Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship



BEYOND NETWORKS

Feedback in International Migration

Edited by
Oliver Bakewell
Godfried Engbersen
Maria Lucinda Fonseca
Cindy Horst

Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship

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Beyond Networks

Feedback in International Migration

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Preface and Acknowledgements

This volume is the result of the collaboration of an international team of researchers who worked together on the project Theorising the Evolution of Migration Systems in Europe (THEMIS) between 2010 and 2014. The project was coordinated by the International Migration Institute (IMI), University of Oxford, UK, where Oliver Bakewell was the principal investigator. The principal partners were the Citizenship, Migration and the City (CIMIC) research group at Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands, led by Godfried Engbersen; the Institute of Geography and Spatial Planning (IGOT), University of Lisbon, Portugal, led by Maria Lucinda Fonseca; and the Migration Research Group at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) led by Cindy Horst.

All contributors have been working on the project at various stages. Many others were also involved in the project and have contributed immensely to the research underpinning this book. First, there are a number of other researchers who worked at the four partner institution at various stages, each making a valuable contribution to the project: at IMI, Gunvor Jónsson, Carolin Fischer and Anais Resseguier; at CIMIC, Sanne van de Pol and Margrietha 't Hart; at IGOT, Dora Sampaio, Rui Carvalho and Juliana Iorio; and at PRIO, Rojan Ezzati, Jennifer Wu and Tatyana Tkachenko.

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The origins of THEMIS lie in discussions among Stephen Castles, Hein de Haas and Oliver Bakewell at the IMI in Oxford from 2009. This gave rise to the original proposal which was then refined in discussion with the various partners. Robin Cohen was the first project leader and on his retirement in 2011 this mantle was passed on to Oliver Bakewell. While distance or the pressures of other commitments have limited their day-to-day involvement in the project, Stephen, Robin and Hein have all continued to take a close interest in THEMIS and have provided invaluable advice and encouragement.

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As editors, we would particularly like to acknowledge the contributions of Agnieszka Kubal (IMI) and Sónia Pereira (formerly IGOT now at the University of Deusto, Bilbao), who played an invaluable role in

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1
Introduction: Feedback in Migration Processes

Oliver Bakewell, Agnieszka Kubal and Sónia Pereira

Introduction

The story of the pioneers setting off on an adventure into distant places, building new lives and then calling on people back home to join them has been told in many different ways over generations. Such tales of journeys and migrations lie at the heart of many narratives of national origin. For example, this is seen very clearly in the foundations of the United States, with the European 'discovery' of the New World and the subsequent mass migration across the Atlantic away from the desperate poverty of Europe. Today, it is commonly reflected in debates about the growth of migrant populations across the world. The idea of migration stimulating further migration is also well established in migration studies (de Haas, 2010; Massey et al., 1998). However, this process is often taken for granted and there is very little analysis of how and why this should happen, or – perhaps equally importantly – we are lacking the in-depth exploration of cases where it does not occur or when the process appears to be reversed so that initial migration actually hinders further migration.

This is the starting point for this volume. In this book, we examine how migration at one time affects subsequent patterns of migration. Inevitably, this leads to a concern with understanding how the presence of one group of migrants may influence the decisions and actions of those who come later. We need to go beyond the simple correlations that can indicate the possibility of a relationship between an independent variable (migrants already present) and an observed outcome (new migrants arriving) to unpick the social mechanisms that operate to create these links across time and space. Throughout this volume we ask, how does this work?

We describe this mechanism as feedback, drawing on a metaphor long used in migration theory and derived from broader theories on social systems (Mabogunje, 1970). In this Introduction, we present the broad themes running through the volume, starting with our basic research questions and showing how these led us to focus on feedback as a social mechanism through which migration at one time changes subsequent patterns of movement. While this idea of feedback is frequently invoked in the migration literature, we argue that too often it is elided with the analysis of migrants' social network. We then move on briefly to present the empirical basis for the volume – the findings of THEMIS, a project exploring the evolution of migration systems in Europe – and explain the other elements of our conceptual framework that were developed in this project. In the final section of this Introduction, we show how the various chapters contribute to these debates in different ways.

The questions and the main focus of this volume are unashamedly theoretical. At the same time, our work is grounded in particular empirical settings: the movements between a set of three origin countries (Brazil, Morocco and Ukraine) and four European destinations (the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and the United Kingdom). While we are not aiming to provide exhaustive empirical analysis of the movement between any of these origin/destination pairs (or migration corridors – see the following), the chapters present new empirical evidence that illustrates important migration processes taking place in each corridor. Some of these have already been the subject of considerable volumes of research; for example, there is extensive literature on Moroccans in the Netherlands (e.g., see De Haas, 2007; van Meeteren et al., 2013) and Brazilians in Portugal (e.g., Malheiros, 2007; Góis, 2009; Padilla, 2006). There is much less material on some of the other corridors, such as Brazilians in Norway or Moroccans in Portugal, and the volume can offer some tantalising glimpses into these little-explored movements. The discussions of the changing economic, social and political contexts for migration in the different countries aim to serve only the theoretical arguments in the various chapters. We are aware that this may disappoint those who seek detailed analysis of migration in the different corridors, but to include that would have made for a very different volume.

While the focus of the volume may be theoretical, there are important implications for policy and practice, especially at this time of heightened concern about migration in Europe and many other parts of the world. This idea of feedback has permeated into the policy arena, where there is a widespread assumption that the presence of migrants from

one origin area is likely to stimulate the arrival of more migrants from the same area. To some extent this has been institutionalised in policies of family reunification, developed in response to human rights' obligations. It is also seen in public policy concerns about the development of ethnic enclaves, integration and transnational engagement and identifications. The concept of feedback is rarely explicitly invoked in these discussions, but it can be clearly seen to underlie the widely held view that migration begets more migration. In addition, these contemporary policy debates have been focused on migrant networks as if they were the primary cause of further migration, rather than exploring the broader range of factors that shape migration patterns. Moreover, the discussion about feedback, *qua* social networks, tends to be restricted to particular subsets of migrants, in particular low-skilled labour migrants and irregular migrants. The differential operation of feedback across various social and economic classes and groups is rarely considered. While this book cannot hope to bring solutions to these problems of policy, it can help by developing a more substantial foundation of social scientific knowledge on which policies can be designed.

The origins of this book: From systems to feedback

This volume is the product of extensive collaboration among an international team of researchers based in four academic institutions: the University of Oxford, Erasmus University Rotterdam, the University of Lisbon and the Peace Research Institute Oslo. In 2010, we set out on a research journey to explore the evolution of migration systems, drawing on empirical case studies of migration to Europe. This project, *Theorising the Evolution of Migration Systems in Europe* (THEMIS), was funded for four years by the NORFACE research programme on *Migration in Europe – Social, Economic, Cultural and Policy Dynamics*. The central aim of THEMIS was to explain how and why migration between particular origins and destinations waxed and waned. Why is it that sometimes the movement of a few people to a new destination heralds the beginning of a new pattern of migration that may expand and become well established? For example, we can think of the movement of Polish migrants to the United States in the late 19th century (as described by Morawska, 2011). Under what conditions do such patterns start to break down? Or why do we sometimes see no such patterns being formed? Here examples are less well documented as social scientists and policymakers have not been concerned with the non-story of somebody migrating and little more happening as a result.

As we debated how to get purchase on these questions, it rapidly became clear that we needed to understand how the experience of one group of migrants mediated their influence on and the relationship with any people from the same origins who contemplated migration at a later date. We were inspired by the work of Mabogunje (1970), Kritz et al. (1992), Massey (1990), Faist (2004) and the critical perspective on migration systems offered by de Haas (2010).

Although the project was originally framed in terms of migration systems, it soon became clear that the idea of the system would make a poor guide for our empirical endeavours. Given that we were interested in understanding both when systems are formed and when they are not, we could neither make migration systems the object of our enquiry nor take them as the unit of analysis for the study. Moreover, coming from our different backgrounds and disciplinary perspectives, there was no clear consensus on the definition of a migration system or even the analytical value of the concept (see Bakewell, 2014, for a much more detailed discussion of migration systems). Hence, it was also impossible to set the migration system as the outcome to be explained; after all, lacking a consistent definition, it was not clear how we should recognise a system when we saw one. However, recalling our research questions, our collective interest was not so much in identifying and defining systems as observing when migration flows started to show systemic properties or exhibited *systemicity*.

The notion of feedback emerged as a central theme in our search for systemic properties and social mechanisms that could explain the various dynamics of migration movements. We see feedback operating when it is possible to trace a path from the observation of migration from A to B at one time to changes in the patterns of migration from A to B at a later time. Feedback can operate in either direction on a broad continuum – to encourage further migration or to dampen down movement. In other cases, it may be impossible to discern any feedback. It is important to emphasise that this does not mean that migration does not occur nor even that it may be expanding, but we cannot find a plausible link that relates that change in migration patterns to earlier movements. For example, if a new industrial centre is developed, it will attract new migrant workers, who continue to be drawn in by news of sustained economic growth rather than any contact or knowledge of those earlier migrants. In system terms, this would be considered migration being stimulated by a change in the wider environment – the economic conditions (Bakewell, 2014).

This conception of feedback draws on the growing literature on social mechanisms in broader sociological theory (Bunge, 2004; Gross, 2009;

Hedström and Ylikoski, 2010). Merton saw social mechanisms as 'social processes having designated consequences for designated parts of the social structure'; he argued that the main task of the researcher is to 'identify' those mechanisms and to establish under which conditions they either 'come into being' or 'fail to operate' (Merton, 1967; Hedström and Swedberg, 1996, pp. 43–44). In the light of this, we see feedback as a social mechanism of the middle range, to be explored by 'an intermediary level of analysis in-between pure description and storytelling, on the one hand, and universal social laws, on the other' (Hedström and Swedberg, 1996, p. 281).

If we can understand the operation of feedback, we know the means by which migration at one time has a causal relationship with subsequent migration patterns (or not). Moreover, we seek some degree of generalisation of these feedback mechanisms so that we can relate what we observe happening in one setting to what we might expect to observe in another. At the same time, feedback is not directly observable in itself. It is not sufficient simply to observe the correlation between migration at one time and that at another. Our focus is on what underlying social processes are at work to bring this link about.

The task of this volume is to pull apart feedback as a middle-range social mechanism in migration – to understand better its different components and configurations and how they operate in a range of contexts. As we explain in the next section, our central critique of the existing research on feedback in migration processes is that it has been largely conflated with the analysis of migrants' social network, which is often poorly specified, and tends to downplay the role of other factors, such as the changing immigration regimes, the migration industry of travel and employment agencies, class relations and so forth, that shape migration patterns.

Feedback in migration processes

We make no claim to be first to analyse this feedback as a social mechanism shaping migration patterns. Ravenstein's laws of migration published in the late 19th century (1885; 1889) brought to the forefront the observation that migration in one direction stimulates movement in the opposite direction. Nearly a century later, in his article on rural–urban migration systems in Africa, Mabogunje (1970) explicitly introduces the concept of feedback. He understood feedback as the flow of information sent to the area of origin about the success (or failure) of specific migration projects. This was assumed to influence potential migrants' decisions about following the footsteps of the first migrants

and put in motion more stable migration patterns, often independent of the initial conditions for moving.

Massey provides a more systematic analysis of the operation of feedback within migration systems through the idea of 'cumulative causation', which he coined to explain how migration between localities can become a self-sustaining process, based on the experiences of Mexican migration to the United States (Massey, 1990; Massey et al., 1987; Massey et al., 1993; Massey et al., 1998). According to this account, the operation of feedback can first be observed when migrants provide information and assistance through their social networks to contacts in their area of origin. This reduces the costs and risks of migration and encourages more and more people to move towards the same location.

As migration expands, the networks expand even more and the process becomes self-sustained, independently from the structural conditions which generated it in the first place. For example, the emigration of the more entrepreneurial and better-educated population may set back economic growth in the area of origin, reducing employment opportunities and making emigration more attractive for others. While the direction of such cumulative causation – to stimulate rather than inhibit migration – has been contested (de Haas, 2010), it does draw attention to a set of feedback mechanisms that lie beyond networks. As a result of this process, migration flows tend to 'acquire a measure of stability and structure over space and time, allowing for the identification of stable international migration systems' (Massey et al., 1993, p. 454).

While this account does not restrict its focus to the operation of social networks, it does place networks at the core of its explanation of the emergence of these migration 'systems'. It is only as the scale of movement increases to such a level that it affects the broader conditions that the reliance on networks diminishes. It is perhaps then little surprise that much of the literature that draws on cumulative causation as an explanation for migration dynamics focuses rather narrowly on the operation of feedback through migrants' social networks.

What is more surprising is that this emphasis on networks is often not accompanied by a clear definition of these social networks or detailed consideration of the different ways in which they may operate. With notable exceptions (e.g., Paul, 2013; Epstein, 2008; Haug, 2008; Collyer, 2005; Böcker, 1994), there is little attention paid to the wide, and growing, array of forms of network that may be implicated in feedback mechanisms. Simply referring to migrant networks without any further specification gives little clue as to how and why migration patterns change as they do. In general, when the network is invoked, it conjures

up images of migrants facilitating their family and friends back home to come and join them. While this may be part of the story (and perhaps the major part in some cases), as we show in this volume, there is a much more complex set of inter-relationships. In showing the operation of feedback as more complex and nuanced, we thereby challenge simplistic formulations such as '[w]hat matters for the rate of migration is the number of people who are related to new migrants *and who are prepared to help them*' (Collier, 2013, p. 41 emphasis in original).

DiMaggio and Garip (2012) have proposed a more sophisticated analysis of the role of migration networks in shaping migration patterns. They suggest three social mechanisms that lead to network effects in migration, which could be conceptualised as corresponding with the main sources of feedback:

- *social learning* or facilitation (Garip and Asad, 2013) – offering support and advice that reduce the risks and costs of migration;
- *normative pressure* or influence – which shapes people's views of migration and may support or discourage subsequent movement;
- *network externalities* – the pool of common resources created by previous migrants, institutions such as smuggler gangs, migrant business associations, migrant support groups and hometown associations.

This is a useful starting point for breaking down the feedback mechanisms operating through social networks, but the empirical work presented in this volume suggests it could be refined in at least three ways. First, this approach does not examine the different spatial operations of these mechanisms; for example, where does the social facilitation occur – at origin or destination, or transnationally? This is important when we think about how feedback operates and what effects it has. Intuitively, feedback processes seem to belong to the now-established and celebrated transnational social field (Levitt and Glick Schiller, 2004); however, we argue that they are not confined to this sphere only. Social learning among migrants may facilitate their settlement in the destination, but it may only start to operate when a new migrant arrives and finds co-nationals. This is rather different from the social learning that operates where a potential migrant learns about particular opportunities or strategies for finding employment from a neighbour who has recently returned from the potential destination. This spatial dimension is of critical importance to questions of causality. After all, if someone has already moved and then gains assistance through some form of network, one cannot argue that the network caused their migration.

Second, we can start to move beyond social networks by looking at how *social examples*, migrants' narratives of success and failure, can be broadcast through different media outside social networks. For example, even in the absence of any personal link, people may become aware of new houses built by migrants or watch the soap opera featuring the lives of migrants, with potential effects on their migration aspirations. This suggests that we can usefully distinguish between narrowcast and broadcast feedback (Chapter 9), where the former is concerned with mechanisms that target particular individuals or categories of migrants (often operating through networks) and the latter is about more general impacts on migratory conditions, which are independent of one's own networks.

Third, an important task for this volume is to move beyond a narrow focus on the feedback arising from social networks to include interactions such as those with the state, employers, educational establishments and new connections created by social media and information communication technologies (ICTs). DiMaggio and Garip's notion of network externalities only captures some of these in as far as they emerge from network relationships among migrants, but many emerge with minimal or no direct engagement with existing migrants.

We therefore propose that we distinguish between direct and indirect operation of feedback. The former is concerned with how migrants may directly shape subsequent migration, perhaps by assisting or hindering those that follow. The latter is concerned with more extended causal processes. For example, the presence of migrants working in a particular sector may stimulate the creation of employment agencies that subsequently start recruiting in the country of origin, encouraging more migration. These indirect causal mechanisms are likely to operate across different analytical levels. To extend the example, migration at one time may change the labour market, resulting in different levels of demand for migrant labour in future years at the macro-level, which then translates into altering the relationships between the employers and migrants and the operation of migration industry at the meso-level. These changes, in turn, 'trickle down' to the micro-level and may be reflected through varying aspirations and capacities to migrate as expressed by individuals. The growth of the institutional actors of the migration industry – such as travel agents, employment agencies, smugglers and so forth – may be accompanied by the transfer of economic, social and political remittances which convey images and ideas about migration to a broad array of people in the origin country far beyond any social network (Kubal, 2015; Levitt, 1998; Levitt and Lamba-Nieves, 2010; Levitt et al., 2011).

Alternatively, an increase in the number of migrants in one place may be used as a rationale for the destination state introducing tighter controls, restricting the opportunities for regular migration. This may result in more migrants falling on the wrong side of the law, pushing a larger proportion of the migrants into irregularity and resulting in the 'problem' of migration appearing to increase and increasing hostility to migration (De Genova, 2004). This is an example of feedback operating through policy, where responses to migrants at one time influence the reception of those who come later. Here, it is important to note that social networks may play a part in the operation of this indirect feedback, but they cannot be identified as the cause. For example, the changing economic and social environments for immigrants in the Netherlands have resulted in the tighter immigration laws, which have made it much harder for new migrants to come from Morocco. As we see in the chapter by Snel, Engbersen and Faber (Chapter 7, this volume), the social networks of current migrants can play an important role in conveying this message that the gate is closed.

This example also reminds us that feedback does not always have a positive impact on the rate of migration. Theories of migration systems and cumulative causation were developed as attempts to explain the growth of migration between localities over time. However, our notion of feedback has a broader purpose: to understand how migration at one time affects movement at a later time, whether to cause it to increase or *decrease*. As de Haas (2010) noted, migration flows once started do not necessarily expand indefinitely but may stabilise or decline, despite the presence of migrant networks. One only has to think of the very well-established patterns of migration from Europe to the United States in the late 19th and early 20th centuries to find examples of 'systems' that eventually appeared to run out of steam (Hatton and Williamson, 1998; Morawska, 2001). This volume will seek to examine how feedback mechanisms may act not only to expand migration but also to reduce it.

The extent to which networks play a role in negative feedback is open to debate. Previous research has found that (a) migrants do not easily transmit the negative side of their migration experience but rather tend to 'sweeten the truth' and (b) dissenting views on migration passed on to prospective migrants are more difficult to accept and acknowledge than positive views (Garip and Assad 2013). The empirical examples presented in this volume suggest that they may play an important role, either actively discouraging new migration or reinforcing the feedback operating through other channels, such as tighter immigration controls or broadcast media.

The empirical basis for the volume

Unpacking the theoretical questions around the operation of migration feedback, we draw on the empirical findings of the THEMIS project. This project explored movements to cities in four European countries – Norway, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Portugal – from Brazil, Morocco and Ukraine, focusing on how the migration processes of yesterday influence those of today. Between 2010 and 2012, the project team gathered a unique and rich set of data on these themes. All the chapters in the book draw on this qualitative and quantitative database. The former consists of 360 in-depth interviews with Brazilian, Moroccan and Ukrainian migrants in four European countries (Norway, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Portugal) and 270 in-depth interviews with return-migrants and their family members in the respective origin countries. The quantitative component consists of over 2,400 surveys with migrants in the above-mentioned European destination countries, as well as 1,800 surveys in origin countries – Brazil, Morocco and Ukraine – known for high out-migration. More detail about the methodology and some background data on the dynamics between the chosen origin and destination countries can be found in Chapter 2.

Our empirical research was therefore focused on 12 migration 'corridors', or dyads of origin and destination in which changing patterns of migration (or the absence of migration) can be observed. This notion of migration corridors is presented in more detail in Chapter 2, which explains the important role it played in the selection of our case studies. However, in order to understand the mechanisms which drive the changes in migration patterns, a more fine-grained analysis was also required, which took us below the national level of the corridor. The first and most obvious step was to zoom in by geographical scale and focus on particular locations. This was essential for the design of a feasible research strategy. Moreover, our inspiration from the migration systems literature was the way in which migrants from one particular origin come to be clustered around a particular destination. We were not seeking to explain the changing dynamics of migration from Ukraine to Portugal; nor could we do so in practice. Instead, we wanted to understand how and why migrants from Kiev came to be in Lisbon (for instance). At the same time, we were also interested to understand when initial migration does not result in cumulative causation: Why was there no similar clustering of migrants from Kiev in Oslo? Hence, we needed to examine not just the growth of migration but also its stagnation or decline, but always focusing on particular localities.

As we progressed with the research, it was important to disaggregate the migration flows between localities according to a range of characteristics related to the time of migration, which we refer to as *waves*, as feedback could operate rather differently depending on the time of migration and as there may be limited interaction between waves. This was illustrated very clearly in the case of Ukrainians in London (and to a lesser extent in the Netherlands), where there was quite a sharp divide between temporal waves. The relationships between those who came in the aftermath of the Second World War and those who came after Ukrainian independence were somewhat strained, and this appeared to affect how they responded to new migrants (Kubal and Dekker, 2014). Migration flows could also be differentiated on the basis of levels of education, socio-economic status, region of origin and race. This was particularly noticeable in the case of Brazilians moving to the Norway, Portugal and the United Kingdom, where it is possible to see sharp class divisions from Brazil reproduced in migration processes. This example is presented in more detail in Horst, Pereira and Sheringham (Chapter 5, this volume). Similar differences are revealed by breaking down the analysis on the basis of migrants' rationale for moving, their economic activities or their immigration status. This became clear through the research process, as the sampling strategy revealed the limits of trying to find common social networks between the 'high-skilled' and the 'low-skilled' migrants (even active strategies of 'avoidance') from the same origin area living in the same city (see Carling and Jolivet, Chapter 2, this volume, for discussion of the respondent-driven sampling).

How does the feedback work?

These theoretical reflections and empirical findings produced a set of themes and ideas which run through this volume. We look at the operation of feedback mechanisms in affecting the patterns of migration within the 12 different corridors. Through our interviews with migrants in destination areas and return-migrants, family members and the wider population in origin areas, we have sought out explanations for people's migration decisions. In particular, we have probed both what influenced their individual migration story and how they may have contributed to the migration of others. While our aim is to dig below the simplistic reliance on the operation of migrants' social networks as the principle feedback mechanism – to reach beyond networks – they remain an important starting point for the analysis.

This starts in chapters 3, 4 and 5, which pull apart the operation of social networks, highlighting the fissures between migrant waves that create different forms of networks and associated feedback. In Chapter 3, Van Meeteren and Pereira look at the data on Brazilians moving to Portugal and the Netherlands to show how the role of networks varies between both these two destinations and the primary motivation for migrating, differentiating between those moving for employment, study, seeking life experience and family reunification. They carefully note where such interventions arise, whether in Brazil or the destination, thereby calling into question if networks are causing migration or playing a more incidental part. While families and friends often play a major role in facilitating migration, Van Meeteren and Pereira draw attention to the significance of other sources of information and assistance from institutions such as employers and embassies, and also the internet.

The influence of the internet and virtual social networks is a theme taken up by Dekker, Engbersen and Faber in Chapter 4. They analyse how respondents in the THEMIS project reported their use of various online media. They find that it is primarily used as a complementary means of sustaining communication with friends and family living abroad (whether in the origin or destination areas), alongside telephone calls, letters and visits. Nevertheless, it clearly extends the reach of people's networks to sustain and perhaps even strengthen weak ties that may have lapsed in the absence of social media. They also show there is some evidence of people reaching out to complete strangers online, passing on information about places and opportunities. This suggests that operation of virtual social networks cannot be assumed to match that of the personal face-to-face networks envisaged by migration theorists in the 1990s.

Moving away from this focus on these channels of feedback, in Chapter 5 Horst, Pereira and Sheringham examine how the feedback processes vary depending on the social class of the migrants. They note that the idea of class was explicitly invoked by Brazilian respondents to explain differences within the migrant population. In the cases of Portugal and the United Kingdom, the early migrants were more middle class and they are now being joined by lower-middle and working-class compatriots; while in Norway distinctions are made between the well-off migrants from the large metropolises from the Southeast of Brazil and the 'marriage migrants' from the Northeast. Such class differences, in terms of access to both resources and aspirations, clearly shape migration practices, but this chapter shows how class fissures are also

reproduced within the migrants' social networks. Again, this highlights the dangers of thinking of social networks as linking people moving within the same (national) corridor or even the same city. This chapter shows that where feedback operates through social networks it will be directed along channels which are shaped by class relations, intersecting with other markers of social difference such as gender and race.

Chapters 6 and 7 turn their attention to more indirect feedback mechanisms, which have been driven by the rapid decline in economic conditions in Europe as a result of the global financial crisis in 2008. This moves the focus to negative feedback that helps to reduce migration flows. In Chapter 6, Fonseca, Esteves and McGarrigle look at the case of Brazilian and Ukrainian migration to Portugal, one of the EU countries worst affected by the financial crisis. They show how factors at the macro-level (the economic crisis), disseminated widely through the broadcast and print media, influence the content of direct informational feedback distributed through migrant networks. The negative feedback was reinforced by the personal accounts of migrants and the observation of their return migration to Brazil and Ukraine. Moreover, Ukrainian and Brazilian migrants who may have once helped new arrivals may now lack either the means or the inclination to offer support.

Snel, Engbersen and Faber (Chapter 7) look at the case of Moroccan migration to the Netherlands, which has seen a marked decline since the early 2000s, starting even before the economic crisis. They first show how the 'context of reception' for new migrants in the Netherlands has worsened during this period. With the rise of the political right and popular concern about immigration, the Dutch government has put in place more restrictive migration policies, especially for unskilled non-EU migrants. The job opportunities for Moroccan migrants have also diminished as the expansion of the European Union has enabled Eastern Europeans to compete against Moroccans for the low-skilled jobs. These trends have been accompanied by increasing hostility to migrants, especially Muslims, in Dutch society. These worsening conditions not only have had a direct effect on Moroccan migration but have also been internalised into Moroccans' transnational networks. Snel et al. argue that this makes Moroccans in the Netherlands much less willing to offer any support or encouragement for new migrants. They suggest that rather than being gatekeepers for migration channels, Moroccans are now adopting a stance of more active discouragement, even to the extent that they may be seen to be closing the gates to new arrivals.

The next three chapters (8, 9 and 10) present different theoretical contributions to the analysis of feedback. A critical part of much of

the feedback discussed in earlier chapters is the assistance – or lack of it – provided by migrants to those who follow. If this is to become a self-sustaining cycle of help between migrant cohorts, as suggested by the theory of cumulative causation, it is important to know whether migrants who receive help do pass it on in due course. This is the puzzle addressed by Carling in Chapter 8. He shows that there is evidence of chains of assistance operating in the migration corridors; practices of help are often self-reinforcing. At the same time, he also finds that such chains do not operate uniformly within each corridor; in some cases, it seems there is both 'chain' migration and also 'independent' migration, where assistance from earlier migrants plays little part.

Bakewell and Jolivet (Chapter 9) introduce the concept of broadcast feedback as a counterpoint to feedback operating through social networks. This includes information and ideas about migration transmitted indiscriminately through television shows, radio and the internet, as well as impressions and ideas conveyed by migrants' public behaviour observed in their place of origin. The critical distinction between this and network feedback is that there is no social network link between the migrants and those who are influenced by them – this reaches beyond even the most extensive networks of friends and family. While this is not the most important form of feedback for explaining migration patterns, the THEMIS data suggest that it can have a marked influence on the migration behaviour of some people.

In Chapter 10, Engbersen, Snel and Esteves address the puzzle of how the micro-level interactions between individuals that have been documented through the THEMIS research link together with the macro-level factors, highlighted in chapters 6 and 7 to provide explanations for the changing (macro-level) patterns of migration. Drawing on wider sociological literature on social mechanisms, they show how it is possible to identify the impact of macro-level factors on individuals' context for action (which might be styled as their habitus), which translates into changes in their actions and which results in changes in the macro-level context. They illustrate this cycle by examining the mechanism through which migrants provide negative feedback that acts as a brake on later movements in the case of two corridors: Morocco–Netherlands and Brazil–Portugal. Inverting Massey (1990), they refer to this mechanism as reverse cumulative causation.

The concluding chapter by Engbersen, Snel and Horst starts by highlighting the main contributions the book makes in relation to our understanding of direct and indirect feedback mechanisms and to different forms and channels of feedback. Additionally, they demonstrate

how the operation of feedback affects different stages of migration (increasing migration, declining migration and small number migration) within the 12 corridors. It shows that migrants' recommendations to move to people at home appear to be most significant in the corridors with rather small populations of migrants and to a lesser degree in the corridors with expanding migrant populations. While this volume has started the research journey to look beyond networks, we know there is much more to be done, and the conclusion notes some of the possible avenues of enquiry.

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2

Exploring 12 Migration Corridors: Rationale, Methodology and Overview

Jørgen Carling and Dominique Jolivet

Introduction: From concepts to data and back again

The team of researchers whose work is presented in this book set out to study 'the evolution of European migration systems'. But it is not possible to observe, measure or interview a migration system. In fact, as noted in the Introduction, the concept was shrouded with doubts and misgivings, even within the research team, and it seemed an elusive candidate for empirical research. The idea of migration systems nevertheless served us well as a guiding star, impelling us to identify the researchable mechanisms that might produce such systems, develop them or cause them to stagnate. The initial challenge was to determine *from whom* we could collect data in a way that was theoretically meaningful and methodologically feasible. Equally important, *what* could we ask people about in qualitative interviews and surveys that would shed light on our overarching questions about migration systems and expose the workings of feedback mechanisms?

The theoretical and methodological journey towards data collection led us to use *migration corridors* as our frame of observation and to zoom in on a set of specific themes in the project, such as the role of pioneer migrants, communication between migrants and people at the origin, and the provision of help at various stages of the migration process. By exploring these issues, we could identify elements of systems dynamics.

Four rich datasets were produced, containing qualitative and quantitative data from both origins and destinations.[1] The data analysis constituted a second journey, back towards theoretical concepts that help

explain migration processes. Paramount among these was the notion of feedback, which was marginal to the original research proposal but represents the red thread running through this book.

The purpose of this chapter is to map out these two journeys. Firstly, we present the rationale and methodology that we applied during the project. Secondly, we use our data to present a comparative overview of the 12 migration corridors.

The concept of migration corridors

Part of the rationale behind the THEMIS project was that the *absence* of migration could be as theoretically important as its presence. Why does migration stagnate or come to a halt? And why does it often not begin in the first place? With such questions in mind, it would have been misleading to think of 'migration flows' as our object of study. Instead, we developed the concept of migration corridors to guide the empirical research.

Migration corridors are *frames for observation,* not empirical phenomena. This has the advantage that, as structures for analysis, migration corridors are devoid of empirical assumptions. In other words, migration corridors are independent of the *level* of activity within them: they can be empty, or nearly so. We cannot assume, for instance, that there is a migration *flow* from Colombia to Iceland, but we could set out to study the Colombia–Iceland migration *corridor*. (There are, in fact, more than 150 Colombian-born persons in Iceland – a sufficient number for asking questions about the underlying social dynamics.) In other cases, it will be the relative emptiness of corridors that warrants explanation.

Moreover, migration corridors do not have a predetermined *direction*. The movement within them may go predominantly from one end to the other, and the primary interest in an empirical study could be with movement in one direction. Still, the notion of corridors is open to different forms of asymmetries in movement. The research design of the THEMIS project emphasised migration *from* Brazil, Morocco and Ukraine *to* our four European destination countries. The dynamics we explored also involved return movement.

Migration typically flows from certain parts of one country to specific destinations in another. Consequently, one might question whether the nation-state is the appropriate anchor point of migration corridors. There are, however, both practical and substantive advantages to focusing on *binational migration corridors* – that is, corridors linking one *country* with another. First, sub-national differences can often only

be accounted for through empirical analysis, while the binational corridor can itself be identified a priori. Second, the nation-state is a standard unit that facilitates comparison of different corridors. Third, migration data are usually confined to national origin – be it in the form of country of birth, country of departure or citizenship. Fourth, factors at the national level (such as migration control policies) are often decisive to the activity within migration corridors. Data collection in the THEMIS project was, as we will later explain, limited to specific locations. We often refer to the corridors in binational terms, but this is an approximation of what the data represent. As Horst, Pereira and Sheringham show in Chapter 5, migrants' regional origins can be an important source of differentiation within migration systems.

The temporal dimensions of migration are central to the THEMIS project: we are interested in how migration systems evolve and are sustained over time. Such processes can be studied in two ways. First, it is possible to use *historical* data to describe the changing characteristics of a migration corridor, for instance the size and composition of migrant stocks and flows. Second, one can collect *retrospective* information from the relevant current populations.

In the THEMIS project, we have relied on retrospective data; migrants have provided information about their own migration histories and past experiences. This approach allowed us to collect rich and detailed data about the mechanisms we sought to study. The picture we can paint with retrospective data differs from the actual historical process for three reasons.

First, because of return migration, onward migration and mortality, the migrants who can be interviewed today are not the same as the ones who experienced the historical process. A comprehensive study from the United States found the emigration rate of immigrants to be 2.9% per year on average across all migrant nationalities (Van Hook and Zhang, 2011). This implies that if we are interested in developments that had taken place 20–25 years ago, then it would be difficult to gather information as half of the migrants who experienced them would have left in the meantime. For some migrant groups this turnover is much more rapid. Among Brazilians in the Netherlands, for instance, the emigration rate exceeds 8% per year.[2] Consequently, half of the Brazilians who had been in the Netherlands in 2004 were no longer there when we collected data in 2012. The significance of this depletion depends on the selectivity of out-migration – whether the migrants who return differ systematically from the ones who remain. It could, for instance,

make a big difference whether return migration is dominated by return of failure or return of success (cf. Cerase, 1974).

Second, retrospective data are affected by interviewees' ability to recall past experiences. This ability is often lower than what migration researchers would hope for (Carling, 2012). Migrants could, in principle, provide detailed facts about the past, but the information that can realistically be retrieved is quite limited. Finally, retrospective accounts are often coloured by subsequent experiences and rationalisation. If migrants recount experiences of community cohesion and solidarity in the past, for instance, and contrast it with individualism today, it may be hard to determine how such statements relate to actual historical change. We have adapted to these characteristics of retrospective data by concentrating on exploring the mechanisms that are at work in migration systems, rather than attempting to reconstruct historical developments.

Research design

In order to meet our theoretical objectives we wanted a diverse set of corridors, representing different stages and experiences of migration. The four partner institutions were located in countries with different immigration histories and policies. The United Kingdom and the Netherlands represent well-established countries of large-scale immigration from an increasingly diverse range of countries. The English language makes the United Kingdom a particularly attractive destination for migrants from across the world. In the last 20 years, Portugal has changed from a country of emigration and post-colonial immigration into a major destination for immigrants from Eastern Europe. Unlike the other three countries, Norway does not have a colonial history that has shaped immigration. The country has, however, been a significant immigration destination since the early 1970s, initially for labour migrants and subsequently for asylum seekers, resettled refugees and family migrants. In recent years, immigration to Norway has been driven by better economic conditions than in the rest of Europe. Once we decided to retain these four European countries as countries of destination because of their diverse migration environments, the data collection journey started with identifying three countries of origin. The primary criterion was to have 12 corridors that represented a theoretically interesting range of developments. Moreover, it should be realistic to interview 200 migrants at the destination. This was a limiting factor, since many potential countries of origin were represented with a few hundred people or less in either Portugal or Norway.

Our initial review produced a shortlist of six countries of origin: Bangladesh, Brazil, Egypt, India, Morocco and Ukraine. We then studied their migration trends towards the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and the United Kingdom over time. These scoping studies included detailed reviews of literature, national and local migration statistics and interviews with key informants. The studies underpinned the final choice of countries. We settled on Brazil, Morocco and Ukraine as the three origin countries. India turned out to be a case that challenged the feasibility of analysis based on migration corridors: there was not only variation between corridors – which is what we wanted – but extreme heterogeneity *within* each corridor compared to other options. Moreover, a large proportion of Indians have complex migration trajectories that defy the binational observation frame of migration corridors. We opted to exclude Bangladesh and Egypt partly because of the low number of Bangladeshis and Egyptians in several of our destination countries.

With this decision made, we focused the subsequent research on the 12 migration corridors illustrated in Figure 2.1.



Figure 2.1 Migration corridors examined in the THEMIS project

The next step involved selecting one or more research areas in each country of origin and destination according to a complex set of characteristics, including migration history, and socio-economic development. Within the three countries of origin, we picked up at least one core region and one more peripheral area. We chose Governador Valadares, Rio de Janeiro[3] and Campinas in Brazil, Rabat in Morocco and Kiev in Ukraine to represent urban contexts. Mantena (Brazil), Nador (Morocco) and Lviv Oblast[4] (Ukraine) represented the periphery. In order to select the research areas in the destination countries we took into account the places where migrants from Brazil, Morocco and Ukraine tend to concentrate. In Norway and the United Kingdom, it was possible to use the same localities to study the three target groups: Oslo and London, respectively. In Portugal, we studied Brazilians and Ukrainians in Lisbon. Moroccans tend to live scattered in the Algarve region and therefore we selected this region to study their migration patterns. In the Netherlands, each target group tends to settle in a different area and therefore we studied Brazilians in Amsterdam, Moroccans in Rotterdam and Ukrainians in the area surrounding The Hague.

We started the fieldwork conducting qualitative semi-structured interviews. From December 2010 to July 2011, we carried out 362 interviews at the destination end of the migration corridors with people who were aged 16 or more and born in Brazil, Morocco and Ukraine or with at least one of their parents born there and living in the areas under study. At the origin end of the corridors we conducted 271 semi-structured interviews between July 2011 and January 2012 with return migrants and migrants' family members (up to the third degree of kinship) aged 16 or more, with links to the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal or the United Kingdom, and mainly born in their country of residence. We selected the respondents strategically with snowball sampling, aiming for a diverse group in terms of gender, age, social class, motive of migration and duration of stay in the case of the migrants in Europe.

With the data and knowledge gathered from the qualitative semi-structured interviews, we developed initial hypotheses about how migration systems evolve and appropriate survey instruments to test them. We surveyed 2,859 migrants living in the European research areas between February and November 2012. The respondents were aged 18 or more, and they were born in Brazil, Morocco and Ukraine, or with at least one of their parents born there. The last stop of the long data collection journey was the fieldwork in the research areas in Brazil,

Morocco and Ukraine, where we conducted 1,246 survey interviews between October 2012 and January 2013, with respondents aged 18 or more and living in the surveyed households.

During the analysis of secondary data for the scoping studies, we focused on the contextual, macro-level factors that shape migration patterns. The qualitative interviews looked especially at the characteristics and the changes in the communities of origin and in the migrant communities at the destination. In the surveys too, we asked about the communities of origin and destination, but we focused on micro-level factors. In addition, from the micro-level perspective, the surveys allowed us to examine the perceived influence of macro-level factors on migration behaviour and aspirations.

Qualitative interviews

We designed the semi-structured interviews at both ends of the migration corridors around five topics. First, the interviews asked the informants about their personal migration history. This provided a comprehensive view of the migration experiences of the informants and their family members, capturing all their movements over time, as well as their motivations to move.

Second, the interviews enquired on the concept of migration threshold, the point beyond which migration becomes partly self-sustaining.[5] To capture whether this threshold exists or not, the interviews asked questions about the presence of formal and informal migration-related institutions and businesses that could foster migration. They also included questions on the presence of a migrant community and its willingness to help others in the migration process over time. In the European end, the interviews also enquired about the eventual constraints to obtain residency permits and citizenship.

A third main topic included in the interviews was the role of pioneer migrants in influencing the evolution of a migration system. Pioneers could be the first migrants who left or arrived, but the concept also referred to the pioneers of a particular migrant group that emerged later, such as the first Moroccan family migrants who arrived in the Netherlands after the first wave of labour migrants. Our aim was to identify the characteristics of the pioneers and the circumstances under which they moved.

We also included some questions on migration feedback. In the countries of origin, the interviews investigated the existing communication links and exchanges within the migration corridors. In the destination

end of the corridors, we asked about the type of advice that respondents would give to other people willing to migrate.

Finally, we also aimed to capture the evolution of a migration system by asking about informants' perceptions of the changes over time in migration patterns and people's rationales for moving.

The informants were selected taking into account criteria such as age, gender or migration experience. Religion was also considered when recruiting Brazilian informants in London due to the high variety of religious denominations among this group that could lead to different patterns of reliance on social networks. We recruited most of the informants using strategic snowball sampling. In the origin end of the corridors, especially in the Ukrainian sites, we also used the social media (Facebook and migrants' forums). The large number of return migrants in Lviv Oblast (Ukraine) allowed us to experiment with techniques close to random sampling, randomly picking up households starting from the first house on the main street and knocking at each third door until we could find an informant. In the destination end, other methods included recruitments in locations frequented by the target groups (migrant organisations, consulates and embassies, language schools, restaurants and cafes, mosques and churches, and universities). Some respondents were also recruited through social media, employers, political parties, specific social events or interviewers' personal contacts.

During the fieldwork in the countries of origin, interviewers encountered difficulties in identifying people with migration experience in the countries of the project, especially in highly populated areas such as Rio de Janeiro. The biggest challenge was to find enough informants with links in Norway. To overcome this difficulty, interviewers in the Brazilian sites relied on their social networks available within the university, leading to a slight overrepresentation of students. In Oslo, we also found an overrepresentation of highly educated Brazilians and that Moroccans were particularly reluctant to be interviewed. In London, highly skilled Moroccans were also difficult to interview.

Surveys

The THEMIS project conceptualised migration system formation and breakdown as a process embedded in broader processes of change, and therefore, as in the scoping studies and in the qualitative interviews, the survey took a longitudinal approach and studied changes over time.[6] To do so, we focused on 'the present as a product of the past', asking about the present dynamics rather than trying to reconstruct the past.[7]

Questionnaire design

The objective of the survey was to examine systems dynamics at the individual level and thereby contribute to addressing the THEMIS questions at the aggregate level. We needed to develop a set of variables that would allow us to perform statistical analyses in order to address the main research questions of the project. Focusing on the variation among migrants (surveys in the countries of destination) and non-migrants (surveys in the countries of origin), we included in the two questionnaires common variables regarding four main topics: (1) respondents' personal history, including their migration experience, (2) their perceptions of contextual institutional conditions, both in their country of origin and in Europe, taking a longitudinal perspective, (3) direct feedback mechanisms – including questions on social and economic remittances, contact with migrant networks, communication between the two ends of the migration corridors, visits to the other end of the corridor and information flows and sources, and (4) assistance, understood as 'help given to family and group members that directly and positively influences further migration'.[8]

Respondent-driven sampling in countries of destination

Another challenge that we faced before starting the quantitative data collection was to find a valid common sampling strategy for the diverse research contexts. Solid sampling frames including all members of the target population do not exist in most of the research sites; the target population size is sometimes small and migrants are often difficult to reach, especially if they lack the required residence permits in their country of residence. Therefore, we decided to employ respondent-driven sampling (RDS) in the countries of destination.

This methodology was developed to overcome the obstacles of sampling among 'hard-to-reach' populations for which sampling frames are unavailable, or which are difficult for outsiders to penetrate (Heckathorn, 2007). Although RDS is a form of chain referral sampling, it differs from typical snowball sampling in several ways (Heckathorn, 1997). First, participants receive an incentive for participating in the research and an additional incentive for each of their recruits. Second, participants are not asked to identify peers for the researcher to contact but to contact potential recruits directly; the potential recruit can hence choose to accept or refuse the offer without being approached by the researcher. Finally, the use of recruitment coupons with unique numbers allows the researcher to track recruitment chains. The recruitment chain

information, along with information on the size of each participant's personal network within the target population, can be used to calculate and weight particular characteristics of respondents (Heckathorn, 1997). In the case of THEMIS, the network information needed for RDS calculations was also of substantive interest to the research (Friberg and Horst, 2014).

In line with the RDS methodology, we selected in each target group a few initial members (seeds) that were well connected with their migrant community and had a distinguished role in their peer group. The selection of seeds took also into consideration their diversity in terms of individual characteristics – gender, socio-economic status, age, place of residence, year of arrival, legal status, and membership to particular cultural, ethnic or religious groups.

The recruitment chain initiated by each seed grows as each subsequent research participant recruits a specified number of peers. The goal is to create long recruitment chains, to the point where the sample composition is independent of the original seeds (Johnston and Sabin, 2010). The recruitment process was closely monitored and the parameters were adjusted during the fieldwork when the success rate of referrals was low. For instance, the maximum number of recruits was increased from two to three per respondent in the case of Ukrainian migrants in Oslo, and mobile RDS sites complemented the planned fixed ones to foster the recruitments. Other creative strategies to attain sufficient respondents included replacing physical coupons by coupon references sent by email and SMS, sending reminders through text messages or contacting directly potential recruits on behalf of recruiting respondents. Eventually, despite the adjustments, we had to replace formalised RDS recruitment by informal referrals for three groups: Brazilians and Moroccans in Norway, and Ukrainians in the Netherlands. The change of sampling method was partially due to the low numbers in these three migration corridors but also due to other challenges specific to each group (Ezzati and Wu, 2013). In those corridors where the RDS recruitment was successful, some groups were more difficult to reach than others. For instance, the RDS incentives were inadequate for those with good incomes, whereas they were attractive to irregular migrants and the unemployed.

Surveys in countries of origin

At the origin end of the corridors, we employed a multi-stage stratified sampling based on sampling frames where available[9] with random

route and random selection of one person aged 18 or more and living in the selected household. During the fieldwork in Nador (Morocco), interviewers encountered a high number of refusals, whereas in some sectors of Campinas (Brazil) respondents living in gated communities were hard to reach. Consequently, in practice, the random sampling was combined with snowball sampling in limited cases. In addition, we selected non-randomly some Ukrainian respondents to increase the amount of respondents with previous migration experience in order to carry out comparative analyses with respondents who never migrated.

Furthermore, whereas men are probably more willing to participate in research studies than women in Morocco, in Ukraine we observed the opposite trend and women were more accessible. This led to gender misbalances in the final samples – an overrepresentation of women especially in Kiev (Ukraine) and a slight underrepresentation of women in the Moroccan research areas. We also observed a bias towards young people in the Moroccan city of Rabat.

Approaches to analysis

The long data collection journey produced four valuable quantitative and qualitative datasets. A second adventure consisted in finding the way back towards our initial theoretical concepts. To approach the analysis, we developed a collaborative coding of the qualitative data and we weighted the quantitative data collected in the European sites.

Collaborative coding

The fieldwork produced 633 interviews mostly collected in the native language of the informants and simultaneously translated and transcribed in English.[10] In order to facilitate the analysis of the two large qualitative datasets, the research team developed two shared codebooks – one for the origin interviews and one for the destination interviews. This involved much discussion and debate, but the end result was a set of codes which could be applied to the qualitative interviews in different countries, greatly facilitating comparative analysis. The interviews were coded using NVivo 9 software by members of the research team, interviewers and transcribers who were familiar with the main research topics of the project. Members of the core research team tested the use of the codebook in each country while the codebook was being designed and before starting the systematic coding in order to eliminate major inconsistencies and refine the coding system.

Weighting the survey data

The survey data from the countries of origin required weighting only to account for stratification in the sampling design. In the destination countries, by contrast, weighting was more complicated. As a result of the variable success of RDS, the final sample size ranged from 80 to 420 in each corridor. Moreover, since RDS had to be abandoned in three of the corridors, it was not possible to use standard weighting of RDS data to correct for sampling biases. In order to address the unevenness in the data, we developed a simple alternative of weighting that first balanced our samples across each corridor and also took account of individual network size.

Turning to the first, we had to ensure that the variation in the number of respondents we were able to recruit should not affect the relative weight of different corridors. We therefore compensated for the variation in sample size through population weights, so that each corridor represents one-twelfth of the weighted sample. This generated corridor weights for each individual.

Second, in the absence of RDS weighting, we constructed individual weights for sampling probability based on network size. We assume that each individual i has a probability p of being sampled, which depends on a number of factors. Paramount among them is the size of the individual's personal network, k_i, which is defined so that it overlaps with potential recruiters. In other words, persons who know many others by whom they could be recruited are more likely to be sampled. In addition, however, there are other factors that affect the likelihood that a person will receive and use an RDS coupon: personality, availability, employment and family commitments, for instance. Since these influences cannot be estimated in a satisfactory way, we consider them a group of unknown factors, x. The relative importance of network size and unknown factors is represented by the weights w_k and w_x. The sampling probability weight pw for individual i can thus be calculated as

$$pw_i = w_k \frac{1}{k_i} + w_x x_i \tag{1}$$

In the absence of meaningful estimates, we set $w_k = w_x$ and $x_i = 1$, which seems plausible: the inverse of network size accounts for half of the variation in selection probability. Network size is top-coded at 50, which represents the 95th percentile of the frequency distribution.

