Lester Embree

The Schutzian Theory of the Cultural Sciences

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The Schutzian Theory of the Cultural Sciences

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Printed on acid-free paper

*This study is dedicated to the memory of
George Franklin Schutz,
kindred spirit*

Preface

The present work is devoted to advancing as well as expounding the theory of the cultural sciences of the philosopher Alfred Schutz (1899–1959). How *Wissenschaftslehre* is fundamental for him is shown in the Introduction. It is sad to report, however, that a remarkable proportion of scholars of phenomenology fail to recognize that the project of Edmund Husserl, the founder of our tradition, was of a *Wissenschaftslehre*. This seems due to how most of the leading phenomenologists (Merleau-Ponty is the major exception) who came later in our multidisciplinary tradition have usually been the opposite of positively interested in the sciences, thereby apparently throwing the beautiful baby out with the dirty bathwater of naturalism and positivism.

But Schutz was chiefly interested in science. *Wissenschaftslehre* can be rendered in English as "theory of science" or "science theory," the latter conveniently yielding "science-theoretical(ly)" as modifiers. He usually referred to the subdiscipline in question as "methodology," but that was in a time when this word did not yet chiefly denote statistical and logical techniques in much of science and philosophy and hence the alternative expression of *Wissenschaftslehre* that he used but once can be preferred today.

Schutz's approach in science theory is distinctive in fully appreciating that scientists as well as philosophers tend to reflect on their own disciplines and that there can then be interaction between them to the benefit of both, something the recognition of which originally drew me years ago into the problematics of this study (see Chap. 11). The disciplinary difference evident in Schutz's thought is that scientists tend to focus exclusively on their own particular disciplines, while philosophers seek to understand shared aspects of whole species and genera of science. Thus it is philosophical for Schutz to focus on the whole classes not only of the social sciences but also of the cultural sciences, which also include the historical sciences. "Science theory" additionally and valuably avoids the awkwardness of scientists not prepared in philosophy saying that they engage in philosophy of science. Perhaps unfortunately, philosophers seem less prone to claim their work is scientific.

Even though they include points of wider significance, nine of the 18 chapters of this book are devoted to particular disciplines and can be studied separately by

scientists interested in reflecting on just their own disciplines, the possibility of such separate studies calling for and possibly excusing some of the repetitions that occur, particularly in this new commercial and technological era when chapters within a book can be purchased separately. The additional eight chapters are, however, philosophical by having multidisciplinary bearing.

What are best called the "cultural sciences" are focused on by Schutz. These are often currently called "the human sciences," an expression not yet coined in Schutz's time, but the title, "cultural sciences," a title that he did use significantly, is arguably preferable first of all in order to include primate ethology, where culture in non-humans is now recognized.[1] In the second place and systematically speaking, if the naturalistic sciences are about natural things, then the sciences that are about cultural things are the cultural sciences, something that requires recognizing that humans, e.g., taxi-drivers, and non-human animals, e.g., watchdogs, can have cultural characteristics of use and value.

Some of the following chapters are devoted to cultural sciences that Schutz himself referred to, but the historical sciences other than archaeology are omitted because, while there are remarks scattered elsewhere, he nicely devotes the concentrated § 41 of his masterpiece, *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt* (1932), to history.[2] While quite a bit is now known about Schutz's views of language,[3] there are no indications about how he conceived the theory of linguistics. Chapters on the theories of nursing and psychotherapy have been included to show how Schutz would probably have approached "science-based" practical disciplines.

Except for his *Aufbau,* the expression of Schutz's ultimately consistent thought is not systematically presented. Statements about most of the relevant topics can be found scattered about in many places in the oeuvre and thus have needed to be collated in this chiefly internal study. This in addition to how well he expresses himself has led to an unusual amount of quotation that the reader is also asked to excuse if it irritates her. And because four chapters are significantly based on work by others than Schutz, this work is called "Schutzian" rather than "Schutz's."

Finally, it deserves mention that Schutz's thought is currently appreciated in many theoretical and practical disciplines beyond those covered here, e.g., commu-

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[1] Cf. Lester Embree, "A Beginning for the Phenomenological Theory of Primate Ethology," *Topos,* 2/11 (2005): 149–160. Castillian translation, "Un comienzo para la teoría fenomenológica de la etología de los primates," published in *Escritos de Filosofia*, vol. 45 (2005): 145–60 (appeared in 2007). Modified English version in *Journal of Environmental Philosophy*, Vol. 5/1 (2008): 61–74.

[2] I have proposed modifications of Schutz's position to accommodate so-called "Contemporary History" in "A Problem in Schutz's Theory of the Historical Sciences with an Illustration from the Women's Liberation Movement," *Human Studies,* 27 (2004): 281–306.

[3] Alfred Schutz, "Problems of a Sociology of Language (Fall Semester, 1958)," ed. Fred Kersten with an Introduction by Lester Embree and Fred Kersten, *Schutzian Research*, vol. II (2010), 53–107.

nicology, geography, and psychiatry. Among the major hopes for the present work is that it will not only encourage deeper research on the cultural sciences in general as well as the particular disciplines focused on here, but also that other colleagues will undertake Schutzian science theories of yet further particular disciplines.

Acknowledgements

Contents

Part II   Theories of Science in the Manner of Schutz

Part III Complementary Philosophical Studies

Chapter 1
Introduction: Alfred Schutz's Philosophical Project

> *On the basis of Schutz's conception [of the common-sense world as social reality] and in continuity with it, a theory of the social sciences could be established. Schutz did not develop such a theory in a fully developed and coherent form, though he has given a great many most valuable hints toward it, which should be gathered and systematized (Aron Gurwitsch, "The Common-Sense World as Social Reality—A Discourse on Alfred Schutz" (1962) (III xxviii)).*

What did Alfred Schutz fundamentally do and how should it be called in English? His own opinion is especially relevant here. In the first place, he reported that his highest degree was in the theory of law (V 64, cf. V 149). Secondly, on October 20, 1955 Schutz wrote to his New School colleague Leo Strauss, who had praised his "Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social World" (1955), that, "[i]f you were good enough to refer to me as a 'philosophically sophisticated sociologist' I assume you did so with tongue in cheek, but if you have to call me names, I should have preferred you calling me a sociologically sophisticated philosopher."[1] (Self reports, i.e., subjective meanings or insider interpretations weigh heavily in Schutz's theory of science!)

Furthermore, there is this from an interview of November 20, 1958, "Dr. Schutz said he was not an economist, that he had studied philosophy of the law, and that he had been a student of [Hans] Kelsen. He came to the social sciences from that angle and developed an interest in sociology especially."[2] (While most probably think Schutz had his interest in the social sciences from Max Weber, this singular remark suggests otherwise [cf. Chap. 3, on Jurisprudence, below]).

Embedded citations refer to works of Schutz listed at the end of this chapter.

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[1] Alfred Schutz Papers, Beinecke Library, Yale University.

[2] Bettina Bien Greaves, "Interview with Dr. Alfred Schutz," *Schutzian Research*, Vol. 3 (2011), p. 23.

Then again, if his bibliography is considered, by far most of Schutz's writings relate to philosophy. Some are interpretations of Edmund Husserl, William James, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Max Scheler, but most of them are phenomenological investigations that are arguably philosophical, although cultural scientists can take them as belonging to their particular disciplines. He did chiefly teach in a Department of Sociology in his years at the New School for Social Research and had several important sociological students, e.g., Thomas Luckmann, but he also had several important students in philosophy, e.g., Fred Kersten, also taught philosophy, and even chaired the Department of Philosophy of the Graduate Faculty of the New School in his later years.

Schutz appears, then, to have been a philosopher and is a "phenomenological sociologist," as some say, no more than Merleau-Ponty was a child psychologist because he taught courses in that science at the Sorbonne for several years and also was no more a sociologist because he wrote extensively about that science than Carl Hempel was a physicist because he wrote about physics. But how was Schutz a philosopher and what did he philosophize about?

"Science Theory"

One might call Schutz's project one of "philosophy of the social sciences," although this expression does not occur in his oeuvre and had probably not yet been coined in his time. But then both "philosophy" and "social sciences" need to be carefully comprehended in this expression. It is actually better to say that what he supported was, to use his own words (although he does not assemble this exact phrase), "the theory of the cultural sciences."

It is better to say "theory" than "philosophy," not only because "theory" includes more than a search for the rules of thinking or methodology in the narrow signification, which much other philosophy of science focuses on, but also because the phrase can be used to name a discipline that accommodates reflections on science by scientists as well as by philosophers: "It is a basic characteristic of the social sciences to ever and again pose the question of the meaning of their basic concepts and procedures. All attempts to solve this problem are not merely preparations for social-scientific thinking; they are an everlasting theme of this thinking itself" (IV 121). "Theory" is thus not exclusionary, which "philosophy" too often is.

Schutz was under no illusions that the sciences he reflected on always took science theory to the philosophical level:

> On the one hand, methodology and studies in the logic of science have been concerned for more than two centuries primarily with the logic of the natural sciences and assume that their techniques of classification, measurement, theory-building, and empirical correlation are the only scientific ones. On the other hand, those social scientists did not have sufficient knowledge of the epistemological problems involved. They tried to overcome the difficulties they had encountered in elaborating the concrete problems of the social sciences with which they were concerned by forging their own methodological tools without any attempt at clarifying the underlying philosophical position. They broke off their endeavors as soon

as they felt themselves sufficiently equipped with the conceptual frame of reference needed for their concrete social studies. (PP 125)

Newly arrived in the United States, Schutz unsuccessfully sought reflections on methods and basic concepts by a scientist in Talcott Parsons (V 5-68, see Chap. 11). Earlier and continuously, he had had better luck with some economists, particularly Fritz Machlup, but in the 1920s he had already been disappointed at what he found in Max Weber, "one of the greatest masters of the methodology of the social sciences," who himself had been disappointed at what he found in some philosophers about method:

As he himself stated in various personal documents, [Weber] looked in vain for help in the epistemological writings of his contemporary philosophical colleagues, who belonged either to the neo-Kantian School or the so-called South-Western German School. These schools had influenced most of the writings of the historians and jurists studied by Max Weber at the beginning of his career, and he himself could not entirely escape their influence. But very soon he found that the conceptual frame of reference offered by these philosophers could not help him in building up a social theory applicable to the concrete sociological problems with which he was concerned. Therefore, he decided independently to investigate the methodological issues which he encountered, later professing his aversion to this job, which he compared with the sharpening of knives when there is nothing on the table to be carved. Guided by his intimate knowledge of the concrete problems of the social sciences and by an admirable feeling for relevant issues, he succeeded better than other social scientists in delimiting the realm of the social sciences and in describing the methods by which it can be explored. (PP 126)

Disciplinary definitions, basic concepts, and distinctive procedures are clearly the aspects of science that deeply interested Schutz, but in what way and to what end? As he writes to his New School colleague Adolph Lowe on 17 October, 1955, "It is my conviction that methodologists have neither the job nor the authority to prescribe to social scientists what they have to do. Humbly he has to learn from social scientists and to interpret for them what they are doing" (IV 146).

Earlier Schutz went further in writing that

In this role, the methodologist has to ask intelligent questions about the technique of his teacher [i.e., the social scientist]. And if those questions help others to think over what they really do, and perhaps to eliminate certain intrinsic difficulties hidden in the foundation of the scientific edifice where the scientists never set foot, methodology has performed its task. (II 88)

What Schutz thus urges might be called a gentle prescriptivism because not only are the sciences carefully studied with the hope of eliminating foundational difficulties and fostering better self-understanding in scientists, but also because Schutz seems to accept that it is for the scientists themselves to decide whether or not to accept suggestions from philosophers and other science theorists. The Schutzian philosopher does not tell the scientists what to do.

If Schutz thus favors communication with scientists as well as close examination of what they do, why does he call the multidisciplinary endeavor he favored "theory of science"? As seen in quotations above, he tended to call it "methodology" in a wide signification, but this word also has a narrow signification today whereby "the description of ["definite operational rules"] is the business of a methodology of the

social sciences" (I 255) and in many disciplines, at least in the USA, it has furthermore come to designate merely formal analytic techniques, i.e., statistics.

What other titles occur in the oeuvre? Between 1940 and 1945 Schutz uses the expression "methodology and epistemology" repeatedly (V 63; II 64; IV 48, 251), nevertheless commenting to Talcott Parsons,

> I fear that in this country the terms methodology and epistemology are used in a more restricted sense than their equivalents in German and I accepted these terms only because I could not find any better translation for "*Wissenschaftslehre*" which includes both logical problems of a scientific theory and methodology in the restricted sense. (V 63)

This is the only time Schutz uses "*Wissenschaftslehre*," but "*wissenschaftstheoretischen*" already occurs in the first sentence of *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt* (PSW xxxi), mistakenly translated as "theoretical writings." Then again, "*wissenschaftstheoretischen Einstellung*" is used in 1936 (IV 121), although oddly translated as "theoretical-scientific approach" when "science-theoretical attitude" would be more accurate. "*Theorie der Sozialwissenschaften*" is also used on the first page of the *Aufbau* and again in the German original of Schutz's last essay, "Some Structures of the Life-world" (1959), where Aron Gurwitsch translates it as "theory of the social sciences" (III 131). In letters Schutz received from Gurwitsch "*Wissenschaftstheorie*" occurs in 1952 and 1953 and is correctly translated by Claude Evans as "theory of science" (V 246, V 255). Writing himself in English in 1945 and 1953, Schutz again uses "theory of the social sciences" (V 75, V 91).

The leading Husserl scholar, Dermot Moran, traces the word "*Wissenschaftslehre*," which occurs early in Edmund Husserl's *Logische Untersuchungen*, back at least to the work of Bernard Boltzano.[3] Without naming this subdiscipline of philosophy, Schutz does seek to expand its scope:

> To Husserl's list I would like to add a social science which, while limited to the social sphere, is of an eidetic character. The task <of such a social science> would be the intentional analysis of those manifold forms of higher-level social acts and social formations which are founded on the—already executed—constitution of the *alter ego*. This can be achieved in static and genetic analyses, and such an interpretation would accordingly have to demonstrate the aprioristic structures of the social sciences. (IV 164)

Incidentally, although its rigid translation is "science," "*Wissenschaft*" in German is best comprehended as designating a disciplined cognitive practice that can include procedures of experimentation and hypothetical and deductive nomological argumentation, but is in no way confined to them. Thus biography, for example, is a *Wissenschaft* for Schutz. The three *Wissenschaften* that especially concerned him from the outset were economics, jurisprudence, and sociology cum social psychology, with political science coming soon after and cultural anthropology eventually added to the list studied (see Chaps. 4 and 8).

In sum, there are at least three reasons why "theory of science" and its transform, "science theory" ("science-theoretical[ly]" is the modifier), appears to be the best expression for what Schutz was chiefly engaged in:

(1) it can cover the clarification of basic concepts and disciplinary definitions as well as rules of procedure; (2) it can include both *scientific* science theory, i.e.,

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[3] *Introduction to Phenomenology* (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 94.

theory of science done by scientists, as well as *philosophic* science theory done by philosophers; and (3) the theory of science is where scientists and philosophers can meet and learn from one another.

A Philosophical Perspective

Just in case one still wonders whether Schutz recognizes that philosophy is different from science, there is this passage that distinguishes them: "Subjective meaning, in this sense, is the meaning which an action has for the actor or which a relation or situation has for the person or persons involved therein; objective meaning is the meaning the same action, relation, or situation has for anybody else, be it a partner or observer in everyday life, the social scientist, or the philosopher" (II 275).

But then there is still the question of how what can be more elaborately described as "philosophical theory of science" differs from "scientific theory of science." Two connected differences are evident in Schutz's efforts.

In the first place, there is a hierarchy of five of what can be called "perspectives" on what Schutz calls the meaning of an actor's action: (1) the perspective of the actor herself; (2) the perspective of the partner interacting with the actor; (3) the perspective of the observer of the action or interaction in everyday life; (4) the perspective of the social scientist of one sort or another; and (5) the perspective of the philosopher. Each higher perspective includes those below it within its scope.

In the second place, while a scientist practices science theory on just her own discipline, a philosophical science theorist also practices it on species or genera of science, i.e., the social sciences, the historical sciences, the cultural sciences, and, for that matter, the physical sciences, the biological sciences, the natural sciences, and the formal sciences. Combining these differences, the perspectives in philosophical theory of science are at once wider than the lower perspectives and arguably further from the original subjective meaning.

(It goes beyond the internal scholarship to which this work is chiefly devoted, but seems worth mentioning that after recognizing that Schutz came to prefer in his later writings "subjective interpretation" to "subjective meaning," it occurred to me in my own investigations to go beyond that and to speak of "insider interpretations" and contrasting "outsider interpretations." This somewhat parallels the distinction between William Graham Sumner's in-groups and out-groups that Schutz accepted and avoids "subjectivity's" connotations of cognitive unreliability. Moreover, it is perhaps then clearer that the matter fundamentally is how the actor, who can best understands it, interprets her own action, when it starts and ends, its motives, how its project relates to others and ultimately to the actor's plan of life, etc. I will sometimes use these terms of my own concocting in the body of this work [cf. especially Chap. 17]).

Also where the perspective of Schutz's philosophical science theory is concerned, most philosophy of science is interested in with founding all the other sciences in one discipline. For positivists, the founding discipline is of course physics and for Husserl it would be transcendental phenomenology. Beginning, however,

in the *Aufbau* (PSW 44), Schutz identifies the approach in science-theoretical clarification that he uses with what Husserl called "constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude" or "phenomenological psychology":

> One can always reactivate the process which has built up the sediments of meaning, and one can explain the intentionalities of the perspectives of relevance and the horizons of interest. Then all these phenomena of meaning, which obtain quite simply for the naïve person, might be in principle exactly described and analyzed even *within the general thesis* [*of the natural attitude*]. To accomplish this on the level of mundane intersubjectivity is the task of the mundane cultural sciences, and to clarify their specific methods is precisely a part of that constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude of which we have been speaking. (I 136, cf. I 208, IV 108)

One can still consider Schutz a philosopher even though he resorts to "phenomenological psychology" because in his time psychology was often still a subdiscipline within philosophy, psychology—like ethics—having long been a philosophical subdiscipline. Thus, his most famous essay, "On Multiple Realities" (1945), belongs "to the field of phenomenological psychology; that it is, it will be restricted to the constitutional analysis of the natural attitude" (IV 26). A transcendental phenomenologist would not consider phenomenological psychology used this way ultimate, but Schutz considered it sufficient for his science-theoretical purposes.

"The Cultural Sciences"

The probably unavoidable expression today, "philosophy of the social sciences," is also problematical with respect to the genus and species of science that Schutz almost exclusively theorizes about. Regarding the formal sciences, he seems to have said nothing concerning the theory of grammar or the theory of mathematics, but at least agrees with Husserl on the use of formal logic to unify all of science (I 49). There are also some remarks regarding the naturalistic sciences that are interesting (I 58, I 29; IV 106, IV 124; V 9, V 10, V 191), but these seem insufficient for inferring even the outlines of a theory of that kind of science. For psychology, only William James as well as Husserl are at all appreciated in anything like a science-theoretical perspective (see Chap. 6).

What this leaves is what can provisionally be called "the social sciences in the wide signification." The general field of the social sciences in this signification is approached by adopting the theoretical attitude and by *not* performing the *epochē* or abstraction that enables one to thematize the nature of the naturalistic sciences:

> The concept of Nature… with which the natural sciences have to deal is, as Husserl has shown, an idealizing abstraction from the *Lebenswelt*, an abstraction which, on principle and of course legitimately, excludes persons with their personal life and all objects of culture which originate as such in practical human activity. Exactly this layer of the *Lebenswelt*, however, from which the natural sciences have to abstract, is the social reality which the social sciences have to investigate. (I 58)

Schutz's overlapping lists of particular disciplines in the genus of the social sciences in the wide signification are interesting. For example, in the *Aufbau* of 1932

he writes that, "the social sciences [*Sozialwissenschaften*] include, according to our own concept, such widely separated disciplines as individual biography, jurisprudence, … pure economics, … the history of law, the history of art, and political science [*allgemeine Staatslehre*]" (PSW 242). He also mentions economic history (PSW 137) and the histories of music and philosophy (PSW 211). In 1940, he lists "concrete sciences of cultural phenomena (law, the economic and social world, art, history, etc.)" (I 122). In 1953 he lists "sciences of human affairs—economics, sociology, the sciences of law, linguistics, cultural anthropology, etc." (I 58). That same year and then later he mentions "a theoretical science of the mythological and religious experience of men" (PP 131). And since he says "I can understand the acts and motives … of the caveman who left no other testimony of his existence than the flint hatchet exhibited in the showcase of some museum" (V 36), the genus may in addition be presumed somehow to include archaeology (cf. PSW 109, 201, 209; I 10, 17). Finally, Schutz's thought about literature might also belong here.[4]

It would be useful to have a better title than "social science in the wide signification" for this whole group of disciplines not usually grouped together in the USA of late, particularly since Schutz significantly refers to what can provisionally be called by contrast "the social sciences in a narrow signification." In the title of § 28 of the *Aufbau* he does use Wilhelm Dilthey's word, *Geisteswissenschaften,* which it is there translated as "cultural sciences" (PSW 14), and also in his 1932 review of Husserl's *Meditations Cartesiennes*, which is there translated as "human sciences" (IV 164), a widely accepted translation of *Geisteswissenschaften* today in the Anglophone world.

But another expression used by Schutz himself is "*Kulturwissenschaft*," which is of course best translated as "cultural science." He himself repeatedly accepted this as well as "social science" as a translation for *Geisteswissenschaft* in his "Phenomenology and the Social Sciences" of 1940, which originally had *Kulturwissenschaften* in its title, and the various sciences listed above can accordingly be understood as thematizing different aspects of the sociocultural world. And the neo-Kantian connotations of this title seem now to have faded away. In sum, we can prefer "cultural sciences" for the wide signification that is nevertheless frequently expressed by Schutz with "social sciences." From a systematic rather than scholarly point of view, if the "natural sciences" are about natural objects, then the sciences that are about cultural objects—such objects including human and non-human animals in their social roles as, e.g., taxi drivers and guard dogs—are best called the "cultural sciences."

Whatever the genus of the cultural or human sciences be called, it has for Schutz two species. There are social sciences in the narrow signification that thematize others who share time but not place with a given self, i.e., those whom Schutz technically calls "contemporaries," and then there are the historical sciences, which are concerned with "predecessors," i.e., those whose lives do not overlap those of the living. Among the former would fall cultural anthropology, economics,

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[4] Lester Embree, ed., *Alfred Schutz's "Sociological Aspect of Literature": Construction and Complementary Essays*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997.

jurisprudence, linguistics, political science, social psychology, and sociology and among the latter would fall biography, history (including the histories of art, economy, law, literature, music, and philosophy), and archaeology. It is not definite where the science of myth and religion would fall for Schutz. And then there is music.[5]

Interestingly, Schutz actually mentions more historical sciences than social sciences in the narrow signification. Then again, there are enough particular historical sciences corresponding to particular social sciences that one might wonder if such pairings are always possible for him, and thus that musicology, for example, might also be a social science in the narrow signification since he recognizes the history of music.

Many seem to think that Schutz was a philosopher or theorist of the social sciences in the narrow signification, but if most of his science theory relates to the social sciences in the wide signification, he is actually a philosophical theorist of the cultural sciences.

This interpretation would be further supported if a theory of the historical sort of cultural sciences can be discerned in his scattered remarks. Besides the section devoted to it in the *Aufbau*, Schutz speaks in some places of the science of history (*Wissenschaft der Geschichte*) (PSW 211, IV 4), also mentions Jacob Burchardt in the *Aufbau* (PSW 210 n. 72), and in a late essay mentions historical writings by Marcel Granet, Arnold J. Toynbee, and Eric Voegelin (I 333 n. 48). Furthermore, in two letters to Voegelin in 1952 he also mentions the philosophy of history (*Philosophie der Geschichte*, [IV 227]), which would seem for him to include some efforts by Husserl (I 139). Although they are scattered, there are far more remarks explicitly about the historical sciences than about the formal sciences and the naturalistic sciences put together in Schutz.

In sum, there are historical as well as social sciences in the cultural sciences and Alfred Schutz was engaged in the philosophical theory of them all.

The Opening for and Approach for this Study

Little has previously been previously written about Schutz's theory of the cultural sciences. He died in 1959 with what was to be the culminating expression of his thought unfinished. His close student in sociology, Thomas Luckmann, accepted to continue that effort and he seems inadvertently to have helped create the mistaken notion of Schutz as primarily a sociologist. The last chapter of what became *The Structures of the Life-World* was outlined as follows by Schutz:

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[5] See Christine Skarda, "Alfred Schutz's Phenomenology of Music," in *Journal of Musicological Research* 3 (1979), pp. 75-132. Reprinted in F. J. Smith (ed), *Understanding the Musical Experience*, Gordon & Breach, New York (1989).

Chapter VI: Sciences in the Life-World

> Life-world as the unquestioned ground of science
> Toward a phenomenology of the natural attitude
> Natural science and social science
> What is the object of social science?
> The social scientist and his situation
> Life-worldly and scientific interpretation of the social world
> Postulates of social-scientific constructs
> The unity of science and the problem of continuity

Luckmann decided to abandon the projected final chapter thus outlined on the methodology of the social sciences and gave his reasons as follows:

> Schutz's plans do not seem to go far beyond what is systematically developed in the essay on common-sense and scientific interpretation of human action; nor do they give sufficient details on how he intended to proceed. Thus I did not think I could successfully develop the analysis of *this* problem in a manner fully consistent with Schutz's ideas (I have formulated my own thoughts on the subject elsewhere).[6]

Thus, the most influential presentation of Schutz for decades has been based on the substantive research that Luckmann handsomely interpreted without a presentation of his theory of science. At the same time, the opportunity for the present study has also existed for years, but perhaps it has not been pursued because of the great effort to collect the scattered passages that it required, something the availability of the oeuvre in electronic form now makes much easier.

The Contents of this Study

Colleagues have encouraged me to include comparative discussions, but an internal study has seemed sufficient for this crucial but understudied aspect of Schutz's work. The body of present work first contains the five theories of particular cultural sciences that can be based on Schutz's own statements, which statements, as mentioned, are scattered in his oeuvre. To a considerable extent, these particular theories are expounded with pertinent quotations, Schutz speaking for himself usually appearing the most clarificatory and persuasive, but if this practice bothers her, the reader is asked to forgive it.

After the portion of Part I devoted to internal studies of sciences Schutz wrote about sufficiently for an interpretation, there are four chapters in Part II in which Schutz's approach is taken in his spirit but beyond his letter to other disciplines. There are still many more cultural disciplines, e.g., art history, education, and communicology, and it is hoped that readers familiar with them are motivated by these not "Schutz's" but "Schutzian" studies to attempt similar efforts.

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[6] Alfred Schutz and Thomas Luckman, *The Structures of the Life-World,* trans. Richard M. Zaner and H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., 2 vols. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), Vol. I, pp. xxii and xxiii.

Finally, in Part III there are eight chapters devoted to issues of significance for all of the cultural sciences and for that reason they are, in Schutz's terms, deemed philosophical. Ideally, there should also have been a chapter in this part devoted entirely to the concept of relevance, which Schutz wrote about from his earliest to his latest text, but this is a topic that deserves book-length treatment and is thus beyond the scope of the present work. Instead, I have included a revised early essay (Chap. 12) comparing Gurwitsch and Schutz on relevance to give some idea of what relevance is.

Possible Further Work

There at least three issues for further research in the perspective of this work. In the first place, while Schutz is today well appreciated as an example of what can be accomplished in so-called "qualitative research," which seems essentially a matter of non-positivistic—especially including non-mathematical—interpretive and descriptive investigations, it is actually clear that he also recognizes a place for mathematization, especially in economics, where data are often already quantified:

> Do we not have modern economics as an example of a social science which does not deal with personal ideal types, but with curves, with mathematical functions, with the movement with prices, or with such institutions as bank systems or currency? Statistics has performed the great work of collecting information about the behavior of groups. Why go back to the scheme of social action and to the individual actor?
> The answer is this: It is true that a very great part of social science can be performed and has been performed at a level which legitimately abstracts from all that happens in the individual actor. But this operating with generalizations and idealizations on a high level of abstraction is in any case nothing but a kind of intellectual shorthand. Whenever the problem under inquiry makes it necessary, the social scientist must have the possibility of shifting the level of his research to that of individual human activity, and where real scientific work is done this shift will always become possible. (II 84)

The question here is of the possibility and degree to which such a recourse to "intellectual shorthand" like this is of value in other cultural sciences, e.g., in political science where there are quantified data from elections and opinion polling to analyze statistically.

In the second place, economics and sociology (and schools of thought within them) are specifically theoretical in a way that can again make one wonder about the other cultural sciences. "The answer is that in every branch of the social sciences which has arrived at the theoretical stage of its development there is a fundamental hypothesis which both defines the fields of research and gives the regulative principle for building up the system of ideal types" (II 87). This approach seems ultimately to have come from Kelsen's theory of law, but Schutz also finds it in Husserl's theory of naturalistic science (I 129). Whether analogous fundamental hypotheses exist in some or all of the other cultural-scientific disciplines is an issue that deserves investigation. It may be that it only occurs in schools of thought within them, but of course such schools can become so dominant that they claim to speak for their whole disciplines.

In the third place, Schutz continues in general Husserl's struggle against objectivism or naturalism and this can be worked out in further detail for particular cultural-scientific disciplines:

> The life-world, as an object of scientific investigation, will be for the investigator *qua scientist* predominantly the life-world of Others, the observed. This does not alter the fact that the scientist, who is *also* a human being among human beings in this single and uniform life-world and whose scientific work is in itself a working-together with Others in it, constantly refers and is obliged to refer in his scientific work to his own experience of the life-world. But it must always be clearly borne in mind that the disinterested observer has to a certain extent departed from the living stream of intentionalities. *Together with the substitution of another null point for the framework of orientation, every meaning-reference which was self-evident to the naive person, in reference to his own I, has now undergone a fundamental specific modification.* It remains for each social and cultural science to develop the type of such modification proper to it, that is, *to work out its particular methods.* In other words, each of these sciences must give the equation of transformation according to which the phenomena of the life-world become transformed by a process of idealization.
> For idealization and formalization have just the same role for the social sciences as the one which Husserl has stated for the natural sciences, except that it is not a question of *mathematizing the forms* but of developing a *typology of "fullnesses"* (*Füllen*). Also, in the social sciences the eminent danger exists that their idealizations, in this case typologies, will not be considered as methods but as true being. Indeed this danger is even greater in the sciences which deal with the human being and his life-world, because they are always obliged to work with a highly complex material involving types of a higher order. This material does not refer back immediately to the subjective activity of individuals, which is always the chief problem if it is in the sphere of mundane apperception. (I 137)

Yet another philosophical problem has been worked on. Some colleagues have considered Schutz's postulate of adequacy to be a rule for establishing truth, but study of his descriptions of the adequacy postulate (see Chapter 16) shows that this postulate only establishes plausibility. Beyond that it has been shown that he has an implicit postulate of verification that was unaccountably not explicitly described by him but can be explicated.

It is likely that there are yet further science-theoretical issues in the oeuvre of Alfred Schutz. And again it is also hoped that the theories of particular disciplines offered below are recognized not only as beginnings calling for further research but also serve as motivations for similar research on others of the dozens of cultural disciplines not even mentioned here.

The reader is warned once more that many interpretive points are made and even quotations used above will be repeated in the chapters below not only for their persuasive force, but because it has now become possible for readers to purchase chapters of interest to them separately from the rest of the text and thus that repeated cases of support for important points are sometimes in order.

Works of Schutz

Note: Unless done otherwise, the following works will be cited with the embedded abbreviations as listed down the left margin below, plus the page number(s).

I=Alfred Schutz, *Collected Papers,* Vol. I, *The Problem of Social Reality*, ed. Maurice Natanson (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962).

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PSW=—-, *The Phenomenology of the Social World,* trans. George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967).

PP=———-, "Positivistic Philosophy and the Actual Approach of Interpretive Social Science: An Ineditum from Spring 1953," *Husserl Studies*, Vol. 14 (1998): 123–149. Reprinted in Dermot Moran and Lester Embree, eds., *Phenomenology: Critical Concepts in Philosophy*, 5 vols. London: Routledge, 2004, III, pp. 119–145. Also available at http://www.springerlink.com/content/t52u22v305u28g04/

Part I
Theories of Science in the Writings of Alfred Schutz

Chapter 2
Schutz's Theory of Economics

> *It must be clearly stated that the relation of phenomenology to the social sciences cannot be demonstrated by analyzing concrete problems of sociology or economics, such as social adjustment or theory of international trade, with phenomenological methods. It is my conviction, however, that future studies of the methods of the social sciences and their fundamental notions will of necessity lead to issues belonging to the domain of phenomenological research. (I 116)*

Introduction

The attempt will be made in the present chapter to cover most of what Alfred Schutz writes about the science of economics. There is at least as much said about this science in his oeuvre as there is about sociology cum social psychology. He claims not only that it is as advanced a science as chemistry and biology (PP 131), but also that it is actually the most advanced social science (PP 128, V 19). The core of his philosophy is his methodology, or better, his "theory of science" (*Wissenschaftslehre*), which can also be called "science theory" and which includes (a) basic concepts, (b) disciplinary definition, and (c) methodological postulates.

Scientists as well as philosophers can engage in science theory, however, which raises the question of how their perspectives might differ. It appears that while scientists, e.g., Max Weber, reflect only on their own particular sciences (PSW 7), philosophers, e.g., Schutz, also reflect on whole species and genera of science as well as on particular disciplines. Thus, when Schutz referred to the work of his friend Felix Kaufmann as "a general methodology of the social sciences" (IV 138), he might have been speaking of his own work as well.

Some of what Schutz called "basic concepts" are listed on the first page and elsewhere in *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt* (1932), and others are mentioned later (e.g., IV 121, V 75). But what will be emphasized in this chapter are what Schutz calls "postulates." It is not immediately clear what these are. Occasional

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Embedded citations refer to works of Schutz that are listed at the end of this chapter.

synonyms are "laws," "ideals," and "principles." More significantly, he mentions "procedural rules" (IV 64, I 6, PP 128) and "operational rules" (V167) and equates them with postulates (I 251); his source is the book of Kaufmann.[1] "Rules for scientific procedure" (I 49) also occurs.

If Schutz conceived of his postulates as rules, he could also have expressed them as norms, or even imperatives. Interestingly, he rarely if ever does so. Instead, he emphasizes how the methodologist is like a student:

> In this role, the methodologist has to ask intelligent questions about the technique of his teacher. And if those questions help others to think over what they really do, and perhaps to eliminate certain intrinsic difficulties hidden in the foundation of the scientific edifice where the scientists never set foot, methodology has performed its task. (II 88; cf. IV 24)

To use another metaphor, which Schutz did not use, this task would be like somebody who composes a cookbook by observing what chefs do in the kitchen, recording as recipes what is evident in the chefs's skillful practices, with a result that could be of use to them in subsequent cooking—except that cooking recipes typically list series of imperatives, while, again, Schutz's postulates are not explicitly expressed in this way.

Postulates for All Cultural Sciences

Some postulates of wide application can be reviewed before turning to a postulate distinctive of modern economics. Although Schutz also mentions "ethical-political postulates" (II 263, cf. II 270, IV 149), they will be ignored here for the sake of the postulates pertaining specifically to the sciences.

What is science in general for Schutz? Properly speaking, science is first of all in a first signification *theoretical*: "Scientific theorizing … does not serve any practical purpose. Its aim is not to master the world but to observe and possibly understand it" (I 245). He approves of the value neutrality of Max Weber, who was "one of the first to proclaim that the social sciences must abstain from value judgments. He took up the battle against those political and moral ideologies which all too easily influence the judgment of the social scientist, whether the influence is conscious or not" (PSW 5).

Then again, Schutz distinguishes *pure theory* and *applied theory* and does so clearly in the Table of Contents for *Collected Papers,* Vol. II that he composed before he died. In that volume, "The Homecomer" (1944) most notably includes at the end practical recommendations for the treatment of returning veterans from World War II. Moreover, "pure" appears to be a synonym for "theoretical" in one signification and is then used by Schutz to qualify economics extensively, presumably because, like jurisprudence, economics is often also an applied or, better, a science-based practical discipline.

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[1] *Methodenlehre der Sozialwissenschaften (*Wien: Springer, 1936*)* and, revised, *Methodology of the Social Sciences* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944).

In addition, the postulate of *rationality* holds not only for the cultural sciences but for all of the sciences: "The methodologies of the true sciences are rational, involving, as they do, the use of formal logic and interpretive schemes. All true sciences demand the maximum of clarity and distinctness for all their propositions" (PSW 240).

What genera of contentual or empirical science are there for Schutz? The generic difference is between the *cultural* and the *natural* sciences. The title "cultural sciences" may seem odd, even though Schutz uses it significantly in work written in Europe. Probably because he wanted to get along in American science, where it was seldom used and the memory of the neo-Kantian connotation had not yet faded, he himself does not use "cultural science" in English (although it occurs in one translation he approved [I 120ff.]).

In *Der sinnhafte Aufbau* (1932)*,* however, Schutz not only uses "*Geisteswissenschaft*" and "*Kulturwissenschaft*," but even "*Sozialwissenschaft*" to include the historical sciences along with the strictly social sciences (e.g., sociology), actually calling biography, jurisprudence, pure economics, history of law, history of art, political science (PSW 242), history of politics (PSW 136), economic history, (PSW 137), and the histories of music and even philosophy (PSW 211) "social" sciences. Thus, although Schutz is indeed concerned in general with "concrete sciences of cultural phenomena (law, the economic and social world, art, history, etc.)" (I 122), one always needs to ask if a wide or a narrow signification is expressed when he uses the term "social science."

The cultural sciences thematize aspects of the socio-historical world. This lifeworld is concrete and original, whereas the nature of the naturalistic sciences differs in being abstract and derivative:

> The concept of Nature … with which the natural sciences have to deal is … an idealizing abstraction from the *Lebenswelt,* an abstraction which, on principle and of course legitimately, excludes persons with their personal life and all objects of culture which originate as such in practical human activity. Exactly this layer of the *Lebenswelt,* however, from which the natural sciences have to abstract, is the social reality which the social sciences have to investigate. (I 58)

What of species within the genus of cultural science? Psychological science might be considered a species of cultural science, but Schutz does not explicitly say so; it will be returned to in Chap. 6. The list assembled above can be divided. Economics, ethnology, jurisprudence, linguistics, political science, and sociology are social sciences in the strict signification, while the history of art, economic history, history of law, history of music, history of philosophy, and history of politics are historical sciences.

These two species of cultural science differ with respect to the regions of the socio-cultural world referred to in them. Among humans alive at the same time as a self, those with whom direct interaction and understanding in shared place and time are possible are deemed "consociates," while those living others who are only indirectly within cognitive and practical reach are called "contemporaries." Encounters with consociates are especially short-term and transitory. The social sciences in the narrow signification essentially address the region of contemporaries. But if

the others being investigated are deceased and thus "predecessors," the sciences involved are historical sciences, according to Schutz.

Two remarks can further serve to indicate how the socio-cultural life-world is thematized in the cultural sciences in general. In the first place, naturalistic scientists are not the only ones who construct models, for the cultural scientist too observes typical patterns of action and on that basis constructs models (I 36, 40ff.)

> Thus the social scientist arrives at a model of the social world or, better, at a reconstruction of it. It contains all relevant elements of the social event chosen as a typical one by the scientist for further examination. … For from the outset the puppet type is imagined as having the same specific knowledge of the situation—including means and conditions—which a real actor would have in the real social world. From the outset the subjective motives of a real actor performing a typical act are implanted as constant elements of the specious consciousness of the personal ideal type. It is the purpose of the personal ideal type to play the role an actor in the social world would have to adopt in order to perform the typical act. (V 40)

In other words, the cultural scientist develops a model of the social world in terms of a system of mutually coordinated ideal types of actions as well as of roles, relationships, situations, and products.

And in the second place, the ideal types—also called "constructs" and even "thought objects" (see Chap. 15)—that are employed in the cultural sciences are actually concepts of a higher level, i.e., constructs about constructs:

> But the observational field of the social scientist—social reality—has a specific meaning and relevance structure for the human beings living, acting, and thinking within it. By a series of common-sense constructs they have pre-selected and pre-interpreted this world which they experience as the reality of their daily lives. It is these thought objects of theirs which determine their behavior by motivating it. The thought objects constructed by the social scientist, in order to grasp this social reality, have to be founded upon the thought objects constructed by the common-sense thinking of men, living their daily life within the social world. Thus, the constructs of the social sciences are, so to speak, constructs of the second degree, that is, constructs of the constructs made by the actors on the social scene, whose behavior the social scientist has to observe and to explain in accordance with the procedural rules of his science. (I 59; cf. IV 72)

(Although Schutz does not say so, one might wonder whether there is not a need to recognize constructs of a third degree, i.e., science-theoretical or methodological constructs *of* cultural-scientific constructs *of* common-sense constructs. And if a distinction is made between scientific science theory (i.e., efforts at theory of science made within the framework of, and limited to, a particular science) and philosophical science theory (which also includes genera and species of science), then constructs of the fourth degree would need to be recognized. Postulates would then be constructs of the third and/or fourth degrees.)

What are the key postulates for the cultural sciences in general? Schutz discusses a number of postulates that arguably hold for all cultural sciences (e.g., II 18 f.) and those of *adequacy* and *subjective meaning* are especially important. Regarding the former,

> each term in a scientific model of human action must be constructed in such a way that a human act performed within the life-world by an individual actor in the way indicated by

the typical construct would be understandable by the actor himself as well as by his fellow-man in terms of the common-sense thinking of everyday life. (PP 148)

Moreover, "compliance with the postulate of adequacy warrants [the] compatibility [of the thought objects constructed by the social scientist] with the constructs of everyday life" (I 64), since the latter are "the true subject matter of all the social sciences" (PP 148; I 64, cf. I 44, PP 145, V 41, IV 22.). It is a mistake, however, to believe "adequacy" is a synonym for "truth" [see Chap. 16].

The other especially important postulate for the cultural sciences is what Max Weber called the postulate of "*subjektiver Sinn.*" This expression is, however, problematical for Schutz, who renders it increasingly as "the postulate of subjective interpretation" (IV 22; cf. II 85), commenting in 1955 that,

in Weber's unfortunate—but generally accepted—terminology, we have to distinguish between the *subjective meaning* a situation has for the person involved (or the one a particular action has for the actor himself), and the *objective meaning,* that is, the interpretation of the same situation or the same action by anybody else. The terminology is unfortunate because the so-called objective meaning—or better, meanings—are again relative to the observer, partner, scientist, ["or the philosopher" (II 275)], etc. ["and, therefore, in a certain sense, 'subjective' (Idem.)]." (II 227, cf. I 24)

The postulate of subjective interpretation applies to "economics as well as to all the other social sciences" (I 35; cf. PP 144), including history (PSW 214). One of the better formulations of this postulate reads as follows:

What is really meant by the postulate of subjective interpretation is that the actor understands what he is doing and that, in daily life as well as in science, the observer who wants to grasp the meaning of an action observed has to investigate the subjective self-understanding of the actor. Strictly speaking, it is only the actor who knows where his action starts and where it ends. The observer sees merely the segments of the ongoing course of action which become manifest to him, but does not know the span of the projects within which this ongoing course of action occurs. (PP 138)

However, a problem arises in this connection, and not only for economics, but for most "social" sciences (Schutz is referring, of course, to the sciences of his time, i.e., ca. 1953):

Is it not the "behavior of prices" rather than the behavior of men in the market situation which is studied by the economist, the "shape of demand curves" rather than the anticipations of economic subjects symbolized by such curves? Does not the economist investigate successfully subject matters such as "savings," "capital," "business cycle," "wages" and "unemployment," "multipliers" and "monopoly" as if these phenomena were entirely detached from any activity of the economic subjects, even less without entering into the subjective meaning structures such activities may have for them? The achievements of modern economic theories would make it preposterous to deny that an abstract conceptual scheme can be used very successfully for the solution of many problems. And similar examples could be given from the fields of almost all the other social sciences.
Closer investigation, however, reveals that this abstract conceptual scheme is nothing else than a kind of intellectual shorthand and that the underlying subjective elements of human actions involved are either taken for granted or deemed to be irrelevant with respect to the scientific purpose at hand—the problem under scrutiny—and are, therefore, disregarded. Correctly understood, the postulate of subjective interpretation as applied to economics as well as to all the other social sciences means merely that we always *can*—and for certain

purposes *must*—refer to the activities of the subjects within the social world and their interpretation by the actors in terms of systems of projects, available means, motives, relevances, and so on. (I 34f., paragraphing altered; cf. PP 144, V 86, II 84f.)

The same contrast can be seen in the following discussion of the sociology of Talcott Parsons:

> Modern sociologists dealing with the social system as such describe a concrete social group, for example, as a structural-functional context of interlocked social roles and status relations, of patterns of performance and significance. Such patterns, in the form of expectations adhering to these roles and status relations, become motivational for the actual and future actions of the incumbents to fulfill the functions prescribed by the positions occupied by them within this system … But it will be useful to remember that what the sociologists calls "system," "role," "status," "role expectation," "situation," and "institutionalization," [are] experienced by the individual actor on the social scene in entirely different terms. To him all the factors denoted by these concepts are elements of a network of typifications— typifications of human individuals, of their course-of-action patterns, of their motives and goals, or of the sociocultural products which originated in their actions. These types were formed in the main by others, his predecessors or contemporaries, as appropriate tools for coming to terms with things and men, accepted as such by the group into which he was born. (II 231–33)

Thus both the postulate of adequacy and the postulate of subjective interpretation serve to anchor the second-order constructs of the cultural scientists in the first-order constructs through which the actors themselves understand their social world.

Now that postulates for science in general and for the cultural sciences specifically have been sketched, it is possible to consider some more particular postulates.

Economics as a Theoretical Social Science

How is a "theoretical social science" theoretical? Social science must be recognized as able to be theoretical in more than one signification for Schutz, i.e., "theoretical" can signify more than an attitude that contrasts with the practical. Late in the *Aufbau*, he mentions "the theoretical social sciences, including … pure economics" (PSW 244) and by 1953 his list of "theoretical sciences of human affairs" had also come to include law, linguistics, and cultural anthropology (I 58). And early on he seems to hold that theoretical economics and sociology do not have to be developed because they already exist (IV 88).

The question can now be confined to how economics and sociology are specifically theoretical.

> The answer is that in every branch of the social sciences which has arrived at the theoretical stage of its development there is a fundamental hypothesis which both defines the fields of research and gives the regulative principle for building up the system of ideal types. (II 87)

The system of ideal types for a theoretical science would seem to be the same as the model of the social world built up in the cultural sciences mentioned above, i.e., a model that "contains all relevant elements of the social event chosen as a typical one

by the scientist" and that "complies perfectly with the postulate of the subjective point of view" (V 40).

However, Schutz hesitates to define the research field of economics in terms of the social world as a whole:

> No economist considers the totality of human actions as falling under the province of his science. Whatever his definition of the economic field may be … this definition will designate certain actions, goals, means, and motives as economically relevant, whereas all the others remain as "economic matters" outside the scope of economic science. (V 87, cf V 149, 99 IV 104)

Hence, a fundamental hypothesis for the whole of the cultural sciences—or even of the whole of the specifically social sciences—does not yield the postulate that will define the research field and method of theoretical economics in particular.

Similarly there seems to be no statement of a fundamental hypothesis for the whole of sociology from Schutz. But in discussing the research field and method of the school of *verstehende Soziologie* or what can be called in English "interpretative sociology," which he came to call social psychology in the USA (see Chap. 5), Schutz does say that "the primary task of this science is to describe the processes of meaning-establishment and meaning-interpretation as these are carried out by individuals living in the social world" (PSW 248).

Later, he appears to approve of a characterization of theoretical social sciences (including sociology in the signification of Talcott Parsons), stating that "the outstanding feature of these theoretical sciences is the interpretation of the social world in terms of a system of determinate logical structure" (II 86, cf. II 80, PP 142). And he also says that

> *Sociology* [is] a special analytical science on the same level with economic theory as the science which attempts to develop an analytical theory of social action systems (the term social involving a plurality of actors mutually oriented to each other's action) insofar as these systems can be understood in terms of the property of common value integration. (V 16; cf. II 231f.)

What, however, of schools of thought within the social sciences? In addition to the interpretative sociology already mentioned and also to utilitarianism, to be discussed presently, Schutz recognizes behaviorism, grants its intention to be scientific, and acknowledges that it is already accepted by the majority of social scientists in his day (V 118 ff., cf. I 48ff.). But with perhaps some irony he also objects to behaviorism:

> To be sure, these scientists admit that phenomena such as nation, government, market, price, religion, art, or science refer to activities of other intelligent human beings and constitute for them the world of their social life; they admit furthermore that alter egos have created this world by their activities and that they orient their further activities to its existence. Nevertheless, so they pretend, we are not obliged to go back to the subjective activities of those alter egos and to their correlates in their minds in order to give a description and explanation of the facts of this social world. Social scientists, they contend, may and should restrict themselves to describing what this world means to them, neglecting what it means to the actors within the social world. (V 33)

Then there is the school of thought called *utilitarianism*.

> Some … of the outstanding features of the utilitarian model of human actions—used until our day by prominent economists and sociologists—can be characterized as follows: Any human being is at any moment of his life aware of his likings and dislikings. These likings and dislikings are arranged in a hierarchical order, in a scale of graduated preferences. Men are inclined to act by the wish to obtain something more preferable, by the wish to avoid something less preferable, and, more generally, by a feeling of uneasiness or by an urge, drive, need, etc., to be satisfied; the removal of this uneasiness or the satisfaction of the need is thus the end (the goal) of action. Sometimes it is even assumed that if there were no such uneasiness (drive, urge), man would be in a state of equilibrium—that the emergence of the uneasiness disturbs such an equilibrium, and the action aims at restoring it. (V 81)

Returning now to economics, the following is the fundamental hypothesis of the school of *classical economics*:

> The sense of this postulate [of utilitarianism] is the following: Build your ideal types as if all actors had oriented their life-plan and, therefore, all their activities to the chief end of realizing the greatest utility with the minimum of costs; human activity which is oriented in such a way (and only this kind of human activity) is the subject matter of your science. (II 87)

By contrast, generally, however, "it is a methodological postulate of *modern* social science that the conduct of man has to be explained *as if* occurring in the form of choosing among problematic possibilities" (I 83, emphasis added). This is then specified:

> According to *modern sociology,* the actor has "to define the situation." By doing so he transforms his social environment of "open possibilities" into a unified field of "problematic possibilities" within which choice and decision … becomes possible. The sociologist's assumption that the actor in the social world starts with the definition of the situation is, therefore, equivalent to the methodological postulate, that the sociologist has to describe the observed social actions *as if* they occurred within a unified field of true alternatives, that is, of problematic and not of open possibilities. (I 83 f., emphasis added)

In other words, utilitarianism (in contrast to behaviorism) does seem to include the perspective of the actor, but assumes an "objective" ranking of what is to be liked and disliked, without acknowledging that this ranking stems from the (subjective) orientation of the researcher. In contrast, modern sociology can accommodate a more nuanced field of possibilities, one that is relevant to the situation of the individual actor.

Analogously, the school of *modern economics* is characterized by the principle of marginal utility, and what this does is eliminate the question of an inherent (economic) value of goods:

> With admirable clarity the marginal-utility principle establishes from the outset all possible decisions with respect to economic goods as choices between problematic possibilities. Each of these possibilities has, according to the marginal-utility principle, its own positive and negative weight *for the economic subject*; and although this weight originates in the higher order of the presupposed economic system itself, it is a different one for each of the economic subjects by reason of his position within the system.
>
> In other words: the marginal-utility principle does not postulate that all problematic possibilities are available to any individual actor or that all of them have equal weight for everybody. But it postulates that any way of action open to the individual actor originates in a choice between the problematic possibilities accessible to him and that each of these possibilities has for him its own weight, although this weight is not the same for his fellow-actor, to whom other possibilities—also problematic—are accessible. (V 89)

And with this, the requisite postulate emerges and indicates what will count as "economically relevant" (V 87) for the investigation.

Thus, the marginal-utility principle or postulate characterizes the school of modern economics within the social-science species of the cultural sciences for Alfred Schutz.

Summary

As mentioned at the outset, the results of Schutz's reflections on the practice of economics could be expressed as a series of imperatives. However, he resists prescribing to scientists; instead, he wants instead to report to them what he discovered in the foundations of their science, leaving it to them whether to reflect on and possibly eliminate some previously hidden difficulties there. In the same spirit, the results reported in the present chapter can now simply be restated, beginning with principles proper to science in general and gradually specifying them for cultural science; social science in the narrow signification; and for modern theoretical economics according to Schutz.

The theoretical attitude is adopted; ideology is resisted; and clear, distinct, and consistent results are sought in order to produce pure rather than applied theory.

Pertinent aspects of the socio-cultural life-world are thematized in a cultural-scientific investigation.

The strictly social sciences are differentiated from the historical sciences by virtue of the region of others that they thematize, i.e., that of "contemporaries."

Objectivistic mathematical accounts (e.g., of the behavior of prices) can be anchored in subjective interpretations in terms of the projects, motives, etc., of actors in everyday life.

Scientific models of the cultural world and aspects of it are constructed out of ideal types based upon the common-sense constructs of actors, partners, and observers in everyday life.

Such scientific constructs are deemed adequate if understandable to participants in everyday life, but this is not to say that they are thereby considered true.

The fundamental hypothesis of modern theoretical economics is identified as the principle of marginal utility.

Works of Schutz

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VI = ——-, *Collected Papers*, Vol. VI, *Literary Reality and Relationships*, ed. Michael Barber (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013).

PSW = ——-, *The Phenomenology of the Social World*, trans. George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967).

PP = ——-, "Positivistic Philosophy and the Actual Approach of Interpretive Social Science: An Ineditum from Spring 1953," *Husserl Studies*, Vol. 14 (1998): 123–149. Reprinted in Dermot Moran and Lester Embree, eds., *Phenomenology: Critical Concepts in Philosophy*, 5 vols. London: Routledge, 2004, III, pp. 119–145. Also available at http://www.springerlink.com/content/t52u22v305u28g04/

Chapter 3
Schutz's Theory of Jurisprudence

Kelsen ... offered his students a unique approach to the social sciences. The pure theory of law was in the true sense a theoretical system designed to explain concrete human behavior, insofar as it is relevant for the jurist. (IV 137)

Introduction

In 1941 Alfred Schutz wrote to Talcott Parsons that he "came from the most concrete problems of economics and of the theory of law" (V 64) and in the interview with Bettina Greaves in 1958 he asserted that he was not an economist but that his degree was rather in the philosophy of law.[1] Schutz uses "jurisprudence" as a synonym for "theory of law" (PSW 138, 242, 246) and "theories of jurisprudence" are mentioned in a co-authored text.[2] The *Oxford English Dictionary* defines "jurisprudence" as "the theory or philosophy of law." Alfred Schutz had studied with Hans Kelsen, author of the constitution for the new Austrian Republic established after World War I, and from early in the 1920s onwards he was of course involved for his "day job" with legal aspects of business matters in Europe, Mexico, and the USA. Thus he had great practical familiarity with as well as training in the law.

There is a substantial number of remarks about the law in Schutz's oeuvre, including some in his writings about Felix Kaufmann, Tomoo Otaka, and Miguel Cervantes, but no writing by him is focused on it. Nevertheless, if his scattered remarks are considered under the headings of disciplinary definition, basic concepts, and specific methods, the outlines of a theory of law emerge.

Embedded citations refer to works of Schutz that are listed at the end of this chapter.

