GOVERNANCE AND THE CRISIS OF RULE IN CONTEMPORARY AFRICA

Leadership in Transformation

Edited by
Ebenezer Obadare & Wale Adebanwi

THE PEOPLE'S CHOICE

Governance and the Crisis of Rule in Contemporary Africa

AFRICAN HISTORIES AND MODERNITIES

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
Leadership in Transformation

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Acknowledgments

In July 2013, the Obafemi Awolowo Institute of Government and Public Policy (OAIGPP) based in Lekki, Lagos, Nigeria, organized a two-day international conference on Leadership and Governance in Africa, where papers were presented by scholars and graduate students from Africa, Europe and North America. That conference forms the basis of this book.

In our invitation to potential presenters at the conference, we noted how "the unenviable history of the African postcolony can be written around the subject of the absence...of positive leadership". However, we insisted that "despite the overwhelming focus in both academic and lay literature on bad leadership in Africa, the continent has produced outstanding leaders in all spheres of human endeavor and at every level of state and society." "Therefore," we added, "this is an exciting time to be a student of leadership in Africa, given the myriad challenges to, and opportunities for leadership which have been produced by the ascendance of neo-liberal economics, the surge of globalization, the undeniable push for greater democratization and transparency, and the unprecedented diffusion of new media technologies...in contemporary African state and society." Against this backdrop, we were interested in exploring "the various dimensions of leadership and its connections to governance, both at the macro and micro levels."

Despite our vital scholarly focus, the participants at the conference were not only scholars and students. Politicians, former and serving state governors, administrators, public servants and others were present to engage with both the theoretical and practical issues raised by the question of rule in contemporary Africa. Those who contributed to the discussions and debates—not necessarily from an academic perspective—helped expand the horizons of the presenters and assisted in no small measure in emphasizing the critical role of leadership in contemporary Africa. In his address at the conference, Governor Kayode Fayemi of Ekiti State, himself a scholar and former civil society activist, articulated the heritage of leadership and governance symbolized by the man after whom the host Institute is named, Obafemi Awolowo. Stated Fayemi, "Whether in the context of political structure [in Nigeria], particularly democratic federalism, in the nature, order, purpose and limits

of government as evident in the rule of law, the rights and duties of citizens, or in the directive principles of state policy which should be geared towards economic freedom, good health, liberty and welfare of the people, the struggle that some of us have engaged in in the last three decades, is based largely on this heritage: that is, a settled conviction in which the one and only purpose of political leadership and governance is the delivery of [public] goods."

In examining "the nature, order, purpose and limits government," particularly in the context of what Fayemi described as "the one and only purpose of political leadership and governance"—that is, the delivery of public goods—the conference was concerned with the absence of a consensus on the nature, order, purpose and limits of government and the divergent understanding of what constitutes "public goods" and how best to pursue them by different leaders in the different countries and contexts in contemporary Africa.

In the attempt to confront the dilemmas, opportunities and constraints of leadership in Africa, the editors of this book owe a lot of gratitude to those who made both the conference—hence this volume—possible. We are especially grateful to the chairman, Governor Bisi Akande, and the members of the board of trustees of OIGPP. We thank the former director-general of the Institute, Adigun Agbaje, who did not spare any effort in ensuring the success of the conference. Also, we thank Governor Kayode Fayemi, Governor Babatunde Fashola, Ambassador Tokunbo Awolowo Dosunmu, Jumoke Ajasin-Anifowose, Kemi Rotimi, Odia Ofeimun, Kunle Ajibade, and members of the press who gave generous publicity to the conference in Nigeria.

The contributors who attended the conference in Lagos and survived our constant hectoring to revise and resubmit their papers deserve our appreciation for their diligence and patience. We also invited other contributors who did not present papers at the conference. The latter had to work within a more limited time frame but delivered on their promises with grace. We thank them.

We are grateful to the series editor, Toyin Falola, our editor, Kristin Purdy, and her assistant, Mike Aperauch.

This book is dedicated to the memory of our dear teacher and friend, Kunle Amuwo (*E'yan mi!*), who passed in the process of completing it. He was a good man. We miss him deeply.

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and
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Governance and the Unending Search for Leadership in African Politics

Wale Adebanwi

and

Ebenezer Obadare

> *We sought to discover what "spirit" is at work in this turbulent activity, this maelstrom. We asked why this part of our world persists in overturning itself in every direction, splitting itself, and, so to speak, getting lost in its own movement. Why does it seem to take satisfaction in the limitation of its existence? What is the emblematic significance of the hieroglyphs that have assembled all along its itinerary, or are they mere appearances? What is hidden behind the mask and its shadows?*
>
> —Mbembe (2001: 240)

A Matter of Context

In December 2013, after news broke that Nelson Mandela, the former South African president and African National Congress (ANC) leader had passed on, something interesting, though not entirely unfamiliar, happened. Within the continent, major commentators and politicians eulogized the departed statesman, emphasized the fortitude he displayed throughout the 27 years he spent in confinement at the mercy of the apartheid regime, and saluted him for his moral courage in forgiving his jailers, even though, as South African president, it was within his power to exact his pound of flesh. Such eulogies usually concluded with a lamentation that Nelson Mandela was the kind of morally substantial

and politically intelligent leader that postcolonial African countries have, almost as a rule, been bereft of: a rare golden freckle in a landscape riddled with base metals. Oblivious to the irony, the majority of foreign commentators took the same tack, praising Mandela for his humanism and resoluteness, and invariably using him to highlight the poverty of such high-toned qualities in the ranks of most postcolonial African leaders.

The analytic takeaway from this has less to do with Nelson Mandela as a historical figure, and more with the limitations of existing approaches to the study of leadership in Africa. No one seriously doubts Mandela's political virtues, or the personal qualities that helped forge his reputation as arguably the most morally influential world leader of the past half-century. The halo of divinity may be slightly incongruous, but Mandela's reputation is thoroughly deserved, and his place in history is secure. Yet, precisely what made him great, the specific habitus of his moral, ideological and personal formation, often looms small in most analyses. This ahistoricity, while regrettable in the case of Nelson Mandela (Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni's contribution to this volume marks a refreshing departure), is, unfortunately, a fixture of many attempts to grapple with the question of political leadership, governance, and the crisis of rule in postcolonial Africa. The problem is this: all too often, conversations on leadership in African politics tend to swing between the extremes of absolute condemnation or unqualified approval, with leaders themselves little more than a convenient lightning rod, victims of a tedious routine in which snap judgment tends to precede, or at times displace, academic deliberation. The leaders who attract the most attention are those that "Africa has long been saddled with," as Robert I. Rotberg (2004) describes them: "poor, even malevolent leadership: predatory kleptocrats, military-installed autocrats, economic illiterates, and puffed-up posturers...indifferent to the progress of their citizens...unswayed by reason...hypocrites, always shifting blame for their countries' distress." The alternative to this kind of leaders are "the few but striking examples of effective African leadership" (Ibid.), such as early Prime Minister Milton Obote of Uganda, who was rather simply rendered in the late 1960s as a "reconciliation leader" by Mazrui (1970: 540); or Botswana's President Seretse Khama, described more recently by Rotberg (2012: 66–67) as a "resolute democrat" to whom the country owes its "achievements and outcomes." In these accounts, the structural context in which the leader as historical agent is located is often understated or dismissed as incidental.

Against this backdrop, our basic mission in this volume is to advance a slowly coalescing consensus around the imperative to ground discussions of leadership in Africa in the longue durée of Africa's specific history,

culture, economy, and politics. In other words, we desire to make specific forms of agency, which cannot be denied, speak to the structural constraints and opportunities in every sociocultural context. As John Makum Mbaku correctly argues in his important foreword to A. B. Assensoh's *African Political Leadership* (1998), the constraints of colonialism and the decolonization era continue to create challenges for African leaders. Mbaku (1998: x) contends that "leaders like [Kwame] Nkrumah, [Julius] Nyerere and [Jomo] Kenyatta inherited poorly developed and nonviable laws and institutions which were to prove quite problematic in the post-independence period." While this was a fundamental problem faced by, for example, Nkrumah, Nyerere and Kenyatta, who all "unquestionably believed fervently in African liberation" (Assensoh 1998: 3), Mbaku (1998: x–xi) points out the possibilities for the agential transformation of this problem by condemning the failure of African post-independence leaders "who captured the apparatus of government after independence to engage in institutional reforms to reconstruct the state and provide the African peoples with appropriate and viable institutional arrangements." Therefore, in privileging the *longue durée*, we wish to emphasize historical *depth*, which is to say that our objective is to promote an understanding of leadership and its paradoxes, which are anchored within the historical sociology of Africa's postcolonial existence. The chapters by Enocent Msindo, Olúfẹ́mi Táíwò, Warris Vianni, Ibrahim Gambari and Basile Ndjio, respectively, are perfectly grounded within this historical framework, though without sacrificing what Rotberg (2012: 2) calls "the critical role of leadership in the developing world." Still, while historical analysis is often invoked as grounds for moral exculpation, that is hardly the intention here. Instead, our goal is to illuminate the conditions under which political leadership in postcolonial Africa has been produced, and the extent to which those conditions have shaped the kind of leaders and leadership paths that have consistently emerged across the continent. In other words, we seek to expand existing discussions by highlighting the context within which leaders act and the various ways of understanding their impact. In its alertness to what the author describes as "the ecologies within which African leadership is tested and forged," Warris Vianni's chapter on the late Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya embodies this critical spirit.

One implication of this stance is that, instead of the standard approach, in which leadership is more or less viewed as an inscrutable black box that holds the secrets to the malfeasances of governance in Africa, we approach leadership as an intersecting variable, one that influences and is at the same time determined and influenced by the constraints and opportunities of its immediate ecology. In this approach, leadership is as much an analytic model that explains, as it is a conundrum that calls for elucidation. In other words, while,

to take an example, the nature of African politics can be illuminated by a focus on individual rulers, leaders and regimes, as Jackson and Rosberg (1982) and Rotberg (2012) so successfully demonstrated (cf. Southall and Melber 2006; see also Sani 2008; Adebanwi 2009, 2014; Falola and Odhiambo 2002; Kinzer 2008; Waugh 2004; Iliffe 2011; Decalo 1998; O'Brien et al. 1989), the dynamics of individual rulers and regimes may be understood better if equal consideration is given to the socio-historical context of their production. In effect, we are challenging the common and simplistic assumption that personal rule on the African continent led to weak institutions, which in turn reinforce personal rule. The focus on personalization, to be sure, is not in itself problematic. It only becomes an issue when it results in a neglect of broader national and transnational structures and institutions and their impact upon governance. Any analysis of governance cannot simply begin and end with a discussion of personal rule or a single leader's shortcomings, no matter how egregious those are. Investigating leadership is clearly central, but can only be fully understood in the context within which leaders acted and the critical dynamics of the nature of rule in that context.

For us, therefore, it becomes even more pertinent to emphasize the global milieu in which political leadership in postcolonial Africa has emerged and has been negotiated. For instance, the prevalence of tyrannical rule in the immediate post-independence era until the dawn of political liberalization in the late-1980s is partly attributable to the logic of East-West competition in the Cold War era. Within this paradigm, personal hegemony was strengthened, if not validated, by African leaders' access to financial, military and geopolitical incentives from contending global powers. With state coffers bulging with hard currency, and, especially in the case of several francophone countries, with foreign troops never more than a phone call or telex message away (for more on the politics of a "typical" francophone country, see, for instance, the account in Takougang and Krieger 1998), leaders had scant incentive to pursue fiscal discipline, never mind mount policies that might strengthen effete state institutions.

The neoliberal era, the dawn of which can be traced to the introduction of structural adjustment by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the 1980s (Olukoshi 1998, cf. Ferguson 2006; Harvey 2005), has thrown up a similar concatenation of circumstances, leaving African leaders yet again at the relative mercy (mercy being hardly the right word here) of powerful impersonal and global forces. The defining features of the current conjuncture are too familiar to warrant a retelling: the enthronement of privatization and deregulation as the overriding principles of the economy, the unremitting marketization of nearly every

aspect of social life, and, increasingly, the helplessness of ordinary subjects when confronted with the brutal logic of global finance (Mensah 2008; Joseph 2014; Bond 2014; Piot 2010). Furthermore, and in a dynamic reminiscent of the Cold War era, African countries are having to contend with the socioeconomic and political implications of a new era of "surgical colonialism" (Bergesen 2013; cf. Connell 2013; see also Alden 2007) as a resurgent Chinese state determined not to be deterred by moral scruples aggressively pursues natural resources, advantageous trade relations, and global imperium.

To be sure, neither of these scenarios should be read as translating into a complete forfeiture of political agency, or a discounting of local reality, at least not as far as African leaders are concerned. If anything, Samuel Zalanga's retrospective on Julius Nyerere's tenure as independent Tanzania's first Prime Minister and Táíwò analysis of Awolowo's egalitarian vision prove the opposite. Nor are we suggesting that the global dimension is sufficient to illuminate the parameters of rule in postcolonial Africa. We merely insist, pace Bayart (2009: 266) "that the production of 'internal dynamics' is indissoluble from the interference of 'outside dynamics.'" Our point is that failure to reckon with the global milieu, most especially in regard to both the opportunities and challenges it contains (Obadare and Willems 2014), can only produce a stunted understanding of political leadership in postcolonial Africa. Taking "the global" seriously is doubly important at the current juncture, as the African continent once again becomes an important arena for the staging of "imperial entanglements" (Steinmetz 2013) and oppressive economic policies enable and sustain the production of precarious life among the majority (Comaroff 2007).

To engage with the global in this way is also to reckon with those powerful currents which are transforming politics and political practice across the world, and whose consequences for the way leadership is exercised cannot be overestimated. We have in mind here the sort of transformations in the society, the economy, and across class identities that Crouch (2013; cf. Runciman 2013; Przeworski 2010; Barber 2004) has housed under the label of "post-democracy." Although Crouch refers primarily to changes taking place in European industrialized societies, we are convinced that the thrust of his thesis, which identifies the profound disarticulations between politics and policy, state and society, plus a nagging sense of a general exhaustion of the political system, is directly applicable to contemporary African reality. At the very least, "post-democracy" helps to illuminate the condition in which political power is exercised and the inherent limitations of political authority even within a supposedly democratic ambiance.

Implications

What does this mean for the study of political leadership and governance in Africa? Primarily, it demands a rethinking of the ways in which the question of rule—and by extension, power—is usually framed. Although it is almost impossible to summarize the extensive scholarship on the subject (Young 2012; Chabal 1992, 1986; Ekeh 1975; Villalón and Huxtable 1998; Bates 2008; Hagmann and Korf 2012; Herbst 2000; Markovitz 1987; Bayart 2009), a certain despondency at power's apparent irremediability in postcolonial Africa cuts across the board. Hence, classifications like "parasitic," "kleptocratic," "predatory," "rentier," "bandit" and "prebendal," which, whilst not necessarily to everyone's taste, do underscore one undeniable fact about the nature of rule and power in Africa—the widespread tenacity of a social logic in which standard distinctions between the '"public" and the "private" are effectively redundant in praxis. Yet, if leadership is not to be trivialized, an understanding of how the global context furnishes the template for the construction of power is absolutely essential. This entails looking beyond the usual reductionist explanations for what Mbembe (supra) describes as Africa's propensity for "getting lost in its own movement" to careful explorations of the wide range of forces—local and global—affecting the conduct of power across postcolonial Africa.

The foregoing, at any rate, was the animating spirit behind the July 2013 International Conference on Leadership and Governance in Africa at which majority of the contributions to this volume were first presented. Held under the auspices of the Obafemi Awolowo Institute of Government and Public Policy (OAIGPP), Lagos, Nigeria in July 2013, the conference was organized as an attempt to address the question of leadership and governance in Africa in a variety of critical, theoretically driven, and empirically anchored styles. We recognized that, in many ways, the unenviable history of the African postcolony can be written around the subject of *the absence*, for the most account, of positive leadership and good governance. At the same time, the excesses and eccentricities of many African leaders mean that political leadership in Africa in relation to governance continues to exercise an unusual level of fascination for scholarly analyses and theorizing. (This is particularly so because leadership directly manifests in the nature of governance.) The prevailing tendency in such analyses is to, in a predictably circular manner, blame such excesses and eccentricities on personal rule, which leads to weak institutions, and which in turn fertilizes the soil for personal rule. It is not that the emphasis on personality, or more accurately personalization of rule, is misplaced. What seems to be the main problem, according to our reading of the

literature, is that the iteration of personalization tends to result in the neglect of the total environment that determines the nature rule itself. While the former is casually invoked, the latter is hardly historicized or adequately problematized.

Approaching leadership as "the nature of the influencing process—and its resultant outcomes—that occurs between a leader and followers" (Alves et al. 2005: 9), and governance as "the conscious management of regime structures with a view to enhancing the legitimacy of the public realm" (Hyden 1992: 7), this book examines the different ways in which leadership determines the nature of governance and the implications of this for the crisis of rule in Africa. How does the "nature of the influencing process" determine "the conscious management of [public] structures" toward enhancing legitimacy? The importance of an approach that underscores how agency is affected, even if not overdetermined, by structure and context in understanding the role of leadership and the nature of governance in analyzing the crisis of rule is articulated by Hyden (1992: 8) when he argues that governance approach to understanding African politics "sits somewhere between the two extremes [of rational choice theory and structuralist theories, both Marxist and non-Marxist] by assuming that human beings make their own history but not in circumstances of their own choice." Against this backdrop, contributors examine the actor and structural dimensions in relation to the governance realm (Ibid.: 8–15). In examining the actor—or agency—dimension, contributors examine different contexts involving how power is mobilized and used, how authority as legitimate power—"an underlying normative consensus on the rules for the exercise of power" (Ibid.)—modulates the mobilization and use of power, how "mutually rewarding and beneficial relationships" (Ibid.) of exchange are created, perpetuated or subverted, and how reciprocal relationships founded on a moral imagination of continuing relationships regulate sociopolitical relationships of exchange (Cf. ibid.: 9–11). Also, contributors examine the structural contexts in which actors *act* or in which agency is performed. As "normative framework created by human beings [competitively and cooperatively] to pursue social, economic, and political ends" (Ibid.: 10–11), structures—whether primordial or civic in Africa—offer a critical background for analyzing the performance of power, authority, exchange and reciprocity that define leadership and governance.

Therefore, leadership (i.e., good leadership) is a means to achieving governance (i.e., good governance); the contrary is true for bad leadership. The crisis of rule in this context is defined by the social struggle to link or reconcile the logic of leadership with that of governance and the social outcomes of such link or reconciliation.

As we see it, rule is the historically situated process through which governance is achieved and political power exercised by leaders, leaders who are constantly emerging and acting within a sphere of contestation—the state—mediated by class and identity. In our formulation, rule, or more precisely the specific character it has come to acquire in Africa, has to be set against a backdrop of horrific colonial violence, and postcolonial despoliation and dispossession. The particular light this throws on the study of leadership and governance in Africa is to illuminate the agency of many of the continent's postcolonial leaders as reactions that often defy, but never quite escape, the persistent trauma of the structural conditions of the historical and continued plunder, dispossession (see Butler and Athanasiou 2013; Harvey 2003) and expropriation (Lapavitsas 2009)—which, unfortunately, many of the postcolonial leaders have reproduced. This, at the very least, is what the "crisis of rule" in the theme of the current volume aspires to capture. This crisis is, first and foremost, the evident failure by African states and societies to break free from the stranglehold of chronic *Mobutism* and inaugurate the social conditions that will be generative of alternative traditions and praxes of leadership. But it also denotes the conditions of real squalor and acute economic disempowerment produced by the former. Both, clearly, are mutually reinforcing, and we reject any assumption that one can be resolved without a proper appreciation or understanding of the other, or the way in which they are mutually intertwined.

Hence, rethinking existing approaches to the study of leadership in Africa not only requires a reevaluation of the analytic lenses used; more important, it requires a change of mentality, which will force a new way of imagining, studying, analyzing, and writing about the subject—in short, a new political anthropology of African leadership, African states and the crisis of rule. With a change in analytic mentality, it would be evident how often simplistic, if not outright naïve, many of the recent analyses of democracy, governance, the role of international agencies, and the state in Africa tend to be. The contributions to this volume, grouped respectively under the rubrics of "Postcolonial and Decolonial Philosophies of Leadership," "Nation-Building and the Question of Rule," and "Power, Governance and Non-State Leadership" attempt, in different ways, to overcome the limitations that we have identified, and show the value of a historically informed and context-specific approach.

But there is also a different sort of justification, or perhaps orientation, for the volume as a whole. Despite the overwhelming focus in both academic and lay literature on bad leadership in Africa, the continent has actually produced outstanding leaders in all spheres of human endeavor and at every level of state and society. From the exceptionally

self-abnegating type, like Nelson Mandela (subject of the chapter by Ndlovu-Gatsheni) and Albert Luthuli; to the thinker-visionaries (Julius Nyerere, Obafemi Awolowo, Kwame Nkrumah Nnamdi Azikiwe, Amilcar Cabral and Léopold Sédar Senghor are exemplars; the first two are subjects of Zalanga and Táíwò's chapters); the leader as revolutionary (Amilcar Cabral, Chris Hani and early Robert Mugabe easily come to mind); social reformers (Desmond Tutu, Aminu Kano, and Wangari Maathai); and activist-public intellectuals (Wole Soyinka, Ngugi Wa Thiongo, Ruth First, Joe Slovo, and Steve Biko, to mention a few), Africa has always had a legitimate claim to leaders of distinction. To the extent that such leaders have been too easily brushed over in the stampede to either pathologize or exceptionalize, the current volume, with its readiness to shower critical applause where it is due (see chapters by Táíwò, Gambari and Ndlovu-Gatsheni especially), stands as a much needed corrective, a token effort to restore some balance to a sub-field that urgently requires it. This is without prejudice to examining bad leadership (see chapters by Ndjio, Msindo and Reno).

In any case, given the myriad challenges to, and opportunities for leadership which have been mandated by the ascendance of neo-liberalism, the limitless horizons of globalization, the undeniable push for greater democratization and transparency, and the unprecedented diffusion of new media technologies (including social media and mobile phones) in contemporary Africa, it is difficult to imagine a more exciting time to be a student of leadership and governance in Africa. It is against this backdrop that we explore various dimensions of leadership and their connections to governance, with an emphasis on the moral and intellectual qualities of leadership, as well as the regional and transnational sociological factors that constrain the parameters, praxes and rituals of leadership on the continent.

Postcolonial and Decolonial Philosophies of Leadership

Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni's chapter is a theoretically informed attempt to unwrap the riddle of the Mandela legacy. The chapter uses what the author describes as "a critical decolonial ethics" to analyze the emergence of Mandela as a humanistic leader, and argues that, principally because of the leadership role that he played in the negotiations that culminated in a more or less non-violent transition to democratic rule, Mandela in effect inaugurated a paradigm shift from the Nuremberg paradigm of justice, which privileges the victim and advocates for criminal prosecution and punishments of individuals, to a "more humane" paradigm of political justice issuing from a survivor's desk and privileging political reform and

overall transformation of settler/native/perpetrator/victim identities. Along the way, Ndlovu-Gatsheni weighs the different elements that went into the forging of Mandela's unique political temperament, including the lessons gleaned from his (i.e., Mandela's) Xhosa traditional society's mode of governance. In Ndlovu-Gatsheni's rendering, Mandela becomes an epitome for leadership as "acting," and whatever philosophy of leadership may be attributed to the late statesman has to be grounded in his specific "politics of life."

If Mandela's leadership philosophy may be gleaned from his actions, that of Obafemi Awolowo, the exemplary nationalist who was the first premier of the Western Region during the botched Nigerian First Republic (1960–1966), could be approached through his writings. The central question at the heart of Olúfẹ́mi Táíwò's chapter is that of knowledge and knowledge-production. However, contra the standard focus on knowledge generated in mainstream sites of knowledge-production like universities and think tanks, Táíwò's interest is in the kind of knowledge produced by African statesmen and women—something, he argues, that Africa's professional philosophers have by and large ignored. The dominant attitude, he laments, is that "We are all too eager to assimilate their writings to their political concerns when we are not actively denigrating them as unworthy of our scholarly attention." Drawing on Awolowo's extensive writings on politics, nationalism, the economy, and democracy, Táíwò shows that the writings of the leading African statesmen and women, many of which are models of philosophical rigor, contain timeless principles and postulations that can be used for the necessary task of social, political, economic, educational and cultural engineering in Africa. The chief impediment to making use of such postulations, Táíwò regrets, is the "displacement of knowledge from the horizon" in Africa. Táíwò's contribution foregrounds and reinstates an important ingredient—knowledge—which is often absent from most analyses of the leadership question in Africa. He shows that without taking seriously knowledge and the vagaries of its production, there can be no positive discussion of leadership and governance.

By drawing, if only in part, on the writings of Julius Nyerere, first president of independent Tanzania and a contender for the twentieth century's most disciplined and morally-serious leader, Zalanga validates Taiwo's perspective on the need to take leaders as philosophers in their own right. But Zalanga's interest is not in the writings of Nyerere per se. Instead, through them he seeks to construct a portrait of Nyerere's unique mode of leadership, with the aim of capturing the macro historical and cultural forces that shaped both his personality and leadership style. In reading Nyerere's public statements with his actual performances, Zalanga is able to approach and scrutinize many of the

conceptual thematics typically glossed over or, in a few cases, overlooked outright, in examinations of leadership in Africa.

Nation-Building and the Question of Rule

A basic aim of this volume is to highlight the local and global factors constraining the exercise of leadership by postcolonial African leaders. As stated earlier, in pursuing this aim, our desire is not to manufacture excuses for African leaders. On the contrary, we seek to encourage an appreciation of the variety and complexity of factors influencing those leaders. This we do as a way of broadening scholarly understanding of political leadership itself. Warris Vianni's chapter on Jomo Kenyatta, independent Kenya's first prime minister and president, typifies this ambition. Using one historical episode—the late Kenyatta's handling of the Mau Mau's demand for land as compensation for their (Mau Mau's) contribution to the termination of colonial rule in the country—Vianni shows that leaders invariably assume positionality in the shadow of "a complex interplay of constraints and influences," while seeking to balance "the interests of different classes and patrons." Against the backdrop of a brutal colonial history, which continued to excite passions across a spectrum of clashing constituencies, Kenyatta earned antagonism and adulation in almost equal measure, whilst continuing to radiate natural authority with which he maintained relative political stability.

Basile Ndjio traces the historical evolution of citizenship in postcolonial Cameroon through a comparison of the contrasting policies of former president Ahmadou Ahidjo (1960–1982) and the incumbent, Paul Biya (1982–). He contends that while the former's hegemonic project of "citizenization" aimed at homogenizing a heterogeneous population, while the latter's "ethnicization" policy is a strategy to preclude "the emergence of a nationalist or trans-ethnic consciousness" (cf. Geschiere 2009). At the heart of Ndjio's analysis is the issue of how power is exercised and deployed under changing conditions of rule—brought about by global intellectual and political transformations—linked creatively to the ways in which the imagination of citizenship has mutated in postcolonial Cameroon, specifically, and the rest of postcolonial Africa, in general. This dynamic has produced many intriguing results. For instance, Ndjio argues that, rather than an indication of civic flourishing, the associational turn in Cameroonian society over the past three decades may in fact owe to the rise of "corrosive ethnic particularisms."

Much scholarly—and not so scholarly—ink has been spilled on the regime of Robert Mugabe (see, for instance, Chan 2003; Meredith 2007; Holland 2010; Godwin 2011; cf. Hill 2003), the Zimbabwean

leader who, over the past two decades, seems to have gone through a total transformation from hero to villain. In the 1980s, Robert Mugabe was a beloved icon of the anti-colonial struggle, widely admired both at home and abroad, and across the ideological spectrum. However, since the 1990s, Mugabe has faced intense domestic and international opposition, and these days, for many in the West, he is the very epitome of all that is wrong with political leadership in Africa. Enocent Msindo, while not exonerating Mugabe of accusations of highhandedness and chicanery, seeks instead to understand why Mugabe, opposition to his regime notwithstanding, has been able to hold on to power. Msindo traces Mugabe's political longevity to his possession of three crucial attributes—a revolutionary, an intellectual, and a statesman. An understanding of his (Mugabe's) deft manipulation and juggling of these attributes by presenting different "faces" to different "publics," Msindo contends, is the key to unlocking the "secrets" of his durability. The chapter also shows how Mugabe has benefited from the politics of factionalism within the Zimbabwean nationalist movement and within the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) both leading up to and following independence in 1980. Much as the factionalism within his party and among the opposition has been crucial to his durability, it is clear that Mugabe could not have lasted so long in power without his personal charisma, an attribute that even his fiercest critics readily concede to him.

For his part, Ibrahim Gambari revisits the legacy of the late Nigerian nationalist, Sir Ahmadu Bello, especially his efforts to ensure that the forces of modernization did not leave behind Northern Nigeria, as Nigeria transformed from a colonial to a postcolonial state. The core of the chapter is the raft of policies he instituted as premier of Northern Nigeria (1954–1966), and his readiness to embrace new ideas, even when those ideas placed him on the path of collision with established conservative forces. Gambari also traces the process of the Sardauna's formation, highlighting the role that religion and ideas of communal solidarity played in his personal evolution. Crucially, Gambari does not neglect the obstacles that Sir Ahmadu Bello faced as he tried to steer his region in a new direction, but argues on the contrary that it was his undisputed success in overcoming them that made him stand out as a leader of distinction.

Power, Governance and Non-State Leadership

Until recently, governance was the *idée fixe* of international financial agencies in Africa, above all the World Bank and the International

Monetary Fund (IMF). Defined by the former (1994: xiv) as "the form of political regime in a given country, the process by which authority is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for development, the framework of laws, the structure of accountability, and the capacity of governments to design, formulate and implement policies and discharge functions," governance was heralded and promoted as the long sought for answer to the continent's development conundrum. But not unlike civil society—coincidentally the "civic aspect" that was seen as pivotal to its "implementation"—the Bank's usage of governance tended to be techno-managerial, lacking in necessary historical depth. Olukoshi (1998), echoing the disappointment of many leftist intellectuals, has argued that the focus on "good" governance was always misplaced, and that the Bank ought to have concentrated instead on "democratic" governance. Be that as it may, traces of the governance campaign survive in the attempt to forge a path to development via the pursuit of various Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and similar so-called growth-targeted strategies (compare for instance Noman et al. 2012; Booth and Cammack 2013). Collectively, the contributions in this section extend previous efforts by African intellectuals to rehabilitate the idea of governance by grounding it in a theoretical and historical crucible. The challenge of governance in contemporary Africa—which has been trivialized by the IFIs and some development agencies—must be grounded in the inherent violence of structural crisis in the contemporary African state, the enduring incapacity of this state to guarantee justice, liberty, equity and the opportunities for the pursuit of happiness, and the ways in which this crisis downloads these tasks on individual beneficent leaders—such as Big Men (Animasawun's chapter) and ethical leaders (Ilesanmi's chapter), or violent leaders—such as insurgents (Reno's chapter) and managers of the instruments of legitimate violence (Iheduru's chapter).

William Reno's chapter is an original and fascinating attempt to grapple with the usually overlooked problem of leadership among insurgent groups. How do insurgent groups recruit their leaders? How do such leaders exercise leadership within their groups? How do conditions within and external to such groups affect the recruitment and exercise of leadership? These are three of the several important questions that Reno, bringing to bear decades of expertise on the subject, tries to answer in his contribution, and his most significant insight is to show how changes in the nature of insurgent leadership are a crucial factor in explaining "the shift in the organization and behavior of Africa's insurgencies." Drawing on the work of James Scott, Reno cautions against the tendency to see insurgent leaders uniformly. More important, he shows that most insurgencies themselves are nothing

more than a coalition of diverse rebellions. In clarifying and deepening academic understanding of insurgencies and the different ways in which leadership is exercised in them, Reno's historically grounded chapter furnishes important insights which could be invaluable for attempts at conflict resolution in Africa. All in all, Reno's is a solid case for the inclusion of "insurgent leadership" in the long list of the emergent forms or *styles* of leadership in Africa. Against the backdrop of a tradition of strong political leaders across the continent, he sharply contrasts what seems to be the dominant model of leadership with the emergent "insurgent leaders" and their "record of predation and fragmentation." Finally, he examines the socioeconomic factors that undermine the formation of centrally organized ideological, armed groups in Africa and the implications for the present and future of the afflicted states in the continent.

Weaving together insights from moral philosophy, religious studies, and constitutional law, Simeon Ilesanmi's chapter is an inquiry into what the author himself describes as "the normative dimensions of leadership as a basis for a reconsideration of the meaning and purpose of politics in human life, broadly construed." While enabling a conversation between thinkers and modes of thought spread across various spatio-temporalities, Ilesanmi grapples with the ethical, civic and constitutional conundrums elicited by the rash of anti-gay legislations in different parts of Africa. With this, he poses the question of the limits of the right of a political community over its constituent individuals, and what it means for our understanding of "the proper role of government in situations of value pluralism." Though he stops short of offering a full-blown theory of rights, we are not in any doubt as to where Ilesanmi's sympathies lie in the old individual versus community dilemma. For him, "human beings are the intended beneficiaries of rights, and . . . when the putative rights of other entities, including the states, conflict with *human* rights, those entities must yield the right of way" (italics in original).

Although it grapples with the general subject of power under democratic control, Iheduru's chapter stands apart from the remaining contributions to this volume because of its focus on leadership in the military. Given the role of the military in the politics of many African countries in the post-independence era, the importance of this cannot be overestimated, and Iheduru's analysis is a timely reminder of the continued political salience of the military leadership even in a democratic context. The chapter's overall objective is to deepen our understanding of the conditions under which military leadership in post-transition Nigeria – that is, after 1999 – has been produced, and how those conditions have shaped and are being shaped in return by the kinds of leaders and leadership paths of the Nigerian Army under

elected civilian authorities. While extant studies of civil military-relations and security sector reforms "assume that civilian leadership will prioritize control over the military," Iheduru argues that early attempts by military leaders to reinvent the military as a "political actor" were, in fact, largely cosmetic. The chapter opens a fresh line of inquiry into the internal leadership process of the armed forces, which, the author argues, is a key but largely neglected component of studies of civil-military relations.

The subject of charismatic leadership is the focus of Gbemisola Aniwasawun's contribution. With the political career of the late conservative Nigerian politician and Big Man, Olusola Saraki, as pivot, Aminasawun approaches the idea of charismatic leadership as an entrée into that alternate but nonetheless resilient cosmos where formal institutions may be weak or even completely absent, but where, as some have suggested, the real source of political power may sometimes be found. Animasawun also argues that, for the most part, patron-client relations at the local level have been insufficiently covered in the literature. At the same time, he holds, patrons or patrimonial figures at the local level, "even where they have a lot of power and influence beyond their locality, are usually not approached as 'leaders' in the literature on leadership and governance." To fill this critical hiatus, Animasawun analyzes the career of the late Olusola Saraki, and shows that his charismatic leadership was of a piece with his astute manipulation of (the Islamic) religion, social philanthropy, and traditionally anchored relations of exchange.

Conclusion

Leadership continues to provide a fascinating standpoint from which postcolonial African societies may be analyzed. However, perhaps because of the negative connotations associated with the subject across postcolonial African history, its potentiality as a key to unlocking various aspects of political practice on the continent remains largely under-appreciated. Indeed, for the most account, it has sufficed to affirm as matter of fact, and without any need for further elucidation, that the problem with Africa is the problem of leadership. We have no wish to come to the defense of contemporary African leaders. Instead, what we hope to achieve with the essays collected in this volume is to put the challenges and opportunities of leadership on the continent in context, to engage local, national and global constraints, and consider a range of leadership roles and styles. Instead of focusing only on the failings on individual leaders—and they are abundant—we wish to call attention instead to the changing temporalities in which leadership is produced as they confront the different structural opportunities and

constraints posed at different points by the dynamics of rule. For us, political leadership in Africa does not exist in isolation, but is often times a combination of practices shaped, if not determined, by overlapping historical, socioeconomic and cultural factors, both local and global. Whilst a tunnel-vision emphasis on leadership as a problem is not without its uses, it comes with a real danger of glossing over habitus.

At any rate, and as indicated earlier, many of the problems encountered in investigating political leadership in postcolonial Africa are bound to be discovered in any other context. Worldwide, leaders are idiosyncratic; they never act alone; leaders interact with and are influenced by other actors in state and society, from the most local to the global; they arguably set agendas or strongly influence what issues are addressed and which are to be ignored; they manage and build (or destroy) networks; they build or undermine institutions; they gather supporters. They do all this whilst wielding and dispensing various forms of power. As such, studying African post-colonial experiences is, for us, a way of providing key questions and approaches to studying leadership in other regions as well. The chapters in this volume show that it is possible to accomplish this task while keeping in view the particular challenges faced both by leaders and analysts researching leadership in postcolonial Africa.

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Postcolonial and Decolonial Philosophies of Leadership

Nelson Mandela and the Politics of Life

Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni

Introduction

The idea of politics of life is well-articulated by the Latin American philosopher and historian Enrique Dussel in his *Twenty Theses on Politics* (2008). In this work, the politics of liberation is understood as "politics of life with others and for others" (Mendieta 2008: viii). It is a politics that is formulated and thought of from the "underside" of Euro-North American-centric modernity that authorized mercantilism, the slave trade, imperialism, colonialism, apartheid and underdevelopment. These processes and events contributed to corruption of "the noble vocation of politics" which is that of inscription of "the will to live" (Dussel 2008: 78–82). The corruption of politics takes the form of what Dussel (2008: 3), arguably inspired by Nietzsche's "will to power," calls "the fetishism of power."

Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela emerges as an embodiment of the politics of life from the centre of this imperial/colonial/apartheid milieu vehemently opposed to the paradigm of war, logic of racism and coloniality to the extent of being prepared to die for the cause of democracy and human rights, long before these values were globally accepted as part of the post-Cold War international normative order. This set Mandela apart as a leader who was fully committed to decolonial ethical humanism that underpins the will to live. Even after enduring 27 years of incarceration at the notorious Robben Island, Mandela avoided bitterness and preached the gospel of racial harmony, reconciliation and democracy.

Mandela's leadership role during the transition from apartheid to democracy inaugurated a shift from the Nuremberg paradigm of justice

to a new paradigm of political justice that privileged political reform and social transformation as its teleology in a post-Cold global context in which neo-liberal discourse emphasized liberal democracy and human rights as the normative order of the world. When he became the first black president of a democratic South Africa, Mandela practically and symbolically made important overtures to the erstwhile white racists that were aimed at hailing them back to a new, inclusive, non-racial, democratic, and pluriversal society known as "the rainbow nation." However, it must be pointed out from this outset that despite the profound impact that Mandela and his decolonial ethical humanist political thought had upon the people around the world, he could not single-handedly influence a Euro-North American centric world system that was impervious to decolonization and the modern global order that was inherently imperial. This is why his ideas and influence could not immediately produce economic transformation and social justice in South Africa. Mandela had to navigate and negotiate with global economic constraints that were too strong to the extent that some sections of society viewed him as too soft on issues of economic transformation and economic justice. Despite these constraints, Mandela managed to deliver South Africa from the notorious apartheid system and avoided a racial bloodbath that was always looming. Thus, from a critical decolonial humanist perspective, what Mandela delivered in 1994 was a beginning, and not the end, of dismantling apartheid.

This chapter deploys a critical decolonial ethics of liberation to analyze the "Mandela phenomenon" (idea, symbol, signifier, voice and representation) as an encapsulation of humility, integrity, generosity of spirit, and wisdom. This interpretation identifies Mandela as a creature and advocate of decolonial humanism and servant leadership, informed by what Dussel (2008: xvi) terms "obidential power," entailing leading and commanding "by obeying." Decolonial humanism is opposed to the paradigm of war and is committed to the advancement of the unfinished and ongoing project of decolonization as a precondition for the paradigm of peace and post-racial pluriversal humanism. Therefore, this chapter on Mandela as a leader and a "phenomenon" inevitably ventures into critical engagement with the broader question of the meaning and essence of being human (subject, subjection, subjectivity, resistance, and liberation) and conditions that inhibited the human flourishing—in this case, the paradigm of war and apartheid. More precisely, Mandela's life of struggle and legacy is part of what the philosopher and decolonial theorist Maldonado-Torres (2008a: 115) terms "a third humanist revolution that has existed alongside the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, always pointing to their constitutive exclusions and aiming to provide a more consistent narrative of the affirmation of the value of the entire human species."

In decolonial theory of the human, the first humanist revolution was during the Renaissance, when a "shift from a God-centred worldview to a Man-centred conception of selves, others, and world" was initiated (Maldonado-Torres 2008a: 106). The second was with Enlightenment humanism, which Kant (1996: 58) celebrated as mankind's emergence and liberation from "self-incurred immaturity" resulting in the creation of modern institutions ranging from Inquisition, the nation-state, modern racial slavery, to the establishment of universities as centers of studying the humanities (see also Maldonado-Torres 2008b: 109). The third humanist revolution is driven by thinkers, activists and intellectuals from the Global South, who have experienced the undersides of modernity, which included enslavement and colonization, and is therefore inevitably predicated on decolonizing and deimperializing the world as part of breaking from the paradigm of war. Its horizon is black people regaining ontological density and a new post-racial pluriversality.

In this chapter, the "Mandela phenomenon" is cast as a direct challenge to the paradigm of war that Friedrich Nietzsche, in his *The Will to Power* (1968), articulated so well, insisting that war was the natural state of things and that human beings were destined to rarely want peace, and if they do, only for brief periods of time. To Nietzsche (1968: 550) "the world is the will to power." It is dominated by human beings who were always attempting to impose their will on others. According to Nietzsche, there were no truly altruistic human actions, and the idea of selfless action was discounted as a psychological error informed by Judeo-Christian thought. According to Nietzsche (1968: 382), "The commandment to love one's neighbor has never yet been extended to include one's actual neighbor." It was the same Nietzsche (1990: 102) [1909] who posited that "He who fights with monsters should look to it that he himself does not become a monster [. . .] When you gaze long into an abyss the abyss gazes into you." Here Nietzsche was addressing the other important aspect of the paradigm of war—dehumanizing its victims and making them see war as natural, in the process falling into what Fanon (1968) understood as "repetition without change." In this case, repetition without change takes the form of embracing the paradigm of war and degenerating into what Jean-Paul Sartre termed "anti-racist racism" in one's search and struggle for peace and new humanism.

Mandela's life of struggle and his legacy challenge the paradigm of war and its ability to turn those who were involved in the liberation struggle against such monstrosities as imperialism, colonialism, apartheid, neocolonialism, and coloniality to end up becoming monsters themselves. This article deploys critical decolonial ethics of liberation to open a canvas on the meaning of Mandela, suggesting that he stood for a paradigm of peace, and his life of struggle became an embodiment of pluriversal humanism (a world in which many worlds fit, see Mignolo 2011) that is

opposed to the paradigm of war and racial hatred that emerged at the dawn of a Euro-North American-centric modernity. The paradigm of war is founded on the politics of racial hatred and denial of humanity of black people, which is part of the darker side/underside of modernity (see Mignolo 1995, 2000, 2011).

Apartheid colonialism and the apartheid regime that came to power in South Africa in 1948 were a typical manifestation of this darker/underside of modernity. It had survived the early decolonization processes of the 1960s, and it continued to defy global anti-apartheid onslaught until 1994. Apartheid existed as form of coloniality, which is not only a darker/underside of modernity that has survived direct administrative colonialism, but is also a constitutive element of the paradigm of war and coloniality (Maldonado-Torres 2007; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013a, b). Quijano (2000, 2007) a leading Peruvian sociologist, defined coloniality as a global power structure underpinned by four invisible colonial matrices of power, namely *control of the economy*, based on appropriation of natural resources, including land and labor, as well as financing of indebted countries; *control of authority*, through imperial institutions and use of military and sophisticated technology; *control of gender and sexuality*, through projection of Christian, bourgeois and monogamous family as a model for the rest of the world and naturalization of human heterosexual relations; *control of knowledge and subjectivity*, through universalization of rationalist-scientific, Euro-North American-centric epistemology, drawing from the Cartesian *cogito* (see also Mignolo 2007; Grosfoguel 2007; Maldonado-Torres 2007).

A broader canvas is opened that places Mandela at the centre of a broader decolonial critique of modernity/imperiality/coloniality/apartheid system. Mandela's political struggles, as encapsulated in his autobiography, and as demonstrated in actual leadership of the ANC during the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), as well as his presidency, collectively signify the consistent push for a decolonial turn, which Maldonado-Torres (2008a: 8) articulated as including "the definitive entry of enslaved and colonized subjectivities into the realm of thought at previously unknown institutional levels." The premise of this article is in tandem with Maldonado-Torres' (2008a: 8) argument: "If the problem of the twentieth century and indeed the problem of modernity, is the problem of the color line, the solution for the twentieth and twenty-first centuries is, at least in part, the de-colonial turn" (see also Du Bois 1903). Mandela, in this case, is studied as the voice, conscience, and representative of the enslaved, colonized and dehumanized subjectivities that have, since the time of colonial encounters, been fighting for restoration of their lost ontological density and for a new post-racial-pluriversal world.

The chapter is organized into four broad sections. The first provides a theoretical framework in which such concepts as decoloniality, critical decolonial ethics of liberation, paradigm of war, paradigm of peace, and pluriversalism are defined and evaluated in terms of their conceptual value. The second section delves deeper into Mandela's various lives and faces, as it elaborates on his political formation and crystallization of a global iconoclastic figure. The third section is a critical evaluation of Mandela's leadership during the transition to multiracial democracy negotiations as signaling a departure from the Nuremberg paradigm, which privileges the victim's justice and advocates for criminal prosecution and punishments of individuals, to a broader paradigm of political justice, issuing from a survivor's desk and privileging political reform and overall metamorphosis of settler/native/perpetrator/victim identities (Mamdani 2013a, b). The fourth section analyses the Mandela presidency (1994–1998), with a particular focus on nation-building. The last section is the conclusion.

Mandela and the Politics of Life

Dussel (2008: 78) argues, "The victims of the prevailing political system cannot live fully (this is why they are victims). Their 'Will-to-Live' has been negated by the Will-to-Power of the powerful." He elaborates that "this Will-to-Live against all adversity, pain, and imminent death is transformed into a infinite source for the creation of the new" (ibid.). The will to live was at the centre of Mandela's preparedness to walk through the shadow of death as part of the long-walk to freedom. It is the nerve centre of the paradigm of peace that Mandela's life of struggle and legacy embodied and symbolized. Mandela was opposed to the paradigm of war, even though the intransigency and brutality of the apartheid regime forced him to embrace violence and war as a protection for those who were victims of the apartheid system.

A paradigm of war is defined as "a way of conceiving humanity, knowledge, and social relations that privileges conflict or *polemos*" (Maldonado-Torres 2008a: 3). In his ground-breaking book, entitled *Against War* (2008), the philosopher and decolonial theorist Maldonado-Torres articulated the core contours of the paradigm of war that are constitutive of coloniality. Coloniality, which is defined in the previous section of this article, is genealogically traceable to the emergence a Euro-North American-centric modernity in 1492, a date that decolonial theorists identify as figuratively marking the birth of the modern world-system and its shifting global orders (Blaut 1987; Mignolo 1995, 2000, 2011; Quijano 2000; Grosfoguel 2007, 2011; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013c).

Christopher Columbus's breakthrough—reaching the Americas—which became known as the discovery of the "New World" in imperial/

colonial discourse, is interpreted by decolonial theorists as paradigmatic in a number of ways. First, it is said to have marked the birth of a world capitalist economy whose nerve centre became the Atlantic region. Second, it opened the resources of Latin America to colonial exploitation of Europe. Third, it marked the beginning of the rise of Europe and the crystallization of its notion of being the centre of the world. Taken together, these developments marked the birth of a peculiar Euro-North American-centric modernity and a new world-system founded on racism (Blaut 1987; Amin 1989; Mignolo 1995, 2000, 2011; Quijano 2000, 2007; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013a, b).

The rise of Euro-North American-centric modernity enabled the birth of modern subjectivity mediated by race as an organizing principle. A unique modernist consciousness that manifested itself in terms of a radical ontological unevenness between Euro-North Americans and non-Europeans emerged. A world system that Grosfoguel (2007, 2011) characterized as racially hierarchized, patriarchal, sexist, heteronormative, Euro-North American-centric, Christian-centric, capitalist, imperial, colonial and modern, was also born. This world system was managed by what became known as Cartesian subjects (Euro-North American people) who had elevated themselves into a master race that was capable of using secular knowledge and science to overcome all obstacles to human happiness. These Cartesian subjects claimed "being" for themselves and relegated all other people who were not of European stock and descent to the realm of "becoming" human (Maldonado-Torres 2007; Grosfoguel 2007; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013a, b). At the centre on this Euro-North American-centric world was what Maldonado-Torres (2007: 245) articulated as imperial Manichean misanthropic skepticism that was naturalized through the use of natural science to produce scientific racism. As elaborated by Maldonado-Torres (2007: 245): "Manichean misanthropic skepticism is not skeptical about the existence of the world or the normative status of logics and mathematics. It is rather a form of questioning the very humanity of colonized peoples." Constitutively, the paradigm of war is fed by racism and is inextricably tied to "a peculiar death ethic that renders massacre and different forms of genocide as natural" (Maldonado-Torres 2008b: xi).

Thus, while the paradigm of war is traceable to the birth of Euro-North American-centric modernity and capitalism, the paradigm of peace originated in the Global South as an epistemic site in which the slave trade, imperialism, colonialism and apartheid were practiced. The paradigm of peace is traceable to people such as former slaves, like Ottobah Cugoano, who wrote *Thoughts on the Evils of Slavery and Other Writings* (1999), expressing his dismay at how Europeans who claimed to be Christians had embarked on the slave trade. The paradigm of peace is founded on what the philosopher, historian and theologian Enrique Dussel in his

Twenty Theses on Politics (2008) describes as the politics of life. Mendieta (2008: viii) elaborates on what Dussel (1989, 2011) terms "philosophy of liberation/politics of liberation," highlighting what he terms "a politics of life with others and for others" and "a politics of life and for life, a politics from the underside of necrophilic globalization."

Mandela was not the first leader emerging from the Global South to embrace and articulate critical decolonial ethics of liberation as the foundation of a new politics of life as opposed to imperial politics of death. Such previous decolonial humanists as Mahatma Gandhi, Aime Cesaire, William E. B. Du Bois, C. L. R. James, Albert Luthuli, Thomas Sankara, Frantz Fanon, Kenneth Kaunda, and many others were opposed to the paradigm of war (Cesaire 1955; James 1963; Du Bois 1965; Fanon 1968; Falola 2001; Rabaka 2010). Decolonization and deimperialization were considered essential pre-requisites for a paradigm of peace to prevail. It had to be followed by the return of humanism as a foundation of socialist society, where there was no exploitation of human beings by others.

For example, the former president Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia became one of the leading advocates of humanism as indicated in the Mulugushi Declaration (Kaunda and Morris 1966). Others, like former president Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal, articulated humanism in terms of negritude and socialism. It was Senghor (1967) who described socialism as a form of humanism and explained that when he and Aime Cesaire formulated the term "negritude" in the 1930s, they were plunged into a state of panic and despair as the horizon of liberation was blocked, with colonialists justifying colonialism by using the theory of the *tabula rasa* (Senghor cited in Ahluwalia 2003: 32). Negritude as a liberatory utopia emerged in struggle as Africans strove "to divest ourselves of our borrowed attire—that of assimilation—and assert our being; that is to say our *negritude*" (ibid.).

The former president of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, like Senghor, understood humanism in terms of African socialism, which he tried to implement in the form of *Ujamaa villages* (Nyerere 1968). Kwame Nkrumah, former president of Ghana, articulated humanism in terms of African personality, concienscism and pan-Africanism. Nkrumah (1964: 70) advocated for a new harmonious African society born out of a synthesis of Islamic, Euro-Christian and African values. Mandela understood humanism as *Ubuntu* as a foundation for a rainbow nation (Mandela 1994). Therefore, here the concept of humanism is used to mean all those progressive efforts evolved by colonized and racialized subjects in the course of their struggle to regain their lost ontological density. This point is well-captured by the leading African novelist and humanist Chinua Achebe:

> You have all heard of African personality; of African democracy; of African way to socialism, of negritude, and so on. They are all props we have

fashioned at different times to help us get on our feet again. Once we are up we shall not need any of them anymore. But for the moment it is in the nature of things that we may need to counter racism with what Jean-Paul Sartre has called anti-racist racism, to announce not just that we are good as the next man but that we are better. (Achebe in Ahluwalia 2001: 61)

The paradigm of peace is therefore inextricably linked with decoloniality. It is made possible by decolonial turn. Du Bois in 1903 announced "decolonial turn" as a rebellion against what he termed the "colour line" that was constitutive of the core problems of the twentieth century. By the problem of the colour line, Du Bois was speaking of increasing racism and the forms of resistance and opposition that it was provoking. But broadly, decolonial turn embodies critical decolonial ethics of liberation:

It posits the primacy of ethics as an antidote to problems with Western conceptions of freedom, autonomy and equality, as well as the necessity of politics to forge a world where ethical relations become the norm rather than the exception. The de-colonial turn highlights the epistemic relevance of the enslaved and colonized search for humanity. (Maldonado-Torres 2008a: 7)

Novelist Ngugi wa Thiong'o (1993, 2009) expressed the decolonial turn in terms of "moving the centre" (from Eurocentrism/Europhonism to a plurality of cultures) toward "re-membering Africa" (addressing Africa's fragmentation that was imposed by imperialism and colonialism, and restoring African ontological density and cultural identity). It therefore becomes clear that decolonial turn is rooted in struggles against racism, the slave trade, imperialism, colonialism and apartheid. But as Maldonado-Torres (2008a: 7) notes, decolonial turn "began to take definitive form after the end of the Second World War and the beginnings of the wars for liberation of many colonised countries soon after."

Critical decolonial ethics of liberation differ from the postcolonial approaches that became dominant in the 1990s in a number of ways. Genealogically, decoloniality and critical decolonial ethics of liberation, are traceable to anti-slave trade, anti-imperialist, anti-colonial and anti-apartheid thinkers originating from the Global South, whereas postcolonialism is traceable to thinkers from the Global North, such as Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Antonio Gramsci, among many others. Postcolonialism was then popularized by those scholars from the Global South working in North American academies, such as Edward Said, Homi Bhabha, Gayatri Spivak and others (Grosfoguel 2007: 211). The core subject of attack in postcolonialism is meta-narratives and ideological certitudes. Decoloniality grapples with what Grosfoguel (2007)

terms "hetararchies" of power, knowledge and being that sustained an asymmetrical modern global system.

In terms of horizon, decoloniality seeks a decolonized and deimperialised world in which new pluriversal humanity is possible. Postcolonialism is part of "critique of modernity within modernity," which genealogically builds on Marxism, poststructuralism, and postmodernism. These critical social theoretical interventions do not directly address what decolonial theorists termed "coloniality" as the underside/darker side of Euro-North American-centric modernity. Coloniality of being that took the form of hierarchization of human races and questioning of the very humanity of black people is one of the major departure points of decolonial approaches. Decoloniality gestures toward pluriversality (a world within which many worlds fit harmoniously and co-exist peacefully). This is in tandem with Mandela's push for *ubuntu* (the African ethic of community, co-humanness, unity, and harmony) and the "rainbow nation" (Campbell 2013). These are typical examples of the decolonial horizon.

Mandela's life of struggle and his legacy is an embodiment of a consistent and active search for peace and harmony. In his autobiography, Mandela states,

> I always know that deep down in every human heart, there was mercy and generosity. No one is born hating another person because of the colour of his skin, or his background, or his religion. People must learn to hate, and if they can learn to hate, they can be taught love, for love comes more naturally to the human heart than its opposite. Even the grimmest times in prison, when my comrades and I were pushed to our limits, I would see a glimmer of humanity in one of the guards, perhaps just for a second, but it was enough to assure me and keep me going. Man's goodness is a flame that can be hidden but never extinguished. (Mandela 1994: 609)

Mandela, in a typical decolonial ethics of liberation, interprets the anti-colonial/anti-apartheid struggle as a humanistic movement for restoration of human life. This is how he puts it: "This then is what the ANC is fighting for. Their struggle is a truly national one. It is a struggle of the African people, inspired by their own suffering and their own experience. *It is a struggle for the right to live*" (my emphasis) (ibid.: 352).

This paradigm of peace marks a radical humanistic-oriented departure from the paradigm of war. It is premised on a radically humanistic phenomenology of liberation aimed at rescuing those people reduced by racism to the category of the "wretched of the earth" through recovery of their lost ontological density and epistemic virtues. Thus, what one gleans from Mandela's *Long Walk to Freedom* is that, in the face of apartheid official and institutionalized racism as well as brutality and

intolerance of dissent, he emerged as the advocate of decolonization, a fighter for freedom, and the face of new, non-racial, inclusive humanism. It would seem that Mandela was ahead of his time. This is evident from his clear articulation of the discourse of democracy and human rights, long before it became a major global normative issue. For many political actors and leaders, the discourse of democracy and human rights became a major issue at the end of the Cold War. But Mandela had already vowed to die for democracy and free society as far back as the 1960s.

What is also distinctive about Mandela is that he did not easily dismiss the Euro-North American modernist project of emancipation. He fought for the realization of those positive aspects of it that were denied to Africans but were enjoyed in Europe and North America. Here was an African located in the "zone of non-being" (Fanon 1968), claiming entitlement to the fruits of Euro-North American-centric modernity on the basis of being a human being with equal ontological density to those residing in Europe and the white colonialists resident in Africa.

Zizek (2013) credits Mandela with providing a model of how to liberate a country from apartheid colonialism "without succumbing to the temptation of dictatorial power and anti-capitalist posturing." He elaborates that "Mandela was not Mugabe," as he maintained South Africa as a multi-party-democracy, ensuring that the vibrancy of the national economy was insulated from "hasty socialist experiments" (ibid.). Mandela was worried more about denial of democracy rather than its Euro-North American genealogy and articulation. It would seem that, to Mandela, democracy and freedom were simple positive human values that have to be enjoyed by every human, being irrespective of race and location.

Interestingly, Mandela also credited his Xhosa traditional society's mode of governance, which he described as "democracy in its purest form," in which everyone, irrespective of societal rank, was allowed space to "voice their opinions and were equal in their value as citizens" (Mandela 1994: 20). At the same time, Mandela described himself as "being something of an Anglophile," confessing that, "while I abhorred the notion of British imperialism, I never rejected the trappings of British style and manners" (Mandela 1994: 48). Should we therefore not understand Mandela as a liberal-nationalist-decolonial humanist? In the face of the full wrath and violence of the notorious apartheid system, which directly threatened to cut short his own life through charging him for treason, Mandela maintained a steadfast commitment to decolonial ethics of liberation and refused to compromise on his humanist principles. He lamented how the apartheid system was leaving him with no option but to engage in counterviolence as form of defense for those fighting against apartheid. Does Mandela fit into the line of Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King, who strongly believed in non-violent civil disobedience?

The answer is yes and no. Mandela was instrumental in the formation of "uMkhonto We Sizwe" (Spear of the Nation) and became its commander-in-chief. This was the armed wing of the African National Congress (ANC). The fighting forces had to adhere to strict ethical conduct, only engaging in destabilization, not killing people. Even when Mandela was being tried for treason, he continued to tower above apartheid system's provocations, brutality, and violence, and was able to invite the architects of apartheid to return to humanity in a moving speech delivered during the course of Rivonia Trials:

> During my lifetime, I have dedicated myself to this struggle of the African people. I have fought against white domination, and I have fought against black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to see realized. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die. (Mandela 1994: 352)

Mandela made it clear that the continued use of brutality and violence by the apartheid regime against unarmed anti-apartheid freedom fighters, left them with no choice but "to hit back by all means in our power in defence of our people, our future and our freedom" (Mandela 1994: 78).

It was those people who inhabited the "zones of non-being" that Mandela committed his life toward their liberation from the scourge of racial oppression. Mandela's liberation struggle was also aimed at the liberation of both the oppressed and the oppressors from the cul-de-sac of racialism in the truly Freireian resolution of the oppressor-oppressed contradiction created by colonialism and coloniality (Freire 1970). On this, Mandela writes:

> It was during those long and lonely years that my hunger for the freedom of my people became a hunger for the freedom of all people, white and black. I knew as well as I know anything that the oppressor must be liberated just as surely as the oppressed. A man who takes away another man's freedom is a prisoner of hatred; he is locked behind the bars of prejudice and narrow-mindedness. I am not truly free if I am taking away someone else's freedom, just as surely as I am not free when my freedom is taken from me. The oppressed and the oppressor alike are robbed of their humanity. (Mandela 1994: 611)

This set him apart from such other African nationalist liberators, like President Robert Gabriel Mugabe of Zimbabwe, who ended up frustrated by the policy of reconciliation, and finally reproduced the colonial paradigm of a war of conquest predicated on race. By the end of 1990s, President Mugabe increasingly articulated the decolonial project

in Zimbabwe in racist, nativist, and even xenophobic terms predicated on the idea of "conquest of conquest," the "prevailing sovereignty of Zimbabwe over settler colonialism, and the notion of "Zimbabwe for Zimbabweans" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009a, b).

Indeed, unlike Mandela's nationalism, Mugabe's nationalism had escalated to what appeared like "reverse-racism" as a form of liberation, as he pushed for a fast-track land reform program predicated on compulsory land acquisition from white commercial farmers to give it to black Zimbabweans (Mugabe 2001). Fanon (1968) had warned of the dangers of degeneration of African nationalism into chauvinism, reverse racism and xenophobia, and he characterizes this regressive process as "repetition without change," cascading from pitfalls of national consciousness (Fanon 1968). Mandela carefully managed to distinguish himself as a committed decolonial ethical leader and successfully avoided degeneration into reverse racism, nativism, and xenophobia. However, Mandela, like all other African freedom fighters, had to transcend various ambiguities, contradictions and ambivalences arising not only from his upbringing but also from the complex exigencies of the liberation struggle itself. This is why it is important to reflect on his different lives and meanings.

Different Lives and Meanings of Mandela

The best way to do justice to the analysis of Mandela's complex life struggle is to see it as plural and shot through by ambiguities and contradictions, just like that of other freedom fighters. But the tensions, ambiguities, contradictions, vicissitudes and exigencies did not dent and tarnish Mandela's stature as a leading advocate of critical decolonial ethics of liberation. Various lives of Mandela are discernible within which his political formation and making emerged and crystallized. Danny Schechter's *Madiba A to Z: The Many Faces of Nelson Mandela* (2013) dramatizes the various lives of Mandela. The leading African historian Zeleza (2013: 10) posits that the political formation of Mandela and the meaning of his politics as well as legacy "cannot be fully understood through the psychologizing and symbolic discourses preferred in the popular media and hagiographies." Zeleza emphasizes that Mandela was a political actor within the broader drama of African nationalism and decolonial struggles, concluding,

> Mandela embodied all the key phases, dynamics and ideologies of African nationalism from the period of elite nationalism before the Second World War when the nationalists made reformist demands on the colonial regimes, to the era of militant mass nationalism after the war when they demanded independence, to the phase of armed liberation. (2013: 10)

Zeleza (2003) distills five important humanistic objectives of African nationalism that are discernible in Mandela's life of struggle: anti-colonial decolonization, nation-building, development, democracy, and pan-African integration and unity. Zeleza adds:

> Reconciliation was such a powerful motif in the political discourses of transition to independence among some African leaders of the imperatives of nation building, the second goal of African nationalism. It was also a rhetorical response to the irrational and self-serving fears of imperial racism that since Africans were supposedly eternal wards of whites and incapable of ruling themselves, independence would unleash the atavistic violence of "inter-tribal warfare" from which colonialism had saved the benighted continent, and in the post-settler colonies, the retributive cataclysm of white massacres. (2013: 12)

Mandela was, however, not the only African humanist who railed against both racism and reverse racism. Leading African scholar Mahmood Mamdani, in his *Define and Rule* (2013c: 112), documents how Julius Nyerere of Tanzania introduced an alternative model of statecraft that sought to dismantle both tribalism and racism in the same manner that Mandela sought to dismantle apartheid colonialism. Like Mandela, in, Nyerere sought to create an inclusive citizenship, even stating publicly,

> If we are going to base citizenship on colour we will commit a crime. Discrimination against human beings because of their colour is exactly what we have been fighting against…They are preaching discrimination as a religion to us. And they stand like Hitlers and begin to glorify the race. We glorify human beings, not colour. (Quoted in Mamdani 2013b: 112–113)

One just needs to add, though, that the variations in forms of colonialism had a bearing on the forms of nationalism, nature of struggles for decolonization, and ideologies. Mandela emerges as a "largely a home grown pragmatic revolutionary" whose politics was shaped by his location within a country that was organized on racial basis (Zeleza 2013: 10). The long incarceration further enabled him to reflect carefully on the nature of the racial problem facing his country and the possible solutions. But like all other African political actors, Mandela also fought to transcend some parochialisms imposed on his life by history, tradition, and culture.

The first ambiguity that Mandela had to rise above was that of his cultural identity. Mandela was born into a Xhosa family in Eastern Cape, so Xhosa custom, ritual, and taboo shaped his early life in a profound way. Inevitably, his early mind-map fixed on Mvezo, Qunu, and Mqhekezweni, where he was born and grew up. Mandela's formative

political consciousness was influenced by what was happening at the "Great Place" (royal place) of Chief Jongintaba Dalindyebo, the acting regent of the Thembu people. He clearly articulates this in his autobiography: "My later notions of leadership were profoundly influenced by observing the regent and his court. I watched and learned from the tribal meetings that were regularly held at the Great Place" (Mandela 1994: 19).

Chief Jongintaba had become Mandela's guardian after he lost his father. Mandela therefore grew up a part of a royal family, knowing that he was a Thembu first, and a Xhosa second. He did not know that he was a South African until he went to school, when "I began to sense my identity as an African, not just a Thembu, or even Xhosa. But this was still a nascent feeling" (Mandela 1994: 36). Mandela came from a society where even marriages outside his own "Xhosa ethnic" identity were considered a taboo. Marriages were still being arranged. This might explain why his two former wives, Evelyn Mase and Winnie Madikizela, were of Xhosa stock. Thus, Mandela admits, "as I left Healdtown at the end of the year, I saw myself as a Xhosa first and an African second" (ibid.: 40).

It was only after studying at the University of Fort Hare that Mandela advanced socially beyond Xhosa parochialism to the extent of rebelling "against the social system of my people" (Mandela 1994: 52). Mandela admits that he had to learn through travel and exposure that he was a South African who was experiencing racial discrimination and domination. Mandela also mentioned in his autobiography that some prisoners criticized him of always keeping the company of Xhosa-speaking prisoners. He had to grow from this ethnic parochialism.

The second issue Mandela had to deal with was that of his political consciousness. Mamdani (1991: 236) once argued that "without the experience of sickness, there can be no idea of health. And without the fact of oppression, there can be no practice of resistance and no notion of rights." Mandela's explanation of his political formation and consciousness seem to confirm Mamdani's argument. Mandela states:

> I cannot pinpoint a moment when I became politicized, when I knew that I would spend my life in the liberation struggle. To be African in South Africa means that one is politicized from the moment of one's birth, whether one acknowledges it or not. An African child is born in an Africans Only hospital, taken home in an Africans Only bus, lives in an African Only area and attends Africans Only schools, and if he attends school at all. (Mandela 1994: 89)

Mandela admits that when he left the University of Fort Hare, he was advanced socially but not politically. He only developed politically when

he reached Johannesburg "a city of dreams, a place where one could transform oneself from a poor peasant into a wealthy sophisticate, a city of danger and opportunity" (Mandela 1994: 56). The city life tended to erode strong ethnic distinctions and foster new broader identities and solidarities.