Corridor weights are calculated by dividing by the actual sample n in each corridor c. To prevent network size weights from overriding

corridor weights, we also divide by the average sampling probability weight for the corridor $\overline{pw}_c$. The combined individual weight a for individual i in corridor c is therefore

$$a_{ic} = \frac{1}{n_c \overline{pw}_c} \left(w_k \frac{1}{k_i} + w_x x_i \right) \tag{2}$$

which after our simplifying assumptions about w and x can be rewritten

$$a_{ic} = \frac{w_k}{n_c \overline{pw}_c} \left(\frac{1}{k_i} + 1 \right). \tag{3}$$

Four countries of destination

We now turn from discussing methodology to exploring the substance of our research. First, we provide a brief background to the context of migration to and from our case-study countries. Next, we draw upon our own data to describe and compare the 12 migration corridors.

There are three factors that we consider as particularly important aspects of the macro-level context in the destination countries: the rising popularity of anti-immigrant parties, the economic recession of the global economic crisis and the increasingly selective immigration policies in Europe. These are factors that have had a bearing on the migration flows we examine and the feedback mechanisms that we address in this book.

Firstly, the period after 2000 is characterised by the rise of anti-immigrant parties in many European countries. This hostile political environment towards migration in Europe was coupled with a context of religiously inspired terrorist attacks such as the 9/11 in New York (2001), the killing of the film-maker Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam (2002) and the bombings in Madrid (2004) and in London (2005). These attacks raised feelings of threat of Islam and hostility towards the European Muslim community. The most extreme example of this adversity took place in 2011 in Norway, with the killing of 77 people by a terrorist whose ideology was against multiculturalism and Islamism (Europol, 2012).

Table 2.1 displays selected economic indicators for the period 2011 and 2012 – the period when most of the data were collected. Among the four destination countries, Portugal was hardest hit by the crises, with double-digit unemployment and a severe decline in per capita income. Norway was the least affected by the crisis, but the difference

Table 2.1 Selected economic indicators for countries of origin and destination

	2011–2012					2006–2007 Total unemployment (%)
	GDP per capita		Unemployment (%)			
	PPP, (1,000 USD)	Annual change (%)	Native-born	Foreign-born	Total	
Netherlands	42.8	−0.6	4.2	9.9	4.9	3.6
Norway	63.4	0.8	2.7	7.3	3.3	3.0
Portugal	25.6	−2.0	14.6	18.2	14.2	7.8
UK	34.8	0.0	7.9	9.3	7.9	5.5
Brazil	14.4	1.0			6.8	8.3
Morocco	6.8	2.4			8.9	9.7
Ukraine	8.4	3.0			7.8	6.6

Sources: OECD: Key Statistics on migration in OECD countries, Labour market outcomes of immigrants, 2008–2012 (for unemployment by country of birth); World Bank: World Development Indicators (GDP and total unemployment). Unemployment measures are not identical between the sources. All data are averages for the two-year periods indicated.

in unemployment between Norway and the other destination countries was much smaller for the foreign-born than for the native-born.

The global economic crisis also brought an increase in the out-migration of foreigners, especially from Norway and the Netherlands, a decrease in immigration to Portugal and a rise of intra-European movements towards the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, among other countries (OECD, 2013).

Table 2.1 also presents comparable statistics for the three countries of origin, which, during 2011–2012, all had higher economic growth than the destination countries, and unemployment rates comparable to those in the United Kingdom. In addition, in Brazil and Morocco, the official unemployment rates were lower in the period of our data collection than during the 2006–2007 period.

In addition, over time, immigration policies in Europe have become more selective, favouring the entry of highly skilled migrants, investors and entrepreneurs (OECD, 2013). There are however differences between our four destination countries. In the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, since 1965 and 1975 respectively, changes towards more restrictive policies have dominated, whereas in Portugal and to a lesser extent in Norway, migration policy changes towards less restriction have prevailed.[11] Furthermore, in Portugal, even though the



Figure 2.2 Proportion of respondents who agree that 'immigration policies are very strict' in the destination country
Source: THEMIS destination country survey data, weighted.

large-scale regularisation campaigns had stopped, the Portuguese law still allowed for an ongoing regularisation (SEF, 2008).

Our destination country survey included a question about the perception of immigration policy. In the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, the vast majority of migrants in all three groups under study considered immigration policies in their country of residence to be 'very strict' (Figure 2.2). However, perceptions differ between the three groups surveyed in Norway and in Portugal. In Portugal, for instance, only 18% of the Ukrainian migrants felt that the Portuguese immigration laws were very strict, whereas more than the half of the Moroccan migrants did. These differences are likely to reflect a combination of perceptions and real differences in policy between migrants from different origin countries.

Three countries of origin

The profiles of the THEMIS countries of origin differ in terms of wealth, human development and migration history. As common background, in this section we aim to highlight what we consider the most important events taking place during our study. They are related with the ongoing socio-economic and political transformations that caused social unrest in the three countries before, during and after our data collection.

Morocco is the most disadvantaged of the three countries in terms of GDP per capita and level of human development (World Bank, 2014a; UNDP; 2014a). When our fieldwork started, the social demonstrations

of the *Moroccan Arab Spring* and its *20 February movement* were fading away. The social protests about the stagnating democratic reforms led to a new constitution voted in a popular referendum in July 2011 – when the THEMIS qualitative interviews started – and to the legislative elections of November 2011. Despite the fact that the resulting reforms were considered insufficient by many, in the months that followed – when the survey was conducted – Moroccan society experienced a period of relative optimism about the future of the country (Jolivet, 2012).

Brazil is the seventh largest economy in the world (World Bank, 2014b) and the wealthiest of the three THEMIS countries of origin. However, high levels of inequality, poverty and social exclusion prevail in some regions and for some sections of the population (World Bank, 2015; UNPD, 2014b). Our fieldwork took place during the period of the highly criticised construction works related to the 2014 FIFA World Cup and Confederation Cup. The first demonstrations of the anti-World Cup riots due to dissatisfaction with the social policies and against price increases had started in some areas of the country, but most of the riots took place some months later.

Ukraine, like Brazil, is a country that witnessed high rates of human development but, since its independence in 1991, it has been through a privatisation process of its economy which caused unemployment and the worsening of working conditions (Malynovska, 2004; Brown et al., 2006; ILO, 2011). When our fieldwork took place, the global economic crisis had hardly hit the financial situation of many Ukrainians (World Bank, 2014c). Moreover, the survey data collection took place just before controversial parliamentary elections in October 2012. It was a period of tension for our potential respondents, who tried to avoid anybody knocking at their doors for election-related polls and interviews. It was one year before the protests started in Kiev claiming for greater integration into the European Union, which led to the *Euromaidan revolution* in 2014 and to the outbreak of a separatist civil war in the eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk.

Despite these contexts of socio-political discontent, more than half of the sample in the areas under study in Brazil and Morocco had a positive perception of the economic opportunities in their country of residence (Table 2.2). In the Moroccan area of Nador and in the two main regions in Brazil where the survey was conducted, more people believed in the good economic opportunities in their country than in the ones available in Western Europe hit by the recession. The Ukrainian regions showed the reverse trend, evidencing the lack of trust in the opportunities in their national economy. This pessimism could explain the higher

Table 2.2 Selected characteristics of the samples in the countries of origin (%)

	Proportion with transnational connections in Western Europe	**Proportion with a positive perception of economic opportunities in the country of residence**	**Proportion with a positive perception of economic opportunities in Western Europe**	**Proportion who would migrate to another country if they had the opportunity**
Brazil				
Gov. Valadares	58	72	53	26
Campinas	34	61	48	38
Morocco				
Nador	97	63	56	57
Rabat	91	51	59	48
Ukraine				
Kiev	46	17	88	40
Lviv	80	20	88	50

Note: This table takes into account only transnational connections with migrants from the same origin country as the respondents and who were living in Western Europe when the survey took place. To measure the perception of economic opportunities we asked respondents if they agreed or disagreed with the statement that in Western Europe or in their country of residence there are good economic opportunities. Finally, to measure the aspirations to migrate, we asked in the survey 'ideally, if you had the opportunity, would you like to go abroad to live or work some time during the next five years, or would you prefer to stay in [Brazil/Morocco/Ukraine]?'.
Source: THEMIS origin country survey data.

proportion of the population aspiring to live in another country in the Ukrainian areas (up to 50%) than in the Brazilian ones (less than 40%). But the rates are lower than in Nador (Morocco), where nearly 60% of the population had migration aspirations.

Finally, when it comes to migration towards Europe, Morocco has the longest migration tradition among the three countries. Brazil, however, was traditionally a country of immigration and its flows towards Europe did not emerge significantly before the 1980s, whereas Ukrainian migration flows to Western Europe were limited before the collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence of Ukraine in 1991. These historical ties are reflected in the level of transnational connection between both ends of the migration corridors under study. In the two Moroccan areas under study, almost everybody (more than 90% of the population) knows somebody from their country of residence living in Western Europe. This is a much higher level of transnational connection than in

the Brazilian and Ukrainian regions, where migration emerged much later.

The 12 migration corridors

In this section, we use the survey data from destination countries to portray the 12 corridors in a comparative manner. We start by examining migration histories and experiences and proceed to explore assessments of opportunities and migration advice to others. We use graphical displays that reflect the unique origin–destination matrix of the dataset, facilitating comparisons between migrant groups, as well as between receiving societies. The figures are the primary vehicles for describing the corridors, and the accompanying text provides explanation and commentary.

In the description of corridors we use comparable data for each one, such as percentage distributions of experiences and opinions. It makes a difference, though, that they vary considerably in size. Table 2.3 provides an overview of the migrant stock in each of the 12 corridors based on available official data.

Migration experiences

The characteristics of each corridor are not a straightforward result of the combination of origin and destination. For instance, as we shall see, Moroccans in Portugal differ substantially from Moroccans elsewhere, as well as from the other migrant groups in Portugal. In other words, particular histories produce particular outcomes. We therefore begin by describing two fundamental features of migration patterns within each

Table 2.3 Migrant stocks in each corridor, by country of birth (2010)

Country of residence	**Country of birth**		
	Morocco	**Brazil**	**Ukraine**
Netherlands	167,305	10,719	674
Norway	4,861	2,728	2,440
Portugal*	2,436	139,703	33,172
United Kingdom	16,000	56,000	15,000

Note: *Data for Portugal refer to 2011.
Sources: Official statistics from Statistics Netherlands, Statistics Norway, Statistics Portugal and Office for National Statistics (UK).



Figure 2.3 Time since initial migration to the country of destination
Curves represent Brazilian (B), Moroccan (M) and Ukrainian (U) respondents in each country
Source: THEMIS destination country survey data.

corridor, features that help contextualise the feedback-related themes we subsequently turn to.

Figure 2.3 shows the time since the initial migration to the destination country, displayed as survival curves.[12] Each curve starts at 100% for zero

years, representing all the migrants who are currently present. At ten years, the curve shows the proportion of current migrants who had already migrated ten years ago. The profiles thus illustrate the maturity of the current migrant population.

Moroccans in the Netherlands represent one extreme, with almost 90% of respondents having lived in the Netherlands for ten years or more. A sizeable number, almost one in five, came to the Netherlands more than 30 years ago. Moroccans in Norway and the United Kingdom have similarly established profiles but with a somewhat larger share of recent arrivals. Ukrainians in Norway represent the other extreme, consisting primarily of people who migrated in the past few years.

The profile that is most distinct is that of Ukrainians in Portugal, with its tall, almost vertical segment around the ten-year mark. This represents the surge of Ukrainian migration to Portugal, part of the larger expansion of migration from Eastern to Southern Europe in the early 2000s. While migration continues with new arrivals, those who came in 2000–2002 still make up the majority of Ukrainians in Portugal.

Another key demographic feature, not shown graphically, is the gender balance of each migrant population. In all but two of the corridors, women represent between half and two-thirds of our weighted sample. The exceptions are the even more imbalanced populations of Ukrainians and Brazilians in Norway, where women make up 72% and 80%, respectively.

Migrants' self-reported primary reasons for coming to the country of destination are shown in Figure 2.4. Respondents were first asked whether each of the following five factors had been important for the decision: experiencing the culture and life of another country, opportunities for work, opportunities for studying, learning a language and being with family members or other people you care about. The majority of people said that three or four of these reasons had been important, which illustrates the complexity of motivations. Respondents were subsequently asked to say what they felt was *most* important, and these answers are displayed in the figure.

The 12 pie charts in Figure 2.4 are remarkably diverse. In three cases, a majority cite opportunities for work as the most important; in three other cases, a majority cite reunification with specific people. In the remaining six cases, no factor accounts for more than 40% of the responses.

Brazilians stand out as the most heterogeneous group in terms of motivations for migration. In the Netherlands, the primary reason for



Figure 2.4 Most important reason for coming to the destination
Source: THEMIS destination country survey data, weighted.

migration is almost evenly distributed across the five possible answers. There is also diversity among Brazilians in the other three countries, and the most common reason differs from country to country. Brazilians in the United Kingdom are the only group among the 12 that cite learning a new language as the most common primary motivation for migrating.

Experiencing the culture and life of another country is never the most commonly cited reason for migration. However, it is the main motivation of a sizeable proportion of Brazilians in each destination country, as well as among Moroccans in the United Kingdom and Ukrainians in Norway. This observation challenges typical assumptions about the reasons for migration and the classification of migrants.

Respondents were also asked to assess the impact of their migration on their own lives. These assessments might affect their inclination to encourage or help others migrate. The survey included separate questions about changes to one's financial situation and quality of life as a result of migration. Figure 2.5 shows the result for each corridor. Overall, respondents' assessment of their migration is positive. Two-thirds felt that their quality of life had improved, and slightly fewer (61%) thought that their financial situation had too. The most positive assessments were those of Ukrainians in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom and of Moroccans in Norway.

The largest discrepancies between the two dimensions are found among Brazilians, who tend to be more satisfied with the quality-of-life impacts of migration than with the financial benefits.

The greatest polarisation of experiences appears to be found among Moroccans in the Netherlands, particularly with respect to quality of life. Almost a third says that migration has reduced their quality of life, while slightly less than half say that the result has been an improvement.

Comparing opportunities and encouraging migration

We also enquired about the economic dimension of migration by asking migrants whether they thought there were 'good economic opportunities' in the country of destination and country of origin, respectively. Again, the structure of the THEMIS survey data allows us to compare along several dimensions.

Figure 2.6 shows how economic opportunities at both ends of the migration corridors are assessed. In addition to responses from migrants at the destination, the figure incorporates results from the surveys in countries of origin, where respondents were asked about economic conditions in Western Europe and in the country of residence. In Figure 2.6, consider each marker's placement along the two axes: the further to the right, the more positive the view of economic opportunities at the destination; the further towards the top, the more positive the view of economic opportunities at the origin.



Figure 2.5 Respondents' assessment of how migration has affected their financial situation and quality of life
Source: THEMIS destination country survey data, weighted.

There are many things to note in Figure 2.6. First, the three countries of origin are systematically layered horizontally: Brazilians, regardless of their location, generally have a positive assessment of economic opportunities in Brazil, with 61%–74% saying they are good. At the other



Figure 2.6 Assessment of current economic opportunities in the country of origin and country of destination

Source: THEMIS destination country survey data, weighted. The shape and colour of markers differentiate the three countries of origin; markers with white fill represent origin-country surveys, abbreviated as follows: B (GV): Brazil, Governador Valadares; B (C): Brazil, Campinas; M (N): Morocco, Nador; M (R): Morocco, Rabat; U (K): Ukraine, Kiev; U (L): Ukraine, Lviv. In these surveys, questions are not about the 'country of destination', but about Western Europe as a whole.

extreme are Ukrainians, who have a grim view of economic opportunities in Ukraine, regardless of where they live. The assessment Moroccans give of economic opportunities in their country lies somewhere in between and with larger variation (34%–68% saying conditions in Morocco are 'good').

The four destination countries are layered vertically in the figure. The situation in Norway is rated very highly by all three groups, with more than 90% saying there are good economic opportunities. The corresponding proportion for Portugal is around 40%, almost identically assessed by Brazilians, Moroccans and Ukrainians. Appraisals of opportunities in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom lie between these two extremes, though always well above Portugal.

Plotting the assessment of origins and destinations in the same diagram makes it possible to see relations between the two. The samples below the diagonal line see economic conditions at the destination as better than those at the origin. The extreme cases are in the bottom-right

corner. Ukrainians, in particular, consistently believe that migrating to Western Europe (apart from Portugal) means a move from poor economic opportunities to good ones. Above the diagonal, there are six samples, consisting of Brazilians and Moroccans, who are more likely to see migration to Western Europe as foregoing economic opportunities.

Referring back to the economic indicators presented in Table 2.1, we see that the perceptions of economic opportunities displayed in Figure 2.6 paint a somewhat different picture. In particular, perceptions of Ukraine are remarkably negative considering that, at the time of the survey, economic growth was higher in Ukraine than in any of the six other countries, and unemployment was at the same level as in the United Kingdom. Per capita income in Ukraine is low, but it is even lower in Morocco, which a much higher proportion of respondents perceive as a place of good opportunities. These observations underline the importance of studying *perceptions* of opportunities as influences on migration rather than taking economic indicators at face value.

The Moroccan samples in Figure 2.6 form a striking, inverse relationship between assessment of opportunities in Morocco and in Western Europe: the more poorly opportunities in Western Europe are rated, the more favourably conditions in Morocco are seen.[13] There is no such relationship among Brazilians and Ukrainians.

The final point to note in Figure 2.6 concerns the six samples of non-migrants in the countries of origin, represented by markers with white fill. In every case, they are nested within the cluster of destination country samples of the same national group. In other words, the assessment of economic opportunities in the country of origin versus in Western Europe is pretty much the same among Brazilians in Brazil and Brazilians in Europe. The same goes for Moroccans and Ukrainians.

Relative economic opportunities are only one aspect of the appeal of migration, of course, as reflected in the diversity of motives among those who have already migrated. We asked people in our migrant samples whether they would recommend someone from their country of origin to move to the destination country in which they lived. Figure 2.7 shows the results. On average, across all corridors, slightly less than half said that they would not recommend it; the others were equally divided between recommending it and deciding on a case-by-case basis.

The clearest discouragement of migration is expressed by Moroccans in the Netherlands: for every person who would recommend other Moroccans to come, there are ten who would advise against it in all cases. The second-most discouraging are the Moroccans in the United



Figure 2.7 Inclination to recommend people from the country of origin to move to the country of destination
Source: THEMIS destination country survey data, weighted.

Kingdom, where the corresponding ratio is six. All three migrant groups in Portugal are also prone to advise against migration.

There are three corridors in which migration is clearly more likely to be encouraged than discouraged: Brazil–Norway, Ukraine–Norway and

Ukraine–UK. However, the advice in these cases is not anywhere near as skewed as the uniform discouragement among Moroccans in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated the value of simultaneous comparisons across *both* origins *and* destinations. Comparative migration research tends to do either one or the other, but rarely has the data to do both. As we showed initially, the notion of migration corridors can serve as units of analysis for such double comparisons. Migration corridors are frames for observation devoid of empirical assumptions and independent of the level and direction of activity within them.

Our displays of empirical data about the 12 corridors provide a foundation for the more specific analyses that follow in the subsequent chapters. In particular, Figures 2.3 (migration histories) and 2.4 (primary motivations for migration) can be used to relate experiences in particular corridors to the wider scope of the project.

The various figures in this chapter have showed how the characteristics of a corridor can rarely be deduced by origin or destination alone. The heterogeneity of the 12 corridors reflects the complexity of factors that affect how migration to a particular place and at a particular time shapes subsequent migration.

Notes

1. The data have been archived and the full survey datasets are available for consultation and further analysis. For more information, see http://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/completed-projects/themis
2. Calculated on the basis of data from Statistics Netherlands; average rates for the decade 2004–2013.
3. In Rio de Janeiro, the project only collected qualitative data.
4. Lviv city was excluded from the sample.
5. Source: de Haas, H. and Bakewell, O. (2010) THEMIS conceptualisation note. Unpublished project document.
6. Source: de Haas, H. and Bakewell, O. (2011) Draft of THEMIS (questionnaire) operationalisation note. Unpublished project document.
7. Source: Carling, J. (2011) Operationalisation for THEMIS Phase 4 – Countries of Destination. Unpublished project document.
8. Source: Kubal, A. (2011) Draft of THEMIS (questionnaire) operationalisation note. Unpublished project document.
9. Sampling frames were available in the sites of Brazil (census tracks) and Ukraine (voters lists). In Morocco, we employed geographical clusters based on cells of a grid drawn on a map.

10. The interviews collected in Portugal were transcribed in Portuguese but not translated into English due to budget constraints, and in Norway interviewers produced complete non-verbatim reports of the interviews and transcribed key sentences verbatim.
11. Source: The DEMIG POLICY database (2014 version), Oxford: International Migration Institute (IMI), University of Oxford. For every migration policy enacted since the Second World War, the database shows whether it has introduced a change towards more or less restrictiveness. Migration policies include immigration, border control, integration and exit policies (de Haas et al., 2014).
12. Slightly fewer than one in five respondents had returned to their country of origin for three months or more since their initial migration; the time since migration shown here is therefore not always the same as the combined duration of residence in the country of destination.
13. The two extremes are Moroccans in Norway and in Portugal. Since Moroccans in Norway have a much longer average length of stay, one might think that they compare Norway of today with Morocco of the past, and hence reach a very different conclusion from the recently arrived Moroccans in Portugal. However, the pattern displayed by the other observations rules out differences in length of stay as the sole explanation.

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3

New Roles for Social Networks in Migration? Assistance in Brazilian Migration to Portugal and the Netherlands

Masja van Meeteren and Sónia Pereira

Introduction

The crucial role played by social networks as facilitators of migration has been well established in migration theory (Massey et al., 1993; Massey et al., 1998; Gurak and Caces, 1992; Fawcett, 1989; Tsuda, 1999; Pellegrino, 2004). They have been conceptualised as the ties that link potential migrants in the place of origin to current or previous migrants in the destination countries (Curran and Rivero-Fuentes, 2003, p. 289). Migrant networks are the 'sets of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrant and non-migrants in origin and destination areas through ties of kinship, friendship and shared community origin' (Massey et al., 2005, p. 42). Important feedback mechanisms are generated within these networks in the form of information, resources and support that reduce the costs and risks of migration, thereby contributing to facilitate it. Through these feedback mechanisms, migration becomes 'a path-dependent process because inter-personal relations across space facilitate subsequent migration' (de Haas, 2010, p. 1589). According to the DiMaggio–Garip typology used by Garip and Asad (2013, pp. 6–7) and presented in Bakewell, Kubal and Pereira (Chapter 1), it is especially through the social mechanism they define as *social facilitation* or *social learning* that 'network peers (typically family or community members) provide useful information or assistance that reduces the costs associated with migration or increases the benefits that might be expected from it'. In Brazilian migration, the importance of feedback mechanisms working through migrant networks has also

been identified, for example in the case of *Valadarenses* going to the United States (Fusco, 2002; Margolis, 1994), Brazilians going to Spain (Solé et al., 2011), Brazilians moving to Japan (Zell and Skop, 2011) or Brazilians migrating to Portugal (Padilla, 2006). Though empirically supported by many studies, this understanding of feedback mechanisms within social networks and their role in facilitating migration requires further examination on three grounds.

First, to a large extent, the centrality of social networks to the process of international migration is strongly influenced by Massey and colleagues' study of Mexican migration to the United States (Massey et al., 2005) and their theory of 'cumulative causation'. According to Massey and colleagues (2005, p. 42), sustained growth in migration flows is deeply rooted in feedback mechanisms that take shape within migrant networks. Although reference has been made to the relevance of other migrant-supporting institutions in facilitating migration as well as other actors beyond kinship, friendship and community ties, such as employers, government officials, traffickers and other migration brokers (Margolis, 1994; Singer and Massey, 1998; Krissman, 2005; Elrick and Lewandowska, 2008; Fonseca et al., 2014), who are also important facilitators of migration, few studies have examined and provided specific empirical evidence of the multiple actors that may be involved and the details of their participation (Garip and Asad, 2013, p. 6). For example, there is little account of 'where' actors providing assistance are located and who/which actors are involved in the different domains of assistance.

In addition, with internet use becoming more widespread and people increasingly gaining access to all kinds of migration mediators, those wishing to migrate are likely to be able to use more sources to get information and assistance than in the past. As a result, the act of migrating may become less dependent on feedback mechanisms generated within 'conventional' migrant networks involving known migrants and there may be a crucial role for unknown people who supply information online. While some scholars have highlighted the role of the internet and social media for community life among migrants at the destination (Oosterbaan, 2010; Schrooten, 2012), few have studied their role in facilitating migration (Dekker and Engbersen, 2014). To start filling this research gap, it is therefore essential to provide empirical evidence about which actors comprise migrants' social networks (moving beyond the early definition, which only considered those networks involving previous migrants) and to specify their role in assisting with migration.

Second, the theorisation of social networks as facilitators of migration is largely drawn from the experience of labour migration, despite the fact that we are at present witnessing more complex and diverse migration flows than in the past (King, 2002). It is still unclear to what extent feedback mechanisms generated within social networks are also important for explaining other types of migration, and if so, in what way. Collyer (2005), for example, shows that social network theory cannot explain the migration flows of asylum seekers. In addition, the mechanisms underlying the theory of cumulative causation are less likely to come into play in the case of student or marriage migration (to foreign spouses). Despite the rapid growth of the share of students in migration flows, the study of international student mobility is a relatively neglected field (King and Raghuram, 2013); this has resulted in calls for more research to be done on the question of how students migrate and the assistance they receive with their migration (Raghuram, 2013). Considering how networks and feedback mechanisms within them operate for different types of migration is therefore paramount to advance our understanding of how earlier migration influences later migration.

Third, the configurations and role of social networks may differ in relation to the context of destination, namely because of the different structural constraints migrants are exposed to in different settings, including immigration regimes or economic opportunities (Zell and Skop, 2011; Curran and Rivero-Fuentes, 2003; Poros, 2001). In addition, with the emergence of new destinations – beyond traditional migration destinations – it is expected that the role of social networks will be different there in comparison to a long-standing destination (the two cases are analysed here). Those seeking to migrate to a long-standing destination are more likely to have access to social networks than those seeking to migrate to a new destination. As Garip and Asad (2013, p. 19) put it, 'social ties become an increasingly important predictor of migration behaviour as migration flows gain prevalence in sending communities'. It is therefore important to investigate how the influence of social networks changes in relation to different contextual factors, such as immigration regimes, economic opportunities, language, historical connections or previous migration links.

In this chapter, we aim to provide an updated and more contextualised understanding of the role of social networks in facilitating migration by addressing these shortcomings: (i) a narrow definition of migrant networks, which fails to recognise a variety of relevant actors facilitating migration (e.g., migration industry, contacts made through

the internet); (ii) increasing complexity of migration flows beyond labour migration and (iii) the need to consider differences per destination country, which has not been addressed in early work based on the experience of migration to the United States. We draw on the qualitative and quantitative data from the THEMIS project (Carling and Jolivet, Chapter 2, in this volume) to analyse the case of Brazilian migration to Portugal and the Netherlands. These two corridors have been selected as they are illustrative of two distinct reception contexts for contemporary Brazilian immigrants. Portugal has historical links to Brazil, a shared language, large previous Brazilian migration flows and a relatively open immigration regime. In contrast, Brazilian migration to the Netherlands is relatively recent and limited, and the Dutch immigration regime is relatively strict, but economic opportunities are better than in Portugal.

Furthermore, we seek to answer three main questions identified before as largely missing from existing research: (1) Who are the actors involved in assisting migrants, within and beyond the migrant network, and what forms of assistance do they provide? (2) How are different types of migrants (e.g., labour migrants, students) assisted by these actors? (3) Do destination contexts matter in terms of the assistance received to migrate?

Actors involved in assisting migrants: Beyond migrant networks?

Most Brazilian immigrants within our sample in Portugal and the Netherlands received at least some form of assistance with their migration, particularly with housing and employment on arrival at the destination. We put forward the question as to from whom they received such assistance and where this actor was located. When asked about assistance with information, travel costs and documents, respondents could name a maximum of three actors. With regard to assistance in finding a first house and job, respondents could name only one actor, and we did not ask for a location as we assumed these actors are located in the destination country only. Respondents' answers were then given a code using our code list, which specified 40 different types of individual actors (ranging from spouse to strangers) and 21 institutional actors,[1] including online sources. We have categorised these actors into five groups: (1) family members, (2) friends and acquaintances, (3) institutions, (4) internet sources and (5) strangers. Table 3.1 describes the percentage of respondents who have mentioned each actor category as a source of assistance and the country in which that source was located.[2]

Table 3.1 Percentage of respondents who obtained information by actor category and source country

	Origin	**Destination**	**Total**
Family	2.4	**35.3**	**37.2**
PT	2.2	33.0	33.8
NL	2.6	41.2	43.1
Friends/acquaintances	8.2	**38.4**	**45.4**
PT	9.9	34.9	44.1
NL	5.2	44.4	47.7
Institutions	**24.7**	5.9	**29.2**
PT	32.4	4.4	35.3
NL	11.1	8.5	18.3
Internet	**9.2**	3.3	**12.5**
PT	12.9	2.6	15.4
NL	2.6	4.6	7.2
Strangers	0	3.3	**3.3**
PT	0	2.6	2.6
NL	0	4.6	4.6
Total	**31.8**	**74.9**	**68.4**

Note: NL: the Netherlands; PT: Portugal.

Our data show that 68% of respondents obtained information before departure (Table 3.1) and that almost half of them received help from friends or acquaintances (45%), particularly in the destination country. In addition, family ties based in the destination country constitute the second most important source of information, with 35% of respondents mentioning this source. This evidence reaffirms the importance of ties linking potential migrants with earlier migrants or other people known in the destination country to obtain information before migrating. However, it also shows that institutions or the internet play a non-negligible role, as 29% of respondents mention institutions and 13% internet sources as a source of information. Furthermore, these sources were mentioned especially in relation to the origin country, and less often the destination, making access to information prior to migration less dependent on previous (direct) contacts with the destination country.

Assistance with travel costs is also relevant as 44% received at least some funding for their trip, most often from family members both in the destination and origin countries (Table 3.2). Family members in the destination country are also the most important source of assistance for obtaining documents in the Netherlands but not so much in Portugal, where institutions were most frequently cited by respondents as a source

Table 3.2 Percentage of respondents who received assistance for travel costs and documents by actor category and source country

	Travel costs				Documents		
	Origin	**Destination**	**Total**		**Origin**	**Destination**	**Total**
Family	40.7	36.3	76.7	*Family*	3.4	19.0	22.4
PT	42.1	31.7	73.2	PT	2.6	12.3	15.0
NL	37.9	46.0	83.9	NL	8.3	61.1	69.4
Friends/ acquaintances	8.9	4.1	12.2	*Friends/ acquaintances*	0	6.5	6.5
PT	10.4	3.8	13.7	PT	0	5.3	5.3
NL	5.7	4.6	9.2	NL	0	13.9	13.9
Institutions	9.3	3.0	12.2	*Institutions*	3.8	68.1	71.9
PT	10.9	3.3	14.2	PT	3.5	75.8	79.3
NL	5.7	2.3	8.0	NL	5.6	19.4	25.0
Internet	0	0	0	*Internet*	0	0	0
Strangers	0	0	0	*Strangers*	0	0	0
Total	57.8	43.3	43.8	**Total**	7.2	92.4	42.8

of assistance in this domain. Given the stricter immigration regime in the Netherlands, migrants are much more dependent on previous migrants to arrange documents, while in Portugal legalisation opportunities have existed for those able to present a valid working contract and respective social security and tax payments, making employers the key facilitator of access to a residence permit or visa. Internet sources were not mentioned at all as a source of funding or of assistance with respect to obtaining documents.

Migrants have to find accommodation in the city where they arrive and often have to prove at the border that they have done so. The vast majority of migrants in both countries either received assistance (39%, see Table 3.3) or came to live with someone who already had a house (49%). In the Netherlands, only 2% of respondents found a first house on their own compared to 15% in Portugal. This is probably because of the tight and highly regulated housing market in the Netherlands, which makes it especially difficult for undocumented migrants to find a place to stay (Van Meeteren, 2010). In addition, in the Netherlands, Brazilians face a language barrier which makes it more difficult to find housing on their own than in Portugal. As a result, immigrants in the Netherlands strongly rely on their social networks and they often make sure they have a place to stay before they arrive. Furthermore, friends and acquaintances were mentioned most often as a source of support (63%), and there is only a minor role for assistance from institutions, internet sources and strangers.

Table 3.3 Percentage of respondents who received assistance with finding first house and job by actor category

	House	**Job**
Family	28.5	**25.2**
PT	29.5	24.1
NL	26.0	26.9
Friends/acquaintances	**63.2**	**66.9**
PT	62.7	66.5
NL	64.4	67.4
Institutions	4.6	5.0
PT	3.6	5.3
NL	6.8	4.6
Internet	2.1	1.4
PT	3.0	2.3
NL	0	0
Strangers	1.7	1.6
PT	1.2	1.9
NL	2.7	1.1
Total	**39.1**	**71.8**

Note: This table displays percentages of respondents who indicated they received assistance with finding a house and not those who indicated they came to live with somebody who already had a house.

Most immigrants received assistance to find their first job. As regards housing, Brazilians in the Netherlands, compared to Portugal, more frequently indicated they had received support in finding their first job. The most important source of this kind of help was friends in both countries. Institutions such as employment and recruitment agencies did not appear to be very relevant in either of the countries. The role of friends is likely to reflect the specificity of this kind of assistance. Studies have pointed at the significance of weak ties in finding employment (Granovetter, 1973), also for undocumented migrants (e.g., Van Meeteren et al., 2009). Friends may not only be earlier known ones, from the country of origin, for example, Vitória, an immigrant in the Netherlands, who mentions 'a friend of mine came five years ago . . . Back then she was visiting Brazil . . . I asked her to give me an opportunity to help me here, so she helped me . . . with finding a job and a place to stay', but they can also be new friendships made upon arrival, for example through the mediation of others. The experience of Dinorá in Portugal illustrates how through a Portuguese immigrant she knew in

Brazil (Daniel) she got in touch with his family in Portugal who provided assistance upon arrival. She recalls:

> The lady [Daniel's aunt] was amazing with us, she took us to find work. She would take us to a café and say: 'Look, these two Brazilians just arrived, last week, and they need a job.' She did that several times, in several cafés and restaurants.
>
> (Dinorá, female, 25, returned migrant)

Furthermore, it may also be that family members mediate the contact of the migrant with others who are more able to find them a job. For example, Carolina, from Minas Gerais, a returned migrant from Portugal, who joined her brother who already lived in Portugal, says:

> Then I got to know more Brazilians of the group that worked with him [the brother] in the firm, that's where I got more help to find work. One said: 'Ah, Carolina, this place is looking, has vacancies to work in a Cafe', others would say 'there are some vacancies in a snack-bar or a restaurant'.
>
> (Carolina, female, 33)

In the Netherlands, undocumented workers also find their first jobs through their network of weak ties, or have family members mediate for them. Sometimes, this type of mediation takes place even before the migrant arrives. Jobs in the Netherlands are not necessarily freely passed on to Brazilians but sold at a price. As a result, Brazilians who receive family members or friends have sometimes bought a job already for the migrant they receive. Juliana (female, 49) says, 'Nowadays you only bring a relative if they can buy work. You announce they are bringing a relative and ask who can sell their work. It is now like this.'

Overall, actors beyond the 'migrant network', such as institutions and online sources, may be considered important sources of only some forms of assistance for Brazilian migrants who move to Portugal and the Netherlands. Internet resources were mostly mentioned as sources of information. Assistance with housing or finding a job is mostly provided by traditional actors like friends and acquaintances or, though to a lesser extent, family members; however, the former are not necessarily ties that existed prior to migration but are rather built in the process of migration (see also Bakewell and Jolivet, Chapter 9, in this volume).

Regarding differences between the two destination countries in terms of relying on other actors beyond the migrant network, it is important to note that the policy framework, namely the immigration regimes in place in each country, appears to have a strong influence. Brazilians in Portugal have been less dependent on social networks and made most use of institutions as sources of assistance, particularly to obtain documents, compared to those who moved to the Netherlands,[3] who have been more dependent on their social networks in all domains.

Different types of migration and the assistance received

In this section, we examine how types of migrants differ with regard to the actors they receive assistance from in their migration. We distinguish between types of migrants by looking at their migration motives. In the survey, respondents were asked to indicate which of the following motives for their move they considered most important: 'experiencing the culture and life in another country', 'opportunities for work', 'opportunities for studying', 'learning a language' or 'being with family members or other people you care about'.[4] Table 3.4 shows that in both countries the largest share of migrants are driven by work motivations.

Through the analysis of our qualitative material and by looking at the secondary motives in the survey, we found that in the Netherlands those who indicated they migrated to learn a language were very similar to those who were driven by opportunities to study. They are similar with regard to their socio-demographic profile and the assistance they received with their migration. In addition, from the qualitative material, we gather that the motives themselves are in fact quite similar (see also Martes, 2011): they have come to learn something. We have therefore combined these two motivations into one 'study' category, but only for those who also indicated that 'study' was a secondary motive.[5]

Table 3.4 Distribution of migration motives per country of destination (survey sample)

	Portugal	**The Netherlands**	**Total**
Work	161 (40%)	75 (35%)	**236**
Student	88 (22%)	37 (17%)	**125**
Experience	76 (19%)	48 (22%)	**124**
Family	70 (18%)	41 (19%)	**111**
Other	5 (1%)	13 (6%)	**18**
Total	**400 (100%)**	**214 (100%)**	**614**

Table 3.5 Use of assistance by migration profile, type of assistance, source of assistance and location of the source

		Work	**Study**	**Experience**	**Family**
Received information from	PT	Destination	Origin	Destination	Destination
	NL	Destination	Destination	Destination	Destination
	PT	Friends	Institutions/ friends	Friends/ institutions	Family
	NL	Friends	Friends/ institutions	Friends/ institutions	Mixed
Received help for travelling cost from	PT	Origin	Origin	Origin	Destination
	NL	Origin	Balanced	Origin	Destination
	PT	Family	Family/ institutions	Family/ friends	Family
	NL	Family	Family	Family/ institutions	Family
Received help with documents from	PT	Institutions	Institutions	Institutions	Institutions/ family
	NL	Family	Family	Family/ institutions	Friends/ family
Received help with first housing from	PT	Friends	Friends	Friends	Family
	NL	Friends	Friends	Friends	Family
Received help with finding first job	PT	Friends	Friends	Friends	Friends
	NL	Friends	Friends	Friends	Friends

The combination of quantitative survey data and qualitative data from in-depth interviews enabled us to delve into these main motives. Overall, our in-depth analysis of how assistance takes shape reveals that there are interesting differences (Table 3.5) in terms of the main actors involved with each type of assistance for the different types of migrants in the two countries.

Main motive: Work

The majority of those with work motivations found jobs in low-skilled or semi-skilled occupations; only a minor proportion were professionals on departure or were inserted in high-skilled occupations upon arrival. In the Netherlands, migrants driven by work prospects are mostly female, while in Portugal there is a gender balance. This most likely reflects the opportunities in the local labour markets, which in Portugal provide opportunities for both female and male migrants, while in the

Netherlands mostly 'female' occupations are available, such as domestic work in Dutch households or for other Brazilians (usually women married to Dutch men). Another major difference is that in the Netherlands the vast majority of respondents were undocumented, while in Portugal the vast majority were not.

In both countries, these migrants mainly rely on friends in the destination country to obtain information, on family in the origin country to fund the trip (mostly by borrowing money) and on friends to find the first house and job. Thus, the crucial dimension of accessing funding for the migration project rests largely outside the 'migration dynamics' and is much more rooted in the resources available within origin families (in addition to their own resources for those that are (also) self-funded). The most noticeable difference between the two countries is that workers rely on institutions for obtaining documents in Portugal and on family in the Netherlands, which is largely related to the particular immigration regime in place there, as mentioned before. This illustrates that the actors involved in providing assistance may vary depending on particular conditions faced in each destination country.

Study motives

Brazilians that chose Portugal as a destination on the basis of educational opportunities are mostly female, young and unmarried. They also show the highest education levels of all the profiles, which is mainly related to the fact that the majority of them attend undergraduate or postgraduate levels. From both the survey and the qualitative material, it becomes evident that Brazilians have always sought to study in Portugal's higher education institutions and have also benefited from bilateral agreements between the two countries. For example, Artur, (male, 65) interviewed in Lisbon, went to Portugal in 1967 to study medicine at the University of Coimbra. However, the majority of Brazilian students surveyed are recent arrivals (from 2009 onwards). This is not surprising as it is very likely that the vast majority of students return to Brazil or migrate elsewhere after their studies have been completed in Portugal. Bilateral agreements between Brazilian and Portuguese institutions as well as funding options increasingly available for Brazilian students wishing to study abroad are important facilitators of this mobility. The recently created *Ciência sem Fronteiras* ('Science without borders') has funded until 2014 the exchange of 60,344 Brazilian undergraduate students abroad, of which 2,122 were granted to study in Portugal until 2013/2014.

In the Netherlands, this profile also includes many people who indicated that they migrated to learn a language. As in Portugal, they are relatively young and unmarried, but the number of women and men seems more equal than in Portugal. Brazilians who went to the Netherlands to study are less highly educated than in Portugal, where all the students were undergraduates or postgraduates.

In spite of their overarching studying objectives, students' experiences are often not disconnected from those of other migrants and in both countries many have work experience, apart from studying. In Portugal, despite their high qualifications, their jobs do not substantially differ from other groups and include mostly low-skilled occupations (in Portugal it is uncommon that higher education students take up low-skilled jobs, see, e.g., Mauritti, 2002). Paula (female, 24), for example, did an exchange programme in Portugal and worked in a pizzeria to help fund her stay. In the Netherlands, domestic work is popular, including also au pairs (who migrated to learn English).

Clearly, for student migration it is not only the 'network externalities' (Garip and Asad, 2013, p. 7) associated with previous migration which generates a support infrastructure for migration. The institutional framework set up within a context of globalisation of higher education also contributes to facilitate students' migration processes. In Portugal, institutions are important sources of help for obtaining documents (e.g., international departments at universities, agencies involved in international student mobility) and also for funding.

Unlike most other migrants whose sources of information are located primarily in the destination country, students in Portugal received most information from friends or institutions located in Brazil (e.g., previous exchange students and the Portuguese embassy or consulate). In addition, students retrieved a lot of information from websites with information on Portugal. In the Netherlands, students received information primarily through friends who were in the Netherlands and some from the Dutch embassy or consulate in Brazil, as well as through agencies that recruit students. Higher education levels among students in Portugal are probably reflected in their higher use of online resources in their migration process (data for OECD countries show that the higher the education level, the higher the access and use of broadband and ICT[6]).

Seekers of life experiences and culture

Respondents who indicated they migrated to experience life and culture in a different country have usually come because they want to 'see the

world'. They do not plan to migrate permanently but want to experience what other countries are like for a while. As Miguel (male, 57) in Portugal says, 'I just came to have a look.' They see it as an adventure or an experience. They do not emphasise work, study or family issues but talk about how they need an experience:

> I told my bosses 'I want to leave Brazil. I need this experience. I am almost 30 years old, I need to experience this. I cannot live another year without doing anything, going to work, going back home, paying bills. I need an experience, I need to live.'
>
> (Juan, male, 36, the Netherlands, migrant)

As in the Netherlands, in Portugal these migrants express a wish to travel and experience life in Europe. Jonas, a medical dentist, indicates:

> I always enjoyed travelling, discovering. So I waited until I graduated, I had travelled a lot in Brazil, in South America and so on but I had never been to Europe. So I came here. As I said the initial idea was to work, travel and 'get to know'.
>
> (Jonas, male, 47, Portugal, migrant)

For some of these immigrants, Portugal functions as a point of access to an experience in Europe, particularly because of the shared language, as illustrated by Bernardo, who migrated to Portugal in 1990:

> My wish was to discover Europe. Portugal because of the language and also because I already had a friend here, also a photographer.
>
> (Bernardo, male, 57, Portugal, migrant)

In the Netherlands, there are also some respondents who were especially attracted by the socio-cultural climate there, particularly the tolerant attitudes towards homosexuality:

> You hear your mother and your father tell you that homosexuality is a disease, which is unacceptable in the family. (...) And I could not get married in Brazil. The homosexual partners have some rights in Brazil, but for health insurance, retirement and inheritance purposes it is complicated. So that was a motivation to come to the Netherlands.
>
> (Luiz, male, 41, the Netherlands, migrant)

In addition, some were attracted by the Dutch cultural climate in general, especially those who worked in the cultural scene in Brazil. As Debora explains:

> In my time, I came here in 1987, there were more artists or intelligentsia or people who came here to study or came for a vacation. (...) We didn't leave Brazil with the idea to migrate. (...) We played in a lot of theatres, also in Belgium. We decided to extend our tickets, over and over again. (...) We stayed, even though our aim wasn't to stay. (...) It was an adventure. We were young, we liked it.
>
> (Debora, female, 53, the Netherlands, migrant)

In parallel, conditions in Brazil for artists were not favourable then, which also played a role in the migration of artists to the Netherlands. Debora elaborates:

> We had a horrible president. (...) Fernando Collor de Mello. It was very strange for people who were concerned with culture and art. I think it has to do with that. People wanted to take some distance.

There is an equal gender division in the group of migrants who came to experience another culture in both countries in the survey sample. Likewise, in both countries, the majority of survey respondents are aged between 26 and 55 and have finished at least upper secondary school or have undergraduate education. In the Netherlands, the proportion of writers or creative professionals is striking, a professional category which is not relevant in any of the other profiles and is in tune with data found in the interviews about the attractiveness of the Netherlands for artists. Regarding their immigration status, there are many Brazilians who are undocumented in the Netherlands. At the same time, there is also a significant proportion that has taken Dutch citizenship; similarly, many of those in Portugal have become citizens.

Migrants who moved to experience life and culture in another country mostly received money from their parents in Brazil, particularly those that migrated to the Netherlands. Four individuals received financial aid from migrant organisations or cultural organisations in the Netherlands. In our qualitative material, we also have some stories about artists who were invited and paid to perform. As Leticia, who was invited by the Portuguese government, states:

> We were a very good dance group in Brazil and we were invited. Sometimes festivals in Portugal would invite groups from Brazil to

> take part and they did so with us. They paid everything, they gave us tickets and everything.
>
> (Leticia, female, 46, the Netherlands, migrant)

Actors involved in providing assistance to this type of migrants do not differ substantially between the two countries. As with the previous types of migrants, the crucial dimension of access to funding is by and large dependent on family resources from the origin country.

Family migration

The wish to join family members or other persons that respondents care about is overwhelmingly a female motivation for migration, particularly in Portugal. In both countries, the person they came to join is usually either their partner or mother. We found that family migrants can be subdivided into those who joined other Brazilians and those who migrated to marry a Dutch or Portuguese person. We will discuss both cases here.

In Portugal, about half of those who joined someone of Brazilian origin were married at the time of migration and they joined mostly male partners. Moreover, in the Netherlands, there are also respondents who follow their partner from country to country and have migrated not directly from Brazil but from other countries (around half of those with international migration experience).

Unlike other types of migrants, funding that enables the migration is obtained through previous migrants already located in the destination country. This is a robust example of close ties within the migrant network actually enabling the migration by providing resources to fund the trip rather than just facilitating it by giving information and/or assistance upon arrival. Also the role of the family is more important, for example in assistance with finding first housing (in both countries) or getting documents (in Portugal) than for the previous cases. Given that these types of migrants are moving to join family/loved ones, it is unsurprising that they are supported more by family members than those with other migration motives. One caution in relation to prevailing views of the 'migrant network' is that close ties may be with nationals of the destination countries (marriage migrants) as well as with family co-nationals. Globalisation has increased the ways in which people come in contact with each other, which are likely to generate further migration links and dynamics, namely through the development of love relationships leading to marriage.