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[1] Bettina B. Greaves, "Interview with Alfred Schutz. 20 November 1958" (ed. Robert Koppl and Mie Augier, *Schutzian Research*, vol. 3 (2011), 23.

[2] Harold D. Lasswell and Alfred Schutz, "Report on the Discussions of Barriers to Equality of Opportunity for the Development of Social and Civil Judgment," in Lester Embree, ed., *Schutzian Social Science* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999), p. 303.

Disciplinary Definition

It may seem that Schutz hesitates to define the discipline of law:

> [I]t would be erroneous to believe that any approach to a corpus of knowledge (say, to a particular science) has to start from the basic definitions determining its object and fundamental concepts and axioms and then proceed to build up *more geometrico* theorem by theorem, deduction on deduction. First, such a system of teaching and learning would fit merely deductive sciences and would not be applicable to empirical or inductive ones. Second, we have a series of well-advanced sciences which nevertheless cannot adequately define their subject matter. Biology cannot explain what life really is; medicine has no satisfactory definition of health and disease; many schools of thought conflict in their attempts to define the nature of law…. (V 149)

Where schools of thought in the law are concerned, Schutz refers only to the jurisprudence of Kelsen, but no doubt there are other schools. How modes of education in the law that vary with the society and historical period is probably related to differences among schools of thought:

> Any subject requires its particular form of approach and this form varies among the cultures and times, as any history of education clearly shows. To give one example, it cannot be said that the well-trained American lawyer is superior to the well-trained French lawyer or vice versa. Yet in civil law countries, the student of law is trained for several years in the system first of Roman law, then of the national law of his country, then in the techniques of application and interpretation of the law, and only in the last stage of his training does he study actual cases. The student in an American law school will start with case analysis and will from there arrive at an insight into the theory of law as such, of evidence, of interpretation, and so on. (Idem.)

A definition of law can be pieced together from the scattered statements in Schutz's oeuvre. To begin with and as already seen, law for Schutz is a science—something that needs to be returned to below. In the second place, law is a science of culture, i.e., a cultural science: "The ideal of history, to recount the past 'as it then actually was' (von Ranke) is also, with certain modifications, the ideal of all other sciences of culture, i.e., to determine what society, the state, language, art, economy, law, etc., actually are in our mundane life-world and its historicity."[3] The law, like the state, economy, art, etc., is a "cultural object" (PSW 195).

In the third place and more specifically, like economy, government, and religion, law is for Max Weber among the "social phenomena" (PSW 6) and Schutz then appears to follow Weber in considering jurisprudence a social science (PSW 242). The focus then is not on the regions of what Schutz technically called "consociates" or "predecessors," but rather on that of "contemporaries."

Even more specifically still and in the fourth place, law along with pure economics is one of "the two most advanced 'theoretical' social sciences" (PSW 248). How

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[3] (I 131) Cf. "The researcher who occupies himself scientifically with the objects of the world of nature is in no way in the same relationship to the objects of his interest as the sociologist, the economist, the theorist of law, or the historian. Any well-founded consideration of the methodological problems of the social sciences needs to begin with the clarification of this difference" (IV 121).

a social science can be theoretical by virtue of a fundamental hypothesis for Schutz is analyzed above in Chap. 2. The particularizations of these two most advanced theoretical social sciences are nicely stated:

> In pure economics the principle of marginal utility is the defining principle of the whole field and presents a highest interpretive scheme which alone makes possible the scientific systematization of the subjective meaning-contexts of individual economic acts. Correspondingly, in the realm of pure jurisprudence, as Kelsen himself clearly recognizes, application of a presupposed basic norm determines the area of invariance for all those subjective meaning-contexts of legal acts which are relevant for jurisprudence or which, to use technical terminology, bear the mark of positivity. (PSW 247)

Thus there is a definition of law in Schutz's theory of science or at least for the school of thought that he subscribed to.

Basic Concepts

There seem no specific basic concepts of the law characterized as such by Schutz, but there are first of all the basic concepts (*Grundbegriffe*) for the human or cultural sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*) in general in the first paragraph of the Preface of his *Aufbau* that certainly apply to the law:

> Among these concepts are those of the interpretation of one's own and others' experiences, meaning-establishment and meaning-interpretation, symbol and symptom, motive and project, meaning-adequacy and causal-adequacy, and, above all, the nature of ideal-typical concept formation, upon which is based the very attitude of the social sciences toward their subject matter. (PSW xxxi)

Schutz does mention constitutional and international law (PSW 200), also criminal law (PSW 63, n. 39), and, given his day job, could have mentioned commercial law, but did not. The concepts of these types of law are presumably basic. In a passage quoted below he does mention the legislator, the persons subject to the law as law-abiding as well as law-breaking, the law-interpreting court, and the agent who enforces the law. There is a similar passage relating to legal sociology which the concepts of judge, lawyer, partner, verdict, and execution occur (PSW 206). And knights in *Don Quixote* know of laws of persons and of property, but are exempt from jurisdiction, "their law is their sword, their charter their courage, their statutes their own will" (II 138). Thus some seemingly basic legal concepts actually occur in the oeuvre.

Alfred Schutz quotes from Kelsen's "Die philosophischen Grundlagen der Naturrechtslehre und des Rechtspositivism" (1928) about what is the clearly most important concept of *basic norm* for him:

> While positivism means that only that is law which has been created by constitutional procedure, it does not mean that everything which has been thus created is acceptable as law, or that it is acceptable as law in the sense which it attributes to itself. The assumption of a basic norm which establishes a supreme authority for the purpose of law-making is the ultimate presupposition which enables us to consider as "law" only those materials which

have been fashioned by a certain method. The above described interpretation of legal mate-
rial has actually long been in use by legal science. If it is correct, and if this imputation of an
objective meaning is possible (without which there can be no legal science), then it must be
the basic norm itself which gives the significance of law to material produced by a certain
procedure. It must, moreover, be possible to ascertain from this basic norm which part of
the material is valid "law," and also the objective meaning of the legal material, which actu-
ally may conflict with its own subjective meaning. The hypothesis of the basic norm simply
expresses the assumptions necessary for legal cognition.[4]

Alfred Schutz comments on this passage that

There is nothing to add to these ideas from the standpoint of the theory being advocated
here. Kelsen quite clearly indicates that his basic norm is the principle by which are con-
structed those ideal-typical schemes which alone make it possible to interpret subjective
meaning-contexts as objective meaning-contexts of law. (PSW 248)

It can be wished, however, that Schutz had offered examples of basic norms, but a
passage from Kelsen like the following does shed some additional light.

The statement "Any man who manufactures or sells alcoholic liquors as beverages shall
be punished" is a valid legal norm if it belongs to a certain legal order. This it does if this
norm has been created in a definite way ultimately determined by the basic norm of that
legal order, and if it has not again been nullified in a definite way, ultimately determined by
the same basic norm. The basic norm may, for instance, be such that a norm belongs to the
system provided that it has been decreed by the parliament or created by custom or estab-
lished by the courts, and has not been abolished by a decision of the parliament or through
custom or a contrary court practice. The statement mentioned above is no valid legal norm
if it does not belong to a valid legal order—it may be that no such norm has been created
in the way ultimately determined by the basic norm, or it may be that, although a norm has
been created by the basic norm.[5]

Specific Methods

As an Husserlian, Schutz is concerned with the foundations of the sciences in the
life-world, the socio-historical world of culture. Concerning law, he mentions a few
things that seem relevant in this connection. To begin with, the man in the street
"lives in a world taken for granted until further notice" and knows "for all practical
purposes enough about things of his immediate concern," but he "knows, further-
more, who are experts in particular fields, and is confident to find a good … lawyer
… if needed" (II 292).

With a bit more sophistication, it can be recognized that "Any law means some-
thing different to the legislator, the person subject to the law (the law-abiding citi-
zen and the lawbreaker), the law-interpreting court and the agent who enforces it"
(II 276).

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[4] PSW 247, quoting Kelsen, "Natural Law Doctrine and Legal Positivism," trans. Wolfgang Kraus
in Kelsen, *General Theory of Law and the State*.

[5] Hans Kelsen, *General Theory of Law and the State*, trans. Anders Wedberg (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1945), p.113.

Furthermore, "the more highly standardized a given typifying scheme, the better the subjective chance that the typifying scheme I ascribe to my partner is, indeed, shared by him. This is the case with typifying schemes which are 'institutionalized' by law, ordinance, tradition, etc. …" (II 54).

While Schutz mentions the interpretation and application of law, he does not discuss these procedures. However, as mentioned above, the use of ideal types is essential for jurisprudence, as for any cultural science in general and for social sciences specifically, but Schutz is not entirely clear about what sort of types are relevant for the law.

> By studying a given cultural product, we can gain some insight into what its creator had in mind, regardless of the anonymity of the ideal type we are employing. Accordingly, the different social sciences deal with subject matter[s] of different degrees of anonymity and concreteness. This should be obvious enough when we consider that the social sciences include, according to our own concept, such widely separated disciplines as individual biography, jurisprudence, and pure economics. (PSW 242)

Perhaps inconsistently, he later refers lumpingly to "the concrete sciences of cultural phenomena (law, the economic and social world, art, history)" (I 122).

The reduced passage just quoted relates the subject matter of jurisprudence to the ideal types of "cultural products," which here seem not confined to material artifacts. The ideal types of products are not directly either personal or course-of-action types. The above quoted passage continues as follows.

> And here we should add that not all of the social sciences have as their goal the interpretation of the subjective meaning of products by means of personal ideal types. Some of them are concerned with what we have called course-of-action types. Examples of such social sciences are the history of law, the history of art, and political science. This latter group of disciplines simply takes for granted the lower stages of meaning-establishment and pays no attention to them. Their scientific goal is not to study the process of meaning-establishment but rather the cultural products that are the result of that meaning establishment. These products are then regarded as meaningful in themselves … and are classified into course-of-action types. (PSW 242)

Probably this signifies that if laws are products and as such not actions, they nevertheless refer to actions and can hence be classified in relation to course-of-action types even though the types expressed in laws are not themselves course-of-action types.

And clearly the products of interest in jurisprudence have subjective and objective meanings for Schutz:

> Every student of law is familiar with the distinction between considering a point of law as a proposition within the legal system and in accordance with philological and juridical canons of interpretation, on the one hand, and asking, on the other hand, what "the intention of the legislator" was. All these differences come down to the distinction between subjective and objective meaning of the product. (PSW 138)

There is an important difference of laws in contrast to other meaningful products. It is already clear that the concept of basic norm is crucial for the theory of law in Kelsen that Schutz accepted. He quotes more of Kelsen's *Allgemeine Staatslehre* (1925) about such a norm. Simply put, the question must arise of whether a given

act, e.g., the manufacturing or selling of alcoholic beverages, which can be of interest to an economist, is also legal or not.

> Is a constitution republican, for instance, merely because it announces itself as such? Is a state federal merely because its constitution calls it such? Since legal acts usually have a verbal form, they can say something about their own meaning. This fact alone betrays an important difference between the subject matter of jurisprudence, indeed of the *social sciences* as such, and the subject matter of the natural sciences. We need not fear, for instance, that a stone will ever announce itself to be an animal. On the other hand, one cannot take the declared legal meaning of certain human acts at their face value; to do so is simply to beg the question of whether such declared meaning is really the objective legal meaning. For whether these acts are really legal acts at all, if they are, what their place is in the legal system, what significance they have for other legal acts—all these considerations will depend on the *basic norm* by means of which the scheme that interprets them is produced. Jurisprudence must pronounce that certain acts standing at the outer boundary of the legal system are, contrary to their own claim, *invalid acts*. The root of the problem is that the human acts which are the subject matter of jurisprudence have their own immanent subjective meaning which may or may not coincide with the objective meaning that accrues to them in the legal system to which they belong, *and by the basic norm postulated by the theory governing the system.*[6]

Alfred Schutz again comments, but this time on a quoted passage about outsider interpretations of insider interpretations:

> It would be hard to find a more penetrating formulation of the true relation of the social sciences to their subject matter, which we have defined as the ordering of subjective meaning-contexts within an objective meaning-context. According to Kelsen, the subjective meaning which the individual legal acts have for those enacting or performing them must be ordered within an objective meaning-context by means of what *we* should call ideal-typical constructions on the part of the interpreting science of jurisprudence. The ideal-typical construction that we find in jurisprudence is carried out through formalization and generalization, just as in pure economics. In pure economics the principle of marginal utility is the defining principle of the whole field and presents a highest interpretive scheme which alone makes possible the scientific systematization of the subjective meaning-contexts of individual economic acts. Correspondingly, in the realm of pure jurisprudence … application of a presupposed basic norm determines the area of invariance for all those subjective meaning-contexts of legal acts which are relevant for jurisprudence or which, to use technical terminology, bear the mark of positivity. (PSW 246)

It seems not especially important for other social sciences whether the persons, actions, and products are legal or not, while of course this is crucial for jurisprudence. This would also seem to be the difference between the pure theory of law and legal sociology (cf. PSW 206).

Finally, it may seem odd that the law is considered a theoretical science. One might instead consider it a practical discipline like nursing, psychotherapy, or medicine. Like these other disciplines that are concerned with preserving and restoring health, the law might be considered concerned with the practice of preserving or even increasing justice in society. Schutz does not address this question, but, as shown, focuses on how it is known what law is, which is a theoretical scientific concern. However, it is difficult to doubt that he would accept that the purely

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[6] PSW 246, quoted from Kelsen's *Allgemeine Staatslehre* (Berlin, 1925), p. 129, italics Schutz's.

theoreretical understanding of law is foundational for sophisticated practice, which is then science-based.

In introducing probably his most significant defense of purely theoretical science, Schutz does not mention jurisprudence in particular explicitly but does refer to theoretical social science, which has been seen above to subsume jurisprudence:

> Scientific theorizing—and in the following terms the theory, theorizing, etc., shall be exclusively used in this restricted sense—does not serve any practical purpose. Its aim is not to master the world but to observe and possibly understand it.—Here I wish to anticipate a possible objection. Is not the ultimate aim of science the mastery of the world? Are not natural sciences designed to dominate the forces of the universe, social sciences to exercise control, medical science to fight diseases? And is not the only reason why man bothers with science his desire to develop the necessary tools in order to improve his everyday life and to help humanity in its pursuit of happiness? All this is certainly as true as it is banal, but it has nothing to do with our problem. (I 245)

In sum, Alfred Schutz was a lawyer by training and experience and supported the theory of law or jurisprudence as a cultural science with basic concepts, especially that of the basic norm, and distinctive methods, laws as cultural products with subjective and objective meanings, and a special use of ideal types.

Works of Schutz

Note: Unless done otherwise, the following works will be cited with the embedded abbreviations as listed down the left margin below, plus the page number(s).

I=Alfred Schutz, *Collected Papers,* Vol. I, *The Problem of Social Reality*, ed. Maurice Natanson (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962).

II=——-, *Collected Papers,* Vol. II, *Studies in Social Theory*, ed. Arvid Broedresen (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964).

III=——-, *Collected Papers,* Vol. III, *Studies in Phenomenological Philosophy*, ed. Ilse Schutz (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966).

IV=——-, *Collected Papers,* Vol. IV, ed. Helmut Wagner, George Psathas, and Fred Kersten, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996).

V=——-, *Collected Papers*, Vol. V, *Phenomenology and the Social Sciences*, ed. Lester Embree (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011).

VI=——, *Collected Papers*, Vol. VI, *Literary Reality and Relationships*, ed. Michael Barber (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013).

PSW=——-, *The Phenomenology of the Social World,* trans. George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967).

PP=——-, "Positivistic Philosophy and the Actual Approach of Interpretive Social Science: An Ineditum from Spring 1953," *Husserl Studies*, Vol. 14 (1998): 123–149. Reprinted in Dermot Moran and Lester Embree, eds., *Phenomenology: Critical Concepts in Philosophy*, 5 vols. London: Routledge, 2004, III, pp. 119–145. Also available at http://www.springerlink.com/content/t52u22v305u28g04/

Chapter 4
Schutz's Theory of Political Science

> [T]he world into which I was born already contained …
> political organizations of a most diversified nature and … I as
> well as Others are members of such organizations, having a
> particular role, status, and function within them (I 313).

Introduction

It is already clear in *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt* (1932) that Alfred
Schutz (1899–1959) had a strong interest in understanding scientifically as well as
philosophically not only matters economical, jurisprudential, and social but also
matters political, but he does not present there or elsewhere in his oeuvre a sys-
tematic statement of his theory of political science that could clearly be part of
his *Wissenschaftslehre*. Unlike economics and jurisprudence, he was not trained or
experienced in political science. Yet, given the many references to politics in his last
major publication, "Symbol, Reality, and Society" (1955), one can suspect that he
was nevertheless tending toward the development of such a theory.

On the basis of what scattered remarks there are and his reflections on other
cultural sciences, above all economics, the attempt is made in the present chapter
to construct what Schutz's theory of political science might probably have become.
Such an effort should help phenomenological cultural science theory advance.

It is striking that Schutz makes reference to a far wider and deeper literature
relating to political science than he does with respect to any other discipline and
that he also commented on many political events that occurred during his life. Al-
though he did not develop an explicit theory of political science, study of his reflec-
tions on other disciplines has established that there are three components to science
theory for Schutz. These components can be called "disciplinary definition," "basic
concepts," and "distinctive methods." What he does write can be related to these
headings. There is naturally some overlap in these components.

Embedded citations refer to works of Schutz that are listed at the end of this chapter.

Disciplinary Definition

Some distinguish between "political philosophy" and "political science." Schutz uses both expressions, but does not clarify a distinction between them. He does accept the rendering of Aristotle's *epistēmē politikē* as "political science" (II 203). What does this expression signify?

Political scientists can draw on a deep intellectual tradition, as the reference to Aristotle already shows. Among cultural scientists in the West, only historians might go deeper into the past by referring to Herodotus and Thucydides. In his letters to his friend, Erich Voegelin, and also elsewhere, Schutz indicates familiarity with the positions in political theory not only of Aristotle but also Augustine, Aquinas, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, and Plato. Although this resort to millennia of literature appears distinctive for Schutz's thought where political science is concerned, it is hardly definitional.

What, again, is political science for Alfred Schutz? We can begin with what it is not. While not discussed in all of the following respects, political science for Schutz is first of all plainly not a formal science like logic and mathematics. It is also certainly not a natural science. "Social science" for him sometimes has the wide signification that includes predecessors considered in the specifically historical sciences and that can also be more clearly expressed as "cultural science." Furthermore and despite his appreciation of the history of political ideas by his friend Voegelin, political science is not an historical science. Because of its interest in groups or collectivities, it is plainly not a psychological science either, although it can be related to social psychology when methodological individualism is practiced in the search for foundations. By a process of elimination then, political science is a social science in the narrow signification whereby what are investigated are "contemporaries," i.e., fellow humans who necessarily share time but not necessarily place with a self. Yet it is then not yet clear just what positively differentiates political science from other social sciences in this narrow signification.

Schutz reports in a seemingly sympathetic way that there are five analytical disciplines for Talcott Parsons, "each of which refers to a special subdivision of the action scheme as a frame of reference: … [Among these is] *Political Science* and the scheme of social relations in the special form of power relationships and group schemes" (V 16). If it was sure that Schutz was not merely reporting Parsons's position but also approved of it, the difference for him of political science from other social sciences would be clear.

There is some indirect approval of Parsons's position in what Schutz says about Max Weber on the state, the state being of course a central theme for political science: "The state can be interpreted as the totality of acts of those who are oriented to the political order, that is, of its citizens" (PSW 136, cf. I 354 quoting Weber). For Schutz as well as Weber there are "social collectives" and this large class includes "ideal types like 'the state,' the term 'state' is merely an abbreviation for a highly complex network of interdependent ideal types," and "every 'action' of the state can be reduced to the actions of its functionaries" (PSW 199).

If Schutz's approving of Parsons with respect to group schemes is thus somewhat supported, what about power? In this respect, Schutz clearly accepts from Max Scheler that for the meaning structure of the social world there are material factors (*Realfaktoren*) that include "political power relationships" (II 249). Moreover, the world into which one was born already contains political organizations (I 313) and these have "hierarchies of rulers and subordinates, chiefs and vassals …" (I 335), which are certainly matters of power.

More can be said. In "Symbol, Reality, and Society" Schutz asserts that "there are experiences which transcend the finite province of meaning of everyday life so that they refer to other provinces of meaning, … to other subuniverses, such as the world of … politics …" (I 329, cf. I 353). This is a finite province of meaning *to which* there is transcendence. The following example is a case of the everyday reality *from which* there are references that plainly include relations of power:

> If in a face-to-face relationship with a friend I discuss a magazine article dealing with the attitude of the President and the Congress toward admission of China to the United Nations, I am in a relationship not only to the perhaps anonymous contemporary writer of the article but also with the contemporary individual or collective actors on the social scene designated by the terms "President," "Congress," "China," "United Nations"; and as my friend and I discussed this topic as citizens of the United States of 1954, we do so in an historical situation which is at least codetermined by the performances of our predecessors. And we have also in mind the impact which the decisions now to be taken might have on our successors, the future generations. (I 352, cf. I 34)

Where the transcending reference beyond everyday life is concerned, Western culture—but Schutz also refers at length to Chinese culture in this connection—has systems of symbols, including "great symbolic systems of … politics" (I 337). Thus some "modern political scientists" are said to hold that humans "participate in and are determined by the order of the cosmos, the social organization," for example, "with its hierarchies of rulers and subordinates, has its correlate in the hierarchy of the heavenly bodies" (I 333, I 335).

As an example of "rude symbolism" for social collectivities, of which the state is one, Schutz says that, "[s]trictly speaking we are all in the situation of Crainquebille, in the story by Anatole France, to whom government is just a grouchy old man behind a counter" (I 353).

On a more sophisticated level, Schutz sympathetically summarizes Voegelin:

> By way of illustration you cite Joachim of Flora's very interesting application of the trinity symbol to the course of history. From his theory emerge our four typical symbols: 1) the Third Realm, 2) the Leader, 3) the Prophet or Forerunner, and 4) the Brotherhood of autonomous persons. Subsequently these four symbols are studied in their historical evolution with particular stress on National Socialism and Russia's political philosophy. (IV 228)

In the last regard, dialectical materialism seemed to Voegelin and/or Schutz to be "headed in the direction" of becoming "a symbol of the society's self-understanding" (IV 225). Democracy should have this symbolic role for the USA, but this is not said, much less discussed, although for the USA "Uncle Sam" is said to be another "rude symbolism" (I 353).

Voegelin is furthermore cited approvingly on how a political society is a "cosmion" illuminated from within and Schutz draws on Robert M. MacIver concerning how such illumination occurs through a "central myth governing the ideas of a concrete group":

> This central myth … [is] the scheme of self-interpretation, belongs itself to the natural conception of the world which the in-group takes for granted. For example, the idea of equality might be referred to an order of values ordained by Zeus, or originating in the structure of the soul; it might be conceived as reflecting the order of the cosmos, or the Right of Nature, as revealed by Reason; it might be held as sacred, and connected with various ideas of taboo. (II 245)

Within a cosmion there is furthermore political "representation," perhaps by popular election, and "some of its members—the ruler, sovereign, government, prince— … find habitual obedience to the acts of command." And Schutz quotes approvingly from Voegelin on distinguishing between the representation of society by its articulated representatives and a second relation in which *society itself becomes the representative of something beyond itself, of a transcending reality* …. All the early empires understood themselves as representatives of the cosmic order…[1] (The claims that all men are created equal and endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights might well fit this view.)

In sum, it is plausible to say that political science for Alfred Schutz is a social science in the narrow signification that is concerned with collectivities made up of ideal types especially of functionaries and their power relationships and that these form a transcendent finite province of meaning referred to by symbols and myth in everyday life and are at least sometimes taken to represent the cosmic order.

Basic Concepts

Concepts that appear especially relevant for political science are expressed fairly often in Schutz's oeuvre. None explicitly deemed "basic concepts" have been noticed, perhaps because most are fairly self-evident, which would not preclude foundational clarification, something called for at the outset of his review of his friend Tomoo Otaka's book (IV 203). There is some clarification, however, when it is told, for example, that one is born into a national group, but can change one's citizenship, as Schutz himself did.

Then again, it may be that Schutz agreed, interestingly, with George Santayana that a family is a "political unit" (II 214). Otherwise, there is mention of the "body politic," "citizen," "government," "political beliefs," "political life," "political party," "political rights," "politician," and, as also seen above, "political organizations," especially "the state," the further clarification of all of which Schutz in effect left to others.

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[1] I 355, quoting Voegelin's *The New Science of Politics,* emphasis added by Schutz.

More generally speaking again, the first paragraph of the Preface of *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt* (1932) includes this list.

> Among these [basic] concepts are those of the interpretation of one's own and others' experiences, meaning-establishment and meaning-interpretation, symbol and symptom, motive and project, meaning adequacy and causal adequacy, and, above all, the nature of ideal-typical concept formation, upon which is based the very attitude of the social sciences toward their subject matter. (PSW xxxi)

These "*geisteswissenschaftlicher Grundbegriffe*" hold for political science because it is a cultural science as well as, more specifically, a social science. Most of these concepts are also methodological and can be addressed next.

Distinctive Methods

In most respects, the approach that Schutz would advocate for political science is like that for other social sciences in the narrow signification. Thus, in contrast with ideological thinking, respect for logic, clarity, and the value-free theoretical attitude is to be sought and ultimately one seeks objective meanings about subjective meanings, i.e., what can also be called scientific outsider interpretations of everyday common-sense insider interpretations, and relies on the postulate of adequacy to ensure contact with the pertinent reality that informants encounter.

No doubt political scientists like other social scientists can gather empirical data through interviews, participant observation, and questionnaires (V 39). Furthermore and as discussed above, they can also benefit from the history of political ideas, which would require recourse to scholarship. But insofar as the latter recourse does not seem necessary, it does not differentiate political scientific method. Although no signs have been noticed in the oeuvre, various schools of thought within political science might also be discerned especially through historical study, including positivistic behaviorism and classical political philosophy in contrast to both of which a Schutzian political science would be interpretative. (Incidentally, Schutz's use of history is not entirely Eurocentric because of his references to Chinese culture, which were probably unusual in the West of the 1950s.)

Like all other cultural sciences, political science employs ideal-typical concept formation, which, as quoted above, is that "upon which is based the very attitude of the social sciences toward their subject matter," but there is some additional specification in this respect for political science.

> And here we should add that not all the social sciences have as their goal the interpretation of the subjective meaning of products by means of personal ideal types. Some of them are concerned with what we have called course-of-action types. Examples of such social sciences are the history of law, the history of art, and political science. This latter group of disciplines simply takes for granted the lower stages of meaning-establishment and pays no attention to them. Their scientific goal is not to study the process of meaning-establishment but rather the cultural products which are the result of that meaning-establishment. These products are then regarded as meaningful in themselves … and are classified into course-of-action types. (PSW 242)

Several comments on this passage might help. In the first place, social science in the narrow signification now appears to have at least two subspecies that might called "personal" and "collective," although Schutz does not name them, something that could well have been included in the section on disciplinary definition above. Secondly, the caricature that government is just a grouchy old man does involve a personal ideal type, but this personification of a collectivity is an anthropomorphism like that whereby the USA is "Uncle Sam" and the emphasis instead on course-of-action types is significant. If the historical sciences mentioned are excluded, political science is the only strictly social-scientific discipline of that sort that is mentioned, which does not signify that some other social sciences might not also be "collective."

In the third place, some "cultural products" or "cultural objects" grasped with ideal types are political:

> [L]et us consider what are called "cultural objects," in other words, such ideal objectivities as "state," "art," "language," and so forth. These are all products according to our theory, for they bear upon them the mark of their production by our fellow men and are evidences of what went on in the minds of our fellow men. … who created them. Here highly complex cultural objects lend themselves to the most detailed investigation. The state can be interpreted as the totality of the acts of those who are oriented to the political order, that is, of its citizens… (PSW 136)

Finally, while course-of-action types are often considered by Schutz not in their own right, but as bases for the formation of personal and product types, that is probably because he was more interested in social psychology than art history, history of law, linguistics, or political science, which, as just seen, fundamentally involve course-of-action types. (And if linguistics is another strictly social science focused on course-of-action types, there still remains power as the specific difference of political science.)

What are course-of-action types?

> The concept "ideal type of human behavior" can be taken in two ways. It can mean first of all the ideal type of another person who is expressing himself or has expressed himself in a certain way. Or it may mean, second, the ideal type of the expressive process itself, or even the outward results which we interpret as signs of the expressive process. Let us call the first the "personal ideal type" and the second the "material" or "course-of-action" *type*. Certainly an inner relation exists between these two. I cannot, for instance, define the ideal type of a postal clerk without first having in mind a definition of his job. The latter is a course-of-action type … Once I am clear as to the course-of-action type, I can construct the personal ideal type, that is, "the person who performs this job." (PSW 187)
>
> The fixation in conceptual form of external modes of behavior or sequences of action, derived from either direct or indirect observation, leads to a catalogue of material course-of-action types…. But these course-of-action types can be of different degrees of generality: they can be more or less "standardized," that is, they can be derived from behavior of greater or lesser statistical frequency. (PSW 197)

Despite its greater concern with personal ideal types, also called "puppets" in it, Schutz's "Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action" (1953) adds to the above account of course-of-action types that one begins to construct them from "observed events" (I 40, cf. I 63), recognizes that types of this sort are

constructed in common-sense thinking as well as in cultural science (I 34), and adds that "[i]n constructing course-of-action types of contemporaries other than consociates, we impute to the more or less anonymous actors a set of supposedly invariant motives that govern their actions" (I 25, cf. PSW 186).

For what might have seemed only consociates, Schutz offers the interesting example of observing a group playing cards. One can observe the playing of each player separately as a Thou, but one can also observe the whole group as a They.

> I can then make a statement like "They are playing a game of poker." This statement will apply to each individual player only to the extent that the course-of-action type "poker game" corresponds to a series of conscious experiences in his mind and stands in a subjective meaning-context for him. In this way the action of each player will be "oriented" to the rules of poker. (PSW 186; *Schutz's footnote:* "Even the cheater is oriented to the rules; otherwise he could not really cheat.")

From this example one might wonder analogically from rules to the role of law in political organizations. As seen above, Schutz recognizes that citizens are oriented to the political order of the state, but he seems not to consider the role of law in this connection (but cf. PSW 200 and II 121). In his rendering of *Aufbau,* Part IV, however, Thomas Luckmann does consider the law:

> If I perform or refrain from performing some determinate act in order to avoid the intervention of certain people with badges and uniforms—to adduce another of Weber's examples—that is to say, if I orient my conduct to the law and its enforcement agencies, I stand in a social relation with my contemporaries personified according to ideal types, i.e., in a They-relation.—In these examples I have acted with the expectation that certain determinate kinds of conduct are likely on the part of others … [including] policemen. I have a certain attitude toward them: I reckon with them when I plan my actions, in short, I am in a social relation with them. But my partners in these relations do not appear as concrete and specific individuals. They appear as instances of the genus … "policeman." I ascribe to them specific patterns of conduct, specific functional performances. They are relevant for me as contemporaries only so far as they are typical performers of such functions, that is, as ideal types. (II 45)

Thus, while law is not excluded, it is clear that it has a major place in political science for Schutz. Otherwise, political science differs from most other cultural sciences in relying on course-of-action rather than personal ideal types to grasp the role players or "functionaries" (PSW 199), including citizens, and their exercises of power within political collectivities.

To close, it might finally be observed critically that political science for Schutz would have to find a place for applied or, better, science-based political action in the world of working. In other words, how normative politics can have scientific bases needs also to be explored. He mentions politicians, political decisions, and political actions, but not how these might have such a basis, which increasingly they do when political decisions are made.

Works of Schutz

Note: Unless done otherwise, the following works will be cited with the embedded abbreviations as listed down the left margin below, plus the page number(s).

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III ——-, *Collected Papers*, Vol. III, *Studies in Phenomenological Philosophy*, ed. Ilse Schutz (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966).

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Chapter 5
Schutz's Theory of Sociology

How can the life-world of all of us be made an object of theoretical contemplation and how can the outcome of this contemplation be used within the world of working? (IV 45)

Introduction

That many still call Alfred Schutz (1899–1959) a phenomenological "sociologist" is bothersome not least because this characterization has negative connotations for some thinkers even outside Analytical Philosophy. It might be that Schutz is thus characterized because he chiefly taught sociology and had famous sociological students, Thomas Luckmann first of all, and that some of his writings are substantively social scientific, i.e., "The Stranger" (1944), "The Homecomer" (1944), "The Well-Informed Citizen" (1946), and "Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social World" (1955). Yet Schutz's doctorate was in philosophy of law, most of his writings are in or on philosophy, and in a letter of October 20, 1955 to his New School colleague, Leo Straus, he wrote, "If you were good enough to refer to me as a 'philosophically sophisticated sociologist' I assume you did so with tongue in cheek, but if you have to call me names, I should have preferred your calling me a sociologically sophisticated philosopher."

Moreover, if one asks what was central to Schutz's project, the title that best fits today is "philosophy of social science," although it did not exist in his day (cf. Chap. 1). What he often called his work was "methodology and epistemology" and his focus was on the social sciences in the wide signification or, better, the "cultural sciences" that includes the historical sciences as well as the social sciences in the narrow signification, but this no more makes him a sociologist than his philosophizing about physics made Carl Hempel a physicist.

Embedded citations refer to works of Schutz that are listed at the end of this chapter.

And since "methodology" now often chiefly connotes logic and statistics, Schutz's alternative expression, "*Wissenschaftslehre*," translated as "theory of science" or "science theory," can be preferred. While science theory is often engaged in by cultural scientists such as Max Weber with respect to their own particular disciplines, Schutz chiefly addressed the species and the genus of the cultural sciences and was thereby a philosopher. His theory of cultural science can be seen to have three components reflected upon: (a) basic concepts, (b) disciplinary definition, and (c) distinctive methods.

In what follows, the question of disciplinary definition will be approached first, then those of basic concepts and methods will be addressed, and finally how some practical disciplines might have social-scientific foundations will be considered.

What is Sociology?

The focus in this chapter is on the relation of social psychology and sociology. It has an emphasis on what Schutz came to call social psychology, but most sociologists today would consider that to be part of sociology. He was no positivist for whom all science either is or ought to be like physical science. Social science in the wide signification, better called cultural science, is different from naturalistic science by virtue of its subject matter for him. Schutz is clear in many places that the social sciences in the narrow signification investigate the realm of "contemporaries," i.e., others who have community of time but not necessarily of place with the self who is begun from, while the historical sciences investigate the realm of "predecessors," who do not have such community of time. Sociology (or social psychology) is in these terms a social science like economics, linguistics, and political science, but how they differ requires some explication.

Where the substantive science that Schutz did a few times engage in is concerned, the case can be made that at least in the USA "Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social World" is sociological, while "The Stranger" and "The Homecomer" are said by their author to be social psychological. This is a matter of contrasting approaches that either begin from the social group that individuals belong to (methodological collectivism) or begin from the individual relating to others (methodological individualism). While he disapproved of it, Schutz did recognize that at some universities in the USA sociology and social psychology could be studied separately (IV 113) and he also recognized that one can conduct laboratory experiments in social psychology (I 49), but presumably not in sociology.

No distinction is made between sociology and social psychology in Schutz's *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt* (1932). Yet in the last paragraph of the penultimate section, he writes, "There is still a word to be said about the field and method of interpretive sociology. The primary task of this science is to describe the processes of meaning-establishment and meaning-interpretation as these are carried out by individuals living in the social world" (PSW 248). This is the approach of what he later called social psychology.

In the Austria of 1932, however, this was "*Soziologie*," but when Schutz published "The Stranger" and "The Homecomer" in 1944, he had, in effect, learned that in the USA this describes social psychology and he used that expression in the subtitles of these essays. (Colleagues tell me that in the USA and Germany today social psychology as Schutz does it is now part of sociology, while there is also social psychology as a subdiscipline of psychology.)

In the *Aufbau* Schutz does, however, claim that "social collectives," such as the state, the press, the economy, the nation, the people, and the working class, are absolutely anonymous ideal types and asserts that "every 'action' of the state can be reduced to the actions of its functionaries" (PSW 199). Twenty years later, he mentions disapprovingly that Husserl referred to groups as "personalities of a higher order," but, against that, he asserts that "The attempts of Simmel, Max Weber, [and] Scheler to reduce social collectivities to the social interaction of individuals is, so it seems, much closer to the spirit of phenomenology than the pertinent statements of its founder" (II 39). (On social groups, see Chap. 13 below.)

As for what, in contrast, sociology strictly speaking is about, at least in the USA when he emigrated there, Schutz refers to books of Talcott Parsons, whose work he had begun studying by 1940, and asserts that "Modern sociologists dealing with the social system as such describe a concrete social group, for example, as a structural-functional context of interlocked social roles and status relations, of patterns of performance and significance" (II 231).

"Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social World" is then sociological since it begins as follows. "The subject of the present paper is the theoretical analysis of various aspects of the notion of equality in the common-sense thinking of social groups." And in that and other late writings (e.g., II 276) Schutz does distinguish and describe subjective and objective interpretations not just of individuals but also of in-groups and out-groups and also of existential groups and voluntary groups. (II 250–257)

Not only does Schutz thus recognize groups but he also recognizes that "the individual finds himself always a member of numerous social groups" (II 253), even though, as seen below in Chap. 12, it is possible by a "fictitious abstraction" to consider an individual "separated from his fellow-men" (I 218), i.e., "we proceeded as if the world were my private world and as if we were entitled to disregard the fact that it is from the outset an intersubjective world…" (I 10, cf. I 53, I 306). On this basis, one can say that for Schutz groups are concrete and individuals considered apart from their memberships are abstractions.

Schutz's great emphasis, nevertheless, is on individuals and this is perhaps clearest with respect to how individuals understand and/or influence consociates, contemporaries, predecessors, and successors, something he describes in many places (See I 318 for the final statement). By its subtitle, "The Stranger" is "an essay in social psychology" and "The Homecomer" is quite similar. Both begin not from collectivities or groups but from the typical common-sense thinking about others of typical individuals. Schutz could have recognized that immigrants, his chief example of strangers, often come in families, as his own did from Austria to the USA, and thus as groups, but he focuses on the typical individual immigrant. People can also return home in groups, but Schutz focused on individual homecomers.

Besides the two essays chiefly referred to in the present chapter, the focus on individuals occurs in many other essays by Schutz, so that "Equality" as sociological is the exception rather than the rule. Sociology begins with groups of which individuals are members and social psychology begins with individuals relating to others and eventually gets to collectivities and groups made up of individuals. The same data are approached in opposite directions. Where his secondary engagement in substantive science in several essays is concerned, Schutz is, in sum, far more a social psychologist in the American terms of the 1940s than a sociologist.

Some Basic Concepts of Social Psychology

In the first pages of the *Aufbau* and various times elsewhere, Schutz refers to basic concepts (*Grundbegriffe*). Both "The Stranger" and "The Homecomer" are rich essays and only some basic concepts presented in them will be discussed here. In the latter, he writes that the "typical experiences of the homecomer will be analyzed … *in general terms* of social psychology" (II 107). His example is that of the veteran returning home from World War II, which is like what he himself experienced coming home from World War I. While the stranger goes into a new situation where he is an outsider seeking to become an insider, the homecomer returns to an old situation in which he arrives often unfortunately believing that he is still an insider.

The first basic concept that Schutz analyzes in "Homecomer" is that of "home" and, in relation thereto, there is "life at home":

> It means, of course, father-house and mother-tongue, the family, the sweetheart, the friends; it means a beloved landscape, "songs my mother taught me," food prepared in a particular way, familiar things for daily use, folkways, and personal habits—briefly, a peculiar way of life composed of small and important elements, likewise cherished. … Life at home follows an organized pattern or routine; it has its well-determined goals and well-proved means to bring them about, consisting of a set of traditions, habits, institutions, timetables for activities of all kinds, etc. … There is no need to define or redefine situations which have occurred so many times or to look for new solutions of old problems hitherto handled satisfactorily. (II 108)

Where social relationships are concerned, "it could be said that life at home is, for the most part, actually or at least potentially life in so-called primary groups" (II 109), the concept of which is also plainly basic. And Schutz seeks to overcome the equivocalness of the concept of primary group in the thought of Charles Cooley. To begin with, "face-to-face relationships" and "intimate relationships" (surely two more basic concepts) need to be distinguished. Individuals face-to-face have place and time directly in common so long as their relationship and interaction last.

> In the face-to-face relation I can grasp the Other's thoughts in a vivid present as they develop and build themselves up, and so can he with reference to my stream of thought; and both of us know and take into account this possibility. The Other is to me, and I am to the Other, not an abstraction, not a mere instance of typical behavior, but, by the very reason of our sharing a common vivid present, this unique individual personality in this unique particular situation. These are, very roughly outlined, some of the features of the face-to-face relation which we prefer call the "pure we-relation." (II 110)

Charles Cooley included intimacy in his notion of primary group and the face-to-face relationship, but Schutz contends that there are "manifold degrees of intimacy and anonymity" (which must also be basic concepts) in such structures. Thus, "[t]o share the vivid present of a woman we love or of the neighbor in the subway are certainly different kinds of face-to-face relations" (Ibid.).

There is a third essential aspect to primary groups:

> A marriage, a friendship, a family group, a kindergarten, does not consist of a permanent, a strictly continuous, primary face-to-face relationship but rather of a series of merely intermittent face-to-face relationships. More precisely, the so-called "primary groups" are institutionalized situations which make it possible to reestablish the interrupted we-relation and to continue where it was broken off last time. (Ibid.)

The warrior returning home from war expects to be at home again, but plainly s/he and probably also this home have changed in the meantime, so there can be difficulties, which Schutz explores, but our concern here is merely to present some of the basic concepts in social psychology.

Several basic concepts in "The Stranger" also especially deserve comment. While a member of an in-group is at home in actual or potential primary groups, the stranger is an individual outsider encountering a different "cultural pattern of group life," which is

> all the peculiar valuations, institutions, and systems of orientation and guidance (such as folkways, mores, laws, habits, customs, etiquette, fashions) which, in the common opinion of sociologists of our time, characterize—if not constitute—any social group at a given moment in its history. This cultural pattern, like any phenomenon of the social world, has a different aspect for the sociologist and for the man who acts and thinks within it. (II 92)

The "cultural pattern of group life" would thus seem a basic concept of sociology cum social psychology for Alfred Schutz when related to by the individual stranger or homecomer.

Schutz furthermore accepts Robert S. Lynd's "thinking as usual," which would seem the cognitive component in "life at home," and he also accepts W. I. Thomas's definition of a "crisis," which "'interrupts the flow of habit and gives rise to changed conditions of consciousness and practice'" (quoted at II 96). Strangers are usually in crisis and homecomers are often soon as well.

Perhaps these examples suffice to show what basic concepts are for sociology and especially social psychology. A great number more need to be recognized in various areas of social life, whether one begins from the individual or from the group.

The Approach of Social Psychology for Schutz

Methodology in the narrow signification is an account of a method or approach and can be described in terms of the rules for an operation, the attitude involved, or effects on the object. There seem to be at least six components to the methodology of sociology cum social psychology for Schutz:

1. Social psychology is, first of all, a science conducted in the natural or, better, worldly attitude and thus not in the transcendental attitude that Edmund Husserl distinguished and emphasized.
2. The abstraction by which the pure nature of natural science is distinguished (I 58) is not performed in the cultural sciences, which is to say that the social psychologist remains in an attitude accepting the sociocultural stratum of the life-world. These first two features of the attitude that do not require any special effort to be adopted are only mentioned for the sake of completeness.
3. Science for Schutz is theoretical and how the theoretical attitude is established through a specific *epochē* is extensively described by him in "On Multiple Realities" (1945).
4. Next, because the life-world is not only social but also historical, the regions of predecessors and successors need to be abstracted from for the sake of the region of contemporaries, which is the subject matter of the social sciences in the narrow and strict signification.
5. To distinguish the subject matter of social psychology from that of sociology, there is furthermore need to begin from individuals relating to individual and collective others rather than beginning from collectivities or groups and eventually reaching individual members.
6. Lastly where his methodology is concerned, Schutz emphasizes three postulates for the constructing of all social-scientific models that, it follows, hold for social psychology (and sociology as well):

   a. To begin with, models in social psychology need "to be established with the highest degree of clarity and distinctness … and must be fully compatible with the principles of formal logic" (I 43).
   b. Besides this "postulate of logical consistency," there is "the postulate of subjective interpretation" ("which has, indeed, been observed so far in the theory formation of all social sciences" [I 62]):

> In order to explain human actions the scientist has to ask what model of an individual mind can be constructed and what typical contents must be attributed to it in order to explain the observed facts as the result of the activity of such a mind in an understandable relation. The compliance with this postulate warrants the possibility of referring all kinds of human action or their result to the subjective meaning such action or result of an action had for the actor. (I 43)

   c. Finally, there is "the postulate of adequacy":

> Each term of a scientific model of human action must be constructed in such a way that a human act performed within the life-world by an individual actor in the way indicated by the typical construct would be understandable for the actor himself as well as for his fellow-men in terms of common-sense interpretation of everyday life. Compliance with this postulate warrants the consistency of the constructs of the social scientist with the constructs of common-sense experience of the social reality (I 44).

(Some colleagues believe that the postulate of adequacy establishes truth. For how this is not the case and that verification for Schutz takes effort to understand, see Chap. 16.)

In sum, once the theoretical attitude toward individual contemporaries and groups in the social world is adopted, the social psychologist can build models of typical individual action and understanding relating to others that are composed not only of logically consistent scientific constructs about the common-sense subjective meanings, constructs, or interpretations of the typical individuals, e.g., strangers and homecomers (and social psychologists!), but also deemed adequate through being understandable by such individuals.

Practical Disciplines Based on Social Psychology

One may wonder whether social psychology as sketched above can be applied in at least some practical disciplines. The traditional expression, "applied science," is problematical because it appears to connote that there are purely theoretical disciplines, philosophy included, from which practical disciplines are subsequently derived. This may often be the case in modern times for naturalistic science and technology, but in the practical species of the "cultural disciplines," as they might be called to include disciplines such as architecture, nursing, and psychotherapy, disciplined practices have existed with considerable success for many centuries before any attempt was made to make them scientific through providing scientific foundations, and this is so even if that attempt is considered to have ultimately begun in general at least with Aristotle.

When there are such foundations, the practical disciplines in question can be said to be "scientific" without being properly considered sciences, because they are not theoretical disciplines. And instead of "applied sciences," one might then prefer to speak of "science-based disciplines." Experience has shown that a practice based on a scientific understanding is of course usually more effective.

Not all practical disciplines can have social-psychological foundations. Theoretical economics is often "applied" and sometimes political efforts have bases in theoretical political science, but in those cases the focus is on collective behavior and groups. Modern nursing and psychotherapy, however, are science-based practical disciplines in which the practitioners focus on the actions and lives of individuals and scientific foundations for their practices can then be sought in social psychology (see Chaps. 9 and 10).

"The Homecomer" is explicit at the end on how veterans returning from war may be helped to live at home again and help for strangers entering new in-groups can be inferred from "The Stranger," so these essays contain more than purely theoretical accounts. And if "Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social World" is sociological in the signification of beginning from collective life and groups, it also has practical implications where race relations in the USA are concerned and the same can be said of "The Well-Informed Citizen" (see Chaps. 3 and 17)

In nursing and psychotherapy, there are health conditions to be addressed and this can be said to specify these disciplines. And where methods are concerned, the methodology sketched above is at best generic and hence a great deal needs to be added where discipline-specific research and practice are concerned. It is hoped,

however, that what has also been shown about the basic concepts, disciplinary definition, and methods of social psychology in this chapter can be a place to start for advancing such specific theories of science and practice, which already exist, but appear not yet to have availed themselves of the science-theoretical contributions of Alfred Schutz.

Works of Schutz

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Chapter 6
Schutz's Theory of Phenomenological Psychology

> *[I]t is the great contribution of Max Weber in his "verstehende Soziologie" to have given the principles of a method which attempts to explain all social phenomena in the broadest sense (thus all objects of the cultural sciences) in relation to the "intended meaning" which the actor connects with his action. At the same time he has given the main characteristics of the style of method of these sciences in his theory of the ideal type and its laws of formation. But, it seems to me, these methods can only become fully intelligible by means of the far-reaching investigations of a constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude. (I 138)*

Introduction

Many today characterize the work of Alfred Schutz (1899–1959) as "phenomenological sociology" and some do so in order to disparage or dismiss it. This categorization is to some extent plausible, provided one associates social psychology with sociology, which Schutz seems to have preferred (IV 113), and recalls that "The Stranger" (1944) and "The Homecomer" (1944) are explicitly social psychological (see Chap. 5). In addition, the substantive analyses in his oeuvre have been appreciated by sociologists, Thomas Luckmann above all, as social science.[1]

Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of Schutz's writings are in or on philosophy and fundamentally continue Edmund Husserl's central project of what today is called "philosophy of science" and Schutz in his time called "methodology" in a wide signification or "*Wissenschaftslehre*." And when his colleague Leo Straus commended him for being a philosophically informed sociologist, Schutz responded that he preferred to be considered a "sociologically informed philosopher."

Embedded citations refer to works of Schutz that are listed at the end of this chapter.

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[1] Alfred Schutz and Thomas Luckmann, *The Structures of the Social World,* trans. Richard M. Zaner and H. Tristram Englehardt, Jr., (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973).

Where Schutz's central effort differs from most previous phenomenological philosophy of science is first of all in his concern not with either the formal or the naturalistic sciences but with what he usually calls, in a broad signification that includes history, the "social sciences." His intention to extend the scope of Husserl's project is clear enough:

> To Husserl's list I would like to add a social science which, while limited to the social sphere, is of an eidetic character. The task < of such a social science > would be the intentional analysis of those manifold forms of higher-level social acts and social formations which are founded on the—already executed—constitution of the *alter ego*. This can be achieved in static and genetic analysis, and such an interpretation would accordingly have to demonstrate the aprioristic structures of the social sciences. (IV, 164)

Curiously, however, no place in Schutz's classification of the sciences is explicitly reserved for the science of psychology. He does refer occasionally to psychoanalysis, behaviorist psychology, and Gestalt theory, but does not philosophize about them. He does, however, sketch the approach of such naturalistic schools:

> With the enormous success of the mathematical natural sciences has come the fact that modern philosophy and critique of knowledge generally perceive the prototype of scientific thought in their methods. The consequence is a dualistic cleavage into a real and self-contained corporeal world, and a mental world, which latter, however, remains dependent upon the natural world and is not brought to any independent status in its own right. The further consequence is that even this mental world ought to be explained *more geometrico* according to the unclarified rationalism of the mathematical natural sciences, or, as Husserl terms it, by means of physicalistic rationalism. Above all, psychology ought to be treated objectivistically, where objectivistic should mean that in the realm of the world which is self-evidently given through experience one will search for the "objective truths" without inquiring about the subjective activities of the mind, out of which the ontic sense of the pre-given life-world is constituted. For the life-world is a subjective formation resulting from the activities of the experiencing pre-scientific life. (I 130)

The following nearly unique passage does not explicitly express that the position expressed in it is Schutz's own, but instead expounds Husserl's, which he nevertheless very probably agreed with:

> Psychology is meaningful only as positive science, that is, only as a branch of anthropology. Its theme, then, is solely the psychological ego bound to the world.—If psychological analysis is executed in an eidetic-*a priori* way (which is always possible), then it is constitutive analysis in the natural attitude (psychological phenomenology); that is, it maintains its relations to the corporeal and to the mundane. (IV 172)

"Anthropology" here has the European signification of theory of the human and not that of "cultural anthropology" more common in the USA. When the eidetic as well as the empirical or factual psychology within such a discipline is not behavioristic, it is now sometimes called "descriptive psychology."

If today's phenomenological psychology, such as that developed by Amadeo Giorgi and his followers, existed in Schutz's time, he might well have philosophized about it. What Schutz writes about William James's *Principles of Psychology* (1890), which work unfortunately did not engender a distinct school of thought, will, however, be returned to below.

While not having an explicit place in his classification of the sciences, phenomenological psychology is, however, regularly referred to by Schutz in his description of his own approach to science, i.e., in his theory of the cultural sciences. His science theory can be conceived of as a hierarchy of levels of thinking: (1) On the bottom level there is first of all the common-sense thinking of everyday prescientific life; (2) then, in what can be called "substantive cultural science," empirical and theoretical accounts are developed with reference to the common-sense interpretations expressed by informants in writings as well as in interviews and questionnaires; (3) next, "*scientific* science theorists" can reflect on efforts in particular substantive cultural sciences in order to clarify foundations and help improve substantive research; and (4), finally, "*philosophical* science theorists" can be conceived on a fourth level where they reflect not only on common-sense thinking and substantive research but also on scientific science theory in specific and general forms. The scope of philosophical reflection is then the widest, but philosophers can also be seen as the furthest from the ultimate data, which the substantive specialized researchers are closer to.

Schutz's masterpiece, *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt* (1932), begins by showing his interest in science theory and his appreciation of the recourse to social psychology introduced by Georg Simmel. He holds, however, that the clarification of foundations needs to go further, which he does through recourse to Henri Bergson but above all to Edmund Husserl's "constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude," which he and Husserl also called "phenomenological psychology." Because of its clarificatory role, this phenomenological psychology can be considered foundational for all the other cultural sciences.

The present chapter will briefly review how such a phenomenological psychology derived from transcendental phenomenology accomplishes the fundamental clarificatory role in Schutz's cultural-science theory and then it will explicate the theory of this psychology that is implicit in his oeuvre.

Psychology in Cultural-Science Theory

From the beginning, Alfred Schutz craved clarification for foundations of the cultural sciences that were deeper than those he found in Max Weber. He sought them first in the work of Henri Bergson,[2] but was unsatisfied. Then his friend Felix Kaufmann urged him to study the work of Edmund Husserl. At first, he found nothing to his purpose in the *Logische Untersuchungen* (1900–01, 1913) and *Ideen zur einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Philosophie, Erstes Buch* (1913), but once Husserl's *Vorlesungen zur inneren Zeitbewusstsein* (1928) and *Formale und transcendentale Logik* (1929) appeared, he saw the importance of phenomenology: "In a book published in 1932 I tried to use Husserl's phenomenology … and

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[2] Alfred Schutz, *Life Forms and Meaning Structure,* trans. Helmut R. Wagner (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982). Reprinted in Alfred Schutz, *Collected Papers,* VI, ed. Michael Barber (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2012).

Weber's methodology as a starting point for the analysis of the meaning-structure of the social world" (V 2).

After a part chiefly devoted to showing inadequacies in Weber's methodology where the concept of meaningful action, the understanding of the other's subjective meaning, observational and motivational understanding, and the concepts of subjective and objective meaning are all concerned, the other parts of Schutz's *Aufbau* are devoted to the constitution of meaningful experience in the separate constitutor's own stream of consciousness, the foundations of intersubjective understanding, the structure of the social world, and some basic problems of interpretive sociology cum soial psychology.

What is the function of phenomenological psychology within Schutz's theory of the cultural sciences? Husserl's "Nachwort zu meinen 'Ideen'" (1930) appeared while Schutz was reading the proofs of his *Aufbau* and he appended a note on its basis to Part I that in effect introduces Part II. In it he states that the analysis of the consciousness of inner time was carried out by Husserl within the transcendentally reduced sphere in which the natural world is bracketed, but that he, Schutz, did not need to go so far in order to gain the insight into the inner-time phenomena that was needed to found the analysis of mundane sociality.