In Johannesburg, black people experienced the common problem of racial profiling and racial domination. This condition had the effect of politicizing Africans. This is why, Mandela writes, "There was no particular day on which I said, henceforth I will devote myself to the liberation of my people; instead, I simply found myself doing so, and could not do otherwise" (1994: 89). Being an African in a racist society made African people political. Mandela was further influenced by a number of people whom he met in Johannesburg—such as Walter Sisulu, Anton Lembede, and many others.

It is worth noting that Mandela's early political consciousness was deeply nationalistic. He rejected both communism and the involvement of Indians and whites in African politics. As he puts it, "At the time, I was firmly opposed to allowing communists or whites to join the league" (Mandela 1994: 94). He elaborates that during the heyday of the ANC Youth League, "I was sympathetic to the ultra-revolutionary stream of African nationalism. I was angry at the white man, not at racism. While I was not prepared to hurl the white man into the sea, I would have been perfectly happy if he climbed abroad his steamship and left the continent on his own volition" (Mandela 1994: 106).

The third ambiguity confronting Mandela was what it entailed to be a freedom fighter. Besides his activism and leadership within the ANC Youth League, by 1952 Mandela entered the centre of top ANC leadership when he was appointed first deputy president to Chief Albert Luthuli. But his first position in the ANC came in 1947 when he was elected to the Executive Committee of the Transvaal ANC. This meant that Mandela became exposed to banning, endless appearances in court, and imprisonment. By then, Mandela notes, he was "more certain in those days of what I was against than what I was for" (Mandela 1994: 112). It was also a time for Mandela to reflect and revise some of his political convictions. He began to study works of Marxism and Leninism, which resulted in him changing his opposition to communism without changing his nationalist bona fides.

His frontline leadership included the drawing of the M-Plan, which ensured the continued existence and operation of the ANC in the event it was banned. Part of M-Plan included political lectures on "The World We Live In," "How We are Governed," and "The Need for Change" (ibid.: 135). Mandela also took the initiative to critique the strategy of non-violence. His idea was that "non-violence was not a moral principle but a strategy; there was no moral goodness in using an ineffective weapon"

(ibid.: 147). Mandela strongly believed that "To overthrow oppression has been sanctioned by humanity and is the highest aspiration of every free man" (ibid.: 151). It was the experience of how the apartheid government responded to the Defiance Campaign that provoked Mandela to see no alternative to armed and violent resistance. His conclusion was this: "A freedom fighter learns the hard way that it is the oppressor who defines the nature of the struggle, and the oppressed is often left no recourse but to use methods that mirror those of the oppressor. At a certain point, one can only fight fire with fire" (ibid.: 155).

Mandela was therefore not a typical Gandhi-style character, though his life of struggle and legacy had deep elements of Gandhism. The intransigence and violence of apartheid could not be dealt with using Gandhian tools only. They were not adequate to the task. Mandela took singular leadership in motivating for the establishment of *uMkhonto we Sizwe* as a military wing of the ANC in the post-Sharpeville period. His determination was demonstrated by his underground work and the risks he took, which earned him the name "Black Pimpernel."[1] Mandela's approach to armed struggle and the use of violence still distinguished him as a humanist because the emphasis was on not endangering human life. Whites were not targeted as a people. Future reconciliation of races was envisioned from the beginning; hence, the liberation struggle was not reduced to a "blood-feud between whites and black" (Mandela 1994: 170). Symbols of white supremacy and racist oppression were targeted. Sabotage was the chosen tactic.

Mandela also distinguished his leadership and commitment to the liberation of South Africa when he left the country illegally in 1962 to mobilize support for the armed struggle. He even underwent military training in Ethiopia. The experience he gained through his travel on the continent was that African leaders were suspicious of the ANC's cooperation with liberal whites, Indians, and communists. Mandela's solution was that the ANC must feature prominently within the Congress Alliance as the effective leader of Africans (Mandela 1994: 294). Even though Mandela was soon arrested when he arrived back in South Africa, he continued to demonstrate courage and leadership. He clearly understood what his life symbolized:

> I was the symbol of justice in the court of the oppressor, the representative of the great ideals of freedom, fairness and democracy in a society that dishonoured those virtues. I realized then and there that I could carry on the fight even inside the fortress of the enemy. (Mandela 1994: 299)

The other issue to deal with was that of being a symbol of resistance. Mandela's long imprisonment inadvertently contributed in a big way to the making of a global icon. He became a macrocosm of the anti-colonial

and anti-racist struggle as a whole. But, he states, the intention of the apartheid regime was to use imprisonment to undermine the anti-colonial and anti-racist forces' struggle and resolve: "Prison is designed to break one's spirit and one's resolve" (Mandela 1994: 373–374).

Within the prison, Mandela continued to play a leading role as the spokesperson for all prisoners. Oliver Tambo took over the presidency of the ANC in the absence of Mandela and built the ANC in exile. Mandela spent 18 years in Robben Island, and he used that time to develop an even deeper understanding of the problems facing South Africa and its possible resolutions. He entered prison as a radical nationalist and emerged from it as voice of reason and moderation—a radical humanist.

He entered prison at the age of 44 and came out at 71, having assumed a mythical stature within anti-colonial and anti-racist political formations. He became a living martyr of the liberation struggle. On the impact of imprisonment on one's character, Mandela writes, "Perhaps it requires such depths of oppression to create such heights of character" (Mandela 1994: 609).

But one can also argue, at another level, Mandela's long imprisonment made him part of a project of those in control of the apartheid state. This was clear when they could suddenly remove him from Robben Island to Pollsmoor Prison in 1982 and then to Victor Verster Prison in 1988. Mandela could not be ignored in any of the political schemes of the beleaguered apartheid regime, such as isolating him from his fellow political prisoners. The second part of the scheme was to offer him preconditions for release. But this scheming opened up possibilities for a negotiated settlement. Even more importantly, Mandela effectively took advantage of the overtures from the beleaguered apartheid regime to push for political change at every stage of the encounters.

In justifying his individual initiative to initiate negotiations with the apartheid regime, Mandela states, "There are times when a leader must move out ahead of the flock, go off in a new direction, confident that he is leading his people the right way" (Mandela 1994: 510–511). Opening up negotiations with the apartheid regime was very risky. Mandela risked being misunderstood by the ANC, both inside and outside South Africa. The second bigger risk is well captured by Schechter (2013: 28): "He was one man up against an adversary with a whole bureaucracy behind it." But by standing on a high moral and humanistic pedestal, Mandela managed to gradually gain the confidence of his adversaries and the support of the progressive world.

By initiating the negotiations, Mandela in the process transformied his political identity from that of a terrorist and a prisoner to that of a negotiator and facilitator of talks between the ANC and the apartheid regime. Through his initiative, Mandela managed to pull off one of the most challenging, significant and unexpected transitions from apartheid

colonialism and authoritarianism to democracy. It is important to analyze and evaluate how the negotiations that produced the transition to democracy in South Africa were informed by a new logic of justice that was superior to the post-1945 Nuremberg template.

Mandela at CODESA

The paradigm of war gave birth to Nuremberg trials as a template of justice. The paradigm of peace produces political justice. As Mamdani argues (2013a, b), the Nuremberg paradigm of justice is predicated on the logic that violence should be "criminalized without exception, it perpetrators identified and tried in a court of law." The Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) paradigm of justice became predicated on a particular thinking of mass violence as political, rather than criminal, which suggests remaking political society through political reform as a lasting solution (Mamdani 2013a, b). At the centre was a drive to transcend a paradigm of war and conceptions of justice as criminal justice involving punishment of certain individuals. A paradigm of war is sustained by an unending circle of production and reproduction of perpetrators and victims, in which today's perpetrator becomes tomorrow's victim and vice versa.

It would seem Mandela, working together with other stalwarts of the struggle like Joe Slovo, was fully committed to trying something new in the domain of transitional justice. In fact, the situation of a political stalemate needed political innovation and creativity to unblock. The stalemate is crisply captured by Mamdani (2013a: 6): "Neither revolution (for liberation movements) nor military victory (for the apartheid regime) was on the cards." Mandela led the ANC into CODESA fully aware that it was another "theatre of struggle, subject to advances and reverses as any other struggle" (Mandela 1994: 577). History was not on the side of the apartheid regime. Apartheid had far outlived its life as a form of colonialism. If it survived the decolonial winds of change of the 1960s and 1970s, it could not survive the post-Cold War normative discourses of democracy and human rights. One can even say the post-Cold War dispensation was more favorable to Mandela's initiatives. But the ANC had also lost its major ally in the form of the collapse of the Soviet Union (Ramphela 2008: 45).

The points raised above are reinforced by Wilderson (2010) who argues that it took major tectonic shifts in the global paradigmatic arrangement of white power, such as the fall of the Soviet Union—the major backer of the ANC—the return of 40 000 black bourgeoisie exiles from Western capitals, and a crumbling global economy, "for there to be synergistic meeting of Mandela's moral fiber and the aspirations of white economic power" (8). Indeed imperatives and interests of white capitalists who

were experiencing the biting effects of sanctions and popular unrest at home played an important role in influencing the negotiators.

But it is clear that what Mandela wanted and demanded from the apartheid regime was the dismantlement of apartheid and commitment to a non-racial, democratic and free society. He sought to achieve this through the following strategy: "To make peace with an enemy, one must work with that enemy, and that enemy becomes your partner" (Mandela 1994: 598).

Building on Mamdani's (2013a) argument about how South Africa's transition to democracy was predicated on a paradigmatic shift from the post-Second World War Nuremberg form of justice founded on criminal justice, one arrives at a favorable evaluation of CODESA. It was not merely a time of betrayal of decolonial liberation struggle through compromises: CODESA embodied another form of justice. This reality was well captured by Mamdani:

> Whereas Nuremburg shaped a notion of justice as *criminal* justice, CODESA calls on us to think of justice as primarily *political*. Whereas Nuremberg has become the basis of a notion of *victim's justice*—as a complement to victor's justice than a contrast to it—CODESA provides the basis for an alternative notion of justice, which I call *survivor's justice*. (2013a: 2, emphasis in original)

Mamdani went on to elaborate on the differences between criminal justice and political justice:

> CODESA prioritized political justice over criminal justice. The difference is that criminal justice targets individuals whereas political justice affects entire groups. Whereas the object of criminal justice is punishment, that of political justice is political reform. The difference in consequence is equally dramatic. The pursuit of political justice requires that you decriminalize the other side. This means to treat the opponent as a political adversary rather than as an enemy. This makes sense only because the goal is no longer to punish individual criminals, but to change the rules and thereby reform the political community. Morally, the objective is no longer to avenge the dead but to give the living a second chance. (Ibid.: 7)

Indeed, the decolonial anti-apartheid struggle was not meant to punish the ideologues of apartheid but to destroy the edifice of apartheid itself. On the ashes of juridical apartheid, the ANC and Mandela envisaged a new post-racial and pluriversal political community founded on new humanism and inclusive citizenship. The ghost of apartheid had to be laid to rest. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was the chosen mechanism for "laying the ghosts of the dark past to rest with neither retributive justice nor promotion of a culture of impunity"

(Ramphela 2008: 46). Mamdani (2013a: 13) credited the TRC for transcending the Nuremberg trap "by displacing the logic of crime and punishment with that of crime and confession."

Having said this, Mamdani goes on, nonetheless, to distill how the TRC was still influenced by the Nuremberg template of justice, particularly in its definition of victims and perpetrators. In the first place, victimhood was individualized alongside the individualization of the responsibility of the perpetrator (Mamdani 2013a: 13). This had two immediate and one long-term implication. The first was that a human right violation was consequently narrowly defined "as an action that violated the bodily integrity of an individual (Mamdani 2013a: 13). The second implication was "obscuring the fact that the violence of apartheid was mainly that of the state, not individual operatives" (Mamdani 2013a: 13). The long-term implication was that the narrow definition of both victim and perpetrator created an ideal environment to avoid dealing with the pertinent question of social justice and structural socioeconomic transformation. Most of the energy was spent finding an immediate way of creating a viable post-apartheid political society in which those who had survived apartheid, hailing from across the political divides, could have a chance to live a new life.

Netshitenzhe (2012), an ANC stalwart, explains the logic of the negotiations and the settlement from the perspective of the ANC, arguing, "At the risk of oversimplification, it can be argued that a critical element of that settlement, from the point of view of the ANC, was the logic of capturing a bridgehead: to codify basic rights and use these as the basis for more thoroughgoing transformation of South African society" (16). Perhaps a strong confidence in the morality of decolonial humanism made the ANC and Mandela even naïve to the extent of expecting those who benefitted from apartheid economically to be immediately reborn into new, compassionate human beings, capable of acknowledging the historical grievances of those who were abused and dispossessed by apartheid to the level of voluntarily committing themselves to playing an active in the equal sharing of resources.

But Netshitenzhe reinforces the argument that decolonial humanism drove the way Mandela and the ANC imagined a post-apartheid South Africa:

> The articulation of the ANC mission by some of its more visionary leaders suggests an approach that, in time, should transcend the detail of statistical bean counting and emphasis on race and explicitly incorporate *the desire to contribute to the evolution of human civilization. At the foundation of this should be democracy with a social content*, excellence in the acquisition of knowledge and the utilization of science and *a profound humanism* (my emphasis). (2012: 27)

Mandela is a child of this ANC decolonial humanism. But concretely speaking, the year 1994 marked not only the end of administrative apartheid, but more importantly, it was also the beginning of a difficult process of nation-building, which was always tempered with a delicate balance of allaying white fears and attending to black expectations and demands. This reality became a major test of Mandela's politics of life.

The Mandela Presidency and the Practice of Politics of Life

At a practical level, Mandela's politics of life became founded on avoiding diminishing one's dignity through diminishing that of others, and the avoidance of humiliating one's adversaries, as he sought to create a new South Africa. Thus, when he became the first black president of South Africa in 1994, Mandela practically implemented a decolonial humanist vision of a post-racial pluriversal society. At the core of this vision was a departure from racism toward a deeper appreciation of the importance of difference. Maldonado-Torres (2008a: 126) argues that the appreciation of human difference is informed by a humanistic "interest in restoring authentic and critical sociality beyond the colour-line." This point is also articulated by Gordon (1995: 154) who posits, "The road out of misanthropy is a road that leads to the appreciation of the importance of difference." Apartheid was a worse form of misanthropy, founded on "bad faith." It had to be transcended by all means, including symbolically.

This is why Mandela's presidency was a terrain of the symbolic, which he used effectively to further hail the erstwhile racists into a new South Africa. Nation-building through use of symbolic gestures and other means, including sporting events, dominated Mandela's presidency. These involved him visiting the 94-year-old widow of Hendrik Verwoerd, who was identified as the ideologue of apartheid and its architect. Mandela also agreed to the erection of a statue in remembrance of Verwoerd. He visited Percy Yutar, who played the role of the prosecutor during the Rivonia Trial, in which Mandela was sentenced to life imprisonment. He even visited ex-apartheid President P. W. Botha. While he was criticized in some quarters of bending too much to placate whites, his idea was to ensure that indeed the erstwhile "settlers'/'citizens" and the erstwhile "natives'/'subjects" were afforded enough room to be reborn politically into consenting citizens living in a new political society where racism was not tolerated (Mamdani 2001: 63–70).

Conclusion

This chapter attempts to understand Mandela phenomenon as founded on strong principles opposed to the permanence of the paradigm of war

and its founding charter of the will to power. Mandela is analyzed as an embodiment of a politics of life that emerged within a modern world that was bereft of humanness, goodness, love, peace, humility, forgiveness, trust and optimism. It was a world dominated by the paradigm of war and racism. Mandela provided an antidote to the paradigm of war. He introduced the paradigm of peace, reconciliation, and racial harmony. He was moved politically by profound humanism. Mandela signified what Mkandawire (2013: 3) terms "sane relationship to power." He embodied a rare commitment to democracy and rule of law to the extent that Mkandawire (2013: 3) writes, "In a sense, Mandela normalized the idea of democracy in Africa."

But Wilderson (2010: 11–13) accuses Mandela of being a sell-out who squandered the revolutionary potential of the ANC and ignored the Freedom Charter as he compromised with white and global capital. The rebuttal is that the balance of forces did not allow Mandela enough room to maneuver because he was dealing with an undefeated enemy. Mandela had to inevitably pursue a middle road through and through, in the hope that in future, white hegemony would be dismantled. His vision of a post-racial, pluriversal world remains powerful in a modern world that is trapped in a paradigm of war and a narrow Nuremberg paradigm of justice that is replicated by the International Criminal Court (ICC). Maylam (2009: 31) correctly argues that Mandela "stands out among world leaders of the last century as a person not obsessed with power, not entangled in the politics of manipulation and spin, not enticed into conspicuous consumption, but forever humble, honest and human."

Note

1. This name was taken from the Baroness Orczy's fictional character the Scarlet Pimpernel, who daringly evaded capture during the French Revolution.

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Obafemi Awolowo: Knowledge, Leadership, Governance*

Olúfẹ́mi Táíwò

INTRODUCTION

Something significant happened in the summer of 2013 in Ikogosi-Ekiti, Nigeria. A state government, Ekiti, at the suggestion and under the direction of two gifted Nigerian scholars who ply our common trade in a land that knows the value and celebrates the life of the mind, spent a considerable amount of money on knowledge that is not structured by the need to solve any specific problem. The Ikogosi Graduate Summer School was an instant and resounding success. But that judgment cannot but be transient. The real success of the enterprise may never be known or may not be known for several years hence. Even then, that success would show up in all manner of intangible outcomes, dissertations whose authors would not be able to recall from where the original inspiration for their ideas came, conversations with threads that are traceable but not to the chance encounters hosted by the seminar, and so on. That ultimately is the life of the mind, the pursuit of knowledge for the sheer joy of knowing, and an indulgence that Obafemi Awolowo[1] held we do not do enough of, if we do it at all, in Africa:

> It is a mistake to think that all researches must lead to positive results. A research can go on for years before it is abandoned or modified. Whether positive or negative, it tells something which propels us to further research. That is why in the advanced countries, unlike in Africa, a lot of money is spent on Research and Development (R&D). Since we spent little or nothing on research (which is not one of our priorities), we always depend on the products of the research efforts of others in order to survive. Again, this is where education comes in, and that is why investment in education

has always been my priority, and shall remain so as long as I live. (Makinde 2009: 88)

Those are the words of Obafemi Awolowo, and it is my aim in this chapter to share my apprehension of and participation in Awolowo's philosophical universe with a view to excerpting those elements of it that I believe speak to two keywords in the theme of this book: leadership and governance. It will become clear presently why knowledge has been added and made lexically prior to the other two.

The severe crisis of confidence that afflicts Nigerian—indeed, African—scholars in their preference for foreign, mostly Euro-American, subjects for their intellectual exertions meant that until about 30 years ago, Awolowo did not attract the attention of scholars, and his writings were neither taught nor his ideas expounded upon in Nigerian, much less African universities. To give an example, when I wrote my very first scholarly article on Awolowo in 1983, *only* three articles had ever been published on his ideas.[2]

Although, to my knowledge, Ogunmodede's book remains the only one of its kind, the situation has improved appreciably, and Awolowo is fast approaching the level of interest in his work that other African thinkers have enjoyed. We witness this in the number of works that have been published on the man's ideas and the growing number of dissertations that are being written on his works. Yet, at home in Nigeria where Awolowo did all his work, where he profoundly touched and drastically changed lives, much of the attention devoted to him is superficial. He remains virtually unknown as a significant thinker in the rest of Africa.

My becoming an Awolowo scholar was the product of an epiphany while I was a graduate student back in 1983. It led me to declare myself a student of the philosopher, and I authored my first paper on him, a critical exegesis of his political thought, before the end of that year. Since then, I have striven to bring the world to acknowledge him as a significant thinker in the modern mode whose ideas, circumscribed by the peculiarities of his historical location, nonetheless managed to apprehend the universal. Those who are familiar with the routine denial that Africans ever apprehended the universal, not to talk of their being philosophers of it, a libel originally articulated by G. W. F. Hegel, know how important a point this is.[3]

Thanks to Awolowo's apprehension and theorizing of the universal, his ideas cannot be boxed within the confines of African phenomena. Rather, he shares that especial quality of all great thinkers and writers: from their peculiar historical locations (the local) they are able to apprehend the universal (the global), and by so doing, leave us a legacy of ideas that can truly illuminate the specific problems they deal with wherever in the world those problems might be confronted.

My fundamental and abiding interest in Awolowo is that of a scholar fascinated by the originality, depth, and audacity of his thinking in many areas, the richness and complexity of his expostulations, the sophistication and thoroughness of his policy formulations—in short, in his status as one of the preeminent thinkers of the last century. What do the preceding details have to do with the theme of this chapter?

In a recent book, *Africa Must Be Modern: A Manifesto* (2012), I argue that modern society is a knowledge society, par excellence, and in modern society, the pursuit of knowledge is undertaken for the mere sake of knowing. It is not that the knowledge obtained therefrom has no utility value, or that, from time to time, specific realizations of the pursuit are not or may not be motivated by some use-value considerations. No, the pursuit of knowledge is neither aimless nor without rewards for the pursuer or for the society in which she conducts her investigations. The point, rather, is simply this: a pursuit of knowledge that is too specific-problem focused, or motivated solely or principally by the need to solve our problems, is one that may make less attainable any significant advance toward solving the problem or set of problems that is its object.

The reason for this outcome is simple. Reality is messy; nature is complex. At bottom, everything is related to everything else. A simple problem is the ultimate deception. The order that phenomena present us with, on serious investigation, often turns out to be an imperceptible whirl of activity in which pulling one strand might mean the unraveling of the entire structure. This is why Albert Einstein declared that the primary motivation of his work was not to solve this or that problem. Rather, it was "to know the mind of God," the ultimate principles lurking behind the phenomena that we apprehend with our senses. It is an acknowledgment by the great scientist of the interconnectedness of things, and of why those who desire to understand and maybe untie this knot do not adopt an atomistic, problem-by-problem approach to their task. To be agitated by single problems or immediate problems is to limit and, as a result, impoverish the imagination of our knowledge seekers. It is to tie their hands and render them incapable of anticipating future problems or serendipitously happening upon unanticipated, unforeseen problems. An expansive imagination, an imagination that dares to mimic God, is at the base of humanity's greatest knowledge conquests. Needless to say, since the success of the scientific revolution, science has become the paradigm of this knowledge-seeking model.

There should be no misunderstanding the point at stake here. Science may be paradigmatic, but science is by no means alone. Whether in philosophy or in religion, in sociology or in economics, in political science or in linguistics, all disciplines are regional variations on the singular theme of untying reality's knot, forcing nature to yield to us the grounds, the logos, of its complex operations in their infinite concatenations. In this

endeavor, a country that is satisfied with constricting the imagination and investigative energies of its knowledge seekers and knowledge producers to the exigencies of work-a-day problem solving, if what we just said is true or plausible, is one that is unlikely to make any serious headway in securing the benefits of the right kind of knowledge seeking.

I would like to argue that Awolowo embraced the preceding characterization of knowledge. Not only that, he made it one of the pylons of his philosophy, as well as a prerequisite for good leadership in a modern setting. This aspect of Awolowo's modern outlook deserves more attention than it has received so far in the scholarship on his ideas. Indeed, the need for knowledge is the principal fulcrum for his lifelong pursuit of and insistence on free education for all.

In his conversation with Moses Makinde (2009: 59), an Awolowo scholar, Awolowo said, "First of all, when I was in the Calabar prison I decided, if possible, to know something about everything." Later, he cited the philosophers that he had read and who had influenced him. "Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Nietzsche, Locke, Hegel, Marx and Engels, Mill and a few others I can't remember now. By the way, I am also interested in science" (ibid.: 61). We shall come back to this point.

Given that knowledge seeking requires a knowledge seeker, and knowledge's fruits are not meant to serve a nebulous world, Awolowo turns his attention to philosophical anthropology, the theory of human nature. "I take a theme," he declared, "from the point of view of man as an instrument of change" (ibid.: 62):

> So my central theme has always been man. And when you come to economics, my view is that man is the sole dynamic in nature. There is nothing you can do to change that. The time to produce, man is the vector of production, and the time to consume, man is the vector of consumption, etc. So with man there as my theme, I take him as one. I do not take him as an Hausa man, an Igbo man or Yoruba man. I take man as whole without caste, creed or colour. (Ibid.: 63)

There is the universal moment again. There is no hint here of some peculiar "African" view of humans. There is no suggestion that human problems may be amenable to some specific African solutions. And when he asserts, "It is my duty now to write and explain the position of man, the status of man in the scheme of things as a domineering figure, a sacred figure," we are not to understand this only in the context of Africa or any other culture or historical boundaries.[4]

No doubt, under the inspiration of Christianity,[5] Awolowo believes that we are creatures made by God and that our lives as well as our way through the world are supposed to be wending toward fulfilling God's purpose for us. Yet, simultaneously, we detect some Deistic echoes in

Awolowo's metaphysics. In his account, God practically made us, gave us our marching orders and retreated, leaving us free to make or mar the world created for us to render account to God when we have departed this world marked by mortality. I cannot present here a full explication of the thesis I just summarized. But Awolowo's philosophical anthropology and the relationship between that anthropology and his religious faith have implications for his position regarding the place of knowledge in the human journey through the world.

God made us. God made the world, what we ordinarily call "Nature." God gave us dominion over the world thus made, and, endowing us with the power of naming, made us co-creators. So, at its very bottom, our relationship with the world is one of knowledge, both of the world made up of our propensities and the natural world of which we, too, the lawgivers, are a part.[6] Such is the premium that he placed on knowledge and on our responsibility to relate to the world from its standpoint that he turned the old perennial philosophical problem of evil from one of theodicy—respecting the incompatibility between God's omnipotence and omnibenevolence and the presence of evil in the world, into one of epistemology—evil as ignorance of how things work or lack of knowledge of Nature's logos, human and material.[7]

Again, we find Awolowo discounting the role of God in the quotidian operation of the created world.[8] Instead, as *àrólé Ọlọ́run* (God's heirs), humans are charged to be like Einstein in all things and do our best simulation of God without at the same time permitting ourselves to think, even for one moment, that we *are* God. On the contrary, Awolowo's point is that our refusal to take knowledge seriously, to have our relationship with the world denominated by knowledge seeking and knowledge production, to make available the necessary resources to underwrite this core function of our human nature amounts, for him, to behavior bordering on blasphemy, a sin in the eyes of God, our presumed creator.[9]

Consider the following exchange in *The Last Conversation*. In the wake of Awolowo's asseveration that "There is no evil as such. Things that don't please us we call evil," Makinde asks, "But what about those who argue that natural evils like volcanoes, earthquakes, etc. are not man-made and that for this reason man cannot be held responsible for them?" (Ibid.: 73) Certainly, in our legal system, we call those "acts of God." Awolowo is not buying it:

O.K. For instance, all these forces of nature like volcano, earthquake you mentioned. You see, God ordained us to dominate the earth, and *to dominate anything you must know about it.* God intends that there will be a time, may be about one thousand years from now, may be less, when we shall know that the so-called forces of nature—they are accidents really—will not happen again. We will be able to predict, for instance in America

and some parts of Europe, I believe especially in America; I say, we will have some devices by which we can predict an earthquake, or volcanic eruption. If we have such knowledge, then volcanoes and earthquakes which you call natural evils but which I call accident will not occur again. (Ibid.: 73, my emphasis)[10]

He would later conclude: "When knowledge expands, there will be no evil of these kinds" (Ibid.: 126).[11] Awolowo's account applies not only to the natural world. It can be extended, without distortion, nor any objections from Awolowo, to the domain of human nature and its psychological proclivities. This is a significant point. As much as we have reduced the play of natural evil in human lives, we are still very much in the dark regarding the operations of human nature. As a result of this limited knowledge, human evil continues to loom large, and we are continually victimized by it. For those who may not want to think much of Awolowo's submissions, I remind them of how much we have reduced crimes arising from mental illness as a consequence of our understanding of mental illness and how, concomitantly, certain criminal behaviors result from patients not following their treatment regimens. We may never have complete knowledge. Awolowo merely insists that we may have enough knowledge to reduce the play of evil in our lives to a negligible level. So far, the empirical evidence is in his favor.

According to Awolowo, God created the world, Nature, including humans. God elevated humans above other creatures by giving them reason. Reason made humans co-creators of reality—both of themselves and of the world that they inhabit. Thereafter, God sort of retired and entrusted humans with the responsibility of mastering both worlds through the acquisition of knowledge of them.

Some implications follow from the preceding argument. Any society—any humans—who turn their backs on knowledge, represent an unacceptable departure from God's plan for humans. Simultaneously, any humans, as individuals or groups, who insist on always going back to God for instructions on how to rule their dominion betray a lack of understanding of God's mission for them. Finally, humans who yield total control of their affairs in their dominion to God have thereby abandoned their inheritance and brought shame to God's intention.[12]

It might appear that we are going beyond what Awolowo believed or shared with us in his writings, but here is evidence. Prompted by his interlocutor regarding how

in Africa, especially in Nigeria, when our economy collapsed some people said we should pray to God for economic recovery. I [Makinde] think that God will not consider our prayers since we have left undone those things we ought to have done, that is, make use of our God-given brains and

scientific intelligence to solve our economic problems instead of asking
God to solve the problems for us. (Ibid.: 75)

Awolowo's reply is pithy and instructive: "Yes, because we can do it our-
selves, why then do we call upon God to do it for us? *This is stupid*"
(Ibid.: 75, my emphasis).

There is widespread ignorance of Awolowo's works and his more phil-
osophical ideas. That is part of what I mean by the superficiality of the
attention that he receives in the academy, not to talk of the wider intel-
lectual scene.[13] The impact can be seen in the fact that Awolowo's home-
land, Nigeria, the immediate laboratory for his social, political, economic
and cultural experiments has, to put it mildly, regressed and now exhib-
its some of the worst maladies that Awolowo's intellectual and practical
exertions were designed to attenuate, if not eradicate. We find indisput-
able evidence of this in the dilapidated infrastructure, in all sectors; in
the general collapse of all that Awolowo led citizens to expect to have a
right to have and to enjoy: education, healthcare, agriculture, industrial-
ization and gainful employment, in short, the good life.

Additionally, few would disagree that, across the African continent,
knowledge has been displaced from the horizon. Contrary to Awolowo's
admonitions, obscurantism fuelled by superstition, supernaturalism, and
the abandonment of reason are now the dominant modes of interac-
tion with both human and physical nature in Africa. And no one better
evinces this abandonment of what, for Awolowo, is the correct path, than
African leaders and our intellectuals.

We now have African presidents who are overwhelmed by the task of
governing and run to imams, prophets, and soothsayers who claim to
have God's direct line and can summon him at will. They sleep in syna-
gogues or kneel to be blessed in full view of the world in abject displays
of fake piety. Indeed, if we believe Awolowo, a president sleeping in a
church or kneeling before a preacher is the ultimate sin of abandonment,
not fulfillment, of God's purpose for humans: to use reason to procure
knowledge designed to constrict the place of evil in the unfolding of
human evolution and that of our relationship to nature.[14]

In Awolowo's approach to his office and practical politics, we find
him modeling the man of knowledge and putting knowledge at the
base of everything that he and the parties that he led did. Between
1952 and 1959, he ran the most progressive regime in Africa, sec-
ond only perhaps to Kwame Nkrumah's government in Ghana. The
remarkable fact is that this was done while the country was still under
the thumb of British colonial rule. The highest achievement of that
regime was the introduction of free universal primary education for all
children in the Western Region of Nigeria beginning in 1955, a mere
three years after taking the administrative reins of the region. His

approach to the introduction of the scheme was characteristic of his attitude about the role of knowledge, and it is what has marked him out for scholarly recognition by philosophers and political theorists. He would gather intellectuals and charge them, under his leadership, to research and produce a blueprint for the program.[15] His capacity for planning was legendary; a reputation that was solidified by his performance as the finance minister in the Federal Military Government of Nigeria during the Civil War that lasted from 1967 to 1970. Under his able stewardship, Nigeria fought and won the war without accruing any foreign debt.

The programs that he designed, championed, and implemented were merely practical manifestations of deep intellectual engagement with philosophy and the history of ideas. It is not enough to want to build schools, for instance, when you have not thought long and hard about those for whom the schools are being built, what kind of education would empower them to realize their best potential, etc. Rather, now we build schools in many parts of Africa because children must go to school even if there are no teachers, or where the teachers are incompetent and unmotivated, and the school buildings barely rise above the level of chicken coops, and so on.

Africans can do better at this stage of their historical and material existence. I am sure that such a manner of proceeding would not have attracted Awolowo's approbation. The humanist in him would have been horrified by such a decidedly expedient approach to the management of human destiny. Motivated by a primary concern with the dignity of human beings who had been battered under colonial rule, Awolowo sought "freedom for all, and life more abundant"—we must not ignore the combination of freedom and abundance or the lexical ordering that placed freedom before abundance—and insisted that that dignity is impaired unless it were exercised in institutions marked by beauty.

Certainly, in explaining the current situation, we must not discount the devastating impact of military rule, especially on the imagination of Nigerian youth, most of whom were born after 1970, and whose political socialization has unfolded for the most part under military tutelage. The trend toward ugliness and mediocrity in Nigeria began under the military, and grew progressively worse the longer military rule lasted. Now, Nigeria has come to the point where no one thinks of beauty or grandeur in the design of public spaces, and everything is dominated by how quickly it can be built, so the dash can be secured and a plaque stuck on it in futile attempts at securing immortality for the worst of the country's pretenders to greatness.

But so limiting the cause of the current predicament to the ravages of military rule alone would be mistaken. Unlike the present rulers, Awolowo's practical engagements were built on some solid, very profound

philosophical foundations. Very few young people in Nigeria now know how and why they ought to pay serious attention to Awolowo's intellectual legacy.[16] If the Nigerian example is repeated in other African countries, their youth, too, may hear the slogans, but they are unlikely to know the deep thought the slogans were coined to distil. It is tough to see how to begin to undo the philistinism that military rule and authoritarian-totalitarian regimes have made the quintessence of lives in Africa and mobilize young minds once again to embrace idealism, optimism and nobility and not just be content to "make it," unless Africans begin to make available, in language that is accessible without being condescending, the core ideas that made Awolowo and other thinkers such a powerful presence in global intellectual history.

Leadership and Knowledge

I hope that the preceding discussion offers a sufficient indication of the centrality of knowledge and its principal author—reason—in Awolowo's philosophy. This commitment to knowledge undergirds his specifications of what leadership ought to be. Once again, the core, the beginning point, is the human being. Not only must the leader be committed to organizing life and thought guided by knowledge, such organizing must be designed to maximize knowledge in order thereby to reduce the play of evil in human life.

Although he believes that, as children of God, human beings are all equal, he makes a lot of the inequalities that proliferate among humans. Humans have different innate abilities and they do not all possess the same diligence levels when it comes to their working their gifts and excelling with them in their multifarious engagements in life. He was convinced that "the majority of the people do not have the disciplined education which is indispensable to systematic and scientific thinking. Consequently, their perceptual faculty is dull, vague and desultory, and their perceptual, conceptual, and ideational capacities are either underdeveloped or never developed to any significant level."[17]

Awolowo does not think that these inequalities are unbridgeable, and whatever consequences follow from them are not rigidly foreordained. Whether or not these inequalities persist has less to do with nature and more to do with social conditions and the strivings of individuals.[18] His commitment to the improvability of human nature provides the metaphysical grounds for his emphasis on self-improvement and self-discipline and on the insistence that society provide the wherewithal for all to do these tasks. The reward for those who diligently pursue self-improvement and acquire the highest levels of self-discipline is entry into what Awolowo (1968: 230; cf. 1966: 158–159) calls

the regime of mental magnitude, properly and eminently equipped with a considerable measure of intellectual comprehension and cognition, insight, and spiritual illumination. In this regime, we are free from: (1) the negative emotions of anger, hate, fear, envy or jealousy, selfishness or greed; (2) indulgence in the wrong types of food and drink, and in ostentatious consumption; and (3) excessive or immoral craving for sex. In short in this regime we conquer what Kant calls "the tyranny of the flesh," and become free.[19]

Membership of the regime of mental magnitude provides Awolowo with a certain metric with which to determine those who deserve preferment in the modern state. Not everyone is deserving, but the commitment to equality is preserved by the insistence that everyone be provided with the necessary tools to render themselves fit for membership of the regime of mental magnitude: everyone should have equality of opportunity. A primary tool, in his view, for self-improvement is education, and it is no surprise that throughout his life, as was shown earlier, he was a principal theorist, advocate, and practitioner of free education for all. And as far as he was concerned, the state exists, principally, to provide the wherewithal for citizens to improve themselves and, by extension, their communities and, ultimately, humanity. This is one use of knowledge to reduce evil in the external world.

The leader must also be a knowledge seeker dedicated to removing evil from his own person. That is, the leader must be conversant with human nature, its propensities for evil and good, and do all she can to ensure that she minimizes, if she cannot eliminate, the evil of ignorance, of greed and others that scuttle human plans and make us unfit for the task of eliminating external evil. This means a serious education in the sciences that study human nature and the arts that educate humans concerning the best life for humans. That is, the leader must enter "the regime of mental magnitude," a state in which the individual who would rule "will rule through reason rather than his appetites or desires" (Ibid.: 189).

> Our leaders must be well educated, possess good intellect. They must be righteous, for The Bible says, "righteousness exalteth a nation." Of course, they must be self-disciplined and possess the ability to comprehend salient details in economics and the art of governance. In addition, they must have what I call *spiritual depth*. Above all, they must always act in accordance with the injunction, "Love thy neighbor as thyself" or "Do unto others as you would wish them do unto you." (Ibid.: 132, emphasis added)

Awolowo modified his position in *The People's Republic* (1968), insisting that a university degree, at not less than second class honors, lower division, should be requisite for leadership in public service and for

appointment to the judiciary. In *The Last Conversation*, he says, "I am not saying that a university education is both necessary and sufficient for good rulership. But I think that a good education, probably a university education, is necessary, as it is the case in the civilized countries, and even in some so-called Third World" (Makinde 2009: 141) In light of the experience in Nigeria, for instance, where the infusion of multi-degreed university graduates has simultaneously witnessed disastrous declines in the quality of public life and discourse, it is obvious that Awolowo's prescriptions need to be revised on this score, or his position reinterpreted on this aspect of leadership.

The second option is apposite here. Awolowo reminded his audience "that the word university means universal institution, disseminating universal knowledge in all its ramifications" (Makinde 2009: 153). By their very nature, universities seek to expand the horizons of those who come to them. They are the embodiments of the approach to knowledge adumbrated in the first part of this chapter above. Nigerian universities have not quite met this definition; they have instead been founded essentially for the purpose of manpower training.[20] All the expectations Awolowo had of the university-educated person have either been frustrated or betrayed. This explains the divergence we just noted between the array of university-trained persons and dismal leadership at all levels of public life and discourse in Nigeria. Should a leader exhibit the appropriate temperament, the preoccupation with knowledge would lead to the kinds of outcomes that we talked about earlier.

Here is an illustration of the kind of leadership that combines knowledge of human nature with the requirement to procure the good life for humans. One of the practical implications of Awolowo's philosophical anthropology was his insistence on humans having sound minds in healthy bodies—*mens sana in corpore sano*, was his preferred Latin rendering. Sports, games, and sundry physical exercises designed to strengthen the body were integral parts of the people's academy that was supposed to be the crucible in which the superior minds were to be forged that would deliver on the promise of life more abundant and freedom for all for the members of the People's Republic. I am deliberately omitting the direct inspiration from Plato that Awolowo not only acknowledged but celebrated in his magnum opus: *The People's Republic*.

If sports and other forms of physical activities were adjudged integral to the best life possible for humans, is it any wonder, then, that Awolowo would build, as one of the first tasks of his administration in the defunct Western Region in the immediate post-independence period, a befitting temple to the cultivation and celebration of healthy bodies: the Liberty Stadium, Ibadan, Nigeria? In other words, the Liberty Stadium was not a prestige project, and it definitely was not built for purposes of having a plaque celebrate Awolowo. Because it was meant to be the physical

manifestation of deep philosophical convictions, the Liberty Stadium was, for its time and context, big, beautiful, and well-constructed. It said a lot about the vision that undergirded its building that the stadium had a capacity for 55,000 spectators, and the National Stadium, built to serve the entire country more than ten years later, originally had a capacity for 65,000 spectators.[21]

And even if the leader does not have the innate ability to evince the qualities we have discussed in this section, she might be in a position to attract to herself the kinds of counselors and advisers who will help advance the task of removing evil from human life. This, it turns out, is the basis of Awolowo's legendary respect for intellectuals. "My respect for intellectuals lies in their ability to see things critically, differently and objectively, and comprehend salient details of issues, apart from their research capability. That is why I always have a romance with intellectuals," (Makinde 2009: 203), Awolowo states. Uneasy truly lies the head that wears the leadership crown in Awolowo's philosophical universe. Doubtless his insistence on a combination of intellectual curiosity and Spartan discipline, and his effort to model this in his own life, fed unfounded accusations of self-preference and arrogance. His response is quintessentially Awolowo-ic:

> I have never regarded myself as having a monopoly of wisdom. The trouble is that when most people in public life and in the position of leadership and rulership are spending whole days and nights in clubs or in the company of men of shady character and women of easy virtue I, like a few others, am always at my post working hard at the country's problems and trying to find solutions to them … Only the deep can call to the deep. (Makinde 2009: 208)

Time was when Africa had leaders who rightly belonged to the deep. Whatever it is that irks us about their practice, it is my hope that essays like this one encourage more scholars to study and argue with their philosophical contributions. The need for this in an Africa that is still trying to come to terms with the challenges of modernity cannot be overstressed.

On the issue of governance, Awolowo addressed in his works one of the central questions of political philosophy: who ought to rule when not all can rule? The leadership qualities by themselves do not suffice to make someone a ruler. He or she must be able to persuade her fellow citizens of her suitability for office. As much as the leader should possess the qualities of the regime of mental magnitude, the followers should not seek after knowledge any less.

His mantra always was to develop the mind and strengthen the body as prerequisites for sound achievements in personal, as well as public, life.

To this end, he fought tirelessly to the very end of his life for the implementation of free education at all levels for all Nigerians as a precondition for freeing the country and its peoples from the evils of ignorance, ill-health, poverty and the predations of vestigial survivals of feudal rule in different parts of the country, most notably its northern sections. The dialectic of the deep is not without relevance in the area of governance, either. The deep are not limited to the ranks of the rulers, actual and prospective. The ruled, too, must share of the characteristics of the deep if they are going to play their part in the drama of democracy and would not succumb to paltry inducements to line up behind charlatans or be swayed by empty demagoguery.

The issue of governance is addressed from two core pieces of Awolowo's political philosophy: federalism and liberal democracy. Again, we find the centrality of knowledge and a serious engagement with philosophy as a template for formulating policies. Africa's philosophers and other theoretical types have been remiss in ignoring the theoretical knowledge produced by Africa's statesmen and women. We are all too often eager to assimilate their writings to their political concerns when we are not actively denigrating them as unworthy of our scholarly attention. That is a mistaken attitude that is totally unwarranted (See, Taiwo 2004). In the case of Awolowo, it is scandalous. Unlike many other African leaders, he labored to produce substantive philosophical works. Awolowo was an original thinker whose work was marked by incomparable erudition. For one who never proclaimed himself a Marxist or any of the other monikers associated with marrying theory to practice, Awolowo acted on the dictum that "practice without theory is blind; theory without practice is empty." His major works are not mere collections of his speeches, policy papers, party manifestoes, and interviews. In this regard, four major works are deserving of attention in any attempt to make sense of Awolowo's philosophy. They are *Path to Nigerian Freedom* (1947), *Thoughts on the Nigerian Constitution* (1966), *The People's Republic* (1968), and *The Strategy and Tactics of the People's Republic* (1970).

Additionally, his speeches brim with recondite explications of the core ideas of his philosophy, erudite analyses of various problems, and incredible solutions to them (See, Awolowo 1981a, b, c). Whatever problems interested him were never, strictly speaking, practical ones. They were apprehended by him at the philosophical level, and the theoretical blueprints he came up with owed everything to his philosophical anthropology: that is, his philosophy of human nature; his views of who ought to rule where not all can rule: that is, his theory of political obligation or what some will call the moral distribution of political power in a state; and his understanding of what constitutes a good society and the best means for realizing it, one of the perennial questions of ethics and political philosophy (See Taiwo 2004).

For a man of Awolowo's stature in the intellectual history of the twentieth century, though, one can argue that scholars have not paid sufficient attention to his intellectual accomplishments and the theoretical genealogies of his core ideas. The scholarship on and about Awolowo is nowhere near what it should be in terms of volume and quality. In fact, it is disappointing that few scholars have bothered to dig deeply into Awolowo's voluminous writings and, in so doing, argue with him, confute his postulations, push his ideas in directions that he himself might not or could not have anticipated or even wanted, and, generally, produce first-rate original and secondary scholarship about his wide-ranging body of work (See Oyelaran et al. 1988; Oke et al. 2009).

Next, we consider Awolowo's theoretical defense of federalism as the best state structure for a multilingual, multi-national country such as Nigeria is, marked as it also is by cultural pluralism. If there is one area where Africa has been ill-served by the indifference of its scholars to the perorations of a thinker like Awolowo, it is in the area of federalism. Dominant in the scholarship on Africa regarding what state structure is best suited for the multination-states of the African continent is the idea that the central problem facing African countries after independence was that of turning the hodge-podge of states that had been bequeathed to them by colonialism into nations. This is captured in what has come to be known in the literature as the "nation-building" problematic. Underlying this idea is the questionable assumption that there were no nations in Africa before colonialism, and none were fashioned while colonialism lasted. It then fell to the governments and peoples of the then-newly minted states to form and consolidate nations in the continent. Once African scholars allowed themselves to accept this template, they were led down a theoretical blind alley that made them believe that African countries are unlike other countries in the rest of the world because they do not approximate the true definition of nation-states. This accounts for the popularity of themes in African political science respecting the challenge of creating nations in Africa. Yet, if Walker Connor were to be believed, only a tiny fraction (ca. 10%) of the world's states really qualify to be called nation-states; the rest are state-nations or multi-nation states.[22] This means that African states are very much ordinary in their multinational character and several insights can be garnered from looking at how other multination-states in the world have managed the relationships among their many nationalities while evolving a supranational identity to which all citizens of the state subscribe and in which they take pride when they celebrate their patriotism.

Once understood this way, it is possible to remove the foolish idea that Africans have to stop being whatever national identity they have in order for them to become citizens of the new states. One way in which this has been tackled in other areas is through the facility of federalism;

an arrangement in which the federating units have autonomy within the context of a system in which they all agree to submit certain powers and delegate particular functions to a central authority. Whatever the federating units are—national, ethnic, religious—they can maintain those identities and practices while they all subscribe to an artificial supranationality denominated by a common, indivisible *citizenship* within a single geo-polity.[23]

Federalism has become popular again in Nigeria. In terms of contributions to the theory and practice of federalism in Africa, Awolowo has few peers. He makes clear that his preference for federalism was not a pragmatic embrace dictated by political expediency. As Awolowo (1966: 26–27) puts it in the major work in which he articulated and developed his theory:

> The making of a country's constitution is applied political science. The science of politics has built up over the years a body of principles which are identifiable, and which, in spite of incessant frictions and deliberate distortions, are capable of universal application. . . .
>
> In other words, we make bold to assert that at this stage in the evolution of man, it is possible to discern political principles or laws of universal application which must determine the type of constitution best suited to a given country. It is also possible, in the face of such general principles, to declare and predict that any wide departure from them, in identical cases and circumstances, is bound to come to grief sooner or later.
>
> It is incumbent upon us, therefore, in making a choice between a unitary and a federal constitution, to endeavour to discover, from the empirical facts which political history supplies, and from the conclusions which political scientists and analysts have reached, whether there are any patent and well-established political principles by which our action can be guided. And if we discover them, to follow them with objective fidelity, whatever our predilections, personal feelings or secret aspirations.[24]

He proceeds to show how his preference is compelled by his consideration of political scientific principles and analyses as well as his thorough study of the peculiar circumstances of Nigeria. Awolowo's theory of federalism represents a creative adaptation of ideas that he culled from some of the classics of federalist literature with a very thorough investigation of the empirical data regarding the demographic distribution of nationalities and ethnicities within the boundaries of Nigeria. His aim was to come up with theoretical postulations regarding what geopolitical structure is most likely to redound to the even development of Nigeria and the advancement of its diverse population.

Unfortunately, the penchant for always seeking to work on themes that might endear them to foreign sponsors has meant that few, indeed, are the Nigerian African scholars who can lay claim to being experts on

this aspect of Awolowo's ideas. It might be an indication of how sound the promise of Awolowo's theory was that *Thoughts on the Nigerian Constitution* was a frequent companion of Ken Saro Wiwa in his heroic quest for Ogoni self-determination in Nigeria's Niger Delta. In a more decent environment, in which the life of the mind is celebrated, there would be many writings around Awolowo's postulates on federalism and few of the baseless accusations of tribalism usually leveled at Awolowo on account of those postulates. I cannot wait to see the fruits of the engagement—expository, critical or comparative—with Awolowo's ideas on this score.[25]

Let us turn now to the second exemplar of his position on governance. Writing in his autobiography, Awolowo affirmed his unhesitating and unequivocal preference for Western democracy in the context of the then-existing division of the world into ideological camps (1960: 309). His unyielding and, until his death, undiminished commitment to liberal democracy was an integral part of his embrace of the much wider movement of modernity. This is not the place to expound upon this larger claim. The discussion here is limited to pointing out how this democratic preference has not been seriously studied or canvassed by scholars of Awolowo, not to talk of his followers. Yet, the investment in liberal representative democracy based on the party system and universal adult suffrage, in which free citizens freely choose their representatives in electoral contests marked by the clear articulation of ideas and policies, ranks as Awolowo's most significant commitment. He states:

> As we planned for Nigeria's independence, we were fully conscious that freedom from British rule does not necessarily connote freedom for individual Nigerian citizens. I and most of my colleagues are democrats by nature, and socialists by conviction. We believe in the democratic way of life: equality under the law, respect for the fundamental rights of individual citizens, and the existence of independent and impartial tribunals where these rights could be enforced. We believe that the generality of the people should enjoy this life and do so in reasonable abundance. The most detestable feature of British administration was that the governed had no say in the appointment of those who governed them. A Nigerian administration by Nigerians must be erected on the general consent and the united goodwill of the majority of the people. In my view, there can be no satisfactory alternative to this. At the same time I fully recognize that the healthy growth of a democratic way of life requires the existence of an enlightened community led by a group of people who are imbued with the all-consuming urge to defend, uphold and protect the human dignity and the legal equality of their fellow-men. (Ibid.: 255)[26]

Awolowo was no ordinary politician. His commitment to liberal democracy was founded upon his study of modern political philosophy and it

takes but little familiarity with the classics of modern political philosophy to realize that the principles enunciated by Awolowo are the same ones that animate the countries that Nigerians look up to as models of the democratic way of life. At the bottom of those is the core principle that no one ought to be bound by the dictates of a government in the constitution of which she has had no hand: this is the *principle of governance by consent* that emerged at the dawn of the modern age. Given his firm commitment to this principle, he was opposed to one-party rule, and he did not think that a government could be legitimate that was not a product of the popular will freely expressed through the mechanism of fair elections.[27]

"In my view, therefore, democracy exists only when the people are free, periodically and at their will, to re-elect or remove those who have been elected by them to administer their affairs. It is when this freedom exists that man can grow into the self-reliant and fearless creature that God intends him to be" (Awolowo 1960: 272). Needless to say, he was not enamored of the democracy that he witnessed in Nigeria prior to his death in 1987. His dark view of democracy's prospects remains germane today, but I think that Nigeria is making progress to reduce the gap between the ideal and our reality. Indeed, it was, in part, his commitment to the freedom of the individual to choose those who shall rule him\her and to not be subject to a government in the constitution of which she has had no part, which is the metaphysical foundation of liberal representative democracy, that stood in the way of his acceptance by the elite in the northern part of Nigeria.

It is a testament to this predilection of his that Awolowo departed from the colonial regime's preference for rule by chiefs and subjected "traditional authority" to that of modern elected officials. That is, in spite of Awolowo's much-vaunted and justly celebrated enthusiasm for Yorùbá culture, he made it clear that chiefs could no longer enjoy any supremacy in politics relative to the elected representatives of the people, who were considered superior to successors to "traditional authority" derived from inheritance, appointment, and other forms of ascription. This is a feat that has yet to be duplicated in areas of Nigeria still dominated by the emirate system. Unfortunately, the gravity of Awolowo's preference for governance by consent is not fully appreciated by many of his followers, especially the scholars among them. Every time a commentator on Awolowo tries to make it seem as if there is continuity between his liberal-democratic, and later democratic socialist, leaning and chiefly rule in Africa, they betray a profound misunderstanding of his philosophy. Indigenous institutions of governance were to be preserved more as cultural institutions and not to be restored to their dominant position in governance in African societies, especially during colonialism.

This was an issue that featured prominently in the 1990s in the process that led to the new South African constitution regarding the role that indigenous modes of governance would play in the new dispensation. In many parts of the continent, positions based on ascription, not merit, continue to play significant roles in the political structures of various countries and societies. Such perpetuations represent radical and, as Awolowo might have insisted, unacceptable diminutions in the quality of our commitment to and strengthening of a democratic way of life in our polities. Studying Awolowo's ideas and those of others like him, especially Sylvanus Olympio, Kwame Nkrumah, Kofi Busia, and Julius Nyerere, regarding their theoretical expostulations on democracy and the way of life it enjoins, is likely to elevate the quality of political philosophical debates across our continent.[28]

Conclusion

Awolowo was a gifted, even if self-taught, student of political economy and its historical evolution. Although he was an avowed socialist, he did not subscribe to the idea that the state had to control every aspect of economic production. As he insisted in his writings, socialism was more of an attitude than a system of production of goods and services.[29] He wanted to preserve the prodigious production associated with capitalism while using the instrumentality of the state, especially through taxation, to effect a more equitable distribution of the wealth that is produced, especially in regard to providing the lower classes with the resources requisite for humane living with dignity.

This philosophical orientation, combined with his study of political economy, led him to use the state to create enabling conditions for private capital to operate and for the state to use its power to put in place the infrastructure necessary for wealth and job creation, as well as the wherewithal for funding social services, the provision of which, by his administration, assumed legendary proportions. What has now been reduced to expedient means predicated on the abdication by the state of its responsibility to its citizens—so-called public/private sector partnership—originated for Awolowo in carefully articulated, well-grounded philosophical and politico-economic principles as well as a critical engagement with comparative political economy in other parts of the world. This is one area that can use specialized studies in the larger context of Awolowo scholarship.

Multiplying illustrations of Awolowo's philosophical genius in this chapter would be otiose. Areas that a larger study of the sort that I said motivated this chapter will cover include his philosophy of education, his model of the mass political party—an idea that he introduced to

Nigeria—his prescient recognition of the centrality of communication in the modern polity, his sponsorship of research into Yoruba culture, and just his general insistence that the service of the masses is the only justification for seeking public office.

My modest objective in this chapter has been to introduce the reader to the ideas of a man who played a pivotal role in twentieth-century Nigeria and, by extension, Africa. I hope that my isolation of my three themes help set the ball rolling for more fecund engagements with Awolowo's work. Awolowo was an individual who embodied the kind of knowledge production that should catalyze thinking about the themes of this volume. I have argued that the kind of knowledge that he produced has not received the critical attention from scholars that it deserves. If this chapter helps along the process of discovery and engagement respecting Awolowo's and other African thinkers' works, its purpose shall have been served.

Notes

*This chapter was originally delivered as a keynote at the Conference on Leadership and Governance in Africa, hosted by the Obafemi Awolowo Institute of Government and Public Policy, Lekki, Lagos, Nigeria on July 12, 2013.

1. For details of Awolowo's personal and political life, see his autobiography, *Awo: The Autobiography of Chief Obafemi Awolowo* (1960); Wale Adebanwi's *Yorùbá Elites and Ethnic Politics in Nigeria: Ọbáfẹ́mi Awólọ́wọ̀ and Corporate Agency* (2014) and Insa Nolte's *Obafemi Awolowo and the Making of Remo: The Local Politics of a Nigerian Nationalist* (2009).

2. They are: Omorogbe Nwanwene, "Awolowo's Political Philosophy," *Quarterly Journal of Administration*, vol. IV (October 1969–July 1970), pp. 127–153; Omorogbe Nwanwene, "Awolowo's Strategy and Tactics of the People's Republic of Nigeria: A Review Article," *Quarterly Journal of Administration*, vol. V (October 1970–July 1971), pp. 229–241; Billy J. Dudley, "The political Theory of Awolowo and Azikiwe," in Onigu Otite, ed., *Themes in African Social and Political Thought* (Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1978). The first book-length study of his ideas as a coherent, integrated socio-political philosophy came in Ogunmodede (1986).

3. See Taiwo (1998).

4. This is an important point that I do not develop here. But it provides the basis for Awolowo's denial of the existence of "African socialism," "African science," or "African philosophy" when any of them is meant to signify some peculiar identity that is not a mere variation on the disciplines concerned. "If any principle is purely and strictly peculiar to a given institution, region, or state, it may be a custom, practice, or even a theory, but it certainly cannot lay claim to the status of science. Just as there can be no

African ethics *qua* Ethics as a science, or, African logic, so there can be no African socialism" (Awolowo 1968: 208).

5. Although I think it is more appropriate to substitute religion or spirituality in this context, there is no space to develop the relevant explanation. It suffices to say that his was not a "Christian" philosophy. Irreligious persons or others hostile to religion may fault his ideas for their spiritual inspiration, the universal scope of his theory is not in any way hurt by this.

6. This is a preeminently modern moment in Awolowo's thought. He too contended that Nature is inferior to humans and that it is meant to be dominated by us as a matter of divine right. We see this intuition widely distributed throughout his writings whether in his philosophy of education where human reason is to be enhanced above what talents nature has endowed an individual with; to his explanation of why Africa is underdeveloped: Nature is kind to us and we are not compelled to improve it to get by; or his concept of "the regime of mental magnitude" where those who would assume rulership of human society must tame nature in themselves, conquering thereby what Immanuel Kant called "the tyranny of the flesh." In all things, Awolowo insisted, as Plato did, that reason must rule over the appetites and desire.

7. In a future essay, I shall be presenting Awolowo's remarkable take on the perennial philosophical problem of evil to the world of academic philosophy. As far as I know, there is no view similar to it abroad in the literature.

8. This may strike some as counterintuitive, if not contradictory, given Awolowo's reputation in his lifetime as a Christian, a significant benefactor of many Christian denominations. But it is a reminder of how little we know of Awolowo's philosophy and the complexity of his relationship to his faith and the need for us to move away from our preoccupation with his sagacity to serious studies of his philosophy.

9. No, Awolowo was not a sceptic in matters of religion; he was a staunch believer in the fundamentally spiritual nature of our being. What he did not believe was that God is ever in direct control of our lives as humans. That is why I identify his stand with some version of Deism.

10. Volcanoes are easily predicted now and their evil has been ameliorated through evacuations. Death tolls from earthquakes have been reduced where they have invested in knowledge of earthquake. Waterways are channeled to ensure that there would be no new Noahs in human history.

11. One of the themes under discussion in this thread of the conversation was the issue of AIDS.

12. They become like beasts of the wild to whose care God tends by giving each what it would need for its subsistence. To humans God gave the least natural protection against the elements but gave reason to enable us to make the world in our image and dominate and subdue the rest of nature for purposes of our thriving. Submitting to God and handing over our daily lives to God's power is a vacation of this divine-inspired authority. This, I contend, is Awolowo's point.

13. On this score, one must lament the near complete absence of a serious engagement with Awolowo's significant philosophical corpus in the

only book published to commemorate the centenary of his birth (Oke et al. 2009).

14. It is out of place in the present discussion to explore the radical implications of this embrace of the modern tenet of the centrality of reason for the traditional philosophical problem of evil. Might the exercise of reason, as some have argued in philosophy be itself a source of evil? If it is, how can the same reason be the key to the extirpation of evil in the world? Yet, it may not be denied that a whole lot of what we used to regard as evil has been reassigned as we came to solve the mysteries of their occurrence and their nature. These are themes that would make for some interesting discussions on a different occasion.

15. A similar point is made by Banji Akintoye, "Fundamental Essentials of the Awolowo Heritage," in Oke et al. (2009). In Oke, David O., Olatunji Dare, Adebayo Williams, and Femi Akinola (eds.). 2009. *AWO: On the Trail of a Titan*. Lagos: The Obafemi Awolowo Foundation. Pp. 109–146.

16. It would be interesting to do comparative studies of the awareness and reception among the young in various African countries—Nkrumah in Ghana; Senghor in Senegal; Nyerere in Tanzania—of the ideas of our philosophers who also performed as politicians in their respective countries.

17. Obafemi Awolowo, *The People's Republic*, p. 229. See also, Awolowo, *Path to Nigerian Freedom*, pp. 31, 57, 63, 77, 100; *Voice of Reason*, p. 133.

18. Even in his philosophical anthropology, nature is not to be left alone or accepted with equanimity. It is to be shaped by that piece of human inheritance that makes us co-creators with God: reason.

19. I have examined this at length in Taiwo (1986).

20. Although this chapter has deployed examples mostly from Nigeria, and I am reluctant to generalize about Africa, I am convinced that some of the claims made here have empirical analogues in many parts of Africa. One can only hope that other scholars find enough inspiration in Awolowo's works and our exposition of them to test the relevance of his ideas in other African countries and beyond Africa's borders, too.

21. If one is looking for evidence of the illiteracy that now rules the roost of our public life, one need look no further than the renaming of Liberty Stadium after Awolowo by the current Nigerian president in 2009 in commemoration of the centenary of Awolowo's birth. The politico-philosophical significance of the original name does not resonate with Goodluck Jonathan and his bevy of doctorate-wielding advisors. It is almost as if they thought that "Liberty" was a mere designator, not what it truly was: a marker of our break from and with the ideational structures of colonialism.

22. See his "The Politics of Ethnonationalism," *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 27, no. 1 (1973), p. 1; and "Nationalism and Political Illegitimacy," *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism*, vol. 8, no. 2 (1981), p. 213.

23. Awolowo's theory of federalism has implications for the rest of Africa. It is remarkable that, contrary to received wisdom and even Awolowo's own insistence, a unilingual, one of two *nation-states* in Africa, Somalia, is

now attempting to install a federal system to take account of its fractious clan politics.

24. For critical discussions of Awolowo's theory of federalism see, Olufemi Taiwo, "Unity in Diversity?: Obafemi Awolowo and the National Question in Nigeria," *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism*, vol. XVIII, no. 1–2 (1991), pp. 43–59; Kunle Amuwo, "The Political Thought of Awolowo" and Eghosa E. Osaghae, "Awolowo and Nigerian Federalism" both in Olasope O. Oyelaran, Toyin Falola, Mokwugo Okoye, and Adewale Thompson, eds., *Obafemi Awolowo: The End of an Era?* (Ile-Ife: Obafemi Awolowo University Press, 1988), pp. 440–461, 526–562, respectively.

25. Unfortunately, continuing discussions of federalism by some of Nigeria's top scholars of the topic do not inspire confidence where this is concerned. See, for example, L. Adele Jinadu, "Ethnic Conflict and Federalism in Nigeria," ZEF Discussion Papers on Development Policy, no. 49 (2002); J. Isawa Elaigwu, *The Politics of Federalism in Nigeria* (London: Adonis & Abbey, 2007); "Practice of Federalism in Africa: The Nigerian Experience—Challenges and the Way Forward," Public Lecture delivered at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, Nigeria, November 12, 2013.

26. In a future article, I intend to explore Awolowo's understanding of liberalism and of the influences that he acknowledged in his preference, especially John Locke and John Stuart Mill. In this regard, it would be interesting to speculate on what Awolowo's reaction would have been to the demonization of homosexuality across Africa in light of his singling out of the freedom of the individual as one of the fruits of independence accruable to ordinary African citizens.

27. Awolowo, *The People's Republic*, "Part Three: Blueprint for Self-Rule."

28. See especially the collection, James Duffy and Robert A. Manners, eds., *Africa Speaks* (Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrand, 1961).

29. Awolowo, *The People's Republic*, "Part Two: Exposition of Principles."

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Julius Nyerere: Leadership Insights for Contemporary Challenges

Samuel Zalanga

Introduction

The contemporary literature on leadership is replete with references to contextual factors that shape leadership, and contingency theories of leadership, which analyze how social, environmental and situational factors affect the leadership process. What they all, however, fail to do very well as they contribute to our understanding of leadership is to take into cognizance "the impact of long-term historical forces and influence of cultural values upon leadership" (Wren 1995: 246). Similarly, there are references in the literature to the trait approach to leadership, which examines a leader's actions and behavior and the role that followers play in shaping a leader. This, of course, entails examining organizational level variables and transactional approaches to leadership in order to arrive at a clear and concise understanding of the leadership process (Chemers 1997). Based on the limitation of the foregoing contributions in the literature, what is needed, as a corrective that informs this chapter's analysis, are the following: a) acknowledgement of the role of "macro contextual factors," and b) integration into our analysis of leadership formation and process the "longer influences of historical and cultural forces into the broader leadership equation" (Wren 1995: 246).

The chapter is divided into four broad sections. After the introduction, some conceptual issues that are relevant for an incisive reflection on leadership in general are examined. The third section selects nine relevant themes from President Nyerere's engagements and public

statements with regard to the struggle for nation building and eco-
nomic development in Tanzania, starting from the period the coun-
try was named Tanganyika and agitated for freedom and independence
from British colonial rule. In the concluding section, an attempt is made
to stress the lessons and insights from Nyerere's work that are relevant
for understanding contemporary challenges in postcolonial African
development.

Conceptual Issues in Analyzing Leadership in the Process of Promoting Change and Development

Julius Nyerere was a political leader of Tanganyika, which later became
Tanzania. In order to appreciate his contribution to transformational
leadership and to draw some lessons and insights from his leadership
roles, we need to start by appreciating the fact that political leadership
in a social system is often characterized by conflicting values and prior-
ities. Part of what any leader tackles in order to lead effectively is how
to resolve conflicting values and priorities in the community (Couto
2010: 164). In this respect, to understand how such leadership pro-
motes change in an effective way, one has to examine the holistic scope
of the leadership jurisdiction, so as to appreciate the numerous forces
and variables that intersect to bring about a particular social reality. As
Lewin (1951) argues in his field theory, one cannot fully grasp how
effective change is without examining the totality of coexisting factors,
which are conceived as mutually interdependent. For instance, critical
in this respect is how people's identity is shaped and how that in turn
impacts the behavior of leaders and the population. In this respect, in
order to thoroughly examine the process of leader-initiated change,
we have to integrate into our analysis the idea of cumulative effect and
a move from stable equilibrium to "dynamic analysis of the process
of change in social relations" (Myrdal 1994: 1065). Related to this,
Heifetz (2007) notes that when a system is functioning very well, it is
able to effectively adapt as a living entity, and in doing so, develop the
capacity to absorb the best survival strategies and practices from its past
and combine them with new changes in order to effectively survive in
the future.