The experiences of marriage migrants were primarily captured in the Netherlands and largely through the qualitative interviews (it was only

marginal in the survey). This category is comprised mainly of Brazilian women who marry Dutch men, whom they met in diverse ways. Some met their husband in Brazil while he was on holiday or doing business there, others met while travelling or studying in the Netherlands or other European countries and others met online:

> I would sometimes go in chat rooms, practice my English. Then one day I met this Dutch man, he was also a lot online, so we were always in touch. After some months he travelled to Brazil. And the whole story began. (...) It was getting too expensive all the travelling. We thought, if we want to be together one of us has to move.
> (Beatriz, female, 55, the Netherlands, migrant)

If we look at how this type of migrants funded their trip to the destination country, we see that they often benefited from funding provided by their partner in the destination country. They have also often been assisted in obtaining documents by their partners/future husbands who they came to join. They have usually arranged the necessary paperwork or asked a friend or family member to take care of it:

> He spoke with a friend who had the same case, with a foreign girlfriend. Actually I don't even know exactly how the procedure really is because he did everything, and he checked everything.
> (Carolina, female, 26, the Netherlands, migrant)

For marriage migrants, migration is mostly facilitated by contacts with nationals of the destination country, which lies outside more conventional understandings of social networks that contribute to explain migration processes. Even though marriage migration is an expanding field of study within migration studies, deeper understandings of the dynamics involved in transnational marriage and their influence in generating future migration are still missing. As Charsley et al. (2012, p. 881) have recently put it, 'marriage-related migration is, like other migration flows, dynamic in both volume and character', therefore requiring full attention by migration scholars.

We have seen that different types of migrants receive some forms of assistance with regard to their migration from different actors in different locations (except for assistance with finding a job which is always provided by friends and acquaintances). Institutions constituted relevant sources of information and funding for students and those who migrated to experience life and culture abroad, but they were

not found relevant for other types of migrants. These institutions are largely related to the policy framework. For students, the internet, embassies/consulates and agencies that participate in the recruitment of international students or organise exchange programmes are fundamental sources of information, and therefore this is the type of migrant less dependent on personal networks to access information. Their younger age and higher education levels (mostly in Portugal) contribute to explain their higher reliance on internet sources.

Employers were important sources of help with regard to documentation in Portugal but not in the Netherlands (see Zell and Skop, 2011, for similar findings elsewhere) and they were also not actively engaged in the recruitment of Brazilian workers and therefore have not been considered sources of assistance in this domain as has been found in other studies (Krissman, 2005, for Mexican migration to the United States). The economic context matters here as well. Macro-economic conditions or specific sectorial labour demands are likely to influence the active engagement of employers in recruiting foreign labour or lack thereof.

Family members are important sources of information for family migrants but not so much for other migrants where friends assume a more prominent role. They are fundamental sources of funding. They benefit largely from the migration of others who usually fund their migration, while those seeking work, study opportunities or experiences abroad depend on the resources available within their families in the origin country. We have also seen that friends are most important for finding a first house and a first job for all motives. Only family migrants stand out in this respect, as family is their most important source of assistance in finding their first place to stay.

Conclusion

This chapter draws on qualitative and quantitative data on the migration experiences of Brazilians in Portugal and the Netherlands to reflect and expand upon the existing knowledge on the 'social facilitation' role of social networks in migration processes (Garip and Asad, 2013) and the actors involved in providing direct feedback through assistance and information. We have taken as the point of departure the fact that most immigrants are assisted at least at some point with their migration and scrutinised (1) which actors are involved in assisting migrants in what way, (2) how different types of migrants are assisted with their migration and (3) how contextual specificities in destination countries are at play.

Our findings indicate that traditional social network actors – family and friends – are key providers of assistance and information in migration, but several nuances need to be taken into account if we are to fully grasp how feedback operates. First, institutions play a key role for students as sources of information as well as funding, which reflects by and large the institutional framework put in place in the context of the globalisation of higher education, with implications on 'how' the migration of students takes place and differentiating it from other types of migration. In addition, institutions are also providers of assistance with regard to obtaining documents in Portugal for other migrants, given its particular immigration regime. In the case of the Netherlands, where the policy framework is substantially different, family members are the key source of help in this domain.

Second, while we expected an important role for the internet in facilitating contemporary migration moves, we found that online resources are important sources of information, not of other types of assistance, and are more important for students than for other migrants. Moreover, only very few respondents relied solely on the internet for information and then managed to find a house and a job on their own. The internet and web-based contacts were present in a different dimension that also pertains to migration and should be explored further: the development of 'love' relationships across countries.

Third, family in the origin country constitutes the key source of funding for most migrants (apart from own resources). Therefore, the resources that actually enable the migration process are largely independent of previous migration and network ties in the destination country. In other words, regardless of the access to networks that can link the migrant to the destination country and facilitate migration, in most cases it is the pool of resources that migrants have available in their origin country that makes migration possible. Social as well as economic factors are therefore intertwined in the facilitation of migration. The exception is observed for family migrants who indeed tend to rely on funding from family members who are already in the destination country (previous migrants or nationals of that country). Migration motivated by family reasons is enabled by resources available as a result of earlier migration or relationships developed with nationals of other countries.

Fourth, for all types of migrants except family migrants, friends play a prominent role in providing assistance with housing, employment and information. These friendships do not necessarily originate from the country of origin or belong to pre-migration social networks but can

be made upon arrival, usually through the mediation of others already known; in the case of students in Portugal, information was mainly obtained from friends or acquaintances in Brazil (e.g., returned students). Family migrants rely more on family already in the destination country.

Finally, differences found in assistance received to migrate to the two countries indicate that the more restrictive and unknown environment faced in the Netherlands has resulted in higher dependency on social networks to migrate, while in the case of Portugal 'network externalities' as well as the shared language and (perceived) historical familiarity have contributed to the decrease in the need to draw directly on social networks to migrate. In addition, migrants in the Netherlands were more often undocumented than in Portugal, which probably added to their dependency on social networks, as has been found in other research (Zell and Skop, 2011).

All in all, our findings confirm that actors beyond the traditional 'migrant network' are indeed involved in facilitating migration, although their relevance is in general relatively small compared to traditional actors like family and community members. Moreover, the relevance of these actors beyond the traditional migrant network depends on the form of assistance that is provided, the type of migration (as proposed by Collyer, 2005) and the context of destination (as suggested by Zell and Skop, 2011).

Our findings demonstrate that migration scholars need to move beyond the narrow conceptualisation of feedback mechanisms emanating from social networks consisting of community or kin relationships. Instead, we need to consider the involvement of multiple actors – both in the origin and destination countries – in providing different types of assistance. In addition, we show that future analyses would benefit from taking into account the differences between migrants driven by distinct motives in different places instead of assuming overall 'social mechanisms' emanating from a shared national origin. This way we will be able to uncover more of the underlying mechanisms related to the cumulative evolution of migration flows over time.

Notes

1. The category of institutions comprises employers or businesses, lawyers (private and legal aid), employment/recruitment agencies, state agencies that recruit labour migrants, agencies that recruit international students (and scholars) (e.g., universities), agencies that recruit au pairs/domestic labour, agencies that mediate relationships with partners, agencies that

financially support international students, migrant organisations or cultural organisations from the country of origin, religious institutions (churches, mosques, etc.), travel agencies, translators, embassy or consulate, human smuggler/criminal organisation, financial institutions and banks, and other institutions at the destination.
2. The destination consists of the destination country and all other countries except for the origin country; the vast majority of references correspond to actors based in the destination country. We therefore chose to label this category destination country and not 'other countries'.
3. Proportion: times assistance received from institution per number of respondents is 45% in Portugal compared to 4% in the Netherlands.
4. They were also asked whether they rated each of the motives as important or not.
5. In Portugal, this only concerned one respondent. Respondents who did not have learning a language as an important motive are in the category 'other', along with those who indicated 'do not know' and missing values.
6. OECD 2007, available here http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/science-and-technology/oecd-information-technology-outlook-2008/internet-access-by-high-medium-and-low-education-level-in-selected-oecd-countries-2007_it_outlook-2008-graph4_5-en. 31st March 2015.

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4
Online Feedback in Migration Networks

Rianne Dekker, Godfried Engbersen and Marije Faber

Introduction

Feedback that is exchanged in migration corridors often entails information about migration to, and life in, different destinations. This is known to influence migration plans and decisions of prospective migrants. This type of feedback is transferred via means of long-distance communication. In the early 20th century, this was sustained through letters sent by surface mail (Thomas and Znaniecki, 1918–1920). Over the years, the means of communication between migrants and their country of origin have become faster, cheaper and more encompassing. For example, international telephone calls brought synchronous communication with the intimacy of hearing each other's voice. Today, internet-based video chat and social media enable the simultaneous exchange of content combining text, (moving) images and sound. These exchanges facilitate intensive co-existence while living miles apart (Madianou and Miller, 2012).

Online media are not merely new channels of exchanges in migration networks. The choice of medium determines and delimits to a certain extent the type of information that is exchanged and among whom. They also have the potential to change the scope of network exchanges as online media enable connecting to previously unknown others (Haythornthwaite, 2002). Moreover, online feedback reaches beyond one-to-one exchanges of information as it is often exchanged in (semi-) public spaces which are constructed based on common interests. Thus, it possibly affects a broader community of non-migrants in origin countries besides the direct recipients as a form of indirect feedback (Dekker and Engbersen, 2014, see also Bakewell and Jolivet, Chapter 10, in this volume). From a migration systems approach, we can state that

online media provide an important channel for sending and receiving direct and indirect informational feedback on issues that are relevant for migration. Among prospective migrants, this can bring about social learning effects as well as normative influence effects (DiMaggio and Garip, 2012).

Access to new information and ties may reduce the barriers for migration. Based on quantitative and qualitative data from the THEMIS project, this chapter studies the effect of transnational exchanges of information via online media in migration corridors on migration decisions of non-migrants. The leading research question of this chapter is as follows: *how does the exchange of online feedback in migration networks influence subsequent migration decision-making?* In the following, we will first discuss insights about the uses of online media in migration networks, focusing on the role of online feedback. Second, we will analyse to what extent migrants in the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and the United Kingdom use online media as a new channel of feedback and what patterns of feedback this entails. Third, we will examine the determinants of sending online feedback. Finally, we will analyse how online media use influences non-migrants' propensity to migrate.

Online media as a feedback channel

Online media and migration networks

For many years, long-distance communication between international migrants and their homeland was very challenging. In *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, Thomas and Znaniecki show that migrants used to write long letters to show familial solidarity, despite the fact that many of them were not fully literate and sending letters or packages would take weeks (1918–1920, p. 303). While Cairncross (1997) claims that the internet has caused the 'death of distance', Mok et al. (2010) assert that communication media such as the telegraph and telephone already decoupled communication from geographical distances, facilitating simultaneous exchanges without physical proximity. Vertovec (2004) and Horst (2006) have described how the proliferation of cheap international telephone calls made the telephone one of the most important means of communication in migration networks. Scholars of social geography have demonstrated that email contact as well is insensitive to distance, especially when it comes to transnational contacts of immigrants (Mok et al., 2010, p. 2778, p. 2761).

The emergence of 'Web 2.0' applications or 'social media' increased the uses of the internet as a medium for interpersonal communication –

as they are characterised by the exchange of user-generated content. As 'Web 2.0' and 'social media' are contested terms, we choose in this chapter to focus on the concept of 'online media' that we conceptualise as (semi-) open online venues that enable users to exchange content and allow for many-to-many communication (see Lievrouw and Livingstone, 2002; Boyd and Ellison, 2007). Online media exist in different shapes and sizes, but several types can be distinguished (Kaplan and Haenlein, 2010). Social networking sites, virtual communities and forums, blogs and micro blogs, picture-sharing sites and video-sharing sites are just a shortlist of typical forms in which online media exist. Today, most online applications have a social component. For example, many websites that were originally developed as top-down domains now offer opportunities to leave a review or have an additional Facebook page or Twitter account that allows interaction with users. Various online media are used for relatively cheap, simultaneous and media-rich communication in migration corridors.

Qualitative studies have shown that online media have different uses for prospective migrants. First, they use online media for maintaining strong ties and for mobilising weak ties transnationally (Dimenescu, 2008). Second, online media provide an infrastructure that expands the availability of network ties for prospective migrants (Hiller and Franz, 2004; Dekker and Engbersen, 2014). Ties that connect previously unconnected others, providing an opportunity for weak ties to develop and strengthen, are called 'latent ties' (Haythornthwaite, 2002, p. 385). Third, information that is (semi-)openly available online may support and influence migration aspirations. Hiller and Franz (2004, p. 737) claim that 'pre-migrants' who are still in the country of origin and consider the possibility of moving look online for information about migration and various destinations. They use the internet primarily for information seeking, exploring and evaluating migration prospects, making formal and informal contacts, obtaining assistance and advice about the move. This lowers the costs and risks of migration. Burrell and Anderson (2008) argue that next to practical information and assistance, online media provide images of other places of residence and lifestyles, fuelling aspirations and decisions to move. Thulin and Vilhelmson (2014) argue that the internet influences plans and decisions of migration by affecting people's interest in migration, migration motives and choice of destination.

Quantitative studies on the effects of online media on migration processes are scarce. Moon et al. (2010) found a weakly positive relationship between personal internet use and rural-to-urban migration intentions

in South Korea. Vilhelmson and Thulin (2013) found that a substantial proportion of young adults in Sweden state that the internet affected their most recent decision to migrate. They emphasized that the internet is not a driving force of migration in itself but instead supports migration decision-making (Vilhelmson and Thulin, 2013, p. 214). This is confirmed by our own THEMIS-based publication on the use of online media by non-migrants (Dekker et al., 2015). Among other factors, non-migrants' propensity to migrate explains the extent to which they use online media to communicate with people in destination countries.

Online media as carriers of informational feedback

In migration systems theory, feedback in the form of information flows is considered to be a major driver of migration movements by influencing the migration aspirations and opportunities to migrate for people in origin areas (Mabogunje, 1970). According to De Haas (2010), feedback may influence the migration potential of non-migrants either directly or indirectly. Direct feedback affects only non-migrants who are connected to people in destination localities within a migration network. Indirect feedback, however, affects a broader community in the place of origin. For example, others in the origin locality notice financial and social remittances such as new houses being built and stories on the quality of life in the place of destination. The migration systems approach thus allows us to look beyond the role of online media within pre-established migration networks. This is important because qualitative studies have shown that online media also affect people who are not embedded in such networks (Dekker and Engbersen, 2014). When online media content is (semi-)publicly available, it is a form of indirect feedback as well.

In the terms of Bakewell and Jolivet (Chapter 10), we can refer to indirect online feedback as 'narrowcast' and 'broadcast' feedback, as it is available to those who are not part of migration networks. Migrants may be sharing information online targeted towards people in their networks in their countries of origin (narrowcast feedback), which may unintentionally be picked up by those outside the networks (thereby becoming broadcast feedback); moreover, prospective migrants can purposefully seek to expand their social networks online for the purpose of migration (induced broadcast feedback).

A migration systems approach acknowledges that feedback can be either migration-facilitating or migration-undermining (De Haas, 2010; Engbersen et al., 2013). The exchange of information in migration systems will not always occur and feedback may not always be



Figure 4.1 Analytical framework

migration-encouraging. In some cases, settled migrants will perform gatekeeping or gate-closing behaviour in order to discourage subsequent migration movements to their destination country (Böcker, 1994; Engbersen et al., 2013; Snel et al., Chapter 7, in this volume). We consider both the information-sending perspective of migrants in destination countries as well as the information-consuming perspective of non-migrants in origin countries. From these two perspectives, we discern (1) to what extent online feedback is sent by settled migrants in destination countries and what the nature of this feedback is; (2) what determines whether settled migrants in destination countries are sending online feedback; and (3) how online feedback received by non-migrants in origin countries of migration influences their migration propensity (see Figure 4.1).

Measuring online feedback

Data from the THEMIS project enable us to analyse the exchange of online information as feedback. We use data from the survey conducted in four Western European destination countries on sending online feedback among migrants and data from the survey held among non-migrants in the three THEMIS origin countries on the reception of online feedback. Qualitative material from semi-structured interviews with the same migrant groups and with non-migrants in Brazil, Morocco and Ukraine is used to enrich the relationships that are found in the quantitative data with concrete examples. For a more detailed discussion of the methodology and datasets, see Chapter 2.

THEMIS surveys

Firstly, we look into sending online feedback from the destination countries. The destination questionnaire asks, 'Do you share information about life in your current country of residence on blogs, online forums, social network sites or other websites such as Facebook, written in your native language? (yes/no)'. Even though we did not directly ask whether this information had a positive or negative content, we provide some descriptive data on the nature of the feedback by looking

at the migrants' general attitude towards further migration from their country of origin to their country of residence. We use another item as a proxy: whether the respondent would in general recommend others to migrate (yes/in some cases/no). Finally, the destination countries' questionnaire includes an item asking to whom in their country of origin the respondent provided information. This item includes the answer category 'people whom you met on the internet'. This item was used to establish the extent to which online feedback was provided to latent ties.

Secondly, we test two models with possible determinants of sending online feedback. The first model evaluates to what extent personal characteristics (gender, age, education) determine whether migrants are sending online feedback. Literature on digital divides teaches us that they are generally important predictors of online media use (DiMaggio et al., 2004). In the second model, we look at migration characteristics as determinants of sending online feedback. Origin and destination countries are taken into account. There are expected deviations based on country-level differences in internet access (Chinn and Fairly, 2007; International Telecommunication Union, 2013). Furthermore, we composed a variable measuring the main migration motive, which may be labour, family, education or other reasons, and included an item asking respondents about their future migration intentions in the regression model. These variables are included to evaluate whether some 'types' of migrants distinguished by migration motivation and definitiveness are more inclined to share feedback online.

Thirdly, we turn to non-migrants in the origin countries and ask whether receiving online feedback influences their propensity to migrate. We conducted multinomial logistic regression analysis of their propensity to migrate (categories 'no aspirations', 'not likely' and 'very likely'). The questionnaire in origin countries asks non-migrants what means of communication they are using to communicate with people in Western Europe. We recoded their responses to a variable distinguishing 'online media use', 'solely traditional media use' and 'no communication'. Online media use includes the use of 'social media', 'messenger services', or 'websites or blogs', besides the use of traditional media (see Table 4.1). We control for personal characteristics such as age, gender, education and country of residence. Migration studies show that the availability of social ties is an important source of information for prospective migrants. Online media may compensate a lack of existing migration network ties. We included the variable 'number of ties in Western Europe' in the analysis. For a more elaborate discussion of

Table 4.1 Means of communication used in migration networks (%)

	Migrants in destination countries (N = 2,801)		**Non-migrants in origin countries (N = 751)**	
	Yes	**No**	**Yes**	**No**
Letters or tapes	4.3	95.7	0.8	99.2
Phone or Skype	97.6	2.4	47.1	52.9
Text messages	19.5	80.5	4.7	95.3
Messenger	26.8	73.2	13.2	86.8
Email	36.0	64.0	11.1	88.9
Social media	43.0	57.0	16.7	83.3
Other websites or blogs	3.1	96.9	0.6	99.4

Source: THEMIS destination country survey data (unweighted data) and origin country survey data.

the variables used in the analysis and related hypotheses concerning non-migrants in the origin countries, see Dekker et al. (2015).

THEMIS qualitative interviews

Thirty semi-structured interviews were conducted with Brazilian, Moroccan and Ukrainian migrants in each of the four destination countries in 2011 and 2012. In each of the three origin countries, 90 interviews were conducted with return migrants (people who had resided in the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal or the United Kingdom for at least three months) and with family members of current migrants in the four Western European destinations, such as parents, siblings, aunts, uncles and cousins. All of these interviews included a section about transnational communication and impersonal resources that were used (to explore possibilities) to migrate to Western Europe. In some interviews, online media were explicitly prompted by the interviewer; in others it was left to the respondent to bring the subject to the table. We searched all interview transcripts based on a selection of online media-related search terms such as computer/PC; Internet; social media/Facebook/Orkut/Vkontakte/Odnoklassniki; weblog/blog; forum; messenger; and VoIP/Skype. Relevant sections of the interviews were coded in terms of positive and negative feedback and consequences for migration plans. All the respondents were anonymized by assigning fictitious names for reasons of readability and to demonstrate that we quote different respondents.

Keeping in contact and being informed through different means of communication

Descriptive statistics show that the majority of our migrant population (98%) are in contact with people in their country of origin and they communicate regularly with them. Sixty two per cent communicates with people in their country of origin at least once a month. We asked the respondents who are in contact with persons in their country of origin as to what means of communication they are using. The respondents could indicate one or more categories. Phone or Skype calls are the most popular means of communication, followed by social media and email. Websites or blogs and letters or tapes are used the least (Table 4.1). In the qualitative interviews our respondents sketch an evolution of the types of media that are used in migration networks over time: 'They [friends and relatives who migrated to the Netherlands in earlier years] travelled back to Morocco every year in the summer holidays. Sometimes they would send letters or audio tapes, later on we would have contact by telephone and now almost everything is possible via the internet' (Rabia, female, 36, Morocco–Netherlands, migrant). However, our quantitative data show that online media are not fully replacing more traditional forms of communication (such as the telephone). Instead, they are used complementarily: only 33 respondents use online media exclusively.

Of the migrants in destination countries, 1,254 (44%) indicate that they are sharing information online about life in the country of residence in the language of the country of origin. Social media are the most popular of three categories of online media in the survey: 'messenger services', 'social media' and 'other websites or blogs'. Most respondents are using one or more types of online media in combination with traditional media. Only 34 respondents (1%) indicate having shared information with latent ties whom they met online (not in table). This is happening only on a small scale and so it seems that online media are used to maintain contact with existing ties rather than to communicate with newly established ties.

Of the 1,247 respondents in the origin countries 882 (71%) of them indicated that they personally know one or more persons living in Western Europe. They thus have transnational ties in possible destination countries. We have excluded those without ties in Western Europe from the analysis. Respondents could indicate multiple means of communication, but in total 271 (22%) of the respondents use online media (according to our definition) in their contacts with people in Western

Europe (Table 4.1). This percentage is smaller than the share of migrants in the destination countries who are using online media. In the origin countries, social media are the most popular type of online media as well and 54 non-migrants are using online media exclusively to communicate with people in Western Europe.

From the 364 respondents in the origin countries who indicated that they did not personally know anyone in Western Europe, 23 still indicated that they use online media to communicate with people in Western Europe. We interpret this as having activated latent ties of which the infrastructure was laid by online media or receiving impersonal narrowcast feedback. This entails 2% of the non-migrants in our sample. This indicates that online media are primarily used for communication with existing (strong and weak) migration network ties rather than constituting new ties in possible destination countries.

All in all, about half of the migrants from Brazil, Morocco and Ukraine in the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and the United Kingdom are sending online feedback to people in their origin countries. Also, among non-migrants in the origin countries with contacts in Western Europe, online media are a rather popular means of communication. Kamal from Morocco describes that he is very frequently in contact with his brother in Oslo:

> We contact each other on a regular basis through the internet more than on the phone. The internet is cheaper for both of us. Not only do we hear each other, but we can also see each other and send photos. When we are both free, we talk through the internet.
>
> (male, 34, Morocco–Norway, family member)

Our respondents praise online media for their cheap, accessible and media-rich features, and for their applicability in maintaining strong ties with friends and family abroad.

Two functions of online feedback: Migration supporting and undermining

Claims about cumulative causation would assume that online ties and information provide feedback that supports migration. However, the results of the THEMIS project teach us that feedback can also discourage migration (see Snel et al., Chapter 7, in this volume, and Engbersen et al., 2013). Even though we did not directly ask the respondents about the nature of the online feedback that they are sending,

Table 4.2 Do migrants who share information online generally recommend non-migrants to migrate? (%)

	Would generally recommend migration (N = 1,245)
Yes	31.6
Sometimes	27.0
No	41.4

Source: THEMIS destination country survey data (unweighted data).

we are able to say something about the nature of the feedback by comparing information-sending behaviour with migrants' general attitude towards further migration from their country of origin to their country of residence. Table 4.2 shows that 32% of the migrants who are sharing information online would generally recommend migration and 41% would not. This indicates that online information may entail migration-encouraging as well as migration-undermining feedback. However, using this proxy variable comes with limitations. Online information that was sent in concrete situations may differ in nature from the general attitudes towards further migration. Moreover, we do not know how this information is interpreted by the receiver.

Qualitative data from migrants in the destination countries confirm that information sent via online media may either be migration-encouraging or migration-undermining. Cesar, a Brazilian migrant in the United Kingdom, describes how social networking sites encourage non-migrants to migrate: 'For example, you see pictures of different places. It encourages people to come. Many people would think, if that person is there, why couldn't I go there as well?' (male, 39). A Moroccan non-migrant, Samia, describes the generally positive image that she got from the United Kingdom via online media content:

> The internet is of great importance as way of communication between my cousin and me. I notice from the photos that they have a high quality lifestyle. They wear beautiful and expensive clothes and my cousin takes good care of her children. She usually goes on long trips to different places and enjoys her life in England.
>
> (female, 30, family member)

Settled migrants posting success stories and beautiful pictures of their lives in the destination countries function as positive feedback in

migration networks. In terms of DiMaggio and Garip (2012), this brings about a social learning effect. Some may paint an online picture that is even better than reality (cf. Bakewell et al., in this volume, Chapter 1). Online information may also entail normative influence in terms of practical advice. Cristiane, a Brazilian return migrant, describes how online information from Portugal was helpful to her:

> Basic information about how much it would cost, where I could stay in the beginning, I all got from the internet. It is a very useful tool. I found information in an Orkut group. At that time I didn't use Facebook. People studying in Portugal put such information on social media.
>
> (female, 25)

Next to offering migration-encouraging images and advice, online feedback may also entail migration-discouraging feedback. Ihor, a Ukrainian migrant in the United Kingdom, experienced this:

> There are some online groups and different topics on forums. There is one called Ukrainians in Great Britain. There are some topics where people ask questions. [...] I visited those groups in Odnoklassniki a couple of times. I saw that people ask questions like 'how to come here?' People ask questions even from Ukraine. But now most replies are like 'it's very hard now' and 'there is no sense to go now'.
>
> (male, 24, Ukraine–UK, migrant)

Also Myriam from Morocco was discouraged from migrating on the basis of the information she received through online media: 'During the late 90s, Moroccans, thanks to the internet and satellite channels, are more exposed to the outside world and are very aware that the economic situation in Europe is not good and their chances of finding good jobs are not big' (female, 58, Morocco–Netherlands, return migrant). Online information is thus supporting migration decisions in a dual sense: on the one hand, they can encourage non-migrants to take their migration aspirations a step further and eventually undertake the act of migration. On the other hand, online information points to the sometimes harsh reality of migration and urges them to revise their plans or blow them off altogether.

Our qualitative interviews indicate that migrants are selective with regard to whom they advise and encourage to migrate and whom they discourage via online channels. Andriy, a Ukrainian migrant in Portugal,

explains why he discouraged friends from migrating to Portugal via online media:

> I have many (Ukrainian) friends on Skype and Facebook and I talk to them a lot. They ask me if they can come here [Portugal] but I tell them that it is not worthwhile because he cannot speak Portuguese. He can live in my house for a while but how is he going to make a living? It is better to stay in Ukraine.
>
> (male, 37, Ukraine–Portugal, migrant)

Online media are thus rich sources of information and contacts for non-migrants. More frequent and media-rich communication via online media will however not necessarily lead to an increase in migration. Feedback may be discouraging non-migrants to migrate as well.

Who is providing online feedback?

The findings about the different functions of online feedback bring us to the second sub question: what determines whether or not migrants in destination countries are providing online feedback? We tested two sets of independent variables that can be expected to influence whether or not migrants are sending online feedback to people in their country of origin. The first set of variables (model 1) concerns personal characteristics of the migrant: gender and level of education. The second set of variables (model 2) are characteristics of the migrants' migration movement: country of origin, country of destination, length of stay, future migration intentions and migration type (Table 4.3).

Binary logistic regression analysis model 1 shows that age and level of education significantly explain sending online feedback. Highly educated migrants are more likely to share information with persons in their country of origin via online media than less educated migrants. The category of medium-educated migrants did not significantly differ from the reference category. The variable age shows that younger migrants are more likely to use online media in addition to traditional media. These results fit more general theories of the digital divide (DiMaggio et al., 2004).

When we add migration characteristics to the model, the effects of personal characteristics remain present. Furthermore, origin country is a strong predictor of sending online feedback. Brazilian migrants share most information online and Moroccan migrants the least in comparison with the reference category (Ukrainian migrants). From the

Table 4.3 Logistic regression analysis of the likelihood of sending online feedback by Brazilian, Moroccan and Ukrainian migrants living in Norway, the Netherlands, Portugal and the UK (N = 2,726)

	Model 1	**Model 2**
	Odds ratio	**Odds ratio**
Personal characteristics		
Gender (ref = female)	0.851	0.836
Age	0.749***	0.765***
Level of education (ref = high)		
Medium	0.834	0.947
Low	0.157***	0.326***
Migration characteristics		
Origin country (ref = Ukraine)		
Morocco		0.407***
Brazil		2.242***
Destination country (ref = UK)		
Netherlands		0.977
Norway		0.669*
Portugal		1.200
Type of migrant (ref = family migrant)		
Labour migrant		0.773
Study migrant		0.966
Other		0.990
Future migration intentions (ref = remain in destination country)		
Return to country of origin		1.404*
Live partly in origin, partly in destination		1.553**
Migrate to other destination country		1.362
Nagelkerke R-square	0.134	0.264

Note: *** p < .001; ** p < .010; * p < .050 (two-tailed).
Source: THEMIS destination country survey (weighed data).

destination countries in our sample, only Norway differs significantly from the reference category. Migrants in Norway are sending significantly less online feedback to their origin countries than migrants in the United Kingdom. These differences do not seem to reflect the internet penetration in the countries of origin and destination. The International Telecommunication Union (2013) measures internet penetration as the percentage of the population that used the internet over the past 12 months from any device, including mobile phones. Internet penetration does not account for the differences between the destination countries,

as Norway shows highest (95%) internet penetration and internet penetration in Portugal is for example far less (64%). This is not reflected in our data. With respect to the origin countries, higher internet penetration does not correspond with more information-sending behavior in our model. Morocco has the highest internet penetration of the origin countries (55%), followed by Brazil (50%) and Ukraine (34%). A strong effect of origin country can perhaps be explained by the characteristics of the migration flow at hand. For example, it can be expected that in migration systems with individualised migration, online media have the advantage of providing access to latent ties and information that was previously unattainable because of a lack of network ties. Further research is needed to test this hypothesis.

Furthermore, we analysed whether the type of migration and future migration intentions explain sending online feedback. Sending online feedback does not differ significantly for different types of migrants. When we look at future migration intentions, we see that migrants who intend to live partly in the destination country and partly in their origin country and migrants who intend to return are sending significantly more online feedback than migrants who intend to stay in their country of residence. We assume that these groups are more prone to exchanging information online and offline as they are very closely involved with life in their country of origin. This may be motivated by a transnational lifestyle or disappointment and dissatisfaction with life after migration. Next to exchanges via traditional media, online media offer media-rich, (semi-)public sources of information and facilitate many-to-many exchanges.

The influence of receiving online feedback on non-migrants' migration propensity

Multinomial regression analysis is applied to analyse whether online communication with migrants in Western Europe – in addition to communication via traditional media – affects non-migrants' migration propensity. Migration propensity is measured in three categories: non-migrants stating that they are likely or almost certain to migrate, non-migrants who consider themselves a little likely or not likely to migrate and non-migrants having no aspirations to migrate at all. Model 1 in Table 4.4 shows that non-migrants who are using online media are less likely to have no aspirations to migrate than migrants who are likely or almost certain to migrate (odds ratio: 0.684~). In other words, migrants who are using online media in addition to traditional media

Table 4.4 Multinomial logistic regression analysis of migration propensity (likely/almost certain = reference category) (N = 728)

	A little/not likely		No aspirations	
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 1**	**Model 2**
	Odds ratio	**Odds ratio**	**Odds ratio**	**Odds ratio**
Online media use (ref = no)	0.849	0.853	0.684~	0.672
Gender (ref = female)		0.623*		0.818
Age		1.016~		1.063***
Level of education (ref = high)				
Medium		0.944		0.600*
Low		1.280		0.523
Origin country (ref = Ukraine)				
Morocco		1.201		2.687**
Brazil		1.658		4.358***
Number of ties in Western Europe (ref = 1 to 3)				
4 to 10		0.672		0.553*
More than 10		1.160		0.923
No ties in Western Europe		1.095		1.716
Nagelkerke R-square	0.006	0.176	0.006	0.176

Note: *** p <. 001; ** p <. 010; * p <. 050; ~ < 0. 100 (two-tailed).
Source: THEMIS origin country survey.

have a higher migration propensity. This effect is however marginally significant and it disappears once we add a number of control variables in model 2.

Adding age, gender, country of origin, level of education and number of social ties in Western Europe to the model changes the effect of online media use on migration propensity. In model 2, migration propensity does not significantly differ for non-migrants who are using online media next to traditional media and those who solely use traditional media. Gender has a significant effect in case of migrants who are a little or not likely to migrate. Women seem significantly less likely to migrate. This effect of gender is not found with regard to having no aspirations. Age has an independent effect on migration propensity: the older the non-migrant, the higher the likeliness of having no aspirations

to migrate or to consider themselves only a little likely or not likely to migrate. Level of education only shows an effect concerning medium-educated non-migrants: they are less likely to have no aspirations to migrate in comparison with the reference category.

With regard to origin country, some effects were found: non-migrants in Brazil and Morocco are significantly more likely to have no migration aspirations than migrants in Ukraine. Brazilians have the lowest propensity to migrate to Western Europe and Ukrainians the highest. Lastly, we controlled for the number of ties in Europe. It can be hypothesised that the influence of online media use on migration propensity is less strong for non-migrants who already have many migration network ties in Europe. For them, online media will not bring too much new information. We did not find full support for this hypothesis. There is only a significant effect in case of non-migrants with four to ten ties in Western Europe. They are less likely to have no aspirations to migrate.

The absence of an effect of online media use on migration propensity might firstly be explained by the different functions of feedback. As discussed earlier, online media may provide non-migrants with migration-encouraging as well as migration-discouraging information. The effect of online media use on non-migrants' migration propensity is likely to be mitigated by the nature of feedback. Secondly, we believe that the effect is diminished by the control variable of social ties. Our data from the destination countries show that online media are primarily used to maintain strong and weak ties and only to a lesser extent to establish new ties. Online media rather support existing ties instead of establishing new ties and therefore their use does not bring about a change in migration propensity.

Even though our quantitative material does not indicate a large role for online media in establishing new ties, we encountered quite some examples of this in our qualitative interviews. Either this was something the migrant or non-migrant experienced themselves, or they had seen this among other migrants. Olga from Ukraine states:

> I think that today due to the Internet you have more possibilities to make friends abroad. One of my friends made a lot of foreign friends and now she can easily travel to visit them in any country. We didn't have this chance earlier. During the Soviet time one had to work somewhere where foreigners could be to get acquainted with them and it was not so easy. And today the Internet is available for

> everyone. I think it opened the borders for people, so they can go anywhere they want, make friends or find a job in any part of the world, learn the language. That is why I suppose that today migration has increased.
>
> (female, 31, Ukraine–Norway, return migrant)

Juliana, a Brazilian migrant living in Norway, describes from her own experience:

> I met my Norwegian husband through ICQ, an instant messaging computer program, in 2005. I started to use ICQ to find people from abroad so I could practice my English skills. [...] While using ICQ I learned about a related service called ICQ Universe. However, joining ICQ Universe was by invitation only, so I sent messages to several members in order to get an invitation. [...] Three men responded and one of them eventually became my husband.
>
> (female, 33, Brazil–Norway, migrant)

In the qualitative interviews, we encountered specific instances in which the encouraging role of online information was mentioned. This seemed to be the case particularly regarding marriage migration (family formation) and student migration. The latter is also discussed by Van Meeteren and Pereira (Chapter 3, of this volume) with respect to migration from Brazil to the Netherlands and Portugal. Recollection of such events may have been underestimated by the survey as the question was framed more in terms of day-to-day communication.

Conclusions

The internet has become a ubiquitous medium for information sharing and communicating with others. It allows for low-cost and media-rich many-to-many communication. Online media are a mix of interpersonal communication and mass broadcasting of information. The affordances of online media are useful in the context of migration corridors, where communication over long distances is required. Migration corridors are very *mediated* structures: except for personal visits, information and resources are exchanged through different long-distance communication media. It can be assumed that migration corridors are also *mediatised* in the sense that the choice of medium determines and delimits what information is exchanged and between whom. According to Hjarvard (2004, p. 48), 'mediatization implies a process through which

core elements of a social or cultural activity (like work, leisure, play etc.) assume media form'. Events that are said to influence subsequent migration moves are communicated to prospective migrants via informational feedback in migration corridors. Traditional and online media structure the transnational relationships in a situation of absence: a 'mediatisation of migration'. The choice of medium for exchanges in migration networks delimits what information and ties are available to prospective migrants.

This chapter studied the use of online media in migration networks from a migration systems approach. In this approach, online media can be seen as new channels for the exchange of feedback in migration networks. It is therefore expected that by offering new ties and information, online media use will increase non-migrants' migration propensity. Different elements to this hypothesis are analysed in this chapter by addressing the question as to how the exchange of online feedback in migration networks influences subsequent migration decision-making. First, we turned to the question to what extent migrants in destination countries are sending online feedback and what determines this; subsequently, we turned to the question what the nature of this feedback is; and finally we asked how receiving online feedback influences non-migrants' migration propensity.

Our analyses challenge the general hypothesis that online media use increases non-migrants' migration propensity. This only happens under specific conditions. First of all, not all migrants and non-migrants are using online media for transnational communication due to digital divides. Online feedback sending and receiving are explained by personal characteristics as well as migration characteristics of the migrant. Age and level of education are strong predictors of sending online feedback. This is in line with studies about the digital divide. Online feedback is also dependent on destination and primarily origin country. Secondly, our findings indicate that the use of online media to contact previously unrelated others is still a marginal phenomenon. Most migrants are providing online feedback to ties that were already part of their social network. Only 34 respondents (1%) indicate that they have deliberately shared information about either visas, housing, jobs, studying or general attitude towards non-migrants with people in their country of origin whom they met online. This concerns latent ties that could not have been established without the availability of online media. Third and finally, the feedback that circulates in migration networks via online media is both of a migration-facilitating and migration-undermining nature. Of the migrants who are sending

online feedback, 32% would generally recommend migration, while 41% would discourage it. Whatever the reasons behind these attitudes, these figures indicate that positive as well as negative feedback is distributed via online media. Even though we could only measure this by proxy, this indication is confirmed in the semi-structured interviews with the same groups of migrants in the destination countries and non-migrants in the origin countries. We find accounts of sending and receiving online feedback that is migration-encouraging and migration-discouraging.

Presumably as a result of this, receiving online feedback shows only a small positive correlation with non-migrants' migration propensity. This effect however disappears when adding control variables such as age, number of transnational ties and country of residence. This suggests that online feedback does not have an independent effect on migration decision-making. Our qualitative data suggest that with regard to specific types of migration (such as marriage and student migration) this may differ. This should be further researched. All in all, we found that online media have become important channels of transnational communication in migration networks with potentially growing popularity. Online exchanges of information do not however unequivocally encourage subsequent migration as feedback may also be migration-undermining.

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5

The Impact of Class on Feedback Mechanisms: Brazilian Migration to Norway, Portugal and the United Kingdom

Cindy Horst, Sónia Pereira and Olivia Sheringham

Introduction

This chapter analyses the interplay between class and migration patterns of Brazilians to Norway, Portugal and the United Kingdom in order to refine our understanding of feedback mechanisms. At the policy level, socio-economic distinction among migrants is an ever-present, if often disguised, form of differentiation: migration management regimes are set up to distinguish between the desired high-skilled and 'resource-rich' migrants and the unwanted low-skilled and 'resource-poor' migrants, facilitating access to territory for the first group while restricting it for the second. Yet, while it is widely acknowledged that socio-economic resources have a direct impact on the opportunities people have to migrate and the outcomes of their migration projects, class has been notably absent from migration studies (Van Hear, 2014).

We seek to address this gap and explore how social class – which we conceive of as a relational concept that expresses differentiation in social, cultural as well as economic resources – plays a pivotal role in the differential operation of feedback in migration processes. More specifically, we focus on the role of social class in the migration dynamics and feedback processes among Brazilians migrating to Norway, Portugal and the United Kingdom. We do not suggest that social class exists in a vacuum and we are attentive to how it intersects with other factors, including race, gender, language or region of origin. We argue, however, that understanding the complex workings of feedback mechanisms

requires attention to how they operate differently according to class position in both sending and receiving settings. We suggest that for understanding the role of class in the operation of feedback, we need to move beyond a national frame of analysis. Several authors have argued that, while social and economic differentiation is a major factor impacting migration processes, this impact has been invisible in nationality-based approaches to migration research (Hall et al., 2013; Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2002).

The chapter is based on 120 semi-structured interviews with migrants in Norway, Portugal and the United Kingdom and 90 interviews with returnees and families of migrants in Brazil. These interviews were conducted within the THEMIS project; for details of the methodology, see Carling and Jolivet (Chapter 2 of this volume). Our observations are based on coded data from these 210 interviews on migration decisions; aims of the migration project; migration assistance; transnational information; transnational ties; settlement and social networks in the country of residence; and class. The quotations in this chapter are merely a selection of the most telling examples of the general trends that we observed.

Brazilian migration to Europe provides a good case study to explore the interplay between social class and migration because class as a key marker of difference emerged as a particularly salient theme in our analysis of the Brazilian data. While the concept of 'migration waves' (see Chapter 1) explained some of the differences in migration realities and feedback processes, patterns of differentiation in the Brazilian case were not necessarily only related to when people migrated to Europe or the particular 'wave' in which they arrived. Rather, it seemed that class differences – which had been a vital feature of people's social realities in Brazil – played a critical role in explaining different outcomes. We base our analysis on migrants' self-perceptions of class, transmitted in their own narratives on how they differentiate themselves from others on the basis of factors such as educational background, socio-economic status, region of origin, race, taste and forms of speech and so forth. We look in particular at how these class identifications are also intertwined with migration destinations, aspirations and transnational social fields, thus impacting the feedback mechanisms studied in this volume.

This chapter contributes to calls to bring a more nuanced understanding of class – and its configurations in both origin *and* host countries – (back) into the migration debate (Van Hear, 2014). It explores how Brazilian migration to Europe is shaped by class belonging, which, in Brazil, is inseparable from racial and geographical positions as well as the

endowment of certain cultural resources. We focus on the interactions between class and migration in two important ways. First, we question how class position influences processes of migration, including the formation of aspirations, decision-making, settlement and transnational practices, and, second, how migration itself contributes to shape and re-construct class identities and belonging locally and transnationally. We argue that class plays a pivotal role in shaping the migration experience and, importantly, that class-based distinctions lead to the differential operation of feedback mechanisms.

The chapter consists of three main sections. In the following section, we present our conceptual reflections on class and how it intersects with feedback processes in migration. This section is followed by a discussion of the notion of class in the Brazilian context, in relation to race or skin colour, gender, occupation, education, and place of residence and birth. In the third, we explore how class influences the migration trajectories of Brazilians to the United Kingdom, Portugal and Norway. In our analysis, we illustrate how Brazilian migrant communities are made up of socio-economic sub-groups with limited interaction and we focus on the differential workings of feedback in these social networks. A concluding section teases out the implications of our findings for the relevance of class in the operation of feedback more generally.

Analytical inspirations for understanding class in feedback mechanisms

In our analysis of the intersections of class and migration we draw on concepts inspired by Bourdieu, for whom social class is not solely about economic differentiation but intersects with other forms of distinction that structure and constrain people's everyday social realities. We are interested in how socio-economic differentiation operates in 'transnational social fields' (Levitt and Glick-Schiller, 2004), influencing migratory projects and journeys and, in turn, the functioning of feedback. We will illustrate how class identities impact migration aspirations and the migration opportunities that people have, as well as the expectations that migrants face from relatives in the country of origin after having migrated.

Bourdieu and Bourdieu-inspired work have reformulated the problem of domination by questioning the material existence of groups and exposing the politics of group-making (Wacquant, 2013). Bourdieu (1985; 1987; 1989) has shown how class is a truly relational concept which produces ranks through struggle and contestation. While

class positions reflect access to economic resources and decision-making power, it is cultural capital that legitimises superior economic and social positions (Fouron and Glick Schiller, 2001, p. 551). Similarly, techniques of symbolic aggregation whereby boundaries are drawn in certain ways and populations are artificially placed into a group by policymakers, social scientists and others further contribute to transforming a mental construct into a reality. The fixation of class categories thus takes place both as class identities are internally experienced and actively constructed by individuals and through institutional measures that build on and reify perceptions of such identities (Wacquant, 2013).

While class is constructed through relations, it is often understood as natural and taken-for-granted in a similar way to gender (Mahler and Pessar, 2001). People are socialised to view gendered distinctions as natural, inevitable and immutable, while in class terms power, profit and privilege are taken-for-granted. Meanwhile, the 'undeserving poor' are stigmatised and held responsible for their own position (Hall et al., 2013, p. 18; Rezende and Lima, 2004, p. 767). There are deep-seated and embodied tendencies behind class distinctions both to behave and to see others in distinctive ways. Several authors have shown how the domination of certain groups over others – locally as well as globally – takes place by consent, as familial and social and cultural practices and institutions maintain and justify differences in power and status (Fouron and Glick Schiller, 2001; Oliver and O'Reilly, 2010). At the same time, however, it is important to understand that such a view of class also introduces the opportunity to both challenge and reproduce norms. The production of understandings of class is an ongoing process and people negotiate identities, relations and ideologies, particularly considering the fact that they hold various other positions that intersect with class to influence the ways they think and act (Anthias, 2009; Hall et al., 2013).

Class plays a role in shaping migration and, in particular, who is *able* to move where and how (Van Hear, 2004, 2014). At the same time, it is important to explore the role of cognitive processes, such as the imagination, planning and strategising, in order to understand who is *willing* to do so (Mahler and Pessar, 2001). Imagination has become a collective social fact instead of an individual, private experience. Through a range of broadcasting mechanisms, 'images of the lives of others and a rich, ever-changing store of possible lives to be lived are presented' (Appadurai, 1996). Several studies have shown how this ability to imagine beyond the local context has influenced migration (Gardner, 1995; Horst, 2006; McMurray, 2001; Teo, 2003). What has not

been explored, however, is how these imaginative practices are mediated by class backgrounds: who has the desire to migrate and what implications class position has for expectations generated in transnational networks. Migration could be understood as a way of creating alternatives – of subverting or transcending class – for socio-economically disadvantaged groups, stimulated by an awareness of other people's life situation elsewhere and a wish to obtain the same.

Most migrants have social networks that span more than one society. As Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004, p. 1014) point out, 'when society differs from polity and is made up of sets of social relationships in intersecting and overlapping national and transnational social fields, individuals occupy different gender, racial and class positions within different states at the same time'. How this plays out for different individuals needs to be explored empirically. Yet, what is crucial in Levitt and Glick Schiller's analysis is that Bourdieu's concept of the social field, which allows us to study how social relationships are structured by power, can be expanded to focus not just on localised relationships that largely take place within national boundaries. Near *and* distant social relationships penetrate the daily lives of individuals and co-exist or interact in complex ways (Kelly and Lusis, 2006).

Fouron and Glick Schiller (2001), through a case study on Haitians in the United States, for example, show how Haitian women of higher status experience downward mobility in their class position in the United States, but they use the resources gained to invest in their social status in Haiti. These scholars also argue that through these practices the women simultaneously free themselves from gender constraints while sustaining gender and class hierarchies in Haiti (Fouron and Glick Schiller, 2001, p. 559). Such insights are helpful in examining how class relations affect the functioning of feedback in the migration context. Migration involves not merely the transferring of one set of class relations to another. Rather, it involves the intersection of overlapping social fields which span origin, destination and transnational contexts.

Class and forms of distinction in Brazil

The 2014 World Cup which took place in Brazil highlighted many of the contradictions that lie at the heart of Brazilian society. Indeed, while the privilege to host such a high-profile international tournament was testament to Brazil's growing importance in the global economic and cultural arena, the event itself brought to the fore the stark inequalities that continue to blight Brazilian society and the reality that recent

economic success has not addressed the deeply entrenched forms of social exclusion (Scalon and Salata, 2012).

