PALGRAVE MACMILLAN TRANSNATIONAL HISTORY SERIES

TRANSNATIONAL JAPAN AS HISTORY

EMPIRE, MIGRATION, AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Edited by Pedro Iacobelli,
Danton Leary & Shinnosuke Takahashi

PALGRAVE MACMILLAN TRANSNATIONAL HISTORY SERIES

Akira Iriye (Harvard University) and **Rana Mitter** (University of Oxford)
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Series Editors' Foreword

If there persists any doubt that transnational history is an excellent way of studying the recent past, the chapters in this volume will dispel such skepticism. They make clear that the transnational approach to history is a particularly valuable tool when examining a country such as Japan whose territorial borders are presumably well defined and where both its state and society tend to embrace one kind of mon-nationalism or another. Editors and contributors demonstrate that Japan has been a transnational nation like all countries.

A transnational analysis of a country's history pays particular attention to the ways in which its people intermingle with one another both domestically and externally. Within the nation, the Japanese are no more "homogeneous" than anyone else, if indeed there has ever existed a "homogeneous" society anywhere in the world. The Japanese people have been intermingling with people and cultures of other societies for centuries, and yet Japanese history continues to be viewed as Japan's story, well defined in its borders and developing with its own momentum. When it interacts with other countries, these, too, tend to be comprehended within the framework of their respective national identities.

Trasnational history has developed as a way to overcome such parochialism and to provide a fresh way of looking at the world's past and present. It is assumed that no nation is detached from worldwide developments and that besides nations and states there exist many nonnational and nongovernmental entities that constitute humanity: ethnicities, races, religions, and other communities as well as individual men, women, children, and many others. Humanity is divisible not only into national communities but also into such other groupings as rich and poor, men and women, young and old, educated and uneducated, healthy and sick, and many other categories. They all constitute the global community. To study Japan, therefore, is to understand the world, and vice versa. It is to be hoped that the contributors' efforts in this book to "transnationalize" Japanese

history will be matched by similar attempts to reexamine other countries' records. That would be the best way to come to terms with the globalizing world today.

Akira Iriye
Rana Mitter

Acknowledgments

The idea of a volume of research articles examining a transnational perspective for Japan's modern and contemporary history began in discussion among the editors in late 2013. We sought a way to contribute to the understanding of Japan's history in the twentieth century from our respective fields of Japanese Imperial history, Japanese Migration History, and the history of Contemporary Social Movements in Japan. Evoking the quest for a transnational interpretation of historical phenomena initiated by scholars such as Akira Iriye and Ian Tyrrell in the late 1980s, this project's initial aim was to "hitch" Japan to these contemporary historiographical trends while bridging our fields of expertise. The contributors to this book harness various approaches to Japanese history within the transnational perspective, each enriching our understanding of Japan's history. Foremost, thanks are due to them.

From the commencement of this project it has accumulated debts of gratitude from a wide number of people who aided it along its various stages to completion. At the early stage, the editors benefitted greatly from the wise council and warm encouragement of colleagues at the Australian National University, Dr. Keiko Tamura, Dr. Craig Reynolds, Dr. Thomas Dubois, Prof. Robert Cribb, Dr. Tomoko Akami, and Prof. Tessa Morris-Suzuki. Some of the key ideas put into this book were developed at the Asian Studies Association of Australia's annual conference held in Perth, July 2014. The editors benefitted from the feedback of those in attendance. At later stages the project received generous support from Dr. Yasuko Hassall Kobayashi, Dr. Takashi Saikawa, Prof. Tetsuya Sakai, Prof. Hidekazu Sensui, Dr. Hiroko Matsuda, and Dr. Hiroshi Ishiwata.

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Introduction: Framing Japan's Historiography into the Transnational Approach

Pedro Iacobelli, Danton Leary, and Shinnosuke Takahashi

Rarely are national histories seamlessly insulated within national borders. For example, no event in recent Japanese history illustrates this more shockingly than the triple disaster on March 11, 2011. The disaster that devastated large areas of northeast Japan and left thousands dead or missing was a tragic and poignant reminder of the interconnectedness of Japan with the wider world community. The earthquake, the tsunami it caused, and the subsequent nuclear emergency at the Fukushima Daiichi power plant were truly global events—geologically, humanitarianly, economically, and politically. Fear of nuclear fallout, like seismic waves, respects no national borders. Neither does the generosity of the human spirit. The disaster elicited a transnational outpouring of humanitarian support from governments and individuals across the globe. It also reignited the smoldering debate on the potential dangers of nuclear energy.[1] The triple disaster highlighted in a most tragic fashion that national histories can rarely remain confined to the national unit; they transcend political and geographical borders and entwine with regional and global ones. Similarly, transnational influences penetrate national histories leaving indelible legacies. This volume explores the transnational history of Japan by looking at that history through the prisms of empire, migration, and social movements.

Within Japanese history, as in other fields, the last decade has seen an upswing of research that approaches history from transnational perspectives. In a recent edition of the *American Historical Review*, for example, Louise Young has pointed out the increasing body of English language publications dealing with Japan's history through transnational, international, and global history perspectives.[2] Despite this, "transnational history"—as a category in its own right— remains a relatively new field within historical

studies. While some historians have for a long time sought to transcend the boundaries of the nation-state in their narratives, it has only been since the "transnational turn" in the 1990s that transnational history has emerged as a self-consciously distinct scholarly project.[3] Taking inspiration from this body of literature built up over two decades, here transnational history is broadly understood as: (1) history that focuses on flows across borders, (2) history that contextualizes the nation-state within its global setting, and (3) history that is sensitive to the local ramifications and manifestations of these transnational trends. Within modern historiography, this approach has been confined to the minority and even today much history remains intrinsically tied to the nation-state perspective. It is widely recognized that historical narrative has been integral to the formation and maintenance of national consciousness and in the affirmation of the nation-state.[4] Over the last few decades some historians have increasingly undertaken a concerted effort to exorcise history from the Hegelian nation-state-focused *Geist*. This perspective continues to gain popularity with an ever-increasing number of explicitly transnational histories that deal with a wide array of subject matter being produced every year.[5]

Fittingly, "transnational history" emerged into English-language historiography through a transnational circuit, with Australian historian of the United States, Ian Tyrrell, contributing most profoundly to this trend in the Anglosphere. In his seminal article "American Exceptionalism in an Age of International History," Tyrrell sought to dismantle the myth of US "exceptionalism" by placing that history within its world context under the rubric of "new transnational history" and thus rescuing it from the parochialism engendered in that perspective.[6] According to Pierre-Yves Saunier, it was within the context of this debate that the term "transnational history" was coined.[7] Tyrrell's views, echoed by other scholars of US history, were followed by a publication of a special issue of the *Journal of American History* devoted to the topic: "The Nation and Beyond" and in an volume edited by Thomas Bender in 2002, *Rethinking American History in a Global Age*.[8] In the spirit of the transnational perspective, these efforts by scholars of US history have not been limited to the United States alone, but have had a wide-ranging influence.[9]

Despite the influence of debates coming out of the United States, the "transnational turn" in historical writing was not solely the product of re-conceptualizing the history of the United States within its global context nor isolated to the English-speaking world. Roughly

contemporaneously to developments in US history, French, Ibero-American, German and, indeed, Japanese historians similarly began to question the hegemonic position of nation-bounded approaches to history.[10] These developments, no doubt, are emblematic of the continuing transnational transnationalization of historical writings. Central among recent efforts to push the transnational history agenda has been Akira Iriye, who together with Pierre-Yves Saunier, edited the enormous volume *Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History* in 2009.[11] This dictionary is expressive of the long journey transnational history has taken over the last two decades to become a firmly established historical approach.

This chapter introduces some of the most important elements of the transnational approach to history. In particular, it delves into the emergence of transnationalism in historical practice, its usefulness and relevance as an historical approach, and its place in Japanese historiography. The second section of this introduction contextualizes the chapters of this book from the specific perspective of transnationalism in the history of empire, migration, and social movements.

The Meaning and Usefulness of Transnational History

Benedetto Croce famously claimed that "every true history is contemporary history."[12] All serious studies of the past, in other words, are informed by the problems and needs of the writer's own time. Living in an increasingly globalized world we are more easily able to appreciate the connectedness of the places we inhabit to wider global trends. These trends know no national boundaries, and while our entanglement with the wider world is increasingly intensifying, these processes are not new. The transnational turn in history represents Croce's truism insofar as historians began to study the past from a contemporary understanding of the state which includes elements that transcended national boundaries. Indeed, the transnational approach to history emerged, in the form we understand it today, as the result of changes in the historical paradigm: from being centered within nation-states to a more general, global, and international framework.[13]

Underlying these changes is the far-reaching effects of globalization and also the reconfiguration of the metanarratives triggered, among other factors, by poststructuralist thought. Both phenomena, as noted by Akira Iriye, began around the 1970s but were only belatedly noticed by historians.[14] The social and cultural changes in the second half of the twentieth century affected the work of historians

and their perception of the global past from the late 1980s and early 1990s. The transnational turn, thus, meant the re-examination of the past from a perspective that cuts across national borders and narratives. Along the latter line, the most important contribution of poststructuralist thinkers to history was a critical consciousness of the limits of nation-based historical narratives. As Jean-Francois Lyotard defined it, postmodernity encompassed an increasing disbelief toward "grand narratives," historical accounts of the past, and correlative anticipation of the future of a people, nation, or other community, which perform the functions of social integration and political legitimation.[15] It emerged as a critical and explicit rejection to Hegel's organicism of history, philosophy, and the nation.[16] Indeed, it criticized the epistemological assumption of national history that had been strongly rooted in the spatiality of the modern nation-state (e.g., its borders).[17]

For many historians of the late twentieth century, writing amid a buoyant globalization in terms of the flows of people, goods, and ideas, nation-state centered scholarship required at the very least a context.[18] Responding to this increasingly globalized world context, since the end of the Cold War, historians began to provide more global and international perspectives to their historical narratives. To be sure, the transnational historical approach is bounded within a narrative that goes beyond national borders. The bird's eye perspective of history was thus a response to the cultural and social changes that occurred in the latter part of the twentieth century. The growing awareness that nations were the products of modernization processes contributed to questions on the historical paradigms that sustained national histories. In this sense, this historical approach raises critical issues about transnational flows but, as Chris Bayly notes, does not claim to embrace the whole world.[19] The very same self-awareness that the transnational history is another approach and thus does not claim to be the Holy Grail for all historical narratives has allowed historians to present a more critical view on established national-based institutions and subjects. For example, the transnational approach enters into conflict with nation-based areas studies. This is particularly evident in Northeast Asia, where Japanese, Korean, Chinese, Mongolian studies have been separately configured as the principal areas of study. Flows across the region tend to be fragmented by national contexts, thus losing their coherence as part of a wider and richer experience. In the same vein, Harry Harootunian has criticized the metonymical characteristic of area studies,[20] that is, taking a partitioned knowledge of the region and projecting it onto the whole. A transnational approach, by contrast,

forces the historian to look beyond national borders aiming for a more complete level of understanding.

To be sure, the centrality of nation-states to both the lived-reality of most humans and to the foundations of the international order is undisputable. Yet nation-states are not, nor have ever been, hermetically sealed, self-contained and absolutely self-referential spaces of action; they are porous zones susceptible, indeed reliant, upon external stimuli. The transnational history approach, thus, brings to the fore the nation's existence within its wider regional and global contexts and within the multitudinous connections and relations it and its inhabitants have with phenomena beyond the borders. Yet, it does not deny the political, epistemological, and ontological significance of the nation to both international affairs and to the people who live within it.

But is transnational history a useful approach to historical problems? Or, is the emphatic rejection of national perspectives, as Sebastian Conrad has discussed in relation to the postwar Japanese Marxist experience, a Sisyphean task that frequently continues to rotate around the nation as the center of gravity of historical interpretation?[21] The question about the utility of transnational history emerges as a result of the preexistence of other international, global, and comparative approaches. How useful is it to adopt a new approach if what we want to refer to has already been framed within other perspectives or areas? The problems of the historicism of supranational or international phenomena have been thoroughly discussed from global and international approaches. But it is from the limits of these very same approaches that transnational history acquires its own relevance. For example, "international history," as Erez Manela has pointed out, is so spatially and theoretically broad that it risks losing intellectual coherence, becoming a "catch all designation."[22] In contrast, Akira Iriye has emphasized that traditional international history is pregnant with a focus on state actors (*haute politique*), tying it closely with older forms of diplomatic history and rendering it less capable of embracing non-state subjects. Iriye also points out the problematic uninational focus of much of this history, where the foreign relation of a single nation dominates the analysis.[23] Global history, inheritor of both world history and the late twentieth century's globalization process, presents its own limitations. At first glance, the term brings into mind the totality of the world.[24] The problem is the scope of the term, which preferentially focuses on global processes such as the expansion of industrialization and the various paths to progress and modernity around the globe. Therefore, this approach tends not to favor regional or

more local historical problems and subjects.[25] The focus tends to lie on unidirectional activity, on the homogenization of the world.[26] Conversely, transnational history can be a useful historical approach since it combines an implicit critique of nation-centered approaches in preference for "movements, flows and circulations that transcended politically bounded territories."[27]

The transnational historical perspective, to be sure, reexamines the nation-state from different angles, perspectives, and dynamics.[28] Indeed, the nation-building process is a transnational phenomenon, spreading from one section of the globe to others. An awareness of this *transnationality* in nation-building processes deeply enriches our understanding of the history of the nation and the forces and precedents that shape it. That is to say, a transnational historical perspective does not, necessarily, attempt to efface the importance of the nation; rather, it seeks to place the nation within these transnational forces that have impacted it. In other words, the transnational history perspective focuses on the social and political forces that cannot be contained by national boundaries. These forces emphasize uncovering connections across political units and the strengthening of alternative solidarities, social connections, and interpenetrations among actors from within and without the nation-state.

Isabel Hofmeyr has commented on this topic as follows, "the key claim of any transnational approach is its central concern with the movement, flows, and circulations, not simply as a theme or motif but as an analytic set of methods which defines the endeavour itself."[29] Hofmeyr meant by this that historical processes are made in different places but that they are constructed "in the movement between places, sites, and regions."[30] In the same vein, we could say that transnational history is also methodological honesty. For, if we follow our subjects wherever they may lead us we will sometimes cross borders just as they did.[31] It could be said that the transnational turn is a renovation of the *histoire-problème,* the problem-oriented historical inquiry, developed by the *Annales* School in France. Yet, the *Annales* School, together with the Japanese and British Marxist historiographical tradition, social history in Bielefeld, and American social and economic history tended to encapsulate their historical inquiries in their immediate national context.[32] Moreover, beyond adjusting the sociospatial perspective of the problem researched, transnational history is not limited to any particular methodological approach. It could be said that the transnational historical perspective, therefore, is an umbrella perspective under which a wide range of histories have been written. It is a historical approach that

recognizes that national histories cannot be understood within the delineated space of the nation only, but must be grasped within the interlocking spaces surrounding the nation. In sum, it embraces a methodological diversity.[33]

In Japan, where self-centered narratives are still influential, histories that transcend the nation-state have gradually emerged from social, political, and intellectual trends dating back to the 1980s. While outside of Japan transnational history has been widely discussed in relation to academic methodology, curriculums, and institutions since the 1990s, in the Japanese context the concept of transnationalism had originally been directed toward a different trajectory. In Japan, as part of government initiatives tied to boosting economic growth, the idea of "internationalization," or *kokusaika*, has become fashionable since the late 1980s. Similarly, the term "globalization" (*gurōbaruka*) has come to be widely used since the new millennium. Tied to these wider trends, researchers from a range of backgrounds have directed their efforts toward studying these phenomena since the 1990s. Particularly, the transnational approach to history has been informed by academic trends such as Cultural Studies and Postcolonial Studies and has benefitted from the international interaction of scholars in Japan and those overseas. Realization of the deep interconnectedness of Japan and the wider world led many Japanese researchers to question the underpinning assumptions of Japanese ethnic identity and nationalism, and indeed, notions such as "national culture" (*kokumin bunka*) and "the Japanese" (*nihonjin*) began to be scrutinized within fields such as sociology and literature.[34] Issues such as gender, diaspora, indigenous culture, minority groups, and so forth drew attention among intellectuals who also began to critically examine the issue of power in dominant representations of "Japaneseness." These elements helped to promote the historical reconsideration of the notions of "national identity" (*nashonaru aidentitii*), "national history" (*nihonshi*), and "Japan" (*Nihon/Nippon*) within the Japanese academia.[35] In this sense, early efforts by Japanese scholars to break away from a singular focus on the nation in historical narrative derived from an internal deconstruction of the most basic tenets of Japanese national consciousness—the critique of so-called *nihonjinron* (or, "theories of the Japanese").[36]

From this perspective, we can identify a number of recent academic works that develop transnational issues in the scholarship on Japanese history. Most notable are the 25 volumes that cover Japanese history from the ancient to the contemporary period, *History of*

Japan (*Nihon no Rekishi*), published in the early 2000s by Kodansha.[37] Including contributions by scholars from differing disciplines and covering many topics, one of the common themes of this project was how to overcome the homogenous images of Japan in historical perspective and also how to open our understanding of "Japan," "Japanese," and "Japaneseness" to spaces that tend to be dismissed in the dominant discourse of Japanese history. For this project, scholars based outside of Japan such as Tessa Morris-Suzuki, Harry Harootunian, Carol Gluck, Brett de Barry, and Takashi Fujitani joined scholars from Japanese universities such as Kang Sang Jung, Hiyane Teruo, Iwasaki Naoko, and others. Other important works produced include the eight-volume collection *The Knowledge of 'Imperial' Japan* (*'Teikoku' Nihon no Gakuchi*), published by Iwanami Shoten in 2006 and edited by historians such as Sakai Tetsuya, Yamamuro Shin'ichi, and Hirosue Akira and the more recent scholarship of Akita Shigeru and Momoki Shirō under the rubrics of regional and global history.[38] This and the work of other historians, sociologists, and cultural critics based in Japanese institutions have sought to reformulate our understanding of Japanese history as enmeshed within global power relations during the periods of imperialism, the Cold War, and post-Cold War. Approaching closely to these works, our project aims to contribute to the historiography of Japan by re-framing it as a transnational historical subject.

Transnational History and Empire

Empires are axiomatically transnational polities and the study of empires perfectly fits a transnational history perspective. Between the "scramble for Africa" in the 1870s and the close of World War II in 1945 empires, often violently, enveloped the majority of the world's populations within their borders. From 1895 Japan, too, was an active participant in the politics of modern imperialism. The Empire of Japan together with the Western Powers were instrumental in acting as the political adhesive in the formation of a globalized world and extending "modernity," in its many and contested forms, to all corners of the earth.[39] Indeed, the emergence of modern Japan was shaped by the global order of European imperialism and Japan self-consciously adopted the imperial formation, not just the nation-state form, in its quest for political independence from the threat of European imperialism.[40] Once fully established as a modern empire, Japan acted as a partner of the Western Powers in molding a transnational discourse on imperialism as the dominate form of political organization and as the "standard of civilization."[41]And yet, in Japan

the dominance of this Euro-centric imperialism was eventually challenged by new Japan-centric imperial projects under the guise of pan-Asianism and the political programmes of the New Order in East Asia and the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere from the late 1930s.[42]

The process of imperial expansion was at most times exploitative, coercive, and violent, but at others conciliatory and accommodating; no uniformity exists in the process by which empires acted to connect the world in a common, though contested, modernity nor in the process by which colonial populations encountered, reacted to, molded, adopted, or rejected this modernity. Importantly, this process was also by no means unidirectional. Empires, the Japanese or otherwise, did not have the unfettered ability to cast their modernity onto accepting populations *carte blanche*, and imperial metropoles were not sealed from the effects of the imperial project and the presence of colonized peoples. [43] A transnational history approach to empire offers insight into the multidirectional flow of influence within empires, yet is still sensitive to the endemic power disparities inherent in imperialism.

While a transnational history perspective can be usefully applied to increase our awareness of the mutually influential relations between the metropolis and colony, it can also enlighten our understanding of the empire and its colonies within the global order. Tomoko Akami has recently pointed out that the modern world order was as much an inter-imperial one as it was an international one and that "the notion of the 'nation state/empire' as a new way of conceptualizing an actor in international politics, and as a basic unit in an analysis of international politics for the period between the late nineteenth century and 1945" can usefully be applied to history.[44] Until at least 1945, empires, centered on powerful nation-states, continued to dominate world politics, and indeed, imperial formations provided *the* model of political organization until nation-states rose to dominance on the wave of the decolonization movement following the political upheavals of World War II. A transnational historical approach fruitfully deepens our understanding of the modern history of the Japanese empire within its intra-imperial relations between the imperial metropole and the colonies and in the totality of its global connections.

The three chapters presented in this volume focusing on the issue of empire offer illuminating examples of the transnationality of the Japanese Empire, its potentialities, and its legacies. Toyomi Asano begins by reconsidering Japan's decision to annex Korea in 1910 from the perspective of the legal reform process to abolish

extraterritoriality. Asano argues that the legal reform process pursued by the Japanese Government, most enthusiastically by Itō Hirobumi, was a transnational endeavor that encompassed a diverse range of actors, including the Japanese Government, Japanese settlers, the Korean population, the United States and the European powers. In this process, Japan deployed "civilized" legal codes produced in the West to formulate an alternative regional order, based on a confederative project that would maintain Korean sovereignty and be distinct from European-style empires. Japan's decision to ultimately annex Korea into the formal empire, Asano argues, was an outcome of the failure to realize this historical transnational alternative. In Chapter 2, Yuka Hiruma Kishida examines pan-Asianism within intellectual circles of Manchukuo's Kenkoku University. Hiruma Kishida argues that Japan's imperial project in Manchukuo entailed the creation of transnational spaces in which alternative visions of pan-Asianism could be articulated. While a mainstay of Japanese imperial ideology in the 1930s, pan-Asianism was also intrinsically a transnational ideology capable of being interpreted diversely. Hiruma Kishida offers a unique insight into this diversity by comparing and contrasting the pan-Asianist scholarship produced by both Japanese and non-Japanese faculty members of Kenkoku University. The transnational space of the University allowed several non-Japanese scholars to offer subtly alternative versions of the discourse which circumvented the Japan-centrism of wartime ideology. Finally, Sherzod Muminov examines the legacies of the Japanese Empire in the immediate postwar period through the history and memories of around 600,000 Japanese who returned from internment in Siberia. Internment, Muminov argues, was not only indelibly marked on the minds of the returned internees, but memory of the event significantly impacted the politics and imagery of the Cold War in Japan. Not only does Muminov offer a transnational perspective on the legacies of Japan's empire, crucially, he presents a transwar story that persuasively ties Japan's prewar and postwar histories together; where the Empire's end in battle against Soviet troops in northeast China and the ideological battles against Communism under the turbulent politics of Cold War-era Japan are fused.[45]

Transnational History and Migration

International migration is one of the most natural venues for reflecting on the concept of transnational history. People's mobility is a central element in many transnational accounts of the past. But the

older form of the history of migration, with respect to countries such as the United States, Argentina, Australia, or Brazil, was written to incorporate the immigrant into a national narrative.[46] Indeed, in many historical migration accounts the arrival of peoples has been closely connected with the nation's internal processes. As Patricia Seed put it, the focus has heavily laid on the impact of migration on the destination.[47] Pioneers seeking to incorporate new territories to the hosting nation, European migrants unconsciously helping to "whiten" the local society; or even more recently, non-European people contributing to the building of a modern and multicultural society, among others, are all narratives centered in the receiving state. These stories tend to obscure the migrant's agency and the conditions of departure and favor forms of national mythologizing (e.g., "melting pot" or "immigration nation").

In contrast, the transnational history approach frames migration within a more complex circuit where multiple networks coexist. As Adam McKeown puts it, international migration is a world of "complex and overlapping flows and nodes, none of which can be entirely captured within a single national or regional history."[48] In the same vein, transnational accounts of the past focus on migrants' experiences and processes at both ends of the migratory line; but not only as a history of the circumstances at the points of origin and arrival in the migratory flow. Transnational history explores the exchanges along the way, the different forms of migratory movement and transformation of identities. Also, transnational history sees migration not as a unilateral movement where one end is severed once the migrants arrive at the other; it focuses on the fluid interconnections at both ends that migrants embody. Furthermore, the transnational perspective is open to examine the continuing presence of the country of origin throughout the migrant experience. And thus, migration can be adopted as part of the sending state's transnational history as well.

There are good examples of the transnational history approach to migration for the Japanese case. For example, Eiichiro Azuma in his many studies on Japanese immigration to the United States has explored the ways in which Japanese first generation of migrants (*issei*) in California attempted to create a "pioneer theory" that highlighted their position over other foreign nationals in the quest for expanding the US border westward. His study also reflects on the repercussion that this "pioneer theory" had back in mainland Japan and the ways in which the Tokyo government later distorted and used it to foster nationalism before the Pearl Harbor attack.[49] Further,

as Christiane Harzig and Dirk Hoerder point out, because migration is so often a highly selective process, families and households are separated by migrations, creating incentives for communication and further movement in order to perpetuate fundamental social bonds, ties of affection, and familial forms of economic exchange, solidarity, and mutual assistance.[50] Indeed, we can observe literally tens of thousands of cases where Japanese migrants saw their household conformation radically changed by migration, including the well-documented cases of mail-order brides (*shashin kekkon*) for single Japanese migrants.[51] Finally in the postwar era, migrants (Japanese and otherwise) problematized the reconstruction of a new and democratic Japan. The repatriation of former Japanese colonizers and the presence of former imperial subjects from Korea and China in mainland Japan became transnational reminders of the near imperial past.[52] Japan was both origin and destination for migration and the Japanese state an active agent in its promotion.

This volume presents three studies on Japanese migration seen from the abovementioned framework. The fluid interconnections between the point of departure and destination, seen from a cultural perspective, is examined in Tessa Morris-Suzuki's chapter on colonialism and the migration of mainland Japanese (*naichi*) to Karafuto (Sakhalin) in the early twentieth century. Indeed, as the case of the Japanese in Karafuto shows, not all migrants left their homes with the intention of settling permanently elsewhere, some succeeded in moving back and forth across borders altering the material culture in the host society. Noriaki Hoshino's chapter frames migration within a more "complex circuit of multiple networks" emphasizing the impact that migration had on both ends of the migratory line. By examining the discourse and activities of Nagata Shigeshi and other early presidents of the Japanese Christian Organization (Nihon Rikkokai)—particularly their involvement in Japanese migration to the United States and the development of an "ethnic discourse" that was applied in Japan's colonies—Hoshino explores the relationship between migration and ethnic discourses during the formative years of the Japanese empire. Finally, Bill Mihalopoulos' chapter provides a good example of the continuing presence of the country of origin throughout the migrants' experience. In his study, Mihalopoulos brings to the fore the important subject of labor migration, in particular, the case of poor Japanese women, from rural areas, and their engagement in the sex industry in British Colonial Singapore. The power relationship between these Japanese prostitutes and the Japanese consuls emphasizes Japan's attempts to shape and regulate

overseas Japanese migrant communities. In all, these three studies provide a truly transnational approach to the study of Japan's migration history.

Transnational History and Social Movements

Social movements are those developed through "a series of interactions between power holders and persons successfully claiming to speak on behalf of a constituency lacking formal representation."[53] As in this definition by Charles Tilly, the concept of social movements illuminates a crucial dimension of modern social life, focusing on politics for the equal distribution of material wealth and also for recognition. While the notion of "power" and "power-holder" can be flexibly applied depending on different circumstances, the core element of social movements is the assumption that social masses and social forces speak or take action for the equal treatment of the less powerful or invisible subjects. Following from this premise, the study of social movements has ramified into the research of many different kinds of social and political practices that take social justice as their objectives. Traditionally within sociological literature, social movements have been imagined as emerging from problems associated with industrialization—such as urban poverty and labor-related problems, and identity-based issues such as gender, youth, and the ecology movement found under conditions of so-called late capitalism in Western countries.[54] The arrival of "transnationalism" in the 1990s has been accompanied by a new wave in the research on social movements. The new approach inspired by transnationalism has focused on nongovernmental civic organizations working on global agendas such as war, poverty, refugees and migration, political violence, labor condition, and other matters related to human rights issues.[55] Namely, the transnational approach has enabled us to imagine a form of civil society that transcends territorial boundaries.

Historical studies also play crucial roles to enrich our understanding of transnational social movements. For example, cultural historians such as Paul Gilroy in his famous *Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness* (1993), and Robin D. G. Kelley in *Freedom Dreams: The Black Radical Imagination* (which are greatly inspiring works) have covered the history of slavery, imperialism, and counterculture across the Atlantic Ocean.[56] Their works have been considered as insightful and also provocative in the way in which they have brought different experiences and consciousness into modern historiography through the prism of "race." In relation to the history

of the so-called Global South, scholars such as Vijay Prashad have also published an alternative view of contemporary history. In his *Everybody Was Kung Fu Fighting: Afro-Asian Connections and Myth of Cultural Purity* (2002) and in *The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World* (2008), the early period of this history has been persuasively illustrated.[57] Further, Leela Ghandhi's *Affective Communities* is a great example that explains the intellectual linkage of anticolonialism and affective solidarity friendships between the United Kingdom and colonial India during the late Victorian period.[58]

In the context of Japanese studies, the number of contemporary and historical works on transnational civic movements has been growing since at least the early 2000s. Jennifer Chan's *Another Japan Is Possible* (2008) along with Michiba Chikanobu's *Teikō no Dōjidaishi* (2008) are good examples of studies of social movements in Japan.[59] Also, Uemura Hideaki and his colleagues compiled a volume on civic diplomacy based upon their transnational movement for the rights of indigenous people.[60] Similarly, historical inquiries into transnational aspects of Japanese civic activism have also recently increased. For example, Yuichiro Onishi wrote *Transpacific Antiracism: Afro-Asian Solidarity in 20th-Century Black America, Japan, and Okinawa* (2013) and Naoki Sakai and Hyon Joo Yoo edited a volume called *The Trans-Pacific Imagination* published in the same year.[61] Historians such as Tessa Morris-Suzuki map out the traditional livelihood space of northern indigenous people which spread over the Sea of Okhotsk and Simon Avenell shows the transnational historical traces of the environmental movement in postwar Japan.[62] Those works sought to find and establish a historical common ground in Japan and the Pacific region through a cross-cultural history of the movement of people, ideas, and problems.

Building upon this scholarship, this section's three scholars discuss the histories of transnational social movements from different perspectives. First, Ian Rapley, explores the Esperanto movement in the early twentieth-century Japan. Esperanto is an engineered language that emerged in the modern period with the intention to be used as a universal language. However, by focusing on people, their ideologies, and the international political environment, Rapley considers Esperanto as a social movement through which he elucidates cultural and societal connectivity among European and Japanese intellectuals and social activists in the 1920s and 1930s. While Japanese social movements, inclusive of liberalism, communism, and labor movement, were influenced by and connected with overseas countries, the second chapter by Hiroe Saruya applies this

basic understanding to discuss transnationality in the post-1945 peace movement in Japan. As an example, she delves into the history of the transnational networks of the antinuclear movement, which were very significant in Japan and in the world from the 1950s. The importance of Saruya's chapter is not only because it shows us the Japanese antinuclear movement in the global historical context, but also because her work illuminates the historical present of today's antinuclear movement, which has become widely active in Japan and elsewhere in the world since the Fukushima nuclear disaster of March 2011. The third chapter by Kelly Dietz examines issues of political identity in Okinawan anti-base politics by highlighting ethnicity or indigeneity as core to this identity. It critically articulates liberalistic notions of civic identity, which are arguably dominant in Okinawan anti-base politics. Yet Dietz does not merely characterizes the current trends in the local political identity, she considers this identity as a key that enables Okinawan anti-base politics to be connected with other ethnic minorities who have been conducting social activism inside and outside Japan such as Ainu, ethnic Koreans in Japan (or so-called *Zainichi* Koreans), the Chamorro people in Guam, and those in the Philippines and South Korea. By analyzing the historical consciousness of activists in Okinawa and other places, Dietz theorizes people-to-people connectivity that transcends national and cultural boundaries in order to challenge "empires" in Japan and further afield in the Asia and the Pacific region.

Notes

1. German Chancellor Angela Merkel described the nuclear emergency as a "turning point for the entire world" and quickly moved to shut down operational nuclear power plants in Germany, see: Spiegel Online, "Out of Control: Merkel Gambles Credibility with Nuclear U-Turn," <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/out-of-control-merkel-gambles-credibility-with-nuclear-u-turn-a-752163.html> [Accessed 21–04–2014].
2. Interestingly, Young revealed a regional bias in these recent works toward the former sphere of influence of the Japanese Empire in East Asia, noting that "transnational projects look at Japanese in China, Koreans in Japan, Chinese and Koreans in Manchuria," in Louise Young, "Introduction: Japan's New International History," in *The American Historical Review* 119 no. 4 (2014): 1119.
3. Pierre-Yves Saunier, *Transnational History* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillian, 2013), pp. 1–3.
4. Prasenjit Duara, "Transnationalism and the Challenge to National Histories," in *Rethinking American History in a Global Age*, ed. Thomas Bender (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).

5. Bernhard Struck, Kate Ferris, and Jacques Revel, "Introduction: Space and Scale in Transnational History," *The International History Review* 33, no. 4 (2011): 573.
6. Ian Tyrrell, "American Exceptionalism in an Age of International History," *American Historical Review* 96, no. 4 (1991): 1031–72.
7. Saunier, *Transnational History*, p. 27.
8. Organization of American Historians, Thelen, D., "Rethinking History and the Nation-State: Mexico and the United States as a Case Study: Special Issue," *The Journal of American History* 86, no. 3 (1999); Thomas Bender, ed., *Rethinking American History in a Global Age* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).
9. For example, see: Ann Curthoys and Marilyn Lake, eds., *Connected Worlds: History in Transnational Perspective* (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2005); Sharon Crozier-De Rosa and David Lowe, "Nationalism and Transnationalism in Australian Historical Writing," *History Australia* 10, no. 3 (2013): 7–11.
10. Struck, Ferris, and Revel, "Introduction: Space and Scale in Transnational History," pp. 573–84. In French the seminal work of Gérard Noiriel together with, for example, Roger Cartier are good examples of this trend. See Gérard Noiriel, *La tyrannie du national: Le droit d'asile en Europe 1793–1993* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1991); Roger Chartier, "La conscience de la globalité (commentaire)," *Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales* 56, no. 1 (2001). In the Ibero-American scholarly world, we can mention the seminal work of Carmen De la Guarda and Juan Pan-Montojo, "Reflexiones sobre una historia transnacional," *Studia historica. Historia contemporánea* 16 (1998); the work done in Colombia by Hugo Fazio Vengoa, "La historia global y su conveniencia para el estudio del pasado y del presente," in *Historia Crítica Edición Especial* (Bogotá: 2009); and the volume edited by Chilean scholars Fernando Purcell and Alfredo Riquelme, eds., *Ampliando miradas. Chile y su historia en un tiempo global* (Santiago: RIL Editores, 2009), among others. As discussed below, in the Japanese context, these early attempts overcome nation-centric history focused on the deconstruction of the central ideological tenets of Japanese nationalism rather than attempting to place the nation within its wider international and transnational context.
11. Akira Iriya and Pierre-Yves Saunier, eds., *The Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History: From the Mid-19th Century to the Present Day* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
12. Benedetto Croce, *Teoria e storia della storiografia*, 1920 ed. (Bari: Gius, Laterza & Figli, 1916), p. 4.
13. Erez Manela, "International Society as a Historical Subject," (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University, 2013).
14. Akira Iriye, "A Transnational Turn in the Study of History," in *Ca'Foscari International Lectures* (Italy: Universita Ca'Foscari Venezia, 2012). This lecture can be seen at <https://youtu.be/qI27UqVXHbM> [accessed on March 12, 2015].
15. Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi, 1984 ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1979).
16. Lyotard, *La posmodernindad (explicada a los niños)*, trans. Enrique Lynch, 2003 ed. (Barcelona: Gedisa Editorial, 1986).

17. Duara, "Transnationalism and the Challenge to National Histories"; Barbara Weinstein, "Pensando la historia más allá de la nación: la historiografía de américa latina y la perspective transnacional," *Aletheia* 3, no. 6 (2013).
18. Thomas Bender, "Introduction. Historians, the Nation, and the Plenitude of Narratives," in *Rethinking American History in a Global Age*, ed. Thomas Bender (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).
19. C. A. Bayly et al., "AHR Conversation: On Transnational History," *American Historical Review* 111, no. 5 (2006).
20. Harry Harootunian, *History's Disquiet: Modernity, Cultural Practices, and the Question of Everyday Life* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000). Some exceptions (that prove the rule) are works that have attempted to bridge the gap between various national histories such as: NiChuKan Sankoku Kyōtsū Rekishi Kyōzai Iinkai, *Mirai wo hiraku rekishi: Nihon, Chūgoku, Kankoku kyōdō henshū higashi Ajia sankoku no kingendaishi* (Tokyo: Kōbunken, 2006).
21. Sebastian Conrad, *The Quest for the Lost Nation: Writing History in Germany and Japan in the American Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), p. 2.
22. Erez Manela, in contrast to traditional approaches to international history, has introduced the idea of an international society as a subject of historical inquiry. See Manela, "International Society as a Historical Subject."
23. Akira Iriye, "Internationalizing International History," in *Rethinking American History in a Global Age*, ed. Bender Thomas (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).
24. For a good example of global history that covers an expansive timeframe and embraces the totality of the world, see: Andre Gunder Frank, *ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age* (Berkley: University of California Press, 1998).
25. Bayly et al., "AHR Conversation: On Transnational History."
26. Ian Tyrrell, "Reflections on the Transnational Turn in United States History: Theory and Practice," *Journal of Global Studies*, 4 (2009): 458.
27. Lisa A. Lindsay, "The Appeal of Transnational History," *Perspectives on History* 2012.
28. Mae M. Ngai, "Promises and Perils of Transnational History," *Perspectives on History* 2012.
29. Bayly et al., "AHR Conversation: On Transnational History."
30. Ibid.
31. Lindsay, "The Appeal of Transnational History."
32. De la Guarda and Pan-Montojo, "Reflexiones sobre una historia transnacional." For a consideration of the experience of Japanese Marxism and West German social history, see: Sebastian Conrad, *The Quest for the Lost Nation*.
33. Bayly et al., "AHR Conversation: On Transnational History."
34. Sugimoto Yoshio and Ross Mouer, *Nihonjin wa "Nihonteki" ka* (Tokyo: Tōyō Keizai Shinpōsha, 1982); Sugimoto Yoshio and Ross Mouer, *Nihonjinron no hōkeishiki* (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1995).
35. Indeed, the transnational historical approach played a significant role challenging the Japanese version of historical revisionism, or the so-called

Liberal View of History Study Group (*jiyūshugi-shikan kenkyūkai*), which emerged after the end of Cold War in the Atlantic Ocean and Europe.

36. Amino Yoshihiko, *Nihonron no shiza: Rettō no shakai to kokka* (Tokyo: Shogakukan, 1990) and *"Nihon" to wa nanika* (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2000); and Oguma Eiji, *Tan'itsu minzoku shinwa no kigen –"Nihonjin" no jigazō no keifu* (Tokyo: Shinyōsha, 1995).
37. Carol Gluck, Sanjung Kan, and Tessa Morris-Susuki, eds, *Nihon wa doko e ikunoka: Nihon no rekishi* (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2003).
38. Sakai Tetsuya et al., ed. *"Teikoku" Nihon no gakuchi* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2006). Akita Shigeru and Momoki Shirō, eds. *Rekishigaku no furonntia: Chiiki kara naosu kokumin kokka shikan* (Osaka: Osaka Daigaku Shuppankai, 2008); Akita Shigeru and Momoki Shirō, eds. *Gurōbaru hisutorii to teikoku* (Osaka: Osaka Daigaku Shuppanakai, 2013).
39. Tony Ballantyne and Antoinette Burton, "Empires and the Reach of the Global," in *A World Connecting*, ed., Emily S. Rosenberg (Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2012); Durba Ghosh and Dane Kennedy, eds, *Decentring Empire: Britain, India and the Transcolonial World* (Hyderabad: Orient Longman, 2006); C. A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914: Global Connections and Comparisons* (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2004).
40. Yasuhisa Shimizu, "Nijū seiki shotō Nihon no teikoku shugi ron," *Hikaku Shakai Bunka* 6 (2000): 1–17.
41. On the importance of the concept of "civilization" for legitimacy and full membership in the international community prior to the age of decolonization, see: Gerrit W. Gong, *The Standard of 'Civilization' in International Society* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984). For the centrality of "civilization" to international law during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see: Wilhelm G. Grewe, *The Epochs of International Law*, trans. Michael Byers (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2000), part four, Chapter 2. On the entwinement of the idea of "civilization" in the legitimation of European imperial projects see: Brett Bowden, *The Empire of Civilization: The Evolution of an Imperial Idea* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009).
42. On the entwinement of notions of pan-Asianism and Japan's challenge to the regional order from the late 1930s see: Masafumi Yonetani, *Ajia / Nihon: Shikō no furonteia* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2006), section 2, Chapter 2. Recently, Prasenjit Duara has presented this type of imperialism based on formally independent states, the creation of which the authors of the Co-Prosperity Sphere claimed as their goal, as "new imperialism" and has argued that it was exhibited in the foreign policies of the Soviet Union, the United States, and Japan. See Duara, Prasenjit, "Nationalism, Imperialism, Federalism and the Example of Manchukuo," *Common Knowledge* 12, no. 1 (2006): 47–65.
43. Stoler and Cooper influentially argued in 1997 that "Europe's colonies were never empty spaces to be made over in Europe's image or fashioned in its interests; nor, indeed, were European states self-contained entities that at one point projected themselves overseas. Europe was made by its imperial projects, as much as colonial encounters were shaped by conflicts within European itself." See: Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper, "Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda," in

Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World, ed. Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Copper (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), pp. 1–56.

44. Tomoko Akami, "The Nation-State/Empire as a Unit of Analysis in the History of International Relations: A Case Study in Northeast Asia, 1868–1933," in *The Nation State and Beyond: Governing Globalization Processes in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries*, ed. Isabella Löhr and Roland Wenzlhuemer (Heidelberg: Springer, 2013), p. 177. Also see: Akami, "The Nexus of the Nation-State and the Empire: Reconsidering the League's Order and Japan in the Inter-War Period," in *Japan and the UN in International Politics: Historical Perspectives*, ed. Asahiko Hanzawa (Hokkaido: Hokkaido University, 2007), pp. 33–84.
45. For recent examples of the "transwar" perspective in Japanese history see: Andrew Gordon, "Consumption, Leisure and the Middle Class in Transwar Japan," *Social Science Japan Journal* 10, no. 1 (2007): 1–21; Karashima Masato, *Teikoku Nihon no Ajia kenkyū: Sōryokusen taisei/keizai riarizumu/minshu shakaishugi* (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2015).
46. Weinstein, "Pensando la historia más allá de la nación: La historiografía de América Latina y la perspectiva transnacional."
47. Bayly et al., "AHR Conversation: On Transnational History."
48. Adam McKeown, "Global Migration, 1846–1940," *Journal of World History* 15, no. 2 (2004): 180.
49. Eiichiro Azuma, "The Politics of Transnational History Making Japanese Immigrants on the Western 'Frontier,' 1927–1941," *The Journal of American History* 89, no. 4 (2003).
50. Christiane Harzig, Dirk Hoerder, and Donna Gabaccia, *What Is Migration History?* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), p. 129.
51. Kei Tanaka, "Japanese Picture Marriage and the Image of Immigrant Women in Early Twentieth-Century California," *The Japanese Journal of American Studies* 15 (2004).
52. For Japanese migrants as agent in Korea see Jun Uchida, *Brokers of Empire: Japanese Settler Colonialism in Korea 1876–1945* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2011). For repatriation movement see Lori Watt, *When Empire Comes Home* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009). And for postwar Korean migrants see Tessa Morris-Suzuki, *Borderline Japan: Foreigners and Frontier Controls in the Postwar Era* (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
53. Charles Tilly, "Social Movements and National Politics," in *State Making and Social Movements*, ed. C. Bright and S. Harding (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1984), p. 306.
54. As basic texts to follow the changing nature of social movements, see, for example, Alain Touraine, *The Voice and the Eye: An Analysis of Social Movements* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Alberto Melucci, *Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
55. It should also be noted that there were other currents leading transnationalism in different trajectories around the turn of the century. While political scientists such as Sidney Tarrow and others tended to regard the nation as a basic entity and transnationalism as an alternative framework for a comparative approach, anthropologist Arjun Appadurai has

highlighted grassroots social activism as a crucial site of reference to consider contemporary transnational politics. This argument enables us to see the political terrain of globalization from the perspective of people's everyday life through the notion of "production of locality." Appadurai has examined the influence of transnationality in terms of a complex set of local politics, society, and culture that often transgresses geopolitical demarcation of the nation-state. Sidney Tarrow, *The New Transnational Activism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Also, see for example, Donatella Della Porta, *Globalization from Below: Transnational Activism and Protest Network* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2006); Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).

56. Paul Gilroy, *Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1993); Robin D. G. Kelley, *Freedom Dreams: The Black Radical Imagination* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2003).
57. Vijay Prashad, *Everybody Was Kung Fu Fighting: Afro-Asian Connections and the Myth of Cultural Purity* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2002); *The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World* (The New Press, 2008).
58. Leela Gandhi, *Affective Communities: Anticolonial Thought, Fin-De-Siècle Radicalism, and the Politics of Friendship* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006).
59. Jennifer Chan, ed. *Another Japan Is Possible: New Social Movements and Global Citizenship Education* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2008); Chikanobu Michiba, *Teikou no dōjidaishi: Gunjika to neoriberarizumu ni kōsite* (Tokyo: Jinbunshoin, 2008).
60. Hideaki Uemura, Makiko Kimura, and Yoshikazu Shiobara, eds., *Shimin no gaikou: Senjūminzoku to ayunda 30 nen* (Hōseidaigaku Shuppankyoku, 2013).
61. Yuichiro Onishi, *Transpacific Antiracism: Afro-Asian Solidarity in 20th-Century Black America, Japan, and Okinawa* (New York: NYU Press, 2013); Naoki Sakai, ed. *The Trans-Pacific Imagination: Rethinking Boundary, Culture, and Society* (Singapore: Hackensack, 2013).
62. Tessa Morris-Suzuki, *Henkyō kara no nagame* (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō, 2000); Simon Avenell, "The Borderless Archipelago: Toward a Transnational History of Japanese Environmentalism," *Environment and History* 19 (2013).

1

Regionalism or Imperialism: Japan's Options toward a Protected Korea after the Russo-Japanese War, 1905–10

Toyomi Asano

Scholarly and public interest in the history of empires continues to become more widespread, not only in Europe and the United States, but also in Japan. A specific trait of Japan's imperial history is that it is often associated negatively with the current idea of East Asian regionalism. Historically, empire-building based upon transnational human and institutional connections had its own dynamism and was pushed by the structure of international norms in each era. This chapter argues that Japan's annexation of Korea in 1910 was an outcome of the failure of Japan's protectorate policies, which had been an alternative historical option, a confederative regionalist project that was a kind of softly constructed empire-building.[1]

To examine this hypothesis, this chapter focuses on the most important political issue during the protectorate era in Korea: the abolition of the extraterritorial rights of Western and Japanese nationals who had mainly lived in the treaty ports and big cities in Korea (1905–10). At the time of the inauguration of Japan's protectorate over Korea in 1905, the foreign nationals who enjoyed extraterritoriality in Korea were those from the United Kingdom, the United States, Russia, France, Germany, Qing China, and Japan. Foreigners other than Japanese citizens accounted for only 13,109 people in June 1909, 94 percent of whom were Chinese. Meanwhile, the number of Japanese citizens in Korea was 42,460 at the end of 1905, when the Russo-Japanese War ended.[2] The following year, this number nearly doubled to 81,754.[3] The Japanese population grew from over 100,000 in 1907 to 130,000 in 1908, finally growing to 150,000 the next year.[4] The number at the end of 1910, when the annexation of Korea was completed, reached 171,453.[5] That is, the number almost doubled

during the period between 1905 and 1910. This number stood in contrast to 153 Britons, 464 Americans, and a total of 777 Western foreigners in 1909. This small number of Western foreigners consisted of 256 missionaries (almost one-third of the total), mining technicians, trading merchants, and others,[6] which was nevertheless approximately ten times higher than the number of Westerners in Taiwan at the time of Japanese control.[7]

Though the number of Western and Japanese nationals was small compared with the Korean population, it was decisively important when the Japanese government tried to introduce into Korea, and link with those of Japan, modern governmental institutions, laws, and judicial systems. In fact, in the thinking of some key Japanese leaders, such transnational institutions were supposed to support a confederacy between the two countries. However, until the abolishment of extraterritoriality, all foreigners, including Japanese, were regarded as "civilized," unlike Koreans: protected by extraterritoriality from Korean sovereignty and immune from both taxation and arrest by the Korean government. To make Korea "a prosperous and strong nation," as was advocated formally in the protection treaty in November 1905 between Korea and Japan, foreign extraterritoriality had to be abolished. In this sense, the domestic legal and judicial systems, which were controlled by the Korean government at least until July 1907 when a reformed protection treaty was ratified, were important tools in persuading Western and Japanese nationals to accept the abolition of extraterritoriality. However, domestic authority for reforming the judicial system and law belonged to the Korean government until July 1907, while foreign diplomacy had been controlled by Japan since November 1905.

To understand the historical dynamism of the protectorate era from a transnational perspective, it is critically important to understand the correlation between Japan's foreign policy for the abolishment of extraterritoriality and the domestic administration responsible for arranging the legal system, which had been exclusively under the charge of the Korean government until 1907, as noted. The case of modern Japan had been an ideal model of this correlation. When Japan entered into the modern interstate system, its domestic legal system, which was controlled by the Diet, was of vital significance in determining its status in diplomatic negotiations that were under the charge of cabinets. To be admitted into the family of "civilized nations," Japan had to adopt a legal and judicial system learnt from the West through cooperation between

the Diet and the cabinet.[8] This domestic legal reform, which was civilized enough to be recognized by Britain, led to diplomatic success in 1899 with the abolition of extraterritoriality in Japan. This meant that Japan was now formally recognized as a sovereign territorial power protecting Western "civilized people's" lives and property within its national borders.

In the same way, when Japan attempted to reform Korea's legal and judicial systems under the first protection treaty in 1905, the Japanese government needed to persuade the Western civilized nations and Japanese residents in Korea to accept the new systems. Protecting the lives and property of these civilized nationals was essential for success; however, this obligation was still the responsibility of the Korean government. Thus, Japanese leaders believed that legal reform in Korea was indispensable and that it must be completed via good relations between Japan and Korea.

Furthermore, there was another reason why the territorial expansion of the Japanese Empire needed to be accompanied by the expansion of civilized legal and judicial systems. While Western empires expanded into so-called unsettled lands, the Japanese Empire expanded into an East Asia controlled by the Western treaty port system. Under this treaty port system, to protect civilized people's lives and property, extraterritoriality allowing for Western state sovereignty over its nationals who resided in settlements in the treaty ports was supposed to be necessary. In Korea, however, this was finally to be substituted by the Japanese Empire's civilized legal and judicial systems.

This expansion of the Japanese Empire, in turn, provided a unique historical opportunity for alternative empire-building, that is, an alternative based upon regionally divided legal units with transnational and interregional legal coordination. Indeed, the extension of the imperial legal system to each dependent society served as an instrument for imperial Japan to control its peripheries, such as Taiwan, Korea, and Manchuria.[9] Although Manchukuo (Japan's puppet state in Manchuria) was never legitimated internationally, Japan tried to convince the major powers to recognize this state as a new sovereign unit by arranging its legal system in the same way as Japan did in its Korean protectorate, as will be shown in the last part of this chapter. Thus, Japan's elder statesmen, including Itō Hirobumi who became the first resident-general of Korea (1906–9), regarded imperial judicial reform as a powerful tool for abolishing extraterritoriality and a means to win international recognition

both for making a new sovereign Korea and for Japan's imperial expansion.

However, this interregional legal coordination to institutionalize the transnational flow of human groups took several forms. By highlighting the process of abolishing extraterritoriality and forming a legal and judicial system in protected Korea, this chapter will describe what kind of regional combination, whether a confederacy or an empire, was supposed to be constructed at each stage of the political process and how the political concept of a regional union was transformed into annexation as time progressed. Furthermore, even for the concept of annexation itself, there existed several different potential types under the same term.

Previous studies have interpreted Japan's protectorate over Korea only as a prelude to its colonization. This chapter argues that the protectorate was not intended to be the preparatory stage toward annexation; on the contrary, Korea's colonization was a result of the failure of Japan's protectorate policy.

The basic historical facts concerning the protectorate era can be arranged as follows.[10] The Second Japan-Korea Convention was signed in November 1905 and was followed by the installation of the office of the residency-general in Korea in February the next year.[11] Itō Hirobumi had been one of the revolutionary elites in the Meiji era and the leading figure in Japan's own adoption of the so-called civilized legal and constitutional system in the 1880s.[12] In his capacity as the resident-general, Itō tried to overcome the extraterritorialities of the foreign powers in Korea by extending some of Japan's laws to Korea and by combining the Japanese and Korean judicial systems, making new institutions for a transnational association between Japan and Korea. He also believed that this peculiar merging of two sovereignties was different from annexation, regarding it as a kind of confederation between the two countries that preserved Korea's statehood.

To understand the dynamism of the political process of the protectorate era, it is important to take note of the influence of the Japanese settlers, which eventually caused the failure of Itō's project. We may identify several other reasons in the interaction of international and local factors, but, among them, the political posture of the Japanese residents in Korea played a key role, as is argued below. Japanese residents in Korea strongly opposed Itō's policies to transform the Korean protectorate into a "friendly nation" confederated with Japan. These grassroots Japanese transnational actors formed into an association and resisted the concept of regional confederation because the

abolition of their extraterritorial rights would place them on an equal footing with Koreans, whom they regarded as uncivilized. Moreover, such a scheme would also have abrogated their immunity from taxation by the Korean government.[13]

By analyzing this dynamic political process by which the system of extraterritoriality was finally partially abolished through negotiations with the United States and Britain, including also an examination of the social structure of Japanese residents in Korea, we may unravel the complex process of the transition from Japan's protectorate over Korea to the subsequent annexation of Korea. Doing so allows us to become detached from contemporary political debates over colonial history, which are usually pervaded by national sentiments.

Extraterritoriality in the Korean Protectorate as an International Issue

One important reason why the abolition of extraterritoriality had been regarded as a main purpose of Japanese policies under the Second Japan-Korea Convention of November 1905 was because international influence was still strong even under the Japanese protection system. Japan made much of cooperation with the Western powers in administrating Korea following the end of the Russo-Japanese War. Japan's leaders, including Itō, saw it as a matter of course that the Japanese protectorate over Korea did not imply the abolition of Korea's former diplomatic relations with other third-party states. They shared an understanding with the other major powers that "third nations shall retain the same position as before [the establishment of the protectorate] with regard to extraterritoriality [including] immunity from taxation and conventional cheap tariffs, which influence Western merchant's trade with Korea."[14] In fact, though Britain and the United States recognized Japan's "paramount" political, military, and economic status in Korea before the Portsmouth Peace Treaty in the Second Agreement of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (August 12, 1905) and the Taft-Katsura Agreement (July 29, 1905) respectively, these agreements did not imply the renunciation of extraterritorial rights, non-arrest privileges, and tax-free privileges enjoyed by the citizens of the Western powers living in Korea.[15]

The Portsmouth Treaty, while including Russian acknowledgment of Japan's superior position in Korea, also contained a controversial point regarding the status of Russian citizens. Russia, even following defeat in the war against Japan, continued to exercise extraterritorial rights in Korea because the Peace Treaty guaranteed

most-favoured-nation treatment for Russian citizens in Korea. The first sentence of Article 2 of the Treaty stated that Russia acknowledged Japan's "paramount political, military, and economic interests" in Korea and authorized the Japanese government to take "measures for guidance, protection, and control which the Imperial Government of Japan may find necessary" toward the Korean government. This was, however, followed by a sentence in the middle of the same article, prescribing that "Russian subjects in Korea shall be treated in exactly the same manner as the subjects and citizens of other foreign powers" and that "they shall be placed on the same footing as the subjects and citizens of the most favoured nation."[16] By these arrangements, citizens of third-party states, such as Russia, Britain, and the United States, continued to enjoy extraterritorial rights.[17] This ambiguity made Japan's relations with Russia, Britain, and the United States tense even under the Japanese protectorate.[18]

The maintenance of Korean independence and the abolition of extraterritoriality, therefore, were regarded as the most important goals of Japan's protectorate policy. In this context, how to install a new legal system in Korea became a touchstone for Japan, which faced two alternatives—either modernizing Korea as an independent nation, confederated or somehow united with Japan by transnational institutions and accepted by the international community, or colonizing Korea by expanding Japan's formal empire legally and risking to evoke mistrust toward Japan from the Western powers.

In fact, in the Second Japan–Korea Convention (November 1905), the issue of extraterritoriality was formally arranged. The convention provided that Japan would "supervise and instruct foreign affairs" in Korea (Article 1) and "implement the treaties existing between Korea and other nations" (Article 2).[19] Here, the phrase "implement the treaties" meant that Japan assumed responsibility for the maintenance of the extraterritorial rights of foreigners and the conventional tariffs in Korea. In April 1906, when Japan's Cabinet Council decided the basic line for its protectorate policy in Korea, ministers were also aware that Japan would "seise jurisdiction over foreigners in the future by installing an appropriate legal system in Korea."[20] Thus, the abolition of the extraterritorial rights of Western foreigners and Japanese was formally incorporated into Japan's policy goals at the time of the formation of its protectorate over Korea. However, the simultaneous abolishment of extraterritoriality for both Westerners and Japanese would make Japanese simple foreigners, with the same legal status as Westerners. Thus, how to form a confederacy in which the Japanese in Korea had some sort of special status became a new issue.

Moreover, at the time of Japan's protectorate over Korea, Japan was still bound by its own unequal treaties concerning tariff autonomy until as late as 1911, when a series of new commercial treaties was ratified to restore Japan's sovereignty over customs administration. Yet it is true that the endeavor to restore Japan's sovereignty over customs did induce some Japanese leaders to push for the annexation of Korea.[21] In 1909, the Cabinet Council expressed an opinion concerning conventional tariffs and saw it "better to conclude a necessary agreement [with Korea] in case of the treaty revision between the Empire of Japan and the family of nations in the future." In other words, Japanese politicians preferred that the Korean protectrate should be strengthened in the context of Japanese reformation of the unequal treatties over tariffs.[22] Indeed, as the possession of Taiwan was coupled with the revision of Japan's unequal treaties with the Western powers under Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu in 1898 leading to the end of extraterritoriality in Japan, the annexation of Korea was followed by a similar revision of Japan's unequal tariff treaties under Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō in 1911.

Furthermore, the fact that Korea became Japan's protectorate with its diplomatic powers transferred to Japanese control did not automatically restrain the Americans and the British in their dealings with Korea. Though both countries responded to the establishment of the protectorate by downgrading their diplomatic representation in Korea from ambassadorship to consulship, with their diplomats reassigned to their embassies in Tokyo, this was merely a voluntary action by the United States and Britain. Resident-General Itō expressed his opinion that the great powers still reserved the rights to communicate and conduct diplomacy with Korea.[23] In other words, even though Japan managed to deprive Korea of diplomatic rights, Japan could not force the Western powers to abandon their right to have unilateral diplomatic contacts with Korea. Itō also warned the then Prime Minister Saionji Kinmochi that "[the protectorate treaty] does not guarantee [the powers] not reinstalling their embassies [in Seoul]." [24]

Itō also mentioned that domestic reforms in the Korean protectorate were important not only for domestic security but also for maintaining relations with areas surrounding Korea. As the Portsmouth Treaty prescribed the demilitarization of the Russo-Korean border, Japan could not relocate troops from Korea's interior to the borderlands even to liquidate the revolt of the anti-Japanese righteous armies (Ŭibyŏng). The rebels were ex-soldiers of the army of the former Korean dynasty, which was dissolved according to the Third Japan–Korea Agreement of 1907. Since then, these soldiers were scattered

throughout Korea for protesting against the Japanese protectorate and had started rebelling as the righteous armies. Itō did not fear the righteous armies' military potential per se, but was concerned about the revolt's impact on international relations, especially in regard to such locations as the Korean–Russian border. Also, he feared that the rebellion, caused by those whom he called "the Korean mobs," would possibly be "recognised as a civil war" and that foreign powers would declare neutrality and acknowledge "the mobs" as a belligerent party, which was eventually advocated by Itō's assassin, An Jung-geun himself in 1909.[25]

Itō's caution was also caused by his concern about the international financial market that was funding Japan's protectorate policy in Korea.[26] During the Russo-Japanese War, while the British government remained reluctant to credit Japan, merchant banks in London and New York cooperated with the Japanese government to sell war bonds. After the war, money procured from the financial market in London was lent to the Korean government via the Japanese government. Among these loans was the "Second Entrepreneurial Finance Bond" issued by the Industrial Bank of Japan in the fiscal year of 1908–9, totaling 20 million yen and sold in Britain and France, with the money accumulated being borrowed by the Korean government. When the bonds were released to the financial market, because of the relatively high interest rate that was derived from Japan's country-risk, capitalists in Britain and France competed to apply for them.[27] For the Japanese government, this money procured from the financial markets in Britain and France was to be invested in "those projects agreeable to everyone" to strengthen Korea's financial basis, such as water services and other sorts of infrastructure, as well as a real estate survey.[28]

Thus, it proved impossible, at least for the time being, to annex Korea into the Japanese formal empire without making good on these investments and gaining the consents of the Western powers, from which Japan derived its finances. Another important goal had to be making Korea a "rich and strong" country as was defined in the protection treaty. Thus, the abolition of extraterritoriality had to be made acceptable to the Western powers due to its effect upon strengthening Korea's wealth and power. Itō responded to this challenge by attempting to convert Korea into a "Japan-friendly" (*yūhō*) nation united with Japan in a kind of confederacy, which meant, in practice, the continuation of Japanese residents' special status in Korea even after the abolishment of extraterritoriality. To understand the concept of "friendly nation," which is related to the concept of

"confederation" (*kyōdō*), the real process of abolishing extraterritoriality in Korea through reforming its legal and judicial system must be examined.

Abolishing the United States' Extraterritoriality in Protected Korea

The issue of abolishing extraterritoriality in Korea was initiated by the United States during its negotiations with Japan concerning the legal system for dealing with the intellectual property of US merchants on the peninsula. In the name of the then Assistant Secretary of State Robert Bacon, through the ambassador in Tokyo, the United States proposed diplomatic negotiations in June 1906 on the protection of industrial property in Korea and Qing China.[29]

At that time, the United States had just finished installing a special court, distinct from the American counsels, for its citizens in China, Japan, and Korea.[30] Washington had also adopted an approach of relaxing international tensions with Japan over the issue of the exclusion of Japanese children in San Francisco Public Schools and the American war of conquest in the Philippines. They did this while linking the political principle of equality of opportunity under the Open Door policy with an actual expansion of trade with China.[31]

Secretary of the Army and future president, William Howard Taft, toured the Far East twice, including Japan, in 1905 and 1907 as part of his policy to translate the Open Door principle into an actual expansion of trade, a model for the Dollar Diplomacy during his presidency after 1909. During his visit to Japan at the end of September 1907, Taft made a speech at the Japan Chamber of Commerce after an interview with Foreign Minister Hayashi Tadasu.[32] In it, he expressed an opinion that, with regard to trading with "undeveloped nations," long-term instability was causing a disruption in the trade order and therefore strong nations needed to aid in their progress and welfare in the name of "justice and civilization." In effect, this speech reaffirmed the raison d'être of Japan's protectorate over Korea. US support for Japan's protectorate over Korea was based upon the expectation of expanding US trade in Asia under a cooperative relationship with Japan. And the US proposal for abolishing extraterritoriality in Korea only in the field of industrial property could be regarded as a part of this mixture of expectations.