The relevant issue here for postcolonial African societies is that
they are living in a world that is going through a rapid process of
social change, but the fundamental question is whether African soci-
eties have developed the capacity to absorb and effectively handle
the social changes taking place in the world. Unless they are able
to do that well, and in such a way that they can be competitive and

succeed, failure will mean becoming irrelevant and a pawn in the chessboard of neoliberal globalization where the world is under the hegemony of a Social Darwinist philosophy of survival of the fittest (Frank 2012).

Generally, leadership change comes about through piecemeal incremental change instead of colossal transformations. In this process of change, there has to be "balance and proportion." And in examining this process of change, we have to focus on how the values of the leader or leadership team shapes how they deal with issues (Hickman 2010: 175–177). In focusing on how the values of a leader can play a decisive role in shaping the substance and direction of change, we need to specifically examine the following: What are the values shared by the leadership team? To what extent is inclusiveness an important concern for the leadership team? Which change does the leadership team prioritize and pursue first? What is the depth of the leadership team's critical thinking skills, and what is the content of their vision as they lead? And, finally, how does the leadership team reflect and communicate what their vision for change is? While leadership is not the exclusive explanation for success in the pursuit of nation building and economic development, it is still the most decisive issue in mobilizing the human and natural resources of a society to fight against underdevelopment, disease, poverty and ignorance. Although the kind of leadership in a society is shaped by the social and cultural context, it is also true that dynamic leadership can shape and transform the social and cultural context of a society.

On another note, leadership can also be understood from the dual perspectives of: *the ethic of ultimate ends* versus the *ethic of responsibility*. In the case of the ethic of ultimate ends, the emphasis is on values and what the leader or leadership team intends as the ultimate goal. On the other hand, in the case of the ethic of responsibility, the concern is about the negative consequences of a leader's action that can be anticipated in advance. Weber (1946: 126) is concerned that since leadership in modern society is exercised through politics, there is tension between how a leader balances the ethic of ultimate ends and the ethic of responsibility. Weber clarifies this concern by asserting that when leaders do not balance these ethics, this can result in folly. Folly has been characterized by Hickman (2010: 183) as the lengthy pursuit of policies by leaders that run counter to their self-interests. It is impossible to look at postcolonial development policies in Africa and not be struck by the fact that often the ruling elites have pursued policy that undermined the national interests of their countries, and even their own self-interests, assuming their goals were to sincerely build their nations and promote economic development in a just and egalitarian manner.

Nyerere: Transformational Leadership and National Development

The Challenge of Uneven Integration along Racial and Ethnic Lines

Very early in his effort and struggle for nation building and economic development in Tanzania, Nyerere (1966: 23–29, 73–74) addressed the challenge and issue of uneven integration of the different racial and ethnic groups in the country into a modern capitalist state and economy. The policies that created the uneven integration were put in place by the colonial government through its policies of extraction and governance. This has created a situation where there is a coexistence of the very rich and the poor in the same society, which causes resentment among people. Such envy and resentment can spill over into antagonism and bitterness between or among social groups, especially since the structure of inequality intersects with ethnic, racial or even religious boundaries.

Nyerere was of the view that postcolonial countries must rush to eliminate the structures of social inequalities that intersect with racial and ethnic divisions; otherwise, this challenge would make the countries extravagantly difficult to govern. For Nyerere, the vision was not one of totally eliminating inequality as such, but removing the ethnic and racial dimensions of inequality and the manifestation of inequality in gross manner. Failure to solve this problem may result in a situation where Westerners who want to maintain their privileges in Africa can exploit grievances rooted in the gross nature of inequality and injustice in African societies in order to continue to balkanize and dominate African people based on their preconceived belief that Africans are incapable of governing themselves (Nyerere 1966: 73–74).

As part of a broader strategy for laying the foundation for national stability and security that is necessary for economic development and nation building, Nyerere made a strong case for the need for affirmative action in the form of "Africanization" of postcolonial governing institutions. Owing to the legacy of colonial rule as highlighted above, many of the people occupying positions of responsibility in the civil service did not reflect the distribution and diversity of the people in the country. Given that the great majority of people in Tanzania are indigenous Africans, the civil service must adequately represent and reflect that population distribution. The challenge was that, based on pure merit, most of the positions in the civil service would go to Asians and Europeans because they had higher access to university education than the indigenous black African population. So without a deliberate affirmative action policy, the lopsided nature of the civil service would not reflect the distribution

of local population in the country, most of which is indigenous black African.

On the other hand, with a deliberate commitment to ensure that national institutions reflect and represent the diverse population of the country, Europeans and Asians would not be represented in the legislature as all the legislative positions would end up going to indigenous African people. But deliberate effort was made in Tanzania to ensure that Asians and Europeans were equally represented in the legislature. Nyerere observed in this respect:

> You will find out that the vast majority of the students are from the Asian and European communities. If therefore, as a result of a misapplied idealism you were to say, in recruiting officers to our civil service, it is going to be a free-for-all fight, [then] it is not going to be an equal fight. The chances are that the vast majority of qualified people are going to come from the two communities which in this respect are the strong communities and therefore you deliberately discriminated in favor of the weaker community in order to give the civil service a local look. (1966: 101)

What Nyerere was trying to wrestle with in this respect is an issue that many African countries, or even societies such as the United States, face in the form of the need for affirmative action (Katznelson 2006). If the countries focused on what Nyerere referred to as misplaced idealism, they could recruit strictly based on merit, ignoring past historical realities and their impact and continuing affect on the present. In an attempt to create a more just and egalitarian society, therefore, Nyerere pursued a development strategy characterized as African socialism (i.e., Ujamaa).

Nyerere's Explication of the Basis of African Socialism (Ujamaa)

One of the defining political and public policy decision that constitutes the highlight of President Julius Nyerere's time in office was the adoption of Ujamaa, or African socialism, as a distinctive approach to Tanzania's national development. Much has been written about the rationale, success and failure of this approach to Tanzania's development in particular and the development of African countries in general. For all its many flaws, the Ujamaa development strategy still remains of great relevance to serious students of African development (Nyerere 1966: 162–171).

First, Nyerere was of the view that being a millionaire does not of itself make one to be an enemy of socialism. The real issue is not the wealth per se, but how the wealthy person perceives his or her wealth, and what he or she decides to do with it. In this case, the real question for Nyerere was the service to which the millionaire or wealthy person decides to put his or her money. If he or she decides to use the money to dominate

others, then he or she becomes an enemy of socialism and the people. But if he or she decides to use the wealth to elevate the struggles for human dignity and development, then the wealthy individual can be a socialist. Second, Nyerere believed that the central question between capitalism and socialism was not the technology they use or method of production as such. Rather, what matters are the rules of the game that govern the distribution of the wealth produced in a society, and where the wealth is produced. Given this focus on distribution, Nyerere believed that with a fair method of wealth distribution, a society cannot produce a pauper and a millionaire at the same time. And that is where African socialism matters, because while it would not create a society in Africa where everyone is equal, it will drastically reduce the gap between the rich and the poor.

Third, Nyerere argued that there was enough wealth in many traditional African societies to produce millionaires, but there were no millionaires in such societies. The reason for the lack, he notes, is that there were certain important principles of equity that characterized traditional African society that prevented such gross forms of inequality emerging (Nyerere 1966: 166–172). Nyerere anticipated the fact that some would argue that the failure to have a class of wealthy people in traditional African society precluded the emergence of a leisure class that is committed to luxury. The pursuit of luxury in turn led to great achievements in arts and culture, as Voltaire argued (Clark 2003). But Nyerere maintained that art and culture are God's gift for humanity, and he lamented a situation where a God that wants people to express and enjoy their artistic and cultural gifts cannot do so except with the existence of gross inequality in society that oppresses many human beings. In taking a position against luxury and its justification for the purposes of promoting artistic creativity, Nyerere is in consonance with the position of the French Enlightenment and romantic philosopher, J. J. Rousseau (Clark 2003).

Fourth, in defense of the egalitarian aspiration and ideal of African socialism, Nyerere found it relevant to address the counterargument that some people in society deserve to have more by being extremely rich because of their extraordinary contribution to the economy and society, owing to their exceptional creativity and innovative capacity, which make invaluable contributions in society. Nyerere argued that no matter what a person's ingenuity, creativity and innovativeness, that alone couldn't justify the gross inequality in the distribution of wealth and inequality under capitalism. No entrepreneur is an isolated person who lives in a social vacuum, owing nothing to society. For Nyerere, the crucial explanation of the gross inequality of wealth distribution under capitalism is the way the rules of the game that defined how wealth is to be distributed is set upare set up. In effect, influential and wealthy people lobby the government to pass laws that allow them to pay few if any taxes compared to the ordinary population (Smith 2012: 5–34).

Fifth, Nyerere identified the corruptive influence of consumerism in a capitalist society characterized by gross inequality in wealth and income. The rich and wealthy in such a society try to distinguish themselves by consuming extravagantly and expensive materials so as to distinguish themselves through conspicuous consumption (Veblen 1994). Gradually, because their consumption habits are extravagantly expensive, they begin to look down on other citizens as ordinary mortals. Such a situation is not healthy for a society, even though enlightenment scholars like Voltaire (Clark 2003) argued that the luxurious consumption of the rich and wealthy creates jobs and employment opportunities for the poor and ordinary citizens who are employed in industries and businesses that are created to meet the consumption needs of the rich and famous.

Sixth, Nyerere believed that African socialism must distinguish itself by continuing with the virtues of traditional African society, which includes providing a social security system and social welfare arrangement for everyone in society. Nyerere was concerned about the situation in some liberal capitalist societies where, in spite of what is called the welfare state, many people are left to their own devices as they wallow in abject poverty (Shipler 2005). For him, a decent society must set a minimum dignified living standard that everyone in a society is entitled to.

Seventh, Nyerere believed that African socialism means everyone in a society must be productive. It is an integral part of traditional African culture that everyone must work (Nyerere, 1966: 165). No one is entitled to live off someone else's labor except if the person was sick, underage or elderly. Articulating this point strengthens Nyerere's commitment to socialism and also serves as a counter-critique and narrative to those who assume that African socialism is an excuse for people to be lazy.

Eighth, and finally, if socialism is not going to lead people to become lazy or lack an incentive to work hard, something needs to be done in African societies. It is in this context that he strongly prescribed the need for reeducation of Africans after the reorientation or disorientation they went through under colonial rule and domination. The significance of colonialism for African socialism is that it introduced capitalist values and mindset among Africans, thereby creating new people in terms of personality and worldview. To build African socialism on traditional African values, there is a need to reeducate Africans (Nyerere 1966: 166). Thus, Nyerere's Tanzania promoted adult and self-reliant education far more than any Black African postcolonial country.

Nyerere on the Role of Education in National Development

Nyerere, in one of his major public statements on education, focused on the reasons for the huge expenditure on higher education. This is an issue that still remains relevant in contemporary African countries. The issue is

this: given limited resources, how can the countries in Africa justify the huge expenditure on higher education, which is done at the expense of providing certain social services and public amenities to the general public? Nyerere noted that the only way to justify the huge expenditure on higher education is to show how it can contribute to greater productivity and elevate the standard of living of the general public, especially those who are the least advantaged in society, who were his focal concern.

According to Nyerere, the investment in education was costing the government of Tanzania much, and it was obviously used in creating what by African standards was a privileged class; in the sense that the country was poor, with limited resources, yet instead of investing those resources on the ordinary population, they were used to educate a crop of young people who would later take over the reigns of leadership of the young country. Nyerere reflected on the moral/ethical dimension of the investment in higher education as a path to national development, which is still very pertinent to the situation in all African countries even today. He observed poignantly:

> The annual per capita income in Tangayika is 19 pounds, six shillings. The cost of keeping a student at this College will be about one thousand pounds a year. That is to say that it takes the annual per capita income of more than 50 of our people to maintain a single student at this College for one year. It should not be necessary to say more. It is obvious that this disparity can only be justified, morally or politically, if it can be looked upon as an investment by the poor in their own future. (Nyerere 1966: 307)

The only way such an investment in higher education can be justified in a country with a large number of poor people is if those who receive higher education at the expense of the state perceive their education as not a private but public investment for the purpose of creating public and common good. What this means is that there is a social mortgage on everyone's education, given what the society invested in the person's human capital. Later, in the 1980s, neoliberal scholars would argue that it is better for the sake of efficiency for people to pay their way as they pursue higher education; otherwise, it creates a situation where such investment by the state becomes a promotion of private welfare at the expense of public welfare. To the extent that many Africans educated at the expense of the state use their education to further their own private welfare, often ignoring public interest or the common good, the neoliberals are right (Todaro and Smith 2003: 379–392). But the proposition that the solution to this conundrum is to promote the privatization of education is a hugely contested issue, given that neoliberal reforms in higher education have widened the gap between the rich and the poor in all African countries and in the process, created other development problems.

In stressing the role of education in national development, President Nyerere underscored the importance of science, scientific thinking, scientific mindset, and objectivity in nation building and national development. Nyerere believed that, in analyzing all issues and policies pertaining to national development, the scientific method needs to be applied to identify or diagnose problems and proffer solutions. Interestingly, Nyerere acknowledged that using the scientific method in the pursuit of national development and nation building may unravel unpleasant facts that many would rather not deal with (Nyerere 1966: 308–309). But he maintained that the new nation cannot be built without applying scientific thinking and objective method of reasoning. One challenge that the leadership of a country faces when it adopts a scientific mindset is that it highlights the dangers of populism in governance, especially with regard to how government officials use populism to becloud certain policies and behaviors that are not serving the ordinary citizens well. Thus, Nyerere took time to address the problem of populism in governance.

The Need to Be Cautious of Populism

Populism often does not provide a coherent analysis of the path and mechanism of the change process that will lead to the elevation of the living standards of the general population. For instance, Nyerere desired to achieve a high standard of living for his people by bypassing the capitalist stage of development and achieving socialism in a predominantly agrarian population. His desire was to preserve the best of traditional African society and values, while also elevating his nation to an advanced living standard, as is desired in the modern world. In this respect, Nyerere was able to provide an incisive critique of the contradictions and the dehumanizing nature of capitalist industrial development, but without really providing a realistic path leading out of it or that would transcend it (Fatton 1985). The real question that he needed to wrestle with was how a poor Third World country, bedeviled with poverty, ignorance and disease, can transition to a socialist society that is modern, industrial and egalitarian, while totally avoiding the contradictions of modern capitalist industrialization and development. In this respect, one of the challenges that Nyerere's populism faced was that while he, as a leader, and some others around him, had internalized the ideological vision of Ujamaa, the great majority of the citizens and government employees coming from desperately poor social and economic backgrounds saw their official position as an instrument of material and capitalist accumulation resulting in new class formation (Bryceson 1982: 567). In essence, the driving force in Nyerere's understanding of creating a socialist society was his idealistic conception of what traditional African society was.

In another respect, one can make the case that Nyerere's vision of a modern socialist society was confronted by the challenge of what Alavi (1982: 172–194) characterized as an over-developed post-colonial state. In this case, postcolonial socialism is supposed to operate as a state that universally includes citizens that come from diverse ethnic, social and spatial backgrounds. As highlighted earlier, many of the officials of the socialist state did not fully comprehend the vision of Ujamaa in terms of their consciousness, let alone embrace it. The great majority of the peasants remained in their rural homestead and perceived their local community as the center of the universe (Feldman 2013: 154–182). Their production structure and technology was pre-modern and often subsistent. Attempts to incorporate them into the larger society were often resisted and opposed by the peasants, resulting in what Goran Hyden described as a situation where the African peasantry remains uncaptured, in the sense that its production structure and process is not under the effective control of state institutions owing to weak state capacity (1980, 1983). What this means is that many attempts at building modern African societies ignore the centrality of developing productive capacity and social relations. The state often is satisfied with collecting tributary taxes without transforming the production system and relations.

What is insightful about Hyden's analysis is that in many parts of Africa, the state is irrelevant to the productive capacity and relations of many peasants, such that even if the state were to collapse, in many cases it would have little impact on the day-to-day lives of the people, because by and large, the state has not penetrated society deeply, and where it has done so, the penetration has been merely predatory.

The Role of Trust in Government Institutions and Functionaries

Nyerere identifies poverty, disease and ignorance as the key enemies of African societies in the postcolonial period. One indicator of the commitment of the government to addressing the yearning of her people is the budget document as an instrument of public policy (Nyerere 1966: 81–84). Do the government's budgetary expenses, in spite of public rhetoric, reflect the pressing needs of the ordinary citizens of the country? Nyerere acknowledges the high expectation that the people of postcolonial Tanzania had toward the government attending to their needs in order to make the benefits of freedom and independence concrete and meaningful. The mechanism for doing this was through the effective collection of tax revenues and spending it judiciously on people's needs. When this happens, people acknowledge that justice has taken place. In this respect, a major threat to the postcolonial state's achieving its objectives is the lack of confidence of the

general population or citizens in the government institutions of the country and all institutions and government functionaries at various levels of governance that represent the state or serve as mechanism for translating state policies into concrete reality. Indeed, without building and achieving this trust, no government policy can be successfully implemented (Fatton 1985: 15–17). For the government to realize her development objectives, the population and citizens of the country must trust the political movement representing the state; there must be trust in those who control government departments, trade unions, cooperatives, and local governments.

A second major threat to the postcolonial government achieving her objective of transforming the nation, according to Nyerere, is corruption. He expressed his concern about corruption in the following manner:

> There is corruption. Now, sir, I think corruption must be treated with ruthlessness because I believe myself corruption and bribery is a greater enemy to the welfare of a people in peace time than war. I believe myself corruption in a country should be treated in almost the same way as you treat treason. If people cannot have confidence in their own Government, if people can feel that justice can be bought, then what hope are you leaving with the people? (1966: 82)

Here again, Nyerere had the foresight to anticipate the way corruption will become a threat and an obstacle to national development in postcolonial Africa (Mbaku 2012). Nowhere is the problem more acute than in resource-rich countries where the earnings from the sale of mineral resources benefits a small percentage of the elite population. On this question of spearheading the development transformation of a nation through effective leadership, Nyerere ventured into analyzing the role that the ruling political party can play in the process of social transformation in a country.

The Ruling Party and Social Transformation

After independence in 1961, Nyerere wanted to remind the members of the ruling party of the fundamental principles that informed the struggle that TANU led for the country's independence (1966: 138–141). Given what political parties have become in postcolonial Africa today, it is worthwhile to refresh our memories with the elevating and inspiring nature of Nyerere's TANU, which today is not a priority of the great majority of postcolonial African political parties. Neither would most African leaders address their ruling party members or citizens of their country with such an elevated sense of burden and social responsibility toward national interest and the common good. The contrast between

the way the parties operated and the neglect of the citizens of the country was so glaring. Nyerere asserted in this respect:

> All the time that TANU has been campaigning for Uhuru we have based our struggle on our belief in the equality and dignity of all mankind and on the Declaration of Human Rights. We have agreed that our nation shall be a nation of free and equal citizens, each person having an equal right and opportunity to develop himself, and contribute to the maximum of his capabilities to the development of our society. We have said that neither race nor tribe nor religion or cleverness, nor anything else, could take away from a man his own rights as an equal member of society. This is what we have now to put into practice. (Nyerere 1966: 139)

Just as the struggle for freedom and independence (i.e., Uhuru) was only made possible through the sacrifices, effort, and determination of the people of Tanzania, Nyerere maintained that it is these same virtuous acts that would contribute to the development of the country. He was also of the view that while postcolonial African nations can learn from the experiences of the development of other nations, and they might receive aid or assistance from foreign countries, ultimately, no one provides a ready-made blue print plan for the development of a new postcolonial nation. It is the citizens of the country who would have to figure that out. It is a nation's effort, in combination with its natural and human resources that become central to this struggle for nation building and economic development.

In the new nation, the struggle is not against other people per se but against nature as well. For in order to build the new nation and eradicate poverty, ignorance and disease, there is a need for unity among the people to fight nature. And the citizens' willingness and opportunity to participate, and their attitudes, become central in defining the contours of this struggle. It was in this respect that Nyerere mobilized TANU in the post-independence era to be prepared for engaging the people to participate in shaping and contributing to the national development of the country as the people did during the nationalist struggle. He challenged TANU's rank and file to play several roles as a contribution of the party to national development and nation building. First, the party must constitute a medium for aggregating people's concerns and yearnings and channeling them to the government. Second, the party should serve as a medium and mechanism for articulating the government's policies, vision and program to ordinary citizens. Third, the party must mobilize people to form civil society organizations that can embark on addressing social concerns, problems and challenges in the society. In this case, they would not just be complementing the government, but be agents of social transformation, based on their own merit and initiative.

Nyerere, Religion, and National Development

In Nyerere's vision for Africa, religion—in particular, Christianity—should play a positive role in the struggle for national development and building. Given Nyerere's commitment to the ideals of social justice, egalitarianism and equality, which led to his implementation of Ujamaa, it is not surprising that he left no stone unturned in exploring how all institutions and social processes can contribute or constitute an obstacle to the realization of postcolonial development ideals. In this respect, he focused on and analyzed how the Christian faith can contribute to the realization of the struggle for a more just society in Tanzania (Aylward 1980: 82–88). Religion constitutes the foundation of people's consciousness and worldview, so given Nyerere's desire to transform the consciousness of the people of Tanzania and Africa, it is not surprising that he was keenly interested in the role that the Christian faith can play in this respect. In this section, I highlight several themes from his analysis of the role of religion that are still relevant to nation building and development.

First, Nyerere made a distinction between charity and the pursuit of social justice. He maintained that there are many churches/denominations that are more satisfied with the existence of the poor and oppressed, who then become an object of religious charity and compassion. Nyerere was not trivializing or denying the need for charity and compassion. But he rejected and opposed a situation where Christian churches and denominations are more committed or interested in showing love, compassion and charity to persons who are assumed to permanently remain objects of their faith practice. In the name of peace, the church opposes people who rise up to rebel against their oppression and exploitation. Second, Nyerere counseled churches and Christian denominations that for them to fully live out their faith, they must engage in what in Latin America is characterized as liberation theology (Gutierrez 1973). Liberation theology encourages the oppressed to rise up and struggle for social justice in the here and now, by making themselves agents of history instead of waiting to receive justice in the life hereafter, or, as some scholars say, by and by, pie in the sky (Miranda 1974). Third, Nyerere was skeptical about miracles, insisting on the necessity for humans to transform themselves by deliberately acting as historical agents. Fourth, Nyerere noted that some Christian churches and denominations promote saintly living in poverty as an act of worship. While he recognized this as applicable to saints, in terms of its application to the whole of society, he saw poverty as dehumanizing and disempowering, a situation that diminishes the self-esteem and agency of a person to be fully human. Moreover, if the church promotes poverty while ignoring its unjust causes, it may be unwittingly condoning evil in the name of saintly worship.

Fifth, he maintained that religious organizations such as the church "must work with the people ...it is important that we should stress the working with, not the working for," he asserted (Nyerere 1966: 84). For the church to be relevant, it must work side by side with people in their struggles for justice and dignity, instead of working on behalf of the poor, directing them and dictating to them what their lives should be or look like. Here, Nyerere calls for the church to act in humility and be in solidarity with the poor as they struggle and work together. In effect, the church should work side by side with the poor instead of for them. Sixth, Nyerere counseled the church to separate its role in the "provision of service from its evangelical activities" (Nyerere 1966: 85). Doing so, in his view, "will make it clear that it desires men's conversion to Christianity to come from conviction, not from gratitude or from the compulsion of indebtedness" (ibid.).

Trade, Monocultural Economy, and Neocolonial Concerns

As early as 1965, just a few years after independence, Nyerere had raised a fundamental concern about the stability of postcolonial economies that were monocultural and faced declining terms of trade using the example of sisal production in his country, which was the main source of foreign exchange income for the country (Nyerere 1966: 320–322; Todaro and Smith 2003: 575–576). He warned that the price of sisal, even if stable at one point, would continue to decline. The decline in price, he noted, had to do with changes in demand, the development of substitute product, changes in quality, delivery and marketing. In spite of the forces working against Tanzania's economy, owing to the declining terms of trade, Nyerere insisted that the country must continue to fight on with new strategies. In doing this, he clarified how what happened in Tanzania with regard to the price of sisal would depend on what was happening in other developing agricultural economies, changes in industrial usage and demographic changes and shifts. He maintained that Tanzania could not reduce its production of sisal in order to prop up the price, because in the long run, that is not sustainable. Rather than just seeing themselves as victims, he counseled the Tanzanian people to be proactive and strategic in addressing this crisis:

> Our selling policy too must be adapted to our circumstances and needs. Our traditional markets must be retained, and an aggressive policy adopted to increase their purchase of Tanzania sisal and sisal products. But we must also go out and seek for additional outlets in new markets. Have we really nothing which could be useful to other developing countries? Is it not possible that their economic plans reveal a potential need which our sisal could meet? (Nyerere 1966: 321)

In regard to the neocolonial challenges of postcolonial countries like Tanzania, Nyerere raised three concerns that are still relevant today. First, he asserted that foreign nations that give assistance to Tanzania have their own national interests, and Tanzania should not be naïve to assume that foreign aid comes without strict conditionalities (Moyo 2009). Second, while Tanzania and other African countries need foreign investment, foreign capital is not invested overseas for the sake of developing other nations. Rather, it is the responsibility of the Tanzanian nation to set its national priorities in such a way that foreign capital can complement the strategy for national development, instead of undermining and subverting it. In effect, Nyerere is instructing African countries to be smart enough to know that foreign investors and corporations do not have developing Third World countries as their primary agenda.

Third, Nyerere anticipated a second scramble for Africa. Even though Africa is free and politically independent, he thought that through multinational control of businesses and foreign policy interventions, discords could be created among African countries and used to maintain foreign control and domination of Africa (Nyerere 1966: 204–208). In thinking about how globalization is not necessarily a guaranteed path to progressive development in Africa that will uplift the living standards of all citizens, Nyerere's analysis preempted the debate about the destructive consequences of neoliberal globalization on certain nations and segments of the populations in Third World countries.

Nyerere and Neoliberal Globalization

Nyerere's development strategy was inspired by the struggle for a just, equal and egalitarian society. In pushing these objectives and ideals that informed the Ujamaa vison of African socialism, he believed that the state has an important role to play by intervening in the development process and spearheading it. In the United States, many development economists were not only critical and contemptuous of the idea of making the struggle for greater equality and social justice; many felt it was a fundamental mistake to saddle the postcolonial state with the primary responsibility of socially engineering the development process (Rodrik 1996: 9–41). For instance, public choice theorists like Buchanan (2000: 95–109) and Olson (1971, 1982) believe that the state never gets anything right. Their argument is that the ruling elites and state bureaucrats pursue their self-interest while in office, instead of having benevolent attitude and commitment in their exercise of state power. Thus, public choice theorists saw Nyerere's type of commitment to African socialism and the struggle for a more just and equal society as misguided and a naïve approach at using the state to effectively implement development decisions.

Conclusion

I wish to draw out some lessons from Nyerere's leadership engagements and public policy declarations that are applicable to the contemporary challenges of leadership and development in postcolonial African societies.

First, it is clear from the foregoing that we cannot comprehend Nyerere's leadership without understanding the historical and cultural contexts that shaped his growth and maturity as a leader. This is, however, true for any African leader today as it was for Nyerere. No leader grows up in social vacuum. Second, Nyerere' leadership experience underscores the fact that leadership aimed at promoting nation building and inclusive economic development always confronts conflicting values and priorities. Whether a country succeeds in her attempt to develop or not is, by and large, contingent on how the leadership forges mechanisms for resolving or compromising conflicting values and priorities.

Third, if African countries want to succeed in the twenty-first century, they need to create and strengthen their societal adaptive capacities to cope with the speedy process of change that is constantly unleashed on African countries by domestic and external forces. The adaptive capacities serve as shock absorbers that can help a country cope with upheavals by remaining balanced and not breaking down. Fourth, in order to avoid the need for violent revolution that can be very unpredictable and open-ended in terms of its consequences, African countries through their leaders must pursue continuous incremental reform. Honest and sincere incremental effort at reforming society with specific reference to addressing issues of nation building and inclusive economic development will result in cumulative progressive change, which is preferable to a revolution or social unrest.

Fifth, African leaders must train themselves to develop the capacity for deep thinking and reflection and the ability to effectively communicate the philosophical reasoning and vision that grows out of such deep thinking. Sixth, Nyerere' Ujamaa socialist strategy of development woefully failed. But in hindsight, he left a legacy for the need for African leaders and their countries to discover their own path in the process of nation building and economic development. There is no ready-made blueprint.

There are several reasons why Ujamaa socialism as development strategy failed in Tanzania, and they are not any different from the reasons behind the failure of many other projects administered by highly technocratic professionals, such as in the Challenger disaster, which was a failure of rocket science. First, Nyerere had a romantic view of traditional African society and its social structure. His observations were not always accurate, and even where they were accurate, he froze it for the sake

of analytical convenience. He underestimated the depth and extent to which Western education and colonialism in general had corrupted the values and ethics of traditional African societies, thereby creating people who are less constrained by traditional values in their acquisitive tendencies (Fatton 1985: 15). Second, even though President Nyerere believed the vision and was willing to sacrifice for it, it was obvious that state civil servants and bureaucrats did not internalize the Ujamaa vision and the ethical and moral foundation informing it, never mind sacrifice for it. The great majority of the bureaucrats and civil servants elevated their private interests over and above the common good (Fatton 1985: 14–17). A third reason for the failure of Ujamaa was the assumption that development and social transformation can only take place when the peasants are forced to relocate from their traditional places of domicile. Given the structure of communal living in Africa, it would have been better to create viable opportunities for prosperity and then use it as an incentive to encourage people to move.

Finally, one of the major challenges that Ujamaa socialism faced was how to synthesize tradition (in this case African) and modernity. Nyerere was accurate in analyzing the good but also the corrupting influence of neoliberal capitalism. In doing this, his position was consistent with Weber's admiration of the transformative nature of modern capitalism, yet his acknowledgement that the evolution of capitalism would lead not only to a disenchanted world, but also a world where the future of humankind, is an iron cage, rather than a Garden of Eden. Piketty (2014) argues that the world as currently constituted will continue to experience widening inequality in spite of increased economic growth and productivity. This is because there is nothing inherent in the nature of capitalism that compels it as a matter of commitment to fairly distribute or redistribute the benefits of economic growth. The shared benefits of growth that created prosperity in the Western and non-Western word in the postwar era were byproducts of social justice-oriented social movements that disciplined the state and capital, compelling them to make deliberate concessions to labor and the working classes. Unlike neoliberal globalization, which is built on a vision of humanity that is distorted and amoral (Ferber and Nelson 1993), Nyerere's vision of humanity and the challenges of inequity in the process of economic development still remain solid and prescient of contemporary issues in economic development, even though his development policies failed.

African leaders today must learn from Nyerere: the fundamental significance of ensuring that whatever development strategy a country adopts, it should make central the issue of the distributional consequences of the development strategy adopted and treat the issue as a moral/ethical issue, and indeed, a national security concern. Contemporary African leaders must not evade the issue simply because Ujamaa socialism failed,

or because of the pressure on them by neoliberal economists. Widening inequality, even when presumably legitimate, creates hatred, envy, and resentment, which create fertile ground for nurturing violent conflict (Stiglitz 2015). It is also relevant to note that the failure of Ujamaa socialism as development strategy underscores the fact that good intentions are not enough when it comes to the successful conceptualization and implementation of development policies.

Seventh, Nyerere raised a fundamental moral and ethical question with regard to investment of public funds in African countries in the higher education sector. The huge investment is an indirect tax on the country's scarce resources and citizens. The investment can only be justified on grounds of promoting the common good. But when public funds are invested to educate a small group of future elites who later treat their education as a private commodity, this creates an ersatz economy, where risks and costs are publicly shared (i.e., socialized), while the benefits of the investments are privatized. More needs to be done to make education more accessible and its benefit geared toward promoting social welfare concerns instead of individual private gains. Ninth, from Nyerere, African leaders and people can learn an important lesson with regard to creating a well-functioning modern society that is fair and just. A modern society, for him, cannot exist without a modern mindset, personality and worldview as expressed in the adoption of scientific thinking, reasoning and outlook. When African countries adopt Western-style systems of education, governance, healthcare, transportation etc., but ignore the fact that such institutions can only effectively function in the context of a paradigm shift from traditional to rational, scientific thinking and worldview, such countries are setting themselves up for failure.

Furthermore, African leaders need to learn from Nyerere that their countries cannot develop without effective institutions and without the citizens trusting those institutions as truly championing and representing public welfare and interest. Without institutions being effective, and without the citizens trusting them, African countries are doomed to the kind of institutional failure that characterized the outbreak and spread of the Ebola virus in West Africa in 2014. The epidemic became serious because of weak institutions and the distrust of them by the public.

Yet another lesson for contemporary African leaders is that religion in its public role can only be used to promote universal human values and inclusion. In particular, institutional religion should not settle down to merely promoting charity at the expense of the struggle for social justice. A religion that is relevant for contemporary Africa must condemn attempts to keep the poor where they are in order to justify spiritual compassion of the persons of faith, or to use the social and economic desperation of the poor as basis for converting them to a new faith. Using Christian teaching, one could characterize Nyerere as saying that religion

cannot be justified with just producing Good Samaritans to save people who are metaphorically mugged regularly on the road between Jericho and Jerusalem. What Nyerere would want is to eliminate the social conditions that create an environment conducive to armed robbery and mugging people on the road. This means focusing on social justice.

Finally, African ruling elites and leaders must learn from Nyerere that they need to develop a hermeneutic of suspicion (Scott-Baumann 2012) toward development strategies imposed on them by the Western world, such as neoliberal globalization. Any thorough and serious study of Western economic history would lead a person to conclude that the official theory and strategies of development promoted in standard economic texts and official discourse from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank are not consistent with the concrete historical experiences of Western nations during their time of development (Chang 2008). African leaders and ruling elites must understand that in the parlance of international political economy, Western nations have no permanent friends but interests. African leaders should cultivate a disinterested hermeneutic of suspicion toward prescription for nation building and inclusive economic development from western nations. Without an informed, realistic and sincere hermeneutic of suspicion, they cannot differentiate between economic developments strategies that are promoted in Africa as benign but in reality, they are Trojan horses. A good hermeneutic of suspicion can enable African leaders and ruling elites to differentiate between true and genuine support for Africa vis-à-vis dubious projects that appear innocuous.

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Nation-Building and the Question of Rule

Jomo Kenyatta: War, Land, and Politics in Kenya

Warris Vianni

INTRODUCTION

This chapter revisits a particular narrative that attends upon the reputation of Jomo Kenyatta, Kenya's first prime minister and president. It recounts Kenyatta's relationship with Mau Mau in his refusal to yield to their claim for land as recognition and reward for hastening the end of colonial rule in Kenya. The controversy dates from the transfer of power from Britain and Kenyatta's assumption of office. Kenyatta had to take a position on an issue of moral and economic significance with far-reaching political implications. A practical assessment of the episode reveals a complex interplay of constraints and influences; it also discloses a vivid example of the ecologies within which African leadership is tested and forged. Far from suggesting leadership as a kind of "black box that holds the secrets to the malfeasances of governance in Africa" (see chapter 1 of this volume) Kenyatta's decision, which haunts his reputation, illustrates the political skill required in balancing the interests of different classes of clients and patrons, while holding steadfast to a vision of salvation through freedom and self-mastery.

Jomo Kenyatta was prime minister and then president between 1963 and 1978; when he died in office, he was more than 80 years old. His long and eventful political career, which started when he became the general secretary of the Kikuyu Central Association in the 1920s, meant that by the time he came to power, at nearly age 70, Kenyatta was a figure of some renown. Considered a nationalist and a leading Pan-Africanist when he led Kenya to independence, Kenyatta's presidency was marked by a focus on the affairs of his own country, and his political constituency. Kenyatta

radiated natural authority, exercised supreme power, and with his history and aura of mystique, he "grew into his own myth" (Bienen 2015: 81). Although he authored two books and various pamphlets, edited a newspaper and wrote to many, and gave hundreds of speeches, his thought on the high politics of his rule is often difficult to discern. When a visiting journalist once asked for an interview with the president, officials advised him that Kenyatta "is a God to us. He does not meet strangers" (Raju 1982: 17). Despite the opening of some of the archives that document his rule,[1] in many ways, Kenyatta, now dead for over 35 years, remains as inaccessible in death as he was in life.

Kenyatta's three principal achievements in power can be summarized as presiding over an administration that, contrary to expectations, oversaw an orderly transfer and consolidation of colonial power in Kenyan hands, managing rapid economic growth, and maintaining relative political stability. In comparison, of the six counties surrounding Kenya,[2] only one escaped the overthrow of civilian government during Kenyatta's 15-year tenure.

If we regard the ability to conserve power a key attribute in a ruler, then Kenyatta may be considered particularly successful. He died in office after nearly three terms in office and was buried in great state. In his fading years, those who exercised power in Kenya could only do so in his name. Though skillful as a practitioner of the art of politics, Kenyatta took various decisions that raise questions about aspects of his leadership, and political judgment. An issue of considerable significance that Kenyatta had to confront early on was what was to be done with the legacy of Mau Mau. At a practical level, the question revolved around the expectation by Mau Mau of land as reward for their role in ending settler rule in Kenya.[3]

According to critical discourse, Kenyatta ignored landless Mau Mau after riding to power on the back of their sacrifices (Buijtenhuijs 1973: 50–52; Kinyati 2000; Thiong'o 1981: 89). He had encouraged them by saying that the "tree of freedom would be watered by blood" (Lonsdale 2003: 59). Baldly put, the accusation tends to dismiss Kenyatta as ungrateful or, worse, cynical. As a judgment, it tends to be pre-emptory, foreclosing a larger consideration of an issue with many dimensions to it. One of the more sophisticated reviews of the literature on Mau Mau's reputation in independent Kenya emphasizes the emergence in the closing years of the colonial period of a loyalist middle-class antagonistic to Mau Mau, and the inheritance of the state by Kenyatta in alliance with this class, which wished to protect its interests against the claims of the forest fighters (Maugham-Brown 1985: 195).

With Kenyatta's immense prestige and the political capital at his disposal, the idea that Kenyatta should be hostage to the interests of any one particular group requires closer examination. A consideration of the fluid

situation unfolding at the time of independence suggests a complexity in the interplay of a number of factors which had a bearing on Kenyatta's calculations. That relatively short period—following Kenyatta's release from detention in 1961 and the start of his presidency in 1964—might now be looked at with an illusory linearity and a neat, sequential narrative. In reality, it was a time of many unknowns and tense calculations. Ultimately, it must be a political judgment whether Kenyatta made a flawed decision, but such a judgment can only be properly made by regarding the different variables influencing Kenyatta's decision.

Mau Mau and the War

The market in literature on Kenya as a travel destination is possibly only rivaled by a flourishing corner of the publishing industry focusing on "Mau Mau," a label that, more than 60 years on, yields to no analysis that will satisfy historical memory, intellectual rigor and political acceptance. Proscribed in 1950, Kenyatta was charged with managing Mau Mau on the declaration of a state of emergency in 1952.

Whether Mau Mau was a disparate "collection of individuals, organisations and ideas" (Berman 1991: 199), which acquired a name and a narrative coherence thanks to a colonial administration in search of a tidying label before unleashing a war of terror against it, continues to be debated. Questions about the nature of Mau Mau also continue to exert intellectual fascination: was it a peasant uprising, a Kikuyu civil war, a struggle for Kenya's independence, or a Kikuyu civil society movement agitating for better access to land? The fighters in the forest were militarily defeated, but in the process, Mau Mau wore down the British in the jungle and at Westminster, in treasure and in reputation. However it comes to be categorized, perhaps Mau Mau's greatest achievement was that it forced the transfer of power from the colony back to London, which was finally shamed into taking responsibility for settler mismanagement and preparing for a solution whereby the settlers could be brought home and the Kenyans could begin to take control of their own destiny.

Mau Mau expected to be rewarded with land after Kenyatta's ascent to power in 1963. Land is what they had fought over. It had been taken away unjustly. It was expected to be returned on the departure of the white man. Surely, nobody was more justly deserving of it than Mau Mau, having shed blood for it. For many who had doubted Kenyatta's resolve after his return from Europe in 1946, his arrest by the colonial authorities was confirmation that, despite his denials, he must have been Mau Mau's mastermind (Kershaw 1997: 10). But just as Kenyatta had denied that charge in court, so now, in power, he denied Mau Mau's claims upon him.

Kikuyu who took to the forests were mostly landless and poor (Kershaw 1997: 213–237). In reply to hopes of landed respectability as reward for their labors, Kenyatta decreed that there would be "no free things" (Kenyatta 1968: 277; Leo 1984: 151), but in a spirit of a shared nationhood with all of Kenya's various communities, he pronounced, "We all fought for Uhuru" (Kenyatta 1968: 343). Kenyans were invited to forget the past and join in a national program of renewal and collective effort (Kenyatta 1968: 241). Estates in the former "White Highlands" were being liquidated, and everybody was equally welcome to apply for loans to purchase land and civilized respectability. Land resettlement programs had been instituted in the run-up to Kenyan independence. The landless were provided access to loan finance so they could buy plots on farmland being vacated by the departing British settlers.

The colonial incursion had deepened divisions amongst Kikuyu, which appear to pre-date the colonial era, with emerging differences in wealth and poverty since at least the nineteenth century (Berman 1991: 196; Kershaw 1997: 61–65; Kitching 1980). Kikuyu felt acutely the loss of land to colonial alienation: about 6 percent of land previously considered to be settled by Kikuyu (Lonsdale 2003: 56).

Leadership and the Land Question

In the frontier economy of pre-colonial Kenya, there was more land and few people, placing a premium on the value of human labor. In traditional Kikuyu thought, poverty might even suggest fecklessness, since there was an abundance of land, and the possibility of bringing forest under the hoe.

Colonialism brought decisive change. The combined effect of land alienation, the enclosure of Kikuyu into a "native reserve," an increased population, and the more intense cultivation of land in a money economy had a severe impact on social and economic relations. The value of land in relation to people was transformed during the course of the twentieth century. With land now much more valuable, those in Kikuyu society who had land were now less willing to provide it to poorer kinsmen as tenants (*ahoi*) and helpers as they would have when labor was valued for clearing the forest and asserting domain over the land. Land-poor Kikuyu were turning into a class of the dispossessed. Many migrated to the Rift Valley to become squatter labor on settler farms, others drifted into towns and non-agricultural work. The sense of dispossession was further exacerbated by the post-war expulsion of Kikuyu squatters from settler farms in the Rift Valley, now more intensively cultivated and with greater mechanization. For Kikuyu, land not only provided a living and insurance against an uncertain future, it was also evidence of ancestral blessing (Kershaw 1997: 15).

Larger landowners in Kikuyu society were not only freeing themselves of the traditional obligation to provide succor to poorer kinsmen, but their families were also more likely to have taken to the enchantments of colonial modernity: education, the church, the colonial bureaucracy, and trade. Land-poor Kikuyu looked with resentment upon wealthy Kikuyu, who seemed to have "eaten well of the fruits of colonialism." Mau Mau was also, in a sense, an internal revolt about social obligations within the Kikuyu moiety. (Branch 2009: 17; Clough 1990; Lonsdale 1992: 315–504; see Kershaw 1997). Driven to the forests when the colonial state declared war on its subjects (Lonsdale 2003: 58), Mau Mau fighters, mostly angry young men, many illiterate, some criminal, despaired for dignity that came from possession of a vital economic asset in an agricultural civilization.

Mau Mau's cry had been *wiathi*: land and self-mastery (Hobson 2008: 456–470). Large numbers of detainees had been released by the time the state of emergency ended in 1960. With the promise of self-government in 1961, many of the detainees started moving into the Rift Valley, positioning themselves for the expected departure of the settlers (Hornsby 2012: 59). The pressure from the landless continued through the charged period of transition to independence. It was also when Kenyatta was most anxious to assure the British that he was not going to lead a government of Mau Mau, a movement tainted in the colonial mind as nothing but a barbarous reversion to tribal savagery (Carothers 1954; Corfield 1960). Kenyatta, much older than his colleagues, understood the advantages of a good working relationship with Britain, a country he knew better than any of his colleagues or countrymen. He could look past the bitterness, which he also had every reason to feel, and remain focused on the future, which required new relationships and alliances. The British could, simultaneously, be patrons and clients. Magnanimity made good politics. The alliance with the former colonial power paid dividends, immediate and long term: help with suppressing an army mutiny within weeks of independence, supporting the Kenya army in putting down a secessionist campaign in the North East Province bordering Somalia, as well as security arrangements that helped underwrite Kenya's stability under Kenyatta (Parsons 2007: 63–65).

Kenyatta also understood the risks of antagonizing the former colonial power. The events in the Congo, and the role of Western powers in the fate of Congolese leader Patrice Lumumba had cast a shadow on the progress to independence in Kenya (Sanger 1995: 397). The essential independence bargain that settler land would be bought out by the Kenyans had been outlined when Kenyatta was in detention (Hornsby 2012: 60; Leys 1994: 54–57; Wasserman 1976), and all parties had to agree before the transfer of power (Harbeson 1971: 242). An ex-Mau Mau detainee and former squatter in the White Highlands recalled many

years later much discussion in 1959 about the land in the Highlands expected to be vacated by the white settlers. Like many others, he was in a dilemma about whether to purchase land that might ultimately be distributed free. The advice he was given by a leading Kikuyu politician, James Gichuru, was "There's only one thing I can say—you will get nothing free" (Wambaa and King 1976: 216). Kenyatta and his colleagues were also wary of providing pretexts for delaying independence, giving an advantage in the bargain over independence to their rivals, the Kenya African Democratic Party, or jeopardizing continued investment in the Kenyan economy. Settler-owned land accounted for 80 percent of Kenya's exports and employed nearly half its people (Hornsby 2012: 76). Capital flight in 1961 had been £1m a month (Ogot 1996: 63). Kenya risked moving toward independence a bankrupt economy (Kyle 1999: 144). The incoming Kenyan administration was subjected to the tight embrace of the World Bank and the financial arrangements agreed to fund the land transfer program (Ogot 1996: 64). It was, in any case, going to be reliant on aid and investment capital flows from abroad, since neither of the leading political parties was promising a radical transformation of the economic system.

The period in the lead up to independence was one of suspense and uncertainty; it was not entirely clear whether Mau Mau would reemerge as a political force. Large numbers of Mau Mau combatants remained in hiding even after Kenyatta's release, with hundreds emerging from the forests during the independence celebrations (Edgerton 1990: 221–222)—and there had been a resurgence in oathing. A year after his release, but over a year before independence (the date of which was then unknown), Kenyatta (1968: 188–189) had to admonish his fellow Kikuyu:

> If reports in newspapers that some of you are going back to the forests, making guns, taking unlawful oaths, and preparing to create civil war after independence, are true, I request all Kikuyu to stop doing such things. Let us have independence in peace. I am requesting you strongly not to hold any secret meetings.

In the event that forest fighters had been assured free land, Kenyatta's administration would have been faced with an immediate logistical difficulty. Almost certainly, the land resettlement program painstakingly put together in the overall bargain over independence (Wasserman 1976) would have started to unravel, possibly with violence (Carey-Jones 1966: 168–169). Take-up on the resettlement program—which was to include more than just Kikuyu landless—would almost certainly have been deferred pending determination of claims for reward. As it was, particular effort had been made to settle as many Kikuyu landless as quickly

as possible: though comprising less than 20 percent of the population, Kikuyu were allocated 45 percent of the land in the Million-Acre Scheme (Harbeson 1971: 243).

Whilst there was much talk on the ground about the injustice of Africans buying back African land from the Europeans (Leo 1984: 128; wa Wanjau 1988: 210–211), no plan was put forward by claimants to free land distribution setting out the mechanics of how such a program would actually work. There was relatively little land for resettlement in Central Province itself, the traditional area of Kikuyu. The great prize was the "White Highlands," almost all of which was in the Rift Valley (Branch 2011: 30), a vast area west of Kikuyuland. Among the Kikuyu, there were also different groups of claimants: those who were legal laborers on settler farms in the Rift Valley, and those who were squatters. There were unknown numbers of landless within Central Province itself. Migrant laborers who were living in towns, who might or might not have a little patch of land in their family areas, would also have added to the numbers. On the "supply side," the independence government faced the prospect of insurrection in the Rift Valley with bellicose autochthonous claims to "ancestral land" from the communities traditionally associated with the region (Branch 2011: 12–15). The report, in 1962, of the Regional Boundaries Commission, which took evidence and recommended the borders of Kenya's eight regions in preparation for an independence constitution with strong regional powers, provides an insight into the emotions aroused over the question of land and the freedom to make decisions about its allocation after independence. The Meru African Coffee Co-operative Union submitted that they did "not wish to be in the same region as the Kikuyu who have always tried to dominate them and steal their land." In the Rift Valley, the delegates from the Kenya African Democratic Party "KADU" (Laikipia Branch) felt equally strongly, contemptuously claiming they could "never live together with the Kikuyu who came to Laikipia and Nanyuki merely as workers on the farms." Dramatically, KADU at Nakuru submitted that "Naivasha is Kalenjin and Masai land and should not be included in the Central Region. If this is done, there will be another Congo in Kenya." The Kalenjin Political Alliance (headed by The Hon. Mr. Daniel arap Moi M. L. C.) in its submission simply stated that the Kalenjin did "not want to have anything to do with the Kikuyu who take oaths at night."[4]

Kikuyu expectation of free land in the Rift Valley was predicated on their previous tenanted occupation there, not on claims of autochthony (Bates 1989: 60). The largest number of the landless were Kikuyu, but there was relatively little land in Central Province to distribute as free reward. Land alienated during the colonial period for white settlement—"The White Highlands"—comprised 12,200 square miles (Morgan

1963: 146; Wasserman 1976: 21); of that, land claimed by Kikuyu as traditionally theirs comprised 109.5 square miles (Kanogo 1987: 9), translating to less than 1 percent of the White Highlands. Kalenjin and Maasai, the traditional inhabitants of the Rift Valley, would have been displeased with any attempt at the free distribution of their ancestral land to Kikuyu. Thus, the land-buying route actually meant that the vast Rift Valley area was opened up for Kikuyu settlement in a way that was practical and politically astute.

A program of land consolidation, the process whereby pockets of disparate landholding were consolidated into a single unitary landholding, had been undertaken during the final phase of the Emergency in large parts of Central Province. The process had been complex and extensive, and there were many complaints of irregularities. Some Kikuyu returning from detention found their plots of land incorporated into consolidated plots now belonging to fellow Kikuyu who had decided to settle scores, or who had simply taken up an opportunity too good to miss (Branch 2009: 122–125). A promise of free land also risked reopening consolidation, a program that had been embraced with some alacrity in Central Province.

The numbers of potential claimants to free land would have had a significant impact on the land resettlement program that had been negotiated with external funding—and which was being adjusted in a fire-fighting exercise in the approach to independence (Leo 1984: 127). At the peak of the state of emergency, 70,000 Kikuyu supporters of Mau Mau were held in detention (Anderson 2005: 5), and 1,090 had been judicially executed (Anderson 2005: 7). The number of Mau Mau estimated killed by the security forces was 12,000 according to official figures, 20,000 according to one historian (Anderson 2005: 4), possibly 50,000 according to a demographer (Blacker 2007: 205–227), with an outside figure of 300,000. The number of combatants who came out of the forest toward independence was 2,000 (Hornsby 2012: 114). As problematic, but for different reasons, would have been the question of the 1,800 Kikuyu civilian victims of Mau Mau who were killed for a variety of reasons, including refusal to take oaths or to settle old scores. As a reference, the Million-Acre Scheme for settling the landless was agreed to in 1962; it was to settle 35,000 families in small, high-density plots over a period of 5 years, with a total project cost of £25m (Leo 1984: 95). And it was nowhere near adequate to deal with the scale of the problem.

The Kenya Land Freedom Army, the organization—and this might not be the most apt characterization—that most aggressively voiced the demand for free land in the run up to independence, had a shadowy existence. It lacked the support of the main political parties; it offered no coherent plan; its support was restricted to sections of

Central Province only; like Mau Mau, it relied on secret oathing to bind its adherents (Leo 1984: 128). The effect it had was precisely the opposite of that intended. With freedom finally on the horizon, it was unlikely that Kenyatta would now abandon his steadfast focus on the larger goal. Despite widespread feeling even before his release from detention in 1961, that Kenyatta would sooner or later lead the country, he could not take this for granted; London had secretly instructed district commissioners on the ground to use their influence to ensure the defeat of KANU, Kenyatta's political party, in the elections leading to independence (Sanger 1995: 396). The risks to Kenyatta were considerable.

Kenyatta and the Politics of Land in Post-independent Kenya

Against the background of the foregoing, responding to Mau Mau claim for free land had to be considered within the overall context of a bigger political consideration: precisely where was Mau Mau, an almost purely Kikuyu grouping, to be accommodated within a nationalist narrative for a new, unfolding nation amidst the rancor and ethnic division leading up to independence? The issue posed significant political risks for Kenyatta. If he singled out Mau Mau sacrifice for special distinction—and thereby also implicitly recognized a heroic role for Mau Mau violence—Kenyatta would be giving Mau Mau a preeminence, both morally and politically. He would also risk suspicion of duplicity in the minds of the wider Kenyan community: that when he led the pan-ethnic Kenya African Union political party in the run-up to the emergency, he was simultaneously party to a secret, ethnocentric movement. In the event, the behavior of elements within Mau Mau at the time of independence played into Kenyatta's hands, with newspaper reports of an unattractive sense of Mau Mau entitlement. In one incident, an MP and a senator were publicly flogged by Mau Mau leaders for the "crime" of refusing them a lift (Hornsby 2012: 174). There were reports of assaults, of women having their hair forcibly shaved, and of disorderly conduct.[5] A prominent Mau Mau field marshal demanded that he be accorded "equal respect and recognition" as the prime minister.[6] In Meru, north of Mt Kenya, the people complained that they were "tired of feeding the forest fighters, whom they thought should return home immediately."[7] Newspapers reports of the fighters emerging from the forests in response to a government offer of amnesty and an appeal to lay down arms and recognize an African government in power depicted them as wild men, out of touch with developments. The imagery of the fighters in platted hair, dressed in skins, having survived on the flesh of wild animals and honey, appearing in turns dazed and truculent, provided an unnerving contrast with the men in suits now in

government. The gulf is vividly captured in a report on the independence celebrations:

> As soon as they arrived at the stadium…Dr Wayaki, who is in charge of liaison between the Government and Mau Mau groups in the forest, told the Prime Minister who left the Royal box to greet them. He took the "field marshal's" panga from its sheath and after shaking it told him: "You should use it now for cultivation and other useful tasks." The "field marshal" asked Mr Kenyatta where the "African Independence" flag was and the Kenya National flag was pointed out to him. Police had to intervene to disperse a crowd of spectators, photographers and correspondents which surrounded Mr Kenyatta and the two men, to allow Mr Kenyatta to return to his seat beside the Duke of Edinburgh and the Governor-General.[8]

By declaring that "we all fought for Uhuru" (Kenyatta 1968: 343) Kenyatta was not necessarily denying the role of Mau Mau; it was simply not politically expedient for him to valorize its role, or to downplay the suffering of others. Kenya's unexpectedly peaceful transition to independence is often credited to Kenyatta's astute political skills (see Tamarkin 1978). A particularly sensitive decision he had to make in that critical period was how to deal with the demand for free land from a high-profile constituency.

The idea that Mau Mau were betrayed has been aired in various studies (Branch 2011: 94; Buijtenhuijs 1973; Kinyati 2000; Thiong'o 1981). It is a regular theme in the Kenyan press, finding focus in periodic reports of the deaths of former Mau Mau in circumstances of neglect and destitution. Most Mau Mau were Kikuyu; those who made critical decisions about Mau Mau after independence were also Kikuyu. Kikuyu thought provides insights into possible influences informing Kenyatta's response to Mau Mau. Besides pressing issues of the political economy, the salience of traditional Kikuyu thought cannot be disregarded, given Kenyatta's age and the history of his interest in the Kikuyu cosmology.

An agricultural people, the Kikuyu sense of self has been defined by the relationship with land and the sweated labor that civilizes the forest (Kenyatta 1961: 21, 27). Kikuyu thought valorizes the idea of work to an almost religious ethic. As Lonsdale puts it (1990: 417) Kikuyu virtue

> lay in the labour of agrarian civilisation directed by household heads. Honour lay in wealth, the proud fruit of burning back the forest and taming the wild, clearing a cultivated space in which industrious dependents might establish themselves in self-respecting independence; the possibility of working one's own salvation was the subject of more Kikuyu proverbs than any other.

Kershaw (who lived in Kiambu during the Emergency in 1955–1957 and 1962) has provided some of the most useful insights into what she called the "Kikuyu ideology of history" (Kershaw 1997: 15–16):

> Spiritual blessings were expressed in land, fertile wives, a long life, wealth and authority...The inheritance of land was worthless without the willingness to work it...authority flowed from one's achievements...Those who had limited land or none should not be downcast; their misfortune might originate in events long before they were born.

Whilst unity oaths were administered at Githunguri, Kenyatta's base in Kikuyuland after his return from Europe, Kenyatta's exhortations against violence earned him a warning from the younger men (Kershaw 1997: 230). He took to going around protected by bodyguards, and the murder of Chief Waruhiu by Mau Mau, which precipitated the declaration of the state of emergency, cannot have lightened Kenyatta's mood.

Kenyatta was aware that the colonial government saw him as the face of Mau Mau; his liberty and his personal safety were under threat as much from the colonial government as from Mau Mau. Kenyatta was now in his 50s and with adult children. His political work stretched back to the 1920s. He was no longer the young man writing angry letters to the *The Socialist Worker*. It would not be surprising, at his age and with a much broader perspective after his life in Europe, that Kenyatta would not share the same approach as Mau Mau. When Kenyatta, in his thirties, set sail for England in 1929, he went as a petitioner for Kikuyu land and honor. During his almost 16 years away, he met various other petitioners from different parts of the empire, all with their own grievances (Murray-Brown 1972). There, Kenyatta learned that the resolution of his own parochial concerns would have to lie in the successful pursuit of a much larger goal: that of first obtaining government. Mau Mau's focus had been and remained with land; Kenyatta learnt other, larger, lessons at the heart of empire.

Kenyatta's antipathy toward Mau Mau can also be understood in the context of Kikuyu ideology. Kikuyu had been troubled by land alienation in ways not readily apparent to outsiders. The alienation was both loss of livelihood and the lost inheritance of descendants; more profoundly, it was also considered a failure by the living, incurring ancestral disapproval. Also, some Mau Mau oaths to recover the land had violated Kikuyu moral order; Mau Mau had brought division amongst kinsmen; the land had been polluted with death and impurity. In Kikuyu thought, that which had brought evil was best left in the past and forgotten. This was the "stern moral order" that Kenyatta's generation, but less the members of Mau Mau, would have understood instinctively. The Kenyatta

government's attempt to erase Mau Mau from history was also "a proper Kikuyu response to a painful event" (Kershaw 1991: 284–285).

Kenyatta's refrain, writing as editor of the Kikuyu newspaper *Muigwithania*[9] in the 1920s, in speeches after his return from Europe, and through his presidency, was the call for hard work, and for realizing one's worth through self-mastery (Muoria-Sal 2009: 317–391). He framed his response to the demand for free land accordingly, castigating it as morally irresponsible. Political expediency coincided with a morally informed outlook. It was the stern message of a Kikuyu elder and a political strategist.

Kenyatta might also have been wary of claims to free land for other reasons. He "knew his people,"[10] and would have been alert to the prospect of divisive claims over land, which would exacerbate dissension amongst his deeply divided people. Land has profound economic, social and moral significance in Kikuyu thought. Land is life, it is freedom, it is the mother of the people; its acquisition by Kikuyu pioneers might even involve buyer and seller adopting each other as kinsmen (Kershaw 1997: 20–21; Sorrenson 1967: 8–9). To categorize land simply as capital in relations of production between men would be too banal. Its significance in Kikuyu thought and practices has a social resonance that economics alone cannot explain. Thus, Kikuyu ownership of land and the passions aroused in land disputes are more fully intelligible when considered in the context of Kikuyu social relations.

Kenyatta's engagement with the political ardor aroused by the land question in colonial Kenya went back much further than it did with the angry young men of Mau Mau. He had been a leading protagonist in Kikuyu politics when the Carter Commission[11] enquired into African land grievances in the early 1930s. Extravagant Kikuyu claims to ancestral land abounded when the commission came collecting evidence. The whole of Kikuyuland seemed to be swarming with claimants filling out pre-printed forms distributed by the Kikuyu Central Association (Kershaw 1997: 101; Peterson 2004: 71, 92; Sorrenson 1967: 22; see also Lonsdale 2008: 307). The commission was not impressed. The few white sympathizers who understood Kikuyu grievances were appalled, and the slender chance that redress might be obtained for Kikuyu grievances was blighted.

Kikuyu disputatiousness over land is a subject worthy of study in itself. Traditionally, land amongst Kikuyu would be held by individuals or, more usually by a kinship group that constituted the *mbari*, with *ahoi*—tenants—working on *mbari* land. The Crown Lands Ordnance promulgated in 1915 that decreed that all "native land" was henceforth Crown land struck at the roots of Kikuyu moral order. But all was not lost. Landowners, already traumatized, were then confronted by the inventiveness of claims from their own *ahoi*, who now argued that the

Crown Lands Ordnance had altogether abolished landowner rights, with the result that *ahoi* were no longer tenants but occupants of the land as equals (Kershaw 1997: 179–180).

Disputes over land took up a substantial amount of time at native tribunals in Kikuyu areas. In 1953, the district commissioner in Kiambu recorded that half of the murders in his area had been the result of land disputes (See also Lonsdale 1992: 424; Kershaw 1997: 9; Leakey 1952: 109; see Leo 1984: 61).

Writing about Kikuyu in the early twentieth century, Muriuki (himself Kikuyu) observes (Muriuki 1972: 13–14):

> There were many opportunists among their kinsmen who feathered their own nests by selling their own mbari or even other people's land without their knowledge or consent and significantly as much energy, time and money were expended in interminable land cases amongst themselves as was spent in the campaign against the settlers. Indeed this internal pressure was only reduced by the political leadership which redirected this growing resentment from within society toward the administration and the settler community around them. Equally telling, though not fully documented, is the undeniable fact that many of the so-called Mau Mau murders arose from land quarrels.

A Kenyan minister wrote of the difficulties facing the incoming government in dealing with claims by the "ex-freedom fighters" in the politically sensitive land resettlement program undertaken at Nyaharuru (Kariuki 2001: 43):

> Although the government re-settled about 400 ex-fighters through various settlement schemes, it discontinued the programme by the end of 1964 because more claims were received than expected, which made administration difficult. Nearly all of those who presented themselves to us claimed that they were either a general or a brigadier in the Mau Mau hierarchy and therefore deserved special consideration.

In a similar vein, the first African head of the Kenyan civil service recalls claimants who were not "genuine Mau Mau" but had gone into the forest and emerged having "taken the names of dead colleagues" (Ndegwa 2006: 337–338). When Kenyatta declared in 1962 that "Mau Mau was a disease that had been eradicated and must never be remembered again" (Kenyatta 1968: 189), he was repeating what he had said before his arrest in 1952. He had then described Mau Mau as "a disease in Kikuyuland" that needed to be "cured." He had also spoken of thuggery and criminality and how they would hold back freedom (Bailey 1993: 47).

Increasingly, what had earlier seemed to be a clear distinction between those termed Mau Mau and those termed "loyalists" is now seen as

problematic. The division amongst kin pained Kikuyu, they feared for their own safety, and most of them feared identification with either side of the war. Whether someone ended up being Mau Mau or loyalist might be contingent on factors beyond their control; someone could be both, at different times, or simultaneously (Branch 2009; Kershaw 1991: 288–289). Poignantly, Kenyatta's own son, Peter Muigai, had switched sides while in detention. After confessing to his alleged crimes, he joined in the interrogations of Mau Mau convicts in the detention camps. Since Peter Muigai visited his father in detention, we can assume that they talked about his work, and that Kenyatta was aware of the terrible discord amongst Kikuyu (Elkins 2006: 148, 201).

Kenyatta's public position alternated between condemning Mau Mau and downplaying its role. Official responses argued against the prohibitive cost of free land, as well as the threat to the sanctity of land titles (Branch 2011: 94; Gertzel 1970: 45–46). To Mau Mau, some of the arguments must have sounded specious. They expected land in recognition of their efforts, not as a gratuitous gift. And it was always possible for the government to *acquire* land to settle Mau Mau, the cost ultimately borne by the taxpayer. But this would have been politically divisive and logistically challenging. Ironically, the Kenyatta government did actually accept the ideological bargain of land as reward in three specific cases, thus undermining some of the intellectual basis its own arguments: the gift of a 100-acre farm to Jesse Kariuki, Kenyatta's political comrade from the days of the Kikuyu Central Association, as well as loan waivers for the widows of Mau Mau figures Dedan Kimathi and Stanley Mathenge (Abrams 1979: 65).

Kenyatta might not have publicly recognized the right of Mau Mau to be rewarded, but he remained deeply concerned about Kikuyu landless. He spent considerable time and effort attending to their demands (see Ondego 2008: 20). A rare insight into Kenyatta's concerns is obtained from a report of conversations between a British diplomat and Isaiah Mathenge, the powerful provincial commissioner for Rift Valley Province in the early 1970s. It is worth quoting extensively:

> Mathenge then went on to explain that, apart from divisions within the Kikuyu tribe, the President was also scared of the Kikuyu have-nots. These were mainly people from the Mau Mau villages who were still without land. He was desperately concerned to ensure that they were satisfied…the President was afraid of driving such groups in to the forest where he would lose control over them…The President did not regard the junior Kikuyu in the Army as safe. There was always a danger that they…could link up with a discontented group elsewhere. The landless ex-Mau Mau were such a group who would be well able to organise themselves from the forests…Although the President himself might seem well guarded he had surrounded himself by ex-Mau Mau toughs. Although

now 'tamed' they could still present a threat if provoked too far. Hence his desire to appease his own bodyguard by getting them farms.[12]

According to a retired senior civil servant who served Kenyatta as provincial commissioner in the two key provinces of Rift Valley and Central Province, Kenyatta feared that if land were offered as reward, it would lead to a civil war with everybody trying to get what they could for free. Instead, he would patiently encourage Mau Mau to aspire for reward from their own labors on the land, and to recognize the injustice that would be done to the squatters, whose families had farmed on white farms for generations, if they were denied land in favor of Mau Mau.[13]

Effectively, Kenyatta had made a decision to keep the Kikuyu—his key and most demanding political constituency—united by directing substantial benefits to them without regard to need (Leonard 1991: 79–80). One consequence was that his government did not have to undertake the fraught exercise of verifying who was Mau Mau, the amount and cost of land to be granted, and the precise basis of individual allocations, and at the same time deal with the inevitable airing of grievances by the loyalists against Mau Mau, in a conflict that had resulted in Kikuyu deaths on a horrific scale.