These inequalities in Brazil reflect a long history of social and economic differentiation which dates back to the colonial period and the slave-based economy on which the country was founded and are inseparable from issues of race (Skidmore, 1983; see also Rezende and Lima, 2004). Indeed, despite the high degree of miscegenation between Portuguese, African and Indian populations leading to a largely 'multi-racial' society – and what became a founding myth of a 'racial democracy' (Freyre, 1933; 1940; 1947) – it is impossible to discuss class relations in Brazil without reference to race. Extreme social inequalities exist alongside racial divides (Gradín, 2014) which have repercussions on all aspects of society, including household income, access to education and occupational mobility (see also Leite, 2005). Moreover, these divisions are played out geographically as African descendants are overrepresented in Brazil's poorest regions, mainly in the North and the Northeast (Gradín, 2014, p. 84).

The Brazilian sociologist Jessé Souza (2005, p. 50) argues that the roots of inequality in Brazil have never been challenged, allowing them to become naturalised within a deeply entrenched moral hierarchy. According to Souza, empirical studies demonstrating the overrepresentation of blacks at the bottom of social indicators point to the existence of a relationship between inequality and race but do not explain why it occurs. He argues that struggles between social classes are determined by the assumed opposition between reason and soul – the virtues of the dominant intellectual class – and the body – dominating the lower class (see also Rezende and Lima, 2004). This opposition is expressed, for example, in the massive wage inequality between intellectual labour and manual labour in Brazilian society (Souza, 2005, p. 50). It is furthermore reflected in migration processes that distinguish between 'marriage migrant' women from lower-class backgrounds in the Northeast (*'Nordeste')* and the professional/intellectual migrants from the South and the Southeast larger cities.

Others have shown how issues of race and class are not just closely linked with each other but also intertwined with gender. In their case study of domestic workers and their employers, Rezende and Lima (2004, pp. 769–770) show how the construction of a common gender identity becomes eclipsed by social distinctions such as economic conditions and education, which in turn become reinforced by and embodied in race differences. The authors conclude that gender and race take the form of various categories and attributes that are employed by different

social groups in diverse contexts to create a hierarchical social scheme and also a distinct, even subversive, view of what would be Brazilian social reality.

Within the Brazilian context, the question raised is whether long-established systems of social and economic differentiation and domination are undergoing change (Souza, 2010). Despite the income increase experienced at the bottom end of the socio-economic hierarchy, in 2009 the income levels of professionals and administrators were still substantially higher than those of unskilled manual workers (Scalon and Salata, 2012, pp. 397–398). The critics of the idea of changing class structures in Brazil, through a widening middle-class or the emergence of a 'new' middle class, point to the fact that class position depends not only on the amount of economic resources available (which has increased) but also on other factors. These include occupational position and the existence of formal labour relations, which impact life chances and perspectives (Scalon and Salata, 2012, pp. 390–392) as well as status. Research indeed shows that the percentage of the population employed in the occupations which are considered 'middle-class' experienced limited change between 2002 and 2009 (Scalon and Salata, 2012, p. 396).

Brazilians in Norway, Portugal and the United Kingdom

A profile of our case-study contexts

Migration from Brazil to Norway, Portugal and the United Kingdom has different characteristics and a different evolution. The Brazilian community in Norway is very small, with 4,378 persons, of whom 4,169 are migrants and only 209 are Norwegian-born to immigrant parents. The two most striking features of Brazilian migration to Norway are its long history – with the first Brazilian migrant arriving in 1890 but very few following – and its recent exponential growth since the early 2000s (Horst et al., 2010). The majority of Brazilians in Norway are women, and many of them have come through family formation or reunification with Norwegian partners. Another group are high-skilled migrants who work for Norwegian companies – a number of which are established in Brazil. This composition of the Brazilian community in Norway has to do with the legal and economic opportunities that are available for professionals, as opposed to the lack of such opportunities for low-skilled migrants. The Norwegian labour market has very limited opportunities for unskilled labourers, which is reflected in migration regulations.

In Portugal, Brazilian migration is part of a historical relationship that exists between the two countries, and Brazilians constitute the largest

foreign community in the country (92,120 registered by the Aliens and Borders Service (SEF) in 2013). Before the 1980s, immigration from Brazil was not particularly significant and was composed mainly of political exiles, married women and executives. During the 1980s, the flow grew and was mainly comprised of professionals and descendants of previous Portuguese emigrants in Brazil (Malheiros, 2007). At the end of the 1990s, the so-called second wave of Brazilian immigration (Casa do Brasil/Acime, 2004) emerged and was made up mostly of workers for low-skilled occupations, including a large share of undocumented migrants. Since the financial crisis of 2008, employment opportunities have declined, with a consequent deceleration of the flow to Portugal (from 32,751 new-resident permits issued in 2008 to 11,715 in 2012, SEF).

Brazilian migration to the United Kingdom follows a similar pattern of migration to Portugal, with the first 'wave' arriving in the 1980s, and comprising predominantly young middle-class migrants (Torresan, 1995; Cwerner, 2001). Migration during this period was often spurred by economic instability in Brazil, yet studies also emphasised other factors, such as the notion of a 'rite of passage' or studying (*ibid*). Migration continued to increase slowly throughout the 1980s, yet it was the late 1990s and early 2000s that witnessed the peak of Brazilian migration to the United Kingdom. While accurate figures of the size of the Brazilian community in the United Kingdom are hard to ascertain (McIlwaine, 2011), unofficial estimates, backed up by figures released by the Brazilian Ministry for Foreign Affairs (2013), put the numbers of Brazilians in London at somewhere between 150,000 and 200,000. Brazilians in the United Kingdom tend to be categorised as middle or lower middle class since, as Robins (2014, p. 40) writes, '[t]he rich have no need to migrate and the poor usually can't afford to do so'. The majority is employed in low-skilled occupations, and a large proportion is undocumented. The financial crisis has also led to a notable deceleration of the flow to the United Kingdom, though this is less marked than in Portugal. In fact, more recent arrivals of Brazilians to the United Kingdom have tended to be from other European countries more affected by the crisis (McIlwaine et al., 2015).

Class (re)positioning after migration

While class contributes to shape the experiences of incorporation into the host countries' labour markets, research on migration from Brazil has highlighted issues of downward occupational mobility, or 'deskilling'. After migration, most migrants end up working in

'elementary occupations' (usually low-skilled, low-paid, service-sector jobs), regardless of their qualifications or previous employment in Brazil (Sales, 2000; Evans et al., 2011, see also McIlwaine et al., 2011) or indeed class belonging. Claudio, in London, expressed this with a laugh: 'Brazilians arrive in London and get the mop. That is your reality here.' Except for those who enter as professionals, belonging to an affluent class in Brazil is not necessarily recognised or valued in Europe. Often, migrants experience a disconnection between previous class belonging in Brazil and socio-economic inclusion in the destination country. While many migrants may have heard this before they departed, the real meaning of this fact may only become clear once in Europe. As Alina, also in London, comments:

> I knew that Brazilians worked in low-skilled jobs here and I came prepared for this sort of job, because if you want to live in a different place – not speaking the country's language – I believe you must be prepared to work in whatever type of job you find. But I didn't know anything about how people lived here or their life style. Actually, it was a shock for me because I had to adapt to a different way of living . . . I kind of dropped.

Interestingly, for those with disadvantaged socio-economic positions in Brazil, realities in Europe may have generated expectations that do not match the reality they find after arrival. In the Northeast of Brazil in particular, there is a perception of European men as wealthy. Our data show that this is partly caused by the role that Norwegian men play in renegotiating class positions transnationally. As Thais, a woman in her thirties from the Northeast, who now lives in Oslo, points out:

> Norwegians bring a lot of money when they go to Brazil on vacation because they saved it throughout an entire year. It leads the poor Brazilian women they are dating to believe that they are rich. Once in Norway, these women keep demanding to be treated as if their husbands were rich, which is usually not the case as most of them have low-skilled jobs.

In a subjective sense, our data show that social class positioning inherited from the country of origin is transposed and naturalised in the new context, without taking into account possible reconfigurations based on migrants' incorporation into new material as well as cultural, social and symbolic class realities. This is particularly evident through the

upper-class view on lower-class immigrants, or on their perception of lower-class belonging, regardless of social transformations that occurred with the migration (e.g., through material improvements). This clearly reflects the politics involved in group-making (Wacquant, 2013) and the perpetuation of class difference in new contexts. It is also a consequence of the fact that class positioning is experienced transnationally as much as locally, especially since Brazil remains the main reference for many.

The clearest example of this is in Norway, where social divisions within the small Brazilian community are very strong. Our informants illustrate in various ways that the Brazilian community is organised in groups according to people's wealth. Lucinda argues: 'People who have more money stay in one group [...]; they do not want to mingle with people whose husbands do not have a lot of money.' There is a lot of suspicion between groups, and a lack of interaction is also caused by not wanting to be associated with other groups. Thais expresses this very explicitly when she says: 'Here there are people that come from very different social levels. Some girls behave in a different way than others [...] I am not coming if one of those prostitutes is coming too.' Similar reactions of shame and disassociation are clear from what Miguel, a 57-year-old migrant in Portugal, says:

> When I encounter a 'guy' with a t-shirt from Brazil, I change my sidewalk! Because I'm ashamed! Sometimes I'm ashamed to be Brazilian and that I may be identified with this type of social stratum, which has absolutely nothing to do with me.

Other research has also revealed the existence of 'cleavages' within the Brazilian community and high levels of mistrust (Martes, 2000; McIlwaine et al., 2011; Sheringham, 2013). On the other hand, several studies of Brazilian migration describe how interaction with Brazilians from diverse social backgrounds has a 'levelling effect' on Brazilian migrants (Robins, 2014, p. 41). This work shows how labour market experiences in Europe have to some extent challenged existing class divisions, as Brazilian migrants are brought into contact with other Brazilians from diverse backgrounds (Sheringham, 2013, p. 41). In the new context, Brazilians from diverse backgrounds are often obliged to associate with other Brazilians with whom they would otherwise not have interacted in spaces such as religious institutions, neighbourhoods or community events, for example (Sheringham, 2013; see also Vasquez, 2009). Such studies have highlighted how these everyday interactions allow Brazilians to create a sense of 'Brazilianness', which had not

existed prior to migration, and which to some extent transcends previous regional, educational or cultural divisions (Margolis, 2008). There are some examples of this in our data as well. Gabriel, who came to Norway from Rio de Janeiro, explains:

> But what I can say is that Brazilians meet other Brazilians here, whom they would never have met back in Brazil, because the main thing they have in common is that they come from Brazil. So they meet and get to know each other . . . and that's people you most probably never would have met in Brazil . . . who come from very different social classes.

As such, there is variation in the level of national consciousness and inclination to mingle with other Brazilians. Such variation may be caused by the social positioning of the individuals involved – including not only class position but also gender, race and place of origin. Yet, as Vasquez (2009, p. 41) has argued, while it is important not to reify or homogenise the Brazilian 'community' in countries of settlement, it is also important to consider how social cleavages are determined by the 'structural and spatiotemporal dynamics' of the destination setting.

Migration from Brazil: Exploring class within transnational social fields

In this section, we examine the experiences of Brazilians in Norway, Portugal and the United Kingdom. Our data illustrate how migration is a classed project, as class has an impact on migration destination, aspirations and transnational social fields created after migration. At the same time, class belonging may be re-evaluated and challenged as a consequence of the migration experience.

Changing class composition and impacts on migration destination

Several of those we interviewed who had migrated many years ago pointed to specific changes in the social class composition of those who migrated over time, which was often linked with the region of origin in Brazil. Bernardo, a 57-year-old migrant in Portugal, for example, remarked:

> By the time I arrived 20 years ago, I think it was a type of immigration . . . a type of person who came: more dentists, more professionals

> and staff in television and advertising [...] Nowadays, other people came: construction, labour, less skilled work [...] and then there was an invasion of northeastern and all that stuff.

Here, Bernardo makes an explicit link between occupation, migration and perceptions of class distinction related to regional differences. The notion of an 'invasion of northeastern' suggests that forms of distinction associated to certain regions of origin in Brazil are reinforced in the Portuguese context (even though the Northeast was not a noteworthy region of origin of Brazilians in Portugal). From the range of observations available from our data, it becomes clear that informants refer both to economic capital and other forms of capital. Almir from the United Kingdom, for example, states: 'Brazilians who are coming now, have completely different backgrounds from those who came 20 or 15 years ago. Today, the cultural level of Brazilians is lower and they are coming to make money.'

Padilla (2006, p. 3) discusses the phenomenon of 'proletarisation' of migration from Brazil to Portugal, showing how recent migrants have a lower-middle-class and working-class background whereas earlier waves tended to involve people from 'the professional middle classes'. This trend is also observed in recent studies of Brazilians in other places, including the United States (Margolis, 2008) and the United Kingdom (Evans et al., 2007; 2011; McIlwaine et al., 2011). There are a number of key reasons for increased migration from Brazil, and for the possibility of migration as an option for people across the social strata, including technological advances facilitating and reducing the cost of international travel; the widespread circulation of information about potential destination countries; and what scholars have termed the 'migrant division of labour' (May et al., 2007). As Yara, who was living in London, remarked:

> And then I suppose, it was very expensive for people to come from Brazil to Europe. It was like a status thing to do – because it was very expensive as in those days we didn't have internet, we couldn't search for a cheaper ticket, so tickets to come here were very expensive; transport was very expensive.

Some of the differences we observe between contexts are caused by preferences for and opportunities available to migrate to certain destinations. As Figure 2.4 in Chapter 2 shows clearly, there are great differences in what is the most important reason for Brazilians to come

to Norway, Portugal and the United Kingdom. In the United Kingdom, learning a language scores highest; in Portugal, it is opportunities for work; whereas in Norway it is being with specific people. Norway is a marginal destination for Brazilians (Horst, 2013), whereas Portugal and the United Kingdom are more established destinations. This is also reflected in place of origin: about one-third of the respondents in Norway originate from Brazil's poorer regions in the Northeast of the country.

Class impacts on migration aspirations

Several informants explicitly talk about 'class' and describe migration as a classed project. Indeed, class impacts the motivations for migration and the way people understand its importance. For some, it is about investing in a new lifestyle, adventure or experience, whereas others migrate in order to create an alternative to a disadvantaged class position in Brazil. Joana, a researcher from Rio de Janeiro living in Campinas, reflects back on her experience as a postgraduate student in the United Kingdom and on the migration projects of other Brazilians she came across there:

> Something more permanent, more fixed, with the intention 'I am going to live here' . . . those guys that were there working. People that went to study were there for a defined period.

The narratives of our informants illustrate such differences, and, in particular, those who consider themselves of a more affluent class make a point of clearly distinguishing themselves from others in a less privileged class position. More affluent migrants see their personal migration project as individualised and disconnected from others in Brazil, with little direct impact on the aspirations or livelihoods of those who remain there. The migration of those from lower-class backgrounds, on the other hand, is assumed much more as (potentially) generating migration aspirations and collective migratory processes mediated by direct feedback. For the latter, migration becomes a group mechanism of contesting a disadvantaged class position in the origin country. Sabrina, who moved to Norway with her Norwegian partner in the early 1990s, remarks that 'No one with a good standard of life in Brazil wants to move to another country. [. . .] If you do not have financial problems you do not have to move.' Joana, a 42-year-old migrant in Portugal, similarly argues:

> Families that more or less have a better life, they will not want to leave; those that have a good job will not leave their country. Those that leave do so because they do not have a good job . . . they have difficulties and that is why they leave more.

In the United Kingdom, by contrast, several informants draw attention to the differences in assistance which depend on the diverging migration motivations of family and friends. Paolo in London, for example, says:

> I think there are two levels of Brazilians here, without sounding too discriminating. The ones that normally ask us; the middle class . . . Like this daughter of a friend, she is going to university. There are four brothers as well; I have known them since I was a kid. Now they have a daughter, 18 years old, who wants to come for three months to study English. And then there are those who come to make money, lower class Brazilians and also students.

The motivations of the less affluent, on the other hand, are quite different from the ones of the middle class, Paolo describes. The clearest example is presented by poor Brazilian women from the Northeast who now live in Norway, many of whom are married to Norwegian men. For these women, marriage to Norwegian men followed by migration to Norway constitutes a way of contesting and overcoming a disadvantaged status position in Brazil, which offers limited opportunities for improvement. As discussed above, for many people in the Northeastern regions of Brazil, class distinction intersects with race and gender to the extent that many of these migrants in Norway are triply stigmatised. Migration as an opportunity emerges in relation to the tourism industry in the Northeast of Brazil, which has enabled social interaction between Brazilians and Western Europeans (many of whom are from Norway). It could be understood as an attempt to create alternatives and challenge otherwise fixed class positions. Many of our informants describe the poor conditions in a range of cities in the Northeast and the inability for people to make a living there as the driving factor behind migration. As Lucinda in Oslo – who is not from the Northeast – argues, 'It is because they do not have money. (. . .) They live in misery. Most of them did not have the chance to study (. . .). Their families are very poor and the parents are usually divorced.'

While the gendered nature of this migration emerges predominantly in our data from Norway, some informants in the United Kingdom and Portugal (usually of more affluent class backgrounds) offered similar explanations. Eduardo from the United Kingdom explains:

> The majority of people who come to London are people from small cities; they have problems to communicate even in their first language. It is difficult for them to find a job here because of their lack of knowledge in English and their focus is money. They come to have here what they couldn't have in Brazil.

Transnational support networks

Migration motivations are not just relevant for understanding how migration is experienced, but they also have an impact on how migrants maintain social networks after migration. The transnational social networks that migrants maintain often match their own class background, which impacts their understandings and practices of keeping in touch with family and friends in Brazil. The position of non-migrants in a migrant's network and their perceptions of migration impact the types of transnational practices a migrant engages in and the ways in which feedback operates.

Two common transnational practices discussed in the literature which are closely linked to the role of feedback in perpetuating migration are, first, sending remittances and, second, helping others to migrate. Our findings suggest that those in affluent positions feel that their networks are not in need of either form of assistance. In particular, in the case of Norway, due to its marginal position as a migration destination for Brazilians, class differences seem to have a direct relationship with the propensity to ask for assistance with migration. Eduardo, a migrant in his thirties who was headhunted by a Norwegian company, argues: 'I get the impression that at least the Brazilians I know are not very interested in migrating to Norway. I think it depends on their age, their level of education and what social class they belong to.' Sabrina adds: 'It is a financial thing. The ones who bring people to Norway are the ones who have friends and family in need in Brazil. If your family does not need your help, you do not bring people to Norway.'

Maria-Eduarda, a 35-year-old migrant in Portugal, responds very strongly when asked whether she sends money to people in Brazil. Like many other informants, she clearly wishes to underscore that she does not belong to a certain class background when she answers:

> Nothing, nothing! My family there doesn't need money. They do not have any financial problems like sometimes people come here and talk about. No problem: what's mine is mine here. I left some money there that my father uses to pay the bills that I have there, because I have a real estate consortium there.

For people who migrate from social and regional contexts in Brazil where conditions are tough, the kind of interaction with Brazil tends to take a different form to that described earlier among more affluent classes. They face much stronger pressure to assist others – both by providing financial support and by helping others to migrate. This is again particularly evident in the Norwegian context, where there exist such strong discourses around class and regional background. While those who come from well-off backgrounds respond very strongly and negatively to any question that suggests they help others, there are many stories of assistance provided by the women from the Northeast. As Raphaela, who stresses that neither she nor any of her friends and close acquaintances had helped others to come as well, argues:

> I think it is more common among these girls from the North, from Natal. They are . . . you know . . . poor. They come because they see meeting and marrying a Norwegian man as a life opportunity, as an opportunity to have a better life.

Our interviews with women from the Northeast confirm that financial and migration assistance is more common among this group. Lucinda in Oslo not only confirms that this is common but also explains one of the strategies:

> A common strategy used by Brazilian people is to bring a female friend or a relative to stay with them for three months and within that period try to find them a Norwegian husband. There are a lot of arranged marriages here [. . .] There is always a friend of the husband that is single.

In these circumstances, where migration is understood as a way out of disadvantaged positions in regions of Brazil with few livelihood opportunities, it is not surprising that among people from these regions it is also much more common to provide financial assistance and various types of migration-related support to family members and friends.

Migration feedback on class

Another important element to explore is to what extent class positions change in the transnational social field. This shift can take place before migration, in relation to imaginings of alternative lives, and after migration, through the class mobility of family members or changing perceptions of Brazil's social hierarchies. Those with family members in need actively engage in creating new opportunities for what is perceived as class mobility for members of their family. Embedded in what could be considered class strategies of solidarity, new opportunities for class 'transcendence' are generated for members of the migrants' family. This occurs either through facilitating migration or through improving material conditions back in Brazil. Joana, a 42-year-old migrant in Portugal, explains:

> Because there [in Brazil] in our job, we earned very little . . . I earned very little and I have always been very poor; my parents as well. [. . .] And as I am separated – I have got my three children – I had to give them a better life.

Whether this will lead to substantial change remains to be seen, as migration needs to be understood as one element in a range of aspects impacting societal transformations in Brazil. Class realities in Brazil are changing, as rising incomes and access to a range of resources begin to challenge existing class structures, some of which may be connected to migration. Yet in order for significant changes to occur, much more than immediate material realities needs to be transformed. In addition, migrants will need to start challenging Brazilian class hierarchies (as they intersect with race, region of origin and gender) not only locally, in the new context of residence, but also transnationally, within pre-existent social relations. Alessandra, who has lived in Norway for over ten years, reflects on how she changed her views on the Brazilian social class structure following her migration experience:

> The social class differences in Brazil become too shocking once you have lived abroad too long and come back. You think it is wrong, but there is nothing you can do about it. You get really frustrated.

This not only illustrates how perceptions of class belonging and difference may change with migration and the experience of class structures in other contexts, but it also shows that transforming such structures does not depend solely on one's own perceptions. Changes in

migrants' perceptions may lead to what Levitt (1998) has termed 'social remittances'. By debating and challenging the ways in which social class differences in Brazil impact people's everyday lives, migrants may contribute to changing perceptions in the country of origin as well. The quotation above also reveals the situated nature of class belonging and the usefulness of understanding class as relational. Class is thus determined in certain social fields of power that do not just reproduce existing class positions but also leave space for people to contest those. The transformation and contestation of both material socio-economic realities and perceptions about status thus illustrate that not only do class differences lead to differentiated feedback mechanisms in migration processes but migration may also lead to feedback mechanisms that challenge existing class positions.

Conclusion

Despite the important insights of existing research for understanding the heterogeneity of Brazilian migrant groups in their destination countries, few scholars have examined how migration aspirations and the transnational forms of assistance of migrants are shaped by these complex forms of socio-economic differentiation. Class determines both *who* is willing and able to move and, importantly, *where* they are able to go – the 'hierarchy of destinations that different migrants are able to reach' (Van Hear, 2014, p. 111). Research on Brazilians in three destination countries enables us to analyse how forms of distinction between Brazilian migrants, including class, play out in different ways according to both where they migrate from and also where they migrate to.

Class intersects with other elements of a person's identity, and in the Brazilian case class position is also, to a large extent, determined by factors relating to race, place of origin and gender. While class is thus not an independent factor affecting migration and feedback mechanisms, it is commonly overlooked and deserves much greater attention than is currently the case in migration studies. Our data suggest that migrants from the poorer Northeast region of Brazil have higher incentives to migrate and help others than migrants from, for example, the large urban metropolises such as São Paulo or Rio de Janeiro. Class position influences migrants' social networks and the ways in which they draw on and support transnational links. At the same time, Brazilian material and subjective class realities are not just reproduced but also challenged and transformed in Europe, which impacts upon those local contexts as well as the transnational social field.

In this volume, feedback is understood as the social mechanism that operates to create links across time and space between the migration of migrants who come at a certain time and those that follow after them. The book's aim is to nuance our understanding of the exact mechanisms of feedback operating through social networks, as well as mechanisms that operate beyond networks in more indirect ways, including economic conditions, migration policies and general reception climate. Throughout this chapter, we have sought to nuance our understandings of the feedback mechanisms which operate through social networks, although we have also shown how these are influenced by migration policies and economic conditions.

Our main contribution is to argue that feedback cannot be understood from a national group perspective only. First, there are strong differences in the workings and relative weight of feedback mechanisms *within* national groups, for example depending on class identity. The conceptual and empirical discussion in this chapter helps us explain why migrants who arrive through chain migration are less likely to break the chain and those who came independently are less likely to start a chain (Chapter 8). Our analysis suggests that chain migration is more common among those in disadvantaged socio-economic positions since they are more interested in migration as an alternative to a disadvantaged class position and face most restrictions in access to the destinations they wish to migrate to. Second, a national frame for studying the interrelations between class and migration is insufficient because class may be reconstructed and transformed within *transnational* social fields. Understanding class positions as relational and embedded in power struggles allows us to acknowledge that they are open to questioning and subversion and that this may be put in practice through mobility. These aspects provide important new angles for exploring the operation of feedback mechanisms in migration systems more fully.

Through our analysis we have also identified important areas of further study. First, the impact of migration policies on feedback is a crucial area to explore since migration policies are restrictive for some and not for others. Socio-economic characteristics of potential migrants are often central here. For example, European states aim to stimulate and facilitate the migration of professionals who thus do not require support from social networks in order to have access to migration into Europe. At the same time, the range of legal restrictions that various types of 'unwanted' migrants face lead to situations of 'semi-legality' (Kubal,

2012; 2014) that are likely to impact practices of transnational assistance and migration aspirations. Second, movement in corridors can be in two directions, and more attention is needed as to how migration streams in both directions are connected. Marriage migration that follows from tourism or business investments, which in turn leads to hiring professionals in a company's headquarters, is a good example of types of mobility that interconnect to create complex feedback mechanisms.

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6

The Economic Crisis as a Feedback-Generating Mechanism? Brazilian and Ukrainian Migration to Portugal

Maria Lucinda Fonseca, Alina Esteves and Jennifer McGarrigle

Introduction

Migration researchers have demonstrated the central function that feedback plays in the perpetuation of migration flows between a specific origin and destination region (Massey et al., 1998; de Haas, 2010; Mabogunje, 1970). Feedback mechanisms are the changes in the constituting elements, for example organisations, strategies or flows of people, which are fed back into the migration system, regulating its functions (Bakewell, 2014). Thus, the system's behaviour is modified by the information that is incorporated back by the actors, nurturing, or not, the continuation of the migration process due to its impact in the areas of both origin and reception (Mabogunje, 1970; Massey et al., 1998; Bilsborrow and Zlotnik, 1995). The literature has pointed to the central role of migrant networks in transmitting feedback. These are a form of social capital composed of "institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition or in other words, to membership in a group" (de Haas, 2010, p. 1589). As Massey et al. (1998) explain, the support provided by informal migrant networks for successive migrants decreases the costs of migration, easing the process of migrating and settling in the destination. Indeed, a large body of scholarship contends that sending information, money and goods or transmitting ideas to relatives, friends and acquaintances either in the home country or in another location is an important factor in influencing the intensity and composition of migratory flows connecting origins and destinations

(Poot, 1996; Massey et al., 1998; de Haas, 2010; Bakewell, 2014). This information can cover many different issues, ranging from practical aspects on the migratory process and journey (documentation, travel, etc.) to life in the host society (e.g., the functioning of the labour and housing markets, cost of living, bureaucratic procedures related to permanence, etc.). Moreover, the ability of individuals to introduce alterations in the system depends on the size of their network of relations and also on the capital of those they have ties with. Wider and richer networks can, in principle, have a more prominent role in introducing modifications to the migration complex in comparison with smaller and weak network connections (Boyd, 1989).

The positive impact of feedback results in what Massey et al. (1998) refer to as cumulative causation (Massey, 1990; Fussell and Massey, 2004) and the expansion of migration systems. The flip side of these network mechanisms is the potential role that negative feedback might play in contributing to declining migration flows along specific migration corridors (de Haas, 2010; Engbersen et al., 2013). In this chapter, while acknowledging the importance of other forms of feedback beyond the network, as explored in different chapters in this volume (Bakewell et al., Chapter 1, in this volume; Bakewell and Jolivet, Chapter 9, in this volume; Dekker et al., Chapter 4, in this volume), we focus on the role of migrant networks as a transmissive vehicle. We explore how factors at the macro-level influence the content of direct informational feedback. In particular, we are concerned with the content of feedback that has developed in the context of the economic crisis in Portugal. Our focus on one destination, in the height of a severe economic crisis, and two origins permits us to hold constant macro-factors in the destination and explore the inner workings of migrant networks and feedback mechanisms affecting two different flows.

Migration from Brazil and Ukraine to Portugal increased rapidly during the late 1990s and early 2000s. Both flows are distinct, while past colonial ties and linguistic and cultural links connect Brazil to Portugal, allowing for a continuous presence of Brazilians in the country, these historical connections are absent in the case of Ukraine. Indeed, the inflows from Ukraine to Portugal relate to shifting social and economic realities in the origin and destination and strong network dynamics (Fonseca et al., 2014). The dimension of the flows was such that Brazilians and Ukrainians became the two largest foreign nationalities present in Portugal. Since then there has been a stabilisation and a recent decline of the flow. While the economic crisis has created impetus to return or migrate onwards to new destinations, there have also been changes in the characteristics of both stock and flows, with demographic

consolidation due to family reunification among Ukrainians, and new student migrants from Brazil.

This chapter examines the role that negative feedback mechanisms have played in recent migration dynamics in Portugal, namely declining and return migration. It uses a subset of the data from the THEMIS project: the survey of 400 Brazilians and 306 Ukrainians residing in Portugal, and 62 in-depth interviews conducted with the same groups in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area, as well as return migrants in the country of origin (more details about the methodology are provided in Chapter 2). In particular, our analysis examines one explanation for decreasing migration: the active discouragement of potential migrants by Brazilian and Ukrainian migrants. Using a logistic regression model, we show variations by country of origin in the independent variables that help to explain discouraging migration through sending negative feedback.

This chapter is structured in four main sections. It starts by discussing the changing dynamics of migration to Portugal, focusing specifically on our study groups, followed by a short presentation of the methodology and the empirical data used in the research. Drawing on the survey and interview data, the third section examines the role that the economic crisis has played in return migration and the extent to which macro-factors have generated feedback through actual social networks. The fourth section presents the results of the logistic regression to analyse the propensity of settled migrants to discourage potential further migration. The chapter ends with a final discussion of the more relevant results, stressing the similarities and differences between the way these feedback mechanisms operate in migration to Portugal originating in Brazil and Ukraine.

The changing dynamics of migration to Portugal

The evolution of international migration flows to Portugal from the 1990s onwards is closely associated with the macro-economic, political and institutional conditions of the country (Fonseca and McGarrigle, 2014). In particular, the 1996–2002 cycle of economic growth coincided with an unprecedented increase of labour migration, especially from Ukraine and Brazil. Thus, according to the Aliens and Borders Office (SEF), between 1996 and 2002 the stock of documented Brazilians and Ukrainians living in Portugal changed, from 20,082 to 60,034 and from 71 individuals to 62,448, respectively. The annual evolution between 2002 and 2013 is quite irregular, reflecting not only the change in the legal mechanisms enacted

to ensure a continuous supply of labour into the market but also oscillations resulting from the degree of attractiveness of specific sectors of economic activity. By 2013, there were 92,120 Brazilians and 41,091 Ukrainians representing the two largest migrant groups in Portugal.

Concerning the flows, according to the SEF, 15,000 Brazilians and almost 18,000 Ukrainians entered Portugal in 2002 – many of whom were attracted by the possibility of regularisation in 2001 and again in 2004. The inflows slowed down over the following years after a major reduction in the economic dynamics of the civil construction sector and the slowdown of the Portuguese economy (Figure 6.1).

The inflows increased in 2008 and 2009 due to the profound changes introduced in the immigration law in 2007 that allowed for the regularisation of many undocumented migrants already present in the country (Figure 6.1). From that date on, the worsening of the economic and financial situation of Portugal went hand in hand with the reduction of migratory inflows and increasing return or re-emigration to other countries. In 2009, the GDP decreased by 2.9% in comparison to 2008. In 2010, there was a slight recovery, with a growth of 1.6%, but in the following years a contraction of the economic activity was observed and the growing unemployment reached 15.6% in the third trimester of 2014. Given the fact that most immigrants are confined to the secondary labour market (with insecure working conditions, low wages and low levels of professional mobility), the severe loss of jobs over the last years has affected them more seriously than native workers.



Figure 6.1 Inflow of documented foreign citizens, Brazilians and Ukrainians to Portugal (2002–2013)
Source: SOPEMI 2014.

Data and methodology

The way feedback mechanisms shape the recent dynamics of migration flows to Portugal was analysed using data gathered through 62 (in-depth) interviews conducted in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area, between February and May 2011, with immigrants from Brazil and Ukraine (31 individuals from each of the two groups), and 706 questionnaires responded by immigrants, aged 18 or more, of the same groups, between February and August 2012. We also draw briefly on research developed in the country of origin: 425 questionnaires were answered in Brazil (in Campinas, Governador Valadares and Mantena) between October 2012 and January 2013 and 420 in Ukraine (Kiev and Lviv Oblast) during September and October 2012. In both locations, multi-stage stratified sampling was followed with random route and random selection of a person living in a household. In practice, in Campinas, random sampling was combined with snowball sampling. A more detailed discussion of the instruments and methods used to collect the data can be found in Chapter 2 of this volume.

Some of the basic features of the respondents are summarised in Table 6.1. In the case of Brazil, 37% of the respondents are men and 63% are women. Concerning the Ukrainians, there is a slight predominance of men among the respondents compared to women (51% and 49% of the total, respectively).

Both groups show differences concerning school education: 61% of Ukrainians have post-secondary education (completed at least one year) or higher, whereas the equivalent for Brazilians is 37%.

The interviewees mostly work in the secondary labour market, that is, in low-paying jobs demanding few skills (Fonseca, 2007; Pereira, 2010). However, there are distinctions between the two groups. Indeed, close to 40% of the Ukrainian respondents perform semi-skilled/unskilled manual jobs (e.g., domestic worker, unskilled construction worker, kitchen helper and cleaner), whereas for Brazilians the proportion is much lower (26%). Despite the challenges of finding a job matching one's qualification, 18% of the Ukrainians and 15% of Brazilians perform skilled manual jobs (e.g., skilled construction workers, hair dressers and cooks). Very few respondents of both groups have highly skilled jobs involving coordination, management or intellectual activities. In terms of the employment situation at the moment of the interview, both groups were seriously affected by the economic crisis in Portugal, exhibiting their higher fragility comparative to national citizens (Fonseca and McGarrigle, 2014; Peixoto, 2013). One-fifth of

Table 6.1 Basic structure of the sample

	Brazilians	Ukrainians
	%	%
Sex		
Male	37.4	51.2
Female	62.6	48.8
Year of arrival to Portugal		
< 1995	0.4	0.0
1995–1999	4.5	6.9
2000–2004	28.6	63.3
2005–2009	43.8	19.4
>= 2010	22.7	10.4
Education		
Post-secondary vocational training (completed at least one year)	37.3	60.8
Main activity		
Inactive	23.1	8.3
Unemployed	12.4	20.2
Semi-skilled/unskilled manual	25.8	39.1
Skilled manual	14.7	17.8
Non-manual workers	11.6	4.0

Source: Theorising the Evolution of European Migration Systems (THEMIS) – destination country survey data, 2012, weighted by network-dependent sampling probability.

the Ukrainian respondents and 12% of the Brazilian respondents were unemployed, although the real unemployment rate among foreigners reached higher figures in comparison with Portuguese nationals. Inactivity is also another distinguishing feature with a much higher proportion among Brazilians (23%) than Ukrainians (8%), which is likely explained by the number of Brazilian higher education students in the sample.

The majority of Brazilians and Ukrainians in our sample came to Portugal in the 2000s (Table 6.1). More than 60% of the Ukrainian respondents arrived in the country between 2000 and 2004, and from then onwards there has been a very steep decline in the number of arrivals. In the case of Brazilians, not only is the flow more regular, but there is also a higher concentration in the 2005–2009 period. This reflects the development of a new wave comprising higher education students (Fonseca et al., 2015). The reasons underlying changes in the migration flows will be explored in the following section.

Perception of the macro-economic conditions: Return and transmission of negative feedback

The transmission of negative feedback can have a deterrent effect on other potential migrants from the country or region of origin, leading to the decline of migratory flows (Engbersen et al., 2013; Fonseca et al., 2014). However, as the other chapters in this volume demonstrate, the experiences of migrants in a given destination are relayed to potential migrants through various different media in addition to the network. These include online channels, broadcasting and other forms of indirect feedback. As such, it is important to contextualise our analysis of migrant networks as one mechanism in a more complex puzzle. We can gain some insight into the significance and impact of networks through the THEMIS survey data. Bakewell and Jolivet (Chapter 9, this volume) point out that while the majority of migrants living in the destinations studied for the THEMIS project knew someone before they migrated, this does not necessarily mean that they communicated with them or did not receive information from other sources. Indeed, when we look at the data collected from potential migrants in the country of origin, in this case Brazil and Ukraine, this becomes clear. Among the Brazilian respondents who said they would ideally like to live abroad, around 40% claimed to be influenced either positively or negatively by contact with people who live in Western Europe. In the case of Ukraine, the number is strikingly similar. As such, transnational networks, while having continued significance, are one mechanism among others that shape migration decision-making. Keeping this in mind, we move forward. In this section, using both survey and interview data, we examine, first, the role that the economic crisis has played in return migration and, second, the function that feedback might play in discouraging further migration among the two groups under study.

Return migration

Before turning to the qualitative data, it is important to note that the high intensity of return migration was also confirmed by the results of the THEMIS survey conducted in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area. In fact, 96% of Brazilian respondents and 80% of Ukrainians admitted they knew immigrants from their home countries who had previously lived in Portugal and since left the country (Table 6.2). Moreover, among those who responded affirmatively to that question, 73% of the

Table 6.2 Return and re-emigration: 'Do you know any Brazilians/Ukrainians who previously lived in Portugal and left the country?'

Left the country	Brazilians	Ukrainians
	%	%
Yes	96.4	79.9
No	3.6	20.1
Total	100.0	100.0

Source: Destination country survey data, 2012, Theorising the Evolution of European Migration Systems (THEMIS). Weighted by network-dependent sampling probability.

Brazilians and 54% of the Ukrainians contended they knew six or more people who had already left Portugal.

News of the Portuguese economic crisis and the austerity measures implemented, in 2011, after the bailout by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Commission and the European Central Bank, also reached the origin countries of the main immigrant groups established in Portugal. Leonel from Brazil describes the way that the Portuguese crisis was described on Brazilian TV:

> More things started to appear on the television, about the crisis, do you understand: banks closing, companies losing their contracts? This is a little scary.
>
> (male, 30, born in Rio de Janeiro, migrated to Portugal in 2001 where he worked in advertising before returning to Brazil in 2008)

While the media played a role, informal information networks established between family, friends and acquaintances also transmitted negative feedback. The respondents' narratives show how limited economic opportunities in the destination country are often cited as a major reason for return migration. In the case of Ukrainians, some interviewees, like Anatoliy, explain how migrants had started to return even before the crisis.

> There were many more Ukrainians living here [Portugal] than now. I think that half of them went back to Ukraine. They worked here for a while, saved some money and returned... Some people started to go back to Ukraine because they were tired of being

> here [in Portugal] and far away from the family, since 2006 . . . And now, with this crisis, many more people are returning to the origin country.
>
> (Anatoliy, male, 34, born in Ternopil, migrated to Portugal in 2001, still living in Portugal at the time of the interview and working as an acrylic processing worker)

Experiences of unemployment or extremely short-term and precarious employment are common and clearly act to deter successive migration from both origins as illustrated by the following quotes:

> Now, it's not interesting to come to Portugal because our Ukrainians [country fellows] say they don't have work, it's difficult to find work. Many Ukrainian men are here in Portugal either without work, or enrolled in the Employment Centre, or they work for one month, then they stop for two weeks. It's like this.
>
> (Olga, female, 54, born in Stryi, migrated to Portugal in 2000, still living in Portugal at the time of the interview and working as a housemaid)

> Not so long ago when we walked on the street one could only hear people speaking Portuguese with a Brazilian accent. Now, forget it! It's nothing like before. And it was all in six months! People started to hear that Brazil is performing better . . . Those who are returning get there and say: 'Look, it's not worth going!'
>
> (Elisa, female, 31, born in Piracicaba, state of São Paulo, migrated to Portugal in 1991, still living in Portugal at the time of the interview, the director of her own school)

Return migration is also qualified by positive economic conditions in the country of origin. Moreover, the decision to return is not always made at crisis point, that is, upon becoming unemployed. Oftentimes, as highlighted in the discourses of Francisco and Andrea, a longer-term evaluation of career prospects and potential professional growth was an integral part of their decision to return to Brazil. Both interviewees explain how a lack of professional mobility was a major factor:

> One of the motives is the crisis . . . People don't have jobs, the internal market is very weak and this has been the situation for quite some time. From a professional point of view, I was working but I couldn't grow much more. There wasn't a position that I wanted

> because I had already been promoted and then I was demoted . . . and Brazil, in economic terms, at least in theory, was growing.
>
> (Francisco, male, 31, born in São Paulo, migrated to Portugal in 2004 where he worked as a personal trainer before returning to Brazil in 2010)

> I came to the conclusion that [in Portugal] I was going around in circles. We had a normal middle-class life there . . . we were living a very quiet life there, we paid our bills . . . but we weren't able to send money home [Brazil]. It was useless because [at the end of the month] there was no money left. But I wasn't going through a hard time, I lived quite well, very well.
>
> (Andrea, female, 28, born in the Metropolitan Region of Campinas, state of São Paulo, migrated to Portugal in 2003 where she worked as shop assistant before returning to Brazil in 2007)

The central position that the worsening situation of the Portuguese economy has assumed in informing migration decisions by both migrant groups is observable in the survey data. Around 60% of respondents from both groups disagree with the statement that 'in Portugal there are good economic opportunities'. Still, significant proportions continue to affirm that there are good economic opportunities in Portugal (Table 6.3).

Table 6.3 Perceptions of the macro-economic conditions: 'In Portugal there are good economic opportunities'

Opinion	Brazilians	Ukrainians
	%	%
Agree	38.5	42.8
Disagree	61.5	57.2
Total	100.0	100.0

Source: Destination country survey data, 2012, Theorising the Evolution of European Migration Systems (THEMIS). Survey data weighted by network-dependent sampling probability.

Feedback

In line with their general perception of economic opportunities in Portugal, according to data gathered by the THEMIS survey, 69% of the Brazilian respondents and 66% of the Ukrainian immigrants would not

recommend moving to Portugal to other co-nationals. Both Ukrainians and Brazilians elaborate on their reluctance to assist others or to encourage the move to Portugal due to current constraints in the Portuguese labour market, as the quotes below clearly illustrate.

> Now many people want to come here. But they get here and there is not much work. My father can give my number, then someone from my home village calls me. I have to explain that I don't have work . . . he can't even speak the language, doesn't have a visa or anything. What is there for him to do here now?
>
> (Vladyslav, male, 42, born in Lviv, migrated to Portugal in 2001, still living in Portugal at the time of the interview and working as a bricklayer)

> Now it's not worth coming to Portugal, because if he comes [he is referring to an acquaintance], he can't speak [Portuguese], he may stay with me, ok, but concerning work, how much is he going to earn? Five hundred, six hundred euros . . . it's not enough. There won't be any money left in the bank account (. . .), it's not worth it. It's better to stay there.
>
> (Andriy, male, 37, born in Zhitomir, migrated to Portugal in 2000, still living in Portugal at the time of the interview and working in a removals company)

Brazilian immigrants talk of the same difficulties:

> Before it was worth it, but not today. When I arrived, I sent 1,000 Euros back and it reached 4,000 reais [in exchange]. Today you have 1,000 Euros and get 2,000 reais. Almost not worth it, right? And to earn 1,000 Euros here today, cleaning is not easy, because we have to pay rent and all . . . and you can not send anything. So today, I would advise people not to come . . . Financially speaking no. To make money, I would not advise anyone to come.
>
> (Mateus, male, 47, born in Naviraí, state of Mato Grosso do Sul, migrated to Portugal in 2004, still living in Portugal at the time of the interview and working as a mechanic)

The lack of economic opportunities also impacts the capacity of settled migrants to provide assistance to new migrants. As Rafaela explains:

> Although at the time I came here I think this [mutual aid] happened, and before I came too, I know many cases . . . over the past few years

> I think this has been declining a lot . . . because people are already struggling.
>
> (Rafaela, female, 30, born in Sumaré, state of São Paulo, migrated to Portugal in 2003, still living in Portugal at the time of the interview as a student)

Interestingly, negative feedback is often shaped by an objective assessment of Portugal's economic climate rather than being shaped by settled migrants' own life circumstances. For instance, if we look at the survey data, over three-quarters of Ukrainians and 70% of Brazilians contend that their quality of life apart from economic issues is either somewhat better or much better than the equivalent in their country of origin. Significant differences can be observed in the interview narratives between Brazilians and Ukrainians with regard to the type of criteria used to evaluate the benefits of living in Portugal. As such, informational feedback reflects differences in expectations of the two groups based on their assessment of the conditions in their origin country. This is reiterated in migrants' discourses, as elaborated by Leonardo:

> We all know that Portugal is in crisis and in fact today Brazil . . . for those wanting work presents a better life. So I would advise people who want to come here not to come, to be quiet and try life because in reality is not easy here. It doesn't compensate for those who do not have a steady job and a steady paycheck . . . nowadays the Brazilians are leaving the reality is that.
>
> (Leonardo, male, 33, born in Governador Valadares, state of Minas Gerais, migrated to Portugal in 2009, still living in Portugal at the time of the interview and working as an Evangelical church pastor)

While economic concerns dominate informational feedback among Brazilians, Ukrainians consider other factors in evaluating the benefits of migrating to and living in Portugal. Indeed, several of the interviewees, in spite of the challenging employment conditions, contended that they would continue to encourage migration to escape the volatile political situation in their country of origin. Olena sums this up succinctly:

> I would advise people to move, because in Ukraine, there it is worse, even worse. The crisis is worse.
>
> (Olena, female, 52, born in Lviv Oblast, in Portugal since 2001, unemployed)

This is reiterated by Artem:

> Despite the difficult times, even so, it is advisable to come to Portugal. My advice would be yes, I haven't changed my opinion . . . there is more stability here.

Moreover, the same interviewee contended that many return migrants actually ended up coming back to Portugal again:

> I know many people who already went back to Ukraine, they said for good, but in the end they returned to Portugal again because Ukraine is not stable.
>
> (Artem, male, 47, born in Mycolaiv Oblast, Ukraine, in Portugal since 2001, welder and electrician)

Beyond economic concerns, other aspects that improve life quality are valued and considered when sending feedback. Borysko values the more tranquil lifestyle he has in Portugal.

> It is calmer, more peaceful here. Here there are better people . . . I speak freely, I don't need to be nervous. In Ukraine I am more nervous. Life there is not worth it, there is no money and everyone is nervous. Here it is much better.
>
> (Borysko, male, 54, born in Liviv Oblast, Ukraine, in Portugal since 2001, assistant electrician)

Similarly, Valentyna values freedom of speech, democracy and social security:

> We can say what we want, we can say anything, there is democracy here . . . Even though there is little work and a crisis in Portugal people could still come as there is always the possibility of finding work, also here there are benefits for the unemployed. There is still not this type of help in Ukraine.
>
> (Valentyna, female, 52, born in Kherson Oblast, in Portugal since 2001, domestic cleaner)

As pointed out by Fonseca et al. (2014, p. 126),

> it is also evident that the feedback sent home concerning migration to Portugal also involves some selectiveness in perception and/or

> in the people to whom the advice is given. This suggests that the advice provided, and eventual assistance, can be different in specific conditions and for particular persons.

Indeed, 18% of the Ukrainian interviewees and 11% of the Brazilians stated that *in some cases but not in others* they would recommend that people move to Portugal. For instance, almost half of the Brazilian students surveyed would recommend that others come to Portugal and a further 21% in some cases and not in others.

The case of Brazilian students attending higher education institutions in Portugal is an interesting one. Indeed, due to long-standing historical ties and linguistic proximity between the two nations, these international students choose Portugal as the destination for their graduate and post-graduate studies (Fonseca and Hortas, 2011; Fonseca et al., 2015). In the academic year of 2012/2013, there were 8,917 Brazilian university students in the country, accounting for 29% of the total number of foreign students in higher education in Portugal. Often benefitting from a scholarship given by the Brazilian government in the ambit of the Programme Science Without Frontiers, these foreign citizens are not directly affected by the economic crisis and challenges posed by the labour market. Taking advantage of the mobility agreements between the universities of both countries, selecting Portugal to pursue their higher education studies provides Brazilian students with an opportunity to improve their CV, gain international experience and know other cultures.