In deliberating on how to respond, two Americans hired by the Japanese government as advisers put forward several proposals. Henry Willard Denison and Durham White Stevens, who had served

as diplomatic counselors for Japan's treaty revision negotiations since the 1880s, were invited by the Japanese Foreign Ministry and the Residency-General Agency to the negotiations. Denison exerted an important influence on the Japanese government with his opinions regarding the Korean protectorate. Denison agreed with the US proposal for negotiations over the industrial property issue only as a positive step toward the general abolition in future of all extraterritoriality for Americans in Korea. According to him, the creation of a legal system for the protection of industrial property in the Korean protectorate offered an opportunity to improve Japan's international prestige as a civilized nation with "an acclamation as a protector of authentic trademarks" for "the healthy advancement of commerce." He believed that by seizing this opportunity, Japan would be able to realize the first case of circumventing extraterritoriality in Korea, no matter how partial and specific to the category of industrial property it might be.[33]

Denison's basic argument was that the nature of the legal system regarding the protection of trademarks was such that no two systems could coexist within one country.[34] To create a system that would enable Japan to take charge of the protection of industrial property as a civilized nation, it was deemed necessary to register trademarks at a single administrative agency in Korea according to a single law based on territorial sovereignty. But, in accordance with the treaty of 1905, such domestic administration was under the authority of the Korean government, at least until July 1907, while diplomatic power belonged to Japan. Because of this, a ratified new treaty was regarded as a powerful tool to construct a joint administrative institution as required by the territorial principle. Indeed, what worried Denison most was a scenario in which "the judges of both nations concerned might assert jurisdiction over a trademark case involving their citizens and deliver justice in accordance with their own laws." This would create "discordance" due to the conflict of the industrial property laws of each nation and the disunity of court jurisdiction, which would make it impossible to "realise our wish to ensure the trademarks protection at all."[35]

The detailed process of the US–Japan negotiations concerning this issue cannot be delved into in this chapter. In any case, immediately before the Hague Secret Emissary Affair in July 1907, at the meeting of the Corporative Council for Administrative Reform with Korean cabinet ministers on June 25, 1907, Itō reported that the US–Japan negotiations regarding industrial property were in progress with Japan guaranteeing the enactment of the concerned Japanese laws in Korea

in exchange for a US promise to abolish extraterritoriality. In Itō's explanation to Korean cabinet members it was argued that in the case of abolishing extraterritoriality in Japan proper in 1898, the enacted laws were necessary to protect industrial property and that the institutions used to register and execute them, such as the Patent Office, were also indispensable. Justice courts were also needed to handle all industrial property related cases. Itō explained to the Korean ministers that these lessons should be repeated in Korea under Japanese protection, because the United States was willing to rely on Japan's "facilities and institutions for the protection of American industrial property" in Korea and accept the abolition of extraterritoriality in that legal field.

Further, on the grounds of Japan's experience in the treaty revision negotiations in the 1880s, Itō emphasized the importance of the development of legal codes and a judiciary system for Korea's domestic affairs. Here, Itō clarified that Korea should simply "reply to Japan noting that it had no objection to the use of Japan's laws and courts for the protection of this [industrial property] until the completion of Korea's [own] laws." This statement regarded the implementation of Japan's laws in Korea as no more than a tentative measure.[36] And the transfer of Korean court jurisdiction to Japanese consular courts in Korea was yet to be fulfilled, with the Korean court system installed in August 1908. But this agreement can be regarded as a starting point both of the extension of Japanese laws to Korea and of the absorbing of Korean jurisdiction into Japan as a means to abolish extraterritoriality.

At this time Itō emphasized further that these legal reforms would also be quite convenient in realizing the total abolition of extraterritoriality in the future if, even with the Japanese laws used, a part of Korean legal sovereignty was recovered from the foreign nations, including Japan. In this context, an often-repeated statement, that one could only be a truly independent and sovereign country without extraterritoriality, was laid out.[37]

After the the Hague Secret Emissary Affair in 1907, with the Resident-General's authority confirmed further on domestic issues, on August 13, 1908, the imperial ordinances on Patents in Korea (No. 196), on Industrial Designs (No. 197), on Trademarks (No. 198), on Trade Names (No. 199), and on Copyrights (No. 200), were promulgated as the ordinances receiving the respectively concerned Japanese laws. At almost the same time in August, a Korean court system was installed to be responsible for all civil and criminal cases among Koreans, except those related to industrial property issues. For example, the

ordinance on Patents was a very simple order for both Koreans and all foreigners who surrendered their extraterritoriality. Article 1 provided for the "reception" of the Japanese domestic law regarding patents in Korea with a few clauses to be replaced regarding supervising agencies and the scope of coverage while Article 2 stipulated the application of the ordinance also for the citizens of the countries that agreed to the abolition of extraterritoriality.[38]

Another imperial ordinance issued during the same period also set in motion the preparation for the foundation of the Patent Office in the Residency-General Agency to enforce this provision.[39] A document that Vice Residency-General Sone Arasuke sent to Foreign Minister Terauchi Masatake on the eve of the promulgation of these ordinances reconfirmed that it was unnecessary to create a Korean law to cover affairs between Koreans alone. Here, we can see the consolidation of the model for the abolition of extraterritoriality for the citizens of other civilized nations by the extension of Japanese domestic laws to Korea as also applicable to the Koreans through an official note as well as by Japan's exercising court jurisdiction over all residents including Koreans at least in the legal field of industrial property. This model came to be applied to all fields of Korean law and jurisdiction in July 1909 when a new treaty was ratified between Korea and Japan to commit the Korean judicature in general to Japan.

However, three factors had shaped the course of events after August 1908 when the Korean court system was installed under Japanese protection based on a Japanese loan to Korea: (1) the financial problems associated with the installation of two legal and jurisdiction systems, those of Korea and Japan; (2) the negative response of the great powers other than the United States (such as Britain and France), whom Japan expected to accept the abolition of extraterritoriality in Korea if limited to the field of industrial property as the United States did; and (3) the decisively antagonistic reactions to these changes by the Japanese residents in Korea. The next section will focus on the last of these factors: Japanese residents in Korea.

Japanese Residents and Extraterritoriality

Itō's strategy was at odds with not only the European powers but also the Japanese residents of Korea. If extraterritoriality was to be abolished in Korea, the most seriously affected group would be none other than its Japanese residents, who made up the majority of foreign residents. The Japanese settlers in Korea can be regarded as a kind of "modern citizen," in contrast to, for example, Russian migrants from

European Russia to East Siberia and the Far East, a significant portion of whom were penal colonists. The Japanese who migrated to Korea were politically conscious as imperial citizens.[40] They even requested a change to the legal status of the Japanese Resident-General of Korea, who had been accountable only to the Emperor, trying to make him practically accountable to the Japanese residents in Korea through the Japanese Diet. Representing the voice of Japanese settlers in Korea, a statement in the House of Representatives by Ōuchi Chōzō criticized the Residency-General in the Imperial Diet:[41]

> What is the Resident-General? He does not represent Japanese residents in Korea. I have to say that it is extremely disgraceful that we bear the Resident-General silently even though he does not fulfill his missions but conducts politics which do not serve Japanese resident's wishes in Korea. If the Resident-General's policies do not make sense, we can mobilise public opinion and replace him . . . Japan is a country of constitutionalism, and a country with public opinion. The Resident-General should act based on Japanese public opinion. But if he does not listen to Japanese public opinion, we have the power to remove the Resident-General, compel him to resign, and reassign an appropriate person to the position [through a responsible cabinet system with the Resident-General included in it].

Japan, which had already become a constitutional state, was vulnerable to this democratizing request. The Japanese settlers in Korea were unhappy to be treated on an equal footing with the "less civilised" Koreans, so they "acted in concert and delivered a staggering blow to the state's infringements upon their autonomy, creating a force so strong as to [become] an issue at the Imperial Diet."[42]

Those Japanese residents who were organized in the "Settler's Association" accounted for almost two-thirds of the total Japanese population in Korea and made up a substantial political force. Even Itō could not simply neglect their demands. Though there were many displaced people and guest laborers who did not participate in the Association, the aggregate of the assets possessed by the Japanese in Korea as of June 1906 reached nearly 20 million yen, which was roughly equivalent to the state budget of Korea in the fiscal year of 1909.[43]

The abolition of extraterritoriality, starting with the taxation of Japanese settlers, was expected to provide the Korean government with significant financial resources for the promotion of

domestic reforms. This situation was met with desperate resistance to the Resident-General from the Japanese residents, whether organized or not, who had been taking advantage of the tax haven situation under extraterritoriality and had most to lose from these changes.

However, Itō's protectorate policy was focused on making Korea a "wealthy and strong" nation with the first step being the introduction of a corporate tax for all foreign firms including the Japanese-owned ones. Itō implemented this policy because of his belief that the eventual goal of the protectorate must be the nurturing of a "wealthy" Korea. Itō expected that an independent, prosperous, and strong Korea would someday emerge as a "friendly nation" to Japan, somehow united together. Itō supposed that legal reform in Korea, following the example of industrial property, including the extension of Korea's sovereignty over civilized foreigners, would generate such a Korea, for which the protectorate was conceived. Itō had also tried to adopt a series of real estate laws and tax codes to be imposed on foreigners' real estates in Korea.

Critics of Itō regarded his policies as not only too severe to Japanese residents but also too indulgent to Western foreigners. As Japanese society developed modern technology and nurtured industrial organizations, it was beneficial for the Japanese to exclude foreign capital from key industries in Korea that had built Korea's industrial infrastructure, such as electricity (American capital), water service (American), and mining (Japanese and American). However, when Itō gave permission to an American company to run gold mines in June 1908, as a gesture of respecting the principle of the economic Open Door, trying to reward a concession for an American company in exchange for its government's accepting the abolition of partial extraterritoriality in Korea, he was severely criticized by Japanese right-wing activist, Uchida Yōhei. Uchida channeled the voices of the Japanese residents in Korea and Japanese politicians belonging to Yamagata Aritomo's faction, who had been long opposed to Itō's soft-pedaling policy toward protected Korea. Uchida argued that the international recognition of the "independence" of Korea's judiciary would mean Korea's "independence" from extraterritoriality and, in turn, the full "independence" of Korea itself.[44] Uchida was, thus, strongly opposed to Itō's policies for abolishing extraterritoriality in Korea, until jurisdiction was transferred formally to Japan in July 1909.

The effective independence of Korea was what the abolition of extraterritoriality really meant, and Itō's initiative for its abolishment for Japanese first was to provide a model to emulate for the

Western foreigners. His efforts, however, provoked furious protests from Japanese residents in Korea, who called Itō a pro-Korean politician and even an "enemy" of the Japanese Empire.[45] When Itō was assassinated by An Jung-geun in October 1909, many of the Japanese residents ridiculed Itō's death, seeing it as a result of his "pet-dog" Koreans betraying him who they believed had been patronized by Itō. The protectorate policy for the abolition of extraterritoriality in Korea was difficult to achieve, infringing as it did on the vested interests of the Japanese residents. Itō's request to the Japanese residents of Korea to act as a model to the Western nations for the abolition of extraterritoriality was thus futile.

When considering the Japanese residents' position in Korea, Itō called on both Japanese and Koreans for the organizing of a "Japanese–Korean cooperative self-rule" (*nicchō kyōdō no jichi*) association. Itō's idea of "self-rule" was based on a transnational cooperative association between Japanese and Korean citizens which was expected to be the core of a regional community. This concept was also supposed to serve as a model for the joint judiciary and executive authorities after the abolition of extraterritoriality under the protectorate regime. On the eve of the Hague Secret Emissary Affair of July 1907, Itō addressed the Korean ministers with a proposal to create a "Japanese–Korean cooperative self-rule" community, modeled after the Seoul Hygienic Committee (with a Korean chairman, a Japanese vice-chairman, and Japanese police officers and doctors included as its members). Itō argued as follows:

> Although one cannot go beyond the provisions of the commercial treaties at treaty ports, I would like to see this [Seoul Hygienic Committee] done cooperatively outside the ports where many Japanese residents live together with Koreans, by which I mean cities like Pyongyang and Daegu where no particular settlement-district for foreigners exists [where Japanese and Koreans lived mixed]. Neither the Japanese nor Koreans can ignore each other. The Japanese are organised into a group called *Mindan* (Japanese Settler's Association), and on the other hand the Koreans are organised into local governments. It is impossible to deal with one side and neglect that of the other. So, I believe that a Japanese-Korean cooperative self-rule [organisation] is most suitable. As for the Seoul Hygienic Committee, I find it most convenient and appropriate to draft an organisation plan in the spirit of Japanese-Korean joint cooperation and urge the local Korean governor of Seoul to request the Interior Minister of Korea for the approval of

> its establishment as a formal Korean association based on Korean law and its government's recognition. On the other hand, we the Residency-General Agency would also accept in advance a proposal from the Japanese to join the Korean association so that we would immediately issue an affirmative reply and these Japanese would be administrated under Korean laws concerning this issue as a member of the [territorially] Korean society not protected by Japanese extraterritoriality. Such a dual system will help to abolish extraterritorial rights.[46]

Such a dual legal system in the same territory can be regarded as a part of Itō's vision for the formation of transnational institutions to support a confederacy between the "friendly nations," which he sought to accomplish under the Japanese protectorate. With the Seoul Hygienic Committee as a model, Resident-General Itō insisted that "Japanese–Korean cooperative self-rule" be organized according to "the spirit of Japanese–Korean joint cooperation" and geographically extended to cities of mixed residence such as Pyongyang and Daegu. With the Hygienic Committee formed cooperatively, a cleanup of sewage was conducted jointly to prevent epidemics. Itō intended to expand the sphere of Japanese–Korean cooperation to other practical areas, including firefighting. In short, Itō advocated transnational cooperation in the realm of practical daily life in the Korean protectorate.

The desire to set up a transnational cooperative self-rule organization both for Japanese and Koreans can be found also in the political utilization of the emperor system in Japan and Korea. The royal families of both Japan and Korea played key roles. In 1907, the Japanese Crown Prince Yoshihito, soon to become the Taishō Emperor, visited Korea, with the Japanese and Koreans organizing welcoming committees separately, which subsequently merged into a joint committee. In the lead up to the Crown Prince's visit, under the joint Hygienne Committee noted above, Japanese and Koreans cooperated in containing a cholera outbreak, removing the wall on the north-side of the Namdaemun (Great South Gate, or Sungnyemun), and reclaiming the South Pond near this gate. By utilizing the two royal families jointly Itō tried to foment a political atmosphere favorable to such transnational cooperation.[47] Yet these initiatives were met with cynicism from the Japanese residents in Korea, who rejected the policy of respecting the Korean royal family. On the other hand, a number of Korean citizens interpreted Itō's policy as an attempt to exploit Koreans by utilizing the Korean royal family, as was shown in their

opposition to the Korean Emperor's boarding a Japanese navy ship for the celebrations.[48]

Annexation

In August 1908 when the Korean court system was installed under the protectorate regime, though it was excepted to apply to the field of industrial properties, jurisdiction over which was transferred to Japanese courts in Korea, Itō still insisted on prioritizing measures targeted at abolishing extraterritoriality in general, not simply limited to that field. For this purpose, he tried to separate the Korean court system from the executive branch as an independent and civilized institution. Only in this way, he believed, would foreign Western powers trust Korea's new court system and allow their citizens to be subordinate to it. The field of industrial property was supposed to be the first step to achieve the abolition of extraterritoriality in all law fields in general. As noted, however, Itō was restrained by two main factors: relentless opposition to his schemes by the Japanese residents of Korea, represented most articulately by Uchida Yōhei; and the noncooperation of the European Western powers, with Britain and France rejecting Itō's proposal for the gradual abolition of their extraterritoriality (despite the fact that the United States had ealier agreed to such changes).[49]

Furthermore, Itō faced opposition from Koreans too. No matter how many speeches Itō gave in support of the independence of the Korean judiciary, this concept was becoming all the more contradictory to the nature of the protectorate. Itō's policy, per se, had inherent contradictions. Itō proposed inviting a large number of Japanese judges to the Korean courts, but this would neither have improved the efficiency of the courts nor appeased Korean feelings of opposition to Japan.[50] In July 1909, facing opposition from Japanese residents in Korea, Itō agreed to incorporate Korea's judicial power, a symbol of its independence, into the Japanese court system. Thus, Korea's domestic court system was incorporated into the jurisdiction of Japan's protectorate. This decision was an important milestone in Korea's incorporation into the Japanese formal empire, rejecting, as it did, the previous option of creating a regional confederation with the preservation of Korea's statehood and supported by cooperative transnational associations for joint self-rule. Despite this, Itō still continued in his endeavors to incorporate Korea and Japan into a confederation not by force but by law, even after Korean judicial power was entrusted to Japan. This was regarded by Itō as necessary

for integrating Koreans into Japan's constitutional, rather than colonial, order, leaving some spheres of judicial autonomy independent even of the Governor-General, who was to be the representative of the Japanese government in Korea following annexation.

However, Egi Tasuku, who was a senior legal advisor in the Cabinet Legislation Bureau of the Japanese government, strongly supported the incorporation of Korea into Japan with all legislative and juridical power committed to the supreme administrator, the Governor-General, as was accomplished in Taiwan. Egi criticized the ambiguity of Itō's arguments for "cooperative self-rule." Egi remarked that no foreign power would trust the newly established Korean court system, be it autonomous or not, as long as Korea was Japan's protectorate.[51] Facing criticism of this kind from inside and negative responses from the foreign powers, Itō seems to have begun to draft a plan for Korea's judicial incorporation into Japan in which the Japanese court system in Korea would still be independent of both the Governor-General (formerly the Resident-General) and his administration (the Governor-General Agency). Understandably, however, the Korean public did not accept any judicial incorporation that would possibly lead to the loss of Korea's independence.

Confronted by the difficulties of abolishing extraterritoriality both from inside and from outside, Itō's last hope for forming a cooperative relationship between the two nations, however lopsided, lay in the relationship between the two royal families. In January 1909, Itō guided the still young Korean Emperor in a royal procession through Korea. During the Korean Emperor's trip, Itō reportedly kept shouting "banzai" for the Emperor of Korea, but not once for Korean independence, before the gathered Koreans and Japanese residents in Korea. Itō's speech during the procession was not only directed at Koreans but also called on the Japanese settlers to respect the Korean royal family. Itō's assassination demonstrated that his hopes for the two nation's unity in a transnational cooperative framework were no more than a fantasy. Itō's final decision to resign as Resident-General and accept the option of annexing Korea was in the beginning of April in that year.[52]

In October 1909, Itō went to Harbin for talks with the Russian minister of finance in an attempt to gain Russia's understanding of Japan's Korean and Manchurian policies. Itō, however, was shot and killed at Harbin Station. The assassin, An Jung-geun (a Christian, baptized by a French missionary), had apparently believed in the slogan of "Peace in East Asia," which paradoxically seemed akin to Itō's ideal.[53] It is said that just before his death Itō lamented the assassin's

action, which he speculated might eliminate Korea's independence completely, despite the assassin's intentions.

Conclusion

In summary, Japan's basic strategy toward its Korean protectorate was strongly influenced by the international norm of the "standard of civilization." Without the formal recognition of the Western powers, the abolition of extraterritoriality in Korea, which would have thus become the second modern state in Asia, was impossible. On the other hand, in the thinking of Resident-General Itō Hirobumi, this new state of Korea was expected to be united legally with Japan, with Japanese settlers holding a status differentiated from other foreigners. The concept of a corporative transnational institution for joint self-rule was supposed to justify such a special partnership. As a result, when Japan, and more specifically Itō, initially aimed to reform the Korean legal system and persuade the major powers to abolish their extraterritoriality on the peninsula, Japan expected that a modernized Korea would enter into a confederation with Japan supported by transnational institutions. However, it was difficult to institutionalize the concept of a "friendly-nation" into some kind of confederacy based on popularly supported transnational associations. At the dawn of the twentieth century, Japan was the only non-Western "civilized country." Itō was willing to bear the burden of civilizing Korea and turning it into a "friendly-nation" for Japan as its modernized counterpart in a confederation. The extension of the Japanese formal empire into the Korean peninsula derived from the failure of realizing this historical alternative for regional confederation. The annexation of Korea was nothing but the result of the failure to construct this regional confederation supported by transnational corporative associations.

This failure derived from strong opposition to the scheme from Japanese residents in Korea, the negative response of Koreans to Itō's conceptualization of Korean "independence" even as a "friendly nation" united with Japan, and the rejection of Itō's proposals by most of the foreign powers. This failure gave way to the annexation of Korea.

Although Japan was recognized by the Western powers as the primary stakeholder in Korea, because of the continuation of the treaty port system even after Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War, the abolition of extraterritoriality and the treaty port system remained indispensable for Japan to implement domestic reforms in Korea. Yet

Itō's attempts to remove extraterritoriality provoked strong opposition both from Japanese and Koreans on the peninsula. The Japanese regarded themselves as superior to the Koreans and were unwilling to give up the benefits they derived from their extraterritorial status, despite the fact that Itō's plan would have maintained Japanese superiority in relation to other foreigners in the country. The Koreans, on the other hand, were skeptical of Itō's conception of a regional confederation that maintained Korean "independence." In short, resident Japanese, Koreans, and the Western powers rejected the framework.

In contrast to the expansion of the British and Russian Empires, Japan advanced not into a so-called no-man's land, but encountered the British-made treaty port system in East Asia. Britain and the United States helped Japan wage war against Russia to protect this system based on the principle of the economic Open Door. However, the fragile status of Korea under this extraterritorial system prompted Japan to seek a new regionalist confederation with self-ruling transnational corporations, designed to combine Japan with its surrounding nations through legal and judicial reforms. This method was distinguished from the empire-building that other empires implemented. However, because of their numbers, Japanese residents in the imperial peripheries decisively affected the course of Japanese government policy.

Moreover, the real expansion of the Japanese Empire would eventually betray the principles of the Open Door policy. At least until the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910, Britain and the United States were willing to allow Japan to extend its legal mechanisms to substitute the treaty port system combined with the Open Door policy. Perhaps they desired to use Japan's expansion as a counterbalance against Russia. However, in the 1930s, Manchukuo stood in different circumstances. Having failed in the bid to get Manchukuo recognized by Britain and the United States, Japan began to advocate a "New Order" in East Asia as late as 1938, rejecting the basic norms of Western international society. In regard to the early stages of Japan's control of Manchukuo, at least until 1935, Japan adopted a policy strikingly similar to the Korean precedent, calling for Western-style legislation and justice to persuade Britain and the United States to recognize the state formally. Many famous Japanese specialists of jurisprudence and judges were invited to Manchukuo to create a new legal system, with an aim to realize the abolition of extraterritoriality in the same way as was convened in the Korean protectorate in 1908. In fact, in June 1936, the first treaty signed between Japan and Manchukuo removed Japan's extraterritorial rights in police affairs and taxation. The

second treaty, signed in November 1937, abrogated Japan's consular jurisdiction. Yet Manchukuo had a carefully prepared loophole; that is, dual citizenship was allowed only for Japanese citizens.[54] Thus, the Japanese residents of Manchukuo enjoyed the special status of being the citizens of Japan and Manchukuo simultaneously. Overall, one may find a key to understanding Japan's imperial expansion in the legal status of Japanese residents in the imperial peripheries, regardless of the specific ideologies of Japanese imperialism deployed in justifying its policies.

The Japanese Empire continued to abuse the concept of regional order in Asia throughout the long period between 1910 and 1945. The discussion of the imperial legal system can illuminate the unrealized historical potential in the early pre-global age at the turn of the former century, as well as the subsequent course of its imperialist distortion. This legalist framework could be helpful, above all, for historians to build a common ground for constructing regional histories beyond nation-centric historical narratives.

Notes

1. In the early twentieth century, the concept of the protectorate was still controversial. It was basically modeled after the precedent of Britain's control of Egypt, as well as the numerous feudal states in India before the Rebellion of 1857. Ariga Nagao, *Hogokoku ron* (Tokyo: Waseda Daigaku Shuppanbu, 1906), pp. 301–33; Ariga Nagao, "Hogokokuron wo chōshitaru riyū," *Kokusaihō gaikō zasshi* 5, no. 2 (November 1906).
2. Kimura Kenji, *Zai-Chō Nihonjin no shakaishi* (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1989). See Chapter 1.
3. Chōsen Sōtokufu, ed., *Chōsen sōtokufu shisei nenpō, Meiji 39, 40 nen ban* (Tokyo: Kuresu Shuppan, 1991), p. 400.
4. Yuhō Kyōkai, ed., *Chōsen kindai shiryō kenkyū, dai 2 kan: Zaisei* (Yuhō Kyōkai, 1974), p. 449.
5. Kimura, *Zai-Chō Nihonjin*, p. 12.
6. The population as of the end of June 1909 was, respectively: 153 Britons, 464 Americans, 87 French, 33 Germans, 14 Russians, 12,332 Chinese, and 40 of other nationalities. Fukuda Tōsaku, *Chōsen heigō kinen shi* (Dai-Nihon Jitsugyō Kyōkai, 1911), p. 938.
7. Korea qualitatively differed from Taiwan in that the former had relatively fewer Germans but many Americans living as miners and missionaries. Shinobu Junpei, a consul in Jinsen, was then in charge of negotiations with German landlords. He reported, among many, that the Settlers' committee was always torn between the Germans, Americans, and Russians on one hand and the Japanese and British on the other, with the Chinese and French, as neutral, having the balance of power; that 99 percent of those who paid the real estate tax and the business tax for the revenue of the Settlers' committee were Japanese, and yet the Japanese settlement

police acted almost as the "private servants" of the German chairman of the Settler's committee. Telegram, Secret, no. 7, Jinsen riji-chō rijikan Shinobu Junpei hatsu tōkan dairi fuku tōkan Sone Arasuke ate [Resident of the Resident Agency in Jinsen, Shinobu Junpei to Acting Residency-General and Vice Residency-General Sone Arasuke], "Jinsen ni okeru kyoryūchi sei no jōkyō oyobi shōrai [The Status and Future of the Settlement System in Jinsen]," February 10, 1908 (with the stamp of director of the Bureau of Foreign Affairs Ishizuka Eizō), *Chōsen sōtokufu bunsho gaiji gaikoku kyoryūchi kanren shorui* (National Archives of Korea), no. 6, pp. 88–92.

8. Current books on Japanese reformation of extraterritoriality are as follows: Komiya Kazuo, *Jōyaku kaisei to kokunai seiji* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2001); Oishi Kazuo, *Jōyaku kaisei kōshō shi—1887–1894* (Kyoto: Shibunkaku Shuppan, 2008); Iokibe Makoto, *Jōyakukaiseishi: Hōken kaifuku heno tenbō to nashonarizumu* (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 2010).
9. Asano Toyomi, *Teikoku Nihon no shokuminchi hōsei: Chiiki tōgō to teikoku chitsujo* (Nagoya: Nagoya Daigaku Shuppankai, 2008).
10. On the lifestyles, ideologies, and narratives of the Japanese settlers, their basic relationship with government and the Korean population in protected Korea see the following two books: Peter Duus, *Abacus and the Sword* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998, Chapter 11; Jun Uchida, *Brokers of Empire: Japanese Settler Colonialism in Korea, 1876–1945* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2011).
11. Article 1 declared the possession of the diplomatic power by the Japanese government thereafter, and Article 2 provided the inheritance of all diplomatic transactions by Japan. But the domestic affairs including administration and jurisdiction belonged to Korea. Gaimushō,ed., *Nihon gaikō nenpyō narabi shuyō bunsho, jō* (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1966), p. 252.
12. In the following book, the author argues for Itō's commitment to constitutionalism not only in Japan but also in Korea. Takii Kazuhiro, *Itō Hirobumi – Japan's First Prime Minister and Father of the Meiji Constitution* (Oxon: Routledge, 2014). The author also argues that Itō was determined to modernize Korea and consolidate further constitutional reforms simultaneously with Japan and that Itō did not aim to colonize Korea during his time there. These aims were not understood by either Japan's home government or the Koreans themselves at the time.
13. On the strong anti-Itō Hirobumi sentiments among the Japanese settlers, see also Uchida, *Brokers of Empire* (2011)
14. Cabinet Council decision, "Kankoku hogo ken kakuritsu no ken", April 8, 1904, in *Nihon gaikō nenpyō*, ed., Gaimushō, p. 233.
15. Korea had been placed under the treaty port system before the Russo-Japanese War, which basically remained the same after the war. Korea had been incorporated into this system since the Treaty of Kanghwa with Japan in 1876, followed by the treaty with the United States in 1882 and that with the United Kingdom in 1883. These treaties acknowledged extraterritoriality in the territory of Korea and laid out the customs system at a low rate.
16. Gaimushō, ed., *Nihon gaikō nenpyō*, p. 233.
17. Another major issue was the status of ethnic Koreans holding dual citizenship of Korea and Russia. Many Koreans lived near the borders to Russia and Russia claimed that the Koreans who lived in their territory

had been naturalized as its subjects. The existence of extraterritoriality could possibly turn this dual-citizenship question into a political problem between Japan and Russia. The final outcome was that Russia accepted Japan's claim that the Koreans with dual nationality should be regarded as Koreans at least in Korea.

18. Those who borrowed the names of Japanese and Westerners could own land practically with no tax, while those Koreans who were naturalized as Russians declared that they should be immune from arrest by the Japanese police, though eventually this political dispute was resolved by Russia's concession to surrender extraterritorial rights over the naturalized Koreans.
19. This is based on the Second Japan-Korea Convention which made Korea a protectorate of Japan. Article 1 declared the possession of Korea's diplomatic power by the Japanese government thereafter, and Article 2 provided for the inheritance of all diplomatic transactions by Japan. Gaimushō, ed., *Nihon gaikō nenpyō*, p. 252.
20. Memo, "Kankoku hogo ken kakuritsu no ken." (Cabinet decision on April 8, 1905.) Gaimushō, ed., *Nihon gaikō nenpyō*, p. 233. In that decision, "ministers of foreign nations were supposed to completely withdraw under international law" once a protectorate was installed, but the cabinet recommended a cautionary policy that did not directly force them to do so, "taking into consideration the attitudes of foreign nations."
21. Asano Toyomi, "Nihon no saishū teki jōyaku kaisei to kankoku ban jōyaku kaise," in Itō Yukio and Lee Seong-Hwan, eds., *Itō Hirobumi to kankoku tōchi* (Kyoto: Minerva Shobō, 2009), pp. 139–162.
22. Cabinet Council decision, "Kankoku hogo ken kakuritsu no ken", April 8, 1904, in *Nihon gaikō nenpyō*, ed. Gaimushō, p. 233.
23. Memo, "Rikugun shōkō shōtai sekijyō Itō tōkan enzetsu yōryō hikki", June 12, 1908, in *Kuratomi Yuzaburō Bunsho*), The Modern Japanese Political History Materials Room, National Diet Library (hereafter, MJPHMR), pp. 30–1.
24. Memo, "Itō tōkan Kankoku mondai no jūyōsei o Saionji shushō ni kaichin June 11, 1907", in *Gaikō shiryō Kankoku heigō, ge*, ed. Unno Fukuju (Tokyo: Fuji Shuppan, 2003), p. 452.
25. Memo, "Rikugun shōkō shōtai sekijō Itō Tōkan enzetsu yōryō hikki", June 12, 1908, in *Kuratomi Yuzaburō Bunsho*, MJPHMR, pp. 30–1.
26. Masuda Tomoko, "Nisshin sengo keiei," Inoue Mitsusada et al., eds., *Nihon rekishi taikei 14: Meiji kenpō taisei no tenkai, jō* (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1996), p. 66.
27. Memo, "Rikugun shōkō shōtai sekijō Itō Tōkan enzetsu yōryō hikki," June 12, 1908, in *Kuratomi Yuzaburō Bunsho*, MJPHMR, pp. 30–1.
28. Chōsen Sōtokufu, *Chōsen no hogo oyobi heigō* (1918), pp. 142–3. The reprint version in *Hogo oyobi heigō (Meiji hyakunen shi sōsho, dai 291 kan: Nikkan gaikō shiryō)*, ed. Ichikawa Masakki (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1980), pp. 194–5.
29. See "Hayashi gaimu daijin hatsu keijō Itō tōkan ate, Meiji 39 nen 8 gatsu 16 nichi", in *Shin-Kan ryōkoku ni okeru hatsumei ishō shōhyō oyobi chosakuken sōgo hogo ni kansuru Nichi-Bei jōyaku teiketsu ikken, dai 1 kan* (thereafter *Nichi-Bei jōyaku teiketsu ikken*, vol. 1), 2–6–1–16, Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Tokyo.

30. For the advocacy for the strengthening of the American consul court in the Far East following the example of Turkey, see Frank E. Hinckley, *American Consular Jurisdiction in the Orient* (Washington: W. H. Lowdermilk and Co., 1906).
31. Theodore Roosevelt's administration recruited many talented people versed in both building legal systems and practical business. Secretary of State Elihu Root, for example, had the experience of being involved in the development of the colonial system in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, which were annexed by the United States after the Spanish-American War. Ralph Eldin Minger, *William Howard Taft and United States Foreign Policy: The Apprenticeship Years, 1900–1908* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1975), p. 214.
32. Minger, *William Howard Taft*, pp. 161, 211.
33. See "Hayashi gaimu daijin hatsu keijō Itō tōkan ate, Meiji 39 nen 8 gatsu 16 nichi", in *Nichi-Bei jōyaku teiketsu ikken*, vol. 1, 2–6–1–16, Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Tokyo. For Denison's biography, the following unpublished paper, generously provided by Dr. Shawn McHale, is referenced here. Shawn McHale, "George Washington University's First Asian Students" (Unpublished paper).
34. See "Hayashi gaimu daijin hatsu keijō Itō tōkan ate, Meiji 39 nen 8 gatsu 16 nichi",
35. See "Hayashi gaimu daijin hatsu keijō Itō tōkan ate, Meiji 39 nen 8 gatsu 16 nichi."
36. Ichikawa, Masaaki, ed. "Kankoku heigō shiryō, dai 2 kan," in *Meiji hyakunenshi sōsho, dai 268 kan*. (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1978), pp. 559–560. Itō's additional explanation for the Korean ministers went on solemnly: as Korea then remained an agrarian society, the rights of its citizens hardly changed in any direct manner, even if the Japanese laws on industrial property were declared as its own laws and court jurisdiction was entrusted to Japan. However, it was necessary to deploy the Japanese laws temporarily to control Japanese nationals who committed fraud by using Korean names.
37. Ichikawa ed., "Kankoku heigō shiryō, dai 2 kan," p. 560.
38. After the operation of the Patent Act of Korea and others, the administrative institutions for the patent registration service were developed through the Administrative System of the Patent Office of the Residency-General Agency (Imperial Ordinance, no. 202, August 12 in 1908) and the Rules for the Divisions of the Patent Office of the Residency-General Agency (Residency-General Agency Instruction, no. 17). The first official patent gazette of the Residency-General Agency was issued on November 1 of the same year. The trademarks registered at the Patent Office of the Residency-General Agency are shown in the following book: *Kōgyō shoyūken seido hyakunenshi, jō*, ed. Tokkyochō (Shadan Hōjin Hatsumei Kyōkai, 1984).
39. The 1908 fiscal-year budget of the Patent Office of the Residency-General Agency was, from September and on, 48,502 yen, growing to 59,554 yen in the 1909 budget. Employees comprised 7 government-appointees, 12 government-commissioners, 10 hired employees. Telegram, Director of Patent office, Nakamatsu Morio to Manager of Research branch in the

Foreign Ministry, Adachi Mineichirō, July 22, 1908, in *Shin-Kan ryōkoku ni okeru hatsumei ishō shōhyō oyobi chosakuken sōgo hogo ni kansuru Nichi-Bei jōyaku teiketsu ikken, dai 2 kan*, 2–6–1–16, (Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Tokyo).

40. The Japanese residents' various attitudes toward the Resident-General and the Korean people can be seen in Uchida, *Brokers of Empire*, 2011.
41. Ōuchi Chōzō, "Taikan zakkan," *Journal of Chōsen*, 27, May (1910), p. 15. As well as proposing that the Resident-General should be responsible to the parliament, Chōzō also proposed radical annexationism for Korea. See: pp. 12–13.
42. Kawabata Gentarō, *Keijō to naichijin* (Seoul: Nikkan Shobō, 1910), pp. 294–5.
43. The total state revenue was 21,434,723 yen, including regular revenue of 13,848,443 yen, mainly made up of the land tax (about 6 million yen), the liquor tax, the tobacco cultivation tax, customs (about 2 million yen) and others, and special revenue of 7,586,280 yen (of which 4,653,500 yen was money borrowed from the Japanese government to pay salaries to Japanese officials hired by the Korean government, with the remainder of the revenue coming from the loans raised in the British and French financial markets). Three years back, in 1906, the revenue from "land tax" of the Korean government was 3.95 million yen, with the customs revenues at 2.11 million yen. "Tōkan kangeikai," *Man-Kan no jitsugyō*, 42 (1909)
44. Mitani Taichirō, *Seiji seido toshite no baishinsei* (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 2001), p. 274.
45. This was an important difference from the earlier legislating process in colonialized Taiwan, which can be characterized as a simple extension of the abolition of unequal treaties for Japan Proper. In the case of Taiwan, there were few Japanese living there before its annexation to Japan. Only camphoric merchants and missionaries of German and British origins lived in the borderless foreign concessions. In contrast, a Japanese community existed in Korea well before the inauguration of the protectorate. Massive emigration of Japanese to Korea was made possible by the Japan–Korea Treaty of Amity of 1876.
46. "Kankoku shisei kaizen ni kansuru kyōgikai dai 22 kai, Meiji 40 nen 7 gatsu 9 nichi." Ichikawa, ed., "Kankoku heigō shiryō, dai 2 kan," p. 589.
47. Asano, "Nihon no saishū teki jōyaku kaisei.".
48. Christine Kim, "Politics and Pageantry in Protectorate Korea (1905–10): The Imperial Progresses of Sunjong," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 68, no. 3 (August 2009): 835–59.
49. Britain's negative response seemed to have originated from their views concerning Korea's fragile legal framework, with no universal civil code promulgated yet, limited to just industrial property as a sort of special field of intellectual property legalized into a specific code.
50. Ariga Nagao's *Hogokoku ron* typified the protectorate, and made a labored argument that the second type of protectorate was independent from a third country but not so in relation to the protecting country. Moriyama Shigenori, "Hogo seijika Kankoku niokeru shihō seido kaikaku no rinen to genjitsu," pp. 287–94.

51. Egi Tasuku, "Kankoku ni okeru shihō seido ni tsuite", *Kokka gakkai zasshi*, vol. 23, no. 10 (1909): 17. In Egi Tasuku, *Shokumin Ronsaku* (Tokyo: Juseido, 1910).
52. On Itō's plan for using the union of the royal families for the formation of a joint Japan–Korea confederation, see Shinjō Michihiko, *Tennō no Kankoku heigō: ōkōzoku no sōsetsu to teikoku no kattō* (Tokyo: Hōsei Daigaku Shuppankyoku, 2011).
53. Ichikawa Masaaki, *An Jung-geun to nikkan kankeishi* (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1979); Saki Ryūzō, *Itō Hirobumi to An Jung-geun* (Tokyo: Bungei Shunjū, 1992), pp. 18, 65.
54. Asano, *Teikoku Nihon no shokuminchi hōsei*, Chapter 4.

2

Pan-Asianism in the Wartime Writings of Japanese, Chinese, and Korean Intellectuals in a Transnational Space at Kenkoku University in Japanese-Occupied Manchuria

Yuka Hiruma Kishida

Introduction

Kenkoku University (Nation-Building University, abbreviated as Kendai) was founded in 1938 by the Kwantung Army, the Japanese army of occupation of the northeastern provinces of China, commonly designated Manchuria. Kendai was the only institution of higher learning administered directly by the Manchukuo's governing authority, the State Council, which was dominated by Japanese officers. Kendai recruited male students of Japanese, Chinese, Korean, Taiwanese, Mongolian, and Russian backgrounds, who applied to the school of their own volition and passed very competitive entrance examinations.[1] The school aimed to nurture a generation of leaders who would actualize the pan-Asianist goal of *minzoku kyōwa*, or "ethnic harmony," one of the founding principles of this ostensibly independent state.[2] To experiment with this pan-Asianist education, not only Japanese but also non-Japanese intellectuals joined the faculty.

By examining these Kendai faculty members' conceptions of pan-Asianism, as reflected in their academic writings published in the late 1930s and early 1940s, this chapter aims to achieve two goals. First, it extends the effort made by the recent works on pan-Asianism to elaborate the field's knowledge about this topic. Until recently, the research that focused on the Japanese Empire has often paid little attention to Japan's wartime discourse of pan-Asianism, dismissing it as just another empty rationale for the domination of subject peoples

by an imperial power, akin to the Anglo-American "white man's burden."[3] Recent scholarship, however, has complicated the picture by identifying multiple and competing articulations of pan-Asianism while reexamining its effects on policy making and its reception by subject populations.[4] This chapter adds to this effort by showing a variety of perspectives on pan-Asianism expressed by Japanese, Chinese, and Korean faculty members of Kendai. The University serves as a perfect window into diverse articulations of pan-Asianism because it intended to provide a transnational space for Asian scholars and students to experiment on and create a new theory of pan-Asianism.

Second, on a broader level, this chapter contributes to the growing body of literature that rethinks the relations between peoples within the Japanese Empire. Wartime relations between Japanese and non-Japanese have often been framed in terms of binary narratives of resistance to, or, collaboration with Japanese imperialism. For instance, while scholars on the Japanese Empire have provided solid knowledge on Japan's geopolitical and economic interests in Manchuria and demonstrated exploitative motives behind its development projects, their national focus on Japan inevitably has drawn a line between the colonizer and the colonized.[5] Recent research on the region has broken from a nation-centric view of Japan's imperial history and incorporated a plurality of experiences into the analysis.[6] The Japanese, Chinese, and Korean scholars, whose writings I examine in this chapter, chose to join the Kendai faculty voluntarily. The different meanings they assigned to Asia and the current project of creating "Asia for Asians" complicate our understanding of the transnational interactions that occurred in Japanese occupied Manchuria.

Kendai as an Incubator of Pan-Asian Unity: Ishiwara Kanji's Proposals and Recruitment of Non-Japanese Instructors

Kendai was the brainchild of an eminent Japanese military thinker, Ishiwara Kanji. As Operations Officer of the Kwantung Army, he played a prominent role in the expansion of Japanese interest in Manchuria by orchestrating the Manchurian Incident of 1931. Furthermore, he was actively involved in the subsequent state-building scheme that culminated in the foundation of Manchukuo on March 1, 1932. Ishiwara's involvement in both of these military and political operations flowed from his strategic calculation of the

essential role Manchuria would play in Japan's "Final War"—the confrontation between Japan and the United States that would divide the globe into two camps, the East and the West, which he believed was imminent. Meanwhile, Ishiwara developed his broader vision of an East Asian League, a federation of Japan, Manchukuo, China, and other Asian nations based on cooperation in preparation for the "Final War." Manchukuo would serve as the model of Ishiwara's envisioned alliance of Asian countries. While often omitted in the narratives of Ishiwara's involvement in Manchuria, the idea of creating a university that would not be just another overseas Japanese institution of higher learning but a radically different kind of institution with a pan-Asianist mission sprang from Ishiwara's idealism.[7]

In the fall of 1936, Ishiwara proposed the founding of a university to Kwantung Army officials through Kwantung Army Captain Tsuji Masanobu, who lost no time in recruiting staff for a planning committee. The impetus was Ishiwara's growing disillusionment with the continuing military occupation and tensions within the diverse population of Manchukuo. He believed that such circumstances inhibited a sense of Manchukuo nationhood from taking root. Ishiwara's hope was that the proposed school would become the center of genuine pan-Asian unity not just among the diverse peoples residing in Manchukuo but also among all Asian nations. In the end, however, he did not have the final say in key decisions due to the nature of his assignments during the crucial phase of Kendai's planning.[8] Nevertheless, Kendai's uniquely strong commitment to the ideal of unity on the basis of equality originated in Ishiwara's two concrete proposals. One was to create integrated student residences where students of different ethnic backgrounds would share all aspects of life, interact as equals, and thus engage in honest dialogue, which he believed would lead to genuine bonding among Asian youths. The other proposal Ishiwara made was the recruitment of non-Japanese scholars to serve on the faculty.[9]

One passage from Ishiwara's essay, "Kokubō seiji ron," discloses his rationale for the unconventional proposal of inviting not only prominent scholars of Asia but also revolutionary leaders from around the world. In an essay published five years later but articulating his early commitment to genuine and wide ranging intellectual inquiry, Ishiwara wrote:

> I also suggested studying the history of Japanese rule of Taiwan and Korea as well as the history of [Western] rule of India, Vietnam, the Philippines and Outer Mongolia. This was to understand why the

> Taiwanese and Korean public's feelings [about Japanese rule] were still recalcitrant despite the fact that the Japanese rule since the Meiji period had brought them great improvement and happiness. Also, a comparative study of Western colonial policy [and that of Japanese] could provide lessons for the politics of Manchukuo.[10]

This passage reveals that Ishiwara somewhat naïvely believed that progress in the form of economic and social modernization under Japanese rule should have brought "happiness" to the peoples of Taiwan and Korea. While he recognized the failure of Japanese colonial regimes to win the hearts and minds of many Taiwanese and Koreans, he had no doubt about the validity of Japan's colonization per se. At the same time, Ishiwara appears to have recognized that learning from past mistakes was necessary to overcome the obstacles to gaining Asian people's support for Japanese-led pan-Asian unity. To this end he suggested that Kendai invite various revolutionary leaders, including but not limited to those who were involved in the anti-Japanese movement in Manchukuo, and critics of Japanese expansionism.[11] In this context, we must see his idea of inviting Mohandas Gandhi and Subhas Chandra Bose from India, Leon Trotsky from the Soviet Union, and Pearl Sydenstricker Buck from the United States not as a sign of his cosmopolitanism but as derived from his attempt at reforming the Japanese Empire.[12]

To start this grand recruitment project, Ishiwara ordered members of the planning committee to approach Chinese and Korean scholars in the autumn of 1937. This mission was entrusted to Nemoto Ryūtarō, two other Japanese academics who had resided in Manchukuo and later joined the Kendai faculty, and Gu Cixiang, a Chinese politician in the position of Assistant Manager at Manchukuo's Management and Coordination Agency.[13] Initially, Gu, who spoke both Chinese and Japanese, was to head the mission to Beijing. However, he asked Nemoto to lead the group instead, arguing that "[i]f we Chinese go to Beijing and speak to Chinese scholars, they would dismiss us as running dogs of the Japanese and discussions would go nowhere… On the other hand, If you take the lead and I serve as an interpreter, they would be more likely to trust us. So, I'd like you to perform that role of the front man."[14] In Nemoto's account, Gu's advice was genuine and evidence of his desire to cooperate. However, we cannot rule out the possibility that Gu was hoping to avoid making an official appearance as a Manchukuo government agent in Beijing.

Leaving aside Gu's real intention, the mission, now headed by Nemoto, succeeded in contracting three prominent figures: Bao Mingqian and Su Yixin from China and Ch'oe Namsŏn from Korea.[15]

Bao, a graduate of Qinghua University in China and Johns Hopkins University, and Su, a graduate of Columbia University, were both specialists in politics and well-known political activists who played leading roles in the May Fourth Movement of 1919 and subsequent anti-Japanese activities in China. Ch'oe, too, was known as a nationalist activist in Korea. After dropping out of Waseda University in Japan, he became involved in the March First Independence Movement of 1919. In fact, he was one of the authors of the declaration of Korean independence from Japan that was issued during that movement.[16] The three scholars were not only renowned intellectuals but also genuine nationalist movement activists.

In an address to a group of Chinese scholars in Beijing, Nemoto explained why Kendai wanted to invite non-Japanese intellectuals to join the faculty:

> Kenkoku University is an educational and research institution whose true mission is the creation of "ethnic harmony" in Manchukuo. Indeed, we are building the University based on this principle not as a mere theory but as a philosophy of actual practice. This is why we are inviting scholars who are veterans of real nationalist movements.[17]

Bao was impressed by this speech and agreed to teach at Kendai. He then persuaded Su to join him.[18] Later, Ch'oe also decided to join Kendai, believing that Manchukuo recognized Koreans as a distinct people, unlike in Korea where the Japanese colonial regime was carrying out the assimilation policy.[19] Because of these intellectuals' affiliations with nationalist movements, some of the commanders of the Japanese Army in China and Korea opposed their appointments, and Tōjō Hideki, the Kwantung Army Chief of Staff, was furious. Nevertheless, Ishiwara and Nemoto insisted and managed to overcome the opposition of these senior military officers.[20]

Besides these 3 intellectuals, 14 scholars from China, Korea, and Germany joined the Kendai faculty by 1941. However, the 17 non-Japanese represented only a small portion in the Kendai faculty, which totaled 191 Japanese members as of 1941, including affiliated faculty.[21]

During the eight years of Kendai's short history from 1937 to 1945, a total of 295 faculty members served this institution as educators, researchers, and administrators. Approximately 45 members were non-Japanese.[22] Although some Kendai scholars' publications have been preserved, they represent only a small portion of the whole faculty's output. Most of what has been preserved is research reports

and articles that were published by the Kenkoku University Research Institute (KURI). Below I examine seven Japanese and two non-Japanese Kendai faculty members' writings from the late 1930s and early 1940s that appeared in KURI's monthly newsletters and other publications. I chose their writings not only because of their relevance to the topic of pan-Asianism but also because of their varying articulations of the ideology and its relationship with Manchukuo.

Kendai University's Japanese Faculty Members' Conceptions of Pan-Asianism

Japanese Kendai faculty members' conceptions of pan-Asianism varied among individuals and yet shared the general characteristics of the contemporary Japanese pan-Asianism in the early 1940s. On the one hand, writing in the early 1940s in Manchukuo, the cornerstone of the Japanese imperial project at that time, Japanese Kendai intellectuals appeared to have been influenced by Japan's increasingly aggressive foreign policy in Asia. On the other hand, through their involvement in the idealistic endeavor of Kendai, some of their writings reflected some universalistic aspects of pan-Asianism.

Strong criticisms of the West drove historian Mori Katsumi to develop a hierarchical conception of Asian unity under Japanese leadership in an article published in 1942. Mori, Associate Professor of History, described the long history of Western imperialism in Asia, from the fifteenth-century Portuguese arrival in India, the sixteenth-century Spanish conquest of the Philippines, and the subsequent interventions of the Netherlands, Britain, France, and the United States. He also cited the Russian expansion southward since the sixteenth century. In terms of Western aggression against China, Mori recognized that Britain and the United States had taken the lead—the British Opium Wars (1839–42 and 1856–60) laid the ground for China's semi-colonial fate, while at the turn of the century the United States advanced imperialist competition over China through the Open Door policy. Mori described the contemporary situation regarding China as follows: "the United States and Britain, the fox and raccoon, are now wiping away their past evil deeds and eagerly backing Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi), the betrayer of Asian peoples, as if they were the saviours of the Chinese. That is what I call the comedy of the century."[23] Not surprisingly, Mori did not mention Japan's participation in this scramble for China.

Associate Professor of Economics Matsuyama Shigejirō echoed Mori's anti-Western theme but concentrated his critique on Western

individualism and economic liberalism. In an essay published in 1942, Matsuyama argued that these two features of Western civilization formed the current world order in which Western imperialists enjoyed material wealth at the cost of other peoples' misery. In such a world, "countries came together only for the shared interests or under the American and British plutocratic authority"; Matsuyama continued, "such despotic unity of nations would . . . surely dissolve when national interest conflict or the subordinated countries' economy exceeded that of the domineering states".[24] Matsuyama insisted that the new order, which would replace this failing model of international relations, must apply the "principle of 'ethnic harmony' based on morality and comradery."[25]

Assuming that the world was shifting from one era to another, Mori and Matsuyama stressed Japan's special mission in leading Asia's march into the new era. The previous era, which they called "*kindai*," denoted the period when the West exercised imperialistic control over the East and other parts of the world. Highlighting the common suffering that Asian peoples had borne, Mori and Matsuyama explained that Japan was destined to become Asia's leader because it had achieved a preeminent modernization among Asian countries. Mori asserted that Japan's triumph in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–05) " . . . had revealed Japan's historical mission of liberating Asian peoples from the shackles of the United States, Britain and the Netherlands, and recuperating the viability inherent in Asia itself."[26] For Matsuyama, Japan's initiative in establishing Manchukuo proved Japan's capacity to cleave a path to a new era in which Asian peoples would live harmoniously.[27]

Mori's and Matsuyama's historical explanations for Japan's legitimate leadership led them to assume that Asian peoples would voluntarily cooperate with Japan in creating the new order. Such an assumption is evident in Matsuyama's assertion that "creating the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere is the historical mission of the billions of Asian peoples."[28] Because all Asians were historic victims of Western imperialism, the ongoing pan-Asianist project was a task that was the charge of all Asians, not just of the Japanese. In addition to the shared experience of Western imperialism, Mori identified the long history of the East as a cultural bloc as an important foundation for the Co-Prosperity Sphere. He stated:

> . . . before the sixteenth century, the East formed an independent world with a single cultural bloc . . . The currently advocated Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, though the term itself is

> new, is by no means concocted rhetoric of opportunism or sheer expediency but is grounded on the cultural bloc that emerged as a natural outcome of the shared historical experiences of Eastern peoples.[29]

In short, Mori's and Matsuyama's rationale was as follows: because Japan had emerged as the political center of Asia in the midst of Asian peoples' experience of Western oppression, and because Japan shared the common historical culture of other East Asian countries, it was now in the position to provide leadership for Asia.

While Mori and Matsuyama assumed Asian peoples' voluntary cooperation in the creation of the Co-Prosperity Sphere, Nakano Sei'ichi, Professor of Law, and Ono Kazuhito, Associate Professor of History, argued that Japan could legitimately impose unity on Asians. Behind this dissimilarity were subtle differences in the pan-Asianist theorists' understandings of the origins of Japanese leadership in Asia. As seen above, Mori's and Matsuyama's rendering of world history stressed the shared historical experiences among Asian peoples, including Japanese, in validating Japan's guiding position. By contrast, Nakano and Ono, emphasizing the superiority of Japan and its long-lasting efforts to modernize and protect Asia from Western imperialism, argued that Japan was uniquely capable of leading Asia's modernization. In other words, they regarded Japan's central position in the Co-Prosperity Sphere as the historical legacy of Japan's arduous but successful march to modernity. Nakano explained that Japan endeavored since Meiji "to catch up with the West economically, culturally and militarily so that it could eventually produce a pivotal political power [Japan] to East Asia."[30] Ono emphasized the contrast between Japan, the first and the only Asian nation that correctly understood the Western threat, and "the other regions of East Asia that had remained asleep and dormant."[31] Japan, Ono continued, had no choice but to stand up to assure "the survival of the whole of East Asia in the midst of the Western [threat]."[32]

Assuredness about Japanese supremacy over Asia enabled Nakano and Ono to justify Japan imposing cooperation upon Asian peoples whom they recognized as not necessarily willing participants in the Japanese imperial project of uniting Asia. Unlike Mori and Matsuyama who assumed the "voluntary" participation of Asians in the Japanese-led pan-Asianist movement, Ono clearly recognized other Asian peoples' opposition to Japan's leading role. He lamented that "the unawakened East Asian peoples had mistaken Japan as another imperialistic latecomer capitalist" even though Japan had

fought for the sake of Asian survival.[33] Among those "unawakened" peoples, Ono specifically blamed Qing China which "…failed to understand in good faith" the true intent of Japan and the succeeding Republic of China which "continued to offer resistance in desperation at the instigation of the countries like the United States and Britain."[34] Ono argued, however, that the leadership of Asia was a destined and inescapable mission given to Japan, the only Asian nation with the capacity to counter the West. Hence, Ono insisted that Asia must unite under Japanese leadership. An important omission, which weakens his argument, is the sheer brutality of Japan's invading forces in China.

Nakano's belief in Japan's supremacy over Asia was reflected in his vision of a three-level hierarchy in Asia with Japan at the top. In his conception, the top place in the hierarchy belonged to those nations that possessed advanced technology and military power and thus were "in the position of guiding the others…"[35] The second place belonged to independent Asian nations that required guidance to achieve further development. In third place were Asian peoples within East and Southeast Asia who suffered from Western colonial rule. Nakano claimed that Japan was in the first position, responsible for guiding the second group and freeing the third group from the shackles of Western imperialism, and establishing peace and order within the Co-Prosperity Sphere. He further stated: "each nation's equal sovereignty must not contradict the tutoring relationship among the nations."[36] Thus, Nakano, as a member of the guiding nation, imposed this three-level hierarchy despite "equal sovereignty" within the "tutoring relationship" on Asian peoples. In short, Nakano and Ono were more assertive about Japan's role of guiding other Asian peoples because the two regarded them ignorant, vulnerable, and inferior to Japan.

While the abovementioned four intellectuals envisioned a hierarchical Asian order with Japan at the top, Murai Tōjūrō and Sakuta Sōichi assigned the leading role to both Japan and Manchukuo. Murai, Professor of Politics, claimed that "*daitōa* (Greater East Asia) is not only objectively capable of and has good reasons for uniting as one—due to its shared world historical mission (to revolutionise the Western dominated world), and geographical, economic and cultural reasons—but also is destined to unite due to its shared historical experiences and culture."[37] In Murai's conception, the shared "destiny" and shared moral principles were the key to a new form of Asian unity, which must replace the Western nations' unity that was based on each constituent nation's "self-centred utilitarianism."[38]

Murai believed that the Japan–Manchukuo bond must lead to new Asian unity because "Japan is the only *dōgi kokka* (ethical nation) that has embraced morality since the country's birth" and because "the Japan–Manchukuo alliance was as strong as that between blood-related brothers."[39] He also likened the relationship between Japan and Manchukuo to that of a parent and a child.[40] Hence, while placing both Japan and Manchukuo at the center of a new order, Murai clearly posited Japan's superiority.

Agreeing with Murai, Honorary Professor of Economics and Kendai's Vice President Sakuta's pan-Asianist vision was based on the concept of *hakkō ichiu* ("eight corners of the world under one roof") with Japan and Manchukuo as its center.[41] In his view, the two countries were not equal but possessed different yet equally important complementary roles in the creation of a new order. Japan was the only country capable of creating the multiethnic community of the Greater East Asia, while Manchukuo was expected to offer a working model as an embodiment of the principle of "ethnic harmony." Sakuta asserted:

> The true purpose of the establishment of Manchukuo as an Asian state that was created under the guidance of Heaven is to firmly establish the integrity [as a state], unite its peoples, cooperate with Japan, build the foundation of the state so its peoples will enjoy stable life, administer the state, become the continental fortress for reviving Asia, and to contribute to the global project of *hakkō ichiu* and the creation of the harmonious world.[42]

Entrusting this unique mission to Manchukuo, Sakuta placed Manchukuo in the pivotal position in the ongoing pan-Asianist project. Unlike Nakano and Ono, Sakuta did not indicate a clear tutoring relationship among Asian peoples. For, in Sakuta's understanding, if Manchukuo could showcase the ideal of pan-Asian unity, peoples throughout Asia would naturally cooperate with Japan and Manchukuo in freeing Asia from subordination to the West. Hence, both Murai and Sakuta emphasized the need for cooperation between Japan and Manchukuo as motors of change, while differing from each other as to the nature of the Japan–Manchukuo relationship.

Honorary Professor of Philosophy Nishi Shin'ichirō's communal vision of pan-Asianism adds further variety to the conceptions of pan-Asianism expressed by Kendai faculty members. Considering all peoples living in Manchukuo as the "Emperor's children," Nishi emphasized the equality of all residents under the imperial family's

benevolent rule.[43] However, as seen in the following passage, Nishi argued that imperial loyalty came first: "Rather than intending to create an ideal society by harmonizing the peoples of five different ethnicities, Manchukuo people must nurture loyalty to their emperor whose benevolence impartially reaches out to everyone without fail. Only then, can peoples of different backgrounds nurture companionship and prosper together as the Emperor's children."[44] In this statement, it should be noted that Nishi referred to Puyi, the Manchukuo Emperor, not Japan's. In that sense, he regarded Manchukuo as an independent polity. Nevertheless, he added that Puyi's sovereignty only existed when he was embraced by the Japanese imperial order. In the last analysis, although Nishi's vision of Manchukuo's harmonious relationships was communal rather than hierarchical, it ultimately hinged on the centrality of the Japanese imperial order. This tendency could be extended to his conception of pan-Asianism because he believed Manchukuo could offer a model for the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

Despite differences, there were three overall commonalities in these seven Japanese Kendai intellectuals' conceptions of pan-Asianism. First, they fundamentally rejected the contemporary world order of Western imperialism. Second, they assumed that history had reached a turning point away from the Western dominated "*kindai*" to a new era of change. Third, they concurred that Japan will play a special role in the ongoing worldwide transition. In other words, they all emphasized Japan's centrality—Japan was situated at the top of the hierarchy, at the center of *hakkō ichiu*, or at the special position as the home of the Emperor, the father of all Asian peoples. These common characteristics of pan-Asianist thinking were reflected in their perceptions of Manchukuo as well because these scholars regarded Manchukuo as a part of the bigger project of creating the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. It followed that Manchukuo, as an integral part of Japan's imperial project, must also be led by Japan or cooperate closely with Japan.

Kendai University's Non-Japanese Faculty Members' Conceptions of Pan-Asianism

Despite Ishiwara's recommendation that Kendai invites scholars and anticolonial activists from around Asia, as noted above, non-Japanese instructors constituted a small minority within the faculty. Although as many as 45 non-Japanese members were affiliated with Kendai at some point, KURI's monthly newsletters show that only a handful

of them actively participated in research and teaching at Kendai. Moreover, only three documents extant today record their contemporary views on pan-Asianism—one by a Chinese scholar Li Songwu and two by the Korean nationalist Ch'oe Namsŏn.[45]

Li Songwu joined the Kendai faculty in 1938 as Research Associate and became Associate Professor in the following year. After graduating from Beijing University with a degree in history in 1933, Li worked for Beijing University's Law School as a researcher focusing on the economic history of China. He moved to Kendai by invitation but was not proficient in Japanese. All the three articles he wrote for KURI's monthly newsletters were written and published in Chinese. Nonetheless, language apparently did not overly hinder collegiate relations. He wrote that he made a research trip to Japan with a few other Kendai faculty members who helped him communicate in Japanese. He also met many Japanese scholars in Kyoto and Tokyo who were fluent in Chinese.[46] There was also a long tradition of East Asian peoples communicating with each other through written language in the absence of a commonly spoken language.[47] It is notable that Li and other Chinese-speaking faculty members had the option of publishing their writing in Chinese. It may show the cultural tolerance of KURI. On another level, however, the institute valued the use of Chinese as a means of fulfilling one of its missions: producing materials for mass education in Manchukuo. In fact, KURI was undertaking a project of translating some of its research results into Chinese and publishing them for "the youth of Manchukuo, especially new government clerks."[48] The planned publication date was June 1943; however, the outcome is not certain. As seen next, Li's pro-Japanese perspective served perfectly for such a purpose.