Also, by channeling benefits personally, Kenyatta was able to achieve a number of things simultaneously. He could exercise much greater discretion in dealing with the complaints of his co-ethnics; he could conform, selectively at least, with traditionally Kikuyu ideas of an elder exercising patronage in favor of those in his pastoral care; he held out hope of his benediction in return for personal loyalty; and he avoided the need for an official position on a matter that was delicate, embarrassing and dangerous.

Conclusion

Kenyatta's response to claims for free land from ex-Mau Mau calls for an evaluation of the interplay of a number of factors: the chronology of unfolding events before and immediately following independence, the political economy and relations with Britain, Kikuyu moral thought, inter-Kikuyu relations, and Kenyatta's need to hold himself out as a national leader. The question of land as reward is related to, and at the same time distinct from, the question of Kenyatta's general attitude toward Mau Mau and their rightful role in independent Kenya. While some well-known Mau Mau figures were appointed to government positions and became members of the ruling party, Kenyatta showed no desire to memorialize Mau Mau, no wish to acknowledge any distinct role played by them, or to cede to them a rival focus of authority (Buijtenhuijs 1973). The tribute Kenyatta paid to Mau Mau was backhanded: he repeatedly

exhorted Kenyans to forget Mau Mau, so helping to keep their memory alive (Anderson 2005: 336). Mau Mau acquired a potency that Kenyatta's name had acquired in the colonial imagination when he was in detention, and it had become taboo to mention it. The proscription on Mau Mau remained on the statute books throughout Kenyatta's tenure.

When courted by Kenya's two main political parties while still in detention, Kenyatta remarked that he felt like "a general with two armies—one in each camp."[14] It was to become an apt metaphor for the tests to which Kenyatta's leadership was subjected in the fragile and fractious polity that was independent Kenya; he needed great skill and the wisdom of his old age to navigate choppy waters: balancing factions and patching up compromises while maintaining a grip on power, the most demanding and dangerous of patrons (see Lonsdale 2002). Kenyatta's great goal had been the end of colonial rule; this meant independence, and it was described as "freedom." Kenyatta did not have an intellectual bent; he had the earthy wisdom of Kikuyu of a certain generation. Questions of class relations, of how society should be ordered and on what basis, had never greatly interested Kenyatta. His sophisticated London friends had despaired of him, finding that after hours of patient discussion and step-by-step political analysis, he would not make the final leap to a more universal understanding of the human condition. To them Kenyatta was "an unreconstructed Kikuyu tribalist" (St Clair Drake 1987: 175; see Polsgrove 2009: 41). True to himself, Kenyatta embraced the idea that freedom with self-mastery—a core idea in the moral economy of Kikuyu (Lonsdale 1992: 315–504)—would, in the long run, answer all the political questions. Freedom was his ideology; it was also an end in itself (Atieno-Odhiambo 1987: 195).

The colonial conjuncture in Africa disrupted lives on a scale and in ways that had never previously been possible. Its disruptions also destroyed mechanisms for managing local disputes in ways that had local legitimacy. One of its legacies has been the introduction of power on a scale that is almost monstrous and which overwhelms local moralities. How power might be tamed, either by dissipating it back to meaningful localities, or domesticated within a purposeful sense of nationhood, continues to be the great challenge. As with other parts of Africa, the idea of independence in Kenya was conflated with the larger idea of freedom, itself a problematic concept in a world upended in so many ways. A lingering sense of betrayal scars the idea of a Kenyan nationhood. The memory of Mau Mau and the discourse around the idea of its betrayal acts, increasingly, as a metaphor for the larger sense of disappointment with Kenya's politics. It is just possible, in the decades ahead, when the passions are spent, that the discourse on Mau Mau and betrayal might acquire an allegorical force for civilizing monstrous power and making a modern state safe to live in.

Public references to Mau Mau by Kenya's leaders have waxed and waned depending on political opportunity (Buijtenhuijs 1973; Clough 1990). In 2007, President Mwai Kibaki unveiled, in the centre of Nairobi, a statue of Dedan Kimathi,[15] the most elusive and feared of Mau Mau leaders, on the fiftieth anniversary of Kimathi's execution by the colonial authorities. Sanctified by death at a young age, and unsullied by engagement with post-independence politics, Kimathi—as myth and legend—usefully serves various purposes. His memory acts as a blank canvas onto which can be projected contemporary claims; he remains also a potent symbol for an alternative rendering of Kenyan history, and as a reproach for the unfulfilled promise of freedom. A younger Kibaki had served Kenyatta as a minister when Mau Mau remained proscribed. Like Kimathi, Kibaki is also from Nyeri, rather than Kiambu, Kenyatta's home district and political heartland of Kikuyuland during Kenyatta's tenure. With the passage of time, and a shared sense among Kikuyu of an ordeal ended after the long Moi presidency, a new political dynamic allowed for a public assertion of valor and ethnic unity in an election year. Upon Kimathi's memorialization in bronze, there stood in central Nairobi statues of only two leading Kenyan figures: Kenyatta and Kimathi, each representing a particular tradition in Kenya's struggle for freedom (see Branch 2010; Coombes 2011).

In 2013, as part of the settlement of claims brought by Mau Mau survivors for their mistreatment at the hands of the colonial administration, the United Kingdom government undertook to fund the construction in Nairobi of a memorial to Mau Mau victims of torture and ill-treatment.[16] At the time of writing, the memorial is under construction following a design competition organized by the British High Commission in Nairobi in consultation with Mau Mau survivors. There is a prospect that a memorial to Mau Mau built by the British will be unveiled by Jomo Kenyatta's son, born a few weeks following Kenyatta's release from detention, and now president of Kenya. The anticipated commemoration by the son of the man who wanted Mau Mau to be forgotten would constitute one of the ironies of the (re)making of postcolonial nationhood and the dynamics of specific kinds of leadership in that process.

Notes

1. The most accessible and extensive archives, but which provide the insights of foreign diplomats, are at the Public Record Office in London, United Kingdom, and the National Archives in College Park, Maryland, USA.
2. Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda, Tanganyika, and Zanzibar.
3. "Fighters Want Land and Trips Abroad." *East African Standard*, February 12, 1964, p. 5.

4. Cmnd. 1899. Kenya: Report of the Regional Boundaries Commission, London, HMSO, 1962.
5. "Men of the Forest." *Daily Nation*, January 10, 1964, p. 6.
6. "'Field Marshal's' Meru Statement under Fire." *Daily Nation*, January 9, 1964, p. 2.
7. "Compensate Us or Else Say Meru Fighters." *East African Standard*, March 31, 1964, p. 5.
8. "Men of Forest See Uhuru for Themselves." *East African Standard*, December 13, 1963.
9. Copies of Muigwithania are in the Kenya National Archives: KNA/DC/MKS.10B/13/1.
10. The accusation put to Kenyatta at his trial by prosecuting counsel and echoed by the judge in his sentence; Kenyatta Trial Transcripts, KTT 5, p. 1292, February 9, 1953, and sentence on April 8, 1953; Kenya National Archives, KNA:MAC/KEN 68/1, p. 97.
11. Cmnd. 4556. *Report of the Kenya Land Commission: Evidence and Memoranda*, vols. I–IV (Sir Morris Carter CBE), 1933, and Cmnd. 4580. *Kenya Land Commission: Summary of Conclusions Reached by His Majesty's Government*, 1934.
12. Newman to High Commissioner et al., March 7, 1972; TNA: PRO FCO 31/1191 (The Public Record Office, London).
13. Nyachae, S. July 9, 2008. *Conversation with Simeon Nyachae*. Nairobi.
14. *Africa Digest*, 9 (1), August 1961, London.
15. Kanina, W. 2007. "Kenya Unveils Monument to Mau Mau Leader." *Reuters*, February 18, 2007. Available from: http://uk.reuters.com/article/2007/02/18/uk-kenya-maumau-idUKL1811612620070218 (accessed March 16, 2015).
16. Statement by Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, "Mau Mau Claims Settlement." Hansard June 6, 2013, column 1692, in http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm130606/debtext/130606-0002.htm. (accessed March 3, 2015); and Kenya: Written Question—HL1268, in http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-question/Lords/2014-07-18/HL1268/ (accessed March 3, 2015).

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Leadership, Nation, and Subjectivity in Cameroon: Ahidjo's "Citizenization" and Biya's "Autochthonization" in Comparative Perspectives

Basile Ndjio

Introduction

> In the past, I was told that I was a *citoyen camerounais* (Cameroonian citizen), but now I am considered an *originaire de l'Ouest-Cameroun* (fellow from the western region of Cameroon). Who knows, tomorrow I would probably be viewed as a foreigner in my own country—An informant in Douala, November 13, 2009.

The above statement suggests that the history of citizenship in postcolonial Cameroon is far from being only the chronicle of a simple and unaffected "relationship that exists between the individual and the state in which the two are bound together by reciprocal duties and rights," as one Cameroonian political anthropologist has enthusiastically put it.[1] Nor can it be reducible to the history of "natural" rights and privileges that, since 1960, Cameroonians have been enjoying as citizens of a free and an independent country called "Cameroon," and that made them an object of the postcolonial state: that is, a person to take care of, protect, monitor, discipline, and if necessary, punish. It can also be narrated as the story of complex, confusing, and especially problematical forms of belonging, connectedness, and "rooting" which are constantly reshaped, reconstructed and deconstructed, remade or unmade by Cameroonian political elites (see Geschiere 2009; Konings 2001: 169–194; Konings and Nyamnjoh 2000: 5–32; Ndjio 2006: 66–87). More importantly

these affiliations or connections are generally established in a dialectic of inclusion of some populations, which are valorized as autochthons or "sons of the soil" on the one hand, and the political exclusion of other social groups, which are catalogued as allochthons or "strangers," on the other hand.

However, if we are to narrate the history of citizenship in Cameroon, it would be undoubtedly the history of a steady move from the former modernist project of the postcolonial state, which went along with the citizenization, and especially the de-tribalization of the so-called primitive, tribal African subjects to a more pragmatic policy of identity and autochthony that rather exacerbates their ethnicization, autochthonization and villagization. This is all the more plausible given that the history of citizenship is consubstantially linked to that of the postcolonial Cameroonian state, which itself has made an astonishing move from the former "*Etat-nation*" (nation-state) to what one Cameroonian political scientist has described as "*Etat-tribal*" (tribal state) or "*République des ethnies*" (republic of ethnic groups) (Cf. Mbuyinga 1989), peopled by ethnicized subjects.

Symptomatic of these changes in both the imagination and practice of citizenship by the political leadership in Cameroon is a slow replacement of the former policy of *citoyenneté nationale* (national citizenship) promoted by the Cameroon's first president Ahmadou Ahidjo (1960–1982),[2] with a new policy of ethnic and regional citizenship encouraged by his successor, Paul Biya (see Ndjio 2012; Monga 2000: 273–249; Socpa 2002). These dynamic and often contradictory constructions of citizenship indicate that the two leaders have different viewpoints about what citizenship entails. Yet, both Ahidjo's policy of national citizenship and Biya's ethno-politics embody two distinctive forms of authoritarian political leaderships, which have dominated the country's political scene since the independence period in 1960. One is national in its ideological tenets and tends to use national consciousness or identity as a political tool to enable the achievement of the nation-building project; the other is rather parochial and is much more inclined to exalt tribal ties and ethno-nationalism to the detriment of national cohesion or unity. However, despite their different perspectives and styles, both Ahidjo's and Biya's leadership styles have been essentially characterized by what Bayart (1993) could call a "*recherche hégémonique*." This "hegemonic ambition" explains the monocratic and authoritarian character of their leadership. This recherche hégémonique also explains why both leaders have been much more concerned with consolidating their power or building a nation of submissive and loyal subjects than achieving meaningful development, despite the country's rich economic potentials.

During the Lagos international conference on "Leadership and Governance in Africa,"[3] from which the present chapter derives, most

contributors pointed to mediocre and inefficient leadership as one of the main causes of the political and economic stagnation of a large majority of African countries (see other chapters in this volume). They also argued that if many African countries have become "failed states," which are now trapped in a vicious circle of underdevelopment, mismanagement and corruption, or are prone to endemic diseases, civil strife and military coups, it was because, since the independence period, these countries have been ruled by self-interested and unpatriotic political leaders who did very little to spur their country's sustainable development. Cameroon provides an interesting case study of an African country whose political leaders have failed in their effort to turn their subjects into citizens, to paraphrase Mamdani (1996), or to build a free and democratic nation.

Despite the fact that the practice and imagination of citizenship in Cameroon, like in many African countries (Bayart et al. 2001: 177–194; Comaroff and Comaroff 2001: 627–651; Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 2000: 423–452), have gone through remarkable changes over these past 50 years, no serious study on the topic has so far paid sufficient attention to these mutations. Thus, the main objective of this chapter, which aspires to fill this intellectual gap, is to trace the historical evolution of citizenship in postcolonial Cameroon through a comparative analysis of Ahmadou Ahidjo's policy of national citizenship, which in principles made Cameroonians all and equal citizens of one nation regardless of their ethnic, regional or religious backgrounds, and the current ethno-politics promoted by the regime of Paul Biya, which rather appears to celebrate ethnic, regional and cultural differences, or makes ethnic identity the basis of belonging and selfhood. It will be demonstrated, for instance, that, while President Ahidjo built his hegemonic project on the citizeni-zation of the masses, which offered him the possibility of nationalizing, or homogenizing, the heterogeneity of the Cameroonian people through the valorization of "unity in diversity"—as celebrated in various official slogans of national integration or unity—President Biya opted instead for the autochthonization and ethnicization of the masses as a means of precluding the emergence of a nationalist or trans-ethnic conscious-ness perceived by barons of the ruling Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (CPDM) as a threat for their maintenance in power. Across Africa, it was the old trick of divide-and-rule that has enabled many auto-cratic leaders to extend their power over the *longue durée*.

This chapter is divided into four parts: the first section sheds light on the elusive character of citizenship in postcolonial Cameroon, and especially the complicated and convoluted trajectories it has been fol-lowing since the independence period in 1960. The second and third sections discuss in detail both Ahidjo's policy of citizenship and national unity, and Biya's "autochthony governmentality," to borrow Geschiere and Nyamnjoh's apt term (2000: 423–452). The last section nuances

the coherence and achievement of both policies by arguing that these totalizing projects have been partially successful because they are fraught with tensions.

The Tale of an Elusive Citizenship

Recent literature on African politics (for instance, Bayart et al. 2001: 177–194) have persuasively demonstrated that, in many sub-Saharan African countries, the concept of citizenship constantly experiences change, alteration, rearrangement, and adjustment to the point of taking the form of a *liquid citizenship*, as Bauman (2000) has demonstrated in the case of modernity. This is the case with a country such as Cameroon where both the elites and the masses have rendered the word "citizenship" so slippery and malleable that it has now become an all-purpose term that is open to all sorts of usage, functionality, interpretation, and comprehension. For example, the term is now indiscriminately associated with Cameroonian nationals, home-based Cameroonians (in opposition to their compatriots in the Diaspora), native or autochthon populations (in opposition to *allogène* or allochthon populations), sons of the soil (in opposition to "foreigners" or "migrants"), populations from regions favorable to the Biya regime, educated people at large, members of the elite class, so-called law-abiding people (in other words, submissive or conformist populations), militants and sympathizers of the ruling CPDM party often praised as "good citizens" or "real Cameroonians" (in opposition to supporters of the opposition movement, generally misrepresented as "bad citizens"), urban populations (generally contrasted to rural populations), etc.

The current constitution, enacted in January 1996, and which somehow embodies the radicalization of the politics of belonging endorsed since the late 1980s by the Biya regime (Geschiere 2009; Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 2000: 423–452), provides a good illustration of how the political elites in Cameroon have been successful in manipulating the concept of citizenship. The singularity of this constitution rests on the fact that it is a text that alienates the former constitution's language of citizenship, for it produces another imagination, representation and understanding of the very concept of citizenship, national unity and integration. Indeed, breaking with the June 1972 constitution that not only fostered the idea of citizenship but also helped design what the official discourses then referred to as a "*nation camerounaise*" (Cameroon nation), this new fundamental law rather creates "interior barriers" among Cameroonians, for it explicitly makes reference to controversial and divisive terms such as "autochthon," "allochthon," "minority groups," "indigene populations," "sons of the soil," etc. For example, in its preamble and in Article 57(3), the 1996 constitution upholds the state's obligation to "protect

minorities and preserve the rights of indigenous populations." It also stipulates that "the Chairperson of each Regional Council and Local Government region shall be an autochthon of the area."

Some scholars have criticized this law for exacerbating the crisis of citizenship in this country, and especially for differentiating Cameroonian nationals along ethnic and regional divides (Awasom 2001: 23–24; Ndjio 2008: 115–156). Other analysts have rather pointed out the fact that this constitution was fuelling ethnic divisions among those who formerly viewed themselves as "children of the Cameroon nation" (Geschiere 2009; Konings 2001: 169–194; Socpa 2002). A Cameroonian political scientist has critically observed that, by putting emphasis on the rights of "indigenes" and "minorities" against other Cameroonian nationals considered "outsiders" or "strangers," this fundamental law "stratified citizenship by starting first with belonging to an ethnic group, district or province before any national consideration" (Cf. Awasom 2001: 23–24).

More importantly, by identifying some Cameroonians as "autochthons" who need to be protected by state power against other Cameroonians (construed as "allochthons"), whose cumbersome presence allegedly poses a threat to the very existence of so-called "sons of the soil," the 1996 constitution contributes not only to the "strangeness" and "alienation" of some Cameroonians, but also to the problematization and abstraction of their very status as citizens of their country (cf. Ndjio 2006: 66–87). By this, we mean that this controversial law makes the citizenship of a cross section of the population an abstract and imaginary reality, and especially as something always questionable and debatable.

The enactment of this new constitution clearly indicates a number of facts that deserve to be underlined in this chapter: Firstly, the tortuous and variegated trajectories that citizenship has been following in Cameroon since 960. Indeed, in Cameroon, citizenship first derived from (forced) surrender or capitulation of all the previous affiliations (ethnic, regional, cultural and religious affiliations) to which the "natives" were (traditionally) bound, in favor of one kind of spatio-temporal totality (nation-state), which became the new generative force of *appartenance* (belonging). To be more explicit, through the process of citizenization, the masses were compelled to break or severe ties with their village or region of origin. This is another way of saying that, in the past, the citizenization of Cameroonians was mostly associated with their de-linking or retreat from the village, while in present day, it seems to embody the process of returning to one's (ethnic) roots or tradition. At the center of this argument lies the observation that the *citoyenneté* (citizenship), which was formerly conceived of as a sentinel of national unity and integration among Cameroonians, generally imagined as one and indivisible people, has now become a hallmark for ethnic belonging and "primary

patriotism," to paraphrase Geschiere and Gugler (1998). In addition, in the past, the *citoyenneté* was made a social and political tool through which the nation-building project of the Cameroonian postcolonial state was achieved, while nowadays, it is rather used as an index of social categorization and hierarchization of citizens, and especially a modality for constructing an ethnic subject.

Secondly, the adoption of the January 1996 constitution is a strong reminder that the Biya administration has radically reshaped the landscape of citizenship to the point of making it become a highly contested terrain. It has especially become a site of tensions between, on the one hand, the so-called autochthon populations, whose citizenship is conceived of as "natural" or predetermined, and on the other hand, the "allochthon" populations who now experience serious challenges in asserting their citizens' rights or status, or in making the state acknowledge, unquestionably, their citizenship. The latter are people who have lost the assurance and confidence they formerly had about their citizenship, for they are now obliged to negotiate, bargain, and sometimes "beg" (*mendier*) their connections, either with the state or their region of origin, as some studies have demonstrated for urban migrants in Cameroon (see Eyoh 1998: 338–359; Geschiere 1996: 82–96; Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 1998: 68–91; Konings 2001: 169–194). Indeed, because they live in the place which is not their *chez soi* (homeland) or to which they do not really belong, these "hyphenated citizens," to use Gyan Pandey's term (2006: 103), are generally suspected by both the state and their village kinsmen. For example, with respect to the Cameroonian constitutional law, they are *allogène* or allochthon migrants who cannot exercise their citizens' rights *chez les autres* (foreign lands), while in their native village, they are considered "uprooted people," "lost sons," people with "broken roots" or "loose identities," and people "with no consciousness of history, traditions and culture," as Malkki (1995: 11) has observed for refugees from Burundi.[4] This is because in the Cameroonian context dominated by the politics of belonging, the local population tends to associate migration with uprooting (*déracinement*) and acculturation, which allegedly exacerbate the denial of one's origin, the dissolution of collective (ethnic) identity in a more cosmopolitan form of culture and lifestyle, and especially the loss of one's culture.[5]

Ahidjo's Style: National Citizenship and Unity

First, it is necessary to recall that when Ahmadou Ahidjo became Cameroon's first president in January 1960 with the help of the French colonial administration (see Gaillard 1994b), the country was still culturally, ethnically, linguistically and religiously divided between Northerners

(*Nordistes*) and Southerners (*Sudistes*), Anglophone and Francophone Cameroonians, Christians and Muslims, nationalists and anti-nationalists, modernists and traditionalists, etc. Politically, the country was facing an unprecedented political unrest triggered by a rebellion movement led since 1955 by the *Union des Populations du Cameroon* (UPC), a leftist, Marxist-inspired political party, which was fiercely opposed to the French-backed Ahidjo's regime. In many regions of the country, notably the Grassfields and coastal regions, where the UPC then enjoyed a tremendous popularity, Ahidjo's power was vehemently contested, as the local populations still considered Ruben Um Nyobe, the charismatic UPC leader who was assassinated in 1959 by the French colonial forces, as a real national hero and true nationalist leader. Conversely, Ahidjo was often depicted as a mere puppet promoted by the French in order to serve their interests or to help them achieve their neocolonial enterprise in the country (see Bayart 1985; Joseph 1977). At times, political opposition to the Ahidjo regime was expressed through ethno-nationalism, parochial solidarities and ethnic affiliations by some of his political opponents (Bayart 1985).

This lack of legitimacy and charisma partly explains why, right from the beginning of his rule, Ahidjo opted for monocratic governance, which caused him to adopt a political system that was highly centralized and rested above all on the goodwill of the head of state. In his ambition to consolidate his power, and especially to suppress all forms of contestation and political rivalry, Ahidjo decided in 1966 to impose a one-party state system, thus putting an end the long tradition of the multi-party system the country had experienced until then. This autocratic rule went along with the violent management of the masses, who were forced to show their allegiance to a man who was often referred to as the "Father of Nation" or "Enlightened Guide." It is against this backdrop that one can understand why both Ahidjo's nation-building project and citizenship policy took the form of a disciplinary process aiming above all to create docile citizens who could remain loyal to him and his regime.

Under President Ahidjo, there was a certain way of thinking correctly about one's self and others without getting into trouble or incurring the anger of the Father of the Nation. There was especially a unique mode of imagining one's selfhood, constructing one's identity or claiming one's belonging. This "indigenous" mode of *self* was so coherent that it constituted what could be called African ontology. I was, above all, a hegemonic construction or imagination of the self, not only because it suppressed other possibilities of defining one's identity, but also because it precluded Cameroonians from the possibilities of being something else other than what the political leadership of that time wanted them to be. Backed by an authoritarian regime that had never hidden its desire or ambition to homogenize the masses and their thoughts, this indigenous

mode of subjectivation was constructed around two main ideas: First, that the inhabitants of a country called Cameroon were all Cameroonian citizens (*citoyens camerounais*) protected by a paternalist state whose "Supreme Guide" watched over their lives and well-being in return for their allegiance and loyalty to his uncontested and almighty power. Second, their unity, symbolized by their connections or belonging to an imagined (national) community (the so-called Cameroon nation), had more importance and significance to them than their ethnic extraction, which linked them to their village, clan, or tribe.

One of the consequences of these "verities" professed by the Ahidjo administration as a biblical truth beyond any dispute was the fact that they led, after a reunification of the former two Cameroons in 1972, to a philosophy of ignorance about one's roots or ethnic background. More importantly, they induced many Cameroonians to experience or express their ethnic identity through self-censorship, hypocritical silence, false concealment and duplicitous dissimulation. In some instances, this regime of secrecy and simulacrum found its mode of expression through the denial by many of the possibility of "claiming an [authentic and whole] origin for the self," as Bhabha (1994: 47) puts it. In other instances, it manifested in the refusal to develop essentializing discourses stressing cultural boundaries and ethnic purity, as it has now become pervasive, in both popular and official discourses.

For example, up the mid-1980s, many Cameroonians generally associated their belonging and rooting with their place of birth and residence, rather than with their native village or region of origin. In addition, in urban areas many city dwellers usually saw themselves as people with no fixed (ethnic) identity (*sans identité fixe*) or imagined their village as *lointain* (far away). That is why for many, modernity meant, not only evading ethnic boundaries or fences, but also challenging what Castells (1997) would call "the power of identity," which tried to fix their multiple and elusive selfhoods.

The above comment suggests that during his rule, Ahmadou Ahidjo opted for a form of politics of population that promoted national citizenship as "an ultimate identity" (Geschiere 2009: 23). Also, citizenship was celebrated as an embodiment of the modernist project of the Cameroonian postcolonial state.[6] As Geschiere (2009: 24) rightly notes, at that time, "being a national citizen used to be a very icon of modernity" and proof that one was no longer a *villageois*, generally misrepresented as a backward or primitive person—in opposition to a citizen, generally viewed as a modern and civilized native. More importantly, under Ahidjo, national citizenship was made the only sign and symbol of belonging, and especially the sole way of claiming or expressing one's rooting in the Cameroon nation. During Ahidjo's authoritarian rule, the sole tolerable or acceptable belonging that was not submitted

to administrative and juridical proscriptions, and could be legitimately claimed by the citizens without running a risk of enduring the state violence, was that which particularly insisted on being Cameroonian or the "children of the nation," one whose destiny was bound to that of the postcolonial state—as Radio Cameroun, the state-controlled media, repeatedly reminded the population. In this context, one belonged to the Cameroon nation, not as a member of a particular ethnic group or tribe, but rather as a Cameroonian citizen or as a member of the so-called Cameroonian community. This "imagined community" erected by nationalist discourses to a "blazing symbol of faith and unity" and "land of promise and glory" (cf. Bissohong Nug 2009: 89), was idealized, for example, in the Cameroon national anthem as the "ancestral land," the "cradle of our forefathers" or "our fatherland" to be cherished.[7]

In this wave of celebration[8] of national identity and the sense of commonality and brotherhood among Cameroonians, "regionalism," "tribalism," and "ethnicism" came to be seen by the political leadership as basic expressions of the *identités primaires* (primary identities) and the *esprit grégaire* (herd instinct), and were endless stigmatized by President Ahidjo in many of his speeches and declarations (see Ahidjo 1964, 1968), or by some apologists of his regime (cf. Alima 1977). These primary identities were also repudiated for their potential to exacerbate divisions among Cameroonians. No wonder that in the early days of post-independence period, "tribalism," "ethnicism" and "clanism" were generally equated with indigeneity, primitivism and backwardness, while (national) citizenship was rather praised as a sign of a people and its leaders moving toward civilization, progress and modernity, or as proof that the so-called backward and tribal Africans were slowly freeing themselves from the perverse grip of tradition and custom.

In many respects, Ahidjo's policy of national citizenship went along with what I referred to earlier as the citizenization of the populations, which somehow replicated the Western colonial civilizing mission with its idea of enlightenment, progress, and emancipation of the so-called primitive Africans. Generally, the citizenization of the African natives makes reference to a historical process by which former colonized people are bestowed a new legal and juridical status as citizens of a free and independent state. It also denotes a complex process by which native populations who were formerly connected to their village, clan or tribe are now bound to the postcolonial state through a mutual engagement in dynamic and changing relations of proximity, connivance and familiarity.[9]

However, by citizenization of the natives, I mean here not only the fact of transforming the former *villageois,* tribalists, and natives into modern citizens of a particular country through assimilatory processes or through the acquisition of shared values that bind all the members of the so-called imagined community. In this context, the concept also

makes reference to the fact of making the nation present in people's mind, or cultivating national consciousness among the population or a strong sense of belonging to a (Cameroonian) nation. The term particularly accounts for the fact of saturating both the bodies and minds of the population with signs and symbols that dramatize the importance of the postcolonial state and its representatives, particularly, the national leader, the president. To this should be added the fact of making the native populations submissive subjects and servitors of this postcolonial power. For example, under Ahidjo's rule, this process was seen as a bulwark against the sirens of tribalism and the perils of ethnic belonging, to paraphrase Geschiere (2009). It was premised on the idea that both tribal identity and ethnic consciousness enslaved the local populations in primitive behavior, as well as prevented them from rising above parochial solidarities, thus, constituting a hindrance to both the modernization and development processes on which the country had embarked (see Mbuyinga 1989).

Thus, the forceful citizenization of the masses made Ahidjo's policy of citizenship appear as a kind of authoritarian governmentality, a technology of power and domination that helped him achieve his totalizing project: building a powerful and stable state, and especially reinforcing the hegemonic position of his leadership in the local political landscape (Bayart 1985; Gaillard 1994b). Indeed, under Ahidjo's rule, the citizenization of the natives, which was dramatized after the advent of the unitary state in May 1972—which led to the suppression of the multiparty system and the institutionalization of one party system—took place at a particular moment in the history of the postcolonial Cameroon: at the time when his regime attempted to disempower or paralyze all the traditional institutions and social forces which formerly claimed control over the local space and populations, in favor of what Axel (2002a: 233–266) could call a kind of "spatio-temporal totality" (postcolonial state). This totality became the new generative force of belonging and interconnection. It was especially carried out at the time when the political leadership of that epoch was striving to unbind the "natural" links that had so far bound the natives to their village or region of origin, or to detach their bodies from those of their traditional or customary rulers who, in the past, played a major role in identity-formation. Concretely, President Ahidjo managed to construct the "Cameroon nation," and especially to *citizenize* the populations through various complex processes: (1) the slow process of de-ethnicization or de-tribalization of the natives; (2) the forceful homogenization of a very diverse and heterogeneous population (i.e., Anglophone and Francophone, Muslim and Christian) melted into a "total" nation, a large and single entity called Cameroon; (3) the suppression of ethnic and racial differences perceived as a threat to the imagined national community.

President Ahidjo achieved his hegemonic ambition through the promotion of the ideologies of national unity and nation-building, which, during his long rule, became his "ultimate mission" (*mission suprême*), as he put it (Ahidjo 1964: 24). Coming within the framework of the citizenization of the native populations, these pervasive ideologies (national unity and nation-building), which celebrated cosmopolitanism, uprootedness, and mobility as some of the most pregnant expressions of (national) citizenship and modernity, were forged or constructed on the declarations of uniquely accommodating character of the Cameroonian people and the country, as Bayart's *L'Etat au Cameroon* (1985) and Fogui's *L'Intégration Politique au Cameroun* (1990) have persuasively demonstrated. Ahidjo himself explained in his *Contribution à la Construction Nationale* (1964), which embodied his vision of a modern Cameroonian society, these dreams of national citizenship and modernity: "National unity means that in the process of nation-building there is no Ewondo, no Duala, no Bamileke, no Bulu, no Fulani, no Bassaà, etc, but everywhere and always Cameroonians," Ahidjo (ibid.: 29) states. He then adds, "We want to and should convince all Cameroonians of the urgent need for national unity...As far as we are concerned, in our decisions, we exclude any consideration, any factor liable to confirm or maintain directly or indirectly tribal particularisms" (Ibid., translation is mine).

No wonder that Ahidjo was often praised by his panegyrists as "detribalist" (*détribalisateur*), the "Apostle of National Unity."[10] It is in lines with this policy, so dear to Cameroon's first president, that under his rule, the place of residence (and not of birth) was a powerful and primary referent of connectedness and belonging. Also, cosmopolitan subjects and uprooted citizens who claimed no ethnic or regional identities were praised as modern and good citizens, unlike the *tribalistes* and *régionalistes* (people with strong attachments to their homeland or native region) who were then generally regarded with contempt as *villageois* or backward people. In many respects, under Ahidjo the *tribaliste* and *régionaliste* subjects were not only perceived as obstacles to the achievement of national unity or integration, the political leadership also misrepresented them as a dark side of the state modernist project.

In other respects, the citizenization of the populations, which in many respects embodied Ahidjo's effort to preclude the propagation of ethnic patriotism, and primary ethnic solidarities, allowed for the dramatization of the importance of the postcolonial nation-state (and thus, his leader) as the ultimate entity. This also produced the mythologizing of the state and the leader as the embodiments of the people's social aspirations and dreams of modernity. This idealization of the postcolonial state and its leader was compounded by the vague desire of holders of political and administrative powers to position the state as an inescapable center of production and (re)distribution of wealth. This meant

that, outside the state framework sanctioned by the leader, there was no alternative pathway to social promotion and upward mobility (see Jua 2003: 26–27; Ndjio 2008: 192–219). In addition, the citizenization of the masses contributed to the extension of the state's supremacy and authority over a large spectrum of populations who were ethnically and culturally different. By so doing, the postcolonial state invaded the space of power and violence formerly controlled by local chiefs and kings (see Bayart 1985, 1993). Last but not least, making the native populations become citizens of the Cameroon nation was crucial for Ahidjo's administration, because the citizenization process allowed for the creation of submissive and obedient people, often depicted in paternalistic terms as "*les enfants de la nation*." It was these "children of the nation" who, from "North and South, East and West," were required to "show their endless love" to their fatherland, to be faithful to their leader, to show their "deep endearment to serve with great honor and fidelity" their "beloved Land," to make the nation-state their only "source of joy and life," to commit themselves to remaining "faithful children" who were "eternally grateful" to the state-nation and the self-proclaimed "Father of the Nation," while promising to make "progress in peace" and "work to achieve the state welfare" (See Bissohong Nug 2009: 89).[11]

Although virtually all social groups willingly or unwillingly endorsed Ahidjo's policy of citizenship, because of the repressive character of his administration, which left no room for opposition and contradiction, it was, however, among the populations from the Grassfields region of West-Cameroon, his project found its staunchest supporters and advocates. Indeed, right from the implementation of this policy of citizenship in the earlier 1960s, the Francophone Bamileke at large enthusiastically adhered to Ahidjo's ideology of national unity or integration to the point of becoming its flag-bearers or iconic figures. However, some Bamileke intellectual elites have pointed out the fact that during Ahidjo's era, the Western region was excluded from political decisions' (See Kamga 1985: 87–88). If the leader's project enjoyed tremendous support among the people from the western region of Cameroon, it was above all because it was in accordance with what some analysts have referred to as Bamileke's entrepreneurial spirit and nomadic habitus which, according to them, are two of the most determining elements of the Bamileke culture, and the basis of the economic success of numerous prosperous Bamileke businessmen (See Dongmo 1981; Tabapssi 1999). In addition, the same policy that promoted the cosmopolitanization of the citizens, and especially urged Cameroonians to feel at home whenever they happened to settle, might have helped the Bamileke to "colonize" not only the main cities of the country, but also the whole coastal region of Cameroon (Dongmo 1981; Socpa 2002). Next, we examine Paul Biya's management of people and space.

Biya's Ethnopolitics

Paul Biya, a Christian from the forest region of Cameroon, took over Ahmadou Ahidjo in November 1982. As the major political figure of the country, he has played a significant role in the making and spread of ethnic citizenship as well as the constitution of a *république des ethnies* or a tribal nation mentioned earlier. Both his autochthony politics and policy of ethnic belonging have prompted the crisis of (national) citizenship in Cameroon. Yet, contrary to his predecessor, Biya's leadership has been marked by the endorsement of a new form of autocratic system that not only organizes or achieves political domination through the instrumentalization and manipulation of ethnic and cultural diversities, but also promotes ethnic identity in citizens compelled to self-identify above all as fellows from a particular village, or as members of a particular ethnic group (on the political invention of ethnicized citizens, see Mamdani 1996).

However, President Biya first seemed to endorse his predecessor's policy of national unity and nation-building. This policy had, allegedly, enabled Cameroonians to "build up our country in unity, peace and political stability," as Salomon Tandeng Muna, the former chairman of the National Assembly once enthusiastically stated.[12] This was because during the early years of Biya's administration, citizenship was first considered national and trans-ethnic, and was generally imagined beyond the scope of ethnic patriotism and primary solidarities, as under his predecessor's. In addition, up to the late 1980s, Cameroonians were still defined first as *nationaux* (nationals), *fils et filles de la nation* (sons and daughters of the nation) or *enfants de la patrie* (children of the fatherland), and not as *originaires* or *ressortissants de* (fellows from a particular region or village). This was when both official discourses and pro-Biya administration spokespersons were still idealizing citizenship as an antidote against parochial solidarities, ethnic consciousness or identity, or against the "demons of tribalism" (Biya 1987; Mbock 1985; Mono Djana 1985). Indeed, as Paul Biya put it in an interview granted on January 18, 1983, to *Cameroon Tribune*, the main governmental daily newspaper: "I can say that on the fate of our dear and beautiful country, national unity and national consensus are now living and experienced realities; realities that blossom everyday in solidarity and harmony of minds and hearts" (translation is mine).[13] This quotation from President Biya evidenced the fact that at that time, the mythology of national unity was still rooted in his mind to the point of making both his policy of citizenship a pale copy or a simple replica of his predecessor's.

Biya's commitment to promoting national unity and integration, and especially to pre-empting the emergence of ethnic consciousness was confirmed in August 1983 during his ever first visit as a head of the state

in Ebolowa, the regional capital of his native region. On this occasion, he delivered a memorable speech during which he reminded his fellow Beti, who enthusiastically welcomed him, that, although he did not forget that he was "born somewhere" (*né quelque part*) and was a Bulu (one of the several Beti sub-groups), he, first and foremost, considered himself a Cameroonian and the president of all Cameroonians, regardless of their ethnic, regional or religious backgrounds.

This statement was a strong reminder to Cameroonians from other ethnic groups that he was not a *tribaliste* and that his power was not a tribal power, as some might think. The presidential message was especially addressed to some of his ethnic constituents who might be tempted to claim special rights or privileges on the grounds that their "*frère du village* or *de la tribu*" was in power, and that therefore, it was their turn to "eat the state too" (cf. Mbuyinga 1989). At that time, Biya enjoyed a tremendous popularity with Cameroonians from different ethnic groups, not only because of his progressive view on politics, notably his intention to establish a democratic and free society in Cameroun,[14] but especially because many viewed him as a "national leader" who placed himself above ethnic divides. For example, to mark their staunch and indefectible support to the man who was affectionately called "*L'Homme du Renouveau*" (the man of New Deal, in reference to his regime, which is officially referred to as *Renouveau National*), many prominent Grassfields customary rulers made him the "*fon of the fons*" (the chief of the chiefs) during a tour in the Grassfields region as a head of state.

But from 1985 onwards, what many Cameroonians had so far taken for an irreversible process of social evolution of their country proved to be a short-lived historical trend, as the Biya regime began to show some signs of abandoning the former project of national unity in favor of a new mobilizing myth of ethnicity and autochthony that rather encouraged the construction of what Castells (1997: 11) would call "defensive identities based on communal principles and parochial solidarities."

The first signs came after a series of promotions or appointments of many Beti from the South and Centre Regions to strategic or influential positions in the administration, such as the government, the police, the magistracy, and especially the armed forces, thus reinforcing the growing sentiment among Cameroonians from other ethnic groups that the Biya regime had now engaged the state in the process of "*tribalisation à outrance*" (excessive tribalization or ethnicization)—to borrow the words of one Cameroonian political scientist (Kamga 1985: 23). Biya was especially criticized for promoting what some people disdainfully dubbed the "Betisation of the administration,"[15] a radical form of ethnicization of the Cameroonian society. According to one analyst, this Betisation[16] of the public service went along with the patronization of a new class of Beti businessmen who could counter or limit the so-called Bamileke's

predominance in the national economy or the growing economic influence of some successful Bamileke entrepreneurs (See Mbuyinga 1989: 127–128). When this strategy proved ineffective, the so-called Beti lobby, which allegedly holds political and administrative powers in Cameroon since 1985, did not worry about setting the foreign fox to mind the Cameroonian geese. For example, in her study on the privatization process in Cameroon, Béatrice Hibou observes that Cameroonian officials allowed foreign interests (notably French entrepreneurs) to get control of most of the privatized public enterprises and companies. According to her, "the government's principal aim was to keep these assets out of the hands of Bamileke entrepreneurs often regarded as potential or occult financiers of political parties opposed to the current CPDM regime" (Hibou 1999b: 73).

Some observers have interpreted this Betisation of the state apparatus as Paul Biya's reaction to the failed coup d'état of April 6, 1984 that was attributed to some elements of his presidential guard from the northern region—the region of origin of his predecessor, Ahmadou Ahidjo, with whom he had fallen out, following the latter's attempt to recapture the power he deliberately gave up two years earlier (see Bandolo 1985; Gaillard 1994a). It was alleged that the plot, which resulted in massive purges of *nordistes* (Cameroonians from the northern region of the country) in the police, armed forces and the administration, put an end to Biya's progressive idea of social change (embodied by his main slogan of "rigor and moralization"), and especially his endorsement of the mythology of national unity. For since this attempt to topple him, he has allowed himself to be a captive of some extremist members of his ethnic clan in a politics of belonging that has made ethnic affinity the major stylistic of citizenship, and especially "the most active principle of gathering [*rassemblement*] (Kamga 1985: 29)."[17] Moreover, the attempted coup has made him shield his power with his fellow Beti who now made up what the popular literature in Cameroon often refers to as "*Pays Organisateur*" (lit. organizing country, that is, region in which members hold political and administrative power).[18]

It is no surprise, therefore, that some analysts did not hesitate to derisively translate Biya's "*Renouveau National*" (National New Deal) into what Elenga Mbuyinga dubs the "*Renouveau Tribal*" (Tribal New Deal) (Mbuyinga 1989: 128). This is a parody of the way in which Biya has transformed ethnic separatism into the main referent for citizenship and the major mode for claiming one's rights as a Cameroonian citizen. By this expression, Mbuyinga implicitly suggests that Biya had substituted former national rationalities with ethnic subjectivities. He also means that the Biya administration had abruptly moved from the mythologizing national identity and citizenship to a growing distrust and apprehension of this process.

In other respects, the endorsement of a policy of autochthony by the Biya regime was accompanied by the development of an extremist and a virulent literature that openly and publicly marked some ethnic groups either as the enemies of the *Renouveau* or as "ethnofascists" who allegedly made no secret of their "will to power" (*volonté de puissance*) and "hegemonic project" (*projet hégémonique*), and especially their "devilish ambitions" to seize power.[19] Indeed, as Mbuyinga has rightly observed (ibid.: 34, translation is mine):

> The fundamental difference between the current period and those that preceded it, is this: the ideas and theories of tribalism, which until then had been just whispered from mouth to ear, with a hint of bad conscience, a little shamefully…are now openly and boldly said, shouted and even written in the leaflets, brochures and books and have aired every wind, without any complex, as if nothing had happened. They are also the content of Ph.D. theses, allowing citizens to strut with a scientific endorsement of the university.

The democratization process of the early 1990s that went along with the strong opposition to the Biya administration was equated with the prospect of getting rid of a political system generally described as despotic, predatory and kleptomaniac (Monga 2000: 359–379), persuaded Biya to dramatize this policy of autochthony and identity, which became part of his divide-and-rule strategy. The radicalization of this ethno-politics clearly indicated that many leaders of the ruling CPDM saw the expression of citizenship (which many Cameroonians now associated with the freedom of speech and assembly) as a menace to the government-promoted *démocratie avancée* This politics of belonging and ethnic identity embodied the governmental effort to curb the impact of an uncontrolled oppositional policy, which first undermined the hegemonic position of the political leadership in the country. In many respects, the "advanced democracy" exemplified the radical turn taken by Biya's ethnocracy, because it allowed, for example, for the enactment of a series of laws that not only divided Cameroonians along ethnic or regional lines, but also problematized their citizenship. What is more important about these legislations was the fact that they gave priority to ethnic, indigenous or autochthonous citizens, while the concept of national citizenship, so dear to Ahidjo regime, was relegated to the background.

This was the case with the Electoral Code of 1992 and the January 1996 Constitution which not only institutionalized the politics of ethnicity and autochthony in Cameroon, but also endorsed the CPDM regime's divide-and-rule policy, which was based, above all, on the exclusion or marginalization of a cross-section of populations. For example, the electoral code requires that the list of candidates to be presented by political

parties in a constituency must reflect the "sociological components" of this constituency. This means the mandatory inclusion of "autochthon" populations or the "sons of the soil" in the list of candidates presented by a political party. Yet, prior to the enforcement of this text, there was already a directive issued in 1988 by the general secretary of the ruling CPDM party, the then-state party, which stipulated that the president of the divisional section of the CPDM in both Douala and Yaoundé (the two major cities of the country) should be chosen exclusively among the "local ethnic" group (*ethnie locale*): that is, among the autochthon populations (see Mbuyinga 1989: 25). According to one observer, some key elements of the Biya administration made use of this disposition to prevent some ambitious allochthon from the Grassfields from controlling the local branch of the ruling CPDM party (Mbuyinga 1989: 25). In many respects, Biya's ethno-politics proved to be a segregationist political system that called into question the citizenship of a section of the population, insofar as under his rule, the allochthonization of some citizens went along with their de-citizenization. This meant the deprivation of their rights as citizens or full members of the Cameroonian national community.

However, the singularity of contemporary politics of autochthony in Cameroon rests less on the fact that it is a vicious form of exclusion of some citizens politically and ideologically construed as "strangers" or "allogènes," as Geschiere has convincingly demonstrated (2005), than because it dramatized the importance of village, homeland and localism over urbanity and cosmopolitanism, now viewed as a threat to the government-sponsored ethnopolitics. One Cameroonian political scientist has used the expression of "*retour au village*" (return to the village) to give meaning to this *villagization* of politics in contemporary Cameroon (Cf. Monga 2000: 723–749). One of the main expressions of this process is a growing tendency among city-based elites to search for political legitimacy and social recognition exclusively in their native village or region of origin. Another manifestation of this villagization is the fierce political battles among the elites who now compete with one another for control of local populations and spaces (cf. Eyoh 1998: 338–359; Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 1998: 69–91; Nyamnjoh and Rowlands 1998: 320–337).

However, the adoption of this ethno-politics by the Biya regime did not indicate the end of citizenship or national unity so prominent under the former regime of Amadou Ahidjo. It only revealed the change in both the policy of citizenship and in the style of management of citizens—to use a Foucauldian phrase—in contemporary Cameroon. For example, the ideologues of ethnocracy construe a good citizen above all as a *villageois* or an *autochtone* who limits his political ambition primarily to his native village, and, at best, to his region of origin. He is also an ethnicized subject who promotes the development of his own locality,

makes only ethnic claims, practices endogamous marriage, makes the state resources flow only toward his native region, and eventually *reste chez soi* (stays at home). Conversely, a bad citizen is represented as an itinerant or a nomadic citizen who has no *chez soi* or "root"; he is an *allogène* who settles everywhere, disregards ethnic boundaries, takes a wife from another ethnic group, invests his money everywhere, searches for popular support everywhere, etc.

Symptomatic of this change in the local representation of citizenship is the transformation of the former idealized comprehension of citizenship into a more pragmatic understanding that now makes it a matter of constant negotiations and arrangements under Biya's leadership. Citizenship is no longer considered a natural right that any Cameroonian can enjoy as a national of the country, but a series of privileges and gratifications that the holders of political power bestow on those who prove that they are "real" or "authentic" Cameroonians and loyal citizens. At the same time, citizenship rights are denied to those who refuse to play the game of collaboration with the ruling CPDM party and the regime of President Biya.

Tensions in the Postcolonial Imagined Community

The above discussions of both Ahidjo's policy of citoyenneté and Biya's ethnopolitics should not mislead us into believing that these hegemonic projects were devoid of contradictions and incoherence. Reestablishing the truth about these totalizing projects requires that we also pay attention to the vicissitudes and unpredictability, and especially the moments of tension and anxiety which, since 1960s, have been permeating all the policies that aim at managing or governing ethnic differences in postcolonial Cameroon.

Take, for example, Ahidjo's nationalist discourses on citizenship, which overemphasized the oneness or unity of the people of Cameroon, assumedly based on a voluntary or forced submission to national norms and egalitarian principles. The same discourses claimed that "in Cameroon, only Cameroonians exist" (*au Cameroon, il n'y a que des Camerounais*) or that Cameroon was what Axel (2002a: 233–266) would call a "fantastic community" based on generalized citizenship and inclusive social rights among all Cameroonians, regardless of their ethnic or religious affiliations. But examined both historically and practically, they looked more a *trompe-oeil*, a hypocritical ruse Ahidjo administration used, above all, to mislead naive observers of the Cameroonian political landscape. Indeed, although Ahidjo was obsessed with the idea of (national) citizenship and national unity that supposedly would suppress prior ethnic, linguistic and regional attachments, he was, however, keen

on enacting a number of juridico-political procedures and legislations that purposely favored his Muslim fellows from the Northern region of Cameroon, notably from Garoua, his native region (Bandolo 1985; Bayart 1985, 1993).

This was the case with Ahidjo's famous policy of *équilibre régional* – often translated by jocular Cameroonians as a "policy of ethnic balance" (*politique d'équilibre ethnique*)[20]—which was mainly profitable to the *nordistes* (Northerners) or *wadjo* (Muslims from the Northern Cameroon). Indeed, as Bayart (1993: 44) has observed, during his rule, Ahmadou Ahidjo appeared not only to privilege Northerners in the public service and the armed forces, but also to promote the expansion of Muslim businessmen who later came to be named after their religious and ethnic affiliations: *Aladji* and *Haousa*.[21] It is common knowledge in Cameroon that in the past, local bankers were generally generous with these "nordistes" to whom interesting loans with low interest rates were granted, even if many proved to be insolvent or unreliable debtors (cf. *Aurore Plus*, May 2, 2011). It is also alleged that Ahidjo regime created for northerners at large what the editor of the local tabloid, *Aurore Plus* (Ibid.: 3), has called "*un systême illégal d'entrepôts fictifs*" (lit. "an illegal system of fictitious bonded warehouses"): that is, unofficial or undeclared duty-free zones, where imported goods could be warehoused for several weeks or months in the port of Douala, exempt from any customs or freight duty.

Young nordistes[22] also enjoyed special treatments in official competitive examinations. For example, they were attributed higher quotas in the admission to prestigious *ecoles* (schools) such as EMIA (Military Academy School), ENAM (National School of Administration and Magistracy), and ENP (police school academy) for which they were eligible only with a BEPC (general secondary certificate), while their southern counterparts required a *License* (a bachelor's degree). It is also said that young southerners had to score at least 12/20 to get admission to top-ranking vocational schools, while northerners only needed 10/20, and sometimes less.

Northern elites, who mostly occupied high or prominent positions in both the government and administration under the Ahidjo regime, justified what many disgruntled Cameroonians from other regions or ethnic groups considered a blatant discrimination in favor of people from the native region of the first President. For instance, they claimed that, in the Northern Cameroon, both school enrolment rates and the level of alphabetization were almost two times lower than those of the southern region at large. Therefore, they argued that it was the state's duty to help this disadvantaged region to catch up with the rest of the country. Both Islam and the local culture, which allegedly caused the local youth to turn their back on the Western-style education, notably the French-based

assimilationist model of education endorsed by the Cameroonian post-colonial state, were often used to explain why the northern region lagged behind its southern counterpart, and why there were very few Westernized, educated, *nordiste* elites. Although this argument is not devoid of some pertinence, it does, however, pass over the fact that the analphabetism and illiteracy of many northern Cameroonian youths were encouraged by their political elites. These local "big men," who themselves were hardly educated,[23] had some apprehension that the promotion of high education among the *nordiste* youth could lead over time to the emergence of a group of intellectual elites who might be tempted to challenge or contest the hegemonic position of the older generation, or could claim more power and prestige on the basic of their academic credentials or intellectual superiority over the latter.

As regards Biya's ambition to create "ethnic citizens" in counter-distinction to national citizens or to substitute national citizenship for ethnic or regional citizenship, this has produced what we will call "bastardized ethnic citizens," who straddle the local and the global, but are neither fully ethnicized nor totally cosmopolitanized. We are also making reference to what we referred elsewhere as *citadins villageois* (urban villagers) (Ndjio, forthcoming). Urban villagers are city dwellers who generally maintain symbolic and material ties to their native villages, and primary loyalties to their ethnic community. In addition, these ethno-cosmopolitanized populations are continually engaged in an impassioned (re)construction of their ethnic or communal identities through the construction of imposing houses in their native village.[24] On the other hand, their evanescent and fluid identities, which are the result of their migratory spirit and diasporic ethos, seem to escape the ethnic boundaries or challenge state-promoted policy of belonging.

In many respects, young successful Grassfields urban tricksters, commonly known in Cameroon as *feymen*, embody these ambivalent figures of ethno-urbanized citizens. As a matter of fact, in their attempt to curb the impact of the growing expression of citizenship and civic rights by the then highly politicized Cameroonians, and especially to counter the growing influence of the opposition in the Western region of the country that was then reputed for its hostility toward the ruling CPDM, governmental authorities tried from 1996 onwards to instrumentalize some of the most prominent members of Grassfields *feymen* as "rural ballot providers," to paraphrase Monga's word (2000: 726–728). Like many town-based elites, these affluent urban tricksters were urged to search for popular support exclusively in their homelands or native villages, even though a larger number of them grew up or lived in the urban areas. By trying to transform these subversive urban youths who initially transcended parochial solidarities and "primary patriotism" (Geschiere and Gugler 1998: 309–319), into mere local or ethnicized citizens who

could now position themselves as representatives of their villages, the Biya regime aspired to "localize" them: that is, to "fix" the identities of these independent-minded confidence tricksters who ambiguously straddled, crossed and threatened its ethnic divides. In previous works on these professional swindlers (see Ndjio 2012), it has been demonstrated that their reaction to both the state's and community's attempt to entrap them in preexisting political and cultural fences has been ambivalent. Indeed, while some *feymen* accepted being used as important assets in mobilizing regional or ethnic support in favour of Paul Biya's contested *démocratie avancée*, others have maintained their independence vis-à-vis both the government and their native villages. Amenable and submissive Bamileke feymen were generally praised as "good" and "responsible" citizens. By contrast, "uncaptured" or "rebellious" *feymen* were generally misrepresented by the Biya administration as "bad" citizens or "dangerous" subjects.

Conclusion

In many respects, the first two decades of independence in Cameroon was marked by the triumph of the ideology of citizenship that was itself backed by Ahidjo's policy of national unity and nation building. His hegemonic construction of national society depended above all on the homogenization and standardization of the population construed as one and indivisible people. This process was achieved not through the imposition of a "written national language," as Hobsbawm (1990) has demonstrated for Western Europe. Instead, it required the negation, if not suppression, of ethnic, regional and religious differences in favor of transcendent subject-citizens that came to embody the images of civilized and modern Cameroonians. At the glorious epoch of citizenship, there was a pervasive idea that ethnicity prevented the Cameroon state from becoming a nation, particularly a modern nation. One can understand, for example, why the Ahidjo regime generally had a very negative view of what is commonly characterized in Cameroon as *associations des élites du village.* Indeed, under Ahidjo's rule, these village elite associations were generally (mis)represented as "true secluded circles" (*véritables cercles fermés*) and "cliques of tribalism and regionalism operating under cover of development" (*chapelles de tribalisme et de régionalisme opérant sous le couvert du développement*) (quoted in Mbuyinga 1989: 68). The existence of these "ethnicised elite associations" (Nyamnjoh and Rowlands 1998: 320–337) was also perceived as a hindrance to the state' main ideologies of nation-building and national unity. That is why Ahidjo's administration never lacked words to castigate or vilify these communitarian gatherings, which reportedly exacerbated ethnic sectarianism, and what Cameroonian officials then disdainfully called the *fibre tribale*

(tribal "fibber" or "sentiment"). Nor did it ever hesitate to crack down on Cameroonians who dared to promote such ethnic associations, generally depicted in negative terms (see Bayart 1985).

However, Ahidjo's policy of citoyenneté and national integration has been dismissed by some analysts as a "*mystification délibérée*" (deliberate mystification), a "*vue d'esprit*" (entirely imaginary) or a "*projet utopique*" (utopian project).[25] One ideologue of the Biya regime once referred to Ahidjo's policy of citizenship "an abstract universality purposely developed in order to hide the exploitation, and yet visible, of different ethnic particularisms."[26] All these critiques point to the fact that Ahidjo's ideology of national citizenship was not devoid of contradiction. Symptomatic of the incoherence was his controversial policy of "regional balance" that mainly benefited his fellow *nordistes* who were generally offered a big share of the "national cake."

Contrary to his predecessor, Paul Biya rather opted for an ethnocratic system that encouraged the localization or autochthonization of the citizenship in Cameroon. Thus, it made many Cameroonians become true fanatics of "tribalism." This chapter demonstrates that, over time, President Biya's ethnopolitics have resulted in the growing idealization of the village, not only as the most authentic and undisputable form of belonging and rooting, but also as a space of self-realization. Symptomatic of this growing importance of the village in identity-building is what is commonly known in Cameroon as "electoral village politics,"[27] which compels town-based elites to stand for elections or to search for popular support and prestige only in their home village or region of origin.

Another critical fact showing that corrosive ethnic particularisms are on the rise in Cameroon, and increasingly taking over national citizenship is an unprecedented development in the major cities or towns of the country of the so-called *associations des élites du village* mentioned earlier. These village elite associations[28] are now being promoted by the CPDM regime, not only as a spearhead for local development, but also as one of the main expressions of belonging and *enracinement ethnique* (ethnic rooting). In the same line, autochthony and ethnic belonging are increasingly encouraged or promoted by state or governmental officials in Cameroon as more appropriate pathways of building citizenship from below. Yet the example of some successful urban tricksters commonly known in Cameroon as feymen, who generally maintain ambivalent relationships with their village of origin or homeland, shows that not all urban elites adhere to President Biya's ethnopolitics. Nor are they all willing to become ethnic brokers or representative of their ethnic groups.

The unsuccessful story of both Ahidjo's policy of citizenship and Biya's autochthony governmentality, exemplified by their failure to forge a strong nationhood or to transform the ethnically diverse Cameroonian

society into a national imagined community called Cameroon, is proof that the success of a nation-building project in Africa depends above all on two preconditions: first, a well-advised and inspired political leadership, which is not only concerned with building a stable, fair and democratic society offering to all citizens the same rights and privileges, and second, the endorsement by African political leaders of good governance principles and practices in the management of both people and resources. More importantly, the current economic and political stagnation of Cameroon is a strong reminder that bad governance and poor political leadership can drag even potentially rich and viable African countries, such as the one discussed in this chapter, to an unenviable position of "Bottom Billion" (Collier 2007), which are clearly heading toward what might be described as a black hole, or to a state of "phantom states" (Derrida 1994: 83), which only exist as a shadow of the former glorious self or past.

Notes

1. Cf. Socpa (2010).
2. El Haj Ahmadou Ahidjo, a Muslim from the northern region of Cameroon, was the first president who ruled the country from 1960 to 1982 when he decided to step down in favor of Paul Biya, his then- Prime Minister and constitutional successor.
3. The conference was held from July 12 to13, 2013.
4. For the meaning attached to displacement and uprootedness in the national order of things, see Malkki (1995).
5. As already demonstrated for the Bamileke from the Grassfields region of West-Cameroon. See Ndjio (2008: 77–100).
6. However, this argument should be nuanced because Ahidjo's insistence on national unity and national citizenship, did not prevent his regime from endorsing at the time what was officially designated as the policy of *équilibre régional* (regional balance or equilibrium).
7. For a critical discussion of the Cameroon national anthem, see Bissohong Nug (2009).
8. It is important to stress that the celebration of citizenship was neither peculiar to Cameroon nor to Africa at large, as demonstrated by recent researches on the crisis of citizenship around the world (see Ceuppens 2006: 147–186; Pandey 2001; Pandey and Geschiere 2003). Yet what particularly marked Ahidjo's policy of "citoyenneté" was the fact that it made the very concept of "citizenship" a sort of fetish to be worshipped or venerated by all Cameroonians.
9. In many respects, these relations are based on reciprocity of rights and duties guaranteed by the laws of the republic.
10. See *Cameroon Tribune*, February 29, 1980. Especial issue on the CNU (Cameroon National Union, the then state-party) held in Bafoussam, the regional capital of the Grassfields region.

11. Bissohong Nug (2009: 89).
12. In *Cameroon Tribune*, February 23, 1980, p. 3.
13. "Je puis affirmer que l'unité nationale et le consensus national sur le destin de notre cher et beau pays sont aujourd'hui des réalités vivantes et vécues"; cf. *Cameroon Tribune*, January 18, 1983, p. 3.
14. See Mbock (1985) and Mono Djana (1985).
15. Cf. the newspaper *La Voix du Cameroun*, no. 54, December 1986, especially the article titled: "*C'est quoi le Système Politique de Paul Biya?*"(What Is Paul Biya's Political System?). It is important to underline that this newspaper was run by the *Union des Populations du Cameroon* (UPC), the nationalist party that was the first to advocate for the country's independence in the early 1950s. This party which led the rebellion movement in many regions of the country from 1956 up to 1972 was fiercely opposed to both the French colonial administration and the regime of Ahidjo. See also Mbuyinga (1989: 34); the newspaper *Challenge Hebdo* (April 24, 1992: 3).
16. This neologism accounts for the exclusive positioning by the Cameroonian Head of State of his own Beti kinsmen to the most important posts in the state apparatuses, or in most state-run enterprises or parastatal companies.
17. Kamga (1985: 29).
18. In the local parlance, this concept generally makes reference to the forest region of Cameroon where most influential members of the Biya regime originate from.
19. See Mono Djana's *L'Idée Sociale chez Paul Biya* (1985).
20. In its principles, this policy of regional balance aimed at favoring the "balanced development" (*développement équilibré*) of all regions of the country, to paraphrase the official language. Cf. Nchoji Nkwi and Nyamnjoh (1997).
21. Even if the same author (1993: 95) believes that some prominent Grassfields businessmen long benefited too from what he calls the "deliberate short-sightedness of the CNU regime" (*myopie volontaire du regime UNC*) which encouraged the emergence of Grassfields entrepreneurs, with the hope that this would urge leaders of this community to stop supporting the UPC rebellion which was very active in the region between 1957 and 1966. See also Joseph (1977).
22. This term can be misleading because it doesn't take into account the mosaic ethnic groups that make up the northern region of Cameroon. Nor does it acknowledge the ethnic and religious divisions among the dominant Fulani/Fulbe people who are predominantly Muslims and the *Kirdi*, a term which generally makes reference to different politically and economically marginalized non-Muslim and Christian populations such as the Tupuri, Moundang, Massa, Moffo, etc. Cf. Ignastowski (2004: 411–432).
23. For example, Ahmadou Ahidjo, like the large majority of prominent northern politicians, only had a *CEPE* (first living primary school certificate), while many southern political elites graduated from the French universities or *Grandes Ecoles*. See Gaillard (1994a).

24. As we showed in another context, architecture embodies the effort of these "villageois urbains" to reconnect themselves to their native village, to assert their ethnic identity, and more importantly, to recover their lost "roots" (see Ndjio 2008: 1–28).

25. Bandolo (1985); Fogui (1990); Kamga (1985); Mono Djana (1985).

26. "Une universalité abstraite développée à dessein pour masquer l'exploitation, mais pourtant visible, des différents particularismes ethniques" (Mono Djana 1985: 184).

27. This expression was theorized by one ideologue of the CPDM regime, the late Prof. Roger Gabriel Nlep who was one of the authors of the January 1996 Constitution that endorsed the division of Cameroonians between *autochthon* and *allochthon* (see Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 1998: 69–91). According to him, Cameroonians should be offered the possibility to vote or seek a popular suffrage only in their own "electoral village"; that is, in their native region, or the place where they really "belong." See also *La Nouvelle Expression* (May 3, 1996: 18); Monga (2000: 723–747).

28. Some recent studies have underlined the critical role played by these village elite associations in promoting or exacerbating ethnic consciousness. See Nyamnjoh and Rowlands (1998: 320–337).

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Factionalism and Robert Mugabe's Leadership in Zimbabwe

Enocent Msindo

Introduction

In the 1980s, Robert Mugabe was seen as an icon in Zimbabwe and internationally. By the 1990s, voices of dissent against his leadership were beginning to emerge, together with fractures in his party. Since the late 1990s, however, opposition has grown with the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and bigger, influential civil society organizations. But Mugabe (who turned 90 years old in 2014), having won another presidential term in July 2013 in the face of allegations of vote rigging, has managed to cling to power (www.dailynews. co.zw/articles/2013/08/11/nikuv-paid-10-million-to-rig-polls-mdc, last accessed April 16, 2014). He has now had an unbroken 34 years in government and 50 years in the leadership structures of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). To some, Mugabe is a legendary and inspirational figure whose personality generates mixed emotions, yet to others, he is a divisive figure who brooks no opposition. Mugabe has three striking attributes—a revolutionary, an intellectual, and a statesman—but these alone do not explain his longevity in power. He also knows how to manage different constituencies of people. The Mugabe of the podium looks different from the Mugabe of the negotiating table, who also differs from the Mugabe at social functions, who is viewed by

those who meet him as an affable, wise, and loving father of the nation (See Showbiz Reporter 2012. See also http://www.zbc.co.zw/news-categories/top-stories/22449-macheso for the same report; see also, "Shingisai Breaks Down in Admiration of Mugabe" 2013). But how does such an old man manage ZANU-PF and the country? As Mahmood Mamdani controversially argued a few years ago, in an essay published in the *London Review of Books*, not only dictatorship has sustained Robert Mugabe's political career, but also popular consent (http://www.lrb.co.uk/v30/n23/mahmood-mamdani/lessons-of-zimbabwe, accessed June 18, 2013). This does not mean Mugabe still has the support of the majority, but notwithstanding significant loss of support over the years, he has a sizeable number of supporters, although not enough to give him victory in a free and fair election.

In this chapter, we argue that Robert Mugabe is a product and beneficiary of the politics of factionalism within the broader nationalist movement and in his own party, before and after independence. Because Mugabe rose to power within the context of factional power struggles in ZANU, his leadership has been sustained chiefly by the tendency to generate and manipulate factions to weaken internal dissent in ZANU-PF and government. As Mugabe has advanced in years, the major factor sustaining him in power is the enmity of the factions within his party, which makes it difficult for them to unite and challenge him.

Mugabe is now the remaining elder and the face of his party, ZANU-PF. However, by criminalizing succession debates and stifling internal party democracy, he has weakened the party and undermined its capacity after independence to rebrand itself from a liberation movement into a people's party—little wonder that his party is usually reactive and paranoid when faced with a myriad of crises. Since Zimbabwe is technically a one-party state, with the ruling party being supreme over state institutions and structures (Masunungure 2007: 125–142), whatever happens in ZANU-PF directly affects the state.

Leadership Crisis, Factionalism and the Struggle for Independence

The leadership challenges in the nationalist movement since the mid-1960s created conditions for factional power struggles that shaped Mugabe and ZANU's way of doing politics. Mugabe emerged as the president of ZANU in 1976 mainly because of his ability to seize opportunities presented to him amidst increasing factionalism and intrigue within ZANU in the 1970s.