Regarding migration policy, the opinions of Brazilians and Ukrainians are more divergent than in the case of the country's economic situation. Immigration policy is considered very restrictive by more than half of the Brazilian respondents and only by 18% of Ukrainians. It is possible that this difference may be explained, at least partially, by the fact that a larger number of Brazilian migrants are in an irregular situation with their hopes of regularisation frustrated. Their expectations were built on the previous experiences of relatives, friends and acquaintances who easily obtained a residence permit in Portugal. It is also important to note that regarding other aspects of life in Portugal or in relations with the native population, Brazilians often feel they experience discrimination and, generally speaking, present less favourable views compared to migrants from other nationalities (Fonseca and McGarrigle, 2014; Fonseca and Malheiros, 2011; Malheiros and Esteves, 2013; António and Policarpo, 2011). This trend is also seen in the difference of opinion among Portuguese people about the image of Ukrainian and Brazilian

men and women. Thus, whereas 85% of the Ukrainian respondents consider that 'in general, people in Portugal see men from their country of origin in a positive way', only 43% of the Brazilians share the same opinion. When the question focuses on women, the divergence is even greater: only 18% of the Brazilian respondents and 97% of the Ukrainians think that female migrants from their countries are seen in a positive way by Portuguese people. Although these are perceptions, and thus, subjective evaluations, the differences observed between the two groups of migrants are statistically significant.

In summary, we can conclude that the THEMIS survey, together with the testimonies of settled Ukrainian and Brazilian migrants in Lisbon, shows that the initial positive perception of labour market opportunities has, in general, been replaced by largely negative views on current economic opportunities in Portugal. Despite this, not all informational feedback sent home through social networks is negative. Other aspects also play a role in determining the feedback fed into the migration system. In particular, the experience of students results in a different form of feedback than workers showing the complexity within specific national origin groups. In addition, negative perceptions of the political situation in Ukraine led several interviewees to send positive feedback through social networks. The stability and security of Portugal, and the freedom this affords, even in the context of the crisis, still made migration worthwhile and recommendable.

Explaining the transmitted negative feedback through migrant networks

As noted in the previous section, around two-thirds of the respondents of both groups would not recommend migrating to Portugal. However, there is a clear difference evident in the THEMIS data between 'not recommending' and actually having had discouraged someone from moving to Portugal. Certainly, only 40% of Brazilians and 21% of Ukrainians surveyed had ever discouraged someone from their respective countries of origin from emigrating to Portugal. Brazilians are more proactive than Ukrainians in discouraging migration to Portugal. One reason for this is that Ukrainians are relatively more satisfied with their migration outcome. This is evidenced by the fact that 73% of Ukrainians compared to 36% of Brazilians see their economic situation today as being better as a result of migrating to Portugal. Still, at the same time, almost half disagree with the statement that there are good economic opportunities in Portugal. For both groups, other non-economic factors

play a fundamental role in determining the respondents' satisfaction with their migration experience.

In this section, through logistic regression analysis, we aim to explore the factors that explain why some migrants proactively discourage people from emigrating to Portugal. Four groups of independent variables are considered: (i) individual characteristics, including sex; (ii) actual characteristics (age, education level, legal status, employment status, social network composition and an evaluation of actual economic situation compared with that before migration, contacts and representation of economic and political conditions in the origin country); (iii) time of migration to Portugal (before or after the economic crisis); (iv) representation of economic and political conditions in Portugal, as well as representation of attitudes of Portuguese natives on immigration. The analysis was conducted using SPSS (version 20 – using the Forward: LR method).

Results

The results of the logistic regression model are summarised in Table 6.4. The best predictors of discouraging migration from the country of origin identified by the logistic regression model are different for Brazilian and Ukrainian immigrants. For the Ukrainian respondents, only age and communicating at least once a week with people from their country of origin present a statistically significant effect on the probability of discouraging migration to Portugal. Thus, older respondents and those who maintain regular contact with their country of origin are more likely to discourage migration to Portugal (Table 6.4).

For the Brazilian respondents, there are three statistically significant variables: time of immigration to Portugal, their opinion on economic opportunities in Portugal and a comparison between their actual personal economic situation and that before emigrating (Table 6.4).

Brazilian migrants who arrived in Portugal before the beginning of the crisis in 2008 are twice as likely to discourage more migration from Brazil than those who arrived later. By contrast, the likelihood of dissuading others from emigrating is reduced by half among Brazilian migrants who have a positive view of their migratory project and the economic conditions in Portugal in 2012.

Although the remaining variables included in the regression model are not statistically significant in disincentivising emigration to Portugal, it is important to note that the majority of factors considered have the same effect for Brazilian and Ukrainian migrants. Indeed, the likelihood of deterring other potential immigrants from coming to

Table 6.4 Odds ratios from logistic regressions of having discouraged anyone from origin who wanted to move to Portugal, by country of origin

	Ukrainians	**Brazilians**
Sex (Male)	1.518	1.640
Arrival in Portugal before 2008	2.690	2.025*
Agree there are good economic opportunities in Portugal	.670	.524*
Agree that immigration policies in Portugal are very strict	.529	1.380
Agree that there are good economic opportunities in origin country	.878	1.118
In general, people in Portugal see Brazilian/Ukrainian women in a positive way	.456	.824
Sharing information about life in Portugal on blogs, online forums, social networks or websites such as Facebook, written in Portuguese/Ukrainian or Russian	1.462	1.216
People you feel closest to, whether your friends or family members, include Brazilians/Ukrainians living in Portugal	.588	.961
People you feel closest to, whether your friends or family members, include Portuguese people who live in Portugal	.636	.876
Current legal status (documented)	3.837	1.592
Unemployed (currently)	.802	1.283
Undergraduate education (at least one year)	1.104	1.205
Have been asked for help with things such as documents, travel costs, employment or housing	.781	1.478
Economic situation is today, as a result of moving to Portugal, compared to what it would have been in Brazil/Ukraine better or much better	.679	.481*
Communication with people in Brazil/Ukraine at least once a week	6.313*	1.711
Age in years	1.041*	1.025
Pseudo R^2		
Cox and Snell	0.126	0.108
Nagelkerke	0.194	0.146
McFadden	0.128	0.085

Note: $^*p < 0.05$

Source: Destination country survey data, 2012, Theorising the Evolution of European Migration Systems (THEMIS). Weighted by network-dependent sampling probability.

Portugal reduces with a more positive representation of the Portuguese economy, a positive evaluation of the migration experience in economic terms and the image that the host society has of Ukrainian and Brazilian immigrant women and intimate social networks composed of friends resident in Portugal (Portuguese and co-ethnics).

Similarly, individual characteristics, such as sex, age, education level and legal status, also display a relationship in the same direction for both groups. The likelihood of deterring the arrival of new immigrants from the country of origin is also greater in both groups, for men, for documented immigrants and for those who have attended at least one year of university. Employment status and opinion on the restrictiveness of Portuguese immigration policy also have different effects according to nationality group on the likelihood of sending negative feedback. Despite the fact that these differences between Brazilians and Ukrainians were not statistically significant, they are easy to interpret from the perspective of origin country conditions. In the light of the economic downturn and the growing social and political instability in Ukraine, it is understandable that the perception of economic opportunities combined with political freedoms and stability in Portugal is manifest in more positive feedback to Ukraine in comparison with Brazil.

Conclusion

After several years of economic growth and labour market expansion driven by civil construction and the internationalisation of the Portuguese economy that attracted foreign workers from a wide range of countries, the migrant communities living in Portugal were confronted with a shrinking labour market, escalating unemployment rates, wage cuts and enterprise bankruptcy. Keeping this context in mind, this chapter sought to analyse the nature of feedback sent to the home country by Brazilian and Ukrainian nationals living in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area. Given the lack of attention paid to negative feedback in the literature, we were particularly interested in understanding the mechanisms of discouraging potential migrants from migrating. By focusing on two origins, we were able to compare the explanatory factors for sending negative feedback through personal networks in these two different corridors. We show the continued relevance of networks from the perspective of settled migrants, yet acknowledge other mediums through which feedback is transmitted. Moreover, migrants' encouragement or discouragement of new migrants coming from their country

of origin mainly influences individuals who already have aspirations to migrate.

Among the interviewees of the two largest immigrant communities in Portugal – Brazilians and Ukrainians – the perception of the worsening of macro-economic conditions predominates in both groups (62% and 57%, respectively). Through the qualitative data, in particular, it is apparent that unemployment, precarious working conditions and a lack of professional mobility result in negative perceptions of Portugal and future opportunities. The evaluation of structural factors in Portugal, not necessarily linked with settled migrants' own experiences, interacts with the perception of opportunities in the country of origin to determine the nature of feedback fed into the migration system. Despite this, there is a difference between not recommending migration and proactively discouraging migration to Portugal. Indeed, while around two-thirds of the respondents of both groups would not recommend migrating to Portugal, only 40% of Brazilians and 21% of Ukrainians surveyed have ever discouraged someone from their respective countries of origin from migrating to Portugal. Concerning the factors that may help to explain why migrants proactively discourage others from migrating to Portugal, for the Ukrainians, age and communicating at least once a week with people from their country of origin are the best predictors. This suggests that those who have been in Portugal for more time and keep in regular contact with their origin countries are more likely to discourage migration to Portugal. For Brazilians, statistically significant variables that result in a greater likelihood of discouraging emigration are the time of immigration to Portugal, namely having arrived before the economic crisis; their opinion on current economic opportunities in Portugal; and a comparison between their actual personal economic situation before and after their emigration.

While the qualitative and quantitative data point to the significance of the economic crisis in Portugal in shaping the content of informational feedback sent through personal networks, we also showed the continued consideration of other non-economic factors. In the case of some Ukrainians, quality of life considerations, such as political stability, freedoms and welfare, were reasons for continuing to encourage migration even in the current economic climate. To understand the process, it is also important to take account of the activity status of migrants; for example, we find that feedback remains positive in the case of Brazilian students, regardless of the economic crisis, but reflecting global trends in international student migration. Thus, our understanding of how feedback is developed through personal networks in the context of

economic downturn depends on a complex interplay between individual characteristics and structural circumstances in the country of origin and destination.

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7

From Bridgeheads to Gate Closers: How Migrant Networks Contribute to Declining Migration from Morocco to the Netherlands

Erik Snel, Godfried Engbersen and Marije Faber

Introduction

A key finding of contemporary migration research relates to the crucial role of social networks and informal support within migrant networks in the initiation and the continuation of migration flows between sending and receiving countries (Massey, 1990; Massey et al., 2005; Epstein, 2008; Faist, 2010; Boyd and Nowak, 2013). Migrant networks encourage migration in numerous ways, both directly and indirectly. Whereas 'pioneer' migrants have to find their way to and in the destination country on their own, by facilitating their successors – giving, contributing to transport costs and providing access to housing and employment – they make migration easier and cheaper, and thus more attractive for potential new migrants. But previous migrants encourage migration also indirectly. Frequent home visits and transnational communication spread information about the benefits of migration and contribute to the rise of a 'culture of migration' in the home country. Bakewell and Jolivet (Chapter 9, in this volume) describe these personal or impersonal 'messages' from previous migrants to prospective migrants as 'personal network feedback' and 'general broadcast feedback'. But in whatever way, migration networks contribute to migration up to the point that migration flows perpetuate, 'independent of their initial conditions' (Mabogunje, 1970, p. 14). For Massey and colleagues, the latter mechanism is the crux to what they call 'cumulative causation': 'Once begun, international migration tends to expand over time until network

connections have diffused so widely in a sending region that all people who wish to migrate can do so without difficulty' (Massey et al., 2005, p. 45). However, as De Haas (2010) rightly observed, the underlying assumption of this line of reasoning is that migration flows, once they start and reach a certain level, have an inherent tendency to increase *ad infinitum*. Contemporary migration research offers only few insights into how and why migration may also decline.

This chapter deals with declining migration. We will show how social networks and broader feedback mechanisms under certain conditions may also impede migration. Our analysis focuses on an empirical case of declining migration within a well-established migration system from Morocco to the Netherlands. This started with the arrival in the Netherlands of labour migrants from Morocco in the 1960s and 1970s, followed by their spouses and children since the mid-1970s and 1980s. Even in the 1990s, movement continued, particularly because of ongoing marriage migration: Moroccan-Dutch youngsters finding their spouses in the home country of their parents. However, as we shall see, the inflow of Moroccan newcomers in the Netherlands started to decline in the early 2000s and has decreased steadily since then. Using qualitative and quantitative empirical data from interviews and a survey of Morocco-born migrants in the Dutch city of Rotterdam (N = 420), we will outline how migrant networks contribute to the declining migration between Morocco and the Netherlands.

Declining migration from Morocco to the Netherlands

Like many other West-European countries, the Netherlands recruited labour migrants (guest workers) from the Mediterranean in the second half of the 20th century. Initially, in the early 1960s, most of these migrants were from Spain, Italy and Portugal; later, large numbers of guest workers arrived from Turkey and Morocco. In addition to individual employers recruiting guest workers from the Mediterranean countries, the Dutch government also assumed a direct role by concluding recruitment treaties with various sending countries: Italy (1960), Spain (1961), Turkey (1964) and Morocco (1969). Between 1964 and 1972, almost a quarter of a million guest workers arrived in the Netherlands, of which about 40,000 were from Morocco (Nicolaas et al., 2012). Following the 1973 oil crisis, the Netherlands found itself facing rising unemployment for the first time in decades. The Dutch government reacted by formally ending the recruitment of labour migrants. Although the government expected the guest workers to return home,

many of them – particularly Turks and Moroccans – decided to stay and, instead, bring their families over to the Netherlands (Entzinger, 1984). Over the years, the process of family reunion was followed by the new process of family formation (the children of migrants finding their spouse in their parents' origin country).

Furthermore, there was a substantial irregular migration flow from Morocco to the Netherlands. Although labour migrants were no longer formally admitted, they kept coming. The Dutch government responded with a policy of tolerance and small regularisation programmes. In 1975, about 15,000 mainly Turkish and Moroccan undocumented migrants were regularised (Lucassen and Lucassen, 2011, p. 133). Another limited regularisation of mainly Moroccan irregular migrants occurred in 1980. As a result of this progressive migration, Moroccans are now the fourth-largest migrant group in the Netherlands (after Turks, Germans and people born in the former Dutch-Indies). In 2014, there were almost 375,000 migrants from Morocco and their descendants residing in the Netherlands.[1]

Since the late 1990s, migration from Morocco to the Netherlands has been declining. In the late 1990s, more than 5,000 Morocco-born immigrants arrived in the Netherlands annually. After 2004, the figure was down to less than 3,000 (Figure 7.1). The years 2006 and 2007 even saw



Figure 7.1 Inflow of Morocco-born immigrants in the Netherlands (dashed line = trend line)
Source: Statistics Netherlands.

a negative net migration between Morocco and the Netherlands: more Moroccan-born immigrants left the Netherlands than arrived.

The data in Figure 7.1 are derived from Dutch population registers, which means that only officially registered Morocco-born immigrants are included, but there is also a declining trend in the irregular migration of Moroccans to the Netherlands. Police records over the years 1997–2010 show a declining trend in the number of irregular Moroccan migrants stopped by the Dutch police, from nearly 1,500 in 1997 to just 200 in 2010 (see De Boom et al., 2012). Although there are no reliable apprehension figures available for the years before 1997, there are clear indications that substantial numbers of irregular immigrants came to the Netherlands in the 1980s and early 1990s to work in horticulture, manufacturing, construction, cleaning and other low-skilled work (Burgers and Engbersen, 1996; Van der Leun and Kloosterman, 2006).

Changing institutional contexts of immigration

To explain this steep decline in the migration from Morocco to the Netherlands, we should consider what Portes (1995) calls the three 'contexts of reception' for immigrants: (1) the host country's government's policy towards migration in general or specific migrant groups; (2) the degree to which the host country's labour market offers opportunities for newcomers; and (3) the societal reception of migration or specific migrant groups in the public opinion of the host country (Portes, 1995, pp. 23–25; Portes and Rumbaut, 1990, pp. 85–90).[2] Our argument is that the declining migration from Morocco to the Netherlands is not – or at least, not only – a direct consequence of these developments in the three contexts of reception. We argue that institutional developments – stricter immigration policies, reduced labour market opportunities and an unfriendly societal reception of immigrants – may negatively affect the size of migration, but that these effects are reinforced by migrant networks because settled migrants are less willing and less able to support potential newcomers (family, friends and co-ethnics).

Until the late 1980s, there were substantial economic opportunities for Moroccan migrants in the Netherlands, migration policies were rather tolerant and also the societal reception of guest workers in the old urban districts where they settled was rather friendly. Their arrival was generally not perceived as a threat, also because guest workers did not compete with Dutch workers for the same jobs (Bovenkerk et al., 1985). Several of our elderly interviewees recall the welcoming social

and economic climate for Moroccan labour migrants in the Netherlands in the 1960s and 1970s:

> When I arrived in Utrecht [1965], I stayed there for one day. The next day I went to the industrial area in Utrecht. And when I arrived there, everyone was waving to me (...) In that time you could find work everywhere. There was more than enough work in the 1960s. Everyone was waving to me and telling me 'come to us, come to us'. I went to a company that was fixing streets. They make tiles and bridges. I went there; they welcomed me and accepted me as employee. They gave me a chair, and put all kind of stuff in front of me to choose from. Different kinds of cigarettes and cigars, cookies ... In those days they were really happy with us. They immediately gave me a place to stay in a caravan. And I started to work there.
>
> (Youssouf, male, 70, Morocco–Netherlands, migrant)

> My husband always talked with great respect about Dutch people, because in his first months here (before 1975) the people were very helpful and friendly towards him (...) with everything (...), like going to the doctor, finding the shopping mall, getting to know Dutch institutions and organisations like the police station, the public health centre (GGD) or work agencies. The migrants were very helpful towards each other, but the Dutch people also really helped the migrants to find their way here. In both neighbourhoods in Rotterdam that I lived in (...) there was a very good atmosphere between migrants but also between migrants and Dutch people.
>
> (Nadia, 55, female, Morocco–Netherlands, migrant)

However, many guest workers lost their jobs in the economic crisis of the late 1980s. Successive Dutch governments reacted, among other things, with more restrictive immigration policies. With many previous migrants on social security and the opening of the borders within Europe due to the Schengen Agreement, the problem was framed in socio-economic terms: new regulations were meant as protection around the Dutch welfare state. In 1991, the Dutch government barred the use of social security numbers for irregular migrants, which severely limited their access to the (formal) labour market and social security work. In 1998, the Linking Act ('Koppelingswet') was implemented, which effectively barred irregular immigrants from a wide array of public services, including welfare, public housing, education and (most) health care. Since then it has been obligatory for government and semi-government services, such as welfare departments and

housing associations, to check whether their clients are lawful residents and hence are entitled to certain services or benefits (Broeders and Engbersen, 2007; Leerkes et al., 2012; Van der Leun, 2003). In the same era, the Dutch multicultural integration policies were gradually replaced with new approaches with more obligations and less specific provisions for immigrants that aimed at enhanced labour market participation of immigrants (Entzinger, 1984).

During the second half of the 1990s, the labour market opportunities for migrant workers improved – partly thanks to the steady economic growth in these years – and unemployment among Turks and Moroccans in the Netherlands dropped from around 30% to around 10%. Nevertheless, the societal reception of immigrants became more hostile and prejudiced. In the large cities and poor neighbourhoods, there was a growing discontent about multicultural society (Scheffer, 2003). This resulted, in 2002, in the rise of the populist politician Pim Fortuyn, who came to prominence through his sharp criticism of the Dutch multicultural society and ongoing immigration. His arguments in favour of closed borders ('the Netherlands is full') and against Islam ('a backward culture') found resonance in Dutch public opinion. In 2002, Fortuyn was assassinated, but his political party became the second-largest party in the national parliament and in the following years (until 2006) the Netherlands had several conservative governments (Van Holsteyn and Irwin, 2003; Koopmans and Muis, 2009). Selective immigration policies were a key focus of these cabinets, especially in relation to labour migration and family migration. In this period, Geert Wilders established his populist Freedom Party, becoming a powerful and vocal actor in the Dutch national parliament and public debate. Wilders is best known – like Pim Fortuyn – for his anti-Muslim and anti-immigration statements.

Also in the early 2000s, job opportunities for Moroccans and other immigrant categories once again declined. As many migrant workers got temporary jobs in the late 1990s, they were the first to be dismissed in the new economic recession that started in 2003. Moreover, following the EU enlargement of 2004, large numbers of labour migrants from Central and Eastern Europe travelled to the Netherlands (Black et al., 2010). Many of them work in low-skilled jobs, particularly in the Dutch horticulture and in construction work, where they compete with irregular and regular migrants from non-EU countries.

Moreover, Dutch public opinion increasingly adopted anti-immigration and anti-multiculturalism sentiments in this period. For instance, in a 2002 national survey, a majority of the respondents (strongly)

agreed with statements such as 'there are too many immigrants in the Netherlands' or 'immigrants abuse social security' (SCP, 2003, p. 370). Moreover, the murder of the film-maker Theo van Gogh in 2004 reinforced latent and manifest anti-Muslim sentiments in Dutch society. In a national survey in 2012/2013, one-third of the respondents – including respondents with an ethnic minority background – agreed with the statement that there are too many immigrants in the Netherlands (SCP, 2013, p. 72).

All in all, the societal contexts of reception of immigrants changed dramatically in the Netherlands in the late 1990s and early 2000s: (i) the Dutch migration regime became more restrictive and selective over the years, (ii) labour market opportunities for Moroccan migrants reduced, partly due to the influx of competing labour migrants from Central and Eastern Europe, and (iii) there was a more hostile societal reception of immigrants in general, but particularly those coming from predominantly Muslim countries like Morocco.

Changes in the institutional context of migration may affect migration in various ways. The direct effect of stricter migration policies, declining economic opportunities and a more hostile societal reception of migrants, may be that potential migrants are discouraged from coming to a receiving country or are unable to meet the enhanced migration requirements.

However, here we focus on the indirect consequences of these changes in the institutional context of migration. Stricter immigration policies, declining economic opportunities and a harsher public opinion climate vis-à-vis immigrants, may also influence the behaviour of settled migrants in the receiving country towards potential migrants: possibly to discourage them from coming or to refuse to support them. For instance, when settled migrants are held financially responsible for newcomers,[3] they will be more cautious about inviting newcomers to work or marry in the host country. Not only will they be less willing to encourage and to support new migrants, they will also be more selective: they are likely to refuse to support vague acquaintances and only be willing to support close friends and family. As Böcker (1994, p. 103) observes in a small-scale study on Turkish migrants in the Netherlands and their relatives in Turkey: 'settled immigrants are not always willing to act as *bridgeheads* for prospective migrants. They sometimes act more like *gatekeepers* for the (...) authorities' (our italics). And, as we shall see, under certain conditions settled migrants may even act as *gate closers* for newcomers (see also Paul, 2013).

Measuring assistance and support by migrant networks

In our survey and qualitative interviews with settled Morocco-born immigrants, we asked them extensively about both the support they received during their own migration and their intentions to support potential newcomers from Morocco to the Netherlands. We also asked the respondents about their perception of Dutch migration policies, the economic opportunities for migrants in the Netherlands and the current public opinion climate vis-à-vis immigrants. This information enables us to describe the extent to which settled migrants are still willing to support newcomers or not, and what their motivations are for taking this stance. We expect a negative correlation between negative views on the current developments in the Netherlands regarding the three 'contexts of reception' on the one hand, and the respondent's willingness to support potential newcomers on the other. If this is the case, this may be a part of the social mechanisms that explains the declining trend in Morocco–Dutch migration.

THEMIS survey in Rotterdam

The survey had 420 respondents, somewhat more women than men. Many of our respondents belonged to older age categories: two-third of our respondents were 40 years or older; one in six respondents was 60 years or older. The age of respondents obviously strongly overlaps with their duration of stay in the Netherlands. On average, our respondents had been living in the Netherlands for over 23 years. More than half of them (59%) had lived in the Netherlands for at least 21 years. Only 10% of respondents had arrived in the Netherlands within the last ten years. These figures suggest that a relative large share of our respondents belong to the generation of Moroccan guest workers and their spouses who arrived in the Netherlands in the 1960s and 1970s. This also explains the relatively low educational background of our respondents, at least compared with current Dutch educational standards. Almost three-quarters of our respondents were less educated or had not completed any education at all; only one in four respondents had an intermediate educational level. Less than half of the respondents were working. This may seem a low employment rate, but it is representative for the Moroccan-born population in Rotterdam.[4] More than one in four respondents was unemployed, occupationally disabled or retired. The remaining respondents did not work for other reasons (mainly housewives). Some respondents told they were participating

in voluntary work or either studying or following a language or civic integration course. To summarise, we can say that particularly the older generations of (former) guest workers and their spouses were well represented in our sample, and that we interviewed relatively few recent migrants, particularly recently arrived highly skilled migrants.

Our survey contained several questions about the role of informal social support in migration processes. Firstly, we asked respondents about the support they had received during their own migration. We asked whether they were assisted with (1) financing the costs of travelling abroad, (2) obtaining necessary visa or permits, (3) finding their first job and (4) their initial housing in the Netherlands. We constructed a new variable by counting the number of domains in which people received assistance during their migration to the Netherlands. The variable ranges from 0 (did not receive help in any of the four domains) to 4 (received help in all the four domains).

Secondly, we asked respondents about their intentions to support newcomers today. We asked about the respondents' support intentions in five specific domains, namely (1) obtaining a visa or residence permit, (2) covering travel costs, (3) finding a job, (4) finding housing, and (5) accommodating someone in one's own home. The respondents could answer that they would either 'never help', 'help in some cases but not always' or 'always try to help'. Instead of studying the answers in each domain separately, we constructed two variables in which the five domains are combined. The first variable ('always support') represents the number of domains in which a respondent would 'always' try to help (Table 7.1). The variable ranges from 0 (would not help in any of the five domains) to 5 (would always try to help in all five domains). This variable is used in Table 7.2. The second variable ('scale support') is a scale, taking the mean of the five variables (using all three categories of the variables). The scores on the scale 'intention to provide assistance today' range from 0 to 2. The higher the score, the stronger the intentions to offer support in several domains to potential migrants from Morocco to the Netherlands. With a Cronbach's alpha higher than 0.8 (0.839), this is a statistically reliable scale. This variable is only used in the regression analysis (Table 7.3). Finally, we also asked respondents whether or not they, in general, would recommend people from Morocco to move to the Netherlands. The answer categories were 'yes', 'sometimes' and 'no'.

Thirdly, we asked respondents about their perception of the political, economic and social situation in the Netherlands. Respondents were asked whether or not they agree with statements such as *'In the*

Netherlands, immigration policies are strict', 'In the Netherlands/Morocco, there are good economic opportunities' and *'In general, people in the Netherlands see Moroccan men/women in a positive way'* (this was asked in two separate questions in the questionnaire). These three items cover the three contexts of reception of Portes (1995). Respondents could agree or disagree with these statements or they could reply '*Don't know*' – only few respondents chose the latter option. In order not to lose these respondents, we incorporated a separate category 'Don't know' into the analyses. We combined the two questions about how the Dutch perceive Moroccan men and women into an index measuring the societal reception of Moroccan individuals by Dutch public opinion. Sixty respondents answered 'Don't know' at both questions; they received the mean score at the scale (0.49).[5] The index ranges from 0 to 1.[6]

Finally, the survey contained questions about the respondents' personal characteristics. Gender, educational level, duration of stay, frequency of contact with people in Morocco and most important migration motive are taken into account. Educational levels were divided into three categories: lower education (primary education); intermediate education (secondary and vocational school); and higher education (tertiary education). The duration of stay is measured by the time elapsed since the respondent first migrated to the Netherlands. Since the duration of stay strongly overlaps with the age of respondents, we did not include the latter variable into the analyses. Respondents' frequency of contact with people in Morocco was put in three categories: often (every day or once a week); regularly (every month); and, rarely or never (less than every month or never). Finally, we asked migrants what their most important reason for migrating was and we classified responses in four categories: family reasons, experiencing culture, employment/economic opportunities and study/learning the language.

THEMIS qualitative interviews in Rotterdam and Rabat and Nador

We conducted 30 in-depth interviews with Moroccan migrants residing in the Rotterdam area in the Netherlands and 44 Moroccan respondents in the regions of Rabat and Nador in Morocco (24 return migrants and 20 family members of current migrants in the Netherlands). Respondents in the Netherlands were asked about their own migration history and their perception of the current migration from Morocco to the Netherlands. Respondents in Morocco were asked about their migration aspirations and also about their perceptions of migration from Morocco to the Netherlands and other receiving countries.

Received assistance and contemporary support intentions

Informal social support is the oil that keeps the immigration machine going. That goes certainly for our Morocco-born respondents at the time of their own arrival in the Netherlands. As can be seen from the column "Received assistance during migration" in Table 7.1, the (large) majority of our respondents had received some kind of support during their own migration. They received support to finance their travel expenses, to obtain a visa or residence permit and to find employment. Fewer respondents (only 19%) were supported to find accommodation after their migration. Many respondents did not need this kind of support because they joined their partner who already lived in the Netherlands. All in all, few respondents came to the Netherlands without any support of others. However, the figures on the support received during one's own migration contrast sharply with the figures on the current intentions of respondents to support potential newcomers from Morocco to the Netherlands (see column "Intention to support newcomers today" in Table 7.1). Today, only a minority of respondents will always try to help newcomers with various aspects of their migration. Less than one in four respondents would always support newcomers with their employment or housing. Less than one in ten respondents would always support newcomers financially with their travel expenses, with obtaining visa and document, and with accommodating newcomers in their own houses.

Table 7.2 gives a more condensed picture of the assistance respondents received during their own migration and their intention to support newcomers today. The majority of them (69%) has no intention to support new arrivals from Morocco today; 22% of the respondents intends to support newcomers in only one or two domains. This implies that less than 10% of the respondents intend to support newcomers in three or more domains. As Table 7.1 shows, our respondents are particularly hesitant to provide assistance when the financial or emotional costs of support are substantial (as is the case with paying for someone's travelling expenses or accommodating someone in one's own home). With regard to less demanding kinds of support (helping to find employment or housing), more respondents say they would try to help sometimes or even always. Moreover, the large majority of our respondents (79%) would not encourage Moroccan people to come to the Netherlands; only 9% of all respondents would recommend friends and family in Morocco to come to the Netherlands right away (figures not in the tables).

Table 7.1 Received assistance during one's own migration and intention to provide assistance today (%)

	Received assistance during migration				Intention to support newcomers today			
	Received assistance	**No assistance**	**Not applicable**	**Total (N)**	**Always try to help**	**Sometimes**	**Never**	**Total (N)**
Paying travelling expenses	78.8	21.2	–	100 (415)	8.2	22.1	69.7	100 (416)
Obtaining visa/documents	81.1	14.9	4.1[1]	100 (390)	10.6	29.1	60.1	100 (414)
Obtaining first job	55.6	25.2	19.2[2]	100 (417)	23.0	17.3	59.7	100 (417)
Finding housing	18.9	6.0	75.2[3]	100 (419)	20.9	16.8	62.4	100 (417)
Accommodating someone	–	–	–	–	6.5	15.4	78.1	100 (416)

Note: [1]This percentage includes respondents who already had the Dutch nationality during their migration.
[2] This percentage includes respondents who already had a contract during their migration and respondents who have never worked at all.
[3] This percentage includes respondents who came to the Netherlands to live with someone who already had a dwelling.
Source: THEMIS destination country survey data of Moroccans in the Netherlands (unweighted data).

Table 7.2 Received assistance during migration compared with the intention to provide assistance today ('would always help') (%, N = 420)

Intention to give assistance today	Received assistance during migration			
	None	1–2 domains	3–4 domains	Total
None	80.0	69.5	67.5	69.0
1–2 domains	20.0	22.2	21.1	21.7
3–5 domains	–	8.4	11.4	9.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: THEMIS destination country survey data of Moroccans in the Netherlands (unweighted data).

Table 7.2 shows to what extent both issues – the assistance respondents received in the past and their intentions to support newcomers today – are interrelated. It shows a sharp contrast between received assistance and intentions to support newcomers today. Respondents who did not receive any support during their own migration generally do not intend to support newcomers today. However, this also goes for the majority of the respondents who did receive assistance in one or two domains and even for those who received assistance in three or four domains. We see these outcomes as an indication that settled Moroccan migrants in the Netherlands have taken the role of 'gate closers'.[7]

Negative perceptions about the Netherlands and support for newcomers

Our main research question is, however, to what extent the support intentions of settled Dutch-Moroccan migrants are related to the political, economic and social developments in the Netherlands – or at least, to their *perception* of these developments. Therefore, we examine what factors explain the declining inclination of settled migrants to support newcomers.

Table 7.3 presents the outcomes of a regression model with 'intentions to give assistance nowadays' to potential newcomers as dependent variable. To simplify the analysis, we here use the scale that measures the extent to which respondents intend to support newcomers on various domains ('scale support'). As explained before, this scale varies between 0 (no support) and 2 (maximum support). The first two models in Table 7.3 show the effects of various personal characteristics of respondents on their support intentions. First, we see that male respondents intend to support newcomers more than females.

Table 7.3 OLS regression with 'intention to give assistance today' as dependent variable (N = 394)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	B	B	B
Female (ref = male)	−0.198*	−0.228*	−0.265**
Education (ref = low)			
Medium	0.088	0.091	−0.001
High	−0.320*	−0.358*	−0.528***
Duration of stay	−0.007*	−0.006*	−0.007*
Frequency of contact (ref = often)			
Regular		−0.116	−0.119
Rare or never		−0.208*	−0.194*
Most important migration motive (ref = family reasons)			
Experiencing culture		0.034	−0.060
Labour possibilities		−0.068	−0.147
Study/learning language		0.135	0.074
Received assistance during own migration		0.044	0.048
Strict immigration policies in NL (ref = disagree)			
Agree			−0.380*
Don't know			−0.531**
Good economic opportunities in NL (ref = disagree)			
Agree			0.124
Don't know			0.152
Good economic opportunities in Morocco (ref = disagree)			
Agree			−0.156
Don't know			−0.188*
People in NL see Moroccan people in positive way (index 0–1)			0.209**
Missings index (ref = no missing value on index)[1]			0.145
Nagelkerke R-square	0.053	0.090	0.202

Note: [1]In order to control for deviancy, we included a separate dichotomous variable which includes the categories (0) respondents with valid answers on the index 'people in NL see Moroccan people in positive way' and (1) respondents with missing answers on this index (in the index, those missing are replaced by the mean of the index: 0.49).
***p < .001; **p < .010; *p < .050 (two-tailed).
Source: THEMIS destination country survey data of Moroccans in the Netherlands (weighted data).

The model furthermore shows that educational level has a strong effect on support intentions. Higher educated respondents – a small minority in our sample – are significantly less inclined to offer support than less educated respondents. Probably, they face more financial risks when supporting new migrants. The longer respondents are staying in the Netherlands, the less their intention to give support. As we already observed, more than half of the Moroccan respondents in the Netherlands lived here for 20 years or longer. We may assume that quite of few of these older Moroccan respondents, who arrived before 1990, are now retired and living from social security or small pensions. Obviously, they will often lack the means for extensive support for new migrants. However, 'duration of stay' explains the differences in the support intentions of respondents only marginally.[8] The migration motive of respondents seems no factor in explaining support intentions. With regard to the frequency of contact in the home country, those with little or no contact intend to support newcomers to a much lesser extent than those with more contact. Finally, having received support during the own migration process does not have an effect on the intention to give assistance today.

In Model 3, the perceptions of respondents of the political, economic and social situation in the Netherlands are included into the analyses. First, the respondents' perceptions of the stricter Dutch migration policies are related to their support intentions. Respondents who agree with the statement '*The Netherlands have strict migration policies*' and even those who answer '*don't know*' to this statement have less intention to assist newcomers than respondents who disagree with this statement. That the stricter Dutch migration policies in particular are an obstacle to support potential new migrants from Morocco also becomes clear from our qualitative interviews with both settled Dutch-Moroccan immigrants and with returnees in Morocco who lived in the Netherlands. As Aicha, a 30-year-old domestic worker in Rotterdam, says: 'When Moroccans want to migrate to the Netherlands, I tell them it is more difficult now because of government rules' (female, migrant). Respondents like Ilham, an 82-year-old widow, warn potential newcomers how hard it is to get the correct papers and that if they do not manage to, they will be in the Netherlands illegally, which can be very difficult: 'In the past I didn't tell them to stay in Morocco, but now I do. Holland doesn't let them stay without a reason. Do they want to become an illegal? Do they want to get chased by police? It isn't an option!' (female, Morocco–Netherlands, migrant).

Some respondents offer clear negative advice to (young) Moroccans wishing to emigrate to the Netherlands, and other respondents offer more moderate negative advice, such as Fatima, a 25-year-old return migrant in Kenitra, who was born in the Netherlands, states:

> In Morocco, you just need a job and everything is available. I explained to them: what are you going to do in the Netherlands? There are a lot of restrictions; you have to pay a lot of money, visa constraints. Even marriage is made very difficult on the Dutch part.
>
> (female, Morocco–Netherlands)

And Meryem says:

> Every time I go on a holiday to Morocco they ask me to help them. But I tell them that I can't help them. (...) They think that I deny them happiness or a better life. They don't call us anymore. One time they told me that I was able to help them, but that I don't want to help. I told them that Holland wasn't mine. I can't tell the government what to do. I can't open the borders for them. I don't want to get into trouble with police.
>
> (female, 76, Morocco–Netherlands, migrant)

Another outcome of Table 7.3 (Model 3) is that the respondents' perceptions of the economic situation in both the Netherlands and Morocco hardly influence their support intentions. (This is different from the findings of Fonseca et al., Chapter 6, in this volume.) However, in our qualitative interviews our informants are also rather negative about the current economic opportunities for Moroccan immigrants in the Netherlands. In their assessment of the situation, migration to the Netherlands is hardly profitable. For instance, when Yassir, a retired labour migrant currently living in Rotterdam, was asked whether he advises people in Morocco to come to the Netherlands, he answers: 'No! What would he do here? Without work, without papers? What would he do here?' (male, 66, migrant). As Miro, a 26-year-old taxi driver in Rabat, told us:

> I know that the economic situation in the Netherlands is not that good. Even my cousin who has been in the Netherlands for quite some time said that it becomes more and more difficult to find a job. He has not even saved up any money to invest in projects here in Morocco. If my cousin who has been in the Netherlands for a long

> time did not make it, how could a newcomer like me ever achieve something there?
>
> (male, Morocco–Netherlands, family member)

Table 7.3 (Model 3) finally shows that the support intentions of respondents are also strongly related to their perception of the societal reception of Moroccans in the Dutch public opinion. Respondents who agree with statements that the Dutch public see Moroccan men or women in a positive way are more inclined to support newcomers than respondents who disagree with these statements. Also our qualitative interviews with settled Dutch-Moroccan immigrants and with return migrants in Morocco give ample evidence about the negative effect of the anti-immigrants and particularly anti-Moroccans sentiments in the current political and public debates in the Netherlands. As Tarik, a 33-year-old tram driver in Rotterdam, says:

> I really like this country in many respects, but there is one thing that I think is very dangerous: the fact that politicians like Geert Wilders are becoming very popular. For Muslims this means that their rights to practice their religion are in danger. I think a lot of European countries – including the Netherlands – are very afraid of Islam, and they are trying to keep this religion outside their borders (. . . .) Muslims are not welcome anymore. That is why I would be cautious with giving Moroccans the advice to come here.
>
> (male, Morocco–Netherlands, migrant)

Kamar, a 41-year-old return migrant, does not even want her daughter – who has the Dutch nationality – to move to the Netherlands because of the current Dutch social climate towards migrants:

> I do not like her to live there although she has a Dutch nationality, because the Netherlands of today is not the Netherlands of the past, that beautiful tolerant country; now it is getting cruel and bad. I do not like my daughter to always be or to have 'second choice'.
>
> (female, Morocco–Netherlands)

The same goes for Zohra, a 41-year-old housewife in Rotterdam, who advises prospective migrants not to come to the Netherlands:

> The Dutch people have changed a lot; they are more hostile towards migrants and towards people with a different ethnic background. So

> no, I would not advise them to migrate [to the Netherlands]. I mean life is also hard in Morocco, but at least in Morocco people don't discriminate you or look down on you. (...) Life is hard; people should be aware of that. It's not like the old days. It's really not.

In sum, two of the three 'contexts of reception' identified by Portes – the societal reception of Moroccans in the Netherlands and the respondents' perceptions of governmental policies – are related to their intentions to support newcomers. The third 'context of reception', the economic opportunities for Moroccans both in the Netherlands and in Morocco, appears not to affect their intentions to support newcomers.

Conclusion: Migrants as gate closers

Migration theory and migration research have a tendency to focus on increasing migration flows. There is less attention to the phenomenon of declining migration (De Haas, 2010). Our analysis describes one specific example of declining migration, the 'migration corridor' between Morocco (areas of Rabat and Nador) and the Netherlands (Rotterdam area). We have argued that at least three different macro-developments in the Netherlands have contributed to the declining migration from Morocco to the Netherlands: the current economic crisis resulting in declining job opportunities for newcomers from Morocco, the Dutch immigration policies that have become much stricter and selective in the past decade, and the growing hostility in the Dutch public opinion towards immigrants, in particular (though not exclusively) towards those coming from Muslim countries such as Morocco. We argued that these macro-level developments may have influenced migration to the Netherlands *directly*, for instance because fewer potential migrants meet the new Dutch immigration requirements, or because fewer potential migrants aspire to go to the Netherlands since the migration costs (both financially and emotionally) are now too high. However, this chapter focused on how these macro-developments negatively affect migration *indirectly*, specifically through their negative effect on the intentions of settled migrants to support potential newcomers.

Our research found that the majority of the Dutch-Moroccans who we interviewed in Rotterdam received informal support from Moroccan *bridgeheads* during their own migration but is nevertheless not inclined to support potential newcomers today. In fact, a large majority of the respondents would not even recommend Moroccans to come to the Netherlands; less than one in ten respondents would recommend

friends and family to come to the Netherlands. These figures clearly show that settled Dutch-Moroccan migrants have become *gate closers*, closing the door for potential newcomers by warning them for the limited possibilities in the Netherland, but also by actively discouraging them and not supporting them (see Engbersen et al., 2013; Paul, 2013).

We also found that the respondents' refusal to support potential newcomers is related to their perceptions of both the unfriendly societal reception of Moroccans in the Netherlands and the stricter Dutch migration policies. The latter is, indeed, a rational argument. Stricter migration policies not only negatively affect new immigrants themselves – the threat of becoming an undocumented immigrant – but also their benefactors. Before arriving in the Netherlands, a potential immigrant has to find someone – often friends or family already living there – who takes financial responsibility for him or her. However, with limited economic opportunities due to the current economic crisis and possibly limited access to the formal labour market, the benefactor takes a substantial risk in supporting the newcomer financially, not only in a short period after arrival, but also in the long run. Confronted with this risk, settled Dutch-Moroccan migrants will rather not support potential newcomers.

Our theoretical argument, to conclude, would be that social networks still matter for migration. Whereas dominant migration theory emphasises the migration-facilitating effects of migrant networks on the rise and continuation of migration flows, we here saw that social networks can also have negative migration-undermining effects. The refusal of settled migrants to support potential newcomers *reinforces* the effects of the macro-developments in the three 'contexts of reception' on migration.

Notes

1. In 2014, 168,320 Dutch residents were born in Morocco and 206,676 residents were born in the Netherlands with at least one parent born in Morocco; Netherlands Statistics refers to the latter category as 'second generation allochthonous'. (http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication/default.aspx?DM=SLNL&PA=37296NED&D1=26%2c31%2c39%2c47&D2=0%2c10%2c20%2c30%2c40%2c50%2c60-64&STB=T%2cG1&VW=).
2. Portes and Rumbaut (1990) distinguish three 'contexts of reception': governmental policies, labour markets and ethnic communities, whereas in later work Portes (1995) adds societal reception of migrants as a relevant 'context of reception'. Here, we do not use 'ethnic community' (to provide instrumental and emotional support to migrants) as a relevant perception because this factor is almost identical with the central independent variable in our analyses (the intentions of settled migrants to support newcomers).

3. According to Dutch legislation, the person who invites a foreign migrant (incl. his or her spouse) to come to the Netherlands has to guarantee the means of existence of the migrant (for a maximum of five years).
4. According to recent data, only 44% of all Rotterdam residents with a Moroccan background (first- and second-generation migrants) in the age of 15–65 years were employed (Entzinger and Scheffer, 2012, p. 89).
5. In order to control for deviancy, we included a separate variable which includes a dichotomous variable with the categories (0) respondents with valid answers on index, (1) respondents with missing answers, replaced by the mean.
6. The value 1 means that the respondent agrees with both statements ('Dutch people see Moroccan men and women in a positive way'); the value 0 means that the respondent disagrees with both statements.
7. We should add, however, that we checked whether Moroccan migrants who arrived in the Netherlands in the 1960s and 1970s received more assistance than Moroccan migrants who arrived in later periods. This was not the case.
8. The factor 'duration of stay' explains 1.3% of the total variance of the dependent variable. We could not include the age of respondents as an independent variable into the regression analysis next to 'duration of stay' because of collinearity (older respondents have arrived earlier).

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8

Making and Breaking a Chain: Migrants' Decisions about Helping Others Migrate

Jørgen Carling

Introduction

Someone who wants to migrate to Europe might encounter a host of obstacles: understanding the legal requirements, obtaining the necessary documents, paying human smugglers, arranging a place to stay, finding work upon arrival. The relevance of different hurdles, and how hard they are to overcome, differs from person to person. A common element, though, is that receiving help from someone already in Europe can be invaluable.[1]

The idea of people helping one another conjures up notions of harmony. But this is a sphere of more intricate mechanisms and emotions. In previous fieldwork among Cape Verdeans – both prospective migrants and people in the diaspora – I was struck by the prominence of help from settled migrants in the way people talked about migration. The move to Europe was often described with words that attributed the helpers with remarkable agency and influence: 'it was Calú who put him in the Netherlands', 'Bia gave him papers', 'he sent for his cousin'. Providing such help could be a source of gratification for migrants, attesting to their personal benevolence as well as their standing within a larger migration system.

I also encountered frustration on both sides. Migrants sometimes felt burdened by unrealistic requests for help. 'Many people asked me for help to emigrate', said a Cape Verdean janitor in the Netherlands. 'They like to ask, but there is nothing you can do. You can't help everybody – but they don't understand!' The mirror image of this vexation was evident in Cape Verde, where people vented disappointment in emigrant

relatives who ignored calls for help or failed to provide the help they had promised (Carling, 2008).

Ethnographic fieldwork, such as mine among Cape Verdeans, enables close-up analyses of human drama. But ethnography cannot lay out the larger patterns of occurrence and variation. How common is it for migrants to receive requests for help, to honour them or to turn them down? What factors can predict the likelihood of different outcomes? These are questions that require survey data. The THEMIS survey in destination countries, accounted for in Chapter 2, was designed in part to answer questions such as these.

I focus on help that settled immigrants provide to prospective migrants in their country of origin. Such help is an essential form of feedback that can initiate and perpetuate migration systems. Moreover, as we will see, stagnating migration flows are sometimes associated with settled migrants' lower inclination to assist with migration.

Requesting and providing help to migrate: A conceptual framework

In order to understand the mechanisms at work, we need a precise understanding of 'help' in the context of migration. A quantitative approach, like the one I take here, engages with individual preferences and agency in a very limited way. But its requirements for precise operationalisation can inspire new theoretical reflections on concepts that we often use casually. What does it mean, for instance, that a person 'helps' someone else migrate? I suggest a conceptualisation of help to migrate based on three tenets:

1. Help consists of *actions* that make it easier for others to achieve an objective; these actions require some level of effort on the part of the helper.
2. The objective of interest is *international migration* – moving to another country for an extended period of time. The relevant forms of help are therefore actions that contribute to making migration possible. Such actions include help with planning and carrying out the move, as well as initial assistance after arrival, which could be decisive for making migration sustainable.
3. Help is restricted to actions in response to the prospective migrant's *aspirations* for migration. In other words, it is not 'help' if migration is orchestrated without consideration for the migrant's own wishes. This is a point I will return to in a later section.

There is scope for great variation within the notion of help as it is laid out above. I will discuss three dimensions of variation in the nature of migration help: its value, its cost and its geographical location. First, the *value of help* – in terms of contribution to achieving the migration objective – can range from insignificant to decisive. Imagine a settled migrant who seeks to help a nephew in the country of origin by providing detailed information about migration regulations and ways of securing a residence permit. This help could be decisive if it enables the nephew to identify and make use of an opportunity. But if there is nothing new compared to what the nephew knew already, the value of the uncle's help is zero.