The largest piece of Li's contribution to KURI's monthly newsletters was full of his praise for the Japanese Empire. Titled "Cultural and Intellectual History of Manchuria," and published in December 1943, well into Japan's war with the Allies, it reads like a polemic in its enthusiastic support for Japan. After describing the changes in culture in Manchuria from nomadic and agricultural to the current state of civilization, Li stated that currently Manchuria's culture was flourishing under the Manchukuo government. "Not only agriculture but also industry and business were simultaneously developing; and, both urban cities and rural villages were prospering."[49] He then praised "our beloved Japanese people . . . who gave us all of these things."[50] In return, he continued, "we must give our all to further develop Manchukuo's culture as a whole and bring together the different cultures of various peoples and all of our efforts so we could definitely win the sacred war."[51]

Li also defended Japan's war effort and identified the United States and Britain as the enemies of Asia. "We must think about it. We are living comfortably behind the battle lines. Who gave this life to us? Was it the heavens? Was it something we had achieved on our own? We owe all of this happy life to our beloved imperial army [of Japan]."[52] After this emotional statement, Li argued that the situation would have been disastrous at the hands of the United States and Britain and again insisted that "the imperial army was fighting the sacred war, killing enemies and trying to drive out Americans and British from East Asia for the sake of our future, development, liberation and survival."[53] Here, Li omitted any mention of China as the enemy of the imperial army, although China had been a crucial member of the Allies and the bulk of Japan's army was deployed in China. Furthermore, Li ignored the fact that China had been at full-blown war against Japan since 1937.

Like Kendai's Japanese faculty members, Li too viewed Japan as the driving force in the ongoing pan-Asianist project of realizing "ethnic harmony" in Manchukuo and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. However, Li's understanding of the relationship between Manchukuo and Japan differed slightly from that of his Japanese colleagues. The central message in his article was that the peoples of Manchukuo must work hard to create a new culture. "We, the peoples of Manchukuo, relied upon our beloved nation Japan's support, guidance and assistance to found a new country. Now, isn't it we who must change, prepare for anything, exert efforts, cultivate our minds, train ourselves, and overall, spiritually reform?"[54] This passage implies that Japan had fulfilled its role by founding the Manchukuo state and that the peoples of the new independent country now had to assume responsibility for its future. While positing a mentoring relationship between Japan and Manchukuo, Li stressed the necessity of the peoples of Manchukuo taking the initiative.

What should Manchukuo's peoples do to create the new culture of "ethnic harmony"? It is in his attempt to answer this question that one can detect slight but important divergence from the Japan-centered pan-Asianism expounded by his Japanese colleagues. That is, Li clearly expected that the Chinese culture and people would play a decisive role in the nation-building of Manchukuo. Throughout his article Li drew heavily from Confucius and Mencius. By copiously citing these ancient Chinese philosophers, Li appears to believe that the diverse population of Manchukuo could all learn lessons from China's past. As seen above, it is notable that when Li used the words "we" and "us," he appears to include the non-Japanese population of Manchukuo. In the passages cited above, he established a

clear-cut distinction between "we," the peoples of Manchukuo, and the Japanese. The majority of Manchukuo's population was Han Chinese or other Chinese-speaking minorities. If we see Li's article as targeting the Chinese-speaking population, the use of Confucius and Mencius appears unexceptional. However, publishing in KURI's newsletter, Li must have been aware of another audience: his fellow Kendai researchers including Japanese colleagues who could read Chinese. Thus, if we see this article as Li's message to his colleagues at Kendai, the extensive use of ancient Chinese philosophers could be interpreted as his subtle way of claiming the centrality of Chinese culture in the ongoing pan-Asianist project.

One does not find the pro-Japanese outlook of Li's work in Ch'oe Namsŏn's research. As noted above, Ch'oe was one of the three academics whom Kendai invited to join the faculty on Ishiwara's recommendation. It appears that the other two—Bao Mingqian and Su Yixin from China—were not involved in Kendai's teaching and research in any meaningful way by the time KURI was established in 1940. Their names do not appear on the lists of instructors of courses offered on campus as published in KURI's newsletters; nor do we find publications or any other evidence of their research activities as Kendai scholars.[55] By contrast, Ch'oe actively engaged in his historical research while at Kendai between 1938 and 1943. Through KURI, he published two articles on the ancient religious cultures of Manchuria and northeast Asia. Moreover, he apparently was an active participant in the institute. KURI's monthly newsletters show that Ch'oe belonged to at least three research groups between April 1941 and August 1942—groups that focused on the issue of *minzoku*, Eastern languages, and Manchurian-Mongolian culture. He was a leader of the last group that consisted of six other scholars, all Japanese.[56]

The thrust of Ch'oe's research offers an alternative perspective on Asia. Put more directly, Ch'oe challenged the Japan-centered view of Asia endorsed by the Kendai faculty. He accepted the premise that Asians share many things in common but provided a different idea of what those commonalities were. As seen above, for some of Kendai's Japanese scholars, it was the historic experience of the Western encroachment that Asians share and thus serves as a ground for pan-Asian unity. By highlighting the common enemy, they sought to validate Japan's dominant position in Asia as they believed that Japan with its modernized state and military was the only capable leader. By contrast, Ch'oe looked back to ancient religious customs to find commonalities among the societies of northeast Asia. In his 1939 piece, he examined various names of a mountain in Manchuria,

contemporaneously called *chōhakusan*, or Long White Mountain. He found that this mountain had been named differently by peoples residing in the surrounding areas but equally seen as a sacred place. Among those peoples Ch'oe introduced were the Jurchens of the Jin Dynasty (1115–1234), the Manchus of the Qing Dynasty (1644–1912), the Han Chinese of the preceding dynasties, Koreans and Mongolians.[57] Despite the differences in language, culture, and time, these societies all held great reverence for the sun, regarding it synonymous with the heavens, gods, and the sovereign, and saw the mountain as the sacred dwelling place of the sun. In tribute to one of the ancient names of Long White Mountain, Ch'oe proposed designating northeast Asian culture "Purham" culture.[58] In his view, this cultural zone covered northeast Asia centered on Manchuria. However, it is interesting to note that he did not mention the Japanese in his explanation of the shared religious worship of Long White Mountain within what he termed the "Purham" cultural zone. Indeed, the Japanese, separated by the sea, had had no contact with this mountain until the beginning of the twentieth century. Ch'oe thus was indirectly emphasizing the non-Japanese past of the culture that existed in this region.

Ch'oe's thesis challenges the very foundation of *kōdō* ("imperial way")—the idea that Japan was a unique nation with its divine emperor who was the direct descendant of the sun goddess. Ch'oe's article shows that many societies had linked their sovereign and the sun god. His list of examples included not just the societies of the "Purham" cultural zone but also from ancient India and Rome.[59] After stating that such a tendency was "…universal at a global level…," he stressed that the reverence for the sun had been particularly strong and prevalent in northeast Asia.[60] Ch'oe then added that "the idea that Japan's imperial family had descended from the sun goddess…falls into the shared tradition of this cultural zone."[61] By emphasizing the universality of this religious tradition, Ch'oe was refuting the uniqueness of the Japanese imperial leadership with which the Japanese state legitimated its rule over Asia.

Ch'oe's challenge to the Japan-centered perspective appeared again in his 1941 publication in which he went so far as to highlight the Korean past of Manchuria. He began by noting how the wind had been deified in various cultures including China, India, and Japan. After thus placing Japan's religious tradition in a broader context, he expounded on his main topic: *sui no kami*, the highest god in Goguryeo, an ancient kingdom that ruled the northern part of the Korean peninsula and Manchuria. While the national identity of

Goguryeo continued to spur debates, Ch'oe assumed it was a Korean kingdom.[62] He had found the mention of the god *sui no kami* in *Romance of the Three Kingdoms*, a fourteenth-century Chinese historical novel; however, this text did not make clear what exactly *sui no kami* was. Ch'oe's etymological investigation of the god's name led him to conclude that *sui no kami* referred to the god of the east wind that signified the arrival of spring to Manchuria.[63] Moreover, he found that Manchuria's god of wind had originated from an ancient Korean kingdom. By extension, Ch'oe, as a Korean scholar, appears to have been staking a claim to Manchuria's past.

In 1941, Ch'oe was assigned to teach a course on the culture of Manchuria and Mongolia to the first entering class.[64] Although no records of his course survive, there are references, which are not entirely consistent, in two Korean students' memoirs. Jin Wŏn-Jung did not have an opportunity to attend Ch'oe's lecture as he was a member of the third entering class. But, based on what he had heard from fellow Korean students, Jin writes that Ch'oe expounded his theory of "Purham" culture in the course. Jin implies that Ch'oe taught the course for one year.[65] A member of the second entering class Hong Ch'un-Shik' gives a different account on the length of Ch'oe's course. According to Hong, Ch'oe delivered a lecture only once as the Kendai administration removed him from the instructor's position after the first day of class. Hong explains that it was because Ch'oe directly opposed the view of Manchurian history advocated by a Japanese Kendai faculty member Inaba Iwakichi. Hong writes: "[w]hile Professor Inaba taught us that Goguryeo was a kingdom of ethnic Manchus and not of Koreans, [Professor Ch'oe] told a story that…Koreans originated in Manchuria, gradually migrated southward, and eventually found Japan."[66] Unfortunately, there is no official record that explains what actually happened to Ch'oe's course. What we do know from these accounts is that Ch'oe did not hesitate to share his alternative perspective on Manchuria and Asia with his students and that the administration intervened at some point.

Ch'oe's career at Kendai reveals that while not absolute, Kendai's academic culture was perhaps uniquely open compared to that of the wartime Japanese homeland. As seen in his articles, Ch'oe did not explicitly defy the Japanese Empire. Nevertheless, written in proficient and sophisticated Japanese, his argument comes across clearly. The implication of his thesis—that he was challenging the Japan-centered view of Asia—must have been clear to any Japanese scholar who read these pieces. Kendai, with its explicit commitment to the principle of "ethnic harmony," created the space for the transnational

exchange of ideas. Ch'oe seized this opportunity to articulate his alternative regional vision. The fact that Ch'oe could publish these works and remain on the faculty shows the degree of academic freedom allowed at Kendai. Furthermore, even after publishing these articles, he was selected by the administration to teach a course in 1941. This appointment seems to indicate that the Kendai regime, at least at the beginning of 1941, was willing to expose its students to the alternative view of Asia that Ch'oe was putting forth. Even after the administrations' subsequent intervention in his course, Ch'oe remained on the Kendai faculty. He continued to hold informal "lectures" at his residence for Kendai's Korean students. Not only that, he continued to lead one of the research groups at KURI until February 1943 when he quit the school for an unknown reason.[67]

Conclusion

At Kendai, a unique institution that was relatively removed from armed conflict until late into the war, scholars from Japan, China, and Korea were charged with the task of creating a new theory of pan-Asianism that could unite peoples of Manchukuo and Asia more broadly. Joining in this endeavor of their own volition and expounding on pan-Asianism, the nine faculty members discussed above seemed to have had their own agenda. The resulting discourse on pan-Asianism and Manchukuo in the Kendai faculty allowed differences rather than establishing a single theory even amidst Japan's war. Variation of views among Japanese faculty members was less impressive. One essential agreement was the central role that Japan must play in the ongoing pan-Asianist project, but their writings also exhibited slight differences. Most Japanese scholars imagined Asian unity to be a hierarchical order led by the Japanese and insisted that Asian peoples must cooperate under Japanese leadership. Others clung to the egalitarian idealism and envisioned a communal order in Asia in which Asian peoples' participation in the creation of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere would be voluntary. Still, Japanese members' views more or less conformed to the general trend of Japan's official discourse of pan-Asianism in the early 1940s.

Non-Japanese scholars' writings added greater variety to the Kendai faculty's discussion of pan-Asianism. Li's emphasis on the Chinese initiative was obviously compatible with the official pronouncement of Japan-led Asian unity. At the same time, by highlighting what the Chinese people with their rich culture could contribute, Li appeared to lay claim for the Chinese population to play an expanded role

in Manchukuo. Unlike Li's subtle departure from the Japan-centered conceptions, Ch'oe's writings defied the official line of thinking more explicitly. He contextualized and refuted the Japanese claim to the unique, divine imperial rule—not once but twice. He also freely put forth his argument that Manchuria had been home to Korean people in the ancient past. It is clear that Ch'oe was not wielding a pen in service of the empire. Under the limitation of the colonial setting, he—and to a certain degree, one can argue that Li, too—managed to exercise intellectual freedom to express ideas that diverged from the ethnocentric pan-Asianism prevalent in Japan's official pronouncements.

The transnational endeavor of creating a new theory of pan-Asianism at the Kendai faculty certainly had its limitations. The ethnic imbalance of the faculty body betrayed the schools' pronounced commitment to pan-Asian unity on the basis of equality. In addition, many of the Japanese faculty members were prone to the wartime need of supporting the chauvinistic rhetoric of Japan's official pan-Asianism. Nonetheless, it is notable that the school administration allowed its faculty to express different perspectives—although with obvious limits, as seen in the removal of Ch'oe from the classroom. As shown above, the variation among the Kendai faculty members' conceptions of pan-Asianism and Manchukuo suggests that the transnational character of Manchukuo and Kendai allowed interchanges of ideas among the Asian intellectuals. In that sense, Kendai faculty members were not merely replicating the official version of pan-Asianism as an imperial ideology. At least some of them were exploring different meanings for the ideal of pan-Asian unity, and the faculty body endorsed those differences by including them in its Research Institute's newsletters.

Notes

1. The "Chinese" here refers to the background of the students who spoke Mandarin Chinese. The majority of this group were ethnic Han Chinese, but it also included ethnic minorities such as Manchu and Hui.
2. The principle of *minzoku kyōwa* can be translated as "racial harmony" or "ethnic harmony." The Japanese term *minzoku* was not a purely biological concept of race. In terms of race or *jinshu*, the official discourse of wartime Japan claimed that there was only one race in East Asia. Focusing on the 1920s and 1930s, Kevin M. Doak translates *minzoku* as "ethnicity," "as a replacement for what was widely perceived as the failure of the nineteenth-century biological concept of race." Kevin M. Doak, "Building National Identity through Ethnicity: Ethnology in Wartime Japan and After," *Journal of Japanese Studies* 27, no. 1 (2001): 4. I follow Doak's suggestion and use "ethnicity" to translate *minzoku*.

3. One example can be found in John Dower's analysis of a massive report published by the Population and Race Section of the Research Bureau of the Ministry of Health and Welfare in July 1943, *An Investigation of Global Policy with the Yamato Race as Nucleus*. He concludes that the report is "an unusually frank statement of the relationship between Japan's expansionist policies and its assumption of racial and cultural supremacy—that is, of the assumptions of permanent hierarchy and inequality among peoples and nations that lay at the heart of what the Japanese really meant by such slogans as 'Pan-Asianism' and 'co-prosperity'." John W. Dower, *War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), p. 265.
4. Cemil Aydin, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007) takes a global approach to anti-Westernism by comparing pan-Islamism and pan-Asianism. Masafumi Yonetani, *Ajia/Nihon: Shikō no furonteia* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2006) and Sven Saaler and J. Victor Koschmann, eds, *Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders* (New York: Routledge, 2007) both focus mainly on Japanese pan-Asianism but examine a variety of conceptions articulated by progressive thinkers such as Rōyama Masamichi and Miki Kiyoshi, feminist internationalist Inoue Hideko, and a religious organization Ōmotokyō. Eri Hotta, *Pan-Asianism and Japan's War 1931–1945* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007) examines different and changing articulations of pan-Asianism in Japan's wartime policy and makes a strong claim that it shaped Japan's national policy throughout the Fifteen-Year War. More specifically, she argues that pan-Asianism functioned as "a consensus-building tool for an otherwise divided government" throughout the years between 1931 and 1945 (p. 226). More recently, Takashi Fujitani, *Race for Empire: Koreans as Japanese and Japanese as Americans during World War II* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011) showed that the Government-General of Korea as well as the media committed themselves to the ideal of creating a multiethnic empire to fill the manpower shortage under the total war condition. He also uncovered the subjective experiences of Koreans and the support of some for Japan's pan-Asianist policies and greater assimilation.
5. Research that focused on political and economic relationships in the Japanese Empire has revealed exploitative aspects of Japanese policies and presence in Manchuria and Manchukuo. Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie, eds, *The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895–1937* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989) includes articles by Ramon H. Myers, Nakagane Katsuji, and Alvin D. Coox that particularly focus on Manchuria and Manchukuo. Yoshihisa Tak Matsusaka, *The Making of Japanese Manchuria, 1904–1932* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2001) is an expansive examination of Japan's exploitative motives behind its development project in Manchuria from defense, political, and economic perspectives. Shin'ichi Yamamuro, *Manchuria Under Japanese Dominion*, trans. Joshua A. Fogel (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), originally published in Japanese in 1993, provides a political history of the region. He shows that the collaboration between Japanese and non-Japanese political figures brought benefits only to the former.

6. A pioneering work in this school is Prasenjit Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003). Rejecting the national scope of Japanese imperialism, Duara examines the origins of Manchukuo's ideological construction in a broader context of the emerging discourse of Asianism—both perceived by Japanese and Chinese. Another example is Mariko Asano Tamanoi, ed., *Crossed Histories: Manchuria in the Age of Empire* (Honolulu: Association for Asian Studies and University of Hawaii Press, 2005). Focusing on nongovernmental actors as subjects of study, authors call into question the assumption of necessary opposition and even clear-cut boundaries between the colonizer and the colonized. Norman Smith, *Resisting Manchukuo: Chinese Women Writers and the Japanese Occupation* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007) and Hyun Ok Park, *Two Dreams in One Bed: Empire, Social Life, and the Origins of the North Korean Revolution in Manchuria* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), both challenge a dichotomist characterization of the Chinese and Korean responses as collaboration or resistance, respectively. Smith does this by demonstrating that Chinese women's literature that flourished in Manchukuo until 1943 represented two different forms of resistance. Park examines the social relations of Korean migrants and shows that they took advantage of the competition between Japanese and Chinese powers and pursued their interests of becoming landowners.
7. Mark R. Peattie, *Ishiwara Kanji and Japan's Confrontation with the West* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975) is a comprehensive political biography of Ishiwara Kanji. It does not, however, mention Ishiwara's involvement in the planning of Kenkoku University. Even the ten-volume collection of Ishiwara's writings, *Ishiwara Kanji senshū*, does not contain any single document related to the planning of Kendai, though his mention of the school appears in a few entries.
8. Ishiwara left Manchukuo in August 1932 after playing a significant role in the foundation of the state. Subsequently, his military career was mainly associated with the Japanese Army in Tokyo. Although he was appointed Vice Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army in September 1937, by then, the basic principles and structure of Kendai had been already determined by the planning committee. Peattie, *Ishiwara Kanji*, Chapter V. Manzō Yuji, *Kenkoku daigaku nenpyō* (Tokyo: Kenkoku Daigaku Dōsōkai, 1981), p. 19.
9. Takayuki Mishina in *Kendaishi shiryō 2* (Tokyo: Kenkoku Daigaku Dōsōkai, 1967), p. 6; Mishina in Yuji, *Kenkoku daigaku nenpyō*, p. 17.
10. Ishiwara Kanji, "Kokubō seiji ron" (1942) in Yuji, *Kenkoku daigaku nenpyō*, p. 118.
11. Mishina in *Kendaishi shiryō 2*, p. 6; Mishina in Yuji, *Kenkoku daigaku nenpyō*, p. 17.
12. Ibid. The proposal of recruiting these prominent figures from around the world was simply impractical in the context of Japan's expansion in East Asia as well as its deteriorating relations with the major powers of the world. However, as historian Fumiaki Shishida concludes based on his interview with former Chinese students, Ishiwara's emphasis on intellectual open-mindedness was materialized as a uniquely tolerant academic culture where students could read even Marxist works that were banned

outside the campus. Fumiaki Shishida, *Budō no kyōikuryoku: Manshūkoku kenkoku daigaku ni okeru budō kyōiku* (Tokyo: Nihon Tosho Senta, 2005), pp. 126–7.

13. According to historian Shin'ichi Yamamuro, Gu Cixiang was a graduate of Tokyo Higher Normal School. Yamamuro, *Manchuria Under Japanese Dominion*, p. 172.
14. Ryūtarō Nemoto in *Kendaishi shiryō 1* (Tokyo: Kenkoku Daigaku Dōsōkai, 1966, p. 8; Nemoto in Yuji, *Kenkoku daigaku nenpyō*, p. 62.
15. Ibid.
16. Both the May Fourth Movement in China and the March First Movement in Korea were major anti-Japanese, national independence movements, respectively in China and Korea.
17. Nemoto in *Kendaishi shiryō 1*, p. 8; Nemoto in Yuji, *Kenkoku daigaku nenpyō*, p. 63.
18. Ibid.
19. Historian Eriko Miyazawa quotes one of the planning committee members Fushinosuke Ehara for this explanation. Eriko Miyazawa, *Kenkoku daigaku to minzoku kyōwa* (Tokyo: Kazama Shobo, 1997), pp. 98–9.
20. Nemoto in *Kendaishi shiryō 1*, p. 8; Nemoto in Yuji, *Kenkoku daigaku nenpyō*, p. 63.
21. Miyazawa, *Kenkoku daigaku to minzoku kyōwa*, pp. 99–101. Miyazawa draws the numbers of faculty from "Kenkoku daigaku yōran" (Shinkyō: Kenkoku daigaku kenkyūin, 1941).
22. These numbers are drawn from *Kenkoku Daigaku Dōsōkai meibo* published in 1955. In this same period, a little more than 1000 students were enrolled at Kendai. The ratio of the faculty member to the students was one to three. These sources do not explain this improbably large ratio of the faculty. A member of the first entering class from Taiwan, Li Shuiqing, later testifies that there were more faculty members than students during his first year at Kendai. Shuiqing Li, *Dongbei banian huigulu* Trans. Kenzō Takazawa (Tokyo: Kenkoku Daigaku Dōsōkai, 2007), p. 31. In *Kenkoku Daigaku Dōsōkai meibo* published in 2003, the number of faculty further increases to 400. This number seems to include not only faculty in residence but also affiliated scholars and other staff members. The number of faculty in residence is not known. The incredibly large ratio, however, was not particularly unusual if we compare it with other colonial universities in the Japanese Empire. For instance, the ratio at Taihoku Imperial University in Taiwan was three to five. Many scholars were hired not so much for the purpose of education as they were for the purpose of research and information-gathering in service of the Japanese Empire.
23. Katsumi Mori, "Daitōa kyōeiken no rekishisei," *Shin chitsujo kensetsu sōsho* vol. 9 (Shinkyō: Manshū teikoku kyōwakai, 1942).
24. Shigejirō Matsuyama, "Daitōa kensetsu no sekaishi teki haikei," *Shin chitsujo kensetsu sōsho* vol. 4 (Shinkyō: Manshū teikoku kyōwakai, 1942), p. 50.
25. Ibid., p. 51.
26. Mori, "Daitōa kyōeiken no rekishisei," p. 72.
27. Matsuyama, "Daitōa kensetsu no sekaishi teki haikei," pp. 31–2.
28. Ibid., p. 43.
29. Mori, "Daitōa kyōeiken no rekishisei," pp. 50–1.

30. Sei'ichi Nakano, "Manshūkoku minzoku seisaku eno shoyōsei," *Kenkyū kihō* 1 (1941): 36.
31. Kazuhito Ono, "Manshū kenkoku to nippon: Nippon no taiman kōdō ni kansuru jakkan no rekishiteki kaiko," *Kenkyū kihō* 3 (1942): 161.
32. Ibid., p. 175.
33. Ibid., p. 161.
34. Ibid., pp. 176–7.
35. Nakano, "Manshūkoku minzoku seisaku eno shoyōsei," p. 34.
36. Ibid., p. 43.
37. Tōjūrō Murai, "Daitōa kyōeiken no kōiki hōchitsujo," *Shin chitsujo kensetsu sōsho* vol. 10 (Shinkyo: Manshūkoku Kyōwakai, 1942), p. 14.
38. Ibid., p. 16.
39. Ibid., quoted from p. 24 and p. 16 respectively.
40. Ibid., p. 25.
41. Sōichi Sakuta, *Manshū kenkoku no genri oyobi hongi*, ed. Tōjūrō Murai (Shinkyō: Manshū Tomiyama Bo, 1944), p. 84.
42. Ibid., pp. 83–4.
43. Shin'ichirō Nishi, "Kenkoku seishin to ōdō," *Kenkyū kihō* 3(1942): 86.
44. Ibid., p. 86.
45. By the time KURI was established in 1940, Bao Mingqian and Su Yixin from China, who had been recruited in 1937 together with Ch'oe Namsŏn, returned to China. See note 55.
46. Songwu Li, "Duri de jingguo yu ganxiang," *Kenkoku daigaku kenkyūin geppō* 8 (1941): 6.
47. For more on this unique mode of communication, see D. R. Howland, *Borders of Chinese Civilisation: Geography and History at Empire's End* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996), pp. 43–4. Howland calls this mode of communication "brush talking."
48. *Kenkoku daigaku kenkyūin geppō* 26 (1943): 4.
49. Songwu Li, "Manzhou wenhua sixiang shi," *Kenkoku daigaku kenkyūin geppō* 36 (1943): 19.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid., p. 29.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid., p. 27.
55. Historian Eriko Miyazawa explains that the Kendai administration allowed Bao and Su to return to China sometime before 1941 while keeping their affiliations with the school. This was because some members of the administration sympathized with these Chinese scholars who lived away from their original homes in Beijing. Miyazawa, *Kenkoku daigaku to minzoku kyōwa*, p. 99.
56. *Kenkoku daigaku kenkyūin geppō* 8 (1941): p. 7; *Kenkoku daigaku kenkyūin geppō* 19 (1942): 8.
57. Namsŏn Ch'oe, *Tōhō kominzoku no shinsei kan'nen ni tsuite* (Shinkyō: Kenkoku Daigaku Kenkyūin, 1939), pp. 4–5.
58. Ibid., p. 22.
59. Ibid., p. 21.
60. Ibid., p. 21.
61. Ibid., p. 21.

62. While the Korean societies have viewed Goguryeo as a Korean kingdom, the PRC holds that it was part of the larger Chinese empire.
63. Namsŏn Ch'oe, "Sui no kami," *Kenkoku daigaku kenkyūin geppō* 9 (1941): 3.
64. *Kenkoku daigaku kenkyūin geppō* 6 (1941): 2.
65. Wŏn-Jung Jin, "Kaiko to sekkei," in *Kankirei—manshū kenkoku daigaku zaikan dōsō bunshū*. Trans. Ŭn-Suk' K'im and Yoshikazu Kusano (Kenkoku Daigaku Dōsōkai, 2004), pp. 108–9.
66. Ch'un-Shik' Hong, *Hankyore no sekai: Aa nihon* (Ansan, 1999), p. 33.
67. *Kenkoku daigaku kyōshokuin roku*, ed. Shōjirō Suzuki (Tokyo: Kenkoku Daigaku Dōsōkai, 2007), pp. 76, 94, 111.

3

The "Siberian Internment" and the Transnational History of the Early Cold War Japan, 1945–56

Sherzod Muminov

Introduction: Toward a Transnational History of the Collapse of the Japanese Empire

It is one of the overlooked ironies of history that Japan's imperial project both started and ended in northeast China. Another irony—or historical coincidence—lies in the fact that Japan's quest for empire had both its beginning and end in confrontations with the same country. While its victory over the ailing Russian Empire in 1905 set Japan on the path to imperial expansion, it was Soviet Russia that delivered, at the end of World War II, the last blow to Japan's empire. In a matter of four decades, the tables of history had turned Japan from the glorious victor in the Russo-Japanese War to a "defeated nation."

Victors may have been vanquished, but the entanglement between Japan and the Soviet Union (and its successor, the Russian Federation) has remained crucial for decades thereafter.[1] The relationship between these "distant neighbors" defined, perhaps more than any other, the history of northeast Asia in the first half of the twentieth century.[2] Following World War II, the Japan–USSR nexus remained vital to the postwar order in East Asia, albeit overshadowed soon by the US–Japan alliance. Any attempt to comprehend the initial postwar decade without taking this entanglement into account risks reinforcing the US-centered bias in Japan's modern history. In this chapter, I aim to bring the Soviet connection back into this history through the lens of the "Siberian Internment" of about 600,000 former Japanese servicemen and civilians in Soviet labor camps (1945–56). Following the Kwantung Army's crushing defeat to the Red Army in August 1945, former soldiers and officers were transported to Soviet camps, where they were interned, exploited, and indoctrinated for several years.

This forced migration, captivity, and repatriation of Japanese citizens was more than a bilateral affair; it was a multidimensional encounter between Japan, the USSR, and the United States during the formative postwar decade. It is all the more surprising, therefore, that historians writing in the English language have largely overlooked the topic in the last decades, whereas in Japan and Russia there has been a boom in publications on the Siberian Internment.[3] The transnational flows of images and ideas that accompanied the movement of Japanese soldiers from Japan to Manchuria, from there to the Soviet Union, and finally back to Japan played a crucial role in how Japan remembered its past and imagined its future in the new global order. To outline these flows is the primary purpose of this chapter, which also aims to partly address this gap in the English-language literature.

Historian Sebastian Conrad has emphasized how even within the seemingly transnational environment in occupied Japan and Germany, whereby the futures of the two countries were effectively decided by the consensus of several victorious powers, war memories soon became fixated on the relationship with one country, the United States.[4] This was especially true in the case of Japan, where the US Occupation administration (GHQ) governed the country almost singlehandedly. The GHQ effectively drove "a wedge" between the prewar and the postwar periods, reducing Japan's 15-year imperial project in Asia to the "Pacific War" with the United States.[5] Perhaps because the US Occupation of Japan in 1945–52 was a unique experiment in nation-building, its history has also been preoccupied with *the nation*. This narrow focus on nations and relations between them overlooks the links and entanglements that occur across, beyond, and despite national boundaries, especially in analyzing a period where the very definition of what constituted the "Japanese nation" (*Nippon kokumin*) was redefined following the empire's collapse. Without attempting to rewrite the history of the period, I argue that the Siberian Internment and its representations in Japan present us with fresh points of view for questioning this nation-centered approach to history, and in explaining how this "tunnel vision" came to prominence in postwar Japan.

There are at least three ways in which the memory and history of the Siberian Internment can contribute to the transnational history of Japan's early postwar period. First, as a legacy of the Japanese Empire, the Internment can serve as a bridge between the prewar and postwar periods that are often defined in oppositional terms. The *yokuryūsha,* as the former internees in the USSR are known in Japan, bridged this rupture, coming back to the *new* Japan as the "remnants

of empire."[6] In this sense, their experience was somewhat akin to time travel, returning to a Japan of a different historical period and circumstances after years of absence. As a result, the fissure between prewar and postwar periods that they had not witnessed firsthand played out most conspicuously on their lives, and is best analyzed through them. Second, the experiences of the returnees from Siberia demonstrate that in the conception of the new Japan, some narratives and interpretations were favored over other, less convenient stories. The returnees' travails in rejoining the society upon repatriation lift the veil on the turbulent postwar decade in Japan, a brief window when "national and media consensus" on the war was yet to be achieved, and the political sphere was arguably more open and pluralistic than in later decades.[7] In other words, it was a period of political struggles when ideas and ideologies fought for primacy in defining the new Japan. The multiple identities the *yokuryūsha* assumed or were assigned upon return—victims, witnesses, alleged Soviet spies—are testimony to how their Siberian past redefined their role as citizens. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Siberian internees became intermediaries in and victims of the ideological confrontation between the United States and the USSR that started in the late 1940s–early 1950s. As the group most familiar with the Soviet rival, the internees played a vital part in forging the new, anti-communist discourses in Japan, and in informing the public debate with interpretations, images, and perceptions about the USSR. At the same time, they played a major, if often reluctant and passive role in propagating the US Occupation's utmost goal: keeping Japan free of communism and turning it into a "peaceful," "democratic," capitalist nation in the image of the United States. I argue that the returnees' direct association with what can be called "transnational communism" often led to their alienation and marginalization, especially during the "Red Purge," a period of repression and persecution of the Japan Communist Party and other left-wing groups by the GHQ. Returnees from Siberia became drawn into this maelstrom in the late 1940s and early 1950s, jumbled together with the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), unions, and other groups that fell under suspicion during the Red Purge.

Japan's imperial project has been studied well and widely and, although I provide a brief historical summary of Manchukuo below, there is no need here to address in detail the Japanese attempts to build an empire in its own image.[8] Rather, in this chapter I am more interested in the opposite: how as the empire's legacy, the Siberian Internment influenced the ways in which Japan was reinvented

and its history rewritten during the early postwar period, both by the US Occupation administration, and societal and political forces within Japan. I analyze these themes in three core sections that follow this introduction. The first section briefly recounts the history of Manchukuo (*Manshūkoku*), Japan's puppet state in northeast China, and locates the Siberian Internment in the context of Japan's empire. I briefly analyze the so-called repatriation literature (*hikiage bungaku*), stories of flight from Manchukuo that gave rise to narratives of national victimhood. The second section is on the internment; it provides, along with stories of everyday existence in labor camps, an overview of the Soviet propaganda education program known among the internees as the "democratic movement" (*minshu undō*). In this section I challenge the established tendency to reduce camp experiences to a handful of clichés in postwar "literatures of hardship" by crosschecking them against Soviet archival documents. Finally, the third section analyzes the post-repatriation lives of the former internees in the USSR and their entanglement in the web of anticommunist propaganda during the Red Purge. I view the returnees' predicament after repatriation as both emanating from, and helping shape a series of repressive measures toward the JCP and other left-leaning groups.

Manchuria: Where the Empire Began, and Ended

For the historian Louise Young, Manchukuo was at "the heart of the new empire Japan won and then lost."[9] Indeed, in the 1930s, the opportunity to build "a new heaven on earth" on expansive Manchurian plains appealed to many Japanese not simply as a chance to expand beyond the cramped space of the home islands in search for *lebensraum* on the continent.[10] Manchukuo was more than that; it was the embodiment of the country's imperial destiny, as government propaganda argued at the time. Conceived as "an ideal country" (*risōkoku*), Manchukuo would showcase the advantages of Japanese nation-building, development, and rapid modernization; it was the way for Asian nations to escape, under Japan's leadership, the stranglehold of Western imperialism.[11] It thus occupied a special place in the empire, and in the hearts of millions of Japanese. Even today, Manchukuo embodies the nostalgia for Japan's ambitious and failed attempt to build its own empire.[12]

Japan's informal colony in Manchuria occupies a special place in our story, too. Its importance is evident in a question asked in his memoir by Hirade Setsuo, an army doctor interned in the USSR for four years: *Why was the Kwantung Army stationed [in Manchuria] in*

the first place?[13] For many, this question was a way to remind postwar Japan that the Siberian Internment was first of all the fault of the Japanese empire. For others, it contained the guilt and shame of depriving Manchu and Chinese peasants of their land. In any case, the numerous answers they could offer in response to the question all led to Japan's quest for empire. Yet unlike Hirade, not every memoirist had the honesty and courage after the war to admit that they, along with millions of other Japanese, were in Manchuria because they had supported the imperial project in one way or another, that their Siberian journey had actually started in northeast China.

Many farmers and soldiers who ended up in Soviet camps were in Manchukuo as a result of the Japanese government's ambitious designs for populating its "informal colony" with pioneers from the home islands. In 1936, for example, a plan was drawn to achieve the settlement in Manchukuo of one million Japanese families, or five million people in total, within the following 20 years. The logic behind the plan was simple, as summarized by historian Miyawaki Junko: "Japanese home islands were small and overcrowded. Manchuria, to the contrary, was vast and sparsely populated. It would serve everyone well if the landless Japanese farmers were moved to Manchuria and bought land from local farmers at a fair price."[14] However, while on paper the Japanese colonizers emphasized the fair transfer of land, coercion and forcing people out of their land was common.[15] For all the propaganda about Manchukuo where five ethnicities lived in harmony, it was clear who was more privileged than others.

These privileges were created to encourage Japanese migration to Manchukuo. For many Japanese pioneers (*kaitakusha*), the primary reason to move to the mainland was the dearth of economic opportunities at home. The 1930s were a turbulent decade for Japan, both politically, marked with "terror and coup d'etat" and assassinations of government leadership, and economically, with the Great Recession's effects keenly felt by the Japanese households. The Japanese village suffered most from these shocks.[16] Many of the pioneers came from large rural families struggling to make ends meet in the overcrowded home economy. Manchukuo, touted by the imperial propaganda as the land of opportunity, presented them with a chance to start anew. Carrying out the ambitious plans of populating the colony, however, proved much more challenging than drawing them. As Louise Young has demonstrated, total mobilization at all levels of society, widespread propaganda campaigns, and thousands of individuals and organizations spreading the government message among the wider population, was necessary for the creation of a "migration machine"

to Manchuria.[17] So was the narrative about the valiant Kwantung Army and pioneers' vigilante groups that ensured the safety of the Japanese population in Manchukuo. The soldiers who were soon to become captives at Soviet hands were stationed to protect the Manchurian "heaven on earth," or, as Hirade pointed out, to advance Japanese colonialism.[18]

Not all soldiers had found their way to Manchukuo through the *akagami*, or military call-up papers. Many, just like the pioneer farmers, had sought to escape the difficult conditions on the home islands, especially during the later years of the war. For example, former internee Katō Kintarō chose to join the Kwantung Army in 1944 because "in the army you could at least eat your fill." Sent to Manchukuo in January 1945, some eight months before the Soviets captured him, Katō felt "as if he had joined the war effort only to become a POW."[19] His story was hardly unique; for thousands of soldiers, Manchukuo was the last hope, a relatively peaceful place where one could escape the deprivations of the wartime home islands.

In short, the reasons for which 2.7 million Japanese had found themselves in Manchuria were as diverse as their personal circumstances. What united them, however, was that they were all invariably tied to the Empire. Manchukuo government bureaucrats, businessmen and entrepreneurs, schoolteachers, pioneers reclaiming land, artists, writers, and other propagandists of colonization, and the Kwantung Army officers and soldiers who created the illusion of security—these people of diverse backgrounds, beliefs, and interests were united in the name of the empire. That theirs was largely a union of convenience, forged and maintained by the overarching imperial project became all too clear when the news of the Soviet attack arrived one August morning.

In what became the last campaign of World War II, three Red Army fronts battle-hardened in the European fronts crossed the Soviet–Manchurian border in the early hours of August 9, 1945, under the general command of Marshal Aleksandr Vasilevsky.[20] They rapidly advanced south, crossing inundated plains, mountain ranges, and wastelands at a speed that astonished even the experienced soldiers who had swept through Eastern Europe on the way to Berlin that spring.[21] Their advance was made easier by feeble and disorganized opposition from the Kwantung Army, caught unprepared and soon outgunned and overrun by the quick and efficient Red Army. The news of the Soviet attack caused panic, chaos, and the crumbling of trust and cooperation among the Japanese residents. The shock of defeat and despair at seeing what had been touted for years as "the

lifeline" for Japan crushed by the ferocious onslaught of the ruthless enemy thus became a formative moment in the nation's new history, if only for the way it revealed the divisions beneath the surface of the seemingly harmonious Japanese community.

Memoirs of defeat reflect both the crumbling of societal norms, and the resentment at those who caused this insecurity—the beastly and treacherous Soviet enemy as much as the Kwantung Army that abandoned its compatriots before that enemy. Furumi Tadayuki, at the time a high-ranking Japanese bureaucrat in the Manchukuo government and later an internee in the USSR and prisoner in China, could not help but notice the divisions that became evident overnight among the Japanese over the issue of who should board escape trains to Korea first. Furumi did not hide his resentment at the repatriation procedure whereby the families of the Kwantung Army commanders were evacuated first, followed by the families of the *Mantetsu* (South Manchurian Railway) employees who "had the advantage of using the trains freely." After these came the families of the Manchukuo bureaucrats, while ordinary Japanese residents were neglected.[22] Similarly, in the bestselling memoir of her flight from Manchuria, Fujiwara Tei wrote about "the cracks" (*kiretsu*) that appeared in the Japanese community at the news of the Soviet advance.[23] These bitter memories of chaos, destruction, rape, and flight became an important contribution to the postwar Japanese victimhood narratives. Historian Park Yu-ha has grouped the accounts of the empire's collapse in Manchuria under the title "repatriation literature."[24] These stories became a convenient addition to the lore on the suffering of the ordinary Japanese throughout the war. In short, repatriation memoirs played their part in monopolizing Japanese suffering and, by lifting the sufferers to the moral high ground of victims, erased their participation in and support for Japan's empire.

Internment: The Narratives of Camp Life

The Siberian Internment that followed, however, was even more unexpected than the Soviet invasion. The captivity of the more than a half-million Japanese in the Soviet Union became for those interned a life defining, unifying experience that haunted them for the rest of their lives, long after the majority of them were finally repatriated by 1950. For roughly one in ten Japanese captives, "Siberia" became the last destination, and those who survived spent anything between a few months to 11 years in the USSR. Memoirs of the Siberian Internment almost all start in Manchukuo, and follow the railway tracks to the

snowy fields of the Soviet Union. I base the following paragraphs on an extensive reading of both these memoirs and Soviet archives.

The events that led to the decision to transport the former Japanese soldiers to the USSR remain shrouded in mystery even today, as not all Soviet-era documents on the internment have been made public. On August 23, 1945, three days after the Kwantung Army's surrender, the State Defence Committee of the Soviet Union issued top-secret Decree #9898ss, signed by Joseph Stalin, "On receiving and accommodating the Japanese Army prisoners-of-war and utilising them for labour." It ordered the interior ministry (NKVD) to "select up to 500,000 Japanese…*physically fit to work in the conditions of the Far East and Siberia*" and to transport them to the USSR.[25] The decision is even more confusing because a week prior, a troika of Soviet top officials had sent a directive to Marshal Vasilevsky, clearly stating that "the prisoners-of-war of the Japanese-Manchurian Army will not be transported to the territory of the USSR."[26]

While what caused this U-turn in a matter of one week is yet to be revealed, what happened after is well established. In a move that exposed the Soviets as treacherous and untrustworthy in the eyes of the thousands of Japanese, Red Army officers gathered the Japanese in front of freight trains, informed them they were going back to Japan, and transported them along with some material spoils of war (food reserves, clothing, equipment, etc.) across the Soviet–Manchurian border. The unsuspecting Japanese believed they were on the way home, until some of them noticed, observing the position of the sun, that the trains were actually running west. Furumi and many other internees later found out that the Soviets had lied to them as a precaution against potential uprisings. For Furumi, this was not the last time he was misled by his captors; in 1950 he was summoned by the camp warden who reassured him of repatriation, and ordered him to write his impressions about his internment and the war crimes investigations conducted by the Soviets.[27] Furumi set out to write the document "with vigour" (*isshō kenmei ni*), only to realize later that the warden had mentioned repatriation to extract a favorable opinion than Furumi would otherwise have provided.[28] Instead of being sent to Japan, Furumi was transferred to China "for crimes committed against the Chinese people," where he would spend another thirteen years as a prisoner.[29] This uncertainty and the lies, so ubiquitous in recollections, could not have failed to make an impact on the Japanese opinion of the Soviets.

The trains took the Japanese captives to various parts of the USSR, where they were placed in camps hastily and often badly prepared

for accommodating human beings. That the Soviet Union was unprepared to quickly fit more than half a million new inmates into its vast camp system became painfully evident within the first weeks of internment. Delays in constructing new camps, lack of transportation, and mismanagement on all levels meant that for several autumn weeks in 1945, thousands of Japanese found themselves stranded in transit camps quickly constructed around the Soviet–Manchurian border. As witnessed by a Soviet officer inspecting these camps, the Japanese were often lodged in dugouts, slept on hay and subsisted on a diet of *kaoliang* sorghum, Chinese millet, or flour given as substitute for bread.[30] Captured in the August heat, many were still wearing their summer uniforms. Winter came early to the plains of Siberia and the Far East, and the cold soon caught up with the trains transporting the Japanese captives to camps in various regions of the USSR. For example, the train carrying a former officer Shimada Shirō on a month-long journey to Rada, a camp some 400 kilometers southeast of Moscow, had only reached Lake Baikal when the temperatures dropped to minus 30 degree Celsius. The lake was frozen "like an enormous mirror," Shimada remembered, and those Japanese careless enough to grab the metallic handrails of the carriages with bare hands lost the skin of their palms.[31]

The winter of 1945–46 was one of the harshest on record, and the conditions in which the prisoners were kept meant that the Japanese became ill very easily and diseases spread quickly. Many were unaccustomed to the Siberian cold and between ten to twenty thousand captives of the roughly half a million transported to the USSR died of cold, infection, and malnutrition during the first winter. Those who survived the first winter, according to memoirs, had a very real chance of surviving until *damoi* (repatriation). Just in the two camps in Taishet, Krasnoyarsk region, as remembered by a former internee Ōsako Terumichi, 2600 Japanese died of malnutrition and diseases.[32] The situation so alarmed the Soviet officials that, in a February 1946 report to the premier Lavrentii Beria, minister of the interior Sergei Kruglov recommended increasing food quotas and, in a rather desperate move, to transport Japanese to areas with "more customary climatic conditions," such as Central Asia.[33] While the situation with clothing and lodging improved over the years, the terrible cold became one of the defining characteristics of the Soviet Union for the internees, and through their memoirs, for the wider Japanese public.

The food situation did not improve for at least two more years as the war-ravaged Soviet Union grappled with rural hunger caused in equal measure by natural calamities and mismanagement.[34] These initial

two years were crucial in etching in the memories of the Japanese captives the image of the Soviet Union as a starving country, as many accounts of terrible hunger testify.[35] In a constant fight against starvation, the internees ate wild herbs and mushrooms, tree bark, and small forest animals. Food was always a nagging concern: one internee was so hungry that he mistook horse dung for potatoes.[36] By 1947 the Soviet leadership's extensive efforts had succeeded in improving the food situation, yet as late as February 1950, a *Mainichi* special feature article reported about how fellow countrymen in Siberia had survived on "snails and frogs."[37] The image of a hungry Soviet Union was persistent even for those who stayed in the USSR long enough to witness this improvement in conditions.

Yet perhaps the biggest source of Japanese suffering and indignation were the impossible daily work quotas, known as *norma,* that the internees had to fulfill in the camps. This word, which the *yokuryūsha* brought back to Japan, was the main measurement of their performance, and the food they received depended on whether *norma* for the day was fulfilled. For camp officials, the internees were first of all seen as a workforce, divided into three categories according to their ability to work and "rented" by the NKVD to state-owned enterprises. They were put to work in diverse areas such as mining coal and other resources, felling and transporting wood, urban construction, building railways and roads, in agriculture, fisheries, and other industries and workplaces too numerous to list here. Work was supposedly regulated by a series of rules, such as the "Regulations on the Utilisation of the Prisoners-of-War for Labour" issued by the NKVD on September 29, 1945, but the existence of detailed instructions on paper did not necessarily mean the rules were followed.[38] The Soviet camp system was a "report economy" where the fulfillment of the plan was the supreme goal and Moscow's instructions were often overrun by local management decisions.[39] In such conditions, the Japanese and other foreign internees were exploited to the full, which caused righteous indignation ubiquitous in their memoirs. Many memoirists likened their time in the USSR to slavery, contributing to the image of the USSR as "a slavery kingdom" popular in the West during the early Cold War.[40]

These hardships were canonized in internee memoirs as the "Siberian trinity of suffering" (*Shiberia san jūku*): cold (*gokkan*), hunger (*ue*), and work (*rōdō*).[41] This "trinity" served two important purposes in writing the history of the Siberian Internment. First, by bringing the deprivations of the internees to the fore, it helped add the memories of Siberia to the narratives that depict the Japanese as

the sole victims. In reality, the suffering of the Japanese internees was hardly unique; over three million European POWs captured during the war had endured similar, or even harsher conditions for months before the arrival of the Japanese in the camps, not to mention the gulag existences of the millions of Soviet citizens exploited in the vast forced labor economy since at least the early 1930s. By reducing the diverse experiences of the Internment to a few memorable buzzwords, memoirs compiled in collections or published separately have succeeded in creating a negative image of the Soviet Union commensurate with the trinity of suffering—that of a cold, hungry, backward and brutal country. Second, monopolizing Japanese suffering in the postwar public space served to strictly confine war memories to the framework of the Japanese nation (*kokumin*). In the 1940s the internees in Siberia were often compassionately referred to as "brothers" (*dōhō*), written in characters that literally mean "from the same belly." This reflected the exclusive focus of the victimhood narratives on the hardships of the brethren born to the same "mother Japan," while the suffering of others, including that of Japan's own victims, was often neglected.[42]

There was one aspect of life in the Soviet camps, however, that influenced more than others the internees' place in Japanese society after repatriation. From the early months of the Internment, the Soviet leadership embarked on an ambitious "re-education" (or "indoctrination," for the GHQ) program better known among the internees as the "democratic movement" (*minshu undō*). Soviet documents reveal a meticulously planned set of policies carried out using a variety of methods that, in conjunction with the internees' circumstances, produced fairly impressive outcomes.[43] The "democratic movement" was organized in several stages, foremost among which was the selection, through careful observation and questioning, of individuals sympathetic to socialism or Marxism.[44] It also involved exploiting the disadvantages caused by the inequality in the ranks; grievances and divisions within the rigid hierarchy of the former Imperial Army were carefully studied and put to use. The revolution in the minds of the Japanese soldiers was to begin among the ordinary soldiers and noncommissioned officers (hence the term "democratic movement"). Thus, an editor of the propaganda newspaper *Nippon Shimbun* wrote optimistically about "the powerful fermentation" of progressive ideas among the lower ranks in a report to Mikhail Suslov, a high-ranking Soviet official and later Head of the Central Committee Department for Agitation and Propaganda.[45] Those internees who were most enthusiastic were exempted from work in the camps and sent to

regional political schools to become instructors; each camp had a pool of "activists" (*akuchību*) from which these were selected. Perhaps the most powerful incentive to join the *akuchību* was the promise of early repatriation, not to mention other inducements such as easier job assignments and authority over fellow captives. Understandably, after return to Japan even those who were active in camp propaganda programs avoided mentioning this experience in their testimonies or memoirs lest they fall under suspicion as Soviet spies—the allegation frequently attributed to the returnees from Siberia in the anticommunist frenzy of the early 1950s Japan, as seen in greater detail in the next section.

A dominant thread in the internee memoirs was the wait for repatriation, longing for the day when a repatriation ship would take them home. The hope that that day would eventually come, no matter how long the wait, was expressed in the simple yet powerful lyrics of *Ikoku no oka* (On the foreign hills), a song that became the anthem of the Internment: "The day of return will come, the spring will come."[46] The reference to spring was not simply metaphoric; the internees had literally to wait for April because the Soviet Union suspended repatriation each November quoting the difficulties of navigation during winter. For the Japanese side, however, this was one of many Soviet excuses. Among the best known was the one about ships: the Soviets apprised the Japanese captives that their government refused to send ships for their repatriation. Using these excuses to drive home the powerful propaganda message of "your government does not care about you and does not want you back," the Soviet leadership tried to delay the repatriation of the able-bodied Japanese and other foreign internees in order to extract as much value from them as possible. This is evident in a September 1946 memo sent to the foreign minister Viacheslav Molotov by the ambassador to Japan Iakov Malik, who wrote that "in the interests of the national economy, it is desirable that the period of utilization of the Japanese POWs in the USSR be extended as long as possible."[47] The real contribution of the foreign POWs to the Soviet economy, in monetary terms, has been seriously questioned by Russian historians, but at the very least the USSR needed spare hands.[48] Until 1950, when the Soviet Union announced that all internees and POWs had been repatriated and only convicted war criminals remained in Soviet custody, and for a few years after, the Japanese government and citizens' groups joined the Occupation authorities and other organizations, such as the Japanese Red Cross, in lobbying for the early return of

the compatriots at the United Nations and other venues.[49] The Soviet response to these calls was often one of denial and dismissal. Months after the USSR declared the end of repatriation in 1950, the GHQ and the Japanese government continued to claim that as many as 300,000 Japanese citizens remained in the Soviet Union, an assertion based on a deliberate miscalculation.[50] The discrepancy in numbers led to speculation, an interesting example of which was a news report published in the London *Daily Telegraph* on March 2, 1951, about "a Communist-indoctrinated Japanese corps" which represented "the imminent danger…[of] infiltration and internal subversion" for Japan.[51] Printed in a newspaper half the world away, this allegation reflected the wariness of communism in the West in the early 1950s, although British diplomats dismissed it as "rather far-fetched."[52]

When the day of repatriation finally came, hundreds of thousands of returnees with direct knowledge and experience of the USSR carried their memories across the Sea of Japan. Their stories gave rise to the representations of the Soviet *other* that served as a convenient foil to the new Japan. Thorough pre-departure searches at the Nakhodka port meant that hardly any written material made it to Maizuru, but even the all-controlling Soviets could not prevent the internees from carrying their camp memories in their heads.[53] Thus, these internee accounts became the largest and most important flow of ideas and images about the Soviet Union during the early postwar period, besides the sensational stories told by defectors and spies that escaped to the West through the cracks in the Iron Curtain.[54]

Yet Japanese society judged the returnees not only by what they wrote. Many former internees were demonstrating, upon repatriation, militant behavior that could be expected only from newly converted communists. This had an immediate impact on the returnees' reintegration into society, their involvement in the ideological confrontation and the so-called Red Purge in Japan, as well as the attitudes of both the government and society, all of which I address in the following section.

Home at Last: The Returnees After Repatriation and the Advent of the Cold War to Japan

Historians in the West have in general tended to discredit the importance of the returnees for Occupation-era Japan. In her seminal work on postwar repatriation and reintegration, Lori Watt has claimed that "few people in Japan found use for the Siberian detainees and

their stories," which were reminders of the humiliating defeat and exploitation at the hands of the enemy.[55] Yoshikuni Igarashi, writing both in English and Japanese, has maintained that "the vast majority of the returnees' personal accounts were forgotten as soon as they were published except for a brief period in the late 1940s–early 1950s."[56] While these claims chime well with the general state of postwar Japanese society, they leave out the more nuanced parts of the story. True, the contribution of the returnees to the postwar narratives and memories of the war might not have been as conspicuous as the photographs of the victims of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings, or the Tokyo University students protesting the renewal of the Security Treaty with the United States in 1960. I argue that this contribution rather became an *undercurrent* in postwar history, influencing the way in which the Japanese people conceived of the new world order, and Japan's place in it.

There were objective reasons why the *yokuryūsha* felt out of touch with the Japan of the late 1940s, when they returned from the Soviet camps. They found Japan on its knees; the prosperity of the later years was yet to come. The majority of the internees had spent at least two years (and some as long as eleven) in the USSR—longer if one added the time spent in Manchuria and other Japanese colonies prior to the internment. As a result, the returnees naturally took longer to reacclimatize to the social and economic conditions of Occupied Japan. In a typical example of the gulf between the prewar and the postwar period, returnee Ōtsuka Takeshi was paid 3000 yen of relief money by the authorities upon his return to Japan. Thinking in prewar prices, Ōtsuka could not believe his luck: with relief money he would be able to buy a new house! But the inflation since the end of the war had been so high that all Ōtsuka could purchase for his money was a pair of shoes.[57]

Yet it was not only the economic hardships that made life difficult for the former *yokuryūsha* in the homeland they so longed for while in the Soviet camps. It was, rather, a combination of suspicion felt by the inhabitants of the home islands (*naichi*) toward the repatriates from overseas territories (*gaichi*), and the volatile political atmosphere of the times.[58] The latter meant that the internees became involved in the political struggles between the Japanese communists led by the firebrand Tokuda Kyūichi and the conservative core supported by the Japanese government and the GHQ.

In this section, I demonstrate how the returnees' embroilment in the early ideological struggles of the Cold War helped settle in Japan's collective mind the image of the Soviet and communist

enemy eager to disrupt peace and stability in Japan. I also intend to show that there was more to Japan's postwar decade than the legacy of Occupation-instigated reforms, that the Soviet factor has been largely neglected in historical works of recent decades. The ten years between Japan's defeat in World War II and the establishment of the so-called 1955 System of one-party dominance and orientation toward the United States in all spheres were, as I argue, more transnational than has been acknowledged in historiography. And if "transnational history deals with trends, patterns, organisations and individuals that have been living between and through [nations and regions]," then it is difficult to think of a better group than the returnees from the Soviet Union on which to base the history of Japan's immediate postwar period.[59] In the following paragraphs I outline, briefly, (a) the Siberian internees' role as both witnesses of the Soviet Union, and alleged agents of "transnational communism" in Japan, (b) the rising popularity of leftist groups and the alarm this caused for the GHQ, resulting in the repression of the JCP and other leftist groups, and (c) the Cold War struggles to keep Japan oriented firmly toward the United States.

Returnees from the USSR were a major reason behind the wave of debate and opinion about the Soviet Union that swept the Japanese shores in the 1950s. True, they were not the only, or even the most important, force behind the preoccupation with the Soviet Union in the public sphere, as there were powerful external factors in play, mainly the escalation of Cold War tensions in East Asia.[60] But as someone who had lived in the USSR for several years, the returnees had the most up-to-date and reliable knowledge about the enemy that could be injected into the public debate. Besides memoirs and recollections, returnees' experiences inspired a myriad of musical, literary, and cinematic works that influenced how Japanese society remembered the past. However tired of the war the Japanese public was, such cultural works were always in demand during the postwar decades.[61] Even as passive onlookers, the returnees became instruments in the political struggle in the increasingly anticommunist Japan, as various political groups, led by successive conservative governments, used them, their testimonies, and simply the fact of their presence in postwar Japan in advancing their political agendas.

The returnees were thus vehicles that carried the flow of ideas about the USSR into Japan. Not only the words that the repatriates uttered or wrote, but also their very existence, appearances, and their journey across land and sea were scrupulously analyzed by the welcoming Japanese public. For example, in a front-page news story of the liberal

Asahi newspaper on June 28, 1949, the reporter who had witnessed the disembarking of repatriates from Siberia observed:

> The two thousand repatriates were dressed in durable (*jōbuna*) clothes and had apparently been fed well. I also suspected they were well drilled in communist ideology. My suspicion was soon proved right: about half of those I approached readily admitted that they were planning to join the Communist Party… Some were genuinely surprised to find that Japan was not starving: the propaganda newspaper *Nippon Shimbun*, published in Siberia, had reported… that people were selling their children to buy food.[62]

As the quote shows, the returnees were all suspected, regardless of their behavior upon return, of being indoctrinated. This association with international communism made them the truly transnational influence in the turbulent years of early Cold War in Japan. What proportion of the returnees saw themselves as "soldiers of world revolution" is not easy to establish even for a historian with unlimited access to archives and memoirs; the pressure the returnee-memoirists felt upon return to Japan in the late 1940s meant that not many were ready to make open their allegiance to the international labor movement or the JCP. But there is no doubt what the Soviet propaganda chiefs expected of their charges upon return to motherland. The archival documents reveal that the highest echelons of Soviet power, and the officials in the NKVD Chief Directorate for POWs and Internees (GUPVI), saw the Japanese returnees as an important force in furthering the communist cause in Japan. The Soviet leadership was aware of the growing popularity of the "lovable Communist Party," and counted on the JCP's cooperation in the propaganda battles of the early Cold War.[63] In reports to the Soviet cabinet, the Soviet interior minister Kruglov and his subordinates responsible for "political enlightenment activities" (*politiko-prosvetitel'skaia rabota*) among the POWs emphasized the returnees' potential role in "consolidating sympathy and friendly feelings towards the USSR" in their home countries.[64] In a 1952 memo to Stalin and Politburo members, Kruglov wrote that "upon return to their motherlands, many POWs play an active part in the democratic transformations in their countries, laying bare the calumnies of the bourgeois reaction against the Soviet Union, and promoting among their peoples the need to consolidate friendship with the USSR."[65]

On the other side of the ideological divide, both the GHQ and the Japanese officials were familiar with the Leninist belief that chaos

and devastation following a major war provided the most favorable breeding ground for the spread of proletarian revolutions. These revolutions then would eventually join together to bring about the global revolution and the overturn of capitalist governments.[66] While this theory did not find its reflection following the end of World War I as Lenin had hoped, the Soviet Union's dominant position at the end of World War II was causing alarm in both Western Europe and the United States. As *The Red Conspiracy* ("Aka no inbō"), a 1952 propaganda feature made with support from the GHQ Civil Information and Education (CIE) department alarmed about the potential spread of communism to Japan argued, the world map was being painted red at an astonishing speed. "Communism wants to get to Japan, too," proclaimed the film's narrator to Japanese viewers, after showing how following the victory over Nazi Germany, Stalin was spreading communism across the world. The international labor movement, inspired by the USSR's new confidence on the global stage, was extending its reach to the east and west. The Communist Information Bureau (Cominform), founded in 1947 under Stalin's initiative to unite the communist parties across countries under the USSR's domination, was reaching out to Japan, raising alarm among the US Occupation administration.[67] The transnational appeal of communism, in short, was causing anxiety in Japan.

The return of the majority of 'indoctrinated' repatriates from the Soviet Union coincided with this period of rising tensions and apprehension about communism. Occupation reports from the period reveal a mixture of suspicion and alarm about the returnees as a destabilizing agent that could contribute to the JCP's "subversive" activities. The suspicion that the Soviet Union was keen to stage a communist revolution in Japan was widespread in the late 1940s and early 1950s.[68] Yet it was not simply paranoia on the Japanese side; in 1949, the year of the "recalcitrant repatriates," to borrow a phrase from a GHQ special report published in 1950, thousands of *yokuryūsha* from the Soviet Union behaved in ways that warranted widespread suspicion under which they soon came. They refused to cooperate first with ship crews, then with repatriation officials, put forward unreasonable demands, "shout[ed] labor songs and perform[ed] Communist dances, to the bewilderment and consternation of the majority of their waiting families."[69] Even in the postcards the internees sent from the USSR the fruits of the "democratic movement" were evident. In one such postcard, internee Motoyama Seiji informed the JCP of his determination, upon return, to "at once call upon you and join you so as not to lose time in establishing a people's government

in Japan," before ending his message with a cheer: "Long live the JCP!" In a clear regurgitation of Soviet camp propaganda, another internee, Aoki Nobuo, wrote to the Japan Youth Communist League: "During our stay in Soviet (*sic*) for three years since the end of the war we have come to awaken to class consciousness . . . [O]ur young spirit is burning against the reactionary camp."[70]

This hardly surprised the Occupation officials who had been scrupulously gathering information on the nature and outcomes of the Soviet propaganda education in the camps for the last several years, but, reported in newspapers, it added fuel to the flames.[71] As seen in the *Asahi* quote, the arrivals of these new converts to communism soon gave rise to the label "red repatriate" (*akai hikiagesha*), attached to those who were particularly enthusiastic about turning Japan into a "workers' country" (*rōdōsha no kuni*) in the image of the Soviet Union. Although not all returnees were communist converts, the label invariably translated to their whole number by the media and the suspicious parts of Japanese society. Thus, while the returnees' experiences as slaves who were worked at gunpoint by ruthless camp chiefs became the inspiration for victimhood narratives in the early years of internment, their indoctrination and possible conversion to communism became a more dominant theme starting from 1949 onward. This transformation both coincided and was consonant with the change of perceptions toward Siberian internees, and hence is very important. Suddenly, from brethren trapped in the "slavery kingdom," the returnees made an almost complete transition in the public sphere into potential agents of communist revolution.

