evolving culture of external security guarantees? Does the external support for regional security cooperation undermine internal initiatives and, if so, why? Scott said that regionalization is not an answer to urgent popular demands: 'Instead, domestic governance problems and external pressures have played an important role' (Scott, 2009b, pp. 250–251). Thus, regional cooperation seems to be a process that is more top-down than bottom-up. Therefore, in the next section, regional security cooperation in the Western Balkan region is analyzed to answer the research question whether 'regionally grown' regional cooperation in security affairs among the Western Balkan states is declining: Thus, is regional cooperation really slipping into 'obscurity'?

Regional Cooperation and the Western Balkans

The collapse of the Yugoslav state and the processes of independence led to several problems in the region's security sector in the 1990s: 'institutional weakness and governance incapacity; the spread of corruption and organized crime; and a general weakening, sometimes even a complete breakdown, of the rule of law' (Winkler & Zore, 2008, p. 108) were the consequences. International actors, mostly the EU, NATO, OSCE and UN, helped to stabilize the security situation in the region. During the 1990s and especially at the beginning of 2000s, the EU moved towards greater involvement in security issues in the Balkan region. The failure to prevent war and violence, in particular, led to the development of the European Security and Defence Policy. Consequently, not only is the history and security of the Balkan region determined by the EU, but also the evolution of the EU is determined by the region as well. The EU was

not only involved in the police reform process, but also, with other international actors, took part in the reform of the defense and intelligence sectors.

But international actors do not foster positive security developments only through EU Commission projects, field missions and the integration process as a whole. The EU supports and demands regional cooperation in this policy field, too.[15] The expansion of regional cooperation is included in the EU cohesion plan, in the SAA negotiations and, even, within the framework of field missions (see Pridham, 2007). The Proxima mission in Macedonia, for example, supported the cooperation of the Macedonian government in police matters with other Balkan countries (see Council of the European Union, 2013).

This points to the first finding: Most of the security-related projects and reforms in the region have been, and are still, initiated by external actors, and most of the security interests in the region are directed outwards (see Winkler & Zore, 2008, p. 107). Not only the EU, but NATO, too, is guaranteeing regional security, and many argue that, as a result, regional cooperation in security matters is sliding into 'obscurity'. Thus, 'regionally grown' initiatives are declining, although regional cooperation in security issues is required.

Winkler and Zore reason that, because of the wide and deep engagement of international actors in regional security, regional cooperation in this field is not only supported, but is also being constrained (see Winkler & Zore, 2008, p. 108). Petritsch, Solioz and others show that regional cooperation is mostly perceived as an exogenous product and not as something growing within the region (see Anastasakis & Bojicic-

[15] 'Regional cooperation refers mostly to strategies developed by the actors involved—governments, in cases of interstate cooperation—with which to approach common problems, negotiating around the specific interests of all actors. In the case of most SEE organizations mentioned in this volume, it is worth noting that regional cooperation was engineered from outside and approached as a peace project from a neofunctionalist viewpoint. First, cooperation had to be established through the promotion of cross-border activities such as transport, trade, production and welfare; and, second, this cooperation process was supposed to guarantee security and stability, and to lead to political integration' (Petritsch & Solioz, 2008, p. 18). Despite the growing research discussion on new regionalism (see Söderbaum & Shaw, 2003) and regional cooperation in Asia, Africa, Central and Latin America, the Balkans are almost a 'black box' in this discussion, especially from a theoretical viewpoint.

Dzelilovic, 2002; Bechev, 2011, p. 5; Delevic, 2007, pp. 5–10; Petritsch & Solioz, 2008, p. 24).

Here, we look at one thing at a time. What is the state of affairs? The first regional cooperation concerning political and security issues in the region after the collapse of communism was the Central European Initiative,[16] which began in 1989 and deals with several problems—combating organized crime being one of its objectives—and covers a large geographical area extending beyond the Western Balkan region. The Black Sea Economic Cooperation, established in 1992, is quite similar to it concerning the area and its objectives.[17] The Southeast European Defence Ministerial was launched with US support.[18] The ministers of defense meet regularly in this cooperation initiative. The aim is to foster cooperation in the field of defense capabilities. The Southeast Europe Brigade was founded within the framework of this initiative.[19] The Southeast European Cooperative Initiative,[20] too, was launched by the USA and covers a wide area of security, transport, economy and the environment. This forum's most prominent project is the SECI Center, which brings together police and customs officials to coordinate activities in fighting organized cross-border crime.

With the Royaumont Process, which was initiated in the 1990s, the EU wanted to foster cooperation in the Western Balkan region in the field of civil society and human rights (see Ehrhart, 2005). Under the framework of the Stability Pact, the EU was involved in a variety of regional (security) activities, especially in the spheres of police cooperation, small arms, border management, corruption and asylum. The Stability Pact was transformed into the Regional Cooperation Council in 2008,[21] and

[16] See http://www.cei.int/ (accessed October 1, 2014).

[17] See http://www.bsec-organization.org/Pages/homepage.aspx (accessed October 1, 2014).

[18] See http://www.crm2013.si/formats/south_eastern_europe_defence_ministerial/ (accessed October 1, 2014).

[19] A 25,000-strong troop which can 'be deployed as a conflict prevention of peace support unit in NATO or EU-led operations' (Winkler & Zore, 2008, p. 117).

[20] See http://www.secicenter.org/ (accessed October 1, 2014).

[21] The Stability Pact was replaced by the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) in 2008 to make the support for regional cooperation more effective. The RCC has the following focus: economic and social development, infrastructure, justice and home affairs, security cooperation, human capital and parliamentary cooperation.

today it functions as an umbrella for several regional projects.[22] And, finally, both the Southeast Europe Police Chiefs Association,[23] founded with Canadian government help, and the Police Cooperation Convention for Southeast Europe,[24] supported by the Austrian government, were initiated to enhance cooperation among the police of the region in the fields of education and the fight against organized trans-border crime.[25]

Compilation shows that there is regional cooperation in the domain of security in the Western Balkan region. Hence, regional cooperation could not recede entirely into oblivion. But, most of the initiatives are supported by external actors and have the aim of integrating or driving towards the Euro-Atlantic community. It seems likely that the governments in the region engaged in the regional initiatives in order to 'fulfil a perceived expectation from their Western partner or because they believe it is a paramount in the process of European Integration' (Winkler & Zore, 2008, p. 120). What follows is that '[t]he overall assessment is that the countries of the region are now much more connected than they were some ten years ago. Nevertheless, […] despite the achievements […], sub regional cooperation is still mostly fragmented and insufficiently visible; the results are limited and there is an obvious lack of regional ownership; further, sub regional cooperation is not sufficiently recognized as a value per se' (Petritsch & Solioz, 2008, p. 128). Consequently, regional cooperation in the Western Balkan region is regionalism from the outside, 'that is defined, assisted and controlled from outside the region itself' (Anastasakis, 2008, p. 37).

In the next section, the latent connection between the EU, regional integration and security is discussed in greater detail by using the examples of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, leading to the formulation of some explanations concerning the links. Up to this point of the chapter, the consequential thesis could be that the EU project for the Western Balkans in terms of security—which comprises EU integration, the CFSP and regional cooperation support—causes a decline in regional

[22] See http://www.rcc.int/ (accessed October 2, 2014).

[23] See http://www.sepca-see.eu/ (accessed October 2, 2014).

[24] See http://www.pccseesecretariat.si/ (accessed October 2, 2014).

[25] Petritsch and Solioz (2006) and Winkler and Zore (2008) present an overview about several regional initiatives and the support of the international community.

cooperation among the Balkan countries in security matters. But is it really that easy?

What about the Problems of Regional Cooperation?

It might be true that regional cooperation is not the point of focus of foreign policy in the Western Balkan states, and perhaps the external engagement of the EU and other international organizations pushed regional cooperation too much from the outside. But there are certain aspects that could weaken the strong logic of the argument.

First, it is crucial that not only external factors hinder regional cooperation, but historical legacies also have an important role in reducing interest in it and kindling a latent wariness about regional developments. Winkler and Zore explained that:

> a political dimension is clearly evident. Regional Leaders tend to show a degree of ambivalence towards deeper and stronger regional cooperation. This has (earlier) been partly due to a perception that regional cooperation leads towards the recreation of some sort of Yugoslav space, and partly to the fear that regional involvement hinders rather than fosters chances for integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. This has led some countries to prefer cooperation bilaterally or selectively with a few neighbors only. (Winkler & Zore, 2008, p. 122)

Anastasakis' argument on this issue focuses on perception and identity as well:

> Most of the local elites feel that they are either part of multiple identities and different regional groupings—Euro-Atlantic, Central European, Mediterranean, Adriatic or Black Sea—or part of a very narrowly defined ethnic or national group that often excludes the neighboring ethnic or nationality (Anastasakis, 2008, p. 43).[26]

[26] Similarly, Delevic (2008, p. 48) refers to a study from 2001 which stated that respondents had a very weak regional identity level.