In the late 1950s, Mugabe left the country to work in independent Ghana. On his return for holiday in 1960 (Venter 1976: 207), he found

a vibrant nationalist movement whose leaders thought that because of changes in British policy toward decolonization, and because of political uncertainly brought about by the imminent collapse of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, majority rule was imminent. Before this period, middle-class Africans had been cautious of supporting the nationalist movement because of its radical and exclusivist tendencies to identify those outside the movement as "sell-outs" (See generally Scarnecchia 2008) and also because of the movement's call for rich Africans to mix with the poor masses, which compromised their status (Msindo 2007: 267–290). Mugabe joined the National Democratic Party (NDP), successor to the banned Southern Rhodesian African National Congress (ANC). Already possessing three degrees, he was asked by the NDP leadership to join as its publicity secretary (Smith et al. 1981: 27). Before his migration to Ghana, Mugabe had been a member of the moderate, multiracial, and white liberal-controlled Capricorn Society, which was in favor of "racial partnership" (Smith et al. 1981: 18). Mugabe's association with the Capricorn Society, despite having professed radical Marxism in his days as a student at the University of Fort Hare in South Africa between 1949 and 1951 (Venter 1976: 206; Smith et al. 1981: 17–18), typifies the general ideological confusion that most Southern Rhodesian African intellectuals found themselves in during the 1950s, which continued even after the emergence of the ANC in 1957.

Under Mugabe's leadership, the NDP developed a strong semi-military youth system, which played a pivotal role in mobilizing support for the party and organized forms of defiance to Settler rule. The NDP was banned in 1961 and was succeeded by the Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union (ZAPU) in the same year. ZAPU was banned by the Edgar Whitehead regime in September 1962, after which the leaders resolved to form the People's Caretaker Council to stand in for ZAPU until its ban was lifted (Todd 1967: 77). This ban further disillusioned the nationalist movement and precipitated its split into two factions, which became rival political parties: ZAPU and ZANU (Msindo 2012: 192–202).

Although Mugabe was junior in rank to other leaders in ZANU, he became its first secretary general. Evidence suggests that Mugabe had been nominated by at least one committee member, Simpson Mutambanengwe, to be president of the party at the 1964 Gweru Congress, but he lost the election to Ndabaningi Sithole, a loss that he rued (Sithole 1979: 59–60). This set the stage for latent manifestations of factionalism and enmity between Mugabe and Sithole (Ibid.: 60). In his new position, Mugabe had privileged access to information and developments within ZANU, and in times of crisis, he would use this information against his opponents.

Mugabe played an active role in the 1963 split, as he was the most vocal critic of Joshua Nkomo at the time. Writing barely three years later,

journalist and ZANU cadre Nathan Shamuyarira (Maurice Nyagumbo argued that Shamuyarira was one of the activists who promoted the split. See Nyagumbo 1980: 170) said, "Already strains inside the national executive were being felt. Mugabe in particular was beginning to disagree fundamentally with the way Nkomo was running things" (Shamuyarira 1966: 174). Shamuyarira's argument is not supported by any evidence. There was nothing fundamentally different between ZANU's and ZAPU's political agendas and core beliefs in the 1960s. There were obviously disagreements about whether the executives of the banned ZAPU should form a government in exile or not, but this alone was not substantial enough to cause the split. There is also no evidence to suggest that the relationship between Nkomo's PCC and the ZANU faction was so irretrievably broken down that any resolution of "fundamental differences" was impossible. The rebelling faction was basically unwilling to negotiate with Nkomo, as this would jeopardize their chances of forming a rival political party: the decision to split had already been made prior to the manifestation of what they saw as a litany of Nkomo's blunders. The personal political ambitions of Sithole, Mugabe and other members of their faction caused the split; they hoped that with the British call for majority rule after the collapse of the Federation, the Rhodesian Front regime would falter under pressure (Msindo 2012: 196). The Federation collapsed in July 1963, and ZANU was formed in August 1963. Some months before the split, Mugabe, Leopold Takawira and a few cadres outside the ZAPU executive, chiefly Nathan Shamuyarira, had already started spreading anti-Nkomo propaganda in the form of leaflets and letters to foreign governments and influential individuals (Nkomo intercepted some of the letters); they also wrote in African newspapers, condemning Nkomo's leadership style and touting the idea of forming a new political party (Cory Library, Rhodes University, 363(iii), St. Quintin's Historical Notes: African Nationalism Offices Abroad, 1961–1964; Nyagumbo 1980: 170–171, 176–179, 181, 185–187).

After the split, the two rival parties engaged in propaganda campaigns against each other as they vied for grassroots support. ZANU started its own magazines, the *Battle Cry* and the *Zimbabwe News*, and initially had the support of the Salisbury-based *Daily News*, which was edited by Shamuyarira (Msindo 2009: 663–681). Rival political parties viewed violence against state infrastructure, white farmers, and members of rival political parties, especially in African townships, as legitimate political activities. This violence signaled the end of the previous constitutional approaches toward achieving nationalist goals (Msindo 2012: 199; Sithole 1968: 109–111). Rival party publications competed to claim responsibility for acts of violence, as this proved crucial in winning popular support. Mugabe's career is part of this politics of violence, nationalist propaganda, and factionalism.

Increasing political violence gave the Settler regime an excuse to detain key ZAPU and ZANU political leaders. Between 1964 and 1974, Mugabe and other ZANU and ZAPU leaders were detained, leaving the day-to-day running of their parties in the hands of other leaders who escaped detention by skipping the border into Zambia, Tanzania and overseas. In ZANU, lawyer Herbert Chitepo, the ZANU chair, resigned from his job as director of public prosecutions in Tanzania and relocated to Zambia to direct party activities. He initiated the first phase of military training of ZANU guerrillas. These guerrillas infiltrated the country in 1966 but perished in battle at Chinhoyi as they fought government forces (Sadomba 2011: 9). In detention, Mugabe initiated moves to position himself as the leader of ZANU by sowing disaffection against its president, Sithole. The first chance for him came in 1969 when Sithole was convicted of attempting to assassinate Ian Smith, the Rhodesian prime minister.

In 1968, Sithole told his prison mate, Maurice Nyagumbo, of his intention to assassinate Smith. They wrote letters with instructions on how to execute the plan and smuggled them through by their visitors from detention to the would-be assailants (See, generally, Alexander 2011: 551–569). The plan failed, as a messenger leaked the letters to the police, and they were tried for treason. Sithole was convicted and sentenced to a six-year jail term (Nyagumbo 1980: 200–204). In mitigation, he said, "My Lord, I wish to publicly dissociate myself in word, thought and deed from any subversive activities, from any terrorist activities and from any form of violence" (Ibid.: 205). When the detainees heard of Sithole's mitigation, they accused him of renouncing the struggle. Mugabe, in particular, accused him of cowardice and of not being strategic (Venter 1976: 205). This came as no surprise, considering Mugabe's interest in leading the party. This trial dented Sithole's image and was later used by Mugabe and others against him in the mid-1970s.

In the 1970s, the war-weary ZANU party began to crack. This was partly caused by the Rhodesian Front regime's efforts to weaken African political parties, and partly masterminded by Mugabe, who sought to grab the party from its top leaders, such as Sithole (ZANU president, in prison), Chitepo (ZANU chairperson, in Zambia), and Tongogara (commander of the Army, in Zambia). Sithole was the easiest target because his political resolve had been weakened by his 1969 trial, and because he made other blunders that his opponents, chiefly Mugabe, Takawira and Malianga, took advantage of (Nyagumbo 1980: 206). Maurice Nyagumbo, a pro-Mugabe faction member in detention, argues that Sithole was prone to errors; for instance, Sithole tried to convince Mugabe and Takawira to ask other detainees to stop the armed struggle and negotiate with the Rhodesian regime, so they would be released from detention. The ZANU executive members in detention were

divided over this issue, with Mugabe, Takawira and Malianga in support of continuing with ZANU's "policy of confrontation," while others embraced Sithole's view, considering their prolonged detention, the deteriorating health situation of their colleagues in detention, the worsening political crisis in the country, and the lull in the armed struggle since 1966 (Ibid.: 205–206). Leadership squabbles between the Mugabe and Sithole factions led to physical fights and verbal exchanges amongst the detainees (Sithole 1979: 60). For the anti-Sithole group, it was becoming evident that either a new movement had to be formed, or Sithole had to be ousted from ZANU.

Amidst this chaos, in 1971, a new movement, Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI) emerged, supposedly to unite the nationalist movements and revive the armed struggle. FROLIZI was made up of mainly Zezuru Shona from both ZANU and ZAPU. According to Masipula Sithole, there were plans to appoint Mugabe to lead FROLIZI. However, this plan failed, as it hinged on an unsuccessful pro-FROLIZI press propaganda initiative by one of the FROLIZI ideologues, Shamuyarira, which involved hoodwinking black Zimbabweans and the Frontline States into believing that both Nkomo of ZAPU and Sithole of ZANU had endorsed Mugabe as the FROLIZI "unity" leader. When Sithole got this information, he quickly circulated a letter locally and abroad denouncing FROLIZI. This scuttled Mugabe's plot, so Mugabe tactically remained in ZANU, where he intensified efforts to oust Sithole (Sithole 1979: 61). FROLIZI collapsed in 1973, with Shamuyarira and Parirewa leading most of the FROLIZI members to ZANU (Astrow 1983: 77).

In November 1974, ZANU leaders in detention, namely Mugabe, Zvobgo, Nkala and Nyagumbo, suspended Sithole from leadership, using Sithole's 1969 court blunder as an alibi, and accusing him of working with the Rhodesian security regime to destroy ZANU (Martin and Johnson 1985: 21, 22). They replaced him with Mugabe (Ibid.: 77). However, ZANU leaders based in Zambia (especially Chitepo) and the Frontline States refused to endorse this decision and pushed for Sithole's reinstatement. Zambia threatened to jail all ZANU's 2,500 guerrillas in Zambia if the ZANU executive refused to reinstate Sithole (Ibid.: 78; Sithole 1979: 62). Sithole was reluctantly reinstated, but the enmity between Mugabe and himself grew (From this period, Mugabe, as Secretary General, refused to report to Sithole, the party president. Sithole 1979: 64–65). In December 1974, ZANU and ZAPU leaders were released from detention.

Meanwhile, fissures were emerging in the ZANU military wing. Led by Thomas Nhari, this military faction complained of the failure of Josiah Tongogara (the leader of the ZANLA army since 1973) to meet their basic needs as soldiers (Sadomba 2011: 13). They wanted his leadership

replaced by a new military leadership, the High Command. About 30 soldiers marched from the battlefront in northeastern Rhodesian to Chifombo, the main ZANU base on the borders of Mozambique. They took over Chifombo, arrested members of the existing High Command, and later presented their grievances to the ZANU leadership. The leadership refused to hear them, so Nhari and his men crossed into Zambia and abducted more ZANU officials. At this point, the Zambian government arrested them, and consequently, ZANU regained control of the Chifombo base. The rebels were tried by a committee of three, namely Chitepo, Rugare Gumbo and Kumbirai Kangai. The latter two were on the Nhari rebels' hit list. The committee never concluded its hearings and never produced any report.

Soon, the rebels were secretly executed and buried around the Chifombo area (For the Nhari rebellion, see generally Sithole's account, Sithole 1979: 74–77; Sadomba 2011: 17–18; White 2003: 19–30). Far from being a simple cry for help by soldiers, or a result of their unwillingness to engage with China in favor of Russian training, or that they were simply agents of apartheid South Africa, as believed by Martin and Johnson, this Nhari rebellion was planned. Tongogara believed this rebellion was planned and supervised by "some big fish" in ZANU, implying his awareness of rival factions (White 2003: 26).

The suppression of the Nhari rebellion was followed by the assassination of Chitepo in March 1975 through a parcel bomb from an anonymous sender. It is not clear who killed Chitepo, and postmodernists like White have used this case to argue about the problematic nature of sources, the actors in such sources, and ultimately the problematic nature of historical truth (White 2003). There are two dominant schools of thought on the Chitepo assassination. The ZANU view is that Chitepo was killed by the Rhodesian security operatives with a view to thwart the military struggle because he was the default head of the Military Command, above Tongogara (Martin and Johnson 1985: 38–59). If ZANU's official explanation was difficult to believe in the 1970s, it is more difficult to believe now, because of increasing criticisms of Mugabe and many suspicious deaths of politicians from his party. The second view comes from conclusions from an international team of investigators constituted by the Zambian government. The team concluded that a ZANU faction murdered Chitepo. This view was strongly held by Solomon Baron, a former lawyer involved in the enquiry in Zambia; by a former ZANU member turned critic, Masipula Sithole; by Edgar Tekere, a former Mugabe loyalist of the 1970s; and also by the Rhodesian government, which was keen to deny liability (See NAZ Oral 239, Leo Solomon Baron's Interview with I. J. Johnstone, Borrowdale, Harare, August 9, 1983; Sithole 1979: 77–83; Smith 2001: 174–175. Tekere claims that Chitepo was murdered by ZANU, particularly by the Tongagara faction,

see Holland 2008: 43). According to Masipula Sithole, citing the *Report of the Special Commission on the Assassination of Herbert Wiltshire Chitepo*, Chitepo was assassinated by members of the ZANU *Dare* (war council) and the High Command for the following reasons: first, Chitepo knew of their secret executions of the Nhari rebels and that had he been left at large, he was going to divulge the secrets. Second, Chitepo's colleagues, particularly Tongogara, suspected him of being sympathetic to the Nhari rebels, and hence his presence in the party would undermine the struggle (Astrow 1983: 83). Third, Chitepo was an impediment to Tongogara's ambitions to control ZANU (Sithole 1979: 79). Consequent to the commission's findings, the Zambian government detained most of the ZANU leaders in Zambia, accusing them of killing Chitepo. The Nhari rebellion and the Chitepo assassination helped Mugabe's rise to ZANU presidency and also resulted in the dominance of Zezuru Shona in ZANU's leadership (Mugabe's faction), replacing the Manyika faction (Sithole 1980: 17–39). We will explain this below.

Apart from his quarrels with Sithole, Mugabe had not directly interacted with the powerful ZANU *Dare* leadership in Zambia. The War Council, dominated by Chitepo had until 1975 been supportive of Sithole's presidency. The death of Chitepo, who supported Sithole, left him without protection from his political adversaries who were waiting for him to make further mistakes. Sithole's handling of the Chitepo assassination only added to his woes. When the Zambian government detained members of the war council on allegations of assassinating Chitepo, Sithole was expected by radicals like Mugabe to criticize Zambia for these arrests. However, for diplomatic reasons, he did not, because the Zambian government had hitherto supported ZANU's liberation struggle. Mugabe, who had not interacted with the Zambian government before, seized the opportunity and criticized Zambia for detaining ZANU leaders, securing for himself further political mileage ahead of Sithole, who worsened his plight when he wrote a letter alleging that Chitepo's death was caused by tribal factionalism in his party (Sithole 1979: 82).

Yet another challenge confronted Sithole in 1975—and this one sealed his fate. Under pressure from Frontline States who wanted the liberation movements to unite, Sithole tried to reunite ZANU and ZAPU under the banner of a reformed African National Congress (ANC). He instructed ZANU to disband and join the united ANC. This irked ZANU leaders, who saw the move as another attempt by Sithole to destroy the party (Astrow 1983: 88–89). His ANC idea, plus his reaction to the Chitepo assassination, led to his eventual ouster in mid-1975, three months after the death of Chitepo. This meant that two high profile ZANU leaders from Manyikaland (ZANU chairperson and president) were eliminated in succession. By March 1975, about 250 other leaders, including

John Mataure, the chief political commissar in the war council and Noel Mukono, the external affairs secretary, both from Manyikaland, had died as a result of tribal infighting in ZANU (Sithole 1980: 31). Consequently, the ZANU War Council in exile remained Karanga-dominated, but they were arrested by the Zambian government on charges of killing Chitepo. Their arrest gave the Zezuru faction, which was beginning to consolidate after the demise of FROLIZI, an opportunity to regroup, and this ultimately consolidated Mugabe's position as the new ZANU president.

However, up to this point, Mugabe did not have the support of the army. Mugabe soon relocated to Mozambique, where he got in direct contact with the army. Incidentally, at that point, the Rhodesian government had imprisoned army leader Tongogara (who was Karanga Shona) (Norman 2008: 61). Mugabe's advocacy for the release of arrested *Dare* and High Command cadres in Zambia enhanced his reputation with the army, because on their release, the victims pledged loyalty to him.

Although support for Mugabe was growing steadily after 1975, he was relatively unknown to the outside world before the Geneva Conference of November 1976, where leaders gathered to negotiate with the Rhodesian government for majority rule. ZANU, like ZAPU, also weakened by factionalism, was in danger of being excluded from these negotiations, known as the Internal Settlement, because the Rhodesian regime insisted on negotiating with the ANC of Ndabaningi Sithole, Abel Muzorewa and others. Recognizing the risk of becoming irrelevant, Mugabe allied with Joshua Nkomo under the banner of the Patriotic Front (PF). The PF resolved to intensify the military struggle as opposed to negotiating with Ian Smith. In reality, this unity was merely a marriage of convenience. Unity with Nkomo opened a door for Mugabe to join the Geneva conference, where he postured as the representative of the militants back home, threatening a return to war should their demands not be met (Smith et al. 1981: 95; Venter 1976: 205). We will not discuss the many and complex party splits during the late 1970s. It suffices to say that Zimbabwean independence came amidst this fragile relationship between Nkomo and Mugabe, and in 1980, Mugabe, who calculated his sums well, decided to run for the elections without Nkomo. But shortly before 1980, Josiah Tongorara, the head of the army, died.

Tongogara, just recently released from prison and still popular within the army, died in a car accident in Mozambique on December 26, 1979, days after his serious disagreement with the ZANU Central Committee over unity under the PF. It is unclear who actually killed Tongogara, but it is suspected that Tongogara's "accident" came amidst serious infighting in ZANU over the control of the army and also over issues of the PF unity. Tongogara strongly believed in the PF and was pushing for ZANU and ZAPU to contest the elections in 1980 as one party, a view that Mugabe and some in his Central Committee strongly opposed because

they believed that the war had mainly been won by ZANU, and that any unity during elections would give Nkomo's ZAPU undeserved recognition (Nyarota 2006). Ian Smith argued that "his own people" killed Tongogara:

> His death was a great tragedy and the announcement that he had been killed in a motor accident rang hollow to me, especially because of his disclosure to me in London that he had to guard his back against those die hard extremists in his party who took strong exception to his philosophy that the time had come to forget the bitterness of the past, and work together constructively with all other parties to build the country. He had accepted reconciliation....I made a point of discussing his death with our police commissioner and the head of special branch, and both assured me that Tongogara had been assassinated. (Smith 2001: 335)

The above might perhaps be mere speculations. However, Smith and Tongogara had generally been on talking terms and Smith regarded Tongogara highly because Tongogara was more moderate than Mugabe when it comes to negotiations. Tongogara grew up on Smith's farm where his mother worked. During the Lancaster House negotiations in 1979, Tongogara was spotted talking to Smith, asking about his mother, "How is the old lady? Please send her my warm wishes," and is also said to have explained his point in joining the struggle: "I didn't want to destroy Smith or the old lady. I did want to destroy the system that he built" (De Waal 1990: 42). Tongogara's death left Mugabe without an open challenger, giving him absolute control of the army and the party. Tongogara died during the confusion surrounding the second phase of the Internal Settlement era (1978–1979), when fighting for political positions between former *Dare* members and the new arrivals in Mozambique led to an attempted coup on Mugabe in 1978 (Sithole 1979: 184). Mugabe's backlash resulted in the incarceration of Henry Hamadziripi, Mukudzei Mudzi, Rugare Gumbo, Mandizvidza, Fay Chung, Joseph Taderera, Wilfred Mhanda, and hundreds of ZANU militants who were detained as punishment for supporting the Tongogara faction (Nyarota 2006: 115; Sithole 1979: 184). These "rebels" were only released at the intervention of Lord Soames in 1980, as a condition for Mugabe's return from exile in 1980, just before the elections (Sithole 1979: 184; Cory 1980: 59). Once freed, most of them pledged their loyalty to Mugabe for patronage in independent Zimbabwe (Nyarota 2006: 115–117. Chihuri, Muchechetere, Chimedza and Alexander Kanengoni served as top officials in the civil service, security sector, and in the media. Only Mhanda remained independent minded and later formed a splinter group of War Veterans who refused to be used by Mugabe to perpetrate violence against innocent citizens during the post-2000 land invasions). However,

as it now appears, this loyalty was tenuous, as some of these leaders have now recently challenged Robert Mugabe's long stay in power. For siding with the Mujuru faction in challenging Robert Mugabe's self-perpetuation in power, Rugare Gumbo, was quickly stripped of his ZANU-PF spokesperson post and suspended from the party at the hastily arranged ZANU-PF Congress of December 2014 ("ZANU Congress a Charade: Gumbo" 2015).

One Party, One Leader: A Failed Experiment, 1980–1989

Although Mugabe emerged the ultimate beneficiary of factionalism during the 1970s, his future in independent Zimbabwe would depend on how he managed the different factions in his party. Without Sithole, Tongogara and Chitepo, internal party democracy was severely undermined, particularly for the politics of consensus and negotiation, as Mugabe surrounded himself with people who depended on his approval for political positions. Enos Nkala, in whose house ZANU was formed, was loyal to Mugabe and was crucial in ZANU's ethnic balancing, him being the only senior ZANU leader from Matabeleland. Edson Zvobgo, who was also in ZANU from the beginning, spent the rest of the 1970s in the United States, where he studied law at Harvard. So he was not directly involved in the factional fights that brought Mugabe to power, being politically ambitious but loyal to Mugabe in the 1980s. Nathan Shamuyarira, another senior man, had blundered in joining FROLIZI in 1971. On his return to ZANU in 1973, he knew that his future depended on his loyalty to Mugabe. The same applies to slightly junior but powerful leaders like Rugare Gumbo, Mukudzei Mudzi, and others who had survived the purge in the late 1970s when there was an attempted rebellion against the military leadership and Mugabe. Apart from these, Mugabe also surrounded himself with trusted leaders who had remained loyal to him during the war—such as Simon Muzenda, Emerson Mnangagwa, Sydney Sekeramayi, Kumbirai Kangai, Didymus Mutasa, Oppah Muchinguri (Most of these leaders had been in Mugabe's Executive in exile in 1978. These loyalists served in Mugabe's government since 1980), guerrilla leaders like Solomon Mujuru, Josiah Tungamirai, and Vitalis Zvinavashe (Sadomba 2011: 45), and some returning ZANU intellectuals who had been in the diaspora.

Between 1980 and 1988, Mugabe generally enjoyed unity in his party, mainly because he had been cautious in the ways he dealt with ideological challenges of the late Cold War, which caused political upheavals in neighboring countries like Namibia, Mozambique and others. Secondly, as the foremost remaining senior elder of the party, no one dared challenge

him directly during those years because he was undoubtedly very popular, locally and internationally. Moreover, with the exception of the violence in Matabeleland, Mugabe did not do anything radical that would have dented popular perceptions of ZANU as a party. However, he faced one major problem—that the country was not yet under one-party state leadership. Having a one-party state meant that Mugabe would concentrate on managing his party and consolidating his power within ZANU without worrying about possible opposition from without the party. The Whites, under Ian Smith, still had their reserved seats in parliament, and Abel Muzorewa, the leader of the transitional government of 1978–1979, had won three seats. Sithole's United African National Congress (UANC) had lost dismally. Whereas Smith's party would die naturally at the expiry of the Lancaster House Constitution's ten-year tenure, and the Muzorewa party would not be difficult to deal with, Mugabe's biggest rival was Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU, which had won resoundingly in Matabeleland and received 20 parliamentary seats overall. Mugabe did not mask his desire for a one-party state, even before he came to power. He once argued, "We believe sincerely that a multi-party system, unless it is particularly desired by the people, is a luxury in a state." (Cory 1980: 58). Whereas ZAPU wanted one party before the 1980 elections, ZANU wanted to discuss this after the elections, because they were confident of winning without ZAPU (Cory 1980, for an "Interview with ZANU President Mugabe" by Rebecca Reiss and Michael Fleshman, undated. Here Mugabe says, "ZAPU would like one party now, and one leader. This is where we differ of course. This is why we cannot have one army, because they say one party first.").

In the first ten years of independence, weakening or destroying ZAPU became Mugabe's priority. To weaken ZAPU, government engaged in attacking people in Matabeleland under the guise of dealing with dissidents who were supposedly causing instability in the region and the nation at large. Preoccupation with the Matabeleland issue proved important in unifying ZANU during the 1980s, as they all supported this one major cause—the weakening of ZAPU so that it could submit to the one-party state ideology on ZANU's terms. Under these circumstances, it was not expected that Mugabe would be challenged from within. To ensure that he was absolutely safe, in 1980, Mugabe dismissed Edgar Tekere from his cabinet. Tekere subsequently lost his position of ZANU secretary general in 1981 (Astrow 1983: 168) and also his position as provincial chairperson for Manyikaland province in the late 1980s (De Waal 1990: 101). Tekere was sacrificed because he refused to embrace Mugabe's politics of reconciliation, which he felt to be a betrayal of the party's socialist goals, as reconciliation clearly promoted established White capitalism during the Cold War (Astrow 1983: 168, 172, 183). Tekere had been Mugabe's most loyal supporter in Mozambique and had campaigned vigorously

for Mugabe in the run-up to the 1980 elections (Holland 2008: 41). His immediate ouster signaled Mugabe's attitude toward internal party democracy and how important loyalty and patronage were as essential elements in entrenching Robert Mugabe's personal rule.

In 1988, the year that Mugabe finally achieved his one-party state vision, by swallowing ZAPU into ZANU-PF, frictions began to emerge in ZANU as details of government corruption and abuse of office for financial gain, particularly the "Willowgate" vehicle scandal, became public (Bulawayo Public Library 1989). The Willowgate scandal was one of the many instances of corruption in Zimbabwe at a time when the media was tightly controlled and where independence euphoria meant that most people generally trusted Mugabe and were not yet critical of him. The failures of government's socialist-oriented programs, such as rural cooperatives, small-scale communal farming, and other projects that were directed by the state through Village Development Committees (VIDCOS) and Ward Development Committees (WADCOS), for instance, were explained away by some of ZANU-PF's supporters to mean, "The government is still learning" or that the government was being sabotaged by remnants of the Smith regime that Mugabe kept in the civil service after independence (De Waal 1990: 105–109; Government ignored traditional systems of governance, preferring VIDCOs and WADCOs instead). However, repetitive instances of abuse of public funds by government officials to buy personal farms and houses, instead of buying land to resettle ordinary citizens, the rise of an unaccountable one-party state that tolerated no opposition, the government's move to abolish the prime minister's post in favor of an all-powerful executive presidency, the government's ill-judged adoption of the IMF and World Bank's Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), which hurt the workers most, and the general failure to fulfill the promises made to the citizens during the struggle for independence all bred some degree of restlessness. Although many still liked Mugabe, they were becoming concerned by his failure to create an enabling environment for democracy at the grassroots level and in his own government. WADCOS and VIDCOS became government's instruments to subordinate people to the state by centralizing developmental projects and distribution of the national goods in ways that slowly entrenched vertical patronages and undermined the evolution of grassroots democracy. The formation of these village and ward-based structures did not follow any grassroots consultation and critical analysis of the kind of development that communities really wanted. It is little wonder that by the late 1980s, the earlier optimism and the independence euphoria, which had hitherto sustained Mugabe's regime, were beginning to fade. In the late 1980s, Victor De Waal interviewed a woman, Ndana, whose views he paraphrased below. I view Ndana's

concerns as succinctly representing the general attitude of the people toward Mugabe's leadership style in the late 1980s:

> She (Ndana) likes Mugabe, although she feels he doesn't listen enough. At a women's meeting he spoke for three hours. And the "yes" men are in government. There is change, but nothing like as big as she had hoped for. Ministers send their children to private schools—socialism is for others...As she sees it, "our government is not liberating us"— but she does not know how this is to be achieved. (De Waal 1990: 108–109)

1989 and After: Rising Opposition, Unmanageable Factions

Because of state controls and constraints to developing grassroots-based democracy in rural areas and because of the general lack of an active rural civil society during Zimbabwe's first ten years, challenges to Mugabe's power started mainly in the cities where active civil society organizations were emerging, notwithstanding their weaknesses (Makumbe 1998: 305–317). For the first time, a constituency made up of tertiary education students, workers, middle-class professionals, those in ZANU and ZAPU who opposed the Unity Accord, and also regionalists from Manyikaland who saw Edgar Tekere as a potential regional power broker, began to question Mugabe's one-party leadership. Consequently, an opposition party, the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) was launched in 1989. ZUM contested the 1990 presidential election against ZANU-PF under difficult conditions, with Tekere arrested on flimsy charges, and his party denied freedom of assembly (Chan 2003: 44; Smith 2001: 387. Tekere, a former close friend of Mugabe, was expelled from ZANU in 1988 for criticizing ZANU for its departure from its socialist-oriented leadership code that tolerated no corruption). Moreover, Tekere's supporters in rural areas were threatened that their food supply will be withdrawn if they continued to support ZUM, and if ZUM should win, there would be war (Laakso 2003). In fact, one of his officials, Mayor Patrick Kombayi, who was very popular in Gweru, was shot by intelligence operatives who were pardoned soon after their conviction in court (Ibid.). Nonetheless, Tekere's ZUM got 20 percent of the presidential vote and two parliamentary seats, a significant political gain under the circumstances (De Waal 1990: 102).

ZUM collapsed soon after the 1990 elections for many reasons. First, its diverse membership found it difficult to stick together for a long time. Secondly, it experienced financial strains. Third, Mugabe's regime officially abandoned the one-party state idea after the 1990 elections, and this weakened his critics. Fourth, Tekere's leadership was poor. He

suspended some of his leaders after the elections, which resulted in some of them defecting to ZANU. Consequently, Tekere merged ZUM and the old United African National Congress (UANC) into one party, the United Parties, but remained largely ineffectual (Laakso 2003). Forum, another party led by Justice Enock Dumbutshena, was formed in 1993. It was elitist and did not attract ordinary Zimbabweans. Forum, United Parties, Sithole's ZANU (Ndonga) and some independent candidates like Margaret Dongo participated in the 1995 elections, but they were too divided to challenge ZANU-PF. Dongo was subsequently expelled from ZANU-PF and formed her own party, the Zimbabwe Union of Democrats.

Until the mid-1990s, opposition to Mugabe remained weak. However, serious tensions in Mugabe's party increased toward the end of 1997. Understanding the broader context is important for one to understand this development. By the mid-1990s, the IMF and World Bank's structural adjustments had failed dismally in Zimbabwe. The withdrawal of state subsidies resulted in sharp increases in prices of basic commodities, triggering a wave of "bread" demonstrations at a time workers were struggling due to meager salaries. Tertiary education students had concerns with government's tendency to curtail students' demonstrations against corruption and deteriorating standards of living. Ordinary people and war veterans were also complaining about the slow pace of land redistribution and how the process had benefitted rapacious ZANU-PF elites. Facing a restive population locally and willing to demonstrate his regional political pedigree in SADC, Mugabe unilaterally sent troops to the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1998 without consulting cabinet, or even examining the economic impact. Zimbabwe's dollar tumbled to its lowest since independence (Sithole 1998). Mugabe's reckless foreign policy and his domestic leadership blunders led to the creation of a broad alliance of people who viewed Zimbabwe's problem as essentially a political one, with Mugabe's long stay in power and his manipulation of the constitution being seen as the major issues. This broad alliance soon developed into the National Constitutional Assembly and also the MDC party.

In ZANU-PF and in government, the house was not in order. Political change seemed frozen indefinitely as Mugabe had turned his ruling party into his personal fief where he suspended or fired opponents at will. This frustrated some of the leaders who had helped Mugabe get to power, hoping that he would retire and leave them in charge. Mugabe surrounded himself with people whose future in the party depended on their absolute loyalty to him, because he knew their weaknesses and secrets, which he could use against them should they become difficult. Heidi Holland is correct in maintaining that one major weakness of Mugabe's leadership is his acute personal insecurity, which makes him too sensitive to criticism

(Holland 2008: 52). This paranoia explains his desire to manipulate and divide the party, even if this weakens it.

Aware that in the forthcoming (1995) elections, there were real challenges of convincing the electorate, which was battered by ESAP, concerned about the then-74-year-old Mugabe, who refused to retire, and further beset by factions at every level of the party (Since the early 1990s, there were several factions in ZANU-PF provinces. These include the Zvobgo/Mavhaire faction versus the Hungwe/Muzenda faction in Masvingo; the Shamuyarira faction (Politburo member) versus the Swithun Mombeshora (provincial chairperson) faction in Mashonaland West Province; the Didymus Mutasa faction (Politburo member) versus the Kumbirai Kangai faction (provincial chairperson) in Manyikaland. These factions change faces with time as new politicians join the fray. However, factionalism is self-perpetuating because the problems that led to its emergence were never solved. In Chivi North district for instance, I know of a married couple who are both in ZANU-PF ward leadership, yet they belong to different factions), there were calls for Mugabe to go by some ZANU politicians beginning in the early 1990s. Echoing growing dissent in 1998, Dzikamai Mavhaire, a ZANU politburo member and an ally of former Justice Minister Edson Zvobgo (who drafted amendments to the Lancaster House Constitution) argued in his House of Assembly debate on the terms of the president, "We believe we are not a monarchy. Honorable members will agree that we must remain a democratic republic…What I am proposing is that the President must go." (See, "Government of Zimbabwe: Zimbabwean Parliamentary Debates" 1998). Mugabe responded by suspending Mavhaire from ZANU and subsequently promoting members of the anti-Mavhaire faction (the Hungwe/Muzenda faction) in Masvingo province to high government positions so as to neutralize the Mavhaire faction. In the run up to the 2000 parliamentary elections, the weakened Mavhaire faction lost to the Hungwe faction in the ZANU-PF primary elections. Mavhaire's compatriot, Zvobgo was removed from cabinet and replaced by Samuel Mumbengegwi of the rival faction (Compagnon 2010: 18).

Having been summarily dismissed from cabinet in 2001, Edson Zvobgo, a key ZANU-PF official and one of the leaders who formed ZANU in 1963, became more critical of Mugabe. At a funeral of a party colleague in his province, Zvobgo likened Mugabe's cleaving to power as symptomatic of melancholia. He likened Mugabe to a relay athlete from Ngomahuru mental hospital who, having run his part of the race so fast and arrived well ahead of other competitors, with crowds cheering, refused to pass the relay baton to his running mate, who was eagerly waiting on the line. Instead, he sprinted to the mountains with the button stick. Disappointed, but still seeing a chance to win the race, the team supporters chased after him, hoping

to snatch the button and hand it to the running mate. When he got to the top of the mountain, he began to throw stones and push down boulders on anyone who dared advance toward him ("Zvobgo Warns ZANU-PF" from personal recollections of what Zvobgo said at that rally). Zvobgo's sentiments attracted further ire from Mugabe, who accused him of supporting the opposition MDC, thereby weakening ZANU-PF in Masvingo province. Before the disputed 2002 presidential elections, Zvobgo publicly stated and also privately confided to the American ambassador in Zimbabwe that although he still supported ZANU-PF, he would not campaign for Mugabe in the 2002 elections. The WikiLeaks document says,

> Zvobgo had few kind words for his old brother-in-arms Mugabe, saying the aging president does not listen to him or anyone else anymore. Zvobgo stated that Mugabe is becoming more unpopular all the time and would lose the March Presidential election. "How do you convince voters to vote for you by beating them up?" He asked rhetorically. Zvobgo intimated that one of the areas that Mugabe would lose would be Masvingo Province. He hinted that he and his supporters would not be campaigning for the President…Zvobgo did note that virtually no Karangas…were in Cabinet or Permanent Secretary positions, a fact that will hurt Mugabe in the election. "Mugabe will lose the election on his own," the MP predicted. (WikiLeaks 2002)

Zvobgo died in 2004, but this did not end Mugabe's troubles. Zvobgo's snub of Mugabe marked the beginnings of what Mugabe later discovered after the 2008 elections to be the *bhora mudondo* strategy that was being used against him by some of his party officials (*Bhora musango* is a Shona phrase that means kicking the ball out of open play to frustrate the opponent, delay, or impede play. In Zimbabwean politics, this meant that ZANU-PF structures sabotaged Mugabe's possible victory. *The Insider* 2013; Sibanda 2014). *Bhora mudondo* was a strategy whereby factions that were currently not benefiting from Mugabe's patronage did not campaign for Mugabe during presidential elections. In 2008, this strategy resulted in Mugabe losing to Tsvangirai in provinces where he previously had "considerable" support. In April 2008, a retired dommander of the Defence Forces, General Vitalis Zvinavashe, from Masvingo province and of the Muzenda faction, blamed Mugabe after he lost his bid for the Gutu senatorial seat and after some of the MPs in Gutu lost to the MDC in March 2008. He said,

> Most of us lost these elections not because we were not popular in our constituencies. We lost these harmonized elections because of one man. People rejected us because we were campaigning for Mugabe. People in Masvingo have rejected him and we became collateral damage. There is no

reason to fight with the MDC over this election. Their real problem is that man[,] not us. ("We Lost: Admits Zvinavashe" 2008)

Zvinavashe died in 2009, but before his death, he was suspected to have been sympathetic to Simba Makoni, who left ZANU-PF and formed a new political party in 2008 called Mavambo/Kusile/Dawn (MKD). Zvinavashe's disappointment with Mugabe was most probably a result of the fact that Mugabe did not appoint him vice-president after the death of Simon Muzenda in September 2003 (WikiLeaks 2003). He retired from the army toward the end of 2003, expecting to be appointed vice-president, in line with what had been Muzenda's wish, which Muzenda communicated to Mugabe on his deathbed in 2003 (WikiLeaks 2003). Zvinavashe's remarks against Mugabe, whom he served faithfully for years, having served in the army since 1968, prove that Mugabe's leadership style was now backfiring. The Zvinavashe case, once again reveals the tenuous nature of loyalty to Mugabe, even from those who are often thought to be absolutely loyal. When he was still commander of the defense forces, Zvinavashe was thought to be highly loyal to Mugabe, vowing with other state security officials that they would never salute Morgan Tsvangirai of the MDC.

Since 2004, Mugabe has been trying hard to neutralize bigger and consolidated factions that emerged during the early 2000. After the death of two rival factional leaders, former vice-president Muzenda and former Politburo member Edson Zvobgo, two bigger factions developed: the Mnangagwa and Mujuru factions (Mnangagwa belonged to the Hungwe/Muzenda faction. His rise as the senior man in that faction followed the death of Muzenda and Mudenge a few years ago. He also has the advantage of being seen by Mugabe as his obedient "son." See WikiLeaks 2003). Although these two factions are actively engaged in canvassing for support at regional, district, and ward levels, they only need the grassroots leadership insofar as it helps them bolster their chances of succeeding Mugabe. Their leaders are not necessarily more democratic than Mugabe, and will most probably reproduce Mugabe's brand of leadership should they usurp power because that's the only kind of leadership they know. These two factions have attempted to find ways of taking over from Mugabe. In November 2004, a faction loyal to Emerson Mnangagwa planned a secret meeting at Dinyane High School in rural Tsholotsho, more than 600 kms from Harare under the guise of attending a school prize-giving ceremony. The Tsholotsho meeting was about plotting ways of positioning Mnangagwa for the first vice-president post, so that on Mugabe's departure, he becomes the president. The move was to block Joice Mujuru's bid for vice-presidency in government. Mujuru belonged to the faction that was headed by her husband, Solomon Mujuru, to which powerful leaders in ZANU-PF ranks, like

Didymus Mutasa; Rugare Gumbo'Dzikamai Mavhaire and many others, belonged.

According to Jonathan Moyo, the Tsholotsho saga was a culmination of political scheming that has been happening since 2000 and was necessitated by the need to realign leadership, so ZANU-PF would be better positioned to win forthcoming elections (Muleya 2006; Moyo 2009. Moyo's argument suggests that there was nothing sinister in the Tsholotsho meeting, as it was about negotiating democracy in the party. However, the secrecy surrounding this meeting masked the organizers' sinister motives). Opponents of Moyo in Matabeleland, chiefly John Nkomo and Dumiso Dabengwa, used the incident to attack him and many of the "young Turks" in the party, accusing them of planning to oust Mugabe. Incensed by the Tsholotsho plot, Mugabe interrogated and intimidated Moyo, accusing him of plotting a coup. Perhaps in a show of power, Mugabe publicly boasted that when he confronted Moyo over the Tsholotsho issue, Moyo wept for fear. He fired Moyo from the politburo, the party, and his portfolio as information minister (See "Moyo Wept over Coup" 2005; and also "Moyo's Lawsuit on Dabengwa and Nkomo" 2012). Mugabe moved quickly to weaken the Mnangagwa faction by demoting Mnangagwa from being ZANU-PF's secretary for administration, the party's fifth highest position to secretary for legal affairs (the twelfth position in the Politburo hierarchy), replacing him with Didymus Mutasa of the Mujuru faction. Mutasa had previously lost this position to Mnangagwa in the 2000 leadership shift (WikiLeaks 2004). In 2005, Mnangagwa became a non-constituency MP and lost his parliamentary speaker post to John Nkomo. Justice Minister Patrick Chinamasa, another Tsholotsho "rebel," also lost his ZANU-PF Politburo position in December 2004 and his post of Justice Minister for six months before he was reinstated in 2005. Many other changes followed in government and within ZANU-PF structures as Mugabe wielded the axe. The witch-hunt also affected ZANU-PF businesspeople who were associated with the Mnangagwa faction. Mutumwa Mawere lost his Shabani and Mashaba asbestos mines and was declared a specified person (Mawere 2009). Some had court cases opened against them, lost businesses under extraordinary circumstances, and many of them skipped the country's borders in fear. To Mnangagwa's disappointment, Joice Mujuru was appointed vice-president. The ascending Mujuru faction began to manipulate party structures by ousting pro-Mnangagwa leaders from provincial and district portfolios. Six provincial chairs—namely Mike Madiro (Manyikaland), Daniel Shumba (Masvingo), July Moyo (Midlands), Jacob Mudenda (Matabeleland North), Loyd Siyoka (Matabeleland South), and Themba Ncube (Bulawayo)—lost their positions for supporting the Tsholotsho "coup," as they got suspended. Their suspension was later rescinded mainly in

2008 (Ncube 2008). The same would happen to the Mujuru faction in 2014 (code-named the "Gamatox" faction) as the Mnangagwa faction (codenamed the "Weevils") hit back, this time using Mugabe's wife, Grace, who convinced Mugabe to side with this faction ("ZANU-PF in Turmoil" 2014).

The Tsholotsho saga had lasting consequences for ZANU-PF. It further divided Mugabe's party as popular provincial leaders lost positions to junior officials who didn't have grassroots support, leading to ZANU-PF's election loss in 2008. The Tsholotsho saga also upped enmity between the Mujuru and Mnangagwa factions to new levels where political assassinations became possible. For instance, on December 6, 2008 Elliot Manyika, then ZANU-PF political commissar who belonged to the Mnangagwa faction died in a vehicle accident under suspicious circumstances (Magora, "Who Killed Elliot Manyika"). A political commissar is largely responsible for overseeing party portfolio elections and realigning leadership structures within the party. They usually rig elections in favor of their own faction). Although police investigations concluded that there was no foul play, the Manyika family maintained that the wound that was found on Manyika's head could have been a result of a bullet shot (See "No Foul Play in Manyika Death" 2012).

Although the Mnangagwa faction has been rising again since 2008, it has no capacity to openly challenge Mugabe. Their best plan is to patiently wait for Mugabe to die. A leaked (WikiLeaks) discussion between Jonathan Moyo and Dell, the American ambassador to Zimbabwe, shows that although Mnangagwa is a careful schemer with a bigger political constituency than Joice Mujuru, he could not openly challenge Mugabe because of his timidity and also his personal loyalty to Mugabe (WikiLeaks 2006). Incensed by Mnangagwa's timidity, Moyo who in 2005 was seen as the brains behind the "Third Force" idea, (an attempt to form a new party composed of disaffected elements from the Mnangagwa faction and disgruntled MDC members) (WikiLeaks 2005). The rise of Simba Makoni's MKD party was probably part of this "Third Force" plan. It failed as most of Mnangagwa's loyalists remained in ZANU. However, there were other breakaways with veteran Matabeleland politicians in ZANU-PF like Dumiso Dabengwa and Thenjiwe Lesabe, leaving ZANU-PF in 2008 to revive ZAPU) is said to have

> lamented their [Mnangagwa faction's] continued low profile and unwillingness to break with or even challenge the ZANU-PF Old Guard so far. The stakes for patronage and succession made them hang on to their moribund party even though they were emotionally ready to leave. He (Moyo) explained that few could afford economically and politically to break from the party for more than a couple of months…Moyo opined, however, that

delay until too late by Mnangagwa himself could cost him politically as a sign of leadership failure. (WikiLeaks 2006)

Moyo's analysis of the Mnangagwa's faction is correct. However, Mnangagwa's resurgence within the party, aided by the rescinding of the suspensions of his faction's provincial leaders in 2008, the death in August 2011 of his opponent, Solomon Mujuru, in a suspicious fire at his farmhouse ("Who Killed Solomon Mujuru? The Mystery in Zimbabwe Deepens" 2012), and the recent victory of members of his faction in the 2013 primary elections, who then won the parliamentary elections, has put him a step ahead of the Mujuru faction.

The death of "kingmaker" Solomon Mujuru marks a sad end to a bold man who was trying to challenge Mugabe. If Mujuru's death was not a result of factional struggles within the party, it was, however, good news to the other faction anyway. A (perhaps conspiracy) theory by one faceless Facebook character, Baba Jukwa, blames Mujuru's death on Mnangagwa and partly on Mugabe. Baba Jukwa argues that shortly before his death, Mujuru met Mnangagwa with a view to heal their enmity between the two, so they could unite and oust Mugabe. At the meeting, they discussed the need to rebrand ZANU-PF so as to stem its waning fortunes against the MDC. They agreed to collectively approach Mugabe and tell him to step down for the good of the party and state. Unknown to Mujuru, Mnangagwa secretly reported the Mujuru plan to Mugabe, who, on hearing this, tactically granted Mujuru and Mnangagwa the requested audience. After this meeting, Baba Jukwa claims, Mnangagwa and Mugabe then secretly plotted the downfall of Mujuru (Jukwa 2013). Baba Jukwa's account is silent about how this plan was executed. However, this account masked as an insider's account of what happened must be viewed as part of the voices of people who suspect that the death of Solomon Mujuru was politically motivated.

As Zimbabwe prepared for the 2013 elections under an atmosphere of deep confusion following the adoption of a new constitution without aligning relevant laws to this constitution, ZANU-PF has come under severe stress as confidential information about the party, government, and its political figures is leaked out via Baba Jukwa's Facebook page. Baba Jukwa, who claims to be a "concerned father, fighting nepotism and directly linking community with their Leaders, Government, MPs and Ministers" (See "Baba Jukwa's Facebook Wall") is not one person as such, but a network of agents, most probably ZANU-PF and government officials and perhaps Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) operatives who feed information to the managers of the Baba Jukwa Facebook page (Khumalo 2013). Baba Jukwa's informants are privy to secret ZANU-PF and government meetings as records of those meetings are uploaded to the page, sometimes in real time. Rivals in ZANU-PF

used this Facebook character to undertake character assassinations on their nemeses to gain political mileage in the 2013 elections. Save for the arrest of Edmund Kudzayi after the 2013 elections, whose court case is still pending, the government of Zimbabwe's CIOs have no real clue as to who was Baba Jukwa. The Facebook page is now closed. The mysterious car accident that killed Edward Chindori-Chininga, a former ZANU-PF Member of Parliament for Guruve South, on June 18, 2013 occurred amidst suspicions that Chininga was Baba Jukwa (Mukwati 2013). But his death did not weaken this social network, months after his death. Instead it exposed the loopholes in the operations of the CIOs, their tenuous loyalty to Mugabe, and their limited capacity at intelligence gathering, especially where it involves cyber warfare. For this reason, ZANU-PF's political fortunes will depend more on how they play their political games on the ground in Zimbabwe than on the Internet. Already, Mugabe won the 2013 elections under serious allegations of vote rigging with Mnangagwa, not Joice Mujuru, as his chief election agent.

Conclusion

ZANU was born amidst the Cold War and it rose with the help of socialist countries both in Africa and internationally. Nonetheless, what ZANU borrowed from these socialist movements was that compulsive approach to politics that gives the leader overriding power over his juniors. Mugabe of the post-1978 period epitomizes a Leninist leader who brooks no opposition but enjoyed the warmth of a coterie of "Yes men" who had their own agenda in being part of ZANU, and whose future depended on their level of loyalty to Mugabe. However with their long stay in government and in ZANU-PF leadership structures where they are constantly reshuffled, they get bored about the limited prospects of promotion to higher positions. Unfortunately for them, any attempt to demonstrate ambition is viewed as an attempt to overthrow Mugabe.

Liberation movements like ZANU rose in an atmosphere of violent nationalism and factionalism. As such, one's survival depends on his or her network of relations to strong men that rose in the history of the party. This breeds factionalism in the party as these networks of loyalty jostle to control party structures. As we have demonstrated, Mugabe was born and nurtured in this politics of factionalism. He failed to rise above this kind of divisive politics. Having emerged as the ultimate leader by directly benefitting from either deaths or elimination of opponents, Mugabe inherited an organization that lacked transformative ambitions, as transforming ZANU-PF entails a dismantling of the whole political edifice. This is not contemplated under the current Mugabe regime, or

perhaps in the near future. Since his takeover in the mid-1970s, Mugabe kept the party in this organized disorder to keep challengers at bay.

However, factionalism in ZANU-PF has now reached its highest levels, where it risks undermining the whole organization. Mugabe has failed to renew the party, and therefore, it is not expected that he will leave ZANU-PF in order when he dies. As his control of these factions is weakening with his old age, Mugabe's future lies on keeping these factions busy against one another as curtailing factionalism will only create possibilities for these factions to unite against him. However, his recent overreaction to the yet to be proven allegations that the Mujuru faction was trying to oust him by expelling the challengers, by removing them from influential party and government positions, by threatening their arrest, by orchestrating a virtual government media blitz against them, and by openly siding with the Mnangagwa faction (as if he belongs to that faction himself) has done nothing more than expose the failure of his governance-by-factionalism approach. As his formerly trusted lieutenants like Mutasa, Gumbo, Mujuru, and others swallow the bitter pill of the recent leadership restructure and purge, yet defiant that they will make a dramatic comeback, Mugabe's position is becoming a hot-seat, and his divide-and- rule strategy may potentially backfire sooner or later.

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Ahmadu Bello and the Challenges of Nation-Building in Nigeria*

Ibrahim Gambari

INTRODUCTION

In many ways, the structural constraints and opportunities of the peculiar trajectories of what became the colony of Northern Nigeria and eventually the federation of Nigeria determined and largely transformed the personal and political agency of Sir Ahmadu Bello, the first and only premier of the Northern Region of Nigeria (1954–1966). By extension, Bello's personal and political agency also helped in reshaping modern Northern Nigeria, and thus contributed immensely to the shaping of the future of Nigeria. The Northern Nigerian Protectorate, as the British officially called the colony that it formally acquired in 1900, was the largest and most populous of the two regions that were amalgamated in 1914 to form the Protectorate and Colony of Nigeria. As Bello's biographer, John N. Paden (1986: 6) argues, "One advantage of studying the life of an individual is to try to see how larger-scale changes in society are reflected in a specific case. On the other hand, when dealing with a leader of the magnitude of Ahmadu Bello, the other side of the coin is how much a key individual…can influence the redefinition or change values."

Robert Rotberg also argues that "leaders are more responsible for societal outcomes in the developing world than in the developed world" (2012: 2). He suggests that "formative leaders help build nations and political cultures, and…their actions help to enable institutions to take root in otherwise stony soils…Leaders in emerging…countries help to build institutions" (Ibid.). Although Rotberg underplays the power of structure in the making of those such as Bello that he describes as

"compelling leaders" (Ibid.: 15), the emphasis he puts on nation-building as a slow and deliberate process, particularly in societies lacking the rudiments of a democratic political culture (Ibid.: 14) sets the tone for understanding the transformational role of Bello in nation-building in Nigeria.

Ahmadu Bello was born in 1910 in Rabah, about 20 miles from Sokoto. His father was heir to the most powerful throne in the Sokoto Caliphate, the sultanate and grandson of Sultan Bello, who was the son of Othman dan Fodio, and "Commander of the Faithful," and leader of the jihad that changed a substantial part of what was then Western Sudan. As a kid, he attended the Sokoto Provincial School maintained by the colonial government. From there, he attended Katsina College, which was for the training of teachers in the Northern Region. He started working as a teacher after his education at Katsina College. He was appointed by the Sultan to be a teacher in the Sokoto Middle School as an employee of the Native Administration (Bello 1962: 1, 10, ff). In 1934, the Sultan appointed him as the district head of Rabah in succession to his cousin. He was 24 and thus became one of the youngest district heads. He described it as "a position of great responsibility and trust" (Ibid.: 39). From there, he was sent to Gusau, about 125 miles from Sokoto. by Sultan Abubakar to supervise 14 District Heads. By this appointment, he also became a member of the Sultan's Council in Sokoto (Ibid.: 50–51). He was later moved back to Sokoto as a councilor.

After studying local government in the United Kingdom in 1948, he returned to Nigeria and was then elected a member of the regional House of Assembly. However, he was not overtly a member of any political organization until 1951, when the provisions of a new Constitution encouraged the NPC to change from a "cultural society" into a political party (Whitaker 1991: 96). Subsequently, he participated in the various Constitutional Conferences organized by the colonial government that preceded Nigeria's independence and became the president-general of the Northern People's Congress (NPC), the dominant political party in the Northern Region. During the period of limited self-rule, Bello became a regional minister for minister of local government, and eventually the premier of the Region.

In the mid-1940s, as the push for self-determination gathered pace in Southern Nigeria, Bello confessed, "I knew little about Nigeria and nothing about the world outside" (Bello 1962: 64), and thus he was eager "to extend my knowledge of the theory and practice of government" (Ibid). Significantly, less than a decade later, Bello became perhaps the most powerful agent in the determination of the fate and future of that same country, Nigeria, and its relationship with the world. Interestingly enough, his life represents "in a profound way, the

effort to bring three different worlds of value and meaning into an integrated whole," as Paden correctly argues. "These world-value systems, or world views, or identity systems, may be termed African, Islamic and European" (Ibid.: 7). Kwame Nkrumah (1970), Africa's most famous leader of the late colonial and immediate postcolonial era, had noted that Africa's future will be determined by the synthesis that resulted from the dialectic of these three forces or civilization (Ibid.: 7). This synthesis was the task of the emergent leaders in late colonial and early postcolonial Africa.

Bello's political career from the mid-1940s until his assassination in January 1966 exemplified Margaret S. Archer's (2000: 7, emphasis added) argument in *Being Human: The Problem of Agency* that "(u)nscripted performances, which hold society together, need a*n active agent who is enough of a self to acknowledge [his] obligation to perform* and to write [his] own script to cover the occasion." Bello was a "blend of values," who was regarded by his many followers and supported as a religious leader, a traditional leader and a modern leader (Paden 1986: 11). The obligation to perform (these different roles) that Bello felt at the start of his political career was the pivot on which the rest of his life rotated. His immediate concerns and commitment in late colonial Nigeria focused first on Northern Nigeria and next on the rest of Nigeria. In the end, despite his shortcomings, he contributed in significant ways to the liberation of the people of northern Nigeria, and in ensuring that they became equal partners with the more developed parts of Nigeria in the task of nation building.

The Past, Present and Future: Bello's Historic Agency

In 1949, Sir Ahmadu Bello visited Lagos and, for the first time, as he states in his autobiography, met and "saw in action, Nigerian politicians of the caliber of Dr. Azikiwe" (Bello 1962: 66). Given the state of affairs in the North at that time in comparison with the South, especially Lagos, the experience was a very instructive one. He writes, "I began to see that we in the North would have to take politics seriously before very long. If we did not do so we should be left far behind in the future governmental development of Nigeria" (Ibid.). Although he was certainly not the most influential person in the northern region of Nigeria at this point, Ahmadu Bello's reaction to his experience in Lagos, and his conclusions about how to rouse the region politically and make it a formidable and respected partner in the emerging country and the Nigerian federation of the future, became the fundamental basis of his subsequent public life. With vision and unparalleled determination, the Sardauna forged

an unprecedented coherence out of a diverse region in a way that none of his empire-building forebears could have imagined. For a man who was a direct descendant of Usman dan Fodio, the *Amir al-Muminin* (Commander of the Faithful) and founder of one of the most expansive and powerful pre-colonial African empires, the Sokoto Caliphate, Ahmadu Bello's fleeting observation of the march of history and millennial changes in Lagos—a city which, at that time, represented the specific African manifestation of European Enlightenment and modernity (see Cole 1975; Echeruo 1977)—helped focus his mind on the challenges of the future.

Ahmadu Bello was a product of a great tradition founded on Islamic scholarship, piety, communal solidarity, and charitable leadership. The Sokoto Caliphate was established in the early nineteenth century through a jihad led by dan Fodio, a Fulani Islamic scholar. It replaced the city-state system long established by the Hausa. The values of the caliphate regarding community and authority included (1) the composition of community by good Muslims, with provisions for fair treatment of non-Muslim minorities; (2) the guidance of the Quran and the Sunna must be the basis of the community while ensuring justice; (3) leadership in the community must be vested in someone who has the qualities of honesty, learning, courage and humility; (4) councils of learned people must decide succession to leadership, and they should choose the most qualified person; (5) through their actions as well as in words, the leaders should serve as examples to their people; (6) leaders are personally responsible to God for their actions (Paden 1986: 43). The caliphate established on this basis became the territorial basis for the Northern Nigeria later established by the British.

Against this backdrop, Bello was committed to preserving the unique qualities of that heritage and leveraging it within the emergent conditions of late colonial and early postcolonial Nigeria. Yet, as is evident in his observation after the visit to Lagos, he was also unswerving in his devotion to harnessing this heritage in the service of a better future for his people. He once stated that belief in continuity "has helped other nations to greatness, God willing it will do so for us" (cited in Whitaker 1991: 99). He can be described as a man who saw the future in the past and saw the past in the future and worked tirelessly in his time to transform his region and the country by cuddling the past, even while embracing the future. For instance, it is difficult to understand Bello without understanding the cultural context and the structural properties of the era that produced him and the way in which he understood his own location in that cultural, historical and structural contexts, combined with his willed sense of his own potential to intervene in that history and structure, to reproduce the traditions of the past and fit them into a project that confronted present

challenges and tackled the endless possibilities of the future. Bello can be approached as a paradoxical figure of history. For instance, the man who stood so strongly and resolutely against change was also the greatest change agent in the history of northern Nigeria. When change threatened to impose disorder and violate the spirit of the ancient values that defined the life of northern Nigeria, the Sardauna was its implacable enemy. But when change sought to leverage his people and provide them with access to the outcomes of modernization and good governance, Ahmadu Bello was its skillful advocate and defender. Whitaker (Ibid.) contends that:

> The Sardauna [did] not appear content to rely on…propitious reflexes, however essential they may be to his initial opportunity to shape the future, in regard to which he approvingly cites the Hausa proverb "it is better to repair than to build afresh." Rather, he seems to envisage a regime of aristocratic composition which will, like himself, accept the conditions and restraints of a framework of modernizing and democratic institutions, and within it earn, as it were, the right to go on ruling.

The greatest challenge that Ahmadu Bello confronted, one that defined his political life and conditioned his vision of the future, was twofold: One was the question of power. The other was the question of the political organization of a society-in-transition—the northern region. Both questions are related, and he reflected and acted on them throughout his relatively short, but eventful, political life. In the late colonial and immediate post-colonial era, the question was not only how to acquire power, but also, more importantly, it was about how to mobilize power in the service of a self-defined, yet collective, culturally grounded and historically structured mission. Naturally, the question presented political, social, economic, cultural, and religious dilemmas in terms of how to resolve the challenges of the past and reconcile the North's Islamic heritage with the opportunities and paradoxes of the colonial and postcolonial present while focusing on the shaping of the future of the emergent region and the larger polity. He realized, as Markovic (1974: 10–11) has argued, that both "past and future are *living in the present*." "Whatever human beings do in the present is decisively influenced by the past and the future," Markovic advances further, because "the future is not something that will come later, independently of our will. There are *several possible futures* and one of them *has to be made*" (Ibid.).

In attempting to choose a particular future that could be "made" for his people, the Sardauna was confronted with a question: How do you deploy power to consolidate a past and continuing religious culture and unify an ethnically-diverse region in the present, while simultaneously mobilizing resources and rallying the people toward

the creation of a modern life with modern amenities in the areas of education, health, and physical infrastructures in the near future? Archer (1988 [1996]: xxvi) contends that resolving this kind of question involves "cultural elaboration" which implies a "future which is forged in the present, hammered out of past inheritance by current innovation." Bello did not believe in change for its own sake, but rather in change that is initiated for the socioeconomic progress and development of his people.

The question of the political organization of a society-in-transition, as I stated earlier, is related to the question of power. No society exists only in and of itself. Inevitably, every society exists in relation to other societies, both near and far. Therefore, Ahmadu Bello's North was a society-in-transition, and one that had to relate to other political entities and formations, including the South of Nigeria, the colonial government, European transnational modernization and the Islamic world. These unavoidable relations, both local and foreign, presented challenges in terms of how to politically organize the North, in particular, and Nigeria, in general. How would the local relate to the regional? How would the regional relate to the national or the federal? And how would all these formations relate to the global?

The genius of Bello as a political, religious and traditional leader lay in the way he resolved the question of power and the question of the political organization of a society-in-transition. In embracing the indirect rule system introduced by the British, and then slowly participating in its gradual reform and becoming an agent, as much of the traditional ruling system as of the emergent modern ruling system, Ahmadu Bello became the best example of a historically specific resolution of the challenges of power and political organization in a society-in-transition. After World War II, the British moved from the indirect rule system toward encouraging democratization in their African colonies. This led to a system in which "modern" and traditional forms of rule were integrated. In northern Nigeria, this produced the emergence of "progressive conservatives" (Paden 1986: 180), such as Bello, who took the middle road in the context of the three paths that opened up in this era. While the radical elements such as Malam Aminu Kano and the members of his party, Northern Elements People's Union (NEPU) wanted the abolition of the political leadership functions of the traditional leaders and core conservative elements, particularly the traditional rulers opted for the maintenance of the status quo in which the pre- and early colonial powers were preserved, Bello and others embraced the option of the reform of the role of the traditional rulers and the integration of their activities into the emergent modern system (Ibid.). It was no accident, therefore, that Bello later combined the portfolio of minister for local government, to

which he was first appointed, with that of leader of the government in the northern region. Even when he became the premier of the northern region, he retained direct control over the Council of Chiefs, the key body responsible for disciplining and rewarding traditional rulers (Ibid.: 185).

Ahmadu Bello worked within and with the non-democratic and restricted traditional institutions, but also pressed them into the service of steadily democratizing and modernizing institutional processes. It therefore remains a mystery for some that the man who sought to protect the north from the "excesses" of European modernization was also the man who conveyed modernization to the north and entrenched it in the region. For instance, in June 1952, as regional minister of works, Bello introduced the process of native authority (NA) reforms. Before this period, particularly from 1933, the Muslim emirs had served as sole native authorities. This involved (1) widening the basis of representation in the councils that advised the emir or chief; (2) substituting decision-making by the "emir-in-council," where the emir took decisions to the "emir-and-council," in which a majority vote decided things (Ibid.: 188). Also, Bello started appointing younger, Western-educated men or men who were loyal to him (Ibid.: 198). He used this means to dominate the politics of the region and ensure that his vision of the process of modernization triumphed.

The legacy of modernization, modernity and development that the Sardauna brought to place and managed from this period on became the foundation of northern Nigeria. The institutions that were created in this period included Northern Nigeria Development Corporation (NNDC), Northern Nigeria Investment Limited (NNIL), Bank of the North (BON); the Broadcasting Corporation of Northern Nigeria (BCNN), New Nigerian Newspapers, Government Girls' Colleges, Women Teachers' Colleges, Kaduna Polytechnic, Ahmadu Bello University (ABU), Zaria; ABU Teaching Hospital, Kaduna, Ahmadu Bello Stadium, Hamdala Hotel, Kaduna, and several textile factories and industries. These are the social and economic legacies of the Sardauna's leadership. But these achievements were accomplished amid formidable challenges. Some of the cultural and structural problems have been discussed earlier. In addition to these was the problem of manpower in the region. At every level, the north faced the urgent need for qualified manpower to replace the British and take charge of important areas of economic and political life. As the process began, some of the early ministers could not cope with the challenges. As Paden (1986: 221) reveals, some of these ministers were not interested in policy. Instead, they concentrated on politics.

However, Bello's socioeconomic legacy is intelligible only within the framework of his political vision. Although the north was a

relative latecomer to the debates about the best political structure for Nigeria, Ahmadu Bello led the region to support a federal system of government. Because he did not want the north to play second fiddle to any other part of Nigeria, and because he was committed to ensuring unity in diversity, he ensured that the cultural diversity of the different parts of Nigeria was not compromised in a way that would set the basis for a conflagration. This was a central concern of Ahmadu Bello's. He was primarily devoted to the building of a "northern nation" (Paden 1986: 227). As Paden argues, while "he was prepared to accept the idea of historic communities (often language based, or kinship based) as the legitimate local level of the political community, he [was] determined to create a community which transcend[ed] these particularisms." He refer[ed] to the "community of the North" (*Jama'ar Arewa*) as a trans-ethnic community" (Ibid.: 314). For, the Northern region was "a federation within a federation" (Ibid.: 357)— of Nigeria.

He wanted northerners to replace Europeans and southerners in the key positions in the Northern region. He was virulently criticized for this by opposition elements within the Northern House of Assembly, particularly Ibrahim Imam and J. S. Tarka, both of whom were in alliance with southern parties (Ibid.: 255). Indeed, while he was approachable, unassuming and generous in dealing with northerners, as his biographer states, he adopted "a different style in dealing with the south; one of pomp, dignity, unapproachability, distance" (Ibid.: 363). In connecting his "personal destiny" to "traditional authority," Bello "deliberately cultivated the style of ancestral figures in his role as Premier" (Whitaker 1991: 100). At a point, Bello had to defend his "northernization" policy as follows:

> So in other words, the general policy of the Government of Northernisation is as follows: To Northernise the Northern Region Public Service as soon as possible; to ensure for Northerners a reasonable proportion of posts in the Federal Public Service; to ensure for Northerners a reasonable proportion of posts in all Statutory Corporations; to increase the number of Northerners in commercial, industrial, banking and trading concerns in the region; to expand as necessary the educational, training and scholarship schemes of the Region in order to provide the qualified personnel required for the Northernisation Policy. (cited in Paden 1986: 255)

On this point, Bello stood his ground. As former President Shehu Shagari told Bello's biographer, the Sardauna's task in this era was to "emancipate the northerner from the clutches of southern domination." Yet, "the Sardauna was a nationalist. His main preoccupation was to catch up with the south and to keep Nigeria as one...The Sardauna thought

of everything in the context of north-south. He wanted to catch up in all fields" (Ibid.: 256). Nigeria, he was convinced, could not be strong if its constituent parts were not strong. Unity, Ahmadu Bello preached, could not be based on an abstraction; it had to be based on a common understanding freely entered into by the concerned parties, which perhaps explains why he reportedly responded to Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe's call for the leaders of Nigeria to "forget our differences" by saying "No, let us understand our differences…By understanding our differences, we can build unity in our country" (Ibid.: 3). This succinctly captures his anxieties about Nigeria's unity and future. He was apprehensive about national-level community formation in Nigeria because he felt that "the built-in bias" against the "backward" North in the more developed South of Nigeria "will lead to a presumption that the coastal/westernized model of nation-building is the only, or most appropriate, way to develop" (Ibid.: 358). Even though he resisted the widespread notion of nation building in the south of Nigeria, he was not opposed to the idea of a "community of destiny" which could emerge in a future Nigeria (Ibid.).