Importantly, the above reports also came at a time when the JCP was at its most popular: it had won 35 seats, its largest ever victory, in the Diet elections in January 1949.[72] The fiery rhetoric used by its leader Tokuda Kyūichi, an old Marxist who had spent the war years in prison and had been released by the US Occupation in October 1945, raised alarm about the imminent "violent revolution" in Japan about to be staged by the USSR and China.[73] In such circumstances, it was perhaps not surprising that the arrival of thousands of "red repatriates" from the Soviet Union was met with anxiety by both the Occupation administration, and Japanese society. Ōtsuka Takeshi remembered his surprise when his group was greeted, upon return from the Soviet Union, not by mothers waving their handkerchiefs with delight at their sons' arrival, but by a group of 400 policemen.[74]

Clearly, the GHQ's patience with the JCP was running thin. On April 30, 1950, the Japanese Diet Special Committee on the Issue of

Repatriation judged that Tokuda had tried to "obstruct" the repatriation of Siberian internees by "demanding" in a letter to the Soviets that they repatriate only the communist converts and delay the return of the "reactionary elements" (*handō bunshi*).[75] Kan Sueharu, an internee who had interpreted this letter to fellow captives in Karaganda camp in the USSR committed suicide after members of the Diet committees grilled him in two long sessions, pushing for a confession.[76] On the third anniversary of the Japanese Constitution on May 3, 1950, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers General Douglas MacArthur publicized a statement titled "The Other Minority." The minority he had in mind was the JCP and its followers, who were abusing the rights granted to them by the postwar Constitution. MacArthur stated this in no uncertain terms: "Under foreign dictation to establish a domestic basis favorable to the ultimate subjugation of Japan to the political control of others," this minority sought "to encompass freedom's destruction . . . through the perversive use of liberty and privilege," and by "the spread of false, malicious and inflammatory propaganda intended to mislead and coerce the public mind."[77] The Red Purge culminated in the ban of JCP top echelon "from public service" following clashes at American Memorial Day celebrations, where US citizens were attacked by left-wing demonstrators.[78] The Cold War, having started on ideological fronts, was about to move onto real battlefields: the Korean War, the first major conflict since Japan's surrender in 1945 broke out four weeks later.

Conclusion

The returnees from Siberia were the vestiges of the Japanese Empire. They arrived in the new Japan, on its way to a peaceful future, as grim reminders of its recent past. Many of them talked about their experiences in Manchuria and the subsequent Soviet captivity, while many more chose to remain silent. Telling their versions of the past, the returnees' testimonies provided the Japanese public sphere with foil for the bright future it was eager to build. These narratives also created in the Japanese collective mind the image of the cold, hungry, backward and treacherous Soviet Union, built on the old stereotypes dating back to the Russo-Japanese War. Bearing witness to the daily existence in the "slavery kingdom," these stories served as vital raw material for Japan's ideas of the *self*, of what it *was not*, and what it would try not to become. In this, the returnees' testimonies helped reassure the war-tired Japanese public weary of chaos and violence

that the path toward the future lay in cooperation with the United States, and that Japan should never fall to communists.

But the returnees from Siberia did not need to speak, as their presence in itself was the perfect contrast to what being a Japanese citizen meant during the postwar period. Their multiple identities and transborder experiences set them apart from the seemingly uniform and unified Japanese people of the home islands. The returnees, of course, were victims—arguably even more so than many millions of other Japanese citizens—who had suffered at the hands of two empires, the erstwhile Japanese Empire and the newly emerging Soviet one. Yet they were also victimizers, just like many other active participants in Japan's imperial project who had extended unfair treatment to the local population of Manchuria and other Japanese colonies. They were war heroes who had survived the war and the hardships of the internment that followed. On the other hand, they were also prisoners-of-war, a shameful label in the Japanese Imperial Army where anyone who was caught alive by the enemy was considered a coward, insufficiently loyal to the Emperor. Finally, they were Japanese, referred to as "compatriots" and greeted with cheery calls of *Gokurōsama!* (Thank you for enduring the hardships!), and not sufficiently Japanese at the same time, seen by many as the agents of the communist Soviet Union whose supreme goal was to overthrow the emperor system.

In their precarious existences lies both the importance of these unfortunate souls, and their contribution to our understanding of contemporary Japan. For looking at their lives, the hardships they endured during and after the war, a historian can reconsider what has seemed as simple and straightforward—Japan's march toward democracy, peace, and prosperity in the postwar years. Thanks to their contribution we can see that the experiment of nation-building that was the US Occupation of Japan did not always run as smoothly as those who orchestrated it had hoped, that ruptures between the past and the present were never too clean-cut, and that the vestiges of empire showed their heads even amidst the optimism of the postwar decade.

Notes

1. One example of this entanglement's lasting importance is the yet unresolved territorial dispute over four Kurile Islands (known in Japan as the *Northern Territories Issue*). The postwar history of the bilateral relations in English has been preoccupied, in my view, with this issue. In this

chapter, I attempt to emphasize the role of historical memory in bilateral relations and argue that geopolitics alone cannot account for the decades of mistrust between the two nations. Negative emotions were fuelled by the Cold War, but the memory and legacy of the Siberian Internment has been crucial in imagining the USSR and Russia in postwar Japan. On the role of memory in postwar Japanese society, see Carol Gluck, "The Past in the Present," in *Postwar Japan as History*, ed. Andrew Gordon (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 64–98.

2. The phrase "distant neighbors" is from the title of Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Jonathan Haslam, and Andrew Kuchins, eds., *Russia and Japan: An Unresolved Dilemma Between Distant Neighbors* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
3. Andrew E. Barshay's *The Gods Left First: The Captivity and Repatriation of Japanese POWs in Northeast Asia, 1945–56* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013) is the only monograph written on the topic in the last quarter of a century. Other works have partially taken up the subject: Lori Watt, *When Empire Comes Home: Repatriation and Reintegration in Postwar Japan* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009); Yoshikuni Igarashi, "Belated Homecomings: Japanese Prisoners of War in Siberia and their Return to Post-war Japan," in *Prisoners of War, Prisoners of Peace: Captivity, Homecoming and Memory in World War II,* ed. Bob Moore and Barbara Hately-Broad (Oxford: Berg, 2005).
4. Sebastian Conrad, "Entangled Memories: Versions of the Past in Germany and Japan, 1945–2001," *Journal of Contemporary History* 38, no. 1 (2003): 87. See also, *The Quest for the Lost Nation: Writing History in Germany and Japan in the American Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010).
5. John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Aftermath of World War II* (London: Penguin, 2000).
6. I borrow the phrase "remnants of empire" from Lori Watt, *When Empire Comes Home*.
7. On the "consensus," see Philip A. Seaton, *Japan's Contested War Memories: The Memory Rifts in Historical Consciousness of World War II* (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 93; on the period as a whole, Nobuo Shimotomai, *Nippon reisenshi: Teikoku no hōkai kara gojūgonen taisei he* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2011).
8. On Japan's all-out project of imperial expansion, see Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998). On imperial propaganda's role in signing up the wider society for the imperial project, see Barak Kushner, *The Thought War: Japanese Imperial Propaganda* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2006). Lori Watt's *When Empire Comes Home* is about the aftermath of the imperial project, but is crucial in understanding the dynamics of the empire's development and, more importantly, fall.
9. Young, *Japan's Total Empire,* p. 3.
10. The Nazi ideology of *lebensraum* is credited to Karl Haushofer; he was an ardent proponent of Japan's expansion. See Henry Frei, "Japan and Australia in Karl Haushofer's Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean," *The Journal of International Studies (Institute of International Relations, Sophia University, Tokyo),* no. 22 (January 1989).

11. A series of short propaganda films under the title "Nostalgia Series" (*Bōkyōhen*) or "Manchurian Archives" (*Manshū ākaibusu*), produced in the 1930s, drove home this message. DVD Recordings (Tokyo: Dolby, 2005).
12. Among the memoirs of Manchuria, a recollection by Tadayuki Furumi stands out: *Wasureenu Manshūkoku* (Tokyo: Keizai Ōraisha, 1978). See also Mariko Tamanoi, *Memory Maps: the State and Manchuria in Postwar Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2009).
13. Setsuo Hirade, *Shiberia ni uzumeta karute* (Tokyo: Bungeisha, 2000), p. 5, added emphasis.
14. Junko Miyawaki, *Sekaishi no naka no Manshū teikoku* (Tokyo: PHP Shinsho, 2006), p. 219.
15. Young, *Japan's Total Empire,* pp. 401–5. Also, Makio Okabe, "Shiryō ga kataru: Manshūkoku tōchi no jijō," *Sekai*, no. 6 (1998): 163.
16. Asahi Shimbun, *Shimbun to Shōwa* (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun Shuppan, 2010).
17. Young, *Japan's Total Empire*, pp. 352–98; Kushner, *The Thought War;* Annika A. Culver, *Glorify the Empire: Japanese Avant-Garde Propaganda in Manchukuo* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2013).
18. Hirade, *Shiberia*, p. 5.
19. Takeshi Ōtsuka, Toshio Kikuchi, and Kintarō Katō, "Shiberia yokuryūsha zadankai: Onshū no arara ni musubareta kizuna," *Bungei Shunjū,* no. 9 (2014): 329–30.
20. Due to difference in time zones, Soviet documents record the start of the operation on August 8.
21. Aleksandr Koshelev, ed., *Ia dralsia s samuraiami* (Moscow: Eksmo, 2005).
22. Tadayuki Furumi, "Manshū teikoku no saigo wo mite," in *"Bungei shunjū" ni miru Shōwashi*, ed. Kazutoshi Handō (Tokyo: Bunshun Bunko, 1995), p. 142.
23. Tei Fujiwara, *Nagareru hoshi wa ikite iru* (Tokyo: Hibiya shuppansha, 1949), quoted in Ryūichi Narita, *Sensō keiken no sengoshi: Katarareta taiken/shōgen/kioku* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2010), p. 88.
24. Yu-ha Park, "Hikiage bungakuron josetsu—sengo bungaku no wasuremono," *Nippon Gakuhō* 81, (2009): 121–31.
25. Central Archive of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation (TsAMO RF), fond (f.) 66, opis' (op.) 178499, delo (d.) 1, listy (l.) 593–8, added emphasis.
26. TsAMO RF, f. 66, op. 178499, d. 3, l. 220–1.
27. He is apparently talking about the Khabarovsk War Crimes Trials conducted in December 1949.
28. Furumi, "Manshū teikoku no saigo wo mite," p. 149.
29. State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF), f. 9401, op. 2, d. 269, l. 178–80.
30. TsAMO RF, f. 66, op. 178499, d. 11, l. 373–5.
31. Shirō Shimada, "Soren yokuryūki", in *Horyo Taikenki*, vol. 3, *West of Ural Mountains* (Tokyo: Society for Recording the Life and Experiences of Japanese POWs in the USSR, 1984), p. 86.
32. Terumichi Ōsako, "Shinu omoitsuzuku jigoku no shūyōjo Taishet," in *Senba taiken: "Koe" ga kataritsugu Shōwa,* ed. Asahi Shimbunsha (Tokyo: Asahi Bunko, 2005), p. 177.
33. Centre for Preservation of Historic and Documentary Collections (TsKhIDK), f.1/p, op.01e, d.40, l. 37–41.

34. Around two million died in the famine of 1946–47 in the Soviet Union, caused by the devastation of the war, droughts of 1946, and Stalin's shortsighted policies. See V. F. Zima, "Golod v Rossii 1946–1947 gg.," *Otechestvennaia istoriia* 1 (1993).
35. Almost every memoir in the nineteen-volume part on the Siberian Internment of the collection *Heiwa no Ishizue: Shiberia kyōsei rōdōsha ga kataritsugu kurō* (Tokyo: Public Foundation for Peace and Consolation, 1991–2009) bemoans the constant hunger in the camps.
36. Takao Takahashi, "Bafun ga jagaimo ni mieta", in *Heiwa no Ishizue,* vol. 1, pp. 279–81.
37. "Jū man jin'i shinda—Shiberia no higeki—Tanemura moto taisa no shōgen," *Mainichi Shimbun*, February 7, 1950, p. 2.
38. GARF, f. 9401, op. 12, d. 20, t. 14, l. 127–129.
39. Viktor Berdinskikh, "Problemy ekonomiki Vyatlaga (1938–1960)," in *Istoriia stalinizma: Prinuditel'nii trud v SSSR. Ekonomika, politika, pamiat',* eds., L. I. Borodkin, S. A. Krasil'nikov, and O. V. Khlevniuk, (Moscow: Rosspen, 2013).
40. Heihachirō Tōjō, "Ikiuzume no kei," in *Heiwa no Ishizue,* vol. 2, p. 163; Konokichi Amaya, "Watashi no seishun: Shiberia ga nikui," in *Heiwa no Ishizue,* vol. 5, p. 148; Kumaichi Takeyasu, "Furyoki," in *Heiwa no Ishizue,* vol. 2, pp. 90–1.
41. I quote the phrase "*san jūku*" from Toshio Kurihara, *Shiberia yokuryū: Mikan no higeki* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2009).
42. Without absolving the USSR of its responsibility for the detainment and exploitation of Japanese POWs, one should also mention the flip side of the coin. Japanese historians who decry the suffering of the Siberian internees rarely mention the fates of Allied POWs exploited in constructing the notorious Burma–Thailand Railway; equally, those writing about the rapes of Japanese women by Soviet soldiers rarely acknowledge the systematic abuse of the so-called comfort women by the Imperial Japanese Army throughout World War II. All of these crimes, regardless of who committed them, deserve condemnation, but only by regarding them in greater, transnational context can historians arrive at a more nuanced, complicated picture of events.
43. These achievements were acknowledged even by the US Occupation Administration in a GHQ Civil Intelligence Section Special Report "Jap Repatriates from Soviet Territory: Communist Indoctrination," MacArthur Memorial Archives, MMA-18, Reel # 13, Modern Japanese Political History Materials Room (Kensei shiryō shitsu), National Diet Library, Tokyo.
44. Elena Katasonova, *Poslednie plenniki Vtoroi mirovoi voiny: Maloizvestnye stranitsy rossiisko-iaponskikh otnoshenii* (Moscow: Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2005), p. 64.
45. Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI), f. 17, op. 128, d. 212.
46. Masuda Kōji wrote new lyrics to a military song composed by Yoshida Tadashi; both Masuda and Yoshida were internees. The song became a hit during the postwar decade. In 1949, Shin-Tōhō studio produced an eponymous film.
47. Quoted in Katasonova, *Poslednie plenniki,* p. 50.
48. See L. I. Borodkin, et al., eds., *Istoriia stalinizma*.

49. See, for example, "Announcement of Japanese Foreign Ministry and Letters of Foreign Minister to President of United Nations General Assembly, on Repatriation Problem," July 25, 1951, Reel K' 0001, The Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.
50. According to historian Tomita Takeshi, this discrepancy in numbers was a result of miscalculations on two sides: when the USSR presented the total number of Japanese POWs, it meant only those interned in "the USSR and Mongolian People's Republic," whereas the GHQ/Japanese government's interpretation of "Soviet-controlled territories" included the Kuriles, Southern Sakhalin, North Korea, and Manchuria. See Tomita, "Shimbun hōdō ni miru shiberia yokuryū – beiso kyōchō kara reisen he, 1945–1950 nen," *Yūrashia (Eurasian Studies)*, May (2013): 7–13.
51. The National Archives of the UK, FO 371/92602: Reports on Soviet-indoctrinated Japanese troops on Sakhalin Island and despatch of Soviet troops from the mainland, 1951, p. 4.
52. Ibid., p. 10.
53. There are isolated examples of internees smuggling notes or drawings to Japan, but they are too few and far between. The risk was too big to ignore as any internee could be returned to the camps if caught. Internee Nakamura Shigeru brought back his short poems *(tanka)* and notes tied to his torso; when they finally reached Japan, many writings were damaged by his sweat. His wife managed to publish them in book form in 1989. See Tatsuhiko Sakamoto, *Shiberia no sei to shi: Rekishi no naka no yokuryūsha* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1993).
54. For an interesting study of defectors and escapees from the USSR to the United States and Europe, see Susan L. Carruthers, *Cold War Captives: Imprisonment, Escape, and Brainwashing* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009).
55. Lori Watt, *When Empire Comes Home,* p. 135.
56. Igarashi, "Belated Homecomings," pp. 105–21; also, by the same author, *Haisen to sengo no aida de: Okurete kaerishi monotachi* (Tokyo: Chikuma Sensho, 2012), Chapters 3 and 4.
57. Ōtsuka et al., "Shiberia yokuryūsha zadankai," p. 335.
58. Lori Watt's *When Empire Comes Home* mentions the inequalities between, and the mutual distrust felt by, those on the home islands and those who had been repatriated from the *gaichi* following the end of empire.
59. Pierre-Yves Saunier, *Transnational History* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 3.
60. JCP's success in the general elections in January 1949, the proclamation of the PRC, as well as the escalation of tensions on the Korean Peninsula that eventually led to the Korean War in the summer of 1950—all of these made 1949 a turbulent year for political groups opposed to communism.
61. Besides Gomikawa Junpei's *The Human Condition* (Ningen no jōken), perhaps the most well-known example is Yamasaki Toyoko's 1976 novel *Wastelands* (Fumō chitai), made into a movie in 1976, a popular drama series by TBS in 1979, and once again in 2009 by Fuji TV. The series is loosely based on the life of a Japanese army strategist and internee in the USSR Sejima Ryūzō.
62. "Kyōsantō kyōiku no eikyō rekizen," *Asahi Shimbun,* June 28, 1949, morning edition, p. 1.

63. On the "lovable communist party," see J. A. A. Stockwin, "The Japan Communist Party in the Sino-Soviet Dispute–From Neutrality to Alignment?" in J. A. A. Stockwin, *Collected Writings of J.A.A. Stockwin, Part 1* (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 105. On the relationship between Stalin and the JCP, see David Wolff, "Japan and Stalin's Policy toward Northeast Asia after World War II," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 15, no. 2 (Spring 2013).
64. GARF, f. 9226, op. 1, d. 1124, l. 127–72.
65. GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 269, l. 36–46.
66. See, for example, Christopher Read, *Lenin: A Revolutionary Life* (London: Routledge, 2013), pp. 106–41.
67. GHQ Civil Intelligence Section, Special Report, "The Japan Communist Party and the Cominform," July 1, 1948, MacArthur Memorial Archives, MMA-18, Reel # 13.
68. The term "violent revolution" (*bōryoku kakumei*) was ubiquitous on the front pages of national newspapers in the period between late 1949 (the proclamation of the PRC) and the start of the Korean War.
69. GHQ, Military Intelligence Section, Special Report "Japanese Prisoners of War: Life and Death in Soviet P.W. Camps," Section 7, p. 2. The Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.
70. Civil Censorship Detachment, MacArthur Memorial Archives, MMA-18, Reel #13.
71. This information, largely based on the interrogations of the returnees, culminated in a number of secret documents, such as the 1950 GHQ Civil Intelligence Section Special Report "Jap Repatriates from Soviet Territory: Communist Indoctrination," MacArthur Memorial Archives, MMA-18, Reel # 13.
72. Stockwin, "The Japan Communist Party," p. 105.
73. In addition, archival sources reveal that the intelligence community kept a close watch on the JCP and the returnees from the USSR as potential "agents of subversion." See MacArthur Memorial Archives, MMA-18, Reel #13.
74. Ōtsuka et al., "Shiberia yokuryūsha zadankai," p. 334.
75. See Yoshito Okamoto, ed., *Zaiso dōhō no seishi to Tokuda yōsei mondai no shinsō* (Tokyo: Nikkan Rōdō Tsūshinsha, 1950); Tadashi Odagiri, "Kan Sueharu: "Bungeiteki shinrigaku e no kokoromi" josetsu (sono 7)", *Hokkaido University of Education—Jōsho shōgai kyōiku kenkyū kiyō* 20 (2001): 265–74; Barshay, *The Gods Left First,* pp. 95–97.
76. National Diet of Japan, House of Councilors Special Committee on the Issue of Repatriation of Japanese Nationals Overseas, 7th cong., 16th session, March 18, 1950. See also Shigeharu Tada, *Uchinaru Shiberia yokuryū taiken: Ishihara Yoshirō, Kano Buichi, Kan Sueharu no sengoshi* (Tokyo: Shakaishisōsha, 1994).
77. Douglas MacArthur, "The Other Minority," in *A Soldier Speaks: Public Papers and Speeches of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur,* ed. Major Vorin E. Whan, Jr. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), pp. 204–9.
78. Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, p. 272.

4

Colonialism and Migration: From the Landscapes of Toyohara

Tessa Morris-Suzuki

In Search of New Japans

Emerging transnational visions of Japanese history draw attention to two dimensions of Japan's modern historical experience that had been relatively neglected until the last decades of the twentieth century. The first is the dimension of migration both into and out of the Japanese archipelago. Japan's relatively low levels of migration in the period from the 1950s to the early 1980s encouraged an image of the nation as an enclosed and homogeneous unit; but this image obscured the very complex flows of people between the Japanese archipelago and Japan's overseas empire, which had profoundly shaped the history of East Asia in the first half of the twentieth century.

The second long-neglected topic was the history of Japan's shifting borders and the people who inhabited the border zones. Despite the popular image of Japan as a clearly defined and self-contained nation, the political borders of Japan were in fact repeatedly redrawn in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This created a number of particularly porous zones whose populations shifted and were redefined as the geopolitical map of East Asia was redrawn. One such zone was Okinawa in the south; another was Karafuto/Sakhalin in the north. This chapter seeks to contribute to transnational reimaginings of modern Japanese history by exploring migration and its social impact particularly in the context of Karafuto and of its colonial capital, Toyohara.

In its 1971 official survey of one hundred years of Japanese emigration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs defined the period from 1921 to the early 1930s as the age when "our country's government and people together devoted the greatest energy to migration."[1] Responding to concerns about unemployment and rural poverty, the bureaucrats

and intellectuals of the Taishō (1912–26) and early Shōwa (1926–89) periods impassionedly debated the advantages and disadvantages of emigration as a solution to overpopulation, while the government devised a series of policies to encourage migration to the colonial empire, Latin America and (from 1931 onwards) the quasi-colony of Manchukuo. Although the response to these policies fell short of expectations, a steady stream of emigrants did indeed leave Japan during the 1920s and 1930s. By 1932 there were estimated to be some 825,000 Japanese settlers living in foreign countries, Japan's Pacific mandated territories, and Manchukuo, and over one million more in the colonial territories of Korea, Taiwan, and Karafuto.[2]

Meanwhile, as the Institute of Pacific Relations noted in 1931, Japan was also "increasingly coming to be regarded as a country of immigration."[3] Though the total number of foreigners in Japan was relatively small (around 54,000 in 1930), the inflow of colonial subjects from the empire was rising rapidly. According to one estimate, some 1,186,000 people entered metropolitan Japan (*Naichi*) from Korea between 1917 and 1929, of whom over 330,000 remained as long-term residents.[4]

Interwar migration to and from Japan was the subject of study and debate at the time, and has continued to be so ever since. Yet despite this attention there remain large gaps in our understanding of the social and cultural effects of cross-border movements of people. The society and culture of Japanese settler communities in the colonial Manchuria have been the subject of considerable research in recent years. Yet until recently there has been relatively little historical analysis of the lives of Japanese colonizers in Korea, Taiwan, and Karafuto.[5] Studies of émigré communities beyond the bounds of the colonial empire, meanwhile, tend to be treated as part of a distinct realm of migration studies, rather than as part of the history of that always protean and porously bounded entity "Japan."

On the other side of the equation, migration to Naichi from the colonies too has been much researched, both before the war and since. Yet it could be argued that the implications of this migration have yet to be adequately integrated into understandings of interwar Japanese cultural history. Even today, the tendency to separate out immigrants or foreign residents in Japan as a distinct field of research—typified by the definition of *Zainichi* literature as a distinct cultural sphere—at times serves to reinforce a mental boundary around an imagined category of "authentic" Japanese culture, obscuring the extent to which cultural history within the borders of Japan has always been a product of flows that cross those borders. So (to give just two interwar

examples) the history of the Japanese Communist Party has repeatedly been told without reference to the Korean communists who played a central part in its creation, and interwar Japanese historiography is discussed with scant regard to the presence of historians like Paek Nam-un and Yi Chŏng-won, who were active participants in Japanese-language debates on history within the boundaries of Naichi.

These silences in historical narratives are just part of a wider silence—a tendency to forget the extent to which colonialism generated movements of people, not just to and from Naichi but in many directions, across many borders within and around the colonial empire: from Korea to Manchuria/Manchukuo and Siberia, from China to Taiwan and Karafuto, and so on. Though many of these migrations in fact resulted in the formation of permanent communities of settlers in new lands, not all migrants left their homes with the intention of settling permanently elsewhere, and some succeeded in moving back and forth across borders. Yet the history of interwar, wartime, and immediate postwar Japan has paid little attention to the social and cultural consequences of such two-way or return movements of migrants. There is, therefore, a particular need to reconceive the Japanese colonial empire as part of a complex space of cross-border flows whose trajectories were to influence the cultural history of East Asia throughout the twentieth century and beyond.

The lacunae in narratives of the interwar movement of people are partly a result of the way in which the discourse of migration was framed from the early twentieth century onward. While many proponents of emigration argued their case in terms of the pragmatic need to reduce population pressures in Naichi, it is interesting to observe how often this argument came to be linked to a grander social Darwinist rhetoric: dynamic ethnic groups (it was repeatedly suggested) had a natural tendency to expand, and thus to spread out into territory occupied by those "static" or "backward" groups who were destined to be losers in the endless process of interethnic competition. Addressing a public gathering in 1918, for example, Ōkuma Shigenobu, elder statesman and president of the Japan Migration Association (*Nihon Imin Kyōkai*) observed that

> [O]verall, migration is a very vague term. However, as you know, the basis of the development of humankind is none other than the movement of people, that is, the expansion of ethnic groups . . . This is not new problem of the present day, but one that has occurred continuously since the dawn of history, and history offers proof to

> the effect that (to summarize the process) what are called "superior ethnic groups" expand, and inferior ethnic groups are steadily put under pressure by the forces of expansion.

Thus, though Ōkuma went on to insist that Japanese migration policies should avoid the racial arrogance evident in Western colonization, he reflected a widespread perception when he wrote thus: "to put it bluntly, migration can be interpreted as the control of superior ethnic groups over inferior ethnic groups."[6]

Not all theorists of migration, of course, put things in such stark terms. Many saw the movement of people more prosaically in the context of the need to reduce pressure on the overpopulated rural regions of Naichi: a view that became particularly popular during the rural economic crisis of the 1920s. Others again sought to develop a more complex analysis of the relationship between population, migration, and economic development.

Discussing the issue in 1927, for example, the economist and theorist of colonial policy Yanaihara Tadao criticized those who saw emigration to the colonies and beyond as a simple panacea for overpopulation in Japan. The view that unemployment was a result of overpopulation, he pointed out, failed to make sense of the fact that, despite rural poverty and unemployment, Japan was actually importing labor from Korea. Population problems, Yanaihara argued, must be understood, not simply in terms of numbers of people, but also in terms of the quality—the culture, wealth, and well-being—of populations. The solution to such problems therefore lay neither in birth control nor merely in emigration by itself, but above all in industrialization and the development and diffusion of more productive technologies. Ultimately, however, migration was also crucially important, not so much because it relieved pressure on land and resources at home, but rather because it was the means by which economic dynamism and technological creativity was carried to all parts of the world.

Yanaihara is often remembered as an outspoken critic of the government's policy of promoting agricultural migration to Manchukuo, where (he was to argue) Japanese farmers had little prospect of competing successfully with their more frugal and experienced Chinese counterparts.[7] His 1927 report, however, reminds us that Yanaihara's view of the potential impact of Japanese emigration was far from being wholly negative. Observing (as Ōkuma had done) that movements of people were an age-old part of the march of human progress, he cited the establishment of the Phoenician colony of Carthage in

classical times as an example of the power of migration to promote human progress. A more recent model, Yanaihara suggested, was to be found in the example of British colonization of the United States, Canada, and Australia. The diffusion of their progressive culture to other parts of the world meant that "even if Anglo-Saxon civilization were extinguished in the home nation of Britain, it would flourish in other countries."[8] Similarly, "Japanese civilization and the civilization of the Japanese ethnic group has emerged in this island nation, but its limitless development is to be desired." So Japan's role was not to restrict its population growth but rather to contribute to further development of this civilization and thus promote social well-being by "as far as possible constructing new Japans and new societies of Japanese people" in other parts of the world.[9] Though starting from a more complex analysis of the dynamics of population and migration, Yanaihara's approach to the problem thus concluded on a note surprisingly reminiscent of Ōkuma Shigenobu's vision of the expansion of progressive *minzoku*.

Several points about these perspectives on migration deserve emphasis. One is the fact that here migration is presented primarily as a process radiating outward from certain key foci (including Japan), rather than as a complex set of multidirectional and intersecting flows. The second is that migrants from Japan are assumed to be settlers moving permanently to a new country. They are also implicitly assumed to carry with them certain key elements of Japanese culture, thus sustaining the limitless development of "Japanese civilization and the civilization of the Japanese ethnic group." But at the same time the migrant, as a dynamic agent of progress, is also expected to be capable of change and adaptation to the new homeland. Yanaihara, indeed, specifically went on to chide some Japanese emigrants to California for clinging too tenaciously to their Japanese roots, and particularly to customs that made them look less prosperous or progressive than their non-Japanese neighbors. Early twentieth-century writings on the subject, indeed, often emphasized the value of migration as an instrument, not just for the development of the host society, but also for the moral improvement of migrants themselves. As a manual for would-be Karafuto colonists put it, the migrant "having chosen the country of settlement as his permanent abode," should "maintain the good customs and traditions of his old homeland, while rectifying the bad."[10]

In the pages that follow, I want to tease out some problems and paradoxes inherent in this view of migration by shifting the focus from writings on migration theory to the material landscape of the migrant

community: specifically by reflecting on the landscape of one particular "new Japan"—the colonial city of Toyohara in Karafuto. I hope by doing this to fill in a relatively neglected corner of Japan's interwar cultural history, and also to highlight some broader implications of the migrant experience for our understanding of that history.

A Paradise for our Descendants

In 1907, two years after Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese war, a civilian colonial administration was established to govern Japan's newly acquired colony of Karafuto (southern Sakhalin). A year later, a permanent local headquarters for the colonial government was established in the village of Toyohara, on the broad Suzuya plain in the southeast of the island. Toyohara thus became the colonial capital, and was to remain so until Karafuto was captured by Russian forces immediately after Japan's surrender to the allies at the end of the Pacific War.

At the time of its elevation to the status of colonial capital, Toyohara (which had previously been the Russian convict settlement of Vladimirovka) had a population of about 250, living in a few small groups of log houses huddled in clearings carved out of the forest. Within ten years, however, its population had swelled to some 28,000, and the town boasted a post office, hospital, Shinto shrine, and theater. By the beginning of 1936 (when it was officially declared a city) Toyohara registered 35,849 inhabitants and possessed several schools, a library, a regional museum, an airfield, a giant pulp mill and (as its publicists were fond of emphasizing) one of the best ski slopes in East Asia. Built on a geometrical grid of relatively broad streets, Toyohara embodied the best principles of modern town planning, but the town was also carefully designed around key symbols of imperial power. The principle administrative buildings, including the Karafuto Chō and local government offices and the post office, fronted onto the main street, Jinja Dōri, which ran due east toward the Karafuto Shrine. The shrine itself was built on the lower slopes of the imposing peak that the colonial rulers had renamed Asahigaoka (Rising Sun Hill), and commanded a sweeping view over the plain below.

The design of Toyohara had much in common with the urban planning principles applied to other Japanese colonial capitals such as Taihoku/Taipei and Keijō/Seoul. There too, emphasis on modernization, order, and geometrical symmetry went hand in hand with street plans focused on the symbols of imperial power. Streets

were straightened; drainage was improved; libraries and museums, department stores and Shinto shrines were constructed. In Korea and Taiwan, however, Japanese city planners were superimposing their vision on long-established urban landscapes. The imposition of colonial order was often carried out with a heavy hand, most notably in the tearing down of the city walls of Taipei and Seoul, and in the 1924 construction of the new neo-Renaissance style Korean Government General Building, which was designed to conceal from view the Chosŏn Dynasty Kyŏngbok Palace and to "break the original spiritual axis of the city, so carefully laid out during its foundation."[11] Nevertheless, existing precolonial urban forms could not entirely be obliterated, and continued to place constraints on the realization of the planners' vision of the colonial urban order.

By contrast, the architects of Toyohara, working on a sparsely populated site, faced few restraints and were able to exercise their imaginations with relative freedom. Toyohara thus became a particularly clear material expression of some of the underlying assumptions and aspirations of Japanese colonial migration. Its streets and buildings, parks and public spaces combined nostalgic evocations of "Japanese ethnic civilization" with pragmatic adaptations to local climate and environment, as well as with utopian aspirations for modernity. As one proud city official put it, the citizens of Toyohara sought "while maintaining the beautiful customs of our 'mother country,' to build our own homeland and a paradise for our descendants in the new territory of Karafuto."[12]

The Railway Station and the Shrine

The landscape of this "new Japan" makes visible the ambivalent interconnection within colonial thought between the image of the migrant as bearer (on the one hand) of national culture and tradition and (on the other) of dynamism and modernity. For the emigrant community (as I have suggested) was expected to be the outstanding exemplar both of the traditions of the national civilization and of the nation's progressive force: its capacity for adaptation and change. Thus, in Toyohara two of the first buildings to be constructed were (to the east) the Karafuto Shrine [*Karafuto Jinja*] and (to the west) the railway station. The main street of Jinja Dōri ran in a perfectly straight line from station to shrine, like a thread connecting the two.

The Karafuto Shrine was commissioned by the central government in 1910, and in August 1911 a dedication ceremony was held at which the shrine was designated a Major Government Shrine (*kanpei*

daisha), a distinction it shared with seven other shrines including the Taiwan Shrine (Taiwan Jinja) and Korea Shrine (Chōsen Jingū). The central hall contained a sword in a white scabbard, presented as a sacred treasure by the Emperor Meiji on the occasion of the dedication ceremony, and the complex was dedicated to three deities from the Shinto pantheon, Ōkunitama no Mikoto, Ōnamuchi no Mikoto, and Sukutaikona no Mikoto—figures whose rather complicated roles in foundational mythology required considerable explanation to make them comprehensible to visitors.[13]

The railway station, at the opposite end of Jinja Dōri, enshrined a different set of myths. The first railway line on the island was constructed by the Japanese army for military transport purposes immediately after the end of the Russo-Japanese War. Running between the southern port of Korsakov (soon to be named Ōdomari) and Vladimirovka (Toyohara), the 40-odd kilometer light rail line was completed in just 60 days. The following year, the line was opened to the public, and an imposing stone railway station, complete with restaurant and colonnaded portico, was subsequently erected in Toyohara. The construction of the Ōdomari-Toyohara line was just the first in a series of feats of railway engineering that became focal symbols of colonial identity formation in Karafuto. The most memorable of these feats was the construction of a line across the rugged mountainous interior of Karafuto between Toyohara and Maoka: a project involving the building of 35 bridges and the blasting of 15 tunnels through the mountains, at the cost of the lives of a rather large number of construction workers.[14] Completed in 1928, the Toyohara–Maoka line became a symbol of the colonizers' role in transferring the power of modern technology to remote regions and "opening up" an unforgiving natural environment. The story of its construction was incorporated into a song and story as a part of the emerging narrative of Karafuto identity, and in 1941 it was chosen by the colonial administration as the central theme of a melodramatic full-length feature film, *Northern Lights* (*Hokkyokukō*), which they coproduced with the Shinkō Cinema company in an effort to promote a sense both of regional identity and national patriotism among the colony's inhabitants.[15]

The railway station and the shrine thus embodied two contrasting versions of national/colonial mythology: to the east, the myth of national origins and unchanging tradition; to the west, the myth of progress, mobility, and the power of technology. Station and shrine were counterpoised—both physically, in terms of their location at opposite ends of the main street, and symbolically, in terms of the

narratives of identity that they represented. But it is also important to notice how they were *connected*: a connection made visible by the road that ran between them.

For visitors to Toyohara, the road straight from the railway station to the Karafuto Shrine had a useful practical purpose as the shrine was the first stop on the tourist route recommended by guidebooks to travelers visiting the colony. Indeed, as contemporary observers pointed out, a substantial proportion of the shrine's visitors were not local people at all, but visiting dignitaries and others who came to Karafuto on business or for recreational travel: the shrine authorities boasted that "almost every traveller to this island from metropolitan Japan is sure to visit the Karafuto Shrine."[16] In this sense, the shrine functioned not just as a focus of patriotic piety but, equally, as instant tourist attraction. As time went on, the shrine also came to incorporate memorials to the new heroes of the emerging colonial mythology, alongside mementos of the gods of Shinto creation myths. By the late 1930s, the grove adjoining the shrine garden contained an impressive array of monuments to the evolving narrative of colonization, including weaponry captured in the Russo-Japanese war, a memorial to "the Ainu Matsunosuke who, although a native, shot dead seven Russians while protecting his master's property" and "a memorial to the people who sacrificed their lives in the construction of the Toyohara-Maoka railway."[17]

"Karafuto Yoitoko": Colonizing Mass Culture

This link between the railway, with its promise of modernity and mass mobility, and the Karafuto Shrine, with its evocation of the myths of state Shinto, is a reminder of an important aspect of interwar culture made visible in the landscape of Toyohara. Accounts of interwar history commonly draw a rather sharp dividing line between the Taishō era, characterized by the flowering of mass culture and the frenzied pursuit of the modern, and the Shōwa era, characterized by the rise of oppressive and homogenizing nationalism. But the urban architecture of Toyohara, and the uses to which this urban space was put, remind us how readily mass culture, mobility, and nationalism could become interfused. With the growth of tourism as a middle-class pursuit – signaled (for example) by the founding of the Japan Tourist Bureau in 1912 and the launch of its journal *Tabi* in 1924—nationalist icons like the Karafuto Shrine came to be consumed as tourist attractions by people who had very little interest in their religious or political symbolism. The Shintō nationalism embodied in the shrine

was thus, paradoxically, also a product of transnational movement: the more Japanese nationals moved into unfamiliar territory, the more important it became to reassert and reconfigure images of the primordial nation.

The media of mass culture were readily harnessed to nationalist ends. The government, for example, was quick to grasp the potential of film as an instrument for molding the minds of citizens, and particularly of the new citizens of colonized territories. In Karafuto, this was best symbolized by the making of the rather lavish 1941 feature film *Hokkyoku Kō*, but elsewhere the use of film as a vehicle for conveying images of nation and empire began much earlier. As Tamura Shizue points out, the colonial authorities in Taiwan had already initiated a program for producing and showing educational films as early as 1914 (some nine years before similar programs were initiated by the Ministry of Education in Naichi). The Taiwan project built on foundations created by the local branch of the Patriotic Women's Association (Aikoku Fujinkai) which, from 1909 onward, had used public film showings as a way to raise money to support the colonial authorities' violent campaign of "pacification" then being waged against the indigenous peoples of Taiwan.[18]

In Karafuto, Taiwan, and Korea alike the colonial governments also mobilized popular songs as a medium for identity-building. An interesting example was the popular song "Karafuto Yoitoko" ("Good Place, Karafuto!") and its accompanying dance, which were performed at a festival held at the main sports-ground in the center of Toyohara during the summer of 1936. The song, extolling the natural wonders of the island, was modeled on the earlier Japanese colonial popular songs "Chōsen Yoitoko" and "Taiwan Yoitoko," which in turn echoed the well-known Japanese local ballad "Kusatsu Yoitoko." Like "Chōsen Yoitoko" and Taiwan Yoitoko," it thus aimed to present a benign (if exoticized) image of colonial culture. As one local official pointed out, such songs "possess, as forms of publicity, the power to express the local colour of the land and the character of the changing times in the most simple, most profound and most popular manner."[19] At the same time, the rhythms of "Karafuto Yoitoko" and its accompanying dance, modeled on the traditions of *Bon Odori*, evoked memories of the traditions of Naichi and served implicitly to locate the colony in the popular imagination as a region of Japan. But although "Karafuto Yoitoko" appears to have been quite enthusiastically accepted by a popular audience, it was hardly a spontaneous product of mass culture. Rather, it was one of a number of "local ballads" commissioned by the Karafuto Chō to celebrate its thirtieth anniversary, and was recorded on the Columbia label with financial

support from the colonial authorities for distribution to communities throughout Karafuto.

The example of songs like "Karafuto Yoitoko" also highlights a further enduring ambiguity of colonial culture. On the one hand, both central government and colonial authorities continuously urged Japanese migrants to the colonies and Manchukuo to be proud of their Japanese heritage, and repeatedly reminded them of the special need for patriotism among settlers of frontier regions such as theirs. But on the other, in attracting settlers to "new Japans" and encouraging them to adapt to an unfamiliar physical environment, it was also important to foster a certain enthusiasm for and pride in the distinctive characteristics of the colony itself. As Narita Ryūichi has pointed out, one response to rapid industrialization and urbanization in Naichi during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was the rise of a new interest in, and nostalgia for, the local culture of one's "native region" (*furusato*).[20] By the 1930s, as a generation of colonial-born émigrés from Naichi was beginning to come of age, a curiously inverted echo of this process was making itself heard in the colonies: a quest to redefine the colony itself as the settler's "native land" (*kyōdō*), and to explore the distinct traditions that might allow such colonial identity to take root.

In the colonial context, however, this rediscovery of the colony as "native land" was necessarily always riven by particular complexities. To explore these complexities further, we need to turn to another of the major landmarks of Toyohara's streetscape: the Karafuto Government Museum (Karafutochō Hakubutsukan).

The Museum and the Pulp Mill

The Karafuto Museum embodied in the purest form the utopian aspects of the quest to construct "new Japans" abroad. It transplanted aspects of Japanese tradition to the new environment of Toyohara, while at the same time bringing the power of science and technology to bear on the tasks of opening up that environment to economic development. But by the same token, the story of the Museum also highlights some of the limitations of utopian visions of settler culture.

The museum began its life in 1917 as a display of minerals, plants, stuffed animals, and indigenous artifacts, exhibited in a room within the headquarters of the Toyohara branch of the *Kempeitai* (Military Police)—a reminder of the diverse roles played by the police in interwar society. In 1934 the display was moved to a military barracks on the northern outskirts of Toyahara, and in 1937 it was rehoused

in a splendid purpose-built museum toward the eastern end of Jinja Dōri.[21] The architecture of the new museum perfectly blended those elements of tradition and modernity so characteristic of interwar colonial nationalism. The building, constructed largely of a synthetic material designed to resemble natural rock, incorporated the latest design features, including steel-sashed windows and toilets with an automatic ventilation system.[22] Inside, separate well-lit rooms housed displays of animals, plants, minerals, meteorology, local industries, archaeology, and the history of the island's exploration and colonization. Yet the design as a whole—with the concave slopes of its tiered roves supported by decorated beams, and its portico fronted by stone lanterns—was conceived so as to evoke images of traditional architecture of a Japanese castle.

The design of the museum was an expression of the philosophy of its staff and management, who saw their task as being to use the most modern scientific principles to preserve the past and to disseminate notions of national and local identity. In this respect, the Karafuto Museum was part of a wider current of innovation within museums throughout the Japanese formal and informal empire. Though it evolved from the work of a number of curators during the 1920s and 1930s, this innovative spirit was perhaps most clearly spelled out by Fujiyama Ichio, Deputy Director of the Manchukuo National Central Museum, in a 1940 publication entitled "A New Approach for Museums" (Shinhakubutsukan Taisei). The "new approach" outlined by Fujiyama was one that rejected the notion of the museum as a mere display of artifacts, and stressed its role as a living body, contributing to mass culture and serving the public through its education and research activities.[23]

As the Director of the Karafuto Government Museum, Sugahara Eizō, put it, the role of the museum was "first of all ceaselessly to carry out research and investigations, and thus to demonstrate the newly-created fruits [of research] to ordinary people in a tangible way; second, to serve as an educational facility; and, third, by making known the resources of the natural world, to promote research on their use and regeneration."[24] Far from simply preserving specimens of nature and culture, the museum, from this point of view, was a key active agent in developing the colony and putting its resources to work in the interests both of local society and of the colonizing nation:

> [I]t is some 30-odd years since Karafuto became our territory, and in order to bring about the healthy increase in industrial

> production and to promote the national interest and the welfare of the people, a particularly pressing present task is to encourage the advance and dissemination of scholarly knowledge. In a place like this island, which is blessed with an environment rich in natural resources, it is especially desirable that we should research nature, seek to apply that research to the development of industry, and thus increase the wealth of the nation.[25]

Yet, while contributing to national prosperity through its research into local natural resources, the museum also had a special mission as a beacon of local culture. So, for example, the Director and other museum staff, played a leading role in the 1938 establishment of the Karafuto Local Research Association (Karafuto Kyōdō Kenkyūkai), a voluntary society designed to promote "the birth of northern culture" (*hoppōbunka no tanjō*) through activities such as researching and presenting public lectures on the natural history and culture of the colony. In a sense, of course, such educational activities fitted the museum's overarching goal of "serving the national interest" by raising the cultural level of the colony. Sugahara's view of the museum's role, in other words, perfectly fitted Yanaihara's ideal of migration as serving the interests of both home and host nation by spreading the fruits of progress to new lands. But at the same time the creation of groups like the Local Research Association reveal a certain implicit tension between the interests of colony and metropolis.

In an article welcoming the formation of the Association, for example, one of its leading members complained bitterly about the practices of scholars from metropolitan Japan, who made brief visits to Karafuto, carrying away local specimens and research findings which they used to enrich their own museums and research projects.[26] This was just one instance of a common refrain in Karafuto writings of the 1930s: a vision of the colony as sidelined, neglected, and misunderstood by social elites of the imperial metropolis. Museum Director Sugahara Eizō himself seems to have shared this uneasy sense, at once of serving as a bearer of Japanese culture to the margins of empire, and also of being marginalized by the cultural establishment of Naichi: the semi-autobiographical writings of his son, the novelist Samukawa Kōtarō, vividly depict Sugahara as embattled on all sides by arrogant Naichi scholars who claim credit for his discoveries, small-minded colonial bureaucrats who undermine his work, and mercenary settlers who see Karafuto's resources only as a potential source of personal gain.[27]

Sugahara's utopian image of the "opening up" of the island's rich resources never quite matched the realities of colonial development in Karafuto. Resource use had another side, manifest, not in the castellated splendor of the Karafuto Government Museum, but to the north of the city, in the sprawling complex of the Ōji Paper Company's Toyohara Pulp Mill. The development of Karafuto's wood pulp industry, which was built on botanical research into local tree species conducted by Sugahara's predecessors from 1908 onward, had taken off during the boom years of World War I. During the 1920s wood processing (including pulp making) became the mainstay of the colony's economy, and by 1934 the total output of Karafuto's timber and pulp industry was worth some 22 million yen, almost twice the value of the output of its nearest competitor, the fishing industry (although the fisheries continued to employ more workers).[28] As the colonial authorities were fond of pointing out, indeed, Karafuto helped to support the entire literary and intellectual life of Japan, since, by the 1930s, the colony's forests were producing about half the pulp that went into Japanese paper.[29]

Established in 1917, Ōji's Toyohara pulp mill covered an area of over 100 hectares and included a maze of ferroconcrete buildings whose chimneys dominated the skyline of northern Toyohara. Nearby were rows of barrack housing for workers, and the factory soon became the center of an expanding industrial area, surrounded by chemical plants and other factory buildings. When Ōji first invested in Karafuto it was in vigorous competition with two main rivals, Fuji Paper and the Karafuto Industrial Company. But the merger of the three companies in 1933 left Ōji in a dominant position, and from then on Karafuto was in some respects a "company colony," just as certain urban areas of Japan were "company towns."

The symbiotic relationship between colony and corporation had a profound impact on the landscape and life of Karafuto. During the early years of the development of the pulp industry, Karafuto's forests—those forests whose unique ecology Karafuto Government Museum Director Sugahara Eizō sought so eagerly to study and preserve—were ravaged by over-harvesting, forest fires, and introduced pests. Although some reforestation programs were introduced from 1920 onward, the damage remained very visible. On a visit to the colony in the late 1930s, the economic historian Honjō Eijirō described the view from the window of the Ōdomari-Toyohara train as follows: "the scenery along the railway is very bleak. The mountains are not high and the forests are not deep. Moreover, logged mountain forests, fire-damaged trees and large amounts of left-over log stumps stand in

disarray, and their appearance makes one think that Karafuto's forest policy until today has been a tree-felling policy that forgot about tree-planting."[30]

The rise of extractive industries like the pulp industry, and later also coal mining (whose output grew particularly rapidly from the mid-1920s onward), affected the social structure as well as the natural environment of the colony. The archetypal image of the colonial pioneer was of the rugged settler carving a plot of farmland out of the forest, the fearless engineer constructing railways and bridges across the mountains, or the dedicated teacher or researcher bringing the fruits of metropolitan culture to the frontiers of empire. But this limited range of images failed to capture the real diversity of colonial society. It was true that, at least until the mid-1930s, farmers made up the largest group of migrants to Karafuto (accounting for about 48,000 out of the colony's total population of around 313,000 in 1934), but substantial numbers of the colony's population were also engaged in manufacturing and mining (which together employed some 21,000 people), in the fisheries (around 16,000 people), or in running their own small business.[31]

Despite the ideal image of the migrant as one who "chose the country of settlement as his permanent abode," the population of colonial Karafuto was not only diverse but also highly mobile. In the early years, a significant proportion of its inhabitants had come only to earn money during the summer, returning to other parts of Japan during the winter. Even as late as the mid-1920s, the colonizing population was disproportionately young and male—with some 134 men to every 100 women, a statistic suggesting (as one observer put it) that "the society [of Karafuto] is not a very settled society."[32] Although the numbers of seasonal migrant workers fell over time, the survival of the term "*etsunensha*" (those who stay through the winter) in the colonial vocabulary indicated a continuing sense that permanent residence was not something to be taken for granted.

Some colonists, attracted by the offer of free farmland to which they would obtain ownership if they cultivated it successfully, certainly came with the intention of developing family farms to pass on to their descendants. But many others came to try their luck in business, to work as seasonal laborers, or to save some money which they hoped to take back with them to metropolitan Japan after a few years. The novelist Honjō Mutsuo who came to Karafuto from Hokkaido in 1920 and worked for about ten months in Ōji Paper's Toyohara Pulp Mill to earn money for his college education in Tokyo,

was representative of this last group, differing from others only in that he wrote and published accounts of his experience in the mill.[33] Others spent a year or two in Karafuto before moving on to more distant destinations such as Manchuria.

Describing a journey on the ferry from Wakkanai to Ōdomari in 1940, Sugahara's son Samukawa Kōtarō captured the diversity and fluidity that characterized the colony's population even after 35 years of settlement. His fellow passengers include "fishermen, labourers, the families of farmer workers who had returned to Naichi, officials returning from business trips, bustling merchants who are forever traveling back and forth to Tokyo or Osaka," a family on the way to visit their eldest son who works in the Ochiai paper mills; a consumptive missionary traveling north in pursuit of souls to save. As Samukawa notes, "Karafuto is still invariably cosmopolitan with regard to religion. If the power of tradition is feeble, then by the same token there is little resistance to new things."[34]

For many migrants, indeed, part of the appeal of Karafuto and of other colonies (including the quasi-colony of Manchukuo) was that they offered the prospect of escape from "the power of tradition"—from conventions and controls of life in their home towns or villages. Drawn disproportionately from the poorer regions of Japan (particularly Hokkaidō and Tōhoku), Karafuto colonists included a, perhaps unusually, large share of people with left-wing or other unorthodox opinions. Some of the more prominent contributors to prewar "Karafuto literature" expressed outspoken left-wing sympathies—among them Honjō Mutsu and Funabashi Kiyono, better known by her pen name of Yuzurihara Masako, whose writings paint a searing picture of social conditions in the mining and industrial town of Ochiai, to the east of Toyohara, where she worked as a teacher.[35]

Minority religions, too (as Samukawa suggests) flourished in a surprising diversity of forms in interwar colonial society, even if most attracted only small handfuls of converts. Branches of mainstream Christian churches and relatively well-known "new religions" like *Tenrikyō*, *Seichō no Ie*, and *Hitonomichi Kyōdan* (which also attracted adherents in Taiwan and China) existed alongside more obscure groups such as *Kiyome Kyōkai* (an offshoot of Nihon Hōrinesu Kyōkai, whose members followed the Old Testament and believed in a close racial and spiritual connection between Japanese and Jews). These "new religions" attracted the particular attention of the local police, who seem to have been nervously aware of the colony's reputation for "cosmopolitan" ideas.[36]

All of this suggests that the cultural construction of the "birth of northern culture" was a more complex phenomenon than what colonial policy makers or even museum curators might have hoped. Many colonists appear to have enjoyed the lively strains of songs like "Karafuto Yoitoko"; many no doubt felt a certain emotion of identity with the pioneer memorials that filled the grounds around the Karafuto Shrine; and some even took time to attend the lectures on the region's nature and culture sponsored by the Karafuto Local Research Association. But among the relatively poor and relatively mobile population of the colony, most people had more pressing everyday concerns and interests of their own that were not necessarily malleable into the imagined identity of the ideal colonial pioneer.

Museum Director Sugahara Eizō's disillusioned comments on the prospects for the success of his cultural mission, indeed, highlight the vicissitudes that beset utopian visions of the construction of new Japans: "Alas," he observed, "the people of Karafuto are still far from having reached the stage of being able to use the museum. It is a sad fact that, amongst people who live in Karafuto, there are still few who really understand our work and are willing to help us out of love for this island. Unless a new trend which aspires to the healthy development of Karafuto's culture and industry arises spontaneously from amongst the people of the island, we will probably have little hope of our work progressing successfully, or even of having that work recognised."[37]

New Japans, New East Asias: Colonialism and Migration Revisited

The ideal of migration as a force for international progress and welfare and as a generator of dynamic "new Japans," spelled out by Yanaihara in 1927, was ultimately problematic, not just because it was at odds with the cultural and economic realities of the colonial settler experience, but also because it tended to obscure from view the complexity of the flows of migration generated by colonization. In all colonial empires, Japan's included, the process of colonization generated intersecting and multidirectional movements of people: some voluntary and some involuntary; some journeys of hope and some journeys into despair. Neither Korea nor Taiwan nor Manchukuo nor even Karafuto could ever simply provide the site for a "new Japan," for all were part of such a nexus of multidirectional flows, whose currents were to have a lasting impact on the cultural history of twentieth-century East Asia.

Even in Karafuto, whose population was dominated by settlers from Naichi—and even in Toyohara, where the proportion of such settler was particularly high—it was impossible entirely to obliterate traces of these intersections of peoples generated by colonialism. The Karafuto Government Museum's researches into local culture unearthed archaeological evidence of the Ainu villages that had dotted the Suzuya Plain before the coming of the Russian convict settlement of Vladimirovka; tourists to Karafuto consumed the spectacle of the "exotic" streetscape of Russian log houses on the northern fringe of Toyohara; and by 1936 the local police bureau was producing anxious reports on the emergence of "Korean ghettoes" in certain parts of the city.[38]

Indeed, elsewhere in his writings, Yanaihara himself acknowledged that colonization and emigration from Japan were inseparably bound up with other movements of people. Some of these movements took place within, rather than across, colonial boundaries. For example, in Karafuto—so often depicted as an unclaimed *terra nullius*, where the only obstacle to Japanese colonization was the countervailing thrust of Russian expansionism—the "wide open spaces" of the colonial imagination had first to be created, by removing the indigenous populations who originally occupied the land. As Yanaihara put it "the policy of the Karafuto authorities towards the Ainu followed the example of Hokkaido in appropriately amalgamating their villages into villages of a considerable size and establishing outstanding leaders in these settlements in order to achieve assimilation."[39] To put it somewhat differently, the inflow of some 90,000 Japanese settlers to the colony by 1920, and over 280,000 by 1930, was accompanied by a policy of forcibly relocating the Ainu population of the colony from the many small villages where they had formerly lived into ten more centralized settlements, and later also of forcibly removing the other small indigenous populations of Nivkh and Uilta people from the forests and shorelines they occupied to the artificial settlement of Otasu, near the town of Shisuka in the north of the colony.

These involuntary migrations were replicated in other parts of the empire. In Taiwan, as Yanaihara himself noted in 1932, "the primitive accumulation of capital is assisted by the power of the government, which also initiated the utilization of the backward forested regions by a policy of making the highland aborigines come down from the mountains."[40] Yanaihara describes the process as having been "carried out in a civilised manner" (*bunmeitekini nasareta*) with careful regard to the welfare of the indigenous mountain communities, but this view seems to reflect a rather large dose of wishful thinking. In

fact, of course, the relocation of large numbers of indigenous people in Taiwan was achieved through military force, most notably through the creation of a "guard-line" (*aiyūsen*) surrounding the territories occupied by indigenous groups, and its gradual forward movement to incorporate more and more of these territories into "pacified" areas where settlers could "engage in the agricultural, timber and camphor industries with greater safety."[41]

Colonization also generated movements of people across, as well as within, the borders of empire. In his major 1926 study of colonialism and colonial policy, Yanaihara included a highly critical account of the way in which agricultural policies, Japanese acquisition of farm land in Korea, and political oppression following the 1 March Movement of 1919 were accelerating flows of Korean emigration into Manchuria and eastern Siberia.[42] When Korea became a Japanese colony in 1910, there were already some 83,000 Koreans living in eastern Manchuria, but during the 1910s and 1920s this number rose dramatically: by the early 1920s (according to one estimate) there were half a million Koreans in Manchuria, the Tumen Region, and Eastern Inner Mongolia.[43] Between 1907 and 1923, meanwhile, the Korean population in the Russian Far East (according to Soviet statistics) increased from 46,430 to 106,817, and during the 1920s and 1930s the Korean presence in Siberia had a substantial impact on the landscape of the Maritime Provinces, to which they introduced rice and silk production, before being shipped *en masse* to Central Asia in 1937, largely because (ironically enough) the Stalin regime viewed them as potential Japanese spies.[44]

Such cross-border flows were also to have a major impact on the social history of Karafuto. There, colonial resource development during the 1930s (particularly the development of the coal mines) came to rely increasingly on the inflow of migration from Korea. By 1936 the colony had 7399 Korean inhabitants according to police statistics, or 8859 according to the population census. (The discrepancy between these two figures was a source of considerable concern to the Toyohara police, who sensed the existence of blind spots in their powers of panoptical surveillance.)[45] By 1944, the number was to increase to around 50,000—well over 10 percent of the colony's population. The failure of postwar governments to address the consequences of intra-empire migration mean that many of the survivors and their descendants remain in Sakhalin today, their presence helping to shape the economy and culture of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk (as Toyohara has now become), but considerable numbers still seek to return to the hometowns and villages that they last saw more than half a century ago.

Other long-forgotten migration movements also shaped the character of colonial Karafuto. A considerable proportion of those who worked (and died) on the Toyohara-Maoka railway, for example, were not in fact pioneering volunteers from Naichi, but rather Chinese contract laborers. Responding to the difficulties of recruiting labor for the hard and dangerous work on the line, the colonial authorities in 1923 licensed several Japanese labor contractors to bring 1447 Chinese workers into the colony during the summer months. In 1924, 1977 workers were brought over to Karafuto, and in 1925 and 1926 further recruitment from China took place, before the practice was stopped in response to protests from Japanese workers who felt that their wages were being undercut.[46] In Taiwan, too, colonial development projects stimulated migration from China. Contractors based in Taiwan were authorized by the Governor General to recruit Chinese labor for work in plantations and other colonial projects, and Chinese laborers were allowed to enter the colony provided that they had a certificate issued by one of these agencies. In 1924, for example, some 6800 Chinese laborers and 3000 other Chinese were admitted to Taiwan.[47]

While the theorists of migration tended to conceive of the migrant as a "settler," making a permanent move to a new homeland, much of this movement of people across the spaces of the colonial empire (like much of the movement of people between Naichi and Karafuto) had a temporary, "unsettled" character. Chinese migrants to Karafuto, for example, included not only the railway workers (most of whom presumably moved on once their contracts were complete), but also a small but steady flow of traveling merchants, who generally came over to the island during the summer months, bringing their wares to Toyohara and the remoter communities of the island. Some came directly from China or Manchuria, while others ran stores in Yokohama or Kobe that they used as bases for their forays into Karafuto. The monotonous regularity with which colonial police reports record the arrest of Chinese merchants for trading without a license suggests the inability of the colonial authorities to maintain a firm control over these flows of movement across the landscapes of empire.

Lost Memorials

In 1939, writing in the journal *Karafuto Jihō*, one Karafuto resident drew attention to the proliferation of monuments and statues in the streets, parks, and shrines of the colony. These monuments,

he observed, were visible embodiments of a newly emerging sense of colonial identity—an "islander spirit" (*tōminsei*). At the same time, the viewing of the monuments had the power to arouse collective emotions that were helping to nurture the further growth and maturation of this sense of colonial belonging. Colonial identity was distinct, and yet its roots also lay deep in the culture of imperial metropolis. Describing the Karafuto Jinja's memorial to those who "gave their lives" in the construction of the Toyohara–Maoka railway and the nearby monument to soldiers killed in the Russo-Japanese War, the author reflected that these embodied the islanders' sense of self-sacrifice, and went on to remind readers that "'the spirit of self-sacrifice' is indeed just another way of saying the 'Yamato spirit'"[48]

Reading these words, I find myself wondering at the process by which the deaths of an unknown number of anonymous Chinese contract workers became subsumed into the narrative of the self-sacrificing colonial pioneer, and this narrative in turn was incorporated both into an emerging "islander spirit" and (simultaneously) into a nationalist eulogy to the "Yamato spirit." I read these words, too, with a consciousness that the memorials they describe have in turn all been swept away, to be replaced by another set of national/colonial narratives: the site of the former Karafuto Jinja is now the location of the Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk memorial to the Soviet/Russian war dead. Observing the complexities and paradoxes at work in these multiple processes of commemorating and forgetting is, I think, a way of starting to comprehend the flows of human interaction, the utopian dreams, the violence and the eternal contradictions that made up colonial culture in the Japanese empire, as it also constituted the cultures of other twentieth-century colonial empires. By rediscovering the lost landscapes and monuments of colonial cities, and by exploring the stories concealed (as well as revealed) by those monuments, we can begin to retrace the interconnections and movements across the face of empire that have continued to influence the cultural history of East Asia to the present day.