Both quotes show that history and identity still matter. Moreover, security is an especially sensitive policy field because it is the 'last stronghold of national sovereignty' (Koneska, 2008, p. 85; see also Bechev, 2004; Tamminen, 2004).

A second aspect that weakens the notion of a negative influence of external actors is that regional cooperation in other policies other than security is a success story. In economic and trade affairs and transportation issues, regional cooperation has worked better. Some examples are the Central European Free Trade Agreement, the SEE Core Regional Transport Network, the European Common Aviation Area, the Sava River Commission and the South European Cooperation Process. How can it be explained? The reason is cost–benefit calculations in most cases. The economic gains of cooperation in these policy fields are more obvious, and security stability is an additional side effect without the necessity to 'invest' in the security sector (see Bailes & Cottey, 2006, p. 195).[27] Although these initiatives are also supported by the international community and the countries of the Western Balkans are trading with the EU far more than with their Western Balkan neighbors, according to international observers, regional cooperation in this area is more fruitful than cooperation in the security field (see Anastasakis, 2008, pp. 38–39; Bechev, 2011, pp. 108 ff; Delevic, 2008, pp. 47 ff.).

Though the two arguments are yet to be adequately studied in the academic literature and there is little comparative empirical evidence, it is being suggested that the EU and the international community are not the one and only variable to hinder regional cooperation in security matters.

A third argument, derived by comparing Macedonia with Bosnia and Herzegovina, can be offered:[28] Macedonia is more engaged in regional cooperation, including security aspects, than Bosnia and Herzegovina not only in police matters and tackling organized crime, but also in the

[27] It was the same process with the development of the European Union. Economic integration was the peace mechanism between the European states before the phase of deeper integration began in the 1980s with the involvement of other policy fields.

[28] This argument shows that a connection between research and regional cooperation in the Western Balkan region and theoretical regionalism models is missing. Hettne (2005) and Kelly (2007) discussed the question why states with similar security interests nevertheless refuse to invest in regional security cooperation.

field of refugees and asylum (Delevic, 2007, p. 84; Interview with the Director of the MARRI Regional Center, 2010).[29] Moreover, Macedonia is deeply interested in exporting security by participating in field missions (Interview with the Director of the Department for European Affairs, 2010). In comparison, Bosnia and Herzegovina is less engaged in regional cooperation in the security field. Some researches maintain that this can be explained in terms of the internal security situation (see Anastasakis, 2008, p. 44). Since the crisis in 2001, Macedonia has enjoyed a relatively calm security situation and a highly reformed security sector. Moreover, with support from international actors in the field, police missions such as Proxima, which has been deployed by the EU, and the OSCE mission are either long gone, or are on a low level in Macedonia. Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the other hand, is still struggling with internal security issues and different political problems. The various political parties disagree on the constitution. The EU police mission, EUPM, left the country in 2012, the military mission, EUFOR, is still there, and the Office of the High Representative is monitoring the security situation as well. Therefore, it seems appropriate to say that, in a country such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, internal controversies over political and security matters often hinder external security cooperation. Broadly speaking, perhaps, the fact that a state enmeshed in (ethnically divided) post-conflict security problems (and the fact that these problems in some way have their ramifications in the region) could explain the poor progress in regional cooperation compared with the influence of an external actor such as the EU.

Conclusion

It has been shown in the course of this study that the EU is engaged in the security sector reform in the Western Balkan region through several instruments, mainly through field missions under the framework of the CSDP and security sector reform projects managed by

[29] Interview with Director of the MARRI Regional Center and former police advisor in Macedonia, in Skopje, 2010.

the EU Commission in line with the EU integration process. The EU is an active player in the region with the aim of stabilizing the post-conflict states, guaranteeing security on its borders and integrating the countries in the long run, especially since the EU offered a clear European perspective for the Western Balkan states at the Feira European Council in 2000 and the Thessaloniki European Council in 2003. The focus of EU engagement in the Balkan region can be seen in projects dealing with enlargement policy, on the one hand, and those under the CFSP, on the other. The 'enlargement side' of the coin aims to make the Balkan countries 'insiders' to the European Union space in the long run.

To become insiders, regional cooperation is a condition for the integration process, but the Western Balkan states are more interested in active cooperation with the EU than with their neighbors in the Western Balkan space. There are several regional cooperation initiatives, but most of them are initiated from the outside and are not doing very well. Regional cooperation among the Balkan countries, especially regarding security issues, is almost non-existent, or is composed of 'paper tigers' (see Bechev, 2006, 2011, pp. 108 ff. Delevic, 2007, pp. 73 ff.; Koneska, 2008; Winkler & Zore, 2008). At this point, the discussion on the engagement of the EU in security aspects merges with discussion on the weak regional cooperation in the Western Balkan region, and it has been stated that domestic politics of the Western Balkan states and domestic security aspects can foster as well as hinder the engagement in regional cooperation. This is where we come full circle. The potential of the EU's extra-territorial engagement not only lies in the ousting or overlapping of political and/or security space—through support to security sector reforms and the financing and organization of regional cooperation initiatives—but also, especially, in the fact that CSDP and security projects launched by the EU Commission are helping to lead the Western Balkan countries to an internal security situation that can enable the export of security and engagement in regional cooperation in this policy field in the long run, complementing EU integration (see Petritsch & Solioz, 2008, p. 17). Regional security cooperation is not sliding into 'obscurity'

at all; instead, it is a long-term project highly connected to internal security issues of the Western Balkan states.[30]

In this sense, the Western Balkans is not only inside and outside, but also 'in between' the European Union. The current development of Western Balkan–EU relations shows that regional and sub-regional scales, as well as sub- and supra-national geographical scales, co-exist. Thus, the relations between the EU and the Western Balkans are ambivalent, or in a sense (see Heller, 2011) 'hybrid', because the Western Balkan states are candidates to become insiders—actors that are standing outside and states in the gray zone, or in between inside and outside the EU at the same time. But it is not a cause for regret: The main argument derived from this study is that the position 'in between' could, in fact, be an advantage for the Western Balkan states and it leads back to the introductory interdependency argument. While being outsiders of the EU at the moment, the Western Balkan states profit from external security projects. As in Macedonia, these CSDP and EU Commission projects can help to calm domestic security issues in the region with the aim not only of becoming an insider of the EU in the long run, but also in order to have the capacity to build up more 'regionally grown' regional cooperation projects in security issues.

References

Anastasakis, O. (2008). Balkan regional cooperation: The limits of a regionalism imposed from outside. In W. Petritsch & O. Anastasakis (Eds.), *Regional cooperation in South East Europe and beyond: Challenges and prospect* (pp. 35–44). Nomos: Baden-Baden.

Anastasakis, O. & Bojicic-Dzelilovic, V. (2002). *Balkan regional cooperation and regional integration*. London: London School of Economy and Political Science.

[30] Two other research issues are connected with this conclusion and need further analysis: one is that there may be something like a 'double interdependence' concerning regional cooperation in security issues—an interdependence between the European and the regional space, on the one hand, and an interdependence between the domestic and the regional space, on the other hand. The other point is that it would be interesting to compare these findings with softer security fields which are more related to civil society aspects and the so-called political dialogue (Delevic, 2007, p. 76).

Bailes, A. J. K., & Cottey, A. (2006). Regional security cooperation in the early 21st century. In SIPRI yearbook, *Armaments, disarmament and international security* (pp. 195–223). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bechev, D. (2004). Contested borders, contested identity: The case of regionalism in southeast Europe. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, *4*(1), 77–95.

Bechev, D. (2006). Carrots, sticks and norms: The EU and regional cooperation in southeast Europe. *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans Online*, *8*(1), 27–43.

Bechev, D. (2011). *Constructing south east Europe*: *The politics of Balkan regional cooperation*. In *Houndmills, Basingstoke*. Hampshire, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Belloni, R. (2009). European integration and the Western Balkans: Lessons, prospects and obstacles. *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, *11*(3), 313–331.