Bello's attitude attracted criticism, even within the north. While his pedigree "justifies regarding [him] as an exemplification of leadership continuity in modern Africa" (Whitaker 1991: 91), his ideological rival, Aminu Kano, also a Fulani, but from the powerful Kano Emirate, which produced some of the most notable Islamic jurists, priests and scholars in the Sokoto Caliphate, was opposed to Bello's unique marriage of traditional and modern ideas and practices. While in England, Kano met left-wing personalities in the British Labor Party and was exposed to the writings of Marx, Harold Laski and Mahatma Gandhi (Whitaker 1991: 94–95). Like his political mentor, Malam Sa'adu Zungur, Aminu Kano was opposed to the system of native administration and indirect rule (Ibid.: 95). Both men were forced out of the Executive Committee of the NPC in 1950. Kano later joined the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) and became its leader, using the party "as an uncompromising foe of traditionally constituted authority" (Ibid.: 97). He announced that he left the NPC "because I refuse to believe that this country is by necessity a prisoner of the Anglo-Fulani autocracy or the unpopular indirect rule system," and because within the NPC "there is no freedom to criticize this most unjust and anachronistic and un-Islamic form of hollow institutions promulgated by [the Governor-General of colonial Nigeria, Lord Frederick] Lugard" (Ibid.).

While Sardauna's attitude to modernity and democracy was based on religion and tradition, Kano's departure point was class analysis. As Whitaker (Ibid.: 101) argues, "Whereas the Sardauna propounds in effect a doctrine of hierarchy based on a supposed natural harmony of

interests between ruler and ruled, Aminu Kano subscribed to the view that social hierarchy inevitably embodies conflict of divergent social class interests." Also where Sardauna's "conception of democratic development [was] steady improvement and widening popular acceptance of governmental performance without essential damage to the elite composition of those who govern," Kano's "profound wish [was] to see the present basis and structure of authority, leadership, and political participation transformed" (Ibid.). As Kano conceded, he could be described as "a dreamer" or "a revolutionary" (Ibid.: 97) who was not ready to reconcile himself with the reality of Northern Nigeria at this point. The readiness to embrace this challenging reality while pushing for gradual reforms placed Ahmadu Bello at a far better vantage position to reconstruct the future of the region. Even though Bello's approach—like Kano's—was determined by "his particular relationship to, and experience of, a certain kind of traditionally stratified polity" (Ibid.: 89), which meant that he was particularly "preoccupied with obedience, order, stability, and discipline" (Ibid.: 98), Bello used his superior administrative abilities to redirect things and ensure the survival of the existing system while modifying it in a way that helped to leverage the changes occasioned by modernity and democracy.

The Ghost of 1914 and the Lingering Specter of Political Dissonance in Nigeria

After the 1953 crisis in the legislative House in Lagos over the question of the date of independence, the Sardauna was quoted as saying "The mistake of 1914 has come to light." Therefore, some still ask today, did Bello consider the British amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates in 1914 a mistake? Or was he speaking to some fundamental issues concerning the guarantees of enduring national togetherness that were at stake at this point? Unfortunately, Ahmadu Bello never elaborated on this point. He only added that he would go no further. I will return to this shortly, because this question is still haunts Nigeria in manifold ways.

Also, the encounter between Bello and Azikiwe mentioned above is, for me, both a statement of candor and strategic vision. Bello was genuinely concerned about the fate and fortune of Nigeria, and he rejected outright the type of woolly patriotism that glossed over fundamental predicaments. This would seem paradoxical today in the wake of the centenary of the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates, which the country recently celebrated. How can Nigerians resolve "the mistake of 1914" through the understanding of their differences so as to build unity? Addressing this question points to the challenges of nation building.

African states are widely seen as artificial creations. The Berlin Conference (1884–1885), which drove the autonomy of African empires, kingdoms, and other forms of existing political systems into extinction, and turned the continent's territories into objects of a scramble by colonial powers, is often identified as the departure point for all the evils that have befallen the continent in the modern era. While formal colonization of pre-colonial African states and the stateless societies by the European powers permanently reshaped Africa in the modern era, many of those who focus exclusively on the artificiality of colonial boundaries in their approach to the crisis of nation-building in Africa—including Nigeria—forget that wars of conquest, annexation, or conversion, occupation of land, appropriation of territories, invasions and mass migration to found new places existed in Africa long before the colonial contact. I do not contest all the sins and atrocities that have been laid at the feet of the colonial powers; however, I am eager to redirect attention to the fact that what is regarded as the artificiality of boundaries is not exclusive to Africa. Even Western Europe, where the idea of the modern nation-state was consolidated, is replete with similar histories of conquest, annexation, land occupation, appropriation of territories, invasion and mass migration. Anyone who is familiar with the history of the Gauls, the Celtic people who lived many centuries ago in the area later divided into France, Belgium, Switzerland and parts of the Netherlands, Germany and Northern Italy; or the Franks, a confederation of Germanic tribes, which, over the centuries, evolved into the state of France, will know that every people, whether they are called tribe, ethnic group, or nation, evolved over a long period. As one of the architects of the unification of modern Italy, Massimo Taparelli, marquis d'Azeglio, memorably observed, "We have created Italy. Now we must make Italians." There is, therefore, a certain artificiality to every group or nation, because even the evolutionary process by which a people become self-identified as one people necessarily involves a degree of construction. This is why Ernst Renan, in his famous "What is a Nation?" lecture, argued,

A nation is (therefore) a large-scale solidarity, constituted by the feeling of the sacrifices that one has made in the past and of those that one is prepared to make in the future. It presupposes a past; it is summarized, however, in the present by a tangible fact, namely, consent, the clearly expressed desire to continue a common life. A nation's existence is, if you will pardon the metaphor, a daily plebiscite, just as an individual's existence is a perpetual affirmation of life.

A related familiar excuse that Nigerians offer themselves as consolation for the failure of leadership to live up to popular expectation is that Nigeria was created for the purpose of colonial exploitation. The question that serious critics generate from this excuse is this: Are the

colonialists still exploiting Nigeria since 1960? It is interesting to note that in the era immediately post-independence, Nigeria's leading nationalists abandoned the rhetoric of accusing colonialism and the colonizers for the ills of the country. They set themselves to work to redeem the country, to build strong and virile regions and a peaceful and powerful country. Why, then, is it that since the collapse of the First Republic, more excuses around colonialism have been offered for the failure of the leadership than were heard in the immediate post-independent years under the leadership of the likes of Ahmadu Bello, Nnamdi Azikiwe, and Obafemi Awolowo?

Almost a century after the amalgamation, and more than half a century after independence, why should the ghost of 1914 continue to haunt and hound Nigeria? What has happened to the tradition of excellent leadership and selfless public service bequeathed to Nigeria by the post-independence leaders? Why is the North that the Sardauna sacrificed his life to build now in the throes of economic crisis, social upheaval, political uncertainty and terrorism? What has turned the North of Bello into the North of Boko Haram? Can those who today illegally bear arms to regularly cause mayhem in the name of religion claim to be more pious than Bello, the great-grandson of the "Commander of the Faithful"? Why has the North of Ahmadu Bello, which was once an able and forceful partner in nation building, become a comatose region of collapsed industries, rising poverty and aggravating social inequalities? Why is the North in particular, and Nigeria as a whole, trapped in this spate of unprecedented dissonance and purposelessness? What can be done to recover the virtues of leadership and the values of common destiny?

Rather than continuing in the business of bemoaning Nigeria's national fate, Nigeria, in general, and northern Nigeria, in particular, need to rediscover the ethos and practices that once made the northern region and Nigeria great. Despite his concentration on building the Northern Region as a "trans-ethnic community," and his insistence on northernization in the region, Bello also recognized after Nigeria's independence that the country had a unique role in Africa and the world. His approach to nation building, therefore, started with the northern Nigerian nation. His position on nation building is closer to that exposed by René Lemarchand (1972: 68), who argues:

> From the micropolitical perspective of traditional patterns of interaction among groups and individuals, nation-building becomes not so much an architectonic, voluntaristic model divorced from the environmental materials available; it becomes, rather, a matter of how best to extend to the national level the discrete vertical solidarities in existence at the local or regional levels.

Walter Connor noted in the early 1970s that scholars on nation building "have tended either to ignore the question of ethnic diversity or to treat the matter of ethnic identity superficially as merely one of a number of minor impediments to effective state-integration" (Connor 1972: 319). For Bello, it was not so much ethnic diversity that needed to be treated as crucial in a federation such as Nigeria, as it was regional diversity and regional identities. Yet, he did not see these regional identities as impediments to national integration. Indeed, in his peculiar understanding of the validation of northern identity in the present as reconcilable with a Nigerian identity in the future, in his Independence Day message to the people of the north in 1960, he called on the people of the three regions of the country to eschew suspicion and mistrust:

> The eyes of the world are on Nigeria now and there are many friends who hope that we shall be the leading nation in Africa. Let me say with all the emphasis at my command that we shall never attain this goal of there is suspicion and mistrust among the peoples of Nigeria. Such an attitude cannot benefit anyone and can too easily lead to strife as has been the painful experience of other independent nations in Africa and elsewhere. I appeal to the people of this region to work for the success of the Nigerian Federation…It is of the utmost importance that all of us Nigerians whatever our region should work together and pay less attention to differences of tribe and religion. (cited in Paden 1986: 398)

Bello was therefore a regionalist who, by that token, became a federalist. He was opposed to the general tendency in Africa in the late colonial era to centralize power as a means of nation building. Nation building, for him, in multinational and multicultural states, should involve encouraging each constituent part to have its autonomy to grow while ensuring the building of a commonality on some core issues.

The Sardauna and the Virtues of Leadership

Of the many great attributes of leadership that Bello possessed, the fact that he was an incurable optimist is often overlooked. Despite the fact that he held fast to tradition, he was constantly propelling the people and the region forward, whatever the disadvantages that they had suffered. In 1957, while attending the London Constitutional Conference, he told a group of Nigerians about his regrets concerning the "reluctance of our forebears to accept modern education methods." He added, "But it has been a good lesson to us and has made us strive to greater efforts to make up for lost time" (Paden 1986: 258). This is one of the most critical virtues of good leadership: that is, the capacity to identify

a problem, combined with the will and the imagination to solve it. This virtue recommends itself to the present leaders in northern Nigeria, as well as the rest of Nigeria. Against this backdrop, the errors of omission or commission of past leaders should not constitute excuses for present leaders. If there are some things left undone by the earliest nationalists in terms of national integration, the present crop of leaders should pick up the mantle.

In June 1952, in his speech entitled "The Battle Against Ignorance," the Sardauna stated: "What we lack and what we must endeavor to build as quickly as possible is a strong body of well-informed public opinion which will not let itself be fooled by any glib soap box orator, but will examine each statement on its merits and single out what is true and important from what is false and worthless" (*Nigerian Citizen*, June 5, 1952: 6). This mission is still as critical for the leaders of Northern Nigeria today as it was when Bello articulated it 60 years ago. Ahmadu Bello's commitment to development and modernization led to massive investment in education in the Northern region. This was what made it possible for many young men and women from the North to be able to compete with their peers across the federation and beyond Nigeria. The mass literacy project of the Sardauna-led administration helped reverse the reality that he had identified earlier. He was so impatient about this process of mass education that he sometimes didn't wait for planning reports before asking people to get to work (Paden 1986: 257). His goal, as he announced in 1954 in London, was to establish a high school in each province in the region, and ultimately, a university to serve the region. He was also committed to women's education. He proudly announced in London that he had laid the foundation stone for the Ilorin Girls' Secondary School, while another would be built in Zaria. Thus, Bello represents a tradition that is totally opposed to the phenomenon of Boko Haram, which translates as "Western education is sin." The recent capture of more than 200 girls by this terrorist group as part of their campaigns against Western education would have been considered by Bello as a "sin" in itself. Indeed, he publicly regretted the late start of the north in Western education. Addressing a group of students in London in 1957, he said of the northern region, "We are now paying the penalty for the reluctance of our forebears to accept modern education methods. But it has been a good lesson to us and has made us strive to greater efforts to make up for lost time" (*Nigerian Citizen*, June 1, 1957).

This unqualified attitude toward modern education by the primus leader of the north, one who also advertised his religiosity and devotion as a Muslim remains a strong statement against the phenomenon of Boko Haram and present day Islamic extremism in northern Nigeria. This is important because educational opportunities are inversely correlated to a high poverty rate. Therefore, limitations placed on educational

opportunities breed poverty, which deepens social inequality. The north has a lot to do today in this area, and the current crop of leaders in the region must take up this challenge, not only for the sake of their children and the youth of the north, but for the sake of the future of Nigeria as a whole. Using the admission rate to Nigerian universities for the year 2000–2001, it is evident that there is a wide disparity among the different regions of Nigeria. That year, the northwest region had only 5 percent of the admissions, while the southeast had 39 percent. These figures correlate with the poverty rate. The former governor of the Central Bank, Dr. Charles Soludo, pointed out in 2007 that while 95 percent of the population of Jigawa State (in the north) was classified as poor, only 20 percent of Bayelsa State (in the south) was so classified. Also, while 85 percent of Kwara State people (in the north) were classified as poor, only 32 percent of the people in Osun State (in the south) were classified as poor (Soludo 2007). This would have been unacceptable to Bello, because this kind of disparity was what he worked hard to end or reverse.

Therefore, reflecting on the life of Ahmadu Bello is also a way to encourage present-day and future leaders in this troubled region of Nigeria to understand his example and see how it speaks to the value of selfless service. Ahmadu Bello stands out among the first generation of post-independence leaders in terms of their modest means and aversion to the acquisition of personal wealth. Despite his legacy of service, he did not use his position to acquire immense personal wealth. He didn't condone bribery and corruption. When he died, he didn't leave palatial homes behind or millions in major global currencies in Swiss banks or in tax havens such as the Cayman Islands for his family.

Also, in spite of his eminence, the Sardauna never isolated himself from his people. He also fair-minded and did not tolerate parochialism within the northern nation. The concept of "core North" as distinct from the rest of the northern region was foreign to him. All Northerners were his people, and "the North" was one constituency. Anyone who wanted to see him could see him; he visited his associates and aides regularly, and even sometimes sat on the floor in his house. Today's leaders in northern Nigeria, specifically, and Nigeria, in general, must reconsider Bello's life and remind themselves of his example which showed that no one loses his eminence because of humility and dedication to duty. He was a simple and generous man; he listened to everyone who had something to say. In this, as Paden (1986: 101) has argued, Bello's personality was "located within the continuum of 'culture,'" in that "the bedrock of his life [was] 'religion', which gives meaning to the other spheres."

The north inherited a colonial civil service dominated at the top by the British. Bello took up the challenge of building an indigenous civil service at the end of colonial rule. He succeeded in promoting and building

a professional and loyal civil service, despite the fears and criticisms of some expatriates that this process sacrificed merit (Paden 1986: 257). The civil servants produced in this era of "northernization" became the engine of modernization and economic growth in the north. This legacy needs to be reclaimed, by studying how the civil service supported the political officeholders to ensure the development of the least developed area of Nigeria, while making critical contributions to the country at large.

Even though he lived in an age when the mantra of "good governance" was not the preoccupation of international development agencies and local and international civil service, Ahmadu Bello exemplified most of the critical aspects of good governance. His memorial can be used to remind Nigerian leaders, not only in government, but also the leaders in the private sectors about the critical elements of good governance. As the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) emphasizes, these critical elements include accountability, transparency, efficiency and effectiveness, responsiveness, forward vision, and the rule of law.[1] Accountability involves the ability and willingness to show the extent to which public actions and decisions are consistent with clearly defined and agreed-upon objectives. Transparency involves ensuring that actions, decisions and decision-making processes are open to scrutiny by other arms of government and appropriate agencies, civil society and the citizens in general. Government must also produce quality outputs at the best cost, thereby demonstrating efficiency and effectiveness. A responsive government must demonstrate the capacity and flexibility to respond quickly to social changes, identify general public interest and continuously reexamine the role of government. Forward vision signifies that leaders are able to anticipate future problems and issues based on current data and trends and develop policies that would anticipate future challenges and proffer solutions ahead. For example, this was what the Sardauna demonstrated in the area of education. Finally, leaders must be guided at all times by the rule of law.

The present crop of leaders in Nigeria must also pay attention to social justice. Too many people in Nigeria have fallen below the poverty line, while a few are luxuriating in stupendous wealth. Private jets are increasing on the tarmacs of Nigerian airports at almost the same rate as that of the increase in misery and criminal poverty. While the current estimate of the GDP in terms of purchasing power parity for Nigeria is about $414 billion, the unemployment rate is 21 percent, while 70 percent of the population lives below the poverty line. This is not only unjust; it is also unsustainable. When the figures are broken down, the north is the hardest hit in these dismal statistics.

In facing the current social and economic challenges, it is recommended that the governors of the Northern States of Nigeria set up a peer review mechanism. Working with civil society groups, research institutes and international development agencies, they can create a baseline of targets of measurable impact regarding social and economic policies for the Northern States. They can call it the Ahmadu Bello Index (SAB Index). This index can be used to monitor all the key indicators of good governance in the states. Those who consistently score high in this index should be given special awards and recognition, and those who score low should be helped to improve their performance. This will be a practical step toward realizing the vision of Bello for a strong and virile north as part of a strong, virile, and united Nigeria.

Audacity of Hope and Nation-Building in Nigeria

In charting the way forward to a better future for Nigeria, it is important to frankly assess the present state of Nigeria. As a diplomat with two-and-a-half decades of experience, it is not in my nature to raise alarm where none is needed. However, the actuality and threat of terrorism in the north of Nigeria is truly alarming. The links established between this and international terrorism, including Boko Haram's recent announcement that it had joined the Islamic State (ISIS or ISIL), make the situation more disturbing. Is it difficult to imagine the terrifying experience of many Nigerians, particularly in the northeast region of the country, who have lived every day of the last few years under manifest and imminent terror.

Unfortunately, the Boko Haram phenomenon is dangerously becoming the norm in Nigeria. So many promises to end the menace have been made, but none of them have been successful. The present crop of Nigerian leaders needs to embark on a comprehensive effort with a time line to ensure that the mass killings stop and also to end the dreadful threat to peaceful coexistence, religious harmony and the corporate existence of Nigeria. However, it is also important that the Nigerian Army and other security groups involved in combating this terrorist group adhere strictly to the letter and spirit of their own rules of engagement. The Nigerian armed forces and police force have learned useful lessons from their global peacekeeping and peace-enforcement efforts, which must be properly utilized to deal with the Boko Haram menace. The armed forces must to tap into that experience and the existing institutional memory. The Amnesty Report has painted a grim picture of extrajudicial killings that does not bode well for the government and the

citizens of Nigeria. The Joint Task Force (JTF) can conduct the operation against Boko Haram without violating the rules. Nonetheless, the government must not take Boko Haram's threat to the corporate integrity of Nigeria lightly, as it seems to have done for some time now. The operational base of the group must be constricted and eventually eradicated, while the capacity of the group to continue to perpetrate terror must be nullified.

Yet, beyond the immediate measures that must be taken to end the scourge of the group, larger issues must be addressed by Nigeria's current leadership. I have brought up the matter of good governance and its constituent elements. Against this background, the leaders of Nigeria must also pay attention to the long-term socioeconomic factors in the Northern states that provide the context and template for disaffected youths and others to make recruitments into terrorist cells and other illegal and anti-social groups. This is as true for the north as it is for the south of Nigeria. In the Niger Delta, the same conditions are responsible for producing the monster of armed insurgency in the oil-bearing states. In most urban areas in southern Nigeria, there is also a widening circle—in fact, an encirclement—of kidnapping. It started in the South-South as part of the insurgency, and then it was turned into a currency in the Southeast, and now has a new purchase in the Southwest. Recently, someone highlighted the bizarre phenomenon of the existence of a Kidnappers Association in the Southeast. This is proof positive of a breakdown of law and order, because the security of life and property is one of the primary duties of the state. Wherever you turn in Nigeria today, anomie seems to be the reality that stares people in the face. Therefore, while the Boko Haram may be specific to the north, the consequences of social anomie manifest themselves in different ways across the country.

Despite all the violence, the social crises, the economic predicament, the failures in the political terrain, and the gloomy diagnoses, I believe that Nigeria will survive and will fulfill its great potentials in the future. The ingredients of greatness are there, and so are the bases of what I call the audacity of hope for nation building in Nigeria. As a people, Nigerians have the inherent capacity to rise to the occasion and take their place in the world. The country is blessed with the natural resources that will help in facilitating national recovery and national transformation. Nigeria's human resources are even greater than her natural resources. To ensure national greatness, Nigeria must nurture the right kind of leadership, which can utilize the latter and exploit the former properly.

Nigerians' task is to rebuild national solidarity in order to ensure national development and peaceful coexistence. There is also the need

to reproduce good leadership, reenergize the civil society and reeducate our citizenry, so they can all become partners in the process of promotion and projecting good governance—the kind of governance that is accountable, transparent, efficient and effective, responsive, forward looking and visionary, and one that protects and promotes the rule of law. Nigeria can be much better than it is today. There are many glimmers of hope. For instance, the triumph of democratic rule presents Nigerians with one of the best foundations for building a better country. The Fourth Republic is the longest period of democratic rule since independence, which perhaps means that the national elites, both in and out of uniform, now understand that authoritarian rule is no option for the country. Only in freedom and in peace can Nigeria resolve her crises and confront her current and future challenges.

The federal system of government that Nigeria has maintained has not been operated in the way envisaged by the founding fathers. Yet, the fact that the country continues to struggle to make the system more federal is a major progress. However, the task of making a more perfect federal union is one to which Nigerians must rededicate themselves. The recently convened National Conference gave Nigerians yet another opportunity to reconsider many issues that remain contentious. These include revenue sharing—and the raising of revenue—the relationship and powers of the three tiers of government—federal, state and local—and fiscal federalism, judicial reforms, gender equity, etc.

Every part of Nigeria and every citizen must become part of the historic effort of nation building. I believe that Nigerian can be rebuilt as the greatest country in Africa and one of the greatest in the world. This was the vision of the founding fathers. In its December 1960 edition on Nigeria's independence, *Time* magazine stated, "In the long run, the most important and enduring face of Africa might well prove to be that presented by Nigeria."[2] This remains Nigeria's heavy burden.

Conclusion

The political life of the Sardauna of Sokoto, Ahmadu Bello, presents a good opportunity for reconsidering questions of leadership, governance and rule in contemporary Africa. A century after amalgamation, Nigeria should permanently lay to rest the ghost of 1914. In Chinua Achebe's essay, "African Literature As Celebration," he cites *Ambiguous Adventure*, a powerful novel on the relationship between Africans and Europeans, by Cheikh Hamidou Kane of Senegal.[3] What Kane said about that relationship is also true for all the people of Nigeria: "We shall have strictly the same future. The eras of separate destinies have run

their course." But then, as Achebe added, Nigerians must learn to appreciate each other's presence (interests) and accord to every group their due of human respect. Almost 50 years after his death, Bello's leadership remains a model: specifically for northern Nigeria, and generally for the whole of the country.

Notes

* The original version of this chapter was delivered at the Centennial Celebration of Sir Ahmadu Bello and Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa organized by the Sir Ahmadu Bello Memorial Foundation on December 3, 2012 in Abuja, Nigeria. It has been substantially revised for this volume.

1. "Principal elements of good governance," Directorate for Public Governance and Territorial Development, OECD. See, http://www.oecd.org/gov/principalelementsofgoodgovernance.htm (accessed November 22, 2012).
2. *Time*, "Nigeria: The Black Rock," December 5, 1960.
3. African Commentary/November 1989.

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Power, Governance, and Non-State Leadership

The Evolution of Insurgent Leadership in Africa[*]

William Reno

Introduction

Most African insurgencies from the 1960s through the 1980s featured strong leaders who articulated broad programs of political and social change. Mozambique's Eduardo Mondlane, Guinea-Bissau's Amilcar Cabral, and Uganda's Yoweri Museveni led highly organized insurgencies that presented visions of a future society to people in territories that they controlled, and convinced outside observers that they were viable alternatives to the regimes in power. This was true even where rival groups contended for power, as in Zimbabwe between the Zimbabwe African National Union and Zimbabwe African People's Union, and in South Africa between the African National Congress and Pan-African Congress. That earlier leadership contrasts sharply with the record of predation and fragmentation among more recent insurgencies such as Sierra Leone's Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), Uganda's Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the numerous armed groups fighting in eastern Congo and Somalia since the early 1990s.

This turn toward fragmented armed groups and a seeming dearth of ideologically and programmatically minded leadership defines the emergence of the so-called new wars (Kaldor 2001). This approach holds that large structural shifts including the end of the Cold War alliances, the growth of a global trade in small arms, and the weakening state authority in conflict zones have changed how people fight. In 2001, Paul Collier, a former director of research at the World Bank, and his colleague, Anke Hoeffler, pioneered an analysis that explains fragmentation and

predation with reference to the self-aggrandizing pursuits of leaders of armed groups. This approach identifies incentives for looting—especially amidst abundant natural resources—to explain how the micro-motives of individuals in armed groups undermine group pursuits of ideological objectives.

Mkandawire (2002) criticizes these approaches, especially the latter, for ignoring the fact that a high degree of insurgent coordination and ideological consistency existed even amidst opportunities for personal aggrandisement. Others question whether recent wars exhibit new behavior at all. Wars have always included elements of predation and personal enrichment (Kalyvas 2001). Recent reports that some US Army soldiers raped Iraqi women and the widely publicized scandals of sexual misconduct of United Nations (UN) peacekeepers highlights the ambiguous boundary between "new" and "old" wars among even the bureaucratically organized armies of the world's strongest states. Moreover, the history of African warfare shows the importance of commerce and personal ambition. In some of those instances, external commerce and self-aggrandizement was compatible with cohesive state-building, while in others, it undermined the achievement of those same goals (Inikori 1977; Kea 1971).

If economic globalization and the associated trade in looted goods and access to sophisticated weapons have been consistent features of African insurgency warfare over hundreds of years, what accounts for the recent decline in cohesive, ideologically motivated insurgencies in Africa? This is not to say that such insurgencies have been entirely missing from the contemporary scene. The Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) both came to power in the 1990s as centrally organized, bureaucratic insurgencies that used convincing ideological and programmatic appeals to mobilize followers. Nonetheless, gone are the days of heroic liberation movements that gripped the imagination of the world. The common assumption today is that insurgencies spell chaos and threaten the interests of local people. The massive flight of refugees and internally displaced people away from insurgents, involving more than half of the Liberian and Sierra Leone populations in the 1990s, underscores the contrast between the attractions of "liberated zones" in decades past and the views of contemporary populations that insurgents pose dire threats to their interests.

Explaining this change touches on the deeper issue of the surprising absence of armed liberation movements in contemporary Africa. Though political reforms since the 1990s have had an important positive impact on the politics of many African countries, one might expect that continuing legacies of dictatorships, poor economic performance, and corruption should lay the groundwork for more armed rebellions than one actually sees. Georgia's Rose and Ukraine's Orange revolutions

arose out of conditions that were considerably less onerous than those facing many publics in African countries. "People's power" revolutions of the sort seen in the Philippines in 1986 and in Eastern Europe from 1989 have not occurred in the same scope in Africa. Outside of South Africa's liberation from the scourge of political apartheid in 1994, the revolutionary impulse has not appeared in any significant large-scale organizational form in Africa. This absence presents a sharp contrast to the personal opinions of many citizens. The lyrics of music are replete with radical critiques. There is no shortage of political and programmatic ideas among university and secondary school students, in the editorial pages of newspapers, or in theatre and the arts. If societal ideas and personal motivations exist, and if insurgencies of the past have maintained coordinated transformative programs in the past in the face of incentives for looting and personal ambition, why does organizing insurgencies for armed rebellion seem to be so much more difficult now?

The Argument

The argument here identifies changes in the nature of leadership as the key factor that explains this shift in the organization and behavior of Africa's insurgencies. It grows out of the observations of James Scott in his work, "Revolution in the Revolution: Peasants and Commissars" (1979). Though Scott wrote about peasant revolutions in Southeast Asia in the 1960s and 1970s, his analysis is applicable to contemporary African politics. Scott observed that the insurgents that he studied contained two elements: leaders who were drawn from society's educated and economically privileged elite, and followers who came from the wider society. His most valuable insight came in noting that participants were motivated in very different ways: that there are multiple causes of insurgencies. Some pursue self-aggrandisement. Some seek respite from oppressive creditors and petty officials. Others pursue personal vendettas against people who they feel have personally wronged them. A few follow millenarian visions. Understood in this manner, most insurgencies really are a coalition of diverse rebellions. They can include predators and the ideologically motivated in the same organization.

Scott points to leadership as the glue that holds together and defines the nature of these diverse coalitions of interests and grievances. Leaders perceive and define injustice and dissatisfaction in concrete ways and create an ideological formula that will provide the link between their ideas and the interests of followers. A successful ideological platform also enables leaders to subsume and redirect the behavior that characterizes "new wars" but actually has been present all along. One can read accounts of anti-colonial wars in the 1960s and find the same kinds of characters who are condemned for wreaking havoc in Sierra Leone's and Congo's

recent wars. Cabral (1969: 62) observed the challenges of organizing "the really *déclassé* people, the permanent layabouts, the prostitutes and so on" in Portuguese-controlled Guinea and wrote of the challenges of organizing Fula traders as fighters as "their fundamental aim is to make bigger and bigger profits" (quoted in Henriksen 1976: 381). Insurgent organizations, therefore, take shape through the continuous interaction between leaders and followers. If the ideological approach of leaders holds sway, a cohesive insurgency with defined goals is the result. Experts in counterinsurgency have long understood this principle, which is why their craft focuses on addressing the immediate grievances and personal aspirations of followers to drain away the manpower that leaders need for their long-term projects.

If one presumes that publics in most African countries are at least as politically astute and critical as their counterparts in the 1960s—they are likely to be more so with the growth of education and popular media since then—then change in the nature of leadership is likely to hold the key to explaining the course of recent conflicts in Africa. This type of analysis can still incorporate some of the valuable insights of "new wars" approaches. The micro-motives of individuals matter, and looting and clandestine commerce accompany most conflicts. Structural changes, such as those associated with the end of the Cold War and its influence on international competition, are important influences. But the argument here considers behavior linked to these factors through the lens of their impacts on the recruitment of insurgent leadership, and in turn, how this environment shapes the relationship between leaders and followers.

The lens of leadership offers a new way to look at the influence of societal changes in many African countries. The rapid expansion of higher education has had a huge impact on the production of ideological frameworks for rebellion. The extensive migration of educated Africans to other parts of the globe in search of opportunity, in lieu of fighting to change the politics of their own countries, has been a counterbalance to this trend. The liberation of former colonies and minority-ruled states in southern Africa resulted in the end of a broad international coalition in support of insurgencies. The principle of decolonization, as the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the UN defined it, required that rival insurgent leaders join forces and then demonstrate their effectiveness in fighting the colonial foe if they were to receive international support. This has been replaced with an international diplomatic approach that recognizes multiple contenders for power in conflicts, which effectively rewards opportunistic leaders who split from their more ideologically articulate rivals.

Leaders still emerge who can hold together centrally organized insurgencies that articulate coherent programs even amidst these changing

conditions, as the EPLF and RPF in the 1990s showed. But these recent insurgencies organized at arms-length from the regimes that they fought. Prior to their 1990 invasion of Rwanda, the RPF operated almost entirely in exile. Most insurgents, however, operate amidst the evolving domestic politics in their home countries. In places like Congo and Liberia, which appear to be ripe for rebellion (and which have had their share of articulate rebellious political leaders), dictators' styles of rule resulted in the gradual choking off of social space in which organized insurgencies could take shape. This is partly an intentional consequence of regime strategies of rule. The migration of politicians into clandestine markets, university politics and the world of NGOs is seen inside and outside the country as corruption. It also undermines the capacity of would-be insurgent leaders to organize followers. This is especially true where politicians control their own armed groups, which offers a form of counter-mobilization to distressed youths. This partly explains why some African countries experience a proliferation of "civil society" groups that fail to coalesce in effective mass movements to decisively change or overthrow repressive governments where popular opinion overwhelmingly supports radical change. The rest of this article traces these changing conditions, with particular attention to their impact on the recruitment of insurgency leaders and how those leaders manage these changes.

The Changing Recruitment of Insurgent Leadership

The explosive growth of universities during the 1960s and 1970s led to the formation of student organizations where members discussed ideas for political change. Haile Selassie University's (now Addis Ababa University) enrollment grew from about 1,000 in 1962 to over 6,000 in 1973 (Balsvik 2005: 30). Students from the isolated provinces of Tigray found common ground in the Tigrayan Students Association, which included all of the founders of the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front and key leaders in Eritrea's EPFL. The expanding political science department at the University of Dar es Salaam stood out in the late 1960s and early 1970s as an incubator of ideas about national liberation. Professors such as noted Pan-Africanist political thinker Walter Rodney taught there from 1968 to 1974. His students included Yoweri Museveni, the future leader of Uganda's National Resistance Army (NRA). Museveni and other students visited liberated zones in Mozambique in 1968 and reported their experiences to other students. Together, they organized the University Students' African Revolutionary Front (USARF) to discuss these ideas. USARF members at Dar es Salaam included John Garang, the future leader of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). Eric Hobsbawm

noted that successful insurgencies usually develop in isolated rural communities or institutions like universities where day-to-day government control is limited. This provides would-be insurgent leaders and potential followers the social space to organize and plan their rebellion and to regroup once they start to fight (Hobsbawm 1999). No doubt this explains why so many of the newer universities in Africa and elsewhere in the world were situated so far out of town. If the government could not control students, at least they could keep them from infecting other groups and hope that the long trek to town would exhaust rebellious intellectuals.

The economic crisis of the 1980s undermined universities as incubators of revolutionary leadership. Shrinking budgets for higher education and the insistence among foreign creditors that governments devote more of their education budgets to primary and secondary school training shrank the social space that activists earlier utilized for organizational purposes. Education administrators, creditors and many scholars preferred to develop independent research centres to better focus on income-generating activities related to their research. Institutions like the Makerere Institute of Social and Economic Research at Makerere University in Uganda became vehicles for bidding for foreign aid contracts and grant-supported research at the behest of Ugandan policymakers and foreign donors. The appearance of corporate training centres and private universities in the 1990s further fragmented the academic scene.

The severe economic crisis in Africa's worst hit countries severely limited opportunities for scholars to discuss politics with one another. Prior to Sierra Leone's 1991–2002 war, the Department of Political Science at the University of Sierra Leone was a centre for political discussion and opposition to the regime. In 2001–2002, however, the department had only one doctoral candidate, who also doubled as a junior lecturer. The university's economics department awarded no doctorates that year. Promising students across the continent have found opportunities through Ford and Rockefeller Foundation programs and other institutions that assist their studies outside of Africa. African student associations operate in many overseas universities, though it would be difficult to organize an insurgency at such remove. Moreover, many students do not return after their studies. Forty percent of Africans who pursued PhDs in the United States between 1986 and 1996 remained after graduation (Pires et al. 1999: 10–11). Though some helped to fund insurgencies in their home countries, those insurgencies lost a traditional source of talent.

While it is hard to say for certain what would have happened if these talented and educated people had remained in their home countries, one wonders whether the New York attorney, New Jersey accountant or London financial analyst would have been an insurgent leader if

they had not chosen to emigrate. If organized ideological insurgencies usually begin with educated elites, the broader migration of educated Africans could reasonably be expected to have a negative impact, too. In the early 1990s, census figures from the United Kingdom indicated that over 26 percent of adult African immigrants to that country possessed academic qualifications above A-levels, compared with 13 percent of native-born adults (Cross 1994: 92). The 1990 US census revealed that 57.1 percent of the more than 360,000 African-born adults living in the United States had some university training. This made Africans the most educated geographic group of immigrants, outstripping those from affluent regions including Europe (18%) and Japan (35%) ("African-Born U.S. Residents Have Achieved the Highest Levels of Educational Attainment" 1994). According to the 2000 US census, 83 percent of the 109,000 Nigerian adults who moved to the US during the 1990s had university education (Kapur and McHale 2005: 18).

In the 1950s and 1960s, insurgent leaders with university degrees, such as Eduardo Mondlane, PhD in sociology, Northwestern University, 1960, Amilcar Cabral, Agronomy Institute of Lisbon, 1950, and John Garang, BA in economics, Grinnell College, United States, returned to their home countries. They benefited from broad international support for insurgency, provided they joined forces with other factions and articulated a program of national liberation. The creation of the OAU in 1963 provided for a Liberation Committee. The committee became operational in 1964 to provide official backing for insurgencies. Committee members travelled to liberated zones to judge whether insurgents were showing sufficient capabilities and internal unity to merit Liberation Committee funding. In practice, this funding did not amount to much. More important was OAU acceptance of insurgents, which helped to channel the financial, diplomatic and military assistance from foreign governments. The United Nation's Decolonization Committee reinforced this global backing for ideologically disciplined and militarily and diplomatically effective insurgent leaders.

This international support for anti-colonial and anti-apartheid insurgents provided incentives specifically directed to ideologically articulate leaders. While the record of behaviour in the field of battle revealed some of the characteristics of "new wars," and leaders often complained of the challenges of organizing and disciplining groups such as the urban youth, rival leaders with other agendas lacked this vital external support. Leaders with international backing had to restrain and integrate these groups to a degree that enabled them to set up and administer liberated zones that they could show to their foreign backers as evidence of their capabilities. The rise of the Mozambique National Resistance Movement (RENAMO), infamous for indiscriminate violence against civilians and attacks on social service infrastructure in the 1980s, illustrates the

importance of external backing in shaping leadership styles. Rhodesian and South African backing for an alternative insurgent leadership mobilized people who did not share the ideological formula of anti-colonial struggle and national liberation. Its development in opposition to the FRELIMO-led government illustrated Scott's point about the coexistence of multiple grievances and political agendas in the context of conflict. In this case, foreign backers intentionally sponsored insurgents who were predatory and would destabilize Mozambique's liberation insurgency, which had become the country's government.

Shifts in international politics in Africa have contributed to this fragmentation of insurgent groups in the same ways that early Rhodesian and South African backing for "spoiler" insurgent groups did. Since the 1970s, governments in the northeastern part of Africa have supported insurgencies in neighboring states to destabilize their governments. This goal favours violent insurgents, though unlike the South Africans and Rhodesians, officials that use this strategy are wary of helping their proxies too much, for fear that hugely successful or articulate insurgents might lead to separatist claims against their own state or might encourage domestic political opponents. This reflects the vulnerabilities of their own regimes compared to the old apartheid governments and translates into simultaneously backing several insurgent leaders. Thus Somalia's government aided the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia (in Ethiopia) at the same time that it aided the Oromo Liberation Front in the 1980s. Sudan backed the EPLF against Ethiopia in the 1980s while maintaining contacts with its rival Eritrean Liberation Front— Revolutionary Command and Eritrea Jihad. Sudan's government also assisted the Uganda National Liberation Army after it began to fight Museveni's new government after 1986, alongside aid to the LRA in 1992 and the Allied Democratic Forces in 1996. In turn, the Ugandan government backed the SPLA against Sudan's government.

Conflicts in West Africa in the 1990s showed a similar pattern of state backing of insurgents as proxies to influence neighboring states. This was most evident in Liberian President Charles Taylor's support for the RUF in Sierra Leone. Congo's conflict, which began in 1996, drew in intervention forces and proxy support from 11 states by the early 2000s, though the introduction of a UN peacekeeping force limited the duration of that strategy. In any event, the appearance of multiple backers— as opposed to the previous international tendency to try to pick a single winner—encouraged the more predatory political entrepreneurs among insurgent leaders and undermined ideologues. Success in operating liberated zones was no longer a requirement for aid; indeed, it was seen as threatening on the part of many backers. It was sufficient for these insurgents to destabilize existing governments, which required a very different skill set compared to the demands of selling an agenda to the

OAU Liberation Committee or the UN General Assembly, not to mention mobilizing local people to build liberated zones.

The advent of these conflicts in the 1990s has drawn in outside mediators in ways that further promote this fragmentation into predatory armed groups. UN mediators stress the need to include all armed groups in comprehensive peace negotiations. This provides incentives for enterprising junior commanders to split with their leadership, loot local communities to get income with which to buy guns and recruit fighters, and then present themselves as contenders for power at negotiations. Continuous peace negotiations in Liberia's 1989–2003 war produced more than 40 cease-fires and 13 major peace agreements as factions multiplied in tandem with negotiations. Ethiopia's government recognizes that their support for near-permanent peace negotiations among Somali factions is the best way to ensure that no armed group is powerful enough to install a central government in that state and revive the old Somali irredentist dream.

Recent insurgents, such as the Somali National Movement (SNM), that succeed in providing order and services to people in liberated zones, complain that the rest of the world will not recognize and support their accomplishment. Former SNM commanders, the founders of the self-proclaimed Republic of Somaliland, complain that the failure of a single state to extend diplomatic recognition to their government leaves them unable to obtain foreign loans and limits foreign aid, while violent and predatory warlords in southern Somalia are invited to conferences in which they contend for positions in the internationally recognized transitional government. Somaliland officials respond by desperately trying to portray their accomplishments as the culmination of the continent's anticolonial struggle and a restoration—Somaliland was a separate British colony before union with the rest of Somalia in 1960—rather than creation of a new state.

Thus, the international environment that used to support the organizational attributes of focused, ideologically motivated leaders now discounts their skills. The completion of the de-colonization process, the pursuit of regional influence through proxies, and new diplomatic approaches to conflict resolution all promote fragmentation of insurgencies at the hands of self-aggrandizing political entrepreneurs. The early stages of even the most ideologically unfocused insurgencies, such as the RUF in Sierra Leone, featured ideological would-be leaders (Abdullah and Muana 1998: 172–193). While in the more distant past, outsiders would have sought out these people to support them, by the 1990s, they were left to their own devices and eventually fell victim to more violent competitors who did not care to spend time or resources to mobilize local communities or articulate comprehensive programs, yet received outside support.

Insurgent Leadership and the Regime Politics

The internal politics of Africa's weakest and most economically depressed states, which otherwise might be the best candidates for reformist or revolutionary insurgencies, also undermine the formation of centrally organized ideological armed groups. This is not to say that individual fighters in places like Congo lack a personal awareness of societal problems or of political alternatives. Rather, the problem concerns a lack of social space in which ideologues can organize followers and build bases from which to oppose regimes. Many of Africa's supposedly "weak states" possess regimes that are quite adept at disorganizing opponents. They may be weak in terms of their capacities to provide public goods to citizens. In extreme cases, that may not even be the concern of some regimes. Instead, they focus on protecting their hold on power through dividing active and potential opponents (Chabal and Daloz 1999). These regimes can be quite strong in the negative sense of occupying and disrupting the social spaces that insurgents customarily use to organize.

Leaders of newly independent states who feared for the survival of their regimes (and for themselves) soon recognized that capable bureaucracies could become tools in the hands of their political opponents. Coup d'états from the mid-1960s showed how political foes could use the military and security services as platforms to challenge regimes. Protesting students destabilized many governments. Labor unions and other elements of what is now called "civil society" posed threats, too. One short-term solution to this problem was to abolish these organizations by decree. It was easier, however, to allow political supporters to colonize these organizations, usually in an informal manner. This would deprive would-be insurgent leaders of key social spaces that their anticolonial counterparts had used to launch their struggles.

The extensively networked and informal elements of such regimes occupy the social space that otherwise might harbor and finance armed opposition. In Angola, for example, the largest non-governmental organization is run as an adjunct to the country's presidency. In the guise of providing services that formal state institutions fail to supply, the foundation provides services to people who declare their support for the regime. Meanwhile, the regime coerces people who try to set up genuine nongovernmental organizations (Messiant 2001). The same sorts of strategies result in regime favorites occupying the commanding positions in ostensibly private enterprises. Geoffrey Wood traced the business empires of Equatorial Guinea's political elite. He found that "the extreme personalisation of authority and the government's relationship with a wide range of legal, para-legal and criminal enterprises" served as a crucial tool for rewarding a coalition of regime supporters and ensuring that no real

entrepreneurs could arise who could finance political opponents independently of the president (Wood 2004: 553–554).

Such strategies of networked authority render analytically inadequate, standard political science assumptions like the notion that there is a clear boundary between public and private spheres of activity, or between legality and clandestine activity. The case of a Nigerian Transportation Minister who simultaneously operated one of the country's largest smuggling rings while serving in a high office and exercising personal influence over politics attests to the capacity of such regimes to invade and control even the clandestine economic activities that historically have played key roles in financing early stages of armed challenges to corrupt or oppressive regimes (Soyinka 1990).

Moreover, when presidents allow such figures to maintain their own armed groups to use on behalf of the regime and for their own business operations, regime opponents become especially vulnerable as targets of violence. Political militias, originating in the advent of party politics in the case of Nigeria (Dudley 1965: 21–23), siphon away potential recruits to ideological insurgencies, principally among the unemployed urban youth. Especially in the context of economic hardship, marginalized youths have to decide whether it is better to join an armed group associated with a politician and take advantage of associated opportunities for looting and extortion, or take far greater risks of siding with an ideologue who is unable to provide immediate relief from the hand-to-mouth conditions of poverty. Thus, the situation of armed groups like the Bakassi Boys, closely associated with the former governor of Anambra State, contrasted sharply with the armed resistance that marginalized urban youth provided for the anti-colonial struggle in Algeria in the 1950s and early 1960s, or of Palestinian youth against Israeli occupation today. In the first group, individual members may have their own critiques of corruption in politics, but operate in a context where there are few options for resistance. Moreover, in this context, ideologues are likely to be a threat to local political authorities and will attract threats if they voice their criticisms too loudly. This dynamic extends to "campus cults," politically sponsored armed groups that invade university campuses, and at least initially serve as regime agents to disrupt student and faculty organizing.

In fact, most societies do not lack people who develop sophisticated ideological critiques of politics, even where emigration is a viable option for some. Instead some of them lack social spaces in which the opposition can organize and a broader context of incentives that benefits ideologically and organizationally adept leaders. Where political violence and intimidation penetrates most avenues of economic accumulation and political organizing, raising armed opposition is extremely difficult. The most likely outcome in the event that these regimes topple is a free-for-all among regime insiders who are then unburdened of the constraints of

obedience to their old bosses. They utilize their official clandestine business rackets and their private militias to contend for power against their former colleagues. Thus in Congo, Liberia, Somalia and Côte d'Ivoire, the heads of the major factions all were major figures in the pre-conflict political establishments of their countries. Once fighting has produced widespread insecurity amidst violent factional competition, it becomes exceedingly difficult for ideologues to advance realistic strategies to accomplish their programs for reform and revolution. Moreover, foreign negotiators tend to ignore these people, assigning them to the subordinate status of civil society actors, and do not take them seriously in the course of conflict resolution efforts.

This change in the nature and leadership of insurgencies in Africa highlights the foolishness of proposals by some scholars to "give war a chance" as a way of encouraging regimes to perform or allow them to fall to reformers or revolutionaries who can do a better job (Luttwak 1999; Herbst 1997). The result in all of these countries has been conflicts that have benefited a few, while producing long-lasting negative effects for the vast majority of the population. Unlike the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid struggles of the past, these countries will not recover in terms of their ruined infrastructure or economies in at least a generation. This different outcome reflects the links between key war leaders and the structure of pre-conflict regimes. These leaders continue to exercise their authority in ways that undermine the emergence of leaders and organizations that present ideological and programmatic alternatives.

The issue of leadership in insurgencies touches on a much more extensive set of issues concerning the prospects for political change generally. It is likely that regimes that rule through networks of formal and informal control will be extremely loathe to relinquish their instruments of power. This is especially true for regimes that have a poor record of providing services and promoting economic development that they can use as alternative bases for popular legitimacy. They rightly fear that loosening their control will open the kinds of autonomous social spaces that earlier generations of insurgents used to successfully challenge regimes. This contradiction is likely to become even more serious in the future, as European and American officials fear that Islamist ideologues are the most likely to benefit from the opening of political space in some societies. But not undertaking reform is likely to trade short-term stability for a long-term political monoculture of stagnation and unfulfilled societal aspirations for change.

Note

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Democratic Leadership, Religious Values, and Social Justice: Examining the Ethical Dimensions of Anti-Gay Legislation in Africa

Simeon O. Ilesanmi

Introduction

Songs of lament and frustration pervade the political landscape of many African countries. They signal disappointment with apparently indifferent political institutions. Ironically, this sense of melancholy, economic insecurity, and existential despair has heightened since the heralded return of democracy to a continent that arguably leads the rest of the world in its prodigious production of, and almost saintly tolerance for, dictators and political brutes. The expectation that a change in the label of government would be accompanied by a radical transformation in the material conditions of the people and their rulers' governing philosophy and attitudes has proven to be both premature and exaggerated. It does not seem to have mattered much whether the stewards of African political institutions are decked in khaki or *agbada*: the human impact of their abysmal performance and reckless lifestyles has remained the same. In contrast to what was promised with independence, which was a deft management of the collective patrimony to restore and protect human dignity, the continent's experience has been, instead, a succession of an alliance of a tiny fraction of the populace representing narrow interests, routinely cornering the vast actual and potential wealth of the land, while the vast majority of the citizens live out their lives in the shadow of the terrible indignities of want, insecurity, and hopelessness.

This situation poses immense intellectual and ethical challenges to all who are concerned about the fate of Africa and its peoples. For one, there are pessimists who declare Africa to be irredeemable, in part because of what they perceive to be the cyclical nature of the continent's crises, and the belief that Africa's "social groupings are in the simplest descriptive sense backward, largely preliterate, with low productivity, weak overarching social solidarities and slight abilities to organize themselves for the better" (Dunn 1999: 75). To these doubters, Africa's problems transcend the universal dilemmas of institutional stewardship, but reflect an existential condition that almost guarantees in perpetuity what T. S. Eliot, commenting on the perversities of the modern age, called, "an immense panorama of futility and misery" (Eliot 1923: 483). The problem with this view is that it exaggerates Africa's exceptionalism in the worldwide experience of failed social and political arrangements, and represents an affront to the buoyant spirit being displayed by a host of social movements, secular and religious, whose conviction about the continent's potential for political and economic renaissance is unflagging. The issue, then, is not whether Africa's present malaise is reversible, but what would be required to accomplish the task.

One potentially fruitful approach, dictated by the objective of the present volume, is an inquiry into the normative dimensions of leadership as a basis for a reconsideration of the meaning and purpose of politics in human life, broadly construed. Although the concept of leadership is universal, its empirical instantiations and the manner in which it is exercised are always contextual. Thus, while there are certain traits we expect all leaders to possess regardless of the domains of life and society they oversee, each sphere has its inherent constraints and expectations that constitute the criteria by which a leader's legitimacy and performance are evaluated. In this chapter, I address leadership exercised in the context of a democratic polity, and while my overall approach will be interdisciplinary, it will be especially informed by insights from moral philosophy, religious studies, and constitutional law.

I recognize the elasticity of the idea of democracy and the controversy surrounding not only its presumed superiority to other ideological contenders, but also its universal applicability. Yet, confining my focus to this mode of governance, understood here in a political sense and as a fruit of modernity (Taiwo 2014), is not without merits. First, it is the dominant idiom by which Africans, especially since the collapse of the Cold War, articulate their vision of the kind of society they desire to live in.

Second, it is also the mask that African governments put on to project an image of legitimacy within the international community. As a strategy to deflect international censorship and manipulate domestic aspirations, African governments have mastered the art of embracing and

maintaining what Joseph (1998: 3–4) calls signs of "virtual democracy": that is, illusory institutions and practices that are "deliberately contrived to satisfy prevailing international norms of 'presentability.'" However, as is often the case, these governments underestimate the ingenuity of their citizens, whose ability to beat the governments at their own game is demonstrated by their variegated deployment of democratic rhetoric as the yardstick of accountability. The final reason is the observation that some scholars have made about a correlative relationship between democratic stability and economic development. For example, Crawford Young adjudges Botswana and Mauritius, the two countries that "had sustained liberal democratic regimes since independence" as standing far ahead of the rest "in terms of economic performance" (Young 2012: 29). Consequently, it is appropriate that we probe the nature, content, and scope of the expectations that people have of a democratic leader.

The chapter has three sections. The following section begins with a brief discussion of Max Weber's idea of "politics as a vocation" in order to show that not everyone who is involved in politics sees him or herself as a leader or deserves to be designated as such. To merit this title, especially in the context of politics, one must embody certain virtues, what the ancient Greeks call "excellences of character" or enduring traits, and visions that shape one's understanding of the vocation of politics and the responsibility it entails. Without these moral optics, politics becomes a mere career through which to advance one's narcissistic interests. Delineating and clarifying some of these normative attributes of leadership will constitute the bulk of this part. In the third section, I will focus on the anti-same sex law recently passed in Uganda and Nigeria to illustrate the absence of leadership in the handling of the most fundamental issue in any political society—that of belonging or membership. This law has become a catalyst for vigorous debates about a dizzying array of issues with far-reaching implications for Africa's self-understanding, its ability to inspire civic loyalty and commitment among its culturally diverse peoples, and its relationship to the outside world. The chapter ends with a brief conclusion.

Politics as a Calling and the Optics of Morality

For most people today, politics is a despised profession, and the word "politician" triggers scornful reactions, a negative sensibility that reverberates more loudly when we qualify the noun "politician" with the adjective "professional," conjuring the imagery of someone who has merely picked up the tricks of a somewhat grubby craft. In his *Politics as a Vocation* lecture, Max Weber argued that this negative perception is not inevitable. Although he accepts the conventional view of politics as

being about the business of acquiring and sharing power or influence, his conception of politics is emphatically teleological, as denoting the leadership of (influence of leadership upon) a state. This broad definition allows him to consider what it takes to be not only a politician in power but to "make justice of this allocation of power," essentially asking, what kind of traits should a person intending to put his hand on the "wheel of history" possess. In the process of constructing a taxonomy of these traits, he develops what he believes to be an ideal political stance, what he claims to be that of "a man with a true calling *[Beruf]* for politics" (Weber 2014: 32).

Weber relies upon a fellow German thinker, the Protestant reformer, Martin Luther, for his understanding of the concept of a calling. Theologically, to have a calling involves both an outer and an inner dimension (Calvin 1960). Outwardly, a calling is a certain kind of station or office in life. As Luther saw it, in order for any role or work to be a calling, it must be one that can be helpful to others if it is followed (Wingren 1957: 4). Through it, God calls one to serve the need and benefit of the neighbor (This is Luther's characteristic way of indicating what should be the aim of a Christian's action; cf. "Christian Liberty" 1943: 335; "Secular Authority: To What Extent It Should Be Obeyed" 1943: 239), which is our duty in all of life's relationships. Moreover, a calling is an office whose presence serves the common good, the well-being of the whole community, and not only of individuals within it. This outer sense of a calling has a certain objectivity, in that whether an office can serve the good of others depends on how it is related to people's needs, and not only on what any particular individual thinks about it.

Internally, whether an office is a calling depends upon the motivation with which one pursues it. Inwardly, then, one has a calling when she understands that God has called her to this position, this work, specifically as a way of serving the need of the neighbor. If a person holds a position that can, outwardly speaking, be a calling, and yet does not subjectively understand it as a calling, then he shall not pursue it as such. For such a person, it is simply a job. So conceived, is politics the kind of work that can *be* a calling? Is it a role that by its nature can be helpful to others—can serve the common good—if it is followed? And if it is, what kind of activity is the political practitioner called to carry on? What *is* the calling of the politician?

Weber examines these questions in his discussion of the three basic traits he believes a political leader must possess, namely, passion, responsibility, and a sense of proportion. Passion is "a commitment to the matter in hand" or the passionate dedication to "the service of a cause," (Ibid.: 76) which is what anchors the true politician's endeavors and allows him to surmount the slow and tedious demands required by modern politics. However, he clarifies that "mere passion, however genuinely felt, is

not enough" to be successful as a political leader. A politician also has to be imbued with a sense of responsibility as a guiding force for action, a genuine desire to accomplish the goal(s) about which he is passionate. Together with these two, a politician also needs a third trait, which is a sense of proportion, defined as "the ability to allow realities to impinge on you while maintaining an inner calm and composure" (Ibid.: 77). This is a dictate of both prudence and contextual sensitivity.

The demands of modern politics require that the politician distance himself from the people he governs and the events he faces in order to make the most cautious and wise decisions. He cannot afford to be like a religious zealot and lose all sense of scope or what really matters, especially in social settings marked by deep diversity along multiple axes of differentiation. To function effectively and fairly, a balance is called for between passion and proportion. Specifically, for this reason, Weber grounds entitlement to the designation of political leader in the twin notions of justice and merit, thereby implying that those who should have access to such power are few and far between. I return to this point momentarily. The main emphasis here is that without passion, politics is merely a "frivolous intellectual game," but without proportion, the politician is condemned "to political impotence" (Ibid.: 77).

Underlying all three traits are two mutually reinforcing ethical stances, characterized by Weber as the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility. The former connotes a commitment to deeply held values and convictions *[Gesinnungsethik]*, resembling a Kantian ethic that prioritizes duty and intention, while the latter is concerned with the consequences of one's action *[Verantwortungsethik]*, an outlook that he associates with the modern world, impersonal relations, social mobility, and pluralism (Ibid.: 78–80). Because the ethic of conviction requires a feeling of duty toward one's values, an unwillingness or inability to perform this duty would be considered a moral error. Its principles rely on the assumption that there is an objective value order that overarches our social realities and whose precepts must be obeyed. But what is the foundation of such values and convictions? Is there a single foundation, or are there many? Do all values of convictions deserve our assent? In short, what kind of values should the leader of a democratic society be committed to?

Weber's comparative discussion of three types of political leadership, otherwise known as types of legitimate authority, provides a clue to how we might address these questions. The first type is traditional authority, a patrimonial model exemplified by various incarnations of monarchical and aristocratic institutions, whose authority or merit relies on "an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising authority under them" (Weber 1964: 215). Weber disapproves of this paradigm for the modern world because it

lacks (1) a clearly defined sphere of competence subject to impersonal rules, (2) a rational ordering of power relations within a hierarchy, and (3) a systematic way of getting appointments and promotions (Ibid.: 343). It is a type of governance that is susceptible to the arbitrary exercise of power, for not only can the traditional authority demand the performance of unspecified obligations and services as his legitimate right, but more perversely, "obedience is owed to the *person* of the chief who occupies the traditionally sanctioned position of authority" (Ibid.: 328, emphasis in the original). In short, this model does not envision a clearcut separation between the individual's private capacity and his authority (Ibid.: 61).

The second type of authority is closely related to the first in form, if not in substance. Charismatic authority, Weber explains, rests on "devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him (leader)" (Weber 1968: 215). The charm or attractiveness of this model is the persuasive skill of the person in authority and the ability to demonstrate unusually high levels of confidence, assertiveness, authenticity and focus. Charismatic figures typically gain the trust of the masses by invoking strong emotions and, as a result, they are personally recognized as the inherently "called" leaders of men. But since the lifespan of emotional attachment is not infinite, the charismatic leader feels inevitably compelled to employ exceptional, often arbitrary and unlawful, means to produce results in order to stay relevant. More importantly, a charismatic leader feels threatened by pluralism, a characteristic hallmark of modern life, and therefore seems congenitally incapable of appreciating alternative sources of moral wisdom and political imagination.

It goes without saying that the ruling class in Africa has shown preference for either of these two types of governance, or a hybrid of both. This explains the persistence of the ghosts of single-party and military rules, even in the so-called democratic and democratizing countries. Politicians elected within a multi-party arrangement still behave as if their mandate depends upon the bark of command and the grunt of obedience. The cultural justification usually adduced for this authoritarian and messianic approach to governance in Africa is bogus and historically inaccurate. As Arthur Lewis eloquently puts it, "The single-party [and multi-party that operates as such] thus fails in all its claims. It cannot represent all the people; or maintain free discussion; or give stable government; or above all, reconcile the differences between various regional groups. It is not natural to West African culture, except in the sense in which cancer is natural to man" (Lewis 1965: 63).

Without explicitly saying so, Weber seems to suggest that the antidote to the excesses and potential abuses inherent in patrimonial and

charismatic polities is the rational-legal model, whose authority rests on "a belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands" (Weber 1968: 215). Its virtue lies in its "readiness to conform with rules which are formally correct and have been imposed by accepted procedure" (Weber 1964: 131). Unlike the first two, it provides normative rules for the division of power and separates function from personality. As such,

> The fundamental source of authority [here] is the authority of the impersonal order itself. It [power] extends to individuals only in so far as they occupy a specifically legitimized status under the rules, an 'office,' and even then their powers are limited to a 'sphere of competence' as defined in the order. Outside this sphere, they are treated as 'private individuals' with no more authority than anybody else. (Ibid.: 58)

In the context of modern politics, Weber implies that these essential characteristics of a rational-legal order should constitute the values to which a democratic leader be committed. Some recent works in moral and political philosophy agree with this line of thought. For Olufemi Taiwo, such characteristics are fruits of the Enlightenment spirit, and a constitutional democracy is the best political laboratory for their experimentation and realization.[1] Kark Dusza echoes a similar argument: "The constitutional state represents a gigantic historical experiment in transforming the brute facticity of force, inherent in political rule, into a normatively founded and regulated relationship of domination" (Dusza 1989: 98).

To wrap up this section, we must attend to a nagging question: why have democratic experiments, Weber's rational-legal order, repeatedly failed or only been weakly institutionalized in Africa? Taiwo puts the question more forcefully: "Why do African governments almost always win cases involving conflicts between citizens and the state, especially when such conflicts involve human rights?" (Taiwo 2010: 1). It is this badge of democratic failure that animates popular frustration in Africa, for while it is one thing to have a system of rules in the book, it is an entirely different matter for the curators of the rules to abide by them. To address the missing link, we need a theory of virtues, a subject that Weber treats perfunctorily in his essays, but for which we need the assistance of the Greek philosophers who bequeath to us a theory of four classical virtues—prudence, courage, temperance, and justice or public-spiritedness (May 2001: 172).

Although Weber predicates the efficient management of modern life on the role of bureaucrats, a bevy of advisers, consultants and administrators that political leaders rely upon, the availability of these does not guarantee that the leader would be able to choose or decide wisely. The best professional advice is not a substitute for the virtue of prudence,

otherwise described as practical wisdom or discernment. "In order to know what to do," it has been suggested, "leaders must see what is out there; they must see clearly both the cultural/political context in which they must, shrewdly, work and also the corrections needed in prevailing ideals to which they must persuade the country" (May 2001: 172). However, there is a gap between apprehending a wise course of action and overcoming the timidity that stands in the way of its implementation, in part because wise choices are often hard choices for a politician. To ensure that such hard choices would not be traded for cowardly options, a political leader needs the virtue of courage, understood as "firmness of soul in the face of adversity," in its twofold senses. In its active manifestation, it "attacks problems, rather than dodging or ducking them," and its passive mode ("courage of endurance or resilience") cushions a political leader against paralysis engendered by legislative or electoral defeat (Ibid.).

If there is one virtue sorely needed by African politicians, it is temperance, classically understood as inward self-governance and a prerequisite to governing others. Its absence can lead desires to run amok and drive political institutions to lurch out of control. The literature on corruption as the bane of politics in Africa is so extensive that this point need not be belabored here.[2] It is interesting, though, that corruption was more circumscribed in Plato's time than today. In fact, he believed that the greater long-term danger to a Republic's integrity comes from the intrusion and corruption of cash, not sex, into political life.[3] Not only do the vices of African politicians include both money and sex, and much more, but they have also infected the body politic with the mistaken belief that these are acceptable symbols of luxury and are what it means to have "arrived." In this atmosphere, it does not matter how these emblems of success are acquired; the end seems to always justify the means.

For a democratic leader to see the necessity of cultivating temperance, he needs a fourth virtue, public-spiritedness, which is a readiness to sacrifice self-interest to the common good. As the indispensable source of distributive justice, this virtue is what transforms a political practitioner from an imperial self to a civic self. An imperial self, William May explains, is "the self that accepts no limitations upon itself at the hands of others. Half indifferent and resentful of the public domain, the imperial self fails to invest itself in the growth of strong, nurturant, and self-restraining institutions. One needs for the latter task, the cultivation of the civic self," that is, a self that "understands and accepts itself as limited by others, [and] recognizes that it experiences an expansion of its life in and through participation in community" (May 1990: 229–230).

Public-spiritedness encompasses the other three virtues—discernment, courage, and temperance—and possessing it is a proof that all four are integrated in the life and vocation of the political leader. A

public-spirited politician also embodies the traits of passion, responsibility, and a sense of proportion that Weber associates with a vocational political leader. To accept politics as a calling, therefore, is to envision and work toward achieving an inclusive political community in which the grammar of citizenship is shaped by the twin norms of equality and mutual accountability. Correspondingly, it is to reject the Machiavellian opportunism of putting one's own advantage above the common good. There is no clearer indication that serious effort is required to achieve such an inclusive community in Africa than in the furor surrounding the debate about anti-same-sex union law, and it is to the discussion of this that I now turn.

Same-Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Bill: Democracy at Work or Democracy Run Amok?

As widely reported in both national and international media, the Nigerian Senate approved the same-sex marriage (prohibition) bill on November 29, 2011, and the House of Representatives passed it on its third and final reading in May 2013. A "harmonization committee" finalized the bill in December of the same year, and the country's president, Goodluck Jonathan, signed it into law on January 7, 2014. The law was a culmination of a cultural battle and political maneuvering that began in 2006 under President Olusegun Obasanjo, when an attempt was made to introduce legislation that was substantially similar to the one that eventually became law. Obasanjo's information minister at the time, Frank Nweke, argued that the proposed legislation was a "pre-emptive step" against recent developments elsewhere in the world, given that "in most cultures in Nigeria, same-sex relationships, sodomy, and the likes of that, is [sic] regarded as abominable" ("Nigeria to Outlaw Same-Sex Marriage" 2015). One of those international developments was the passage of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) resolution, which adopted the rights of LGBT persons as a human right in 2011, a resolution that Nigeria, along with 19 other countries, strongly opposed and voted against.[4]

The same-sex marriage prohibition is overly ambitious in its determination of the range of conducts that are excluded from the protective canopy of the constitution. It criminalizes public displays of affection between same-sex couples and restricts the work of organizations defining gay people and their rights. It imposes a 14-year prison sentence[5] on anyone who "[enters] into a same-sex marriage contract or civil union," and a 10-year sentence on individuals or groups, including religious leaders, who "witness, abet, and aid the solemnization of a same-sex

marriage or union." It also imposes a 10-year prison sentence on those who "directly or indirectly make [a] public show of [a] same-sex amorous relationship" and anyone who "registers, operates, or participates in gay clubs, societies, and organizations," including supporters of those groups.