Notes

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3. Bruno Lasker ed., *Problems of the Pacific 1931: Proceedings of the Fourth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1932), p. 424.
4. Hōmushō Nyūkoku Kanrishitsu, *Nyūkoku kanri to sono jittai* (Tokyo: Ōkurashō Insatsukyoku, 1964), p. 10; Lasker, *Problems of the Pacific 1931*.
5. The relatively few works on the subject include Takenaka Nobuko, *Shokuminchi Taiwan no Nihon josei seikatsushi* (4 vols) (Tokyo: Tabata Shoten, 1995, 1996 and 2001); Kawamura Minato, *Sōru toshi monogatari* (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 2000), pp. 117–64.
6. Oguma Shigenobu, "Imin no shinzui," in *Saikin ishokumin kenkyū,* vol. 1, ed. Nihon Imin Kyōkai (Tokyo: Tôyōsha, 1918), pp. 1–3.
7. See, for example, Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), p. 319; Sandra Wilson, *The Manchurian Crisis and Japanese Society 1931–33* (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 32.
8. Yanaihara Tadao, "Jinkō mondai to imin," in *Ishokumin mondai kōshūkai kōenshū*, ed. Shakaikyoku Shakaibu (Tokyo: Shakaikyoku Shakaibu, 1927), pp. 75–112.
9. Ibid. p. 110.
10. Muromachi Yasushi, *Karafuto ijū annai* (Tokyo: Aikokusha, 1913,) p. 138.
11. Hyungmin Pai, "Modernism, Development and the Transformation of Seoul: A Study of the Development of Sae'oon Sang'ga and Yoido," in *Culture and the City in East Asia*, ed. Won Bae Kim (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), pp. 110–11; see also Roger Mark Selya, *Taipei* (Chichester: J. Wiley, 1995), pp. 23–4.
12. Imamura Takeshi, "Shi Toyohara no sugata," *Karafuto Chōhō*, no. 3 (July 1937): 202.
13. Saitō Toshio, "Tsuimite kanpei taisha Karafuto Jinja o kataru," *Karafuto Chōhō*, no. 4 (1937).
14. Nihon Tetsudō Bunka Zaidan, *Karafuto Tetsudō shiryōshū* (Tokyo: Nihon Tetsudō Bunka Zaidan, 1995), pp. 32–4.
15. For a more detailed discussion of this film, see Tessa Morris-Suzuki, "Northern Lights: The Making and Unmaking of Karafuto Identity," *Journal of Asian Studies* 60, no. 3 (2001): 645–71.
16. Saitō, "Tsuimite kanpei taisha Karafuto Jinja o kataru," p. 87.
17. Hatayama Teiji, "Karafuto no kinenhi to shiminsei: Karafuto meishō no hiwa 45 shū chūyori," *Karafuto Chōhō*, no. 31 (1930): 83.
18. Tamura Shizue, *Hajime ni eiga ga atta: Shokuminchi Taiwan to Nihon* (Tokyo: Chūō Kōromsha, 2000).
19. Doi Takeo. "Kyōdominyō 'Karafuto yoikoto', 'hirakeyuku Karafuto,'" *Karafuto Chōhō*, no. 3 (1937): 295.
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22. Karafuto Chō Naimubu Eizenka "Chikaku rakusei suru Karafutochō hakubutsukan," *Karafuto Chōhō*, no. 2, (1937): 102–3.
23. Inuzuka Yasuhiro, "Tenrankai no nikusei," in *Shinhakubutsukan taisei: Manshūkoku no hakubutsukan ga sengo nihon ni tsutaeteiru koto,* ed. Nagoya-Shi Hakubutsukan (Nagoya: Nagoya-Shi Hakubutsukan, 1995),

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24. "Hakubutsukan o miru," in *Karafuto Jihō*, no. 28 (1939): 50.
25. Ibid., pp. 49–50.
26. Denpōya Hidemaru, "Kyōdo niokeru kagaku bunka ni tsuite," in *Hoppō Bunka* 1, no. 2 (1938): 53.
27. See the short stories 「Mine」、「Kusabito」and 「Yachō」in Samukawa Kōtarō, *Kusabito* (Tokyo: Chuo Kōronsha, 1941).
28. Herman Friis, "Pioneer Economy of Sakhalin Island," *Economic Geography* 5, no. 1 (1939): 63–4.
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32. Karafuto Chō Tetsudō Jimusho, *Karafuto no tetsudō ryokō* (Tokyo: Karafuto Cho, 1928), p. 17.
33. Kihara Naohiro, *Karafuto bungaku no tabi*. vol. 1. (Sapporo: Kyōdō Bunkasha, 1994), pp. 362–9.
34. Samukawa Kōtarō, "Karafuto kikō: Nosutarujia Sagaren," in *Kusabito* (Tokyo: Chuō Kōronsha, 1941), p. 152–3.
35. See Kawamura Minato, *Nanyō, Karafuto no Nihon bungaku* (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1994), pp. 183–6; Morris-Suzuki, "Northern Lights."
36. See, for example, Toyohara Keisatsusho Higashi-shijō Hasshutsujo, "Kōtō Zassho-tsuzuri—Shōwa 12 nendo," and Toyohara Keisatsusho Higashi-shijō Hasshutsujo, "Tokkou Zassho 12 nendo" (1i-1–75), documents held in the Sakhalin Regional Archive, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk.
37. "Hakubutsukan wo miru," pp. 51–2.
38. Toyohara Keisatsushochō, "Kanka Junsa-dono—Chōsenjin Shūdan Kyojū ni Kansuru Chōsahō no Ken," 1936, (1i-1-p. 59) document held in the Sakhalin Regional Archive, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk.
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42. Yanaihara, "Shokumin mata shokuminseisaku," pp. 306–8.
43. Shuhsi Hsu, "Japanese Subjects in Manchuria: A Chinese View," in *Problems of the Pacific 1931: Proceedings of the Fourth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations*, ed. Bruno Lasker (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1932), p. 283
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46. Karafuto Keisatsubu, "Karafuto Zairyū Chōsenjin Ippan, 1929," in *Nihon shokuminchika no zainichi chōsenjin no jōkyō*. 12 vol., ed. Pak Kyong-Shik hen (Tokyo: Ajia Mondai Kenkyūsho, 1990), pp. 387–92.
47. Charles L de Vault, "Letter from Charles L. de Vault, American Consul Taihoku, to Secretary of State," in *Records of the US Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Japan 1930–1939*.
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5

Migrations and the Formation of a Diverse Japanese Nation during the First Half of the Twentieth Century

Noriaki Hoshino

Beginning with the Meiji period, Japanese population movements outside of the country followed the narratives that accompanied the expansion of the Japanese empire. Beyond the development of settler colonialism in Japanese colonies in East Asian countries, Japanese migrations to North American countries were also expected to establish a "new Japan" (*shin nihon*) across the Pacific.[1] In this context, recent studies of Japanese migration to the United States have started focusing on the connection between Japanese transpacific migrations and the Japanese imperial expansion in East Asia. For example, a representative work of this phenomenon, written by historian Eiichirō Azuma, reveals how the experience of Japanese migrants in the United States was later appropriated by Japanese imperialists to support and promote the Japanese colonial migrations to Manchuria in the 1930s.[2]

In view of such discussions of the close relationship between transpacific migration and Japanese imperial expansion in East Asia, this study introduces another thematic concern: the problem of racial/ethnic relationships within and outside of the Japanese empire. Migration and racial/ethnic contacts are popular topics, usually conjoined, in the study of colonialism, but previous studies of Japanese migrations have not examined how best to situate this issue of the empire's racial/ethnic relationships on the spectrum of evolving discourse on Japanese migrations.

This chapter pursues such an inquiry by examining the discourses and activities of Nagata Shigeshi (1881–1973), the second president of the Japanese Christian organization, Nihon Rikkōkai (Japanese Striving Association), and his predecessors. Nihon Rikkōkai is a

private Japanese organization that is known best for its long-time involvement with Japanese migrations to North and South America and Manchuria. Following its creation by its first president Shimanuki Hyōdayū (1866–1913) in 1900, this organization facilitated Japanese migration to the United States by offering education and training to migrants. Although Shimanuki's commitment to facilitating early Japanese migrations to North America is an important topic in the study of Japanese migrations, my study examines the relationship between Japanese migrations and colonization in East Asia.[3] When Nagata initiated the organization, migration to the United States was restricted by the US government and the organization changed its focus on migrations to South America and later to Manchuria and Japan's Pacific Mandate. As this fact suggests, during his presidency, Nagata and Nihon Rikkōkai's work reflected the changing trend that had been marking Japanese migrations since the 1920s and marked points of convergence between transpacific Japanese migrations and colonization in East Asia.

The first part of this study addresses the activity of Nagata's predecessors, Shimanuki and his mentor Oshikawa Masayoshi (1850–1928), another early Japanese Christian convert, to set Nagata's works within the larger context of Japanese imperial discourse. I focus on the fact that both engaged in the enlightenment of the Korean people and this attitude toward the colonized population carried over to Nagata's philosophy. This examination reveals a tradition of Japanese Christian activism that dates to the turn of the twentieth century. I devote the second part of this chapter to analyzing Nagata's early works in the 1910s and 1920s, covering his discourse on Japanese migrations in general but focusing particularly on how his experience as a Japanese immigrant in the United States intersected with the colonial problems of the Japanese empire. The final part of the chapter addresses the later development of Nagata's discourses on migrations and racial/ethnic relationships in the empire. In the 1930s, increased migration into Manchuria directed Nagata's attention to managing the diverse populations within the empire through Japanese migrations. This shift in his views also resonated with the ongoing formation of the East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.

Nagata's Predecessors

In 1930 Nagata wrote an article titled "Just follow our masters' footsteps" in Nihon Rikkōkai's monthly magazine *Rikkō Sekai*.[4] In this article, Nagata directed his readers' attention to the forgotten relationship

between his organization and Korea. While he admitted that his organization's work had focused on migrations to North and South America for a while, he insisted that his predecessor, Shimanuki, had never forgotten about the situation in Korea. Importantly, Nagata's statement reveals his Japanese Christian predecessors' long-standing commitment to East Asian affairs. In this article Nagata mentioned, in addition to Shimanuki, Oshikawa Masayoshi, a leading early Japanese Christian convert. When Nagata wrote the article, he was involved in building a new village in Korea and he made his ongoing project overlap with the activity of his Christian predecessors in East Asia from the late nineteenth century. What was their original mission and what insight does this genealogy of Japanese Christians' activities give us into Nagata's later practices?

Oshikawa and Shimanuki, the two Japanese Christians mentioned by Nagata, were in a mentoring relationship at Sendai in the late nineteenth century. Shimanuki was born in 1866 to the family of a samurai in Miyagi prefecture and was baptized by Oshikawa in 1886. He studied at the Sendai Divinity School (Sendai Shingakkō), which was founded by Oshikawa and the American missionary William Edwin Hoy in 1886. Thus, Shimanuki was heavily influenced by Oshikawa early on in his career. In the 1890s, Shimanuki started working for relief of the poor and his activities extended to Korea. Shimanuki's interest in Korea, however, was parallel to that of his mentor, Oshikawa, who was active in Korean missionary work.

Oshikawa Masayoshi, one of the early Christian leaders in modern Japan, was born in 1850 in Ehime prefecture. After studying at Kaisei Gakkō, one of the predecessors to the University of Tokyo, he moved to Yokohama and studied at Yokohama Shūbunkan, an English school. In Yokohama, he studied with American missionaries such as Samuel Robins Brown and James Hamilton Ballagh and became a Christian in 1872.[5] He started missionary outreach work in Nīgata in 1876 and, in 1880, he moved to Sendai, where he established a church and Christian school. Oshikawa actively engaged in Christian missionary and educational work there and became the president of Tōhoku Gakuin University, previously the Sendai Divinity School.

However, Oshikawa was not merely a local religious activist and the territorial range of his activity went far beyond the Tōhoku region. He became involved with education in Hokkaido and oilfield development in Sakhalin. Among the wide range of his activities, what is particularly interesting for my study is his commitment to education outside of Japan. In fact, Oshikawa was one of the first Japanese Christians who actively engaged in the expansion of its missionary

activity into East Asia. He was deeply involved around the turn of the century in education in Korea, one of the destinations of future Japanese colonization.

The relationship between Japanese imperialism and Japanese Christianity is itself an important topic in Japanese empire studies. For example, in a recent study of this relationship, Emily Anderson traces the activity of the Japanese Congregational Church (Nihon Kumiai Kirisuto Kyōkai) in colonial Korea in an important case study of Japanese Christian involvement with Japanese imperial subject formation.[6] Anderson's main analysis focuses on the church's activity after the annexation of Korea, such as the work of the newly appointed director of the Japanese Congregational Church in colonial Korea, Watase Tsuneyoshi. However, as she also mentions, Watase and Japanese Christian missionary practice in Korea had already begun before the annexation and Oshikawa took the initiative in this pre-colonization period's penetration of Japanese Christians into Korea beginning in the 1890s.[7]

Regarding the period's historical background, Oshikawa's promotion of early Japanese Christian foreign enterprise in the early 1890s ran in parallel to the emergence of "foreign emigration/colonisation" (*kaigai shokumin*) discourse. In a previous study of this Christian foreign mission, Yun Koncha regards the Japanese leaders' interest in foreign migration/expansion after the first Japanese economic crisis in 1890 as an important part of the historical context. For example, the prominent economist Tsuneya Seifuku encouraged movement outside of Japan by publishing *Theory of Foreign Emigration/Colonisation* (*Kaigai shokuminron*) in 1891 and, in 1893, the Emigration/Colonisation Society (Shokumin Kyōkai) was established and overseas development started to become an important topic among Japanese leaders.[8]

Oshikawa started to develop his idea of a foreign mission when the Sino-Japanese War increased the momentum toward foreign expansion. He regarded the foreign mission of Japanese Christians in the East as an important extension of "Western" Christian missionaries' earlier activities in Japan. For him, this mission was an "obligation" of Japanese Christians.[9] Thus motivated, in 1894 Oshikawa established the Greater Japan Overseas Education Society (*Dai nihon kaigai kyōiku kai*) with other Christians such as Honda Yōitsu and Iwamoto Yoshiharu. This organization was first called the Foreign Mission Society (Kaigai Dendōkai) and then the Greater Japan Christian Education Society (Dainihon Kirisutokyōto Kyōikukai), indicating that it was founded strictly as a Christian organization but was later modified to fit a broader mission.

In December 1894, in the middle of the Sino-Japanese War, the society publicized the following statement:

> Now the West learns a lot from the East and vice versa. Isn't it the moment of cultural renovation based on the encounter between the East and the West? For this reason, the mission of the Japanese empire this time is grand and glorious. That is by synthesising the Eastern and Western cultures, it has to realise the morality of the world…Therefore, we now sympathise with the contemporary situation of Korea and cordially plan their education in order to guide their spirit, cultivate the national power, enlighten their patriotism, and build the basis of truly good and strong national independence.[10]

What is interesting in this articulation of their mission is their interpretation of contemporaneous world politics and the exceptionalization of the status of the Japanese empire. First, the statement expresses sympathy with the difficult situation in Korea and emphasizes the importance of enlightening the people through education to maintain "national independence" (*ikkoku dokuritsu*). Just as Fukuzawa Yukichi's discourse showed, the national independence of their own country was one of the most important themes in Japanese enlightenment discourse.[11] In this regard we cannot ignore the fact that this is a critical reflection of the ongoing worldwide politics of great powers. However, once such an argument for the importance of national independence is extended to the protection of the independence of other countries or East Asian security, it could easily justify one country's intervention into another as a necessity.[12]

The Overseas Education Society had many supporters in political and business circles, such as Konoe Atsumaro, Itō Hirobumi, Ōkuma Shigenobu, and Shibusawa Eiichi. This fact indicates that this organization's activity was expected to contribute to ongoing Japanese national policy. The most important achievement of the organization's activity in Korea was establishing the Keijō Gakudō (Keijō School) in Seoul, a Japanese language school. Around the turn of the century, the establishment of Japanese language schools in Korea had been promoted by Japanese civilians and some Japanese organizations with ambitions to expand into East Asia, such as the Higashi Honganji Buddhist Temple and the East Asia Common Culture Association (Tōa Dōbunkai). Among them, the Keijō Gakudō was regarded as the most representative school. For example, the first Japanese Resident-General of Korea, Itō Hirobumi, stated that Keijō

Gakudō was the only truly successful enterprise in Korea established by the Japanese.[13] Importantly, according to Eizō Ōtsuka's biography of Oshikawa, this organization's educational enterprise was also supposed to expand into China.[14] This expansion plan was not realized and the Overseas Education Society had to stop managing the Keijō Gakudō in 1906 for financial reasons. However, it cannot be denied that establishing this school was a cornerstone of the development of modern education and the extension of Japanese influence in Korea.

In this way, Oshikawa's social activity showed his strong interest in Asian affairs early on in his career and it paralleled the expansion of the Japanese empire. Nevertheless, his activity cannot be summed up as simple support for Japanese colonial exploitation. In another biographical study of Oshikawa, Fuji Kazuya observes that the philosophy of Oshikawa includes both nationalistic and international aspects and that Oshikawa was not exclusively nationalist.[15] This "international aspect" indicates Oshikawa's concern with the independence of Asian countries in the era of imperialism and it is at this point where his philosophy crisscrosses the currents of Asianism (*ajia shugi*).

Indeed, Oshikawa engaged with issues in many foreign areas other than Korea. It has been noted that, when Emilio Aguinaldo, the leader of the Philippine independence movement, sent Mariano Ponce to Japan to purchase arms in 1899, Oshikawa gave him support. Oshikawa also joined the Manchuria–Mongolia Independence Movement *(Manmō dokuritsu undō*), which was initiated by a continental adventurer, Kawashima Naniwa, and the Japanese army. In 1918 he founded the All Asian Association (Zen Ajiakai) with Ōkawa Shūmei and criticized the Japanese people's neglect of their responsibility for the improvement of Asian societies. In this way, Oshikawa's later activity was no longer limited to a simple Christian civilizing mission; instead, he actively intervened in Asian politics with strong antipathy for the politically oppressive situation in Asia.

Oshikawa's Asianistic perspective gives us an important insight when we examine Nihon Rikkōkai's transpacific activities. As I show in detail below, Nagata's concern with Asian politics in terms of Japan's potential hegemonic competition with the American empire across the Pacific was an extension of Oshikawa's Asianistic view. The point is that Shimanuki and Nihon Rikkōkai also operated in parallel to Oshikawa's Asianistic project.

After graduating from Tōhoku Gakuin University in 1893, Shimanuki moved to Tokyo and started working to save "poor students" (*kugakusei*) with his religious belief in the value of diligence

and hard work. At the time, Japanese migrations to the United States had increased and Shimanuki found in this phenomenon an effective way to solve the problem of "poor students." In 1897, Shimanuki toured the United States and Canada, and he was convinced that America was the ideal place for the poor students to find success if they persevered and worked hard. In 1900, he established the organization Nihon Rikkōkai and organized a system of support for "poor students," particularly assisting them with their migration to North America. Interestingly, like his mentor Oshikawa, Shimanuki was also involved in missionary activities in Korea early in his career. When he was working as a member of the student-based Tōhoku Salvation Army, they travelled around the Tōhoku region preaching the gospel and saving the poor.[16] However, their missionary activity was not limited to Tōhoku, as they extended their work during free time into the broader population of the poor all over the country and even into neighboring countries. In this context, Shimanuki travelled to Korea during the summer in 1892 and studied the situation of the poor there.[17]

In 1895, when Shimanuki was in Tokyo, he started publishing a Christian journal, *kyūsei* (*The Salvation*). The first issue of this journal starts with a discussion of Japanese Christian mission outreach in the East and shows how important this topic is for Shimanuki. Referring to Oshikawa's activity in the Overseas Education Society, this article discussed the method of mission outreach and its future prospects:

> I once thought that Japan was a pioneer of Eastern countries. Now that we are totally self-conscious of it, we do not have to explain "why our nation is a pioneer of Eastern countries." Neither do we have to explain "why the Christians in this country have to engage in mission outreach in Eastern countries." What we have to articulate now is the method of it. We have to discuss how we are able to achieve it…Japan won the war against China not simply for the conquest of China, but for the conquest of the East. Japanese expansion just began and this expansion is a good opportunity for the Eastern mission. We have to immediately make a start.[18]

As this quote shows, with the publication of this journal Shimanuki aimed to stimulate the discussion of Japanese Christian missionary work, but the significance of the mission in Asia is already self-evident for him at this point and his main concern is how to achieve it. For Shimanuki, the foreign mission is the de facto practice of Japanese Christians. As the leaders of the Overseas Education Society looked

beyond Korea in their future prospects, Shimanuki also dreamed of Japanese Christians' ambitious mission in the broader area of Asia.

Thus, it is difficult to ignore the close collaboration between those advocating for the Japanese Christian civilizing mission and those advocating for Japanese imperial expansion around the turn of the century. At the same time, we should not ignore the fact that this process was also supposed to form a modern subject that would internalize enlightenment values and the idea of civilizational differences among the recipients of this mission outreach. For instance, remarks made by one of the Korean graduates of the Keijō Gakudō, Go Huijun, who is now known as an early *chinilpa* (people friendly to Japan), show that the civilizational hierarchy relating Japan to "Western" powers is reproduced among Asian countries. He blames the "barbarian" characteristics of his own country for the laziness of the Korean people and justifies missionary intervention for enlightenment.[19] Thus the Asianistic perspective of Oshikawa and Shimanuki found its collaborative counterpart in Korea.

As I have mentioned, Simanuki founded the Nihon Rikkōkai in 1900 and his work gradually focused on migrations to North America as an option for poor students. However, even then the organization's magazine regularly posted articles on East Asia and, as Nagata reflected, Shimanuki seemed to maintain his missionary interest in Asia. The point is that, behind Shimanuki's now well-known commitment to migration to America, there also existed long-standing concerns with the other side of the Pacific, the Eastern mission. The significance of this connection between transpacific migrations and intervention in Asia has not been closely examined before. However, this relationship helps us articulate the meaning of contemporaneous racial/ethnic issues across the Pacific. In particular, the activities and discourses of the second president of the Nihon Rikkōkai, Nagata, show us a more clarified and integrated view of this transpacific relationship.

Nagata's Early Discourses

After Shimanuki's death in 1913, it was Nagata who succeeded him as the head of Nihon Rikkōkai. Nagata was born to a peasant family in Suwa county, Nagano prefecture. He entered Waseda University in 1901 but left the school for financial reasons. He joined the Japanese military in 1902 and experienced the Russo-Japanese War in Manchuria. After the war, he first stayed in a frontier settlement in Hokkaido, but moved to Tokyo with the hope of migrating to the

United States. This was when Nagata joined Nihon Rikkōkai and became a Christian. He migrated to the United States in 1908 and, after performing a variety of jobs around San Francisco, he became an editor of the agricultural magazine *hokubei nōhō* (*North American Farming*). *Hokubei nōhō* was an official publication of the California Central Farmers' Association (Kashū Chūōnōkai), which was organized by Japanese farmers in California. At the time of Shimanunki's death, Nagata was playing an active role in this organization.

Nagata came back to Japan in 1914 to take over Shimanuki's role in Nihon Rikkōkai. Under Nagata's leadership, Nihon Rikkōkai successfully continued its activity and expanded its perspective. In terms of new activities for the organization, Nagata first focused on the education of migrants. In 1915, he had already started to plan the establishment of a "school for migrants" (*imin gakkō*). Nagata, having been a Japanese migrant himself, felt keenly the need to educate migrants before they encountered problems in foreign countries.[20] The salient context of Nagata's particular feeling was the rising tide of Japanese exclusion movements. In particular, when Nagata lived in the United States, the situation of Japanese migrants was becoming considerably more difficult. In 1907, one year before his migration, in response to an exclusion movement on the American West Coast, Japan and the United States entered into a Gentlemen's Agreement under which the Japanese government was supposed to restrict migration to the United States. In 1913, the state of California enacted the Alien Land Law, which denied to aliens who were ineligible for citizenship the right to own or lease land. This affected Japanese farmers in California. When Nagata started his activity in Japan, he was concerned about this difficulty for Japanese migrants.

For Nagata, facing overpopulation and a limited amount of land, "overseas development" (*kaigai hatten*) was the inevitable key to the future of Japanese society and the solution to the exclusion movement was an urgent task. How, then, did he articulate the rationale for the Japanese exclusion movement? According to his article of July 1915, he emphasized the lack of training and education among Japanese migrants. In other words, at this point he found that the problem lay on the Japanese side.[21] Nagata regarded misunderstandings or miscommunication caused by the lack of preparation for these differences as an important source of the recent exclusion movement. To deal with this problem, he proposed building a school for prospective migrants in which the inadequacy of contemporaneous national education would be addressed. In his first proposal, the educational curriculum would include not only languages and foreign affairs

but also religion, music, hygiene, history, geography, law, and domestic work.

He enacted his plans very quickly. By September 1915, he had already received support from many people and organizations including the members of the Japan Emigration Association (Nihon Iminkyōkai). Then, the next year, the Japanese Emigration Association built the school in Yokohama and Nagata became temporary manager of the institution. In addition to this project, in the early years of his leadership at Nihon Rikkōkai, Nagata also hosted lectures on migrations at his home, Nagano prefecture, which later led to his steadfast support for migrations to South America and Manchuria from this prefecture.

In this way, Nagata's new policy was already being realized in the 1910s. Another important change under his leadership was a shift in destinations for Japanese migration. In the context of the Japanese exclusion movement in the United States, Japanese migration to the United States had decreased and, instead, South America became an important new destination for Japanese migration. Nagata and Nihon Rikkōkai became involved in this change by establishing the Shinano Overseas Association (Shinano Kaigaikyōkai) in 1922 and promoting migration to Brazil. Nihon Rikkōkai particularly supported settlement in a village named Alianca beginning in 1925, a process that had been documented in *Rikkō Sekai* as an important example of overseas migrations.

However, Nagata turned his attention beyond the overseas destinations of Japanese migrations during this time period. Like his predecessors, Nagata also showed strong concern for colonial populations within the Japanese empire, particularly that of the Korean people. Nagata was quite critical of Japanese colonial policy in Korea and he showed his indignation when the policy faced a crisis. In April 1919, one month after the March First Movement began, Nagata published articles in *Rikkō Sekai* in which he expressed his disappointment with the Japanese people's condescending reaction to the Korean resistance movement.[22] Sympathizing with the statement of Korean students published in Tokyo, the source of the March First Movement, Nagata called for a reexamination of Japanese colonial policy. For Nagata, Japan's annexation of Korea was no doubt a brutal policy of conquest and Japanese governance in Korea under military police had failed to win Koreans' hearts and minds.

Instead of the abovementioned Japanese colonial policies, Nagata proposed offering equal education to Koreans and giving them the opportunity to have equal status, not to mention the right to vote.

He even suggested allowing self-rule for Korea as a future possibility. In this way, Nagata exhibited a quite liberal view, around this time, of Japanese colonial policy. At the same time, his argument reflected his inherited missionary mentality. He argued for the guidance and enlightenment of the native population as an important colonial policy and did not reflect on the status of colonizers as educators. In his view, the problem of Japanese colonial policy was to be solved by better guidance from the Japanese.[23] This missionary attitude is one of the key elements of Nagata's thought. Meanwhile, his criticism of Japanese colonial policy shows another important aspect of his argument, which is the comparison of Japanese policy with that of the United States.

As Eiji Oguma observed, it was around this time that some Japanese intellectuals discussed discrimination against Japanese immigrants on the American West coast and the issue of Japanese colonialism together.[24] Based on his own involvement with migration movements to the United States and its presence as the other imperial power across the Pacific, the United States is an important point of reference for Nagata's discourse as well. In the same volume from *Rikkō Sekai*, Nagata compared Japanese colonial policy in Korea with the American policy in the Philippines.[25] Referring to the fact that US President Wilson admitted the possibility of future Filipino independence, Nagata shows that Japanese and American colonial policies were at a crossroads. While the former wanted to create one state from two nations, the latter allowed for the formation of a Filipino state as its own nation. At this point, Nagata did not determine which option was better, but what interests us here is that he emphasized the existence of spectators to this potential imperial competition:

> No matter how different those empires' positionalities or situations are, independence movements in Korea and the Philippines present a drama (*engeki*) opened to the Chinese, who live in a semi-protectorate, and Indians, who hope for independence from the British empire. Since both of them are in similar situations, they felt much more sympathy with Filipinos and Koreans than Japanese and Americans. Therefore, they are watching both independence movements with strong interest.[26]

For Nagata, the problem of Korea is not simply a matter of Japanese imperial policy. It is rather related to the future of Asia. This "drama" is enacted by what he called two "candidates" (*kōhosha*) for the future leader of Asia, Japan, and the United States. In this way, Nagata's view

of the Japanese colonial problem is conditioned also by his attention to potential transpacific competition with the American empire.

Behind his analysis of imperial competition, there exist both Nagata's critical understanding of European and American imperial policies and his expectation of the growth of the Japanese empire as a more independent power with a universal mission. For example, in the same year, Nagata wrote an article on the ongoing assimilation movement among the Japanese immigrant community in the United States.[27] In this article, Nagata problematizes American discrimination, but he also finds hope for the future in the major worldwide trend toward the emergence of counterpowers to the American and European empires. He mentions, in addition to anti-colonial movements in Egypt and India, the rise of the anti-Monroe doctrine movement in South America and the problems of Ireland and African-Americans. In this way, Nagata recognizes the crisis that European and American empires were facing all over the world. Obviously, his critical statement on ongoing Japanese colonial policies was based on his concern with this global trend.

For Nagata, however, this crisis was in fact an important chance for the Japanese empire to get out of its isolated position in the international world. In fact, Nagata argues that if Japan "nobly takes the lead with the banner of racial and ethnic equality" (*jinshu byōdō, minzoku taitō*) it will not be alone.[28] Nagata implies the possibility that the Japanese empire will become not only one of the great powers in the world but also the leading country with a higher mission in world politics.

His ambitious expectations for the Japanese empire also sharpened his critique of American racism and imperialism. He paid particular attention to other countries or people suffering from American policies, with the intention of creating alliances with them. For example, when the situation of the Japanese immigrants in the United States was becoming more severe in the 1920s, he proposed forming an alliance with Mexico to counter American imperialism.[29] Importantly, Nagata also emphasized that African-Americans could become an important partner in Japanese opposition to the United States. Referring to the ongoing segregation and the existence of the Ku Klux Klan, Nagata noted how much antipathy African-Americans felt toward "White" people.

There was a historical precedent that allowed him to expect that an alliance with African-Americans was possible, namely the racial equality clause proposed by the Japanese delegation at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. This proposal, which would require

equal treatment of people of color and colonized populations in the countries of the League of Nations, appealed to oppressed people around the world.[30] For example, Philip Randolph and Chandler Owen, the (co)founders of *The Messenger*, a leading African-American magazine at that time, responded to this proposal with enthusiasm.[31] Although the proposal was finally rejected by the committee, this event held symbolic significance in the struggle against American racism and imperialism.[32] Based on these facts, Nagata insisted that the Japanese should also reach out to African-Americans to counter American imperialism. He affirmed that "it is as clear as day" (*hi o miruyori akiraka*) that the "African American people would immediately respond" to the Japanese people's call for alliance.[33] The group's magazine *Rikkō Sekai* also published a series of biographical articles profiling leaders fighting against racism such as Booker T. Washington, Marcus Garvey, and William Lloyd Garrison.[34]

In this way, Nagata's concerns with problems in the Japanese colonies and issues related to Japanese immigrants in the United States in the 1910s and 1920s were directly connected at the level of international politics with transpacific imperial competition given the worldwide trend toward national self-determination and anticolonial movements. Nagata's early discourses on migrations showed both antipathy to the racial discrimination and imperialism of "Western" countries and his missionary gaze on other Asian people. These writings had already indicated some of the logics by which the later expansion of the Japanese empire would be justified. In the next part of this chapter, I trace how Nagata's activities and discourses paralleled the later development of the Japanese empire, particularly with his discourse on the formation of a diverse nation.

Toward the Principle of National Foundation

In the series of events that ran from the enactment of the Immigration Act of 1924 to the Manchurian Incident in 1931, destinations for Japanese migrations had shifted from North America to South America, Japan's Pacific Mandate, and Manchuria. During this period, Nagata's philosophy and activity was also evolving. In particular, as a leader of Nihon Rikkōkai, he expanded the organization's activity into East Asia. As I briefly mentioned in the first part of this chapter, when he wrote about his mentors in 1930, he was in the process of building and managing a village in Korea. This village was located in North Hamgyong Province (presently in North Korea,

close to the border with China) and Nihon Rikkōkai established the Nihon Rikkōkai Institution of Reclamation Practice in Korea (Nihon Rikkōkai Chōsen Takushoku Renshujo) there in May 1930. In this institution, Nihon Rikkōkai offered practical training for reclamation and the members also included young Koreans. It was a test case of Nagata's ideal of "cooperation between Japanese and Koreans" (*nissen kyōwa*).[35] Thus, before the Manchurian Incident, Nagata had already started to expand Nihon Rikkōkai's activity into East Asia.

After the Manchurian Incident, migrations and colonial settlements into Northeast China became national concerns in the context of the 1930s farm crisis that was caused by population pressure and economic decline in rural areas. In 1932, the Kwantung Army held a meeting on migrations and planned to promote them. In particular, the Kwantung Army Major Tōmiya Kaneo and the agrarianist Katō Kanji played a central role in forming the early Japanese migration groups. In 1933, to promote the migrations, the Ministry of Colonial Affairs issued the *Outline of the Migrations to Manchuria* (*Manshū imin yōkō*) and held a Meeting on Migration Projects (*imin jigyō kaigi*). In this context, Nagata was involved in the government's migration policies for Manchuria. He became a nonregular staff member of the Kwantung Army Special Affairs Unit and attended the Meeting on Migration Projects as a committee member. He also travelled to Manchuria at the request of the Ministries of Colonial Affairs and Foreign Affairs.[36] Nagata established the Rikkō Agricultural Farm in Manchuria (Manshu Rikkōnōen) in 1934 and the Rikkō Village in Hsinking (Shinkyō Rikkōmura) in 1938. In this way, Nagata and Nihon Rikkōkai developed its project in response to changing trends regarding migrations. What, then, was the relationship between this new trend in continental migrations and the earlier transpacific migrations?

Although Nagata's commitment to supporting migrations changed with this transformation of historical conditions, he referred to previous experiences of Japanese migrations in the United States as representing an important lesson for ongoing migrations. When Nagata visited the United States in 1931, he was already emphasizing that California was the only place where people could learn from the full range of experiences associated with Japanese overseas migrations involving politics, religion, education, and economics.[37] In that sense, Nagata argued, exploring the historical experiences of those migrants would hold the key to future Japanese overseas development.[38] Various experiences of Japanese migrants were then integrated into the narrative of

national development and became important referential sources in the context of which ongoing practices were examined.

To take a good example of this way of learning from experience, when Nagata supported Japanese migrations to Manchuria in the late 1930s, he was inspired by the slogan "Making North Manchuria a California State" (*hokuman o kashū ni*), which was originally created by Matsuoka Yōsuke, the president of the South Manchurian Railway Company at that time and once a Japanese migrant himself in the United States. In response to this slogan, Nagata offered his own interpretation, expanding on its message by including the case of the Mormons' settlement in Utah led by Brigham Young.[39] In so doing, he emphasized the importance of religious guidance for such a pioneering mission. He then drew on what he saw as a few comparable issues between the settlements in the American West and Manchuria, such as improvements in transportation, effective water policy, and the rationalization of agriculture. Nagata thought that such aspects were important elements of the success of American settlements in the West and should be considered in Manchuria as well. However, in addition to these issues, Nagata also picked up one more important element to apply to the pioneering settlement, the "mind-set of national foundation" (*kenkoku ishiki*). Nagata emphasizes that, if migrants lack this mind-set, even millions of them cannot contribute to the success of settlements. Why is such a mind-set so important for Nagata? In fact, his emphasis on national foundation that appeared in his later discourse on Japanese migrations marked the shift in direction in Japanese migration discourses from the 1930s.

Although the mass migrations from Japan to Manchuria in the late 1930s were well known, the incoming transition of the trend in Japanese migration had already been predicted in Nagata's historical analysis of the ideology of Japanese migration and colonization in 1932. His article entitled "Ideological Development of Migration and Colonisation" looked back on the history of Japanese migrations from the Meiji period, and condensed the ideologies behind these migrations into a single developmental narrative.[40]

Nagata categorized "ideologies of migration and colonization" (*ishokumin no shisō*) into three types depending on the time period. First, there was what he called "migratory labourism" (*dekasegi shugi*). He thought this ideology undergirded the Japanese migrations during the Meiji period. A typical example of this ideology is seen in the phrase "the returner from Hawaii" (*hawaii gaeri*). This word refers to Japanese migrant workers in Hawaii from the beginning of the Meiji period, but its implication is that the higher wages of migrant workers

in Hawaii and their return to the poor villages in Japan became a success story and attracted Japanese interest. This story fit into a popular pattern of "making a triumphant journey back home" (*kokyō ni nishiki o kazaru*). The story shows that these migrant workers were not permanent settlers but rather temporary sojourners at overseas work sites. According to Nagata, this ideology turned into "assimilationism" (*dōka shugi*) after the Russo-Japanese War. What matters here is the emergence of strong racial antipathy to Japanese immigrants on the American West Coast as Japan gained ascendancy in international politics after the war. This antipathy is well known as an example of the effect of the image of the "yellow peril," a scare tactic that was utilized when the exclusion of Japanese immigrants became a serious issue. What Nagata emphasizes here is the logic of American exclusionists, according to which Japanese immigrants are not assimilable into American society. Since this "assimilability" became an important focal point for the exclusion movement, the Japanese immigrant community reacted to this accusation by promoting their assimilation into American society. This is what Nagata calls the second ideology of Japanese migrations, assimilationism. Nagata was quite critical of this ideology. His critique can be broadly divided into two points. The first point is related to the actual consequence of this assimilationist movement in the United States. He emphasized the continuity of American discrimination against Japanese immigrants and the sense of exclusion that their children, born American citizens, should hold in US society. At the same time, he introduces another critique of assimilationism by relying on a civilizational hierarchy. This second critique reflects the geographical transition of Japanese migrations in the 1920s and 1930s. By mentioning the ongoing Japanese migrations to Brazil, China, and Japan's Pacific Mandate, Nagata questioned whether it was necessary for Japanese migrants to assimilate into the society at the "lower cultural level." He argued that, unlike the case of migrations to a society of "higher culture" such as the United States, there is no reason to promote assimilationism for recent migrations.

It is at this point that Nagata introduced his important ideology from the 1930s, which he called the "principle of national foundation" (*kenkoku shugi*):

> Since the Meiji period the ideological trend of our migration and colonisation has developed from migratory labourism to assimilationism, furthermore now to the principle of national foundation. Japan, in many ways, becomes a world power and, in some ways,

> takes a step further. Similarly, in terms of migration and colonisation, we can see that we become more independent, are in a leadership position, and play a central role in the world. This is what we have to celebrate.[41]

Under this third ideology, the mission of migrants is not limited to maintaining their own identity or improving their lifestyle but is rather related to cultivation and enlightenment of the colonized population and "native islanders." Although in the philosophy of Nagata and his predecessors the enlightenment of the colonized population had been an important issue, this principle bridges his long-standing concern with the enlightenment of people of "lower culture" and the movement of the Japanese population. At this point, it becomes obvious that Japanese migration is not only a matter of the survival of the homogeneous Japanese nation, but also raises the question of how to live together within a diverse population within its broader imperial territories.

How did Nagata describe the process of migrants' contact with the colonized population? In his view, the quality of the experience of migrants who come in contact with indigenous populations would depend on the type of encounter they had. The point is that the earlier critique of assimilationism does not lead to the total denial of interaction. On the one hand, he urged migrants to assimilate an inferior indigenous population into the higher Japanese culture. On the other hand, if the indigenous population is of a superior nature, Nagata promoted the assimilation of migrants into the host culture. Therefore, for Nagata, assimilation should be an interactive process, unless it causes degradation of the migrants.[42] From Nagata's perspective on the interactive process of Japanese nation formation, Japanese migrations could greatly contribute to the Japanese empire. In the face of an urgent need for establishing a co-prosperity sphere, Nagata discussed the "guidance of other ethnic/racial groups" (*iminzoku shidō*) and found a weakness in Japanese guidance, in the lack of experience in living in tandem with foreigners.[43] He even insisted that the Japanese should live and eat together with other *minzoku*, wear similar clothes, and speak their languages. Such a deep engagement with others' lifestyles was regarded as an important means of winning their hearts and minds. In this way, Japanese migrants were to be important agents for the expansion of the Japanese nation.

Such a flexible view of assimilation can be also found in Nagata's discussion of mixed-race populations. Nagata and Nihon Rikkōkai were also involved in Japanese migration to Japan's Pacific Mandate

in the 1930s and 1940s and, among other things, what was at issue in this migration were the rights and wrongs of race mixing. Because of the fear of the possible degradation of Japanese migrants in Japan's Pacific Mandate, there emerged a discourse that insisted on the preservation of the pure blood of the Japanese *minzoku* (race/ethno/nation).[44] Nagata presented an alternative view by emphasizing the long-standing history of the adjustment and amalgamation of the Japanese *minzoku*.[45] By referring to the historical movement of the Japanese people and amalgamation in that process, he concluded that the Japanese had not degraded their culture. Instead of opposing interracial contacts and Japanese migrations to Japan's Pacific Mandate, he instead regarded them as providing important opportunities for the Japanese to "become a greater nation" (*sarani idainaru minzoku to naru*).

As Nagata considered the prospect of the Great East Asia War in relation to this issue of amalgamation in Japan's Pacific Mandate, his discussion of racial contacts resonated deeply with the ongoing ideology of the Japanese empire.[46] In response to the call for establishing a "new order" (*shin chitsujo*) by the government, Nagata took the slogan of the Japanese empire, "*hakkō ichiu*," seriously.[47] He interpreted this slogan as "Japanization of the different ethnic/racial groups" (*iminzoku no nihonka*). However, as we have seen regarding Nagata's earlier discussion of assimilation, Japanization was not simply a one-way process of imposing Japanese cultural habits on a subject population. He explained that the Japanese spirit was not a static, frozen, or solidified one. Rather, it should incorporate other groups' strengths and eliminate its own weaknesses. Nagata also called this process the "globalisation of the Japanese *minzoku*" (*nihon minzoku no sekaika*).[48]

Such a perspective is also demonstrated in his *Talking with the Japanese Brethren in the United States*. Interestingly, this work reveals that the ideal of racial equality has become one of the essential components of the Japanese nation. In this book, Nagata describes the formation of the Japanese nation as a history of the assimilation of diverse racial/ethnic groups. Although he admits that there emerged certain inequalities and complaints in that process of assimilation, he insists that he could not find severe discrimination in Japan. He even defines the Japanese as "people who do not know the existence of discrimination" (*sabetsu no sonzai o shiranai kokumin*).[49] Nagata traces the spirit of racial equality as a special characteristic of the Japanese nation to ancient Japanese history. In particular, he draws on historical examples of Japanese rulers' benevolent treatment of local tribes

and other racial/ethnic groups.[50] Thus he finds that the idea of racial equality not only informs a future ideal to be realized but also is the cultivated characteristic of his own nation.

Such an emphasis on racial equality in Japanese society implicitly critiques the racism of "Western" countries and also allows Nagata to claim that the Japanese nation would change this situation and achieve humanistic equality as part of its worldwide mission.[51] At the same time, he explained that the quest for peace and security in the East was the reason for the ongoing Second Sino-Japanese War. Thus we also find that such exceptionalization easily leads to replicating the Asianistic justification of the invasion of Asia.[52]

Nagata's view of assimilation and "diverse" nation formation seemed to cohere completely with the development of Japanese imperial ideology in the 1930s. However, this does not necessarily mean that Nagata drastically changed his argument in response to contemporaneous political ideology. Instead we find the reflection and development of his long-time concern and old perspective. In particular, the Asianistic definition of Japan as the leader of Asia and the ideal of racial equality kept inspiring his interpretation of racial/ethnic relationships around the Japanese empire.

At a later stage of the war, Nagata was still urging the Japanese to devote themselves seriously to the guidance/salvation of various racial/ethnic groups and even deplored the lack of such sacrifice-minded persons in the colonies and encouraged more Japanese migrations.[53] After the war, Nagata continued to engage in Japanese migration, but his strong concern with colonized populations disappeared. His ambitious prospect for a future Japanese nation along with the migrants' contacts became a forgotten imperial project in the aftermath of World War II.

Conclusion

Nagata's discourse and activity provide us with a characteristic intellectual reaction to the shift in Japanese migration patterns during the first half of the twentieth century, from the movement toward American continents to later mass migration to Japan's colonies. What Nagata's activity particularly shows us is that the discussion of migration addressed the expansion of the Japanese nation and racial/ethnic contacts caused by migrants' movements. In other words, intellectuals and activists who were involved in migration issues had to think about relationships with other racial/ethnic groups and the future form of the Japanese nation. In terms of these issues, we can

find the point of convergence between the Japanese missionary perspective toward Asia and the critique of racism and imperialism of American and European powers.

In particular, Nagata noticed that racial/ethnic issues in East Asia and Japanese colonies were directly related to racial issues in the American empire. This is why he was able to articulate the transpacific relationship of the Japanese and American empires as a drama of competition played out in front of colonized populations all over the world. As his interest in the impact of the racial equality proposal at the Paris Peace Conference also indicates, the countercurrent against the world powers' racism and imperialism was an important mediating factor in the development of Nagata's thought. In that sense, his later discourse on the Japanese nation in the context of the government's promotion of the idea of the East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere had already been subjected to critical reflection on international politics.

At this point, we also discover how Nagata's Christian predecessors' perspective was superseded by that of Nagata's. In particular, their involvement with the "enlightenment" project in Korea and a sense of mission about Asian liberation, well represented by Oshikawa's Asianism, formed an undercurrent of Nagata's activity. In a sense, he developed his predecessors' perspective in light of his own experience of transpacific migrations and long-time engagement in migrant support.

In this way, the analysis of Nagata's work clarifies the connection between the Japanese migrations and Japanese nation formation in the empire and, moreover, expands our interpretive framework of the study of racial/ethnic relationships to a transpacific scale.

Notes

1. For example, one of the early Japanese socialists described the Japanese immigrant community in the United States at the turn of the century as a new Japan. See Isoo Abe, *Hokubei no shin Nihon* (Tokyo: Hakubunkan, 1905). For a recent study on Japanese settler colonialism, see Jun Uchida, *Brokers of Empire: Japanese Settler Colonialism in Korea, 1876–1945* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011).
2. Eiichirō Azuma, "'Pioneers of Overseas Japanese Development: Japanese American History and the Making of Expansionist Orthodoxy in Imperial Japan," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 67, no. 4 (2008): 1187–226.
3. There are many previous studies on the relationship between Shimanuki/Nihon Rikkōkai and Japanese migrations to North America. Naohiko Okumuta, "Shimanuki hyōdayū no rikkō kyōikushisō: Sono keiseikatei to iminjigyō eno tenkai," in *Hokubei nihonjin kirisutokyō undōshi*, ed.

Dōshisha daigaku jinbunkagakukenkyūjo (Tokyo: PMC shuppan, 1991), pp. 497–549; Kenji Tachikawa, "Meiji kōhanki no tobeinetsu: Amerika no ryūkō," *Shirin* 69, no. 3 (May 1986): 383–417; Teruko Imai, "Meijiki ni okeru tobeinetsu to tobeiannaisho oyobi tobeizasshi," *Journal of Tsuda College*, no. 16 (March 1984): 305–42; Kenji Tachikawa, "Shimanuki hyōdayū to rikkōkai:shinkō, seikō, Amerika," *Shirin* 72, no. 1 (January 1989): 106–33.

4. Shigeshi Nagata, "Zenshi no kokorozashi o okonau nomi," *Rikkō Sekai*, no. 306 (June 1930): 4–8.
5. For more on those early Japanese converts, see, F. G. Notehelfer, *American Samurai: Captain L.L. Janes and Japan* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985); Irwin Scheiner, *Christian Converts and Social Protest in Meiji Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970).
6. Emily Anderson, "Christianity in the Japanese Empire: Nationalism, Conscience, and Faith in Meiji and Taisho Japan" (PhD diss., UCLA, 2010), Ch. 4. For another recent work on the Japanese imperialism and Christinaity, see Yosuke Nirei, "The Ethics of Empire: Protestant Thought, Moral Culture, and Imperialism in Meiji Japan" (PhD diss., University of California, Berkeley, 2004). Nirei's work focuses more on the ideological function of Japanese Christianity during the Meiji period.
7. Anderson, "Christianity in the Japanese Empire," p. 173.
8. Seifuku Tsuneya, *Kaigai shokuminron* in *Nikkei imin shiryōshū, dai 3-kan* (Tokyo: Nihon tosho sentā, 1991); Koncha Yun, "Nihonshihonshugi no zenshinkichi toshiteno keijō gakudō: Nihon no ajiashinshutsu no kiseki o fumaete," *Kaikyō* 11 (November 1982): 45.
9. Eizō Ōtsuka, *Seiyū Oshikawa Masayoshi: Denki Oshikawa Masayoshi* (Tokyo: Ōzorasha, 1996), p. 49.
10. Tsugio Inaba, *Dainihonkaigaikyōikukai no kyūkankoku niokeru kyōikukatsudō: Shōwarokujunen tsukuba daigaku gakunaipurojekto kenkyūhōkokusho* (Ibaraki: Sakuramura, 1986), pp. 1–2; "Shasetsu," *jyogaku zasshi* 405 (1894): 1–2.
11. Yukichi Fukuzawa, *An Outline of a Theory of Civilization* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).
12. Yun emphasized the popularity of the logic of Asianism as an important context of Japanese missionary activity. Yun, "Nihon shihonshugi no zenshinkichi to shite no keijō gakudō," p. 46, 50.
13. Tetsuzō Okada, *Honda Yōitsu den: Denki Honda Yōitsu* (Tokyo: Ōzorasha, 1996), p. 99.
14. Ōtsuka, *Seiyū Oshikawa Masayoshii*, p. 51.
15. Kazuya Fuji, *Oshikawa Masayoshi: Sono nashonarizumu o haikeitoshite* (Tokyo: San' yō shuppansha, 1991), p. 210.
16. For an analysis of early Japanese Christian social reform practices (anti-prostitution movement), see Elizabeth Dorn Lublin, *Reforming Japan :The Woman's Christian Temperance Union in the Meiji Period* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010); Rumi Yasutake, *Transnational Women's Activism: The United States, Japan, and Japanese Immigrant Communities in California, 1859–1920* (New York: New York University Press, 2004); For the relationship between Christianity and socialism in Japan, see Nobuya Bamba and John F. Howes, eds., *Pacifism in Japan: The Christian and Socialist Tradition* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1978).

17. Hyōdayū Shimanuki, "Yukite chōsen ni dendō seyo," in *Nikkan kirisutokyō kankeishi shiryō: 1876–1922*, ed. Keiji Ogawa and Myŏng-gwan Chi (Tōkyō: Shinkyō shuppansha, 1984), p. 18.
18. "Dendō," *Kyūsei* 1 (1895): 1–2. The author's name of this article was not written, but, since the editor of this journal is Shimanuki, I regard this first article as his statement, which is comparable in content to his earlier argument, further indicating that he wrote this article.
19. Hui-jun Go, "Chōsen Dendō," *Kyūsei* 2 (1895): 16.
20. "Zappo," *Rikkō Sekai*, no. 135 (July 1915): 4.
21. Shigeshi Nagata, "Kaigaitokōsha kyōikuron," *Rikkō Sekai*, no. 135 (July 1915): 1.
22. Shigeshi Nagata, "Chōsen to filipin," *Rikkō Sekai*, no. 176 (April 1919): 1.
23. Shigeshi Nagata, "Chōsen o tōshimitaru nihon no shokumintekinōryoku," *Rikkō Sekai*, no. 176 (April 1919): 2–3.
24. Eiji Oguma, *Nihonjin no kyōkai* (Tokyo: Shinyōsha, 1998), Ch. 9.
25. Nagata, "Chōsen to filipin," p. 1.
26. Ibid.
27. Shigeshi Nagata, "Hidōka ron," *Rikkō Sekai*, no. 182 (November 1919): 1.
28. Ibid.
29. Shigeshi Nagata, "Nichiboku kōshu dōmei," *Rikkō Sekai*, no. 229 (January 1924): 1, Shigeshi Nagata, "Nichiboku kōshu dōmei ron," *Rikkō Sekai*, no. 234 (June 1924): 2–29.
30. Regarding the racial equality proposal of 1919, the following work tries to approach this event from various perspectives. Naoko Shimazu, *Japan, Race, and Equality: The Racial Equality Proposal of 1919* (London; New York: Routledge, 1998).
31. "Peace Conference," *The Messenger*, March 1919, p. 5.
32. For an analysis of the connection between Japan and African-American politics around this time, see Yuichiro Onishi, "The New Negro of the Pacific: How African Americans Forged Cross-Racial Solidarity with Japan, 1917–1922," *The Journal of African American History* 92, no. 2 (2007): 191–213. For a broader survey of African-American relationships with East Asia, see Marc S. Gallicchio, *The African American Encounter with Japan and China: Black Internationalism in Asia, 1895–1945* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).
33. Nagata, "Nichiboku kōshu dōmei ron," p. 28.
34. Don Mizusaki, "Kokudo no kokujin: Būkātē Washinton," *Rikkō Sekai* 237 (September 1924): 32–6; Don Pilot, "Mākasu gābē: Kokujin afrika jiyūkoku no kensetsusha," *Rikkō Sekai* 238 (October 1924): 27–31; Nanmeianshujin, "kokujin kaihō no senkaku roido garison," *Rikkō Sekai* 240 (December, 1924): 10–16.
35. Nihon rikkōkai sōritsu hyakushūnen kinenjigyō jikkōiinkai kinenshi hensan senmon iinkai, ed., *Nihon rikkōkai hyakunen no kōseki : Reiniku kyūsai, kaigai hatten undō, kokusai kōken* (Tokyo: Nihon rikkōkai, 1997), pp. 218–9.
36. However, this did not necessarily mean that Nagata's idea was welcomed by the Army. Nihon Rikkōkai's chronicle instead emphasized the gap between his argument and the Army's. Ibid., pp. 219–20.
37. Shigeshi Nagata, "Kashū ni manabu," *Rikkō Sekai*, no. 313 (January 1931): 2–7.

38. For a previous study that treats the relationship between Nagata's argument on migration to Manchuria and that of United States, see Yūichi Hasegawa, "Hainichi iminhō to manshū, brazilu: Chiba toyoji to Nagata Shigeshi no iminron o chūshin ni," in *Nichibei kiki no kigen to hainichi iminhō*, ed. Kimitada Miwa (Tokyo: Ronsōsha, 1997), pp. 43–87. By contrast to Hasegawa's work, my study covers a much longer time span and analyses the relationship between migrations and racial/ethnic issues with a stronger focus on his complicated relationship with Japanese colonialism/imperialism.
39. Shigeshi Nagata, "Hokuman o kashū ni: Sabaku o hanazono ni," *Rikkō Sekai*, no. 381 (September 1936): 2–8.
40. Shigeshi Nagata, "Ishokumin no shisōteki shinten," *Rikkō Sekai*, no. 336 (December 1932): 2–7.
41. Ibid., p. 7.
42. Shigeshi Nagata, "Ijyūsha no shidō nitsuite," *Rikkō Sekai*, no. 366 (June 1935): 2–7.
43. Shigeshi Nagata, "Kokuminrensei no mondai," *Rikkō Sekai* 451 (October 1942): 4–10.
44. For a survey of discussions of racial mixing in the Japanese empire, see Eiji Oguma, *Tan'itsu minzoku shinwa no kigen* (Tokyo: Shinyōsa, 1995), pp. 235–70.
45. Shigeshi Nagata, "Nanpō shin kenkoku no katei," *Rikkō Sekai* 455 (February 1943): 2–6.
46. Ibid., p. 4.
47. Shigeshi Nagata, "Tōakyōeiken yōin no rensei," *Rikkō Sekai* 448 (July 1942): 2–8.
48. To get a sense of the variety of modern Japanese discourses on race see, in addition to Oguma's writing, Tessa Morris-Suzuki, *Re-inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation* (NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), pp. 78–109. She argues that the Japanese theory of a diverse nation (racial hybridity) supported interwar Pan-Asianism as a response to Western racism, for example, Japanese immigrant exclusion. Nagata's trajectory during the interwar period generally fits this scheme.
49. Shigeshi Nagata, *Zaibei dōhō to kataru* (Tokyo: Nhon rikkōkai, 1940), p. 5.
50. Ibid., pp. 17–18.
51. Shigeshi Nagata, *Mōkyō konshoku to taishi imin* (Tokyo: Fuzanbō, 1939), pp. 2–3.
52. Ibid., p. 6.
53. Shigeshi Nagata, "Iminzoku no kyūsai ni teishinsurumono," *Rikkō Sekai* 470 (May 1944): 3.

6

Statehood, Gender, and Japanese Migration to Singapore, 1890–1920

Bill Mihalopoulos

This chapter takes Japanese migration to colonial Singapore, the political and economic heart of the British Straits Settlements, as a case study to deal with the wider question of how migration, gender, and political economy entwine in the social arrangements of culture.[1] The largest Japanese presence in Singapore until 1920 were Japanese women engaged in sex work. Between 1907 and 1915 Japanese women working as licensed prostitutes made up over half of the Japanese population in the Straits Settlements. In 1908 Japanese sex workers accounted for 79 percent of the total number of Japanese residing in the area. The largest number of Japanese women working as licensed prostitutes was registered in 1917. The Japanese consul counted 1912 women, around 62 percent of the total Japanese population, working in the brothels of Singapore and Malaya.[2]

The academic convention has been to understand the excess of Japanese prostitutes in Singapore before 1920 by using the Japanese nation-state as the explicit frame of reference to explicate the historical significance of the women. These explanations follow two general strands of inquiry. One strand contextualizes the migration of women to Singapore in terms of the role they played in establishing the foundations for Japanese expansion into the region. For example, Yano Tōru asserts that Japanese relations with Southeast Asia began with the emigration of Japanese women to Singapore to take up work in the city's licensed brothels, while Shimizu Hiroshi and Hirakawa Hitoshi argue that the first Japanese immigrants—prostitutes—were not instrumental in Japan's early advance into the region.[3] The other state-centric strand of analysis is epitomized by the works of Yamazaki Tomoko and James Warren, which focus heavily on the trafficking of women and forced prostitution. Yamazaki and Warren tell how the women who worked the brothels in Singapore had their bodies

cynically exploited by the Japanese state in its drive to both industrialize Japan's domestic economy and to establish a commercial presence in Southeast Asia.[4]

Both of these state-centric approaches, however, fail to take into account the voluntarism involved in the migration of Japanese women abroad, which more often than not ran afoul of Japanese government endeavors to enhance the domestic economy via the export of goods and labor. Japan's first efforts to globalize its economy had the unintended effect of supplying impoverished peasant women with the opportunity to gamble with migrating overseas to engage in sex work in an attempt to gain economic and social autonomy. The migration of young rural women from predominantly western Japan to Singapore became possible because of the increase in mobility offered by Japan's incorporation into the colonial world money economy that transcended national boundaries and borders. On a "macroscopic" level, the women's ability to travel overseas was made possible when Kyushu coal emerged as the dominant energy source in East and Southeast Asia. Kyushu ports such as Nagasaki, Kuchinotsu, and Moji became junction points where the different contingencies that enabled rural women to travel abroad met: the global energy market in coal, the securing of trade routes for the circulation of Japanese goods abroad, the development of Japanese shipping lines, and the local, socially prescribed practices of labor and migration. Around these port towns, a complex and informal network of social relations emerged that informed and redistributed—in terms of work, economic, and cultural possibilities—strategies for life overseas as a means of survival, maintenance, and material gain. On a "microscopic" level, finding work overseas was a practical solution to particular problems of life faced by the women themselves and by their immediate communities.[5]

Historically, the migration of predominately Kyushu rural women to Singapore to engage in sex work presented the greatest difficulty for the Japanese government in terms of the conspicuousness of the women and the inability of Japanese authorities to find ways of curbing their movement and behavior.[6] The women's actions persistently escaped the established boundaries of Japanese authority. Japanese consuls in particular, linked the gaining of economic and political rights for Japanese subjects in the Straits Settlements with the regulation and control of women émigrés. Successive Japanese consuls faced the vexing question of how to align the personal conduct and lifestyle of Japanese abroad, especially poor peasant women, with the goals of government to increase the competitiveness of Japanese commerce and labor in world markets.

The question that drives this research is how did the Japanese state come to act as a coherent political force on the movement of disadvantaged rural women to colonial Singapore? A clue to a response to this question can be found in Benedict Anderson's *Imagined communities*.[7] The originality of Anderson's argument is the way he historically situates the practical conditions from which statehood emerged in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. For example, the experience of affinity held by people living in the same territory was constituted by the rise of print capitalism and vernacular languages coeval with the emergence of a standardized, homogeneous scale of time that provided the conditions of possibility for an experience of simultaneousness and unity between strangers from which emotions such as patriotism crystallize and take form.

There are three important points to take from Anderson's insights. First, the state is "an effect" of the synthesis of the aforementioned practices, not their foundation. Second, Anderson identifies a process of coevolution between modern statehood and modern subjectivity; that is to say an alignment between the principles of political action and personal conduct. Third, the materiality of the state—the emergence and stability of institutional structures—was closely connected to the generation and circulation of knowledge that made the state visible while concomitantly producing the cultural framework for individuals to define their embodied experience vis-à-vis the state.

Taking the migration of Japanese women to colonial Singapore to engage in sex work as a case study, this chapter explores the relation between the institutionalization of state apparatus and historical forms of subjectification. To this end, the chapter follows three coalescing lines of investigation. First, the reciprocal relationship between regimes of representation and modes of social intervention. Second, how the issue of lower-class rural women's capacity for self-control was linked to forms of political rule and economic exploitation. Third, how the office of the Japanese consul became an instrument of social regulation in Singapore via an alliance with a newly established Japanese business class in Singapore.