Second, the *cost of helping* can be large or small, and take a variety of forms, including financial outlays, legal risks, social indebtedness, emotional duress, time and hassle. Financial assistance is often unnecessary when migrants have the necessary documents for travel. In all 12 migration corridors of the THEMIS project, the majority of migrants either covered their own travel costs or had it paid by their spouse or partner. For migrants who are smuggled, however, costs are often ten times as high as for regular travel. Providing financial assistance at this level is clearly a form of help that is costly to the helper.

Stricter penalties for human smuggling also make certain types of help costly, exposing the helper to significant legal risks. We envision human smugglers as criminals who orchestrate voyages in overfilled boats or trucks with secret compartments, but less dramatic forms of help also qualify as human smuggling. Under the UK Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, the relevant offence is defined as 'an act which facilitates the commission of a breach of immigration law', subject to a maximum penalty of 14 years' imprisonment. Arranging a marriage of convenience for someone else, for instance, is punishable under this section (Clayton, 2008).

The helper can, in some cases, be more of a broker who helps the migrant by drawing upon their networks. For instance, helping a newly arrived relative find work could involve asking acquaintances who are employers if they can offer a job. The cost of helping might then come in the form of owing the acquaintance a favour. Such social and emotional costs can also come in the form of intra-family strains, for instance related to hosting new arrivals.

The costs of helping can, of course, be offset by emotional rewards. As I mentioned initially, migrants can take pride in being able to provide valuable help and appreciate the positive outcomes for people they care about. The costs can also be offset by material rewards, be it in the

form of an outright payment, or as an implicit understanding that the migrant is indebted to the helper.

The third dimension of variation in migration help – in addition to its value and cost – is its geographical orientation. Help could be provided by people at the origin, at the destination or in third locations (Bashi, 2007; Van Hear, 2004). It could also be received at different points on migration trajectories: help to leave the country of origin, help in transit, help to enter a destination country and help to settle and become self-sufficient after arrival.

The direct help to migrate that comes from the destination has particular theoretical significance: it sets migration chains in motion. Prospective migrants who receive help from settled migrants can in turn help others from abroad. In this chapter, I specifically address such help by settled migrants at the destination. I will use the terms (potential) 'beneficiaries' and (potential) 'providers' to refer to the prospective migrants and the settled immigrants, respectively.

Help, as I define it, requires agency on the part of potential beneficiaries: they need to express an aspiration and make the connection with possible actions by potential providers. I refer to the expression of agency as a *request* for help. This concept serves as an analytical reference point even though the potential beneficiary's articulation could be subtle and implicit. Recognising the role of requests, however, allows us to analyse the provision of help as an interactive process.

This interaction can be conceptualised in a model of request and response. Figure 8.1 presents such a model, incorporating the potential beneficiary, the potential provider and the main sources of influence on their choices. The model centres on two decisions: the potential beneficiary first decides whether or not to request help from the potential provider; if a request is made, the potential provider decides whether or not to offer help. This is a simplification that might seem overly mechanistic. But it is a meaningful use of questions that, because they are asked in a survey, need to be crude and simple.

In our qualitative data, we have seen a greater diversity in the interaction between helpers and prospective migrants. For instance, settled migrants sometimes initiate contact and offer to help someone migrate. At times, this could be motivated by the helper's own needs, for instance a demand for labour. Such situations reflect the potential for further exploring the borderlines of helping. The model presented here can inform future ethnographic research that explores the nuances of whether, when and how people request and provide help. It identifies a series of influences on each decision. When potential beneficiaries



Figure 8.1 Conceptual framework of requesting and providing help in the migration process

decide to request help or not, we may think of three main sources of influence, represented by three arrows in Figure 8.1. First, the assessment and decision-making process is shaped by the potential beneficiaries' aspirations and attributes. Aspirations, in this case, involve international migration either as a means to an end or as an end in its own right (Carling, 2014). The stronger the wish to migrate, the larger the likelihood of requesting help. People's individual attributes include factors such as personality and social standing, which may affect their inclination to ask for help from others.

Second, decisions reflect assessments and interpretations of the external environment, for instance about the obstacles to migration and possible strategies for overcoming them. In many conflict settings an escape to safer environments requires the services of human smugglers, who need to be paid. The potential for financial help is obvious. In other migration contexts, a transnational marriage might be the most realistic prospect for overcoming immigration regulations. The most valuable help might lie in facilitating connection with potential spouses.

Finally, the decision on requesting help or not is influenced by characteristics of the potential provider. The threshold for asking may, for instance, be lower if the settled immigrant is perceived to have ample capacity to offer help. The relevant attributes of the potential provider

are partly constituted *in relation to* the potential beneficiary. In other words, potential providers may be characterised by kinship relations or past exchanges with the potential beneficiaries or their families.

When potential providers decide on their response to the request, we can think of a mirroring set of influences. The external environment they relate to is different from, but overlapping with, that of the potential beneficiaries. Settled immigrants' decisions are affected by their understanding of immigration regulations, for instance, but also by social norms that prevail within the transnational social field they share with the potential beneficiaries.

The decision on providing help or not is, of course, also shaped by the attributes of the potential helpers. Some people are in a position to offer help more easily than others. Moreover, people differ in the value they place on helping. The figure highlights three underlying influences on the relevant attributes: enduring characteristics (e.g., gender), migration experience (e.g., time since migration) and current circumstances (e.g., household finances). But being inclined to help others migrate does not mean being prepared to help anyone. The filtering of whom to help and whom to reject is influenced by the characteristics of the person who asks.

Data and context

Different types of data and analyses could be used to explore the mechanisms that are reflected in the model. Our data from the destination country survey of the THEMIS project are primarily relevant to the right-hand side of the figure but also tell us something about how requests from different people are met. As Chapter 2 describes in detail, the survey was conducted among Brazilian, Moroccan and Ukrainian migrants in the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and the United Kingdom. The average sample size was 238 per corridor.

Table 8.1 shows the sample size for each corridor along with selected descriptive statistics. There are substantial differences between the three origin groups as well as between the destinations. For instance, Brazilian migration to Norway is heavily female and dominated by family formation, unlike Brazilian migration to the three other countries. Brazilians in the United Kingdom represent a migration flow that is driven not only by work or family concerns but by desires for language learning and new cultural experiences. In terms of migration history, Portugal stands out with a more recent Moroccan population and a more established Ukrainian population, compared to the other destinations.

Table 8.1 Key characteristics of the sample, by origin and destination

	Male (%)	Median time since migration* (years)	Came to be with partner* (%)	Motivated by opportunities for work* (%)	Has tertiary education (%)	Sample size *(n)*
Brazilians						
Netherlands	42	3	13	70	30	214
Norway	20	4	60	68	62	187**
Portugal	37	4	13	63	35	400
United Kingdom	47	2	13	47	74	239
Moroccans						
Netherlands	36	20	40	61	3	420
Norway	37	16	55	66	28	80**
Portugal	40	4	35	85	6	207
United Kingdom	32	14	33	66	28	180
Ukrainians						
Netherlands	46	3	34	70	54	215**
Norway	28	1	15	81	87	172
Portugal	51	10	24	91	38	306
United Kingdom	47	5	13	91	68	240

Weighted by network-dependent sampling probability. *See the section 'Influences on decisions about requesting and offering help' for details on the underlying questions and calculations. **Data collection not completed through respondent-driven sampling.
Source: THEMIS survey data.

Pooling and weighting

Each corridor sample is relatively small, and the project's theoretical objective was not to describe each one. The question, then, is how the data should be pooled for analyses like the one I am embarking on here. For most of the analyses, I have chosen to pool the data for each origin group and run separate models for Brazilians, Moroccans and Ukrainians. This approach gives three samples with an average of 953 respondents, and it allows for differentiating between effects within each national group. Destination country is, obviously, one of the control variables in the models. We can therefore determine, for instance, whether a Brazilian in the Netherlands is more or less likely to offer help to co-nationals than an otherwise similar Brazilian in Norway. What we cannot do is to differentiate between the effects that other

independent variables might have on different destinations. In other words, I estimate the overall effect of, say, educational attainment on the inclination to help among all Brazilians in our sample, regardless of whether they are in the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal or the United Kingdom.

The corridors were selected because of their complementarity and diversity. The size of the migrant population in each one is not indicative of its theoretical importance, and it would make little sense to use these population figures as weights. Instead, we have constructed weights that compensate for the variation in sample size and give each corridor equal influence in the total. Since data collection was not completed by means of respondent-driven sampling (RDS) in all corridors, it was necessary to develop alternative weighting procedures that could be applied across all 12 samples. We devised a method of network-dependent sampling probability, which is accounted for in Chapter 2 and applied to the analyses here.

Practices of helping

Table 8.2 shows the proportion of respondents who have ever provided the five specific types of help that were enquired about in the survey. The question specifically referred to helping people 'who wanted to move' to the destination. In other words, the help referred to is linked with the migration process. In all three cases, the most widespread practice is help with employment at the destination, which, in some cases, will have been a prerequisite for migration. Assisting directly with obtaining documents, such as visas or residence permits, is somewhat less common, at least among Brazilians and Ukrainians.

Table 8.2 Proportion of respondents who have provided help to prospective migrants, by country of origin (%)

	Brazilians	**Moroccans**	**Ukrainians**
Obtaining migration documents	17	12	17
Covering travel costs	10	8	13
Finding a job	32	13	25
Finding housing	29	8	23
Accommodating someone at home	27	12	21

Weighted by network-dependent sampling probability (see Chapter 2).
Source: Destination country survey data, 2012, Theorising the Evolution of European Migration Systems (THEMIS).

The qualitative interviews illustrate that other forms of help – not captured by the questionnaire – also play a role in the migration processes. A case in point is match-making endeavours that facilitate migration through family formation. For instance, one of our Brazilian interviewees in Norway found a partner for a friend in Brazil who had been complaining about not finding a suitable husband. The interviewee created a profile on a dating website in Norway, helped the friend read and write messages in Norwegian and even met a prospective match in person to verify that he was a suitable choice. The man then went to Brazil to meet the friend, and 'in six months they dated, got engaged and were married' in Norway.

In other cases, the initial request for help was made by a person in the destination country. A Ukrainian interviewee in the Netherlands was asked by a relative of a friend if she 'had a niece or knew another girl for him'. The respondent then contacted her niece, who agreed to come to visit for a couple of weeks to meet the prospective husband. Such stories illustrate that social networks sometimes shape migration flows in ways that are more complex than our two-person request–response model suggests.

Finally, the qualitative interviews illustrate the importance of another less tangible form of assistance: moral support. As one of our Ukrainian interviewees in the United Kingdom put it, 'you share useful information, which is mainly about employment or housing, things like that. [...] First of all, we were young girls and we held on to one another. There was this moral circle.' Such help can be decisive to the sustainability of migration.

Measuring help and willingness to help

Our survey data contain overwhelmingly complex information about various forms of help that has been given or received. A big part of the analytical challenge is to select and distil from this data in order to address the big issues raised in the Introduction. Since there is no optimal strategy, I pursue a four-fold analytical approach with complementary perspectives.

An overview of the approach is presented in Table 8.3. First, I ask what determines whether or not migrants have ever *been asked for help* with immigration documents by prospective migrants in their country of origin (Analysis A). Overall, 22% of respondents have received such requests. This analysis is an oblique modelling of the decision on the left-hand side of Figure 8.1, the decision to request help or not. The

Table 8.3 Overview of analyses

	Unit of analysis	Dependent variable	Sample	Independent variables	Time frame	Table(s) presenting results
A	Persons (settled immigrants)	Having been asked for help with immigration documents (mean = 0.22)	All immigrants (n = 2,723)	Characteristics of the immigrant receiving the request	Cumulative since migration	Table 8.5, Table 8.7
B	Persons (settled immigrants)	Having offered help with immigration documents (mean = 0.71)	Immigrants who have been asked for help (n = 698)	Characteristics of the immigrant receiving the request	Cumulative since migration	Table 8.5, Table 8.7
C	Persons (settled immigrants)	Intention to help with immigration documents if asked (mean = 0.71)	All immigrants (n = 2,701)	Characteristics of the immigrant receiving the request	Present or near future (hypothetical)	Table 8.6, Table 8.7
D	Requests for help with different aspects of the migration process	Being heeded (mean = 0.69)	All requests (n = 3,433)	Characteristics of the potential provider; relation with the potential beneficiary; sex of both parties	Cumulative since migration	Table 8.8

model is oblique in the sense that our data come from the persons receiving requests, not from the persons making the decisions.

Second, I take the sub-sample of people who have been asked for help with immigration documents and examine who has *provided* such help (Analysis B). The proportion of people who have provided help is 71%. This includes respondents who have always provided help when asked, as well as respondents who say they have provided help in some cases but not in others.

Third, I explore the determinants of immigrants' stated willingness to provide help in a hypothetical situation. The questionnaire item reads as follows: 'We previously talked about helping people in [e.g. Brazil] who want to move to [e.g. the Netherlands]. How about today? If anyone were to ask you to provide the following types of assistance today,

would you *always try to help*, *never help*, or *help in some cases but not always*?' The answers that I use here concern 'Obtaining papers, such as a visa or residence permit.' Answers to this question do not predict people's actual behaviour in a hypothetical situation, but they reveal information about attitudes to helping others migrate. I dichotomise the variable by merging the responses 'always try to help' and 'help in some cases but not always'. My reasoning is that respondents who select any of these two answers can imagine providing help; this is what we are primarily interested in, not whether help is necessarily provided across the board. The psychology of survey response might suggest a bias towards 'help in some cases but not always', the answer that was read last and required the least commitment by respondents. However, this answer accounted for well under half of responses. Among those who gave a categorical answer, 'never helping' was the most common. Among Moroccans in the Netherlands, for instance, almost two-thirds of respondents said that they would never provide help with immigration documents to people in Morocco.

Fourth, I reshape the dataset and use *requests received* as the unit of analysis. We asked respondents whether or not prospective migrants in their country of origin had ever asked for 'help with things such as documents, travel costs, employment or housing', and respondents were subsequently asked to list the relationships with the people they had helped and the people they had not helped. For each request, we thus know the outcome (help or no help), the relationship with the respondent and the full range of characteristics of the potential provider.

Influences on decisions about requesting and offering help

Now that we have established the four ways of measuring outcomes, we can look at how to measure their possible determinants. After exploring a range of variables in the survey, I have selected the ones presented in Table 8.4. Table 8.4 also presents descriptive statistics. For each country of origin the table has two columns: one for persons (Analyses A–C) and one for requests (Analysis D). Comparing the columns illustrates where requests are directed. For instance, we see that among the Moroccans men make up 36% of persons in the sample but they received 53% of the requests for migration-related help.

The independent variables I use to describe individuals can, conceptually, be divided into three groups. First, we have a truly fixed effect: sex. Second, we have a series of variables related to the respondents' migration experience: which country they have come to, what motivated

Table 8.4 Descriptive statistics

	Persons			Requests		
	Brazilians	**Moroccans**	**Ukrainians**	**Brazilians**	**Moroccans**	**Ukrainians**
Dependent variables (percentages)						
Has been asked to help co-nationals[1]	23	20	23	–	–	–
Has helped co-nationals when asked[1]	74	62	75	–	–	–
Intends to help co-nationals if asked[1]	85	50	79	–	–	–
Requests for migration-related help heeded	–	–	–	69	63	72
Categorical variables (percentages)						
Sex (male)	37	36	43	38	53	48
Destination						
Netherlands	25	25	25	19	18	21
Norway	25	25	25	16	12	15
Portugal	25	25	25	37	52	23
United Kingdom	25	25	25	27	18	41
Previous migration experience	27	19	35	24	17	36
Obtained information from destination	45	41	38	39	59	39
Came to be with partner	25	41	21	21	14	19
Motivated by culture or education	89	68	76	81	71	76
Motivated by opportunities for work	62	70	83	70	91	85
Strong tie to destination-country native	63	54	34	69	73	34
Spends free time primarily with co-nationals	43	48	48	48	56	60
Resource commitment to country of origin	56	35	61	66	40	78
High educational attainment	59	58	62	53	51	62
Current principal activity						
In education	22	9	11	15	1	7
Not working, retired or disabled	5	29	5	4	19	5

Table 8.4 (Continued)

	Persons			Requests		
	Brazilians	**Moroccans**	**Ukrainians**	**Brazilians**	**Moroccans**	**Ukrainians**
Unemployed	6	12	10	5	9	8
Employed (professional)	28	16	25	32	18	29
Employed (manual/low-skilled)	39	35	48	44	53	51
Relationship to potential beneficiary						
Spouse/partner Child/parent/grandparent	–	–	–	3	12	7
Sibling	–	–	–	7	13	3
Other relative	–	–	–	9	20	9
Friend or colleague	–	–	–	57	39	46
Other non-relative	–	–	–	25	15	34
Sex of person making and receiving request						
Female to female	–	–	–	34	25	27
Female to male	–	–	–	10	14	14
Male to female	–	–	–	28	22	24
Male to male	–	–	–	27	40	35
Continuous variables						
Current age: mean	34.6	40.2	35.5	36.9	40.0	37.6
Current age: standard deviation	10.1	11.6	10.9	9.5	9.7	10.6
Time since migration: mean	5.6	14.2	5.5	7.9	14.8	7.5
Time since migration: standard deviation	7.2	11.2	5.8	7.1	10.1	4.8
Observations	1,040	887	933	1,702	724	1,150

[1]Refers to help with immigration documents. Weighted by network-dependent sampling probability (see appendix).
Source: Destination country survey data, 2012, Theorising the Evolution of European Migration Systems (THEMIS).

their move and how they were helped, for instance. These characteristics are constant over the period from respondents' migration to the present. Finally, there are variables that relate to respondents' current situation, such as their educational attainment, current age and interaction with destination country natives. After presenting each variable, I return to the significance of this distinction.

Variables related to the migration experience

About a quarter of our respondents had *previous international migration experience* when they came to the country in which they now live and were interviewed for the survey. In the THEMIS project, we define migration experience as having lived in another country for at least three months.

The variable *obtained information from destination* identifies respondents who, prior to their own migration, obtained information about migration documents, housing or employment from people at the destination. If we consider this as a form of help, which is reasonable, we are able to test whether people who received help in their own migration process are more likely to help others – a possible mechanism that would be central to chain migration. The survey also included a question that more directly addressed receiving 'help' with immigration documents. I have chosen not to use this item, which, for various reasons, has very high non-response rates. For instance, respondents who are illegal residents and don't have such documents were unable to answer this question, but they could say whether or not they received information about migration documents before their move.

When it comes to reasons for migration, I take an unconventional approach: instead of classifying migrants – labour migrants, family migrants, students and so forth – I use a multi-dimensional approach that is able to capture the multiplicity of motivations for migration. The analyses include three dummy variables that are independent of one another. All are based on a battery of questions about possible motivations for leaving the origin and coming to the destination. First, I identify migrants who *came in order to be with a partner*, often a spouse.[2] The second dummy variable singles out respondents who said that 'experiencing the culture and life in another country', 'learning a language' or 'opportunities for studying' was an important motivation for migration. I refer to these respondents as *motivated by culture or education*. The third dummy variable similarly identifies respondents who were *motivated by opportunities for work*. This approach makes it possible to reflect overlapping motivations. For instance, almost six out

of ten migrants who came to join a partner reported that opportunities for work were also an important motivation for migration. The family-related mode of migration and the recognition of economic opportunities could each have an impact of migrants' inclination to help others.

Variables related to current circumstances

Age and *time since migration* are calculated with respect to the beginning of the data collection period. Migration here refers to the respondent's first period of at least three months in the country of destination; they may have lived in third countries earlier and could have spent extended periods of time in their country of origin afterwards. For both age and time since migration I have included second-order variables, which allow for detecting non-linear effects.

As an indicator of socio-cultural integration in the destination country, I include a dummy variable that identifies respondents who have a *strong tie to a destination country native*. This is based on a questionnaire item that refers to 'the people you feel closest to, whether your friends or family members'. I also identify respondents who *spend free time mostly with co-nationals*.

Ties to the country of origin are clearly relevant to offering help with migration. However, there is a risk of circular argumentation when we try to measure this effect. For instance, remittances to people in the country of origin could constitute the same migration-related help that we are trying to explain. I therefore use an independent variable, *resource commitment to the country of origin*, which is independent of transnational ties with individuals. This is a dummy variable that identifies respondents who own a house in the country of origin, have made investments there or donated money to institutions. The underlying questions refer to specific forms of investments and donations.

Educational attainment varies greatly between the three migrant groups. I have therefore constructed a dummy variable that identifies respondents whose educational attainment is at the median or above. This represents at least lower secondary school among Moroccans, vocational training or tertiary education among Brazilians, and tertiary education among Ukrainians.

Current principal activity is based on a detailed classification that was used by interviewers, a slightly modified version of the Erikson–Goldthorpe–Portocarero class system. Based on the distribution of occupations in our sample, we have divided employees between professional and non-manual workers on the one hand, and manual and low-skilled

workers on the other. The former category is dominated by generic occupation types such as 'administrative professional' and 'other high-grade professional'. The most prevalent occupations in the latter group are in cleaning, domestic work and construction.

Variables related to requests for help

The remaining independent variables are specific to Analysis D, in which requests are the unit of analysis. For each request we have information about the *relationship with the potential beneficiary*, that is, the person making the request. I describe these relationships with a five-fold classification. As Table 8.4 shows, the largest number of requests came from friends or colleagues. This category also includes classmates.

Finally, we know the *sex of the potential beneficiary*. It is not obvious how this should be interpreted: is it most important whether the potential beneficiaries are male or female, or whether they have the same, or the opposite, sex from the person receiving the request? To capture the effect of sex in both absolute and relative terms, I distinguish between the four possible *combinations* of sex. In other words, we have men asking men, men asking women, women asking men and women asking women.

Time frames and causality

The distinction between variable types is important because of what we are attempting to model. In Analyses A, B and D, we are examining decisions made over the entire period since migration (cf. Table 8.3). The connection with variables that concern respondents' current situation is therefore tenuous. However, many of the variables that are defined with reference to the present also reflect the past. For instance, migrants who spend their free time mostly with co-nationals today are likely to have done so throughout the post-migration period. Similarly, three-quarters of our respondents have the same educational attainment today as at the time of migration.

The two temporal variables are special cases with respect to time and causality. Age is, on the one hand, a continuously changing characteristic. As they grow older, migrants might become more or less inclined to help others migrate. On the other hand, the same variable describes a respondent's birth cohort – an unchanging characteristic. When we see, for instance, that elderly Moroccans are more likely to have been asked for help, it could be because of the era in which they were born, and not because of their current age. Since our data is cross-sectional, collected at a single point in time, we cannot distinguish between the two

possible interpretations. Similarly, time since migration has two indistinguishable meanings: the length of time that respondents have spent in the destination country (a changing characteristic) and the historical period in which they migrated (a constant characteristic).

Results

In this section I present four sets of regression analyses, corresponding to the four analytical strategies laid out in Table 8.3. All are logistic regressions with results displayed as odds ratios. Discussions of the findings, with fewer technical details, come in the next section.

Table 8.5 displays the results of Analyses A and B, modelling the likelihood of *having been asked for help* and the likelihood of *having provided help*, if asked. The sub-samples I use in Analysis B are, in other words, defined by the outcome of Analysis A.[3] Since the sub-samples are relatively small ($n = 202 - 279$), there are large effects that are not statistically significant. Table 8.6 shows the results of the analysis of intention to help others with migration documents (Analysis C).

Comparing the influence of origins and destinations

In an earlier section I accounted for the reasons why I have pooled the data by origin and run separate analyses for the three national groups. What we are missing by following that approach is the possibility to simultaneously compare origins and destinations. Table 8.7 provides complementary analyses for this purpose. Analyses A–C are repeated here with the entire sample pooled. Origin and destination are included as separate variables, shown in the table. Other variables are not shown.

Comparing the three countries of origin, we see that Moroccans are less likely to have been asked for help, less likely to have helped and less likely to intend to help, compared to the two other groups.

The lower half of the table shows model diagnostics for the full model, and for corresponding models that omit the destination and the origin. The purpose is to answer the following question: what is most important for explaining behaviour related to migration assistance: the country that people *emigrate from* or the country that they *immigrate to*. By comparing the pseudo R^2 and AIC figures, we see that destination country matters the most for the likelihood of having been asked and the likelihood of having helped. For the intention to help, by contrast, country of origin matters the most.

Table 8.5 Estimated odds ratios from logistic regressions of having been asked to help, and having helped, co-nationals with immigration documents, by country of origin (Analyses A and B)

	Having been asked to help co-nationals with immigration documents (Analysis A)			**Having helped co-nationals with immigration documents (Analysis B)**		
	Brazilians	**Moroccans**	**Ukrainians**	**Brazilians**	**Moroccans**	**Ukrainians**
Sex (male)	0.842	1.169	0.848	0.626	4.864**	0.407
Destination						
Netherlands	0.329***	0.208***	3.212***	0.197*	0.139**	0.312°
Norway	0.388**	0.167**	3.208**	0.559	0.342	2.480
Portugal†	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
United Kingdom	0.491*	0.325*	2.228**	6.717*	0.532	0.526
Previous migration experience	0.903	0.473	1.220	0.689	0.936	1.977
Obtained information from destination	1.168	1.242	1.499°	2.748*	1.286	3.162*
Came to be with partner	0.943	0.338**	1.300	0.625	0.370	4.781*
Motivated by culture or education	0.934	0.839	1.811*	0.967	1.932	0.307°
Motivated by opportunities for work	0.979	2.085°	0.888	1.273	1.263	4.942°
Time since migration	1.283***	1.124*	1.276**	0.915	1.116	1.118
Time since migration (squared)	0.993***	0.998°	0.994	1.003	0.996	1.000
Age	1.035	1.200*	0.978	1.340°	1.046	0.546*
Age (squared)	0.999	0.998*	1.000	0.996°	1.000	1.007*
Strong tie to destination country native	1.088	1.252	1.028	4.692**	1.168	1.715
Spends free time primarily with co-nationals	0.850	1.838°	2.156**	2.642°	1.972	0.743
Resource commitment to country of origin	1.926**	0.764	2.002**	0.902	1.423	1.348
High educational attainment	1.390	0.675	0.945	4.693*	0.368°	1.842
Current principal activity						
In education	1.403	0.889	1.016	1.091	0.553	0.560
Not working, retired, or disabled	1.223	0.935	1.081	9.367	0.696	0.133°
Unemployed	0.813	0.812	0.683	4.018*	0.310	4.786
Employed (professional)	0.946	2.138	1.331	0.641	1.481	1.057
Employed (manual/low-skilled)†	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Observations	1011	814	907	279	220	202
Pseudo R^2	0.112	0.194	0.116	0.254	0.260	0.249
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)	796	644	769	200	189	185

†*Reference category.* $^{\circ}p < 0.1$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$. Weighted by network-dependent sampling probability (see appendix).

Source: Destination country survey data, 2012, Theorising the Evolution of European Migration Systems (THEMIS).

Table 8.6 Estimated odds ratios from logistic regressions of intention to help co-nationals with immigration documents, by country of origin (Analysis C)

	Brazilians	**Moroccans**	**Ukrainians**
Sex (male)	1.168	0.698	1.688*
Destination			
Netherlands	0.289***	0.448*	0.467*
Norway	0.665	0.508	1.470
Portugal†	1.000	1.000	1.000
United Kingdom	0.926	0.267**	0.284***
Previous migration experience	1.212	1.532	0.678
Obtained information from destination	1.826*	1.131	2.043**
Came to be with partner	1.255	0.526*	0.855
Motivated by culture or education	1.729	0.902	1.587°
Motivated by opportunities for work	1.490	1.085	0.901
Time since migration	1.087	1.026	0.738***
Time since migration (squared)	0.998	0.999	1.016**
Age	0.909	1.030	0.969
Age (squared)	1.001	0.999	1.000
Strong tie to destination country native	1.015	1.143	2.616***
Spends free time primarily with co-nationals	0.863	1.991*	1.937**
Resource commitment to country of origin	1.419	1.706*	1.879**
High educational attainment	1.131	2.287**	1.124
Current principal activity			
In education	3.425**	0.999	0.831
Not working, retired, or disabled	1.400	0.883	7.155°
Unemployed	1.348	0.763	1.393
Employed (professional)	1.046	0.799	1.707°
Employed (manual/low-skilled)†	1.000	1.000	1.000
Observations	1006	809	895
Pseudo R^2	0.085	0.131	0.164

†*Reference category.* °$p < 0.1$, *$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$. Weighted by network-dependent sampling probability (see appendix).

Source: Destination country survey data, 2012, Theorising the Evolution of European Migration Systems (THEMIS).

Table 8.7 Model diagnostics for logistic regressions related to helping co-nationals with immigration documents

	Having been asked to help co-nationals with immigration documents (Analysis A)	**Having helped co-nationals with immigration documents (Analysis B)**	**Intention to help co-nationals with immigration documents (Analysis C)**
Origin			
Brazil	1.026	0.696	1.379°
Morocco	0.676*	0.459°	0.289***
Ukraine	1.000	1.000	1.000
Destination			
Netherlands	0.580***	0.336**	0.430***
Norway	0.512**	0.704	0.809
Portugal†	1.000	1.000	1.000
United Kingdom	0.631**	0.639	0.371***
(Other independent variables not shown)	…	…	…
Observations	2,732	701	2,710
Pseudo R^2	0.071	0.104	0.161
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)	2,289	587	2,318
With destination omitted[1]			
Pseudo R^2	0.064	0.083	0.139
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)	2,302	593	2,370
With origin omitted[1]			
Pseudo R^2	0.068	0.095	0.116
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)	2,293	588	2,435

[1]Each model includes the independent variables displayed in Tables 5–7. † *Reference category.* °$p < 0.1$, *$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$. Weighted by network dependent sampling probability (see appendix).
Source: Destination country survey data, 2012, Theorising the Evolution of European Migration Systems (THEMIS).

Incorporating information about potential beneficiaries

Analysis D is, as explained above, based on a reshaping of the dataset. I no longer examine individuals but dyads of potential providers and potential beneficiaries (Table 8.8). The data are based

Table 8.8 Estimated odds ratios from logistic regressions of positive response to requests for help to migrate, by country of origin (Analysis D)

	Brazilians	**Moroccans**	**Ukrainians**
Destination			
Netherlands	0.947	0.686	0.974
Norway	1.232	0.789	0.631
Portugal†	1.000	1.000	1.000
United Kingdom	2.735***	0.957	0.881
Previous migration experience	0.670°	1.164	1.312
Obtained information from destination	0.896	1.130	1.507*
Came to be with partner	1.112	0.661	2.031*
Motivated by culture or education	0.783	2.233**	0.711
Motivated by opportunities for work	0.853	0.666	2.100*
Time since migration	0.939	1.082	1.077
Time since migration (squared)	1.002	0.999	0.997
Age	0.986	0.922	0.790**
Age (squared)	1.000	1.001	1.003***
Strong tie to destination-country native	1.179	1.497	0.799
Spends free time primarily with co-nationals	1.168	1.514	1.110
Resource commitment to country of origin	0.849	0.700	1.122
High educational attainment	1.773**	0.880	0.948
Current principal activity			
In education	0.591*	0.240	1.643
Not working, retired, or disabled	1.597	1.008	0.988
Unemployed	0.935	0.336*	0.807
Employed (professional)	0.651*	1.631	1.361
Employed (manual/low-skilled)†	1.000	1.000	1.000
Relationship to potential beneficiary			
Close family member	4.367°	10.053***	2.203
Sibling	3.401***	2.305*	23.228**
Other relative	1.353	1.013	0.732
Friend or colleague†	1.000	1.000	1.000
Other non-relative	0.557**	0.783	0.310***
Sex of person making and receiving request			
Female to female†	1.000	1.000	1.000
Female to male	1.236	3.255°	0.685
Male to female	0.673*	0.618	0.578°
Male to male	0.626*	2.211*	0.682
Observations	1655	692	1128
Pseudo R^2	0.084	0.151	0.121
Pseudo R^2 without relationship information[1]	0.049	0.091	0.048

[1]Refers to identical model without the variables 'Relationship to potential beneficiary' and 'Sex of person making and receiving request' but including sex of the respondent.† Reference category. $^{\circ}p < 0.1$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$. Weighted by network-dependent sampling probability (see appendix).

Source: Destination country survey data, 2012, Theorising the Evolution of European Migration Systems (THEMIS).

on respondents' listing of people who have asked them for migration-related help. We see, first of all, that the relationship between the potential provider and potential beneficiary has a large effect on the outcome. There is no significant difference between relatives and friends, but close family members – including siblings – are much *more* likely to have been helped, and non-relatives who are not friends or colleagues are considerably *less* likely to have been helped. Gender relations also matter, but in ways that are inconsistent between the three countries of origin.

The final line of the table shows the pseudo R^2 that is obtained with a model that excludes information about the potential beneficiary. In every case it is considerably lower than the pseudo R^2 for the full model.

Patterns in the making and breaking of migration chains

The results I have presented offer complementary perspectives on the same core theme: how settled migrants decide whether or not to help others migrate. In order to address that question, we need to connect the different perspectives and search for emerging patterns.

Consistency and contradiction

I have compiled the effects of our main independent variables of interest in Table 8.9, allowing us to compare across the four analyses. The table identifies significant effects for each of the three countries of origin, labelled B (Brazil), M (Morocco) and U (Ukraine), respectively.

The first observation we can make is about the lack of consistency: not a single effect is consistently significant across all three migrant groups. That is, no cell has three letters in it. The closest we come to a consistent relationship is that resource commitment to the country of origin increases migrants' intention to help (Analysis C). This effect was only significant among Moroccans and Ukrainians, hence only M and U are indicated in the table. But the effect among Brazilians was also large (1.419), even though it was not significant. Interpreting results such as these requires attention to both effect sizes and significance and is not always straightforward (Ziliak and McCloskey, 2008).

The second observation is about the lack of contradictions: there is not a single instance of statistically significant effects in opposite directions for two countries of origin. In other words, a particular variable might increase or decrease the inclination to help, but it is never

Table 8.9 Summary of results

	Having been asked to help co-nationals with immigration documents (Analysis A)	**Having helped co-nationals with immigration documents (Analysis B)**	**Intention to help co-nationals with immigration documents (Analysis C)**	**Response to specific requests for migration-related help (Analysis D)**
Obtained information from destination	**U**	**BU**	**BU**	**U**
Came to be with partner	*M*	**U**	*M*	**U**
Motivated by culture or education	**U**	*U*	**U**	**M**
Motivated by opportunities for work	**M**	**U**	–	**U**
Strong ties to destination country native	–	**B**	**U**	–
Spends free time primarily with co-nationals	**MU**	**B**	**MU**	–
Resource commitment to country of origin	**BU**	–	**MU**	–

Letters represent statistically significant effects ($p < 0.1$) for the three countries of origin. Positive effects in **bold**; negative effects in *italics*.

the case that it decreases it for one nationality and increases it for another.

These two observations – that there is neither consistency nor contradiction – imply that we can point to tendencies but are unable to fully explain the patterns of who provides help to whom. The conclusions we can draw therefore come with caveats: they rarely apply across the board.

Profiles of helpers

Only a minority of migrants have been asked for help with migration documents, and even fewer have ever provided such help. So who is this subgroup of helpers? To the extent that migrants who help others have a distinct profile, it differs across the three countries of origin (cf. Table 8.5). Among Moroccans, gender has a strong impact: the odds of having provided help are almost five times higher

among men than among women. Moreover, it is Moroccans with lower educational attainment who are the most likely to have helped others migrate. Among Brazilians and Ukrainians, however, both gender and educational attainment have the opposite effect as among Moroccans.[4] These results are useful reminders that such common variables have context-specific meaning. Not only are there cultural differences in gender relations, but the significance of an individual's gender depends on the gendered migration setting. For instance, the experience of being a Brazilian man in Norway is undoubtedly shaped by the fact that four-fifths of Brazilians in Norway are women (cf. Table 8.1).

Patterns of helping are presumably related to social ties, both in the countries and the country of origin. In simplified terms, we can think of three primary social arenas that migrants relate to: their community of origin (transnational ties), the population of migrants from the same country (co-national ties at the destination) and the majority population at the destination.[5] Networks on these three arenas have different impacts on practices of helping. Not surprisingly, people who have committed resources to the country of origin are more likely to have been asked for help (cf. Table 8.5). They are also more inclined to offer help in a hypothetical situation (cf. Table 8.6). We also see an association between co-national ties and chain migration: migrants who spend most of their free time with others from the same country are more likely to provide help to prospective migrants. But strong ties to *destination country natives* also promote chain migration (cf. Tables 8.5 and 8.6). In other words, the most likely helpers are those who are well connected in their community of origin, *and* the co-national community of migrants, *and* the majority population. Such individuals might be found among people who are both highly integrated at the destination and highly transnational (cf. Carling and Pettersen, 2014).

Two-way processes

The model I set out with (Figure 8.1) emphasised the two-way process of requesting and providing help. The results confirm that patterns of helping do indeed emerge from the relationship *between* the potential beneficiary and the potential provider. Examining characteristics of the settled migrants in search of the typical helper thus gives us only half of the picture.

The descriptive statistics I presented initially suggest that potential beneficiaries determine much of the pattern of helping: few migrants

had been asked for help, but many of the requests were heeded (Table 8.4). The numbers can be challenged methodologically, since people are more likely to remember and report their deeds of helping than their refusals of assistance. Nevertheless, the results adjust the 'gatekeeper' image of migrants who are flooded with requests and selectively pick their favourites. The most decisive element, it seems, is who comes knocking at the gate in the first place.

Overall, roughly two-thirds of the requests were met with assistance, according to the migrants. The factor that is most decisive for the outcome is the relationships between the migrant and the potential beneficiary (cf. Table 8.8). The effect of being a relative is in itself limited, but siblings and other close family members are *much* more likely to be assisted than non-relatives.

The outcome of requests is also affected by gender. We captured the relational aspect of gender by distinguishing between the gender of the potential beneficiary and that of the potential provider. Interesting differences emerge from the analysis (Table 8.8). Among Brazilians, help is more likely to be given if the person who asks is a woman, irrespective of the potential provider's sex. Among Moroccans, by contrast, it is the potential provider's sex that matters: requests to men are much more likely to result in help than requests to women.

The two-way determination of help can also be examined at the aggregate level of migration corridors. If we keep other things constant and only consider a migrant's country of origin and destination, which one has the strongest impact on patterns of helping? That is the question I sought to address in Table 8.7. The likelihood of having been asked, and the likelihood of having helped, depended mainly on the destination country. But the intention to help, by contrast, depended primarily on the country of origin. This is a plausible general finding. Still, it is the case that *combinations* of origins and destinations matter. Moroccans were the least likely of the three groups to help others, but Moroccans in Portugal were an exception. In fact, the proportion of migrants prepared to help others with migration documents was higher among the Moroccans in Portugal than in any other corridor (see Chapter 2).

Contagious help

Practices of helping appear to be self-reinforcing. This is the pattern that emerges most clearly from the comparative overview (Table 8.9). Among Ukrainians, this was a consistent trend: those who had obtained help from others in their own migration trajectory are more likely to

have been asked for help, to have provided help and to intend to help others who ask. The same is largely true for Brazilians, though not for Moroccans.

The findings for Brazilians and Moroccans suggest that there are two forms of migration within each system: that which is independent and that which is part of a chain. Migrants who arrived through chain migration are less likely to break the chain, and those who came independently are less likely to start a chain. The lack of such a pattern among Moroccans indicates that there are many short chains that are being broken. This could be the sign of a more hierarchical structure of difference between people who give and receive help, akin to Vilna Bashi's (2007) notion of hubs and spokes in migration networks.

Governments lay down the immigration regulations, but settled migrants are important as bridgeheads and gatekeepers who facilitate or obstruct the migration of others (Böcker, 1994). When we seek to understand the dynamics of migration systems, it matters a great deal of how migrants play those roles. The choices people make about requesting and providing help will remain unpredictable, but the analyses presented here has provided new insights on the broad patterns of such decision-making.

Notes

1. I am grateful to Jennifer Wu for our collaboration in the early stages of preparing this chapter, and to Oliver Bakewell, Lucinda Fonseca and Agnieszka Kubal for providing valuable comments.
2. These are people who reported that 'being with family members or other people you care about' was an 'important motivation' for coming to the destination, and who listed a spouse, fiancé(e), boyfriend or girlfriend among the people they came to be with.
3. The models for having been asked and having offered help (if asked) could have been combined as a paired model of sample selection and outcome determination. However, the available strategies have limitations. A Heckman model (Stata's heckprob command) would have required the selection equation to have at least one additional independent variable, for which there is no theoretical justification. Sartori's selection model (Stata's sartsel command) addresses this problem and allows for identical independent variable sets, but does not accept weighting. Finally, a bivariate probit model with partial observability (Stata's biprobit, partial command) has poor convergence properties and does not converge with the preferred specification of variables. I prefer the possible sampling bias to the limitations of these other options.
4. The effects are sizeable, though not always statistically significant.
5. Other important arenas are co-nationals in other destination countries and other minorities at the destination.

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9
Broadcasting Migration Outcomes

Oliver Bakewell and Dominique Jolivet

Introduction

This chapter examines feedback, one of the social mechanisms by which migration between localities in one period can affect subsequent migrations, giving rise to rather stable and recurrent patterns of migration. This feedback from earlier migrations is generated by the flow and counter-flow of people, goods, information and ideas in what are often referred to as 'migration systems' (Mabogunje, 1970; Kritz et al., 1992; Fawcett, 1989; Bakewell, 2014). Much of the literature to date has focused on feedback arising from the operation of migrants' social networks. The idea of the social networks is certainly a powerful one and helps to explain the dissemination of ideas and behaviour between people and places. It has long played a central part in theories of migration, helping to explain why many migrants from the same origin location may end up at the same destination (Gurak and Caces, 1992; Singhanetra-Renard, 1992; Massey, 1990).

However, in the literature on social networks and migration, there is often far too little discussion about the nature of the networks involved or explanation of how they come to affect migration aspirations and behaviour. To address this concern, this chapter differentiates between forms of network behaviour that are based on social networks and those which are shaped by the shared context more than personal interaction. We are making this distinction by demanding rather a strong definition of a social network as a potential causal mechanism. This can be compared to a much looser idea of a network associated with co-residence, co-location or other shared characteristics which do not necessarily entail *social* network relationships.

Drawing on qualitative and quantitative THEMIS data collected in the three countries of origin and the four countries of destination (as

described by Carling and Jolivet in Chapter 2), this chapter examines the extent to which migration patterns are influenced by factors that operate at the level of this common context – where each individual receives or has the potential to receive the same messages, information or assistance regardless of their position in social networks. We refer to this feedback as being *broadcast*, metaphorically – and as we shall see sometimes literally through TV and radio. Broadcast feedback is available to all without discrimination on the basis of one's social network. Of course, the extent to which it is picked up and the meaning with which it is imbued will be mediated by individual and collective characteristics – including aspirations – and also connections to social networks. All those who pass a house built by a migrant may see it, but it may generate interest only among a particular social group.

In the next section, we critically reflect on the extent to which social networks can plausibly be seen as a cause of new migration, tease apart the different ways that network effects might influence migration patterns and outline our concept of broadcast feedback. In the third section, drawing on the THEMIS data, we show that social networks are not necessarily the primary medium for potential migrants learning of potential destinations or gaining practical advice before moving. Instead, as we show in the subsequent section, different forms of broadcast feedback can be identified and this plays an important role in shaping people's migration outcomes. After acknowledging the fuzzy boundaries between this broadcast feedback and social networks, we conclude that a comprehensive analysis of migration must take both into account.

The limits of social networks as causal mechanisms

The operation of the social network, as an explanatory or causal mechanism for migration (or indeed any other behaviour), implies that there is some common bond among the people in the network. It is more than simply a correlation between people sharing some characteristic (such as living in the same neighbourhood) and a particular outcome (perhaps using the same supermarket); the relationship must be of 'substantial significance' (Granovetter, 1978, p. 1361). There must be both a meaningful and a sustained connection between the people that can be hypothesised to change outcomes. Both aspects are important. It is easy to envisage connections that are meaningful without being sustained. Life is full of important interactions, from the transactions in shops that secure our food and clothing to the exchange with the beggar on the street. However, for the most part, these interactions are relatively

fleeting and we do not have ongoing contact with the people involved beyond the single transaction. Likewise, we can think of connections that are sustained but have little significance for us. We may see the same people every day on our way to work or walking the dog and start to exchange nods and smiles. Left at this level, the connection is rather superficial and does not involve the exchange of information about each other's lives or emotional commitment to the other.

Perhaps, we also need to take this further to include a multifaceted or multiplex relationship. One may have a meaningful and very important interaction with a solicitor at key points of life, when buying a house or getting divorced, for example. If the interaction is simply limited to this formal contact governed by a (usually expensive) contract, is this really a social network relationship? It starts to look like a network when there is more contact outside the contract – perhaps socialising or playing sport together, for example. The same could be extended to the virtual social network, where a functional relationship developed around one aspect of life on LinkedIn, for instance, may be extended to become a multifaceted social relationship.

Just because people live in the same place does not mean they are in the same social network. Their shared context may mean they observe similar things – like new businesses or buildings – but the view of the labourer may be rather different from that of the accountant. What we are concerned with in our discussion of broadcast feedback is the influences of these shared contexts, where images, information and advice may freely flow, be undirected and be picked up by those moving in these common spaces. But it is important to emphasise that we are considering what Granovetter (1973, p. 1361) refers to as 'absent ties', rather than either the strong and weak ties that are the focus of his analysis or Haythornthwaite's (2002) 'latent ties', discussed by Dekker, Engbersen and Faber (Chapter 4).

The important role of social networks in migration dynamics has been extensively studied, and this provides a useful starting point for our elaboration of the idea of broadcast feedback (see also Bakewell, Kubal and Pereira, Chapter 1, in this volume). We focus here on the existing research on their role in migration feedback processes. Massey noted the role of migrants providing information and assistance to non-migrants in their social networks in the areas of origin to reduce the cost and the risks of migration. This help in the form of assistance and information spreads migration behaviour. These self-sustaining effects are part of the idea of the cumulative causation of migration (Massey, 1990). However, if migration experiences are perceived negatively by the majority,

network mechanisms can generate negative feedback loops and call into question the theory of cumulative causation (Garip and Asad, 2013; see also Engbersen et al., Chapter 10, in this volume).

DiMaggio and Garip (2012) identified three types of social network effects that can take place in migration contexts: *social learning effects* that occur when social networks provide pieces of information that have an impact on the costs and risks of migration; *normative influence effects* where social networks can change the way that migration is valued, thereby affecting social pressure to either migrate or stay; and finally, what they refer to as *network externalities* – the common resources available through previous migrant flows and its resulting migration industry. While they describe these network externalities as social network effects, it is not clear that they are necessarily related to the operation of a *social* network. Nonetheless, they reduce the costs of migration and increase its value (Garip and Asad, 2013) or indeed constrain migration (e.g., see Snel, Engbersen and Faber, Chapter 7, in this volume).

As de Haas observes (2010), when analysing patterns of migration it is also important to consider the impact of feedback on the wider social, cultural, political or economic conditions in which migration takes place. As he argues, the focus on social networks has overshadowed the analysis of these indirect feedback loops. However, when it comes to explaining how migration can shape this broader context for subsequent movement, once again migrant networks come to the fore as the source of social remittances. Defined as the flow of ideas, behaviours, identities and social capital transmitted by migrants individually or as a member of a formal or informal group in a transnational social field, social remittances transform ideas, behaviours and organisational practices (Levitt, 1998; Levitt and Glick Schiller, 2004; Levitt and Lamba-Nieves, 2011).

Levitt initially made a clear conceptual distinction between social remittances and other types of socio-cultural exchanges (Levitt, 1998). The former are identifiable and transmitted intentionally to a specific audience; the latter are unsystematic, unintentional and sometimes received involuntarily (Levitt, 1998, p. 936). Nevertheless, this distinction has been blurred later as the literature has subsequently included more impersonal transmissions through local television channels or the internet as part of social remittances (Levitt and Lamba-Nieves, 2011). However, these ideas and behaviours transmitted through TV or the internet, even if they are directed towards a specific group, can be unintentionally transmitted to and involuntarily received by a wider

audience. As a result, at times the term 'social remittances' is used for transfers that do not pass through social networks.