Like his West African counterpart, Uganda's President, Yoweri Museveni, signed an Anti-Homosexuality Act (AHA) into law on February 24, 2014. Among other things, the law was designed to strengthen "the nation's capacity to deal with emerging internal and external threats to the traditional heterosexual family," "to protect the children and youth of Uganda who are vulnerable to sexual abuse and deviations as a result of cultural changes, uncensored information technologies, parentless child development settings and increasing attempts by homosexuals to raise children in homosexual relationships through adoption and foster care," and to "protect the cherished culture—legal, religious, and traditional family values—of the people of Uganda against the attempts of sexual rights activists seeking to impose their values of sexual promiscuity on the people of Uganda" (http://www.parliament.go.ug/new/index.php/about-parliament/parliamentary-news/326-parliament-outlaws-homosexuality. Accessed November 16, 2014). In addition, the law prohibits ratification of any international treaties, conventions, protocols, agreements and declarations which are contrary or inconsistent with the provisions of this act, and prohibits the licensing of organizations that promote homosexuality. The rationale offered for this broad scope of the law was that "same sex attraction is not an innate and immutable characteristic" (http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/530c4bc64.pdf). Thus, the law is essentially a mirror image of the Nigerian one with respect to sexual acts that are considered criminal, and the commensurate punishments. However, Ugandan law contains two additional elements that are missing in the Nigerian text, namely, the offences of "attempted homosexuality" and "aggravated homosexuality,"[6] both of which attract life imprisonment.

Given that the constitutions of these two countries articulate the principle of democratic legitimacy in terms of the norms of non-discrimination, equal liberty and equality,[7] "the fundamental question people in Africa are asking today," according to one Nigerian, is "How shall *we* live?" (Ladimeji 2014). This is both an ethical and institutional question, with the latter concern focusing on "the basic structure of society," that is, on how "the major social institutions [should] distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation."[8] Moreover, the "we" intended in the question obviously refers to all the citizens of the country or countries, and not just to the self-appointed spokespersons of the putative African tradition.

Contrary to the mirage of a moral consensus on normative expressions of sexuality implied by the notion of a collective African "we," a more accurate picture of the situation is that Africans are both confused and divided about what their *traditions* support, and about whether the guidance of traditions is, in any case, good guidance. People at all levels of society—in families, religious communities, local civic groups, government agencies, universities, and interested foreign observers of African affairs—are debating the comparative merits between living in a way that is constrained by unalloyed commitment to and respect for human dignity and fundamental liberties, on the one hand, and by a blind adherence to inherited traditions and metaphysical doctrines, on the other hand, or in Weber's idioms, between traditional authority and rational-legal order.[9]

Reactions to the Nigerian and Ugandan anti-gay legislations were swift, from both within and outside Africa. From the perspective of some Africans, and they are not insignificant in number, the anti-gay legislations are the clearest indication of an incipient triumph of the rule of law in Africa interpreted in a particular way that vindicates her right to self-determination. Oke Epia, a Nigerian senior legislative aide, characterizes the legislations as a possible signal of Nigeria's retreat from tyranny and dictatorship in its governing philosophy and practice. As he says, the bill is "a demonstration of democracy where the majority has its way and the minority had its say" (Epia 2014). Epia's argument that the government was merely carrying out, through this legislation, the express will of the majority is a very tempting credential to present to a world community that has always been critical of Africa's lukewarm commitment to democratic tenets.

But he was not alone in positing that the legitimacy of the government derives from its responsiveness to the people's yearnings. As Hon. Benson Obua Ogwal, a member of Ugandan parliament, also argued during legislative debate, "Ugandans have been anxiously waiting for this Bill. This day will be good day for all Ugandans" (http://www.parliament.go.ug/new/index.php/about-parliament/parliamentary-news/326-parliament-outlaws-homosexuality. Accessed November 16, 2014). The Speaker of the Parliament, Rebecca Kadaga, agreed, calling the bill a Christmas gift for her fellow citizens. Similarly, Nigeria's president, Goodluck Jonathan, deflected the accusation of fueling the embers of illiberalism and intolerance by arguing that "the law is in line with the country's religious and cultural beliefs" ("Glum for Gays: Africa's Most-Populous Country Joins the Anti-Gay Brigade" 2014). He found an ally in the Catholic Archbishop of Abuja, John Cardinal Onaiyekan, who not only commended the government for its uncompromising stand against homosexuality "in spite of pressures from within and outside the

country," but also assured it of the support of Nigeria's major religions, including the indigenous ones, which he said forbid homosexuality.[10]

Related to these arguments is the claim that African countries are not doing anything out of the ordinary by these legislative acts or approaching the issue of homosexuality in a way that is radically different from how other societies, especially Western democracies, typically handle their own affairs. Thus, in addition to the standard expectation that a democratic society should take cognizance of its citizens' deeply held views, African countries are also doing their best to align themselves with the best practices they are observing within the wider international community. This is the thrust of Dapo Ladimeji's claim:

> When the US Supreme Court makes its judgment, it takes into account the mood of the nation, the US nation, not the Ugandan nation. The reason there have been such recent changes in the US is that the mood in [the] US on these issues has changed. Demographically, the majority in [the] US did not support gay rights, but they have stopped being opposed to it, which gave the Supreme Court the opportunity to change the law. To suggest that as soon as the mood changes in [the] US, not even the majority opinion, Ugandans should be whipped or ridiculed into shape, is breathtaking. (Ladimeji 2014)

Archbishop Onaiyekan agrees with this logic, asserting, "We have every *right* to order our social life in any way we think it should go. Our social life should not be organized on the basis of what others think" (http://www.pmnewsnigeria.com/2014/01/17/cardinal-onaiyekan-backs-anti-gay-law/. Accessed November 16, 2014).

However, even if Ladimeji and Onaiyekan are right in asserting the constitutive right of a political community to order its way of life, it is an entirely different matter determining whose voices should count for this purpose among its constituent members. The same logic that makes it objectionable to attempt to whip Ugandans or Nigerians into compliance with outsiders' expectation should similarly operate in how a democratic society adjudicates in a majority-minority moral disagreement. Or does the credibility of democracy rest solely on carrying out the wishes of the majority, even if this entails trampling upon the rights of the minority? What is the proper role of government in situations of value pluralism? Should the power of the state ever be invoked to enforce ethical uniformity or instead accommodate ethical pluralism, especially in matters of sexual relationships? How should the government mediate between respecting the wishes of the majority while also protecting the rights of the minority?

There are a number of discursive moves that are being made to respond to questions like these. One approach has been to turn the questions on their heads by eliding the majority-minority divide that

necessitates the questions to begin with. Differently stated, proponents of the same-sex prohibition laws agree with the argument that it is both politically imprudent and ethically wrong for the majority to ride rough-shod over the minority; their contention is that it must first be shown that a majority-minority divide on the morality of sexuality empirically exists in Africa for this argument to have force. According to Debora P. Amory, African politicians, scholars, and lay people alike have consistently denied the existence of such a divide by astonishingly chanting the mantra that "there is no homosexuality in Africa"; rather, it is a "western perversion" "imposed upon or adopted by African populations" (See her "Homosexuality in Africa: Issues and Debate" 1997: 5). A Cameroonian newspaper actually traced the origin of homosexuality in that country to a specific individual, Louis-Paul Aujoulat, the historic figure in the French administration who had represented Cameroon in the French National Assembly on the eve of decolonization (Awondo 2010: 317). It was not just the alleged foreign origin of homosexuality that should make it a non-issue for Africans; there is also the contention that any perception of its practice there was based on Westerners' misunderstanding of African culture and ritual practices. According to Virgil Capo-Chichi,

> Homosexuality as it exists nowadays is unknown to traditional African societies. There was no man-to-man sex…In contrast, traditional chiefs or priests in the process of their enthronization were known to have lived in isolation and therefore participated in 'recurrent' masturbation to satisfy their sexual desires. That is what was perceived as homosexuality. (Capo-Chichi 2007: 2)

In his work on the "Gay International," a critique of scholarship on Muslim and Arab sexualities, Massad argues that this cultural misperception is largely responsible for a certain mode of discourse that "both produces homosexuals, as well as gays and lesbians, where they do not exist, and represses same-sex desires and practices that refuse to be assimilated into its epistemology" (2002: 363). The consequence is the mistaken belief that ideas about sexual orientation, identity and sexual freedom necessarily transcend culture.

How accurate is this portrayal of Africa? We may turn to the Pew Research Center's 2013 Global Attitudes for a guide. According to this study, six of the 20 top countries opposed to homosexuality on moral grounds are in Sub-Saharan Africa. In Uganda, 93 percent of the population finds it morally unacceptable; Nigeria is not far behind at 85 percent, while Kenya and Ghana are at 88 percent and 98 percent, respectively (http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/06/04/the-global-divide-on-homosexuality/. Accessed on June 2, 2015). The proponents of the democratic imperative not only assume that these figures are reliable, but also that

they constitute evidence the government cannot ignore, if the contract between the state and its citizens is to have any meaning.[11]

The social contract theory is a canonical modern account of legitimacy, according to which "a political community is made legitimate by the consent (tacit or explicit) of its members; it thereby acquires rights which derive from the rights of its members" (Luban 1980: 167). Political philosophers further distinguish between two very different conceptions of the social contract. The first is horizontal, associated with John Locke, referring to "a contract by which people bind themselves into a community prior to any state," and the second is a vertical contract, associated with Hobbes, "by which people set a sovereign over them" (Ibid.). According to David Luban, it is the latter—that is, the vertical contract—that "can legitimate a state" (Ibid.). The process by which this form of contract is expressed in modern times is the periodic ritual of elections, a characteristic hallmark of constitutional democracy.

The fact that the current governments of Nigeria and Uganda came into power through this process lends credence to the arguments of those who see the enactment of anti-homosexuality laws as a proper exercise of power, in that the law they enacted corresponded to the culture their citizens can recognize. For the government to have acted otherwise is to do violence to the people and their cultural sensibilities. Underlying this argument is a view of law as a "sometimes fragile and always changing *cultural* expression" corresponding "with the aspirations of those who participate in it" (Sullivan 1994: 20, emphasis mine).

Proponents of law as a cultural expression rather than as an institutional mechanism for the management and just interactions among cultural entities argue that this was the template of law that the West bequeathed to Africa. Notwithstanding the claim of secularity made on behalf of Anglo-American legal tradition as a byproduct of the Enlightenment and the most enduring emblem of modernist sensibilities, the material expressions of this tradition in all its variegated forms have always had a cultural undertow. This is particularly the case with respect to matters of sexuality. For example, some have argued that the anti-sodomy law previously alluded to not only replaced African "traditional tolerant approach to sexuality," (Ladimeji 2014) but was also an extension of Victorian-era morality to the colonial frontiers.[12] The successor African states kept this law in place, even after the end of colonial rule, thus paving the way for its recent refinement, though in a more robust and certainly not unproblematic way. In short, the law's proponents support their correspondence theory of law with a Durkheimian view of religion, according to which a community is constituted in part by a need to express its unity and periodically reaffirm its identity through its public symbols, of which law is a prototype. As Durkheim says, if "society is God," then such public rituals and legal symbolization

by the majority must be constitutional. In both Uganda and Nigeria, both the state and religious institutions, irrespective of historical theological and doctrinal cleavages, are agreed that it is appropriate to use law to defend spiritual and moral values, especially as centered around traditional family institutions, which they see as being undermined by "the forces of secularism and extreme liberalism" and by "the actions of the homosexuals who reject their reproductive potential and thus defy their responsibility to produce future Uganda [and Nigerian] generations" (Sadgrove et al. 2012: 114, 117).

It is against this backdrop that we should understand the defiant attitude of many Africans, including those who support same-sex rights, toward the threatened sanctions by the West against Uganda and Nigeria if they failed to rescind their anti-homosexuality law. Both the substance and timing of the threat were called into question. Some see a needless "moral panic," a double standard, and an inexcusable lack of historical consciousness in the threats. The Ghanaian scholar, Kwabena Akurang-Parry, vents his anger at what appears to be impatience with Africa. According to him, "the West didn't get up one night to accept homosexuality." Rather, it was "generous dissent, consensus building, and holistic education [that] have transformed how homosexuality is constructed and perceived today in some parts of the West." The emerging trend toward moral convergence on this issue in the West is hardly a sufficient rationale to urge Africans to "leap-frog" on it. Taking a cue from an Akan proverb, he warns that "when the frog wanted to leap like the monkey, the frog broke its legs because it lacked the practiced and cultivated steps of the monkey."[13] There are others who detect in the threats a more self-serving motive. The Nigerian Nobel Laureate, Wole Soyinka, himself a strong advocate of gay rights, characterizes the threats as "noisome emissions," and wonders "if they had not been generated by a desperate need for distraction away from the economic crisis that confronted, at that very time, those parts of the world" (Soyinka 2014).

However, Soyinka's warranted suspicion of the West's moral posturing should not be misconstrued as a smokescreen for myopic nationalistic outbursts. To the contrary, he was acerbic in his reaction to the "monitoring zeal" of the legislators, accusing them of "cloak[ing] prurience in legislative watchfulness" in an attempt to deflect attention from

> the crumbling of society and the failures of governance in multiple directions. These range from minimal infrastructural expectations to mind-boggling escalation of corrupt practices in high places, and the basic issue of security in day-to-day existence of the populace as it affects high and low, affluent or impoverished, old and young, regardless of profession or records of service to Nigerian humanity" (Ibid.).[14]

Most important, he locates the issue of homosexuality and the law banning it in the domain of ethical conversation, seeing it as bordering on "the right to private choices of the free, adult citizen in any land." Soyinka's contributions to the debate shift attention away from the conception of law as a cultural expression to its philosophical and ethical underpinnings as a normative framework for identity constructions, both of the self and the state. A discussion of this argument is in order.

Anti-Homosexuality Law as a Violation of an Ethical Imperative

When a society decides to use the avenue of law to couch its vision about the ordering of its life and the interests of its citizens, it implicitly commits itself to a mode of discourse and governance that is commensurate with the inherent heterogeneity of those interests. As already indicated, a rational-legal regime, otherwise known as the principle of constitutionalism, is an outgrowth of two mutually reinforcing historical impulses—modernity and liberalism, both of which are relevant to the assessment of the justifiability and moral credibility of any law, actual or proposed.[15] In this respect, constitutionalism as an ideal has to be distinguished from the actual constitutions of particular states, whose integrity would rest in part on the extent to which they approximate the tenets of the ideal.

Coextensive with this ideal is the adoption of a new grammar of citizenship, according to which every citizen possesses two distinguishable selves—the constitutional self (what Taiwo calls "the legal subject") and other kinds of self, such as cultural, religious, ethnic or individual selves. Furthermore, the ideal privileges the constitutional self over the non- and pre-constitutional selves, but treats *all* constitutional selves as equals. William Galston articulates the equality of citizenship within a constitutional universe in terms of moral and distributional equality. The former is "the idea that many of the empirical differences we observe among human beings are irrelevant to how they ought to be regarded and treated," and the latter is, roughly speaking, "the idea that, in at least some respects, fairness requires the equal or at least equalizing assignment of goods to persons" (Galston 2003: 25–26). The two dimensions of equality are also interdependent, and in fact, inseparable. For, although moral equality grounds one's standing in the political community, it is also the basis upon which we may rightly compare our distributional entitlements within that community to what are extended to fellow citizens. Disparity at either level of assessment indicates a serious defect not just in the professed ideals of the political community, but also in the translation of those ideals to tangible benefits for its citizens.

This is why Soyinka's deployment of human rights language to frame the debate about same-sex prohibition law is on point. Unfortunately, the specification of rights guarantees in African constitutions is typically followed by "clawback" clauses: that is, provisions that "permit, in normal circumstances, breach of an obligation for a specified number of reasons" (http://www.leganet.cd/Doctrine.textes/DroitPublic/DH/ProtectionofHR.Kabange.htm). Thus, there are good reasons to probe the depth of the Nigerian and Ugandan governments' commitment to their use of this language. An example of conflicting signals in the Nigerian constitution is a provision that "Every person shall be entitled to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence," but then followed with a clawback clause in the very next provision, which states, "Nothing in this section shall invalidate any law that is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society—(a) in the interest of defence, public safety, public order, *public morality*, public health or the economic wellbeing of the community, or (b) for the purpose of protecting the rights and freedom of other persons" (Emphasis added).

Given the allegation that homosexuality represents one of the moral ills against which law may be rightly designed to combat, this clawback clause permits the government to invoke public morality to exempt itself from respecting and protecting the human rights of the individuals perceived to be undermining it. The Nigerian government, not unlike those of other African countries, operates with a crude, utilitarian understanding of rights that justifies bartering away the rights of an individual for the welfare of the community. In contrast, Soyinka advisedly speaks of the right of "the free, adult citizen"—that is, individual singular citizen, not a collective citizenry—and for good reasons. For him and others committed to the moral connotation of this language,

> Rights are not mere gifts or favors, motivated by love or pity, for which gratitude is the sole fitting response. A right is something a man can *stand* on, something that can be demanded or insisted upon without embarrassment or shame…A world without claim-rights, no matter how full of benevolence and devotion to duty, would suffer an immense moral impoverishment…A world with claim-rights is one in which all persons, as actual or potential claimants, are dignified objects of respect, both in their own eyes and in the view of others. (Feinberg 1973: 58, 59)

A nation committed to the regime of rights must do more than merely affirm it as a collective ideal, but also take concrete steps to ensure that citizens as individuals enjoy the benefits denoted by human rights language. As Taiwo explains, "the *individual* is the basic building block of human society" (Taiwo 2006: 22, emphasis added).

Opponents of the same-sex prohibition law are challenging it on precisely this ground, seeing it as a violation of an ethical imperative. They denounce the rationalizations and contextualizing being proposed by culture-embracers as a diversion from what Kenneth Harrow sees as

> the core of the argument: either gays are human beings, subject to unjust persecutions, or they are perverted beings who should be stopped in their sexual practices and punished. To debate that issue is already homophobic since it places gays in the position of outside-objects, not humans equally participatory in the community. It is as if one were to say, should Jews be exterminated, given all the bad things they've done, or not? (ok, Jews, wait on the sidelines while we decide); should slaves have rights? (ok slaves, wait while we decide); should we practice lynching, since that is the only way to stop aberrant behavior of blacks? (etc.); should we justify these issues on biblical grounds?[16]

The "we" in this debate already is exclusionary, and as such presupposes an unacceptable conclusion: namely, that there is a reasonable debate to be rationalized under conditions of unreasonable threat to a group that is "othered" and at risk.

An example of these objectionable rationalizations and contextualizing is that offered by Timothy Furnish, who argues that "homosexuality is deemed a sin not just in the Hebrew Scriptures/'Old' Testament but also in the 'New' Testament...This has been the traditional position of the vast majority of Christian denominations (Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant) for two millennia" (Ibid.). The purpose of his rhetorical ploy here should be obvious, which is that since Africans received this teaching from their Western missionary forebears as moral orthodoxy, they should not be blamed for being faithful stewards of their theological patrimony.

Accepting the argument, however, only serves to reinforce another stereotype that Furnish himself may find equally objectionable: namely, that Africans are incapable of independent rational thinking and evaluation of their circumstances. It is this Weberian rational-legal approach that people like Soyinka have suggested, believing that it would lead to a better understanding of homosexuality. He offers some of the insights that can accrue from this approach. First is what he calls certain "biological truths," among which is the fact that "some are born with imprecise gender definition, even when they have sexual organs that appear to define them male or female." This may be a crude way to intervene in the controversy surrounding the ontological nature of homosexuality, whether it is genetically determined or freely chosen. But his point is that when it comes to the plain fact of "biological human composition, over which no individual has any control whatsoever...what is needed is

understanding and acceptance, not emotionalism and the championing of 'moral' or 'traditional' claims" (Soyinka, 2012).

Kayode Ketefe, a Ghanaian academic, is also of the view that acknowledging the wisdom of this biological inquiry is a reasonable way to bring sanity into the debate. His agnostic stance on the claim itself is similar to Soyinka's. As he says,

> I don't claim to understand why the gays, lesbians etc. people are different from the rest of us, but I think the mere fact that they are different should not be the reason why they should be hounded into prison. The claim of these people is that their preferences were dictated by biological propensity rather than mere licentious perversion. It appears to me that until this claim is discredited via empirical research, it would be inhumane for the rest of society to conspire against them and render them social outcasts and victims of persecutorial legislation. (Ketefe 2014)

Both Soyinka and Ketefe reject the kind of religion-inflected argument that Furnish and his ilk are making, regarding such "articles of faith [as] no substitute for scientific verities, no matter how passionately such faiths are embraced or espoused, or for how long" (Soyinka 2014). To those who categorize homosexuality as a sin, Soyinka, as does Eric Ross, reminds them that sin is a not a legal concept. And if Africans are serious about the kind of society they are projecting outward, namely, a democratic society of free and equal citizens, then they must be willing to nurture it with the necessary ingredients it requires to grow and endure. They must choose between allowing the national train to "run either on secular rails or derail at multiple theocratic switches. No theology can be privileged over another in the running of society. This means, theology and its derivatives cannot be privileged over material reality and its derivatives" (Ibid.).

Another insight that Soyinka believes a rational discussion of the issue would yield is the appreciation of the distinction between "homosexual act" and "same-sex marriage." He does not see this as a trivial distinction, and maintaining the distinction allows him to distinguish what modes of societal response is appropriate to each sphere. Since action is an expression of human agency, a meaningful exercise of which requires an acknowledgement and the possession of presumptive absolute freedom, the creation of conditions that would impede one's ability to express agency is a violation of human dignity and patently wrong. This is his line of attack against hatred and prejudice against homosexuals by their fellow citizens, as well as a basis for his criticism of same-sex laws, including the antecedent anti-sodomy laws, that he sees as "legislative fascism," which "has no place in a democracy," and characterizing them as constituting an "improper encroachment on personal lives, leaving the door

wide open for all forms of social persecution, intimidation and even—as we know very well in this society—incitement to violence against targeted individuals, including lynching."

On the issue of same-sex marriage, however, Soyinka offers a more nuanced proposal, distinguishing between the views and attitudes of private citizens and religious institutions, on the one hand, and the position of the state, on the other. With respect to the former, he argues, "priests—of any religious adherence—remain free to refuse to become involved in the ceremonies of such associations. Individuals cannot be compelled to endorse such conduct. It remains their right to privately ostracize or embrace such liaisons—formal or informal." However, the state "overreaches itself where it moves to criminalize" same-sex marriage. Unfortunately, Soyinka does not elaborate on the import of these differing attitudes to same-sex marriage.

Martha Nussbaum is more helpful on the importance of rights. Most of the reasons she adduces for why marriage rights are important to lesbians and gay men in Western societies are also applicable to the African situation.

> Legally, marriage is a source of many benefits, including favorable tax, inheritance, and insurance status; immigration and custody rights; the right to collect unemployment benefits if one partner quits a job to move to be where his or her partner has found employment; the spousal privilege of exception when giving testimony; the right to bring a wrongful death action upon the negligent death of a spouse; the right to the privileges of next-of-kin in hospital visitations, decisions about burial, and so forth. (Nussbaum 2000: 201)

Nussbaum goes further to show that marriage is more than a civil institution; it also has emotional and sacramental aspects. Thus, recognizing and protecting this right would have implications for the quality of life that gays and lesbians can have, while denying them the right

> has socially undesirable consequences. It reinforces stereotypes of lesbians and gay men as rootless, anti-social, and subversive, thus contributing further to their marginalization and isolation. It also treats them as second-class citizens, denying them a privilege that many nonideal people routinely get; once again, this pattern contributes to a climate that isolates gays and makes them ready targets of discrimination and harassment in other areas of life. (Ibid.: 202)

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have tried to locate the discussion of leadership within an ambit of democratic vision and experiment, and to show why a proper

evaluation of its impact would benefit from an account of its normative meaning and contours. By drawing on the Weberian notion of politics as a calling, I argued that democratic leadership requires the guiding principles of passion, responsibility, and a sense of proportion, supplemented by the aretaic traits of discernment, courage, temperance, and public-spiritedness. Moreover, I argued that the inability of many African rulers to replace the mentality of imperial self with that of civic self is one reason for the checkered history of democratic order in the continent, and a case study of the controversy surrounding anti-homosexuality law helps illustrate this anemic career of democratic polity. Curing these ills would require a robust vision of politics, one not based on traditional mores and charisma, but on a successful integration of the delineated virtues and the acceptance of rational-legal constraints.

Finally, it is also clear from the tone and development of my analysis that I embrace a human rights vision as a criterion by which to judge the credibility of a political society and its laws. While a full-blown theory of rights would await another paper, it suffices to say here that the language remains a useful gatekeeper for how we perceive and treat each other, but most importantly, for how states treat their citizens. The language also allows us to delimit the scope of entities that can claim rights as their normative vestments. I have argued that human beings are the intended beneficiaries of rights, and that when the putative rights of other entities, including the states, conflict with *human* rights, those entities must yield the right of way.

Notes

1. See Olufemi Taiwo, *How Colonialism Preempted Modernity in Africa* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2010).
2. See Richard A Joseph, *Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Kwame Gyekye, *Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the African Experience* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 192–216.
3. See Plato's *The Republic*. Available at: http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.html (accessed January 20, 2015).
4. Some of the countries in the Nigerian camp on this issue were Russia, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. 23 member countries on the council voted in favor of the resolution.
5. The penalty in the 2006 proposed bill was a term of 5 years of imprisonment.
6. Spell out the elements of each of these offences.
7. See the relevant provisions in the two respective constitutions.
8. See John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1971), p. 7 and his *Political Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 11–12.

9. For a view that a debate such as this helps "strengthen democratic culture and contributes to the enlargement of the public sphere," see Ebenezer Obadare, "Sexual Struggles and Democracy Dividends," in Mojubaolu Olufunke Okome (ed.), *Contesting the Nigerian State: Civil Society and the Contradictions of Self-Organization* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 199–215.

10. For a good account of the alliance that hostility toward homosexuality has engendered among the state, religious leaders, and the print media, see Ebenezer Obadare, "Sex, Citizenship and the State in Nigeria: Islam, Christianity and Emergent Struggles over Intimacy," *Review of African Political Economy* 13, 12 (2015), 1–15.

11. For a critique of the use of culture to advance an anti-homosexuality agenda, see a statement issued by a group of Nigerians in the wake of the enactment of same-sex prohibition law by the Nigerian government, "Nigeria's Anti-Gay Law Is a Crime against Reason," in http://sahara-reporters.com/2014/01/18/nigeria%E2%80%99s-anti-gay-law-crime-against-reason (accessed February 27, 2015)

12. See Human Rights Watch, *This Alien Legacy: The Origins of "Sodomy" Laws in British Colonialism* (2008).

13. See his contribution on http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=h-africa&month=1403&week=c&msg=NOq50v%2BsRdO5XDKM90SFjg&user=&pw= (accessed on 2/6/2015).

14. See also Neville Hoad, *African Intimacies: Race, Homosexuality and Globalization* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007), suggesting that what has taken the form of "homophobia" in Africa is first and foremost a political project designed to detract attention from the economic and social failures of neocolonial governments who have lost power under the pressures of globalization.

15. See Olufemi Taiwo, "The Legal Subject in Modern African Law: A Nigerian Report," *Human Rights Review* (January–March 2006), 22.

16. See the discussion trend on http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=H-West-Africa&month=1402&week=d&msg=i4kat3ZuKU15N0jwBPWk4A.

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Social Transformation and Military Leadership: The Nigerian Army and Fourth Generation Wars

Okechukwu C. Iheduru

INTRODUCTION

Whereas military intervention in African politics has continued to receive scholarly attention (see Kieh and Agbese 2004; Souaré 2014; Powell 2014), the internal leadership processes of the armed forces, especially as they transform to meet domestic and external commitments under democratic control, has practically become an analytic black hole. This chapter seeks to fill this lacuna by using the Nigerian Army (NA) as a case study of the ecology of leadership in which there may be wide gaps between legal governance and the leader's ability to hold things together while an institution is undergoing transformation. The chapter adopts a context-specific approach that uses specific leadership events as a framework to understand the conditions under which leadership is produced, and the extent to which those conditions have shaped the kind of leaders and leadership paths which have emerged under the democratic dispensation.

In Nigeria, two major context-specific events have had the farthest-reaching impact on the NA since the return to democratic governance in 1999. The first is the series of efforts that sought to transform, re-professionalize, and reinvent the military as a political actor for demo-cratic stability (see Ehwariene 2011; Magbadelo 2012; Elaigwu 2013). These efforts culminated in the adoption and implementation of a Nigerian Army Transformation Agenda (NATA) by Lieutenant-General Onyeador Azubuike Ihejirika, who served as Chief of Army Staff (COAS) from October 2010 until January 14, 2014. NATA was anchored on a

new vision, "To transform the Nigerian Army into a force better able to meet contemporary challenges." The introduction of NATA, however, coincided with the escalation of the Boko Haram, the terrorist and insurgent group whose battlefield successes have cast serious doubt on the organizational effectiveness and combat readiness of Nigeria's armed forces as they tried to adjust to the changed asymmetric war environment. Indeed, there seems to be an inverse relationship between the implementation of the NATA and a precipitous decline in the ability of the NA to meet contemporary challenges posed by Boko Haram Islamist terrorists and other insurgencies that have escalated in other parts of the country since 2009 (see Amnesty International Report 2012; Osumah 2013; Oyewole 2013; Agbiboa 2014). The coincidence of these two context-specific events has not only taken a huge toll on the public perception of a once-revered army with regional aspirations; they have also helped shape the opportunities and the challenges confronting contemporary leadership of Nigeria's armed forces.

The central argument of the chapter is that although NATA has led to tremendous changes in the NA, the transformation generally addressed the symptoms, rather than the real problems and sources of institutional decay that necessitated military transformation in the first place. In Nigeria, not only was it "remarkable that the defense transformation initiative originated from within the Nigerian military institution itself" (Magbadelo 2012: 251), but the NATA was also designed and executed without input from civil authorities and civil society. Consequently, NATA did not reflect or incorporate the governance approach to security sector reforms involving "a holistic and integrated approach [to address] the needs of both security and development, and of security institutions as well as oversight bodies" (Bryden and Olonisakin 2010a: 8; Fayemi 2003).

One critical error in studies of civil-military relations and security sector reforms is the assumption that politicians will prioritize control over the military or even actively participate in, or structure, military transformation (Williams 2001; Ball et al. 2004; Dzinesa 2007; Agüero 1995; Desch 1999). Leaving reforms to the wishes of military leaders enabled them to narrowly define transformation to suit the organizational interests of the military and, to a lesser extent, those of their political allies. However, Posen has found that while military organizational interests often impede change, resistance to change can be overcome by civilian intervention motivated by supreme national interest (Posen 1984). Without such intervention, military transformation is likely to be incomplete or fail completely. In the case of Nigeria, this outcome not only undermined the ability of the NA to meet contemporary challenges of fourth-generation wars epitomized by the Boko Haram insurgency, the mutual interaction of military organizational interests and the political

interests of civil authorities helped shape the ecology and character of the military leadership that emerged during the period under review.

Finally, this disparity between the "transformation agenda" conceived by the military and the ideals of governance-based security "transformation," reinforced by the tendency for the organizational interests of the military to impede genuine reforms, constitute the biggest obstacle to African militaries truly becoming a force for democracy (see Luckham 1994; Hills 2012; Chukwuma 2008). Indeed, in the 1990s, Claude Welch had warned that in the absence of civilian supervision, restoration of civilian rule would continue to confront deep-rooted beliefs and practices that ensure that officers will not only continue to play major political roles, but lack of fundamental reforms would make successful establishment of a liberal democracy unlikely particularly in the face of limited military professionalism (Welch 1995). So, while the NATA and Boko Haram insurgency as context-specific platforms for evaluating military leadership may be unique to Nigeria, this experience of military-initiated transformation without civilian intervention may offer insights into how "the plague of poorly institutionalized civilian control of the military" (Trinkunas 2013) continues to be a serious threat to the stability of the state and democracy in Africa. It may also shed light on the kind of military leadership that has emerged across Africa since the Third Wave of democratization began in the early 1990s.

The remainder of the chapter will first review the literature on "military transformations" or reforms as offshoots of the general literature on "security sector reforms" in post-conflict societies or as part of the transitions from military dictatorships to civil democracy. I next articulate the specific reforms (namely, force structure, doctrine and principles, recruitment, training and deployment; and welfare) implemented under the NATA from 2010 to 2014, followed by a discussion of the leadership challenges and constraints the NATA program encountered.

Security Sector Reform, Organizational Interests and Military Transformation

The narrow military conception of "transformation" and the more inclusive concept of "security sector reform" (SSR) as necessary conditions for genuine transition from authoritarian rule to democratic governance are both highly contested, starting with disagreement as to whether the correct term should be "reform" or "transformation." Security sector "transformation" connotes a complete break with the past, whereas "reform" may end up being a cosmetic effort that fails to minimize the threat posed by security forces to democracy (see Williams 2001; Ball et al. 2004; Bryden and Olonisakin 2010b). Yet, the SSR concept has

evolved since it was first used in 2001 in the aftermath of the devastating civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone. SSR generally refers to "the need for comprehensive change that radically alters the status quo of power relations in terms of the provision, management and oversight of security in Africa" (Bryden and Olonisakin 2010a: 6). It is also "a systematic overhaul that affects the 'orientation, values, principles and indeed practices' of the security sector" (N'Diaye 2009: 5). The expectation is that all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions would be "working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance" (OECD 2004: 16). Furthermore, countries with serious governance deficits require "governance" or shared responsibility between the civil authorities and civil society on the one hand and the security organizations on the other hand (Ball et al. 2004).

The greatest obstacle to SSR, especially the democratic oversight and control of the security sector, is the absence of "political will" or qualities of civilian decisive leadership as "necessary enablers of transformation" (Cawthra and Luckham 2003). Although Bryden and Olonisakin note that "Long-standing relationships of mutual dependence between security actors and executive authorities are particularly resilient barriers to change in the direction of greater transparency and accountability" (Bryden and Olonisakin 2010a: 6), extant studies of civil-military relations and SSR assume politicians will treat oversight of the security sector as a priority, or they will actively participate in designing the reform or transformation agenda that would consciously strike a strategic balance between building a militarily effective army and ensuring that the army remains responsive to the legitimate demands and challenges of a democratic society.

Secondly, there is hardly any consideration of the role of "decisive leadership" within the security organizations themselves as "necessary enablers of transformation." The military is particularly resistant to change, especially if change threatens its organizational interests (Posen 1984; Feaver 2003). In countries (such as Nigeria) where the military has accumulated privileged power relations over many decades, removing the internal "resilient barriers to change" requires an astute leadership capable of navigating "the new double challenge" (Agüero 2009) of civilian control and kicking out old habits without serious damage to the organizational interests of the military and the material interests of the leaders themselves (see Fasana 2011).

In exploring the role of internal leadership in driving transformation as a context-specific leadership event, therefore, "We are interested in both the *process* and the *outcomes* of army transformation. In terms of process, how did organizational interests and emerging ideas interact in shaping the direction of military change?" (Farrell et al. 2013: 3). When

organizational interests intersect with "emerging ideas" about change, leaders are more likely to adapt and "localize" them, especially if they have the potential to strengthen the organization. As the "third wave" of democratization roared through Africa in the 1990s, the armed forces in Africa became more amenable to the global diffusion of norms of civilian control of the military, at least to distance themselves from the discredited past military dictatorships and to demonstrate their commitment to democracy. Moreover, with the end of the Cold War, military leaders around the world were suddenly confronted with a new global environment in which a multitude of factors, particularly non-state actors and phenomenal changes in technology had altered the terrain on which military forces operate. Among the major powers, the military adopted transformation programs focused mainly on modernization of existing military platforms to defeat new asymmetric enemies in the ensuing "military operations other than war" (MOTOW). They also sought to engineer the requisite changes in mindsets or attitudes to enable the military to imagine new ways of working together in a war environment requiring joint operations by all the services (see Dombrowski et al. 2002; Cohen 2004; Stulberg et al. 2007). More importantly, transformation entailed formulating new doctrines to guide imagination, and adopting strategies to reconfigure the organization to accomplish these goals effectively (see Farrell et al. 2013: 5–7).

Many armed forces in the developing world similarly joined the transformation bandwagon, largely as part of the double challenge of professionalization to create an army fit for purpose and recognition of civilian control and support of the military as a moral factor of military capability. Four core factors define the new order: the professional roles of the military are clearly defined by an elected government and widely accepted by the armed forces and the society; the military leadership is supported to develop the expertise necessary to fulfill these functions effectively and efficiently; there are clear rules governing the responsibilities of individual soldiers; and promotion and career advancement are based on merit. Overall, the new governance regime means that whatever the political leadership defines as the important tasks and operations of the day becomes the functional imperative to which the armed forces must be adjusted in order to minimize the danger the armed forces continued to pose to the new democracies (see Feaver 2003; Agüero 2009; Barany 2012).

The NATA similarly evolved out of this process of "global norm diffusion" (see Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Risse et al.'s 1999 for the concept of global norms diffusion). According to the office of the Nigerian Army Transformation and Innovation, "the Nigerian Army could ill afford to be left behind in the current revolution in military affairs which other militaries over the world have already keyed into. Therefore, the NA has taken transformation and innovation as the threshold to meet emerging

contemporary challenges through improved capacity building and equipment modernization" (NATIC 2013: 3). However, norm diffusion and/or its consolidation is not necessarily a one-way process of socialization because "local norms matter," in that the meanings of global norms can be adapted or "localized" to fit local normative contexts or "cognitive priors and identities." In Nigeria, "defense" or "military transformation" typifies the "complex process whereby norm-takers build congruence between transnational norms…and local beliefs and practices" (Acharya 2004: 239–275). Significantly, the entwining of domestic norms with international norms enables domestic norm entrepreneurs to use these global norms to strengthen their domestic power position. Thus, the 2008 *Report of the Armed Forces Transformation Committee* conceives of transformation as a process that would result in "new capabilities for crisis response and management, peace support operations, civil-military relationships, joint logistics and procurement, human resources development, and improved welfare and medical care" (AFTC 2008: 7–8), whereas the leadership of the NA frames transformation as necessary to prepare the organization against external and internal threats to the survival of the Nigerian state. If SSR advocates portray security forces as the biggest source of threat to human security and democracy, the NA instead sees almost everyone else as the source of domestic threat, for which military transformation is sorely needed. As the former Army Chief states:

> The internal threats to Nigeria include proliferation of weapons, kidnapping, sabotage of oil installations and religious fundamentalism, including recent rise in [Boko Haram] terrorism in some parts of the country. Others are corruption, ethno-religious and inter-communal crises, political crisis, especially those arising from politics of zero-sum that manifests during elections. Additional to the above, are students' unrest, labor unrest and strikes, agitations for resource control, armed robbery, food insecurity, assassinations, natural disasters, and land/boundary disputes. *The dynamics of these threats necessitated the NA to modify its approach to operations through target-oriented training, manpower and equipment requirements in order to combat these threats.* (Ihejirika 2013a: 8, emphasis added)

In addition to the carte blanche given to the military by the civilian leadership, the post-military transition that occurred in Nigeria in 1999 did not involve "post-conflict rebuilding"; otherwise, the relative absence or weakness of a gatekeeping elite in such circumstances would create an opening for radical change. Whereas the Nigerian military had grown weary in 1998 with ruling the country after 29 years, as an institution, it was not defeated, and prodemocracy forces had not fought to a stalemate. Its withdrawal from governance was a tactical move to protect its interests and to position itself as the guarantor of the new democratic order (see Manea and Rüland 2013).

Military Rule and the Imperative of Military Transformation in Nigeria

The painful history of dictatorship, or what one analyst called "the soldiers of fortune," in Nigeria (see Siollun 2013) made transformation an organizational imperative for the military. In an address at the commissioning of some NA officers and soldiers' accommodation at Abuja on November 26, 2012 (whose audience included the minister of defense, the high military command, and senior civilian officials in strategic positions in the defense ministry and the National Assembly), Lt.-Gen. Ihejirika detailed the paranoia and mutual distrust injected into the NA by the "locusts in the army" during "that dark era" as part of a deliberate strategy to shackle the army to decay and to perpetuate the regimes' hold on political power (Ihejirika 2012: 42). For much of the period of military rule, enlisted officers and soldiers of lower ranks saw little direct benefit from military rule, and therefore preferred a return to rule by civilians who would be careful not to offend the military too much for fear of coups (Powell 2014).

When President Olusegun Obasanjo assumed power in 1999, many Nigerians genuinely expected him to fundamentally transform the state security apparatus at the same time that he was using his post-military national and international goodwill to extricate Nigeria from its Abacha-era pariah status and reintegrate the country into the world community (Fayemi 2003: 57–77). A day after his inauguration, he dismissed 93 officers who had been tainted by politics or who could pose a threat to the new order. He also initiated an 18-month "military re-professionalization program" in collaboration with the United States and United Kingdom, and frequently reshuffled the military leadership (Elaigwu 2013). The frustrations of many Nigerians with these largely cosmetic changes were echoed by Obasanjo's deputy, Vice President Atiku Abubakar who bluntly told a NA gathering in 2004, "The Nigerian military was less than contemporary even amongst African countries" (NATIC 2013: 3). Subsequently, the Nigerian armed forces as a whole embarked on a series of self-examinations and change-management retreats that culminated in the draft of a "Defense Transformation" framework by the Ministry of Defense, but the process and the document were actually the work of the Defense Headquarters, and the responsibility for piloting the blueprint into a policy was also given to the office of the Chief of Defense Staff (CDS) from 2006 to 2009 (see Magbadelo 2012; Aiyede 2013). In 2005, then-COAS, Lt.-Gen. Martin L. Agwai, set up the Committee on the NA in the Next Decade, which eventually produced a ten-year framework for the NA transformation (2005–2015). This framework led to the establishment of the Office of the NA Transformation (ONAT) in 2006 to drive the process. However, it was not an all-inclusive policy

framework; neither were any of its projects provided for in the NA or defense budget (Ihejirika 2014, interview).

The discourses on defense transformation, however, put the cart before the horse because Nigeria did not have a coherent defense policy from which specific ideas about defense transformation policy could be derived (see Abacha 1992; Alli 1986). The defense transformation agenda was also a victim of frequent system-level leadership changes, including service chiefs and principal staff officers. Between the administrations of Presidents Olusegun Obasanjo (1999–2007) and Umaru Musa Yar'Adua (2007–2010), and the interim presidency of Goodluck Jonathan (May 2010–April 2011), and Jonathan's substantive presidency from 2011 to 2014, there were five army chiefs who averaged two years at the helm. Each new appointment was followed by a mandatory retirement of the cohort from which the departing chief was appointed. Some of these officers departed with their expertise on the transformation agenda, while some of the newcomers either tried to reinvent the wheel or were reluctant to embark on long-term projects they were unsure of completing. Consequently, "desirable as these [early defense transformation] efforts were, they did little to transform the needed changes [in the military] especially because of the inadequacies in the National Defense Policy (NDP). Such inadequacies include poor identification, development and sustenance of military strategy and doctrine, technology and logistic support, structure, personnel, financial support and planning and implementation" (Oni 2010).

The Pillars of the Nigerian Army Transformation Agenda (NATA)

Whereas the NA had developed a 10-year transformation policy framework in 2005, it took "the goodwill" of Ihejirika as part of "an old reforming elite or new leaders with energy and aspiration for change" (Bryden and Olonisakin 2010a: 17) to finally adopt a comprehensive NATA and translate the policy into action. Elaborating on his vision "To transform the Nigerian Army into a force better able to meet contemporary challenges," Ihejirika stated that "there had been no comprehensive effort at deliberate self-examination, aimed at carrying out reforms in the system until 2004" (Ihejirika 2013b: 55).

Background to the Emergence of Lt-Gen Ihejirika as a Transformational Leader

Ihejirika was commissioned into the NA on December 17, 1977 as a member of the Nigerian Defense Academy 18 Regular Combatant Course. Prior to his appointment as COAS, he was the Chief of Defense

Logistics at Defense Headquarters. He had also previously been the General Officer Commanding (GOC) 81 Division in Lagos and Director of Engineering at Defense Headquarters. Beyond the military, Ihejirika is a fellow of the Nigeria Institute of Quantity Surveyors (NIS), having obtained a bachelor's degree in quantity surveying in 1982 from Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria. At various points in his career, he had also served on a number of assignments, ranging from barracks projects to bridge construction, and the Army Secretary's Department where he was part of the team that developed more transparent evaluation methods for career advancement of officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs). As the first Igbo man to head the army since 1966, when Major-General Johnson T. U. Aguiyi-Ironsi was the General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the NA, Ihejirika's appointment was greeted with a lot of excitement as well as anxiety. While some within the military circles saw his appointment as the triumph of merit and celebration of excellence in the NA, others were dismayed that a non-infantry officer was asked to head the army, contrary to the history of the force. In this context, he was an "insider-outsider," as far as the institutional culture and organizational traditions of the NA as it had developed since 1966 were concerned.

Earlier at the Chief of Army Staff annual conference in Bauchi in 2008, then-Major-General Ihejirika gave a lead lecture, "Transformation in the Nigerian Army: An Appraisal," which covered several themes, such as civil-military affairs to fourth-generation wars (MOTOW), and terrorism. More importantly, he warned that unless the old ways of doing business were modified, the NA would not be able to cope with what he described as "emerging contemporary security issues." Barely one year after this presentation, the Boko Haram uprising occurred in Bauchi and Borno states, but because the group was clustered in a few places and had not yet permeated society, the revolt was quickly contained. Yet, he was convinced the insurgency would reappear on a much bigger scale, and only a transformed NA could defeat or, at least, contain it (Ihejirika 2014, interview).

Pillars of the Nigerian Army Transformation Agenda (NATA)

At the Nigerian Army Day celebrations on July 2, 2012, an annual event during which the NA showcases its history, values, and achievements, Lt-Gen. Ihejirika restated his rationale for, and the various components of, the NATA he had initiated two years earlier:

> Apart from the Civil War period, at no other time in our nation's history has the NA been so tasked as in the current security threats to the country. The paradigm shift from conventional warfare to Counter Terrorism and Counter Insurgency (CT/COIN) since 9/11 and various acts of

terrorism such as kidnapping among other forms of insecurity in the coun-
try informed my vision on assumption of office in Sep 2010…Our efforts
in realizing this vision have been in the areas of force structure, training,
troops' welfare, and innovations. (Ihejirika 2013a: 71–72)

We elaborate on each of these pillars of the NATA below.

(1) Force Structure: On May 29, 1999, when the military handed
power back to civilian rulers, the NA had about 80,000 officers and men
organized into 1 Infantry Division, Kaduna; 2 Mechanized Division,
Ibadan; 3 Armored Division, Jos; 81 Division, Lagos; and 82 Division,
Enugu. In a 2012 address at the Armed Forces Command and Staff
College (AFCSC), Jaji, Lt-Gen. Ihejirika stated publicly what most
observers of the NA had known for a long time: "*On the average, the
NA's State of Readiness is below the ideal 70% required*" (Ihejirika 2013a:
56; emphasis added). Consequently, upon assuming office, he developed
the NA ORBAT (Order of Battle) 2010 to gradually guide the force-
restructuring component of the NATA.

Among several changes arising from ORBAT 2010 was the establish-
ment of an army Division in the Niger Delta region. Despite being home
to huge oil and gas sector and the mainstay of the Nigerian economy,
the region had had little military presence until the creation of the Joint
Task Force in 2009 to quell rising youth militancy and oil theft. Within
one year, he reopened the abandoned army barracks in Ohafia, Abia
State, which subsequently became the home of a new 14 Brigade and its
organic units whose primary responsibility was to enhance internal secu-
rity in the southeast and south-south parts of the country. These areas
had become a "no-go area" for the police because former political thugs
who had been abandoned by their political godfathers were exploiting
the lack of a military presence in the area to perpetrate kidnapping and
other related crimes. He also established a new army barracks for the 145
Battalion at Ikot Umoh Essien, Akwa Ibom State, and 144 Battalion,
Umuma along Aba-Port Harcourt Road in Rivers State, just as he pro-
posed the establishment of an artillery regiment in Ebonyi State that
would support the 14 Brigade during operations.

In August 2013, an entirely new 7 Infantry Division was established
with headquarters in Maiduguri, Borno State specifically as the oper-
ational nucleus of the counterinsurgency operations against the Boko
Haram Islamist insurgency, which had suddenly escalated shortly year
after Ihejirika's appointment. The new force structure also included a
new third Battalion for the Guards Brigade in Kuje, Abuja. By the time
he retired in January 2014, Lt. Gen. Ihejirika had also planned to estab-
lish an Army Aviation Unit (for which 40 helicopter pilots and techni-
cians had already been trained), and to meet 100 percent of the NA's
armored personnel carriers (APCs) and amphibious boats needs through

local production (Ihejirika 2013a: 80, 2014, interview). In a clear departure from the careless and uncoordinated planning of the past that led to several disasters in Liberia and Sierra Leone and during the Niger Delta militancy (2006–2009), Ihejirika established a Directorate of Campaign Planning to "provide the blueprint and contingency plans for all intended local and foreign operations, with a clear focus of achieving maximum operational effectiveness, low casualty rate in men and equipment as well as reduced collateral damage" (Ihejirika 2013a: 57).

Before 2010, the NA had minimal, if any formal capacity in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. To fill this lacuna and in line with ORBAT 2010, he established a Special Forces Command (comprising airborne, amphibious and counterterrorism/ counterinsurgency (CT/COIN) battalions. For the first time in the history of the NA, a Bomb Disposal Squadron was created, first at the Army Headquarters (AHQ) Garrison and subsequently in all divisional headquarters to develop local IED (improvised explosive device) capability of NA troops. This was in addition to an operational canine unit at Abuja (to support the Guards Brigade) and a canine center at Ipaja, Lagos for the training of dogs in explosives and narcotics detection, tracking and guard duties. The canine unit was also mandated to support the Military Police Corps and the Nigerian Army Engineering Anti-Bomb unit. Subsequently, close to 100 officers and soldiers were trained on dog handling techniques in a "training the trainers" program in some of the best canine institutes in the world. A complement of young veterinary doctors was recruited through the Direct Short Service (DSS) Course to cater to the health of these animals (Ihejirika 2013a: 57–58, 2014, interview).

By the time Ihejirika became COAS in 2010, there were at least 32 task forces or internal security operations (ISOs) in various parts of the country involving the NA. In line with the new force structure, he created Forward Operational Bases (FOBs) and highly mobile and well-trained Quick Reaction Groups (QRGs) to complement the ability of these task forces to deny freedom of action to terrorists and other criminals. These outfits were trained and equipped with modern weapons and communication equipment that would enhance their mobility and capability to respond swiftly to counter any asymmetric threats at short notice. He reasoned that the flexibility and nimbleness of these outfits, compared to the hierarchical structure of a traditional battalion or division, were more suitable to the unfolding "new wars" environment (Ihejirika 2013a: 29). Other innovations to aid the new force structure included the erection of detachable roadblocks to aid ISOs; moving targets to aid marksmanship; the use of UAVs (unmanned aerial surveillance vehicles) to aid situation awareness; development of a Balloon Surveillance system; and boat manufacture and modifications as part of the new drive to develop amphibious military capability (Ihejirika 2012: 79).

Pursuant to the ORBAT 2010 mandate, to ensure effective communication with the rank and file and all external constituencies of the NA, Lt-Gen. Ihejirika established the Department of Civil Military Affairs (DCMA) "to introduce and transmit the core elements of effective civil military relations" and to facilitate interaction with local leaders in crisis areas. As the director of administration in the AHQ observed, "The Nigerian Army operates a closed-door system. The civil population and even civil authorities didn't know what the Nigerian Army was doing, and that at times led to serious problems. The DCMR was established to bridge these gaps" (Umahi 2014, interview). Another system-level officer that worked under Lt-Gen. Ihejirika further added, "The general public is woefully not knowledgeable about the role of the military in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. Hence, they expect the military to work miracles, but they would not play their part. The elite are the worst" (Wahab 2014, interview).

The DCMA, located in the AHQ, is headed by a two-star general with extensive experience in media and community relations. It conducts seminars and workshops across divisions and facilitates interactions with local leaders in crisis areas as part of strategies "to win the hearts and minds" of the civil population, which is still skeptical of the democratic and human rights commitment of the military. In addition to partnering with a "civilian JTF" in the northeastern part of the country against Boko Haram terrorists, the DCMA regularly put out films, documentaries and radio jingles to sensitize Nigerians about the ongoing campaign against Boko Haram. Upon assuming full control of the counterinsurgency efforts in August 2013, the NA obtained approval for setting up an FM radio station under the DCMA to aid the counterinsurgency effort. For the first time in the history of Nigeria, the NA established good rapport with large segments of Nigeria's loud and critical media, which still smarts from bitter memories of military rule, through monthly media chats with the COAS and with the DCMR (Koleoso 2013, interview). Ihejirika also complemented this "charm offensive" strategy with the establishment of the Center for Lessons Learned in the Army Transformation and Innovation Center (NATIC) "to harness important lessons learned in various operations conducted by the NA or other countries' armies" (Ihejirika 2012: 72).

(2) Doctrine and Innovations: Until the introduction of ORBAT 2010, the NA was a conventional army tied to old inflexible combat doctrines. The escalation of the Boko Haram insurgency suddenly compelled the leadership to explore strategies to adjust to the new war environment. Ihejirika introduced a "Mission in Command" philosophy whereby once the "what, when, why, and means" of any mission or operation is established by headquarters, the "how" of the mission becomes the full responsibility of the commander. This principle created space for a bottom-up

flow of initiatives, especially at the tactical level, contrary to the old rigid top-down chain of command, fraught with delays that could prove deadly in an asymmetric war environment. Military operation is dynamic, and contemporary issues must guide the evolution of operational directives; therefore, non-dogmatism and flexibility must be a core factor in the principles guiding the prosecution of war. This enables the commander to study the situation on the ground to know what to do without clearance from the chain of command (Muraina 2014, interview). In order to encourage attitudinal change in officers who were used to a top-down command structure to truly empower themselves, Ihejirika reactivated the award of medals to reward superior accomplishments, rather the old practice of ensuring "geographical balance" in the award of medals that encouraged mediocrity (Umahi 2014, interview).

New principles guiding internal security operations were subsequently codified in the "NA Code of Conduct for Internal Security Operations" that enjoins NA personnel to be impartial arbiters amongst their host communities while also maintaining good civil military relations with them. The NA Code also mirrors the "Code of Conduct for Nigerian Armed Forces Personnel on Internal Security & Aid to Civil Power Operations." Whereas NATA did not result in the adoption of a counterterrorism and counterinsurgency doctrine (CT/COIN), Lt-Gen. Ihejirika contends that his main contribution was the changing of "the mode" of CT/COIN operations in Nigeria:

> Prior to 2010, the nation, governments at levels and the military were not in the right mode for this kind of war. This explains why bombs would be discovered by security forces and a state governor would publicly counter that no bombs were discovered. A soldier or policeman is disarmed by civilians at his post and the bystanders watch gleefully; or an officer abandons his post without proper hand-over and gets a mere slap on the wrist. There was a general unacceptable level of complacency. The principle of 'the mode' reminded all stakeholders of the 'new war' situation. (Ihejirika 2014, interview)

He also noted that he made it a habit to read out this principle at annual conferences, and in December 2011 invited Pakistan's United Nations Force Commander to talk to NA troops about the right mode for counterterrorism operations. In line with these doctrinal and organizational innovations, the NATA also led to the review of existing training manuals and publication of new ones to reflect the changing security environment. These included the *Revised Manual of the Nigerian Army*; *COAS Principles/Essentials for Internal Security and Counterterrorism/ Counterinsurgency (CT/COIN) Operations*; *Leadership and Command Manuals*; and *Contributions by Corps and Individual Officers* (Ihejirika 2012: 79).

(3) Recruitment, training and career advancement: It goes without saying that the kind of force restructuring and doctrinal and organizational innovations highlighted above requires "functional and mission-oriented training in order to improve the NA's operational efficiency" (Ihejirika 2012: 79). Once again, Ihejirika deviated from over a century of practice by instituting a policy whereby NA could no longer launch troops into ISOs unless they received two months of rigorous pre-deployment training. Pursuant to this directive, he refurbished and expanded the training auditorium at Jaji (abandoned for 28 years) and built 10 new hostels to complement the old ones that had become too small. In order to remedy the anomaly of other combat corps units receiving better training than the infantry due to dilapidated facilities—"whereas infantry must lead"—he ramped up training quotas from 1,000 to 2,000 for every 20,000 corps population, including officers. He also "liberalized" training by allowing units to increase the frequency of training as they deemed fit "without blockages." The only limitations on "live firing" had to do with availability, not as a threat-prevention strategy as was done in the past (Ihejirika 2014, interview).

Given the centrality of counterinsurgency capabilities in the NATA, Ihejirika redesigned the Special Warfare Wing of the Nigerian Army School of Intelligence (NASI), Kotangora to a CT/COIN Center. By March 2012, two years after assuming office, three sets of counterterrorism training were going on simultaneously at the center in an attempt to train 2,000 men for immediate deployment. Similarly, NATRAC was also upgraded to conduct three levels of training in counterterrorism, advanced recruit and conventional warfare training for newly commissioned and tactical-level officers to deepen the NA's CT/COIN. He also established a CT/COIN Training Camp in Kachia to cater for the large in-take from both the NA and other paramilitary organizations that could no longer be accommodated for similar counterterrorism/ counterinsurgency training at the Anti-terrorism and Insurgency Centre of the Nigerian Army School of Infantry in Jaji, Kaduna (Ihejirika 2013a: 55). He also began to strengthen various formations of the army, such as the Special Warfare unit, the Mountain Warfare Unit, and the Composite Counter Terrorism Unit of the 82 Division of the NA in Enugu. By 2013, no fewer than 6,000 officers had graduated from the counterterrorism training conducted by Israeli anti-terrorism specialists in Israel and at Jaji, Kaduna State, as well as in military facilities in Lagos, Makurdi and Port Harcourt (Ihejirika 2014, interview).

Similarly, the Amphibious Training School (ATS) in Calabar, Cross River State, which had been dormant for years, was reactivated, refurbished, and expanded to position it for building the necessary capacity (training and fast attack boat-building and repairs) for amphibious and riverine operations necessary for the protection of oil and gas

infrastructure in the Niger Delta. NA troops (about 140 per course) once more began to undergo amphibious training in anticipation of establishing an amphibious battalion (Ihejirika 2012: 59). The NA suffered numerous humiliations during the Niger Delta militancy between 2006 and 2010, due to the dearth of amphibious capacity among officers and men of the Operation Pulo Shield, the Joint-Task Force (JTF) created to quell the militancy. As Ihejirika put it, "The ATS over the years lacked necessary infrastructure required for it to play its role in improving the operational efficiency of the NA. The result is that troops were inducted into riverine operations without adequate preparation and training. This reason informed current efforts [to refurbish the school]" (Ihejirika 2013a: 58).

One of the lingering colonial legacies of the NA is the gulf between the officer corps and the non-commissioned officers (NCOs) or "other ranks," not only in terms of remuneration, but also in terms of training and career advancement opportunities. Realizing that none of his NATA would be achieved without a well-trained and competent NCO corps, Lt-Gen. Ihejirika revived the Warrant Officers' Academy "to rejuvenate the Warrant Officers" cadre of the NA which was "observed to be lagging behind in professional standards" (Ihejirika 2013a: 1). At the Army Day celebrations in 2012, Lt-Gen. Ihejirika acknowledged, "one group that has not been well taken care of over the years is the RSMs [Regimental Sergeant majors]." Consequently, he not only introduced systematic, regular training and workshops for the RSMs, but also provided operational (Toyota Hilux) vehicles in the various formations and units of the NA to further raise their critical role in ensuring regimentation and professionalism (Ihejirika 2012: 76).

Given the degradation of professionalism and standards that occurred in the NA during military rule, it was not surprising that attempts to reintroduce professionalism, capacity building, attitudinal change and a merit-based system would prove to be the most controversial and most challenging aspect of the NATA. In order to correct the nepotism and favoritism of the past that undermined *esprit de corps* within the army, he introduced written examinations on "current affairs" for colonels seeking admission into the National Defense College for their strategic studies course, and also required candidates for promotion from brigadier-general to major general to write examinations (as their counterparts do in the civil service), the results of which were combined with the traditional unit-level evaluations in the candidates' personnel files (Ihejirika 2013b: 55).

(4) Welfare: Poor welfare has traditionally been the bane of the NA. Unsurprisingly, a central aspect of the "welfare" package under the NATA was the renovation or construction of office accommodation and army barracks because these were the most visible symbol of the

degradation that was visited on the NA during the "locust years" of military rule. Ihejirika understood the implications of the level of rot for morale and combat effectiveness of the force he had encountered in 2010 (Ihejirika 2012: 77). His other professional training as a registered quantity surveyor, and assignments as officer in charge of bridge and barracks construction/reconstruction in Lagos and Kaduna, service on commissions of inquiry or contract review panels, as well as familiarization tours of NA barracks upon his appointment as COAS, played crucial roles in his articulation of the primary needs and strategies for tackling them. He prioritized the completion of ongoing or previously abandoned barrack accommodation projects, such as the Indian Quarters at Ojo, Lagos and the Infantry Auditorium at the Army School of Infantry in Jaji, which had been abandoned by previous administrations for over 30 years. He also rehabilitated and/or constructed new barracks accommodations in Abuja, Kano, Sokoto, Awkunanu, Enugu, Owerri and Ikeja Military Cantonment. While the bulk of the housing went to the officer corps, Ihejirika also introduced a policy of two-bedrooms as the minimum accommodation for soldiers, starting in March 2012 with Army Warrant Officers and senior NCOs (Ihejirika 2013a: 43). Nonetheless, by the time Ihejirika retired, he had barely scratched the surface of the acute accommodation shortfalls in the NA—what he referred to as "the nightmare of every army chief"—and several barracks were still in the same appalling conditions they have been since the 1970s.

The Challenges and Constraints on Military Leadership in Transformation

The Nigerian military has become the symbol of the perceived failure of the Nigerian state in the popular imagination, because of its failure to defeat or at least contain the Boko Haram insurgency, even though preparation for this kind of asymmetric enemy was the rationale for NATA (Cocks 2014). Yet, in March 2013, Lt-Gen. Ihejirika boasted that "ample progress has been made, even though we have not yet attained the desired end-state [of the NATA]…Currently, there are visible signs of progress, particularly in the areas of force structure, selection, recruitment and training. Also, there has been a remarkable improvement in troop's attitude and welfare, generally" (Ihejirika 2013a: 12). The final phase of Lt-Gen. Ihejirika's NATA was set to end on December 31, 2014, but on January 14, 2014, he was removed from office as COAS.

Most of the reforms and projects instituted or implemented by Ihejirika will probably take some time to mature and/or show evidence of sustainability. Consequently, any evaluation of the impact of the NATA on NA leaders' effectiveness will necessarily be tentative. Yet, the leadership lessons arising from the implementation of this policy and the challenges

confronting military leaders engaged in the double challenge in Africa are worth exploring. A major-general and director of administration at the Defense Headquarters who had worked closely with Ihejirika going back to his days as GOC 81 Division, Lagos, summed up the impact of the NATA:

> He engineered a paradigm shift in attitudinal change. Before him people were not eager to identify with change, especially of the NA's image. They were not eager to give back to the system that brought them up. Now people have caught the bug of transformation at various levels to leave the NA better than they met it. There is now a spill-over effect down the lower rungs of the ladder, especially in resource management and innovation. (Umahi 2014, interview)

On the other hand, Major-General Bassey, the chief of administration under Ihejirika, contended that although laudable changes were introduced between 2010 and 2013, "NATA did not help the situation [it was intended to cure] because it was truncated by the rise of Boko Haram insurgency" (Bassey 2014, interview). The Commander of the Garrison Cantonment, Abuja (a lawyer by training) was less sanguine:

> Ihejirika is a master in using the media to fool Nigerians and the world…the NA has been allowed to deteriorate in terms of quality of manpower and equipment. If NA fails, Nigeria fails as a state. We have gone from a highly professional army to men barely trained for a few weeks and then unconscionably thrown into battle. The decay started with the military era; it worsened with Lt-Gen. Dambazzau [Ihejirika's immediate predecessor]. Today, mediocrity has been elevated to ridiculous levels…The major problem is the general attitude of negotiating around rules. (Ndiomu 2014, interview)

Many Nigerians probably have similar negative opinions about the NA and the former army chief, despite all the laudable transformations and innovations he introduced. Seemingly, the more the NATA was implemented, the less effective the army became, and the worse its public perception as a force capable of defending the territorial integrity of Nigeria. Moreover, Ihejirika has become probably the most vilified COAS (both while in office and upon retirement) in Nigerian history. The most outlandish of these allegations claimed that he was, indeed, a sponsor of the very Boko Haram terrorists that he invested so much energy and resources trying to defeat.

One possible explanation for what could therefore be called "the Ihejirika paradox" is that the NA may have undertaken the wrong transformation, or at least, that the NATA was incomplete to the extent that Ihejirika attempted to graft an unassailable military transformation

agenda on an institution that could have benefited from the kind of fundamental reform supervised by civil society and political leaders as envisioned by SSR advocates in the early life of Nigeria's Fourth Republic (see Fayemi 2003; Cawthra and Luckham 2003; Bryden and Olonisakin 2010b). As noted earlier, the Nigerian military's disengagement from politics in 1999 was not only for reasons of military ethos and professionalism, but also a tactical move to safeguard its image and interests through a self-controlled process of transition that still left unquestioned the military's corporate identity as the dominant institution in the country despite the fact that the military itself had been hollowed as a fighting force during "the locust years" of military rule (Manea and Rüland 2013: 60–61).

However, the institutional decay, lack of equipment, corruption, absence of a national defense policy, etc., which Ihejirika correctly diagnosed, could not be radically transformed because of entrenched organizational interests. Indeed, the calculations of Nigeria's military and political leaders during the period under review seem to lend credence to Chabal and Daloz's (1999) claim that disorder is often an elite strategy to maintain regime stability (see also Bayart et al. 2009 for further elaboration). Persistent cases and allegations of corruption and minimal results from over $30 billion spent on defense since 2011 have continued unabated. The NATA's drive to institute merit, fairness and transparency in the recruitment, promotion, and deployment process elicited allegations that Ihejirika had in the process of his reforms equally engaged in nepotistic and corrupt practices and decisions. Ihejirika's ability "to hold things together" very much depended on his ability to dismantle this 152-year-old institutional and organizational culture without also hurting his own material interests. A mere four years proved to be a difficult challenge without civilian intervention to drive the NA transformation process.