The founding of the analysis of mundane sociality requires *not* the analysis of constitutive phenomena of the transcendental sphere but only the analysis of what corresponds to those phenomena in the natural attitude, an application that Husserl himself authorizes in the "Nachwort" and elsewhere and himself calls "phenomenological psychology." Interpreting Husserl's transcendental findings as phenomenological-psychological findings afforded Schutz a perspective that he considered sufficient for clarifying the foundations of the cultural sciences.

By 1940, Schutz had had a number of personal meetings with Husserl, had heard the Vienna and Prague Lectures, had emigrated to the USA, and had developed great hopes for further insights from Husserl's posthumous works for the sciences concerned with cultural phenomena in art, economics, history, law, and society that point back by their origin and meaning to other subjects and their active constitutive intentionalities and are hence experienced as existing for everyone who belongs to the corresponding community of culture (I 118–139).

In 1945 Schutz then lists some questions crucial for a theory of the cultural sciences to which he says not only transcendental phenomenology but also phenomenological psychology have opened the way and also begun to answer:

> But how does it happen that mutual understanding and communication are possible at all? How is it possible that man accomplishes meaningful acts, purposively or habitually, that he is guided by ends to be attained and motivated by certain experiences? Do not the concepts of meaning, of motives, of ends, of acts, refer to a certain structure of consciousness, a certain arrangement of all experiences in inner time, a certain type of sedimentation? And does not interpretation of the Other's meaning and of the meaning of his acts and the results of these acts presuppose a self-interpretation of the observer or partner? How can I, in my attitude as a man among other men or as a social scientist, find an approach to all this if not by recourse to a stock of pre-interpreted experiences built up by sedimentation within my own conscious life? And how can methods for interpreting the social interrelationship be warranted if they are not based upon a careful description of the underlying assumptions and their implications? (I 117)

And before he died 1959, Schutz sketched seven areas in the social sciences to which Husserl's thought could be applied, including this statement, which includes phenomenological terms.

> The social world has particular dimensions of proximity and distance in space and time and of intimacy and anonymity. Each of these dimensions has its specific horizonal structure, and to each of them belongs a specific experiential style. These experiences are pre-predicative, and their style is that of typologies formed differently from experiences relating to contemporaries, predecessors, and successors. Husserl's analyses of pre-predicative experience and of the nature of types (although not applied by him to the social world) are of particular importance here. Taking them as a point of departure, it can be explained why we interpret the actions of our fellow-men in terms of course-of-action types and of personal types, and why we have to undergo self-typification in order to come to terms with them in establishing a universe of communicative comprehension. The social sciences study this problem under the heading of "social roles" and in terms of the so-called subjective and objective interpretation of the meaning of action (Max Weber). On the other hand, all typifications of common-sense thinking are themselves integral elements of the concrete historical socio-cultural *Lebenswelt* within which they prevail as taken for granted and as socially approved. Their structure determines among other things the social distribution of knowledge and its relativity and relevance to the concrete social environment of a concrete group in a concrete historical situation. (I 148)

What has been sketched above can perhaps suffice to convey that to which phenomenological psychology can be taken to the foundations of, i.e., cultural science. But what is phenomenological psychology itself?

Some Theory of Phenomenological Psychology

As has been told above, Alfred Schutz's theory of the cultural sciences first follows Georg Simmel and Max Weber in having the social and historical sciences ultimately reduce to how cultural phenomena are meaningful for individual selves in the perspective of social psychology. But Schutz does not find sufficient clarity for his purposes until he takes a second step while resorting to the constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude derived from the transcendental phenomenological philosophy of Edmund Husserl.

Schutz's recourse to Husserl is most conspicuous in Part II of the *Aufbau.* There he clarifies not only how actions are projected, performed, and retrospectively assessed but also how actions are motivated by "in-order-to-motives" and "because-motives" within streams of mental life. The whole of the *Reflections on the Problem of Relevance* (reprinted in CP V) is also arguably an effort in this form of phenomenological psychology, with the consequence that more pages in the oeuvre are actually devoted to this psychology in general than specifically to social psychology. Nevertheless, Schutz does not offer an explicit account of just what this phenomenological psychology derived from Husserl is.

It is possible, however, to explicate Schutz's theory of phenomenological psychology on the basis of his overall position, which is to say that one can specify his general theory of science for this particular discipline and that then his interpretation of the psychology of William James becomes relevant.

It deserves mention that phenomenological psychology was in his time only a project. Besides allusions in his publications, Husserl had lectured on this project in 1925, 1926, and 1928, no doubt told Schutz about his lectures during their meetings, and Schutz appears the first after Husserl to focus on such a psychology. It should be remembered that psychology had then long been a subdiscipline of philosophy, like ethics still is, although it began to become an independent discipline late in the 19th Century.

Schutz's theory of science in general has three components: (a) basic concepts, (b) distinctive methods, and (c) disciplinary definitions.

A. Without any claim to completeness, *the basic concepts* for phenomenological psychology that can be gleaned from Schutz's oeuvre include "constitution," "cultural object," "ego" or "I," "eidos" and "eidetic," "empathy," "evidence," "experience [*Erlebnis*]," "ideal object," "intentionality," "intersubjectivity," "inner time," "life-world," "noesis," "noema," "pre-predicative experience," "reflection," "sedimentation," and "stream of consciousness." These are standard Husserlian categories employed by Schutz in the "natural attitude," which would be yet another basic concept for him.

B. As for *distinctive methods*, being theoretical is not specific to phenomenological psychology because all sciences for Schutz are theoretical. But the methodology of phenomenological psychology has at least seven specific components, most of them presented in his essay comparing Husserl and James: (1) the postulate that all people can find themselves thinking; (2) the approach of reflection, which involves a change of attitude from straightforward living to a focus on intentional experiences or noeses and, correlatively, on things-as-intended-to or noemata; (3) an *epochē*, purification, and reduction of some sort; (4) intentional analysis; (5) constitutive analysis; (6) genetic analysis; and (7) description, which can be factual but is ultimately eidetic (III 1–14). Thus, generally,

> The concrete description of the spheres of consciousness as it has to be undertaken by a true descriptive psychology within the natural attitude remains, however, the description of a closed sphere of the intentionalities. That is to say, it requires not only a concrete description of the experiences of consciousness, … but also necessarily the description of the conscious (intentional) "objects in their objective sense" found in active inner experiences. But such a true *psychology of intentionality* is, according to Husserl's words, nothing other than a *constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude.* (I 132)

These are again features of the Husserlian approach and authorize going deeper into Schutz's source, e.g., where generative analysis is concerned (Schutz may be the first after Husserl to mention this type of analysis), but one can wonder whether the recourse to *epochē*, reduction, and purification is actually a recourse to the distinctive approach of transcendental phenomenology or instead to the *epochē*, reduction, and purification needed for psychologically pure phenomenology. Unfortunately, this is something not addressed by Schutz.

C. The question of *disciplinary definition* requires more interpretation. Although logic is a science that can be used to test for consistency in all sciences,

psychology is focused on content and thus not a formal science. Non-phenomenological psychology, e.g., behaviorism, can be a naturalistic science and part of the objectivism or naturalism that Schutz and Husserl oppose. However, given how objects, actions, others, selves, etc., are constituted as meaningful in psychic processes and are thus cultural phenomena and how this meaningfulness is what is abstracted from in the naturalistic sciences (I 58), the alternative is that phenomenological psychology is a cultural science. Schutz nowhere classifies it this way, but it is difficult to see what else it might be.

The question then is how phenomenological psychology is different for Schutz from other cultural sciences. Given his overall approach, this is a question immediately of how it differs from social psychology. Social psychology relies on methodological individualism in order to focus on how others are constituted by and for individual selves and thereby provides a foundation for investigating collective life and groups in various other historical as well as social-scientific ways (see Chap. 5). Beyond social psychology, Schutz then recognizes an approach that abstracts the individual from society in order to gain further clarity with respect to how meaning and other things are constituted.

Thus Schutz says in one place that he proceeds "as if an isolated individual experienced the world of nature disconnected from his fellowmen" (V 135), but in another place he asserts that "the insulated stream of consciousness of the single individual … thought of as separated from his fellow-men" is a "fictitious abstraction … merely made for the sake of a clearer presentation of the problems involved" (I 218). Moreover, he told his friend Aron Gurwitsch that "I had of course only pedagogical reasons for taking a theoretical solipsistic ego as my point of departure and only subsequently introducing the structures which are involved in the social world. But that of course doesn't mean that I believe that a private experience that is not socialized from the beginning is possible" (V 250).

This abstraction is relied on not only in the *Reflections on the Problem of Relevance*, but also in Part II of the *Aufbau* and also in "On Multiple Realities" (1945), the first draft of which significantly mentions "phenomenological psychology" (IV 26). These make up the most extensive component of what can only be considered as the fundamental part of Schutz's substantive phenomenological psychological investigations and are also prior to and presupposed by the other social and historical and thus cultural sciences in addition to social psychology.

Schutz is well aware of the problem of what might be called "ontological solipsism" if this abstraction were misunderstood, but says that the issue is addressed in the sixth of Husserl's *Cartesianische Meditationen* (IV 107), which long remained unpublished. But Schutz could also have referred to this passage late in Husserl's V. "Meditation": "In respect of order, the intrinsically first of the philosophical disciplines would be 'solipsistically' reduced 'egology,' the egology of the primordially reduced ego. Then only would come intersubjective phenomenology, which is founded on that discipline…"[3]

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[3] Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations,* trans. Dorion Cairns (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1960), p. 155.

All things considered, what differentiates Schutz's phenomenological psychology from social psychology as well as from all the other cultural sciences is what can be called its "methodological solipsism."

The interesting question now arises of whether phenomenological psychology can adequately ground itself or whether it needs to be radicalized into transcendental phenomenology for that purpose, but this question does not need to be pursued in the present study.

Works of Schutz

Note: Unless done otherwise, the following works will be cited with the embedded abbreviations as listed down the left margin below, plus the page number(s).

I=Alfred Schutz, *Collected Papers,* Vol. I, *The Problem of Social Reality*, ed. Maurice Natanson (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962).

II=——, *Collected Papers,* Vol. II, *Studies in Social Theory*, ed. Arvid Broedresen (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964).

III=——, *Collected Papers,* Vol. III, *Studies in Phenomenological Philosophy*, ed. Ilse Schutz (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966).

IV=——, *Collected Papers,* Vol. IV, ed. Helmut Wagner, George Psathas, and Fred Kersten, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996).

V=——, *Collected Papers*, Vol. V, *Phenomenology and the Social Sciences*, ed. Lester Embree (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011).

VI=——, *Collected Papers*, Vol. VI, *Literary Reality and Relationships*, ed. Michael Barber (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013).

PSW=—, *The Phenomenology of the Social World,* trans. George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967).

PP=——, "Positivistic Philosophy and the Actual Approach of Interpretive Social Science: An Ineditum from Spring 1953," *Husserl Studies*, Vol. 14 (1998): 123–149. Reprinted in Dermot Moran and Lester Embree, eds., *Phenomenology: Critical Concepts in Philosophy*, 5 vols. London: Routledge, 2004, III, pp. 119–145. Also available at

http://www.springerlink.com/content/t52u22v305u28g04/

Part II
Theories of Science in the Manner of Schutz

Chapter 7
A Schutzian Theory of Archaeology

> *I can understand the acts and motives of … the caveman who left no other testimony of his existence than the flint hatchet exhibited in the showcase of some museum. (V 36)*

Introduction

During a conference at the Schutz archive at Konstanz, Evelyn Schutz Lang, the philosopher's daughter, asked what I was working on next. When I told her it was a Schutzian theory of archaeology, she asked how much her father had written about archaeology and I had to tell her "barely one sentence," i.e., the one offered as an epigraph above. But then I went on to say that I believed Schutz's fundamental concern was with theory of science or methodology in the wide signification and that I hoped to show how his science theory, which can be extended to the disciplines of nursing and psychotherapy (see Chaps. 9 and 10) that he never mentions, could be extended to a science that he thus minimally alluded to.

Schutz's science theory is especially remarkable in two respects. In the first place, his fundamental effort can also be called "philosophy of the social sciences," but that expression seems only to have come into use since his time, and it is also clear that for him that "it is a basic characteristic of the social sciences to ever and again pose the question of the meaning of their basic concepts and procedures. All attempts to solve this problem are not merely preparations for social-scientific thinking; they are an everlasting theme of this thinking itself" (IV 121, cf. I 203).

Since it can seem odd to say that cultural scientists engage in philosophy of science, which philosophical sub-discipline has its own disciplinary context and history as much as any of the cultural sciences have, it will be useful instead explicitly to

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Embedded citations refer to the works of Schutz listed at the end of this chapter.

distinguish "philosophical science theory" and "cultural-scientific science theory" when context does not specify the type of theory of science adequately.

Where the difference between these two types of *Wissenschaftslehre* is concerned, it is fairly clear that cultural scientists who engage in science theory tend to focus solely on their own particular disciplines, while philosophical science theorists also focus on genera and species of science, e.g., that of the whole set of social sciences in the wide signification, and can thus assert, e.g., that the subjective interpretation of meaning is not just relied on in social psychology, but in all of the cultural sciences. That Schutz wrote a great deal in the "theory of the social sciences," an expression he actually does use (III 131), does not justify that he is unfortunately often called a phenomenological sociologist.

In the second place, it is important to recognize that for Schutz "the methodologists <scl. science theorists> have neither the job nor the authority to prescribe to social scientists what they have to do. Humbly he has to learn from social scientists and to interpret for them what they are doing" (IV 146).

> In this role, the methodologist has to ask intelligent questions about the technique of his teacher <i.e., the cultural scientist>. And if these questions help others to think over what they really do, and perhaps to eliminate certain intrinsic difficulties hidden in the foundations of the scientific edifice where the scientists never set foot, methodology has performed its task. (II 88)

On this basis, one could do worse in the present interest than consult a well-regarded textbook in archaeology, such as *Discovering our Past: A Brief Introduction to Archaeology,* by Wendy Ashmore and Robert J. Sharer.[1]

Schutz does not systematically describe his science theory very well—his "Basic Concepts and Methods of the Social Sciences" (IV 121–130) seems the best concise single expression—but by considering his practice along with what he explicitly writes, we can see that this approach has three components that need to be clarified, namely: disciplinary definition, basic concepts, and distinctive methods. This sketch of a Schutzian theory of archaeology will address these components of that science in this order.

Disciplinary Definition

Schutz of course distinguishes the naturalistic sciences from the "cultural sciences" (IV 107) and these cultural sciences then divide into the social sciences in the narrow signification, which thematize contemporaries, who are alive at the same time as the self but not necessarily in the same place, and the historical sciences, which for Schutz thematize others who are dead (cf. II 56–62). He interestingly mentions at least as many historical sciences as he does social sciences (see Chap. 1). Although there can clearly be a cultural-scientific psychology for him (see Chap. 6), it is not located in his taxonomy of the cultural sciences, probably because the disci-

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[1] (New York: McGraw-Hill, Fourth Edition, 2006.) Hereafter: "A&S."

pline did not yet distinctly exist as such in that time and also in order not to obscure its central foundational role in his theory of science.

It is difficult to doubt that archaeology is a cultural science and specifically an historical science. As for its difference from other historical sciences, this must consist in its great emphasis on non-linguistic data, which include biological remains, but such data are not unnoticed in other types of history and so-called "historical archaeology" has a major if still secondary place for textual data.

Basic Concepts

Anyone unaware of Schutz's interest in so-called "basic concepts (*Grundbegriffe*)" should read the first paragraph of the Preface of *Der sinnehafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt* (1932). And he still referred to such concepts in his American period (e.g., I 124, IV 121).

In the glossary for their text, Ashmore and Sharer mention concepts such as "archaeological culture," "archaeological record," "behavioral process," "feature," "horizon," "industry," and "stratification," which seem among the basic concepts for that science. Arguably the most basic concept of archaeology is, however, that of artifact and Alfred Schutz does actually offer some clarification of what an artifact considered a tool is that might be considered relevant by archaeologists:

> [T]o understand ["all artifacts such as tools and utensils"], we need to understand not only the ideal type of its producer but the ideal type of its user, and both will be absolutely anonymous. Whoever uses the tool will bring about typical results. A tool is a thing-in-order-to; it serves a purpose, and for the sake of this purpose it was produced. Tools are, therefore, results of past human acts and means toward the future realization of aims. One can, then, conceive of the "meaning" of the tool in terms of the means-end relation. But from this objective meaning-context, that is, from the means-end relation in terms of which the tool is understood, one can deduce the ideal type of user or producer without thinking of them as real individual people. (PSW 201, cf. 181)

The identification and clarification of basic concepts specific to archaeology and shared with other cultural sciences is a task in the Schutzian theory of archaeology and can plainly be taken much further than this.

Methods

As in all sciences, there are many specific methods, approaches, or procedures followed in archaeology. These seem classifiable by where they must be employed except that the archaeologist is not actually confined to her desk when it comes to the interpretation of her findings.

Field Methods. These methods include how artifacts can be discovered and collected and prominently include looking for archaeological sites on foot and excavating them, but there are also large-scale surface surveys, ground penetrating radar,

infra-red satellite photography, underwater archaeology, etc. Skill with such procedures requires practice, but can be described and critically examined in the theory of archaeology done by philosophers as well as done by archeologists.

Laboratory Methods can as well involve sophisticated natural-scientific technology but also just a great deal of careful drawing and photography. The goal is to prepare data brought from the field for interpretation. There is much concern with absolute and relative dating. Ashmore and Sharer mention in this respect the dating methods of seriation, stratigraphy, geochronology, obsidian hydration, and archaeomagnetism, among other ways.

"*Desk Methods,*" as I call them, are of two kinds. One is the *reconstructing of the past* and it takes two forms. The first form is "culture historical interpretation," which Ashmore and Sharer characterize as follows:

> The analogs used for culture historical interpretation usually presuppose a normative view of culture, describing idealized rules for how things should be done—how pottery should be made, what house forms are prescribed, and so on. These models are primarily descriptive, not explanatory, in that they identify and describe the elements and trends of cultural change, but these models do not attempt to describe the relationships among elements or identify the causes of change. (A&S 213)

The second form of reconstructing the past is called by Ashmore and Sharer "processual interpretation." It "is based on ecological and materialist views of culture and uses both systems and multilinear evolutionary models to explain the past" (A&S 221). Two more quotations may convey more precisely what these are:

> Systems models recognize that an organization represents more than a simple sum of its parts; in fact, they emphasize the study of the relations between these parts. Two kinds of systems can be defined: open and closed. Closed systems receive no matter, energy, or information from other systems; all sources of change are internal. Open systems exchange matter, energy, and information with other systems; change can come from within or from outside. Living organizations and sociocultural systems are open. (A&S 221)
> Multilinear cultural evolutionary models … combine the materialistic view of culture and the adaptation concept of cultural ecology. In so doing, they view the evolution of culture as the cumulative change in a system resulting from the continuous process of cultural adaptation over extensive periods of time. (A&S 226)

The other kind of what I call "desk methods" is called "postprocessual interpretation" in contemporary archaeology and here some convergence with some substantive thought of Alfred Schutz might be seen:

> Postprocessual archaeology uses a dynamic culture concept…, in which culture consists of the set of meanings individuals construct and modify in living and making sense of their lives. This emphasizes the active role of individual decision-making in cultural stability and change. The specific decisions, symbols, and societies of the past existed within their own distinct cultural contexts and should not be expected or assumed to mirror our own ideas and meanings. (A&S 228)

The three types of interpretation distinguished by Ashmore and Sharer are contrasted and illustrated in one more quotation from their text:

> When Europeans arrived in eastern North America, many Native American groups were horticulturalists, and maize was the single most important food crop grown. As we know, maize was originally domesticated in highland Mexico; it reached eastern North America

by about A.D. 150–200 among societies that had by then practiced cultivation of local plants for well over 1500 years. Culture historians would see the introduction of maize as a clear case of *diffusion*, the result of recognition of the value of this productive crop among receptive new societies. *Processual archaeologists* would see this development as an evolutionary process, in which people gradually modified available food plants within the local ecological system. But a *feminist interpretation* by Patty Jo Watson and Mary C. Kennedy shows how considering the role of individual decision-makers offers an expanded insight into this change. They point out that because maize was not native to eastern North America, it required active care and tending, which reflected a deliberate decision to include and encourage this crop, rather than simply a passive or accidental acceptance of a new cultigen. This implies purposeful behavior on the part of ancient individuals, almost certainly women, highlighting the potential importance of women in promoting this cultural change. (A&S 229, emphasis added)

A connection can be developed in postprocessual archaeological interpretation with such texts as Alfred Schutz's phenomenology of "Choosing among Projects of Action," but the postprocessual example of individuals cultivating maize in prehistoric Eastern North America brings to mind most of what seems central to Schutz's science theory, which is to say the relation between what he characterized as objective meaning contexts about subjective meaning contexts. Thus, he begins the penultimate section of his *Aufbau* as follows.

Having completed our analysis of the most important basic concepts of interpretive sociology, we must now try to answer the questions we formulated in section 43 concerning the relationship between the meaning-endowing acts of everyday life and their interpretation in the social sciences. Our answer is this: *All social sciences are objective meaning-contexts of subjective meaning contexts.* (PSW 241)

Here Schutz uses the expressions "objective meaning (*objektiver Sinn*)" and "subjective meaning (*subjektiver Sinn*)." In his later writings he tended to use "objective interpretation" and "subjective interpretation" and also wrote the following.

It was Max Weber who made this distinction the cornerstone of his methodology. Subjective meaning, in this sense, is the meaning which an action has for the actor or which a relation or situation has for the person or persons involved therein; objective meaning is the meaning the same action, relation, or situation has for anybody else, be it a partner or observer in everyday life, the social scientist, or the philosopher. This terminology is unfortunate because the term "objective meaning" is obviously a misnomer, insofar as the so-called "objective" interpretations are, in turn, relative to the particular attitudes of the interpreters and, therefore, in a certain sense, "subjective." (II 275)

Granted that all interpretations are thus subjective, I would go further and suggest that the connotations of "objective" and "subjective" are unfortunate and propose that we speak instead of "outsider interpretations" and "insider interpretations," which expressions enjoy a parallelism with the expressions "out group" and "in group" that Schutz accepted from sociology. And then we can say that the cultural sciences produce contexts of theoretical outsider interpretations about contexts of common-sense insider interpretations.

Coming back to the postprocessual interpretation by Patty Jo Watson and Mary C. Kennedy, what we have first of all is a scientific outsider interpretation of pre-contact Eastern North American maize cultivation, but what more precisely is this interpretation about, what does it refer to? Pretty clearly it is about the insider

interpretations of the courses of action and their products made by rather anony-mous individual persons in prehistoric societies. That it is a matter of individual rather than collective action such as war, for example, relates to how maize must be planted and tended. Beyond that, it is something that would not be typically engaged in by a child.

With some hesitancy, Ashmore and Sharer further report that these adult indi-viduals were also women. That corn cultivation was feminine activity would be supported if ethnography showed such agriculture to be thus gendered in similar societies, if there were visual representations, perhaps paintings on pottery, in which women alone are shown cultivating maize, if there were surviving linguistic for-mulations, e.g., work songs, in historical times, and/or if there were relevant re-ports by Europeans from the time of contact, but such hypotheses about this type of prehistoric action and the highly anonymous actors for whom is it was originally meaningful in their insider interpretations go beyond the archaeology textbook that is drawn on here.

(Squanto, the Native American who allegedly taught the Pilgrims how to grow maize, was a sole survivor of a decimated group but could easily have known enough about this type of activity even if it was not masculine work for him.)

In sum, postprocessual interpretation is at least highly convergent with Schutz's approach and postprocessual archaeologists are now in effect invited to look further into his thought for insights relevant for their interpretations. In addition, a theory of archaeology of Schutzian inspiration, which is plainly feasible, would need to dig much deeper into the archaeological literature than the stratum of textbooks.

Works of Schutz

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Chapter 8
A Schutzian Theory of Cultural Anthropology

> *[A]n anthropologist who would describe the ceremony of a
> primitive tribe merely in terms of overt behavior without any
> reference to its subjective meaning could not decide whether
> this ceremony is a preparation for war or just a dance in order
> to honor a deity, for a barter trade or for the reception of a
> friendly ambassador. (PP 138)*

Introduction

Even the briefest extension of Alfred Schutz's *Wissenschaftslehre* must include
cultural anthropology or ethnology if only because he manifested some interest in
this discipline. Unlike such disciplines as archaeology and psychotherapy, there are
quite a few references in Schutz to this science. By 1950 he had studied Ruth Bene-
dict's *Patterns of Culture* (1934) and there are also references to Ralph Linton's
Two Ethnological Reports (1939) and Abram Kardiner's *The Individual and his
Society: The Psychodynamics of Primitive Social Organization* (1939), Schutz sug-
gesting that the latter's concept of basic personality, "so skillfully used for the un-
derstanding of primitive cultures, actually aims at the typification of the structural
features of the stock of knowledge at hand, although certainly in a rather inadequate
way" (V 151), and mentions the former figure for modern anthropology along with
"Parsons-Shils" in modern sociology with respect to "ascription and achievement as
basic determinants of status and role expectations within the social system" (II 242).

In "T. S. Eliot's Theory of Culture" (1955, first published in *Collected Papers* V)
Schutz also writes especially significantly that,

> it turns out that culture is just everything which is *taken for granted* by a given social group
> at a certain point of its historical existence. This includes not only the things classed by cer-
> tain anthropologists under the unfortunate terms *artifacts* (tools and implements), *sociofacts*
> (institutions), and *mentifacts* (ideas and ideals), and not only the permanently reproduced

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Embedded citations refer to works of Schutz listed at the end of this chapter.

and managed "second environment" which, according to [Bronislaw] Malinowski, is super-imposed upon the primary or natural environment by human activity and is the sum total of habitual and traditional life. (V 285)

So Schutz had some familiarity with the cultural anthropology of his day. He writes, furthermore, that the arguments of Eliot ought to be examined that

refer to the relationship of the individual within the social group and of social groups with other groups; they refer—although without using these technical terms—to folkways, social stratification, and social control—in brief, to the very foundations of the conceptual scheme common to sociology and anthropology. (V 275)

Likewise, the following passage from Schutz would easily refer as well to what ethnologists need to investigate.

Everywhere we find sex groups and age groups; and some division of labor conditioned by them; and more or less rigid kinship organizations that arrange the social world into zones of varying social distance, from intimate familiarity to strangeness. Everywhere we also find hierarchies of superordination and subordination, of leader and follower, of those in command and those in submission. Everywhere, too, we find an accepted way of life, that is, a conception of how to come to terms with things and men, with nature and the supernatural. There are everywhere, moreover, cultural objects, such as tools needed for the domination of the outer world, playthings for children, articles for adornment, musi-cal instruments of some kind, objects serving as symbols for worship. There are certain ceremonies marking the great events in the life cycle of the individual (birth, initiation, marriage, death), or in the rhythm of nature (sowing and harvesting, solstices, etc.). (II 229)

Schutz offers nothing like an explicit theory of ethnology or cultural anthropology, but the beginnings of one in his style can be sketched under the rubrics of (1) disci-plinary definition, (2) basic concepts, and (3) distinctive methods. Information on this science will be chiefly drawn here from a current introductory textbook, name-ly, *Anthropology*, by Barbara D. Miller and Bernard Wood.[1] Like most introduc-tions to anthropology, this text also introduces the biological, archaeological, and linguistic subdisciplines of anthropology, i.e., the other three of the traditional "four fields," but cultural anthropology in the strict signification is distinct and central.

Disciplinary Definition

From Schutz's statement that "a philosophical anthropology, in the Continental Eu-ropean sense, [is] the science of man—not a science of primitive culture which, in contradistinction to anthropology, is called in Europe ethnology" (II 205), it can be gathered not only that that "cultural anthropology" is not philosophical anthropol-ogy for him but also that the alternative title of "ethnology" tends at least to be Eu-ropean rather than American usage and, above all, that the subject matter of cultural anthropology is primitive culture.

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[1] Boston: Pearson Education, 2006. Hereafter: M&W.

Such a culture is not part of the civilization to which Schutz belonged and on which most other social sciences focus (but most of the societies thematized in the historical sciences are also arguably not parts of current civilization either). Even though current cultural anthropology increasingly includes investigation of parts of Western civilization, this focus on primitive culture was definitive of cultural anthropology, at least for Schutz in his time.

What sort of a cultural science is cultural anthropology? Is it a psychological science, a social science in the narrow signification, or an historical science? (That it is a cultural science of some sort needs no discussion.) Here it seems pertinent to quote that the "cultural pattern of group life" in general consists of for Schutz of "all the peculiar valuations, institutions, and systems of orientation and guidance (such as folkways, mores, laws, habits, customs, etiquette, fashions) which, in the common opinion of sociologists of our time, characterize—if not constitute—any social group at a given moment in its history" (II 92). As shown, this could as well have been said about cultural anthropology.

Considering just folkways further, there is then this passage:

> The sum-total of the relative natural aspect the social world has for those living in it con-stitutes, to use William Graham Sumner's term, the folkways of the in-group, which are socially accepted as the good ways and the right ways for coming to terms with things and fellow-men. They are taken for granted because they have stood the test so far, and, being socially approved, are held as requiring neither an explanation nor a justification.—These folkways constitute the social heritage which is handed down to children born into and growing up within the group. (II 230)

If cultural anthropology is chiefly about the cultural pattern of primitive group life, which is collective, then it is not a psychological science, which would focus on in-dividual lives. It would also seem not to be an historical science for, while primitive societies certainly have pasts, these are typically nonliterate and at best accessible through archaeology. By process of elimination, cultural anthropology is then a so-cial science in the narrow signification, the one that is focused on primitive culture. The "field-work" approach of cultural anthropology complements this definition and will be returned to presently.

Basic Concepts

That basic concepts (*geisteswissenschaftlicher Grundbegriffe*) are important for Schutz is clear from the first paragraph of the Preface of *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt* (1932):

> Among these [basic] concepts are those of the interpretation of one's own and others' expe-riences, meaning-establishment and meaning-interpretation, symbol and symptom, motive and project, meaning-adequacy and causal adequacy, and, above all, the nature of ideal-typical concept formation, upon which is based the very attitude of the social sciences toward their subject matter. (PSW xxxi)

These basic concepts were intended by the philosopher Schutz to hold for all social sciences in the wide signification, i.e., for all the cultural sciences. When one turns to cultural anthropology in particular for basic concepts specific to it, one quickly finds that the subject matter of this science appears richer than many other cultural sciences of the social sort, e.g., economics and political science, which thematize only parts of the socio-cultural world. Even sociology, which would seem also to have a fairly unrestricted scope, has many aspects of its theme that are unproblematic in the society not only about which but also from which its investigations proceed, e.g., whether the kinship organization in the USA includes clans seems not an issue for American sociologists.

In the textbook of Miller and Wood, Part III, "Contemporary Human Social Variation," is a good source for exemplary basic concepts and these are already systematized in its Table of Contents:

> For *economic systems*, there are foraging, horticulture, pastoralism, and agriculture and balanced and unbalanced exchange, the latter including market exchange, gambling, theft, and exploitation. For *reproduction* and *human development*, there are foraging, agricultural, and industrial modes and infancy, childhood, adolescence, and adulthood vary within and between cultures. *Illness and healing* also take various non-Western forms. Then there are various *kinship systems* and related *domestic arrangements*. Next are *social groups* and *social stratification*.

Finally, Miller and Wood analyze *political and legal systems*, which include bands, tribes, chiefdoms, confederacies, and states, and it is perhaps in this respect that the impacts of so-called civilization on so-called primitive societies most conspicuously occur currently.[2] Nevertheless, much more can be said from a beginning like this about the basic concepts of cultural anthropology.

Distinctive Methods

All that we have explicitly from Schutz with respect to the approach of cultural anthropology in particular is that experiments are hardly possible in it (I 49); hence it is arguably an observational science because it is traditional to divide empirical science into observational and experimental sorts. But more can be learned from the science itself.

While other social sciences in the narrow signification rely in part on participant observation (most also rely for data collection on questionnaires sent through the mail and over the internet and on telephone polling), this central reliance in cultural anthropology is part of the whole called "fieldwork" and typically involves the investigator living among her informants in their primitive society for a substantial

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[2] At the end of Part III of this anthropology textbook there is also this listing of these "Key Concepts": "authority, band, banditry, big-man or big-woman system, clan, confederacy, critical legal anthropology, critical military anthropology, faction, feuding, influence, in-kind taxation, law, legal pluralism, nation, norm, policing, political organization, power, segmentary model, social control, transnationalism, trial by order, tribe, and war."

length of time. (Living in the same "civilization" with one's informants is not the same, although, as intimated, things are changing in the discipline so that, e.g., a cultural anthropologist might move temporarily to an ethnic enclave within her own society in order to conduct her research on the group living there.)

Miller and Wood outline "Research Methods in Anthropology." The first step is to identify a research topic. Then a location needs to be selected and access to it gained. Equipment such as video recorders and appropriate clothing are needed and "[e]ven with substantial language training in advance, many cultural anthropologists have found that they need to learn a local dialect of the standard version. Many researchers rely on the assistance of local interpreters" (M&W, p. 115).

Because the society of the culture investigated is as a rule rather different from that of the researcher, considerable effort to establish rapport with informants is needed:

> When entering the field area, anthropologists should attempt to explain their interest in learning about the people's lives. This seemingly simple goal may be incomprehensible to the local people, especially those who have never heard of cultural anthropology and who cannot imagine why someone would want to study them. (Idem.)

Moreover, "[a]n anthropologist's class, 'race' or ethnicity, gender, and age may affect how she or he will be welcomed or interpreted by the local people" (Ibid., p.116). Once finally within the field area, the anthropologist asks questions as well as observes and records what she learns.

The approach of cultural anthropology can be related to what Schutz would advocate for other social sciences in the narrow signification. In contrast with ideological thinking, in science there is respect for logic, clarity, and the value-free theoretical attitude is sought. Ultimately, "objective meanings" about "subjective meanings" are constructed, i.e., chiefly what can also be called theoretical scientific outsider interpretations of everyday common-sense insider interpretations or meanings. (This is to take "meaning" to include pre-predicative *Sinne* as well as chiefly ideal-typical constructs. See Chaps. 14 and 15.)

The subjective/objective (or insider/outsider) contrast in the following passage would hold as much for the cultural anthropologist as for the sociologist.

> This cultural pattern, like any phenomenon of the social world, has a different aspect for the sociologist and for the man who acts and thinks within it. The sociologist (as sociologist, not as a man among fellow-men which he remains in his private life) is the disinterested scientific onlooker of the social world. He is disinterested in that he intentionally refrains from participating in the network of plans, means-and-ends relations, motives and chances, hopes and fears, which the actor within the social world uses for interpreting his experiences of it; as a scientist he tries to observe, describe, and classify the social world as clearly as possible in well-ordered terms in accordance with the scientific ideals of coherence, consistency, and analytical consequence. (II 92)

For a Schutzian cultural anthropologist her science would be, more explicitly, the search for scientific ideal types referring to common-sense ideal types. But what are ideal types and which sort or sorts of them are relevant to cultural anthropology for Schutz? (For more detail, see Chap. 15.)

The world, the physical as well as the sociocultural one, is experienced from the outset in terms of types: there are mountains, trees, birds, fishes, dogs, and among them Irish setters; there are cultural objects, such as houses, tables, chairs, books, tools, and among them hammers; and there are typical social roles and relationships, such as parents, siblings, kinsmen, strangers, soldiers, hunters, priests, etc. Thus, typifications on the common-sense level—in contradistinction to typifications made by the scientist, and especially the social scientist—emerge in the everyday experience of the world as taken for granted without any formulation of judgments or of neat propositions with logical subjects and predicates. They belong, to use a phenomenological term, to prepredicative thinking. The vocabulary and the syntax of the vernacular of everyday language represent the epitome of the typifications socially approved by the linguistic group. (II 233)

As for the sorts of ideal types employed by the social scientist to interpret the common-sense experience of people in everyday life, Schutz's great emphasis is on personal ideal types, but if cultural anthropology is about cultural patterns of group life, then scientific types of a different sort are called for (and ethnology can then be added to the following list):

And here we should add that not all the social sciences have as their goal the interpretation of the subjective meaning of products by means of personal ideal types. Some of them are concerned with what we have called course-of-action types. Examples of such social sciences [in the wide signification] are the history of law, the history of art, and political science. This latter group of disciplines simply takes for granted the lower stages of meaning-establishment and pays no attention to them. Their scientific goal is not to study the process of meaning-establishment but rather the cultural products which are the results of that meaning-establishment. These products are then regarded as meaningful in themselves … and are classified into course-of-action types. (PSW 242)

Theorizing in Cultural Anthropology

Cultural anthropology produces rich and detailed factual descriptions often seemingly to the exclusion of general theoretical thinking. This may be part of why it is often called "ethnography" rather than "ethnology." But while recourse to general thinking is chiefly implicit in Miller and Wood, it is focused upon in Philip Carl Salzman, *Understanding Culture: An Introduction to Anthropological Theory*.[3] He begins with a famous investigation.

Let us consider for a moment how Margaret Mead went about her research. Not what she saw … but rather the way in which Mead saw Samoa, its people, and their culture. Mead did not come to Samoa with an empty mind like a blank slate or a blank monitor screen, which she would fill with unselected description based upon undirected observation. Rather, Mead came to her Samoan research with a theoretical agenda. That is, her research was guided by theory, which we can define minimally as a general idea that can be applied to many specific instances or particular cases. (Salzman, p. 1)

Salzman considers Mead's theory, which can be summarized as nurture far outweighing nature in adolescence in Samoa, as a "heuristic theory," which is to say

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[3] Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 2001.

one that "serves to direct attention to certain factors, thus setting the research agenda and raising certain expectations about likely research findings," but the propositions in such a theory cannot be "proven or refuted" because they are "general and imprecise" (Ibid., p. 2).

In contrast, "substantive theories" for Salzman "are specific and precise enough to test through examination of evidence" (Ibid., p. 4).

> The social and cultural anthropologists taking a scientific approach envisioned a two-level discipline: there was ethnography, the study of particular, unique societies and cultures; and there was social and cultural anthropology, sometimes called comparative anthropology or ethnology, which aimed at generalizations based upon the comparison or juxtaposition of two or more ethnographic cases. (Ibid., p. 8)

Salzman also calls substantive theories "theoretical generalizations," e.g., "social status continuity and fixed life courses result in emotionally smooth life course transitions, while social status discontinuity and many life course options result in emotionally disruptive life course transitions" (Idem.).

Salzman devotes the bulk if his book to the approaches of some eight types of anthropological theorists, which might also be called proponents of schools of thought: "functionalists, processualists, materialists, symbolicists and structuralists, evolutionists, and feminists and postmodernists" (Ibid., p. 127).

For example, there is the development of processualism:

> Alongside continuing study of normative rules, social structures and institutions, and the functional relations amongst them, grew an interest in people's intentions, the options that they believed they had, the decisions they made, the consequent actions that they took, and the resultant actions of others. There was thus a shift away from thinking of people as acting strictly in terms of their statuses and roles, as if people always conformed to the normative rules. Rather, there was increased recognition that all people acted intentionally, that their intentions sometimes went beyond or outside the normative rules, and that people's actions could change the structures and institutions within which they lived. (Ibid., p. 33)

This is convergent with Schutz's descriptions of "in-order-to motives" and "life plans" and the views he accepted about social change. But can it be further related to his science theory?

Schutz writes that "a theory which aims at explaining social reality has to develop particular devices foreign to the natural sciences in order to agree with the common-sense experience of the social world. This is indeed what all theoretical sciences of human affairs—economics, sociology, the sciences of law, linguistics, cultural anthropology, etc.—have done" (I 58).

The "particular devices" here must be scientific ideal types for Schutz. What is involved with these can be shown with several quotations, the first one telling about ideal types themselves and the rest converging on how Schutz would probably have understood processualism and some other "anthropological theories," e.g., functionalism and materialism, that Saltzman presents.

> According to our view, ideal types are constructed by postulating certain motives [for example] as fixed and invariant within the range of variation of the actual self-interpretation in which the Ego interprets its own action as it acts. To be sure, this postulation of certain motives as invariant does refer back to previous "experience" (*Erfahrung*). But this

is not the "experience" of shallow empiricism. It is rather the immediate prepredicative encounter which we have with any direct object of intuition. The ideal type may, therefore, be derived from many kinds of "experiences" and by means of more than one kind of constituting process. Both "empirical" and eidetic ideal types may be constructed. By empirical we mean "derived from the senses," and by eidetic we mean "derived from essential insight." The manner of construction may be abstraction, generalization, or formalization, the principle of meaning-adequacy always, of course, being observed. Our own theory of ideal types, therefore, covers the concepts and propositions of the theoretical social sciences … (PSW 244)

[T]he most serious question which the methodology of the social sciences has to answer is: How is it possible to form objective concepts and an objectively verifiable theory of subjective meaning-structures? The basic insight that the concepts formed by the social scientist are constructs of the constructs formed in common-sense thinking by actors on the social scene offers an answer. The scientific constructs formed on the second level, in accordance with the procedural rules valid for all empirical sciences, are objective ideal-typical constructs and, as such, of a different kind from those developed on the first level of common-sense thinking which they have to supersede. They are theoretical systems embodying testable general hypotheses… This device has been used by social scientists concerned with theory long before this concept was formulated by Max Weber and developed by his school. (I 62)

The principle of relevance, the postulate of subjective interpretation, and that of adequacy, are applicable at each level of social study. For instance, all the historical sciences are governed by them. The next step would be to circumscribe within the social sciences the category of those we call the theoretical ones. The outstanding feature of these theoretical sciences is the interpretation of the social world in terms of a system of determinate logical structure. (II 86)

But where may a scientist find the guarantee for establishing a truly unified system? And where are the scientific tools for performing this difficult task? The answer is: Each branch of the social sciences which has reached the theoretical stage contains a fundamental hypothesis both defining its field of research and offering the regulative principles for constructing a system of ideal-types. Such a fundamental hypothesis, for instance, is the utilitarian principle in classical economics and the principle of marginality in modern economics. (IV 23; see Chap. 2 above)

Processualism, functionalism, materialism, etc. in cultural anthropology are schools of thought analogous to classical and marginal-utility economics in economics and the passage quoted about processualism above can be taken as articulating a fundamental hypothesis that makes a school of anthropological theory theoretical, i.e., "all people acted intentionally, that their intentions sometimes went beyond or outside the normative rules, and that people's actions could change the structures and institutions within which they lived." From this fundamental hypothesis the science theorist can attempt to explicate the system of testable hypothesis of that ethnological theory.[4]

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[4] Schutz also refers to the fundamental hypothesis of naturalistic science according to Husserl: "In the world perceptible by our senses, changes in the spatio-temporal positions of solids, changes in their form and fullness, are not accidental and indifferent, but they are dependent on each other in sensuously *typical* ways. The basic style of our visible immediate world is empirical. This universal, and indeed causal, style makes possible hypotheses, inductions, and predictions, but in pre-scientific life they all have the character of the approximate and typical. Only when the ideal objectivities become substituted for the empirical things of the corporeal world, only when one abstracts or co-idealizes the intuitable fullness, which is not capable of <direct> mathematization,

To close, it may be remarked that Schutz's emphasis was on the methods of collection of data from informants and how theoretical accounts relate to such data, but he would certainly have enjoyed conversations with theorists such as those whom Salzman characterizes.

In any case, a Schutzian theory of cultural anthropology would need to recognize the level of theorizing. And besides methods, such a theory of a particular science would need to consider the disciplinary definition and the basic concepts of the actual discipline. This chapter is only intended to show how a Schutzian theory of cultural anthropology might be started and its reliance on introductory textbooks indicates that much deeper reflection remains to be conducted.

Works of Schutz

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does the *fundamental hypothesis* of the entire realm of mathematical natural science result, namely, that a universal inductivity might prevail in the intuitable world, an inductivity which suggests itself in everyday experience but which remains concealed in its infinity" (I 129). Concerning the greater danger in how the idealizations, i.e., typologies, in the social sciences can similarly be substituted for real things, see I 138.

Chapter 9
A Schutzian Theory of Nursing

> *This is the aim of phenomenology in nursing research—to describe the experiences of others so that those who care for these individuals may be more empathic and understanding of another person's experience (Sandra P. Thomas and Mary Johnson, "A Phenomenologic Study of Chronic Pain," Western Journal of Nursing Research, 2000: 22, 699. Hereafter, this source will be cited textually as "Pain.").*

Introduction

Previously I have urged philosophical phenomenologists to reflect on phenomenology as practiced in disciplines beyond philosophy.[1] Since nothing is usually more persuasive for others than a recommender following his or her own recommendation, the present chapter results from a reflection on phenomenological nursing done in the style of Alfred Schutz (1899–1959). Let me tell how I proceeded.

By googling "nursing" in combination with "phenomenology," "hermeneutics," and "lived experience" with the names of major phenomenologists and by asking some colleagues for help, I easily developed a bibliography of so-called phenomenological nursing of some 1000 items. Most are in English but some are in Portuguese, Korean, and other languages. I have placed this bibliography in the department for bibliographies of phenomenology in disciplines beyond philosophy of the O.P.O. website (www.opo-phenomenology.org) and it has now been visited over 4000 times. I can easily imagine that there are many more items for nursing and hope they are sent to me to add to that list. I also hope that bibliographies of phenomenology in other disciplines beyond philosophy will accumulate there. There are at least three-dozen such disciplines and philosophical phenomenologists may make up no more than a plurality in our multidisciplinary tradition.

Embedded citations refer to the works of Schutz listed at the end of this chapter.

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[1] Lester Embree, "Disciplines beyond Philosophy: Recollecting a Phenomenological Frontier," *Phenomenology 2005*, vol. 5, pt. II, ed. Thomas Nenon and Lester Embree (Bucharest: Zeta Books, 2007), pp. 271–282.

Through my university library I was then able to access probably 700 of these items online, began to read articles randomly, and was soon quite overwhelmed by the variety, complexity, and the biomedical jargon of the literature thus accessed. I must now admit that I am not prepared at my age to make philosophizing about phenomenological nursing a major new specialty. Nevertheless, I hope that the present description of one way to proceed will help others.

What I am calling "phenomenological nursing" I define as nursing practice and thought explicitly influenced by phenomenological philosophy, which in no way precludes extensive creative adaptation and development of phenomenology *by nurses*. The history of the phenomenological movement in nursing remains to be written, but a brief sketch can be ventured. A. Davis, "The Phenomenological Approach in Nursing Research" (1973) seems the first clear contribution. By 1980, relevant publications were appearing annually and such figures as D. Allen, P. Benner, A. Bishop and J. Skudder, M. Z. Cohen, N. Diekelmann, N. Drew, S. Gadow, S. Kvale, P. Munhall, C. Oiler, A. Omery, R. R. Parse, F. Reeder, and J. Watson had become prominent.

My bibliography includes over 500 authors thus far (most publications have multiple authors), but no doubt there are many more currently writing in phenomenological nursing, especially in languages other than English. There was a vigorous debate in the 1990s between the more Heidegger-based and "interpretive" and the more Husserl-based and "descriptive" theorists of nursing. Currently there is some tendency for nursing affected by philosophical phenomenology to be absorbed into a larger coalition sometimes called "qualitative research," where I hope it can not only resist dilution but also increase the appreciation of its distinctive approach.

As I wandered about in this amazing new land, I came to wonder why the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the phenomenologist of the body, was so little drawn on. Then I found the recent work of S. P. Thomas, which significantly relies on that work, and decided it was a good example. In this chapter I sketch the theory of cultural science of Alfred Schutz and then relate some of Thomas's work to it.

The Schutzian Perspective in General

Many colleagues have unfortunately learned to classify Schutz as a "phenomenological sociologist" and often dismiss him from philosophy on this basis. While there are parts of Schutz's oeuvre, e.g., "The Stranger" (1944) and "The Homecomer" (1944), that are rightly taken as contributions to social psychology, which is part of sociology today, the vast majority of his writings are clearly in or on philosophy. When his colleague Leo Strauss praised him as a philosophically sophisticated sociologist for writing "Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social World" (1955) (CP II), Schutz replied that he would prefer to be considered a "sociologically sophisticated philosopher."[2] His doctorate was in philosophy of

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[2] Schutz Papers, 20 October 1955.

law but he did mostly teach sociology and had eminent students in that discipline, Thomas Luckmann above all. But he also taught philosophy and was no more a sociologist fundamentally than Merleau-Ponty was fundamentally a child psychologist because he taught in that field for several years. And that Schutz reflected on sociology no more makes him a sociologist than Carl Hempel's reflections on physics makes him a physicist, and, in any case, Schutz reflected more deeply on economics than on sociology (cf. Chap. 1 above).

Schutz's overall project is best called "theory of the cultural sciences." I say "cultural sciences" because his scope included the historical sciences as well as the specifically social sciences in the usual signification in the USA today (he often uses "social sciences" in a broad signification that includes the historical sciences) and because the "cultural sciences" can include primate ethology,[3] which "human sciences" cannot.

I say "theory" rather than "philosophy" of science because for Schutz the theory of science is regularly *also* done in disciplines beyond philosophy, for, as he says, "It is a basic characteristic of the social sciences to ever and again pose the question of the meaning of their basic concepts and procedures. All attempts to solve this problem are not merely preparations for social-scientific thinking; they are an everlasting theme of this thinking itself" (IV 121, cf IV 203).

More often Schutz uses the expression, "methodology," rather than "*Wissenschaftslehre,*" but "methodology" has now too often come in the meantime to denote the application of formal methods in research, i.e., logic and statistics, while "theory of science" and its transform "science theory," covers not only non-formal as well as formal procedures but also the *disciplinary* definitions and basic concepts of sciences for Schutz.

There is an implicit difference in Schutz between what can be called "*scientific* science theory" and "*philosophic* science theory" whereby the former focuses on just the definition, basic concepts, and procedures of a scientist's own particular discipline, while in the latter the focus is also on these aspects of whole species of science, e.g., the social sciences. Thus, in contrast with Schutz, Max Weber and Talcott Parsons focused solely on sociology. The expression, "theory of science" (*Wissenschaftslehre*), occurs in Schutz. I do not dispute his more usual expression, "methodology," provided it is comprehended to include far more than formal analysis.

As for the relation between science *theory* and substantive science, Schutz asserts that, "It is my conviction that the methodologists have neither the job nor the authority to prescribe to social scientists what they have to do. Humbly he has to learn from social scientists and to interpret for them what they are doing" (CP IV, 146)

Schutz further explains that,

in this role, the methodologist has to ask intelligent questions about the techniques of his teacher [the cultural scientist]. And if these questions help others to think over what they really do, and perhaps eliminate certain intrinsic difficulties hidden in the foundation of the

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[3] Lester Embree, "A Beginning for the Phenomenological Theory of Primate Ethology," *Journal of Environmental Philosophy,* Vol. 5, No. 1 (Spring 2008).

scientific edifice where the scientists never set foot, methodology has performed its task (CP II, 88).

As mentioned, there are three components to science theory for Schutz:

(1) Where *disciplinary definitions* are concerned, it may suffice here to say that for Schutz there is a difference between the naturalistic and the cultural sciences, the specifically social sciences focus on living contemporaries while the specifically historical sciences focus on predecessors, and that *such disciplines as* economics, sociology, and political science are particular social sciences. And the research component in phenomenological nursing can be considered a type of cultural-scientific social psychology.

(2) Where *basic concepts* (*Grundbegriffe*) for the cultural sciences are concerned, Schutz lists on the first page of his book, for example,

> the interpretation of one's own and others' experiences, meaning-establishment and meaning-interpretation, symbol and symptom, motive and project, meaning adequacy and causal adequacy, and, above all, the nature of ideal-typical concept formation, upon which is based the very attitude of the social sciences toward their subject matter. (PSW xxxi)

And (3) where *methods* are concerned there are "definite operational rules" (I 255) that need to be described, something that Schutz does using the expression "postulates," the most important of which are "subjective interpretation" and "adequacy." Concerning the latter postulate, he writes,

> Each term in a scientific model of human action must be constructed in such a way that a human act performed within the life-world by an individual actor in the way indicated by the typical construct would be understandable for the actor himself as well as for his fellowmen in terms of common-sense interpretation of everyday life: Compliance with this postulate warrants the consistency of the constructs of the social scientist with the constructs of common-sense experience of the social reality. (CP I, 44)

This is not to say that the actor in everyday life must agree with the cultural-scientist's model but only that its terms be intelligible to her. Furthermore, it would be an error to believe that adequacy here is truth, while some effort is required to discern just what truth and verification are for Schutz (see Chap. 16).

As for the postulate of subjective interpretation, Schutz writes that,

> In order to explain human actions the [cultural] scientist has to ask what model of an individual mind can be constructed and what typical contents must be attributed to it in order to explain the observed facts as the result of the activity of such a mind in an understandable relation. The compliance with this postulate warrants the possibility of referring all kinds of human action or their result to the subjective meaning of such action or result of an action had for the actor. (CP I, 43)

"Subjective meaning" contrasts with "objective meaning," but Schutz importantly comments that,

> It was Max Weber who made this distinction the cornerstone of his methodology. Subjective meaning, in this sense, is the meaning which an action has for the actor or which a relation or situation has for the person or persons involved therein; objective meaning is the meaning the same action, relation, or situation has for anybody else, be it a partner or observer in everyday life, the social scientist, or the philosopher. The terminology is unfortunate because the term "objective meaning" is obviously a misnomer, insofar as the

so-called "objective" interpretations are, in turn, relative to the particular attitudes of the interpreters and, therefore, in a certain sense, "subjective." (CP II, 275)

It is through reflection on the subjective interpretation of the subjective meanings of things that a cultural science and even a theory of cultural science can be considered phenomenological.

Schutz's perspective can be summarized as a structure of four levels:

The bottom level is that of common-sense thinking and on that level there are the meanings that an action, relation, or situation has for an actor, *for* the partner, and *for an* observer in everyday life.

On the second level is the model constructed on the basis of the common-sense constructs by cultural scientist in what can be called "substantive research."

On the third level is the scientific science theory that includes the disciplinary definition, basic concepts, and methodological procedures of the particular science and these refer to the meanings or constructs of the lower two levels.

And on the fourth level there is philosophic science theory, which is theory of science in which more than one discipline as well as the investigations of pertinent cultural scientists are considered. Philosophic science theory is widest in scope but furthest from the concrete phenomena that are bases for the whole structure.

This four-level perspective is related by Schutz himself to economics, jurisprudence, political science, psychology, and sociology (See Chaps. 2–6 above). On Schutzian grounds it then seems already a philosophical task to explore how phenomenological nursing might be viewed in Schutzian perspective. This is because more than one discipline is in effect considered. But for what it is worth, Schutz seems nowhere to mention nursing.

Two Examples of Phenomenological Nursing

I now study some of the work of the nurse Sandra P. Thomas. As mentioned, my attention was drawn to her work because it relies heavily on Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the phenomenological philosopher of the body, which has curiously been underappreciated in the field previously. Besides the fairly recent book, *Listening to Patients: A Phenomenological Approach to Nursing Research and Practice,*[4] the following brief analysis is based on three articles. One urges the appreciation of Merleau-Ponty and includes how Thomas herself converted from the quantitative approach to nursing research to an existential phenomenological one.[5] Another

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[4] Sandra P. Thomas and Howard R. Pollio (New York: Springer Publishing Co., 2002). Hereafter this source will be referred to as "Pain."

[5] Sandra P. Thomas, "Through the Lens of Merleau-Ponty: Advancing the Phenomenological Approach to Nursing Research," *Nursing Philosophy,* 6 (2005).

article nicely outlines the method she advocates, while the third (Thomas and Johnson, 2000) conveys research results on chronic pain.[6]

But before I attempt to relate Thomas's work to Schutz's theory of science, something needs to be said about how these might initially be aligned. Nursing fundamentally relates to people with actual or possible health problems. It often seems better to speak of "clients" than "patients" because, for example, a couple seeking advice about their first pregnancy is not as such sick. Science is, however, involved in what modern nurses do and indeed nursing is often called an "applied science."