This starts to move us away from feedback operating through social networks towards what we will call *broadcast feedback*, which does not operate through social networks but still plays a role in shaping migration decisions and outcomes. While our evidence from the THEMIS project suggests that its role is quite limited in some cases, it seems likely that broadcast feedback mechanisms will become more important in the current global context, where advances in communications enable social practices to be transmitted in the physical space but also remotely across distance (Castells, 2010). For example, it is possible for almost anyone with an internet connection to get a virtual window into a migrant's life, hearing stories, learning of successes and failures, without having any personal connection.

In this chapter, we tease apart the different impacts of the influence of feedback operating through social networks – direct contact with people known through interactions that are not necessarily associated with migration – and that of broadcast feedback operating through more impersonal channels. To this end, we differentiate five forms of feedback:

1. *Personal network feedback*: where a potential migrant has direct individual communication with a personal contact with experience of migration through letters, phone calls, emails, Skype and Facebook chat, and so forth.

2. *Narrowcast feedback*: where the personal contact sends news, information or advice in an impersonal form. In the past, this would have been newsletters, but today it is more likely to be blog posts or other online news items, which may be available publicly but are directed to members of the network.

3. *Induced broadcast feedback*: here potential migrants set out to discover – online or through other means – new contacts outside their existing social network in order to gain advice, information or other help to further their migration aspirations. While this may result in the expansion of a person's social network to take in these new contacts, the resultant migration decision cannot be said to be caused by the potential migrant's network. It is the migration aspirations and decisions that have induced the feedback of information and advice from existing migrants, and in due course this may generate new social networks. This is closely related to the network externalities effect identified

by DiMaggio and Garip (2012) as it relies on the physical and virtual resources resulting from previous migration flows. It operates beyond social networks at the level of the broader common context.

4. *General broadcast feedback*: where the information, images and ideas about migration are transmitted indiscriminately to a wide audience – either intentionally (in TV and radio programmes or webpages that set out to spread messages about migration) or less consciously (where migration features in a story line). Here, feedback is generated in *mediascapes*; in other words, it comes from information disseminated through and images of migration created by the mass media (Appadurai, 1990).

5. *Embedded broadcast feedback*: where images and ideas are transmitted indiscriminately through the transfer of tangible (objects) and intangible (ideas and behaviours) evidence of migration outcomes to a particular context. They will only have meaning in a local area or for a particular audience who have local knowledge or understand that context. This is concerned with the stories and rumours of people in the area who have migrated; the visible signs of the houses they have built, the businesses they have set up or the clothes they wear; and the changes in behaviours and attitudes observed by non-migrants – evidence of a migrant's collective and individual social remittances (Levitt and Lamba-Nieves, 2011). These images and ideas will only resonate among those who can see the change in the condition of the migrant because they know where they have come from. Like the general broadcast, this transmission can either be intentional, for example, where the migrant ostentatiously parades her wealth in public view, or subconscious, where a migrant starts sending his daughters to school and the change is noted by non-migrants.

We acknowledge that distinguishing these forms in this way is primarily a heuristic device and the boundaries between them are extremely blurred. Nonetheless, we argue that we can see different causal mechanisms at work, and making this distinction enables us to understand the interplay between this broadcast feedback and feedback operating through social networks.

There has been a considerable volume of work on feedback through personal networks (as noted above, and see also Bakewell, Kubal and Pereira, Chapter 1, in this volume) and a growing literature on narrowcast feedback (e.g., see Dekker, Engbersen and Faber, Chapter 4, in this volume). However, in the rest of this chapter, we focus on the

last three forms of feedback. Using the THEMIS data, we show how they operate and help to shape migration decisions and outcomes for different people in various contexts. Details of the dataset and methodology are presented by Carling and Jolivet (Chapter 2). For the purposes of this chapter, we analysed the 633 semi-structured interviews from origin and destination, combining text searches with particular pre-coded nodes. We draw on the quantitative dataset to a lesser degree.

We start by showing that while social networks play an important role in shaping migration patterns, they do not offer an adequate explanation in themselves. We suggest that taking account of broadcast feedback is one element that helps to fill this gap and we then discuss the different forms of feedback outlined above, giving examples from the data.

It is not all about social networks

There is no doubt about the high level of transnational connectedness among most of the people surveyed in the corridors studied for the THEMIS project. The vast majority of respondents in the localities of destination had known somebody living there before they migrated. The Ukrainians who migrated to Oslo were the exception; only just over half of the respondents (52%) knew someone in Norway before going there. For all the other groups, the proportions range from 74% up to 94%. These high proportions reflect the general trend in most of the studied regions in the origin countries. The most striking cases are in the Moroccan regions of Nador and Rabat, where over 90% of the respondents reported knowing people living in Western Europe. In contrast, in Campinas (Brazil) it is just over a third of the respondents that knew anybody.

The simple fact of this apparent transnational connectedness may imply that social networks will play the most important role in shaping attitudes to migration, aspirations and decision-making. However, we argue against this intuitive conclusion on the following grounds. First, from the perspective of our stricter definition of social networks, just because you know people in another country does not mean that you communicate with them; you may have no substantive connection. Second, even those who have no communication with people in Europe acquire information on both migration and potential destinations. Moreover, in many cases their knowledge and attitudes are not markedly different from those who are enmeshed in transnational networks. While accepting the importance of social networks, we suggest

that other mechanisms may shape migration among populations in the same locality.

Turning to the first point, we examine the extent to which our respondents claimed to communicate with people abroad. Of our origin areas, the respondents in Nador and Rabat in Morocco not only have the most contacts in Western Europe, but they are also more likely to be in direct communication with people there. In contrast, in Ukraine and Brazil, over 20% of those who know people in Western Europe reported that they never communicate with people there. In the Brazilian city of Governador Valadares, this rises to nearly a third. The destination data suggest that a vast majority of migrants who had known somebody in the destination had some communication before migration. It is impossible to tell whether this communication helped to initiate ideas about migration or was used by potential migrants with the aim of facilitating their movement once an aspiration to migrate has taken root.

We turn to the data from the destination areas to address the second point. We compare respondents who reported that they had no contact or communication with people in Western Europe before migrating (the unconnected) with those who did have links (the connected). It seems reasonable to conclude that the former were not tied into social networks in the destination areas that could directly influence their migration decisions. We would expect these unconnected people to be less aware of the possibilities and implications of migration or less receptive to images and stories about Europe broadcast in the media. However, in most of the studied corridors, there are no striking differences in the proportions of surveyed migrants who had seen images or heard stories in the media before leaving among both the connected and unconnected. There are two notable exceptions where the difference between the unconnected and the connected is higher than 20%: the Moroccans in London and the Ukrainians in The Hague (see Figure 9.1). Statistical analysis confirms this descriptive result by showing that although the likelihood of having seen images or stories in the media before migrating is higher among those who had contacts in the destinations, the effect is not significant. Other factors related to the digital divide or to the coming of the information age (Castells, 2010) – level of education, class and arrival to the destination country before or after the year 2000 – appear to play a more significant role than communicating with people in Western Europe.[1]

This suggests that in many cases contact with social networks plays only a limited role in shaping ideas about migration or places. Therefore, there must be other factors that also need to be taken into account. The



Figure 9.1 Proportion of respondents in each corridor who saw images or stories of their destination before migrating: Comparing those connected and unconnected

influence of previous migration spreads not just through social networks but also through other means, one of which, we argue, is broadcast feedback, to which we now turn.

Broadcast feedback as causal mechanisms

What is common to all broadcast feedback processes is that transmitters and receivers are not initially linked by any social network. Ideas, information and images about migration outcomes can be consciously or unconsciously broadcast. At the same time, the receiver can adopt a more active or passive role in terms of deliberately looking for specific pieces of information or not. In addition, what is broadcast may not reach everybody and may generate different responses according to the particular characteristics of the receiver. For instance, the survey of migrants in the European destination cities shows that the likelihood of a person having noticed houses built with money earned abroad before leaving Brazil, Morocco or Ukraine decreases among those in the higher

socio-economic groups (as indicated by occupation). To take another example, programmes broadcast on TV during office hours may not reach those who are working (although they may be able to record or download the missed programmes).

The transmission of broadcast feedback can take place in a physical space or virtually (as it can with personal and narrowcast feedback). Therefore, we do not conceptualise online feedback as a separate category of feedback but as a feedback channel (see also Dekker, Engbersen and Faber, Chapter 4, in this volume). We understand the internet as a communication medium that links people and information (DiMaggio et al., 2001) like any other mass medium – such as a newspaper – or any social place – such as a shop or a public square (Agre, 1998).

Broadcast feedback can cause positive, undermining or self-correcting effects on migration – when people adapt their strategies in order to fulfil their migration aspirations or decisions. Reading in a magazine in Brazil that the United Kingdom is facilitating visas to those Brazilians willing to invest and open a business in the country could have a positive effect on those who have the capacity to invest and have the aspiration to migrate (Liliam, 28, female, Brazil–UK, returned migrant). Likewise, the information available on the Canadian or Australian websites on the qualifications required to apply for a visa to migrate there can have an undermining effect on low-skilled potential migrants and a positive effect on those high-skilled individuals aspiring to migrate (Miro, 26, male, Morocco–Netherlands, family member).

Each of the three categories of broadcast feedback outlined above – general broadcast, embedded broadcast and induced broadcast – works in different ways across time and space. For example, embedded broadcast feedback is the most clearly related to particular spaces. Induced broadcast feedback may not be bound by geographical space, but it does need time to operate as potential migrants build connections. In this section, we provide empirical examples of how these types of migration feedback operates and shapes migration ideas, aspirations and decisions using the qualitative data gathered in origin and destination areas of Brazilian, Moroccan and Ukrainian migration corridors during the THEMIS project.

General broadcast

Here we are concerned with information, images and ideas scattered widely through the media without being clearly targeted at particular people in given localities. This is the material shared via television, radio, newspapers and the internet. There are ever-fewer limitations in

time or space for such broadcasts; if material is made publicly available online, for instance, it can hypothetically be reached almost anywhere and at any time unless exogenous factors such as technical problems or state censorship intervene.

The THEMIS data provided two very clear examples of such broadcast feedback. First, respondents from Brazil noted the significance of soap operas and other TV programmes in shaping people's ideas and aspirations. 'Brazilians come to know the world through the Brazilian soap-operas . . . It is always like this, what's on the soap-opera is what sells and what people wants to do' (Juliana, 33, female, Brazil–Norway). Brazilian TV was credited with establishing potential destinations by raising their profile. For example, when Norway was proclaimed to be the country with the highest standard of living in the world, Brazilian journalists sought out migrants living in Norway to write about their experiences in the 'best country in the world'. As a result of the publicity, one Brazilian respondent living in Norway was inundated with email requests for information about the country. The idea of the Netherlands as a destination was promoted by a story line on the popular soap opera *Paginas da Vida*, broadcast on the largest Brazilian television network, Globo, which featured characters studying in the Netherlands (Miguel, 36, male, Brazil–Netherlands). In these cases, the migration element is incidental to the larger story. Nonetheless, it may play an important role in instilling an aspiration. Perhaps, it helps start the idea of migration in some sections of the audience, or more likely it may simply bring to life or sharpen a rather vague idea of migration and point in new directions that were previously beyond the horizon.

Second, respondents living in Morocco introduced the example of documentaries and news programmes that portrayed the hardships facing Moroccan immigrants in Europe. These programmes were understood as having the intention of affecting migration outcomes. For instance, a Moroccan TV programme broadcast the 'sufferings of the migrants which might have impacted a lot potential migrants' (Cherif, 68, male, Morocco–Netherlands, family member). Here the broadcast feedback provides a set of social examples to shape behaviour. The message of the broadcasts aligns with a set of other information sources to help reshape a view of migration. The response of Rabha, invoking ideas of dignity and indecency, perhaps gives evidence of how such feedback may help to generate normative pressure – which may then be relayed to others through social networks:

> Migration as a phenomenon has decreased because of . . . the role of media which sensitise the youth about the bad conditions of low

> skilled migration and also they show photos and talk about cases where migrants are on the dole; they inform people that migrants work some hours and cannot find full time jobs. Some young people prefer to work here with dignity and not venture in migration and work under indecent working conditions.
>
> (Rabha, 58, female, Morocco–UK, family member)

In this way, broadcast feedback can be seen as a way of reinforcing or amplifying other feedback mechanisms. It is important to note that the message transmitted may generate a different feedback than that expected or desired by the broadcaster. Where states have tried to use the stories of terrible conditions for migrants to deter those thinking of moving the impact has been very mixed. In some cases, it seems the very fact that they want to advertise against migration may reinforce the message that migration is desirable and valuable (Hernández-Carretero, 2016).

Embedded broadcast

Embedded broadcast is more local; it is what one perceives in a particular place and in a particular time and it can also happen more or less unconsciously. The higher visibility of embedded broadcast of migration outcomes in some areas could be due to the spread of the migration flows in that region. Other factors such as the size or the cultural diversity of a specific place can also play a role. For instance, houses built by migrants in their origin countries might be more visible in some areas such as in Governador Valadares, Nador or Lviv, where about 80% of the respondents have seen houses or apartments in their region that people have built or renovated with money earned abroad. In other places, migrants' investments in housing might be less obvious, such as in Campinas (24%) or Kiev (20%). In a city such as Rio de Janeiro, with 6.3 million inhabitants, migrants' investments or initiatives are difficult to perceive: 'the impact of emigration gets melted amongst the crowd' (Luma, 38, female, Brazil–Norway, returned migrant).

The impact of migration is much clearer in the case of Lviv and in the Moroccan localities – especially in Nador (Berriane, 1994a; Berriane, 1994b; McMurray, 2001), which have been subject to very high levels of emigration in recent years. Not surprisingly, these provide our clearest examples of embedded feedback. This is most evident in the case of Moroccans who for decades have seen the return of migrants from

Europe on their summer holidays. Some respondents referred to this phenomenon as the origin of their intention to emigrate:

> I had dreamt of migration from the 1970s, and I had always thought of going abroad. It was a big dream for me as I wanted to be like those migrants who would usually come back with new and expensive clothes, who bought nice cars.
>
> (Hamid, 62, male, Morocco–Netherlands, returned migrant)

This embedded feedback can also operate across families and generations in people supporting the emigration of children or siblings. For example, Zenhour, a 60-year-old woman of Nador, described herself as 'frustrated' seeing migrants coming back during the summer holidays with nice cars and clothes. She perceived them as being happy and she decided to invest in her son's migration to London in order to 'enjoy life a little bit' through his migration outcomes (Zenhour, 60, female, Morocco–UK, family member).

The extent of emigration in a particular community was also noted as a factor shaping people's ideas about moving, as one respondent from Lviv showed:

> [F]or example in Lviv, in our house, in every second apartment a woman is working abroad, in Italy. It means by-turn that children grow without parents for some time; the second thing is that they get used money being sent and it decides everything. It has a big influence because they do not earn it by themselves, but they know that it will be sent to them every month.
>
> (Irina, 36, female, Ukraine–Netherlands, returned migrant)

The rather negative connotations presented by this respondent are countered by others who refer to contributions of migrants' capital to the public finances and local economy. In Lviv, the mother of one migrant claimed that the total amount of money sent by migrants is comparable to the city budget; they have invested in shops and are also buying cars and apartments (Kateryna, 62, female, Ukraine–Norway, family member). Migrants are also building houses, a phenomenon observed among migrants across the world (e.g., see Erdal, 2012). Their investments in housing are a good example of the meanings and values embedded in commodities (Appadurai, 1986). Sofia, a young woman from Ternopil, illustrates this when she talks about the 'fancy, amazing and big' houses in the village where she spent her childhood. They

are positively valued not only for their characteristics but also because migrants had to work hard in order to get them:

> Each of these houses was built with immigrant's money . . . and my grandmother is always saying 'Look, this guy works on construction in Portugal!'. People are working very hard over there and they are sending money back home, so their family can invest in their own construction.
>
> (Sofia, 28, female, Ukraine–Portugal, family member)

Embedded feedback can arise from less tangible aspects than houses or business, such as from the perceived positive effects of migration in the regional economic dynamics of a high emigration area such as Nador. Nordin, a 59-year-old Moroccan who migrated to the Netherlands and now owns two bakeries in Nador, recalled the few houses, and the lack of coffee shops, restaurants and cars in his neighbourhood before migration outcomes were visible in the area. From his perspective, migration has been instrumental in transforming Nador from a village to the city one finds today.

Embedded feedback can also concern less visible negative aspects, such as the poor quality of life for migrants in Europe:

> For me, the economic crisis has scared many young Moroccans of failure and homelessness in Europe. Since migrants themselves take the plane to come to Morocco, become mean in their shopping and in other activities during summer vacation, people get assured that Europe is undergoing a severe crisis.
>
> (Mouloud, 55, male, Morocco–UK, returned migrant)

Or the problems created in the origin communities:

> There are many big, 2 or 3-storeyed, houses, for example, in Lviv region, built, mainly, by migrants. We call them 'match boxes', because the exterior is primitive, they are too big for one family. It is really hard to pay for utilities if the person earned some money abroad, but don't have a well-paid job here in Ukraine after coming back.
>
> (Taras, 40, male, Ukraine–Portugal, returned migrant)

All these examples show how embedded feedback is identifiable, but unlike the effect of social remittances as described by Levitt (1998), it

can be transmitted unintentionally and unsystematically, and it is often received involuntarily.

Induced broadcast

The induced broadcast feedback demands a more active role of the receiver than general and embedded broadcast feedback. Initially, this type of broadcast feedback is not linked to any individual social network but the receiver can make use of existing impersonal networks to become connected. For instance, somebody who wants to migrate can search online for webpages, social media profiles and blogs that are publicly accessible. This may require sending an invitation to connect but it offers an avenue for pursuing their migration ideas.

This type of feedback is based on the active intention of the receiver to get access to existing pieces of information arising from previous migrants – mainly online through the use of social media (Dekker and Engbersen, 2014). However, it may also involve information disseminated through other channels, including magazines or newspapers; informal and formal networks such as NGOs, private companies, or migrant networks; or even by a group of friends or family members who are initially external to the receivers' social networks. It plays a facilitating role in different phases of the migration project. The induced broadcast feedback is associated with a 'social learning effect' (DiMaggio and Garip, 2012), helping to reduce the costs and the risks associated with migration, but here this effect is not caused by any personal social network. This feedback can generate the network to provide the missing social assistance to those who lack the necessary pre-existing social networks.

This seems to be particularly important in the case of Brazilians moving to Europe, who tend to have less contact with social networks in the continent compared to Ukrainians and Moroccans. Migrants refer to making contact with previous migrants through social media to find out information about a particular destination. Moreover, once they have moved they may be contacted by complete strangers online with requests for information or advice. This is the case for a 25-year-old student in Campinas who spent several years in Portugal. She received many information requests from strangers on her Orkut account: 'I always said "Look people, you will not get rich here, but life here is great, you can do this, can do that . . . ." The advice I gave to almost everyone was: "Do not come over here illegally" ' (Dinorá, 25, female, Brazil–Portugal, returned migrant). Some go a step further and establish

blogs to share their experiences and answer such queries in one place. There are also websites to collate such information:

> (...) I have a blog and I write down everything I think with regards to the Netherlands.... So people react to what I write: 'Ah, Juan, I agree with what you are writing. I would love to live in the Netherlands. Would you be able to give me more information?' (...) I tell them 'Look for the website Brasileiros na Holanda.' If you are really interested in living in the Netherlands, you only have to click on that name and you go straight to the website, on Google.
>
> (Juan, 36, male, Brazil-Netherlands)

It is important to note that while these contacts made between strangers online could be very significant for individual migrants, the survey showed that the vast majority of respondents who offered assistance and advice did so for people who were already part of their social network (see Dekker, Engbersen and Faber, Chapter 4, in this volume). People like Juan, who set out to communicate with strangers, are rare. However, the nature of broadcast feedback is that it may spread despite the intentions of its authors.

The proliferation of magazines, blogs, virtual communities and websites such as *leros.co.uk* and *brazileirosnaholanda.com* with many testimonies of Brazilians living in London or in the Netherlands, and the use of these resources by potential migrants, seem more common in settings where social networks spanning origin and destination are more limited. This may be a reflection of a combination of factors: geographical, where the distance in a country such as Brazil may reduce the likelihood of having personal contact with migrants, or cultural, such as the level of digital literacy, or the huge divides of race and class within the country (see Horst, Pereira and Sheringham, Chapter 5, in this volume).

The influence of such feedback extends through the migration process so, for example, the blog that can provide information for someone before they move can also help them as they find their feet in the new residence. The input of the media carries across into the destination countries where migrants' journals help new migrants find their way:

> One thing that helped me a lot when I got there were Brazilian journals... Besides friends, there were these magazines where you

> could make contact with other Brazilians. These magazines had information about restaurants, hotels, workplaces, city map, means of transportation, so I think that helped a lot.
>
> (Tiago, 35, male, Brazil–United Kingdom, returned migrant)

Advertisements published in newspapers or websites can also facilitate migration projects by enabling people aspiring to migrate to get in touch with migration industry actors. Ukrainian respondents referred to using such intermediaries to find a job as care providers (nurses, au-pairs, etc.), to obtain travel and migration documents or even to find a partner abroad. However, these adverts can also make migration less accessible because of the fear of being a victim of fraud or human trafficking:

> I think there are a lot of varieties of such organisations, as the internet is full of advertisements of employment assistance abroad. But we know that there are a lot of false ones connected with human trafficking cases. People can easily be captured in the slavery, especially girls, who agree to work as dancers and so on.
>
> (Sergei, 52, male, Ukraine–Netherlands, family member)

The interplay between broadcast feedback and feedback operating through social network

These examples of induced feedback clearly show that the boundaries between broadcast feedback and social networks are rather fuzzy. When somebody posts an image or a message in a Facebook account, it may contribute to broadcast feedback if the post is read by somebody outside the broadcaster's social network. If the recipient is one of the 'Facebook friends' of the broadcaster, we will see any impact it has on migration behaviour as feedback operating through social networks. These boundaries are also permeable as the stranger to the network becomes a Facebook or Orkut 'friend' and starts up an online relationship.

In some cases feedback through social networks and broadcast feedback can be complementary and reinforce each other. This is the case, for instance, when a migrant explains to his sister who stayed in the origin community that he is unemployed and cannot find a job to pay his mortgage in his residence country, and she can see on TV the images of the unemployed queuing in front of a job centre in Portugal in times of economic recession. However, in other cases, feedback through social networks could work in the opposite direction to broadcast feedback.

Keeping the same example, the positive feedback of the social networks about the opportunities in Portugal or elsewhere could counter the negative broadcast feedback about the economic crisis in Europe:

> For instance, whatever you see on TV about the crisis, if you have a friend who says 'come here because I have a job for you', 'come here because you can stay at my place', you go. A Brazilian would go.
> (Monica, 37, female, Brazil–United Kingdom, family member)

We might think that feedback from personal social networks could have more impact than broadcast feedback, but the normative influence the latter can generate is not negligible, and it appears to contribute to the development of a culture of mobility that transforms (temporary) migration into a social requirement; for example, Liliana in Brazil claimed:

> It is the message of 'going outside Brazil' which is disseminated. Let's say that you pick a magazine, [and you read] this about France, that about [somewhere else] (...) this shapes people's images (...).
> (Liliana, 61, female, Brazil–Netherlands, family member)

Broadcast feedback can also lower the necessary individual threshold before a potential migrant makes the decision to migrate or to choose a particular destination (Granovetter, 1978). This may happen when broadcast information inflates the perceived popularity of a particular destination, making it easier for others to go in the same direction: for instance, with the impact of a Brazilian TV programme showing the positive experiences of migrants in Norway despite the fact that only very few Brazilians are living there. We can hypothesise that this broadcast feedback will have a greater effect in areas without a strong migration tradition where social networks are less likely to include migrants. This is the case, for example, in areas where migrants invest in houses outside their communities of origin, thereby broadcasting news of their successful migration outcome far beyond their social networks.

In addition, over time, the influence of broadcast feedback can fluctuate due to changes in the strength of people's social ties. For instance, after many years living in Western Europe, what is broadcast on TV can become more relevant to shape a migrant's perception of their country of origin if contact with their initial social networks there has substantially decreased.

> [W]hen a person doesn't come back to his country for quite a long time . . . the image of one's motherland during that period away is created by different unpleasant news on TV or in newspapers or so on. So one is afraid of coming back, as the possibility of being disappointed is too high.
>
> (Olga, 31, female, Ukraine–Norway, returned migrant)

While broadcast feedback may interact with and moderate the social network effects identified by DiMaggio and Garip (2012), its origins lie outside the social networks that they discuss. Moreover, on occasions broadcast feedback may be a more important mechanism in shaping people's migration decisions and behaviour and the emergence of new migration patterns.

Conclusion

The analysis of the surveys collected in Brazil, Morocco and Ukraine shows that even those who do not communicate with people in Europe obtain information on both migration and potential destinations. Often their acquired knowledge is not markedly different from those with direct transnational networks. Without questioning the relevance of social networks to explain migration aspirations and behaviour, other mechanisms shape migration patterns simultaneously.

This chapter differentiates between the effects of social networks defined as meaningful, sustained and multifaceted personal interactions and those of broadcast feedback operating through more impersonal channels in a shared common context. It identifies three types of broadcast feedback that imply distinct dimensions of time and space – general, embedded and induced broadcast. What is common to all is that transmitters and receivers are not linked by any social network – at least at the start of these transfers. Ideas, information and images about migration outcomes can be transmitted in a physical space or virtually in a more or less conscious way and the receiver can voluntarily or involuntarily look for specific pieces of information. Broadcast feedback can generate different responses according to the characteristics of the receiver and can have positive, negative or self-correcting effects on migration.

We make no claim that broadcast feedback is the most important factor shaping migration patterns; most likely (substantive) social networks play a more significant role in many, if not most cases. However, through our empirical examples we show that broadcast feedback can

have a marked influence on the migration behaviour of those who receive it. This suggests that it is worthy of further exploration.

As we have argued, the boundaries between broadcast feedback and social networks are sometimes fuzzy and permeable. Causal mechanisms induced by these two types of feedback can be complementary and reinforce each other, or can have the opposite effect. Even though the importance of personal social networks can neutralise the impact of broadcast feedback in some cases, in other cases the normative influence that this latter can create should not be underestimated. Broadcast feedback can lower the necessary individual threshold before a particular migration-related behaviour is taken. Finally, the impact of broadcast feedback can fluctuate over time according to the changes in the strength of social ties.

If we want to explain how the migration of people at one time affects the subsequent migration of others from the same origin, our analysis will be limited if we focus only on people's social networks. Moreover, as we have argued, social networks are often invoked even when there is no substantive link between people. We can start to develop a more nuanced picture that reaches beyond social networks by exploring more carefully the broader context in which potential migrants learn of others' experience, see the outcomes of earlier migrations and even seek contact, where there was none before. The outcomes of migration are broadcast by various channels for all to see. Our understanding of migration attitudes, aspirations and decision-making may be improved by paying more attention to how these broadcasts are received.

Note

1. Bivariate logistic regressions were run for each corridor to test the relationship between respondents having seen images or heard stories of the destination before migrating (the dependent variable) and the following independent variables: their connectedness (connected/unconnected), level of education, age, year of arrival, origin (rural/urban), gender and current occupation. The full regression tables can be found at http://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/projects/themis.

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10

Migration Mechanisms of the Middle Range: On the Concept of Reverse Cumulative Causation

Godfried Engbersen, Erik Snel and Alina Esteves

Introduction

In a recent collection of articles on the significance of the work by the American sociologist R.K. Merton, Charles Tilly (2010, p. 55) argued for mechanism-based explanations of the middle range. In his own words, 'mechanistic explanations offer a distinctive, superior grasp of how social processes actually work'. Tilly's plea fits in a development in which mechanism-based explanations are increasingly gaining attention. This development is in response to shortcomings in causal explanations and is also expressive of the conviction that proper explanations should detail the 'cogs and wheels' or the 'nuts and bolts' of the causal process through which the outcomes to be explained are brought about (Elster, 1989; Hedström and Ylikoski, 2010; Tilly, 2005; 2010). Another important factor is the explicit interest in developing a theory of action that combines explanations at the macro-level with explanations at the micro-level (Coleman, 1986; 1990).

In this chapter, we argue that mechanism-based explanations are highly relevant for the field of migration studies (see also Faist, 2015). We will illustrate this by means of the migration mechanism of 'cumulative causation' or 'circular migration' as developed by Myrdal and Massey. However, this mechanism was mostly used to explain the continuation and expansion of migration flows. In this chapter we focus on *reverse cumulative causation*. Reverse cumulative causation relates to feedback mechanisms that contribute to the discontinuation and decline of migration flows. A second aim of this chapter is to show the importance of moving beyond migrant networks to understand how the mechanism of reverse cumulative causation works. Therefore, we

analyse how macro-level factors influence the functioning of Brazilian and Moroccan migrants and their networks (the macro–micro problem). We shall explain the mechanism of reverse cumulative causation with reference to two examples of declining migration: the migration corridors from Brazil to Portugal and from Morocco to the Netherlands. We will draw on qualitative and quantitative THEMIS data collected for analysing the Brazil–Portugal corridor and the Morocco–Netherlands corridor (see chapters 6 and 7).

This chapter is organised as follows. In the next section, we discuss the importance of mechanism-based explanations and introduce the mechanism of *reverse cumulative causation*. After that we analyse the workings of the mechanism of reverse cumulative causation. We will focus in particular on the 'agentic' role of individual migrants and their networks in reducing immigration (Paul, 2011, p. 1844; Bakewell et al., 2013). The chapter concludes with a discussion of the main findings.

The idea and structure of mechanism-based explanations

In their overview article on causal mechanisms in the social sciences, Hedström and Ylikoski (2010, pp. 50–52) posit four generally shared ideas on what characterises a mechanism:

1. A mechanism is identified by the kind of effect or phenomenon it produces.
2. A mechanism is a causal notion.
3. A mechanism has a structure: 'When a mechanism-based explanation opens the black box, it discloses this structure. It turns the black box into a transparent box and makes visible how the participating entities and their properties, activities, and relations produce the effect of interest' (Hedström and Ylikoski, 2010, p. 51).
4. Mechanisms form a hierarchy: 'While a mechanism at one level presupposes or takes for granted the existence of certain entities with characteristic properties and entities, it is expected that there are lower-level mechanisms that explain them' (Hedström and Ylikoski, 2010, p. 52).

In elaborating their mechanism-based explanations in sociology, Hedström and Ylikoski mark out two positions. First they point to the necessity of systematically integrating theoretical and empirical work, connecting to Merton's plea for sociological theories of the middle range. These are theories that can explain diverse social phenomena

but that do not pretend to be all encompassing, general theories.[1] As an example they refer to Merton's mechanism of the self-fulfilling prophecy. A typical aspect of how self-fulfilling prophecies work is the *feedback mechanism*. An incorrect definition of the situation (the unjust assumption that a solvent bank is in financial trouble) brings forth certain behaviour (customers pull their money out) which influences other people's beliefs and triggers the same collective behaviour in them (resulting in a 'run on the bank'). In this way a 'self-reinforcing and belief-centred cycle' is created and an incorrect situation definition ends up becoming true (the bank actually does go bankrupt) (Hedström and Ylikoski, 2010, p. 62). This mechanism of the self-fulfilling prophecy has been used to explain a range of different types of phenomena (including ethnic and race relations).

The second position marked out by Hedström and Ylikoski is that it is the primary task of sociology to explain collective phenomena. For this, and in line with Coleman (Coleman, 1986; 1990), they state that it is unsatisfactory to explain macro-phenomena in terms of other macro-phenomena. Their 'macro–micro–macro' model is based on the assumption that a macro-phenomenon is the (unintended) result of the actions of a large number of individuals in micro-situations. Here they note that 'explanatory understanding is only achieved by recognising that actions take place in relational structures' (Hedström and Ylikoski, 2010, p. 59). Figure 10.1 – also known as the 'Coleman boat' – visualises their approach. A relationship is assumed to exist between certain social facts, social structures or institutions and certain social phenomena.[2] Hedström and Ylikoski (2010, p. 59) use the term 'macro-level associations'. As noted above, they argue that scientific explanations that are restricted to macro-level relations are unsatisfactory, as they do not specify the causal mechanisms by which macro-properties are related to each other (cf. Coleman, 1990, pp. 6–7). To explain macro-level associations, three analytical steps are required: first, to identify the 'situational mechanism' by which specific macro-factors shape and constrain individuals' desires, beliefs and motivations (macro-to-micro, arrow 1). The second step is to establish a relationship between individuals' desires, beliefs and motivations and their individual actions. This is known as the 'action-formation mechanism' (micro-to-micro, arrow 2). The third step is to analyse how individual actions interact and interfere with one another, leading to intended and unintended macro-outcomes. This is the 'transformational mechanism' (micro-to-macro, arrow 3).

These insights are relevant for the field of migration studies. This can be illustrated by reference to Massey's theory (1990; Massey et al., 1998)



Figure 10.1 A typology of social mechanisms (based on Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010)

on cumulative causation. This is one of the most developed theories in the migration literature, offering an explanation for self-reinforcing processes of Mexican-US migration and other patterns of international migration. It also illustrates the significance of mechanism-based explanations, because of the systematic focus on the influence of political-economic and local factors on individual behaviour, households, migrant networks, community structures and belief formations (migration cultures and the role of migration aspirations). The mechanism of cumulative causation consists of a hierarchy of interrelated mechanisms. In the study *Worlds in Motion*, Massey et al. (1998) list eight ways through which migration acquires a self-perpetuating and self-reinforcing character.[3] A crucial mechanism is the mobilisation of resources from the social networks in which migrants are embedded (accumulation of social capital) (Fussell and Massey, 2004, p. 152). Ties with migrants increase the likelihood of migration, as they reduce the costs and boost the anticipated benefits of migration. The first pioneering migrants need to find their way in the destination country, and for them the costs are high. They can then help out aspiring and new migrants with jobs, housing and relevant documents, making it easier and hence cheaper for them. In the words of Massey (1990, p. 8):

> [E]xpanding networks cause the costs of migration to fall and the probability of migration to rise; these trends feed off one another, and over time migration spreads out to encompass all segments of a

> society. This feedback occurs because the networks are created by the act of migration itself.

Massey argues in later work that the accumulation of social capital is the *primary mechanism* underlying cumulative causation (Fussell and Massey, 2004, p. 152). He strongly emphasises the role of migrant networks as the channel of migration-facilitating feedback.

A second important mechanism is the establishment of a migration culture. As migration becomes increasingly common in a community, the values and cultural perceptions of that community evolve in a way that increases the likelihood of future migration. Migration is increasingly seen as a valuable and habitual ambition (Massey et al., 1998; Heering et al., 2004). However, Massey et al. (1998, p. 48) also acknowledge 'limits' to cumulative causation. They argue that the mechanism of cumulative causation is especially related to rural contexts, and that at a certain point the migration process reaches 'network saturation', so that the process of migration loses its dynamic (Massey, 1990; Fussell and Massey, 2004). Economic developments (labour shortages and rising local wages) in the sending regions may contribute to the reduction of the out-movement of migrants and to network saturation.

Massey's work is compatible with Hedström and Ylikoski's conceptual framework. Massey shows (1) how economic factors, migration policy and local relationships influence the desires and aspirations of potential migrants to emigrate (situational mechanism); (2) that these aspirations lead to actual migration behaviour and to mobilising information, money, housing and jobs, as the resources required for a successful migration (action-formation mechanism); and (3) that the aggregated result of these individual actions is the emergence, in both the sending and receiving country, of a migration-facilitating infrastructure, so that migration becomes self-sustaining (transformational mechanism).

The mechanism of reverse cumulative causation

The mechanism of cumulative causation provides a valuable framework to explain various migrant movements within specific migration corridors analysed by the THEMIS project. One example is the migration from Morocco to the Netherlands, due to the recruitment of so-called guest workers since the mid-1960s and the subsequent arrival of partners and children since the mid-1970s (Lucassen and Lucassen, 2011; De Haas, 2005; 2007). The number of first-generation (foreign-born) Moroccans in the Netherlands increased from less than 25,000 in 1974 –

the formal recruitment stop for guest workers following the so-called oil crisis in those days – to about 168,000 in 2005, mainly due to processes of family reunification and family formation (migration resulting from the fact that many second-generation Moroccans still found their spouses in Morocco). Another example is the migration from Brazil to Portugal. Although Brazil was always an immigrant receiving country, migration from Brazil to Portugal started in the late 1970s. From the 1970s to 2010, the number of Brazilians in Portugal increased from only 3,000 to almost 120,000 (Fonseca and McGarrigle, 2014). Immigration from Brazil to Portugal started as a middle-class phenomenon: young Brazilians came to Portugal to study due to historical colonial ties and linguistic and cultural links. Since the mid-1990s, it expanded rapidly and started to include low-skilled migrants. Padilla (2006) refers to this shift as the 'proletarisation' of migration from Brazil to Portugal. Other scholars speak of a 'second wave' of low-skilled migrants (see also Bógus, 2007; Peixoto and Figueiredo, 2007). In sum, in Portugal as well as in the Netherlands, economic opportunities, permissive migration policies, support provided by migrant networks and the existence of migration cultures in high migration-impacted regions (such as Mantena in Brazil and Rabat and Nador in Morocco) generated a self-reinforcing process of increasing migration from Brazil to Portugal and from Morocco to the Netherlands.

However, migrant flows from Morocco to the Netherlands began to decline in the second half of the 1990s, while migration flows from Brazil to Portugal started to decline since the recent economic crisis of 2008 (Fonseca et al., this volume, Chapter 6; Snel et al., this volume, Chapter 7). These contemporary patterns of *declining migration* are to our understanding not the result of 'network saturation', but they are a consequence of a mechanism we categorise as 'reverse cumulative causation'. This mechanism is already visible in Myrdal's (1957) original formulations of cumulative or circular causation, which were reintroduced and developed by Massey in his work on international migration. Myrdal showed in his analysis of world poverty that the dynamics of cumulative causation may cause upward spirals of increasing wealth but also downward spirals of increasing poverty. Often, these two processes are interrelated: the upward spiral of an economy may be an important cause of another's downward spiral (see also Myrdal, 1970; Rigney, 2010).

The theory of cumulative causation describes several mechanisms that lead to *upward spirals of migration*, while the concept of reverse cumulative causation seeks to specify mechanisms leading to *downward spirals of migration*. However, in both causes feedback loops are



Figure 10.2 Declining immigration from Brazil to Portugal and from Morocco to the Netherlands as a result of reverse cumulative causation

at work that contribute to self-amplifying processes of increasing or decreasing migration. The conceptual model of Hedström and Ylikoski is helpful for specifying the three social mechanisms that generate the process of reverse cumulative causation (see Figure 10.2). Firstly, we assume that three institutional macro-level phenomena (restrictive migration regimes, limited job opportunities and anti-immigration sentiments) negatively influence the beliefs and motivations of settled migrants to support and stimulate potential migrants to move to Portugal and the Netherlands (*situational mechanism*). Secondly, this negative 'belief formation' (Hedström and Swedberg, 1998, p. 23) of settled migrants regarding migration from Brazil to Portugal and from Morocco to the Netherlands results in deliberate actions not to assist potential migrants, or to provide assistance only very selectively (*action-formation mechanism*). Thirdly, this migration-undermining feedback towards prospective migrants in the origin countries leads to changes in the migration cultures in Brazil and Morocco in which potential migrants are embedded (*transformational mechanism*) (De Haas, 2010). As a result, a much more selectively composed group is capable of moving to Portugal and the Netherlands, namely the higher skilled, those who can meet the strict demands of migration policies and those who are less affected by the anti-immigration attitudes. As a result of these three mechanisms, a causal process arises that results in a decline in new migration from Brazil to Portugal and from Morocco to the Netherlands.

The model presented in this chapter has its limitations. The mechanisms on which our model focuses operate at the level of migrants

and their networks. The effects of macro-economic and political factors in the origin and destination countries are analysed through the consequences they have on migrants' beliefs, assessments and actions. We did not analyse *broadcast feedback* that *operates* through impersonal channels, for example information, images and ideas that are transmitted by communication and mass media (see Bakewell and Jolivet, in this volume). Besides, we did not study systemically how Brazilian and Moroccan migration has transformed communities of origin, for example through investments with remittances. In spite of these limitations, our model offers a framework for understanding migration-undermining feedback processes that contribute to declining migration flows.

Declining immigration flows and reverse cumulative causation of migration

The Brazil–Portugal corridor and the Morocco–Netherlands corridor have different characteristics. The destination surveys show that almost 90% of the Moroccan respondents lived for more than 10 years in the Netherlands, while about 50% of the Brazilians in Portugal have lived there for less than five years. Among the Brazilian respondents we found more young, skilled (especially students) and working people. Furthermore, the Brazil–Portugal corridor is characterised by substantial return migration. The Moroccan respondents were older, less skilled and half of them were working. Within the Morocco-Netherlands corridor, there is limited return migration. The surveys in the origin countries show the strong transnational connections of Moroccans to Western Europe due to a long migration tradition, in contrast with Brazil that has a younger immigration tradition.

The overview in Table 10.1 summarises some characteristics of the two migration corridors and the transformations that took place in the 'contexts of reception' in Portugal and the Netherlands in the last decades (Carling and Jolivet, this volume Chapter 2; Fonseca et al., this volume, Chapter 6; Snel et al., this volume, Chapter 7). Although we are dealing with different migration corridors, the changes in the contexts of reception point in the same direction: less receptive migration regimes, fewer job opportunities and a more hostile climate towards immigrants (cf. Portes and Rumbaut, 1990; Portes, 1995).

Fonseca et al. (this volume, Chapter 6) and Snel et al. (this volume, Chapter 7) show that these macro-level changes in the contexts of reception have impact on the assessment of migrants living in Portugal

Table 10.1 Overview of the characteristics of the Brazil–Portugal and Morocco–Netherlands corridor and the transformation of the contexts of reception in Portugal and the Netherlands

	Corridor Brazil–Portugal	**Corridor Morocco–Netherlands**
Migration corridor characteristics	Young immigration tradition (from the 1980s)	Old immigration tradition (from the 1960s)
	First mainly professional middle class and student migration, later mainly low-skilled labour migration and more recently (after 2011) higher education students	First low-skilled labour migration, later mainly low-skilled family reunification & family formation
	Substantial return migration	Limited return migration
	Semi-strong to weak transnational networks	Strong transnational networks
Changes in macro-level contexts of reception in destination countries	*Migration policy*: From a non-issue (1980s) to permissive & receptive (1990s and early 2000s) to more restrictive (from 2003/2007)	*Migration policy*: From receptive (1960s) and permissive (1980s and 1990s) to very restrictive (from 2000s)
	Job opportunities: From (high) skilled job opportunities (1980s) to (partly irregular) low-skilled job opportunities (1990s and 2000s) to very limited job opportunities (from 2008 onwards)	*Job opportunities*: From regular low-skilled job opportunities (1970s) to irregular job opportunities (1980s and 1990s) to very limited job opportunities (2000s)
	Societal reception: From tolerance (1970s and 1980s) to welcoming (1990s) to selective discrimination (2000s)	*Societal reception*: From welcome (1970s) to tolerance (1980s and 1990s) to discontent and hostility (from 2000s)

and the Netherlands to support prospective migrants in Brazil and Morocco to move to Western Europe. Snel et al. (Chapter 7) introduce the concept of 'gate closing' which relates to migrants refusing to support co-ethnics to move to the Netherlands, and Fonseca et al. (Chapter 6) speak of 'proactively discouraging people from emigrating to Portugal'.

In the next section, we examine the impact of the institutional changes on settled migrants in Portugal and the Netherlands with the help of the model of Hedström and Ylikoski. First, we analyse the changing beliefs and motivations of settled migrants to support prospective migrants. Second, we show that settled migrants predominantly act as 'gate keepers' and 'gate closers' towards prospective migrants (Böcker, 1994; Paul, 2013). Third, we argue that these migration-undermining acts affect migration cultures in Brazil and Morocco.

Situational mechanism: Declining motivation for supporting potential migrants

The qualitative interviews held in both the origin and destination countries indicate that all three macro-factors are at work and influence the motivations to support prospective migrants to move to Europe (Fonseca et al., this volume, Chapter 6; Snel et al., this volume, Chapter 7; Engbersen et al., 2013). However, the outcomes of regression analyses show that in the Dutch case the respondents' unwillingness to support potential newcomers is mainly related to the stricter migration policies and the harsh Dutch public climate about immigration and Muslims (Snel et al., this volume, Chapter 7), whereas in the Portuguese case, economic opportunities are an important factor behind the critical stance towards potential migrants in Brazil (Fonseca et al., this volume, Chapter 6). Table 10.2 indicates that the majority of settled migrants in Portugal and the Netherlands is not recommending prospective migrants to move to Europe. There is a strong *disbelief* in the relevance of a migration project. Furthermore, a minority of the respondents add they would only give support in some cases and not in other cases. This shows the growing selectiveness in the support provided to newcomers.

Table 10.2 Respondents' inclination to recommend people from Brazil to move to Portugal (N = 400) and from Morocco to the Netherlands (N = 420) (%)

	Corridor Portugal–Brazil	**Corridor Netherlands–Morocco**
Yes	20.8	8.5
No	68.2	79.3
In some cases, but not in others	11.0	12.2

Source: THEMIS Destination country survey of Brazilians in Portugal and Moroccans in the Netherlands (unweighted data).

In the literature one can find abundant evidence of how settled migrants do not accurately portray life in the receiving society (Mahler, 1995). Even though they have often obtained positions in the lower strata of the receiving society, they send positive images to the origin country of wealth they have gained, sometimes even increasing their debts in order to do so. While we have indications that this was certainly true for Moroccan immigrants in the Netherlands in the past, this has changed today (Lucassen and Lucassen, 2011). Many respondents explicitly mention that economic opportunities are not as attractive as they used to be. Settled Brazilian migrants in Portugal point to the limited economic opportunities for Brazilian newcomers in Portugal. Isabella tells us:

> I never seen on the Internet, for instance on social media sites, any Brazilian saying Portugal is wonderful, having many job opportunities (...) actually quite the opposite, most of people do say it is difficult to find work in Portugal, even before the crisis. It is been always like that since I started working with migration.
>
> (Isabella, female, 51, Brazil–Portugal, migrant)

Moroccan migrants in the Netherlands express the same negative view on the current job opportunities. Ilham says: 'There is no work here. If they come to Holland they will only get into trouble. In the past there was enough work, but not anymore' (Ilham, female, 82, Morocco–Netherlands, migrant). Other settled migrants also mention that changing economic circumstances in the Netherlands are making life more difficult and less attractive for Moroccan immigrants. Souhaila, who spent nearly 40 years in the Netherlands, mentions: 'There is no money to make here. There are no jobs anymore. It's better to stay over there' (Souhaila, female, 64, Morocco–Netherlands).

Apart from the limited job opportunities, many settled migrants mention that it has become very difficult for Brazilians and Moroccans to migrate to Portugal and the Netherlands due to the selective and restrictive migration policies. Fatima, a 33-year-old Moroccan, elaborates: 'Today it is difficult to obtain a visa. Also for the request you must have a job and a large income. The immigration policies are also stricter than before. Migrants have to do a lot of tests and have to learn a lot about Dutch culture' (Fatima, female, 33, Morocco–Netherlands). In the case of Brazilians in Portugal, they do not have to pass a language and civic integration test in order to marry a partner in Portugal. Moreover, if they have a Portuguese grandparent, they can

easily obtain Portuguese citizenship. Nevertheless, anti-irregular migration policies have become more restrictive and there are no amnesty programmes nowadays that make regularisation possible. These stricter policies reduce the job opportunities and life chances of irregular Brazilian migrants substantially (Engbersen and Broeders, 2009):

> And if I brought someone, employment is difficult, to obtain a visa is difficult, nobody gives employment like that. I hire people in the nursing home where I work, they have to be documented, why? Because if the inspection knocks on the door, I'm the first to go to jail because I admitted someone who is illegal (...).
>
> (Gisele, female, 45, Brazil–Portugal, migrant)

> For those living here [in Portugal], those already with documents, it is difficult; for someone coming without documents it is even worse!
>
> (Oscar, male, 39, Brazil–Portugal, migrant)

Brazilian and Moroccan migrants furthermore feel that the societal reception in Portugal and the Netherlands has changed and that immigrants are now treated with prejudice. Many Moroccan respondents elaborated on their actual negative experiences with native Dutch people and how bad such experiences make them feel. El Ghazi tells us: 'Eighty percent are racists. One day I entered a café in Rotterdam to support the Dutch soccer team and they didn't want me to enter. Things like that upset me' (male, 27, Morocco–Netherlands, migrant). Hassan, a 41-year-old skilled worker, says: 'Sometimes you get the feeling that people hate you. They hate you for who you are and they hate your presence' (male, Morocco–Netherlands, migrant). Like El Ghazi and Hassan, respondents indicate that the attitudes of Dutch people towards them have changed over the years, especially with respect to their Islamic religion (see Snel et al., this volume, Chapter 7).