Brenner, N. (1999). Beyond state-centrism? Space, territoriality, and geographical scale in globalization studies. *Theory and Society*, *28*(1), 39–78.

Calic, M.-J. (2007). EU enlargement and common foreign and security policy in the Western Balkans. *Südosteuropa Mitteilungen*, *47*(1), 12–19.

Collantes-Celador, G. & Juncos, A. E. (2011). Security sector reform in the Western Balkan: The challenge of coherence and effectiveness. In M. Ekengren & G. Simons (Eds.), *The politics of security sector reform: Challenges and opportunities for the European Union's global role* (pp. 127–154). Burlington, VT: Ashgate.

Council of the European Union (2013). *European Union police mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia PROXIMA monthly assessment report for the month of March 2005*. Brussels.

Delevic, M. (2007). *Regional cooperation in the Western Balkan*. Brussels: Institute for Security Studies.

Delevic, M. (2008). Can the Western Balkans stand for geography and a compromise? In W. Petritsch & O. Anastasakis (Eds.), *Regional cooperation in South East Europe and beyond: Challenges and prospects* (pp. 45–70). Nomos: Baden-Baden.

Ehrhart, H.-G. (2005). Die EU als zivil-militärischer Krisenmanager: Zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit. *Integration*, *2*(5), 217–232.

European Council (1999). *Presidency conclusion Tampere European Council 15 and 16 October 1999*. Retrieved November 17, 2014 from https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00200-r1.en9.htm.

European Union (2008). Consolidated version of the treaty on European Union and the treaty on the functioning of the European Union. *Official Journal of the European Union*, *C115*, 9 May.

Freire, M. R. (2008). The European security and defence policy. In M. Merlingen & R. Ostrauskaite (Eds.), *European security and defence policy: An implementation perspective* (pp. 9–24). New York: Routledge.

Gross, E. (2007). Civilian and military missions in the Western Balkans. In M. Emerson & E. Gross (Eds.), *Evaluating the EU's crisis management in the Balkans* (pp. 126–152). Centre for European Policy Studies: Brussels.

Heller, W. (2011). Einführung in die Thematik. In W. Heller (Ed.), *Identitäten und Imaginationen der Bevölkerung in Grenzräumen: Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa im Spannungsfeld von Regionalismus, Zentralismus, europäischem Integrationsprozess und Globalisierung, Münster* (pp. 1–16). LIT: Westf.

Hettne, B. (Ed.) (2000). *The new regionalism and the future of security and development*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Hettne, B. (2005). Beyond the 'New' regionalism. *New Political Economy*, *10*(4), 543–571.

Hettne, B., Inotai, A., & Sunkel, O. (1999). *Globalism and the new regionalism*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Juncos, A. E. (2005). The EU's post-conflict intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina: (re)Integrating the Balkans and/or (re)inventing the EU? *Southeast European Politics*, *6*(2), 88–108.

Kelly, R. E. (2007). Security theory in the "New Regionalism". *International Studies Review*, *9*(2), 197–229.

Koneska, C. (2008). Regional identity: The missing element in Western Balkans Security Cooperation. *Western Balkans Security Observer*, *7-8*, 82–89.

Merlingen, M. (2013). The CSDP in the Western Balkans: From experimental pilot to security governance. In S. Biscop & R. G. Whitman (Eds.), *The Routledge handbook of European security* (pp. 145–158). London: Routledge.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs Bosnia and Herzegovina (2003). Basic directions of BiH foreign policy. Retrieved September 3, 2014 from http://www.mvp.gov.ba/vanjska_politika_bih/osnovni_pravci_vanjske_politike_bih/?id=2.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia (2012). European Union and Regional Cooperation. Retrieved September 12, 2014 from http://www.mfa.gov.rs/en/foreign-policy/eu.

Petritsch, W. & Solioz, C. (2008). Beyond sovereignty: Integration and connectivity. In W. Petritsch & O. Anastasakis (Eds.), *Regional cooperation in South*

East Europe and beyond: Challenges and prospects (pp. 17–31). Nomos: Baden-Baden.

Piana, C. (2002). The EU's decision-making process in common foreign and security policy: The case of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. *European Foreign Affairs Review*, *7*, 209–226.

Pridham, G. (2007). Change and continuity in the European Union's political conditionality: Aims, approach, and priorities. *Democratization*, *14*(3), 446–471.

Regelsberger, E. & Wessels, W. (1996). The CFSP institutions and procedures: A third way for the second pillar. *European Foreign Affairs Review*, *1*, 29–54.

Rummel, R. (1992). Regional integration in the global test. In R. Rummel (Ed.), *Toward political union: Planning a common foreign and security policy in the European community* (pp. 11–33). Nomos: Baden-Baden.

Scharpf, F. W. (2003). Legitimate diversity: The new challenge of European integration. *Zeitschrift für Staats- und Europawissenschaften*, *1*(1), 32–60.

Schroer, M. (2006). *Räume, Orte, Grenzen: Auf dem Weg zu einer Soziologie des Raums*. Suhrkamp: Frankfurt am Main.

Scott, J. W. (2009a). Bordering and ordering the European neighbourhood: A critical perspective on EU territoriality and geopolitics. *Trames*, *13*(3), 232–247.

Scott, J. W. (2009b). New regionalism and evolving territorialities of the state. In J. W. Scott (Ed.), *De-coding new regionalism: Shifting socio-political contexts in central Europe and Latin America* (pp. 249–256). Farnham, Burlington, VT: Ashgate.

Seroka, J. (2012). Revisiting regional security in the Western Balkans. *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, *25*(4), 493–511.

Söderbaum, F. & Shaw, T. M. (2003). *Theories of new regionalism*. In *Houndmills, Basingstoke*. Hampshire, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Stavrevska, E. B. (2010). *What happens after the Mandate completion*? *Evaluating outcome sustainability of ESDP police missions in the Balkans*, Berlin.

Stroh, S. (2003). Außenbeziehungen im Dreieck Kroatien—Bosnien und Herzegowina—Serbien Montenegro. *Südosteuropa*, *52*(7-9), 355–380.

Tamminen, T. (2004). Cross-border cooperation in the Southern Balkans: Local, national or European identity politics? *Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, *4*(3), 399–418.

Türkes, M. & Gökgöz, G. (2006). The European Union's strategy towards the Western Balkans: Exclusion or integration? *East European Politics and Society*, *20*(4), 659–690.

Winkler, T. H. & Zore, G. (2008). Regional security cooperation in South East Europe. In W. Petritsch & O. Anastasakis (Eds.), *Regional cooperation in South East Europe and beyond: Challenges and prospects* (pp. 107–125). Nomos: Baden-Baden.

Wöhlert, R. (2013). Future EU members or Europe's internal other? The reciprocal news coverage between Western Balkan countries and EU member states in view of the support for a further EU enlargement. *Südosteuropa*, *61*(2), 290–311.

10

Mapping European Cultural Actors: Addressing the Case of Belarus

Iryna Matsevich-Dukhan

The present-day reports on European Union cultural policies demonstrate an unprecedented turn to the methodology of economic and cultural geography. The ambivalent consequences of this turn may be revealed, on the one hand, in the uttermost visualization and subsequent simplification of explanatory schemes and, on the other hand, in economic reductionism, which makes visible only a specific class of cultural objects. This chapter considers how Belarusian cultural actors might be neglected in terms of the 'visibility strategy' developed within the Eastern Partnership (EaP). This strategy is closely connected with the EU intention to delineate the contours of its economy and culture by mapping creative industries. A further implication is the endeavor to build a network of creative actors in neighboring countries as potential contributors to the EU's innovative development. The delineation of creative industries and their chief actors has led to the emergence of the concept 'creative Europe'. One of its defining features is the conspicuous convergence between the fields of

I. Matsevich-Dukhan (✉)
Belarusian State Academy of Arts, Minsk, Belarus

B. Bruns et al. (eds.), *European Neighbourhood Policy*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-69504-1_10

economy and culture. The corresponding political programs on creative industries construct a language which privatizes the whole dominion of culture. Technically feasible, these programs become incomprehensible from the axiological standpoint of the third countries.

Given the danger of economic reductionism, what is to be done to find *an appropriate language* for describing the Belarusian cultural space as a European one beyond the concept of creative industries? It is argued, in answer to this question, that a preliminary study of mapping procedures should be conducted. By analyzing their implications and the key categories of European cultural statistics, it is possible to contribute to the quest for a relevant and appropriate terminology in studies of Belarusian cultural policy.