This expression, "applied science," bothers me because it seems to imply that first there is pure scientific knowledge and then *subsequently* it is utilized, whereas not only has nursing been done for thousands of years before the emergence of anything like what we would now call science, but where nurses do not find relevant research in other disciplines, they conduct their own. Hence, I prefer to call modern nursing a "science-based practical discipline." Much of the underlying science is biomedical, but in phenomenological nursing at least some of it is social psychology of a phenomenological sort (See Chap. 5). In any case, social psychology is the part of the scientific foundation in "nursing research" that can be considered in Schutzian perspective.[7]

I focus on Thomas's analysis of chronic pain to begin with and then come to include women's anger. "Chronic pain is an unpleasant sensory and emotional experience arising from actual or potential tissue damage or described in terms of such damage … without a predictable end and a duration greater than 6 months" (Pain, 686). It chiefly includes lower back pain and affects about 25 % of the population of the USA. Although nurses who have themselves suffered intense pain are more sympathetic, the literature on interaction between chronic pain sufferers and health care providers "documents paternalistic staff stoicism; labeling of patients as difficult, demanding, manipulative, and as addicts; and adversarial relationships between patients and care providers" (Pain, 684).

Chronic pain is difficult to treat, clients become weary, discouraged, and angry, they are seldom invited to describe their lived experience of it, but of course they are prepared to say a great deal to those who will listen, e.g.,

> "You can't think about anything else, really." "Pain is king. Pain rules." "The pain just rides on your nerves." "Pain dominates what you can do." "Pain is a monster. All I can say is that it's tormenting." Pain is a formidable opponent with whom they fought daily. "You're drowning and you got that will to fight to get ashore … to live with chronic pain is a challenge every day." "I tried to outlast it. I tried to just tough it out. But it was boss."

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[6] Sandra Thomas, Carol Smucker, and Patricia Droppleman, "It Hurts around the Heart: A Phenomenological Exploration of Women's Anger," *Journnal of Advanced Nursing,* 1998, 28 (2). Hereafter, this source will be cited textually as "Anger."

[7] Schutz recognizes applied theory but focuses on theoretical science: "Of course the desire to improve the world is one of man's strongest motives for dealing with science, and the application of scientific theory of course leads to the invention of technical devices for the mastery of the world. But neither these motives nor the results for 'worldly' purposes is an element of the process of theorizing itself. Scientific theorizing is one thing, dealing with science within the world of working is another." (CP I. 245)

> The dyadic nature of the relationship was succinctly captured as follows: "Now it's me and this pain. It's a thing. And you've got to fight it continuously." Feelings ran the gamut from irritability, anger, helplessness, and frustration to profound depression, despair, and exhaustion. (Pain, 689)

It seems that the interactions of caregivers and sufferers of chronic pain belong on the bottom level I have described in the Schutzian perspective. For this to work, one first needs to consider the nurses as engaged in practical nursing. Besides these actors and partners, there are observers of the interactions of care givers and clients in practical life, e.g., supervisors of trainee nurses. What is happening on this level is meaningful in more or less subtly different ways for such participants and their subjective interpretations can be sought, the clients *doing so* in common-sense terms and the nurses in relatively professional jargon. The focus in Thomas's work is on what patients say, they are interviewed apart from their caregivers, but it is easily imagined that she also investigate phenomenologically the caregivers of chronic pain sufferers.

What pertains to the second Schutzian level is the nursing research that some like Thomas undertake? Individuals are selected and interviews of 1–2 h are conducted, recorded, transcribed, and interpreted by the leading researcher(s) and then also by an interdisciplinary phenomenology research group; "[t]he insights of group members from other disciplines were particularly valuable in assisting nurse members of the group to continuously bracket (set aside) their prior knowledge of chronic pain phenomena" (Pain, 688).

Schutz does not mention but also does not preclude such preliminary interdisciplinary critique, presumably because postmodern challenges to the possibility of objectivity had not yet arisen in his time.[8]

Thomas's "phenomenological exploration of women's anger" contains an outline for phenomenological research projects derived from Pollio, Henley, and Thompson,[9] that has five methodical steps, each with a different focus (Anger, 314):

(1) In focusing on the researcher herself, the first step includes choosing a topic and undergoing a bracketing interview. "Prior to interviewing and data analysis, each researcher took part in a bracketing interview to set aside personal anger experiences, biases and presuppositions about the phenomenon of women's anger" (Anger, 313).

Johnson adds a commentary on Thomas's pain investigation in which she expresses doubts based on Heidegger that utter presuppositionlessness can be achieved through bracketing as some nurses have understood it in Husserl. Then she draws on *The Phenomenology of Everyday Life* for a "positive application of bracketing" and recommends,

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[8] Whether it is recognized that videotaping could be resorted to in order to access non-verbal behavior in this approach is not clear.

[9] Howard R. Pollio, Tracy Henley, and Craig B. Thompson, *The Phenomenology of Everyday Life* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Hereafter, this source will be cited textually as "Everyday Life."

three strategies for guarding against interpreting texts solely from the perspective of the researcher: (a) the researcher should first describe his or her reasons for conducting the research; (b) the researcher should use the participants' words as much as possible in the interpretations; and (c) the research should interpret some of the texts in a group setting. (Pain, 701)

In response, Thomas defends Husserl against assertions of utter presuppositionlessness, charmingly sketches what happens in meetings of her research group, claims that "bracketing is a dynamic, iterative processes in which the researcher repeatedly cycles through reflection, bracketing, and intuiting," and then describes the bracketing interview:

In the bracketing interview, the researcher has been queried about his or her own lived experience and knowledge of the phenomenon. The resultant transcript has been thoughtfully considered by the researcher and the research group before collection of the interview data. Because the bracketing interview has been analyzed within the group at an earlier meeting, group members are acutely alert to a researcher's tendencies to impose personal meanings onto the data. (Pain, 703)

Recourse to an interdisciplinary research group is not mentioned by Schutz, who believes the theoretician solitary when theorizing but not when presenting results or acquiring data, but it is difficult to see how he would consider it other than helpful.

(2) In the second methodical step the focus shifts from the researcher to the clients or participants whom she interviews. "Participants were asked to describe what it is like for them to live with chronic pain. Following this initial question, the interviewer sought to elicit richer description and clarification of the narrative" (Pain, 688). Similarly, "Study participants were asked to describe times when they became angry in daily life. Interviews were unstructured and used open-ended questions so that predetermined categories of interpretation would not be imposed" (Anger, 313).

Twenty-eight pages in *The Phenomenology of Everyday Life* are devoted to "Dialog as Method: The Phenomenological Interview"; presumably the clients are called participants there because the interview is dialogical. This seems the best summary statement:

The questions, statements, and summaries used by the interviewer are designed to evoke descriptions, not to confirm theoretical hypotheses. The most useful questions focus on specific experiences described in a full and detailed manner. The interviewer facilitates the dialogue by employing questions such as "What was that like?" or "How did you feel when that happened?" as well as by incorporating the participant's own vernacular when asking follow-up questions. It is typically recommended that "why" questions be avoided when conducting phenomenological interviews. Such questions often shift the dialogue away from describing an experience to a more abstract, theoretical discussion. (Everyday Life, p. 30)

In the Schutzian perspective, however, the interaction between the client and the nurse researcher is different from that between the client and the caregiver if only because the nurse researcher has theoretical purposes, but it is still a social interaction. While there naturally are differences between the client's vernacular and the caregiver's jargon, this seems best suppressed during interviewing. Nevertheless, there is a difference between the subjective interpretation of the experience from

inside, as it were, by the client and the "objective" interpretation being developed from outside by the nurse researcher.[10]

(3) In the third methodical step the focus is on the transcripts of the interviews. These were read separately by the researcher(s) and then also within the research group, a sense of the whole as well as meaning units are sought, and the "thematic structure" presented to the group for a final critique.

> The thematic structure of women's anger experience comprises four main elements …: violation, confusion, powerlessness and power. Violations such as unfairness, disrespect, and/or lack of reciprocity in relationships, precipitated a building over time of a confusing mixture of hurt and angry feelings. When these feelings were confined within the body, participants reported feeling helpless and powerless. Paradoxically, when angry feelings were expressed, as in an outburst, participants still reported feeling powerless—and very alone. Anger also was described as having the potential for restoring personal power and relationship reciprocity. (Anger, 314)

It is under the influence of Merleau-Ponty that the relations of phenomena researched are then related to the body, self and others, and time:
(a) BODY.

> Much of women's anger was described as confined within the body, where it was "an undercurrent, day after day." Terms such as "simmering," "stewing," and "festering" were used to describe the internal agitation. One woman described being "all tensed up inside. It's like everything on the inside is messed up." The body hurts: "I can tell if I hold anger for awhile … my anger takes the form of stress in my neck… Its hidden but my body knows." (Anger, 315)

(b) SELF AND OTHERS

> Underlying women's anger were views of self as expanding and contracting. As they told their anger stories, participants described themselves as small/diminished/virtually extinguished vs. expanded/authentic/strong. Additionally, they described an episodic sense of no self or unrecognizable self which they sought to disown. …
> Another aspect of the life-world is other people. Women's anger is generated within close relationships. The offenders are intimates, not strangers. Women told stories of self and other, encounters of wife and husband, mother and child, friend and friend. They reported being angry when significant others had let them down in significant ways or expected too much from them. Expressing anger added to the distress rather than giving relief because it "breaks the circle" of relationships, in the words of one participant. Describing how she felt after angry conflict with her husband, she said, "I feel real uneasy… I don't feel like I'm really whole… as if my happy little circle with him had been broken." (Anger, 316)

As for pain,

> Participants generally kept the secret of having a chronically painful condition because they anticipated adverse outcomes if it were revealed. They perceived other people to have pejorative views of pain patients. They expected skepticism and disinterest rather than sympathy and support.
> …….

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[10] I would also observe that in some cultures and ethnic groups there are not just the individual participants but also the immediate families that would sometimes need to be interviewed, perhaps collectively.

Isolation was thematic in all interviews. Dialogue took place between the study participants and their nonhuman tormentor, the pain, more so than with other human beings. Participants described their pain as imprisoning them. For example, the used terms such as *locked off, roped off,* and *caged off*. Pain had somehow reset their interpersonal parameters, creating separation and distance from the world and other people, even family members. They felt that they no longer had much in common with others and no longer "fit in." (Pain, 692)

(c) TIME

Finally, the article about chronic pain also contains this about temporality:

The chronicity of these patients' conditions obviously implies a disease process developing and continuing across a span of time. However, the unit of time that was most consequential to study participants was the moment, a diminutive unit but paradoxically also a lengthy, heavy one that does not correspond to customary notions of clock time. The moment contains not only the pain now but also the perceived possibility of an eternity of suffering, taking "pill after pill after pill." The pain was ever present: "I haven't had 2 days pain free in 6 years." "Constant, can't never get comfortable. Can't never rest. Can't do anything." "Wake up with it, go to bed with it, every time I move, something hurts." There is no assurance that the agony of this moment will end, the future is unfathomable. Time seems to stop. Life is on hold, its rhythms disrupted. One participant used the world *limbo*. Another wondered if he would "ever have a life again." (Pain 693)

As these excerpts show, there is, on the one hand, the subject meaning of the phenomena in question for the participant expressed to a great extent in the terms that participants use and, on the other hand, there are terms and an arrangement that comes from the researcher(s) and amount to what Weber and Schutz call "objective meaning," although it is, as mentioned, also a type of subjective meaning. And plainly this objective meaning is about the phenomena as subjectively meaningful for the participant(s).

(4) In the fourth step, the participant is the focus when findings are reported to him or her. This is where Schutz's postulate of adequacy would apply and, again, it is not a matter of the participant agreeing with the thematic structure developed by the nurse researcher but of whether the terms in which this structure was constructed are intelligible or not.

(5) The fifth step consists in the preparation of the final report for publication and the focus then is on the research community, which would at least be fellow phenomenological nurses if not nurses in general.

Reflecting on the approach thus outlined one can also extract some of the basic concepts of this phenomenological nursing: bracketing interview, caregiver, dialogical interviewing, participants, and thematic structure, and also the distinctive method with its five steps. Thus there is Schutzian style science theory possible on this level as well.

There is much more to Thomas's investigations than there is space to convey, but it is hoped that enough has been said to show what phenomenological nursing is and how it can be related to the science-theoretical perspective that Alfred Schutz related to the social sciences, social psychology and marginal utility economics included.

Works of Schutz

Note: Unless done otherwise, the following works will be cited with the embedded abbreviations as listed down the left margin below, plus the page number(s).

I=Alfred Schutz, *Collected Papers,* Vol. I, *The Problem of Social Reality*, ed. Maurice Natanson (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962).

II=-----------, *Collected Papers,* Vol. II, *Studies in Social Theory*, ed. Arvid Broedresen (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964).

III=-----------, *Collected Papers,* Vol. III, *Studies in Phenomenological Philosophy*, ed. Ilse Schutz (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966).

IV=-----------, *Collected Papers,* Vol. IV, ed. Helmut Wagner, George Psathas, and Fred Kersten, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996).

V=-----------, *Collected Papers*, Vol. V, *Phenomenology and the Social Sciences*, ed. Lester Embree (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011).

VI=-----------, *Collected Papers*, Vol. VI, *Literary Reality and Relationships*, ed. Michael Barber (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013).

PSW=-----------, *The Phenomenology of the Social World,* trans. George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967).

PP=-----------, "Positivistic Philosophy and the Actual Approach of Interpretive Social Science: An Ineditum from Spring 1953," *Husserl Studies*, Vol. 14 (1998): 123–149. Reprinted in Dermot Moran and Lester Embree, eds., *Phenomenology: Critical Concepts in Philosophy*, 5 vols. London: Routledge, 2004, III, pp. 119–145. Also available at http://www.springerlink.com/content/t52u22v305u28g04/

Chapter 10
A Schutzian Theory of Psychotherapy

> *Loosely speaking, psychotherapy is an interpersonal interaction between a therapist and a client aimed at alleviating the client's suffering. But it is not simply a conversation: Therapy has form and substance, created by the therapist's theoretical orientation. (BP 107)*

Introduction

Before addressing the theme of psychotherapy, some background is appropriate. To begin with, what should the core of the work of Alfred Schutz (1899–1959) be called? Writing in English to Talcott Parsons in 1941, Schutz himself uses "*Wissenschaftslehre,*" "methodology," "epistemology and methodology" and also "general theory of social science" as well as "general theory of sociology" (V 63–65). Despite urging "methodology" long ago (see Chap. 12), I now consider "theory of science" or "science theory" preferable to Schutz's usual expression, "methodology," because the latter has come since his time chiefly to denote logical and statistical methods in philosophy and social science, at least in the USA, and Schutz's position extends well beyond that.

Schutz's science theory is focused on the "cultural sciences," such sciences including the specifically historical as well as the specifically social sciences, both of these sorts being sometimes covered by "social sciences" in a wide signification, and as many specifically historical as specifically social sciences being mentioned by him. The title, "Philosophy of the Social Sciences," seems not yet coined in his time, but would thus need to include the historical sciences.

It is a great virtue of Schutz's theory of the cultural sciences that he recognizes science theory as focused by sociologists such as Max Weber and Talcott Parsons on their own particular disciplines as well as by philosophers such as himself as focused on what is common to species and genera of science; hence, we can recognize

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Embedded citations refer to the works of Schutz listed at the end of this chapter.

what can be called "*scientific* science theory" and "*philosophic* science theory," these forms of theory of science being able to learn from each other.

In sum, I hold that for all his contributions to the theory of sociology, Schutz is not, as some say, a "phenomenological sociologist," but a philosopher of cultural science. And, by the way, his theory of economics is more developed by him—especially where recognition of schools of thought is concerned—than even his theory if sociology, which is in the American terms of his time actually a theory of social psychology, something I will return to (see also Chap. 5).

As he actually pursues it, Schutz's science theory has on both the scientific and the philosophic levels three components, namely "basic concepts," "disciplinary definition," and "distinctive methods." In chapters above the attempts have been made to extend his science theory to include a theory of archaeology, a theory of ethnography, and a theory of nursing. The present chapter is an attempt to extend it to psychotherapy, which he does not allude to anywhere. Hence, this essay is a "start" and the hope is that better-informed philosophers, psychotherapists, and psychologists will correct and extend it.

Beyond that, the hope is that attempts will be made to extend Schutzian theory of the cultural sciences to include theories of education, social work, and other *practical* cultural disciplines. After sketching what psychotherapy seems to be, I will offer some observations regarding what Schutz seems to offer it substantively, i.e., apart from the framework of science theory.

Aspects of a Theory of Psychotherapy

Let me report how have I proceeded regarding psychotherapy, a discipline regarding which I had previously only known about common-sensically. To begin with, I consulted a knowledgeable colleague concerning pertinent texts and accepted Bruce E. Wampold, *The Basics of Psychotherapy: An Introduction to Theory and Practice*.[1] This recent book was written to introduce the Theory of Psychotherapy Series of the American Psychological Association, includes some history of the discipline's practice and theory, recognizes schools of thought, and even includes results of research on the effectiveness of psychotherapy. As for its audience, "[t]his book is intended to introduce the emerging professional to psychotherapy" (BP 12).

I then read this source with special attention to "basic concepts," "disciplinary definition," and "distinctive methods." Studying even such an introductory source can often seem like foreign travel! In particular, the discipline investigated proved extremely practical and brought home to me how very theoretical is my own discipline, philosophy, and also is Schutz's thought.

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[1] Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association, 2010; hereafter: "BP."

Disciplinary Definition

In his Introduction, Wampold conveniently devotes a section to "Psychotherapy Defined" (BP 8–12), to which some remarks occurring elsewhere or occurring to me can be inserted between parentheses. This discipline belongs to the class of "healing practices" that rely on talk in face-to-face situations. (Presumably "talk" includes non-verbal communication such as posture and gesture as well as intonation, pacing, etc.) (When the discipline began to become scientific with the work of Sigmund Freud, the "talking cure" was spoken of, but "therapy" is now more modestly spoken of). Wampold proceeds by commenting on this definition which he himself had formulated a decade before.

> Psychotherapy is a primarily interpersonal treatment, based on psychological principles, and involves a trained therapist and a client who has a mental disorder, problem, or complaint, is intended by the therapist to be remedial for the client disorder, problem, or complaint, and is adapted or individualized for the particular client and his or her disorder, problem, or complaint.

Talk is normally face-to-face and it is unclear if "technology-assisted interventions," including those involving telephone, video, and, presumably, email are psychotherapy. ("Psychology" seems often a synonym for "psychotherapy," possibly to emphasize the role of theory in the practice.)

Healing practices are embedded in belief systems and the belief system for psychotherapy is psychological theory. Healing practices moreover have knowledge and status and thus authority that differentiate the practitioners from laypeople. This authority of the trained therapist is evidenced in degrees and credentials. Moreover, this practice "is differentiated from any practice conducted informally (e.g., between friends), as an unofficial part of duties (e.g., hairdressers, bartenders), or not generally sanctioned as professional services (e.g., services provided by a religious figure not otherwise trained and recognized as a therapist)."

"Client disorder, problem, or complaint" is preferred to "mental disorder," which can be stigmatizing. Moreover, psychotherapy is only remedial and thus not preventative (some types of nursing are preventative). And if the client is involved involuntarily, perhaps as ordered by the court, it is doubtful that psychotherapy can occur, but a therapist can sometimes help the client become willing. A collaborative relationship is crucial. The treatment needs to be intended by the therapist as therapeutic. Clients in all healing practices expect the healer to believe in the effectiveness of the treatment.

Finally, psychology is "individualized to the client and his or her concerns." Interventions without such individualization such as "fixed relaxation protocols, meditation, and movement programs (e.g., dance therapy)" are then not psychotherapy. "Individualization" appears wide enough, however, to include "group therapy, couples therapy, and family therapy."

In addition, psychotherapy occurs in a variety of professions, "including counseling, social work, medicine, and psychology," can have specialties such as, in psychology, school counseling and clinical psychology, and can occur in various

settings, "including private practice, community agencies, hospitals and clinics, and counseling centers." And there are various ways in which psychotherapy is paid for.

(This section thus offers an impressive definitional exercise, but how treatment is "based on psychological principles" in the discussed statement is plainly important but curiously not elaborated upon by Wampold in it. Perhaps this is because the role of theory in practice is reserved for his Chaps. 2 and 3.)

(I might observe at this point, however, that one might be tempted to call psychotherapy "applied science," which Wampold and his sources do not do, and wonder if there were practices like psychotherapy long before the practice came to include theory. He does recognize that there was talk therapy in the USA, e.g., in Christian Science, well before Freud (BP 17), but without psychological theory the therapy is not to be psychotherapy for him.)

Interesting pages in *The Basics of Psychotherapy* are devoted to the social context in which psychotherapy arose with a medical model and was soon opposed with other models. One quickly learns that there are many theories relied on in this discipline which are clumped as "forces," psychoanalysis from before World War I being the First Force, behaviorism in the 1920s as the Second Force, which has given rise currently to "cognitive-behavioral theory (CBT)" (BP 22), and after World War II the Third Force of humanistic and experiential approaches.[2] And recently there has also arisen "Multicultural/feminist/narrative" theories (BP 46).

Given the variety of theories that belong to these four "forces," it is not surprising to read that "most current psychotherapies, while having names that imply purity, are amalgamations of various theoretical perspectives and techniques" (BP 34). Wampold attempts to describe the general elements of a psychotherapy theory in two pages (BP 44–45).

In general, "Psychotherapy theories are explanations of human functioning and the process of change" (BP 43). The first question that all theories address is "What is the core motivation of human existence?"[3] Then they all ask, "What are the characteristics of a healthy personality?" and "How does psychopathology develop?" Furthermore, all theories are interested in the role of social relations in disfunction as well as in the healthy personality. Finally, theories tend to emphasize some systems, such as those of emotion, cognition, or action, or organismic and social systems, to the relative exclusion of others (which is going beyond generic into specific aspects).

There is an overlapping classification of aspects presented in a table (BP 46) relating to the four forces and summarized as follows.

(a) the philosophy of science from which the theories emanate, (b) the perspective taken on human motivation, (c) the perspective taken on human development, (d) the definition of psychological health, (e) the therapeutic stance and roles of

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[2] "Theoretical approaches in this class of treatments are loosely based on the humanistic philosophers (e.g., Kierkegaard, Husserl, and Heidegger) and have in common (a) a phenomenological perspective (i.e., therapy must involve understanding of the client's world), (b) an assumption that humans seek growth and actualization, (c) a belief that humans are self-determining, and (d) a respect for every individual, regardless of his or her role or actions." (Given the marginalization of philosophical phenomenology in the USA, to see its role in psychotherapy is delightful!)

[3] Schutz scholars may think of his doctrine of the "fundamental anxiety" in this connection.

the therapist and the client, and (f) The manner in which the goals and outcomes of therapy are framed (BP 45). (Perhaps this classification is sufficient for an Introduction to a series of books on psychotherapy.)

Wampold goes on to discuss the role of theory for therapists, mentioning "case conceptualization " and "treatment plan," the latter especially related, on the one hand, to how the client can be helped and, on the other hand, to what the therapist believes in: "Thus, the question, 'Which treatment will be most effective?' is incomplete. The better question is, "Which treatment delivered by me will be most effective" (BP 49)? And, "It is quite rare that the therapists choose only one theory because … no one theory successfully explains entirely human nature and behavior, mental health, or mental disorder" (BP 50).

Theory also has a role for the client. Wampold interestingly characterizes theory in psychotherapy as a story:

> Of course, each theory tells the story differently—irrational thoughts, unconscious motivations, unexpressed emotions, poor attachment histories—but each tells a hopeful story to the client: "If you believe in this new explanation and follow the steps of this treatment, your problems will be manageable and life will be better." (BP 51)

Perhaps astonishing for theoretical scientists and philosophers is the status of the truth of theory. "As was the case for the therapist, the scientific validity of a theory is subsidiary to its utility for the client. If the explanation is cogent, is acceptable, creates positive expectations, and leads to healthy action, then it will likely be beneficial to the client" (BP 52). (Jerome Frank, an author much appreciated by Wampold, speaks in this connection of "myth" [BP 36].) Perhaps pre-scientific explanations, e.g., demonic possession, are different only with respect to how they are developed and not how they are used in therapy.

Nevertheless, Wampold relates therapy theories and the research methods behind them to philosophy: "In many ways, the schools of psychotherapy are derived from different philosophies of science: behavior therapy from positivism, psychoanalysis from realism …, humanistic and experiential therapy from phenomenology, and multicultural and narrative theory from social constructivism" (BP 58).

This source also dwells at length on investigations of the effectiveness of psychotherapy, concluding that,

> Decades of clinical trials have shown that psychotherapy is remarkably effective. Generally, it is more effective than many accepted medical practices, is as effective as medication for many mental disorders, is more enduring than medication (i.e., the relapse rates are lower after the treatment is discontinued), and is less resistant to additional courses of treatment than is medication. The average person who receives psychotherapy is better off than about 80% of those who do not. (BP 110)

Basic Concepts and Distinctive Methods

The distinctive practical methods of psychotherapy are clear to begin with in the above account of what the discipline is, but there would be some specification with the school of thought. Mostly the method in general has to do with what is needed

for a therapeutic relationship and effective interaction of therapist and client. Quite important is the inclusion of a suitable and somehow scientific explanation that both participants can believe in, regardless of any scientifically established truth the theory might or might not have.

As for basic concepts, it is to be expected that only the minimum be expressed in such an introductory source as *The Basics of Psychotherapy*. Nevertheless, an initial list can be compiled, "therapist," "client," and "psychotherapy" to begin with. Then there are at least "psychodynamic therapy," "case conceptualization," "attachment history," "avoidance styles," "severe neurotic," "psychoneurotic," "healing practice," "psychological problems," "behavior therapy," "cognitive therapy," "interpersonal therapy," "brief dynamic therapy," "reminiscence therapy," "self-control therapy," "social problem-solving therapy," "process experiential therapy," "substance use disorders," "clinical representativeness," "working alliance," and "therapist effects," all of which need to be comprehended clearly.

There must be a great deal more in the way of basic concepts in the variety of theories relating to the four schools of thought or "forces" in psychotherapy today. And much more needs to be understood by a science theorist researching psychotherapy deeper than the surface surveyed in this study.

Substantive Contributions from Schutz

Besides his fundamental concern with the philosophic theory of the cultural sciences, Schutz made substantive contributions in such explicitly social-scientific essays as "The Stranger" and "The Homecomer," and these can be related to the theoretical frame of reference expressed in *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt.* It may be that the widespread and long-term misleading characterization of Schutz as a "phenomenological sociologist" has discouraged the consideration of his substantive contributions for theory in psychology and psychotherapy. If he is thought to be basically concerned with social groups, which he is not, this is plausible, but the approach in the *Aufbau* begins from and dwells upon the relations of an individual with other individuals and only eventually considers collectivities, methodological individualism being then different from methodological collectivism with respect to where research begins and what it emphasizes.

What follows is a sketch of the analysis especially in the *Aufbau*, although interested psychotherapists are encouraged to study the mentioned two essays first and, for all his concern with theoretical science, it needs to be said first of all that Schutz fully recognizes that the practical "world of working" has priority, it especially being where communication can alone take place.

While many philosophers struggle with the question of whether there actually are others (as well as an external world!) and how they and their lives can be known, Schutz affirms that in the cultural sciences it is recognized that in everyday life there is no doubt that others exist and that some access to their lives is possible. Thus, in teaching the teacher can perceive students paying attention or not, puzzled, or understanding what the teacher is saying. Nevertheless, how things including

actions and understandings are meaningful for actors, be they self or others, deserves analysis.

As mentioned, from the outset Schutz borrows the distinction between "subjective meaning" and "objective meaning" from Max Weber's theory of sociology, the former being the meaning that an experience, object, situation, or herself has for a self. This is a distinction he finds useful in all of the cultural disciplines. In his later work he increasingly used "subjective interpretation" and "objective interpretation," also saying that,

> It was Max Weber who made this distinction the cornerstone of his methodology. Subjective meaning, in this sense, is the meaning which an action has for the actor or which a relation or situation has for the person or persons involved therein; objective meaning is the meaning the same action, relation, or situation has for anybody else, be it a partner or observer in everyday life, the social scientist, or the philosopher. This terminology is unfortunate because the term "objective meaning" is obviously a misnomer, insofar as the so-called "objective" interpretations are, in turn, relative to the particular attitudes of the interpreter and, therefore, in a certain sense, "subjective." (II 275)

That the therapist is an outsider interpreting the insider interpretations of the client, and vice versa, appears a useful refinement in practice as well as theory for psychotherapy.

Schutz follows Henri Bergson, Edmund Husserl, and William James in describing mental life as a stream and goes on to describe how mental processes within the stream become meaningful. First there is the project by which one plans to do something, then there is the performance or action, and finally there is a retrospection in which one assesses how well the project was fulfilled. (Questions put to clients about what they were trying to do and what then happened fit this model.)

Concerning motivation, Schutz describes the project of an action as its "in-order-to motive" and recognizes extensive combinations of such motives of various sorts that ultimately culminate in "life plans." By contrast, there are "because motives" that do not, so to speak, pull from the future but push from the past. Such efficient causes are emphasized in modern naturalistic science, but Schutz emphatically recognizes teleology in human life—we have purposes for most of what we do and these are crucial to how situations and ultimately the world is meaningful for each of us and also for groups of which we are members.

And they are part of everyone's own insider interpretation, which others, therapists included, seek to understand. Accordingly, Schutz analyzes how the Other's stream of consciousness is meaningful for the Other and can be meaningful to an outsider on the basis of expressive movements, expressive acts, signs, and sign systems.

Finally, Schutz addresses the structure of the social world and describes Others as of four types. There are (1) "predecessors" who are of course dead, but nevertheless affect us by their now past actions, cannot be affected by us, but we can understand them provided we have suitable data. (2) "Successors" can be influenced, but being unborn they have done nothing yet that might be understood. (3) Then there are "contemporaries" who are alive at the same time as a self but not directly accessible in action or understanding, but nevertheless indirectly influenceable as well as, suitable data again being available, interpretable. In other words, indirect interaction and understanding are possible with contemporaries.

These three types of absent others contrast with (4) "consociates." This is what Schutz would call the therapist and client as they are engaged in psychotherapy. Consociates share space and time and are aware of one another as unique individuals. They have the social attitude he calls "thou orientation," their bodies and voices are fields of expression for their subjective experiences, they perform actions of "thou affecting," and, due to reciprocity of orientations, actions, and understanding, they enjoy a "We-relationship."

Finally, Schutz on how consociates can relate to one another perhaps best shows the relevance of his substantive thought concretely for psychotherapy:

> First of all, let us remember that in the face-to-face situation I literally see my partner in front of me. As I watch his face and his gestures and listen to the tone of his voice, I become aware of much more than what he is deliberately trying to communicate to me. My observations keep pace with each moment of his stream of consciousness as it transpires. The result is that I am incomparably better attuned to him than I am to myself. I may indeed be more aware of my own past (to the extent that the latter can be captured in retrospect) than I am of my partner's. Yet I have never been face-to-face with myself as I am with him now; hence I have never caught myself in the act of actually living through an experience. (PSW 169)
>
>   I interpret the present lived experiences which I impute to you as the in-order-to motives of the behavior I expect from you or as the consequences of your past experiences, which I then regard as their because-motives. I "orient" my action to these motivational contexts of yours, as you "orient" yours to mine. However, this "orienting oneself" takes place within the directly experienced social realm in the particular mode of "witnessing." When interacting with you within this realm, I *witness* how you react to my behavior, how you interpret my meaning, how my in-order-to motives trigger corresponding because-motives of your behavior. In between my expectation of your reaction and that reaction itself I have "grown older" and perhaps wiser, taking into account the realities of the situation, as well as my own hopes of what you would do. But in the face-to-face situation you and I grow older together, and I can add to my expectation of what you are going to do the actual sight of you making up your mind, and then of your action itself in all its constituent phases. (PSW 172)

Whether or not this and similar descriptions are contributions to the understanding and practice of psychotherapy is ultimately for reflective psychotherapists to decide.

Works of Schutz

Note: Unless done otherwise, the following works will be cited with the embedded abbreviations as listed down the left margin below, plus the page number(s).

I = Alfred Schutz, *Collected Papers,* Vol. I, *The Problem of Social Reality*, ed. Maurice Natanson (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962).

II = ——, *Collected Papers,* Vol. II, *Studies in Social Theory*, ed. Arvid Broedresen (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964).

III = ——, *Collected Papers,* Vol. III, *Studies in Phenomenological Philosophy*, ed. Ilse Schutz (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966).

IV = ——, *Collected Papers,* Vol. IV, ed. Helmut Wagner, George Psathas, and Fred Kersten, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996).

V=——, *Collected Papers*, Vol. V, *Phenomenology and the Social Sciences*, ed. Lester Embree (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011).

VI=——, *Collected Papers*, Vol. VI, *Literary Reality and Relationships*, ed. Michael Barber (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013).

PSW=—, *The Phenomenology of the Social World,* trans. George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967).

PP=——, "Positivistic Philosophy and the Actual Approach of Interpretive Social Science: An Ineditum from Spring 1953," *Husserl Studies*, Vol. 14 (1998): 123–149. Reprinted in Dermot Moran and Lester Embree, eds., *Phenomenology: Critical Concepts in Philosophy*, 5 vols. London: Routledge, 2004, III, pp. 119–145. Also available at http://www.springerlink.com/content/t52u22v305u28g04/

Part III
Complementary Philosophical Studies

Chapter 11
Cultural Scientists and Philosophers Can Meet in Methodology

Introduction

Some of us get goosebumps when we hear the word "methodology," probably because it evokes thought of a narrowly formalistic analysis of mainly natural-scientific results in the Logical Empiricistic manner until recently so popular in American philosophy of science. But before Logical Empiricism came to America and established within the philosophy of science something like what Schutz called, in a not unrelated case, a "monopolistic imperialism" (I 49), "methodology" seems to have had a broader signification, with which Schutz and Parsons were well acquainted. My purpose in these remarks is to reclaim use of the word "methodology" for phenomenologically oriented investigators, be they scientific or philosophical.

The Interaction

Let me begin by asking what most centrally and fundamentally is brought to issue between Schutz and Parsons in this set of texts. Note that in formulating this question I do not presuppose that agreement was reached on a resolution of the issue or even that one existed on the terms of the issue. Communication, particularly among intellectuals, is seldom easy. If we ask *who* brought the central issue up, the answer is plainly Schutz. If then we ask *what* the central issue Schutz brought up is, we can notice that, after alleging that Parsons deliberately renounced examination of the logical and philosophical foundations of a correct methodology of the social sciences, and also after contrasting his own "subjective" account of motivation with the account of Parsons, Schutz writes as follows:

> [t]he only question Professor Parsons never asks is, what really does happen in the mind of the actor from his subjective point of view. His analyses only answer the question of how a theoretical scheme can be established which is capable of explaining what may happen or

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Embedded citations refer to works of Schutz that are listed at the end of this chapter.

what may be considered as happening in the mind of the actor. And so Parsons is not concerned with finding out the truly subjective categories, but seeks only objective categories for the interpretation of subjective points of view.

But is Professor Parsons not right in doing so? It must be admitted that this problem of dealing with subjective phenomena in objective terms is *the* problem of the methodology of the social sciences. (V 26, emphasis in original)

I gather, then, that the issue which Schutz raises is an issue which he does not believe Parsons addressed in *The Structure of Social Action* (1937), an issue which—positively determined—is generally methodological and focused particularly on what I call *the participant's insider construal.* Schutz knew from the outset that Parsons was concerned with what I call *the scientific observer's outsider construal*. (II 227)

What was Parsons's response to the issue Schutz raised? In effect, he does not want to discuss methodology but rather what we might call *theory.* In the first moment of his three-letter response to Schutz's long essay, Parsons states, after a quibble, that they—i.e. he and Schutz—"seem to be unable to have a meeting of minds," because their foci of interest differ:

I found myself marking at a number of points statements of yours which imply that my book was, along with the secondary examination of the work of other people, a study of the methodology and epistemology of social science. …

This… seems to be symptomatic of a point of view which runs throughout your treatment. I think it fair to say that you never carefully and systematically consider these problems in terms of their relation to a general system of scientific *theory*. It is this, not methodology and epistemology, which was quite definitely the central focus of my own interest. (V 42, emphasis altered)

So Schutz knew he was raising an issue at least not central to the actual contents of Parsons's book and Parsons knew this too. To this extent, at least, they communicated. It is, of course, possible that they discuss something that is on the horizon that one or both recognize where Parsons' book is concerned, something like the methodological problematics Schutz referred to. But Parsons appears reluctant to go off with Schutz into the methodological horizon.

Declining Schutz's invitation, Parsons has something different which he would like instead to discuss, something which appears to be "the actual logical structure of theory and its empirical use" (V 43). In the third letter of his response, we find some amplification of what this might be:

The empirical facts stated, organized, and analyzed in terms of the system of categories are always, in the nature of the case, facts observed and stated by an observer. Their verifiability is always a matter of operations performed relative to certain kinds of experience and objects of experience, notably what we call overt acts and symbolic expressions. (V 56)

From this we may also gather that Parsons has some methodological opinions, but that his concern is with *the theories one produces by employing a method*, rather than *the method itself* (note also that he would follow his own approach no further than overt acts and symbolic expressions, which seems behavioristic. Rather than probe deeper motivations, however, let us continue to focus on the main overt content of this interaction, in which—after all—both parties seem actually to have known what they were doing.)

Responding to Parsons's response, Schutz affirms that *he had already agreed* with "the greater part of [Parsons'] basic thought" (V 61), which *I* take to be

Parsons's "generalized system of scientific theory." What Schutz had, in effect, proposed they discuss were matters beyond that. After telling how "methodology" and "epistemology" have broader significations in Germany than in America at that time and how he became involved in them—expressions I will return to presently—Schutz suggests that Parsons's analyses are "not radical enough first of all as far as the subjective point of view is concerned…" (V 65). He gives further examples and then states:

> Of course you might object that you are not interested in those problems, and that you do not consider them to be problems of a theory of action. Against such an objection I would be defenseless. I, personally, have been and am above all interested in them and believe that a full understanding, for instance, of the so-called subjective and objective point[s] of view can be gained only by entering courageously into this far too little explored realm. Furthermore, I feel that only such a study would be able to lay the foundation of any theoretical system of the social sciences—nay more, that such a discipline as I have in mind would be itself a part, and the most important part, of a general theory of sociology. I think that all this is *compatible* not only with the work of the four men studied by you and with your interpretation of it but also to a great extent with your system. (V 65)

We might say, then, that Parsons wanted his *general sociological theory—something produced in science*—discussed, while Schutz wanted to discuss how such a theory is produced, considering such to be a part of the general theory of sociology, i.e., that a general sociological theory is a part of a general theory of sociology, although he—Schutz—was more interested in another and more important part, namely: the part called methodology. This is on the horizon of Parsons's work and I do not believe that he would deny it.

The Schutz-Parsons Correspondence is not actually a correspondence, at least not in the sense in which the *Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence* was a "correspondence." Schutz proposed one issue, but Parsons declined to discuss it and proposed instead another issue, which Schutz declined. The thus doubly undeveloped interaction closes when Parsons finally states, "If you feel that you can supply me with definite evidence of the bearing of your analysis on specific empirical problems, I am very much inclined to think that would be the best bridge between us that we could build" (V 67); i.e., Parsons, in effect, reiterates his unwillingness to discuss methodology. Schutz, in the last letter in the set, in effect declines to relate his analysis to empirical problems and writes, possibly with a bit of irony, "… although I feel very humble concerning *solutions* offered by me, I am quite sure that the problems treated in my book [*Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt*, 1932] are *genuine* problems of the social sciences which have to be solved in one way or another" (V 68).

The Meaning of Methodology

In the title of these remarks, I assert that "methodology is where philosophers and human scientists *can* meet" (emphasis now added). The philosopher Schutz proposed such a meeting and the scientist Parsons declined. (In his 1974 retrospect, Parsons seems even less willing to engage in methodological discussions.) *We*,

however, can renew the question of what "methodology" is and also ask how scientists and philosophers can come to meet there.

What does "methodology" mean to Schutz? In this text he writes:

> I fear that in this country the terms methodology and epistemology are used in a more restricted sense than their equivalents in German and I accepted these terms only because I could not find any better translation for "*Wissenschaftslehre*," which includes both logical problems of a scientific theory and methodology in the restricted sense. I consider that your book as well as mine (and even my paper) deals with such problems of a "*Wissenschaftslehre*" of the social sciences and that, for instance, a discussion concerning the subjective point of view in the action scheme is as integral a part of the scientific theory of the social world as anything else. To my mind, of course, the term "methodology" has no limitative meaning and certainly not at all a pejorative one. And I am the first to acknowledge that one of the great merits of your study consists in building up a "*Wissenschaftslehre*" of the social sciences, starting from specific and definite problems of the interpretation of empirical phenomena and generalizations thereof. Moreover, I think that the chief topic of both studies—yours and mine—has been and is to outline the theoretical system of the fundamental science of the social world, namely the science of social action. (V 64)

For our concern, this amounts to saying that "methodology" is the best translation Schutz had found for *Wissenschaftslehre*, but that its signification is not or ought not to be as narrow as Americans make out (the translation of it as "theory of science" seems not to have occurred to him at that time). In other places in his writings, Schutz seemingly uses *Methodenlehre* and *Sozialwissenschaftstheorie* with the same import. Careful historical study could reveal the range of significations that such words had in Schutz's time.

Let me instead suggest that etymology is not in this case irrelevant (for me it usually is). After all, *Methodenlehre* and "methodology" are recent and technical coinages and there is a strong and correct tradition in philosophy and science to respect etymology at least when baptizing a new discipline (one can, of course, forget the original intent, as has happened when in a methodology course in social science today one actually finds merely statistics and/or computer technique taught!). *If one is concerned with producing an* account (a *Lehre* or *Logos*) *of the* approach (a *Methodos*) *which is taken in a discipline*, *one does* "*methodology*." Schutz was thus concerned, and has both an account of science in general in contrast to dream and phantasy as well as practical life and an account of specifically cultural science. In the broad and good sense, Schutz is a "methodologist" (see Chap. 1).

Incidentally, I now prefer "cultural science" to "social science" even for Schutz, i.e., despite his own usage, where he had less choice than we have today when he came to America and began to write in English.[1] On the first page of the Preface of *Der sinnhafte Aufbau*, we find *Sozialwissenschaft* and *Geisteswissenschaft* used interchangeably. The same is clear in the now available original German of the first American article, the one written for the Husserl memorial volume, where the neo-Kantian term *Kulturwissenschaft* also occurs. Since this family of disciplines includes not only economics and sociology but also biography, jurisprudence, and history of art for Schutz (PSW 242), the latter of which are hardly "*social* sciences"

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[1] In the original version of this essay I used "human science," which is still widely accepted.

in the now prevalent North American classification of the disciplines, I prefer to translate the broader and Diltheyian title, *Geisteswissenschaft*, as "cultural science" and often to substitute this term for "social science" when I read it in Schutz's American writings.

How Cultural Scientists and Philosophers Can Meet

My thesis is that methodology or science theory is where human scientists and philosophers can meet. If we have read Schutz, we have seen how a philosopher, specifically a *philosopher* of cultural science, concerned himself with methodology. How do cultural *scientists*, by contrast, get involved? Here Schutz is again instructive, he tells us on an audiotape I was privileged to transcribe and edit that:

> Since my early student days, my foremost interest was in the philosophical foundations of the social sciences, especially of sociology. At that time I was under the spell of Max Weber's work, especially of his methodological writings. I recognized, however, very soon that Max Weber had forged the tools he needed for his concrete research but that his main problem—understanding the subjective meaning a social action has for the actor—needed further philosophical foundation. (V 1)

This says that Schutz was always a philosopher in his foremost interest (at least according to his own subjective point of view, which we can hardly neglect!). It says that social or cultural science is not philosophy. It says that sociology is not the only such science. It says, I believe, that Max Weber was a social or cultural scientist and did *methodological* as well as what we might call "*substantive*" scientific work. Finally, it says that Weber turned to "methodology" out of the needs of his scientific research and that this is where Schutz's philosophically methodological effort began.[2]

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[2] Cf. PSW, p. 7: "But, imposing as Weber's concept of "interpretive sociology" is, it is based on a series of tacit presuppositions. It is a matter of urgent necessity to identify these presuppositions and to state them clearly, for only a radical analysis of the genuine and basic elements of social action can provide a reliable foundation for the future progress of the social sciences [*Gesellschaftswissenschaften*]. It was only when this necessity became clear to him, and then with apparent reluctance, that Max Weber concerned himself with the theoretical foundations of sociology, since he greatly preferred to work with concrete problems. He was interested in epistemological [*Wissenschaftstheoretischen* (better, "science-theoretical")] problems only insofar as they bore directly on specialized research or provided, tools for its pursuit. Once these tools were at his disposal, he lost interest in the more fundamental problems [Schutzs footnote: Cf. Marianne Weber, Max Weber, *ein Lebensbild* (Tübingen, 1926), e.g., p. 322 (2d ed., Heidelberg, 1950).] As significant as were Weber's contributions to methodology, as incorruptible as was his vision of the task of concept formation in the social sciences, as admirable as was his philosophical instinct for the correct critical position on epistemological [*erkenntniskritische*] questions—just as little did the thorough undergirding of his results by a secure over-all philosophical point of view concern him. In fact, he had little interest at all in the clarification of the philosophical presuppositions of even his own primary concepts." Comparing this early expression with the late expression in the passage just quoted in the body of this essay, we see a constant view of the relations of scientific and philosophic methodology illustrated by the Schutz-Weber case.

Generalizing and interpreting Schutz's position here, I suggest that a cultural scientist does methodology in order to develop his basic categories and research techniques. This is what, similarly, I believe Schutz saw Parsons doing to some extent (and where he could never dialogue with the dead Weber he tried, unsuccessfully, to relate, perhaps, to Parsons in Weber's place). *Cultural scientists get involved in methodology out of needs arising in their concrete research efforts.* (If Thomas Kuhn is correct, this happens especially when sciences are immature or undergoing revolutions, but this is not the place to discuss that further.)

If that is how cultural scientists come to methodology, we may wonder whether Schutz merely imagined a methodological component in Parsons's position. On the other hand, it may also be that he knew more about Parsons's approach than Parsons did, a possibility which Parsons himself appears to have recognized in principle. Parsons does say that methodology is subordinate in his own work (V 47). He also offers the following remark:

> This is, naturally, not to say that considerations of methodology, and even at some point epistemology, are irrelevant. There are a great many points at which such considerations had to be dealt with, but I still feel that the perspective in which they are treated is very greatly dependent on their relation to the problems of the status of a generalized system which includes a continual emphasis on the specific logical structure of the system and not merely on the status of certain of the conceptual elements which make it up. (V 65)

In this I see Parsons, *like Weber*, doing methodology for the sake of his substantive research but, *unlike Weber*, not appreciating how certain conceptual elements, e.g., what Schutz called "the understanding of the subjective meaning of social action has for the actor," play the central role, something which I would contend is only fully apparent in the attempt to produce a philosophical account of the cultural-scientific approach in its own right.

Philosophers and cultural scientists can meet in methodology, but they do not have to. It is not clear to me that a cultural scientist must have a *philosophical* understanding of his own approach. It seems possible that a philosopher *can* understand an approach better than the scientist who takes it. I am not even sure that a good scientist, at least in an era of "normal science," must have any understanding at all of what his approach or method is, i.e. any "methodology" or account of method.[3] All that seems necessary is good training in the techniques of approaching matters; understanding an approach is something other and additional to that. Hence, I am not sure whether scientific—much less philosophical—methodology helps or hinders scientific research. Too much methodological reflection might make substantive research hesitant. But cultural scientists *can* engage in methodology, as Weber and even Parsons apparently did, even to the extent of eventually becoming philosophers, as Schutz did. Contrariwise, philosophers may occasionally need to do cultural science (many philosophers of science more than dabble in history of science, a cultural science, these days). The best arrangement seems, however, for them each usually to pursue their separate goals and only to meet in methodology when there is need.

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[3] Schutz believed methodological clarification essential to the progress of science (cf. the previous footnote), but it is not clear who in his view was to develop such a methodological clarification.

Works of Schutz

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II=——, *Collected Papers,* Vol. II, *Studies in Social Theory*, ed. Arvid Broedresen (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964).

III=——, *Collected Papers,* Vol. III, *Studies in Phenomenological Philosophy*, ed. Ilse Schutz (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966).

IV=——, *Collected Papers,* Vol. IV, ed. Helmut Wagner, George Psathas, and Fred Kersten, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996).

V=——, *Collected Papers*, Vol. V, *Phenomenology and the Social Sciences*, ed. Lester Embree (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011).

VI=——, *Collected Papers*, Vol. VI, *Literary Reality and Relationships*, ed. Michael Barber (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013).

PSW=——, *The Phenomenology of the Social World,* trans. George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967).

PP=——, "Positivistic Philosophy and the Actual Approach of Interpretive Social Science: An Ineditum from Spring 1953," *Husserl Studies*, Vol. 14 (1998): 123–149. Reprinted in Dermot Moran and Lester Embree, eds., *Phenomenology: Critical Concepts in Philosophy*, 5 vols. London: Routledge, 2004, III, pp. 119–145. Also available at http://www.springerlink.com/content/t52u22v305u28g04/

Chapter 12
Everyday Relevancy in Gurwitsch and Schutz

Introduction

According to William James, long and avidly studied by both Aron Gurwitsch and Alfred Schutz, "thought is always selective." For James, this is true not only in the ethical, aesthetic, and reasoning departments of our minds, but also on the lower plane of "empirical thought:"

> Let four men take a tour of Europe. One will bring home only picturesque impressions—costumes and colors, parks and views and works of architecture, pictures and statues. To another all this will be non-existent; and distances and prices, populations and drainage-arrangements, door- and window-fastenings, and other useful statistics will take their place. A third will give a rich account of the theatres, restaurants, and public balls, and naught beside, whilst the fourth will perhaps have been so wrapped in his own subjective broodings as to tell little more than a few names of places through which he passed. Each has selected, out of the same mass of presented objects, those which suited his private interest and has made his experience thereby.[1]

Phenomenologically speaking, one may ask in such a case how it was that things of different sorts *stood out* in the fields of consciousness of the different travelers and one may ask how it was that the different egos *were interested in* things of different sorts. Aron Gurwitsch approached the problem of selectivity in the first way and Alfred Schutz approached it in the second way. In the present study I shall attempt to show that their findings are thoroughly complementary and compatible.

Gurwitsch and Schutz were concerned with selectivity throughout their theoretical lives. Under the title of "thematization" it is the main subject of Gurwitsch's doctoral thesis of 1929, in which both Gestaltist and phenomenological sources were drawn on.[2] At the end of his original attempt to clarify the foundations of interpretive sociology on the basis of the work of Husserl and Bergson, Schutz wrote in 1932 of a group of problems with bearing far beyond the social sciences.

Embedded citations refer to works of Schutz that are listed at the end of this chapter.

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[1] *The Principles of Psychology* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1890), Vol. I, p. 286.

[2] Aron Gurwitsch, *Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology*, ed. Fred Kersten, *The Collected Works of Aron Gurwitsch (1901–1973)* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009), 193–318. Hereafter: Studies.

> It is the whole problem of relevance, which has kept cropping up again and again in the present study…. Whether we take our departure from the ideal type, from the existence of in-order-to and because-motives, from the "projected" character of the act, from the possibility of reproduction, even from the mere distinguishability of our lived experiences, repeatedly we come up against the same problem. This is the question of why these facts and precisely these are selected by thought from the totality of lived experience and regarded as relevant. (PSW 249)

In the publications following their meeting in the late 1930's, we have the tip of what must have been an iceberg of discussion between the two friends. One can trace the development of Schutz's position in the *Collected Papers, Reflections on the Problem of Relevance,* and *Structures of the Life-World.*

In *The Field of Consciousness,* completed in 1953, Gurwitsch presented his own theory of relevancy, accompanying it with comments on Schutz's theory:

> According to Schutz, relevancy denotes a relationship in which objects stand to the Ego with regard to the Ego's plans and designs, not, as with us, the relationship of mutual pointing reference of these items. With Schutz, a certain item is relevant to me on account of the projects and pursuits which engage me. As we use the term relevancy, a certain item is said to be relevant to the theme (which may well be a plan of action or a pursuit) and also to other items because of their relevancy to the theme.[3]

Schutz replied as follows.

> Though Gurwitsch believes that his use of the term "Relevancy" differs from mine, I fully endorse his analysis. It seems to me that his concept of "relevancy" is a special case of my concept of "thematic relevancy," mine being more encompassing insofar as I am concerned with a phenomenology of the life-world, with which man in the natural attitude has to come to terms not only in thought but also emotionally and in action, whereas Gurwitsch's analyses deal only with transcendental consciousness after the reduction has been performed and hence the "world has been bracketed." (III 126)

Recourse to the Gurwitsch-Schutz correspondence would no doubt shed considerable light on their interaction and respective developments, but the published comments are sufficient to bring out three surface differences which must be overcome for an accurate comparison of their theories of "relevancy" or "relevance" (the words appear interchangeable):

In the first place, from the passage quoted above, Schutz seems to have believed that Gurwitsch was merely concerned with intellectual philosophy. This is probably because of Gurwitsch's emphasis on perception and thought and his life-long pursuit of a theory of science. However, from the other passage already quoted above and from scattered short discussions in his other writings possibly not readily available to Schutz (see Gurwitsch 1974), it is clear that Gurwitsch actually meant his "field-theory of consciousness" (the book's original title) to cover practical as well as intellectual consciousness. Everyday life in Schutz is of course a practical life.

In the second place, both Gurwitsch and Schutz were aware that the one worked in transcendental phenomenology while the other worked in "constitu-

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[3] Aron Gurwitsch, *The Field of Consciousness* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1964), p. 342. Hereafter: Field.

tive phenomenology of the natural standpoint" (III 44). How can results obtained in these different orientations be integrated? Both men were familiar with the distinction from Husserl's *"Nachwort zu meinen 'Ideen'"* of 1931. In terms of that text, Gurwitsch asserts that "phenomenological results preserve their validity within a psychological setting" (Field 159, cf. 401 & n.). The psychology in question here has to do with, as Gurwitsch puts it, "the human being as a psycho-somatic unity interested in, concerned with, briefly existing and being within, the world" (Field 399, cf. III 22). Perhaps it would be better to call such a discipline "phenomenological anthropology," but in any case Gurwitsch has in effect authorized us to translate his results into an analysis of life in the world, to transpose them to the plane where Schutz confined himself (contrariwise, Schutz's results can be reinterpreted as contributions to transcendental phenomenology, although he does not say so).

In the third place, I believe that Gurwitsch is correct about the difference between his relevancy theory and that of Schutz, a difference I propose to reflect with the terms "theme-relevancy" and "ego-relevance." This is more than a verbal difference, for Gurwitsch denied that egos qua subjects of mental lives exist, while Schutz accepted such egos in explicit opposition to Gurwitsch's position (I 169 n.). Since I can readily observe myself from the transcendental as well as the natural standpoint as an ego who was, is, and will be engaged in some of my mental processes and thereby busied with their themes (Embree 1973), I believe that Gurwitsch was simply mistaken in this respect (although I could never convince him of this in conversation!) and I agree not only with the mature Husserl but obviously also with Schutz, who made substantial contributions to the phenomenology of the *ego—cogito* side of consciousness (1966b).