The hazards of entrenched organizational interests were exacerbated by the abdication of responsibility by civilian leadership to supervise the military because the incentive structures of elected officials, especially during the 15 years of one-party dominant democracy under the rule of the Peoples' Democratic Party, dictated that the military be left alone (see Aiyede 2013). According to one observer, in building democratic militaries:

> The incentive structure faced by elected officials in new democracies may well lead them to establish façade institutions that do not actually provide for civilian control over the military while they address other pressing—or more electorally consequential—matters. Some elected officials instead focus on merely "coup-proofing" the military (rendering it incapable of mounting or supporting a putsch) as a lower-cost alternative to

actually controlling the military. Or officials may even politicize the military in order to gain its backing for new political projects. (Trinkunas 2013: 174)

The failure or incomplete transformation also deepened the distrust between the military and the citizenry. On March 15, 2013 when President Goodluck Jonathan declared a "state of emergency" in the northeastern states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe, he completely changed the rules of engagement for the troops by authorizing "extraordinary measures…to restore normalcy" to the region. According to the president, "The troops have orders to carry out all necessary actions within the ambit of their rules of engagement to put an end to the impunity of insurgents and terrorists." These extraordinary measures, unfortunately, resulted in high levels of civilian casualties and reported cases of human rights abuses. For instance, in the year leading up to the state of emergency, there were 741 civilian deaths reported. By the end of 2013, civilian causalities attributed to both the army and Boko Haram had more than quadrupled to 3,000 (see Walker 2014). The difficulty of fighting bloodthirsty and barbaric religious extremists can hardly be underestimated; yet, the high levels of "collateral damage" deepened the distrust of the NA and further undermined the efforts of the Department of Civil Military Affairs to "win hearts and minds." The failure or resistance to transform this hated "colonial occupation" image of the Nigerian military has often "stoked popular anger" toward the state, driving some people into the arms of rebels (Hill 2012: 9; see also Oyewole 2013). The lingering colonial and militaristic character of the state may also explain why any "encounter with the Nigerian state" continues to leave a bitter taste of resentment that "nothing has changed" (see Obadare and Adebanwi 2010), thereby making it exceedingly difficult for the army to prevail in the ongoing asymmetric warfare.

Military commanders on the ground, especially under Ihejirika's "Mission in Command" philosophy, also often played politics with their assignments because of the organizational culture of the NA, which brands subordinates "incompetent" for relaying "bad news" to their superiors. A good example is the case of the 274 female students abducted by Boko Haram from the school in Chibok, Borno State in April 2014. The field commanders misled the Directorate of Defense Information at the Defense Headquarters that all but 15 of the girls had been rescued, when, in fact, only 58 managed to escape. The same directorate also made so many other similar hollow claims about battlefield success against the Boko Haram terrorists that few Nigerians believe the army and the government any more. Unfortunately, because the chain of command, especially the Directorate of Campaigns at AHQ, is often unaware of the time battlefield situation, when crisis erupts, no one is able to deal

with it effectively. Claims about attitudinal change in the NA's organizational culture induced by the NATA are widely disputed.

> It's extremely difficult to get across new knowledge in an organization that equates wisdom or knowledge with rank: where ignorant superiors bully subordinates who know or are perceived as knowledgeable. We shut down new ideas and encourage herd mentality, while boot-lickers are promoted and posted to sensitive positions, including intelligence. (Edet 2014, interview)

Until recently, the NA hardly made officers take responsibility for battlefield failures. Instead, senior-level promotions based on "federal character" and ethno-religious balancing tended to reward mediocrity and often weeded out good officers (Adamolekun et al. 1991).[1]

Whereas the military is one of the few remaining pan-Nigerian institutions, it is also built on the country's most volatile ethno-religious fault lines. Military leaders therefore sometimes are compelled to take decisions that appear to deliberately undermine institutional rules in order to manage these divides and preserve the stability of the state. In 2013, General Ihejirika essentially subverted the terms and conditions of service (TACOS) of the NA by allowing a rerun for 220 senior staff course qualifying examinations (SSCQE) at the Nigerian Army Training Centre (NATRAC), Kontagora, "without loss of seniority." In 2012, he similarly allowed a rerun for lieutenants and captains who failed the Nigerian Army Major Practical Promotion Examination (CMPPE) (Bolaji 2013). Per the TACOS, which most officers consider sacrosanct, these officers should have been eased out of the service, but the rule was jettisoned because there was a dearth of captains and majors in the NA due to the high attrition rate of junior officers. More than half of those who took the examination in 2010 failed, while 24 of the 203 that took it in 2011 failed (*PM News* 2011). The NA leadership chose to retain the affected officers to avoid creating a serious vacuum in the senior officer ranks in the future. Although this policy spread substantial animosity within the officer ranks of the NA, Ihejirika contended that some of these failing officers would have joined the growing ranks of bitter former officers who had switched sides and were fighting for the Boko Haram insurgency. It was also a kind of mid-way correction of entry point/foundational problems, namely the recruitment of ill-prepared cadets into the NA due to the use of "the federal character" formula in admissions. Discharging these officers would also create bigger political problem in the future because promotions to one-star and two-star generals would inevitably be lopsided in favor of the states with the passing candidates (Ihejirika 2014, interview).

Contemporary military leadership in Africa is hobbled by the continuing ambivalence of political leaders and their foreign partners about the risks of building the capacity of African militaries. The ambivalence arises from the dichotomy of seeing insecurity and state weakness as the result of either "too much" or "too little" force (Krogstad 2012). Some foreign partners question the wisdom and long-term consequences of building and strengthening the military capacity of states with a history of military coups, interventions in neighboring countries, or human rights abuses committed by the very same security forces that must be strengthened to guarantee the stability of weak African states and the security of citizens. According to one observer, "Building the capacity of African militaries is hazardous . . . given their frequent roles in coups, support for authoritarian regimes, and violence against civilians" (Beswick 2014; see also Herbst 2004). Yet, these ill-equipped armies and their hapless leaders take the blame for battlefield failures.

Contemporary military leaders in Africa are also caught between the growing societal impatience and populist temptations for military leaders to "do something" and risk overextension and dissipation of scarce resources, which could easily lead to the collapse of already weakened military forces. In addition to the new force structure and other innovations initiated, as well as the deployment of the NA troops in 32 of Nigeria's 36 states during Ihejirika's tenure, Nigeria still remained the fifth largest provider of troops, numbering about 5,000 for external commitments in peace support operations (Obada 2013: 7). Most African military leaders are thus faced with a widening mismatch between the level of threat in their countries and the strength of the army. In 2013, Ihejirika stated that "Our threat assessment indicates that the current strength of the Army is insufficient, given the increasing demand for the army in tasks that are exclusive preserve of the Nigerian Police Force" (Ihejirika 2013a: 31).

The bitterness with which the elite politicize primordial loyalties within the military may also diminish "the factual contribution of the security forces to the physical security of African citizens" (see Mehler 2012). In Nigeria, even if civil-military relations had been friendly, the effectiveness of the leadership of a theoretically apolitical NA was caught in the crossfire of the "do-or-die" politics of the 2015 presidential elections. For instance, once the NA assumed sole responsibility for the operations, Lt-Gen. Ihejirika's "proactive combat approach" began to yield the desired results and led to a lull in the activities of the Boko Haram terrorist group (see Agbiboa 2014).

Ihejirika's insistence on legal prosecutions of captured terrorists was, however, complicated by Nigeria's slow inadequate judicial and criminal justice infrastructure, with the result that over 2,000 fighters captured in battle and scores of their wives and children remained in the detention

centers without trial for months. This was exploited both by Boko Haram and prominent members of the northern establishment, particularly Borno Elders Forum, who rose stoutly against the federal government, accusing the military of turning the counterinsurgency into a "war on the North." They even threatened to drag the army chief, Lt-Gen. Ihejirika, to the International Criminal Court (ICC), for trial. Some critics alleged that one of the Igbo field commanders whose troops had been scoring battlefield successes against Boko Haram insurgents had been deliberately deployed there by Ihejirika "to avenge Biafra" (Shiklam 2013; *Vanguard News* 2013). The foreign press and human rights groups adopted and spread this allegation of rights violation like wildfire and helped to stamp the tag on Nigeria (see Amnesty International Report 2012; Human Rights Watch 2014; Margon 2014). The United States government later cited these claims as the reason for frustrating arms purchases by Nigeria to fight the insurgency (Ande 2014).

The political dogfight between the PDP and APC and their ethno-religious supporters caused considerable confusion in the army, especially among the troops in the theatre and compounded the problems they were facing. Moreover, as the pressure to go it easy on the terrorist group mounted, President Jonathan and his aides (who contend that the Boko Haram insurgency was manufactured by northern leaders to pressure him to not run for reelection in 2015) agreed to grant amnesty to Boko Haram, but the group promptly denounced the unsolicited gesture. By mid-2013, the demoralized army began to lose focus and suffered "a string of defeats and unprecedented levels of indiscipline (including mutiny and desertion)" (Ogunlesi 2015). Paradoxically, the same "northern establishment" readily exploited this "failure" of military leadership as the strong reason why incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan of the PDP should be voted out and why Major-General Buhari (rtd.), the opposition APC candidate, would be a suitable replacement. They also began to blame Jonathan and the military for not wiping out Boko Haram the same way Buhari had bombed the Maitatsine Islamic sect's uprising in Yola, Adamawa State in 1984.[2]

The foregoing "elite disorder" (Chabal and Daloz 1999) also afflicted the systems-level leadership of the Nigerian military. Conflicts among the service chiefs and continuing inter-service rivalries caused further strain in the war effort. Although the NA was given full responsibility for the counterinsurgency against Boko Haram starting from August 2013, they were still answerable to Defense Headquarters where the Chief of Defense Staff (CDS), a navy Vice Admiral, allegedly tried to micro-manage the operations. Whereas counterinsurgency operations were supposed to be a joint effort, Lt-Gen. Ihejirika described the Nigerian experience of jointness as "a mixed cocktail." Although the NA bore the overwhelming brunt of the counterinsurgency, the bureaucratic

politics of the Ministry of Defense and Defense Headquarters ensured that the other services continued to receive a substantial share of the defense budget, which the NA leadership believed should have been used to adequately equip the NA to properly prosecute the counterinsurgency (Ihejirika 2014, interview).

Finally, any assessment of the effectiveness of military leaders engaged in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations cannot ignore the reality that Fourth-Generation wars are becoming increasingly unwinnable. In the case of Boko Haram, the intersection of ethnicity and religion in Nigeria's politics exacerbated the challenges that asymmetric warfare poses for military leaders who were caught flat-footed when the insurgency exploded in 2009, even though the symptoms of state fragility that generated it have always been present (see Okome 2013; Tonwe 2013).

Military effectiveness, or "victory," is difficult to measure when the unseen enemy largely dictates the fight, where borders are not clearly defined, and the enemy lives amongst the ordinary people on the streets. They strike at will when largely conventional armies least expect, through various means such as suicide bombings, planting of explosives in markets and densely populated places for maximum effect. The "failure" of NATA, particularly in defeating Boko Haram, as a test of military leadership in Nigeria, should therefore be judged alongside the realization that no one can truly claim to have defeated these campaigns of terror, from Hamas to Al Qaeda and its rapidly spreading terror franchises of bloodthirsty religious extremists around the world such as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Al Shabaab in East Africa, and Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (Gross 2009).

Conclusion

The study of leadership in Africa has gravitated from the seeming obsession of the past with the crisis of leadership, which saw little hope for Africa due to its bankrupt leaders, to the possibility of cultivating transformational leadership that could build the requisite social cohesion and democratic order necessary for consolidating Africa's rising economic fortunes of the past two decades. This transformational perspective reposes substantial faith on African militaries as a critical pillar of this desired future, and also sees these armed forces as important allies in the implementation of the security agendas of foreign powers and regional and international organizations committed to comprehensive security in the region.

Whereas military intervention in African politics has continued to receive scholarly attention, the internal leadership process of the armed forces, especially as they are reformed to meet domestic and external commitments under democratic control, has practically become an analytic

black hole. This chapter attempts to fill this vacuum by focusing on the Nigerian Army (NA) which adopted a transformation agenda framed as necessary to meet contemporary security challenges of new or Fourth Generation wars between the state and non-state actors, such as terrorists and other insurgents. The objective of the chapter was to illuminate the conditions under which military leadership in post-transition Nigeria has been produced, and how those conditions have shaped—and are being shaped in return—by the kind of leaders and leadership paths of the NA under elected civilian authorities since 1999.

Extant studies of civil-military relations and security sector reforms assume that civilian leadership will prioritize control over the military or even actively participate in, or structure, the military's concept of transformation. This chapter argues that early attempts by military leaders and bureaucrats in the defense ministry from 1999 to 2009 to reinvent the military as a political actor for democratic stability in Nigeria were largely cosmetic because of the absence of civilian control motivated by supreme national interest determined to guide the military to truly to kick out old habits of human rights abuses, corruption, nepotism, deterioration of professionalism, and the privileging of organizational and individual material interests over the national interest. Given this vacuum, the NA designed and implemented a narrowly defined "Nigerian army transformation agenda" (NATA) from 2010 until January 14, 2014. Although the NATA led to tremendous changes within the NA, it generally addressed the symptoms rather than the real problems and sources of institutional decay that made military transformation imperative after nearly three decades of military dictatorship. Consequently, NATA failed to prepare the NA to respond to the biggest security threat Nigeria has faced since the end of the civil war in 1970.

The NATA and the application of its supposed benefits to the prosecution of counterinsurgency operations against Boko Haram in northeastern Nigeria since 2010 provide a context-specific platform to explore the ecology and effectiveness military leadership in Nigeria. Unsurprisingly, the changes and innovations introduced and/or implemented have been eclipsed by the failure or inability of the NA to defeat or at least contain the terrorists and other insurgencies that have escalated in many parts of the country. Analysis of the embarrassments and negative public perception of an army that once enjoyed respect exemplifies the limits of contemporary leadership in Africa's conventional armed forces. Several factors—from the cascading effects of failed or incomplete transformation to the impediments created by military organizational interests; the politicization of the military and inserting its leadership in the crossfire of Nigeria's ever-widening fault lines that are being exacerbated by the state elite; the ambivalence of African elite and their foreign partners about enhancing the capacity of African armies; inter-service rivalry and

institutionalized corruption; and the increasing realization that Fourth Generation wars are becoming unwinnable— help explain the paradox of a transformative leadership and the failure or ineffectiveness of institutional response to threats to stability and national security.

Finally, this chapter shows that whereas the Boko Haram insurgency, as a context-specific platform for evaluating military, makes Nigeria somewhat unique, the Nigerian experience of military-initiated transformation amidst a widening spate of insurgencies nonetheless offers insights into how "the plague of poorly institutionalized civilian control of the military" (Trinkunas 2013) continues to be a serious threat to the stability of the state and democracy in Africa.

Notes

1. A gale of courts-martial (of mostly NCOs) swept through the NA beginning December 2014: 54 soldiers were sentenced to death for mutiny; 12 others had been previously sentenced to death by firing squad for shooting at a car conveying their commanding officer; and 200 soldiers were sacked after an overnight trial, having been in detention for three months and denied communication to their families or legal representation. On March 9, 2015, the first-ever trial of 22 officers (1 brigadier-general, 14 colonels, 1 major, 5 captains, and one 2nd Lieutenant) commenced in Lagos for offences related to the counterinsurgency operations. The accused/convicts defense that their actions were the result of lack of equipment and poor living conditions may have been bolstered by the series of victories by the NA against the Boko Haram insurgents between early February and mid-March 2015, including retaking territories hitherto controlled by the terrorists, following a massive deployment of many newly-acquired military hardware and improved deployment conditions. See Ezeamalu (2015).
2. That assault on the insurgents killed 700 sect members, 1,500 non-sect ordinary people, wounding over 3,000, destroyed over 5,000 homes and rendered over 15,000 homeless, all in one day operation (see Hiskett 1987; Falola 1998).

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Olusola Saraki, Charismatic Leadership, and Patron-Client Relations in Modern Ilorin

Gbemisola A. Animasawun

Introduction

Eebo ti'nse owo ko le na bi Baba Bukola;
Bi eru banba o rin, yio di oba.
Ojo weliweli Kwara, to ba suu, to ba ro,
bi ara se ntu talika lohun tu ijoba.

(The white man who mints money dare not spend it like Bukola's dad; if a
*   slave befriends you, he will become a king.*
When Kwara's clouds gather and rain,
comfort comes to both the poor and the government)

—Odolaye Aremu, popular Ilorin musician.

Boolu ni oselu, e jeki a fon ko tobi, ki gbogbo wa lerigba
(Politics is like football, let us inflate it very well, so that we can all play it)

—A respondent quoting Dr. Olusola Saraki.

In a response to the dominant view in Western literature, which ascribes negative values to the clientelism, Utas (2012) rejects the argument that patron-client networks are mainly sociocultural and African by citing instances of the existence of informal networks in places like Italy and the United States. Based on this, he posits that it should be viewed as sociostructural because certain structural features dictate specific social outcomes. He argues further that networks are social and cultural manifestations just as they are political and economic. However,

their manifestations are usually peculiar as determined by specific settings. Therefore, it might be jaundiced to describe it as a wholly African phenomenon.

Nevertheless, postcolonial politics and electoral processes in many African countries have for long been controlled by such "alternative governors," or patrons, although some of them have been in and out of government occupying elective and appointive positions. Nigeria is not in short supply of such men (they are mostly men) who qualify as Simeone's alternative governors. They are so described because they perpetually strive to control political processes and by extension socioeconomic activities, primarily, within their immediate political communities, and secondarily, nationally. The dominance of such men, through a combination of corruption, complicity by security agencies and patron-client relationship, both vertical and horizontal, has become an important phenomenon in Nigeria since the inception of the Fourth Republic. Prominent amongst them are late Chief Lamidi Adedibu, called "the strongman of Ibadan politics" (See Omobowale and Olutayo 2007; Obadare 2007), Turakin Ilorin, Dr. Olusola Saraki, the main patron of Kwara State politics, Sir Emeka Offor and Chief Chris Uba both of Anambra State, to mention only a few.

However, given the history of its sustained manifestations on the continent—and irrespective of its conceptual denotations as (neo)patrimonialism, prebendalism, or god-fatherism—clientelism is both sociohistorical and sociostructural. In this network of relations especially in places where formal institutions are weak or absent, patron-client relations constitute alternative modes of governance, which qualifies them as "alternative governors of peopled infrastructure" (Simeone 2004: 42). Obadare (2007: 3) explains that such practices have caused "the retreat of the African state and the ascendance of its Big Men." Pitcher et al. (2009: 144) cautions that (neo)patrimonialism should be understood and utilized contextually and not sweepingly imposed as a causative emblem of African socio-political and economic pathologies. Although neopatrimonialism, clientelism and informality factually describes African pathologies, Olivier de Sardan (2008: 6) argues that they are problematic because they sometimes convey inadequate comprehension and are often applied in too general, sweeping and partial manners. However, given the charisma and social agency of certain individuals like Oloye Olusola Saraki, as alternative governors of peopled infrastructures, the concepts and their variants might still be qualifiedly relevant.

While not pandering to the bludgeoning view in Western literature that depicts and decries the master-slave context of patron-client relationships, it is actually an asymmetric relationship in which the patron

bestows gifts from private or public resources on followers to get and strengthen the loyalty of clients, who, in turn, give their loyalty in exchange for what is received (Weber 1980; Soest 2010). Medard (1982) explains that the exchange between patron and client is inherently unequal and illustrative of what Rothchild (1986) defines as "hegemonial exchange" (Soest 2010: 3). In depicting who a patron is, I transcend the limitation of the concept to holders of official positions alone, as put forward by Therkildsen (2005: 37), who argues that "Patrons are office-holders who use public funds or the power of being in office to build a personal following allowing them to stay in power." Rather, I broaden its application to the web of relationships located outside officialdom but with the capacity to determine what obtains in the official context. Hence, patron-client relations do exist with patrons who do not occupy political offices but determine who gets such political positions, whether such occupants will continue in such offices, and how they will function there.

As a charismatic leader, insight into the leadership style of Olusola Abubakar Saraki provides an interesting perspective into the study of patron-client relations at the local level, which is not covered sufficiently in extant literatures on leadership. Yet, patrons or patrimonial figures at the local level in Africa, even where they have a lot of power and influence beyond their locality, are usually not approached as "leaders" in the literature on leadership and governance. However, it is evidently clear that patron-client relation or networks produce a peculiar type of leadership that offers insight into the nuances of societies, relations and the legitimation of what would pass as unethical in other climes and within the context of bureaucratic rationality. This supports the position that patron-client relations are both sociostructural and sociocultural.

Saraki: The Charismatic Leader

One such man who typifies the ascendance of the Big Man in Nigeria, Africa's biggest democracy, was Dr. Abubakar Olusola Saraki, popularly called *Oloyee* (the Chief) because of his title as the Turakin Ilorin, one of the most respected traditional chieftaincies in the Ilorin Emirate Council. Born in Lagos on May 17, 1933, to Mukhtar Saraki of Agoro compound in Agbaji quarters in the Ajikobi Ward of Ilorin West local government area of Kwara State and Hajia Humuani Saraki, who hailed from Iseyin in Oyo State, he attended Eko Boys High School, Lagos. He later attended Chatham College of Technology England, University of London Licentiate Royal College of Physicians, and St. George's Hospital Medical School, London. He breathed his last in the early hours

of November 14, 2012 in Lagos. As a physician, Oni (2012: 43) reveals, "He made a lot of money through a retainership he had with the Nigerian Ports Authority, Ministry of Defence and other federal agencies where northerners occupied top positions."

Alhaji Saraki's philanthropy began in the early 1960s when he built a bore-hole for some villagers who were walking over great distances to fetch water in his Ilorin home. He followed it up with many more in locations within the Ilorin Emirate. His foray into electoral contest was met with defeat by Alhaji Babatunde Gada of the Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC) in 1964 when he sought to represent Asa constituency in the Northern regional parliament as an independent candidate (Oni 2012). This loss occurred despite his giving free medical treatment to the people of the area, who then had no hospital.

His philanthropic gestures did not go unnoticed, however, as the 9th Emir of Ilorin (1959–1992), Alhaji (Dr) Sulukarinaini Gambari (Aiyelabowo V), conferred on him the traditional title of Turaki in appreciation of his distinguished services to Ilorin emirate on April 12, 1974. Beforethe inauguration of Nigeria's Second Republic, he contested and won election into the Constitutional Conference in 1976 and became the first Senate Leader (1979–1983), while at different times, he held office as the national vice-chairman of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), a presidential candidate, and a man who embodied flamboyance and philanthropy, which earned him the appellation—Oloye (Chief)—in a manner that mirrors the Tswana saying: "A chief is a chief through the people" (Morton 2004: 347).

Ilorin: The Space and Logic of Neopatrimonialism

In this chapter, I use primary and secondary data to reflect on charismatic leadership and patron-client relations in one of the most important cities in Nigeria. I conducted interviews with purposively selected respondents in Ilorin, who cut across ardent followers and opponents of the late Abubakar Olusola Saraki. The interviews centered on providing an empirical basis to analyze his leadership role as a patron in the politics of Ilorin, in particular, and Nigeria, in general. Questions were posed in order to unearth how his dominance of the political landscape of the state for almost five decades was legitimized and sustained, how he managed the opposition, and the impact of his legacy.

Ilorin, the setting of the study was established in the third decade of the nineteenth century (Danmole 2012) and its emergence has etched itself as a permanent subject of interest to historians, anthropologists, political scientists, and students of diplomatic relations and peace studies.

In a review of Ann O'Hear's work, *Power Relations in Nigeria: Ilorin Slaves and Their Successors*, Adejumobi (1998) points out that O'Hear presents the legacy of unequal socioeconomic relationships in the political awareness and growth of the social and economic underclass. This informed the emergence of the populist trans-ethnic commoners' party (Ilorin *Talaka Parapo*). The Commoners' Party provided an umbrella for the descendants of the underclass to temporarily resist their exploitation in their relationship with the hegemonic party, Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC), controlled by the urban elite, which practically set "the gold standard of electoral malfeasance for the country based on its sharp tactics" (Kew 2010: 502). The NPC personalized modern administrative power, a modern police force and judicial system (Islamic and Western), and in many instances used sheer brutalization in undermining a sustained relationship between the commoners and the progressive Action Group (AG). This action defined the sociopolitical and economic relations in Ilorin along the lines of the master-slave relationship (Adejumobi 1998).

Charismatic Leadership

The gap left by the demise of such charismatic leaders in Africa as Julius Nyerere, Obafemi Awolowo, Nnamdi Azikiwe, and Kwame Nkrumah remains unfilled decades after their passing. Since the end of the era of charismatic leaders, most of whom championed the nationalist struggles that led to independence in many African countries, there has been a crisis of succession, as Sylla and Goldhammer (1982) have pointed out. The short supply of these men of stellar qualities perhaps informed the conclusion by Bienen (1993) that the absence of elders in Africa is a major cause of instability and chaos on the continent, occasioned by a rabid quest for power, with little or no concern about its legitimacy.

The yawning gap between expectations and realities in the postcolony has increased the search for good leaders. This search has provided the opportunity for opposition leaders, military adventurists, strongmen and warlords to exploit the disappointment of unfulfilled hopes and expectations in seizing power and imposing themselves on the people under the guise of redemptive leadership. Leaders like Abdel Nasser of Egypt, Muammar Gaddafi of Libya, General Murtala Mohammed of Nigeria and J. J. Rawlings of Ghana are examples of the latter (Osaghae 2010). Osaghae (2010: 407) lists the qualities of good leaders, which have eluded many African countries, including Nigeria:altruism, patriotism, moral uprightness based on conspicuous religiosity in the case of Nigeria, sense of historical mission, comprehension of developmental challenges and how to overcome them,

courage, boldness and determination. These features largely define the charismatic leader.

According to Weber, the charismatic leader emerges in a relational context and rests on a form of bond between such leaders and their followers. Although largely associated with religious leaders, because of the myths and mythologies attributed to them, it is desirable in many countries in Paul Collier's "Bottom Billion," where poverty, deprivation, disempowerment, oppression and exclusion are the lots of the majority. In such places, leaders who provide solutions to these problems automatically become messiahs, liberators, or revolutionaries (Beyer 1999; Jones 2001). Osaghae (2010: 409) enumerates traits such as "sense of mission, oratorical skills, exemplary leadership and boldness" as definers of charisma outside the scope of religion. Achebe (1983: 10–45), quoted in Osaghae (2010: 409), encapsulates the qualities that a charismatic Nigerian leader must possess, including "exemplary leadership, mental or intellectual rigor, patriotism, capacity for just rule, ability to treat every group equally, meritocracy and incorruptibility." Going by the position of Eisensadt (1968: 223) that moments of crisis provide the opportunity for the emergence of such leaders, and given the conflict and instability that have defined the experiences of most countries in Africa, the continued expectation of a charismatic leader possessing the virtues enumerated by Osaghae may not be unfounded after all.

Strange and Mumford (2002) provide a detailed analysis of the charismatic and ideological leadership. They argue that leaders who emphasize personal values, standards to be maintained, and the derivation of meaning based on adherence to these standards are "ideological leaders." On the other hand, leaders who place the highest premium on social needs, events to change, and interpersonal meaning derived from those changes might be referred to as "charismatic leaders." Furthermore, Strange and Mumford (2002) offer a distinction between personalized and socialized leaders using the criteria advanced by O'Connor et al. (1995). Socialized leaders are those who initiate actions for the betterment of society or institutions, and are unconcerned with personal gains (e.g., Woodrow Wilson), while personalized leaders are those who initiate actions to acquire, maintain and extend power (e.g., Joseph McCarthy), without considering the implications of their actions for others or the social institutions. While most of these analyses were derived from examining leadership at the formal and macro-level, their generalization becomes limited because they are largely devoid of instances drawn from the informal spaces and micropractices that largely determine what happens at the formal spaces in most of Africa – which Bratton and Van de Walle (1994: 459) argue

defines life, "from the highest reaches of the presidential palace to the humblest village assembly."

In Nigeria, the nationalists provided the core of the first set of charismatic leaders. Osagahe (2010) traces their emergence and legitimation to the nationalist struggles for independence. Woven around them were narratives of mystifications and deification in some cases based on their extraordinary and supernatural abilities. For instance, Nnamidi Azikiwe was worshiped as a spirit of sorts whose speaking prowess surpassed that of the Europeans; Obafemi Awolowo epitomized personal discipline, a born leader who his followers believed had the solution to human needs (Osaghae 2010). Adebanwi (2009: 37) recounts that one night he was woken from sleep to come and see Baba (Awolowo) in the moon. Awolowo's admirers saw the man's "appearance" in the moon as a manifestation of spiritual powers.

Also, Bola Ige, the late former governor of Oyo State in South-Western Nigeria described Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa as having a "golden voice," adding that "when he spoke, everyone listened" (Ige 1995: 37). Ige (1995: 40) also identifies the features that legitimized the charisma of Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, which included not only "his birth [but also] the struggles he had had earlier in life and an agreeable disposition." The emergence of Chief Obafemi Awolowo was equally legitimated by an overwhelming acknowledgment of his stellar qualities, as reported by Ige (1995: 326), who was physically present when Awolowo was elected "Leader of the Yorubas."

The preceding examples cited illustrate the emergence of leaders legitimated by the appreciation and acceptance of their sterling qualities by peers, followers and adversaries.

On the other hand, negative forms of leadership are analyzed by Jackson and Rosberg (1982: 73–82), who characterize such leaders as "princes," "autocrats," and "tyrants." As summed up by Hyden (2006: 99), the prince is a clever observer and manipulator of lieutenants and clients. He seems to rule jointly with others by leading their struggle for benefits, which he encourages, as he is aware that it constitutes the source of his legitimacy. The princely leadership instrumentalizes the politics of accommodation; its prime example could be seen in Senegal's first president, Leopord Senghor. The autocrat contrasts with the prince because he commands. The autocrat considers the state as his personal estate and uses state apparatus to his satisfaction, based on personal discretion. Party and government institutions basically function to carry out his wishes and instructions. Such forms of leadership could be seen in Presidents Banda of Malawi, Bongo of Gabon, Arap Moi of Kenya, Houphouet-Boigny of Ivory Coast and Nigeria's Olusegun Obasanjo. The tyrant rules through fear, by rewarding agents and collaborators, then converting them into

mercenaries. This type of leadership is impulsive, oppressive, and brutal, without any respect for personal and property rights.

The fourth category of leaders analyzed by Jackson and Rosberg is a positive one: the prophets. Prophet-leaders are visionary. Africa has had very few of such leaders. Hyden (2006) describes them as typically socialist in orientation and eager to reorder their societies. However, they are faced with more and stiffer challenges than the other three types because they often do not possess the brutal and deceptive means of removing obstacles to their vision. The prophet could be seen to have been exemplarily personified by the likes of Tanzania's Nyerere, Ghana's Nkrumah and Nigeria's Nnamdi Azikiwe and Obafemi Awolowo.

Patron-Client Relations in Time and Space

Helmke and Levitsky (2006: 5) define informal institutions as "socially shared values, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels." This is applicable to the study of informal relations and institutions which Douglas (1990: 140) draws attention to by arguing that "informal constraints matter. We need to know much more about culturally derived norms of behaviour and how they interact with formal rules." However, as Piattoni (2001) observes, studies analyzing Latin America and Southern Europe make use of "clientelism" or "political clientelism." In Europe and North America, scholars use patronage to capture the same phenomenon, while "neopatrimonialism" is the term scholars use in studies focusing on Africa. Historically, all of these concepts can be described as derived from "euergetism"—that is, a situation in which wealthy individuals willingly donate funds for the construction of public facilities as munificent gifts to the city public (Barnard 2011). This stemmed from older practices of civic and religious gift-giving, when the gifts served as means of communication, legitimation and mediation between benefactors and cities dating back to the Archaic period (Ibid.). According to the French historian Boulanger, in whose work the concept first appeared, in 1923, euergetism was coined from the Greek word *euergetes*, meaning "benefactor," at a time when wealthy individuals, rather than the demos (people), provided money for public facilities. However, all of these describe the subordination of bureaucratic rationality to informal relations. Eurgetism is comparable to other forms of patron-client relations, like Homeric gift-giving and Hellenistic patronage systems, because it is derived from a sociostructural model that is characterized by the redistribution of wealth in the form of gifts, donating funds, or philanthropy, functioning as a tool for the wealthy to raise their position and society through ostentation, while reinforcing

a mutually beneficial relationship with the society (Ibid.). Euergetism and patron-client relationships are defined by patrons' placing of gifts in highly noticeable areas to show their munificence. In appreciation, the clients or recipients of such gifts give votive offering or mount a statue in their honour.

In a detailed study of patterns of patronage in the Eastern Roman Empire from (31 BCE–600 CE), Kalinowski (1996) traces the phenomenon to the relationship between high-ranking Romans and migrant communities, which is described as "patrocinium," with the Roman elites functioning as *patronus* to the community, known as *cliens*. Muno (2010) traces the etymology of clientelism to the Latin word, *cluere*, meaning "to obey and listen." In ancient Rome, a client was a person who had a lawyer representing his or her interests in a trial, while *clientela* was a group of persons who had someone speaking publicly in their interests.

Based on realities in Sicily, Boissevian (1966) argues that patronage differs from friendship because it involved two unequal parties and the exchange of different kinds of goods and services based on what could be obtained in medieval Sicily. Also, the gifts given by a patron were things that the client did not have the wherewithal to obtain; thus, the patron placed certain obligations on the client. These included public expression of gratitude and attending early morning salutations in the patron's residence. The grand motif of patron-client relations is visible in the words of Cicero, quoted in Kalinowski (1996: 21):

> As the stoics hold, everything that the earth produces is created for men's use and as men are born for the sake of men, that they may be able to mutually help one another; in this direction we ought to follow the nature as our guide, to contribute to the general good by an interchange of acts of kindness, by giving and receiving thus by our skill, our industry, and our talents cement human society more closely together, man to man.

Even though, historically, patron-client relations are not exclusively African in origin, as Taiwo (2011) points out their persistence there explains why Africa cannot fully modernize. However, I suggest that patron-client relations in modern Africa are part of the colonial legacy on the continent, using Nigeria as a referent. This is because patron-client relations can be seen as sociohistorical and sociostructural. Illustrating the perversion of bureaucratic ethos with the institutionalization of political godfatherism, which prioritizes outcome over processes, especially during elections, Taiwo (2011) traces the practice to colonialism, which bequeathed a system in which "those who tried to keep to the noble aims of politics fell victim to the grabbers."

The consequence was the evolution of politics into "a zero-sum game marked by impatience, lust for, and gargantuan misuses of power" (Taiwo 2011: 161).

However, in showing the seeming universal and power-oriented nature of patron-client relations amongst the Yorubas, Taiwo (2011) draws attention to the Janus-faced nature of the concept of a *Babanigbejo*,[1] because having such men subverted and ensured proper dispensation of justice. On the one hand, a Babanigbejo is someone whose word is occasionally law and who carries a lot of weight in the assembled council of the community. On the other hand, as a concept, Babangbejo is close to clientelism because "it is an institution that is often personified in the individuals and groups that deploy it to secure their advantage in [the] relevant situation" (Taiwo 2011: 163). Scott (1972: 92) provides a definition of clientelism that reflects the concept of Taiwo's Babanigbejo:

> an instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher socio-economic status (patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits or both for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part reciprocates by offering general support and assistance including personal services to the patron.

As an enduring informal institution, clientelism thrives on informal rules; this has informed the view of some scholars that it is based on rational choices, while those of the Weberian persuasion emphasize its vertical link with authority and dominance, just as some have underscored the preponderance of loyalty and reciprocity as its girding principles (Eisenstadt and Lemarchard 1981). Muno (2010: 4) enumerates the features of patron-client relations to include being dyadic, asymmetric, personal and enduring, reciprocal and voluntary. Of particular relevance in my context is the personal and enduring nature of patron-client relations, which is visible in the case of the Kim dynasty in North Korea and the Sarakis in Ilorin, Kwara state. Mainwaring (1999) explains that patrons and clients are not involved in impersonal relationships because they know one another. The relationship endures because they are inherited; by sons and nephews of patrons, especially in medieval clientelism. The modern variants of the concept also mirror some traits of the past. While some hold that it serves as a means of stabilizing the society, its antithetical effects on peace and justice are well documented (Harmand 1957).

In understanding the web of relations and complex hierarchies of leadership in Africa, particularly Nigeria, the concept of patron-client relations provides a useful guide. This is because the patron-client network depicts a peculiar mode of organization and mobilization.

Similarly, claims of unorganized systems of political successions might be valid to the extent of a lack of respect for written rules. However, the phenomenon of hereditary or dynastic successions, as seen in distant places like North Korea (Park 2011) and elsewhere, as defined by by Virginei Grzelczyk in his *In the Name of the Father, Son and Grandson*: *Succession Patterns and Kim Dynasty*, can be found in a place like Ilorin, where the late Oloye Saraki's first son, Dr. Bukola Saraki, succeeded him. Hereditary patterns of patron-client networks such as this challenge the description of successions in formal and informal leadership as chaotic and unorganized.

Toward a robust scholarship on leadership in Africa, Agbaje et al. (2009: 3) instructively draws attention to the need to transcend focus on political leadership and direct intellectual enquiry toward leadership in Africa at the informal level as well. This is because leadership in Africa revolves around "a web of relations involving several complex theaters of hierarchies of leadership invested in persons, groups, networks and institutions" (Agbaje et al. 2009). The potentials of this insight are huge, because it provides an opportunity to deepen understanding of the perpetually inchoate nature of the state on the continent, and its informal character, which blurs the line between what is private and public. Also, it provides a veritable source of understanding for why institutional structures are weak, and why institutional rules are less constant, ambiguous, and yet, generally accepted by the people in developing countries (Heather 2008). However, the types of theories adopted must take due cognizance of the African philosophies and sociological context of these philosophies (Agbaje et al. 2009: 8). This backdrop reinforces the justification for this chapter.

Oloyee: Emergence, Legitimation and Leadership Style of the Charismatic Leader

A big void in most discourses on political processes is the scant attention paid to leadership outside formal structures or contexts. The dominant views on leadership within discourses and theories on democracy have often been restricted to the emergence of leaders through elections. Most of these views are rooted in the works of Max Weber and Joseph Schumpeter. Abrahamsen (2000: 69) states that Weber's position on democracy is that it should be a basic means of "producing effective political leadership in conditions of a modern bureaucratic society." According to Weber (1946 99, 113) modern democracy entails the "soulessness of the masses" and the categorization of citizens into "politically active and politically passive elements." Schumpeter

(1976: 269) argues that the electorate lose leverage once elections are concluded; thus, "Democracy means only that the people have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men who are to rule them." However, this was limited to the emergence of leaders through formal processes like elections.

This does not, however, hold for the social structure in many African countries, where investment in reciprocal relations, described by Goran Hyden (1980) as "the economy of affection" doubtlessly shapes the social structure. In such communities, emerging as a leader within the social structure is not rigidly based on written rules but based more on affective relationships. Emerging as a leader is, therefore, contextually and relationally determined. Within such structures, two types of leaders have also emerged. These are the charismatic and the ideological leader, separated by the fact that the former is more interested in meeting the existential needs of his followers, while the latter focuses on setting a vision and shaping the collective will of his or her followers (Strange and Mumford 2002).

Prior to the emergence of Oloyee, Jimoh (1994: 305) recalls that a man known as Alhaji Yusuf Amuda Gobir was the first indigene of Ilorin to be appointed a Federal permanent secretary in 1962. He was an amiable philanthropist and patron who through his efforts,

> silently in most cases, several Ilorin indigenes, in particular...secured Federal appointments and were with his encouragement, able to make impressive advancements in the Federal Public Service. He also obtained for several other people various forms of public patronage, including contract awards in different sectors of the economy. Unfortunately, the man died in a ghastly road accident while holidaying in Spain in 1975.

Jimoh (1994) recounts that around this time, Oloyee was already making generous donations to the execution of community projects that included tarring of roads, sinking of boreholes, establishment of bakery, a cinema, feeding indigents and doling out money with fabrics to all and sundry, from all the nooks and crannies in Ilorin, who thronged to Oloyee's house, first at Agbaji, and later at Ile-Loke in the Government Reserved Area (GRA). While Gobir's death perhaps truncated his emergence as a full blown patron, Oloyee enjoyed longevity, which enabled him to build what Aina and Bhekinkosi (2013: 5) describes as "social relations of assistance and institutionalized giving."

So, undeterred by the first election defeat in 1964, Oloyee ran again and was elected as a member of the constituent assembly that produced the 1979 constitution of Nigeria. By the time the Second Republic began in 1979, Saraki was elected a senator and emerged as

the Senate Leader on the platform of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN). Since then, Oloyee has emerged as the main factor in the politics of Kwara state, in general, and Ilorin, in particular, enthroning and dethroning political clients as he pleases (Ojo and Lawal 2012). Adedoyin (2013) lists the following: Adamu Attah in 1979 (NPN), Chief C. O. Adebayo in 1983 (Unity Party of Nigeria, UPN), and Alhaji Mohammed Lawal in 1999 (All Peoples Party of Nigeria, APP). Saraki's son, Bukola Saraki, of the People's Democratic Party (PDP), had a falling out with his father, as had happened with Bukola's predecessor as governor, Governor Mohammed Lawal. However, Bukola installed the incumbent, Alhaji Abdufatah Ahmed, in spite of his father's support for his sister, Gbemisola, who later became the candidate of another party. Some described the father-son disagreement as a ploy between them to divide the votes of the strongest opposition to their anointed candidates in the 2011 gubernatorial elections in the state. Olusola Saraki was a political patron and a charismatic leader who has even been described by one of his admirers as "immortal" (Adedoyin 2013).

Ayoade (2008) provides an insightful analysis into the changing status of the Oloyee under each of the clients or godsons he installed. In terms of leadership, Ayoade (2008) recounts that the leaders in the political parties of the first, second and truncated third republic were thrown up by the constitution of the political parties. This conferred legitimacy on them while their charisma strengthened their control over the parties. Therefore, they deserved the respect of their followers and did not have to demand it; it came as a sign of submission to a superior. In this context, three types of characters emerged, and Oloyee, at different times, personified each of them.

The first is a mentor, defined by Ayoade (2008: 89) as "a senior person who is desirous of guiding a junior to acquire expertise and competence in the same profession or vocation." Here, mentoring has a noble and positive connotation for the parties involved. A benefactor "puts his/her resources at the disposal of the beneficiary. Such resources include goodwill, support and finance." Financiers are in another category that contrasts with the mentors and benefactors, because they want to remain anonymous and often ensure they cover their tracks. In contrast, while political mentors and benefactors do not expect rewards, financiers do. Similar to the financiers are the money-bags, who overtly fund the political process for the sole purpose of personal advantages. All of these represent different forms of the patron-client relations. However, Ayoade is wrong in stating that mentors and benefactors do not expect reward, and that financiers want to remain anonymous. As the cases of Saraki, Adedibu (in Ibadan and Oyo State, in relation to Governors Rashidi Ladoja and Christopher Alao-Akala), and Andy Uba (in Anambra State,

in relation to Governor Chris Ngige) show, benefactors and mentors, in many cases, not only expect, but also demand, rewards, while financiers such as Saraki, Andy Uba and Emeka Ofor do not always crave anonymity.

In his relationship with the first governor he installed, Oloyee was a financier as well as money-bags to Alhaji Adamu Attah, who was governor of Kwara from 1979 to 1983. Owing to irreconcilable differences over the sharing of political offices and the refusal of Governor Attah to award Oloyee's company a huge contract for the supply of drugs to the Kwara State government, they had a falling out. Reiterating that Kwara State was "contracted out" (Obadare 2007: 12) to him within a clientelistic political economy, Saraki shifted his resources and network to support Chief Cornelius Adebayo, who belonged to a different political party (UPN). Subsequently, Chief Adebayo won the election in 1983. Their relationship could not be tested, as the military seized power barely three months later. In 1999 when the Fourth Republic began, he repeated the same feat at both federal and gubernatorial levels when on February 25, 1999, he vengefully directed his supporters to vote for Chief Olusegun Obasanjo in the election of February 27, 1999 in a move that contradicted his backing Commodore Mohammed Lawal (rtd) with money and his political network to become the governor of the state at a time they both belonged to the same party: the All Peoples' Party of Nigeria (APP). This speaks to Oloyee's understanding of the neopatrimonial character of Nigeria's presidential system with which sub-national patrons must cooperate if they must remain relevant. The relationship between Lawal and Oloyee later turned sour, owing to differences over the sharing of spoils of office; Saraki formally decamped to the People's Democratic Party (PDP), where he made his first son, Bukola Saraki, the candidate. Bukola won election as the governor of the state for two-terms of eight years and has since emerged the scion of Oloyee's political dynasty, albeit within the context of intra-family crises.

The resultant succession of crises within his family lends credence to the prediction of Ayoade (2008: 90) that "The election of 2011 when [Saraki's] son would have completed the mandatory two terms would be a very interesting political event." Tumultuous as that later turned out, it still did not diminish the status of the man in the minds of his followers. The eventual winner of the 2011, Alhaji Abdul-Fatah Ahmed, Bukola's candidate and former commissioner, alluded to this by saying "we have all benefited from Olusola Saraki" (Lucas 2011a, b: 57). This is a testimony to Saraki's philanthropy and charismatic leadership. Also, Senator Simeon Suleiman Ajibola, the gubernatorial candidate of the People's Democratic Party (PDP) in the State, who ran against the incumbent, Governor Fatai Ahmed, a protégé of Senator Bukola, scion of Saraki's

dynasty, was for long a member and beneficiary of the political dexterity and financial support of the late Oloyee. This is evidenced by the fact that he seconded the motion that the airport in Ilorin be renamed after the late Oloyee (*National Mirror*, November 20, 2012). He later distanced himself from the "dynasty."

This trajectory also reveals a constant feature in patron-client relations and conflict. In managing such conflicts, Olooye usually waited strategically for (re)election periods to throw a sucker-punch at his renegade political sons or clients, as seen in the instances presented above, with the exception of the proxy war between him and his biological son, in which he could be described as having been floored (Ojo and Lawal 2012). Where and when there was a conflict between him and his client-candidates or client-governors, Saraki often waited until the eve of elections before directing millions of his supporters on whom to vote for. On each occasion, he succeeded, except when he was confronted by his biological son in 2011. However, the fact that he participated in a reconciliation process, which led to the reintegration of his loyalists into the political camp of his biological son, speaks of his dominant role in the politics of the state, while lending credence to those who suspected the feud between him and his son was a ploy to divide the votes of the opposition against their preferred candidate.

The People's Oloyee

I solicited responses from Saraki's followers to the following questions: What attracted respondents to him? What is his style and role in the politics of Ilorin and Nigeria as a whole? What is his relationship with the opposition? How did he touch you personally? Do you miss him? Of those opposed to Saraki's leadership style, I specifically asked, Why were you opposed to him? How did he relate with the opposition?

Out of the ten purposively selected interviewees, none, including those opposed to his style of politics, denied Oloyee's philanthropy, which dated back to the 1960s, when he first ventured into politics. All the respondents agreed that his philanthropy, more than anything else, attracted them to him because they saw in him a good, merciful and cheerful giver who did everything to meet the existential needs of his followers. Specifically, they listed his philanthropic gestures—providing educational support, daily feeding of the poor, sponsoring people to perform the Holy Pilgrimage to Mecca (Hajj), distributing rams during Muslim festivals, and, despite his status, being accessible to all, anytime, without any formal protocol—as factors that attracted them to him. Also, they were unanimous about the fact that he never abandoned his people, even after winning elections. According to a respondent,

> During a fracas at a campaign that we had in the southern senatorial district of Kwara during the Second Republic a woman lost her an eye and after *Oloyee* was informed, he built a three bedroom bungalow for her, gave her a reasonable amount of money and a grinding machine to eke out a living in front of the house.

Another interviewee who worked closely with him viewed gestures like this as the source of spiritual strength and blessing for the Oloyee, whom he described as sometimes "eccentric." According to the respondent, "He could select a few, especially the aged, and very young ones for special blessings like unimaginable amount of money, scholarships, expensive clothes, and (he) might build houses for (a) selected few."

According to a respondent, a constant factor in Saraki's house was that "he ensured that as many as thronged his house were fed and at least a cow was slaughtered daily and he ensured each person got a transport fare back home." All the beneficiaries nostalgically recounted that, at a time bread was unaffordable in Ilorin, Saraki established a bakery, which, all agreed, folded because a lot of people were receiving free loaves of bread. A key informant was of the view that Saraki's belief in unlimited philanthropy must have contributed to the eventual liquidation of a commercial bank in which he had substantial stakes, because he was always drawing money to give to his followers even on Sundays.[2] According to the respondent, "Baba only put a call through or gave you his complimentary card for money to be released [by the bank]." A respondent who was with him for close to 40 years recounted that he did not start as a politician but a provider of social and economic means for the people before venturing into politics. Therefore, most people were attracted to him because of his philanthropy, which, overtime, created a mass following that could not be ignored by those seeking elective offices especially the seat of the government in Kwara state.

Regarding his style, another respondent who was with him for close to 40 years recounted:

> Before he [emerged as leader], the different sub-ethnic groups in Kwara state such as Ilorin, Igbomina, Nupe and Ibolo were sworn political enemies but he substantially succeeded in bringing them together politically. He extended this to the traditional rulers in these places by placing them on monthly salaries after renovating their palaces. As a result of this, the traditional rulers were the ones who prevailed on their people to team up with him.

Thus, for the people, Saraki exhibited a very important quality of leadership—that is, the ability to bring people together, achieve unity of purpose, and reconcile different groups. Even though he did all these in

the service of his role as a patron, most of the people recognized his role as that of a leader.

Also, respondents revealed that he took the welfare and the opinions of women seriously. He often joined them in merrymaking and dancing within his compound. He also personally ensured that they were all well-fed. In addition, he personally gave them transport fare to travel to and from his home. Respondents revealed that irrespective of the socio-economic status of his followers and where they lived within Kwara state, Oloyee ensured that he was personally present to felicitate and commiserate with them, depending on the occasion. In addition to the preceding, another key informant opined that he understood the attachment of the Ilorin people to Islam because during his first electoral outing, many saw him as a stranger and alien because he did not identify with Islam in any way. Therefore, subsequently, he presented himself as a devout Muslim and observed all the performances of that self-identification and public presentation.

On his role in the politics of Kwara state, respondents described Saraki as a unifier, a grassroots' politician, a stabilizer, and a mobilizer. All of these must have resulted in his emergence as a bride well-courted by the military regimes that Nigeria has had since the mid-1980s. Suberu and Agbaje (1998) argue that Nigeria's post-colonial history is a study of military rule which can be divided into two. Within the two phases delineated either as that of *hegemonic exchange* (1966–1979), during which the country's military rulers encouraged the military governors in the states to exercise a modicum of autonomy which led to the infusion of notable civilian politicians, including ethno-regional elites into the structure of military rule, and the second phase (1984–1999), defined by abusive personalization of power and even the *pacted*[3] Fourth Republic, Oloyee was central to the politics of Kwara state.

Oloyee was a recurring decima in the political equation of the country, through all phases, from the period of post-Second Republic military rule through the Third to the Fourth Republic. During the Second Republic, he participated actively in the formation of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), which gave him the platform to emerge as the Senate Leader in that Republic. According to a respondent "despite the huge amounts of money he spent during party primaries in the Second Republic compared to the paltry resources expended by the eventual candidate Alhaji Shehu Uthman Shagari, Saraki still gave his unflinching support to Shagari campaigns [when the latter won the party's ticket]."

In the Fourth Republic, Saraki was part of what Herskovit (2007) described as "ad hoc coalitions" bereft of any unifying programmes or ideologies that emerged as political parties. Oloyee emerged as a force in the All People's Party (APP), which included the five political parties

formed under General Sani Abacha. Oloyee's influence, as usual, was based on his patron-client network in Kogi and Kwara states (Kew 2010). Just as he parted ways with Adamu Attah in 1983 to support Chief C. O Adebayo on the stable of another political party, he also parted with late Mohammed Lawal whom he installed in 1999. Adebanwi (2012a) provides an account of the corruption of the police in the crises prior to the 2003 elections which speaks to magnitude of respect the Oloyee enjoyed from the federal government under President Obasanjo (1999–2007). During the supremacy tussle between Saraki and Governor Mohammed Lawal, it was reported that three million pounds was paid to Tafa Balogun to ward off Oloyee from Kwara state. Thereafter, Oloyee was advised to stay away from the state by the state's commissioner of police because his safety could not be guaranteed. Consequently,

> Saraki ran to his allies in Abuja who were in charge of federal power. Since Obasanjo and the PDP were desirous of capturing the Middle-Belt state of Kwara from the opposition ANPP, Balogun's scheme ran into trouble. President Obasanjo asked that the Police Commissioner, Ghazali Lawal, be transferred from the state. He replaced him with M.D Abubakar. Balogun tried to get the new police commissioner to do his bidding, but the man obviously had a different briefing from Aso Rock Villa. Balogun then tried another trick. He announced the transfer of eight commissioners of police including that of Kwara. Aso Rock reversed the decision in the case of Kwara (Adebanwi 2012a: 191).

This speaks to the assertion of Utas (2012: 20) that state corruption in non-conflict countries is not random corruption; in many cases, it is the way government works; it is not incidental, but structural. The roots of such practices have been traced to colonial rule that established and designed African administrations as "instruments of command and control" (Englebert and Dunn 2013: 162) within which institutions like the police served as enforcement wings of incumbents rather than providing service to the public.

All the respondents stated that Saraki touched their lives positively in that he built houses and bought cars for some of them, placed them in high political and bureaucratic offices in the three tiers of local, state and federal governments, and even sponsored the education of their children locally and abroad. A respondent recounted an occasion when his father disowned his elder brother for refusing to support Oloyee's candidate during a local government election.

On the other hand, there were respondents who decried Oloyee's type of politics, amongst them septuagenarians, octogenarians, and people in their forties drawn from Asa local government area, his first place of electoral contest, ex-public office holders in Kwara state and his staunch political opponents. Their resentment stemmed from

allegations that he was a "usurper" because he was not an autochthon of Ilorin, and on this, one respondent drew my attention to the existence of an area in Abeokuta capital of Ogun State known as "Saraki-Adigbe" to buttress his claim that Oloyee was not an autochthon of Ilorin or even Kwara State. Alhaji AbdulGaniyu Folorunsho Abdurazak, a former Nigerian ambassador to Cote d'Ivoire, claims that he met Muktari Saraki, the father of Oloyee, in Abidjan and Muktari Saraki told him they hailed from Abeokuta in Ogun State, so if Oloyee's father was from Abeokuta, his claim to be from Ilorin cannot be true (Johnson 2010).

Respondents also dismissed the idea that annual New Year celebrations, at which Saraki doled out goodies, including cash and fabrics, were a diabolical means by which the man spiritually controlled the people. Those opposed to Saraki's style of politics suggested that the distribution of the gifts was actually an occult ritual, in which the recipients would lose their lives so that Saraki could prolong his own and renew his wealth. In the same vein, a septuagenarian who never saw eye-to-eye with Oloyee linked the penury that characterized the lives of Oloyee's estranged beneficiaries to the plausibility that he might cast spells on them. The respondent made reference to Adamu Attah, who was fed and clothed by Oloyee after he left office as an executive governor of Kwara State. The respondent revealed further that Senator Shaba Lafiaji, who had a short stay in office as governor at a time Nigeria practiced diarchy (1991–1993), became so insolvent that he could not afford to pay electricity bills until he reconciled with Oloyee, who again facilitated his election as a senator in 2007. The respondent also linked the death of Commodore Mohammed Lawal after a protracted illness, as resulting from a spell cast on him by Oloyee.

When former governors who were considered ungrateful to Oloyee lost wealth and prestige, it was interpreted as a consequence of a spell cast on them. Respondents opposed to his style of politics also cited as demeaning the arrangement in the "great hall" referred to as Ile-loke, meaning "the house on top," where Oloyee held court with his clients: there was only one seat in the hall, for Oloyee alone. Practically, this means every other person had to sit on the floor while Oloyee assumed a magisterial and royal position. According to a former local government chairman of Edu, decisions or instructions handed down in the great hall were to be obeyed without question. He cited an instance in which he was reported by the elders of his local government for opting to construct roads instead of "taking care of them," and he was summoned. On arrival at Oloyee's apartment, he and his accusers were all taken to the great hall, where he was told his "offense," and instructions were given to him to always "take care" of the elders in the local government before thinking of constructing roads. He revealed that

ordinarily he would have contested such an instruction, but because it was given to him in the great hall, he dared not object. The former local government chairman alluded to insinuations in the quarters of Oloyee's opponents that Ile-Loke has some hypnotic powers that made it impossible for anyone who stepped into the hall to refuse any order Oloyee gave.

The arrangement in the great hall depicts the unequal nature of patron-client relations because every other person must seat on floor while only the Oloyee had the honor and right to sit on a chair. This contrasts with the practice in the residence of the late Lamidi Adedibu, who was the main patron in Ibadan politics while he lived, as observed in an earlier study by Animasawun (2013). The difference in the ways these two major patrons held court speaks to the need to understand "contemporary clientelism from a historical and cultural viewpoint" (Chabal 2009: 92). Adedibu held court in his vast premises with dignitaries and other "big men" and women on his left and right in an hierarchical manner. Although there was a provision for others to sit, there were hardly enough seats, which eventually meant some stood while many sat on the floor. In the great hall, only one chair is available, and this has been inherited by Senator Bukola Saraki, in a manner akin to inheriting a royal stool. This arrangement portrays the description of Chabal (2009: 93) that patron-client relations were "rooted in a very direct and palpable way of life shared between rulers and ruled who lived by cheek by jowl." However, such rulers or patrons emerged in specific socioeconomic, political and military contexts, depending on the needs in each setting, which determined and conferred legitimacy on the emergent patron (See Falola 2012).

Another respondent, who was in his fifties and a former aide to both father (Oloyee) and son (Bukola), decried Oloyee's selfish nature by recalling that "at a point, Bukola Saraki was the governor, Gbemisola Saraki was the Senator of Kwara Central Senatorial district and when a nominee was requested from Kwara as a Special Aide to President Obasanjo, the governor (Bukola) nominated Laolu Saraki." In the respondent's view, this was the height of selfishness and contrasted with the style of the late Gobir, who gave equal opportunities to all Ilorin indigenes.

DECODING OLOYEE'S CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP: EXCHANGE RELATIONS AND RELIGION

For a man who personified the definition of politics as a way of determining who gets what, when and how for close to five decades in Kwara State, it is important to investigate what made Saraki powerful. In doing this, cognisance must be taken of the sociocultural and sociostructural nature of patron-client relations. As revealed by Szeftel

(2000), clientelistic leaders have always relied on mass support for political clout which is translated into opportunities for accumulating personal wealth at the expense of the development of the state, social entry and enhanced class position in the broader political economy of such states. For clients, such accumulations are often rationalized as God's blessings bestowed on such patrons for subsequent distribution to them. This applies to Oloyee because one of the constant factors in the conflicts he had with his political clients was that they were not remitting money to him to enable him to provide for the horde of dependants in his network (For a similar case (Adedibu-Ladoja's) in Oyo State, see Obadare 2007).

As a sociocultural practice, patron-client relation is not recent in Ilorin. According to O'Hear (1986), political intermediaries called *Baba-Kekere*[4] were prominent in Ilorin in the nineteenth century. They represented the interests of subjects or inferiors to the ruler, higher authority or those who held traditional power and got paid for performing such functions. A similar figure also existed in Ibadan known as *Baba-Ogun*, while amongst the Hausa they were referred to as *Kofa*[5] (O'Hear 1986). In Ilorin, the *Baba Kekere* emerged often from among the chiefly families or the titled slaves. They provided access to justice and land and protected the interests of clients in legal cases and any other areas where they had interests. Economically, each craft had its own *Baba Kekere* through whom taxes were passed to the emir. In both political and economic relations, the *Baba Kekere* received no salary but received gratuities, and in both cases, clients were free to choose and change their *Baba Kekere* if he was found not to be delivering as expected. O'Hear (1986) captures this phenomenon, which was the norm in nineteenth century Ilorin and most of the Hausa emirates under the control of the Sokoto Caliphate of the nineteenth century, as institutionalized corruption.

Szeftel (2000: 436) analyzes three types of clientelism: coercive dependence, political identity and exchange relations. Exchange relations were based on meeting the needs of clients in exchange for loyalty. In the case of the Oloyee, he made use of exchange relations by meeting the needs of all and sundry, thereby fulfilling the functions of a charismatic leader, particularly in providing for their existential needs. This also portrayed him as a philanthropist.

Also, Oloyee mobilized religion to sustain his legitimacy amongst the masses while cautiously allowing religious identity to be the fundamental determinant of the candidates he supported or promoted for elective positions. For instance, in the defunct Kwara State, he supported a Christian, Chief Cornelius Adebayo, to be the governor of the state, cognizant of the reasonable demographic strength of the Christians. However, following the creation of Kogi state, excised

from old Kwara State, and cognizant of the dominant demography of Muslims in the current Kwara State, Saraki consistently supported mainly Muslim candidates in order not to offend the sensibilities of the majority of the population and to ensure the marketability of such candidates.

Since his death, his hegemonic hold on the state has been bequeathed on his son, Senator Bukola Saraki, also a one-time governor of the state who installed the state's current governor. A respondent in his seventies affirmed and rationalized the continued loyalty to Oloye's hegemony by political constituents in Kwara State as loyalty to Allah and memory of the Oloyee because there is no household in Ilorin and Kwara whose member can claim not to have benefited from the generosity of Oloyee. Going philosophical and proverbial, he argued, "It is a sign of betrayal to abandon the chicks after the death of the mother-hen and asked rhetorically: 'What will I tell Bukola's father when I meet him in the hereafter as one of the people he left behind.'" As an attestation to his relevance, even in death, and an attempt at monumentalizing a cult-hero, the state-owned university was renamed after Saraki, and when there were reactions against the decision by opposition parties in the state, the Commissioner for Tertiary Education in Kwara state, Mohammed Laide, upbraided those who were against the monumentalization: "If it is possible to rename Kwara State as Olusola Saraki state, I think the late Baba Saraki deserves it. All of us sitting here today and those of us not here, Baba has contributed one way or the other to what we are today" (Jimoh 2013: 57).

A high-ranking Chief in the emir's palace, the Moggaji Nda of Ilorin Alhaji Saliu Mohammed, opined:

> I heard somebody was saying he is objecting to the renaming of KWASU after Saraki...The Commissioner was so kind by saying we can name the state after Saraki. We can name everybody after Saraki. I am proud to call myself Saraki. Let me tell you if there is politics in heaven, we are going to queue behind him. (Ibid.: 57)

However, in an interview with an estranged former aide of Bukola Saraki, the scion of Oloyee's political dynasty, the aide likened the renaming to naming a university after the late Lamidi Adedibu—the strongman of Ibadan politics—and bemoaned the credibility burden it would place on the identity of the university.

In kicking against the renaming of Kwara State University (KWASU) after Oloye, political parties and sociocultural organizations decried the action on different grounds although with a shared concern. The Afenifere Renewal Group (ARG) in the state contented: "The 'leader' had no dominant idea on government like Chief Obafemi Awolowo and

Nnamdi Azikiwe; had no sagacity of Sir Ahmadu Bello; had no privilege of heading a government like Tafawa Balewa and S.L Akintola and had no courage like M.K.O Abiola" (Ibid.: 57).

The above instances speak to the analysis of Shore (2002: 13) that "monumentalizing the past" is one of the strategies used by elites to maintain power and authority over the present (Herzfeld 2000: 234), and the attendant crises that it can generate from opposing elites in such spaces. Further, it alludes to the observation of Adebanwi (2012b: 5) about the centrality of place naming to the everyday life of Africans and how it constitutes a source of conflict and cooperation.

Also, the performance of Oloyee's burial also polarized religious clerics in the state, given the non-observance of the mandatory Islamic burial rites, specifically the spreading of the corpse on a mat on the floor, after which Muslim adherents pray before its interment in plain white clothes. In the case of Oloyee, some Islamic scholars condemned the non-observance of these rituals as a flagrant disdain for a core aspect of the religion, which lead them to question the validity of his claim that he was a Muslim.

Given the strong influence of Islam on the consciousness of most Ilorin people, sustaining relationships with the children of the dead is seen as a spiritual means of sustaining relationship with the departed one. This is premised on a popular hadith of Prophet Mohammed that assures children and friends of a departed Muslim of enormous reward (Lahda) from Allah if they sustain the relationship initiated by the departed as an obligation. In the context of Oloyee's hegemony and Ilorin politics, loyalty is seen as obligatory from both African and Islamic perspectives. While this points to a core aspect that defines being and belonging in many African societies, it brings to minds the assessment of Kearl and Rinaldi (1983: 1) that "death reveals the fundamental sociocultural structures and dynamics in any society." The interaction of Islam and indigenous African belief system provides a discursive rationalization for sustaining relationship with Oloyee's son, and by extension, his political hegemony. Perhaps the people are guided by the words of Antigone, quoted in Adebanwi (2007: 10) that "I owe a longer allegiance to the dead than to the living: in the world I shall abide forever." Therefore, the Moggaji Nda of Ilorin Emirate must have spoken from a rationality girded by a mix of the Islamic and African believe in the certainty of life after death.

Conclusion

Alterman et al. (2005) have observed that philanthropy's attendant institutions, such as patron-client relations, provide a reliable window

for comprehending the dynamics of and values of Muslim societies, such as Kwara state, and Ilorin, in particular. Alterman et al. (2005: viii) observes further that "Muslims tend to favor direct charity to an individual recipient over channeling their donations through an established institution," which makes the emergence and legitimation of charismatic leaders and patrons like Oloyee comprehensible. This position is cognizant of the contrast between gift-exchange and commodity-exchange. This lends credence to the quotations at the introduction of this article in explaining the emergence, legitimation and "immortality" of *Oloyee*.[6] In the case of Oloyee, he could be described as a philanthropist who established and bequeathed a peculiar form of philanthropy, built as a form of social relations of "care," by making meeting the needs of others a means to expand his own self-interest (See Aina and Bhekinkosi 2013: 5–7).

Studying Oloyee offers an insight into how philanthropy and clientelism as sociocultural and sociostructural practice can be implemented to present some people as charismatic leaders in and outside of formal political office. Oloyee bestrode the political space like a colossus, and in death, handed over his political structure and control of the state to his biological son, Bukola Saraki, which depicts dynastic succession, even within a democratic context. Now, Bukola is the "new Oloyee," running Kwara State like an extended kinship group, rewarding clients and punishing opponents.

Notes

1. A *Babanigbejo* is "an influential sponsor at the hearing. He usually is one who has considerable influence in the community concerned and whose word is occasionally law."
2. In the book, *Paradise for Maggots The Story of a Nigerian Anti-Graft Czar*, Adebanwi provides accounts of instances of sleaze involving *Olooye* and his son, Bukola, which culminated in the eventual liquidation of the Bank. See pages 334, 335, and 345.
3. Description of Nigeria's fourth-republic as a product of a pact between the political class and top military brass see, J. Bayo Adekanye, *The Retired Military as Emergent Power Factor in Nigeria* (Heinemann Educational Books, 1999).
4. *Baba Kekere* means smaller or younger father, but schematically he could be likened to an extra-official intermediary conveying the orders of the ruled to the ruler.
5. *Kofa* means door or gate.
6. However, Appadurai (1986) cautions against the trivialization of gift-behaviour or its interpretation as peculiarly African by drawing attention to examples of exchange transactions typical such as the culture of exchanging Christmas gifts in Western societies.

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