This chapter reconciles the methodology of social constructivism and social realism in such a way as to question what the EU's de-ontologized cartography of cultural actors without determinate references to the physical space may visualize in the Belarusian cultural field. A comparative analysis of the EU reports on creative industries and Belarusian state documents on cultural development brings to light novel concepts, and their evolving meanings and re-interpretations in Belarusian cultural policy in the early twenty-first century.

The author questions the axiological status of the EU's extra-territorial engagement, which implies 'control' over the external region mainly for the purpose of self-preservation. The intangible borders of culture are the most fragile and sensitive to the EU's extra-territorial political strategy. The case of Belarusian cultural actors may demonstrate how a refined strategy of intercultural dialogue constructs a language which gradually ruins ethical priorities in the self-maintenance of the European cultural ethos. As a result, the latter transmutes into an aesthetically shaped space of creative actors. It may be interpreted mainly in terms of aesthetic categories and rhetorical figures of speech. The most simplified models of artistic perception are reflected and embodied in modern cartographic language with its variety of mapping strategies.

Maps (from the Latin word *mappa*—cloth) as woven fabrics cover reality with different types of material: for example, words, notions, categories, images and their interrelations. Correspondingly, a mapping procedure may be considered as a process of 'weaving', producing and reproducing

different types of signs and symbols, as a process of covering a tangible reality of material objects with an intangible piece of cloth created out of sounds, words and gestures. A collection of mapping strategies constitutes a cartographic subject matter. The scientific discipline of *cartography* (from the Ancient Greek word χάρτης—a layer of papyrus) constructs and interprets links between reality and representation. This approach refers to the British geographer and cartographer J. B. Harley's definition of cartography as 'a body of theoretical and practical knowledge that mapmakers employ to construct maps as a distinct mode of visual representation' (Thrift, 2007, p. 74), where maps are considered as 'rhetorical texts' (Thrift, 2007, p. 82). The British geographer and cartographer J. B. Harley encourages the interpretation of a cartographic 'fact' as a symbol—in terms of rhetoric, as a metaphor.

This approach may be revealed as well in the actor-network theory of the French philosopher B. Latour and the British sociologist J. Law, which demonstrates the dangerous consequences of a predominant focus on the visual nature of maps in the human and natural sciences.

Aiming to overcome the traditional visualization effects in mapping procedures, this chapter attempts to find alternative prospects for conceptual mapping in the field of cultural policies. Tracing shades and overtones of metaphoric and figurative speech at the level of EU political programming in the cultural field, the further analysis outlines key concepts by means of which cultural territory may be substantially either reconstructed or neglected in the case of Belarus.

In Quest of a Language for Cultural Policies within the Eastern Partnership

It is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore the lack of a shared vision of EU cultural policy and, as a result, within the Eastern Partnership, too. Although the question of cultural policies in this context has almost become neglected, economic and political tasks are challenged by the absence of a shared axiological foundation. The latter issue has acquired a special relevance in the emerging discussion on EaP values and interests beyond the economic (see EU Neighbourhood Info Centre, n.d.),

revealed in the political focus on the potential of the EaP for creative and cultural industries.

This shift determines a new framework for the EaP, since the development of political relations between the so-called *culturalized economy* of the EU and neighboring countries needs a shared vision of the *axiological* background and respect for cultural values, on the basis of which economic and political traditions of national governments have been established. In this context, to rethink the cultural space of Belarus in terms of EU programs on creative industries means to reveal new prospects for an implicit neighborhood cultural policy. This intention might challenge Belarusian official state policy—at least, an explicit one. That is a question of *language* which could be constituted to discover Belarusian cultural actors undetected by EU reports. The original intention of the EaP and its further mapping methods diverge in many essential points. My purpose is to shed light on some crucial gaps in those maps, to re-articulate the same politics of place appealing to invisible actors that are not covered by currently existing mapping programs.

One talks either about business benefits or democratization processes; from neither perspective does the EaP strategy reach cultural actors and collective decisions beyond those related to the state. The so-called present-day shift from the economy of culture to the *cultural economy* aggravates this problem:

> Doing economics means acting on the assumption of a determinate nature waiting to be described and calculated about by a neutral observation language; doing 'cultural economy' means acting on the assumption that economics are performed and enacted by the very discourses of which they are supposedly the cause. (Du Gay & Pryke, 2002, p. 6)

The alternative project, without any wish to differentiate strictly between economic and cultural discourses, may be fulfilled with the intention 'to talk in terms of the complexities of practices and the heterogeneous materials' (Law, 2002, p. 35). According to the British sociologist John Law, the thesis that European economic policies have led to social and cultural integration is hardly acceptable nowadays. He refers to 'the social engineering that has produced the "single unified market" of the EU' (Law, 2002, p. 25). In this context, the 'social' is a net of actors,

human and inhuman, 'gatherings' of actors. The ways of their gathering are relatively identifiable 'ordering modes', such as 'enterprise' and 'administration' (Law, 2002, pp. 33–34). The multiple processes of self-organization increasingly challenge the traditional functions of governing bodies, provoke us to reconsider their defining features in terms of the actor-network theory, and as a result, the difference between governing and organizational bodies may be quite blurred.

Regarding Belarus, the conceptual 'throwntogetherness of place' (see Massey, 2007, p. 135), determined by the artificial administrative language, turns out to be an obstacle to widening the net of EU business and political actors. This chapter analyzes key notions which have been coined and employed by the EU in mapping strategies addressing the case of Belarus. In this particular context the function of Belarusian actors is being constructed anew.

One of the main objectives of this chapter is the critical scrutiny of indispensable terms of present-day EU cultural policies and the addressing of them via a detailed analysis of political programs and reports. Finally, I will discuss possible implications of a mapping strategy for reading Belarusian reality as a rhetorical text. In the course of this, it is possible to re-articulate the issues of creative industries' programs through an account of the Belarusian policy-making discourse.

Adjusting to the new conditions, Belarus has to translate and define newish concepts into its own language, at both theoretical and practical levels. Moreover, we have to start collecting data on the terms coined. In this regard, skepticism was expressed by Andreas Joh. Wiesand, a representative of the ERICarts, who had analyzed the methods by which various countries collected data for the compendium of cultural policies in Europe:

> This work could occur at the expense of some networks without a clear profile or traditional gatekeepers on the national level if they have not adapted to the new situation. (Wiesand, 2002, p. 376)

In 2011, Belarus commenced styling its own information on cultural policies after the compendium's profile. Neglecting all overtones and shades, we had to learn how to produce this meager reality so that it could be easily readable in the context of the EU.

Methodological Approach and Theoretical Framework

The history of the theory and methodology of 'social mapping' began with social space studies developed initially in the framework of G. Simmel's sociology and the urban space analysis of the Chicago School. Simultaneously, the relativistic turn in physics prepared and substantiated the emergence of the notion 'social space'.

The first maps of social and urban space were able to reflect only those forms of social relations which were objectified, physically embedded. The correlation between 'physical/embedded' maps of social relations and mental maps (scientific, political, ideological, axiological and other types) was not an issue of special concern until the mid-twentieth century, when the French philosophers Gaston Bachelard and Henri Lefebvre developed new approaches to social space. Subsequently, geography was gradually re-introduced into the social sciences (see Landry & Bianchini, 1995; Lash & Lury, 2007; Massey, 2005, 2007). Meanwhile, methods and concepts of social and cultural geography transcended the boundaries between the social, human and natural sciences.

In the manner of Lefebvre, emphasizing the 'operational role' of space (2007, p. 11), this chapter attempts to reveal the instrumental role of cultural policy mapping in the EU's extra-territorial engagement. Taking into account Lefebvre's approach, the author elaborates the interdisciplinary methodological background for dynamic cultural policy mapping.

A multidimensional map of cultural actors might demonstrate the coordination between different types of space described by Lefebvre (2007, pp. 11–12): physical space—'space occupied by sensory phenomena'; mental space—'logico-epistemological space'; social space—'space of social practice'. These concepts delineate the keystones of the grid for multidimensional cultural policy mapping.

The combination of Lefebvre's neo-Marxist methodology and the 'object-oriented' approach of the British sociologists Scott Lash (Lash & Lury, 2007) and John Urry (Urry, 2000) contributes to the formation of

the interdisciplinary theoretical and methodological background for the conceptual mapping of cultural policies.