By contrast, Schutz's analyses are weakest on the *cogito—cogitatum* or *noesis—noema* side of consciousness, where of course Gurwitsch among all phenomenologists is strongest. In short, it is fundamental to my strategy in confronting the relevancy theories of Gurwitsch and Schutz to consider them within Husserl's primary scheme of *ego—cogito—cogitatum.*

In sum, Aron Gurwitsch's major discussions of perception and thought and his minor discussions of action, particularly due to their noematic emphasis, can, with appropriate reinterpretation, be used in the attempt to account for the everyday practical life of man in the world. I shall illustrate this study hereafter with an attenuated example from a specific sphere of everyday social life. (While I shall not attempt to clarify it at this point, I believe that human life is always specified in some such way; "everyday social life" is no more concrete than "science" is, which concretely is chemistry or history or mathematics, etc.). My exposition begins with an explication of Gurwitsch on the explanation and description of people as functional objects, on theme and thematic modifications, and on theme-relevancy and then continues with a summary of Schutz on the social self and ego-relevance, with emphasis on how this dovetails with Gurwitsch's account.

Gurwitsch and Theme Relevancy

I begin by introducing my example. The same girl can be perceived as a customer by a shopkeeper, as a student by her teacher and fellow students, and as a suspect by a police detective. It is today almost a matter of course for theoreticians to account for this by saying that the different perceivers of the girl have the same sensations but different interpretations of them. In effect, this makes perceiving like reading, for the object of consciousness then has two strata, one sensuous and the other intellectual. Gurwitsch grants that there are two strata to the object of consciousness in *reading*, a perceptible meaning carrier and an intelligible meaning carried by it, but he would deny that when one *perceives* something one encounters two strata. Indeed, he argues that all dualistic theories of perception presuppose the "constancy hypothesis," according to which where there are physical stimuli of the same sort there must be sense-data of the same sort, and asserts that this hypothesis is neither self-evident nor, since presupposed by any experiment to prove it, verifiable (Field 91).

Where the dualist would explain the percept as the effect of external conditions, e.g., light and sound waves where its sensory stratum is concerned, and of internal conditions, e.g., an attitude or interest, where the non-sensory stratum is concerned, Gurwitsch would claim that from the explanatory point of view the percept is a function of external and internal conditions *operating together* and that when either or both of them changes *the entire percept* as a whole is changed. In short, Gurwitsch can both describe and explain the percept without accepting a dualistic description.

What of the difference among the various social perceptions in the example given above? Certainly it is the same girl and certainly she is perceived differently. It seems to me that Gurwitsch's accounts of what he calls "functional characters" and how they arise implicitly solve this problem. When one reflects one can distinguish the thing which is perceived, i.e., the girl, from the-thing-as-perceived, i.e., the-girl-as-student or the-girl-as-suspect. In the latter perspective one is observing what phenomenologists call the cogitatum or noema. Within the noema, one can distinguish between the *nucleus,* the thing as it appears in its material contents, say the girl from the side with just such an expression on her face and just such a spring in her step, and various sorts of *noematic characters*. "Among such characters we mention (1) those concerning modes of presentation, as when a thing is one time perceived, another time remembered or merely imagined, or (2) when a certain state of affairs… is asserted or denied, doubted, questioned, or deemed probable" (Field 327). I take it that "functional characters" make up a third class for Gurwitsch, who writes:

> Functional characters accrue to objects in situations of concrete action in which the subject manipulates the object, learns to handle it in a determinate manner, to use it for a certain purpose in connection with other objects, and thus acquires a certain mode of action. Such acquisitions will henceforth co-determine future perceptions (Field 98).

Such a noematic character is reflectively observable in perception and it is what changes when, for instance, I temporarily make the bowl with which I will feed my cat into a bell by tapping it with what was and will again be a spoon but temporarily is a clapper.

In practical life, objects are defined by the way in which they serve, i.e., by what can be done with them. To be sure, while such "functional objects" acquire their "functional characters" most originally in one's own using of them, how they are to be used can be seen by watching others or even less originally, e.g., on the basis of hearsay. More important for us, it seems to me that, as Kant knew, in social life we use people for means as well as ends, i.e., that in everyday social life others (and even oneself) are functional objects. One can deal with such objects by following explicit "operating instructions," but most often such instructions or rules have become a matter of habit. Thus, referring to Guillaume's *La Formation des habitudes* (Paris, 1936), Gurwitsch says that after a period of conditioning one's perception of a thing (or a person) is reworked and reorganized.

> With this reorganization, an object involved in a certain situation becomes phenomenally and psychologically different in the eyes of the experiencing subject than it was before the habit was formed. This reworking of perception is only the attribution of a functional character to an object which may have had none or quite a different one (Studies 176).

If one wants to *explain* the perception of such use objects, one need only consider that the perceiver's past experience of a given or similar thing is one of the internal conditions for the percept and thus that it is different for perceivers with different pasts. To return to our example, because he has seen her come in and buy things in the past or because she is behaving like others who have done so, *the shopkeeper* perceives the girl as a customer and because he has read her dossier at police headquarters, *the detective* perceives her as a criminal suspect. That is how I explicate Gurwitsch's contribution to the mundane phenomenology of everyday social perception.[4]

With the abandonment of the constancy hypothesis, we can maintain a reflective-descriptive attitude and proceed, following Gurwitsch, with a "noematically oriented phenomenology" (Studies 183) of the field of everyday social life, thus continuing to explicate his implicit contributions to social science. His central contention is that every field of consciousness is organized into three domains, namely: (1) *the theme,* "that which engrosses the mind of the experiencing subject, or as it is often expressed, which stands in the 'focus of his attention,'" (2) *the thematic field,* "defined as the totality of those data, co-present with the theme, which are

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[4] Because functional characters like other noematic constituents are ideal entities or "meanings" in the broad sense, it is understandable that they be mistaken for significations or meanings in the narrow sense. Besides "functional characters," or, as I would prefer to call them in technical phenomenological terms, "praxothetic statuses," there are the characters objects have as correlates of emotion and belief, i.e. "pathothetic" and "doxothetic" statuses. A cultural object would include the habitually constituted thetic statuses of all three sorts, although in a practical attitude the praxothetic predominates just as the doxothetic predominates in the theoretical attitude and the pathothetic predominates in the aesthetic attitude. Gurwitsch has suggested that the practical attitude of normal western adults, primitives, aphasiacs, infants, and the higher animals have something in common where functional objects are concerned (1974:171 n., cf. 1966:51 ff.). Let me add that in *The Field of Consciousness* the word *perception* has a broad signification perhaps equivalent to "cultural perception," while in later essays (cf. the world of perception, in a narrower sense, is something beyond the cultural world and reached through an abstraction. While the natural scientist is concerned with objects of perception in the narrow sense, the human scientist abides by cultural objects.

experienced as materially relevant or pertinent to the theme and form the back-ground or horizon out of which the theme emerges as the center," and (3) *the margin,* which includes all data which, "though co-present with, have no relevancy to, the theme" (Field 4). It cannot be over-emphasized that for Gurwitsch the field of consciousness is always already organized in this fashion. While this organization is variously specified, there is no field of consciousness without it.

In order to illustrate two important lines along which this description was developed by Gurwitsch, namely: *thematic modifications* and *theme-relevancy,* let us imagine the consciousness of a detective following a female suspect in order to solve or prevent a crime. This example will be resorted to throughout the remainder of this study and relates to the cops-and-robbers specification of everyday life (perhaps its analysis is also a contribution to phenomenological criminology!) The suspect, a functional object, is the detective's practical theme. This means that she stands out in the center of his field of consciousness as he follows her down the street and that some of the remainder of the items he is aware of are relevant to her as a theme while others are not and hence are merely marginal. Once again let me say that for Gurwitsch the organization of the field is no more imposed on unorganized materials than signification is imposed on sensa in perception. Rather the organization is autochthonous in what is here a field of police perception.

It would be a mistake to believe that the perceptual surroundings of a practical theme are necessarily coterminus with its thematic field (Studies 203). Thus, in our example, the suspect is visually thematized, but by virtue of her functional characters, she has pointing references to people and events outside of the detective's field of visual perception. When the detective first took the suspect as his theme, presumably at headquarters with her dossier in his hand, it was because of her known relationships with criminals. As the surveillance continues, more and more of the suspect's acquaintances are noted by the detective and take their places in his thematic field as possible or actual criminal associates, regardless of whether or not they go on being perceived along with the suspect.

It is in relation to this broadening social context that the role of the suspect in criminal activities can be specified. But whether her function in that context proves to be that of planner or messenger, qua theme she is unchanged. The detective's thematic field can also narrow with the theme remaining unchanged, as when what were suspected to be criminal associates turn out merely to be unquestionably the suspect's laundryman, druggist, and dentist. Either way, components of the thematic field and their relationships with the theme become clearer and more distinct, i.e., more determinate, for the detective. Then again the reverse may happen and, e.g., the druggist's relations with the suspect might become obscure when events observed in the drugstore are odd.

Besides increasing and decreasing in its components and determinateness, a thematic field can be radically modified. The suspect is also observed to visit her many nieces and nephews regularly. She continues to be the detective's suspect, but her relationship with this circle of people is different from her contacts with members of her criminal gang on the one hand and with her laundryman, druggist, and dentist on the other hand. Moreover, if the girl meets with another known criminal,

the detective's theme can itself also change such that "suspect-talking-to-criminal-associate" gives way to "suspicious conversation." (Studies 223–29)

To be sure, while the detective is on the case the suspect is not always the theme in his field of consciousness. What can happen to the suspect when he turns away from her? She can (1) disappear from his field altogether, (2) she can move to the margin, as when his hunger becomes thematic for him and the restaurants and food stores he remembers to be in the area make up the thematic field, or (3) she can move to the thematic field, as when another member of the gang becomes his theme. In each of these cases, what had been the theme loses that status, but the field has the same organization into three domains.

It can also happen that the theme itself be profoundly altered. This can happen when, while following the suspect down the street, the policeman becomes interested in how her gait has changed, say to an unusually slow and nervous stroll which could show that she has reached a meeting place or that she has noticed that she is being followed. Here the theme is altered from "the-suspect-walking-down-the-street" to "the-odd-way-in-which-the-suspect-is-walking." In this case the theme as a Gestalt contexture is restructured and thus appears differently.[5]

That, briefly and sketchily, is how Gurwitsch can be understood to have contributed to the noematic phenomenology of the "selectivity" of thought on the plane of everyday social life in the cultural world. Let us turn to the related account of theme-relevancy.

It is Gurwitsch's contention that a theme in its very appearance has what he calls "pointing references" to other data which thus make up its thematic field and which also have pointing references to the theme. This does not preclude the same theme standing out in different thematic fields on different occasions, as we have seen, but it does mean that, universally, a theme is always in a thematic field and appears so upon reflection. Some remarks Gurwitsch offers about understanding a piece of fiction can be transposed into a case of social understanding in which the situation of theme and thematic field is apparent:

> Suppose we concentrate our attention upon a character of a play or story. That character appears in the light of events which have involved him. These events occur around him in his environment, provoke reactions both on his part and on the part of persons involved with him. The person attracting our attention at the given moment is our theme, yet does not present himself in isolation. Rather he appears within, and as a member of, a certain "world." We cannot deal with, nor dwell upon him, make him the theme of our present mental activity without experiencing references to customs, beliefs, and opinions held in "his" country, time, and social environment, to problems and conflicts of general concern in "his" period. Here again it is the structural interconnection between theme and thematic field; the theme appearing in the light and under the perspective of the field. (Field 322)

The pointing references between the theme and the thematic field are often nebulous and obscure. Items in the thematic field may blend and fuse with one another

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[5] (Studies 327, 50) It is possible that the change in behavior be significant in the strict sense, i.e. carry a meaning for someone prepared to understand it. But that would be something founded upon and different from the thing perceived. A gait as such is a perceptual structure as much as a melody is.

phenomenally, but still there is a style to them whereby they make up the context of the theme, whereby they all have something to do with it.

Returning to our detective story, let us compare two sorts of data present with the suspect in the detective's field of consciousness. On the one hand, in following the suspect he is aware of the people in the underworld she has seen or may be going to see and, on the other hand, he is aware of the street along which he is following her, the time of day and how long he has been on the trail, his own fatigue, etc. When the suspect is the theme, her associates are pointingly referred to by the theme, but the street, felt time, and fatigue are not pointingly referred to. Differently expressed, items in the thematic field present themselves as *relevant* to the theme, while marginal items are *not relevant* to it.

Such theme-relevancy is more than the mere fact of being co-experienced. Rather it is that which items within the unity of a context have, indeed it is that on the basis of which they make up a context. The thematic field is thus a domain of relevancy. Data of the second sort—hunger, fatigue, etc.—are merely co-present with the suspect-as-theme, are experienced without having anything to do with it as such (although they could become relevant if the thematic field were to change) and, being irrelevant to the theme, these data belong to the margin (Field 340–54).

Now the contexts in which things are thematic are themselves presented as indefinitely continued. For example, it is always possible that previously unrecognized criminal associates of the suspect (the druggist?) come to light. While the phrase *thematic field* designates the items "of direct concern to, and of immediate bearing upon, the theme" (Field 381), Gurwitsch's phrase *order of existence* designates the totality of items encountered—no matter how indeterminately—as pointingly referred to by the theme. The line of demarcation between these two areas is difficult to draw and actually an order of existence is an indefinitely continued thematic field. For each order of existence there is a relevancy-principle. For reality as a whole, in contrast to ideal orders, objective time is the principle of relevancy. The spatiotemporal "perceptual world," in the broad sense ("cultural world" is a better name), is the fundamental stratum of reality:

> By the perceptual world we mean that order of existence which, in the pre-theoretical or a-theoretical attitude of every day experience, unquestionably counts for every one of us as external reality. At every moment of our conscious life, we find ourselves in the perceptual world. It is in this world that we lead our existence, pursue all of our activities, encounter our fellow-men to whom we stand in the most diversified relations. (Field 382, cf. 161)

As Gurwitsch was well aware, this "perceptual world" is akin to the "finite province of meaning" which Schutz called "the world of working."[6] Pointing the way for further empirical research, Gurwitsch has gone beyond Schutz in this direction to describe "suborders" of the "perceptual world" which he calls "spheres of life," such as those of family, political, and professional life. In the latter connection, he writes:

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[6] Maurice Natanson has extended the explicitly Schutzian and, for us, now, implicitly Gurwitschian line of analysis in these terms to the past in "History as a Finite Province of Meaning," in his *Literature, Philosophy, and the Social Sciences,* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962).

> As to the spheres of professional life, the relevancy-principles involved vary obviously according to the nature of the professional activity. Whatever its nature, every sphere of professional life can be described as a system of purposes, plans, projects, designs, ends, means, and actions. All these refer to one another, each has a certain determinate place within a hierarchial order and organization. Fellowmen encountered within the sphere of professional activity appear in, and appear as defined by, their roles within that sphere. They present themselves as students, teachers, doctors, patients, employers, employees, business associates, customers, officials in whom authority is vested, and the like. Similarly, things are also experienced under the perspective of situations of concrete action in which they serve as instruments and tools, thus appearing with reference to purposes relevant to those situations. (Field 383)

Clearly the suspect and her activities, her hideouts and meeting places, and above all her associates, as well as the detective's fellow policemen, headquarters, the courthouse, and jail belong to his sphere of professional life, where the highest end is the prevention and solution of crimes. This is one way in which everyday life is specified.

Schutz and Ego-Relevance

In explicating Gurwitsch my emphasis, in accordance with his own intent, was on the noematic, on things taken just and precisely as they are meant and intended in the consciousness of them. It was also confined to perception. Had there been more time, I could have rendered his parallel noetic analysis, taking up the distinction between "actual" experience of the form *cogito* and "potential" experiences in which the thematic field and margin rather than the theme are co-intended, expectancies and reminiscences of what is not immediately given, and so on. I might also have gone on to render his implicit account of everyday and scientific *thought* about social life. But now I shall turn from the *noetico-noematic* side of social life to the side of *ego—cogito* in order to outline Schutz's account of the self as selectively interested in things. But first I shall prepare a background in Schutz.

For Schutz, the world of everyday life is composed of public objects in which one has a practical interest, which one seeks to dominate, and in which one's outlook is governed by pragmatic motives. Some of one's spontaneous activities in this life are engaged in on the basis of preconceived projects and are thus called "actions." Mental arithmetic is a species of action, but what Schutz calls "working" is the most important sort of action for everyday life. When working is engaged in, a change occurs in the public world, at least one's body moves in some way. The working self is wide awake and fully interested in life, devotes itself exclusively to accomplishing its objective, and experiences itself as a unity in the simultaneity of inner and outer times, i.e., in the vivid present (I 208–17). All of this obviously describes the good detective very well. Note how Schutz's concern is with things in relation to the self rather than in relation to the theme. This is the pervasive difference between Schutz and Gurwitsch.

The everyday world is naturally social, which means that one can work on, with, for, against, and despite others and thus enter into social relationships. The original of all social relationships is the face-to-face relationship, but of course there are other and derivative relationships such as shoulder-to-shoulder and face-to-back even in intimacy, not to speak of more anonymous relationships (I 218–21). To illustrate this, we can suppose that our detective is moved to apprehend and question his suspect. The situation then comes under the following general description.

> For each partner the other's body, his gestures, his gait and facial expressions, are immediately observable, not merely as things or events of the outer world but in their physiognomical significance, that is, as symptoms of the other's thoughts. Sharing a community of time—and this implies that each partner participates in the on-rolling life of the other, each can grasp in a vivid present the other's thoughts as they are built up step by step. They may thus share one another's anticipations of the future as plans, hopes, or anxieties (I 16).

In order to keep our example simple, however, let us leave our detective as merely following the suspect and let us turn from this background sketch to Schutz's theory of ego-relevance.

The detective, as we know, is following the girl in order to ascertain her role in criminal activities and thereby to prevent or solve crimes. The selective function of his interest organizes the field of his experience into zones of major and minor relevance for him. As Schutz puts it, "From the world within my actual or potential reach those objects are selected as primarily important which actually are or will become in future possible ends or means for the realization of my projects, or which are or will become dangerous or enjoyable or otherwise relevant to me" (I 227).

Note again that this is a matter of what is relevant to the subject, not to the theme, and that thus for Schutz I speak of "ego-relevance." Even so, such an interested and selective self of the Schutzian account can be considered as the correlate on the inward side of life of the theme of the Gurwitschian account of the outward side.

In one of his more venturesome moods, Schutz asserts that each person's entire everyday system of relevance is founded on the knowledge and fear he has of his own death. In other words, this fundamental anxiety or primordial anticipation is the source of all other anticipations and thus of the life-plan and sub-plans within it. "From the fundamental anxiety spring the many interrelated systems of hopes and fears, of wants and satisfactions, of chances and risks which incite men within the natural attitude to attempt the mastery of the world, to overcome obstacles, to draft projects, and to realize them" (1962:228). Because of this anxiety, according to Schutz, one refrains from suspending belief in the everyday world, although from time to time contents of that world do nevertheless become questioned.

Within everyday life, it is our "interest at hand" which motivates all of our thinking, projecting, and acting and thereby establishes the problems to be solved. "Interests," like hopes and fears, are of course matters of the ego involved in his life. To express Schutz's contention differently, interest is what breaks the unproblematic field of life into zones of different types of relevance to the self. First there is the part of the world within reach; it is actually being observed and is immediately alterable by working actions. For example, when the suspect is seen turning to look behind her, the detective must become inconspicuous or his surveillance is finished.

The turning suspect is in the zone of what Schutz calls "primary relevance." To master this area, "we have to possess the know-how—the technique and skill—and also the precise understanding of why, when, and where to use them" (II 124). Here our detective is of course an expert.

But there is then a second zone over which he has no control but in which he still has some interest. Other people on the street between the detective and his suspect are of "minor relevance" because, for example, if the need arose he might be able to screen himself from the wary suspect by stepping behind one of them. In the third zone fall possible events which, at a given time, are "relatively irrelevant," such as the automobile traffic in the street, which could become of at least minor relevance should his quarry cross the street. Finally, there are things which are "absolutely irrelevant" to him, such as planes flying overhead, "because no possible change occurring within them would—so we believe—influence our objective at hand" (II 125).

Schutz's analysis of ways in which things are variously relevant to the self is plainly convergent with Gurwitsch's account. That which has "primary" and "minor" ego-relevance would belong to the thematic field and the "relatively" and "absolutely" irrelevant would belong to the margin. While the distinction between thematic field and order of existence in Gurwitsch is parallel to Schutz's first distinction, the second Schutzian distinction may well call for some refinement in Gurwitsch's treatment of the margin. Schutz's emphasis, however, is on the interests and plans of the ego in relation to the ego and not upon the correlative autochthonous organization of the total noematic field.

In the same vein, while Schutz has nothing I have noticed which is like Gurwitsch's notion of "sphere of life," I do find an "egological equivalent,'" as it were, in one of his discussions of interest:

> The interests I have in the same situation as a father, a citizen, a member of my church or of my profession, may not only be different but even incompatible with one another. I have, then, to decide which of these disparate interests I must choose in order to define the situation from which to start further inquiry. This choice will state the problem or set the goal in respect to which the world we are living in and our knowledge of it are distributed in zones of various relevance. (II 125)

Hence, the specification of everyday life is also intelligible in Schutzian terms.

So far I have been presenting Schutz's theory of ego-relevance in its early form. In 1947, now know from the publication of *Reflections on the Problem of Relevance,* he began to distinguish three sorts of relevance, the "topical" (later called "thematic," possibly under Gurwitsch's influence), the "interpretive," and the "motivational." In the book completed by Professor Luckmann, the articulation is carried further, "'imposed' thematic relevance," for example, coming to have four subspecies. For my purposes here, however, it will suffice merely to follow Schutz's late essay "Some Structures of the Life-World."

Things taken for granted can be put in question, in which case the problem arises against an unquestioned background. As we know, interest determines what is selected from the pregiven world and from one's stock of knowledge at hand. Thus the suspect's slowing down and turning around and the detective's skillfully inconspicuous behavior are brought together by his interest in continuing the

surveillance. The relevance here is experienced as a motive for defining the situation, presumably as an aspect of the in-order-to-motive, and thus Schutz calls it "motivational relevance." If what is on hand in the way of know-how in the stock of knowledge is adequate, then the situation is defined in an immediate and habitual way. But if there is an experienced lack either in the situation to be defined or in the stock of knowledge at hand, then the item of interest becomes "thematically relevant," i.e., it becomes a problem.

Suppose the suspect has moved in and out of a crowd where there was some confusion, bad illumination, and several other females in similar attire. At the distance the detective is keeping, the suspect was merely distinguished by her clothes, but suddenly the detective cannot be sure he is on the trail of the right person. Moving closer, he recognizes her gait and catches a glimpse of her profile. The problem then disappears with a synthesis of recognition and once more he has his suspect unquestionably in view. Now Schutz believed (III 126) that Gurwitsch's concept of "relevancy" is a special case of his own "thematic relevance." For Gurwitsch, however, as we have seen, there is always a theme in the field of consciousness, whether or not it is problematic or in Schutz's sense "thematically relevant." It would seem that Schutz's "thematic relevance" presupposes thematization in Gurwitsch's sense.

Thus there is no incompatibility between the theories in this regard although Schutz apparently erred in comparing them. Returning to Schutz's account, when what the detective was familiar with about his suspect's typical way of walking and her facial configuration were called upon as a means to solving his problem, they were "interpretationally relevant" for him. What is interpretationally relevant as well as what is thematically relevant is determined by the motivational relevance of the project of following the suspect in order to solve or prevent crimes, in which the detective as such is ultimately interested.

In sum, when we consider the theories of theme-relevancy and ego-relevance of Aron Gurwitsch and Alfred Schutz within Husserl's scheme of *ego—cogito— cogitatum,* we find that they are compatible. Gurwitsch's account of functional objects and life-spheres nicely complements Schutz's account of working and interest. Schutz's description of zones of primary relevance, minor relevance, relative irrelevance, and absolute irrelevance as well as that of motivational, thematic, and interpretive ego-relevances are compatible with Gurwitsch's description of the organization of the field of consciousness into theme, thematic field, and margin.

One is encouraged to undertake further phenomenological investigations by such compatibility, convergence, and complementarity. Furthermore, I hope that I have also shown how social scientists can employ the theories of both men in concrete social research.

Works of Schutz

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Chapter 13
Schutz on Social Groups

Each of us is a member of the group into which he was born or which he has joined and which can continue to exist if some of its members die and others enter into it. Everywhere there will be systems of kinship, age groups and sex groups, differentiations according to occupations, and an organization of power and command which leads to the categories of social status and prestige. (I 330)

Introduction

Alfred Schutz first presented his analysis of the meaning structure of the social world in his masterpiece, *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt* (1932), which is named after it, presented it repeatedly during the nearly thirty years of his literary productivity, and in the late essay, "Symbol, Reality, and Society" (1955), nicely restated it:

> We have … to indicate that the face-to-face relationship characterized so far is only one, although the most central, dimension of the social world. If we compare it with the world within my actual reach, we can also find dimensions in the social world comparable to the various forms of the world within my potential reach. There is the world of my contemporaries, with whom I am not biographically involved in a face-to-face relationship, but with whom I have in common a sector of time which makes it possible for me to act upon them as they may act upon me within a communicative environment of mutual motivation. (In primitive societies in which the souls of the deceased are supposed to participate in the social life of the group, the dead are deemed to be contemporaries.) There is the world of my predecessors, upon whom I cannot act but whose past actions and their outcome are open to my interpretation and may influence my own actions; and there is the world of my successors of whom no experience is possible, but toward whom I may orient my actions in more or less empty anticipation. It is characteristic of all the dimensions of the social world other than the face-to-face relation that I cannot grasp my fellow-men as unique individuals but only experience their typical behavior, their typical pattern of motives and attitudes in increasing anonymity. (I 318)

Embedded citations refer to works of Schutz that are listed at the end of this chapter.

This set of claims is about the social world in Schutz's wide signification, which, because of the inclusion of predecessors, is better called "the socio-historical world" (an expression he unfortunately does not use), while the expression "social world" in the narrow signification is best reserved for the world exclusively of what he calls contemporaries. The latter is the region of the social sciences in the narrow signification, while the former is the wider region of the cultural sciences, which, in addition to the specifically social sciences, subsumes the specifically historical sciences, art history and no doubt archaeology included, and psychology is also implicitly a cultural science (see Chap. 6 above).

Although the understanding and/or influencing of individual others by an individual self is fundamental to Schutz's analysis of the socio-historical world, another scattered and somewhat implicit but nevertheless more fundamental perspective is possible. Thus, he ends "Some Equivocations in the Notion of Responsibility" (1957) with some recognition of relations among groups:

> The preceding remarks dealt with the dialectic of the subjective and objective meaning of laws, values, morals, and responsibility merely from the point of view of the individual. But the same dialectic recurs on the level of group relations. Adopting Sumner's classical distinction between in-group and out-group, it can be said that "responsibility," for example, has a different meaning if an in-group acknowledges responsibility for its acts and holds some of its members responsible, or if an out-group makes the in-group and its members responsible for its misdeeds. It is one thing if, in the Nuremberg trials, the Nazi leaders were held responsible by the Allied Powers, and quite another thing if they were held answerable by the German people. (II 276)

If Schutz is thus willing to speak of groups, one can wonder if a group of some sort can serve as a *collective subject* and function like the self in the structure of individuals and one can also wonder if groups of others can then be related to by such a "subject" in ways analogous to how individual consociates, contemporaries, predecessors, and successors are related to by an individual self.

Schutz sometimes seems loath to pursue this possibility, at least in the way in which Edmund Husserl did:

> The assumption that communicating subjects constitute personal unities of a higher order, social subjectivities (collectivities) which have as their environment the world of social and cultural objects is entirely unclarified. Does this theory have its root in Hegel or Durkheim or the "organic" school of social sciences (Wundt, for instance) ruling in Germany at the beginning of the century? Or in Rudolf Gierke's legal theory of the *"Sozialer Verband"* (a term persistently used by Husserl)? The attempts of Simmel, Max Weber, [and] Scheler to reduce social collectivities to the social interaction of individuals is, so it seems, closer to the spirit of phenomenology than the pertinent statements of its founder. (III 38, cf. III 80)

How does Schutz's position nevertheless include social collectivities or groups? Three points need to be made before this question can be pursued. In the first place, while most of Schutz's writings are about individuals, he does—as above—discuss groups of at least contemporaries, which he already in his *Aufbau* calls "social collectives":

> This large class contains ideal types of quite different degrees of anonymity. The board of directors of a given corporation or the United States Senate are relatively concrete ideal types, and the number of other ideal types which they presuppose is quite limited. But we

frequently use sentences in which ideal types like "the state," "the press," "the economy," "the nation," "the people," or perhaps "the working class" appear as grammatical subjects. In doing this, we naturally tend to personify these abstractions, treating them as if they were real persons known in indirect social experience. But we are indulging in anthropomorphism. Actually these ideal types are absolutely anonymous. (PSW 198, cf. I 353 & III 39)

Secondly, "Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social World" (1955) shows that members of groups can share or hold subjective meanings in common:

> [T]he subjective meaning the group has for its members consists in their knowledge of a common situation, and with it of a common system of typifications and relevances. This situation has its history in which the individual members … are "at home," that is, they find their bearings without difficulty in the common surroundings, guided by a set of recipes of more or less institutionalized habits, mores, folkways, etc., that help them come to terms with beings and fellow-men belonging to the same situation. The system of typifications and relevances shared with the other members of the group defines the social roles, positions, and statuses of each. (II 251, cf. II 236)

More will be said about "being at home" presently. Now it may be added that social groups have not only subjective but also objective meanings, i.e., they are interpreted from without by outsiders as well as from within by insiders:

> The objective meaning of group membership is that which the group has from the point of view of outsiders who speak of its members in terms of "They." In objective interpretation the notion of the group is a conceptual construct of the outsider. By the operation of *his* system of typifications and relevances he subsumes individuals showing certain particular characteristics and traits under a social category that is homogeneous merely from his, the outsider's, point of view. (II 254)

It is important, furthermore, to recognize that Schutz accepts from the social science of his time the distinction between "existential" and "voluntary" groups:

> I cannot choose my sex and race, nor my place of birth, and, therewith, the national group into which I was born; neither can I choose the mother tongue I learned or the conception of the world taken for granted by the group with which I was indoctrinated during childhood. I cannot choose my parents and siblings, or the social and economic status of my parental family. My membership in these groups and the social roles I have to assume within them are existential elements of my situation which I have to take into account, and with which I have to come to terms.—On the other hand, I may choose my spouse, my friends, business partners, my occupation, change my nationality and even my religion. I may voluntarily become a member of existing groups or originate new ones (friendships, marital relations), determine at least to a certain extent the roles I want to assume within them, and even make some efforts to attain by my achievements that kind of position and status within them toward which I aspire. (II 250)

Thus, not only are there groups of at least two kinds with multiple sorts within them and not only are there outsider as well as insider perspectives on them, but the members of groups also share definitions of their common situations. The fact that we can be members of many groups, some of them voluntary, ought not to obscure the truth that *we always already are members of some groups or others*. And this is something not always clear in the social world merely considered a structure of individuals.

Thirdly, while one might think that Schutz considers the individuals to be concreta out of which various collectiva are assembled, his position is actually the

opposite. The individual is an abstractum abstracted from concrete collective life and, it would follow, the structure of the social world as a structure of individuals rests on an abstraction and is thus abstract. He once writes of a "fictitious abstraction" by which one can consider "the insulated stream of consciousness of the single individual," continuing, "as if the wide-awake man within the natural attitude could be thought of as separated from his fellow-men" (I 218, cf. I 167), and also writes repeatedly of "a supposedly isolated individual" (V 193 & I 347). This is of course how he proceeds in Part II of the *Aufbau* and elsewhere (see Chap. 6). Furthermore, he remarks that,

> we proceeded … as if the world were my private world and as if we were entitled to disregard the fact that it is from the outset an intersubjective world… because we live in it as men among other men, bound to them through common influence and work, understanding others and being understood by them. (I 10, cf. I 53, I 306, & V 169)

The practice of many social scientists to speak of "members" rather than "individuals" thus seems appropriate and Schutz himself mentions membership in a quotation above.

The question of the present chapter can be refined: Does the concrete sociohistorical world have a structure of groups analogous to the structure of abstract individuals as selves understanding and/or influencing their consociates, contemporaries, predecessors, and successors?

An answer to this question can be developed beginning from a passage in a posthumously published manuscript where he begins with contemporaries in not the narrowest signification, but soon goes on the use that signification:

> We are concerned exclusively with the world of contemporaries. It consists in a kernel of situations in which the individuals participate in what might be called a face-to-face relationship in the sense that the participants share a sector of space and live together [during] a stretch of time. In other words, each participant knows the other and they act reciprocally one upon the other individual…. This group of consocii is surrounded by various layers of contemporaries characterized by increasing social distance and anonymity…. In many cases the individual is even unable to think of the others who will influence him in terms of individual human beings (management, labor, the Democratic party, etc.).[1]

This passage at the end merely repeats what was quoted from the *Aufbau* above whereby there are groups of anonymous contemporaries beyond the region of consociates. But Schutz quickly goes on in this manuscript to write that "[i]n the group[s] of consocii (family, congregation, local town hall meeting, local professional group) the individual may talk to individuals, answer questions in immediacy, argue in vivid discussion."

By the passage quoted above from II 250 (emphasis now added), such "*groups of consocii*" would seem also to include marriages and partnerships and, as also shown below, friendships and thus can have as few as two members. Furthermore

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[1] Schutz ms. from 1956 edited by Lester Embree in "The Ethical-Political Side of Schutz: His Contributions of the 1956 Institute on Ethics concerned with Barriers to Equality of Opportunity," in Lester Embree, ed., *Schutzian Social Science* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999), 270.

and strictly speaking, such groups are made up of "consociates" only when the members are meeting fact-to-face and also, in the groups mentioned, when they meet on a repeating basis. In "The Homecomer" (1945), Schutz accepts from the social sciences of his time to call such repeatedly meeting consocial collectivities "primary groups":

> A marriage, a friendship, a family group, [or] a kindergarten, does not consist of a permanent, a strictly continuous, primary face-to-face relationship but rather a series of merely intermittent face-to-face relationships. More precisely, the so-called "primary groups" are institutionalized situations which make it possible to re-establish the interrupted we-relation and to continue where it was broken off last time. (II 110)

"Life at home," alluded to above, is then life in actual or potential primary groups:

> It means to have in common with others a section of space and time, and therewith surrounding objects as possible ends and means, and interests based upon [them] as underlying [a] more or less homogeneous system of relevances; it means, furthermore, that the partners in a primary relationship experience one another as unique personalities in a vivid present, by following their unfolding thought as an ongoing occurrence and by sharing, therefore, their anticipations of the future as plans, as hopes or as anxieties; it means, finally, that each of them has the chance to re-establish the we-relation, if interrupted, and to continue as if no intermittence had occurred. (Idem, cf. PSW 179 on primary relationships)

Where might such a primary group be located in a structure of groups analogous to the structure of abstracted individuals emphasized by Schutz from the outset? It may go beyond the letter of Schutz but is still in his spirit to say that, *when meeting face-to-face*, a group of consociates can be analogous to the I or self in the social structure of individuals. One might then speak of this subject as a "We." Such an actualized primary group would then have the collective standpoint from which there could most originally be shared meanings or interpretations, self-interpretations included, from which inwardly as well as outwardly directed influence can be exercised.

Next, if the group of consociates that is meeting face-to-face, e.g., a family at the dinner table, is analogous to the individual self, then perhaps other such primary groups, e.g., other families met at a picnic and called "Theys," or perhaps, because of the direct contact, "Thou groups" (not Schutz's expression), might be analogous to the individual consociates in the structure of individuals. After all, such other primary groups can have their own collective internal lives of mutual understanding and interaction when members meet, each group has a common situation that it defines and interprets, these common situations have then shared subjective meanings, and such groups are furthermore both in-groups in relation to other groups as out-groups and vice versa, i.e., We-groups and They-groups, Thou-groups included. Finally, as the examples offered show, these primary groups can be of both the existential and the voluntary kinds.

That a group of others thus has its actual or potential collective internal life is not sufficient, however, for it to be, so to speak, in the face-to-face situation of a "Thou-group" (Schutz only speaks of "We-groups" and generally of "They-groups"). It is also necessary that the collective analogs of the individual I and Thou directly share space as well as time and that the primary We-group be thus able to seek *directly*

to understand and influence a primary Thou-group, which modes of direct relating might then be reciprocated. Although perhaps not frequently for the primary groups Schutz mentions, this does happen essentially in a football game, where the field and playing time are shared and each team is a We-group against what can be called a Thou-group, and this is to say nothing about the large numbers of fans in the stands. (The enjoyment of such an actualized social relationship of mutual orientation and interaction of groups may thus be essential to sports for spectators as well as players.)

If it is amended to refer not only to groups but also to have a football jointly focused on by two teams like that a flying bird is by two individuals, the following description would then include the We-Thou group collective analog of an I relating to an individual consociate.

> While the face-to-face relationship lasts we are mutually involved in one another's biographical situation: we are growing old together. We have indeed a common environment and common experiences of the events within it. I and you [or a We and a Thou group], *We* see the flying bird [or the rolling ball]. And the occurrence of the bird's flight [or the ball's roll] as an event in outer (public) time is simultaneous with our perceiving it, which is an event in our inner (private) time[s]. The two fluxes of inner time, yours and mine [or ours and collectively "thine"], become synchronous with the event in outer time (bird's flight [or ball's roll]) and therewith one with the other. (I 317, amended)

Can the analogy of a structure of groups to the structure of individuals be extended further? In the same time but not sharing space there clearly are groups of contemporaries for Schutz, e.g., the Democratic Party, which are formed of more anonymous ideal types than a typical religious congregation between meetings in church, temple, or mosque. If such groups of contemporaries can be indirectly understood and influenced by an actualized primary group, e.g., the local town hall meeting in session, then the analogy continues to hold.

What of predecessors? In the structure of individuals, a predecessor for Schutz is ultimately an individual who has died before the self in question engages in attempts at understanding her. For groups, there are indeed always already "dead" groups that can be considered predecessor groups. The problem here concerns how other groups might cease to be. A family, for example, can be considered an existential group that extends indefinitely into the past and, if it does not die out, continues indefinitely into the future. In that signification of "family," one would not often speak of predecessor and successor families, but of generations within a family.

Then again, one might think of a society of nuclear families in which a mother, perhaps also a father, and children are a new nuclear family succeeding that in which at least the mother grew up and it might itself be succeeded when her children had children of their own. In this signification, there is no need for the "predecessor" groups to die in order to be predecessors, but they might still be understood to have changed fundamentally when children go out and have families of their own, although three-generation families are not unusual when grandparents live long enough. Unilateral and reciprocal understanding and influencing, which could occur face-to-face at family gatherings, would differ with the generations involved, grandparents and grandchildren included, but all would be contemporaries and only literally deceased nuclear families would be predecessors.

There are also difficulties for Schutz's voluntary groups, including groups that are formed of groups. To be sure, whether simple or compound groups, they can in effect be "born" not only *ab ovo*, so to speak, but also through mergers or acquisitions of what might then be considered predecessor groups that ceased to exist when the new group was "born" and can be related to by the new group as understandable but not influenceable. Moreover, voluntary groups can also "die" through all of their individual members literally dying or simply through the disbanding of the group.

Unborn successor groups can be theorized about analogously.

It might seem better simply to say that the socio-historical world contains many groups of various kinds and sorts that are simultaneous or successive and do or do not directly or indirectly understand and/or influence one another, but it is more Schutzian and more phenomenological to consider how a group can most originally be a group, i.e., a primary group of members meeting face to face, how such a We-group can understand and/or influence other groups, "Thou groups" to begin with, and correlatively have another group or groups in some way or ways understand and/or influence them.

In sum, adjustments being made for how, metaphorically speaking, groups can "live" and "be born" as well as "die," the analogy between the socio-cultural world as a structure of abstract individuals and as a structure of concrete groups holds and can be considered Schutzian in spirit even if somewhat beyond his letter. Moreover, while the social world as a structure of individuals emphasized by Schutz is based on an abstraction, one in which a member's group memberships are abstracted from, the structure of groups in collective life is concrete and thus fundamental. It may even be considered to be what needs ultimately to be clarified beginning from abstracted individuals.

Works of Schutz

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Chapter 14
Meaning in Schutz

Max Weber has shown that all phenomena of the socio-cultural world originate in social interaction and can be referred to it. According to him, it is the central task of sociology to understand the meaning which the actor bestows on his action (the "subjective meaning" in his terminology). But what is action, what is meaning, and how is understanding of such meaning by a fellow-man possible, be he a partner of the social interaction, or merely an observer in everyday life, or a social scientist? I submit that any attempt to answer these questions leads immediately to questions with which Husserl was concerned and which he has to a certain extent solved. (I 145)

Introduction

For Alfred Schutz, the cultural sciences are about cultural objects in the broad signification and it is of the nature of such objects for Schutz to have meaning:

> [The world] is a world of culture because, from the outset, the world of everyday life is a universe of significance to us, that is, a *texture of meaning* which we have to interpret in order to find our bearings within it and come to terms with it. This *texture of meaning,* however—and this distinguishes the realm of culture from that of nature—originates in and has been instituted by human actions, our own and our fellow-men's, contemporaries and predecessors. All cultural objects—tools, symbols, language systems, works of art, social institutions, etc.—point back by their very origin and meaning to the activities of human subjects. For this reason we are always conscious of the historicity of culture which we encounter in traditions and customs. (I 10, emphasis added, cf. I 123 f., & II 229)

What is the problem of the science theory or methodology of the cultural sciences of concern in this chapter? Early on, Schutz asserted clearly that "*All social sciences are objective meaning-contexts of subjective meaning-contexts*" (PSW 241, "meaning-context" translating *Sinnzusammenhang*), but later he asserts that "[t]he thought objects constructed by the social scientists refer to and are founded upon the thought objects constructed by the common-sense thought of man living his everyday life

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Embedded citations refer to works of Schutz that are listed at the end of this chapter.

among his fellows" (I 6). "Construct" appears synonymous then with "type" and some phenomena, beginning with actions, can have "meaning" that is synonymous with "construct" and "type," but other phenomena, especially those designated "essentially actual experiences," are not meaningful in that way for those in whose lives they occur. Does a tacit distinction between "meaning" in two different significations run through Schutz's thought and need to be clarified?

An example may help the following exposition. In many societies there are shoemaker's shops where shoes are sold as well as made or at least repaired. This is a two-sided situation. On the one side, one or more people are involved in the production, distribution, or repair of shoes. On the other side, there are customers who interact with the salespersons. Suppose the customers being served in a given case include a young widow with two children. Suppose further that there is an economist or a social psychologist observing the interactions of the participants in this situation.

Initially, the scientist expects to observe a typical small-shop interaction with the roles of salesman and customer being performed. But in this case something seems unusual about how the mother and salesman look at and speak to one another. Outside the shop afterwards, the scientist approaches the widow, manages to gain her confidence, and learns that she did not go to the shop to buy shoes. Rather, she had met the salesman socially, thought romance was possible, and wanted him to know of her children before anything further developed between them. Her purposes were matrimonial, not commercial, and, since the salesman seemed undismayed at her children and they seemed to like him, a phase of her action was completed in the shop. The categories "construct," "type," "meaning," etc. can be discussed in relation to this case.

Constructs and Perception

The question of the difference between the cultural and the natural sciences is prominent in phenomenological theory of science. Its omission from most Anglo-American discussions is a surrender to Positivism. How does Schutz contrast these kinds of science? In his "Princeton paper," i.e., "Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action" (1953), he writes,

> If, according to this view, all scientific constructs are designed to supersede the constructs of common-sense thought, then a principle difference between the natural and the social sciences becomes apparent. It is up to the natural scientists to determine which sector of the universe of nature, which facts and events therein, and which aspects of such facts and events are topically and interpretationally relevant to their specific purpose. These facts and events are neither preselected nor preinterpreted; they do not reveal intrinsic relevance structures.—But the facts, events, and data before the social scientist are of an entirely different structure. His observational field, the social world, is not essentially structureless. It has a particular meaning and relevance structure for the human beings living, thinking, and acting therein. They have preselected and preinterpreted this world by a series of common-sense constructs of the reality of daily life, and it is these thought-objects which determine their behavior, define the goal of their action, the means available for attaining them—in

brief, which help them to find their bearings within their natural and socio-cultural environment and to come to terms with it. The thought objects constructed by the social scientists refer to and are founded upon the thought objects constructed by the common-sense thought of man living his everyday life among his fellow-men.[1]

"Thought object," a literary allusion to Alfred North Whitehead, is also synonymous with "construct" and occurs elsewhere, but can be ignored here. But Schutz's use of "type" and "meaning" invites pondering. Aron Gurwitsch was quite sympathetic with his friend's Princeton paper, but challenges the

> very free use you make of *constructs,* doing so on the *common-sense level*…. What you write… sounds to me… as if we have the things and then in addition, a *texture of meaning,* whose interpretation is added to the perception, or, if that is too pointed, permeates the perception but as an operation which is distinct from it.[2]

Schutz responds that "in the social sciences there is the increasing tendency to replace the concepts of type and ideal type by the concept of 'construct'" and that "I by no means think that the sense-structure is something additional to the perception of the thing…. What I call "construct" of course belongs to the facts and data themselves…. As you put it, everything that is given is already permeated by sense structures" (*Correspondence* 176).

Are the sense structures of the objects of perception one thing and the interpretive constructs another? Gurwitsch is alluding to the section opposing "Husserl's dualistic theory of perception" in his *The Field of Consciousness*, which Schutz was reading in manuscript at the time. This is the theory of *hylē* and *morphē* whereby "[c]oncerning perception, the duality is between sense-impressions, the raw materials of sensation, and specific acts of apprehension, interpretation, objectivation, and apperception."[3]

Gurwitsch objects that the hyletic data and the noetic form or bestowed meaning alleged by Husserl are not concretely separable in perception and instead follows Gestalt psychology in developing a new account of inherently structured perceptual objects as they present themselves.

Schutz seems to mention hyletic data only three times:

> We have known ever since Husserl's *Ideas* that meaning-endowment is the act wherein pure sense experiences ("hyletic data") are "animated." What in a cursory glance we see as meaningful has already been constituted as such by a previous intentional operation of our consciousness. (PSW 35, cf. III 42 & Correspondence 169)

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[1] (I 5) While the derivation of the nature of the naturalistic sciences from the cultural world is not at issue in this chapter, the following passage nevertheless deserves quotation: "The concept of Nature, for instance, with which the natural sciences have to deal is, as Husserl has shown, an idealizing abstraction from the Lebenswelt, an abstraction which, on principle and of course legitimately, excludes persons with their personal life and all objects of culture which originate as such in practical human activity. Exactly this layer of the Lebenswelt, however, from which the natural sciences have to abstract, is the social reality which the social sciences have to investigate" (I 58).

[2] Aron Gurwitsch and Alfred Schutz, *Philosophers in Exile. The Correspondence of Alfred Schutz and Aron Gurwitsch, 1939–1959,* ed. Richard Grathoff and trans. J. Claude Evans (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1989, 173). Hereafter: *Correspondence*.

[3] Aron Gurwitsch, *The Field of Consciousness* (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1964), p. 268.

This Husserlian doctrine still plays a role without being named in *Reflections on the Problem of Relevance* even though Schutz acknowledges at the outset that he has Gurwitsch's theory of the field of consciousness "in mind" (V 94). He seems initially to recognize a structureless sensuous field upon which "prepredicative interpretation" works:

> We have to choose within the perceptual field those elements which may become… thematic and subject to "interpretations." Such interpretations do not necessarily have the form of predicative judgments. The passive syntheses of recognition, similarity, identity, dissimilarity, likeness, and so on, are interpretative events happening in the prepredicative sphere. The recognition of an object as the same or as the same but modified, or the recognition of its modification, are the outcome of such prepredicative syntheses. (V 101)

Gurwitsch must have been shocked to read his friend then write: "The Gestaltist, too, assumes as given an unstructured common field and seeks to prove that by an act of interpretation the selective capacity of the mind structurizes this field into what is background and what stands out… from such a background." (V 105) But he must have been happy further along to read that

> [i]t was… a merely pedagogical but entirely unrealistic assumption when we spoke in some places in the preceding pages of an "unarticulated" field of consciousness which by experiencing topical relevances may be structured into thematic kernel and horizonal material. Thematic structure, in other words, is essential to consciousness; that is, *there is always a theme within the field of consciousness…*. (V 112, cf. III 98, and, for the earlier position, cf. also PSW 42 and Chap. 12 above).

The perceptual field always already has at least a theme/thematic field structure for Schutz as well as for Gurwitsch, although the latter also recognizes the margin. Moreover, Gurwitsch certainly recognized operations of thinking based on perceptual objects. Thus, while there may still be disagreement between the friends about what all is due to interpretation, what perceptual structures underlie the operations of recognition, etc., matters that do not need to be pursued here, Schutz was able to deny to his friend that he was a dualist for whom all structure in perceptual objects comes from intellectual operations. How this might relate to the widow with children in the shoe shop will be returned to presently.

"Constructs = Types"

Schutz also indicated in his response to Gurwitsch that he was accepting "construct" as a synonym for "type and ideal type." On this basis, what he says about types can be combined with remarks about constructs and the artificial expression "construct = type" can be used here for critical purposes.[4]

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[4] Schutz continued used "construct" to the end of his life, including in his sabbatical proposal for 1958–1959: "The observational field of the social scientist thus is the world of cultural objects and social institutions into which we are all born, within which we have to find our bearings, and with which we have to come to terms. This world—our *Lebenswelt*—has particular meaning and relevance structure to us human beings living, thinking, and acting therein. We have pre-selected and

Ideal types are resorted to by Schutz from the beginning:

> These considerations had to use the linguistic conceptual means in order to approach the phenomena of experience. Therefore, they had to resort to an auxiliary device. They constructed a series of ideal types—forms of consciousness or of life reaching from pure simple duration to conceptual thinking in the world of space and time (thus, in the actual realm of the experience of "science"); all experiencing takes place in them. We constructed these ideal types for mere practical reasons. The erection of such auxiliary constructions is justified if it produces usable results. No science can say more in justification of its method. (VI 76)

The construct = types of common-sense thinking can be called "first level constructs" and those of social-scientific thinking are called "second-level constructs" (I 62). Both levels of thinking can be described in similar terms: "All our knowledge of the world, in common-sense as well as in scientific thinking, involves constructs, i.e., a set of abstractions, generalizations, formalizations, idealizations specific to the respective level of thought organization" (I 5, cf. I 58).

And if one follows Schutz in recognizing common-sense constructs = types similar to scientific constructs = types, then one must recognize that there are personal types, attitude types, relationship types, group types, product types, situation types, course-of-action (and interaction) types, etc. on *both levels*. And constructs = types can be of increasing generality (I 7) as well as of increasing specificity and even particularity (V 96).

> How and from where is the vast bulk of constructs = types acquired in everyday life? Typification is indeed that form of abstraction which leads to the more or less standardized, yet more or less vague, conceptualization of common-sense thinking and to the necessary ambiguity of the terms of the ordinary vernacular. This is because our experience, even in… the prepredicative sphere, is organized from the outset under certain types. The small child who learns his mother tongue is at an early age capable of recognizing an animal as a dog or a bird or a fish, an element of his surroundings as a stone or a tree or a mountain, a piece of furniture as a table or a chair…. [T]he typification required for sufficient standardization is provided by the vocabulary and the syntactical structure of the ordinary vernacular of the mother tongue. (I 323)

The salesman and the mother thus have the means by which to describe their interaction, i.e., with constructs = types, but how is it that what they can thus describe is originally meaningful?

What Does "Meaning" Mean for Schutz?

Besides "construct" and "type," there is another word regularly used by Schutz in the same or related ways, namely: "meaning." Some passages show the relations of constructs = types with meaning:

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pre-interpreted this world by a series of common-sense constructs of the reality of daily life and it is these thought-objects which determine our behavior, define the goal of our actions, the means available for attaining them and so forth. The thought-objects constructed by the social sciences in order to grasp this social reality have to be founded upon the thought-objects constructed by the common-sense thinking of men, living their daily life within the social world" (IV 72).

> [T]ypification depends on my problem at hand for the definition and solution of which the type has been formed. It can be further shown that that at least one aspect of the biographically and situationally determined systems of interests and relevances is subjectively experienced in the thinking of everyday life as systems of motives for action, of choices to be made, of projects to be carried out, of goals to be reached. It is this insight of the actor into the dependencies of the motives and goals of his actions upon the biographically determined situation which social scientists have in view when speaking of the *subjective meaning* which the actor "bestows upon" or "connects with" his action. This implies that, strictly speaking, the actor and he alone knows what he does, why he does it, and when and where his action starts and ends. (I 60, emphasis added)

Husserl's theory of meaning bestowal has been referred to above. Schutz occasionally uses the expression (e.g., I 254), but does not clarify his usage. "Connects with" alludes, however, to Max Weber's phrase, "understanding of the subjectively intended meaning that the actor connects with his action," which as early as 1930 Schutz considers merely a "linguistic metaphor" (IV 84).

As mentioned, Schutz early on held that cultural science seeks to produces objective meaning contexts about subjective meaning contexts, and later writes such passages as "The scientific constructs learned on the second level … are objective ideal typical constructs and, as such, of a different kind from those developed on the first level of common-sense thinking which they have to supersede" (I 63). In the first passages quoted in this chapter, the cultural world is said to be a "texture of meaning." A late essay of 1955 includes "the meaning-structure of the social world" in its very title (I 226), probably Schutz's preference for an English translation of part of the title of *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozial Welt* (1932), and expressions such as "meaning-context" (V 144) and "complex of meaning" (II 11) also occur. Meaning is a central category for the cultural sciences. Whether or not "construct = type" is synonymous with "meaning" is now the issue.

Does "meaning" have one or more than one meaning or, better, signification for Schutz? Concerning meaning, it can be asked not only what it is in general but also what its species are. Where the species are concerned, three distinctions are fundamental and some further terminological modifications in the spirit but beyond the letter of Schutz can be ventured.

First there is the crucial distinction between "subjective meaning" and "objective meaning," which expressions came to bother Schutz:

> It was Max Weber who made this distinction the cornerstone of his methodology. Subjective meaning, in this sense, is the meaning which an action has for the actor or which a relation or situation has for the person or persons involved therein; objective meaning is the meaning the same action, relation, or situation has for anybody else, be it a partner or observer in everyday life, the social scientist, or the philosopher. The terminology is unfortunate because the term "objective meaning" is obviously a misnomer, insofar as the so-called "objective" interpretations are, in turn, relative to the particular attitudes of the interpreters and, therefore, in a certain sense "subjective." (II 275)

Schutz maintains "terminological discipline" (II 227) in continuing to use Weber's terms later in the essay just quoted from relating the subjective and objective meaning of equal opportunity to subjective and objective interpretation (II 269). Responsibility is similarly dealt with (II 274 ff.), familiarity also has a subjective meaning

(V 108 & 128), etc. And in his review of the book, *Grundlegung der Lehre vom sozialen Verband* (1932), by his Japanese friend, Tomoo Otaka, he writes: "The achievement of the ideal-typical method is embodied precisely in finding an access to contexts of meaning by disclosing the subjective meanings of this or that actor—contexts of meaning to which the actor is oriented in the sense of 'meanings for everyone,' in short, as objective meanings" (IV 206).

The qualifiers "subjective" and "objective" have undesirable connotations in English with respect to cognitive reliability, so the qualifiers "insider" and "outsider" might be better. These can be adjectives as well as nouns. Thus there are insider and outsider meanings, types, or constructs and also insider and outsider understanding and interpretation on the common-sense, cultural-scientific, and both of the science-theoretical levels, i.e., the philosophical as well as the scientific.