In Portugal, other mechanisms of discrimination are at work. Many Brazilians – especially women – often feel discriminated against (see Fonseca et al. in this volume). According to Malheiros (2007), discriminatory attitudes towards Brazilian immigrants are becoming more frequent. Brazilian women became the main victims of stereotypes that tend to 'exoticise' their image, often seeing them as 'exotic and easy'. The discrimination is also felt in the labour market. The high unemployment rates among nationals and immigrants increase the competition for jobs and elevate social tensions between these groups. However, the changes in the societal reception of Brazilians are related not only to the

economic crisis but also to the rapid and significant growth of the size of the Brazilian community in Portugal, the features of the so-called second wave that arrived in Portugal in the late 1990s (poor and low skilled), their incorporation in the secondary segment of the labour market and to specific episodes of violent crime which involved Brazilian nationals (Malheiros, 2007).

The growing competition in the labour market and the discriminatory attitudes of Portuguese employers can be found in Bernardo's words who migrated to Portugal in 1990. He reveals how important Brazilian professionals (e.g., dentists, media and communication experts) were to train and teach Portuguese professionals and how things changed over time:

> They were well considered. Nowadays they want to see the back of us (...) I never felt prejudice. If there was prejudice, I didn't understand. Nowadays, I already feel a bit (...) in my area I feel [prejudice] because "he is taking my place here".
>
> (male, 57, migrant)

The negative assessments of Brazilian and Moroccan migrants in Portugal and the Netherlands on migration polices, job opportunities and societal reception contribute to a growing disbelief in the relevance and possibility of migration. This disbelief leads to acts of gate keeping and gate closing among settled migrants in Brazil and Portugal. These outcomes relate to the action-formation mechanism.

The action-formation mechanism: Gate keeping and gate closing

The results of the destination surveys show that more than 54% of the Brazilian respondents do not encourage anyone to come to Portugal, and that nearly 42% have actually discouraged someone from migrating. The Dutch data are more significant. They show that almost 86% of the Moroccan respondents do not encourage migration and that more than 39% is actively discouraging further migration (see Table 10.3).

The qualitative interviews give insight into the process of discouragement. First, settled migrants give prospective migrants realistic information regarding the worsening economic climate in Portugal and the Netherlands and the scarcity of decent jobs compared to the past. Second, migrants try to explain to prospective migrants in Brazil and Morocco that it is complicated to get into Portugal and the Netherlands,

Table 10.3 Encouragement and discouragement of migration from settled Brazilian migrants in Portugal and settled Moroccan migrants in the Netherlands (%)

	Yes	No
Brazilians in Portugal		
Encouraging migration (N = 400)	45.8	54.3
Discouraging migration (N = 400)	41.8	58.3
Moroccans in Rotterdam		
Encouraging migration (N = 418)	14.1	85.9
Discouraging migration (N = 416)	39.2	60.8

Source: THEMIS destination country survey of Brazilians in Portugal and Moroccans in the Netherlands (unweighted data).

due to the increasing restrictions on immigration. Besides providing information on the unfavourable economic climate and migration policies, they also tell potential migrants about the negative social climate towards immigrants. This final aspect is very relevant for the Netherlands in which anti-immigration and anti-Muslim sentiments became very clear.

> They [family and friends in Morocco] always ask for help to come to the Netherlands. I always say the same: that it is difficult to find work and that there is high unemployment (...). If they say that they want to come to the Netherlands and ask if I can help them, then I always say that times have changed and that getting work as an illegal resident is extremely difficult (...) I tell people not to come to the Netherlands because in reality it is tough. I try not to sketch a nice picture of the Netherlands.
>
> (Insaf, female, 45, Morocco–Netherlands)

> The situation has changed dramatically. How are you going to find decent work without the right papers? Marriage also comes with a lot of hurdles. Your spouse has to have a fairly high and stable income, you need to take exams in your home country and when you get here there's another exam you need to take within a year (....) I would advise them not to migrate to Europe. I would tell them to stay where they are.
>
> (Hassan, male, 41, Morocco–Netherlands)

> I really like this country in many respects, but there is one thing that I think is very dangerous: the fact that politicians like Geert Wilders

> are becoming very popular. For Muslims this means that their rights to practice their religion are in danger. I think a lot of European countries – including the Netherlands – are very afraid of Islam, and they are trying to keep this religion outside their borders (. . . .) Muslims are not welcome anymore. That is why I would be cautious with giving Moroccans the advice to come here.
>
> (Tarik, male, 33, Morocco–Netherlands)

Among the Brazilian migrants interviewed in Portugal, the feeling is quite similar. Especially, the lack of jobs plays a major role among settled Brazilian migrants in Portugal to justify the negative advice given to potential Brazilian migrants:

> Considering the current crisis the country, I would not advise [Brazilians to come to Portugal]. Due to the unemployment here, to give opportunity to the people already here. In my opinion, they should stay in their country (. . .) because there's so much unemployment here (. . .) if a job comes up, those living here have more opportunities. If they come, then things get even more complicated, I think.
>
> (Joana, female, 42, Brazil–Portugal)

> I tell them 'no use thinking about came here!' I even had a niece who was thinking of going to Spain now, because her mother's boyfriend lives in Spain. But I told her: 'Don't come, it's not worth coming!' That's what I tell them!
>
> (Joaquim, male, 37, Brazil–Portugal)

These qualitative findings are supported by the results of the destination surveys among Brazilians in Portugal and Moroccans in the Netherlands. The Brazilian and Moroccan respondents were asked about their intentions to support prospective migrants in five areas, namely (1) obtaining migration documents, such as a visa or residence permit, (2) covering travel costs, (3) finding a job, (4) finding housing and (5) accommodating someone at home. They were also asked whether they received support from others during their migration to Portugal and the Netherlands in four areas: (1) financing travel costs, (2) obtaining migration papers, (3) finding a first job and (4) their initial housing in the Netherlands. The results indicate that, today, nearly 52% of the Brazilian and almost 70% of the Moroccan respondents have *no* intentions of offering support, although 77% of the Brazilian and 85% of

Table 10.4 The intention to give assistance today and received assistance during one's own migration (%)

	Settled Brazilians in Portugal (N = 400)		Settled Moroccans in the Netherlands (N = 420)	
	Intention	**Received**	**Intention**	**Received**
None	57.7	5.0	69.0	3.6
1 domain	8.5	22.0	10.7	11.0
2 domains	13.0	36.3	11.0	46.0
3 domains	13.0	31.5	3.6	34.8
4 domains	11.0	5.3	3.3	4.8
5 domains	2.8	–	2.4	–

Source: THEMIS destination country survey of Brazilians in Portugal and Moroccans in the Netherlands (unweighted data).

the Moroccan respondents received support in two or more areas during their migration to Europe (see Table 10.4).

However, the quantitative and qualitative analyses also reveal that a certain group continues to function as selective 'gate keepers', yet only under specific conditions (Carling and Jolivet, in this volume). Three important conditions are possession of regular residence documents, being highly skilled in order to have job opportunities and study purposes. For individuals that meet these criteria migration may still be worthwhile. This is especially true for contemporary students, who are an important constituent of the Brazil–Portugal corridor (Carling and Jolivet, this volume, Chapter 2; Fonseca et al., this volume, Chapter 7).

The transformational mechanism: Migration cultures in transition

The third mechanism involves the aggregation of migration-undermining feedback by individuals, which leads to changes in migration aspirations and cultures. Our qualitative analysis reveals that there are indications that this transformation is indeed taking place in Brazil and Morocco. First, we notice a general decline in the aspirations to leave Brazil and Morocco. This decline is related to improved economic conditions in the sending regions (especially in Brazil) but is also the result of the failed migration project of Brazilian and Moroccan migrants and the migration-undermining feedback they receive from return migrants and family members who live in Portugal and the Netherlands. A common observation among especially the Brazilian respondents is that they don't see people leaving the country anymore,

but rather earlier migrants returning to Brazil: 'Now, my brother is coming back, he also gave up. He is returning due to the economic crisis which affected Portugal a lot' (Milton, male, 35, Brazil–Portugal, family member). 'The number of people who return is increasing. People are coming back, they are not going so much now, because it is not worth anymore, to go to Portugal now' (Ema, female, 42, Brazil–Portugal, return migrant). 'Now, I see people returning because there is no more work (in Europe). It is very difficult, things are expensive, food is expensive, everything is expensive, (...) it's difficult. Thus, I think that the only trend is not to emigrate anymore' (Amanda, female, 25, Brazil–Portugal, return migrant).

The majority of the respondents we interviewed in Brazil and Morocco consider it unwise to migrate to Portugal or the Netherlands today (or to Europe in general). Their negative perceptions are influenced by the migration-undermining feedback received from settled migrants. This feedback influences migration aspirations in Brazil and Morocco. There is less interest in migration to Portugal and the Netherlands and to other parts of Europe:

> The only means through which I know about Holland is from what my cousins tell me. My cousins also told me how they were victims of ethnic profiling. If people there know that you are a Muslim or an Arab they automatically label you as dangerous at best, and as a terrorist at worst. My cousins were victims of this stereotyping. So are veiled women, who are also viewed with suspicion.
>
> (Lahcen, male, 27, Morocco–Netherlands, family member)

> I know that the economic situation in the Netherlands is not that good. Even my cousin who has been in the Netherlands for quite some time said that it is more and more difficult to find a job. He has not even saved up any money to invest in projects here in Morocco. If my cousin who has been in the Netherlands for a long time did not make it, how could a newcomer like me ever achieve something there?
>
> (Miro, male, 26, Morcco–Netherlands, family member)

> She does not advise people to go anymore because it's not the same as it was in the beginning. When she went, it was easier to get a job.
>
> (Heloísa, female, 59, Brazil–Portugal, family member)

> I am always talking with my friends who live there [in Portugal] (...) and I hear them saying that things tighten a lot.
>
> (Marina, female, 39, Brazil–Portugal, return migrant)

Our respondents in Brazil and Morocco also mention the increasing opportunities and prosperity in Brazil and Morocco, in contrast to the declining economic and legal opportunities in Europe:

> Migrants used to come with large of sums of money and help others, for example to buy houses, land, and so forth. Now people from Nador see for themselves that migrants have become very mean and unwilling to spend more money in Morocco. Now when migrants come to my restaurant, they congratulate me for having decided to go back to Morocco for good.
>
> (Aziz, male, 55, Morocco–Netherlands, return migrant)

> Nowadays, with regard not only to Portugal but to almost all European countries, some of them are saved [from this crisis] but people are retuning more, isn't it? Because people who are here [in Brazil] have nothing to earn in Portugal, Spain, because of this financial crisis (...) it affected some countries in particular. Portugal was one of them, Spain also, Italy is now one of them, France is now one of them, do you understand? With this [crisis] people who are there begin to live with difficulties.
>
> (Milton, female, 35, Brazil–Portugal, family member)

The migration-undermining feedback by settled migrants and return migrants together with changes in the economic conditions in Portugal and Morocco contributes to changes in migration cultures. The migration discourse in Morocco has become less widespread, according to the 19-year-old housewife Soumi who lives in Tawrirt and whose father and uncle left for the Netherlands in the early 1980s.

> At the beginning of 2001, everyone talked about migration. Every day I heard about someone from my family or neighbours who had migrated. But people are no longer interested in migration, only a few youths dream of going abroad, especially to Spain or France. They dream of making a lot of money, owning beautiful cars, houses and getting married. The obstacle that stops them is that it is so complicated to get the official documents in order to leave Morocco. The others do not think about migration any more, since they hear about a lot of people who went abroad and came back to Morocco after

> a failed experience. There are no more jobs available, so then they found themselves without the money they borrowed to migrate, and without work in Europe. Most emigrants travelled 10 years ago. These were the golden years of emigration.
>
> (family member)

The changed migration aspirations and preferences are also observed in the accounts of the Brazilian and Moroccan migrants. When they go on a holiday to Brazil or Morocco or when they speak to friends or relatives on the phone, they are not asked about their migration experiences or possible assistance as much as in the past. Hassan, a 41-year-old Moroccan, responds:

> Of course, I know a lot of people, and it always comes up one way or the other. How's life in Holland, how's life in exile, as they call it? But almost every one of them assures me that they have no interest in migrating to Europe. There is nothing left to do in Europe, they say. The mentality has changed. People find something to do and put their thoughts of migration to rest. Years ago everybody was talking about leaving the country. (...) The young people nowadays ask about Europe out of general interest, but not to actually live there. (...) You used to hear talk of migration all the time, all the time young people scheming in the street, telling each other their plans or giving each other tips on the easiest way to leave the country. Now when you meet someone you have a casual conversation and a coffee together and then they are on their way again, going about their business.
>
> (male, Morocco–Netherlands, migrant)

According to Davi, living in Portugal since 1990, who goes on holidays to Brazil almost every year:

> There are many Brazilians leaving Portugal to return to Brazil, because nowadays Brazil is a much more developed country (...) Brazil is a country with lots of potential, thus I think that tradition [of emigrating] is a bit weaker. It's not worth leaving when you are in a country with lots of potential and Brazil is one of the countries growing faster and I believe the reverse is happening in Portugal. Thus so many

> migrants, not only Brazilians, are returning to their home countries or choosing other countries for living.
>
> (male, 47)

The more critical stance towards migration to Europe does not imply that migration is no longer an option. The surveys in the origin countries show that a substantial number of respondents still have the aspiration to migrate (see Table 10.5). More than 50% of the Moroccan population has migration aspirations. The migration aspirations in Brazil are substantially lower, especially in the urban area of Campinas where economic conditions have improved substantially in the last decade (Carling, in this volume).

However, for those who aspire to migrate, the preferred destinations are changing. For Brazilians who aspire to migrate, the United States is on top of the list because of the economic opportunities (see Table 10.6). European countries, including Portugal, have become less popular among the Brazilian population. By contrast, European countries are still preferred destination countries for the Moroccan population due to extensive transnational connections (especially in relation to family and student migration). Germany is mentioned relatively frequently, even though the Moroccan diaspora there is much smaller than in France, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands or Belgium. However, Germany is attractive because of the economic opportunities that it offers.

We also note an interest among Moroccan respondents in moving to countries like the United States and Canada (see Table 10.5). For highly skilled Moroccans (including students), the United States and Canada are becoming more popular because of the economic opportunities and also the presumed tolerant social climate there:

Table 10.5 Proportion of Moroccans and Brazilian respondents who would migrate to another country if they had the opportunity (%)

	Moroccans (N = 401)	**Brazilians (N = 425)**
Yes, go abroad	52.1	32.2
No, stay in Morocco/Brazil	46.9	67.5
Don't know/missing	0.9	0.2
Total	100.0	100.0

Source: THEMIS origin country survey: Brazil and Morocco.

> Well, not so many people want to travel to Holland and as I told you nowadays the most favourite destination for most Moroccans is Canada because it is an open and tolerant country, unlike Europe where the economic situation and the xenophobia are making life very hard for migrants.
>
> (Jamal, male, 49, Morocco–Netherlands, migrant)

> Yes, people, especially students, are still interested in going to countries like Canada, the United States or France. (...) I think that more and more students are migrating abroad. Immigration relating to education is on the rise. This brain drain is becoming more important than migration for economic reasons.
>
> (Zahra, female, 52, Morocco–Netherlands, family member)

In sum, migration cultures in the areas of Campinas and Mantena in Brazil and the Rabat and Nador areas in Morocco are in a process of change. There seems to be less interest in migration to Portugal and the Netherlands. This is partly due to the critical feedback from

Table 10.6 Preferred country of destination (first preference) of Brazilians and Moroccans who would migrate to another country if they had the opportunity (%)

Brazilians (N = 138)	
United States of America	40.6
Italy	13.8
Portugal	10.1
Germany	6.5
Other EU countries	18.8
Other non-EU countries	9.4
Don't know	0.7
Moroccans (N = 213)	
France	19.7
Germany	19.7
Belgium	13.1
Netherlands	12.2
Spain	7.0
Other EU countries	8.9
Canada and USA	9.0
Other non-EU countries	6.1
Don't know/missing	4.2

Source: THEMIS origin country survey: Brazil and Morocco.

family members who have settled in Portugal and the Netherlands or from migrants who have returned. Furthermore, people are also less interested in migration because the opportunities in Brazil (especially in Campinas) and in Morocco (especially in the Rabat region) have improved.

Conclusion and discussion

This chapter has argued that mechanism-based explanations are relevant for the field of migration studies. This has been elaborated further with reference to the mechanism of reverse cumulative causation. First, we postulated that institutional changes at the macro-level (migration policies, labour market opportunities and societal reception) have consequences for the motivations of individual migrants to offer support. The more restrictive Portuguese and Dutch migration policies, the declining job opportunities and the hostile societal reception of immigrants have reduced the motivation of settled migrants to assist potential migrants. These changes have also induced strategies of gate keeping and gate closing (migration-undermining feedback).

We further demonstrated that the critical feedback provided by settled and return migrants to potential migrants induces changes in migration aspirations and migration cultures. The three institutional changes have, of course, a direct effect on the decline in migration from Brazil to Portugal and from Morocco to the Netherlands. However, it is the combination of direct effects and the indirect effects that run via migrant networks that partly explain the decrease in migration. Other relevant factors are the migration-undermining information prospective migrants receive through impersonal channels (*broadcast feedback*) or changing economic opportunities in the origin countries.

Our findings furthermore indicate that for a smaller group of people, migration from Brazil to Portugal and from Morocco to the Netherlands may still be worthwhile. These are higher skilled migrants and migrants who migrate in a legal manner such as through marriage, for education purposes or through special programmes for the highly skilled. We may hypothesise that some of these categories – especially the higher skilled – have a more individualistic lifestyle and are often staying temporarily in the destination country. For these reasons they are less inclined and less able to give prospective migrants genuine assistance for moving to Europe. This will further reinforce the mechanism of reverse cumulative causation.

Reverse cumulative causation is a 'mechanism of the middle range' (Tilly, 2010) that can be used to explain specific patterns within specific migration corridors. It remains important, however, to examine the contextual factors involved in each migration corridor. Thus, there is an increasing amount of migration from Brazil and Ukraine to the Netherlands, while both migrant groups would seem to be affected by the same macro-conditions in the Netherlands as Moroccans. One explanation for this growth could be that both groups occupy specific niches in the urban and rural labour markets. For Brazilians, this is mostly domestic work in the Amsterdam labour market, while Ukrainians mostly work in horticulture in the areas around the cities of Rotterdam and The Hague. The Brazilian migrants exhibit the social mechanism, described by Tilly (2005), of 'opportunity hoarding': jobs in the domestic work sector are divided among Brazilian migrants (the 'in-group'), while shutting out other migrant groups (the 'out-group') (see also Faist et al., 2015). As a result, they are able to guarantee specific jobs for newcomers from Brazil.

It is furthermore easy for these two groups to evade the restrictive migration policy: Brazilian citizens are generally allowed to enter the Netherlands (or any other Schengen area) without having applied for a visa (Roggeveen and Van Meeteren, 2013), while Ukrainians can travel to the Netherlands fairly easily via Poland (that became member of the European Union in 2004). Brazilians are moreover treated positively by the native Dutch population. In other words, macro-level factors in the Netherlands work out differently for different migrant groups. These provisional explanations require a closer study of the Brazil–Netherlands and Ukraine–Netherlands corridors, for which we can use the macro–micro–macro model presented in this chapter. The mechanism of reverse cumulative causation can also be used to explain other declining migration flows, for instance the declining migration from Turkey to Western Europe.

Notes

1. Tilly writes (2010, p. 56):

> Mechanism-process accounts reject covering-law regularities for large structures such as international systems and for vast sequences such as democratization. Instead they lend themselves to 'local theory' in which the explanatory mechanisms and processes operate quite broadly, but combine locally as a function of initial conditions and adjacent processes to produce distinctive trajectories and outcomes.

2. Coleman's well-known example based on Max Weber is the relationship or *Wahlverwandtschaft* between religious values of Protestantism and the economic organisation of a society (capitalism) (see Coleman, 1986, pp. 1321–1323; 1990, pp. 6–10).
3. Massey et al. (2009, pp. 46–48) mention the expansion of migrant networks, the distribution of income, the distribution of land, the organisation of agriculture, cultural factors, the regional distribution of human capital, the social meaning of work and the economic structure of production.

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11

Beyond Networks: Insights on Feedback and Mechanisms of the Middle Range

Godfried Engbersen, Erik Snel and Cindy Horst

Introduction

This book set out to explore how migration at one time influences the subsequent patterns of movement. As noted in Introduction, this tendency for people to move in particular directions apparently following the pathways laid out by those who travelled before is well established in the migration literature, with many empirical examples of these migration systems. In Introduction, Bakewell, Kubal and Pereira argue that much of the existing literature places great emphasis on migrants' social networks as the principal factor generating these stable migration patterns, with little attempt to provide a clear definition of social networks or a detailed consideration of how they operate. Furthermore, existing work does little to explore the role of factors beyond networks.

The aim of the volume was to address this gap by unpacking 'social networks' and the exact social mechanisms through which networks impact migration patterns, as well as to explore other factors generating stable migration patterns. A crucial analytical tool for this undertaking is the concept of feedback. This concept permits us to understand various mechanisms that initiate, perpetuate and reverse migration systems. The concept also makes it possible to focus on either endogenous or direct feedback mechanisms that are mainly related to the role of migrant networks, or on indirect or contextual feedback mechanisms. The latter concern the ways in which macro-factors influence the feedback distributed through migrant network and also the ways in which

'migration transforms the broader social, cultural and economic contexts in sending *and* receiving communities, which, in turn, affect the propensity of migration' (De Haas, 2010, p. 1591; italics in original)

By putting feedback centre-stage in exploring migration from Brazil, Morocco and Ukraine to Norway, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom, the contributors were able to explain through what mechanisms social networks and other factors operate to connect the migration of different people over time. How do we understand the spatial operations of such mechanisms? To what extent do they operate in the country of origin, settlement or transnationally? And how do we understand virtual networks that are not based on existing 'face-to-face' personal contacts? In which ways are the experiences of previous migrants broadcast to potential subsequent migrants, and with what impact? What role do various institutions and different communication channels play in enabling the provision of information and other forms of assistance? How do differences between different types of migrants – including class, gender, region of origin, main motivation – affect feedback mechanisms? What indirect feedback effects do we see when analysing the impact of macro-economic conditions, migration policies and perceptions towards migration?

These are but some of the questions that are addressed in the book, drawing on a comprehensive dataset consisting of qualitative and quantitative data from migrants in the four European countries of settlement and returnees and family members in the three countries of origin. The resulting 12 migration corridors have been explored in a variety of ways in the book, including a single corridor analysis (Snel et al., Chapter 7, in this volume); multiple corridor analysis (Engbersen et al., Chapter 10, in this volume; Fonseca et al., Chapter 6, in this volume; Horst et al., Chapter 5, in this volume; Van Meeteren and Pereira, Chapter 3, in this volume) and all corridor analysis (Bakewell and Jolivet, Chapter 9, in this volume; Carling, Chapter 8, in this volume; Carling and Jolivet, Chapter 2, in this volume; Dekker et al., Chapter 4, in this volume). By analysing a specific case in-depth, making focused comparisons between migrant groups or destinations and doing systematic analysis on specific topics across all corridors, the contributors have managed to contribute substantially to our understanding of the workings of feedback. At the same time, the rich dataset leaves many more aspects to be explored and comparisons to be made.

In this concluding chapter, we will first highlight some of the main contributions the book makes in relation to our understanding of direct feedback mechanisms through social networks. The next section explores indirect feedback mechanisms 'of the middle range'. After

having outlined the insights the book provides on direct and indirect feedback mechanisms, we move back to our original interest in migration systems and explicitly ask how the operation of such feedback affects changing migration patterns. We present an analysis of the role that migrant networks play in various migration corridors. The data from the THEMIS project allow us to explore how the personal recommendation to move offered by migrants to people at home can be related to migration processes within the different corridors. We conclude by reflecting on the limitations of the study and exploring avenues for future research.

Direct feedback through social networks

Unpacking 'social networks'

In order to better understand the workings of social networks in feedback mechanisms, the typology developed by DiMaggio and Garip (2011) has been useful (see also Garip and Asad, 2013). The first two social mechanisms they identify, both pertaining to traditional migrant networks, are *social facilitation* and *normative influence*. These mechanisms pertain to the extent to which migrants provide information and support to prospective migrants so that their cost of migration decreases ('social facilitation') and to the influence that migrants have on the nature and development of migration aspirations among prospective migrants ('normative influence'). Several chapters discuss the role of information provision through a range of channels as well as support provision. Carling in Chapter 8, for example, discusses types of help provided, ranging from finding a job and helping with paper work, to match-making and offering moral support. The analysis shows that the relationship between the two people involved is crucial and this relationship most often is a two-way process of requesting and providing help.

Another insight from this study pertains to the importance of looking beyond and below national origin when exploring feedback mechanisms. Several chapters explore the importance of gender, while Van Meeteren and Pereira's analysis (Chapter 3) illustrates the importance of distinguishing between migrants with different motives for migrating. Carling (Chapter 8) shows how the most likely providers of assistance are those who are well integrated and transnationally active. In Chapter 5, Horst et al. show how *class* has an impact on the operation of feedback patterns. Within corridors, differentiated migration patterns emerge based on migrants' social class. Migration from Brazil to three European destination countries (Norway, Portugal and the United

Kingdom) is a case in point. Class influences migration aspirations and patterns of transnational assistance, because those in disadvantaged class positions face more restrictive migration policies, which leads to a higher dependency on networks and a more vulnerable legal position (see also Van Meeteren and Pereira, Chapter 3, in this volume). Furthermore, considering Brazil's economic situation, migration – especially to peripheral destinations like Norway – is not attractive to all social classes in Brazil. The authors furthermore argue that shifting material and subjective class realities in Europe and transnationally may ultimately lead to changes in class realities in Brazil.

Channels of feedback

This volume has devoted much attention to informational feedback via migrant networks. Information is largely exchanged through one-to-one communication using tools such as telephone, email or Skype. Migrants also obtain information from online media and other forms of media. Online media are (semi-)open online venues that offer users a space to share media-rich content and that allow for many-to-many communication (e.g. messenger, social media, and websites or blogs). They combine a mix of interpersonal communication and mass broadcasting, and where they are media for interpersonal communication the boundaries with social networks are fuzzy (Bakewell and Jolivet, Chapter 9, in this volume). Online media have become an important channel of informational feedback and in particular young and more highly educated people use online media (Dekker and Engbersen, Chapter 4, in this volume). As a consequence, for certain migrant groups such as students, online media provide a rich source of information to support their migration trajectory (Van Meeteren and Pereira, Chapter 3, in this volume).

Most respondents use online media in addition to traditional channels of communication. This indicates that online media are not substituting traditional media but are *complementing* other channels of transnational communication. Another finding is that most migrants are providing online feedback to social ties that were already part of their network. The mechanism of *communicating vessels* is at work here: extensive migrant networks go hand in hand with comparatively frequent use of online media. Very few respondents of the destination surveys (about 1%) indicate that they have shared information with strangers they met online (so-called 'latent ties'). Online feedback does not necessarily increase non-migrants' migration propensity. However, online media are one actor in larger mediascapes that produce information that may influence migrants and potential migrants (Appadurai,

1996). Bakewell and Jolivet (Chapter 9) show that the mass media are important channels for transmitting ideas and images that may have positive, negative or self-correcting effects on migration.

Forms of feedback

A central contribution of this study is the identification of different forms of feedback to explore not only expanding but also declining migration systems (Bakewell, 2014). Various contributors explore the distinction between *migration-facilitating* forms of feedback and *migration-undermining* forms of feedback (De Haas, 2010). The chapters about the corridors Ukraine–Portugal, Brazil–Portugal and Morocco–Netherlands focus on migration-undermining feedback by migrant networks. Snel et al. (Chapter 7) show that settled Moroccan immigrants in the Netherlands, although in large majority supported during their own migration trajectory, now refrain from offering support to prospective immigrants and advise them not to come to the Netherlands. They introduce the concept of 'gate closing', a radical variant of gate keeping by settled migrants. Snel et al. also found that the respondents' reluctance to support potential newcomers is induced particularly by their perception of the current unfriendly societal climate for Moroccans in the Netherlands and the stricter Dutch migration policies. The limited economic opportunities for newcomers from Morocco are less important as an argument to refuse support to newcomers.

Fonseca et al. (Chapter 8), in their analysis of migration from Brazil and Ukraine to Portugal, also focus on the tendency of settled migrants in Portugal to discourage prospective migrants to come to Portugal. The main reason is the current economic crisis in Portugal. This 'negative feedback' from settled migrants in the destination countries, but also from return migrants in the origin countries, affects the migration aspirations and choices of prospective migrants in Brazil and Ukraine. Migration research regularly reveals how settled migrants and return migrants often paint too rosy a picture of their situation in the destination country to boost their status and prestige. Research on the Brazil/Ukraine–Portugal corridors and the Morocco–Netherlands corridor shows a reverse tendency. Settled migrants and return migrants are painting a dark picture of economic opportunities and social life in Western Europe, thus contributing to a change in the migration culture in the origin communities. This becomes clear from the semi-structured interviews in the origin countries.

Whereas Snel et al. and Fonseca et al. focus on the role of migration-undermining forms of feedback, Dekker and Engbersen (Chapter 4) find

that the feedback that circulates in migration networks via online media is both of a migration-facilitating and a migration-undermining nature. This double function of online feedback may explain why the study did not find an independent effect of online media use on the migration propensity of non-migrants. Carling (Chapter 8) also describes both migration-undermining and migration-facilitating forms of feedback. Carling shows how migration chains are interrupted when settled migrants refuse to support prospective newcomers. This migration-undermining feedback is particularly apparent among migrants from Morocco but does not apply to other cases. Those Ukrainian and Brazilian migrants who received support from others during their own migration are more likely to have been asked for support, to have provided support and intend to support prospective migrants who ask for support. With this they forge and maintain the chain – and contribute to chain migration – in line with Massey et al.'s (2009) work on cumulative causation and the role of migrant networks.

Beyond networks: Migration mechanisms of the middle range

In order to understand migration patterns within various corridors, insight into the operation of traditional migrant networks is insufficient. Van Meeteren and Pereira (Chapter 3, in this volume) state that migration scholars need to move beyond the narrow conceptualisations of migrant networks based on friendship or kin relationships. They show how *institutions* such as embassies, consulates, academic exchange programmes and agencies geared to the recruitment of international students are important to students with respect to arranging and financing their study abroad. For many other migrants, state agencies and employers play a key role in legalisation procedures for irregular migrants. The legalisation option is a specific feature of the Brazil–Portugal corridor, incidentally; it does not occur in the other destination countries included in this study.

An important distinction is between *feedback operating through migrant networks based on personal contacts* and *broadcast feedback operating through impersonal channels*. Bakewell and Jolivet (Chapter 9) distinguish between three forms of broadcast feedback: *induced broadcast* feedback – potential migrants set out to discover new contacts outside their existing social network in order to realizes their migration aspirations; *general broadcast feedback* – information, images and ideas that are transmitted indiscriminately by mass and communication media (television,

radio, newspapers and the internet); and *embedded feedback* – information, images and ideas that are transmitted indiscriminately through the transfer of concrete evidence of migration outcomes to a particular locality. Feedback through migrant networks and broadcast feedback can be complementary and reinforce each other, but they can also work against each other offering conflicting migration-undermining or migration-supporting messages about specific destination countries to potential migrants. Bakewell and Jolivet assume that feedback broadcast has a greater impact on areas without a strong migration tradition and without strong transnational connections. They also argue that broadcast feedback can contribute to the making of a culture of mobility and can lower the threshold for potential migrants to migrate.

This volume has also clarified the significant impact of macro-level factors on the development of migration patterns. The recent economic crisis in Europe has substantially decreased migration flows. Portugal, which suffered a severe economic recession as a result of the global economic crisis, offers the clearest example of this. In this volume, Fonseca et al. demonstrate how the steep increase in unemployment and the deterioration of working conditions and future job opportunities have impacted the two largest migrant groups in Portugal: Brazilians and Ukrainians. The decrease in migration from the two countries is a direct consequence of the economic crisis. The Brazil–Portugal corridor also shows how the deteriorating economic circumstances in Portugal partly coincided with the greater economic opportunities in Brazil; something that does not apply to Ukraine.

Aside from the economic crisis, the various chapters have also established the influence of selective European migration regimes, which are not equally restrictive to all migrants, thus impacting migration patterns (Horst et al., Chapter 5, in this volume). Another factor of importance is the rise of anti-immigration and anti-Islam sentiments. The contributors also found that migration-undermining factors in the destination countries (no job opportunities, restrictive policy and the hostile reception of migrants) as well as in the origin countries (particularly the greater job opportunities and prosperity there) have an effect on the mediating role of migrant networks in facilitating migration.

The macro–micro–macro model ('Coleman Boat') used in this study points to the different social mechanisms that contribute to decreasing migration. Engbersen et al. (Chapter 10) discuss the mechanism of *reverse cumulative causation*. It is an example of a *migration mechanism of the middle range* that helps explain patterns of declining migration (Tilly, 2010). This mechanism can be broken down into three sub-mechanisms

(Hedström and Ylikoski, 2010): (1) the impact of institutional macro-level factors on the beliefs and motivations of settled migrants to support and stimulate prospective migrants to move to Western Europe (*situational mechanism*); (2) negative belief formation that results in actions by settled migrants not to assist prospective migrants, or to provide assistance only very selectively (*action-formation mechanism*): (3) the aggregation of these individual acts, which contributes to changes in the migration cultures of origin countries (*transformational mechanism*). As such, while we need to look beyond networks to show the complexity of feedback mechanisms in the operation of migration systems, social networks retain a central place in both the empirical and conceptual deliberations of this volume.

Migration corridors, migration stages and the role of social networks

Having highlighted a number of central insights the book has provided to understandings of feedback, it is time to move back to the inspiration behind the book: the research journey that started with the wish to explore the evolution of migration systems. A common assumption in migration research is that migration flows start with a limited number of migrants moving from one country to another (so-called pioneer migrants; see Bakewell et al., 2012), but that once the number of migrants from a sending country or region in a specific destination country reaches a certain critical threshold, further migration expands as a self-perpetuating process. This is the core of Massey's concept of 'cumulative causation' (Massey et al., 2009, p. 45). However, migration does not expand infinitely. At a certain stage, an established migration pattern may be at its height and decline again. However, as De Haas (2010) observed, the phenomenon of declining migration is under-researched. Migration research and migration theory offer many different explanations as to why migration, after having reached a certain size, tends to continue and increase and particularly focus on the role of social networks in these processes but offer few explanations as to why migration may also start to decline at a certain point. And there is also little attention for the possibility that pioneer migration does not reach the critical threshold where migration becomes a self-perpetuating process but stagnates and remains limited in size.

The 12 migration corridors explored in this volume offer an excellent opportunity for a systematic comparison of the different stages – or trajectories – of migration. Some of the migration flows examined are

sizeable and expanding, whereas others are established migration systems that are meanwhile declining, and yet other flows are still rather of limited size. These relatively small migration flows are either new (one could call them 'starting' migration) or not so new but nevertheless still small (one could call them 'stagnating'). In both cases, migration has not yet reached the assumed critical threshold when it becomes a self-perpetuating process. In previous chapters, both Snel et al. (Chapter 7) and Fonseca et al. (Chapter 6) focused on specific cases of declining migration: migration from Morocco to the Netherlands and from Brazil and Ukraine to Portugal. These cases are examples of established migration patterns that appear to be declining. Although Dutch-Moroccans are one of the largest immigrant categories in the Netherlands, the inflow of Moroccan migrants in the Netherlands already began to decline in the mid-1990s. The declining migration from Brazil and Ukraine to Portugal is of more recent date and started around 2008 as a result of both the economic crisis in Portugal and the increasing economic opportunities in Brazil (which is not the case in Ukraine).

However, fluctuations in the size of migration (rise, continuation and decline) are not just the result of macro-factors like economic crises and policy changes such as the rise of more selective migration regimes in Europe. These macro-developments in the context of migration are mediated and partly amplified through migrant networks. Settled migrants in the destination country may report the limited opportunities to prospective migrants and advise them not to come. Moreover, settled migrants in the destination country may refuse to support prospective migrants, or only selectively support some newcomers. Whereas Massey and colleagues in several publications argue that social support for newcomers in the process of migration and settlement in the destination country is a crucial factor that makes migration cheaper and thus more attractive (Massey, 1990; Massey et al., 2009; Fussel and Massey, 2004), Snel et al. (Chapter 7) and Fonseca et al. (Chapter 6) describe the opposite scenario. In cases of declining migration, they argue, negative reports about the situation in destination countries and a reluctance to support newcomers make new migration more expensive and less attractive.

This section offers a broader test of the role that migrant networks and social support play in both expanding and declining migration. Whereas Snel et al. and Fonseca et al. focused on specific cases of declining migration, we will examine the role of migrant networks and social support in all 12 migration corridors of the THEMIS project. To do so, we first had to classify the 12 migration corridors in three

categories (expanding, declining or relatively small migration flows that are below the hypothetical migration take-off threshold level). The distinction between expanding and declining migration is relatively easy. Both patterns assume a sizeable migration flow. Expanding migration assumes an increasing *inflow* of new migrants, whereas declining migration assumes a decrease in the *inflow* of newcomers.[1] Of the 12 migration corridors, the corridors Morocco–United Kingdom, Brazil–United Kingdom and Brazil–Netherlands are good examples of expanding migration. These are all relatively large migrant communities in the respective destination countries that are still growing due to an increasing inflow of newcomers.[2] The migration corridors Morocco–Netherlands, Brazil–Portugal, Ukraine–Portugal but also Ukraine–United Kingdom are examples of declining migration: relatively large migrant communities with a decreasing inflow of newcomers.[3] Thirdly, we examined five relatively small migration flows (Morocco–Norway, Morocco–Portugal, Brazil–Norway, Ukraine–Netherlands, Ukraine–Norway), that is, migration corridors with relatively small migrant communities in the destination country. The largest of these five small migrant communities is Ukrainians in the Netherlands: less than 3,000 persons (including only formally registered migrants).

The question, then, is whether three types of migration patterns differ from each other, not only with regard to size, but with regard to feedback mechanisms between migrants and non-migrants. For instance, do settled migrants from expanding migrant flows provide more support to prospective migrants than settled migrants from declining migrant flows? The survey in destination countries contained several questions about social support. Here, we will focus on the question whether or not settled migrants would advise newcomers to migrate to the destination country.[4] We expect migrants from corridors that are marked by expansion to advise friends and relatives 'back home' to migrate more often than migrants from corridors that are marked by decline. We also expect that migrants from relatively small migrant communities will take an intermediate position between the two. Table 11.1 shows to what extent migrants belonging to the three types of migrant corridors would advise prospective migrants to migrate to the destination country. It shows that migrants from expanding migrant flows, as expected, are more likely to advise prospective migrants to come to the destination country than migrants from declining migrant flows. More surprising is that migrants from starting or stagnating migrant flows, thus from relatively small migrant communities in the destination country, are most likely to advise others to migrate to the destination country. A possible

Table 11.1 Would you recommend migration to the destination country? (%) (N = 2,814)

	Expanding	Declining	Small
Yes (incl. in some cases)	53.4	42.0	66.4
No	46.7	58.1	33.6
Total	100	100	100

Note: THEMIS Destination country survey (weighed data).

explanation could be that migrants from relatively small populations are keener to invite familiar faces to join them. If, on the other hand, you live in an urban district with many other Moroccans you may be less keen to invite new friends and family members from Morocco to come as well.

Table 11.2 shows the outcomes of a logistic regression model, which examines differences between these migration patterns (expanding, declining and relatively small), controlling for various other factors. Migrants from small migrant communities and, to a lesser extent, from corridors that are marked by expansion are significantly more likely to advise prospective migrants to migrate to the destination country than migrants from corridors that are marked by decline (reference category). These differences hold after controlling for individual background characteristics of respondents (Model 1) and also after controlling for transnational ties (Model 2). Model 1 also shows a positive effect of the year of migration (odds ratio > 1): respondents who migrated more recently are more likely to advise others to migrate as well.

Model 1 also shows significant effects of the educational level of respondents: migrants with lower or medium educational levels recommend newcomers to migrate less often than respondents with higher educational levels (reference category). There are no gender differences in the inclinations to recommend others to migrate as well. Transnational ties matter to some extent, as Model 2 shows. Respondents with very frequent contacts with the origin country ('almost every day') would advise prospective migrants to migrate more often than those with very limited contact (reference category).

Model 3, finally, expands the analysis with respondents' opinions about several relevant macro-factors with regard to migration. As Snel et al. (Chapter 7) explained, the likelihood of migration, and also the willingness of settled migrants to support prospective migrants, may vary because of three macro-factors: migration policies of the

Table 11.2 Logistic regression analysis of 'recommending migration' (no = reference category) (N = 2,793)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	Odds ratio	**Odds ratio**	**Odds ratio**
Corridor (ref = declining)			
Small	2.523***	2.534***	2.266***
Expanding	1.397**	1.352*	1.374*
Year of migration	1.035***	1.029***	1.030***
Male (ref = female)	0.877	0.904	0.959
Education (ref = high)			
Low	0.240***	0.264***	0.297***
Medium	0.440***	0.464***	0.443***
Contact with people from origin country (ref = less than once a month/never)			
Almost every day		1.806*	2.026**
Almost every week		1.388	1.351
Once in a month		1.093	1.176
Strict immigration policies in destination country (ref = agree)			
Don't know			1.161
Disagree			1.184
Good economic opportunities in destination country (ref = agree)			
Don't know			0.629
Disagree			0.374***
Good economic opportunities in origin country (ref = agree)			
Don't know			1.459
Disagree			1.459**
People in destination countries see migrants from origin countries in positive way (scale 0–1)			1.014
Missings scale (ref = no missing value on index)[5]			1.083
Nagelkerke R-kwadraat	0.180	0.189	0.242

Note: ***p < .001, **p < .010, *p < .050 (two-tailed).
THEMIS destination country survey (weighed data).

destination country, the economic opportunities and the societal reception of migrants in the destination country.[6] Settled migrants will be less likely to advise prospective migrants to migrate as well when they think that migration is very hard because of the destination country's immigration regime, the lack of economic opportunities or the unfriendly societal reception of migrants in the destination country. As Model 3 shows, particularly opinions about economic opportunities in both the destination and origin country affect the likelihood to advise prospective migrants to come as well. Respondents who disagree with the statement that the destination country offers good economic opportunities are *less likely* to advise others to come, compared to respondents who agree with this statement (reference category). At the same time, people who disagree with the statement that the economic opportunities in the origin country are good are *more likely* to recommend people to migrate as well, compared to people who agree with this statement. Opinions of respondents about immigration policies of destination countries and about the societal reception of migrants do not affect their inclination to advise prospective migrants to migrate as well.

It is important to note that the opinions of respondents about the three relevant 'contexts of reception' do not explain the differences between migrants from expanding and declining migrant flows in their inclination to advise prospective migrants. The differences between both types of migrants hardly change (or, in fact, increase somewhat) after we introduced their opinions about these macro-factors in the analysis (in Model 3). However, separate analyses of corridors with declining migration flows did show that changing contexts of reception in Portugal and the Netherlands affect the intentions of migrants to support newcomers. More in-depth analysis is necessary for understanding the complex interplay between macro-structural factors in destination and origin countries, social networks and individual characteristics of migrants in shaping migration flows.

Limitations of the study and avenues for future research

Looking back on the long road towards the completion of the THEMIS project and this book, there are many lessons along the way. The great strength of the research is its theory-driven approach combined with an immense dataset consisting of qualitative and quantitative data from 12 migration corridors. At the same time, this strength has also been a main challenge for the study: it has been impossible to do justice to all

the opportunities the data provide in the space of this book and in the period that we have worked on analysing the data after it was collected.

Whereas we identified a range of other actors of importance for explaining certain feedback mechanisms, we have mainly collected micro-level data – interviewing individual migrants and their families. Further research would need to include data collection with employment agencies, consulates, dating agencies, universities and the like. Several of the chapters have indicated more research would be needed to fully explore feedback mechanisms at play in the case of students and for marriage migration. Another factor that is of interest in this respect is mobility in the opposite direction within the corridor, in the shape of academic exchange programmes or tourism and business engagements. The current volume furthermore does not systematically cover irregular types of institutions and forms of migration, though some of this theme is covered elsewhere (Kubal, 2014a and b).

The THEMIS material indeed presents many other puzzles requiring explanation, for example the existence of a large and growing population of irregular Brazilians in the Netherlands with very little prospect of regularisation (except through marriage) or the fact that a sizeable proportion of the Ukrainian migrants in Portugal is still willing to provide support to prospective migrants, despite the very poor economic circumstances and the selective migration policy. For Ukrainian migrants, quality of life considerations, such as political stability, freedoms and welfare, are important reasons for continuing to encourage migration in spite of the current economic climate in Portugal.

Explaining these puzzles requires us to continue a systematic analysis of the qualitative data linked with focused regression analyses based on the survey data. It may also require us to move beyond bilateral corridors focused on national groups. The spatial diversity introduced by the Internet and the relevance of factors like migration motives and social class complicates the picture that a national group perspective can offer. The conceptual framework we have presented in this book, with 'feedback' at the core, can contribute to solving these puzzles and will help us to analyse and explain other migration patterns in this age of migration.

Notes

1. The problem with these international comparisons of migration is that national statistical offices all use their own definitions and measures about

who is counted as an immigrant. The OECD International Migration Database (http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=MIG) tried to solve this problem by harmonising these definitions. Here, we use OECD data about both the stocks and inflow of immigrants from the three origin countries to the four destination countries over the years 2000–2010. Country of origin is defined by nationality, not the country of birth of migrants. By using this definition, we avoid the problem that many Ukrainian migrants were actually born in the (former) USSR. However, the OECD database contains less information about immigrants in and migration to the United Kingdom. We used Eurostat data for the stock of Moroccans, Ukrainians and Brazilians in the United Kingdom (http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do). In 2005, all three migrant communities in the United Kingdom were larger than 5000 (in fact, there were almost 25,000 Brazilian nationals residing in the United Kingdom). We used data UK International Passengers Survey to assess the inflow of Moroccans, Ukrainians and Brazilians in the United Kingdom (only passengers with employment, study or family as purpose of journey). These data were provided by Professor John Salt, UK correspondent for SOPEMI of the OECD.

2. According to OECD data, the inflow of Brazilian nationals in the Netherlands increased from 601 in the year 2000 to 1,153 in 2010. According to the UK International Passengers Survey, the inflow of Brazilian nationals in the UK increased from 12,615 in 2004 to 15,280 in 2010. In the same period, the inflow of Moroccan nationals in the UK increased from 850 to 1,220.
3. The inflow of Moroccan nationals in the Netherlands decreased from 4,160 in 2000 to 1,632 in 2010. The inflow of Brazilian nationals in Portugal decreased from 26,000 in 2001 and 14,722 in 2002 (these high inflow figures are partly due to the regularisation of irregular migrants in Portugal in these years) to 3,442 in 2010. The inflow of Ukrainian nationals in Portugal declined from 45,000 in 2001 and 17,500 in 2002 (also due to regularisation programmes in these years) to 445 in 2010 (figures from the OECD International Migration Database). The inflow of Ukrainian nationals in the United Kingdom decreased from 9,465 in 2004 to 3,530 in 2010 (figures UK International Passengers Survey).
4. In the survey, respondents could choose from three options: (1) 'yes', (2) 'in some cases, but in others', (3) 'no'. To simplify the analyses, we reduced this to two categories: 'yes' (including 'in some cases') and 'no'.
5. In order to control for deviancy, we included a separate dichotomous variable which includes the categories (0) respondents with valid answers on the scale 'people see migrants from origin countries in a positive way' and (1) respondents with missing answers on this scale (in the scale, those missings are replaced by the mean of the scale: 0.43).
6. The questionnaire of the THEMIS destination country survey contained two questions about how migrants are received in the destination country. We asked respondents whether people in the destination country see both men and women from the origin country in a positive way. For this analysis, we included the answers in a scale that varies from 1 (people in destination

country see both men and women from origin country in a positive way) to 0 (people in destination country see neither men nor women from origin country in a positive way).

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Note: locators followed by 'n' refer to notes.