A mapping procedure in the cultural field combines theoretical and practical approaches to the structuring, conceptualizing and visualizing of cultural processes. This procedure cannot be reduced only to the visual representation of objects and directions of their movement. This chapter addresses the issue of categories and concepts, which are used to reveal and identify cultural actors, objects and events, and the relationships between them. The implicit consequence of the conceptual analysis at the level of abstract notions is a simplified scheme of visualized interlinks between things to which categories refer. A dynamic presentation of logical connections between key concepts by associating images facilitates the process of communication at the level of everyday decision-making and policy-making.

The topological analysis of cultural *events* outlines, in this context, the logical connections between cultural things and actors in the framework of the indicated territory of Belarus. An *event* is a meaningful experience of humans and things in their interrelations. A cultural *actor* is a person or a thing, a group of humans or material objects, a community of individuals or tangible artefacts. Event-relations are shaped by cultural *institutions*—the structural embodiment of the systematically repeated actions of cultural actors in the form of the reproducible organization of space and time. Cultural institutions constitute a *cultural infrastructure*.

This chapter reveals the mutual interdependence of conceptual and physical spaces, and questions what the 'deontologized cartography' (Warf & Arias, 2009, p. 53) is to designate as a cartography without determinate references to physical space. Nowadays, when material things in the form of commodities start talking on behalf or instead of people, it is necessary to raise the question of how to map out the key actors of cultural space in a way so as not to be 'caught' by them, or not to be misled. To avoid this trap, alternative dimensions of mapping should be taken into consideration.

A 'Visibility Strategy' of the Eastern Partnership

> *…leise und ruhig, niemand hatte es eilig, es schien, als würden sich das alle noch einmal überlegen können—fahren oder bleiben.*
> Judith Hermann, 'Drei Stunden im Niemandsland'[1]

The placelessness of Belarusian cultural values on the European map becomes virtually recognizable in the negotiations between Belarus and the EU in the Eastern Partnership. Politicians straddle cultural values and economic interests. What does it mean to be or not to be attuned to European cultural values?

It is not a question of whether or not to succumb to EU interests. The issues at stake are values for which one stays. They are displayed in the religious slant of theologically conditioned arguments. Concessions will not solve one of the key problems: The absence of a map of Belarusian values which would be readable in terms of EU cultural policy terminology.

Is it feasible to funnel dreams into cultural statistics? To demonstrate this likelihood, the Belarusian philosopher Ihar Babkou in the book *Adam Klakotski and His Shadows* depicts the experience of collecting and classifying the Belarusians' dreams. In like manner, the delineating of Belarusian dreams may produce a map of cultural values, as that of Belarusian specialists in the cartography of local intangible heritage.

The blending process of economically driven 'creativization' leads to the de-differentiation of economy and culture. Does it make sense to distinguish them in the context of the Eastern Partnership? As economic interests moved to center stage of the Eastern Partnership, for a long period of time cultural policies continued to be an obscure issue without a clear agenda. However, the blurred boundary line between the dominions of creative economy and culture contributes to the confusion of economic and cultural priorities in the dialogue between Belarus and the EU. In light

[1] Judith Hermann's image of the Belarusian topos from the article 'Drei Stunden im Niemandsland' published by *Die Zeit №11*/2012. Translation: ... calm and peaceful, nobody was in a hurry, it seemed as if everybody could think it over again—leave or stay.

of this confusion, sustainable development of economic interests is dependent on *the visibility of cultural values* and measures of their protection.

The Council of the EU, in the adopted conclusions on the Eastern Partnership, underlined the intention of developing 'best practice in terms of approximation to EU standards' and implementing 'a visibility strategy envisaged in the Eastern Partnership Roadmap' (Council of the European Union, 2013, p. 3). To make cultural subjects visible, this EaP intention coincides with the general strategic plan of 'making creativity visible', thereby turning Europe into 'the place to create' (KEA, 2009, p. 9).

This intention is concordant with the idea of transforming urban space into 'open towns'[2] by means of the mapping strategy, expressed earlier by the Council of Europe in the White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue. It prompts 'to develop intercultural dialogue in the spaces of everyday life and in the framework of the respect of fundamental freedoms. Physical places and the built environment are a strategic element of social life. Particular attention needs to be given to the design and management of public spaces, like parks, civic squares, airports and train stations. Urban planners are encouraged to create "open towns" with sufficient public space for encounters' (Council of Europe, 2008, p. 46). The question is what the above strategies are supposed to track.

On June 28, 2013, Belarus officially pursued translating the White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue into its 'own' language. This means that, after having translated the White Paper, one has to start thinking about 'spaces of everyday life' (Council of Europe, 2008, p. 46). The latter notion requires further clarification. Translated into socio-philosophical terminology, it is definitely distinguished from the space of civil society. The former is a new dimension of social life, which only became a subject of scientific research in the twentieth century, in the works of such philosophers as M. Bakhtin, G. Bachelard, H. Lefebvre and others. Lefebvre, as a sociologist, demonstrated the way the concept of everydayness may become an ideological instrument of producing social space.

[2] The term may be interpreted rather as an operational one than as a metaphor. It refers to the openness indicators elaborated by Ch. Landry in the book *Creative City* (2000).

The EU's intention of mapping spaces of everyday life echoes also from the following two quotations:

> We need to go deeper into society with this money. (Olaf Osica, Director of the Centre for Eastern Studies in Poland 2013)

and,

> it's also about visibility, the EaP is not visible for ordinary people. (EurActiv.com, 2013)

With these two statements in mind, I raise the question about methods which would be used to make people visible.

Apart from the terms just mentioned, the White Paper's authors also deployed the notion 'physical spaces', which conjures up the same images of everydayness with its material infrastructure. It is obvious from the context that the Council of Europe invites the re-designing of public spaces in accordance with the recently introduced patterns of 'open towns' (Council of Europe, 2008, p. 46).

By comparison, the physical space of cultural objects in Belarus may be considered by means of a 'visibility strategy' of the Ministry of Culture. One of its methods to make things visible is represented in the state program Culture of Belarus, 2011–15. That is a state strategy regarding the development and effective use of Belarusian cultural potential. It is also aimed at innovations in the field of culture. The general strategy of mapping cultural objects is outlined in the second chapter dealing with technical and economic foundations of the program. First, it describes the types and number of cultural places: 9000 organizations of culture, including almost 4000 libraries, more than 3500 centres for leisure and cultural services, 27 theatres, about 140 cinemas, more than 200 cinema units, 18 concert halls, 3 institutions of higher education, 21 colleges, 600 art schools and more than 900 libraries in agro-cities (see Culture of Belarus, 2011, p. 2). The chapter also indicates the increased number of museums: In 2005, there were 133; in 2008, 145; and in 2009, 147 (see Belarus, 2011, p. 2). Parallel to this list of buildings are various cultural experiences. Museums contain more than 2.8 million exhibits. The national film studio 'Belarusfilm' released eight full-length feature films in

2007, ten in 2008 and 12 in 2009. Moreover, 5000 objects of value were identified and included in the State List of Historical and Cultural Values (see Belarus, 2011, p. 2). And, finally, various examples of cultural building and re-building: 187 modern centers for leisure and cultural services, and the reconstructed National Academic Opera and Ballet Theatre (see Belarus, 2011, p. 2). Of course, that is not a complete list. I have simply chosen those items which constitute *the scheme of mapping*.

The state program has occasioned a good deal of debate concerning such maps of the cultural sector, which are feared to lead to predictability and nothing more than that. Any applications of programs based on cultural statistics are not supposed to yield interesting insights into the mystery of cryptic texts inscribed on intangible objects of spiritual heritage. The whole line of argument is open to serious objection, particularly when questioning what may be introduced instead. It calls on scholars to react, participate in public discussions and introduce theoretical schemes of critical analysis from the viewpoint of the humanities. This statement implies the question as to which kinds of conceptual mapping strategies may be introduced in the framework of the humanities. Could it be Bachelard's topoanalysis of imagination, or Lefebvre's unitary theory of physical, mental and social space? One might map the movement of cultural things as Lash and Urry did, or visualize sensescapes as Landry endeavored to do. There are many prospects and each of them reveals different worlds of cultural actors. Rational politics cannot choose one map and ignore the rest, or justify the non-existence of others. It has to leave space for other worlds. *Does the Eastern Partnership Culture Program constitute this* '*open polydimensional space*' *with regard to Belarus*? Due to a wide variety of choices, geography and policy studies need theoretical foundations to justify a choice. Such a kind of epistemology is rooted in social theory. Otherwise, any type of a map will be easily flawed.