One of the connotations of "subjective" is individual or personal, but then the further new qualifiers "personal" (or "individual") and also "collective" (or "communal") can be ventured on the basis of the passage just quoted from the Otaka review. Again, several levels need to be distinguished, depending on the various forms of typification of structures of relevance, of subjective and objective interpretations of the situation from the points of view of in-groups and out-groups and from the points of view of individuals.[5] (The expressions "in-group" and "out-group" fit nicely with "insider" and "outsider.")

The salesman as such would belong to the in-group of workers in the shoe shop and the mother and her children would form another in-group and each such group, which would be an out-group for the other group and could have outsider interpretations, perhaps the workers agreeing that the widow is attractive and the family agreeing that the salesman is nice. While collective meaning needs to be mentioned for completeness and contrast (see Chap. 12), the personal insider and outsider interpretations will be focal here.

The third major distinction of species of meaning may be the one that is the least well appreciated by scholars but is the most crucial for the present chapter. Schutz writes:

> Applied to music, the terms, "meaning" and "context," "understanding" and "interpretation," are used… in a specific way which is different from other meaningful systems such as languages. To be sure, language is also a meaningful context. Each term within the system of a particular language has its specific semantic functions. Each term is a symbol of the concept which it conveys, and the concept itself refers to the real or ideal objects of our thoughts, to the qualities of these objects, to what happens to them with or without our interference….—Music is an instance of a meaningful context without reference to a conceptual scheme and, strictly speaking, without immediate reference to the objects of the world in which we live, without reference to the properties and functions of these objects. Music does not have a representative function. (Musical notation, of course, does have a representative function.) Neither a piece of music, nor a single theme, has a semantic character. (IV 243–44)

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[5] (IV 150) Cf. "[T]he relation between in-group and out-group interpretation or, if you prefer, between subjective and objective interpretation in Max Weber's sense" (IV 226). Concerning in-groups themselves, see, to begin with, II 99 and II 230.

In terms again beyond the letter of Schutz, this difference can be expressed as between "referential meaning" and "non-referential meaning," expressions not found in Schutz. The sense-structures of perceptual objects that Gurwitsch and Schutz agreed on would be non-referentially meaningful. In contrast, "construct = type" appears synonymous with referential meaning.

What else can be said about non-referential meaning?

> A musical theme, however simple or complicated, is as a whole a meaningful unit without any conceptual reference. It nevertheless has its articulations, its stretches of flight and its resting points, the correct determination of which the musician calls "phrasing." By means of this articulation, the theme can be and for the most part is broken down into meaningful subunits which as such can be recognized, and in many musical forms it furnishes the material of the "development" of the theme. But one cannot break down the theme into meaningful subunits by arbitrarily selecting simply any group of successive notes of the theme. It can be broken down only at the "modal points" provided by its immanent articulation. (V 147)

This passage connects, plainly, with what Schutz discussed about the Princeton paper with Gurwitsch, for it asserts an immanent articulation to music upon which recognition, the first operation of prepredicative interpretation, can work. While referential meaning seems synonymous with construct = type, non-referential meaning does not. *"Meaning" then seems to have a broad signification under which types or constructs form but one species.*

This difference would also seem reflected in how it is not possible for the non-referential meaning of a musical work to be grasped:

> The meaning of a musical work, however, is essentially of a polythetic structure. It cannot be grasped monothetically. It consists in the articulated step-by-step occurrence in inner time, in the very polythetic constitutional process itself. I may give a name to a specific piece of music, calling it "Moonlight Sonata" or "Ninth Symphony"; I may even say, "These were variations with a finale in the form of a passacaglia," or characterize, as certain program notes are prone to do, the particular mood or emotion this piece of music is supposed to have evoked in me. But the musical content itself, its very meaning, can be grasped merely by reimmersing oneself in the ongoing flux, by reproducing thus the articulated musical occurrence as it unfolds in polythetic steps in inner time, a process itself belonging to the dimension of inner time. (II 172)

Schutz is of course interested in more than music:

> The chief interest of our analysis consists in the particular character of all social interactions connected with the musical process: they are doubtless meaningful to the actor as well as the addressee, but this meaning structure is not capable of being expressed in conceptual terms; they are founded upon communication, but not *primarily* upon a semantic system used by the communicator as a scheme of expression and by his partner as a scheme of interpretation. (II 159)

Other forms of non-referentially meaningful social interaction mentioned by Schutz include "marching together, dancing together, making love together, or making music together" (II 162). What the scientific observer in the shoe shop sensed as unusual about the interaction between the salesman and the widow and what at least the widow was watching for may have subtly related to the second mentioned of these forms, i.e., non-referential meaning.

Finally, if the contrast of construct = type = referential meaning, on the one hand, and non-referential meaning, on the other hand, is reflected in the following passage, then insider and outsider non-referential meanings also occur in opera:

> Mozart does not merely communicate to us, the beholders, the objective meaning that the situation has within the context of the plot…. He shows us, in addition, the different meanings that the same situation has to each of the characters involved in it. He makes us understand that to each of them the presence and the behavior of the others are elements of his own situation; and he reveals to us the specific springs of action by which each character acts within and reacts to the situation. This situation itself may be just a typified frame for the events on the stage, and even the attitude of each of the persons involved therein may be merely a typified one. Yet in Mozart's hands such a typified situation becomes unique and concrete, individual and atypical by the particular meaning it has for each of the participant persons. (II 195)

"Essentially Actual Experiences"

The situation for the widow (and for the shoe salesman she has her eye on) can be recognized also to have particular non-referential meanings with inherent meaning structure not due to interpretation even though of course subsequently interpretable. To see this, however, the subjective meaning of actions needs to be explored further. In his first essay written in the USA, Schutz characterizes cultural-scientific research:

> In such a case the answer to the question "What does this social world mean for me the observer?" requires as a prerequisite the answering of the quite different questions "What does this social world mean for the observed actor within this world and what did he mean by his acting within it?" In putting our questions thus, we no longer naively accept the social world and its current idealizations and formalizations as ready-made and meaningful beyond all question, but we undertake to study the process of idealizing and formalizing as such, the genesis of the meaning which social phenomena have for us as well as for the actors, the mechanism of the activity by which human beings understand one another and themselves (II 7).

"Meaning" here is *not* the non-referential and immanently structured antecedent of recognition and other operations of even prepredicative interpretation, but rather the referential meaning = type = construct.

> Meaning … is not a quality inherent in certain experiences emerging within our stream of consciousness but the result of an interpretation of a past experience looked at from the present Now with a reflective attitude. As long as I live *in* my acts, directed toward the objects of these acts, the acts do not have any meaning. They become meaningful if I grasp them as well-circumscribed experiences of the past and, therefore, in retrospection. Only experiences which can be recollected beyond their actuality and which can be questioned about their constitution are, therefore, subjectively meaningful. (I 210)

It is especially interesting that not all experiences, however, can be recollected beyond their actuality.

> There are the mere physiological reflexes, such as the knee jerk, the contraction of the pupil, blinking, blushing; moreover certain passive reactions provoked by what Leibniz

calls the surf of indiscernible and confused small perceptions; furthermore, my gait, my facial expressions, my mood, those manifestations of my spontaneous life which result in certain characteristics of my handwriting open to graphological interpretation, etc. All these forms of involuntary spontaneity are experienced while they occur, but without leaving any trace in memory …. Unstable and undetachable from surrounding experiences as they are, they can neither be delineated nor recollected. They belong to the category of *essentially actual experiences*, that is, they exist merely in the actuality of being experienced and cannot be grasped by a reflective attitude.[6]

Can such phenomena be found in our shoe shop example? Suppose that after speaking with the widow our scientist goes to the shoe salesman, gains his confidence as well, and asks him about what he did when the woman with the children came in. It is readily imaginable that the salesman merely report that he had shown her shoes for the children, but she did not see any that she liked. The scientist might then ask further whether the salesman knew the woman and learn that they had indeed met socially and even that he also found her romantically interesting. It is also readily imaginable that the cultural scientist be convinced that the salesman spoke his whole truth. It would seem that any essentially actual manifestations of his—the salesman's—romantic interest during the interaction, i.e., subtle aspects of how he looked at and spoke with the widow and children, were not projected and not retrospectively recallable or interpretable by him. They are, however, meaningful, seemingly in a non-referential way, as well as interpretable, but only *by outsiders*, i.e., the cultural scientist as well as the widow.

The Methodological Problem and Solution

If cultural science seeks outsider scientific constructs about common-sense insider constructs, what happens to the essentially actual experiences? Clearly they can be important. For example, they are central to the scientist recognizing something unusual about the interaction that she observed in the shoe shop and they are central to whether the widow's action was successful or not. The salesman's reciprocal romantic interest did not diminish when he saw that she had children. This occurred

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[6] I 210. The early draft of the same essay is more encompassing still: "Performances of spontaneity without meaning for the performer, without project and without the intention to realize anything. In so far as these performances are connected with bodily movements we may call them *mere doing*. To this class belong mere physiological reactions provoked by physiological stimuli, so for instance blinking <of the eyelids> or reflexes of the <*patella*>, etc. Moreover facial expressions and other expressive gestures occur during movements accompanying working acts without being noticed separately; thus they remain unperceived. Furthermore there are the indiscernible small perceptions which remain unstable and elusive. Being what they are, they can neither be apperceived nor recollected by the performing individual" (IV 28). Cf. PSW 52 f. A later clause is even broader: "the inner experience of our bodily movements, the essentially actual experiences, and the open anticipations escape the grasping by the reflective attitude …" (I 217). And that such phenomena can be accidentally rather than essentially graspable in self-observation is contended at V 20 (cf. PSW 33).

whether or not the mother projected and could later interpret her own manifestations of romantic interest, coy looks perhaps. Indeed, they determine whether the interaction is commercial or romantic and successful or not.

And the recognizing of essentially actual experiences can be related to the various standpoints involved. To begin on the common-sense level, while the actor allegedly may not be able to recognize them, the partner can. In 1945 Schutz writes:

> We have now to consider the specific functions of the Other's bodily movements as an expressional field open to interpretation as signs of the Other's thought. … There are first the words uttered in the meaning they have according to [the] dictionary and grammar in the language used plus the additional fringes they receive from the context of the speech and the supervening connotations originating in the particular circumstances of the speaker. There is, furthermore, the inflection of the speaker's voice, his facial expression, the gestures which accompany his talking. Under normal circumstances merely the conveyance of the thought by the appropriately selected words has been projected by the speaker …. The other elements within the interpretable field are from the speaker's point of view not planned and, therefore, at best mere conduct (mere doing) or even mere reflexes and, then, essentially actual experiences without subjective meaning. (I 220)

The same position is expressed in late essays:

> In the simplest case, that of a face-to-face relationship, another's body, events occurring on his body (blushing, smiling), including bodily movements (wincing, beckoning), activities performed by it (talking, walking, manipulating things) are capable of being apprehended by the interpreter as signs. (I 319)
>
> The Other's facial expressions, his gestures in handling his instrument, in short all the activities of performing, gear into the outer world and can be grasped by the partner in immediacy. Even if performed without communicative intent, these activities are interpreted by him as indications of what the Other is going to do and therefore as suggestions or even commands for his own behavior. (II 176).
>
> Yet not everything that is interpreted by the partner as an expression of an event in the Other's inner life is meant by the Other to express—that is, to communicate to the partner— such an event. Facial expressions, gait, posture, ways of handling tools and instruments, without communicative intent, are examples of such a situation (II 178, cf. IV 32).

Nevertheless, the essentially actual expriences too are integral elements of the listener's interpretation of the Other's state of mind. Given all the talk about interpreting signs, be they linguistic signs or be they facial expressions, gaits, gestures, intonations, postures, etc., it is perhaps surprising that Schutz rarely uses a generalized concept of the word "reading." He does write in 1932 that "I can 'read' in these cultural objects the subjective experiences of others whom I do not know" (PSW 182) and in 1936 that "I can read the objective meaning of actions of others which I apperceive in the same manner in which I read terms indicated by printed letters" (IV 126). But beyond that there is only this late complaint:

> Communication by expressive and mimetic gestures has so far not found the attention it deserves from students of semantics. Examples of the former are gestures of greeting, paying respect, applauding, showing disapproval, gestures of surrender, of paying honor, etc. The latter combine features of the pictorial presentation, namely, similarity with the depicted object, with the time structure of speech. Even a kind of mimetic vocabulary can be developed, as, for instance, in the highly standardized use of the fan by the Japanese *Kabuki* dancer (I 325).

Some of the essentially actual experiences in the salesman did not have communicative intent. Their manifestations in facial expression, posture, tone of voice, etc., were, however, more or less indicative for the widow and even the cultural scientist. As perceptual objects, these manifestations themselves must be inherently structured. They themselves are non-referentially meaningful, but the widow readily produces personal outsider constructs about them, as does the cultural scientist practicing participant observation. If this is correct, then the ultimate type of meaning is not the construct = type that a person can put on his or her own action and product, for that construct = type must be about something, inner experiences and somatic manifestations of others included, that themselves always already have inherent non-referentially meaningful structures.

The most general principle in Schutz's methodology of the cultural sciences must now be modified in order to be consistent with the rest of his account. The early formulation of "objective meaning contexts about subjective meaning contexts" could be preserved through tolerance of equivocations, especially that between referential and non-referential meanings, but the move toward a late formulation, one possibly rephrased as "contexts of scientific outsider constructs about contexts of common-sense insider constructs," is well begun in the Princeton paper. If there are meanings that are not constructs but still important for the cultural sciences, this later formulation would nevertheless need supplementation.

The supplement of "and non-referential meanings" would be unintelligible to all save readers of the present essay. Another possible supplementary expression, "and meaningful cultural objects," would be better, provided that a coherent statement of what it is to be a meaningful cultural object could be added when appropriate. There are interesting lists of cultural objects in the oeuvre. In sum, the formulation, "cultural science produces contexts of scientific outsider constructs about contexts of common-sense insider constructs and meaningful cultural objects," would seem viable.

Works of Schutz

Note: Unless done otherwise, the following works will be cited with the embedded abbreviations as listed down the left margin below, plus the page number(s).

I = Alfred Schutz, *Collected Papers,* Vol. I, *The Problem of Social Reality*, ed. Maurice Natanson (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962).

II = ——-, *Collected Papers,* Vol. II, *Studies in Social Theory*, ed. Arvid Broedresen (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964).

III = ——-, *Collected Papers,* Vol. III, *Studies in Phenomenological Philosophy*, ed. Ilse Schutz (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966).

IV = ——-, *Collected Papers,* Vol. IV, ed. Helmut Wagner, George Psathas, and Fred Kersten, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996).

V = ——-, *Collected Papers*, Vol. V, *Phenomenology and the Social Sciences*, ed. Lester Embree (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011).

VI = ——, *Collected Papers*, Vol. VI, *Literary Reality and Relationships*, ed. Michael Barber (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013).

PSW = —-, *The Phenomenology of the Social World,* trans. George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967).

PP = ———-, "Positivistic Philosophy and the Actual Approach of Interpretive Social Science: An Ineditum from Spring 1953," *Husserl Studies*, Vol. 14 (1998): 123–149. Reprinted in Dermot Moran and Lester Embree, eds., *Phenomenology: Critical Concepts in Philosophy*, 5 vols. London: Routledge, 2004, III, pp. 119–145. Also available at

http://www.springerlink.com/content/t52u22v305u28g04/

Chapter 15
Ideal Types

Thus, the exploration of the general principles according to which man in daily life organizes his experiences, and especially those of the social world, is the first task of the methodology of the social sciences. (I 59)

Introduction

Alfred Schutz's method of ideal types is studied in this chapter including consideration of passages with the synonyms "constructs," "homunculi," "puppets," and "typification(s)." He deliberately used "construct" more and more especially after 1952,[1] but I will emphasize "type," "typification," and "typical," which he used all along; the other words will occur in quotations. He accepted this expression from Max Weber, but the degree to which there is precise conceptual agreement with Weber is not known to me. There are scores of pertinent passages, most are brief and/or redundant, but enough are sufficiently of substance for a comprehensive interpretation.

Alfred Schutz does not reflect on this method in his first attempt at a book, but does claim there that "'life forms' [are] ideal-typical concepts."[2] In the other translated manuscripts from before *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt* (1932) it is only remarked that the Other appears to the actor as an ideal type (IV 76). But in the Preface of the *Aufbau*, there is mention of "the nature of ideal-typical concept formation, upon which is based the very attitude of the social sciences toward their subject matter" (PSW xxxi).

Then he writes in § 1 that

Embedded citations refer to works of Schutz that are listed at the end of this chapter.

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[1] Schutz wrote to Aron Gurwitsch on April 20, 1952 that "in the social sciences there is the increasing tendency to replace the concepts of type and ideal type by the concept of 'construct,'" also mentioning Howard Becker's suggestion that "constructive type" replace Weber's "ideal type" (V 250, cf. I 61).

[2] Alfred Schutz, *Life Forms and Meaning Structure,* trans. Helmut R. Wagner (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1982), p. 98, cf. 17, and reprinted in CP VI.

the special aim of sociology demands a special method in order to select the materials relevant to the peculiar questions it raises. This selection is made possible through the formulation of certain theoretical constructs known as "ideal types." These ideal types are by no means the same thing as statistical averages, for they are selected according to the kind of question being asked at the time, and they are constructed in accordance with the methodological demands of these questions. Neither, however, are the ideal types empty phantoms or mere products of phantasy, for they must be verified by the concrete historical material which comprises the data of the social scientist. By this method of constructing and verifying ideal types, the meaning of particular social phenomena can be interpreted layer by layer as the subjectively intended meaning of human acts. (PSW 6).

This statement does not convey well, however, that Schutz has an account of typification in everyday life that is crucially related to by cultural scientific typification, but this should become clear below.

Three Types of Ideal Types for Cultural Science

Alfred Schutz not only uses such types as actor, partner, and observer, the stranger, the homecomer, and the layman, the expert, and the well-informed citizen for scientific purposes, but also mentions other types from everyday life, e.g., "a businessman, soldier, judge, father, friend, gang leader, sportsman, buddy, regular fellow, good boy, American, taxpayer, etc." (II 237, cf. IV 20). And "[t]he concepts of 'We,' 'You,' 'They,' of 'in-group' and 'out-group,' of consociates, contemporaries, predecessors, and successors, all of them with their particular structurization of familiarity and anonymity, are at least implied in the common-sense typifications or even co-constitutive of them" (I 38, cf. I 15).

Schutz furthermore recognizes ideal types besides those of human beings: "The world, the physical as well as the sociocultural one, is experienced from the outset in terms of types: there are mountains, trees, birds, fishes, dogs, and among them Irish setters; there are cultural objects, such as houses, tables, chairs, books, tools, and among them hammers…" (II 233, cf. I 8).

His great concern for the sake of cultural science is, however, with types of three kinds that do involve humans.

(a) *Course-of-action types*. These should be studied first because personal types and product types derive originally from them. Few examples from everyday life and common-sense are offered by which to clarify this concept. Schutz does mention the need for a taxonomy and later regrets not being able to supply one, but does mention how in everyday life, e.g., "[p]utting a letter in the mailbox, I expect that unknown people, called postmen, will act in a typical way, not quite intelligible to me, with the result that my letter will reach the addressee within typically reasonable time" (I 17, cf. PSW 197).

More is written about course-of-action types in relation to science:

[A]dopting the scientific attitude, the social scientist observes human interaction patterns or their results insofar as they are accessible to his observation and open to his interpretation. These interaction patterns, however, he has to interpret in terms of their subjective meaning

> structure lest he abandon any hope of grasping "social reality."—In order to comply with
> this postulate, the scientific observer proceeds in a way similar to that of the observer of a
> social interaction pattern in the world of everyday life. … He begins to construct typical
> course-of-action patterns corresponding to the observed events. (I 40).

Schutz holds that the "ideal type of human behavior" can be taken two ways, that
of the "ideal type of another person who is expressing himself or has expressed
himself in a certain way. Or it may mean, second, the ideal type of the expressive
process itself" (PSW 187). The latter is the course-of-action type and the former is
the personal ideal type. "Certainly," he continues, "an inner relation exists between
these two. I cannot, for instance, define the ideal type of a postal clerk without first
having in mind a definition of his job," but it is mentioned on the next page that "we
deduce specific actions from a given personal ideal type" (Ibid). It is thus permis-
sible to infer course-of-action types from personal types. But there is not always
need to do so: "I do not ask about the personality and destiny of fellow-men whose
activity I consider as a purely *typical* function" (II 71), such as, presumably, that of
a postal clerk.

(b) *Personal ideal types.* "The person who does this job" (PSW 187) is again
best described by Schutz not on the level of common-sense but rather for the level
of science:

> This technique consists in replacing the human beings, which the social scientist observers
> as [actors] on the social stage, by puppets which he creates, in other words, in constructing
> ideal types of actors. This is done in the following way.—The scientist observes certain
> events within the social world as caused by human activity and he begins to establish a
> type of such events. Afterwards these typical acts are coordinated with typical because
> motives and [typical] in-order-to motives which he assumes to be invariable within the
> mind of an imaginary actor. Thus he constructs a personal ideal type, which means a model
> of an actor whom he imagines to be gifted with consciousness. But it is a consciousness
> restricted in its content to only those elements necessary for the performance of the typi-
> cal acts under consideration. It contains all those elements completely but nothing beyond
> them. He imputes to it constant in-order-to motives corresponding to the goals which are
> realized within the social world by the acts under consideration; furthermore, he ascribes
> to it constant because motives of such a structure that they may serve as a basis for the sys-
> tem of presupposed constant in-order-motives; finally, he bestows on this ideal type such
> segments of life plans and such stocks of experiences as are necessary for the imaginary
> horizons and backgrounds of the puppet actor. The social scientist places these constructed
> types in a setting which contains all the elements of the real life situation relevant for the
> performance of the personal act under consideration. Moreover, he associates with this first
> ideal type other personal ideal types having motives that are apt to provoke typical reactions
> to the first and his typical acts.—Thus the social scientist arrives at a model of the social
> world or, better, at a reconstruction of it. (V 40, cf. II 81, PSW 188–190).

This description of the process is similar for everyday life, with the difference that
not only others but also the self are mentioned as typified:

> My constructing the Other as a partial self, as the performer of typical roles or functions,
> has a corollary in the process of self-typification which takes place if I enter into interaction
> with him. I am not involved in such a relationship with my total personality but merely with
> certain layers of it. In defining the role of the Other I am assuming a role myself. In typify-
> ing the Other's behavior I am typifying my own, which is interrelated with his, transform-
> ing myself into a passenger, consumer, taxpayer, reader, bystander, etc. (I 19, cf. IV 101).

Among personal types Schutz recognizes two of what can be called "subtypes" (II 239), i.e., "characterological types," e.g., that of a friend, and "habitual types," e.g., the rather anonymous postal clerk who forwards my mail (PSW 196, cf. 227).

Interesting variations of personal types of contemporaries in contrast with consociates deserve quotation at this point:

> Face-to-face interaction involves mutual engagement in which the partners can witness the literal coming-to-birth of each other's experiences. Interaction between contemporaries, however, merely involves the expectation on the part of each partner that the other will respond in a relevant way.
>
> Entering the world of contemporaries itself, we pass through one region after another: (1) the region of those whom I once encountered face-to-face and could encounter again (for instance, my absent friend); then (2) comes the region of those once encountered by the person I am now talking to (for instance, your friend, whom you are promising to introduce to me); next (3) the region of those who are as yet pure contemporaries but whom I will soon meet (such as the colleague whose books I have read and whom I am now on the way to visit); then (4) those contemporaries of whose existence I know, not as concrete individuals, but as points in social space as defined by a certain function (for instance, the postal employee who will process my letter); then (5) those collective entities whose function and organization I know while not being able to name any of their members, such as the Canadian Parliament; [and] then (6) collective entities which are by their very nature anonymous and of which I could never in principle have direct experience, such as "state" and "nation".… (PSW 179–181).

(c) *Products.* These ideal types could have had much more said about them*,* but what we do have is significant. In the *Aufbau* Schutz writes of "cultural products" and their creators (PSW 242) and is clear that he considers them ideal types (PSW 187). "Artifacts," including tools, are either synonymous with or a prominent subspecies of products (PSW 201); later he refers to "sociocultural products" (II 232). More generally, "[t]here will be hardly any issue among social scientists that the object of the social sciences is human behavior, its forms, its organization, and its products" (I 34).

In a posthumously published text Schutz illustrates as well as defines "product":

> For the sake of convenience, we shall call a projected and purposive conduct "working." The change materialized in the outer world by an act of working shall be called "product." … While writing this sentence I am "working"—the product and purpose being to make my thought, the result of my performing activities, understandable—and this white paper covered with ink strokes is the "product" of this, my working, the change in the outer world brought about by my working activity. It can easily be seen that that this "product" of my working does not coincide with the project and purpose of it, that is to convey my thought to an anonymous fellow man, the reader, to make myself understandable to him and—in the twilight of the more or less empty horizon which surrounds any anticipation of future events and therewith also of all projected acts—to provoke a reaction from the reader in the form of assertion, rejection, criticism, and so on. My working activity of covering this paper with ink strokes is thus just one means by which to obtain the intermediate end of the "product," which in turn, is itself merely means to other projected ends, and so on. (V 76).

We have seen that course-of-action and personal types divide the extension of "behavior." Logically prior to that and also ultimate for Schutz is the world "interpreted as the possible field of action for all of us" (V 35) and next comes the distinction between "natural things" and "social things," the latter including tools:

> I cannot understand a social thing without reducing it to the human activity which has created it and, going beyond [that], without referring this human activity to the motives out of which it sprang. I do not understand a tool without knowing the purpose for which it was designed, a sign or a symbol, without knowing what it stands for, an institution, if I am unfamiliar with its goals, a work of art if I neglect the intentions of the artist which it realizes. (V 36, cf. II 85).

The question of how types of the everyday and the cultural-scientific sorts are formed and relate can now be turned to.

Typification in Everyday Life

In the passage from *Aufbau* § 1 quoted at the outset of this chapter, Schutz says that a special method is needed in order to select the material needed to answer the questions that are raised in sociology—and presumably the other cultural sciences—and asserts that this selection is made possible through the formulation of "certain theoretical constructs known as 'ideal types'" and that these ideal types "must be verified by the concrete historical material which comprises the data of the social scientist." Everyday typification comes first because it occurs all the time, which scientific typification does not.

Everyday thinking is by no means especially clear and distinct:

> In everyday life, most of all, we try to clarify the concrete situation insofar as, for whatever reason, they provoke our attention. If this is the case we find ourselves face-to-face with <the necessity of> having to make a decision of importance to us, or else we have to design a plan for decisive action in all its details necessary for us. But even then we only think clearly and distinctly to the degree necessary for any given situation. We may say that we are concerned with parts and contexts of the object of our thinking only to the degree to which that is interesting or relevant for us under the given circumstances.—Aside from this, there exist large areas of our everyday life which are matters only of unclear and vague thinking on our part: there are the habits of conduct but also of our thinking which are simply pregiven in daily life and which we take for granted. Further there is a large realm of our impulses and emotions which govern our acting. There are our needs and drives which—if at all—become objects of thinking only in the modes of unclarity and confusion. But there are also our experiences of the external world, of animate and inanimate nature, and most of all of our consociates. In daily life these experiences are taken for granted to a high degree. If not, they become objects of distinct and clear thinking only to the degree to which this is warranted by the given state of our interests.[3]

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[3] (IV 122, gloss in the original.) Another passage is more comprehensive: "In his daily life the healthy, adult, and wide-awake human being (we are not speaking of others) has this knowledge ["about the world, the social world as well as the natural"], so to speak, automatically at hand. From heritage and education, from the manifold influences of tradition, habits and his own previous reflection, his store of experiences is built up. It embraces the most heterogeneous kinds of knowledge in a very incoherent and confused state. Clear and distinct experiences are intermingled with vague conjectures; suppositions and prejudices cross well-proven evidences; motives, means and ends, as well as causes and effects, are strung together without clear understanding of their real connections. There are everywhere gaps, intermissions, discontinuities. Apparently there is a kind of organization by habits, rules, and principles which we regularly apply with success. But the

Schutz probably does not dwell on the original formation of types in everyday life because practically all common-sense types are received from others:

> [A person's] biographical situation in everyday life is always an historical one because it is constituted by the sociocultural process which had led to the actual configuration of this environment. Hence, only a small fraction of man's stock of knowledge at hand originates in his own individual experience. The greater portion of his knowledge is *socially derived*, handed down to him by his parents and teachers as his social heritage. It consists of a set of systems of relevant typifications, of typical solutions for typical practical and theoretical problems, of typical precepts for typical behavior. (I 348, cf. I 323).

There are indications, however, of how ideal types are originally acquired in everyday life that nevertheless deserve attention.

> Typification is indeed that form of abstraction which leads to the more or less standardized, yet more or less vague, conceptualization of common-sense thinking and to the necessary ambiguity of the terms of the ordinary vernacular. This is because our experience, even in what Husserl calls the prepredicative sphere, is organized from the outset under certain types. The small child who learns his mother tongue is at an early age capable of recognizing an animal as a dog or a bird or a fish, an element of his surroundings as a stone or a tree or a mountain, a piece of furniture as a table or chair. (I 323).

Schutz's description of the prepredicative sphere deserves a study in its own right, especially in connection with the empirical types described in Husserl's *Erfahrung und Urteil*.[4] For present purposes, this passage may suffice:

> [T]ypifications on the common-sense level—in contradistinction to typifications made by the social scientist—emerge in the everyday experience of the world as taken for granted without any formulation of judgments or neat propositions with logical subjects and predicates. They belong, to use the phenomenological term, to prepredicative thinking. The vocabulary and syntax of everyday language represent the epitome of the typifications socially approved by the linguistic group. (II 233).

In short, the experiencing of objects in everyday life includes ideal types coming immediately to mind, as it were, and usually expressible with nouns in ordinary language referring, as mentioned above, to "named things and events" (I 14, cf. II 160 & V 154). These types can become subject terms in relation to predicates in predicative thinking, but are not such terms originally.

Whether deliberate or not, upon closer analysis, how does this typification occur? To begin with,

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origin of our habits is almost beyond our control; the rules we apply are rules of thumb and their validity has never been verified. The principles we start from are partly taken over uncritically from parents and teachers, partly distilled at random from specific situations in our lives or in the lives of others without our having made any further inquiry into their consistency. Nowhere have we a guarantee of the reliability of all these assumptions by which we are governed. On the other hand, these experiences and rules are sufficient to us for mastering life" (II 72). The passage goes on to include calling knowledge of the sort described "cookbook knowledge."

[4] Ed. Ludwig Landgrebe (Prague: Academia Verlag, 1938), cf. especially Schutz I 277–283 and, of course, the late essay, "Type and Eidos" (III 92–115). Cf. Lester Embree, "Two Concepts of Type in the Work of Alfred Schutz," *Schutzian Research*, Vol. IV (2013).

> If we call an animal a dog we have already performed a kind of typification. Each dog is a unique individual and as such different from all other dogs, although he has in common with them a set of characteristic traits and qualities. By recognizing Rover as a dog and calling him so, I have disregarded what makes Rover the unique and individual dog he means to me. Typifying consists in passing by what makes the individual unique and irreplaceable. Insofar as Rover is just a dog, he is deemed to be equal to all other dogs: a doglike behavior is expected of him, a particular way of eating, of running, etc. But even looking at Rover as an individual in his uniqueness, I may find that today he behaves in an extraordinary way. It is typical for him greet me when I return home. Today he is rather lethargic and I fear he may be ill. Even my notion of the individual and unique Rover already involves a typification of what I believe to be his habitual behavior. And even ill Rover has his typical way of being ill. (II 233, cf. I 59)

Next there is selection among typical characteristics:

> [I]n the natural attitude of daily life we are concerned merely with certain objects standing out over against the unquestioned field of pre-experienced other objects, and the result of the selecting activity of our mind is to determine which particular characteristics of such an object are individual and which are typical ones. More generally, we are merely concerned with some aspects of this particular typified object. Asserting of this object S that it has the characteristic property p, in the form of "S is p," is an elliptical statement. For S, taken without any question as it appears to me, is not merely p but also q and r and many other things. The full statement should read: "S is, among many other things, such as q and r, also p." If I assert with respect to an element of the world as taken for granted: "S is p," I do so because under the prevailing circumstances I am interested in the p-being of S, disregarding as not relevant its being also q and r. (I 8).

To put content into this form, suppose that one goes into the backroom, so to speak, of a post office in order to observe how incoming letters are sorted into foreign and domestic, the domestic into out-of-town and in-town, the in-town mail by neighborhoods, etc., etc. Based on observation, one can form the ideal types not only of the course-of-action pattern that might be called "mail-sorting," but also the personal type of the "mail-sorter." One might also notice that the employees are of two generations, that there are two genders, that a few are left-handed, that most are workers in contrast with a few supervisors, etc., but these things can be disregarded in forming the types of interest.

While such sorting of the mail and also its conveyance from mailboxes on street corners to the post office for sorting and eventually on to dwellings, businesses, and offices at home and abroad can be said to be "behind" a letter being successfully mailed, what, briefly, is "within" the curious person in everyday life who seeks to know what happens to the mail in the backroom of the post office?

> Any definition of the situation involves a selection of a particular sector of the social world which is of interest to the actor. This selection depends on the system of interests and relevances originating in the biographical situation of the actor within his actual environment or, as I sometimes preferred to say, in his life plan. The interpretation of this selected sector occurs in the form of typifications which frequently and to the greater part are elements of the world taken for granted and socially derived as well as socially approved. Thus the social world is as a whole experienced by the actor within it in [the] form of preconstituted types and preconstituted interpretations. (IV 141).

There is much implied in this statement that cannot be explicated within the confines of this chapter. Typification in the cultural sciences can now be turned to, which is like but also unlike everyday typification.

Typification in Cultural Science

A text already quoted from above, namely, "Basic Concepts and Methods of the Social Sciences," is quite important for understanding Schutz's attitude in the theory of science. First, he asserts that "it is a basic characteristic of the social sciences to ever and ever again pose the question of the meaning of their basic concepts and procedures" (IV 121). Second, he would have us begin with recognition of the difference between the naturalistic sciences, on the one hand, and the class of disciplines that include sociology, economics, jurisprudence, and history. And third, these cultural sciences contrast with everyday thinking:

> [T]he raw material of social-scientific thinking is necessarily preformed in its meaning, and this by way of acts of forming meanings in daily life in the social world. And that is in the mode of vagueness. In contrast, in scientific thinking no precondition or pregivenness can be accepted as simply given, as not in need of further clarification. Therefore, the first objective of the social sciences has to be the maximal clarification and explanation of what, in general, persons living in the social world think about this world. (IV 124).

Where these raw materials of scientific theorizing are concerned, they must be the same as the "concrete historical material" mentioned in *Aufbau* § 1 and also what is ascertained by the "participant observer or field worker" (I 40), as well as by sending out questionnaires, hearing witnesses, and establishing test cases (V 39). In "The Homecomer" Schutz himself even repeatedly quotes from a newsmagazine.

A fieldworker might originally form a type rather than receive it from an informant and this can lead to error:

> Observation of the social behavior of another involves the very real danger that the observer will naively substitute his own ideal types for those in the mind of his subject. The danger becomes acute when the observer, instead of being directly attentive to the person observed, thinks of the latter as a "case history" of such and such an abstractly defined type of conduct. Here not only may the observer be using the wrong ideal type to understand his subject's behavior, but he may never discover his error because he never confronts his subject as a real person. (PSW 205).

Schutz furthermore asserts that "the basic question of any specifically social-scientific methodology has to be, 'How is it possible to establish objective contexts of meaning about subjective contexts of meaning?'" (IV 129). This question was already put in this way in the *Aufbau* § 49, while later it is written that "the typical constructs formulated by the social scientist for the solution of his problems are, so to speak, constructs of the second degree, namely, constructs of the common-sense constructs in terms of which everyday thinking interprets the world" (II 248, cf. Chap. 13).

Even though Schutz has not been noticed to use the words in quite this way, plainly one can additionally speak of scientific ideal types as about everyday ideal types. If "common-sense constructs" are synonymous with "ideal types," there is actually a difference between the first and the second two of these formulations because at least subjective meanings can be had of unique rather than typical beings and presumably science is not about the unique.

As for the place of typification in scientific research, several passages contrast it with everyday life.

> What is the decisive difference between the constructs on the second (the scientific) level and those formed on the first level by the actors on the social scene? As far as I can see, there are two decisive points. The first is that the social scientist takes the attitude of a disinterested observer. To him—always as a theoretical scientist—the world is no longer a field of action but a field of observation. The scientist's interests do not depend on his wish to come to terms with the social world and to find his bearing in it. Strictly speaking, they do not depend on this integrated system of relevances which constitute his life plan insofar as he is not a scientist but a human being living in the social world among his fellow men. He has replaced his system of interests by the system of scientific interests. He has replaced his personal situation in the world by his scientific situation, that is, by defining the locus of his particular problem and of his particular methods to solve this <problem> within the sum total of his particular science as he finds it in order to carry out its <unending task>. Consequently, all constructs and all typifications which the social scientist will use have to depend on the scientific problem and its level with which he is concerned. Therefore, his first job will be to formulate his problem as clearly as possible; and as soon as he has done so successfully, he has found the locus for all problem typifications and constructions which might be helpful for its solution.
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> The second feature distinguishing scientific constructs from constructs of common-sense thinking is the fact that scientific constructs have to live up to the ideals of clarity, distinctness, [and] consistency. Of course, the scientist is governed by the idealized rule of not being satisfied with simple plausibility and likelihood but with searching for the truth. (IV 143, glosses in the original).

The procedural rules or postulates guiding scientific thinking will be returned to presently (See also Chap. 2). Additional passages and the first consequence of the theoretical attitude deserve quotation now:

> The theoretical scientist—qua scientist, not qua human being (which he is, too)—is not involved in the observed situation, which is to him not of practical but of merely cognitive interest. The system of relevances governing common-sense interpretation in daily life originates in the biographical situation of the observer. By making up his mind to become a scientist, the social scientist has replaced his personal biographical situation by what I shall call … a scientific situation. The problems with which he has to deal might be quite unproblematic for the human being within the world and vice versa. Any scientific problem is determined by the actual state of the respective science, and its solution has to be achieved in accordance with the procedural rules governing this science, which among other things warrant the control and verification of the solution offered. (I 63, cf. I 37–39)
>
> Our analysis of the social world in which we live has shown that each of us considers himself as the center of this world, which he groups around himself according to his own interests. The <theoretical> observer's attitude toward the social world is quite different. This world is not the theatre of his activities, but the object of his contemplation on which he looks with detached equanimity. As a scientist (not as a human being dealing with science) the observer is essentially solitary. He has no companion, and we can say that he has placed himself outside the social world with its manifold relations and its systems of interests. Everyone, to become a social scientist, must make up his mind to put somebody else instead of himself as the center of this world, namely the observed person. But with the shift in the central point, the whole system has been transformed …
>
> The first and fundamental consequence of this shift in the point of view is that the scientist replaces the human beings he observes as actors on the social stage by puppets created and manipulated by himself. What I call "puppets" corresponds to the technical term "ideal types" which Weber has introduced into social science. (II 81, glosses in the original).

Used to show how the scientific model of the social world is constructed, the image of the homunculi or puppets has some complexity, but one could easily relate it to the example of the backroom of the post office if one wished. It is chiefly elaborated in one place:

> [The scientific observer] begins to construct typical course-of-action patterns corresponding to the observed events. Thereupon he co-ordinates to these typical course-of-action patterns a personal type, a model of the actor whom he imagines as being gifted with consciousness. Yet it is a consciousness restricted to containing nothing but all the elements relevant to the performance of the course-of-action patterns under observation and relevant, therewith, to the scientist's problem under scrutiny. He ascribes, thus, to this fictitious consciousness a set of typical in-order-to motives corresponding to the goals of the observed course-of-action patterns and typical because-motives upon which the in-order-to motives are founded. Both types are assumed to be invariant in the mind of the imaginary actor-model.
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>   The homunculus was not born, he does not grow up, and he will not die. He has no hopes and no fears; he does not know anxiety as the chief motive of all his deeds. He is not free in the sense that his acting could transgress the limits of his creator, the social scientist, has predetermined. He cannot, therefore, have any other conflicts of interest and motives than those the social scientist has imputed to him. He cannot err, if to err is not his typical destiny. He cannot choose, except among the alternatives the social scientist has put before him as standing to his choice.
>
>   If such a model of an actor is conceived as interrelated and interacting with others—they, too, being homunculi—then the general thesis of reciprocal perspectives, their interlocking, and, therewith, the correspondence of motives is determined by the constructor. The course-of-action and personal types supposedly formed by the puppet of his partners, including the definition of their systems of relevance, roles, motives, have not the character of a mere chance which will or will not be fulfilled by the supervening events. The homunculus is free from empty anticipations of the Other's reactions to his own actions and also from self-typifications. He does not assume a role other than that attributed to him by the director of the puppet show, called the model of the social world. It is he, the social scientist, who sets the stage, who distributes the roles, who gives the cues, who defines when the "action" starts and when it ends and who determines, thus, the "span of projects" involved. All standards and institutions governing the behavioral pattern of the model are supplied from the outset by the constructs of the scientific observer. (I 40–42, cf. I 255 & IV 20).

It is important to recognize that while the puppets themselves do not think, social scientists certainly do. To begin with, "in particular situations, and then only fragmentarily, can I experience the Others' motives, goals, etc…. in their uniqueness" (I 60), in which case conjectures and inferences can be resorted to. For example,

> [m]otives are never isolated elements but grouped in great and consistent systems of hierarchical order. Having grasped a sufficient number of elements of such a system, I have a fair chance of completing the empty positions of the system by correct conjectures. Basing my assumption on the inner logical structure of such a motive system, I am able to make, with great likelihood of proving right, inferences concerning those parts which remain hidden. (II 16).

More generally, while the original ideal types arising in everyday life are prepredicative, the experience of contemporaries, who are believed existent in the same time but are not directly encountered as consociates are, "is predicative in nature. It is formed by means of interpretive judgments involving all my knowledge of the social world, although with varying degrees of explicitness" (PSW 183).

> My knowledge of my contemporaries is … inferential and discursive. It stands, by its essential nature, in an objective context of meaning and only in such. It has within it no intrinsic reference to persons nor to the subjective matrix within which the experiences in question were constituted. However, it is due to this very abstraction from subjective context[s] of meaning that they exhibit the property which we have called their "again and again" character. They are treated as typical conscious experiences of "someone" and, as such, as basically homogeneous and repeatable. The unity of the contemporary is not constituted originally in his own stream of consciousness. (Indeed, whether the contemporary has any stream of consciousness at all is a difficult question….) Rather, the contemporary's unity is constituted in my own stream of consciousness, being built up out of a synthesis of my own interpretations of his experiences. (PSW 184).

This description can pertain to everyday life as well as to cultural science. Except that no communication is possible, it can apply as well to the understanding of predecessors (PSW 185). As for science, "the meaning context of any system of scientific knowledge is objective knowledge but accessible equally to all his fellow scientists and open to their control, which means capable of being verified, invalidated, or falsified by them" (I 35).

Furthermore,

> the construction of scientific ideal types depends on the total context of scientific knowledge or, what is the same thing, on the total context of clear and distinct judgments about the world. All these judgments, however, insofar as they are scientific, must be ordered into those highest contexts of meaning which, to employ an image of Husserl's, … comprehend in one expression all the axioms, fundamental principles, theorems, and deductions of a science. (PSW 222).

Moreover, "[l]ike all empirical sciences the social sciences formulate hypotheses and theories which are subject to validation by empirical verification" (IV 143).

Another passage relates to everyday thinking, but can be taken to apply to cultural-scientific thinking as well:

> No type … is restricted to a single individual object. But more, there is no such thing as an isolated type … pertaining to one class of generalized objects within the stock of our knowledge. All the types … of our experiencing form systems in which each type … is interrelated with others in manifold ways; so, for instance, types of sequences of experiences of the forms "if-then," "either-or," and so on. (IV 54).

Most importantly, "there is no such thing as a type as such, but only types related to particular problems, carrying, so to speak, 'subscripts' referring to the topic at hand…" (V 129, cf. IV 21 f.)

Interestingly, "the circumstances within which … a [scientific] model operates may be varied, that is, the situation which the homunculi have to meet may be imagined as changed, but not the set of motives and relevances assumed to be the sole content of their consciousness" (I 64; Schutz gives an example from economics). "In this way, it is possible to predict how such a puppet or system of puppets might behave under certain conditions and to discover certain 'determinate relations between a set of variables, in terms of which … empirically ascertainable regularities … can be explained'" (I 65).

Prediction, however, is "a category restricted to scientific thinking":

> In a set of procedural rules are fixed, once and for all, the system of relevances, the types to be used, the required degree of clarity, distinctness and consistency, the formulation of the problem at hand and the type of solution <acceptable by the community of scientists in the particular field>. Also fixed in advance is the prevailing interest governing scientific thought. Certainty, probability, impossibility are modes of scientific prediction. By contrast, all anticipations of daily life are made *modo potentiali* in terms of chance: it is likely, presumable, conceivable, imaginable that what we expect will occur. (IV 56, gloss in the original).

In short,

> [t]he scientific constructs formed on the second level, in accordance with the procedural rules valid for all empirical sciences, are objective ideal-typical constructs and, as such, of a different kind from those developed on the first level of common-sense thinking which they have to supersede. They are theoretical systems embodying testable general hypotheses…. (I 63).

Nevertheless, the scientific ideal types are grown, so to speak, from those of everyday life, for in the "organization of the social world by the human being living naively in it, we already find the germ of the system of types and typical relations which we shall recognize later in its fullest ramification as the essential feature of scientific method" (II 71).

Moreover,

> Since the system of problem-relevances depends … upon the interests originating in a particular situation, it follows that the same object or event may turn out as relevant or irrelevant, typified or untypified, and even typical or atypical, in relation both to different problems to be solved and different situations within which the object or event emerges, that is, in relation to different interests. To illustrate the last case: if parents observe that their child acts in a "strange," *i.e.*, atypical way, a psychologist may comfortingly inform them that it is "typical" for children of that age to behave as their child does. Parents and psychologists simply use different systems of relevances and therewith different types for interpreting the same event. (II 236).

Besides problems and interests, references to levels has already been seen. To begin with, there is the change from everyday to scientific levels that has already been described. Seemingly at the other extreme, Schutz begins with some questions:

> But why form personal types at all? Why not simply collect empirical facts? Or, if the technique of typological interpretation may be applied successfully, why not restrict oneself to forming types of impersonal events, or types of the behavior of groups? Do we not have modern economics as an example of a social science which does not deal with personal ideal types, but with curves, with mathematical functions, with the movement with prices, or with such institutions as bank systems or currency? Statistics has performed the great work of collecting information about the behavior of groups. Why go back to the scheme of social action and to the individual actor?
>
> The answer is this: It is true that a very great part of social science can be performed and has been performed at a level which legitimately abstracts from all that happens in the individual actor. But this operating with generalizations and idealizations on a high level of abstraction is in any case nothing but a kind of intellectual shorthand. Whenever the problem under inquiry makes it necessary, the social scientist must have the possibility of shifting the level of his research to that of individual human activity, and where real scientific work is done this shift will always become possible. (II 84–85).

Conclusion

We could go deeper from this point into Schutz's theory of science, including the role of rationality in differentiating between the theoretical and historical levels within the cultural sciences (II 86, cf. PSW 248), key concepts (II 68), fundamental hypothesis (II 87, I 45), etc., which have been addressed in earlier chapters, but for present purposes it will suffice to show that ideal types are reflected in the postulates for the cultural sciences that Schutz proposes. There are four postulates, that of rationality not being specific to the cultural-scientific level:

The Postulate of Relevance The formation of ideal types must comply with the principle of relevance, which means that the problem once chosen by the social scientist creates a scheme of reference and constitutes the limits of the scope within which relevant ideal types might be formed. (II 18)

The Postulate of Logical Consistency The system of ideal types must remain in full compatibility with the principles of formal logic. (II 19, cf. I 43 & IV 144).

The Postulate of Subjective Interpretation It is now clear that the meaning of an action is necessarily a different one (a) for the actor; (b) for his partner involved with him in interaction and having, thus, with him a set of relevances and purposes in common; and (c) for the observer not involved in such relationship. This fact leads to two important consequences: First, that in common-sense thinking we have merely a *chance* to understand the Other's action sufficiently for our purpose at hand; secondly, that to increase the chance we have to search for the meaning the action has for the actor. Thus, the postulate of the "subjective interpretation of meaning" … is not a particularity of Max Weber's sociology or the methodology of the social sciences in general but a principle of constructing course-of-action types in common-sense experience.

But subjective interpretation of meaning is merely possible by revealing the motives which determine a given course of action. By referring a course-of-action type to the underlying typical motives of the actor we arrive at the construction of a personal type. (I 24)

This describes everyday subjective interpretation. Analogously, "[t]he social scientist has to ask what type of the individual mind can be constructed and what typical thoughts must be attributed to it in order to explain the fact in question as a result of mental activities in an understandable context" (IV 22, cf. II 85).

The Postulate of Adequacy Each term used in a scientific system referring to human action must be so constructed that a human act performed within the life-world by an individual actor in the way indicated by the typical construction would be reasonable and understandable to the actor himself, as well as for his fellow-men. This postulate is of extreme importance for the methodology of social science. What makes it possible for a social science to refer at all to events in the life-world is the fact that the interpretation of any human act by the social scientist might be the same as that by the actor or by his partner. (II 85)

(Adequacy, however, is not truth and Schutz is not explicit with a postulate of truth or verification. See Chap. 16)

In sum, for the basic question of any cultural-scientific methodology, i.e., how is it possible to establish objective contexts of ideal types or constructs about subjective contexts of meaning and constructs,

> [i]t does not take a lengthy discussion in order to demonstrate that this question is merely a specific case of the basic problem of social-scientific methodology, namely how to transpose pregiven materials, offered necessarily in the mode of confusion, into explicit clarity. In anticipation I will now show that that the method of ideal-typical formation of concepts is available to <exponents of> the social sciences as the specific instrument for the performance of this task. (IV 129, gloss in the original).

Works of Schutz

Note: Unless done otherwise, the following works will be cited with the embedded abbreviations as listed down the left margin below, plus the page number(s).

I= Alfred Schutz, *Collected Papers,* Vol. I, *The Problem of Social Reality*, ed. Maurice Natanson (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962).

II=——, *Collected Papers,* Vol. II, *Studies in Social Theory*, ed. Arvid Broedresen (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964).

III=——, *Collected Papers,* Vol. III, *Studies in Phenomenological Philosophy*, ed. Ilse Schutz (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966).

IV=——, *Collected Papers,* Vol. IV, ed. Helmut Wagner, George Psathas, and Fred Kersten, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996).

V=——, *Collected Papers*, Vol. V, *Phenomenology and the Social Sciences*, ed. Lester Embree (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011).

VI=——, *Collected Papers*, Vol. VI, *Literary Reality and Relationships*, ed. Michael Barber (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013).

PSW =—, *The Phenomenology of the Social World,* trans. George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967).

PP =———, "Positivistic Philosophy and the Actual Approach of Interpretive Social Science: An Ineditum from Spring 1953," *Husserl Studies*, Vol. 14 (1998): 123–149. Reprinted in Dermot Moran and Lester Embree, eds., *Phenomenology: Critical Concepts in Philosophy*, 5 vols. London: Routledge, 2004, III, pp. 119–145. Also available at http://www.springerlink.com/content/t52u22v305u28g04/

Chapter 16
Verification in Schutz

> *It is a shortcoming of our presentation of theoretical thinking*
> *that it represents an ongoing process in static terms. For a*
> *process it is, going on according to the strict rules of scientific*
> *procedure. To describe the epistemology and methodology*
> *involved is not within our present purpose. To mention just a*
> *few of these rules: There is ... the postulate that all scientific*
> *thought has to be derived, directly or indirectly, from tested*
> *observation, that is, from originary immediate experiences of*
> *facts within the world....(I 251)*

Introduction

Many cultural scientists have derived benefit from the substantive and method-ological writings of Alfred Schutz, but I am a philosopher and interested in him as such. It is unfortunate that many have come to consider him a "phenomenological sociologist" when no more than five of his some three dozen publications are substantively scientific rather than methodological or philosophical, methodology for him being possibly done by scientists as well as philosophers (see Chap. 11). His self-interpretation is especially relevant in this connection: When his New School colleague Leo Strauss praised his "Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social World" (1955), Schutz responded on October 20, 1955 that, "If you were good enough to refer to me as a 'philosophically sophisticated sociologist' I assume you did so with tongue in cheek, but if you have to call me names, I should have preferred you calling me a sociologically sophisticated philosopher."

In the present study I am concerned with Schutz's theory of verification. An early passage in the *Aufbau* can lead us to expect him to express such a theory:

Embedded citations refer to works of Schutz listed at the end of this chapter.

Never before had the project of reducing the "world of objective mind" to the behavior of individuals been so radically carried out as it was in Max Weber's initial statement of the goal of interpretive sociology. This science is to study social behavior by interpreting its subjective meaning as found in the intentions of individuals. The aim, then, is to interpret the actions of individuals in the social world and the ways in which individuals give meaning to social phenomena. But to attain this aim, it does not suffice either to observe the behavior of a single individual or to collect statistics about the behavior of groups of individuals, as a crude empiricism would have us believe. Rather, the special aim of sociology demands a special method in order to select the materials relevant to the peculiar questions it raises. This selection is made possible through the formulation of certain theoretical constructs known as "ideal types." These ideal types are by no means the same thing as statistical averages, for they are selected according to the kind of question being asked at the time, and they are constructed in accordance with the methodological demands of these questions. Neither, however, are the ideal types empty phantoms or mere products of phantasy, for they must be **verified** by the concrete historical material which comprises the data of the social scientist. By this method of constructing and **verifying** ideal types, the meaning of particular social phenomena can be interpreted layer by layer as the subjectively intended meaning of human acts. In this way the structure of the social world can be disclosed as a structure of intelligible intentional meanings. (PSW 6, emphasis added)

On only one occasion, however, does Schutz even seem to have named such a theory:

Furthermore, the theory of *interpretational relevances* will shed a new light on the *function and meaning of methodology* (which is restricted to the realm of interpretational relevances) and furnish the foundation of a theory of expectation and especially of problems of rationalization. This second theory will also prove to be extremely helpful in the *clarification of the **theory of verification**, invalidation, and falsification of propositions* relating to empirical facts, and as well will contribute to the *constitutive problems of typicality*.[1]

And the closest Schutz comes to describing such a postulate is offered as an epigraph above, but that description fails to specify verification for the social or cultural sciences.

In this chapter I am ultimately concerned with Schutz's theory of verification. My concern arose from seeing colleagues mistake his postulate of adequacy for what might be called a postulate of verification. In the first section I explore what this error is and speculate about its origin and in the second section I attempt to explicate an account of verification from some of his texts.

Adequacy is Not Truth

Concerning how the postulate of adequacy might be misunderstood as a postulate of truth, it does no help that Schutz never specifically named nor described a postulate of verification in the cultural sciences as such. Clearly he could have, so one can

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[1] (V 133, cf. I 35, emphasis added) Richard Zaner, the editor of this particular text, notes that "Schutz did not get to these 'results' in the present study."

only wonder why he did not do so. As will be seen below, it is clear that adequacy is not truth for him.