Representation and Intervention

After the Meiji Restoration (1868) the ruling oligarchy was determined to improve Japan's long-term political stability by importing foreign technology. In 1875–76 however, the Meiji government suffered a setback and had to reevaluate its import-substitution policy. An unyielding cycle of inflation ate away finances the government had earmarked for enterprises to industrialize Japan's manufacturing

sector. As a result, the government embarked on a policy of export promotion instead. At the same time, the Meiji government redefined the function of the foreign ministry. In addition to its diplomatic duties, the foreign ministry was assigned the supplementary task of identifying new niche markets for Japanese exports. The Meiji government calculated that the dissemination of commercial acumen to Japanese merchants and industry by Japanese consuls would "advance the wealth of Imperial Japan" by enhancing the competitiveness of Japanese goods abroad.[8]

On the surface, the directive for consuls to collect information to boost the competitiveness of Japanese trade in the world market seems unrelated to the movement of Japanese women abroad to engage in sex work. However, by 1890, Japanese consuls in every port east of Bombay had reported countrywomen working as prostitutes in their territorial jurisdiction. The same Japanese consuls also began identifying the activities of the gendered and disfavored rural poor abroad as sabotaging the efforts of the Japanese government to secure the welfare of its subjects via trade. [9] The impulse to regulate Japanese peasant women migrating abroad emerged when Meiji authorities began to negatively correlate the movement of the women with the inability of Japanese industry to secure a footing in world markets. The information concerning the minute details of the women's lives provided by consular reports was pivotal in making the migration of indigent peasant women abroad both visible and a target for government action. The foreign ministry was quick to use the intelligence it received to label peasant women finding work abroad as *shūgyōfu*: "unsightly," "ignominious" and "base" women whose behavior and lifestyle was a direct threat to government efforts to create conditions favorable to Japanese trade. [10]

The need to know the details of Japanese peasant women engaged in sex work overseas intensified in the 1880s and 1890s when Japan embarked on an ambitious program to export labor abroad. Inflation and increasing dependency on foreign loans in the first half of the 1880s provoked a policy change within government circles over labor migration. In 1881 the government was divided by finance minister Ōkuma Shigenobu's call for large-scale foreign borrowing to continue financing loans to Japanese enterprises important to trade and national security (mines, arsenals, shipyards). Ōkuma was ousted and replaced by Matsukata Mayoshi, who quickly introduced a policy of fiscal restraint. Matsukata's decision to issue less paper money led to rural distress as silk, rice, and cotton prices fell sharply. Tenancy rates

rose from 29 percent in 1872 to 40 percent in 1887.[11] An estimated 367,000 landholding farmers lost their property during this period, unable to pay land tax.[12] Matsukata's fiscal program reoriented the government's industrial policy to increasing exports and reducing imports. The central government began working with local landed gentry to establish light manufacturing industries in their native regions. To finance such endeavors, the central authorities teamed up with prefectures in western Japan to export agricultural laborers abroad. The year 1885 was the watershed period in which the Japanese government began sending cheap Japanese labor abroad. The foreign minister and Yamaguchi native Inoue Kaoru joined forces with the Yamaguchi prefect governor Nakano Goichi to send migrant laborers to work in Hawaii under strict government supervision (*kan'yaku imin*) as a tactic to industrialize and introduce new technologies to the region.[13]

Government-sponsored migration to Hawaii proved to be a boon to the coffers of the local prefectures and national government. By 1891, Japanese laborers sent to Hawaii had remitted around US$1,300,000, with an average of around US$100,000 of the remitted monies finding its way to Yamaguchi, Hiroshima, and Kumamoto (the prefectures of origin for large numbers of labor emigrants).[14] During the ten-year period of government-sponsored labor migration to Hawaii (1885–94), the total amount of money remitted came to more than US$2,640,000.[15] The significance of the remittances from Japanese laborers abroad can be better appreciated when placed in context with other sources of overseas revenue. For example, in 1892, migrant labor remittances were the eighth leading source of overseas revenue for the Japanese government.[16]

Government-sponsored labor migration also had other spin-offs. Labor emigration to Hawaii boosted the revenue of Japan's fledgling shipping companies. The Nippon Yūen Kaisha was able to open a trans-Pacific route in 1885 thanks to heavy subsidies and a government-sanctioned monopoly in transporting labor emigrants to Hawaii.[17] Due to the relative success of Japanese labor migration to Hawaii, Japanese entrepreneurs began advocating the integration of large-scale labor emigration with the promotion of Japanese sea lanes to increase the competiveness of Japan's commodity exports. The decisive changes to allow private investment in mass Japanese emigration abroad came between the years 1894 and 1896. In 1894, Japan signed its first equal treaty: the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation. Article One of the treaty granted the

Japanese the unrestricted reciprocal right to travel, reside, and buy property on a most-favored-nation footing.[18] At the same time the Japanese government linked labor emigration abroad to the cluster of policies to buttress maritime trade by handing the recruitment and transport of Japanese labor emigrants to the private sector, namely the *imingaisha* (migration companies). The move was buoyed by pro-mercantile legislation subsidizing merchant shipping and shipbuilding in 1896 when the finance ministry channeled the savings of the poorer classes to the Yokohama Specie Bank, which converted the funds to competitive credit for Japanese commerce and industry.[19] In the same year, the Emigration Protection Law (*Imin hogohō*) protecting the rights, life, and property of Japanese labor émigrés was ratified.[20] The Emigration Protection Law became the template for Japanese emigration until the late 1950s, which was characterized by the Japanese state offering administrative guidance and financial incentives for the private sector to invest in the recruitment, transport, and resettling of Japanese émigrés abroad.[21]

Around the projects to sell Japanese labor abroad, Japanese consuls began locating a causal relationship between the out-migration of poor rural women and anti-Asian legislation aimed at Japanese laborers. In March 1891, Chinda Sutemi, the San Francisco consul, informed Tokyo that Japanese prostitution was the issue most "prone to incur the enmity of Americans," and become the "basic pretext" for anti-Japanese agitation.[22] The necessity to stamp out all impropriety in the behavior of Japanese women entering the United States intensified in April 1891, when US authorities prevented a large number of Japanese laborers traveling on a succession of ships from landing. US immigration judged the Japanese passengers had breached recent legislation that prohibited the undesirable—paupers, persons suffering from contagious diseases, prostitutes, or contract laborers—from entering the United States.[23] Most of the male laborers on the ships eventually entered thanks to Chinda's intervention. The nine women traveling on the vessels were deported, however. Chinda chose to not advocate for the women out of political expediency, thus rendering unmarried Japanese peasant women travelling abroad for work among the various categories of persons that the US government deemed as "undesirable." The Japanese consul's affirmation of the threat of impropriety by Japanese women, combined with the certainty of restrictions being placed on Japanese merchants and migrant laborers by US officials, turned the strategic choice of peasant women migrating abroad to evade rural poverty into a problem of government.

In March 1897, a year after the Japanese government initiated a policy of large-scale overseas labor migration as a solution to persistent rural underemployment and industrial underdevelopment, the deputy foreign minister, Komura Jutarō, instructed consuls to ensure that the foreign ministry had full knowledge of Japanese "prostitution" in their area of jurisdiction.[24] Komura's directive was significant for a number of reasons. The call for details on the women's lives reflected the belief that their invisibility was the key to their unruliness. The request for information was an attempt by the foreign ministry to acquire some purchase over the movement of lowly peasant women via the details of their everyday existence. The call for detailed numbers and information concerning the lives of the "unsightly women" was a calculated attempt to expand the axis of political intervention available to the foreign ministry in dealing with Japanese communities abroad. The subject of knowledge in consular reports was no longer just the market, but also individuals considered a danger to the competitiveness of Japanese trade, commerce, and labor migration.

The second aspect of Komura's directive was that the information gathered would ensure administrative fidelity. The call from Tokyo to quantify the number of "unsightly women" within their various jurisdictions was an attempt to standardize the understanding and response of consuls toward overseas "Japanese prostitutes." The directives drew together a whole series of acts by the women such as public rowdiness and intoxication that were not in themselves an act of injury against the Japanese state, but were now taken as proof of a character and an attitude that were morally defective and dangerous.[25] By gathering information on "Japanese prostitutes," the consuls were both producing knowledge about the women and, at the same time, subjecting themselves to an understanding of the women as an illegalism that had to be controlled.

Finally, the information on the women accumulated and disseminated in the consular reports created a new form of seeing and speaking about the rural Japanese women migrating abroad as an illegalism. The identification of impoverished peasant women engaged in sex work as a painful boil that needed to be lanced from the body of the Japanese nation was made possible by tacit and implicit judgments on the optimal relationship between the Japanese living abroad and their political utility to broad government programs that aimed to create the institutions necessary to ensure the security of the Japanese state in economic, diplomatic, and military competition with other nation-states.

A Gender Regime beyond Authority

As previously noted, the migration of Kyushu rural women to Singapore to engage in sex work presented the greatest difficulty for the Japanese government. Successive Japanese consuls in Singapore spoke of the unbearable shame of Japanese women alighting in the ports "barefoot" and "dishevelled," with nothing to their name "except the tattered clothes on their back," "led from the harbour to a nearby Japanese inn," shadowed "by large numbers of Chinese ridiculing them."[26]

The greatest frustration faced by Japanese consuls was the inability to regulate and control the women's behavior. A major reason was the colonial character of Singapore. In the late nineteenth century, Singapore emerged as an international entrepôt linking Western finance with the labor and commodity trade of Asia. Singapore's rise to prominence was the coalescence of a revolution in transportation and communication and a global demand for tin, cotton, rubber, sugar, and coffee. International shipping and trading companies established branches in Singapore to profit from the increasing flow of commodity trade in the region. The trading companies varied in size and function and, broadly speaking, formed two distinct commercial groups: European merchants and intra-Asian traders. European merchants monopolized the import of manufactured goods from the factories of Europe. Despite this monopoly in imports enjoyed by Western trading firms, they were dependent on Indian, Arab, and Chinese merchants for distribution via intra-Asian trade routes to local markets in Indochina, Siam, Burma, and the Dutch East Indies. Asian merchants were also responsible for buying and transporting primary commodities from Southeast Asian markets to Singapore for sale to Western merchants, who in turn exported the commodities to Europe.[27] Because Singapore functioned as an interface between Western and intra-Asian trade, by the turn of the twentieth century the port boasted one of the strongest trading performances in both imports and exports of any British colony.[28]

However, the prominence of Singapore as a major global entrepôt was not due solely to the vision of British colonists and Western traders who transformed economic potential into industry and profit. The evolution of Singapore from mosquito-infested swamps to a major British center of commerce and rule could not have happened without the presence of a new social group: a proletariat made up of single, male laborers mostly from south China and India. This new class of migrant laborer, the so-called coolie, provided the muscle and sinew to construct the roads, wharves, godowns,[29] and buildings

that made Singapore into a functional commercial center. Migrant laborers from India and China also kept the flow of goods circulating freely from the docks to ship, and from ship to docks. To put the amount of Chinese and Indian peasant labor offered to Singapore and the rest of the Straits Settlements into context, from 1870 until 1930, the colony's population increased between 24 and 43 percent each decade.[30] Moreover, well into the twentieth century, young, single men comprised around 90 percent of the laboring population in Singapore.[31]

The concentration of a large, single male population at Singapore encouraged the introduction of working-class houses of prostitution. These brothels introduced a culture of male pleasure that differed greatly from the codified areas of the East Asian city set aside for sexual encounters. Traditionally, the pleasure quarters of East Asian cities were spaces of gratification *and* sociality. Men could go as often as they wanted, usually in the company of friends, walk about, meet other acquaintances, eat, drink, discuss, and if they felt like it, take their pleasure. In contrast, the British authorities in Singapore negated the sociability of the brothel and attempted to sanitize spaces of public sex. The colonial authorities licensed the brothel, registered the women working in the brothel, and introduced hygiene regimes with the aim of preventing venereal disease epidemics that followed unregulated prostitution.[32] As a further hygiene precaution, the colonial masters of Singapore confined licensed brothels to certain designated localities, with separate districts catering to Europeans and non-Europeans. The purpose of this segregation was to prevent the diseases and infections of the menial "Asiatic" laborers from being communicated to Europeans.[33]

Because the regulation of prostitution in the Straits Settlements fell to the office of the Chinese Protectorate, Japanese consuls had no recourse to police powers over Japanese women working in licensed brothels.[34] The extent of the consul's authority was to enter negotiations with the Chinese Protectorate to implement some mechanisms of control. In general, the Chinese Protectorate acted against brothel keepers if there was a suspicion that the women were being forced into prostitution against their will. However, Japanese consuls noticed that British authorities did not intercept and search vessels unless they were certain women were hidden on board, because they did not want to obstruct the volume of shipping entering and leaving Singapore.[35] Moreover, the Japanese consul could not ask the Chinese Protectorate to "save" women they suspected of being trafficked to Singapore for sale to the local brothel owners. Unless individual women came forward and testified to the colonial authorities

of their forced procurement, no action could be taken against the "evil persons" (*yakara*) who lured them abroad.[36]

Initially the attitude of the Japanese consul toward the women was one of benign indifference bordering on contempt. A good example is the actions of Saitō Miki, Japanese consul for Singapore from 1890 to 1895. In general, Saitō did not concern himself with Japanese women arriving in the Straits Settlements. As long as they did not disrupt the "moral climate" of the region and did not hurt the standing of Japanese subjects, Saitō was not opposed to Japanese women taking up work as prostitutes in Singapore.[37] What he found objectionable, however, was the numerous requests from the Chinese Protectorate soliciting him to enquire into the intentions of Japanese women seeking registration to work in the settlement's licensed brothels. [38] Saitō resented the time spent filing reports on the women because it prevented him from carrying out more important duties, such as extending the established rights of Japanese merchants in the Straits Settlements and promoting Japanese commerce.[39] He aired his frustrations to the Chinese Protectorate over "the great number of enquiries" that "could be done equally as well" by the Chinese Protectorate.[40] In another dispatch, Saitō clarified that the protection of this "type of women" did not fall under his jurisdiction. The women "had escaped from Japan," explained Saitō, and had "no right to ask for any protection at the [sic] Japanese consul in any foreign country" without "special instruction from [his] Government."[41]

When Japanese consuls did take notice of the peasant women engaged in sex work, it was because they despised the women's dress, speech, and public conduct which they felt sullied the Japanese. On such occasions consuls attempted to use the authority of their office to badger and bully the women to change their ways—but to no avail. The women simply ignored them. Successive Japanese consuls put their lack of purchase to the fact that the mores of the Singapore Japanese community were topsy-turvy due the incorrigibility of the local Japanese population. However, the explanation may be grounded in the political economy of the local Japanese community. In a missive to Tokyo in November 1895, Consul Fujita Toshirō expressed his disillusion that among the 460 Japanese living in Singapore, only 20 were involved in "respectable" occupations."[42] Fujita went on to note that the few established Japanese merchants, restaurateurs, and tavern-owners in Singapore were disinclined to help him quell Japanese prostitution in the region. He put the reason down to self-interest. They all relied heavily on the traffic in Japanese women and on the

patronage of Japanese prostitutes for their livelihood.[43] Testimony to the dependence of small-scale Japanese business in Singapore on Japanese women engaged in sex work is that from the mid-1880s until the early 1910s the majority of the Japanese-owned enterprises—laundries, barbers, photographers, dentists, drapers, jewelers, restaurants, and taverns—were located in and around Hylam, Malabar, Malaya, and Bugis streets, the heart of the Japanese "red light district" in Singapore.[44]

Japanese sex workers also played a major role in the maintenance and daily running of the Japanese community in colonial Singapore from 1890 until 1915. One example is the Japanese cemetery founded in 1891. Initially, the Japanese cemetery was used as a resting place for destitute Japanese women. Burials and upkeep of the cemetery were shared by women working in the licensed brothels. However, as the Japanese population grew the maintenance of the cemetery was taken over by a mutual aid society (*kyōsai kai*), an independent association comprising all members of the Japanese community. The initial membership of the mutual aid society was over eight hundred people, with the majority comprising Japanese women working as prostitutes. The society was formed ostensibly to provide aid for the Japanese ill and to ensure the Japanese dead were buried with dignity and proper rites.[45] Another example was the 1897 Diamond Jubilee Year of Queen Victoria's rule. The Japanese community in Singapore participated in the celebrations by financing a fireworks display to mark the auspicious occasion. Few people outside the Japanese community knew that the consul gathered the money for the display by undertaking a door-to-door appeal of all Japanese brothels.[46] Similarly, in 1915 Japanese women working in the registered brothels raised and donated money to the war-relief fund for the allied forces fighting in Europe.[47]

Japanese women engaged in sex work were also the main source of finance for Japanese petty merchants in Singapore because of limited access to credit. Until World War I, capital available to the Japanese community was limited to cooperative credit associations whose main membership were Japanese prostitutes.[48] These cooperative credit associations played a dual role. As we have seen, one role of the cooperatives was as *kyōsai kai*. Japanese women engaged in sex work joined these associations to have access to money in times of illness, to cover burial expenses, and pay their medical fees for bimonthly examination for venereal disease. [49] The cooperatives also functioned as credit societies (*tonomashiko*) and played a major role in the expansion of Japanese economic interests in the Malay Peninsula. The

more speculative character of the *tonomashiko* provided an important source of credit to the participants.

The best example of this in action is the rubber boom at the turn of the twentieth century. The boom was the result of technical innovations in rubber manufacturing, the growth of the electric industry, and the increased use of pneumatic tires for bicycles and, later, automobiles. Seeking to take advantage of rising prices in rubber, the British colonial authorities encouraged rubber planting in Malaya by offering subsidies to all planters.[50] As rubber prices soared to unprecedented heights in 1909–10, many Japanese women engaged in sex work in Singapore, along with brothel owners and petty traders, invested in small-sized rubber estates in Johore and other locations on the Malay Peninsula.[51] The capital provided by the *tonomashiko* for Japanese investments in small-scale agricultural production in the Malay Peninsula cannot be underestimated. In 1911, there were 106 individual Japanese-owned rubber plantations in British Malaya. The number of Japanese-owned plantations rose to 221 in 1917 and peaked in 1920 with 226 owners.[52] Moreover, in 1920, on the eve of the abolition of licensed Japanese prostitutes from Singapore and the Federated Malay States, there were 28 active *tonomashiko*. The total monthly payments to these 28 cooperative credit associations came to $26,000 (Straits dollars), of which $10,000 was comprised from contributions by Japanese sex workers.[53]

Deploying Instruments of Control

By the time of the outbreak of World War I, however, the centrality of Japanese prostitutes to the Japanese community in Singapore came under attack from several directions. One strand of attack was European campaigns to abolish licensed prostitution in European colonies in Southeast Asia.[54] Moral reformers, newspaper editors, and politicians challenged the Straits Settlements authorities' insistence on the necessity of licensed prostitution in Singapore. In the early 1900s, the movement to prevent the trafficking of women and girls became a transnational movement to suppress "White Slave Traffic."[55] In 1904 an International Agreement for the Suppression of the "White Slave Traffic" was signed in Paris. Six years later in 1910, 13 countries signed the International Convention for the Suppression of the White Slave Trade. There was a subtle shift between the two agreements. The 1904 agreement emphasized the control and repatriation of migrant women and girls. The focus of the 1910 Convention, however, fell on the criminalization of trafficking. As a consequence, intense public pressure was placed on the Straits Settlements and

other British dominions to end state-regulated prostitution on the grounds that licensed prostitution tacitly promoted international trafficking in women and children. The Singapore colonial authorities first reacted by banishing or imprisoning European *souteneurs* under an emergency amendment made to the Women and Girls Protection Ordinance in 1912. In May 1913, the colonial government adopted a policy of prohibiting European women from obtaining a license to work in a brothel.[56]

With the onset of World War I the issue of prostitution merged with the question of race.[57] The war made Indian soldiers crucial to the operation of the British Empire in Asia. British faith in the loyalty of sepoys in Singapore was tested in February 1915 when 850 Indian soldiers mutinied, killing 47 British soldiers and civilians, including women. In the wake of the mutiny, the indiscriminate mixing of races in brothels became a sensitive issue. Consequently, to assert the supremacy of white British rule, the colonial authorities used their emergency powers to extradite all European prostitutes in the region. A ban on European prostitution in the colony was made effective from July 1916.[58]

However, the strongest move to banish Japanese prostitutes from the Straits Settlements came from the Japanese community. The commencement of World War I was the beginning of a transitional period for the Japanese community in Singapore and Malaya. World War I proved to be a boon for Japanese investment in Southeast Asia. The outbreak of war curtailed trade between Europe and Southeast Asia. Bereft of competition, Japanese industry became the dominant exporter of manufactured goods to Southeast Asian markets. From 1913 to 1918 Japanese exports to Southeast Asia increased fivefold. The financial windfall saw Japan's trade balance go from a net deficit of ¥1233 million to a net surplus of ¥2608 million.[59] In the case of Singapore, Japanese light manufactured exports such as in cotton textiles, matches, ceramics, and other sundry items increased from $11,503,000 (Straits dollars) in 1913 to $44,530,000 in 1918.[60] Out of the 50 leading Japanese enterprises in Singapore in 1919, only 15—30 percent—had opened a branch at the colony prior to 1916.[61]

The rise to prominence of Japanese exports in Singapore brought great change to the composition of the local Japanese community. The years 1916–20 saw the Japanese merchant community—constituted predominantly by petty merchants and crystallized around the finance opportunities created by Japanese prostitutes—replaced by a community with direct links to private and state-controlled Japanese capital invested in expanding Japanese industrial and financial

sectors in the area. The Japanese consular censuses capture the rapid change in the character and composition of the Japanese community in Singapore. At the end of June 1914, there were 45 Japanese men listed as working in white-collar professions. A year later the number had more than doubled, with 106 white-collar professionals listed as working in Singapore. In 1920, the number of Japanese men working in white-collar occupations had reached 1,136.[62]

The increasing exports of light manufactured goods to Southeast Asia coalesced with a policy shift by the Japanese government toward local Japanese communities: from cold indifference to incorporating overseas Japanese into a larger imperial design. One goal of Japanese policy makers was to establish Japanese associations in Southeast Asia that would work in tandem with the Japanese imperial objective, thus intersecting Japanese competition and expansion in global markets with empire-building. Japanese policy makers hoped to mimic the success of overseas Chinese guilds, mutual aid associations, and merchant societies that cultivated relations of solidarity, economically and politically, throughout Asia, and to eventually overtake them.

This policy shift by the Japanese government affected the Japanese community in Singapore in concrete ways. The Japanese consul quickly allied with the newly arrived professional and business migrants and began to organize the local Japanese community in their shared image of what constituted a patriotic and economically useful Japanese subject. The first step was taken in September 1915 with the establishment of the Japanese Association (*Nihonjin kai*).[63] The Japanese Association had two primary objectives: to cultivate a sense of solidarity and cooperation among the Japanese community as subjects of a larger imperial design, and just as importantly, to free the Japanese community from the "undesirable stigma" of bygone days.[64] One of the first moves of the Japanese Association was to take charge of the Japanese cemetery. The motivation behind this action was to undermine the influence of the *kyōsai kai*, whose membership was comprised mostly of Japanese women engaged in prostitution.[65] The Japanese Association also quickly established a Japanese Chamber of Commerce, Japanese elementary school, and Japanese Young Men's Association to cater for the patriotic, commercial, and social aspirations of the newly arrived professional members.[66]

Ridding Singapore of Japanese prostitutes was protracted and took several years, however. On March 31, 1914, the Japanese consul Fujii Minoru gained unexpected support when the colonial authorities

informed him of their plan to banish 37 Japanese men suspected of running brothels and trafficking in Japanese women.[67] Seizing the colonial authorities' desire to end the "trafficking in women and children" to Singapore, Fujii gained the Chinese Protectorate's cooperation to regulate the entry of Japanese women. In January 1915, Japanese language newspapers informed the Japanese community that the Chinese Protectorate was to interview all Japanese women travelling steerage to Singapore to ascertain if they were victims of trafficking. Moreover, from February Japanese hoteliers and boarding houses were to report daily to the consul with a list of all arrivals and departures of Japanese guests. To ensure compliance, every Friday consul officials were to scrutinize hotel and boarding house ledgers. The newspapers warned that any proprietor failing to comply with the new procedures or falsifying entries faced severe fines without exception.

Fujii, however, was reluctant to take draconian measures and abolish Japanese prostitution overnight. He feared that forcefully uprooting the women from Singapore would erase the gains the Japanese community had made in the region. Small Japanese businesses in Singapore relied heavily on the capital of the local credit associations to finance their purchase of small-scale rubber plantations on the Malay peninsula.[68]

To avoid agitation and a blow to Japanese prosperity in the region, Fujii and the Japanese Association orchestrated a public campaign to prepare the Japanese community for the inevitable cessation of Japanese licensed prostitutes in the Straits Settlements. The aim was to forewarn small Japanese enterprises of the "inevitable" end of Japanese prostitution in the region. Numerous articles appeared in the Japanese language newspapers cautioning Japanese establishments that depended on the women for trade to liquidate their investments in the local credit associations, settle any outstanding debt, and start preparations for relocation.

Japanese women working as licensed prostitutes were given another set of directions by the Japanese Association and consul. The women were warned that the cessation of licensed prostitution was imminent. On cessation, former licensed prostitutes were to be repatriated to Japan. The consuls and Japanese Association used the Japanese language newspapers to instruct the women that in such instances they were responsible for bearing the cost of repatriation. Therefore, in this period of grace, it was the women's duty to earnestly prepare for that moment by securing the necessary money to pay for their return to Japan.[69]

The Japanese Association justified these measures as signifying a watershed moment in the evolution of the local Japanese community befitting Japan's newly found standing as a political and economic world power. The monies that the women made did not add to national prosperity. Because the women were mere "playthings (*ganrōbutsu*) for foreign men," their activities sullied the reputation of Japanese merchants and diminished the "greatness of the Japanese empire." It was time for the Japanese community to rid itself of sentiments that the women were the pioneers of a Japanese presence in the region, and to sacrifice shortsighted, individual prosperity for the dignity, pride, and long-term interests of Japan.[70]

The final decision to "eradicate" Japanese licensed prostitutes from Singapore came quickly, albeit not painlessly. In December 1919, acting consul general Yamazaki Heikichi, fortified by instructions from Tokyo and with the support of the British colonial authorities, set the agenda for the abolition of Japanese prostitution from Singapore and the Federated Malay States. On New Year's Day, 1920, Yamazaki summoned the presidents of the Japanese Associations in Singapore and various regions of British Malaya to a two-day conference. The purpose of the conference was to coordinate the timetable for the repatriation of Japanese prostitutes. In the meeting, Yamazaki reiterated that the banishment of Japanese prostitutes was beneficial to national interests, for the welfare of the Japanese community in Singapore, and in the long run for the women themselves. Prostitution was not conducive to good business, claimed Yamazaki, because most of the women ended up in debt, and the Japanese who lived off them were idle, lacked initiative, and carried out their business in slovenly half-measures. Rather than postpone the inevitable, argued Yamazaki, a tight timetable was best, as it would "wake up the businesses connected with the women to the frivolousness (*fumajime*) of their ways." Yamazaki considered the time ripe to replace the *tonomashiko* that ran on the membership of Japanese prostitutes with small-scale banks or credit and saving associations, whose securities would be guaranteed by the Yokohama Specie Bank and Bank of Taiwan. According to Yamazaki, such an arrangement was favorable for it allowed Japanese investors access to larger amounts of credit to invest in large-scale coffee and rubber plantations.[71] Japanese women engaged in sex work in Singapore were given until December 1921 to abandon their trade.[72]

The abolition of Japanese prostitution in Singapore and the Federated Malay States illuminated how a gender regime is coupled with statehood. Japanese economic penetration into Singapore and the Straits Settlements was accompanied by the social integration and

normalization of the Japanese communities to the designs of empire. The new professional middle class that led the Japanese economic penetration into Singapore, glad of their liberty to pursue their interests in commerce and trade, were only too eager to work with the consul to impose new codes of conduct on overseas Japanese communities to turn them into subjects worthy of the emperor. These new codes of conduct were a self-affirmation by a social class invested in the project of Japanese empire and keen to prove their fidelity by colluding with the Japanese consul to create the conditions for authoritarian, transformative interventions aimed at changing the composition and subjective values of the Japanese community residing in colonial Singapore.

The strategy to homogenize and integrate Japanese overseas communities to a pan-imperial design was reinforced in instructions sent by the Japanese foreign minister, Uchida Yasuya, to all Japanese diplomatic representatives in the *Nan'yō* (western Pacific Ocean) and South America on June 15, 1921. In the missive, the actions of the Singapore consul-general Yamazaki were the prototype for the policies the foreign ministry wanted implemented for "the eradication of women of ill fame abroad." The foreign ministry cautioned it was impossible to implement a uniform policy as the social and economic conditions varied markedly from region to region. If, as was the case in Singapore, the consuls found it impossible to eradicate the women in one clean sweep, then it was advisable to "adopt a policy of gradual eradication." Uchida closed his instructions in a didactic flourish. The problem of overseas prostitution had a long and vexing history. The eradication of Japanese women of ill fame abroad was "a matter of imperative necessity." Success, warned Uchida, lay in each consul "establishing a definite policy and to pursue it at all times" so as to facilitate the "sound development of our interests abroad."[73] That is to say, Japanese competitiveness and investment in large-scale plantation agriculture in Southeast Asia demanded the integration of each individual in the local Japanese overseas communities to occupations of labor deemed "useful" in the accumulation of capital and to the designs of the "Great Japanese Empire" (*Dai Nippon Teikoku*).

Notes

1. The Straits Settlements were established in 1826 when control over the trading centers of Penang, Singapore, and Malacca was granted to the British East India Company. Singapore became the administrative capital in 1832. The three territories became a Crown colony in 1867.

2. Hajime Shimizu, "The Pattern of Japanese Economic Penetration of Prewar Singapore and Malaya," in *The Japanese in Colonial Southeast Asia*, ed. Saya Shiraishi and Takashi Shiraishi, *Translation of Contemporary Japanese Scholarship on Southeast Asia*, vol. 3, (Ithaca NY: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1993), p. 68.
3. Yano, Tōru, *Nanshin no keifu* (Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 1975), p. 10; Hiroshi Shimizu and Hitoshi Hirakawa, *Japan and Singapore in the World Economy: Japan's Economic Advance into Singapore, 1870–1965* (London, Routledge, 1999), p. 4.
4. Yamazaki Tomoko, *Sandakan hachiban shōkan–teihen joseishi joshō* (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1972); the English translation is *Sandakan Brothel No. 8: An Episode in the History of Lower-Class Japanese Women*, trans. Karen Colligan-Taylor (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999); James F. Warren, *Ah Ku and Karayuki-san: Prostitutes in Singapore 1870–1940* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1993).
5. This is covered in detail in Bill Mihalopoulos, *Sex in Japan's Globalization, 1870–1930: Prostitutes, Emigration and Nation-Building* (London: Pickering and Chatto Publishers, 2011), pp. 15–36.
6. According to the research carried out by Kurahashi Masanao, the 1910 Japanese Consular Population Survey of Expatriate Japanese by Occupation recorded 19097 women working abroad in unsightly occupations. Of these, 14254 (or 75%) plied their trade on the informal frontier of the Japanese colonial empire; 7928 (42%) Japanese women engaged, directly or indirectly, in sex work in the Kwantung Leased Territory; and 4275 women (22%) worked in southern Manchuria. The consular survey indicated that 20 percent, or 3745 women, made a living in "unsightly occupations" in Southeast Asia. See Kurahashi M., *Kita no karayuki-san* (Tokyo: Kyōei Shobō, 1989), p. 73.
7. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991).
8. Hajime Shimizu, "Kindai nihon no kaigai tsūshō jōhō senryaku to tōnan ajia" in *Iwanami koza "teikoku" nihon no gakuchi: vol. 6 –Chiiki kenkyū toshite no Ajia*, ed. Suehiro Akira (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2006), p. 209; Kaoru Sugihara, "The Development of an Informational Infrastructure in Meiji Japan," in *Information Acumen: The Understanding and Use of Knowledge in Modern Business*, ed. Lisa Bud-Frierman (London: New York, Routledge, 1994), p. 85.
9. Aoki Shūzō to Yamagata Aritomo, July 15, 1890, *Honpōjin fuseigyō torishimari kankei hōki zassan* [*HFTKHZ*] vol. 1, Japanese Diplomatic Record Office, Gaikō Shiryōkan, Tokyo.
10. The consular reports can be found in Japanese Diplomatic Record Office, Azubadai, Tokyo under the major classifications "Juridical Administration and Police" (*Shihō oyobi Keisatsu*), subheading "Matters of Police: Procedures and Regulations" (*Keisatsu Jikō: Torishimari oyobi Shobun*). These files are concerned with Japanese women abroad and the impropriety and illegality (*fuseigyō*) of their work.
11. Tadashi Fukutake, R. P. Dore (trans.), *Japanese Rural Society* (London: Oxford Press, 1967), p. 10.
12. Nobutaka Ike, "Taxation and Land Ownership in the Westernization of Japan," *The Journal of Economic History* 7 (1947): 175.
13. John Dresner, "Emigration and Local Development in Meiji Era Yamaguchi" (PhD diss., Harvard University, 2001), p. 79.

14. "Iminka sechi iken," *Yūbin hōchi*, August 5, 1891.
15. Irie Toraji, *Hōjin kaigai hatten shi*—vol. 1 (Tokyo: Ida Shoten, 1942), pp. 59–96.
16. Alan Moriyama, *Imingaisha: Japanese Emigration Companies and Hawaii* (Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1985), p. 25.
17. The Nippon Yūen Kaisha (NYK) is presently one of the largest shipping companies in the world and a core subsidiary of the Mitsubishi conglomeration. William D. Wray, *Mitsubishi and the N.Y.K., 1870–1914*, Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard East Asian monographs, 108 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984), pp. 263–4.
18. Gaimushō (ed.), *Nihon gaikō nenpyō narabini shuyō bunsho* (Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Rengō Kyōkai, 1955), vol. 1, pp. 143–4; Neville Bennett, "Bitter Fruit: Japanese Migration and Anglo-Saxon Obstacles, 1890–1924," *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*, 4th Series, 8 (1993): 68–9.
19. G. C. Allen, *A Short History of Modern Japan* (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1981), pp. 54–5; Kanji Ishii, "Japanese Foreign Trade and the Yokohama Specie Bank, 1880–1913," in *Pacific Banking, 1859–1959: East meets West*, eds. Olive Checkland, Shizuya Nishimura, and Norio Tamaki (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), pp. 1–23.
20. *Imin hogokisoku*, April 12, 1894, reprinted in Naikaku Kampōkyoku (ed.), *Hōrei zensho* ([1894]Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1974), vol. 2, pp. 112–15; *Imin hogohō*, April 7, 1896, reprinted in *Hōrei zensho* ([1896] Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1974), vol. 2, pp. 116–20.
21. Between the mid-1880s and mid-1900s the major type of Japanese migration abroad was in the form of male laborers indentured to three-year contracts, which guaranteed their return to Japan. The destination of the majority of Japanese migrants was Hawaii and the North American west coast. From the mid-1910s however, the destinations for most Japanese migrant laborers became South America and the colonies of the Japanese Empire due to restrictions imposed on Japanese migration by Australia, the United States, and Canada. Japanese migration to South America was novel in another way. Many of the migrants made the journey with their families with the intention of settling permanently abroad. From the early 1920s onward, the Japanese government particularly encouraged permanent settlement. Migration was put forward as a solution to the array of "social problems" (*shakai mondai*) discovered by Japanese bureaucrats—such as chronic rural poverty, rural-urban migration, substandard housing, and the rise of urban slums culminating in the deterioration of the collective health of Japanese cities. In addition, as Japan's colonial adventures gathered momentum, successive Japanese governments encouraged entire Japanese families to settle permanently in the colonies of the Japanese Empire—Taiwan, Korea, the South Pacific Mandate (*Nan'yō guntō*), and, after 1931, Manchuria. Japanese immigration continued after World War II. With the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty (1951) the Japanese government made special arrangements to send agricultural laborer settlers to South America. Japanese postwar immigrants went to Brazil in 1952, Paraguay in 1954, Argentina in 1955, the Dominican Republic in 1956, and Bolivia in 1957.
22. Chinda Sutemi to Aoki Shūzō, March 10, 1891, "Sōkō ni okeru shūgyōsha ni kansuru hōkoku no ken" in *Nihon gaikō bunsho*, ed. Gaimushō, 73 vols (Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Rengō Kyōkai, 1953), vol. 24, p. 461.

23. Chinda Sutemi to Aoki Shūzō, April 25, 1891, "Gasshūkoku yoyaku rōdōsha ijū kinshi jōrei: Sen happyaku kyūjūichi nen sangatsu mikka gasshūkoku kaitei gaikokujin ijū jōrei," Ibid. p. 464.
24. Komura Jutarō to Hong Kong, Singapore, San Francisco, Vancouver, Tacoma consuls and Vladivostock trade secretariat, March 1897, "Honpō shūgyōfu no shutsunyū oyobi jōkyō nado hōkoku kata tsūtatsu." Extra instructions were sent to the consul general of Hawaii, Minister Resident in Siam, and the consuls of Townsville, Sydney, and Manila. *Kaigai ni okeru honpō shūgyōfu no insū oyobi nado nen nikai hōkoku kata kuntatsu ikken*, Diplomatic Record Office, Gaikō Shiryōkan, Tokyo.
25. Fujita Toshirō to Hara Kei [Takashi], November 16, 1895, *Honpōjin fuseigyō torishimari kankei zakken* [*HFTKZ*], vol. 1, Japanese Diplomatic Record Office, Gaikō Shiryōkan, Tokyo.
26. Saitō Miki to Aoki Shūzō, February 20, 1890, *HFTKZ* vol. 1.
27. Ian Brown, "The British Merchant Community in Singapore and Japanese Commercial Expansion in the 1930s," in *International Commercial Rivalry in Southeast Asia in the Interwar Period*, eds., Sugiyama Shinya and Milagros C. Guerrero (New Haven, CT: Yale Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), pp. 111–32.
28. Philippa Levine, *Prostitution, Race, and Politics: Policing Venereal Disease in the British Empire* (New York and London: Routledge, 2003), p. 24.
29. Godown is a term commonly used in southern Asia, especially India, to denote a warehouse on the dockside. The word is believed to be a synthesis of Portuguese and Tamil, Malayalam and Kannada and in use from the late sixteenth century.
30. Levine, *Prostitution*, p. 25.
31. Ibid., pp. 25, 28.
32. A Contagious Disease Ordinance (CDO) involving the compulsory examination of women working in house-brothels for venereal disease and the licensing of brothels was introduced to Singapore in 1870. The CDO was administered by the Registrar General. P. Levine, "Modernity, Medicine, and Colonialism: The Contagious Disease Ordinances in Hong Kong and the Straits Settlements," *Positions* 6, no. 3 (1998): 676–8.
33. Warren, *Ah Ku*, pp. 91–121.
34. The office of Chinese Protectorate was established in 1877, with the aim of repressing the secret societies, and to bring "the Chinese within the control of the [British] Administration." The duties of the protectorate were to safeguard the Chinese communities and incoming coolie migrant laborers from extortion by Chinese secret societies, prevent the illegal traffic in Chinese women and girls sold to brothel owners in Singapore, and, from 1881, took over from the Registrar General in administrating the CDO. Levine, *Prostitution*, p. 25.
35. Miyagawa Kyūjirō to Aoki Shūzō, November 27, 1890, "Nihon fujin mikkō bōatsu no ken nitsuki utagai," *HFTKZ*, vol. 1. Until the alien Act of 1905, the British government hardly restricted the movement of people entering and leaving its domains due to its commitment to economic liberalism and "open trade" as the surest recipe for prosperity. See John Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship, and the State* (Cambridge [England]: University of Cambridge Press, 2000), pp. 69–70, 91.
36. Miyagawa to Aoki, November 27, 1890.

37. Saitō Miki to Hayashi Tadasu, September 28, 1892, "Penan ni okeru yūfu hinonfu shōgimenkyo shutsugan ni tsuki setsyu irai no ken," *HFTKZ* vol. 1.
38. See note 34.
39. In 1891, Saitō appealed to the foreign ministry for permission to tour the Malay peninsula to assess the suitability of the region for the promotion of Japanese commerce and agricultural settlement. He duly received permission and finance for several fact-finding tours into the southern Malay peninsula between October 1893 and February 1894.
40. Saitō Miki to Protector of Chinese, June 9, 1893, *HFTKZ* vol. 1.
41. Saitō Miki to Protector of Chinese, June 12, 1894, *Honpōjin kaigai e mikkō kankei zakken* vol. 1, Diplomatic Record Office, Gaikō Shiryōkan, Tokyo; Inoue Kaoru to J. Kennedy, June 25, 1880, FO/262/527, Foreign Office: Embassy and Consulates, Japan: General Correspondence, 1859–1957, Public Record Office, Kew Gardens; Undated memo by Asada Tokusoku in response to Shinagawa Tadamichi to Ueno Kakenori, March 22, 1882, *HFTKHZ* vol. 1.
42. Fujita to Hara, November 16, 1895.
43. Ibid.
44. Yano, *Nanshin no keifu*, pp. 124–9; Warren, *Ah Ku*, p. 49.
45. Yeh Siew Kee, "The Japanese in Malaya before 1942," *Journal of the South Seas* 20 (1965): 67. For the detailed workings of cooperative credit associations see John Embree, *The Japanese Village: Suye Mura* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench Trubner and Co., Ltd., 1946), pp. 103–13.
46. Irie, *Hōjin kaigai hattenshi* -vol. 1, p. 237.
47. "Hōjin yōshigun no bikyo," February 5, 1915 *Nanyō nichinichi shinbun*.
48. In fact, the first Japanese bank to establish a branch in Singapore to help finance local Japanese industry and trade was the state controlled Bank of Taiwan in 1912. The establishment of a branch was due to the Bank of Taiwan and colonial government of Taiwan initiating a policy of promoting Japanese economic involvement in Southeast Asia. Shimizu and Hirakawa, *Japan and Singapore*, p. 39.
49. The Contagious Disease Ordinance was repealed in 1887 and replaced by the Women and Girls Protection Ordinance (1888), which eased the requirement of compulsory venereal examinations. As a result, Japanese brothels began to contract either Japanese doctors or the colonial surgeon to carry out venereal examinations. Warren, *Ah Ku*, pp. 91–5; Levine, *Prostitution*, p. 131.
50. Kee, "Japanese in Malaya," p. 53. Restrictions to land ownership took effect in July 1917 when the colonial government promulgated the "Rubber Lands Restriction Enactment." The provisions prohibited the selling of rubber plantations over 50 acres to persons who were not British subjects. See Shimizu, "Japanese Economic Penetration," p. 85.
51. Shimizu and Hirakawa, *Japan and Singapore*, p. 39.
52. Hara Fujio, *Eiryō Maraya no Nihonjin* (Tokyo: Aijia Keizai Kenkyūsho, 1986), Table 4, p. 222.
53. One Straits dollar was equivalent to two shillings and four pence. Report sent by the Singapore consul Yamazaki, January 27, 1920. *HFTKZ*, vol. 5.
54. Shimizu and Hirakawa, *Japan and Singapore*, pp. 41–2.
55. The international trafficking of women came to the fore in Europe with national crusades against white slavery: the procurement—by use

of force, deceit, or drugs—of a white woman or girl against her will for prostitution.

56. Warren, *Ah Ku*, p. 155.
57. Levine, *Prostitution*, pp. 146–7.
58. Governor Young to Colonial Secretary Long, June 13, 1917, CO 273/457, Colonial Office: Straits Settlements Original Correspondence, 1838–1946, National Archive, Kew Gardens.
59. Tessa Morris Suzuki, "The South Seas Empire of Ishihara Hiroichiō: A Case Study in Japan's Economic Relations with Southeast Asia 1914–1941" in *Japan's Impact on the World*, eds. Alan Rix and Ross Mouer (Nathan, Qld: Japanese Studies Association of Australia, 1984), p. 154.
60. Nan'yō oyobi Nihonjinsha, *Nan'yō no gojūnen: Shingapōru o chūshin ni dōhō katsuyaku* (Tokyo: Nan'yō oyobi Nihonjinsha, 1937), p. 235.
61. Warren, *Ah Ku*, p. 163.
62. Shimizu, "Japanese Economic Penetration," p. 69.
63. "Jūrai no Seipōru ryōji," *Nan'yō nichinichi shinbun*, January 8, 1917.
64. Ibid.; *Nan'yō no gojūnen*, pp. 496–502; Kee, "Japanese in Malaya," p. 64. For a sample of the debate among the local Japanese community over who should be included in the Japanese Association see the two-part series by Fuchitoki Satoru, "Zairyūmin no igi," *Nan'yō nichinichi shinbun* 8 & 9 June, 1915.
65. Mori Katsumi, *Jinshin baibai: Kaigai dekasegi onna* (Tokyo: Shibundō, 1960), p. 232.
66. Yuen C. L., "The Japanese Community in Malaya before the Pacific War: Its Genesis and Growth," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 9 (1978): 172.
67. The men were extradited 21 May, under the expediency of Fujii's office. The details were in a report sent by the Singapore consul Fujii Minoru dated May 30, 1914, *HFTKZ*, vol. 5; Shimizu and Hirakawa, *Japan and Singapore*, p. 43; *Nan'yō no gojūnen*, pp. 147–9. In this account however, the number of Japanese "pimps" banished is put at 72.
68. "Nihon shōgi sōkan zehi," May 26, 1916, *Nan'yō nichinichi shinbun*. It was estimated that there were around 30 credit associations in the region with a total investment of $45,000 (Straits dollar).
69. Ibid.; "Iwayuru seigyōsha to shūgyōsha gawa, " June 21, 1917, *Nan'yō nichinichi shinbun*; "Suteretsu ni taisuru—ryōjisan no kunyu, " September 18, 1919, *Nan'yō nichinichi shinbun*.
70. "Nihon shōgi sōkan zehi."
71. The details were in a report sent by the consul-general Yamazaki Heikichi dated January 27, 1920. *HFTKZ*, vol. 5; "Fūki mondai wa mottomo kokka taimen ni kansuru koto jūdai de aru," January 1, 1920, *Nan'yō nichinichi shinbun*.
72. Women in the Federated Malay States were given until December 1922. Ibid.
73. Uchida Yasuya to all diplomatic representatives in *Nan'yō* (Southeast Asia/Pacific) and South America, Dispatch no. 291, June 15, 1921, "Shūgyōfu torishimari kata ni kansuru ken," *HFTKHZ*, vol. 2.

7

A Language for Asia? Transnational Encounters in the Japanese Esperanto Movement, 1906–28

Ian Rapley

In the summer of 1887, Ludovic Zamenhof, a Jewish ophthalmologist writing under the pseudonym "Dr Esperanto," published a pamphlet in Warsaw, detailing "Lingvo Internacia," a proposed language for international communication. This language came to be known by the name under which he wrote, growing as a movement and community that peaked in the interwar years, and continues today. Forty years after its original description, Akita Ujaku, a Japanese playwright visiting Moscow to attend the tenth anniversary of the October Revolution, found Esperanto to be the solution to a set of problems he was having and promoted its use in official meetings as well as for more personal encounters in Moscow and beyond.

It is perhaps surprising that this language, of European intellectual and cultural origin, drawing from European languages for much of its semantic and structural content, should gain an enthusiastic following in twentieth-century Japan. However, Akita Ujaku's was only one example of a number of Japanese international encounters that Esperanto enabled and facilitated, and these encounters were only one aspect of a broad intellectual and social movement. In the 1920s and into the early 1930s in particular, Japan became home to the largest Esperanto community outside of (and larger than all but the very largest within) Europe.[1] By considering the experiences and transnational encounters of a selection of individuals who were connected with the Japanese Esperanto movement, this chapter places language at the heart of transnational engagement, arguing that cross-cultural communication is only possible through some shared medium, and that the choice and nature of that medium reveals something of the underlying assumptions and form of the contact itself.

Esperanto is the most widespread example of what are known as planned, or artificial, languages: languages that have been created through the deliberate work of one or more individuals, rather than those "natural" languages that have emerged over time within a native speaking population. The nineteenth century saw a number of proposed international languages—planned languages designed with the goal of promoting greater ease of international communication. In Esperanto's case, Zamenhof hoped that greater intercourse between nations would lead to mutual affinity and thus world peace.

Although groups grew throughout the late nineteenth century, Esperanto's major breakthrough came at the turn of the century—the first international congress was held in 1906, in France, and thereafter they were organized regularly, supported by a growing speaking population and increasing organization. After a setback during World War I, the 1920s saw Esperanto growing again, reaching the highpoint of its international profile. Japanese support followed a similar pattern: the Japanese Esperanto community was born around the time of the first convention in Europe; that first wave was followed by a lull in the early Taishō era (1912–26), and then there was a greater, more sustained wave in the wake of the peace of 1918. Throughout the period to 1928, the Japanese Esperanto movement was characterized by a well-integrated network, bringing a diverse set of ideological motivations together (largely amicably); it was spread across the Japanese mainland and also reached overseas colonies and settlements; and it featured both internal debate and theorizing as well as a range of different practices and uses.

Recently there has been increasing academic recognition of the interest of Esperanto as a phenomenon in Asia. Scholars such as Ulrich Lins, Gregor Benton, Gotelind Müller-Saini, Usui Hiroyuki, and Sho Konishi have begun to explore various aspects of the history of the language in Asia, predominantly in China and Japan.[2] Likewise, the Japanese Esperanto movement itself has engaged in historical work, often focusing upon patterns of resistance to the Japanese establishment during the interwar and wartime periods.[3]

Esperanto has a social and intellectual history in Japan beyond its presence in mediating and facilitating face-to-face transnational encounters. Not all who studied, supported, or used the language engaged in physical movement across borders—for many farmers, workers, schoolchildren and others, overseas travel was impossible—but nevertheless they still felt the pull of the transnational imagination and participated in what has been described by Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins as "thinking and feeling beyond the nation."[4]

While they studied the language, debated it, and advocated its wider use, their opportunity for practical application, and indeed transnational engagement, was limited to writing letters: many in Japan participated in what seem to have been vast networks of Esperanto correspondence: ideas and words flowing at a time when most people could not.[5]

While these are interesting topics in their own right, an examination of the face-to-face transnational encounters that Esperanto inspired is also revealing. From elite students abroad and Western educators in Japan during the late Meiji era to a growth during the interwar period of a wider range of ex-patriot residents in Japan and increasingly diverse encounters abroad, a number of both Japanese and foreigners were drawn to Esperanto in the course of their travels and border crossings.

The traces that remain of this history can be hard to follow—collections of letters in private hands, fleeting encounters that were often born more from personal initiative and interest than professional vocation, bottom-up groups that received little or no official support or recognition (other than police surveillance), and magazines that were often hand-printed and short-lived. However, weaving these sometimes ephemeral threads together reveals a wide and lasting network of actors, both those seen as of ongoing historical significance and others whose names are largely forgotten; together they articulated a range of motivations for Esperanto that was unified by a common interest in looking out beyond Japan's borders to the wider world.

Significantly, this network of ideas and actions highlights the key role of language, or languages, as a fundamental element of transnational activity. If modern historians recognize language as more complex than a simple, transparent, and unbiased medium through which exchange and communication takes place, the role of language in intercultural and inter-linguistic encounters is doubly complex. Research such as Douglas Howland's on the translation of political and philosophical concepts during the early Meiji period brings issues of language in cross-border flows of knowledge to the fore, but it is arguable that we still too readily forget the difficulties involved in transnational communication, the frictions of language, in our desire to trace the higher level meanings that these encounters sought to express.[6]

Japanese travelers and others came to Esperanto for a range of reasons—blends of pragmatism and idealism. From a practical perspective, faced with the need to master European languages as access

routes to knowledge in a wide array of disciplines, many Japanese were inspired by the idea of a language that would be easy (or at least, easier) to learn. Idealistic motivations covered a broader spectrum—religious and political views (of both the Left and the Right) motivated many, alongside more abstract notions of equality and fairness within an international setting. One place in which these issues came together and in which the questions of language underlying all transnational encounters were most visibly exposed was in a number of "language problems"—breakdowns of communication where the overlap in linguistic abilities fell short of the demands put upon it. In these situations, which occurred in both official and unofficial settings, Esperanto was proposed as the simultaneous answer to broad, long-term issues and as a practical solution to immediate barriers. There, and elsewhere, Esperanto was revealed as both an idea itself—a vision of a world unified through language—and a medium that enabled the spread of other ideas.

Movement of Language: The Origins of Japanese Esperanto

The first mentions of Esperanto in Japan came as early as 1888, in relation to another, now largely forgotten, international language project, Volapük.[7] However the establishment of a working community of learners and speakers, forming a recognizable movement, did not take place until the turn of the century. Then, Esperanto reached Japan and gained a critical mass of advocates and users in the wake of the Russo-Japanese war. Japan's victory over Russia was one key event in the transformation of Japan's relations to the wider world, a period that saw the redefining of its international status to one more close to equality with the Western powers, achieved and symbolized by military victory, the revision of the unequal treaties, and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The Esperanto boom of 1906 represented a perhaps unlikely cultural manifestation of this changing nature in Japan's international position.

Esperanto reached Japan by a variety of routes in the years either side of the Russo-Japanese war. These different routes map out a broad characterization of late Meiji era transnationalism—elite students studying overseas, Western educators teaching in Japan, the Western language press, and Chinese students in Tokyo.[8] The paths, and the range of individuals involved, can be illustrated by consideration of four of the key figures in the early years of Japanese Esperanto: Kuroita Katsumi, a conservative academic; George Edward Gauntlett, a Welsh

missionary and teacher; the novelist Futabatei Shimei; and the anarchist Ōsugi Sakae. They not only represent a range of different professions and opinions, but each played a different role in establishing Esperanto in Japan as a self-supporting, grassroots movement.

Kuroita Katsumi, a lecturer in the Japanese classics at the Tokyo Imperial University, was the organizer of the first major Japanese Esperanto association, the Japana Esperantista Asocio, the JEA. He and others, including the famous Taishō era liberal, Yoshino Sakuzō, encountered Esperanto first through the Western language press, printed in Japan or imported from abroad. In 1906, after studying for a few years, Kuroita began to promote Esperanto himself, initially through an interview article in *Chokugen*, the successor to the early socialist newspaper, the *Heimin Shinbun*, before founding the JEA on June 12.

There were only ten members at the first JEA meeting, but it began to grow through exposure in the likes of the *Yomiuri Shinbun* and the *Asahi Shinbun*. Another source of new members came through the work of the second major figure in the foundation of Japanese Esperanto, George Edward Gauntlett. Gauntlett, a music teacher based in Okayama, was introduced to Esperanto by a fellow missionary and teacher; after experimenting with it for a while he began a study group in Okayama, and then a correspondence course for others further afield. Through this course, over 600 students learned Esperanto in 1905 and 1906, and they naturally fed into the JEA membership.[9]

From there, Esperanto grew rapidly throughout 1906, supported by the publication of a number of Japanese language texts designed for Japanese learners rather than the European texts that they had previously had to rely upon. While many of these were a response to the boom, the most successful was a book, *Sekaigo Esuperanto*, with a much longer gestation. [10]

In 1902, Futabatei Shimei, the novelist and Russian scholar, quit his post at the Tokyo School of Foreign Languages to visit Vladivostok and Harbin. In Vladivostok he became friends with Fjodor Postnikov, a leading Russian Esperantist who taught him the basics. In return, Futbatei promised to work on a textbook to introduce the language to Japan.[11] The following year Postnikov visited Futabatei in Tokyo where the two worked together on translating an existing Russian textbook into Japanese.[12] It was this that was to become *Sekaigo Esuperanto*. However, the Russo-Japanese war intervened, delaying Futabatei's work further, such that the first volume was finally published only in 1906, coinciding with the rapid growth of the JEA.[13]

These then were the key foundations of the Japanese Esperanto movement: a central organization, a critical mass of students and speakers, and a set of texts to support them. Ōsugi Sakae, the final of the four figures considered here, played a different role, helping to deepen the network of transnational links through Esperanto. Ōsugi was involved with the JEA almost from its outset, writing one of the, if not the first, Japanese to Esperanto translations.[14] In the years following the creation of the JEA, he set up a night school for Esperanto, in particular teaching a group of Chinese students. This group, based around Liu Shipei, his wife He Zhen and others, went on to be one of the starting points of Esperanto and anarchism in China.[15]

Although Futabatei moved away from Esperanto, Kutoita, Gauntlett, and Ōsugi continued to participate in the movement in the years following 1906. While their perspectives and motivations were different, they formed a part of what was for the most part a well-integrated network of advocates and users, connecting various different subgroups and outlooks within an interlinked community. While they often disagreed over matters of philosophy and practice, for the first 25 years of its existence, the Japanese Esperanto movement remained the single home to the vast majority of Japanese Esperantists, bringing together a range of different opinions, Left and Right, radical and conventional. In comparison to later years, the pioneers of 1906 perhaps articulated a more practical vision of their language than would become more common in later years, focusing more on questions of ease of study and communication than of equality, fairness, and universal brotherhood. Nevertheless, in building the first institutions, they were responsible for the creation of a movement which, with the sole exception of a brief period at the end of World War II, traces a continuous history of practice up to the present day.

Encounters Through Esperanto: Japan as a Transnational Hub

The outbreak of war in Europe in 1914 was a severe blow, both to the Esperanto vision of a united mankind, and to the practical reality of transnational connections within and from Europe. However, while the Japanese movement was reduced in terms of the size and scale of its activity, it nevertheless continued to develop new ideas and new practices. Indeed, in the absence of European influence, in some respects it was freer to develop independently. Many of the leading figures from 1906 continued to play significant roles, while a second generation of Japanese Esperantists began to emerge, laying the

ground for what was to be a great resurgence in Esperanto, in Japan as it was overseas, when World War I came to an end.

The Esperanto scene in Japan which developed during the late 1910s was but one part of a growing set of transnational connections with Tokyo at their heart. With the European war as an inhibiting factor, many of these developments touched other parts of Asia, rather than looking further west. However, one central symbol of this growing Tokyo-based transnationalism was European: the Ukrainian, Vasily Eroshenko.

Eroshenko was an unusual European visitor to Japan in several respects. Most immediately and obviously, he was blind, the result of a childhood illness. But perhaps more significantly, in contrast to the waves of European traders, missionaries, educators, scientists, and engineers, who brought with them European technology or knowledge or ways of doing business, Eroshenko came to Japan not to teach, but instead to learn. Prior to coming to Tokyo in 1914, Eroshenko had studied in blind schools in Moscow and London; he was drawn to Japan, reportedly to study the art of massage, one of the traditional occupations of the Japanese blind.

Eroshenko was by nature inquisitive and gregarious, and his open personality appealed to many, so the Japanese Esperanto movement was only one of a number of different groups within which he made friends. Between 1914 and 1921, when he left Japan for the last time, Eroshenko was involved with young blind activists, student groups, political radicals, artists and writers, and more besides, weaving a rich web of connections, transnational and otherwise.

One example of the impact that Eroshenko had on his Japanese friends was his relationship with Akita Ujaku. Akita, a playwright and writer based in Tokyo, met Eroshenko in late 1914, at a time when, although he was beginning to make a name for himself, he was struggling to support his wife and children. Things had reached such an extreme that, looking back years later, he speculated that he might even have committed suicide.[16] The impact of his meeting with Eroshenko had a transformative effect on him. The blind Russian's positive outlook on life and its possibilities helped Akita to take on a new perspective himself, and Esperanto was one key element of this perspective. The day after meeting Eroshenko, Akita began to study the language, attending meetings and experimenting with it in his diary.[17] From there, he joined Eroshenko in exploring the networks of transnational possibility opening up in Tokyo.

Both Eroshenko and Akita became involved with the Bahá'í mission to Japan. Bahá'í, a Persian religion, established a presence in Tokyo

in 1914, at the same time as Eroshenko arrived, through the person of Agnes Alexander, daughter of an American missionary couple in Hawaii.[18] Bahá'í's teachings included the establishment of Esperanto as a medium for world communication, so Agnes Alexander became a regular presence within the Japanese Esperanto scene in the early Taishō years, and Japanese Esperantists often visited her Bahá'í meetings in return. Although neither Akita nor Eroshenko became followers of the faith, both were close with Alexander and sympathetic to her cause, helping her with translations and by writing about Bahá'í in mainstream press.[19]

Another group in which Akita and Eroshenko both participated was the literary salon run by Sōma Kokkō and her husband Aizō. The couple were the proprietors of a bakery, the Nakamuraya, in Shinjuku.[20] Behind the bakery was a Western style studio, which was home at various times to several artists and writers, Eroshenko included.[21] The salon met there, and in the rooms above the bakery. Eroshenko became close to both Sōma Kokkō and Sōma Aizō, playing Russian music on the balalaika and violin, participating in discussions of Russian literature (a particular interest to Kokkō, who studied the language for a time with a view to travelling to Moscow), and sitting as a subject for some of the artists who also participated in the salon.[22]

Both the Nakamuraya and the Bahá'í were, in turn, closely associated with the visit to Japan of the poet, Rabindranath Tagore. Tagore had been awarded the Nobel Prize for literature in 1913—the first Asian recipient. He came to Japan in 1916, on a lecture tour sponsored by the *Asahi Shinbun*, before continuing on to America. The Asahi promoted his visit relentlessly, such that his talks and public appearances were met by vast crowds.[23] Although he does not appear to have had a direct interest in Esperanto himself, many of the Japanese Esperantists were fascinated by Tagore's visit. For example, Akita Ujaku followed the news of Tagore's progress across the Indian Ocean, reading both Tagore's own work and also Indian philosophy. Together with Eroshenko and the members of a literary society Akita had founded called the "Red Hat Society," Akita joined a crowd estimated at 25,000–30,000 to see Tagore arrive at Tokyo station. Akita and his society shouted an Esperanto greeting to Tagore across the crowds.[24] Akita, Eroshenko, and Agnes Alexander attended Tagore's most high-profile talk, at the Imperial University while Tagore made visits to both the Nakamuraya and the Bahá'ís.[25] Tagore had a message of caution for Japan, warning that shallow modernization threatened Japan's unique connection with the natural world.[26] This was met with a mixed response by the Japanese audience; for their parts, Akita Ujaku reacted positively to the Indian philosophy he read but was

more ambivalent regarding Tagore's own message, while Eroshenko was reportedly hostile to Tagore's ideas of an east/west divide along spiritual/material lines.[27]

As it happened, in the midst of Tagore's tour of Japan, Eroshenko left Japan on his own tour of a series of Asian countries. He made use of the networks and contacts he had made in Tokyo to find support, visiting Siam, Burma, and finally India. He was in Burma in 1917–18 when the news of the Russian Revolution began to reach Asia, so he endeavored to return home. However, he was unsuccessful: in late 1918 he was put under house arrest in Calcutta and ultimately deported back to Japan.[28]

Back in Tokyo, Eroshenko picked up where he had left off. By this time, the post-1918 resurgence Esperanto was in full swing. Socialism in Japan, too, was waking from its "winter period," and several of Eroshenko's circles, such as the student group, the Shinjin-kai (which also experimented with Esperanto as a means for involving Chinese and Korean students) were engaged with the Left. This proved to be Eroshenko's undoing. The documents relating to his expulsion from India had marked him as a proponent of "extremist thought" and in 1921 he was twice arrested at socialist events: the May Day march on the first of May, and the annual general meeting of the Nihon Shakaishugi Dōmei (the Japan Socialist League) on the ninth.[29] The press displayed shock at these arrests and then later, at the news that he was to be deported.[30] Eroshenko was arrested in the Nakamuraya; this sparked a campaign for his release from a range of figures—those on the Left such as Akita Ujaku and the famous liberal journalist Hasegawa Nyozekan, but also less radical figures from within the Esperanto scene including Kuroita Katsumi.[31] Their appeals were to no avail, however, and Eroshenko was taken by train out of Tokyo, to be shipped out of Japan through Kobe. Ironically, expelled from India and Japan on the grounds of his radicalism, he was unable to prove his revolutionary credentials, and was denied entry to the Soviet Union. Adrift, he made use once again of the burgeoning transnational networks across Asia, finding a new home teaching Esperanto in China, first in Shanghai and later in Beijing.[32]

Not all who took part in the circles of transnational activity through which Vasily Eroshenko passed were Esperantists. However, many were, and the language surged in popularity from 1918 into the early 1920s.[33] Kuroita Katsumi stepped back from an active role in the leadership of Japanese Esperanto, replaced by members of the younger generation, and there was a move from pragmatism toward idealism in the motivating philosophy for the language: a debate within the movement was won by the advocates of a progressive vision of

Esperanto over those who argued for a position of explicit political neutrality. Although he left Japan as these changes were taking place, Eroshenko was a ideal representation of some of the new ideas: optimistic, idealistic, and willing to place his fate in the support of others, whether he was in Tokyo, or elsewhere across Japan, Asia and beyond.