The EU Cartographic Reduction of Culture to Cultural and Creative Industries

The method of cultural policy mapping has been actively employed in political discourse since the end of the twentieth century. It has become an essential instrument for building a 'creative Europe' where the econ-

omy would be driven by creative industries. The latter notion indicates the field where economy and culture converge to the extent of overlooking any boundaries between them. As a result, those programs leave a void, dismissing culture via the economic struggle for leadership.

This section gives a brief overview of how the discourse has run since the 2000s. The evolution from the conception of a creative economy to the theory of creative society is comparable to the development of the twentieth-century ground-breaking conceptions of information industries, an information economy and an information society. The failure of the Seventh Framework Program revealed the issue at stake: They 'have made little effort to integrate culture and creative sectors in the research programs' (KEA, 2009, p. 139). Having recognized the role of culture as an economic driver, the EU has gradually moved from the economic agenda to the cultural agenda. This shift is especially visible in the comparative analysis of the KEA European Affairs reports prepared for the European Commission.

Based on the previous study, the EU Council indicated cultural and creative industries as one of the priority areas of the second work plan for the period 2011–2014 (see Council of the European Union, 2010). The focus on mapping the foregoing sector may be explained by the intention *to make visible creativity* and to depict it as a resource of European sustainable development. The emerged industries delineate the scope of a previously ungraspable abstraction of creativity. This idea was articulated by the European Commission:

> As a general rule successful strategies for the cultural and creative sectors build on a full mapping and mobilization of the cultural and creative resources of a given territory. (European Commission, 2012, p. 4)

Simultaneously, the creative industries policies were justified as a trigger for EU cohesion. To illustrate their strategic role, cohesion policy had to contribute €86 billion to European research and development and innovation for the period 2007–2013. That is 'a quarter of the total Cohesion Policy resources' (European Union, 2009, p. 8). As one of the remarkable examples of projects in building European creative clusters, Musikpark is worthy of note (€5 million, 2004–2019) (see European

Union, 2009, p. 22), as is NanoHealth (€21 million, 2009–2014) (see European Union, 2009, p. 29). They are supposed to contribute to EU regional revival. The far-reaching orientation is the formation of an 'inclusive society' and 'European citizenship' by means of the emerged creative industries. Thus, they have been turned into a 'magic field' of EU social cohesion.

As a result of such revival, many may be struck by the number of *new concepts* emerging in EU reports on cultural policies. This chapter outlines only some of them, such as a 'creative economy' (KEA, 2009, p. 185); a 'creative hub' (KEA, 2006, p. 25); a 'creative cluster map' (KEA, 2006, p. 25); 'the EU creativity scoreboard' (KEA, 2006, p. 10); the 'cultural ghetto' (KEA, 2006, p. 31); 'place-making strategies' (Fleming & Nilsson-Andersen, 2007, p. 13); 'the creative potential of a place' (Fleming & Nilsson-Andersen, 2007, p. 13); 'a creative connector' (Fleming & Nilsson-Andersen, 2007, p. 60); 'the creative policy matrix' (Fleming & Nilsson-Andersen, 2007, p. 14); 'pre-creation and creation stages of the value chain' (Higgs, Cunningham & Bakhshi, 2008, p. 27); 'innovative creative industry clusters' (KEA, 2009, p. 134). All these terms are increasingly present in cultural policy studies and operationalized by means of statistics.

This language extends its competence beyond EU borders. If it is to become actively employed in the EaP Culture Program, Belarus has to understand the meanings of new concepts and find alternatives that would reflect the Belarusian experience within the EaP.

Cultural Statistics

The issue adumbrated in the previous section directs the further inquiry into mapping strategies in terms of cultural statistics. In this field, the definition of a cultural sector remains a contested topic. For Eurostat, this is partly due to the instrumental character of the concept with which it deals in data collection, and partly due to the discrepancies of EU member states' views on the nature of culture. This section introduces a discussion on cultural statistics with a brief summary of key approaches for defining the

cultural sector in terms of statistics, and begins by describing how Eurostat has come to consider the cultural sector as a system of economic activities.

In 2007, Eurostat employed an approach to culture according to which the term covered the scope of eight 'domains': 'artistic and monumental heritage, archives, libraries, books and press, visual arts, architecture, performing arts and audiovisual/multimedia' (Eurostat, 2007, p. 5). They perform six 'functions': 'conservation, creation, production, dissemination, trade and training' (Eurostat, 2007, p. 5). This classification has become the ground for the first 'comparable data relating to culture' in Europe, published in 2007 (Eurostat, 2007, p. 5).

In 2012, the European Statistical System Network on Culture (ESSnet-Culture, 2012) developed the above-mentioned approach (see ESSnet-Culture, 2012, p. 45) by adding the domains of advertising and art crafts, as well as the function 'management & regulation' which 'refers mainly to public institutions that finance, regulate and structure culture' (ESSnet-Culture, 2012, p. 45). Finally, ten cultural domains were outlined: 'heritage; archives; libraries; book & press; visual arts; performing arts; audiovisual & multimedia; architecture; advertising; art crafts' (ESSnet-Culture, 2012, p. 55). There is nothing striking in this classification apart from the fact that the cultural sector was described by the ESSnet-Culture according to the codes of the *Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community* (in French: *La nomenclature statistique des activités économiques dans la Communauté européenne* (*NACE*))[3] which classifies economic activities (see ESSnet-Culture, 2012, p. 59). Such an approach neatly encapsulates the meaning of creative economy.

Regarding the official data on the Belarusian cultural sector, up till now, culture has been defined in Belarusian programs on cultural policies (Belarus, 2006) primarily as 'a collection of cultural values oriented to satisfy our spiritual needs' (Pravo, 2010, ch. 1, para. 1.1). This neo-Kantian focus on values is clearly identifiable in the predominant

[3] 'In NACE Rev. 2, cultural activities can be found mainly under the sections: Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal and household goods (G), Information and Communication (J), Professional, scientific and technical activities (M), Administrative and support service activities (N), Education (P), Arts, entertainment and recreation (R). The full list of cultural activities within NACE Rev. 2 is currently being developed by ESSnet-Culture in the project of the European Framework for Cultural Statistics' (Eurostat, 2011, p. 222).

theoretical approach to culture. In light of the foregoing definition, with its concentration on the spiritual life, it is understandable why there is definitely a lack of cultural statistics. The key data come from publications of the National Statistical Committee of the Republic of Belarus. Here, the sphere of culture is not included in the capital stock with regard to branches of economy (see Kostevich, 2010, p. 84). One may suppose that the cultural sphere is not covered by the meaning of the notion 'branch of economy' and, as a consequence, it is excluded from the chapter 'National wealth'. However, in the section 'The number of employed in the branches of economy' (see Kostevich, 2010, pp. 38–39), it becomes noticeable that, in 2009, 93 600 thousand persons (2 % of citizens) were employed in the field of culture and arts (see Kostevich, 2010, p. 38).

Comparing employment in cultural sectors as a share of total employment in the EU countries in 2009, we see that Croatia, Lithuania, Slovenia and the Netherlands reached the 2 % rate; the United Kingdom and Germany showed 2.1 % and 2.2 % employment rates in the same sectors (Eurostat, 2011, p. 67). From the formal viewpoint, the Belarusian rate is comparable with that of the EU advanced economies. The issue at stake, nevertheless, is not the number of employed persons but, rather, what and how they produce.

In the event that one needs detailed information on the cultural sphere, its structure and mechanisms of functioning, a researcher has to deal mainly with the official information resources. To confirm this statement, I refer to the *Analytical Base-line Report on the Culture Sector and Cultural Policy of the Republic of Belarus* (August 2012, rev. January 2013) prepared by the Regional Monitoring and Capacity Building Unit (RMCBU) of the Eastern Partnership Culture Program. The authors of the report acknowledge the assistance of national stakeholders, ranging from the Ministry of Culture to independent cultural actors. Due to the lack of information collected by institutions, apart from state bodies, the report is mainly focused on the inquiry into policy documents and statements of official pronouncements on the subject of cultural policies, the relevant information of state media resources. As a result, the report comes to such conclusions as follows:

> There are no policy statements on the subject of creativity or the concept 'creative economy'. Neither is 'creativity' a subject of discussion in the media. (Analytical Base-line Report 2013, p. 21)

Moreover, it indicates 'no interest' among cultural sector professionals. This abject refusal to reflect on creativity in Belarus raises the question of the extent to which the negative dialectic may be relevant to such kind of reports. This sort of rhetorical issue has brought forth a series of axiological questions about the EaP norms and criteria by means of which cultural policy-making may be assessed in Belarus. It is with these debates that I engage with a view to distinguishing the light that might be thrown on cultural policy by different accounts of mapping strategies. In other words, my concerns center on *the 'neglect' of Belarus in terms of creativity* produced by cartographic methods.