But where the misunderstanding of the signification of "adequacy" in Schutz is concerned, the student of his writings might be under the influence, however, of how Thomas Aquinas held that "*veritas est adaequatio res et intellectus*," something Schutz knew as having been recognized by Husserl:

> Otaka takes his point of departure from one of the four concepts of truth posed in Husserl's *Logical Investigations*. There truth signifies complete agreement between what is meant and what is given, as given. According to Husserl, this *adequatio rei ac intellectus* is only present when an objectivational intention achieves its ultimate fulfillment by perfect perception, when what is objective is thus actually present or given precisely as that which it is intended to as being. Every meaning, thinking, judging, when accompanied by positing of actuality, aims as its objective correlate, "intends to (*intendiert*)" its objective correlate. This intending either achieves or does not achieve its fulfillment by what is immediately given. Only when the complete and total intending (*Intention)* achieves its concluding and final fulfillment in the immediately given is genuine adequation itself reached in the affair in question. "The object is, then, not merely meant, but given in the strictest sense just as it is meant and posited in the meaning." (IV 209)

Since this is the only concept of truth that Schutz articulates, we will have to consider whether it is one that he accepts. *Can it be shown that for him truth in cultural science occurs when a scientific construct fully coincides or agrees with a common-sense construct about a cultural object?*

In this first section, we can wonder whether his postulate of adequacy actually matches this classical notion. There are seven places where Schutz explicitly articulates what the postulate of adequacy is and the following one from "Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action" (1953) appears the most important one:

> Each term in a scientific model of human action must be constructed in such a way that a human act performed within the life-world by the actor in the way indicated by the typical construct would be understandable for the actor himself as well as for his fellow-man in terms of common-sense interpretations of everyday life. Compliance with this postulate warrants the consistency of the constructs of the social scientist with constructs of common-sense experience of the social reality. (I 44)

If one thought that consistency between constructs of the two sorts, the scientific and the common-sensical, was truth, then this is also a statement of the postulate of truth. Inconsistency here might show falsehood and indeed support falsificationism, but is consistency sufficient for a positive account of truth?

A second statement replaces consistency above with "compatibility" (I 64), a third statement adds "reasonable" to understandable (II 19), a fourth statement adds that "[t]his postulate is of extreme importance for the methodology of social science. What makes it possible for a social science to refer at all to events in the life-world is the fact that the interpretation of any human act by the social scientist might be the same as that by the actor or by his partner" (II 85). ("Might be the same" is not quite the same as "the same.")

Then a fifth statement repeats "reasonable for and understandable by the actor himself as well as for his fellow man" and adds that "[t]his postulate is of extreme

importance for the methodology of the social sciences. What makes it at all possible for social scientists to refer to events in the life-world is the fact that their interpretation of any human act can be basically similar or analogous to its interpretation by the actor and his partner" (IV 22). ("Basically similar or analogous to" is also not the same as "the same.")

A sixth statement includes to a role for verification with respect to whether a construct is understandable by the actor, but basically repeats "consistency" where the adequacy postulate itself is concerned:

> Moreover, each term in a scientific model of human action must be constructed in such a way that a human act performed in the life-world by an individual actor in the way indicated by the typical construct would be understandable by the actor himself as well as for his fellow-men in terms of the common-sense interpretation of everyday life. Whether this is the case or not can be **verified** by empirical findings. Compliance with this postulate, which I suggest be called the *postulate of adequacy,* warrants the consistency of the constructs of the social scientist with the constructs of common-sense experience of the social reality. (PP 145)

Finally, the following passage goes beyond adequacy and expands on the question of the role of observation in social-scientific verification.

> But is not all this building of constructs and theory formation an idle play which is neither self-certifying nor empirically **verifiable** by observational data and facts? The answer is, of course, in the negative and the question a merely rhetorical one. It has to be emphasized that among the aforementioned postulates which the constructs of the social scientist have to fulfill, the *postulate of adequacy* warrants the consistency of the constructs of the social scientist with the constructs of common-sense experience of the social reality, it being the latter which are the true subject matter of all the social sciences. Let us repeat that the postulate of adequacy requires that each term in a scientific model of human action must be constructed in such a way that a human act performed within the life-world by an individual actor in the way indicated by the typical construct would be understandable by the actor himself as well as by his fellow-man in terms of the common-sense thinking of everyday life. … If you call these constructs theories, then these theories can be **verified** by an empirical observation in one or another case in no other way than the theories *of* the natural sciences, *provided that* we do not understand under empirical observation merely the sensual perception of occurrences of the outer world, but that we include in our concept of empirical knowledge also our experience of everyday life. (PP 149)

In sum, the constructs proposed by the social scientist are considered adequate by Schutz if they are also considered by an actor in everyday life as "understandable" and/or "reasonable," or "consistent," or if they "might be the same," and/or they are "basically the same" or "analogous" with her common-sense constructs. The common-sense constructs being "the true subject matter of the social sciences," and theories about them "can be **verified** by empirical observation," which is different from sensual perception, but what is is positively speaking? Adequacy is one thing, but the identification of scientific constructs with common-sense constructs is another.

It seems to me that what the postulate of adequacy can be said to establish is not truth but plausibility. And Schutz remarks that "[o]f course, the scientist is governed by the idealized rule of not being satisfied with simple plausibility and likelihood but with searching for the truth" (IV 143).

Toward a Theory of Verification

Important allusions to verification can especially be found in Schutz's essay, "Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences" (1953), of which "Positivistic Philosophy and the Actual Approach of Interpretive Social Science" [1953] is an earlier and longer draft. I have electronic versions of all Schutz's writings in English and searching them has shown that "**verif**" finds "**verify**," "**verified**," "**verifiable,"** and "**verification**" and that together such words occur 182 times. To enhance the usually marginal presence of these words, I have **boldfaced** them in quotations aove and below.

Searching also shows that the English word "understanding" occurs 3028 times in the 1822 pages of the oeuvre, but, except in translations and citations, the German word, *Verstehen*, in italics, interestingly occurs merely 23 times and all of these occur in just one essay, where the italicization is sufficient to emphasize it in quotations. This essay, "Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences," is crucial for the present interest and it and some passages from elsewhere will be closely read (and much quoted).

We can minimize here the references to Carl Hempel, Ernest Nagel, and positivism, although these cannot be eliminated. Schutz of course also recognizes knowledge of formal and material *eidē*, but the concern here is with the empirical. Thus, "the fact that a set of rules for scientific procedure is equally valid for all empirical sciences whether they deal with objects of nature or with human affairs. Here and there, the principles of controlled inference and **verification** by fellow scientists and the theoretical ideals of unity, simplicity, universality, and precision prevail" (I 49).

Moreover, he writes,

> I agree with Professor Nagel that all empirical knowledge involves discovery through processes of controlled inference, and that it must be statable in prepositional form and capable of being **verified** by anyone who is prepared to make the effort to do so through observation—although I do not believe, as Professor Nagel does, that this observation has to be sensory in the precise meaning of this term. (I 51)

Now Schutz states his problem as follows.

> The postulate of subjective interpretation has to be understood in the sense that all scientific explanations of the social world *can*, and for certain purposes *must*, refer to the subjective meaning of the actions of human beings from which social reality originates.
>
> On the other hand, I agreed with Professor Nagel's statement that the social sciences, like all empirical sciences, have to be objective in the sense that their propositions are subjected to controlled **verification** and must not refer to private uncontrollable experience.
>
> How is it possible to reconcile these seemingly contradictory principles? Indeed, the most serious question which the methodology of the social sciences has to answer is: How is it possible to form objective concepts and an objectively **verifiable** theory of subjective meaning structures? (I 62)

So verification in the cultural sciences includes for Schutz some sort of observation, subjective meanings of actions, and explanations referring to them, but, to begin with, what is this sort of observation? He goes on to sketch what is to be observed

in this other way in these non-natural sciences and this seems the best indication of how it is not merely sensory observation:

> The primary goal of the social sciences is to obtain organized knowledge of social reality. By the term "social reality" I wish to be understood the sum total of objects and occurrences within the social cultural world as experienced by the common-sense thinking of men living their daily lives among their fellow-men, connected with them in manifold relations of interaction. It is the world of cultural objects and social institutions into which we all are born, within which we have to find our bearings, and with which we have to come to terms. (I 53)

Something that sensory observation and thus the positivistic theory of verification cannot handle is, for example, the following, which concerns the subjective meaning of the fellow scientist.

> But the postulate of describing and explaining human behavior in terms of controllable sensory observation stops short before the description and explanation of the process by which scientist B controls and **verifies** the observational findings of scientist A and the conclusions drawn by him. In order to do so, B has to know what A has observed, what the goal of his inquiry is, why he thought the observed fact worthy of being observed, *i.e.,* relevant to the scientific problem at hand, etc. This knowledge is commonly called understanding. (Idem.)

Thus, cultural-scientific observation is involved in the knowledge called understanding or *Verstehen*.

Especially because it correlates with *Verstehen* or understanding, let us recall the signification of "meaning" (*Sinn*) according to two passages in *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt* (1932):

> [E]ven a superficial examination makes it clear that *the problem of meaning is a time problem—*not a problem of physical time, which is divisible and measurable, but a problem of historical time. The latter is always a passage of time, … having the nature of an "internal time consciousness," a consciousness of one's own duration. It is within this duration that the meaning of a person's experience is constituted for him as he lives through the experience. Here and here only, in the deepest stratum of experience that is accessible to reflection, is to be found the ultimate source of the phenomena of "meaning (*Sinn*)" and "understanding (*Verstehen*)." (PSW 12)
>
> In order to sort out these different levels in the meaning of the term, let us first give it a generic definition. Let us say that understanding (*Verstehen*) as such is correlative to meaning, for all understanding is directed toward that which has meaning (*auf ein Sinnhaftes*) and only something understood is meaningful (*sinnvoll*). … In this sense, all intentional Acts which are interpretations of one's own subjective experiences would be called Acts of understanding (*verstehende Akte*). We should also designate as "understanding" all the lower strata of meaning-comprehension on which such self-explication is based.
>
> The man in the natural attitude, then, understands the world by interpreting his own lived experiences of it, whether these experiences be of inanimate things, of animals, or of his fellow human beings. (PSW 108)

Interpretation as well as observation of cultural objects is thus part of understanding or *Verstehen* (see Chap. 17).

Concerning what is understood in *Versthen*, if one tends to believe that only linguistic texts and speeches are meaningful, the last sentence just quoted above is important, for it shows that this is clearly not the case. Yet linguistic data are not irrelevant:

> Not being able to communicate directly with the actors within the social world, [the theorist] is unable to **verify** directly the data he has obtained about them from the different sources of information open to him within the social world. To be sure, he himself has, as a man among others, direct human experiences of the social world. In that capacity he can send out questionnaires, hear witnesses, establish test-cases. From these sources and others he gathers data which he will later use, once retired into the solitude of the theoretician. (II 54)

Schutz even recognizes cinematic data: "The same overt behavior (say a tribal pageant as it can be captured by the movie camera) may have an entirely different meaning to the performers" (I 54).

Where more precisely can one acquire such linguistic and especially non-linguistic data about social reality? In his English adaptation of the fourth part of *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt*, Thomas Luckmann nicely relates such data gathering to Schutz's structure of the social world:

> The bodily presence of the Other offers to the partner in the We-relation as well as to the observer a maximum of vivid symptoms. The world which is within reach of the observer is congruent with the world within reach of the observed person. There is thus a certain chance that the experiences of the world within reach on the part of the observed person roughly coincide with the corresponding experiences of the observer. But the observer cannot be certain that this is really the case. As long as he remains a mere observer, he is not in a position to **verify** his interpretation of the Other's experiences by checking them against the Other's own subjective interpretations. And yet, the facility with which the observer can transform himself into a partner in a face-to-face social relation places him in a privileged position relative to the collection of knowledge about social reality. The observed individual can become a fellow-man who may be questioned, while a mere contemporary is not within my reach Here and Now, and a predecessor is, of course, forever beyond interrogation. (II 34)

So it is in the We-relation of partners in everyday life that the most meaningful data can be gathered and reference to merely the possibility of coinciding with subjective meaning is not the same as the adequacy of the postulate of adequacy.

Continuing with "Concept and Theory Formation," we can appreciate the emphasis brought by the German word *Verstehen* further. First, there is "common-sense knowledge" and also "experience":

> [T]he social world is experienced from the outset as a meaningful one. The Other's body is not experienced as an organism but as a fellow-man, its overt behavior not as an occurrence in the space-time of the outer world, but as our fellow-man's action. We normally "know" what the Other does, for what reason he does it, why he does it at this particular time and in these particular circumstances. That means that we experience our fellow-man's action in terms of his motives and goals. And in the same way, we experience cultural objects in terms of the human action of which they are the result. A tool, for example, is not experienced as a thing in the outer world (which of course it is also) but in terms of the purpose for which it was designed by more or less anonymous fellow-men and its possible use by others.—The fact that in common-sense thinking we take for granted our actual or potential knowledge of the meaning of human actions and their products, is, I suggest, precisely what social scientists want to express if they speak of understanding or *Verstehen* as a technique of dealing with human affairs. (I 55)

Interestingly, however, Schutz first introduces *Verstehen* here not as a part of cultural-scientific method but rather as a form of common-sense thinking, and it is of

course very phenomenological to begin on the level of the life-world and Schutz is well aware of this (I 57). Already on what could also be called the life-worldly level, this *Verstehen* "is controllable at least to the same extent to which the private sensory perceptions of an individual are controllable by any other individual under certain conditions" and "predictions based on *Verstehen* are continuously made in common-sense thinking with high success" (I 56).

Then there is *Verstehen* in the second form, namely: "as a method peculiar to the social sciences." But this method has been objected to for being subjective:

> The critics of understanding call it subjective, because they hold that understanding the motives of another man's action depends upon the private, uncontrollable, and **unverifiable** intuition of the observer or refers to his private value system. The social scientists, such as Max Weber, however, call *Verstehen* subjective because its goal is to find out what the actor "means" in his action, in contrast to the meaning which this action has for the actor's partner or a neutral observer. This is the origin of Max Weber's famous postulate of subjective interpretation. (I 57)

(Subjective interpretation will be returned to presently.)

The contrasting of social-scientific *Verstehen* with sensory observation continues and, to begin with, agreement, which seems the same as coinciding, is actually said to be sought with the common-sense experience of the social world, and this is beyond the "adequacy" analyzed above and seems to be truth as characterized in the review of Otaka quoted above:

> A theory which aims at explaining social reality has to develop particular devices foreign to the natural sciences in order *to agree with* the common-sense experience of the social world. This is indeed what all theoretical sciences of human affairs—economics, sociology, the sciences of law, linguistics, cultural anthropology, etc.—have done.
>
>   This state of affairs is founded on the fact that there is an essential difference in the structure of the thought objects or mental constructs formed by the social sciences and those formed by the natural sciences. It is up to the natural scientist and to him alone to define, in accordance with the procedural rules of his science, his observational field, and to determine the facts, data, and events within it which are relevant for his problem or scientific purpose at hand. Neither are those facts and events pre-selected, nor is the observational field pre-interpreted. The world of nature, as explored by the natural scientist, does not "mean" anything to the molecules, atoms, and electrons. But the observational field of the social scientist—social reality—has a specific meaning and relevance structure for the human beings living, acting, and thinking within it. By a series of common-sense constructs they have pre-selected and pre-interpreted this world which they experience as the reality of their daily lives. It is these thought objects of theirs which determine their behavior by motivating it. The thought objects constructed by the social scientist, in order to grasp this social reality, have to be founded upon the thought objects constructed by the common-sense thinking of men living their daily life within their social world. Thus, the constructs of the social sciences are, so to speak, constructs of the second degree, that is, constructs of the constructs made by the actors on the social scene, whose behavior the social scientist has to observe and to explain in accordance with the procedural rules of his science. (I 58, emphasis added)

Schutz goes on to describe the role of typification in common-sense thinking and the experience of the subject meanings of unique actions:

> To a certain extent, sufficient for many practical purposes, I understand their behavior, if I understand their motives, goals, choices, and plans originating in *their* biographically deter-

mined circumstances. Yet only in particular situations, and then only fragmentarily, can I experience the Others' motives, goals, etc.—briefly, the subjective meanings they bestow upon their actions, in their uniqueness. I can, however, experience them in their typicality. In order to do so I construct typical patterns of the actors' motives and ends, even of their attitudes and personalities, of which their actual conduct is just an instance or example.[2]

He also explores how common-sense knowledge is structurally, genetically, and distributionally socialized and recognizes that typical scientific constructs originate from typical common-sense or, again, in Husserlian parlance, from life-wordly thinking (I 61).

These are, very roughly, the outlines of a few major features of the constructs involved in common-sense experience of the intersubjective world in daily life, which is called *Verstehen*. As explained before, they are the first level constructs upon which the second level constructs of the social sciences have to be erected. But here a major problem emerges. On the one hand, it has been shown that the constructs on the first level, the common-sense constructs, refer to subjective elements, namely the *Verstehen* of the actor's action from his, the actor's, point of view. Consequently, if the social sciences aim indeed at explaining social reality, then the scientific constructs on the second level, too, must include a reference to the subjective meaning an action has for the actor. This is, I think, what Max Weber understood by his famous postulate of subjective interpretation, which has, indeed, been observed so far in the theory formation of all social sciences. (I 62)

If social-scientific constructs are to coincide with common-sense constructs, they must first of all refer to them.

Subjective interpretation would seem the next thing to consider, but Schutz goes on instead to describe the theoretical attitude of the social scientist and then has much to say about how social-scientific models that include homunculi or puppets are built and how circumstances in them are varied. "Concept and Theory Formation" in effect then concludes as follows.

It can easily be seen that each step involved in the construction and use of the scientific model can be **verified** by empirical observation, provided that we do not restrict this term to sensory perceptions of objects and events in the outer world but include the experiential form, by which common-sense thinking in everyday life understands human actions and their outcome in terms of their underlying motives and goals. (I 65)

Looking elsewhere in Schutz, we can now turn to what subjective interpretation is, why there is need for it, and, finally, how it is involved in cultural-scientific **verification**. We know that interpretation occurs on the common-sense level of everyday life and then also on the level of cultural science. What is crucial is that, on both levels, one must often use thinking to go beyond the unique data observable for a partner:

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[2] (I 60) "The more anonymous the typifying construct is, the more detached it is from the uniqueness of the individual fellow-man involved and the fewer aspects of his personality and behavior pattern enter the typification as being relevant for the purpose at hand, for the sake of which the type has been constructed.—Summing up, we may say that, except in the pure We-relation of consociates, we can never grasp the individual uniqueness of our fellow-man in his unique biographical situation. In the constructs of common-sense thinking the Other appears at best as a partial self, and he enters even the pure We-relation merely with a part of his personality." (I 18)

[O]nly the actor knows "when his action starts and where it ends," that is, why it will have been performed. It is the span of his projects which determines the unit of his action. His partner has neither knowledge of the projecting preceding the actor's action nor of the context of a higher unit in which it stands. He knows merely that fragment of the actor's action which has become manifest to him, namely, the performed act observed by him or the past phases of the still ongoing action. If the addressee of my question were asked later on by a third person what I wanted from him he would answer that I wanted to know where to find some ink. That is all he knows of my projecting and its context, and he has to look at it as a self-contained unit action. In order to "understand" what I, the actor, meant by my action he would have to start from the observed act and to construct from there my underlying in-order-to motive for the sake of which I did what he observed.

It is now clear that the meaning of an action is necessarily a different one (a) for the actor; (b) for his partner involved with him in interaction and having, thus, with him a set of relevances and purposes in common; and (c) for the observer not involved in such relationship. This fact leads to two important consequences: First, that in common-sense thinking we have merely a *chance* to understand the Other's action sufficiently for our purpose at hand; secondly that to increase this chance we have to search for the meaning the action has for the actor. …

But subjective interpretation of meaning is merely possible by revealing the motives which determine a given course of action. By referring a course-of-action type to the underlying typical motives of the actor we arrive at the construction of a personal type. The latter may be more or less anonymous and, therewith, more or less empty of content. In the We-relationship among consociates the Other's course of action, its motives (insofar as they become manifest) and his person (insofar as it is involved in the manifest action) can be shared in immediacy and the constructed types, just described, will show a very low degree of anonymity and a high degree of fullness.[3]

So much for subjective interpretation in the common-sense knowledge of everyday life. As in previous connections, the scientific version of a method contrasts with the common-sensical:

In order to explain human actions the scientist has to ask what model of an individual mind can be constructed and what typical contents must be attributed to it in order to explain the observed facts as the result of the activity of such a mind in an understandable relation. The compliance with this postulate warrants the possibility of referring all kinds of human action or their result to the subjective meaning such action or result of an action had for the actor. (I 43)

So [the scientist] arrives at a model of the social world, or better at a reconstruction of it. It contains all the relevant elements of the social event chosen as a typical one by the scientist for further examination. And it is a model which complies perfectly with the postulate of the subjective point of view. For from the first the puppet type is imagined as having

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[3] (I 24) It may also be mentioned that, beyond the face-to-face relation, there are "contemporaries" sharing time but not space and that, concerning them, Schutz writes, "In constructing course-of-action types of contemporaries other than consociates, we impute to the more or less anonymous actors a set of supposedly invariant motives which govern their actions. This set is itself a construct of typical expectations of the Other's behavior and has been investigated frequently in terms of social role or function or institutional behavior. In common-sense thinking such a construct has a particular significance for projecting actions which are oriented upon my contemporaries' (not my consociates') behavior" (*Idem*).

the same specific knowledge of the situation—including means and conditions—which a real actor would have in the real social world; from the first the subjective motives of a real actor performing a typical act are implanted as constant elements of the specious consciousness of the personal ideal type; and it is the destiny of the personal ideal type to play the role the actor in the social world would have to adopt in order to perform the typical act. And as the type is constructed in such a way that it performs exclusively typical acts, the objective and subjective elements in the formation of unit-acts coincide.

On the other hand, the formation of the type, the choice of the typical event, and the elements considered as typical are conceptual terms which can be discussed objectively and which are open to criticism and **verification**. They are not formed by social scientists at random without check or restraint; the laws of their formation are very rigid and the scope of arbitrariness of the social scientist is much narrower than seems at first sight. (II 18)

Conclusion

A theory of verification is concerned with how truth is sought and obtained. Schutz fairly often indicates reliance in verification, which can be done not only by a scientist, but by her fellow scientists as well, the latter to examine critically what the former scientist has done. What a cultural scientist seeks is the agreement of her scientific constructs with those of actors in everyday life, which latter constructs are formed in common-sense understanding by the actor of the meaning of her own actions and motives. Such agreement fits the identificational concept truth that is the only one that is mentioned by Alfred Schutz. This truth is different from the adequacy referred to in the postulate of adequacy. Coincidence is also referred to such an extent that it appears a synonym for agreement. Unfortunately, Schutz does not call it truth.

The actions and their outcomes of an actor are observable by an other if the other is a partner in a We-relation and the motives that are certainly knowable to the actor may or may not be also manifested to the partner in their face-to-face interaction. Inanimate, animate, human, linguistic, and even cinematic data about actions and other cultural objects can be collected in various ways and used in the attempt to understand. Interpretation is also regularly resorted to on the common-sensical and on the cultural-scientific levels in order to construct motives that are not observed and this is included in understanding or *Verstehen* on both levels. Unlike in natural science, however, social-scientific constructs are about the common-sense constructs of actors in everyday life and these common-sense constructs are the constructs of the meanings of her actions and motives observable by the actor herself and thus "subjective meanings." Thus thinking in terms of constructs is, along with observation, an essential part of verification. Social-scientific constructs ultimately refer as well to the subjective meaning understood by the actor in her subjective interpretation and that is what social-scientific constructs, if true, coincide or agree with.

Works of Schutz

Note: Unless done otherwise, the following works will be cited with the embedded abbreviations as listed down the left margin below, plus the page number(s).

I=Alfred Schutz, *Collected Papers,* Vol. I, *The Problem of Social Reality*, ed. Maurice Natanson (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962).

II=——, *Collected Papers,* Vol. II, *Studies in Social Theory*, ed. Arvid Broedresen (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964).

III=——, *Collected Papers,* Vol. III, *Studies in Phenomenological Philosophy*, ed. Ilse Schutz (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966).

IV=——, *Collected Papers,* Vol. IV, ed. Helmut Wagner, George Psathas, and Fred Kersten, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996).

V=——, *Collected Papers*, Vol. V, *Phenomenology and the Social Sciences*, ed. Lester Embree (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011).

VI=——, *Collected Papers*, Vol. VI, *Literary Reality and Relationships*, ed. Michael Barber (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013).

PSW=—, *The Phenomenology of the Social World,* trans. George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967).

PP=——, "Positivistic Philosophy and the Actual Approach of Interpretive Social Science: An Ineditum from Spring 1953," *Husserl Studies*, Vol. 14 (1998): 123–149. Reprinted in Dermot Moran and Lester Embree, eds., *Phenomenology: Critical Concepts in Philosophy*, 5 vols. London: Routledge, 2004, III, pp. 119–145. Also available at http://www.springerlink.com/content/t52u22v305u28g04/

Chapter 17
Schutz on Reducing Social Tensions

> *[W]e are worried citizens of the United States of 1955,*
> *deeply troubled by the many manifestations of discrimination,*
> *prejudices, and other social evils prevailing in our particular*
> *social environments, and we are looking for appropriate*
> *remedies (IV 148).*

Introduction

Is the thinking of Alfred Schutz conservative? Is he a conservative *because* he urges value-neutral research, i.e., does he in effect support the status quo by not working to change it? To defend him, one might contend, positively, that theoretical knowledge is the best foundation for valuing and action and, negatively, that immediate ethical and political purposes distort theoretical efforts to lay such foundations. In that case, however, the question arises of whether Schutz ever gets beyond theory to practical application or at least urges doing so.

That Schutz somehow engaged in practically applied as well as purely theoretical efforts is the opinion of the editor of the second volume of the *Collected Papers*. After mentioning that "the selection and organization of its material generally conform with the table of contents drafted by the author," Arvid Broederson writes as follows about the second part of that volume (Schutz entitled Part I "Pure Theory"),

> The title "Applied Theory" may appear somewhat misleading if the key phrase of *Part II* is read as meaning the use of insight for merely practical ends. These studies are not concerned with "social engineering" or "how to solve social problems." They are, as was their author in all his works, concerned with the use of theory for a more adequate interpretation of social reality. Their accent is on understanding rather than operation. Yet the clues they find to the inner meanings of human conduct lead closer to a sensible way of approaching its problems than any treatise on "techniques and methods of problem-solving" ever could. The man who wrote pieces such as the essay on "Equality" and the related ones on "The Stranger" and on "The Homecomer" with its touch of self-reflection is a man of wisdom in human affairs no less than in scholarly thought and inquiry. (II x & xi)

Embedded citations refer to works of Schutz listed at the end of this chapter.

Several passages from the "applied" essay "Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social World" (1957, hereafter "Equality") especially deserve comment in this connection. After drawing on Georg Simmel with respect to tensions between subordinate and superordinate groups, Schutz asserts that "it makes a characteristic difference whether tensions of this kind can be solved by shifts within the prevailing common systems of relevance, or whether this system itself must be abolished. The first attitude is characteristic of conservative thinking, the second, of revolutionary thinking" (II 268).

He goes on to allude to the French Revolution but must have also had National Socialism and Communism in mind. By contrast, conservative thinking seeks shifts in relevance systems, and Schutz next quotes his friend Albert Salomon: "It is the specific postulate of our contemporary scene to be liberal in order to remain conservative. We can secure the continuity of our social and intellectual world as conservative reformists" (idem).

Does Schutz then actually consider himself a liberal *qua* conservative reformist? Such political labels are of course vague. Nevertheless, there is a remarkable (and unusual) explicit self-reference earlier in the same essay: "Quite another question is that of the strategy by which the evil of social tensions can be at least diminished. This educational goal can in my opinion be reached only by a slow and patient modification of the system of relevances which those in power impose on their fellow-men" (II 262).

Schutz thus considered himself a liberal *qua* conservative reformist. Furthermore, "Equality" can be read not only for the theory but also for the policy on how social tensions might be reduced that it contains more or less explicitly.

Schutz's Approach

"Equality" is methodologically most significant for its emphasis on in- and out-groups, which will be addressed presently, but the refinement of what Max Weber calls "subjective meaning" needs attention first and, as a means to that, the two ways in which his work is theoretical must be grasped.

Alluding to the conference at which "Equality" was presented, Schutz writes that "we are scholars—philosophers, theologians, educators, social and natural scientists—who are eager to investigate *theoretically* the problem of equality and its place within our *theoretical* interests and to use for this purpose the methods of our particular disciplines." (IV 148) His own theoretical interest is generally cultural scientific, i.e., social-scientific in the wide signification, and thus excludes the approaches of philosophy, theology, natural science, etc.

The "social scientist *qua* theoretician" is described:

> The problems of the theoretician originate in his theoretical interest, and many elements of the social world that are scientifically relevant are irrelevant from the viewpoint of the actor on the social scene, and *vice versa.* Moreover, the typical constructs formulated by the social scientist for the solution of his problem are, so to speak, constructs of the second

degree, namely, constructs of the common-sense constructs in terms of which everyday thinking interprets the social world. (II 248)

Since his sources are Charles Cooley, Robert M. MacIver, Gunnar Myrdal, Talcott Parsons, Max Scheler, Georg Simmel, Albert Salomon, William Graham Sumner, R. H. Tawney, W. I. Thomas, Ferdinand Toennies, and Max Weber his perspective here is sociological in particular.

In a different signification of the word "theoretical," however, Schutz's efforts are, again, not merely theoretical: "It is the task of the theoretical social sciences to study the rather complicated structure of this social reality…. It is the task of empirical research to apply such theoretical findings 'in the study of' concrete social groups and social relations in a given setting at a given historical moment" (IV 150).

The reference to application in this statement can be taken two ways. On the one hand, there are the actual cases that fall under theory, such as the varias social groups and relations in the United States of 1955 discussed in "Equality." On the other hand, there is the use of theory to guide efforts at making changes, such as the reduction of social tensions to which Schutz has already been seen to be committed.[1]

Within Schutz's overall sociological approach, including its theoretical vs. empirical and its theoretical vs. practically applied dimensions, there is some evolution in "Equality":

> In Weber's unfortunate—but generally accepted—terminology, we have to distinguish between the subjective meanings a situation has for a person involved (or the one a particular action has for the actor himself), and the objective meaning, that is, the interpretation of the same situation or the same action by anybody else. The terminology is unfortunate because the so-called objective meaning—or, better, meanings—are again relative to the observer, partner, scientist, etc. (II 227)

A parallel but more complex passage two years later explicates this "etc." with "the social scientist or the philosopher" (II 273). This development is complex. Linguistically, "subjective" and "objective meaning" have two components. Concerning "meaning," which the expressions share, there is an increasing tendency to use "interpretation" as an alternative expression in Schutz's later writings and this tendency will be followed in the present study due to the greater flexibility of this term.

Concerning "subjective" and "objective," however, what Schutz curiously fails to appreciate is how they undesirably connote cognitive unreliability and reliability respectively in the current languages of science, philosophy, and everyday life. Further useful alternatives can be supplied for interpretive and investigative purposes by beginning from his acceptance of the contrast of in-groups and out-groups and then proceeding in Schutz's spirit *but beyond his letter:* "Insider" can be used instead of "subjective" and "outsider" instead of "objective," except, of course in quotations. ("Outsider" as a noun, but not as an adjective, does occur repeatedly in "Equality.")

Taking into consideration the passage contrasting the constructs of common-sense and social science, it can now be explicated that the variety of interpretations includes the common-sense insider interpretation relative to the actor, the common-sense outsider interpretation relative to the partner, the outsider interpretation of

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[1] This distinction seems already to have been expressed as early as 1932; see PSW 248.

the common-sense observer, and the outsider interpretation of the sociologist, and, for that matter, those interpretations that are relative to other social scientists, philosophers, theologians, etc. His approach in "Equality" is to common-sense insider interpretations from the standpoint of a sociological outsider interested in empirical and applied as well as purely theoretical research.

Groups and Membership

Groups are always already distinguished, named, classified, and related in common-sense thinking, and Schutz theoretically recognizes social collectivities all along (see Chap. 13). But most of his concrete analyses concern individuals either abstracted from or in relation to others and thus they are psychological or social-psychological analyses (see Chaps. 5 and 6). "Equality," however, is most remarkable in its great emphasis on groups and their collective insider and outsider interpretations on the common-sense level. This is not to say, however, that he accepts anything like Husserl's personalities of higher order, for "[t]he attempts of Simmel, Max Weber, [and] Scheler to reduce social collectivities to the social interaction of individuals is, so it seems, much closer to the spirit of phenomenology than the pertinent statements of its founder" (II 39).

Schutz prefers the expressions "in-group" and "out-group," but also approves of Sumner's expressions "We-group" and "They-group." This contrast can be clarified in terms of the antithesis of insider and outsider interpretations for "the term 'group' has an entirely different meaning for those who say '*We* Protestants,' '*We* Americans,' etc., from the one it has for those who say '*the* Catholics,' '*the* Russians,' '*the* Negroes'" (II 250).

> [T]he subjective meaning the group has for its members consists in their knowledge of a common situation, and with it of a common system of typifications and relevances. This situation has its history in which the individual members' biographies participate; and the system of typification and relevances determining the situation forms a common relative natural conception of the world. Here the individual members are "at home," that is, they find their bearings without difficulty in the common surroundings, guided by a set of recipes of more or less institutionalized habits, mores, folkways, etc., that help them to come to terms with beings and fellow-men belonging to the same situation. (II 251)

There is, furthermore, a different and important distinction that holds *within* in-groups (and also within out-groups). Schutz prefers to speak of "existential" groups and "voluntary groups":

> I cannot choose my sex or race, nor my place of birth, and, therewith, the national group into which I was born; neither can I choose the mother tongue I learned or the conception of the world taken for granted by the group with which I was indoctrinated during childhood. I cannot choose my parents or siblings, or the social and economic status of my parental family. My membership in these groups and the social roles I have to assume within them are existential elements of my situation which I have to take into account, and with which I have to come to terms.—On the other hand, I may choose my spouse, my friends, my business partners, my occupation, change my nationality and even my religion. I may vol-

untarily become a member of existing groups or originate new ones (friendships, marital relations), determine at least to a certain extent the role I want to assume within them, and even make some efforts to attain by my achievements that kind of position and status within them toward which I aspire. (II 250)

The individual member of an in-group finds himself within "a preconstituted system of typifications, relevances, roles, positions, statuses not of his own making, but handed down as a social heritage" (II 252). Race is one of the "existential elements" mentioned, but appears to be more than skin color for Schutz and thus more a matter of ethnicity, which is cultural rather than biological: "Could Marian Anderson sing Negro Spirituals in her unsurpassed way if she did not share with her fellow Negroes this specific cultural heritage, this specific conception of the world of which the Spirituals are partial expression?" (II 259).

What is a "cultural heritage"? If "social heritage" is synonymous, which it seems to be, then Schutz again draws on Sumner:

> The sum-total of the relative natural aspect the social world has for those living within it constitutes, to use William Graham Sumner's term, the folkways of the in-group, which are socially accepted as the good ways and the right ways for coming to terms with things and fellow-men. They are taken for granted because they have stood the test so far, and, being socially approved, are held as requiring neither an explanation nor a justification.
>
> These folkways constitute the social heritage which is handed down to children born into and growing up within the group; and by a process of acculturation the approaching stranger who wants to be accepted by the group has, in the same way as the child, not only to learn the structure and significance of elements to be interpreted, but also the scheme of interpretation prevailing in and accepted by the in-group without question.[2]

What of out-groups?

> The members of an out-group do not hold the ways of life of the in-group as self-evident truths. No article of faith and no historical tradition commits them to accept as the right and good ones the folkways of any group other than their own. Not only their central myth, but also the processes of its rationalization and institutionalization are different. Other gods reveal other codes of the right and the good life, other things are sacred and taboo…. (II 245)

Relations between groups do not always go well. For example, prejudices, which are rationalizations and institutionalizations of the group's central myth (II 262) are, contrary to what many think, exclusively attributed to others. "*I* can never be prejudiced because *my* beliefs are well founded, *my* opinions taken for granted, and *my* faith in the rightness and goodness of *our* ways—whatever this may mean—unfailing" (II 261). This is insider interpretation.

What, again, of outsider interpretation?

> The outsider measures the standards prevailing in the group under consideration in accordance with the system of relevances prevailing within the natural aspect the world has for

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[2] (II 230, emphasis added) In an earlier essay. "The Stranger" (1944), Schutz uses what seems another synonym: "Following the customary terminology, we use the term 'cultural pattern of group life' for designating all the particular valuations, institutions, and systems of orientation and guidance (such as the folkways, mores, laws, habits, customs, etiquette, fashions) which, in the common opinion of sociologists of our time, characterize—if not constitute—any social group at a given moment in its history" (II 92).

his home-group. As long as a formula of transformation cannot be found which permits
the translation of the system of relevances and typifications prevailing in the group under
consideration into that of the home-group, the ways of the former remain ununderstandable;
but frequently they are considered to be of minor value and inferior. (II 246)

The out-group's interpretation of the in-group's natural conception of the world and
the in-group's self-interpretation often interact in two ways:

a. On the one hand, the in-group feels itself frequently misunderstood by the
   out-group; such failures to understand its ways of life, so the in-group feels,
   must be rooted in hostile prejudices or in bad faith, since the truths held by
   the in-group are "matters of course," self-evident and, therefore, understandable
   by any human being. This feeling may lead to a partial shift of the system of
   relevances prevailing within the in-group, namely, by originating a solidarity
   of resistance against outside criticism. The out-group is then looked at with
   repugnance, disgust, aversion, antipathy, hatred, or fear.
b. On the other hand, a vicious circle… is thus set up because the out-group, by the
   changed reaction of the in-group, is fortified in its interpretation of the traits of
   the in-group as highly detestable. In more general terms: to the natural aspect the
   world has for group A belongs not only a certain stereotyped idea of the natural
   aspect of the world for group B, but included in it also is a stereotype of the way
   in which group B supposedly looks at A.

> Such a situation may lead to various attitudes of the in-group toward the out-group: the
> in-group may stick to its way of life and try to change the attitude of the out-group by an
> educational process of spreading information, or persuasion, or by appropriate propaganda.
> Or the in-group may try to adjust its way of thinking to that of the out-group by accepting
> the latter's pattern of relevances at least partially. Or a policy of iron curtain or of appease-
> ment might be established; and finally, there will be no way to disrupt the vicious circle but
> war at any temperature. (II 246)

And, finally, "[a] secondary consequence might be that those members of the
in-group who plead for a policy of mutual understanding are designated by the
spokesmen of radical ethnocentrism as disloyal or traitors, etc." (II 247).

What of the individuals who ultimately make up and participate in groups?
The most important thing for the individual is that she is a member of numerous
social groups and has roles originating in these memberships that she experiences
in terms of her self-typification. Yet "it is only with respect to voluntary, and not
to existential group membership that the individual is free to determine of which
group he wants to be a member, and of which social role therein he wants to be the
incumbent" (II 254). This is a matter of individual insider interpretation.

As for outsider interpretations of individual group members on the common-
sense level,

> [t]he objective meaning of group membership is that which the group has from the point of
> view of outsiders who speak of its members in terms of "They." In objective interpretation
> the notion of the group is a conceptual construct of the outsider. By the operation of his
> system of typifications and relevances he subsumes individuals showing certain peculiar
> characteristics and traits under a social category that is homogeneous merely from his, the
> outsider's, point of view. (idem)

Typification and Relevance

"Equality" is yet again remarkable for its concern with relevance, which concern is much greater than in anything published by him previously and this even though only part of Schutz's full theory is used.[3] Relevance is regularly linked with typification.

> The world, the physical as well as the sociocultural one, is experienced from the outset in terms of types: there are mountains, trees, birds, fishes, dogs, and among them Irish setters; there are cultural objects, such as houses, tables, chairs, books, tools, and among them hammers; and there are typical social roles and relationships, such as parents, siblings, kinsmen, strangers, soldiers, hunters, priests, etc. Thus, typifications on the common-sense level—in contradistinction to typifications made by the scientist, and especially the social scientist—emerge in the everyday experience of the world as taken for granted without any formulation of judgments or of neat propositions with logical subjects and predicates. They belong, to use a phenomenological term, to prepredicative thinking. The vocabulary and syntax of everyday language represent the epitome of the typifications socially approved by the linguistic group. (II 233)

On this basis, Schutz can ask and answer a question: "what are the motives for positing… certain traits as equal (or, as we prefer to say, 'homogeneous') in all the objects falling under the same type; and under other conditions for disregarding particular traits by which the typified objects differ from one another?"

> [T]he answer is that all typification consists in the equalization of traits relevant to the particular purpose at hand for the sake of which the type has been formed, and in disregarding those individual differences of the typified objects that are irrelevant to such a purpose. There is no such thing as a type pure and simple. All types are relational terms carrying, to borrow a term from mathematics, a subscript referring to the purpose for the sake of which the type has been formed. And this purpose is nothing but the theoretical or practical problem which, as a consequence of our situationally determined interest, has emerged as questionable from the unquestioned background of the world just taken for granted. Our actual interest, however, is the outcome of our actual biographical situation within our environment as defined by us.

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[3] (II 235 n.3) The final and fullest albeit the most dense expression of Schutz's theory of relevance is "Some Structures of the Lifeworld" (1959). It was posthumously first published in vol. III., but it is a finished essay. Earlier and in opposition to Jean-Paul Sartre, Schutz offers a description of human reality in which relevance is central to how others as well as selves define their situations: "In the mundane sphere of everyday life I conceive myself as well as the Other as a center of activity, each of us living among things to be handled, instruments to be used, situations to be accepted or changed. Yet my possibilities, my instruments, my situation have their specific structure as they appear to me, his as they appear to him. Each of us 'defines his situation' as sociologists call it. In order to use an object as an instrument, I have to bring it within my reach; in order to engage in a project. I have to acknowledge it as being relevant. What is relevant to the Other, what is within his reach, certainly does not coincide with what is relevant to me and within my reach, if for no other reason than that I am 'Here' and he is 'There.'… Yet recognizing that the Other lives in a setting not defined by me does not transform him into my utensil. He remains within his situation (as defined by him) a center of activity; I can understand him as being not me, his activities as being not mine, his instruments as being beyond my reach, his project as being outside my accepted possibilities. All the social sciences deal with the problem of how to interpret the Other's actions as they appear to me by understanding the meaning which the actor, the Other, bestows upon them." (I 201)

> The reference of the type is to the problem for whose solution it has been formed, its problem-relevance as we shall call it, constitutes the meaning of the typification. Thus a series of types of concrete unique objects can be formed, each emphasizing certain aspects which the object has in common with other objects because these aspects alone are relevant to the practical or theoretical problem at hand. (II 234)

Relevance holds for groups as well as individuals and is also relative to insiders and outsiders:

> The system of typifications and relevances forming part of the relative natural conception of the social world is one of the means by which a group defines its situation within the social cosmos and, at the same time, becomes an integral element of the situation itself. The terms "situation" and "definition of the situation" are, however, highly equivocal. W. I. Thomas has already shown that distinction has to be made between the situation as defined by the actor or the group within it, and the situation as defined by outsiders. This distinction coincides more or less with that made by Sumner between the in-group or We-group and the Others-group or out-group, and is also at the foundation of Weber's concepts of subjective and objective interpretation. (II 244)

A domain of relevance is, actually, a set of interrelated problems. There are no isolated problems. Moreover,

> the field of everyday experience is at any particular moment structured into various domains of relevances, and it is precisely the prevailing system of relevances that determines what has to be assumed as being typically equal (homogeneous) and what as being typically different (heterogeneous). This statement holds good for all kinds of typifications. In the social world as taken for granted, however, we find… a socially approved system of typifications called the ways of life of the in-group. It likewise constitutes a particular structure of domains of relevance which also are taken for granted. Its origin can easily be understood: the world taken for granted by the in-group is a world of a common situation within which common problems emerge within a common horizon, problems requiring typical solutions by typical means for bringing about typical ends. (II 236)

The rank ordering of domains of relevance can vary with the group. (The ordering for the United States relative to racial groups is discussed below.) The Classical Greek analyses of relevance-domain ordering are offered, beginning with Aristotle:

> Merit is, however, esteemed differently in different states; in democracy freedom is the standard and all freemen are deemed equal; in oligarchy the standard is wealth or noble birth; in aristocracy, virtue. This means that the order of domains of relevances prevailing in a particular social group is itself an element of the relative natural conception of the world taken for granted by the in-group as an unquestioned way of life. In each group the order of these domains has its particular history. It is an element of socially approved and socially derived knowledge, and frequently is institutionalized. Manifold are the principles that are supposed to establish this order. In Plato's *Laws*…, for example, all the details of the proposed legislation are derived from the order of goods: the divine ones (wisdom, temperance, courage, justice) and the human ones (health, beauty, strength, wealth); or the things in which every man has an interest have their specific rank; the interests about money have the lowest, next comes the interests of the body, and of the highest rank are the interests of the soul…. (II 242)

Finally, the particular domains of relevance and their order are in "continuous flux within every group" (II 243). This can be accelerated if the relevance structure that

demarcates a domain becomes questionable or if the order of the domains ceases to be socially approved and taken for granted.

Discrimination and Equality

Concerning theory, Schutz's "main thesis is that the meaning which the common-sense notion of equality has for a particular social group is as such an element of the system of typifications and relevances approved by it and so of the sociocultural situation as taken for granted by it at any moment of its history" (II 226).

Equality is different from homogeneity but depends upon it:

> Typification consists in disregarding those individual features in the typified objects, facts, or events which are irrelevant to the actual problem at hand. In a certain sense it could be said that all objects falling under the same type are "equal" or at least deemed equal. For instance, we think of people as Frenchmen or Germans, Catholics or Protestants, aliens or neighbors, Negroes or Orientals, men or women, as speaking English or Russian, and as being wealthy or poor. Each of these terms designates a type, and all individuals falling within such a type are considered as being interchangeable with respect to the typified trait.
>
> This is certainly one meaning of the highly equivocal term equality. But in order to avoid semantic confusion it might be better to call all objects, facts, events, persons, traits, falling in the same type and so pertaining to the same domain of relevance, homogeneous. Elements, however, pertaining to different domains of relevances will be called heterogeneous. We propose to reserve the terms equality and inequality for the relationship of elements pertaining to the same domain of relevance. (II 239)

Equality and inequality are relational terms that can only be applied to homogeneous elements; heterogeneous elements belong to different domains and cannot be compared. This is why "political equality, equality before the law, equality in wealth, equality of opportunity, religious or moral equality, etc." (II 258, cf. II 226) are separate.

Since the domains of relevance are defined and ordered differently by each social group, the content of the concept of equality is part of a given group's relative natural conception of the world. "To give an example from our present culture: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations (Art. 2) proclaims moral and juridical equality, that is to say, it is equality of opportunity, but not necessarily material equality as to the extent and content of rights of all individuals" (II 258). The group under consideration here ("our present culture") would seem to be humanity (cf. IV 148). The second half of "Equality" is, however, focused on the culture or group called the United States, which includes various groups between which tensions can arise.

Discrimination and Outsiders. What is discrimination for Schutz and who discriminates against whom? The attempt by the Daughters of the American Revolution to exclude Marian Anderson from their concert hall in Washington, D.C. is discriminatory because "[c]olor of skin, we may say, has 'nothing to do' with a singer's art as, in Aristotle's example, wealth has nothing to do with the excellence of flute playing" (II 259). In other words, biological race can be a basis for homogeneity,

but is not the same as the domain of relevance established by the problem of musical ability in which individuals can be judged equal and unequal.

Discrimination in "Equality" refers primarily to race relations in the United States. Yet what is race for Schutz? As mentioned, he recognizes a specific Negro cultural heritage that includes Marian Anderson's "unsurpassed way" of singing Negro Spirituals.[4] Another passage above lists Negroes and Orientals along with French, Germans, Catholics, Protestants, English speakers, Russian speakers, men, women, the poor, and the wealthy. Age will be referred to below. Some of these groups are existential and others voluntary, but they are all products of typification and subject to outsider and insider interpretations, and thus might also be called "cultural groups," although Schutz does not apply this expression.

Schutz introduces the case of Marian Anderson to show that a domain of relevance can originate in an imposed typification, and he also uses it to raise

> the highly important question of whether the imposition of a typification alone, that is, the subsumption of individuals under a particular social category by an outsider, involves as such an unequal treatment of the kind that is commonly called discriminatory. In other words, is discrimination the necessary consequence of the imposition of a scheme of typifications or relevances in objective terms? (II 259)

Americans would not feel discriminated against because unable to vote in Switzerland, but then there is the decision of the Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896, which was the beginning of the infamous "separate but equal" doctrine (II 260).

> The Court takes the position that to deny to the colored race equal access to public opportunities… does not establish that the individuals included in the imposed typification—that is, in the objective sense—are inferior. Merely the interpretation of the imposed typification in terms of the scheme of reference of the typified group)—in the subjective sense, therefore—gives birth to such an inference. And such a "construct" is obviously the outcome of an act of bad faith on the part of the colored race ("the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it"). (idem)

As discussed above in general terms, the system of relevance of the typifying outsider group (here the Supreme Court speaking for White America!) includes a stereotype that is presumed to be accepted by the typified group, but is actually imposed upon it. "The imposition of social categories both creates the 'group' and invests it with a fictitious scheme of relevances that can be manipulated at will by the creator of the type" (ibid.). Thereupon, Schutz quotes Myrdal: "'The real problem is not the Negro but the white man's attitude toward the Negro.'"(II 261)

This is not to deny that a social category can affect the in-group upon which it is imposed. "Even under the assumption that segregation was not taken to involve an inferiority of the colored race, segregation is taken as an insult by the Negro and he becomes sensitive about it." (II 261)

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[4] The outmoded expression "Negro" will be retained here for historical accuracy; "Black" and "African American" are chiefly in-group provoked developments since Schutz wrote. His use of "man" in the generic signification should be understood analogously.

> In more general terms, we may state that the imposition of a system of typifications and relevances does not in itself necessarily lead to discrimination. This objective interpretation of group membership has to be supervened by another element, namely, the afflicted individuals' subjective experience: by the very imposition of typification they become alienated from themselves and are treated as mere interchangeable representatives of typified traits and characteristics. Thus, discrimination presupposes both imposition of a typification from an objective point of view and an appropriate evaluation of this imposition from the subjective viewpoint of the afflicted individual. (idem)

Discrimination is the unwelcome exclusion of people of different types from a domain of relevance within which, by the problem-relevant homogeneous typification, e.g., flute players, equality or inequality can obtain. More specifically, the United Nations statement

> points out that equality does not exclude two classes of differences which are generally considered admissible and justified: a) differentiations based on conduct imputable to the individual—examples: industriousness-idleness, decency-indecency, merit-demerit; and b) differentiation based on individual qualities that in spite of not being imputable to the individual have a social value—examples: physical and mental capacities, talent, innate ability, and the like…
>   On the other hand, moral and juridical equality excludes any differentiation based on a) grounds which are not imputable to the individual, and which should not be considered as having any social or legal meaning: such as color, race, or sex; and b) grounds of social generic categories such as language, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other status. (II 262–63)

This is an insider interpretation, i.e., "[i]ts language is clearly that of ethical-political postulates, in terms of the order of domains of relevances established and socially approved by the cultural setting the United Nations represents" (idem). Schutz goes on to comment that the existential groups based on color, race, and sex do have social meaning, but they should not have any meaning where moral and juridical equality is concerned.

As for the other groups, they are based on unignorably social categories, but "[t]he unfavorable treatment of individuals as mere specimens of such categories by an imposed system of relevances is not compatible with the meaning of equality as defined by the United Nations": "[d]iscrimination includes any conduct based on a distinction made on grounds of natural or social categories which have no relation either to individual capacities or merits, or to the concrete behavior of the individual person" (idem).

For Schutz the qualifications in the subsequent section of the United Nations document prevent the above statement on discrimination from being too excessively broad. Discrimination can take the forms of denying rights or advantages to members of a social category, of imposing special burdens on such members, or of exclusively granting favors to members of another category. And, again, these categories are of members of groups, "as whites or blacks, as nationals or foreigners, as men or women, as members of the upper or lower class; as Protestants, Catholics, or Jews; as workers or employers" (idem). There is not just racial discrimination.

Minority Rights from Within Discrimination is first of all based on an outsider interpretation, "They" belong to these or those social categories, and "We" deny them rights and advantages, impose special burdens on "Them," and grant favors to members of groups other than "Them," all of which they may dislike. In the United States

this is most prominently done by the White majority to the non-White minorities. A '"minority"' is a group "whose members share a common ethnic origin, language, culture, or religion" and is interested in preserving its existence as a community or at least in preserving its "particular distinguishing characteristics" (II 265).

As has been seen, discrimination requires not only an outsider imposition of categories but also an insider reaction: "Even if he never intended to travel by sleeping car, the principled denial of its use becomes to him relevant in his own terms" (II 261). Other examples are offered:

> [P]ersons who believed themselves to be good Germans and had severed all allegiance to Judaism found themselves declared Jews by Hitler's Nuremberg laws and treated as such on the ground of a grandparent's origin, a fact up to that time entirely irrelevant. Refugees from Europe, who believed they had found a haven in the United States, discovered themselves placed, after Pearl Harbor, in the category of enemy aliens by reason of the very nationality they wanted to abandon. A change in the rules or definitions established by a Senatorial committee turns loyal civil servants into security risks. (II 257)

In contrast with discrimination, which is based on outsider interpretations plus insider interpretations by individuals as well as groups, Schutz discusses minority rights entirely in terms of insider interpretations by groups.

> The [UnitedNations] document distinguishes very clearly… between a) minorities whose members desire equality with dominant groups in the sense of nondiscrimination alone, and, b) those whose members desire, in addition, the recognition of special rights and the rendering of certain positive services. Minorities in category (a) prefer to be assimilated by the dominant group; minorities in category (b) feel that even full realization of the principle of non-discrimination would not place their group in a position of real equality—but only of formal equality—with respect to the dominant group…
>
> For example, as many sociologists and political scientists have pointed out, a minority group that becomes satisfied with its relationship toward the predominant group tends to become more and more assimilated by the latter. If, however, the members of a minority group feel that the rule imposed by the predominant group prevents them from maintaining their particular distinctive characteristics, or inhibits the development of their aspirations for the future, the group's relationship toward the predominant one tends to become more and more strained. (II 267)

It is not clear whether Schutz favors assimilationism or pluralism as a policy. He would have been acquainted with the latter because Horace Kallen had been his colleague at the New School for a decade, but that he recognized both types of minority-group ambition in that time means that he took them seriously. The quest for minority rights is a source of social tension.

The Order of Domains of Relevance. Concerning the ranking of domains of relevance by Whites and Negroes in the United States, Schutz quotes a famous passage that can be re-quoted here:

The white man's rank-order of discriminations:

1. Intermarriage
2. Social equality
3. Segregation
4. Political rights
5. Equality before the law
6. Economic equality

> The Negro's own rank order is just about parallel, but inverse, to that of the white man. The Negro resists least the discrimination on the ranks placed highest in the white man's evaluation and resents most any discrimination on the lowest level. (II 266, quoting Gunnar Myrdal's *An American Dilemma* [1944])

Here there would seem to be agreement between the two groups about what the domains of relevance are, but not about their order. Social tensions would then seem to originate not only with respect to the whole sets of but also with respect to particular domains. Whites might then hear Blacks say "I don't want to marry your daughter; I want an equal chance at a good job."