Encounters through Language—Japanese Esperantists Abroad

The second wave of Japanese Esperanto was larger, longer lasting, and more sophisticated than the first.[34] Buoyed initially by the global "Wilsonian moment" and associated forms of cultural internationalism, the membership of the Japanese Esperanto associations and clubs grew throughout the 1920s.[35] Increasingly, in addition to developing their domestic movement, Japanese Esperantists were active overseas, representing Japanese perspectives in a growing range of European debates as well as carrying the movement onto continental Asia. The socialist connections to Chinese Esperanto continued, even after the death of Ōsugi Sakae in 1923, while there were also mainstream Esperanto groups in Korea, Taiwan, and in the Japanese settlements in Manchuria.[36]

Within a colonial setting, however, Esperanto took on a different range of potential meanings. The Japanese authorities took a dim view of the first clubs in Taiwan until a leading Japanese Esperantist, Nakamura Kiyō, head of the Japanese meteorological office, intervened on their behalf while visiting in 1915.[37] For the native Taiwanese, trapped between Japanese colonial policy on the one side, and mainland Chinese culture on the other, the question of vernacular language and script was a pivotal one to local identity, one that was debated throughout the early twentieth century, with Esperanto featuring in the debate, linked to other ideas, such as romanization.[38] Perhaps because of this, Esperanto remained a contentious issue. In 1922, with the worldwide spread of Esperanto continuing at its fastest pace, *La Verda Ombro* (*Green Shadow*), the Taiwanese Esperanto Association's magazine, reported a conversation with a Japanese official revealing lingering suspicions regarding the use of Esperanto by the local population:

> Despite studying the same Esperanto, whereas for the Japanese the choice is undoubtedly simply as an international language of world exchange, a symbolic language of the inevitable rise of racial harmony, or perhaps a result of the love of the Japanese language;

> in the case of a Taiwanese the conditions are different. For them it is not the case of practising a world language as one of the peoples of the world; quite the opposite, it is fully imbued with the meaning of opposition to the Japanese language. Since language and thought have a relationship of connection, rejecting the Japanese language must be seen as rejecting Japan itself. The Japanese colonial policy must not tacitly allow such rebellion.[39]

This interview took place the year after Vasily Eroshenko was expelled from Japan, an event that led to reports that the Home Ministry was investigating the possibility that the Esperanto movement was little more than a cover for the radical Left.[40] However, the size and complexity of the state was such that its response to Esperanto was neither uniform nor consistent. While some parts of the Japanese state were looking at Esperanto with hostility, other parts were exploring it from a more positive perspective. The period of the second wave of Japanese Esperanto growth was one in which the Japanese state was committing in earnest to diplomatic ideas of internationalism emerging from the post-World War I settlement, and in that setting Esperanto was seen quite differently to the Taiwanese official's suspicion or the concern of the domestic Japanese authorities about ties to communism. During the early 1920s, Japan was a diligent member of the international community, centered upon its permanent membership of the League of Nations' Council. When questions of international language arose at the League, the Japanese delegation took them seriously.

The first mentions of Esperanto at the League came in the very first plenary sessions of the first year of operation. From there, Esperanto featured in a number of settings, from the main debating chamber, to a report filed by Nitobe Inazō, to specialist subcommittees and the general informal activities surrounding the League. Although the ultimate result of these considerations was rejection—the recommendation that an artificial language was not the answer to problems of international language, nevertheless this serious consideration by some of the members of the League marked a high point in Esperanto's international history and a recognition of its increasing worldwide profile.[41]

Japan occupied an unusual position at the League of Nations—at once both a member of the inner circle (a permanent member of the Council, and supplying vital positions such as that of Nitobe, Under-Secretary General, the second highest ranking member of the League's civil service) and yet also a relative newcomer and outsider—a rare

independent Asian participant, and one with a limited history of diplomatic contact. Thus, when questions of language in diplomacy arose, Japan's position, too, was a complex one.

When Esperanto was first introduced to the League, Japan was reported as siding with a French attempt to forestall consideration, but in subsequent years the official Japanese position changed to one supporting its consideration at the League.[42] In addition to this official position, there were a number of Japanese participants at the League who had personal or individual views on the debates.

Nitobe Inazō is widely recognized as one of the most famous supporters of Esperanto in its twentieth-century history. He attended the annual Esperanto congress in Prague in 1921 at the invitation of the Universal Esperanto Association; on his return he wrote a report of the congress and wider considerations of language at the League. Despite a thoroughgoing attempt to avoid taking a position on the question, this report was considered to be a major act of support for the language, given its recognition of the existence of an "international language problem," and the stress on the importance of equality and neutrality in its solution.[43]

In writing the report, Nitobe was acting, not as a representative of the Japanese government, but rather as an agent of the League itself. While he seems to have made little or no actual effort to learn Esperanto, he lectured on the language back in Japan and was described by friends as being a supporter.[44] There were others among the Japanese participants in League affairs, however, who were more deeply involved with learning and using Esperanto. First, Fujisawa Chikao, another Japanese employee of the League's administrative staff, the Secretariat, had been a major voice in the Tokyo Esperanto scene in the late 1910s. A talented linguist like Nitobe, Fujisawa's view of Esperanto was colored by his experience of the difficulties many of his countrymen found in learning and using foreign languages.[45] He had been involved in a range of official Japanese international activities; at each point he saw Japanese linguistic limitations hampering national objectives. The League was no exception; as he wrote:

> I fear that the delegation recently sent from Japan [to the League] will repeat the same failure [as prior Japanese missions] due to inability at French and English. Thus the adoption of Esperanto as the sole language of international communication would be a very opportune proposal for the interests of Japan.[46]

Yanagita Kunio, the last major Japanese actor in the Esperanto activities surrounding the League, served as an immediate proof of Fujisawa's views. Yanagita, like Nitobe and Fujisawa, was not strictly a member of the Japanese delegation to the League; he was in Geneva to serve on the Permanent Mandates Commission, a body set up to oversee the management of the League's Mandates—ex-colonies of the defeated World War I powers that were administrated for the League by its leading members, Japan included. Despite an elite education and being well read in European scholarship, Yanagita rapidly found that speaking and listening in foreign languages was much harder than reading and writing, and he struggled to participate fully on the commission. Ultimately, this frustration led Yanagita to quit the League and to return to Japan, but before he did so, he turned to Esperanto as a possible solution to his, and others', problems. As he recalled:

> At just that time, there was a movement underway for the recognition of Esperanto at the League, and the reason for the greater than usual interest that I had in it was straightforward: if adopted, I too could express what I thought. Further, it valued the smaller nations: because those [League] representatives who were not diplomats were all suffering; even if it were not to reach the level of [usage of] English or French, I thought that it might be more freely used.[47]

Yanagita recommended Esperanto to his friends, met with Esperantists while back in Japan, and attended a range of meetings in Geneva, which he described in his letters, mentioning the diverse contacts that he made, and speeches he listened to. While it has been suggested that Yanagita's time at the League was one of isolation, in which he would note in his diary, "I did not see a single Japanese face the whole day,"[48] it was nevertheless one in which he also wrote letters back to Japan telling of his Russian Esperanto teacher, his trip to a club in Venice, and the international gathering that came together to celebrate Zamenhof's birthday.[49] Yanagita continued to advocate Esperanto throughout the 1920s, assisting with the official incorporation of the JEI, and arguing that through Esperanto, Japanese scholars might get a wider audience for their work.[50]

Yanagita's language problems at the start of the 1920s were matched by another example of Japanese transnational activity toward the end of the decade: that of Akita Ujaku.[51] Akita had continued to practice Esperanto after his friend Eroshenko had been deported, remaining a

leading figure on the left of the movement. In 1927 he, like Yanagita before him, had the chance to make use of the language overseas for the first time, albeit in a very different setting, when he traveled to Moscow to take part in the celebrations of the tenth anniversary of the October Revolution.

The trip was well organized: Akita spent much of 1927 studying Russian, securing support from magazines and newspapers who published his reports of the celebrations, and dealing with his passport and visas.[52] When he finally set off, together with a friend from his hometown, Narumi Kanzō, a specialist in Russian literature, it was with a sense of euphoria, singing the unofficial anthem of the Esperanto movement, *La Espero*, as they crossed into the Soviet Union, together with some Russians they had met on the train.[53] The trip was to prove a first-hand realization of Akita's belief in both the new Soviet system and the importance and value of Esperanto as a means of international communication.

Akita and Narumi arrived in Moscow on October 13, 1927; ultimately Akita extended his initial visa and ended up staying until the Moscow May Day celebrations of 1928, finally returning to Tokyo on May 18 that year (for his part, Narumi remained behind in Moscow for a further nine years). In many respects the visit was typical of a "fellow traveller's" experience in the new Soviet Union: hosted by the All Union Society For Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries' (VOKS) and taking in visits to theatres and factories, meetings and official celebrations, and featuring a wide range of other people—Russians, fellow Japanese, and other nationalities.[54]

However, language proved a problem for Akita in Moscow, just as it had for Yanagita in Geneva. VOKS provided Akita with a translator for much of his time, and he also met up again with his old friend Vasily Eroshenko, who helped him to study Russian, but despite these and the presence of Narumi Kanzō, he noted immediate problems.[55] After the first day of the centerpiece of the celebrations for international delegates, a Congress of Friends of the Soviet Union, Akita wrote in his diary simply, "'Congress of the Friends of the Soviet Union' opened…language problems; Ruikov's speech: the translation was very difficult."[56] However, while at the congress, Akita met two leading Esperanto supporters from Europe: Henri Barbusse from France and Earnest Drezen from the Soviet Union. Encouraged by them, he went on to propose a motion supporting Esperanto for consideration by the congress.[57]

While the motion was not passed, Akita went on to make widespread personal use of Esperanto. For the most part, he made less of

the formal elements of his visit than the informal ones—he regarded the central parade of the decennial celebrations as disappointingly militaristic, but he increasingly met with more and more varied people outside of the official events. In this regard, Esperanto was not only a means for talking to Russians and the 30-odd foreign Esperantists he met among the foreign delegates in Moscow, it also opened the door to a wider set of experiences of Soviet life. Akita made a set of broadcasts on Soviet radio in and about Esperanto, and he attended meetings of a club in the PTTR (Post Telegraph Telegram and Radio) department; from these starting points, his Russian Esperanto contacts snowballed. The radio broadcast led to an invitation to Minsk, and the PTTR meetings led to a series of more informal meetings with Russian Esperantists and thus a deeper experience of Soviet society: "Once I made some Esperanto friends, I was able to use their linguistic aid to enter the real life of Moscow—through an Esperanto teacher called Zavoronokov, I was able to make contact with workers' daily lives, home, factory, and club lives."[58]

Esperanto, then, was at the heart of Akita's most positive experiences in Moscow, and in turn the trip was of immense personal importance to him. Back in Tokyo, he published the collection of his reports from Moscow as a book, *Wakaki Sobeito Roshia*, he lectured on his experiences, and he formed a research association, the *Puroretaria Kagaku Kenkyūkai* (the Proletarian Science Research Association), seeking to spread and develop the knowledge that he had gained. But before he made it back to Japan, riding the train back across Siberia, he had one final chance to reflect on the need for an international language. Sharing the carriage with some fellow reform-minded Chinese students, also on the journey home from Europe, he marked the futility that "whilst we were the same mankind, humans with the closest relationship of interests, because of the constraints of language we could not exchange these intents."[59]

Conclusion

Akita's return to Tokyo coincided with the emergence of a distinct proletarian Esperanto movement, with its own organizations, textbooks, and meetings separate from the mainstream institutions that had existed to date. What had been a diverse, but integrated movement, bringing together groups with different motivations and intellectual perspectives with a good degree of harmony, increasingly split into two. The wedge between the two Esperanto groups was driven by a mix of internal and external stresses—the hostile stance of the

broader proletarian movement regarding "bourgeois internationalist" groups from within and the aggressive government suppression of communist-linked groups from without. Old Esperanto hands who embraced the proletarian ideology, such as Akita Ujaku, faced a difficult decision in cutting ties with old friends, while those within the mainstream movement were understandably keen to avoid their activities being perceived as linked to the increasingly persecuted proletarian movement.

Thus while Esperanto activity, and transnational encounters, continued to take place into the 1930s on both sides of the bourgeois/proletarian divide, the period from 1928 to about 1932 saw a real change in the nature of the Japanese Esperanto network.

Each phase, from the immediate wake of the Russo-Japanese War to the Taishō period and 1920s, and then further developments during the 1930s (and indeed again in the postwar period) saw the type and nature of the transnational encounters through Esperanto changing in response to political, social, and technological context. However, while each generation revealed a different set of activities and ideas, running through them all was the common desire to make a concrete connection with the wider world, and the recognition of the vital role that language played in the act of engagement.

Notes

1. Accurately estimating the numbers of Esperantists is difficult and involves issues of definition, but see Peter G. Forster, *The Esperanto Movement* (The Hague: Moulton), pp. 20–5, for a discussion of attempts during the 1920s. Membership of the central Japanese Esperanto association, the Japana Esperanto-Instituto (the JEI), peaked in the mid-1920s at around three thousand, but there was also a wider population of learners and speakers who were not members—the distribution of texts supporting various radio courses, for example, was reported as high as 15,000 copies. See Hatsushiba Takemi, *Nihon Esuperanto undō-shi* (Tokyo: JEI, 1998), p. 77.
2. Ulrich Lins, "Esperanto as Language and Idea in China and Japan," *Language Problems & Language Planning* 32, no. 1 (2008); Gotelind Müller-Saini and Gregor Benton, "Esperanto and Chinese Anarchism in the 1920s and 1930s," *Language Problems & Language Planning* 30, no. 2 (2006); Hiroyuki Usui, "Kokusaiha kara okaruto nashonarisuto he," *Japana Esperantologio* 4 (2010); Sho Konishi, "Translingual World Order: Language without Culture in Post-Russo-Japanese War Japan," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 72, no. 1 (2013).
3. Perhaps the most notable example is Miyamoto Masao and Oshima Yoshio, *Hantaisei Esuperanto undo-shi* (Tokyo: Sanseidō, 1973).
4. Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins, *Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nation* (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1998).

5. Advertisements for correspondence partners could draw thousands of replies from across the globe, and some individual relationships lasted decades, surviving wartime interruptions; see S. Yoshikawa, *Naka san'nin okareta hito* (Osaka: Riveroij Sosho, 1996) and JEI, *Wakayama to Esuperanto* (Tokyo: JEI, 2008), p. 19. These networks of letter writing represent a form of transnational engagement that was seemingly on a huge scale and perhaps unexpected but, lying beyond conventional archives, they are largely forgotten to historians.
6. Douglas Howland, *Translating the West: Language and Political Reason in Nineteenth-Century Japan* (Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 2002).
7. "Kokusaigo," *Yomiuri Shinbun*, February 19, 1888, p. 3.
8. In June 1936, the major Japanese Esperanto magazine commemorated the 30th anniversary of organized Esperanto in Japan with a series of accounts by a variety of Japanese Esperantists describing their path to the language, in various places including Japan, continental Asia, Europe, and America (*La Revuo Orienta*, June 1936).
9. Figures given for the number of students range between 677 (e.g., Hatsushiba, *Nihon Esuperanto undō-shi*, p. 16) and 823 (*La Japana Esperantisto*, September 1906, p. 1, reprinted by the Okayama Esperanto-Societo, 2011). A member of Gauntlett's first study group, Muramoto Tatsuzō, went on to work closely with the new JEA, providing the key link between the two. See Oka Kazuta, *Okayama no Esuperanto*, (Okayama Bunko no. 108, 1988), pp. 18–22.
10. There were at least nine textbooks and dictionaries published in 1906–07; see Nihon-Esuperanto-Gakkai, *Nihon Esuperanto undō-shiryō: Vol 1 1906–1929* (Tokyo: JEI, 1956), p. 14.
11. Postnikov had long been keen to introduce Esperanto to Asia (and Japan in particular), even going so far as to visit Nagasaki in 1894, where he left some European language pamphlets with local residents (apparently with no lasting impact), see Itō Saburo, *Takaku takaku, tōku no hō e* (Tokyo: Tettō Shoin, 1974), p. 251.
12. Tsunetarō Fujima, *Kindai Nihon ni okeru kokusaigo shisō no tenkai* (Osaka: Japana Esperanto Librokooperativo, 1978), p. 45.
13. Futabatei's own relationship with Esperanto is somewhat ambiguous. While he described himself as a member of the Vladivostok Esperanto Association in the introduction to *Sekaigo-Esuperanto*, and wrote a series of magazine articles on the language, he later cut any ties with the new movement, seeking to avoid meeting with other Esperantists; Fujima, *Kokusaigo shisō no tenkai*, p. 50.
14. Although Ōsugi is sometimes referred to as a founder of the Japanese Esperanto Association, this is not strictly true, since he was in prison at the time of the first meeting (albeit studying Esperanto while incarcerated). His translation, an Esperanto version of the Japanese Momotarō folk tale, was written for the first JEA congress, held in late 1906. See Hatsushiba, *Nihon Esuperanto undō-shi*, p. 21.
15. Gotelind Müller-Saini and Gregor Benton, "Esperanto and Chinese Anarchism 1907–1920: The Translation from Diaspora to Homeland," *Language Problems & Language Planning,* 30, no. 1 (2006): 11–12. A parallel group, active in Paris around the same time, was the other key means by which anarchism and Esperanto were introduced to China.

16. Akita Ujaku, *Ujaku jiden* (Tokyo: Shin Hyōronsha, 1953), p. 50.
17. Akita Ujaku, *Akita Ujaku nikki Vol.1* (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1965), p. 11.
18. D. Troxel, *70 Years of Service* (Osaka: Bahai Publishing Trust, 1983), Chapter 2.
19. Agnes Alexander and Barbara Sims, *History of the Bahai Faith in Japan* (Osaka: Bahai Publishing Trust, 1977), pp. 15, 21.
20. Aizō Sōma, *Ichi-shōnin to shite*, reproduced in *Kokkō chōsaku shū* (Nagano: Kyōdo Shuppansha, 1996).
21. Akita, *Akita Ujaku nikki Vol.1,* p. 46.
22. Two portraits resulted: the more famous of the two, *Eroshenko no Zō* by Nakamura Tsune, came to be celebrated as a highlight of Japanese western-style art, even as, Eroshenko himself was expelled from the country.
23. Stephen N. Hay, *Asian Ideas of East and West; Tagore and His Critics in Japan, China, and India* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 62.
24. Akita, *Akita Ujaku nikki Vol.1,* p. 59. The Red Hat Society seems to have been named in connection to the red fezzes worn by followers of Bahá'ísm.
25. *Asahi Shinbun*, June 12, 1916; the Nakamuraya website <www.nakamuraya.co.jp/photo/index.html>, accessed August 2014, has a photo of Tagore with Sōma Kokkō, together with her son-in- law, the Indian nationalist, Rash Behari Bose, while there is one of him with the Bahá'ís in Barbara Sims, *Traces That Remain: A Pictorial History of the Early Days of the Bahá'í Faith among the Japanese* (Tokyo: Bahá'í Publishing Trust of Japan, 1989), p. 35.
26. See, for example, Rabindranath Tagore, *The Spirit of Japan* (Tokyo: Indo-Japanese Association, 1916).
27. Hay, *Asian Ideas of East and West,* p. 83; Akita, *Akita Ujaku nikki Vol.1*. p. 66; Takasugi Ichirō, *Yoakem mae no uta* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1982), p. 142. *Yoake Mae No Uta* is a popular account of Eroshenko's life, rather than a scholarly one, and I have been unable to find a more authoritative reference for the claim that Eroshenko disagreed with Tagore, although it is made elsewhere too. Given that Tagore visited the Nakamuraya and the Bahá'ís, it is entirely plausible that they met face-to-face.
28. Takasugi, *Yoake mae no uta,* Chapters 19–22.
29. "Tokubetsu yōshi satsujin jōsei ippan #6 & #9," in GSS, *Zoku gendaishi shiryō, Volume 1–2: Shakai Shugi Enkaku* (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō, 1982), pp. 487, 699; "Mēdē wo uta takarakani rōdōsha kozotte," *Osaka Mainichi Shinbun*, May 2, 1921.
30. For example, "Kare ha Naita," *Asahi Shinbun*, May 29, 1921, featuring a photograph of Eroshenko receiving the deportation order.
31. "Taikyo mae no e-shi no kokubetsu wo yūjintachi ga naishō ni mōshideru," *Yomiuri Shinbun*, June 3, 1921.
32. Müller-Saini and Benton, "Esperanto and Chinese Anarchism in the 1920s and 1930s," p. 176.
33. It is tempting to characterize this broad network as a form of cultural internationalism, indeed it is certainly one key interpretation. However, there were also links to other groups which argue that the full comprehension of this Taishō era transnationalism demands a more nuanced understanding. For example, see the Nakamura-ya's connections to the Far Right through the likes of Toyama Mitsuru. See Eri Hotta, "Rash

Behari Bose and His Japanese Supporters: An Insight into Anti-Colonial Nationalism and Pan-Asianism," *Interventions* 8, no. 1 (2006).

34. With the emergence of this second wave the Japana Esperantista-Associa, the JEA, was eventually replaced by the creation of a new body, better organized and reflecting some of the more open principles of the new era. The new organization was known as the Japana Esperanto Instituto, the JEI, and remains today the central association for Japanese Esperantists.
35. Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Akira Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism and World Order* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).
36. The key figure in ongoing anarchist connections to Chinese Esperanto was Ōsugi's disciple, Yamaga Taiji, while a separate network of communist/Marxist influence developed during the 1920s.
37. Nakamura's status as a leading scientist and member of the Japanese establishment was sufficient to sway official opinion. Fukuda Masao, Katō Kōichi, and Sakai Matsutarō, *Esuperanto Binran* (Tokyo: Yōbunsha, 1967), p. 72.
38. Jing Tsu, *Sound and Script in Chinese Diaspora* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), Chapter 6: The Missing Script of Taiwan.
39. *La Verda Ombro*, April 1922, quoted in Masao and Yoshio, *Hantaisei Esuperanto undo-shi*, p. 94.
40. "Shakai shugi wo niramu," *Yomiuri Shinbun*, May 30, 1921.
41. The rejection of Esperanto is widely considered to have been the work of the French at the League, keen to protect their own language's traditional role in the center of diplomacy. For a full account of the passage of Esperanto through the League, see P. G. Forster, *The Esperanto Movement*, Chapter 6.
42. Advocates of Esperanto never went so far as seeking to have the League adopt Esperanto itself, but merely sought to have an official League statement endorsing its further development and spread. Nevertheless this relatively modest proposal appears to have been seen by many as a stalking horse for the idea of ultimately introducing Esperanto more widely into diplomatic affairs. There is also a question of personality involved in the Japanese change in stance: Ishii Kikujirō, the main Japanese representative to the League, was reportedly hostile to Esperanto, at least at first, while it was another senior diplomat, Adachi Mineichirō, who was the signatory when Japan joined the list of nations supporting the Esperanto motion.
43. Nitobe Inazō, *Esperanto and the Language Question at the League of Nations* (Geneva: League of Nations, 1921).
44. Fujisawa Chikao, *La Revuo Orienta*, January 1921, p. 2; Nagata Hidejirō, "Nihon Kokumin to Esuperanto," *La Revuo Orienta*, December 1933, p. 342; Kunio Yanagita, *Teihon Yanagita Kunio shū* (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1966): Ad. vol. 3, p. 311.
45. Usui, "Kokusaiha kara okaruto nashonarisuto he."
46. Fujisawa Chikao, *La Revuo Orienta*, January 1921, p. 2. Fujisawa was also dismissive of the linguistic abilities of the major Japanese representatives at the League, in particular Ishii Kikujirō and Hayashi Gonsuke, ambassadors to France and the United Kingdom respectively.

47. Yanagita, *Teihon Yanagita Kunio shū*, Ad. vol. 3, p. 311.
48. Oguma Eiji, *A Genealogy of 'Japanese' Self-Images* (Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press), p. 183
49. Yanagita, *Teihon Yanagita Kunio shū*, Ad. vol. 4, pp. 475, 480.
50. Yanagita Kunio, "Nihon ga buntan subeki ninmu," *La Revuo Orienta*, January 1927, p. 1.
51. Indeed, Yanagita and Akita were linked directly: when Yanagita recommended Esperanto to his colleagues and friends back in Japan, such as long-time collaborator Sasaki Kizen, he suggested that they get in touch with Akita Ujaku. Sasaki Kizen, *Sasaki Kizen zenshu*, vol. 4 (Tono: Tono City Museum, 1986), p. 227.
52. Akita Ujaku, *Akita Ujaku nikki*, vol. 2.
53. Ibid. p. 35
54. Ludmila Stern, *Western Intellectuals and the Soviet Union, 1920–40: From Red Square to the Left Bank* (London: Routledge, 2007) outlines the experiences of Western intellectual visitors to the Soviet Union in the same period.
55. Akita, *Akita Ujaku nikki*, vol. 2, p. 38.
56. Ibid. p. 44.
57. Ibid. p. 45.
58. Akita, *Ujaku jiden*. p. 147; see also *Esuperanto*, August 1928, p. 138.
59. Ibid. p. 151.

8

Imagining "World Peace": The Antinuclear Bomb Movement in Postwar Japan as a Transnational Movement

Hiroe Saruya

The end of World War II witnessed the emergence of a new public arena for imagining a "world society" in which nation-states would cooperate to achieve peace around the globe. This represented a dramatic change from the previous world regime in which major nation-states engaged in intense competition on multiple war fronts and through expansive imperial projects. But this call for "world peace"—a renewed political imaginary after the failed attempt of the League of Nations and the Kellogg–Briand Pact—was not simply empty political rhetoric or a naive utopia. Its (re-)creation resulted in vigorous debate that yielded various transnational political institutions and forms of transnational activism in the aftermath of the war.

In Japan, an extensive peace movement emerged that both contained and overlapped with other movements such as the antiwar movement and the antinuclear bomb movement, many of which were premised on the belief that global collaboration was necessary to bring peace to the world. Participants' belief in the ontological existence of "the whole world" (*zensekai*), "all humankind" (*sekai jinrui*), and "the human race" (*jinrui*) provided both the basis of participants' actorhood and the addressee of their mobilization. The phrase "world peace" (*sekai heiwa*) was the commonly repeated slogan that acted as the peace movement's master frame, leading participants toward transnational activism and claims, especially in the early stages of the movement.

The focus of this chapter is the antinuclear bomb movement in Japan from the late 1940s to the 1980s. My goal is both to highlight the transnational dynamics of the movement, which has been examined primarily in terms of its domestic politics, and to provide an

understanding of how the movement interacted with other movements, within and outside of Japan. Counter prevailing arguments in social movement literature that movements become increasingly transnational as globalization increases, I argue that the Japanese antinuclear bomb movement actually underwent the reverse trajectory: attaining its most transnational scope and mobilization at its beginning, only to narrow its focus over time, eventually decoupling itself from other transnational peace movements around the world. I examine, first, how the movement waxed and waned over the course of its movement cycle,[1] and how activists and participants engaged the global imaginary (as represented by the concepts of "the whole world" and "all human kind") and developed forms of transnational mobilization; and second, how the Japanese antinuclear bomb movement converged with but then diverged from broader antinuclear movements in Europe and North America. This chapter not only aims at understanding how the movement waxed and waned, changing its transnational scope and activism, but also addressing why the antinuclear bomb movement kept its distance from the antinuclear power movement until the massive earthquake and tsunami hit Japan's northern coast and crippled the Fukushima-Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in March 2011.[2]

The extant social movement literature has, by and large, argued that transnational or global movements emerged in the 1970s or later.[3] However, the history of the Japanese peace movement reveals that activists and participants began engaging in transnational activism much earlier, namely, in the late 1940s.[4] Indeed, one could argue that Japanese social movements were transnational even before that. This is certainly the case for leftist movements and labor movements. The Japanese Communist Party (JCP) was established in 1922 as a branch of the Communist International (the Comintern) in Moscow, although the Japanese government outlawed both the JCP and communist movements shortly thereafter. Labor movements that began surfacing in Japanese society in the 1910s were led by Katayama Sen and Takano Fusatarō, as notable examples, who learned about unionization and labor movements during time spent in the United States. Charles Tilly locates the origin of social movements, as they are understood today, in modern national polities,[5] and it is likely that some, if not all, social movements already had transnational dimensions from their beginnings. The Japanese peace movement was no exception; for example, while a socialist, Katayama (who later became a communist), also engaged in anti-Russo-Japanese War activism with other socialists at an international socialist meeting in Amsterdam in 1904.

The definitional boundaries between globalization and transnationalization are often blurry, but for my purposes, I use the term globalization to refer to processes that, whether by design or not, tend to erode existing national boundaries and create in their place supranational dynamics and/or entities. As Roland Robertson has argued, the movement is simultaneously one of greater compression and interdependence.[6] I use transnationalization, by contrast, to refer to increasing interactions and interconnections among various actors across the existing boundaries of nation-states. Following Sidney Tarrow, I use the term transnational social movements to refer to "socially mobilised groups with constituents in at least two states, engaged in sustained contentious interactions with power holders in at least one state other than their own, or against an international institution, or a multinational economic actor."[7] Therefore, globalization and transnationalization are irreducible to one another and do not compose the same or parallel processes. Yet, globalization has provided social movement participants with new opportunities and resources for influencing both state and non-state actors.[8] Indeed, studies have found a radical increase in the numbers of both international state organizations (or international governmental organizations, IGOs) and international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), including transnational social movement organizations (TSMOs), between the 1960s and the 1970s, in many countries around the world.[9] The extant studies implicitly or explicitly hypothesize that globalization—the processes of the compression and increasing interdependence of the world—would enable more transnational movements, more mobilization at larger scales, and/or more successful transnational movements. The history of the transnational Japanese antinuclear bomb movement, however, suggests otherwise.[10]

A variety of postwar movements comprised the early peace movement in Japan.[11] A nascent peace movement began shortly after the end of World War II. In Hiroshima, for example, which lost about 90 percent of its buildings and houses and about 40 percent of its population within four months of the atomic bombing in August 1945,[12] survivors and the city began holding official masses for the deceased and vigils for peace the following year.[13] Over time, commemoration ceremonies for Hiroshima as a location symbolizing peace steadily evolved into a more specific antinuclear bomb movement,[14] as I will outline.[15] This chapter focuses on the antinuclear bomb movement in Japan, but there have also been movements that have opposed the American and/or Japanese military bases, constitutional reforms of Article 9,[16] and specific wars, most notably, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Gulf War.

In the following sections I map out the history of the antinuclear bomb movement in Japan from 1945 through the 1980s. I demarcate different phases in terms of how and to what extent the movement was involved in transnational activism: (1) the emergence of transnational world peace movements between 1945 and 1954, (2) the development of the Japanese antinuclear bomb movement as well as other related movements from 1954 to the mid-1970s, and (3) the decoupling of the Japanese antinuclear bomb movements from its European and North American counterparts from the mid-1970s through the 1980s. In each period, I highlight how actors, different forms of activism, movement targets, and actors' framing of themselves and others affected the transnational dimensions of the movement. Each section begins with a discussion of the relevant historical background and political opportunities, and then details the developments during the period in question.

Transnational World Peace Movements, 1945 to 1954

The total devastation from World War II in many countries and regions in Europe and Asia created opportunities for building new international alliances across both governmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The United Nations (UN) and the European Coal and Steel Community—the predecessor of the European Union (EU)—were both founded with the purpose of preventing future wars and maintaining peace and security in October 1945 and April 1951, respectively. The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) was also established in November 1946, with a general mandate to promote peace. In short, in the postwar international political arena, a number of governmental organizations and NGOs focused on the goal of maintaining peace and security. In parallel, peace movements emerged in various countries around the world and attempted to develop relatively congruent relationships with these formal institutions, until participants soon found that neither IGOs nor INGOs were up to the task of ensuring peace as the Cold War and the nuclear arms race intensified.[17]

During the immediate postwar period in Japan, occupational authorities attempted to restrict the development of a peace movement within the country, but sometimes with little success. Approximately one month after Japan surrendered to the Allied Powers, the General Headquarters (GHQ) enforced censorship ("the Press Code"), restricting media critiques of both against the GHQ and the atomic bombings themselves. The censorship was also extended to prohibiting

coverage of the damage that continued after the atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Furthermore, when the Korean War broke out in June 1950, the GHQ began repressing not only communist movements but also any peace-related movements more explicitly. But nascent forms of the peace movement began to emerge shortly after the end of the war nonetheless. As mentioned earlier, beginning in 1946, residents of Hiroshima began memorial services for the deceased and a commemoration of peace in collaboration with city authorities.[18] In the same year, local newspapers in Hiroshima provided extensive coverage of the events organized for the anniversary of the atomic bombing, despite censorship. Articles published in one local newspaper, *Chūgoku Shinbun*, for example, featured headlines declaring "the prelude to peace" (*heiwa no jokyoku*) and "the flare of peace" (*heiwa no senkō*).[19] In 1947, the city launched an official annual event, the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Ceremony (*Hiroshima Heiwasai,* later named *Hiroshima Heiwa Kinen Shikiten*), which called for world peace among all humankind in its peace statement of the year.[20] The still unfolding devastation of the atomic bombing did not keep the local people from organizing themselves to mourn collectively, coming together to remember and rebuild.

Between 1945 and 1954, three major currents of the peace movement—all of which had transnational dimensions—developed in mainland Japan. The first current involved globally oriented organizations that originated outside of Japan, but eventually developed events or organizational offshoots in Japan. The World Congress of Intellectuals for Peace, which later became the World Peace Council, was established in Poland in August 1948, by European intellectuals and scientists such as Frédéric Joliot-Curie, Pablo Picasso, and Jean-Paul Sartre. Their first World Convention for Peace in Paris in April 1949 had participants from 72 countries, and called for the construction of world peace by, for example, abolishing military alliances.[21] For this Paris convention, Japanese representatives were invited to attend, but the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) denied travel documents for them, so the Japanese commission held a corresponding meeting in Tokyo on the same day. At this early stage, the focus was just on peace, so the first convention merely mentioned peaceful uses of atomic energy and restrictions on the nuclear bomb.[22]

However, the focus of the World Peace Council soon shifted to nuclear weapons, first at a convention by its subbranch in Hiroshima and then at the Council's headquarters in Prague.[23] In October 1949, the Hiroshima Convention for Peace (*Heiwa Yōgo Hiroshima Taikai*)

adopted an emergency resolution that demanded a ban of atomic weapons, emphasizing the status of the citizens in Hiroshima as survivors "who experienced the calamities of the atomic bomb for the first time of human history."[24] The following year, the World Convention for Peace adopted the well-known Stockholm Appeal that proclaimed the use of atomic weapons to be a criminal act and called for a ban on all nuclear weapons and their threat of "terror and mass extermination of populations."[25] The appeal launched a worldwide signature campaign and within eight months, the number of people who signed reached 220 million in China, 115 million in the Soviet Union, 19 million in East and West Germany, 15 million in France, 3 million in the United States, and 6.45 million in Japan.[26] In accounting for the spread of this campaign and the development of the peace movement in general in Japan, some scholars have argued that what was actually going on was communist mobilization.[27] But local historians and activists attest that the movement that manifested at the Hiroshima Convention for Peace involved various SMOs, including labor unions, lawyers, and religious groups, and was not limited to communists.[28]

Following a similar trajectory, another organization contributing to this first current was the World Movement for a World Federal Government (hereafter, the World Federalist Movement), a larger transnational peace movement during this period. This movement aimed at building a world government, and was sparked in Britain and in the United States in the face of the menace of atomic weaponry, and then grew rapidly after the bombing of Hiroshima.[29] Judging that the UN was not a sufficiently powerful organization to restrict the use of atomic weapons, intellectuals and pacifists organized the World Federalist Movement. The organization was established in October 1945, the same year as the UN, and advocated the formation of a World Federal Government that would control military and police forces in the world through its world congress and government.[30] The movement steadily disseminated transnationally and into Japan. In August 1948, three years after the atomic bombings, Japanese intellectuals and politicians, including representatives from both the left and right wings, founded the League of World Federal Government (*Sekai Renpō Kensetsu Dōmei*).[31] At one of their meetings, they drafted a resolution demanding a ban on the use and production of atomic weapons, arms reduction, the establishment of basic human rights, and more. The movement continued in Japan through the early 1960s, affecting the Japanese antinuclear bomb movement that developed in the next phase, which I will discuss shortly.[32] As

the movement expanded in Japan, the Asian Conference for World Federal Government (*Sekai Renpō Ajia Kaigi*) was held in Hiroshima in November 1952. Over 250 people from Japan and 51 people from 14 other countries attended this conference. Participants drafted a statement demanding a ban on the production and use of atomic weapons, and calling for the presentation of damages from the atomic bombings and other outcomes revealed by research.[33]

Japanese intellectuals constituted the second notable current of the developing postwar, transnational Japanese peace movement; indeed, this reflected a more general surge of political activism among Japanese intellectuals after the end of World War II.[34] Their peace activism manifested first in a group called the Peace Problem Symposium (*Heiwa Mondai Danwakai*), formed by Yoshiono Genzaburō, chief editor of the general magazine *Sekai*. The group's formation was serendipitous. Yoshino was visiting a GHQ office when he accidently found a UNESCO statement issued by social scientists from both Western and Eastern bloc nations, calling for the construction of peace and opposition to war. Impressed by this international collaboration of social scientists across ideological standpoints, Yoshino decided to organize a group of Japanese intellectuals to issue a similar statement on peace and set it as the new direction for rebuilding Japan.[35] The Peace Problem Symposium was officially founded in 1948, comprising over 50 notable Japanese intellectuals from diverse disciplines, political ideologies, and generations. The group issued three manifestos, concerning war, peace, and the San Francisco Peace Treaty,[36] between 1949 and 1950, and the manifestos were read widely and also used to organize workers' activism, especially relating to the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty.[37]

The third current of the Japanese transnational peace movement that developed during the occupation period centered in and around Hiroshima. While an astonishing variety of worldwide peace movements flowed into Hiroshima,[38] the city and its residents developed their own peace movement, which was, itself, deeply transnational in terms of both its scope, its connections, and its intentions. The aforementioned Hiroshima Peace Memorial Ceremony began in August 1947, and its first peace statement asked people throughout the world to remember the bombing of Hiroshima and to build "absolute peace" (*zettai heiwa*) and "world peace."[39] The next year, a report by an American newspaper about the calamity of the atomic bombing in Hiroshima gained the attention of a pastor in California, who subsequently formed the No More Hiroshimas Movement. This movement became widely transnational and eventually led to the

holding of World Peace Day on August 6 every year to commemorate Hiroshima and to call for world peace. In 1948, the first year the day was officially recognized, at least 26 countries held World Peace Day events.[40] Also on August 6, 1948, the movement boomeranged back to Hiroshima, and the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Ceremony integrated the No More Hiroshimas Movement, demanding world peace and stating the wish that no more Hiroshimas would occur on the earth again.[41]

The development of peace activism related directly to Hiroshima was not linear or uncontested, however, especially in the years between 1949 and 1951, which saw periods of both repression and expansion. On the one hand, the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Ceremony planned in 1950 was cancelled by the police just before it was to take place, given concerns that the event was going to be "anti-occupational" and "anti-Japanese."[42] A similar thing happened the following year, and only a limited number of organizations held other such events, which were careful to emphasize only their commemoration of events, not any demands for peace.[43] On the other hand, independent antinuclear bomb activism began to surge as censorship began to ease in 1949 and as public interest grew regarding the damages resulting from the atomic bombings.[44] Cultural discourse regarding nuclear weapons and their dangers emerged in various forms. Starting in 1948, novels on the atomic bombings became more visible than before.[45] "A-Bomb Children" (*Genbaku no Ko*), a collection of essays, was published in 1951 and adapted and screened as a film in 1952. Also, a photo collection documenting atomic bomb victims and damage was printed and widely circulated in *Asahi Gurafu*, a weekly pictorial magazine, in 1951. Furthermore, students at Kyoto University organized the Atomic Bomb Exhibition as part of their university festival in 1951, displaying debris from the atomic bombing in Hiroshima, as well as hosting lectures on the topic. The event at Kyoto University attracted more than 20,000 people,[46] and the exhibition travelled to university festivals across the country. Other publications and artwork on the atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki flourished beginning in 1951.

All three currents discussed above—the World Peace Council's movement and the World Federalist Movement, the Japanese intellectuals' movements, and the movements centered around Hiroshima, including the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Ceremony—constitute the roots of Japan's later antinuclear bomb movement, which I turn to in the following section. What's important to note here is that these roots were established during the occupational period and that they

developed in a bilateral way in terms of transnational diffusion. Both the World Peace Council and the World Federalist Movement were transnational movements that were disseminated into Japan, whereas the Peace Problem Symposium is a case of an INGO outside of Japan triggering a movement within Japan. In contrast, the case of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Ceremony reveals that the ceremony, as well as the city and the residents of Hiroshima itself, constituted focal points for disseminating antinuclear and peace movements transnationally. Most of these movements called for world peace, and though dissonance in the framing of their claims certainly existed, it appeared less visible or significant than their shared focus on peace.[47] Another crucial characteristic of Japan's transnational peace movement during this period was its bringing together of diverse, multilevel actors, including labor unions, the JCP, intellectuals, left- and right-wing politicians, and city authorities, in Hiroshima. This, however, would shift toward more citizen-based movements, in the next phase, which I turn to now.

The Japanese Antinuclear Bomb Movement, 1954 to the mid-1970s

The antinuclear bomb movement in Japan had numerous precursors in the occupation period, but the major catalyst for its formation was the Lucky Dragon Five incident on March 1, 1954. On that day, a Japanese tuna fishing boat with a crew of 23 men was exposed to nuclear fallout from hydrogen bomb tests performed by the United States at Bikini Atoll in the Pacific. All of the crew suffered from acute radiation syndrome, and one crew member, Kuboyama Aikichi, died six months later. Kuboyama's critical condition and his death were front page news for many months. Many people in Japan blamed his death on the radiation, although the role of radioactivity in his death is still debated. Fish unloaded from Japanese fishing boats that operated in the Pacific were found to be contaminated, and radioactive rain was detected in mainland Japan after the bomb tests.[48] In September, radioactive rain was also detected on the Sea of Japan side, and people presumed the rain to be the result of secret nuclear bomb testing by the Soviet Union.

The United States was only one of the countries conducting nuclear bomb tests at the time, with more and more countries joining a rapidly proliferating nuclear arms race. In 1946, the United States possessed only 9 atomic bombs, but that number increased to 23 in 1947, 50 in 1948, 250 in 1949, 450 in 1950, 650 in 1951, and 2250

in 1952.[49] The Soviet Union conducted their first successful atomic bomb test in 1949, and also performed their first successful hydrogen bomb test in 1953. Starting in the 1950s, countries rushed to produce and test hydrogen bombs, which have more explosive power than atomic bombs. In addition to the United States and the Soviet Union, Britain, France, China, and India also conducted nuclear bomb tests between the 1950s and the 1970s. Facing the nuclear arms race and unceasing nuclear bomb testing in the atmosphere, in the ocean, and underground, antinuclear bomb movements grew steadily in Europe and North America, with the formation of numerous SMOs,[50] some of which became linked to the antinuclear bomb movement that surged in Japan after the Lucky Dragon Five incident. In Europe, the antinuclear bomb movement stopped developing after the conclusion of the Partial Test Ban Treaty signed by the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain, which prohibited nuclear bomb tests in the atmosphere or outer space, and in water, except for underground.[51] However, in its place, a transnational *antiwar* movement sprouted instead, responding to widespread fears of a nuclear world war in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 and rising antiwar sentiments in general sparked by the Vietnam War in particular. In the following sections, I discuss two kinds of antinuclear movements that developed during the period between 1954 and the mid-1970s, both of which saw the impetus for organizing a shift from large organizations toward more citizen-initiated and -driven endeavors.

Shortly after the Lucky Dragon Five incident in March 1954, a specifically antinuclear bomb movement emerged in Japan. Citizens who were concerned about radioactive contamination of foods, especially of fish, started a nationwide signature campaign against nuclear bombs. Various local iterations developed, but it was the campaign in Suginami in Tokyo that spread to the national level. The appeal drafted for the campaign articulated three specific demands: banning hydrogen bombs, protecting the life and happiness of mankind, and bringing these appeals to all governments and all nations in the world.[52] A signature campaign that began in Suginami eventually spread throughout the nation, ultimately collecting more than 30 million signatures in total.[53]

Though often characterized as a grassroots movement,[54] the Suginami movement was influenced strongly by intellectual Yasui Kaoru, and backed by both the ward office and congress.[55] Yasui had been a professor at the University of Tokyo during World War II, but was purged by GHQ during the occupation, and was working as the director of a public library and community center in Suginami

at the time of the campaign.[56] Consulted by a group of housewives in Suginami who were interested in social issues, Yasui had already formed a reading group, the Children of Cedars (*Suginoko Kai*), in 1953, which became the iconic housewives' group later connected with the signature campaign, and which also played a leading role in coordinating other women's groups in Suginami.[57] Yasui, who promoted the signature campaign in Suginami after the Lucky Dragon Five Incident, had a vision from the beginning to develop the movement from a regional one, to a national, then a world movement.[58] To disseminate the movement worldwide, Yasui participated in international conferences and meetings, including an executive meeting of the World Peace Council in 1955. Through Yasui's network, the World Peace Council and the Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (*Gensuibaku Kinshi Nihon Kyōgikai*, hereafter *Gensuikyō*), which was founded in the midst of the signature campaign in order to coordinate it, with Yasui as *Gensuikyō*'s chairman, were aligned in declaring their appeals, especially their absolute opposition to nuclear weapons and nuclear wars.[59] The *Gensuikyō* went on to host the annual World Conference against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (*Gensuibaku Kinshi Sekai Taikai*). Starting in 1955, the national rally was organized annually in August in Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Tokyo, or other places in Japan, calling for nuclear disarmament and world peace, and continues to this day.[60]

During this same period, the movement centered around the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Ceremony and that developed in the previous period made two important shifts. First, the movement began focusing on medical treatment and compensation for atomic bomb victims in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, paid for by the Japanese government. As the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Ceremony came to be a regular and official event, first in Hiroshima and then in Japan nationally, atomic bomb victims who continued to suffer from the effects of the bombings began arguing that the movement ought to work to help the victims rather than just calling for peace. The Hiroshima Peace Memorial Ceremony thus began incorporating a call for the relief of atomic bomb survivors into their activities beginning in 1952.[61] After the Lucky Dragon Five incident in 1954, the importance of helping survivors in Hiroshima and Nagasaki became more salient. One of the reasons the signature campaign gained much attention was by referring to the victims of the more recent incident as the "Third Victims of Nuclear Bombs" (*santabi no hibaku*), referencing Hiroshima and Nagasaki as the first and second victims. Despite this slogan, residents and activists outside of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were *not* particularly

thinking of those cities when they organized the signature campaign; their concerns lay mainly in the immediate issue—the contaminated foods and the conditions of the fish boat crews.[62] And in fact, Yasui wanted the signature campaign to distance itself from the previously developed peace movement, as it was often considered to be promoted by communists.[63] However, after the Lucky Dragon Five incident, both the Japanese and the United States governments were under pressure to offer medical treatment not only to the fishing boat crew, but also to the victims in Hiroshima and Nagasaki—and both governments decided to accede to these demands. For the United States, the rationale was that it was their bombs that had caused the casualties, and helping to treat the victims was seen as a way to mollify any anti-American sentiments among the Japanese people. The Japanese government had neither of those motives, but once they offered assistance to the boat crew, they immediately faced questions of why such assistance would *not* be offered to atomic bomb victims in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Ultimately, this led to the Japanese government's creation of an official designation for atomic bomb victims in 1957, and the launch of medical support for Hiroshima and Nagasaki survivors.

The second noticeable shift in the movement centering on Hiroshima was the expansion of transnational activism in the late 1960s. Here, the pivotal role of Hiroshima Mayor Yamada Setsuo, who served as mayor between 1967 and 1975 until he died of cancer, cannot be overlooked. Yamada was an enthusiastic proponent of the World Federalist Movement, and was also actively involved in the antinuclear bomb movement. For the World Federalist Movement, Yamada attended the conferences of the World Movement for World Federal Government in Oslo in 1967 and then in Ottawa in 1971, after he was appointed as mayor. In Ottawa, Yamada made speeches about the renunciation of war and the abolition of nuclear weapons. Yamada also sent a telegram expressing his opposition to nuclear bombs to French President Charles de Gaulle after France conducted their first successful atmospheric hydrogen bomb test in 1968. This practice has been taken up by succeeding mayors ever since Yamada; mayors of Hiroshima have sent telegrams to prime ministers and presidents around the world, expressing their opposition to nuclear weapons every time a country has performed any nuclear tests.[64]

Yamada was key in encouraging transnational forms of organizing, but so too were other grassroots activists and organizations, with the city of Hiroshima once again playing a leading role. For example, the city organized the Hiroshima Conference (*Hiroshima*

Kaigi), where citizens could learn about the issues of peace, war, and nuclear weapons, as well as poverty and discrimination and how those issues related to peace. The first Hiroshima Conference was held in November and December of 1970 in Hiroshima. The city invited a number of religious pacifists, peace activists, and scientists from within and outside of Japan. Prior to this, Hiroshima City had already begun the institutionalization of peace studies and established the Hiroshima Peace Science Institute (*Hiroshima Heiwa Kagaku Kenkyūjo*) in 1962, and in 1975, Hiroshima University, the primary state university in Hiroshima, established the Institute for Peace Science (*Hiroshima Daigaku Heiwa Kagaku Kenkyū Sentā*).[65] Peace studies came to be institutionalized in Japanese universities largely beginning in the next phase—from around the mid-1970s onward—as a study area in which scholars could debate not only peace and war but also other justice issues such as inequality, human rights, and the natural environment.[66]

The Lucky Dragon Five incident in Japan thus sparked the growth of a specifically antinuclear bomb movement in the mid-1950s in Japan that had, from the very beginning, strongly transnational goals, strategies, networks, and audiences.[67] The signature campaign originating in Suginami made strong connections to external transnational peace organizing, especially the World Peace Council, through Yasui. The activism of Hiroshima Mayor Yamada also demonstrates a strong commitment and connection to transnational peace activism. During this same period, grassroots antiwar movements in various locations around the world were also expanding and increasingly coordinating their activism across national borders. In this way, the years between 1954 through the 1970s witnessed the further expansion of the transnational Japanese peace movement toward more citizen-based movements and activities, compared with the initial period.

Decoupling From the World: The Japanese Antinuclear Bomb Movement from the mid-1970s through the 1980s

The Japanese antinuclear bomb movement faced a critical shift after the Lucky Dragon Five incident and also after the end of the Vietnam War. Following those events, the "social movement industry"[68] in Japan, particularly that pertaining to peace movements, shrank significantly.[69] There were few new developments and expansions of the antiwar bomb movement—or of any other kind of peace movements for that matter—during this period in Japan. However, the 1980s were also precisely when antinuclear weapons movements in

Europe and North America surged in terms of transnational expansion, rendering the Japanese case a seemingly isolated anomaly.[70] The wars and armed conflicts of the 1970s and 1980s included the Cambodian–Vietnamese War from 1977 to 1991, Arab–Israeli conflicts in 1967 and 1973, the Soviet War in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989, the Iran and Iraq War from 1980 to 1988, and the Falkland Islands War in 1982. Furthermore, the deployment of—or more precisely, the debate on the deployment of—antiballistic missiles, which were designed to counter missiles that carry nuclear and chemical warheads and other kinds of newly developed nuclear weapons, stimulated the resurgence of antinuclear weapons movements in Europe and the North America.

The political opportunities that forged this resurgence varied by country. In the United States, President Carter's Presidential Directive, which addressed its most bellicose rhetoric toward the Soviet Union and increased military spending in 1979, constituted one of those political opportunities that instigated the resurgence of the antinuclear weapons movement in the United States.[71] In the case of Europe, the decision of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) regarding the deployment of US Pershing II missiles—new ground-launch ballistic missiles that carry nuclear warheads—in NATO-affiliated European countries in 1984, triggered the resurgence of the antinuclear weapons movement in Europe.[72] This movement developed as a coordinated transnational campaign, allied across Western Europe and the Atlantic in the 1980s.[73] However, it had only limited effects on the Japanese antinuclear bomb movement, which withdrew significantly from the transnational arena during this period. In this section, I examine the Nuclear Freeze Movement (hereafter, the Freeze Movement) and some new trends in the *Gensuikyō* and the antinuclear bomb movement centered in Hiroshima.

The Freeze Movement originated in the United States and had its first national conference at Georgetown University in March 1981.[74] It called on the United States and the Soviet Union to adopt a mutual freeze on the testing, production, and deployment of not only nuclear weapons and of missiles, but also new aircraft designed to deliver nuclear weapons.[75] In the case of the United States, politicians (especially of the Democratic Party), professionals, church leaders, and former peace activists were major organizers of the movement.[76] It was also supported by existing antinuclear SMOs, such as SANE in the United States and CND, in the case of Britain. The Freeze Movement aimed to popularize the idea of a nuclear freeze and disseminate their views to people at the local level.[77] Activists and supporters were

also actively involved in forming an arms control coalition in the US Congress and passing a proposal for nuclear arms control registration.[78] The Freeze Movement's activism culminated in a rally that brought one million people to Central Park in New York City, when the UN held the Second Special Session on Disarmament in June 1982.[79] The Freeze Movement turned out to be the largest campaign in the US antinuclear movement in the 1980s.[80] It was also very successful; the House of Representatives and the Senate voted in favor of a nuclear development "freeze," and both the United States and the Soviet Union halted testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons in the late 1980s and early 1990s.[81] Antinuclear activists in Britain began their own Freeze Movement modeled on the US example in the early 1980s,[82] and were successful in mobilizing support for the movement and extending it into other regions of Europe.

Though the North American and European Freeze Movements influenced the Japanese antinuclear bomb movement, increasingly clear chasms began to develop, isolating the Japanese movement during this period. At the time of the UN's Special Session on Disarmament, Japanese representatives who traveled from Japan joined the rally of one million people in New York City,[83] and 29 million people in Japan signed the petition submitted to the UN in June 1982.[84] Furthermore, large numbers of people participated in antinuclear rallies, such as 200,000 in Hiroshima in March 1982 and 400,000 in Tokyo in June 1982.[85] By this point the *Gensuikyō*, led by Yasui and discussed in the previous section, had split into two groups in 1965; one was more closely related to the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) and the other to socialist groups. The former remained as the *Gensuikyō*, and the latter formed the Japan Congress against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (hereafter, *Gensuikin*). Importantly, the two organizations united again briefly between 1977 and 1985 and supported the Freeze Movement, for example by sending representatives or coordinating collaborative actions in Japan. However, the *Gensuikyō*, in particular, refused to use the term "antinuclear" (*hankaku*), which otherwise became slowly prevalent in Japan around this time, following the broader terminology by the antinuclear movement in Europe and North America. Instead the *Gensuikyō* continued to use the term "anti A- and H-bombs" (*gensuikin*) in describing their movement, and it was partly because the *Gensuikyō* supported the "peaceful use" of nuclear energy—namely, nuclear power.[86] Furthermore, a Japanese member of the *Gensuikyō* who participated in a demonstration of the Freeze Movement in New York wrote that he did not think the Freeze Movement would align well with the Japanese antinuclear

bomb movement since the movement did not aim to abolish, only to stop testingand developing nuclear weapons.[87] After joining the UN's Second Special Session in 1982, the Japanese antinuclear bomb movement began to focus on an increasingly domestic agenda, focusing on the deployment of US warships and Tomahawk cruise missiles that could carry nuclear warheads to US bases in Japan.[88] Specific anti-Tomahawk organizing in 1984 attained some successful mobilizations, but such actions had fewer and fewer connections to transnational antinuclear movements outside of Japan, particularly when compared to the antinuclear bomb movement's strategies of the previous periods.[89]

As the Japanese antinuclear bomb movement began to decouple from the major antinuclear movements in other countries, a new, important focus emerged during this period: relief efforts for non-Japanese atomic bomb victims. This concern dates back to the early 1970s. In 1971, the *Gensuikin* contacted, for the first time, atomic bomb victims in Micronesia who had been affected by nuclear bomb testing by the United States, including the Bikini Atoll tests in 1954, and invited Micronesians to their 1971 World Conference against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs. In the following year, the *Gensuikin* formally decided to create a relief effort for Micronesian atomic bomb victims, who had been exposed to repeated nuclear bomb testing by the United States from 1946 to 1958.[90] Also, in 1971, the *Gensuikin* sent an investigative team to Bikini Atoll to search the area, although the team was unable to complete all of their goals due to the intervention of the US government.[91]

In the case of the locally oriented antinuclear movement in Hiroshima, a dispute concerning the commemoration of Korean atomic victims came to the fore in the 1970s. In 1970, the Korean Residents Union in Japan (then named *Zai Nippon Daikan Minkoku Kyoryū Mindan*, currently named *Zai Nippon Daikan Minkoku Mindan*, and hereafter referred to as *Mindan*) built a cenotaph to commemorate Korean atomic bomb victims, and placed it in a green area close to but outside of the place in Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park where commemorations for Japanese victims were located. At the time, the *Mindan*'s committee chairperson did not think that decision would be problematic. However, shortly thereafter, a dispute among Koreans in Japan began. The members of the *Mindan* argued that it was insulting to have the Korean cenotaph isolated from Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park where Japanese people were commemorated. The dispute grew to a nationwide debate until the Korean cenotaph was relocated to the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park in 1999.[92]

Thus, it happened that just as antinuclear movements were surging and increasing their transnational organizing within and across Europe and North America, the once highly transnational Japanese antinuclear bomb movement began to disengage from international trends and focus in on the victims and survivors of past specific nuclear bomb-related events. Furthermore, new subgroups of the antinuclear bomb movement that developed, such as the anti-Tomahawk movement, focused on domestic issues without devoting major effort to the creation of transnational alliances. Some transnational interactions continued, but not to the extent that they had in the first and second periods. This shift to acknowledge and address the diversity among victims—that is, victims who were not Japanese—within and outside Japan is not peculiar to antinuclear movements during this period. The existing literature has also found that other Japanese movements began focusing on Asian countries in the 1970s and the 1980s.[93] However, what is peculiar to the Japanese antinuclear bomb movement is the way in which it limited its scope of transnationalism just as corresponding movements elsewhere in the world were expanding in precisely the opposite direction; and that it began focusing on Asia and internal diversities during the period when the movement was shrinking its transnational activism, not when it was expanding it.

Conclusion

This chapter has traced the cycle of the transnational Japanese antinuclear bomb movement from 1945 through the 1980s with respect to transnational activism and coalitions. During the first period, between 1945 and 1954, the antinuclear bomb movement largely developed within Japan. Transnational peace movements blossomed in various forms outside Japan, forging aligning movements within Japan, while some Japanese peace movement leaders reached out to organizations outside Japan. A notable characteristic of the movement during this time was that intellectuals, scientists, and large established organizations often held leadership positions in and outside Japan, though this was less pronounced with regard to the forms of activisms that variously developed in and around Hiroshima at this time.

During the second period, from 1954 to the mid-1970s, the Japanese transnational antinuclear movement again attained its largest transnational scope. It did so by liaising with the transnational peace movements outside Japan that developed in the first period.

Ironically, a movement in Japan (the Suginami signature campaign) aimed at disconnecting their movement from the Japanese peace movement that had developed in the first period; however, it spread largely within the country, encompassing the older peace movement, as the movement became transnational. During this time, more citizen-based transnational movements and activities expanded in Japan, although these were sometimes initiated by intellectuals and city authorities.

During the third period, between the mid-1970s and the 1980s, the transnational Japanese antinuclear bomb movement began decoupling itself from the major transnational antinuclear movement, which was making its largest surge outside of Japan. The Japanese antinuclear bomb movement chose instead to focus more on domestic issues, and only engage to a lesser extent with transnational activism. In short, the Japanese antinuclear bomb movement was most transnational in the earlier periods after the end of World War II, but eventually decoupled itself from the major transnational antinuclear movements that developed outside Japan by the end of the third period.

Interestingly enough, the decoupling of the Japanese antinuclear bomb movement, which constituted one of the largest and most enduring social movements in Japan, is also manifested in the weak engagement of other Japanese social movements in transnational movements that existed after the 1980s. This includes other kinds of social movements than peace movements; the 1990s and the 2000s witnessed a surge in transnational social movements in the world, including the anti-WTO movements in Seattle in 1999, the anti-G8 movements in Genoa in 2001, the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, Brazil in 2000, and the anti-Iraq War movements in 2003, and onward. Each movement expanded to encompass a global scope, mobilizing sometimes millions of protesters in cities around the world. However, activists in Japan confess that the Japanese movements that correspond to these movements have been on a much smaller scale, have not garnered substantial attention, and have not been well aligned with actions outside Japan.[94] With a hopeful tone, Jennifer Chan has uncovered a number of NGOs and activists who have vigorously engaged in various transnational peace movements since the 1980s and onward.[95] However, many of these new NGOs and forms of activisms are organized on a smaller scale and take on smaller (or more specific) issues by creating fewer coalitions, compared to the period between 1945 and the 1970s.[96] Another study has found that Japanese participants in the anti-Iraq War movement between 2002 and 2003 told primarily personalized (i.e., related to

their own experiences of participating in World War II) or nationalized (i.e., related to Hiroshima and Nagasaki) narratives to explain their participation.[97]

Why this decoupling and fragmentation of the Japanese transnational peace movement has occurred is a difficult question. The literature on transnational social movements has argued or at least hypothesized that globalization will promote more global, and more transnational movements. And in fact, scholars have found that the Japanese environmental movement became more transnational after Japanese corporations became more transnational in the 1970s and 1980s.[98] The Japanese antinuclear bomb movement, however, defies such expectations. Why only the *Japanese* transnational peace movement has become less transnational over time seems all the more puzzling given that this movement was, in fact, largely transnational in its early phases. In his historical analysis of the Japanese peace movement, Michiba Chikanobu argues that the movement gradually stopped claiming that it was "against all wars," and instead began making claims "against individual wars."[99] Likewise, framing that relied on concepts such as "the whole world," "all humankind," and "world peace"—terms popular in Japanese antinuclear bomb movement rhetoric in its early days—were used less frequently in later periods. The findings of this chapter suggest that we might do better to focus more on the ways in which globalization can paradoxically generate anti-global attitudes and dynamics, through its creation of an awareness of fragmentation and disconnection among people and movements, thus eroding the foundation for imagining the world as an organic whole and human beings as a united human race—the very premise that the Japanese transnational peace movement was founded upon in the beginning.

Notes

1. Social movement studies have found that a movement waxes and wanes, yielding the cycle of the movement. See Sidney Tarrow, *Democracy and Disorder: Protest and Politics in Italy 1965–1975* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).
2. The anti-nuclear power movement had existed in Japan on a smaller scale. After the accident in 2011, it has been more largely and variously organized in Japan, continuing to the present day. On the earlier movement, see, for example, Peter Dauvergne, "Nuclear Power Development in Japan: 'Outside Forces' and the Politics of Reciprocal Consent," *Asian Survey* 33, no. 6 (1993).
3. To name a few, Donatella della Porta, ed., *The Global Justice Movement: Cross-National and Transnational Perspectives* (Boulder: Paradigm, 2007), Donatella della Porta, Massimiliano Andetta, Lorenzo Mosca, and Herbert

Reiter, *Globalization from Below: Transnational Activists and Protest Networks* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006), and John A. Guidry, Michael D. Kennedy, and Mayer N. Zald, eds, *Globalizations and Social Movements: Culture, Power, and the Transnational Public Sphere* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000).