Considering the institutions and organizations involved in arts research, the report points out only nine as 'active' (Analytical Base-line Report, 2013, p. 23): the National Academy of Sciences, Belarusian State Academy of Arts, Belarusian State University of Culture and Arts, Belarusian State Academy of Music, National Art Museum of the Republic of Belarus, European Humanities University, Goethe-Institute in Minsk, Gallery Nova and the Contemporary Art Gallery (see Analytical Base-line Report, 2013, p. 23).

Throwing light on the situation from different perspectives, the report reveals the immense number of opportunities there have been to invert positive and negative assessments of cultural development over the early twenty-first century. However, the underpinning economic curiosity concerning 'countries' relative ability to capitalize on current revolutionary developments affecting culture' (Analytical Base-line Report, 2013, p. 6) makes the soundness of demonstrations vulnerable. Adherence to an economic perspective makes a reader less receptive to the diverse dimensions of cultural life beyond commitments to a political agenda. This lack of receptivity may be explained by methods of collecting data on the economy of culture.

In order to collect economic data on Belarusian cultural statistics, a researcher has to request the information from state institutions. In turn, this implies that cultural policy will be described by means of concepts produced by state political programs. The categories under which the Belarusian state institutions classify different types of information are only *partly commensurable with EU categories*. This approach reveals the objects which are visible *by means of the state's magnifying glass*. Paradoxically, that

is not what the EU strives to find and reach here. Olaf Osica, the director of the Centre for Eastern Studies in Poland, noted:

> We need to go approach ordinary people, in rural areas, in self-governance, we need to go deeper into society with this money. It's also about visibility, the EaP is not visible for ordinary people. (EurActiv.com, 2013)

Osica searches for instruments to make visible 'ordinary people' without explaining the meaning of this term. The issue should be subjected to further scrutiny. Expanding from the economic agenda, the Eastern Partnership Culture Program intends to map and critically assess what amounts to the space of *ordinary people*.

Mapping Belarusian Cultural Policies

The vigorously evolved world of creative industries creates its own language for any inquiry into cultural policies. The ignorance of this language leads to the invisibility of cultural actors and a collapse of any attempt to justify artistic existence beyond the trend heralded by a 'creative class'. And this sort of invisibility might not be interpreted as an enervation. Rather, it is the 'territory-zero' of European axiology, the 'territory before Europe', before its contraries and contradictions, before its judgments and valuations. That is the territory which is silenced. And what is silenced is the luxury of non-language.

The EU economy of culture draws much attention to the 'territorial dimension of creativity'. In its application to Belarus, this approach means the identification of that which might be labeled 'creativity'. In attempting to find manifestations of creativity in Belarus, researchers are being increasingly relegated by EU documents to creative clusters. In which forms may they exist in Belarus? With whom could they cluster? What is a product of local creativity? How would it be exhibited?

A Belarusian artist seeks to take a position of a poet, rather than that of a creator. The coveted position of a poet affirms the transition from the Latin concept of creation *ex nihilo* back to the Greek *poiesis*, because we imitate the primary principles of nature without pretending to be adept

at producing cultural products out of nothing. This paradigm explains why the select repertoire of cultural magazines' names is reduced to the vocabulary of local poetic philosophy: 'Topos', 'Arche', 'Gleam', 'Verb', 'Art', 'Parterre', 'Partisan' and so on.

A peculiar oscillation in the status attributed to Belarusian cultural actors may be identifiable in the range of prescribed titles: a 'worker of the cultural sphere', an 'honored worker of the cultural sphere', a 'member of the Writers' Union', a 'member of the Artists' Union', an entrepreneur, unemployed, retired and others.

What kinds of artists should we discern through the magnifying glass of the EaP Culture Program? One of the most pervasive features of pro-European artists in Belarus could be the critical attitude to state policy in the field of art. However, they have to use state resources of self-identification and the state infrastructure to find a place for their own projects in order to have the right to be officially called 'art workers' when they apply for a European visa.

Those who were late in re-branding themselves as pro-European would be anathematized by the trendy youth. However, altogether this is more or less an unbroken continuum of Belarusian artistic discourses. For instance, the *Belarusian Yearbook 2008*, published under the patronage of the Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies and Belarus Public Policy Fund, introduces a remarkable pattern of describing the cultural sphere in Belarus. The narrative of the chapter 'Belarusian culture: between Batleika and Belsat' by the Belarusian philosopher Maksim Zhbankov is constrained by stamped out labels. The latter range from the 'guerrilla' underground to the 'official culture', 'the pro-regime mass culture', 'the culture of the ruling elite' in a state of 'culture pause' (*Belarusian Yearbook*, 2009, p. 188), 'culture in creative crisis' with attributes such as 'duplicates of the pop style of the 1980s' and 'a collection of late Soviet clichés' (*Belarusian Yearbook*, 2009, pp. 188–195). Accordingly, it demonstrates a 'shallow decorative politically neutered image', 'mainstream conformist nationalism', 'passive loyalty', 'lack of any real breakthrough' and 'creative exhaustion' (*Belarusian Yearbook*, 2009, pp. 188–195).

This brief overview of keywords by means of which Belarusian culture might be visualized contributes to the understanding of a real and potential choice of European experts. On the website www.euroeastculture.eu

(homepage), the expert Elena Daneiko interviews Maksim Zhbankov on the theme 'Culture and Politics. Safeguarding Stability'. The vocabulary of the dialogue and lines of the argument embody one of the 'visibility strategies'. In terms of Zhbankov, we grasp 'a parade of equally weak cultural initiatives of both the authorities and the underground, as well as those of the quasi-market cultural "third" trend'; 'the absence of strong players in each team'; 'some tactics of escaping into marginal projects, scenic cabarets, parody and sarcastic musical theaters, and a pointedly trash cinema'; 'a mass exodus of culture professionals into the fields of nonpartisan, situational, improvisational, and somewhat decadent art'. Such rare and brief interviews, especially in English, have supplied the language with its own magnifying glass through which we have become accustomed to seeing the outcomes of politics titled 'Belarusian cultural policies' (only titled since the concept of policy-making in regard to culture remains obscure in Belarus).

And, finally, what may be presented abroad in the age of creative economy, apart from what has already been mentioned above? What could nowadays be capitalized out of the national past? The residues of the Belarusian culture are not decipherable due to the lack of professionals aware of the code. There surely seems to be an urgent need for nurturing young researchers who would be able to interpret these texts. To be effective, this experience requires a tradition which may not be broken by the absence of financial support. But it was broken in the twentieth century and, thus, can hardly be revived. We do have *La Belle Époque* in the evolution of the Belarusian culture but we do not have an audience being trained to read its texts, since we have lost the previous art of decoding. Nevertheless, even in this state of affairs, parables reproduce a hint at values which may be preserved by the state lists of palaces and their ruins. Such types of products are not immediately marketable; sometimes it takes centuries to create a narrative, to imbue human souls with legends.

Diverse narratives may be reconstructed on the basis of the same physical space and its *physical footprints*. Only in certain selected dimensions do narratives overlap. Which one will be outlined by the EU in the prospectus for tourists? It has to choose only one dimension due to the lack of space for a literary discourse. Someone may contest it by reference to digital footprints. The latter compress local myths, turning them into key

words. Each of them, in the event of necessity, may be unfolded. But the lack of time and money entails the lack of necessity to go beyond spaces visualized by the EU. If the social is really spatially constructed, then, indeed, the footprints matter even in regard to the worlds of dreams and allusions.

The stupefying absence of elaborate EaP programs appealing to the pathos and ethos of local culture induces one to question an interest in finding words, except those which have previously been stamped out. The dynamism of the Belarusian cultural order has recently begun to overrun the concepts of the EaP Culture Program whereby we could probably be modernized. There are now ample signs that the situation is changing. One of them is labeled by the RMCBU as an 'interesting mutation' (Analytical Base-line Report, 2013, p. 10). Therefore, the central concern of the EU may be not how to make the place visible and empty of illusions but, rather, how to let it be the place of myths which express its heart.