Equality of Opportunity aimed-at and to-be-granted. Class differences would seem to be another source of social tension. That groups can be related in terms of power has been alluded to. When Schutz focuses on this relation, he begins with Simmel's analysis of individual life:

> Typically speaking,… nobody is satisfied with the position he occupies with respect to his fellow-men, and everybody wishes to attain a position that is in some sense more favorable…. Equality with the superior is the first objective that offers itself to the impulse toward one's own elevation—and, characteristically enough, equality with the immediate superior. Yet this equality is merely a point of transition. Myriad experiences have shown that once the subordinate is equal to the superior this condition, which previously was the essential aim of his endeavor, is merely a starting point for a further effort, the first station on the unending road to the most favored position. Wherever an attempt is made at effecting equalization, the individual's striving to surpass others comes to the fore in all possible forms on the newly reached stage. (II 267)

The same striving beyond equality would hold for groups, and if there is always already stratification, then there will always be a higher group resisting a lower group.

"Equality aimed-at" pertains to the insider interpretations of the group or individual aspiring—at least initially—to equality and "equality to-be-granted" pertains to the outsider interpretation by "those in the privileged position of who are required to grant equal treatment" (idem). If the formal/real distinction is then added to this situation, then more conflict can arise:

> To minority groups of [the formal] type (a), assimilation is the kind of equality aimed-at. To those of type (b), however, real equality is the kind aimed-at; that is, obtaining special rights such as the use of their national languages in schools, before the courts, etc…. The predominant group may interpret equality-to-be-granted as formal, and may even be willing to concede full equality before the law and full political equality, and yet resist bitterly any claim to special rights. [An] instance is the different interpretation of the rank-order of discrimination by white men and by Negro. (II 267–68)

The "predominant group" would thus defend its language and no doubt other parts of its cultural heritage, e.g., its religion, as not merely one among many but as the one for the whole society. (The United States, it may be remarked, has neither an established religion nor an established language, but this does not prevent English-speaking Protestants from resisting other languages and religions.)

In addition, those in the "privileged position" tend to interpret equality-to-be-granted by them in terms of "conservative thinking," at most adjusting the prevailing system of relevances in order to reduce social tensions, while those aiming to obtain real equality incline to "revolutionary thinking" whereby "the system itself must be abolished" (II 268).

Schutz approvingly quotes Tawney on how the inequalities before the French Revolution originated in social institutions and those afterwards originated in personal character. *"La carrière ouverte aux talents…* was the formula of reconciliation (between revolutionaries and conservatives) which had overthrown the class system of the old regime in France and supplied a satisfactory moral title to the class system which succeeded it" (idem). The title in the America of the 1950s for Napoleon's "career open to the talents" is "equal opportunity."

As seen, equality has insider and outsider interpretations. One can attempt to approach opportunity both ways as well. Schutz begins with "objective" or outsider interpretation in modern sociology:

> In the objective sense a social group is a structural-functional system formed by a web of interconnected interaction processes, social roles, positions, and statuses…. Each role carries along a particular set of role expectations which any incumbent of the role is expected to fulfill.
>
>   In our terminology these role expectations are nothing but typifications of interaction patterns which are socially approved ways of solving typical patterns, and are frequently institutionalized. Consequentially, they are arranged in domains of relevances which in turn are ranked in a particular order originating in the group's relative natural conception of the world, its folkways, mores, morals, etc. (II 269)

Also thus determined are the competence and qualifications needed to perform the role, and hence only qualified persons should be considered for the role or position. "[N]ot only competent persons should be eligible, but *all* competent persons, regardless of any other criteria, should be equally eligible, it being understood that among all the *eligible* persons the best qualified should obtain the position" (II 270).

> In our terminology we should say it is the relative natural conception of the world that determines, or at least codetermines, the competences and qualifications everyone eligible for a position has to possess. The reference of the definition of these qualifications to the natural conception of the world prevailing in a particular group leads frequently to the consequence that elements are included in the definition which have no, or merely a remote connection with the proper fulfillment of the particular position. It is, for instance, characteristic of the present American scene that the qualifications required for certain jobs exclude from eligibility, as they do not in other countries of the West, persons over thirty-five years of age. (II 270)

Another difficulty consists in how all societies include hierarchies of positions in which the higher one goes the fewer positions there are for qualified persons, in which case other factors come into play. On what basis is there selection within the oversupplies of qualified persons?

Equality of opportunity for positions and careers is not the only form of equal opportunity. There is equality of opportunity for "education or the development of ability and talent; equality of opportunity for sharing the benefits of culture;… equal access to public opportunities" (II 271). Here too opportunity is determined by typifications of social roles and expectations as approved in the group.

In terms now of individual insider interpretation, opportunity presents itself differently. "Such an individual experiences what we have defined in the objective sense as an opportunity as a possibility for self-realization that stands to his choice, as a chance given to him, as a likelihood of attaining his goals in terms of his private definition of his situation within the group" (idem).

This opportunity has, however, at least four conditions: (1) the individual must be aware of the chance, (2) it has to be compatible with his private system of relevances and within his reach, (3) the outsider defined-typifications of role requirements must be such that, in his self-typification, he is convinced he can perform them, and (4) the role must be compatible with the other social roles in which he is involved. "Hence, even if it made sense to assume that equal subjective chances correspond to objectively equal opportunities, the individual human being would weigh the chances in terms of his personal hopes, anxieties, and passions, which are his alone" (II 272). Strictly speaking then, equal opportunity can only hold from the objective or outsider point of view.

Can there be "an equal start for everyone"?

> Most of the authors dealing with this problem have referred to many factors that make an equal start impossible: differences of wealth, the pressure of mere material surroundings such as the housing situation, etc., economic conditions (such as the fact that only few men can devote their energies to education until manhood without being compelled to compete early for employment, or the inequality of access to information, particularly to financial information), are among them. Perhaps inequality of leisure time should be added to this catalogue. (II 273)

Schutz agrees that collective action would be required to overcome such existential albeit cultural differences, but he seems not to consider this likely to happen.

Nevertheless, the ideal of equality of opportunity "should assure to the individual who finds himself in the human bondage of his various group memberships the right to the pursuit of happiness… and, therewith—in terms of his own definition—the maximum of self-realization which his situation in social reality permits" (II 273). "The pursuit of happiness" here of course alludes to the USA.

Finally,

> [i]t has to be taken into consideration that the self-interpretation of the group, its central myth, as well as the forms of its rationalization and institutionalization, is subject to changes in the course of history. A good example is the change in the meaning of the notion of equality in the political ideas of the United States from the Declaration of Independence ("We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal") to the wording of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the various interpretations given by the United States Supreme Court to these amendments, leading to the "separate but equal" doctrine and the latter's recent abolishment. (idem)

How to Reduce Social Tensions

By a passage quoted early in the present essay, Schutz holds that social tensions can be reduced and that this is an educational goal attainable by the patient modification of the relevance system those in power impose on their fellow human beings. The tensions recognized in "Equality" are chiefly due to racial discrimination, but other sources are referred to as well. The exclusion from job eligibility of persons over thirty-five when this has no connection with the job's tasks has also been mentioned. Race and age are not imputable to individual effort. Nor are other existential elements on the basis of which there can be typification: Mother tongue, national origin, sex, and one's family's class and religion.

What are (a) the preconditions and (b) the means and (c) who is or are the agent(s) of actions that can reduce such social tensions?

Reflecting on the papers at the conference where he presented "Equality," Schutz writes as follows about the cognitive preconditions, some of which he attempted to fulfill.

> The term, "middle ground," was also used in order to determine the region where the theoretical attitude of the thinker can be translated into the practical attitude of the man of action, or, as it has been said, of the decision-maker…. On the one hand, the question was raised how we, members of the Conference, can communicate our findings to the man on the street who neither uses nor understands our language. On the other hand, several members emphasized the necessity of giving a series of practical answers applying to education, equality of opportunity in choosing work, international relations, etc. All this is 'solely' possible if we have some knowledge of the particular structure of the common-sense thinking within the social group addressed by us, that is, the systems of typifications, the relevance structures, the schemes of interpretation, etc., that prevail in it. To convey our message to the common man and be understood by him we have to use his language and translate our thoughts into the conceptual framework accepted by him. In order to change attitudes and to promote, say, racial equality or equal opportunity of education, we have to know more about the mechanism of discrimination of all kinds. (IV 150)

Cognitive or epistemological conditions furthermore include how a given set of folkways or cultural patterns is affected by previous thinking, which is implied in the notion of social heritage. One is born into a world that existed before one's birth, a world that is sociocultural as well as natural, "a preconstituted and preorganized world whose particular structure is the result of an historical process and is therefore different for each culture and society" (II 229).

One needs also to know that typifications are institutionalized "by law, mores, rituals, etc." (IV 150, cf. II 237). For example, Schutz expected the reinterpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment in Brown v. United States to affect the country's central myth. And philosophical and religious thought can be secularized and institutionalized into common-sense:

> The concepts of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and other thinkers that influenced the framing of the American and French constitutions were secularized in different ways in either case. To the philosophical insight into the dignity of man corresponds the notion of "fair play" in American common-sense thinking—a term that certainly is [more] closely related to sportsmanship than to philosophy in the mind of the man in the street: "Let's give the other fellow a break".
>
> It seems to me that this region of secularized common-sense thinking is indeed the "epistemological middle ground" where ideas and ideals—transformed into taken-for-granted notions of social reality—become springs of social interaction. (IV 149, cf. II 249)

Furthermore, and axiologically rather than epistemologically speaking, it would also seem a precondition for reducing social tensions that such tensions be disvalued; Schutz calls them evil.

The means for reducing social tensions that Schutz explicitly recognizes are legal and educational. On the highest level legally is the United Nations, the Commission on Human Rights which "has not only to make suggestions [presumably to the nations making up the U.N.] regarding the elimination or restriction of discrimination but also regarding the protection of minorities" (II 265). Then, within the United States, there would be the federal constitution and its interpretation by the Supreme Court. State and local laws and courts should be added.

As for education, Schutz seems to have in mind more than formal schooling. A system of relevances and typifications is part of a social heritage "and as such is handed down in the educational process to the members of the in-group" (II 237, cf. III 120). Such an educationally transmitted system determines which items are treated as homogeneous for solving typical problems in typical ways; it transforms unique humans into typical roles, so that "[t]he incumbent of such a social role is expected by the other members of the in-group to act in the typical way defined by this role" (idem): it functions as a scheme of orientation and also a scheme of interpretation for members of the in-group; its chances of success depends on its standardization; and it is the basis for the individual's definition of her situation.

Efforts at change can be made with respect to particular domains of relevance or their orderings.

> [W]hat has been beyond question so far and remained unquestioned up to now may always be put in question; things taken for granted then become problematical. This will be the case, for example, if there occurs in the individual or social life an event or situation which cannot be met by applying the traditional and habitual patterns of behavior or interpretation. We call such a situation a crisis—a partial one if it makes only some elements of the world taken for granted questionable, a total one if it invalidates the whole system of reference, the scheme of interpretation itself. (II 231)

Finally, who are the agents of the preferred change for Schutz? It has been seen that he does not expect collectively produced change and, because much of the cultural heritage is worth preserving, he does not urge the total transformation of revolutionary thinking. Rather, it is his educational goal that a slow and patient modification of the relevance system be imposed by those in power. These would seem to include the privileged for whom there is equality-to-be granted and who are more willing to yield to aspirations to formal equality than the real equality of ethnic minorities. And it includes the Supreme Court and no doubt elected officials of all levels. These would seem the men or women of action or decision makers referred to above.

Works of Schutz

Note: Unless done otherwise, the following works will be cited with the embedded abbreviations as listed down the left margin below, plus the page number(s).

I=Alfred Schutz, *Collected Papers,* Vol. I, *The Problem of Social Reality*, ed. Maurice Natanson (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962).

II=——, *Collected Papers,* Vol. II, *Studies in Social Theory*, ed. Arvid Broedresen (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964).

III=——, *Collected Papers,* Vol. III, *Studies in Phenomenological Philosophy*, ed. Ilse Schutz (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966).

IV=——, *Collected Papers,* Vol. IV, ed. Helmut Wagner, George Psathas, and Fred Kersten, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996).

V=——, *Collected Papers*, Vol. V, *Phenomenology and the Social Sciences*, ed. Lester Embree (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011).

VI=——, *Collected Papers*, Vol. VI, *Literary Reality and Relationships*, ed. Michael Barber (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013).

PSW=—, *The Phenomenology of the Social World,* trans. George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967).

PP=———, "Positivistic Philosophy and the Actual Approach of Interpretive Social Science: An Ineditum from Spring 1953," *Husserl Studies*, Vol. 14 (1998): 123–149. Reprinted in Dermot Moran and Lester Embree, eds., *Phenomenology: Critical Concepts in Philosophy*, 5 vols. London: Routledge, 2004, III, pp. 119–145. Also available at http://www.springerlink.com/content/t52u22v305u28g04/

Chapter 18
A Correction of Schutz on Culture for Cultural Science

Even the typifications and symbolizations in terms of which we distinguish the several strata of our social world, construe and interpret their contents, determine our action in it and upon it and its action upon us to all degrees of ability, are predefined as unquestionably given by virtue of the socially conditioned schemata of expression and interpretation prevailing in the group to which we belong and which we used to call the "culture" of our group. (III 119)

Introduction

Because structured by several concepts of world, the oeuvre of Alfred Schutz (1899–1959) can be interpreted systematically in a way that can be called "cosmological." In such an interpretation, one can first distinguish his account of the sciences from the world theorized about in them[1] and then one recognize how, within the world theorized about, Schutz distinguishes (1) the *social* world, above all in *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt* of 1932 (PSW), (2) the *natural* world, which is what is now sometimes called "life-worldly nature," an expression he would have appreciated, (3) the world of *working*, which can also be called the practical world,[2] and (4) the *cultural* world, which will be focused upon here.

This essay has two parts. The first is a chronological review of what Schutz says about cultural things and the second is an objection to and correction of a central

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Embedded citations refer to works of Schutz listed at the end of this chapter.

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[1] Lester Embree, "Schutz on Science." In *Worldly Phenomenology: The Continuing Influence of Alfred Schutz on North American Human Science*, ed. Lester Embree. Washington, D.C.: Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology and University Press of America, 1988, pp. 251–274.

[2] Lester Embree, "Schutz's Phenomenology of the Practical World." In *Alfred Schutz: Neue Beiträge zur Rezeption seines Werkes*, ed. Elisabeth List & Ilja Srubar. Studien zur Oesterreichischen Philosophie 12 (1988): 121–144.

aspect of his position. Merely the summary at the end of the first part can be read in preparation for the second.

Schutz's References About Culture

Schutz in Vienna on Culture

This is not the occasion for an exhaustive interpretation and critique of Schutz's account of the cultural world and its contents, but a chronicle of the naturally often repetitious and overlapping remarks in his chiefly occasional writings can be ventured that above all includes the quite relevant and previously unpublished essay on T.S. Eliot now available in *Collected Papers*, vol. V.

In the some dozen texts from Schutz available in English from the 1920s and 1930s, the only relevant statements occur, firstly, in the 1932 review of the French translation of Edmund Husserl's *Cartesianische Meditationen*, where Schutz asserts that "the 'cultural world'… presupposes primordial and secondary constitutions on different levels" (IV 164; Schutz had a copy of the German original in manuscript) and, secondly, in *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt* of 1932, where there are several relevant passages:

To begin with, "[t]here is the whole world of cultural objects, for instance, including everything from artifacts to institutions and conventional ways of doing things. These, too, contain within themselves implicit references to my contemporaries. I can 'read' in these cultural objects the subjective experiences of others whom I do not know" (PSW 182, cf. 81).

Then again, "cultural products" seem the same as cultural objects: "The latter's body is, from the point of view of the observer, the field of expression of these subjective experiences. His bodily movements are indications of those subjective experiences arising from spontaneous activity. The cultural products he brings forth are signs of the constitutive process going on in his mind" (PSW 153, cf. 133, 150, & 218).

And a passage about tools, soon to be called cultural objects, also deserves quoting:

> But to understand a tool, we need not only the ideal type of its producer but the ideal type of its user, and both will be absolutely anonymous. Whoever uses the tool will bring about typical results. A tool is a thing-in-order-to; it serves a purpose, and for the sake of this purpose it was produced. Tools are, therefore, results of past human acts and means toward the future realization of aims. One can, then, conceive the "meaning" of the tool in terms of the means-end relation. But from this objective meaning-context, that is, from the means-end relation in terms of which the tool is understood, one can deduce the ideal type of user or producer without thinking of them as real individual people. (PSW 201)

No doubt because cultural things make up the subject matters of the cultural sciences, they are referred to in Schutz's first essay published in the USA, "Phenomenology and the Social Sciences" of 1940, which was written in Vienna and by its title there originally about the "*Kulturwissenschaften*" (IV 106). To begin with, "All cultural

objects (books, tools, works of all sorts, etc.) point back, by their origin and meaning, to other subjects and to their active constitutive intentionalities," and thus it is true that they are experienced in the sense of "existing there for everybody." (Of course, this is only true "for everybody" who belongs to the corresponding community of culture…) (I 124).

More generally, the person posits the life-world "in a *general thesis* as meaningfully valid for him, with all that he finds in it, with all natural things, with all living things (especially with human beings), and with meaningful products of all sorts (tools, symbols, language systems, works of art, etc.)" (I 135).

Then again,

> [a]ccording to Husserl, accessibility for everyone belongs in essence to the constitutive sense of Nature, of corporeality and of the psychophysical human being. *But the world of culture is of a limited objectivity*, and with this it should be borne in mind that the life-world is given to me, and to everyone who retains the natural attitude, primarily as his cultural world, namely, as a world of signification which the human being in question historically takes part in forming. (I 126)

And quite important is this comprehensive passage:

> Our everyday world is, from the outset, an intersubjective world of culture. It is intersubjective because we live in it as men among other men, bound to them through common influence and work, understanding others and being an object of understanding for others. It is a world of culture because, from the outset, the life-world is a universe of significations to us, i.e., a framework of meaning (*Sinnzusammenhang*) which we have to interpret, and of interrelations of meaning which we institute only through our action in this life-world. It is a world of culture also because we are always conscious of its *historicity*, which we encounter in tradition and habituality, and which is capable of being examined because the "already-given" refers back to one's own activity or to the activity of Others, of which it is the sediment. (I 133)

Tradition and habituality are what are constituted in the primordial and secondary constitution mentioned above.

At this point, it is clear that Schutz had already in Vienna a fairly worked-out notion of culture. Besides tools, we now have artworks, books, languages, and symbols as cultural objects, which might still fit under the artifacts/ institutions/ conventional-ways-of-doing-things taxonomy. Generally, cultural worlds are said to be (a) *historical*, which must include that they can continue and change over time, (b) *intersubjective* or shared among pluralities of subjects, (c) relative to groups or *communities of culture*, and (d) *frameworks of meaning*, which humans institute via action in the life-world.

References to Culture in the U.S.A.

If we now have the notion of culture that Schutz brought from Austria, his contacts with Husserl included, there remain some 40 texts now published in English from his American period, 19 of which contain no references to cultural objects, cultural worlds, etc. The remaining 21 include further relevant statements and can be divided into the six including "T.S. Eliot's Theory of Culture" of 1950 and the rest afterward.

Not only do "cultural objects" seem the same as "cultural products," but also seem the same as "social things," an expression Schutz used only in 1940, presumably for the sake of communication with Talcott Parsons. The matter of the expression aside, there are two interesting contrasts and some familiar particularization in a discussion of understanding:

> The world, interpreted as the possible field of action for all of us, this is the first and most primitive principle of organization of my knowledge of the external world in general. Afterwards, I discriminate between *natural things*, which may be defined as things essentially given, such as they are, to me and to you and to everyone else independent of any human act or interference, and, on the other hand, *social things*, which are understandable only as products of human activity, my own activity or that of others.[3]
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> Concerning *natural things* my "understanding" is limited to the insight into their existence, variation, and development, insofar as these elements are compatible, first of all, with my other experiences and the experiences of Others within the natural world in general and, secondly, with the basic assumptions concerning the structure of this world which we all accept by common consent. Within these limits prediction (though only of likelihood) is possible for us all.[4]
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> Quite another "understanding" is peculiar to social things (this term embracing also human acts). In this case it is not sufficient to refer the fact under consideration to other facts or things. I cannot understand a social thing without reducing it to the human activity which has created it and, going beyond that, without referring this human activity to the motives out of which it sprang. I do not understand a tool without knowing the purpose for which it was designed, an institution, if I am unfamiliar with its goals, a work of art if I neglect the intentions of the artist which it realizes. (V 36, cf. I 345; II 92)

If cultural objects are the same as social things, then they and cultural worlds (as well as the natural world) are distinguished within the more original world of working, i.e., the practical world. Moreover, the traditional contrast is made between the natural and artificial so that social things or cultural objects are human products. Finally, tools, signs as well as symbols, institutions (which have purposes), and works of art (which have artistic intentions behind them), are social things or cultural objects.

What is missing from the above list are the "conventional ways of doing things" originally mentioned in 1932, but there is a description of "routine action" in 1943 that seems to fill this gap:

> We cannot simply say that the non-rational routine acts of daily life are not consciously planned. On the contrary, they rest within the framework of our plans and projects. They are even instruments for realizing them. All planning presupposes an end to be realized by stages, and each of these stages may be called, from one point of view or another, either means or intermediate ends. Now the function of all routine work is a standardization and mechanization of the means-end relations as such by referring standardized means to standardized classes of ends. The effect of this standardization is that the intermediate ends disappear from the consciously envisaged chain of means which have to be brought about for performing the planned end. (II 75, cf. V 115)

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[3] Schutz's note: "The term 'thing,' used in both cases in its broadest sense, covers not only corporeal objects but also 'ideal' or mental ones."

[4] Schutz's note: "Of course the interpretation of natural things as products of the agency of another intelligence (though not a human one) is always an overt possibility. The life of the tree is then the result of the activities of a demon or of a dryad, etc."

From the same text another passage seems to combine routine action or conventional-ways-of-doing-things with other cultural objects under the heading of "comfortable equipment to render his daily living and that of his fellow-men a routine matter": "There are, on the one hand, institutions of various kinds, tools, machines, etc.; on the other hand, habits, traditions, rules, and experiences, both actual and vicarious" (II 70).

In "The Stranger" of 1944, Schutz begins to use the expression "cultural pattern of group life" (II 92), even though, in another text of the same era, he considers it "unclarified" (II 115). Elsewhere, however, he attempts to clarify it with a list: "[W]e use the term 'cultural pattern of group life' for designating all the peculiar valuations, institutions, and systems of orientation and guidance (such as the folkways, mores, laws, habits, customs, etiquette, fashions) which, in the common opinion of sociologists of our time, characterize—if not constitute—any social group at a given moment in its history" (II 92).

> Moreover, any member born or reared within the group accepts the ready-made standardized scheme of the cultural pattern handed down to him by his ancestors, teachers, and authorities as an unquestioned and unquestionable guide in all the situations which normally occur within the social world. The knowledge correlated to the cultural pattern carries its evidence in itself—or, rather, it is taken for granted in the absence of evidence to the contrary. (II 95)

Two years later, Schutz remarks that "The power of socially approved knowledge is so extended that what the whole in-group approves—ways of thinking and acting, such as mores, folkways, habits—is simply taken for granted; it becomes an element of the relatively natural concept of the world, although the source of such knowledge remains entirely hidden in its anonymity" (II 133).

Such groups may be the same as the cultural communities mentioned earlier and it may also be that a whole society is a cultural community, but the concern of Schutz, then a fresh immigrant in the USA, is with relations for the member between the cultural patterns of the "home group" and the "approached group":

> To him the cultural pattern of the approached group does not have the authority of a tested system of recipes, and this, if for no other reason, because he does not partake in the vivid historical tradition by which it has been formed. To be sure, from the stranger's point of view, too, the culture of the approached group has its particular history, and this history is even accessible to him. But it has never become an integral part of his biography, as did the history of his home group. Only the ways in which his fathers and grandfathers lived become for everyone elements of his own way of life. Graves and reminiscences can neither be transferred nor conquered. The stranger, therefore, approaches the other group as a newcomer in the true meaning of the term. At best he may be willing and able to share the present and the future with the approached group in vivid and immediate experience; under all circumstances, however, he remains excluded from such experiences of its past. Seen from the point of view of the approached group, he is a man without history. (II 96)

In "Some Leading Concepts of Phenomenology" (1945), we read about Husserl's doctrine of ideal objects and that these include "any of the so-called social and cultural objects which are meaningful and can at any time be made intentional objects of our cogitations" and which are "created by men" (I 110 & 117), points that were made before.

Discussions of culture are interestingly absent from "On Multiple Realities," which also appeared in 1945. This most famous of Schutz's essays offers an invariant set of "finite provinces of meaning" the genera of which correlate with working, imagination, and dreaming as well as theorizing, each of which is then open to specification. If this set of invariants, like that of the social world's set of consociates, contemporaries, predecessors, and successors, is indeed invariant, that would signify that it holds across all variation among cultural worlds and this might explain the absence of statements about cultural matters in the essay.

In *Reflections on the Problem of Relevance*, chiefly drafted in 1947 and 1951, Schutz merely mentions that "We live in our present culture surrounded by a world of machines and dominated by institutions, social and technical, of which we have sufficient knowledge to bring about desired effects, without, however, much understanding (if any) of how these effects have been brought about" (V 177).

This might help to extend the taxonomy where institutions are concerned as well as say something about one particular culture. The paucity of remarks about culture is here also somewhat surprising if one holds that culture includes "the system of relevances and their organization," as Schutz himself does in the lecture on T. S. Eliot (V 285). In any case, his critical study of Eliot's book on culture is not unprepared for in his previous writing.

Schutz's lecture on Eliot in April 1950 is especially interesting. He had no doubt been recently expanding his knowledge of sociology in preparation for his courses that Fall. Significantly, it is plain that social classes appear for Schutz as well as Eliot to be among the groups that have specific cultures at the same time that they partake of the common culture of the whole society: "Translated into the current terminology of the social sciences, this would mean that every participation in the culture of an in-group involves the problem of social status, while Mr. Eliot overlooks the fact that the particular system of stratification and status distribution which prevails in a given culture is in itself an essential element of the realm of things taken for granted" (V 287).

Schutz uses Max Weber's distinction between "objective" and "subjective meaning" in order to criticize Eliot on how influences on culture are to be investigated:

> Religion is, from the point of view of the sociologist, one among many other great powers which influence culture: there are also the state, economic conditions, technology, magic, language, science, philosophy, the arts, and many other factors influencing one another. … It depends upon the problem at hand which of the many relationships has to be considered as relevant for a specific purpose by the social scientist. None of them, however, has a monopoly. (V 284)

But what, after all, is culture in general for Schutz?

> [I]t turns out that culture is just everything which is *taken for granted* by a given social group at a certain point of its historical existence. This includes not only the things classed by certain anthropologists under the unfortunate terms *artifacts* (tools and implements), *sociofacts* (institutions), and *mentifacts* (ideas and ideals), and not only the permanently reproduced and managed "second environment" which, according to Malinowski, is superimposed upon the primary or natural environment by human activity and the sum total of habitual and traditional life. It also includes the whole realm of things taken for granted as well as the system of relevances and their organization, upon which the belief is founded

that this way of life is unquestionably the good one and the right one, perhaps the only good and right one. What characterizes the natural aspect of the world for the in-group is not that all this knowledge is *unconscious*, but that as a whole and in its details, it is taken for "granted beyond question." It is taken for granted beyond question because the motives from which this belief had originated have been forgotten in the course of history and in the course of transmitting such beliefs from generation to generation. (V 286, cf. II 206)

This statement can be interpreted to signify that the second environment super-imposed on nature in human activities is the same as the framework of meaning constituted in secondary passivity that Schutz already recognized in Husserl back in 1932. Moreover, the cultural objects previously mentioned are again broadly classi-fied, even in "unfortunate terms," although, while cultural ideals have a place, it is not clear where "conventional ways of doing things" would fit if they are different from institutions. *But the main thing is the unquestioned but questionable taken-for-grantedness of a whole cultural world of an in-group during an historical period.*

This determination of the world as cultural is something in addition to the his-toricity, intersubjectivity, and meaningfulness already asserted in the last Austrian writing, it was not clearly stated previously, and, if it is central, then what is written about culture later must be compatible with it. Otherwise, except for two signifi-cant remarks made in passing (II 206 & 236), the claim that the cultural world is necessarily *taken for granted by the in-group in an historical period* is not made abundantly clear other than in the Eliot essay.

One may wonder about the relation of language to culture for Schutz. He had referred to language in passing during the previous years and began to teach "The Sociology of Language" in 1952 and last taught it in 1958.[5] In "Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action" (1953), he writes,

Only a very small part of my knowledge of the world originates within my personal experi-ence. The greater part is socially derived, handed down to me by my friends, my parents, my teachers and the teachers of my teachers. I am taught not only how to define the envi-ronment (that is, the typical features of the relative natural aspect of the world prevailing in the in-group as the unquestioned but always questionable sum total of things taken for granted until further notice), but also how typical constructs have to be formed in accor-dance with the system of relevances accepted from the anonymous unified point of view of the in-group. This includes ways of life, methods of coming to terms with the environ-ment, efficient recipes for the use of typical means for bringing about typical ends in typi-cal situations. The typifying medium *par excellence* by which socially derived knowledge is transmitted is the vocabulary and the syntax of everyday language. The vernacular of everyday life is primarily a language of named things and events, and any name includes a typification and generalization referring to the relevance system prevailing in the linguis-tic in-group which found the named thing significant enough to provide a separate term for it. The pre-scientific vernacular can be interpreted as a treasure house of ready made pre-constituted types and characteristics, all socially derived and carrying along an open horizon of unexplored context. (I 13)

Schutz's 1958 lecture course on language includes this passage that relates the tak-en-for-granted, i.e., the cultural, to vernacular language:

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[5] Alfred Schutz, "Problems of a Sociology of Language," ed. Fred Kersten with an Introduction by Lester Embree and Fred Kersten, *Schutzian Research*, Vol. 2 (2010).

According to some writers, the vernacular language peculiar to our daily lives is really the product of certain cultural formations. Here we have what Max Scheler called the "relative natural conception of the world." That is to say, the nature of our vernacular and its use pre-supposes and expresses our accepting or taking for granted the social, cultural, and physical world in which we live. The taking-for-granted may involve a certain culture or, we might say, a certain "world-view," a comprehensive attitude toward the world embodying sets of beliefs about human behavior and understanding. On this account the vernacular then becomes a kind of "treasure house" or "storage bin" for such relative natural conceptions of the world—the conception is "relative" because it is common to a certain group of people at a certain place at a certain time in history; the conception is "natural" because it is largely taken for granted, as a matter of course, without question.[6]

Concerning now the social and cultural sciences, there is also an important defini-tion (*Collected Papers*, Vol. I, is subtitled "The Problem of Social Reality") and an identification of the cultural world in "Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences" (1952):

> The primary goal of the social sciences is to obtain organized knowledge of social reality. By the term "social reality" I wish to be understood the sum total of objects and occurrences within the social cultural world as experienced by the common-sense thinking of men liv-ing their daily lives among their fellow-men, connected with them in manifold relations of interaction. It is the world of cultural objects and social institutions into which we are all born, within which we have to find our bearings, and with which we have to come to terms. From the outset, we, the actors on the social scene, experience the world we live in as a world both of nature and of culture… (I 53)

"Social cultural," occurring twice in this essay, is "socio-cultural" or "sociocul-tural" thereafter (I 6, 9, 145, 312, & 328; II 233; III147; & IV 142). The relation of the social and cultural worlds is intimate and does not need explication here.

In this same essay, cultural objects now seem opposed to social institutions, but tools are yet again said to be cultural objects (I 55). Most importantly, however, the abstraction of nature from the socio-cultural world is described:

> The concept of Nature, … with which the natural sciences have to deal is, as Husserl has shown, an idealizing abstraction from the *Lebenswelt*, an abstraction which, on principle and of course legitimately, excludes persons with their personal life and all objects of cul-ture which originate as such in practical human activity. Exactly this layer of the *Leb-enswelt*, however, from which the natural sciences have to abstract, is the social reality which the social sciences have to investigate. (I 58, cf. III 58)

Remaining with social reality, the following is quite central to Schutz's theory of the social and, more widely, the cultural sciences:

> We want merely to point out that the social scientist *qua* theoretician has to follow a system of relevances entirely different from that which determines his conduct as an actor on the social scene. The scientific situation, that is, the context of scientific problems, supersedes his situation as man among his fellow-men within the social world. The problems of the theoretical originate in his theoretical interest, and many elements of the social world that are scientifically relevant are irrelevant from the viewpoint of the actor on the social scene, and *vice versa*. Moreover, the typical constructs formulated by the social scientist for the solution of his problem are, so to speak, constructs of the second degree, namely, constructs

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[6] Alfred Schutz, "Problems of a Sociology of Language, 59.

of the common-sense constructs, in terms of which everyday thinking interprets the social world. (II 248)

Then again,

> The thought objects constructed by the social scientists refer to and are founded upon the thought objects constructed by the common-sense thought of man living his everyday life among his fellow-men. Thus, the constructs used by the social scientist are, so to speak, constructs of the second degree, namely constructs of the constructs made by the actors on the social scene, whose behavior the scientist observes and tries to explain in accordance with the procedural rules of his science. (I 6)

The next passage is even clearer and more distinct:

> In analyzing the first constructs of common-sense thinking in everyday life we proceeded, however, as if the world were my private world and if we were entitled to disregard the fact that it is from the outset an intersubjective world of culture. It is intersubjective because we live in it as men among other men, bound to them through common influence and work, understanding others and being understood by them. It is a world of culture because, from the outset, the world of everyday life is a universe of significance to us, that is, a texture of meaning which we have to interpret in order to find our bearings within it and come to terms with it. This texture of meaning, however—and this distinguishes the realm of culture from that of nature—originates in and has been instituted by human actions, our own and our fellow-men's, contemporaries and predecessors. All cultural objects—tools, symbols, language systems, works of art, social institutions, etc.—point back by their very origin and meaning to the activities of human subjects. For this reason, we are always conscious of the historicity of culture which we encounter in traditions and customs. (I 10, cf. I 126 & 123 & IV 142)

How do common-sense thought objects relate to cultural objects? For one thing, the latter can be "defined":

> Man finds himself at any moment of his daily life in a biographically determined situation, that is, in a physical and socio-cultural environment as defined by him, within which he has his position, not merely his position in physical space and outer time or of his status and role within the social system but also his moral and ideological position. (I 9)

It is also mentioned in "Symbol, Reality, and Society" (1955) that the sociocultural world "existed before my birth and … will exist after my death" (I 312), and it is then added concerning groups that "the world into which I was born already contained social and political organizations of a most diversified nature and that I as well as Others are members of such organizations, having a particular role, status, and function within them" (I 313).

And more is added about "meaning," where Schutz again follows Husserl regarding cultural objects:

> A book is an outer object, a material thing. I see it as it appears to me, here on my desk, to my right, etc.; but reading it, I am not directed toward it as an outer object but toward the meaning of what is written therein: I "live in its meaning" by comprehending it. The same holds good for a tool, a house, a theater, a temple, a machine. The spiritual < scl. "cultural" > meaning of all these objects is appresentationally apperceived as being founded upon the actually appearing object which is not apprehended as such but as expressing its meaning. And if we listen to somebody, we do not experience the meaning of what he says as something connected with the words in an external way. We take the words apprehensively as

expressing their meaning, and we live in their meaning by comprehending what the Other means and the thought he expresses. (I 314, cf. 328)

Whether an equivocation on "meaning" between the signification expressed and the matter referred to by the meaningful expression might be occurring will be returned to in Part II. And it is on the basis of passages like this that one can wonder why Schutz did not consider Others and selves to be cultural objects, something best left for another occasion.

In the interventions at the 1955 conference on equality of opportunity analyzed by Michael Barber, there is some comparative discussion of Western and primitive cultures, also put as "literate" (and even "theoretical") and "non-literate" cultures, and Western culture in particular is said to be competitive, but such remarks about what seem the highest genera of cultural worlds are unusual.[7]

"Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social World" (1957) may be thought to exclude the cultural aspect of the socio-cultural world, but this would be mistaken, because there is a diversity of cultural worlds and "[t]he ["sociocultural" world] is a preconstituted and preorganized world whose particular structure is the result of an historical process and is therefore different for each culture and society" (II 229).

In contrast with that, there are nevertheless culturally independent invariants that are social:

> Certain features, however, are common to all social worlds because they are rooted in the human condition. Everywhere we find sex groups and age groups, and some division of labor conditioned by them; and more or less rigid kinship organizations that arrange the social world into zones of varying social distance, from intimate familiarity to strangeness. Everywhere we also find hierarchies of superordination and subordination, of leader and follower, of those in command and those in submission. Everywhere, too, we find an accepted way of life, that is, a conception of how to come to terms with things and men, with nature and the supernatural. There are everywhere, moreover, cultural objects, such as tools needed for the domination of the outer world, playthings for children, articles for adornment, musical instruments of some kind, objects serving as symbols for worship. There are certain ceremonies marking the great events in the life cycle of the individual (birth, initiation, marriage, death), or in the rhythm of nature (sowing and harvesting, solstices, etc.). (II 229)

This world is again said to be experienced in terms of types (II 233) and "the field of everyday experience is at any particular moment structured into various domains of relevances, and it is precisely the prevailing system of relevances that determines what has to be assumed as being typically equal (homogeneous) and what as being typically different (heterogeneous)" (II 236).

This would seem to make relevance variable and indeed cultural, and relevance has already been seen to be cultural in the essay on Eliot. It is also relative to groups, so that the world taken for granted by the in-group is a world of a common situation within which common problems emerge within a common horizon, problems

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[7] Alfred Schutz, "Understanding, Self-Realization, and Equality: Alfred Schutz's Participation in the 1955 Conference on Science, Philosophy, and Religion," ed. Michael Barber, *Schutzian Research*, vol. 1 (2009).

requiring typical solutions by typical means for bringing about typical ends; the significance of taken-for-grantedness as essential to the cultural is not emphasized here, but rather, as it were, taken for granted.

One could go deeper into the analysis of social (and cultural) heritage, voluntary and existential groups, etc., including how "Marian Anderson [could not] sing Negro Spirituals in her unsurpassed way if she did not share with her fellow Negroes this specific cultural heritage, this specific conception of the world of which the Spirituals are a partial expression" (II 259). One could thus recognize that ethnic groups are cultural for Schutz, and how, on his view and considering the factor of status, it is "only by a slow and patient modification of the system of relevances which those in power impose on their fellow-men" that "the evil of social tensions can be at least diminished" (II 262), but that is also unnecessary here (see Chap. 16).

Schutz's last statement significantly including the word "cultural" deserves to be quoted for that reason alone even though it brings nothing new.

> The observational field of the social scientist thus is the world of cultural objects and social institutions into which we are all born, within which we have to find our bearings, and with which we have to come to terms. This world—our *Lebenswelt*—has a particular meaning and relevance structure to us human beings, living, thinking, and acting therein. We have pre-selected and pre-interpreted this world by a series of common-sense constructs of the reality of daily life and it is these thought-objects which determine our behavior, define the goal of our actions, the means available for attaining them, and so forth. (IV 72)

Summary

Taking the word "thing" in the broadest signification whereby anything is a thing, Alfred Schutz's various statements about cultural things chronicled above are scattered and repetitious and deserve a summary statement. (Unless otherwise indicated, the contents of this summary paraphrase passages above.) What is fundamental is what Schutz originally reports in his review of Husserl's *Cartesianische Meditationen*, i.e., that the cultural world presupposes primary and secondary passive constitution. This implies that cultural things are constituted biographically in habit for individuals and historically in traditions for groups and that the rest of what Schutz says can be seen in this perspective.

Schutz offers two taxonomies of cultural things. The first includes artifacts, institutions, and conventional ways of doing things. To understand, e.g., a tool, requires ideal types of the user as well as well as the producer and such types are deduced from the means-end relationship. One can "read" the subjective experiences of others in their cultural objects, possibly including their bodies as cultural objects. Unlike naturalistic objects, cultural objects only exist for members of communities of culture. They are meaningful and belong to a "world of signification" that has "limited objectivity" for such communities. Except that it does not mention such limited objectivities and the communities of culture that they correlate with and also the taken-for-grantedness defining culture, the following passage already quoted above brings everything else Schutz asserted in Vienna about cultural things together.

> Our everyday world is, from the outset, an intersubjective world of culture. It is intersub-
> jective because we live in it as men among other men, bound to them through common
> influence and work, understanding others and being an object of understanding for others.
> It is a world of culture because, from the outset, the life-world is a universe of significations
> to us, i.e., a framework of meaning (*Sinnzusammenhang*) which we have to interpret, and
> of interrelations of meaning which we institute only through our action in this life-world.
> It is a world of culture also because we are always conscious of its *historicity*, which we
> encounter in tradition and habituality, and which is capable of being examined because the
> "already-given" refers back to one's own activity or to the activity of Others, of which it is
> the sediment. (I 133)

In the USA, Schutz supplies more that fits his original taxonomy by discussing
"cultural patterns of group life," which are "all the peculiar valuations, institutions,
and systems of orientation and guidance (such as the folkways, mores, laws, habits,
customs, etiquette, fashions) which … characterize—if not constitute—any social
group at a given moment of its history" (II 92).

   Each in-group of course approves its own cultural pattern, believing its way of
life good and right and perhaps the only good and right one. Literate and non-liter-
ate cultures are distinguished. Ethnic in-groups and out-groups in the USA include,
e.g., European Americans and African Americans. In his lecture on Eliot, Schutz
uniquely and importantly recognizes social classes as cultural groups. Furthermore,
"home groups" are distinguished in "The Stranger" for outsiders from their "ap-
proached groups," which can be "a closed club, … the girl's family, … college, …
the Army, … a boom town" (II 91).

   Schutz is ambivalent about the second taxonomy that he mentions and is again
worth re-quoting:

> [I]t turns out that culture is just everything which is *taken for granted* by a given social
> group at a certain point of its historical existence. This includes not only the things classed
> by certain anthropologists under the unfortunate terms *artifacts* (tools and implements),
> *sociofacts* (institutions), and *mentifacts* (ideas and ideals) and not only the permanently
> reproduced and managed "second environment" which, according to Malinowski, is super-
> imposed upon the primary or natural environment by human activity and the sum total of
> habitual and traditional life. (V 285)

Arguably, "sociofacts" as well as "artifacts" have been sufficiently discussed, but
"mentifacts" deserve more attention. To again repeat, "the life-world is a universe of
significations to us, i.e., a framework of meaning (*Sinnzusammenhang*) which we
have to interpret, and of interrelations of meaning which we institute only through
our action in this life-world." And cultural objects are repeatedly said by Schutz to
be ideal objects.

   Furthermore, cultural objects are connected with language for Schutz, as already
quoted from his lecture course on language:

> [T]he nature of our vernacular and its use presupposes and expresses our accepting or tak-
> ing for granted of the … cultural …world in which we live. … On this account the vernacu-
> lar then becomes a "treasure house" or "storage bin" for such relative natural conceptions or
> the world—the conception is "relative" because it is common to a certain group of people
> at a certain place at a certain time in history; the conception is "natural" because it is largely
> taken for granted, as a matter of course, without question.

In relation to the cultural sciences, it is important to note that Schutz began in 1952 to use the word "construct," explaining to his friend Aron Gurwitsch that, "in the social sciences there is the increasing tendency to replace the concepts of types and ideal type by the concept of 'construct'" (V 250), and that he continued using it until the end of his life (IV 72). To re-quote yet another key passage,

> The thought objects constructed by the social scientists refer to and are founded upon the thought objects constructed by the common-sense thought of man living his everyday life among his fellow-men. Thus, the constructs used by the social scientist are, so to speak, constructs of the second degree, namely constructs of the constructs made by the actors on the social scene, whose behavior the scientist observes and tries to explain in accordance with the procedural rules of his science. (I 6)

What are Constructs Ultimately About?

A problem emerges especially in Schutz's account of culture. It seems clear enough that the ideal types or constructs developed and used in the cultural sciences are, for him, about the constructs used in everyday life and at least chiefly found in the vernacular of a cultural group. *But it is not clear what the everyday constructs expressed in the vernacular are of or are about.*

Under the heading of "The Social World as Taken for Granted and its Structurization," Schutz writes

> But it will be useful to remember that what the sociologist calls "system," "role," "status," "role expectation," "situation," and "institutionalization" [are] experienced by the individual actor on the social scene in entirely different terms. To him all the factors denoted by these concepts are elements of a network of typifications—typifications of human individuals, of their course-of-action patterns, of their motives and goals, or of the sociocultural products which originated in their actions. These types were formed in the main by others, his predecessors or contemporaries, as appropriate tools for coming to terms with things and men, accepted as such by the group into which he was born. But there are also self-typifications: man typifies to a certain extent his own situation within the social world and the various relations he has to his fellow-men and cultural objects.
>
> The knowledge of these typifications and of their appropriate use is an inseparable element of the sociocultural heritage handed down to the child born into the group by his parents and his teachers … and the teachers of his teachers; it is, then, socially derived. The sum-total of these various typifications constitutes a frame of reference in terms of which not only the sociocultural, but also the physical world has to be interpreted, a frame of reference that, in spite of its inconsistencies and its inherent opaqueness, is nonetheless sufficiently integrated and transparent to be used for solving most of the practical problems at hand.
>
> It should be emphasized that the interpretation of the world in terms of types, as understood here, is not the outcome of a process of ratiocination, let alone of scientific conceptualization. The world, the physical as well as the sociocultural one, is experienced from the outset in terms of types: there are mountains, trees, birds, fishes, dogs, and among them Irish setters; there are cultural objects, such as houses, tables, chairs, books, tools, and among them hammers; and there are typical social roles and relationships, such as parents, sib-

lings, kinsmen, strangers, soldiers, hunters, priests, etc. Thus, typifications on the common-sense level—in contradistinction to typifications made by the scientist, and especially by the social scientist—emerge in the everyday experience of the world as taken for granted without any formulations of judgments or of neat propositions with logical subjects and predicates. They belong, to use a phenomenological term, to prepredicative thinking. The vocabulary and the syntax of the vernacular of everyday language represent the epitome of the typifications socially approved by the linguistic group. (II 232)

There may be a problem in this passage that continues onto the next page to contrast the concept of a unique individual with the typifications that subsume it and refers to Husserl's *Erfahrung und Urteil* (1939). This is because there is allusion to what Husserl called "empirical types," something to which Schutz devotes a section in "Type and Eidos in Husserl's Late Philosophy" (1959) entitled "Empirical Types and Universals" that begins, "We have seen how empirical types are, according to Husserl, preconstituted in passivity, which he considers as the lowest form of the constitution of universals" (III 99), and goes on to use the same example of a real dog, Rover, which will be returned to presently. Empirical types are for Husserl universal essences or *eidē,* but vague ones because exemplified only by previously observed cases and thus not yet clarified through free-phantasy variation. Arguably, they are then still cultural.[8]

   The long passage just quoted is about typifications, also repeatedly called "types," which, while "construct" is not used, are described in the same ways:

> They are "formed" by others and "socially derived," they constitute a "frame of reference in terms of which … the sociocultural … world has to be interpreted," and they belong to "prepredicative thinking," and the "vocabulary and the syntax of the vernacular of every-day language represent the epitome of the typifications socially approved by the linguistic group."

If common-sense constructs are expressed in the vernacular, what are they about? I see great difficulties in all of them being of or about, among other things, empirical types, e.g., the construct "dog" being about the vague universal essence Dog, but there is more that needs to be said, especially about *unique* individual dogs (and humans) and other cultural objects.

   An example may be useful (in phenomenology, examples often are). I vaguely recall reading somewhere the striking assertion that when we walk in the woods we walk in the word "woods." I initially considered this assertion preposterous, but felt the need to keep thinking about it and eventually came to believe that there is something to it. I do *not* believe that cultural objects of any sort, which for me include humans, myself and Others, are *always* covered with constructs, because much of the time I encounter people and other things without any constructs in mind and correlatively without engaging even in silent thinking, much less speech.

   Since I cannot assume that my hearers and readers are deeply familiar with walking in the woods, let me change the example to that of the presenting of a scientific paper to colleagues in a lecture hall. Here again, I do not always have constructs

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[8] Cf. Lester Embree, "Two Concepts of Type in the Work of Alfred Schutz," *Schutzian Research,* Vol. IV (2013).

come to mind about the things in such a familiar situation, but I can easily enough bring them up, sometimes just for myself and thus not expressing them aloud or in writing. Then I have constructs such as "colleagues," "audience," "walls," "floor," "door," "window," "chairs," etc. possibly come to mind as I look about. These constructs are in the vernacular for us. And besides such nouns there are verbs such as "speaking" and "listening." These are habitual for us individually and they are traditional in a special way for academics. They are cultural on the everyday level. Some reflection easily shows that there is idealization and generalization involved so that all the others are hearers or colleagues.

Particularization will be returned to presently.

Nevertheless, I am still referring to the common-sense constructs that may come to mind as I look about me and not what they are about, obvious as it might be. I like to call the things that such constructs are ultimately "basic cultural objects"[9] and then ask about their characteristics, which for me prominently include uses, values, and belief characteristics, which characteristics have been known to phenomenology at least since the *Ideen* of 1913.[10] Whether or not the constructs about them come to mind, I certainly do encounter such real things as the walls, floors, and chairs (and even colleagues) as useful and valuable for interacting with, sitting on, walking and standing on (and with), for excluding weather and noise, etc.

Moreover, the whole situation in the lecture hall is structured so that what is called the audience is positioned to hear the speaker and then what the words "speaker" and "audience" denote are social roles that real people observably perform. Such roles are functions or uses that persons have as much as chairs have theirs. The speaker may use the audience to learn about defects in her presentation and for help improving it. Sometimes there are antagonistic colleagues who hence come to have negative value for the speaker and perhaps the audience too, but, hopefully, most colleagues in the audience are supportive and have positive value for her. Also, the lecture hall and all in it are positively believed in pre-conceptually.

But not everybody is a regular participant in a scholarly presentation. After the colleagues go to supper, the room is a subtly different cultural situation for the janitor, as it would also be for a functionary of some title or other who comes around to judge whether the walls need re-painting. To some extent, there are constructs in the vernaculars used by such functionaries and janitors that might not be known to the academics.

The uses, values, and belief characteristics of the particular features of the real room, of its real furniture, and of its real inhabitants are learned and thus cultural. These cultural characteristics are constituted in the positional components or theses within concrete encounterings that seem best specified, in broad significations, as willings, valuings, and believings. Much more can be said about what can be called, because they are learned, these "cultural characteristics," e.g., how they can be posi-

[9] Lester Embree, *Environment Technology Justification* (Bucharest: Zeta Books, 2008), Chap. 5.

[10] Lester Embree, "Advances Concerning Evaluation and Action in Husserl's *Ideas II*." In *Issues in Husserl's "Ideas II,"* ed. Thomas Nenon and Lester Embree, 173–198. (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996)

tive, negative, or neutral, firm or shaky, intrinsic and extrinsic, etc.[11] But now the question of constructs that are not specific or general needs to be addressed.

Probably because he is chiefly interested in what cultural-scientific constructs are about, i.e., common-sense constructs, Schutz unfortunately not only pays little attention to what I have called basic cultural objects but also emphasizes how common-sense constructs are general and specific. But, fortunately, he does refer to one individual case, namely that of a particular dog named "Rover." I hope it is not offensive to suggest that a particular colleague at the presentation of a scientific paper can be recognized to fit the same analysis. The following passage that follows the long one just quoted sketches the particularization as well as generalization.

> But of what does the process of typification consist? If we call an animal a dog we have already performed a kind of typification. Each dog is a unique individual and as such different from all other dogs, although he has in common with them a set of characteristic traits and qualities. By recognizing Rover as a dog and calling him so, I have disregarded what makes Rover the unique and individual dog he means to me. Typifying consists in passing by what makes the individual unique and irreplaceable. Insofar as Rover is just a dog, he is deemed to be equal to all other dogs: a doglike behavior is expected of him, a particular way of eating, of running, etc. But even looking at Rover as an individual in his uniqueness, I may find that today he behaves in an extraordinary way. It is typical for him to greet me when I return home. Today he is rather lethargic and I fear he may be ill. Even my notion of the individual and unique Rover already involves a typification of what I believe to be his habitual behavior. And even the ill Rover has his typical way of being ill. (II 233)

The notion of this individual and unique reality involves a singular typification, but is it is nevertheless a notion about the particular reality. In contrast, a cultural-scientific construct about a common-sense construct is an ideal object not about a reality but about another ideality. And the same is the case, if the object is not just a colleague but one called, e.g., Michael, who is also not an ideality but a reality.

Interestingly, there is a somewhat parallel passage in "Type and Eidos in Husserl's Late Philosophy" (1959):

> Anything apperceived in its typicality *may* lead up to the universal concept of the type under which we apprehend it. But we need not be directed in such a manner toward the generic; we need not apperceive thematically this concrete individual dog as a singularization of the general notion "dog." *"In general"* one dog is like any other dog. If, however, we remain directed toward the dog as an individual, then the passively preconstituted relation of this individual dog to the type under which he was apperceived from the outset remains unthematized. This typicality will not exhaust all similarities of the concrete object which will be revealed in the progress of our experiencing it. To the type "dog," for example, belongs a set of typical properties with an open horizon of anticipations of further typical characteristics. If we proceeded in our experiencing of this or that individual dog, we would find ever new characteristics which do not belong just to this individual dog, but to dogs in general, characteristics which are predelineated by the properties appropriated by us as typical for dogs in accordance with the incomplete and fugitive experiences we had had of them until now. This is the origin of a *presumptive idea of a universal* which surpasses the *concept* of *real* dogs as it originated in *real* experiences. (III 100)

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[11] Cf. Lester Embree, *Reflective Analysis: A First Introduction into Phenomenological Investigations*, Second Edition (Bucharest: Zeta Books, 2011).

This passage is chiefly about empirical types, but there is mention of "the concept of the type," which appears the same as a construct about it, although the word "construct" does not occur in this essay. Moreover, there is repeated reference to "this concrete individual dog," the "experiencing of this or that individual dog," and to "the concept of real dogs."

Where I find Schutz incomplete and seek to complete him is with regard to the description of real things in terms of the uses, values, and belief characteristics that they always already have in habit and tradition for us and are thus cultural. These are what constructs are ultimately about. In addition, if empirical types as well as common-sense constructs and also what I call "basic cultural objects" are cultural, then culture is a three-fold phenomenon and, by the way, basic cultural objects are fundamental.

Works of Schutz

Note: Unless done otherwise, the following works will be cited with the embedded abbreviations as listed down the left margin below, plus the page number(s).

I=Alfred Schutz, *Collected Papers,* Vol. I, *The Problem of Social Reality*, ed. Maurice Natanson (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962).

II=——-, *Collected Papers,* Vol. II, *Studies in Social Theory*, ed. Arvid Broedresen (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964).

III=——-, *Collected Papers,* Vol. III, *Studies in Phenomenological Philosophy*, ed. Ilse Schutz (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966).

IV=——-, *Collected Papers,* Vol. IV, ed. Helmut Wagner, George Psathas, and Fred Kersten, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996).

V=——-, *Collected Papers*, Vol. V, *Phenomenology and the Social Sciences*, ed. Lester Embree (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011).

VI=——, *Collected Papers*, Vol. VI, *Literary Reality and Relationships*, ed. Michael Barber (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013).

PSW=—-, *The Phenomenology of the Social World,* trans. George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967).

PP=———-, "Positivistic Philosophy and the Actual Approach of Interpretive Social Science: An Ineditum from Spring 1953," *Husserl Studies*, Vol. 14 (1998): 123–149. Reprinted in Dermot Moran and Lester Embree, eds., *Phenomenology: Critical Concepts in Philosophy*, 5 vols. London: Routledge, 2004, III, pp. 119–145. Also available at

http://www.springerlink.com/content/t52u22v305u28g04/

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