4. As exceptions, some scholars on social movements are cautious to acknowledge that transnational social movements were formed in the nineteenth century or earlier. See Sidney Tarrow, *The New Transnational Activism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Also see Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).
5. Charles Tilly, *Regimes and Repertoires* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006).
6. Roland Robertson, *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture* (London: Sage, 1992), p. 8.
7. Sidney Tarrow, "Transnational Politics: Contention and Institutions in International Politics," *Annual Review of Political Science* 4 (2001): 11. In contrast, advocates of the term "global social movements" have examined what they label global justice movements, for example, by the anti-World Trade Organization (WTO) movements in 1999 in Seattle. These scholars argue that in global social movements, actors define the cause of their movement as global by forming transnational networks. See della Porta et al., *Globalization from Below*, p. 18.
8. Guidry et al., *Globalizations and Social Movements,* p. 1. Also see Tarrow, *The New Transnational Activism*.
9. della Porta et al., *Globalization from Below*. Also see, Jackie Smith, "Characteristics of the Modern Transnational Social Movement Sector," in *Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity beyond the State*, eds. Jackie Smith, Charles Chatfield, and Ron Pagnucco (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1997), Jackie Smith, Ron Pagnucco, and Winnie Romeril, "Transnational Social Movement Organisations in the Global Political Arena," *Voluntas* 5, no. 2 (1994).
10. It is still true that globalization has provided new, or different, resources and political opportunities for the mobilization of some movements. See, for example, Kiyoteru Tsutsui and Hwa-Ji Shin, "Global Norms, Local Activism and Social Movement Outcomes: Global Human Rights and Resident Koreans in Japan," *Social Problems* 55, no. 3 (2008). However, globalization does not always ensure that movements will become more transnational.
11. For the purposes of the chapter, I refer to "the peace movement" in the singular to capture the phenomenon of activists and organizations mobilizing around the goal of world peace. Within this broad movement, however, activists and organizations sometimes focused on more specific issues, thus constituting more specific movements, such as the antiwar movement or the anti-nuclear bomb movement, which variously existed within the peace movement and/or overlapped with it in some way. But within all of these movements, including the broader peace movement itself, there existed numerous, often competing and even conflicting, social movement organizations (SMOs), groups, and association.

12. <http://www.city.hiroshima.lg.jp/www/contents/0000000000000/1111637106129/> [accessed August 8, 2014].
13. Satoru Ubuki, *Hiroshima sengoshi: Hibaku taiken wa dō uketomerarete kitaka* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2014), pp. 10–13.
14. I count the ban-the-bomb movement, anti-atomic and hydrogen bomb movement, as well as nuclear disarmament movement, as comprising the anti-nuclear bomb movement, and consider the anti-nuclear power movement to be a discrete movement.
15. For the history of the peace memorial ceremony of Hiroshima, see, for example, Satoru Ubuki, *Heiwa kinen shikiten no ayumi* (Hiroshima: Hiroshima Heiwa Bunka Sentā, 1992).
16. Adopted in 1947, Article 9 of Japan's constitution renounces the country's right to declare or wage war.
17. The relationship between the two became far more highly confrontational in the late 1990s when anti-globalization movements were organized against the WTO or the Group of Eight (G8).
18. People in Hiroshima and Nagasaki had different takes on their experiences of the bombings, and movements developed differently between the two cities, sometimes in conflictive ways and other times in collaborative ways. The chapter focuses primarily on Hiroshima.
19. Ubuki, *Hiroshima sengoshi*, p. 35.
20. See Hiroshima Heiwa Bunka Sentā, ed., *Heiwa Jiten*, New Edition (Tokyo: Keisō Shobō, 1985–1991), p. 508.
21. Nihon Heiwa Iinkai, ed., *Heiwa undō 20-nen shiryōshū* (Tokyo: Ōtsuki Shoten, 1969), pp. 6–7.
22. Ibid., p. 7.
23. The simultaneous conventions were held by other branches in other parts of Japan. But, Hiroshima's was the only convention that mentioned about banning atomic weapons. See Michiba, *Senryō to heiwa : 'Sengo' toiu keiken* (Tokyo: Seidosha, 2005) p. 282.
24. Ubuki, *Hiroshima sengoshi*, pp. 63–4.
25. Nihon Heiwa Iinkai, ed., *Heiwa undō 20-nen shiryōshū*, p. 8.
26. Michiba, *Senryō to heiwa*, p. 282.
27. For example, Fujiwara Osamu, *Gensuibaku kinshi undō no seiritsu: Sengo Nihon heiwa undō no genzō, 1954–1955* (Yokohama: Meiji Gakuin Kokusai Heiwa Kenkyūjo, 1991), p. 2; and James J. Orr, "Yasui Kaoru: Citizen-Scholar in War and Peace," *Japan Forum* 12, no. 1 (2000): 46. Other scholars have argued that Hiroshima developed a peace movement but not an anti-nuclear bomb movement given occupation authorities' censorship regarding atomic bombs; see Hiro Saito, "Reiterated Commemoration: Hiroshima as National Trauma," *Sociological Theory* 24, no. 4 (2006).
28. Ubuki, *Hiroshima sengoshi*, pp. 63–4.
29. Lawrence S. Wittner, *One World or None: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement through 1953* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), pp. 92–5. Also see, Hiroshima Heiwa Bunka Sentā, ed., *Heiwa Jiten*, p. 59.
30. Hiroshima Heiwa Bunka Sentā, ed., *Heiwa Jiten*, p. 59.
31. Michiba, *Senryō to heiwa,* pp. 270–1.
32. Ibid., pp. 271–2.
33. Ubuki, *Hiroshima sengoshi*, p. 105.

34. Compared to activism by other groups, intellectuals' political activism was less restricted by occupational authorities. I have argued elsewhere regarding the differences in political opportunity structures for organizing social movements during the occupational period. See Hiroe Saruya, *Protests and Democracy in Japan: The Development of Movement Fields and the 1960 Anpo Protests* (PhD dissertation, Department of Sociology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 2012).
35. Yoshino Genzaburō, *"Sengo" e no ketsubetsu: "Sekai" henshū kōki 1956–60-nen* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1995), pp. 92–5.
36. The treaty determined the end of World War II, the termination of the Allied Power's occupation, and the conditions of Japan's independence as a sovereign country.
37. The General Council of Trade Unions of Japan was a notable case.
38. One of the most definitive records of peace movements in Hiroshima is Ubuki, *Hiroshima sengoshi*. Also see his earlier study, Ubuki, *Heiwa kinen shikiten no ayumi*.
39. Hiroshima Heiwa Bunka Sentā, ed., *Heiwa Jiten*, p. 508. Also see, Ubuki, *Hiroshima sengoshi*, pp. 38–9.
40. Ubuki, *Hiroshima sengoshi*, p. 42.
41. Ibid., p. 43.
42. Ibid., pp. 47–8.
43. Ibid., pp. 98–101.
44. Ibid., pp. 68–9.
45. Saito, "Reiterated Commemoration," p. 363.
46. Ubuki, *Hiroshima sengoshi*, p. 117.
47. A notable dissonance came from those who advocated for the importance of offering medical treatment to atomic bomb victims. This dissonance became more visible in the next phase.
48. Between March 1and April 22, 1954, the United States performed six hydrogen bomb tests at Bikini and Enewetak Atolls.
49. Eriko Maruhama, *Gensuikin shomei undō no tanjō: Tokyo, Suginami no jūmin pawā to suimyaku* (Tokyo: Gaifūsha, 2011), pp. 200–1.
50. These new SMOs were numerous, and to name a few, included the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) in Britain and the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE) in the United States.
51. David S. Meyer, "How the Cold War was Really Won: The Effects of the Antinuclear Movements of the 1980s," in *How Social Movement Matter*, eds. Marco Guigni, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), p. 188.
52. Hiroshima Heiwa Bunka Sentā, ed., *Heiwa Jiten*, p. 437.
53. The movement after the Lucky Dragon Five Incident had support from local governments as well: all prefectural parliaments had passed anti-nuclear resolutions by October 1954. See Hiroshima-shi, *Hiroshima shinshi: Rekishi hen* (Hiroshima: Hiroshima-shi, 1984), p. 121.
54. For example, Toshihiro Higuchi, "An Environmental Origin of Antinuclear Activism in Japan, 1954–1963: The Government, the Grassroots Movement, and the Politics of Risk," *Peace & Change* 33, no. 3 (2008).
55. In the case of Suginami, 70 percent of the residents signed the petition within two months. See Fujiwara, *Gensuibaku kinshi undō no seiritsu*, p. 23.

56. He was later able to resume college teaching at a different university.
57. Ibid., pp. 24–5.
58. Ibid., pp. 48–51.
59. Ibid., p. 50. Also see Nihon Heiwa Iinkai, ed., *Heiwa undō 20-nen shiryōshū*, pp. 50–1.
60. To note about the Suginami's signature campaign, it tried to make distinction from the anti-bomb movement in Hiroshima and the older peace movement at the beginning, as I will mention next. However, after the establishment of the *Gensuikyō*, the Hiroshima branch was formed, and people in Hiroshima also joined the signature campaign. See, for example, Chūgoku Shinbunsha, ed., *Hiroshima 40-nen: Moritaki nikki no shōgen* (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1985), pp. 50–2.
61. Ubuki, *Hiroshima sengoshi*, pp. 107–8.
62. Fujiwara, *Gensuibaku kinshi undō no seiritsu,* p. 37.
63. Thus, the Suginami Appeal in the signature campaign avoided the word "peace" and mentioned only hydrogen bombs but not atomic bomb. See Seiji Imahori, *Gensuibaku kinshi undō* (Tokyo: Uishio Shuppansha, 1974), pp. 10–11.
64. Details on Mayor Yamada are based on Ubuki, *Hiroshima sengoshi*, p. 259. Yamada was also a part of the movement who tried to link experiences and memories of Hiroshima and Auschwitz. See Ran Zwigenberg, *Hiroshima: The Origins of Global Memory Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 249–96.
65. The details on the Hiroshima Conference and peace studies are mainly based on Ubuki, *Hiroshima sengoshi*, pp. 259–61.
66. Michiba, *Senryō to heiwa,* p. 511.
67. Though, again, see Saito, "Reiterated Commemoration" for a different perspective on this.
68. Informed by organizational studies on firms, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald define social movement industry as the broadest preferences of a social movement, and argue that it rises and falls. See John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory," *American Journal of Sociology* 82, no. 6 (1977): 1219.
69. Michiba, *Senryō to heiwa,* p. 509.
70. As I mentioned before, after the conclusion of the Partial Ban Treaty in 1963, the anti-nuclear bomb movement waned in Europe.
71. Meyer, "How the Cold War was Really Won," p. 43.
72. Ibid., p. 189.
73. Ibid.
74. Lawrence S. Wittner, *Toward Nuclear Abolition: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1971 to the Present* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), p. 175. The origins of the Freeze Movement are not singular; the Freeze Movement in the United States also derived from the anti-nuclear movement in Europe. See Michiba, *Senryō to heiwa*, pp. 549–51.
75. <http://www.culture-of-peace.info/apm/chapter6–15.html> [accessed August 20, 2014]. It called for a halt on the expansion of the nuclear arms race, not the abolition of nuclear weapons.
76. Wittner, *Toward Nuclear Abolition*, p. 197.
77. Ibid., p. 176.
78. Ibid., p. 185.

79. The UN held their first Special Session on Disarmament in May and June 1978.
80. Wittner, *Toward Nuclear Abolition*, p. 175.
81. Ibid., p. 446.
82. Ibid., p. 133.
83. 1000 people from Japan participated in the rally. But the United States denied visas to more than 200 people who were affiliated with the *Gensuikyō* (which had communist ties). See Kaneko Mitsuhiro, *Gensuibaku kinshi undō no genten* (Tokyo: Shinnihon Shuppansha, 1984), p. 234.
84. Wittner, *Toward Nuclear Abolition*, p. 204.
85. Ibid.
86. Michiba, *Senryō to heiwa,* p. 548.
87. Kaneko, *Gensuibaku kinshi undō no genten,* p. 23.
88. Wittner, *Toward Nuclear Abolition*, p. 205.
89. Michiba, *Senryō to heiwa,* p. 554.
90. Ibid., p. 502.
91. Hiroshi Iwadare, *Kakuheiki haizetsu no uneri: Dokyumento gensuikin undō* (Tokyo: Rengō Shuppan, 1982), pp. 244–5.
92. Details on the Korean cenotaph are based on Ubuki, *Hiroshima sengoshi*, p. 236.
93. Simon Avenell, "The Borderless Archipelago: Toward a Transnational History of Japanese Environmentalism," *Environment and History* 19 (2013).
94. See, for example, Michiba, *Senryō to heiwa,* p. 626. To take the anti-Iraq War movement as an example, whereas a few hundreds and thousands of people participated in a demonstration in New York City in a day in 2003, only some tens of thousands of people participated in it in Tokyo. See Daishirō Nomiya, "Under a Global Mask: Family Narratives and Local Memory in a Global Social Movement in Japan," *Societies without Borders* 4, no. 2 (2009): 122–7.
95. Jennifer Chan, *Another Japan is Possible: New Social Movements and Global Citizenship Education* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008).
96. Another noticeable point of the new SMOs after the 1980s in Japan is that NGOs began engaging with issues that SMOs used to focus on. Social movement scholars have looked into the professionalization of grass-roots activism; see, for example, Edward T. Walker, *Grassroots for Hire: Public Affairs Consultants in American Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
97. Nomiya, "Under a Global Mask."
98. Avenell, "The Borderless Archipelago."
99. Michiba, *Senryō to heiwa*.

9

Transnationalism and Transition in the Ryūkyūs

Kelly Dietz

Japanese San Ramon Caves

The six caves in this cliff are part of an extensive island-wide cave system used by the Japanese. The caves are an example of the tunnelling created by the Japanese military throughout the Pacific islands in the 1940s. They were built by Chamorro, Okinawan and Korean forced labour using primitive tools working under extreme conditions.

San Ramon Hill, Hagatna, Guam

Introduction

The inscription above is from a bronze plaque in the corner of what looks like a tiny park on the edge of San Ramon Hill, located just inland from Guam's western coastline. Unless one knew of the historical site, it would be easy to pass by the small patch of grass without noticing the holes in the cream-colored stone of the hill, half hidden by tropical foliage. But our stop was intentional. My guide was Debbie Quinata, a leader and anti-US military base activist in the Chamorro community. It was our second day driving around the island, with Quinata offering a richly contextualized tour of US military presence in Guam. I had met her a month earlier in Okinawa, where she had been invited by anti-base activists to speak at an unofficial gathering to commemorate the sixtieth anniversary of the end of the Battle of Okinawa.

Quinata's incorporation of the San Ramon Caves into her tour of US military presence would have seemed like an interesting historical side trip if I had not already been taken to other "Japanese caves" by anti-US military base activists elsewhere. My introduction to them was in Okinawa. An activist I first met at a sit-in outside the US Consulate took me to Himeyuri Cave, where Okinawan schoolgirls conscripted to serve as nurses cared for wounded Japanese soldiers

during the Battle of Okinawa. Following a conference in Seogwipo on South Korea's Jeju Island, activists working to halt the expansion of the US Army's Camp Humphreys showed me a beachside cave once used for storing munitions and supplies. Another instance was during a short trip to the Philippines' southern island of Mindanao. A member of the Moro Youth League, which at the time was protesting joint training exercises by American and Filipino troops on the predominantly Muslim island, made a point to show me the remains of a tunnel Japanese soldiers used in the battle along the "Talomo Trail" outside Davao City. Far from being a symbol of the past, then, these earthen relics scattered across the region are part of a contemporary story about imperialism, militarization, and popular struggle. That anti-US base activists in each locale thought it important for me—an American researcher interested in the politics of US military presence in the region—to see Japan's wartime caves highlights the broader relationships these activists understand themselves to be embedded in. Moreover, by challenging continued US military occupation in the same territories today, collectively they expose the contradictions in still dominant representations of the US military as "liberator" of peoples in the region and thus the solution to empire.

This analytical sensibility informs the premise of this chapter: that the only way to understand the politics of Okinawa's anti-base movement is to move beyond Okinawa, and indeed beyond Japan. Significant shifts within Okinawa's anti-base movement in recent decades call for such a perspective. Notably, the geography of the anti-base struggle has changed. Although activism within Okinawa remains an everyday matter, anti-base activists have forged new political ties not only across Japan, but also increasingly beyond its borders, in the region and globally. Many are routinely organizing and attending grassroots gatherings, participating in international fora, and employing strategies that rely on institutions outside the Japanese political context. In short, transnational activism has become a key feature of Okinawa's anti-base movement.

However a critical perspective on the transnational is necessary for a deeper understanding of this shift. For the real significance of these new connections and activities is not that they so often cut across borders, but rather what Okinawan activists themselves make of them. Alliances with anti-US military base activists in the region are as likely to be informed by a sense of common experiences under Japanese imperialism and its historical intertwining with US empire. More globally, their participation within international institutions is often in fora focused on collective rights and self-determination,

while in other international settings activists' strategies and accounts foreground Okinawa's colonial history and how it compromises their citizenship. Even within Japan, ties with Zainichi Koreans and Ainu emphasize experiences of colonization, displacement, marginalization, and (with the Ainu) a shared desire for greater autonomy. Thus most of the alliances and activities Okinawan activists are engaged in challenge state-centric conceptions of the nation(al), and by extension the transnational.

From this perspective, Okinawan activists' transnationalism becomes a lens on a broader political shift within Okinawa, and indeed globally. In contrast to the pre-1972 reversion movement against the United States' prolonged postwar occupation, which sought Japanese citizenship and asserted national belonging as it drew on the discourse of "returning to motherland Japan," a politicized *Okinawan* national identity and discourses of self-determination have come to animate the anti-base struggle. Japanese complicity has become a central part of activists' accounts, analyses, and claims regarding US basing. Simultaneously, activists are rearticulating Okinawan subjectivity in terms of new political identities (i.e., a nation/people, ethnic minority, and indigenous peoples) and collectivist claims to territory. Together, the geographical and political shifts in the anti-base movement offer a critical lens on the post-1972 conditions of rule and militarization in Okinawa. They reveal the historical intertwining of intra-imperial and inter-imperial relations, and their contemporary extension into interstate and state–citizen relations.

This chapter focuses in part on related campaigns that have dominated base politics in Okinawa for two decades: an effort to halt the construction of a massive new military complex on Okinawa's rural Cape Henoko, and a related campaign to close the US Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station. Their centrality to Okinawa's movement makes these issues integral to the shifts highlighted above. After situating the origins of these campaigns in relation to Okinawa's reincorporation into Japan, the chapter details subsequent developments in the context of the shifts described above.

Citizenship and the Origins of the Futenma and Henoko Campaigns

More than 40 years after Okinawa's movement to end America's postwar occupation successfully reincorporated the Ryūkyū Islands into the Japanese state, popular struggle remains a part of everyday life on Okinawa Island. This is because reversion did not alter Okinawans'

experience of US military presence as much as it changed the conditions and terms of struggle. On the one hand, the US military did not leave. Seventy-five percent of land occupied by US forces in Japan is in Okinawa, which accounts for only 0.6 percent of the country's land area. Today roughly 50,000 US military personnel, their dependents and civilian contractors operate 32 military installations, which occupy 20 percent of Okinawa Island (see figure 9.1). On the other hand, membership in the Japanese state provided Okinawans with new freedoms and channels for redress: increased freedom of movement (including the ability to leave Okinawa), more access to official

Figure 9.1 Map of US military bases on Okinawa Island.

Source: Regional Security Policy Division, *Okinawa Prefecture* http://okinawa-institute.com/en/node/32

information, protections for assembly and protest, elections and access to the judicial system.

As I have argued elsewhere, citizenship reconfigured Okinawa's struggle against US military presence along increasingly institutionalized politics and, in terms of the day-to-day work of activists, away from more fundamental change.[1] Because very little improved as far as the actual effects of the bases—the social, cultural, economic, political, psychological, physiological, and ecological impact on Okinawans' everyday lives—the provisions of citizenship had the effect of narrowing the focus of activists' claims by channeling much of their energy and resources into particular campaigns to alter specific practices (e.g., tanks on public roadways, night-time flight training or live-fire shooting exercises near residences) and seek justice for specific crimes (e.g., rape or burglary). Countless successes toward making life more livable and a sense that justice is sometimes served speak to the tirelessness and determination of Okinawan activists since 1972. At the same time, nothing about current US military practices in Okinawa suggests an end to particular (and particularizing) targets for the anti-base movement.

Within this context, the Futenma and Henoko campaigns stand out as signaling a struggle over the future of Okinawa. The plan to build a new base at Henoko ostensibly emerged in response to the intense public anger that followed the kidnapping and gang rape of a 12-year old Okinawan girl by three US service members in 1995. The Clinton and Hashimoto administrations immediately established the bilateral Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO), which produced a plan both governments hailed as a move toward "lessening the burden" of the bases on Okinawans. Their agreement identified a number of US facilities for closure and consolidation, but it also provided for an equal number of "relocations" and "replacements."[2] This meant that military functions and related infrastructure identified for closure would be upgraded within either existing US facilities or entirely new sites. In short, the 1996 agreement was a blueprint for modernizing and strengthening US military presence.[3] Central to the SACO agreement was the US promise to close the Marine Corps' aging Futenma Air Station, located in the densely populated Ginowan City. However, the United States made Futenma's closure conditional on the construction of a "replacement facility" (i.e., a new air base) elsewhere within Okinawa, eventually slated for Henoko. If realized, the new base would be the first major installation built in Okinawa in more than a half-century. For most Okinawans, it symbolizes indefinite US military presence.

From this perspective, tracing the origins of the Futenma and Henoko campaigns to 1995, as most accounts do, is insufficient. It ignores the SACO plan's more complicated lineage, and in doing so disconnects these issues from the broader relations Okinawan activists make central to their analyses. The choice of Nago City's rural Henoko and the new base's offshore design were represented as originating within the Japanese government, which will pay for and construct the base as per the US–Japan Security Treaty. However, US occupation-era maps reveal that the current design, which includes a second runway and naval port added in a 2006 agreement, resurrects a 1966 plan devised but abandoned by the US military in the waning years of its formal occupation of Okinawa (see figures 9.2 and 9.3).[4] In other words, a military complex the Pentagon wanted but did not get because reversion was eminent is deemed possible under Japan's watch via the US–Japan security relationship.



Figure 9.2 2006 design for an air base and naval port at Cape Henoko.

Source: US Department of State, "United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation" < http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/65517.htm>



Figure 9.3 US Navy's 1966 design for an air base and naval port at Cape Henoko.

Source: US Navy, "Master Plan of Navy Facilities on Okinawa, Ryukyu Islands," December 1966.

Transnational Dimensions of Okinawans' Struggle

The new base plan provoked immediate opposition. As Tokyo's efforts to convince or compel Okinawans to accept the base intensified, the campaign grew into a multipronged struggle. It involves unprecedented coalition building, litigation in Japan and the United States, formal condemnation in international fora, and sustained nonviolent civil disobedience at the proposed sites of construction. Efforts to close Futenma are closely linked. The 2004 crash of a large transport helicopter from Futenma into the campus of Ginowan's Okinawa International University and the subsequent deployment

of the military's new and crash-prone MV-22 Osprey aircraft to the urban air base emboldened both campaigns. Okinawan activists and their allies prevented progress on the project for 18 years, creating unprecedented postwar tensions between Washington and Tokyo—flummoxing 3 presidents and 11 prime ministers. This seeming intractability reflects both the confidence American and Japanese officials have in their ability to ultimately do what they want in Okinawa and Okinawan activists' motivation to change this status quo.

Over the last two decades, the Futenma and Henoko campaigns entwined with, and substantially fuelled, the transnational shift within Okinawa's anti-base movement. Understanding the significance of this requires paying attention to the meanings that activists themselves attach to their alliances and actions. "Action is shaped by the meanings people bring to their predicaments or can wring out of them," Philip Abrams tells us. Thus an adequate exploration "has to offer an analysis not only of the observable relationships of power and powerlessness within them, but equally of what is made of those relationships by those involved in them; an analysis of the complex of meaning within which relationships are enacted."[5]

From a distance, popular resistance to US military basing appears as just that—protest against the United States' imposition of its military forces and their wide-ranging effects. On the rare occasions such resistance becomes news in the United States, protests in particular countries are not situated in relation to one another (in this way, particular instances of resistance appear as exceptions to the rule). In the realm of scholarship, the view is more nuanced, but still often limiting. Security and foreign policy studies highlight different instances of citizen mobilization, but understand them as related to one another in additive terms: taken together, movements across East Asia, for example, amount to a general phenomenon of "public sensitivity," but they are assumed to form independently and thus are comprehensible (and resolvable) on a case-by-case (i.e., state-by-state) basis.[6] Transnational social movement scholars and others offer a corrective by directing our attention to the interrelationships among distinct actors and movements in the region.[7] Ultimately, however, these studies limit our understanding of the relationships animating the Okinawan anti-base movement because most conceive of activists and alliances in relation to self-evident states. From this perspective, the transnational is reduced to the spatiality of the nation-state.

Imperialism, War, and Other Ways of Relating Regionally

Okinawan activists intervene in statist perspectives on the transnational through their explanations of why base matters play out as they do. Building on networks forged through participation in the World Conferences on Women in Nairobi and Beijing, the organization Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence (OWAAMV) arranged an Okinawan Women's Peace Caravan to the United States in 1996 and 1998. The delegation sought to raise awareness about Henoko and Okinawans' resistance to the new base given their experience of US military presence. With the closure of Futenma in mind, they also sought strategies for toxic cleanup and redevelopment when military facilities close in the United States.[8] OWAAMV founder and former Naha City Assembly member Takazato Suzuyo recalled:

> Most of the people who came to our gatherings had heard of the [1995] rape. The first Peace Caravan was quite soon after it happened. But they didn't know about Henoko, and they didn't know about Futenma or how many bases the US has in Okinawa. I was surprised at how incredulous most Americans were when they heard their government was trying to build a base in a beautiful bay . . . and keeping open a base like Futenma as a means of forcing acceptance of the new base. Their surprise comes from not knowing the history of US military presence in Okinawa and other places . . . They also didn't know Okinawa's history. Americans only think that Okinawa is Japan . . . But we can't separate the militarism of the United States from the militarism of Japan.[9]

For Takazato, correcting the perception that "Okinawa is Japan" and bringing Japan's militarism into her account were critical to helping Americans understand the Futenma and Henoko issues, and Okinawans' experience of US presence more generally.

Analyses of the historical intertwining of Japanese and American imperialism are at the heart of most ties between anti-US base activists in Okinawa, the Philippines, South Korea, and Guam. A manifestation of this is gatherings of activists at commemorations of the Pacific War. To mark the fifty-fifth anniversary of the end of the Battle of Okinawa, OWAAMV organized a silent march to Okinawa's Cornerstone of Peace. It stands out among modern war memorials for attempting to list the names of all those killed in the Battle of Okinawa—civilian and military, Okinawan, Japanese, and Allied

forces, as well as conscripted Chinese and Korean laborers. However marchers called attention to the exclusion of the so-called comfort women, women in conquered territories forced into sexual slavery by Japan's Imperial Army. This action was a prelude to the International Women's Summit to Redefine Security, organized with the East Asia-US-Puerto Rico Women's Network Against Militarism, a robust network of individuals and organizations from South Korea, Okinawa, the Philippines, Guam, Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and the United States.[10] What stands out and helps account for the network's longevity and solidarity is that members' subjectivities are not erased through statist conceptions of militarism. Puerto Rico, Guam, Hawai'i, and Okinawa are recognized as sovereign nations, which creates conceptual and political space to share "histories of colonization, war, occupation, and the connections between [their] varied histories."[11] By linking Japan's system of sexual slavery with ongoing military violence against women associated with contemporary US basing, activists challenge the marginalization of both within dominant narratives, including representations of the US military as a source of security in the postwar era.

Whereas official commemorations and records of the war become spaces to reaffirm the postwar US–Japan relationship, then, for activists they become spaces for oppositional and alternative narratives. It was at the sixtieth anniversary of the Battle of Okinawa that I met Debbie Quinata, the Chamorro activist who would later take me to the Japanese caves at San Ramon Hill. At an unofficial gathering, she said: "I feel a strong kinship with Okinawans…as we travelled around your island to Henoko and back, I've seen people who look just like my aunties and uncles at home, and I've talked to people who feel just like I do. We are Pacific Island peoples who are tired of our islands being militarily occupied by colonial powers." Quinata's allusion to familial ties captures a broader sentiment among activists that regional alliances have a productive, even healing, dimension that goes beyond addressing the immediate concerns of US basing. "Our exchanges and solidarity with anti-US base activists in East Asia are the most important to me," explained Tomiyama Masahiro, a longtime participant in the civil disobedience at Henoko who maintains strong ties with South Korean anti-US base groups. He continued:

> Okinawa was annexed by Japan, and then so was Taiwan, Korea and the Philippines and so on. Since the war, we have all faced America's militarism—American imperialism. I know a lot of other people face the US military around the world, including

> Yamatonchū.[12] But for me it's most important to put my effort into these ties [with people in East Asia], so we can change our relationship with them. The Ryūkyūs used to have a friendly relationship with neighbouring countries.[13]

Collective memories of an international society prior to European, American, and Japanese imperialism shape interpretations of how these powers altered relations among peoples in the region, and how this might be countered.

Activists' desire to repair connections with peoples in the region (and beyond) is not always born solely of a sense of shared victimhood. "I feel responsible as a former Japanese soldier. Not many people know that I was in the Philippines with the Imperial Army," explained an elderly yet spry activist who asked to remain anonymous. "Then I came to feel responsible for US aggression. I protested America's war in Vietnam. We all did. It became a part of the reversion movement. So I got a real shock when I met a group of Vietnamese . . . and one of them said to me 'Oh, you are from Okinawa? The land of the B-52s!' So many American B-52s left from here that the Vietnamese people saw Okinawa on the side of US aggression. Suddenly my image of Uchinanchū[14] as only victims of America changed. A new base [at Henoko] means more generations will be on the side of aggression."[15]

Frustration over the extent to which American and Japanese interventions create violent and competitive relationships has fuelled solidarity between Okinawans, Chamorro, and Hawaiian activists. After a decade of sustained opposition prevented progress at Henoko, the Bush and Koizumi administrations renegotiated a "compromise" in May 2006. This revised plan, which remains in effect as of this writing, connected the new base to the Marine Corps' Camp Schwab, already located on the cape. It also expanded the original design significantly by adding a second runway, a deepwater military port, and related facilities in Oura Bay. In addition to resurrecting the 1966 plan noted above, the agreement introduced the incentive of transferring roughly 9000 Marines from Okinawa to the US territory of Guam once Okinawans accepted the Henoko base. Within weeks of President Obama's inauguration, his administration signed the "Guam Agreement" with the then Prime Minister Fukuda, reaffirming the 2006 plan.[16] Although a 2012 amendment de-linked the troop transfer from Henoko (to facilitate Obama's "Asia-Pacific Pivot"), it nonetheless links the reduction of troops in Okinawa to their increase in Guam and (per the 2012 agreement) Hawaii.[17] For many activists, the

problem lies in the colonial dimensions of the plan and how these are sustained yet obscured by the relations of citizenship.[18]

> We are being told once again that the US and Japanese governments will "lessen our burden" by moving US soldiers to Chamorro land if we accept the new air and naval bases in our land. And because the Japanese government has agreed to move the soldiers and build the new bases at Henoko, we are paying for this as [Japanese] citizens! We're paying for our own colonisation, and US colonisation of Chamorros. Chamorros are paying for their colonisation, and ours. This is why we have to resist together.[19]

Far from a straightforward anti-Americanism, therefore, analyses underpinning activists' grassroots ties in the region expose the intra- and inter-imperial dimensions of the contemporary US–Japan relationship. In doing so, they also show how these historical dynamics are extended into interstate and state–citizen relations.

Leveraging Power Beyond Japan

International Spaces within Okinawa

As the institutions associated with citizenship proved uneven in their effectiveness, attempts to leverage institutional power beyond Japan's national context became a characteristic strategy of the Futenma and Henoko campaigns, and the movement more generally. At times doing so has meant taking advantage of international political space *within* Okinawa. The 2000 G8 Summit became a global stage at a time when the United States and Japanese governments appeared to have the upper hand.[20] Tokyo had faced years of intensifying challenges to its support of US military practices. The election of a string of anti-base officials, Governor Ota Masahide's (1990–98) rejection of the Henoko plan and refusal to renew leases for base land, and unprecedented anti-base sentiment following the 1995 rape all raised serious questions about Japan's ability to uphold its security commitments to the United States. But a range of politically and economically coercive measures altered the political landscape. Tokyo successfully sued Governor Ota, shifted power to approve Okinawan land leases to the prime minister, ignored the results of a 1997 Nago City citizens referendum in which residents rejected the new base, cut off communication with the prefectural government, and suspended a massive economic stimulus package until Okinawans voted

in Liberal Democratic Party-backed Inamine Keiichi, a governor more amenable to Henoko base. The very choice of Okinawa as the summit location, and specifically Nago City, had everything to do with these reversals.

Keenly aware of the politics behind Okinawa hosting the G8, activists welcomed the opportunity to show foreign leaders and especially journalists Okinawans' anger with "the facts as they are in Okinawa," as Ryūkyū University professor Egami Takayoshi put it at the time.[21] Even their preparations attracted media attention. Six months prior to the summit, the *New York Times* reported of Nago: "Far from celebrating its good fortune and looking forward to its celebrity, this quiet community is now gearing up to resist the base relocation . . . Banners with anti-base slogans flutter in the town's quiet center, and local groups plan to hold large demonstrations during the summit meeting."[22] It was just before the summit that Takazato and OWAAMV hosted the International Women's Summit to Redefine Security noted above. Focusing on military violence within the theme of militarism and economic development, this counter summit called attention to the contradictions in the security espoused by the G8.[23] Media coverage during the summit focused as much on the 27,000-person, 17-km "human chain" around the United State's Kadena Air Base and other protests as they did on G8 meetings.[24] This global audience and institutions are viewed as increasingly important to Okinawan activists given the tactics of the Japanese government and its deference to the US–Japan Security Treaty in the Okinawan context.

Although the ecological impact of US bases in Okinawa (as elsewhere) is significant, the location and offshore design of the Henoko project is predicted to have devastating effects. This has engendered unprecedented coalitions and attracted the attention of many who may not otherwise question military expansion. Construction will involve massive landfill of the coral reef ecosystem surrounding the cape, destroying the habitat of several endangered marine species, including the Okinawa dugong (sea manatee). A related plan to construct eight oversized helipads in the pristine forest of nearby Takae for the MV-22 Osprey aircraft also threatens several endangered species. Both will endanger the safety and livelihood of the surrounding communities.[25] Teaming up with the US-based Center for Biological Diversity, Okinawa's Save the Dugong Foundation (SDF) and Dugong Network Okinawa (DNO) countered official representations of the ecological soundness of the Henoko plan by mobilizing the world's leading coral and marine experts gathered in Okinawa for the Tenth International Coral Reef Symposium (ICRF) in 2004. The coalition

set up an information booth, held a side workshop, and flooded the symposium with a pamphlet that highlighted Okinawa's historical relationship to Japan as context for understanding the Henoko project. In a particularly savvy move, SDF and DNO arranged transportation to Henoko and glass-bottom boat tours of the bays. Nearly 900 participants from 83 countries signed a resolution calling on the governments of Japan and the United States to abandon the project. Like the G8, activists saw in the International Coral Reef Symposium (ICRS) the potential to temporarily shift Okinawan space, from one where local relations and institutions are compromised by bilateral relations, to one intertwined with much broader relations.

The Henoko and Takae sit-in encampments themselves have become transnational spaces where individuals and groups from outside Okinawa and Japan travel or send messages to demonstrate (and sometimes perform) support for the campaign and of Okinawans more generally. When government contractors began constructing platforms in Henoko Bay for drilling surveys in early 2005, Greenpeace activists in Japan arranged for Greenpeace International's reincarnated *Rainbow Warrior* to join the fishing boats and sea kayaks engaging in civil disobedience in the bay.[26] A coalition of Okinawan, British, and American educators raised funds to bring a director and camera crew to film a documentary about the politics and ecological issues surrounding the Henoko project for the BBC's World Service *Earth Report* series.[27]

International Institutions

Beginning in the mid-1990s, amid the burgeoning anti-base sentiment following the 1995 rape and the SACO agreement, Okinawan activists sought to leverage power through international institutions. This has taken different paths. For example, together with World Wildlife Fund Japan, the Save the Dugong Foundation, and Dugong Network Okinawa began attending the quadrennial meetings of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature in 2000. However, most of the activities are within UN human rights institutions. OWAAMV founder Takazato led a delegation of 70 Okinawan women to the 1995 World Conference on Women in Beijing, marking a turning point for mobilization around women's rights and sexual violence in Okinawa.[28] While continuing its participation in international conferences on women's rights, OWAAMV is an excellent example of how grassroots ties emerge out of formal institutional

spaces. In addition to the activities noted above, Takazato also led Okinawan delegations to the 2005 World Social Forum in Brazil and an international gathering of anti-base activists in Manta, Ecuador in 2007.

Most active within the UN is the Association for Indigenous Peoples in Okinawa and the Ryūkyūs (AIPR). Collaborating with the Tokyo-based Shimin Gaikō Centre, AIPR first brought the Futenma and Henoko issues to the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations in 1996. Since then it has participated in various UN fora concerning indigenous rights and ethnic discrimination.[29] The group's rationale is straightforward. In the preface to their 2003 handbook, *Questions and Answers: International Human Rights Law and the Ryūkyūs/Okinawa*, they observe: "It has become abundantly clear that…we, the people of the Ryūkyūs and Okinawa, are placed outside the framework of protections provided for in the Japanese constitution." Founder Chinen Hidenori adds, "The concept of 'indigenous peoples' became an entry point to fundamentally reconsider the various problems Okinawa faces from the perspective of human rights and international law."[30]

In 2014, Itokazu Keiko became the first Diet member to make a direct appeal to the UN when she participated in a hearing of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) and joined AIPR and Ainu representatives at the World Conference of Indigenous Peoples.[31] Her participation was provoked by a series of events that culminated in the Japanese government beginning construction at Henoko in July 2014. At the end of 2013, the then Governor Nakaima Hirokazu removed a major obstacle to construction by approving the government's landfill permit. A third sit-in emerged at the Camp Schwab entrance and rallies attracted tens of thousands. Polls showed an overwhelming majority opposed to the new base and desiring Futenma's closure. By the end of 2014, Okinawans ousted Nakaima, electing instead anti-base candidates to the governorship and all four of Okinawa's lower house seats in the Diet. Nago City residents reelected anti-base mayor Inamine. Despite such overwhelming opposition, the government continued construction and increased its use of coercive measures.[32] In this context, Itokazu described the coercive measures and raised four issues in the CERD hearing: the need for recognition and protection of the will and dignity of the Ryūkyūan people regarding Henoko; ending the crackdown on protesters; closure of Futenma Air Station; and terminating the plan to build helipads in Takae. A CERD member noted official statements by Japan that Okinawans were no different from

Japanese. Wearing traditional Ryūkyūan dress, Itokazu answered that the Ryūkyūs had 500 years of history as an independent nation, and that the Ryūkyūan language is recognized as a language in its own right by UNESCO.

Institutions within the United States

Leveraging institutional power outside Japan includes US institutions. In 2003 a coalition of six Okinawan, Japanese, and US environmental groups filed a joint lawsuit in California's Ninth Circuit.[33] The case, aptly named *Okinawa dugong v. Rumsfeld*, rests on a clause in the US National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), which obliges US agencies operating abroad to avoid or mitigate negative effects of their actions on registered national properties of host nations. The dugong is a protected "natural monument" under Japan's Law for the Protection of Cultural Properties. The Pentagon's motions to dismiss were denied in a landmark ruling in 2005. In what became *Okinawa dugong v. Gates* in appeal, the court found the Pentagon in violation of the NHPA and ordered an assessment of the base's impact. *Okinawa dugong v. Hagel* was filed in July 2014 after the Pentagon concluded that the base would have "no adverse affect."[34] Although drawn out, this legal challenge sets a precedent for other communities and marks a new level of accessing institutional power outside Japan.[35]

The irony in using US institutional channels to address problems associated with US military basing is not lost on activists themselves. Dugong lawsuit plaintiff and Nago City council member Higashionna Takuma explained it this way: "In the end, Japanese policy in Okinawa is shaped fundamentally by US demands, so our best strategy may be to try to intervene in the shaping of those demands."[36] He offered this during a January 2012 trip to Washington DC led by Itokazu Keiko and community leaders, including Takazato Suzuyo. Nago mayor Inamine visited a week later, and again in April 2014, emboldened by his reelection on an anti-base platform. Governor Ota Masahide initiated this post-1972 strategy of circumventing domestic political channels.[37] Delegations typically meet with lawmakers, officials from the Pentagon and State Department, think tanks, Japan experts, and activists.

These delegations demonstrate a studied awareness of the factors and relationships shaping decisions. Higashionna and Itokazu timed their trip to coincide with debates over debt-ceiling-mandated defense cuts and arguments by influential senators on the Armed

Forces Committee who, after visiting Okinawa, called the Henoko plan "unrealistic, unworkable and unaffordable."[38] Former Ginowan mayor Iha Yoichi traveled four times to discuss the lack of progress on Futenma's closure and the problems residents face because of its continued operations. Following the crash, Iha sought to intervene in the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process, which decides the fate of domestic military installations. Iha highlighted opposition to the Henoko plan and the dangers of Futenma to strengthen arguments of congressional and municipal representatives from Southern California as they jockeyed to prevent the closure of Marine Corps installations in their districts. Iha explained that meeting directly with US officials was worthwhile "because Okinawans cannot trust the Japanese government and Japanese politicians to make any effort on behalf of Okinawa if it goes against Japan's interests or jeopardises Japan-US relations."[39] Rather than an abiding faith in American institutions, then, Okinawan efforts to leverage formal institutional power in the United States indicate a faith in how power relations in the United States intertwine with Japanese institutions in the Okinawan context.

Okinawa's Transitional Moment

The transnational shift described above— alliances that foreground the intertwining of Japanese and US imperialism and their extension into the state–citizen relation, and efforts to leverage popular and institutional power beyond national institutional channels —reflects a broader political shift within Okinawa's anti-base movement. Today a profound sense of betrayal by Japan permeates Okinawa's activist community, many of whom struggled for reincorporation into the Japanese state. Although reversion provided Okinawans with new channels for redress, the reality of "becoming Japanese" created ambivalence and frustration. Chibana Shōichi, best known for setting fire to the Japanese flag during the 1987 National Sports Festival (Kokumin Taiiku Taikai or Kokutai) evokes this betrayal of Okinawans' struggle for citizenship in terms of ethnic and territorial exploitation:

> The government and the US began telling us what an important role Okinawa has in both countries' security, and the security of the region. In the end, the citizenship that we won mostly just gave us the burden of their so-called security, not ours… *Yamatonchū* gave the Ryūkyūs to America after the war. In the end, it was as if they

> gave the Ryūkyūs to America again, after reversion. They wanted American protection during the Cold War, and still want it, but they don't want the US military in their own space…Okinawa is Japan's, not a part of Japan.[40]

It is worth recalling Chibana's infamous act of resistance. It was not a coincidence that the hugely popular Kokutai was held in Okinawa for the first time in 1987. The year marked the fifteenth anniversary of the Ryūkyūs' reincorporation into the Japanese state. As a high school student in the 1960s, Chibana carried the Japanese flag proudly. At that time, it symbolized "freedom from American tyranny."[41] By 1987, the flag had come to symbolize a long history of Japanese oppression for Chibana.

More generally, the 1980s saw questions once marginalized within the reversion movement about the logic of "returning" to Japan increasingly engaged publically as progressive scholars, journalists, and public intellectuals offered new perspectives on Okinawa's relationship to Japan. In particular, revelations about Japanese policies in the Ryūkyūs during and after the Pacific War contributed to this process of reevaluation. Critical accounts such as Ota Masahide's "Re-examining the History of the Battle of Okinawa" and Ishihara Masaiei's *A New History of the Ryūkyūs: The Modern Era and Today* detailed the Japanese military's wartime atrocities and systematic discrimination before and during the spring of 1945.[42] Alongside such scholarly reanalyses, personal testimonies and the process of memorializing those who died in the Battle of Okinawa led to unprecedented public disclosure of and debate over wartime experiences.[43] The Okinawan newspaper *Ryūkyū Shimpo* collected and published hundreds of survivors' accounts of the Battle of Okinawa in the early 1980s, uncovering in the process the extent to which civilian experiences of the battle had been repressed in postwar Japan.[44] Systematic attempts by the Ministry of Education to keep details of Japanese aggression in the Ryūkyūs out of school textbooks has only fueled efforts to retell history from a Ryūkyūan perspective and the growing disillusionment toward Japan as a source of protection.[45]

In 1996, Japan's Supreme Court ruled against the then governor Ota Masahide's refusal to sign leases allowing Okinawan land to be used by the US military. In his appeal, Ota recounted:

> The Ryūkyū Kingdom had been widely known, even abroad, as an unarmed land of courtesy…The Meiji government directed the Ryūkyū Kingdom to undertake several reforms toward

> Japanisation . . . The forced acquisition of land for military use occurred [in Okinawa] both before and during the war . . . At the time of Okinawa's reversion to Japan, the Diet adopted a resolution about realignment and reduction of the bases in Okinawa . . . With the collapse of the Cold War structure, my people expected the realignment and reduction of the bases to make progress, if belatedly . . . The 1972 reversion was a return to the rule of the pacifist Constitution and should have been a great turning point for Okinawa. What my people sincerely wished for at the time was a reduction of bases at a rate at least comparable to that experiences on the mainland, together with the restoration of human rights and the establishment of home rule.[46]

By situating Okinawans' 1972 "return to the rule of the pacifist constitution" within Japanese colonization, Ota disavows the notion that reversion was natural and based on historical unity. Rather it was Okinawans' choice based on a desire for citizenship and demilitarization. In this light, Okinawa's modern existence as a profoundly militarized space becomes evidence of the unfulfilled promise of reversion, all the more egregious against the narrative of the Ryūkyū Kingdom as historically and culturally pacifist. Ota's arguments also reflect the increasing emphasis on Ryūkyūan difference. As Okinawan historian Taira Kōji proposed at the time, although the Ryūkyū Islands make up one of Japan's many prefectures, Okinawans are reassured by the belief that their territory is "not a mere prefecture, but something special and distinct." This, Taira suggested, is how Okinawans compensate for their "sense of historical melancholy."[47] Two decades later, it is clear that this sense of difference is more than psychological recompense. It forms the basis for understanding Okinawan/Ryūkyūan subjectivity and the Ryūkyūs as a locus of power and rights.

Collective Rights, Self-Determination, and Independence

Okinawans' reclaimed collective history offers a long critical lens on their relatively short experiences as Japanese subjects and citizens. In doing so, it informs efforts to reimagine and rework their relationship to the state. A growing number of activists and elected officials are mobilizing around notions of nationhood. Because an ethnic perspective on Okinawans' citizen relations is inherently tied to place, politicization of Okinawan identity in the era of a global state system facilitates historically novel interpretations and claims against the Japanese state and the relations governing US military presence.[48]

One manifestation of this is AIPR's claims rooted in indigenous and minority rights. The former introduces a collective framework that challenges the individualistic rights associated with liberal citizenship and human rights more generally. Although territory is the central analytic through which indigenous peoples' rights and struggles are often understood, in theory it claims sovereignty on all dimensions—political, economic, social, and cultural. Indigeneity as a political identity has not been readily embraced among the broader activist community, in part due to associations of the term with a particular way of life rather than a political position vis-à-vis states.[49] However, AIPR's sustained participation in international meetings and their public forums seem to be fostering the latter interpretation. Also, echoing Takazato Suzuyo's desire to correct Americans' perception that "Okinawa is Japan," AIPR member Oyakawa Yūko explains how the term "indigenous people" helps clarify Okinawans' circumstances outside of Japan. "When we explain that Okinawans are not Japanese but indigenous peoples in Japan, suddenly our situation makes sense to them. The term 'indigenous people' is a kind of global code."[50] And while minority rights are founded on a notion of plurality rooted in individual rights and not necessarily tied to territory, Okinawans making claims (through national and UN processes) based on their minority status within Japan do so in explicitly territorial and collective terms.[51]

Okinawan and Ainu activists' ties, though not as frequent or dense as connections with anti-base activists in the region, stand out among their relationships with other minority communities in Japan in that they reflect a mutual recognition as once independent peoples whose territories remain subsumed within the Japanese state.[52] I first met Chibana Shoichi in February 1998 at an Ainu gathering north of Sapporo on "Northern Territories Day" (*hoppō ryōdo no hi*). This is a national(istic) holiday established by the central government in 1981 to assert Japan's claim to four Kurile islands seized by the Soviet Union in the final days of World War II. The Ainu gathering and subsequent march through the snowy streets of Sapporo rejected the government's narrative. As the keynote speaker, Chibana expressed solidarity with Ainu claims to the islands and went on to describe the then two-year-old Futenma and Henoko campaigns. He spoke about the effects of Ryūkyūans' loss of control over their islands.[53] Afterward, Okinawan activist and folksinger Mayonaka Shinya performed alongside Ainu musician Kano Oki.

These ties date to the late 1980s, when Mayonaka, Chibana, and others made trips to Hokkaido, and began hosting Ainu activists in

Okinawa. For Mayonaka, making connections with Ainu musicians "was a great discovery…our music resonates and expresses our similar circumstances…Singing in *uchinaguchi*[54] is my true political voice. When I meet Ainu musicians, I realise it is the same for them."[55] Kano Oki went on to work for several years with AIPR members in UN fora on indigenous rights. More recently, Diet Member Itokazu Keiko participated in the 2014 UN World Conference of Indigenous Peoples alongside Ainu Association of Hokkaido president Abe Kazushi.[56] In February 2015, Uruma-no-Kai, a group working to strengthen solidarity between Ainu and Okinawans, organized a symposium at Okinawa International University on the right to self-determination for Ainu and Okinawans.[57] Such ties remind us that looking only for movements or connections that cross state borders obscures their inherently transnational character, as activists understand them to be.

Another example is the Study Group on Okinawan Self-governance—*Okinawa jichi kenkyu kai*, or Jichiken.[58] Premised on a shared recognition of Ryūkyūans' ethnic and historical distinctiveness as a people (*minzoku*), the project elaborated a vision of a self-governing Okinawa.[59] Jichiken was founded in 2002 by scholars of constitutional law, politics, and public policy at the University of the Ryūkyūs and Okinawa International University, whose biographies reveal backgrounds in the reversion and anti-base movements. The legal and public policy bent of Jichiken's members led the group to tackle head-on the practical matters of self-governance. This means creating the conditions for inhabitants of the Ryūkyūs to collectively decide the islands' future.[60] Exploring case studies of "home rule" and other models of self-governance, including Scotland and the Äland Islands, Jichiken posited three basic paths. The first would work within Japan's constitution by leveraging Article 95, which pertains to local self-government, and/or explore possibilities in current national moves toward greater decentralization. The second would work outside the constitutional framework, seeking a form of territorial autonomy with the right to negotiate diplomatic relations. The third would consider avenues to independence. In 2005, Jichiken published a booklet on these themes aimed at the general public entitled *Okinawa as a Self-Governing Region: What Do You Think?*[61] Until 2013, the group held countless workshops and multi-week seminars aimed at popular education. It also advocated for more Ryūkyūan history and language education.

The different paths Jichiken outlined a decade ago captured an emerging transitional moment in Okinawa; while citizenship remains a meaningful category for some, it is increasingly challenged

and reworked by others. At that time, terms like self-determination (*jikoketteiken* or *jiketsuken*), autonomy (*jiritsu*), and, though less so, independence (*dokuritsu*) were still largely the domain of activists and public intellectuals. But today they are becoming part of a broader public discourse on Okinawa's relationship to Japan, US military presence, and the future of the islands. I offer some examples below.

There is a great deal to read about Okinawan self-determination written by Okinawans. Literary and political journals like *Sekai* (in Japan) and *Ke-shi Kaji* and *Uruma neshia* (in Okinawa) take up the issue of Okinawan autonomy more frequently. *Uruma neshia*, founded in 2000, is explicitly a magazine for "dialogue on autonomy and independence for the Ryukyu Islands." The no-frills website *Fuyu*,[62] is an impressive archive of writings related to Okinawan/Ryūkyūan autonomy by activists, scholars, writers, and public intellectuals, including Medoruma Shun, Takara Ben, Chinin Ushi, Arakawa Akira, Arasaki Moritetsu and Jichiken cofounder Shimabukuro Jun. Books by Okinawans on the topic are far too numerous to list here,[63] but the fact of their increase is a welcome sign, according to journalist and long-time editor of the *Okinawa Times*, Arakawa Akira, who was among those who argued against reversion. In the June 2012 issue of *Sekai*, he recommends Matsushima Yasukatsu's 2012 *The Road to Ryūkyū Independence: A Ryūkyūan Nationalism That Defies Colonialism*. Arakawa argues, "The fundamental premise that must undergird any thoughtful consideration of issues pertaining to the future of Okinawa, including the Senkaku Islands issue and the problems surrounding the military bases, is the securing of our own right to self-determination as Okinawans."[64]

Old and new organizations are active. And in addition to groups noted above whose alliances and activities express, in different ways, a strong sense of Okinawan nationhood, others are emerging. Matsushima, an Ishigaki-born economics professor at Ryūkoku University, founded the Ryūkyūan Independence Study Association (Ryūkyū Minzoku Dokuritsu Sogo Kenkyu Gakkai) in 2013. He maintains, "to achieve a breakthrough on the bases issue, discussions on the option of independence are necessary."[65] And others are getting a facelift. The leftist Ryukyu Independence Party, founded in 1970 by Yara Chosuke, was revived in 2008 under the name Kariyushi Club.

Public forums, strategic visions, and other events are on the rise. Okinawa International University hosted an all-day public forum in February 2015 entitled "Seeking a course: Discussions of Okinawa's right to self-determination." A series of panels reviewed Okinawa's

experience of colonization and systemic discrimination to a 600-strong audience. Panelists agreed that "now is the time for Okinawa to claim the right to self-determination and peace" and assume its role as a "hub" within East Asia: as a demilitarized autonomous zone, a space of exchanges with China and surrounding countries, and a cosmopolitan center for Okinawa's economic self-sufficiency.[66] This idea of Okinawa as a more autonomous regional hub is the economic dimension of the political shift described in this chapter. Successive formulations include Ota Masahide's 1995 "Cosmopolitan City," Yonaguni Island's 2005 "Vision toward Self-Reliance, Autonomy, Self-Governance and Symbiosis" based on regional cooperation and open doors, and the 2010 "Okinawa 21st Century Vision."[67]

The discovery of France's original copy of the 1855 Ryūkyū–France Amity Treaty in early 2015 led to a flurry of media coverage and debate on Ryūkyūan independence vis-à-vis states. Urasoe Art Museum held a symposium to coincide with the exhibition of the treaty and similar treaties signed with the United States and the Netherlands.[68] Coverage of the treaties offers an example of how discourses of self-determination are reproduced through media coverage of Okinawa and base issues. *Ryukyu Shimpo* writer Arakaki Tsuyoshi speculates that "in the midst of growing awareness of and requests for Okinawa's rights to self-determination, especially regarding the U.S. military base issues, the homecoming of these treaties could influence discussions over Okinawa's restoration of sovereignty."[69] It is worth noting that the newspaper cosponsored both the self-determination forum and the treaty exhibit. A cursory search of just the term self-determination (*jikoketteiken*) on the *Okinawa Times* website results in 22 relevant articles in 2014 alone.

The language of self-determination and allusions to the Ryūkyūs' historical independence has also entered mainstream electoral politics and other governing institutions. In the November 2014 gubernatorial election, former Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) member Onaga Takeshi defeated LDP incumbent Nakaima after the latter approved the government's landfill permit. Running on an ardent anti-Henoko base platform, Onaga argued that Okinawa has the "right of self-determination" based on the island prefecture's distinct history. Shimoji Mikio, a Peoples New Party Lower House member, campaigned on putting the Henoko issue to a prefecture-wide referendum. If the central government did not accept Okinawans' rejection, he proposed a Scotland-like referendum on independence.[70] Some saw these as cynical election ploys, but given the stakes this suggests all the more that these terms were expected to resonate with mainstream voters.

Finally, and perhaps most provocatively, there is some evidence of governing institutions reclaiming precolonial Ryūkyūan practices as an authoritative source. In early 2015, the Naha District court recognized Naha City's claim on a sea boundary from a 1997 Ryukyu Kingdom-era map.[71]

The examples above are offered as a recent snapshot. Viewed in the context of my broader analysis, they are evidence of a deepening of the transitional moment within Okinawa. By transitional I do not mean a linear shift from liberal citizenship to a critical self-determination. Collective rights claims rooted in notions of Ryūkyūan nationhood and indigeneity exist alongside demands for equality as Japanese citizens. The multiplicity of activists' political identities and claims intertwine and overlap, and as they do so they constrain, create, and shift scales. And contradictions abound; not least being the possible acceptance of a new Japanese Self-Defence Force installation on Yonaguni Island.[72] That said, re-articulations of Okinawan subjectivity point to a desire to rework rather than (at least for now) undo the state–citizen relationship. The alternative future articulated by many Okinawan activists is nation-centric rather than state-centric, yet increasingly envisions territorial autonomy over social, political, cultural, and economic life.

Conclusion

The story of the anti-base movement presented here is woefully incomplete. In attempting to highlight forms of activism we might understand as "transnational," much has been left out. My aim is to employ transnational struggle in a methodological sense, as a lens on broader historical relations and processes. This requires taking seriously the meanings activists themselves give to their relationships and actions. Okinawans' experiences as marginalized citizens facilitated reevaluations of the Ryūkyūs' relationship with Japan, and a simultaneously ethnic and global perspective on their citizen relations. Accordingly, their activism continued along new paths. Transnational activities and coalition-building has opened political spaces for Okinawans to connect with new political partners, access new kinds of venues and institutions of power, and to articulate alternative conceptions of security that foreground, for example, gendered and ecological understandings of militarization. Through these alliances and activities, Okinawan activists are (re)asserting a nationhood that transcends, decenters and challenges the state.

The Futenma and Henoko campaigns intertwined with and fuelled this transnational shift in the anti-base movement. The significance of this lies in these campaigns' impact on the political transformation within Okinawa. Their emergence as policy in the mid-1990s came at a time when many Okinawans, most certainly activists, were already questioning the logic of reversion. Within this context, the attempt to impose a new base at Henoko, while subjecting Okinawans to the evident dangers of Futenma, appears to be the final straw. The degree to which Okinawans are now openly discussing a more autonomous future suggests that the arrogance with which successive US and Japanese administrations have approached these issues is also significant. That is, the two governments' confidence in their ability to force a new base, and thus an unchanged future, on Okinawans contributes fundamentally to Okinawan activists' already ongoing reevaluation of their citizen relations and the legitimacy of the state in the Okinawan context.

To be sure, demands for greater autonomy are, at least for now, still less common than claims and strategies rooted in the rights of liberal citizenship. Perhaps this is why scholarship on Okinawan base politics tends not to ask whether Okinawans' contemporary "ethnic turn" poses a political challenge to the Japanese state and US military presence. This makes sense given dominant assumptions that posit the anti-base movement in terms of, or situated within, self-evident Japanese and American states, and by extension a self-evident state system. But to only look for or recognize explicitly secessionist claims of self-determination as evidence of a "real" challenge to Japan is to overlook Okinawans' ongoing negotiations and reinterpretations of their citizenship. Studies that consider the "ethnic turn" in post-1972 Okinawa go farthest toward uncovering the ways cultural perceptions, collective memory, and notions of nationhood have shifted Okinawans' interpretations of their relationship to the bases and to Japan and the United States.[73] Because much of this literature remains focused on the Okinawan or Japanese context,[74] however, this chapter has sought to contribute to this growing body of critical scholarship by linking Okinawa's transnational moment to its transitional moment.

Although Okinawan activists' re-articulations of relations with the state does not displace citizenship as a meaningful relation, new kinds of alliances and reclaimed histories reveal different geographies of sovereignty. Situated globally, the convergence of Okinawa's anti-base movement with self-determination movements elsewhere makes developments within Okinawa a lens on a much broader transition

in the current historical period. The politicization of Okinawan identity reflects an historically novel anti-imperialist (trans)nationalism, one that has the state and liberal citizenship as its object of struggle rather than its goal.

Notes

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8. See "Okinawa Women's Peace Caravan, October 3–8, 1998" <http://uchinanchu.com/about/womens_peace_caravan.htm> [accessed March 10, 2015].
9. Personal interview, March 5, 2005. Unless otherwise noted, all quotations are from interviews conducted and translated by the author.
10. See <http://www.genuinesecurity.org/projects/index.html> [accessed March 10, 2015].
11. Ellen-Rae Cachola, Gwyn Kirk, Lisa Natividad, and Maria Reinat Pumarejo, "Women Working across Borders for Peace and Genuine Security," Peace Review 22, no. 2 (April 2010): 164.
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13. Personal interview, April 30, 2005.

14. Uchinanchū refers to inhabitants of Okinawa Island, or *Uchinā,* in the language indigenous to Okinawa Island and immediately surrounding islands. Historically those from outlying islands have not referred to themselves as Uchinanchū, though in Japanese and English all are subsumed under the term "Okinawan."
15. Personal interview, December 11, 2004.
16. Text of the February 2009 Guam Agreement is available at <http://www.state.gov/documents/organisation/130450.pdf> [accessed October 1, 2014].
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27. *Development with Destruction* <www.tve.org/earthreport/archive/doc.cfm?aid=1768> [accessed October 1, 2014].

28. See Takazato Suzuyo, *Okinawa no onna tachi: Josei no jinken to kichi guntai* (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 1996).
29. In addition to the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations, members have detailed the twin campaigns in the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, World Conference Against Racism, World Conference of Indigenous Peoples, Committee on the Elimination of All forms of Racial Discrimination, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, and hearings convened by the Commission on Human Rights and Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.
30. Association of Indigenous Peoples in the Ryūkyūs/Okinawa, *Q&A Kokusai jinkenhou to Ryūkyū/Okinawa* (Naha: AIPR, May 2004).
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47. Kōji Taira, "Troubled National Identity: The Ryukyuans/Okinawans," in *Japan's Minorities*, ed. Michael Weiner (Routledge, 1997), p. 140.
48. This section builds on observations made in Dietz, "Demilitarizing Sovereignty," pp. 195–6.
49. Ibid., p. 198.
50. Quoted in Dietz, "Demilitarizing Sovereignty," p.196.
51. For an example of a report on minority rights in the Okinawan context, see "Rights of Persons Belonging to Minorities: The Issue of Ryukyu and Okinawa," AIPR and Shimin Gaikō Centre, (July 2014), <http://imadr.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Ryukyu-and-Okinawa_ERD-NET_Human-Rights-Committe_111th-session.pdf> [accessed March 10, 2015].
52. The Meiji government unilaterally annexed the vast Ainu territory to the north in 1869, only three years before it proclaimed the Ryūkyū *shobun*, or dissolution.
53. Personal notes, February 8, 1998.
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