The shallow depth of the EaP Culture Program is supposed to attract the so-called 'ordinary people'. This shallowness corresponds to our desire, noted by the Russian philosopher Gustav Shpet, 'to become the Europeans "in general"' (Shpet, 1989, p. 51). As a consequence, we constitute the phenomenon of neighborhood without having become neighbors and thus see each other as abstractions: The EU seeks to visualize the concept 'ordinary people', whereas we urge ourselves to become them in order to be seen.

Conclusion

The EU's economic discourse of cultural policies, with its underlying values, becomes somewhat insensitive to the plurality of Belarusian cultural actors. The hermeneutic analysis of central notions in EU and Belarusian cultural policies might contribute to the development of the EaP in the field of culture beyond economic interests.

In mapping Belarusian cultural actors on the basis of cultural statistics, we deal with a language which is not sufficiently receptive to the variety of possibilities to read maps as rhetorical texts. Therefore, it is

attracting judgment, rather than appreciation. This language caters neither to demotic nor to intellectual curiosity. Everything is accepted as it has been indicated and calculated on a colorful map. However, a critical reflective approach to culture may be elaborated in the process of creating a policy language anew. It could emerge in the life-world of everydayness, rather than in the inveterate discourse of political programs. In such a way, we become more receptive to those overtones without which a melody would have no life. And the only chance to find this way is to be able to recognize diverse variations of the same melody. In this development of faculties for multidimensional 'visibility strategies', the spiritual forces of receptivity to what may not be subjected to mapping will not be unleashed unless the 'visa-conditioned' regime of dialogue is dismissed. The latter has established the criteria of visibility, approved by state institutions. Overcoming this regime, we discover the space of cultural actors which nowadays could hardly be subjected to labeling by means of the EU programs on creative industries. If that is just a utopia, a place which does not exist, the territory 'zero' of the European axiology, it is senseless to read such a text by means of the EaP dictionary.

In this situation, what cannot be uttered is inevitably subjected to steady *aestheticization*. Such an approach clarifies why the concept 'culture' is eventually substituted in political programs with 'cultural and creative industries'. This substitution as an aesthetic possibility is derived from a logical impossibility. In like manner, EU territory has eventually been appropriated by creative industries attracting Belarusian tourists to witness abroad the lacuna of their 'non-being' with its own 'non-language'.

References

Analytical Base-line Report on the Culture Sector and Cultural Policy of the Republic of Belarus (2013). The Regional Monitoring and Capacity Building Unit of the Eastern Partnership Culture Program. Retrieved November 7, 2014 from http://www.euroeastculture.eu. (homepage).

Babkou, I. (2001). *АдамКлакоцкі і ягоныяцені. Раман у дзесяцігісторыях* (*Adam Klakotski and his shadows*). Minsk: BAS.

Bachelard, G. (1969). *Poetics of space*. Boston: Beacon Press

Belarus (2006). Галіновая праграма «Захаванне і развіццё культуры Рэспублікі Беларусь на перыяд 2006–2010 гг.» (Preservation and development of culture in the Republic of Belarus 2006–2010): зацв. Калегіяй Мін-ва культуры Рэсп. Беларусь, 30 мая 2006 г., № 140.

Belarus (2011). Дзяржаўная праграма «Культура Беларусі» на 2011–2015 гады (Culture of Belarus 2011–1015. State Program): пастанова Савета Министраў Рэсп. Беларусь, 26. дек. 2010 г., №1905 //Нац. реестр правовых актов Респ. Беларусь.

Belarusian Yearbook 2008 (2009). *A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2008* (pp. 25–28). Minsk: Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies, Belarusian Public Policy Fund.

Council of Europe (2008). *White paper on intercultural dialogue "Living together as equals in dignity"*. Retrieved September 20, 2013 from http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/intercultural/source/white%20paper_final_revised_en.pdf.

Council of the European Union (2010). Conclusions of the Council and of the representatives of the governments of the member states, meeting within the Council, on the work plan for culture 2011–2014. *Official Journal of the European Union*, 2 Dec. 2010, 1–9. Retrieved January 20, 2015 from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:42010Y1202%2801%29.

Council of the European Union (2013). *Council conclusions on the Eastern Partnership*. Retrieved September 20, 2013 from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/.

Du Gay, P. & Pryke, M. (Eds.) (2002). *Cultural Economy: Cultural analysis and commercial life*. London: SAGE Publications.

ESSnet-Culture (2012). *European statistical system network on culture. Final report*. Retrieved January 20, 2015 from http://ec.europa.eu/culture/library/reports/ess-net-report_en.pdf.

EU Neighbourhood Info Centre (n.d.). Eastern partnership culture programme. Retrieved December 10, 2015 from http://www.enpi-info.eu/maineast.php?id=286&id_type=10.

EurActiv.com (2013). *Expertsslamredtape in EU Eastern Partnership*. Retrieved August 28, 2013 from http://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/news/experts-slam-red-tape-in-eu-eastern-partnership/.

European Commission (2012). *Exploitation and development of the job potential in the cultural sector in the age of digitalisation*, final report. Retrieved September 20, 2011 from http://ec.europa.eu/culture/pdf/doc924_en.pdf.

European Union (2009). Creativity and innovation: Driving competitiveness in the regions, *Panorama* 29. Retrieved January 20, 2015 from http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/panorama/pdf/mag29/mag29_en.pdf.

Eurostat (2007). *Cultural statistics*. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.

Eurostat (2011). *Cultural statistics*. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.

Fleming, T., & Nilsson-Andersen, P. (2007). *A creative economy green paper for the Nordic region*. Retrieved January 20, 2015 from http://www.nordicinnovation.org/Global/_Publications/Reports/2007/A%20Creative%20Economy%20Green%20Paper%20for%20the%20Nordic%20Region.pdf.

Hermann, J. (2012). Drei Stunden im *Niemandsland'*, in *Die Zeit№11*, 19 March. Retrieved January 20, 2015 from http://www.zeit.de/2012/11/Bahnreise-Orscha-Hermann.

Higgs, P. L., Cunningham, S. D., & Bakhshi, H. (Eds.) (2008). *Beyond the creative industries*: *Mapping the creative economy in the United Kingdom*. Retrieved January 20, 2015 from http://www.nesta.org.uk/sites/default/files/beyond_the_creative_industries_report.pdf.

KEA European Affairs (2006). *The economy of culture in Europe. Study prepared for the European Commission*. Retrieved January 20, 2015 from http://www.keanet.eu/ecoculture/.

KEA European Affairs (2009). *The impact of culture on creativity. A study for the European Commission Directorate-General for Education and Culture*. Retrieved January 20, 2015 from http://www.keanet.eu.

Kostevich, I. A. (2010). *Беларусь и Россия 2010 (Belarus and Russia 2010)*. Moskva: Rosstat.

Landry, C. & Bianchini, F. (1995). The Creative City. London: Demos.

Lash, S. & Lury, C. (2007). *Global culture industry*. Cambridge: Polity.

Law, J. (2002). Economics as interference. In P. du Gay & M. Pryke (Eds.), *Cultural economy* (pp. 21–30). London: SAGE Publications.

Lefebvre, H. (2007). *The production of space*. Malden & Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Massey, D. (2005). For Space. London: Sage.

Massey, D. (2007). *World city*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Pravo (2010). 'Аб культуры ў Рэспубліцы Беларусь : Закон Респ. Беларусь, 4 июня 1991 г., № 832-XII : в ред. Закона Респ. Беларусь от 31.12.2009 г. № 114-З: с изм. и доп., вст. в силу с 25.01.2010 г.' (The law on culture in the Republic of Belarus (2010)). Retrieved January 20, 2015 from http://pravo.by/main.aspx?guid=3871&p0=V19100832&p2={NRPA}.

Shpet, G. (1989). Очерк развития русской (Essay on the development of russian philosophy). In G. Shpet (Ed.), *Сочинения* (pp. 11–342). Moskva: Pravda.

Thrift, N. J. (2007). *Cultural geography: Critical concepts in the social sciences. Vol. 1, Mapping culture*. London and New York: Routledge.

Urry, J. (2000). *Sociology beyond Societies: Mobilities for the twenty-first century*. London, New York: Routledge.

Warf, B. & Arias, S. (Eds.) (2009). *The spatial turn: Interdisciplinary perspectives*. London: Routledge.

Wiesand, A. (2002). Comparative cultural policy research in Europe. A change of paradigm. *Canadian Journal of Communication*, *27*, 369–378.

Index

Note: Page number followed by "n" refers to footnotes.

B. Bruns et al. (eds.), *European Neighbourhood Policy*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-69504-1