Making Nations, Creating Strangers

States and Citizenship in Africa

Sara Dorman
Daniel Hammett
Paul Nugent
(editors)

AFRICAN SOCIAL STUDIES SERIES

BRILL

Making Nations, Creating Strangers

African Social Studies Series

VOLUME 16

Making Nations, Creating Strangers

States and Citizenship in Africa

Edited by

Sara Dorman
Daniel Hammett
Paul Nugent

BRILL

LEIDEN • BOSTON
2007

Cover image by Marc Fletcher.

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication data

A C.I.P. record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

ISSN 1568-1203
ISBN 978 90 04 15790 3

PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

CONTENTS

PART FOUR

NATIONS BUILDING BOUNDARIES

PART FIVE

PRESENT, PAST AND FUTURE OF CITIZENSHIP IN AFRICA

MAPS

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

These papers were amongst those presented at the *States, Borders and Nations: Negotiating Citizenship in Africa* conference held at the University of Edinburgh in May 2004. This conference was one of the annual series held in Edinburgh addressing different aspects of Africanist studies, and arose from a belief that little work and dialogue had been undertaken considering the ways in which nationhood and citizenship are negotiated in reference to states and borders.

In recent years civil wars and conflicts across Africa have continued, and the number of conflicts over states and nationhood that we have witnessed since the holding of the conference serves to underline the topicality and importance of this issue. What these conflicts, and the many others still continuing, demonstrate is the complexity of nation and state building processes. The papers explore many of these intricacies and provide analysis of the causes and consequences of the ongoing struggle for identities. Emphasising the role of the state, and the continued prescience of borders, these papers interrogate the processes through which citizenship is defined, nations made, and the political expressions of these constructions.

In compiling these papers we must extend our thanks to a number of people and organisations, including to the rest of the organising committee of the conference for their assistance in orchestrating and running the event. We are grateful to our contributors for their patience and co-operation whilst we finalised the publication. We must also thank the Binks Trust, the British Academy, the Royal African Society and African Studies Association UK, and the British Council (Pretoria) for their financial support to the conference. Permission to print Ruth Marshall-Fratani's paper, *The War of 'Who is Who'*, which originally appeared in the *African Studies Review* 2006, volume 49, issue 2, is gratefully acknowledged.

Sara Dorman
Dan Hammett
Paul Nugent
University of Edinburgh, February 2006

ABBREVIATIONS

AAC	All Anglophone Conference
ADIACI	Association of Defence of Autochthons Interests of Côte d'Ivoire
AKMSS	Aga Khan Mzizima Secondary School
AU	African Union
CCCE	Consultative Constitutional and Electoral Commission
CFA	Communauté Financière d'Afrique
CONAKAT	Confédération des Associations Tribales du Katanga
CURDIPHE	Cellule Universitaire de Recherche et de Diffusion des Idées et Actions Politiques du Président Henri Konan Bédié
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ESR	Education for Self-Reliance
FCFA	Franc de la Communauté Financierè d'Afrique
FESCI	Fédération Estudiantine et Scolaire de la Côte d'Ivoire
FLN	Front de Libération Nationale
FPI	Front Populaire Ivoirien
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IMF	International Monetary Fund
KNDP	Kamerun National Democratic Party
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MBOSCUDA	Mbororo Social and Cultural Development Association
MFA	Mouvement des Forces de l'Avenir
MODEL	Movement for Democracy in Liberia
MPCI	Mouvement Patriotique de la Côte d'Ivoire
MPIGO	Mouvement Populaire du Grand Ouest
MJP	Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix
MSA	Mouvement Socialist Africain
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisations
NPLF	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
OAU	Organisation of African Union
ONI	Opération Nationale d'Identification
ONUC	United Nations Mission in the Congo
OPS	Olimpio Primary School
PANA	Parti Nationaliste Africaine
PDCI	Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire
RDA	Rassemblement Démocratique Africain
RDR	Rassemblement des Républicains
RENAMO	Resistencia Naçional Moçambicana
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SAA	Syndicat Agricole Africain
SCNC	Southern Cameroon National Council
SCPC	Southern Cameroons People's Conference
SDF	Social Democratic Front
SIAMO	Syndicat Interprofessionel d'acheminement de la main-d'ouevre
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SRSS	Shaaban Robert Secondary School
TANU	Tanganyika African National Union
TNA	Tanzania National Archives
TSO	Tous Sauf Ouattara

UC	Union Camerounaise
UDPCI	Union for Democracy and Peace in Côte d'Ivoire
UFERI	Union des républicains et des fédéralistes indépendants
UN	United Nations
UNDCP	United Nations Drug Control Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UPC	Union de Populations du Cameroun
UOCOCI	Union des Originaires des Six Cercles de L'Ouest de la Côte d'Ivoire
ZANU (PF)	Zimbabwean African National Union (Patriotic Front)
ZBC	Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation

CONTRIBUTORS

Neville Alexander is the Director of the Project for the Study of Alternative Education in South Africa (PRAESA), at the University of Cape Town.

Nicodemus Fru Awasom is based at the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences at the University of The Gambia/West Africa.

Ned Bertz is an Assistant Professor at the Department of History, University of Hawai'i at Mânoa.

Daniel Hammett is a doctoral candidate at the Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh.

Sam Hickey is a Lecturer in the Institute for Development Policy and Management at the University of Manchester.

Deborah James is a Reader in Anthropology at the London School of Economics.

Ruth Marshall-Fratani is Director of the Institut Francais de Recherche en Afrique, University of Ibadan, Nigeria.

Paul Nugent is Professor of Comparative African History and the Director of the Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh.

Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja has been the Director of the UNDP Governance Centre in Oslo since 2002. He is also Professor Emeritus of African Studies at Howard University in Washington.

Brian Raftopoulos is an Associate Professor at the Institute for Development Studies at the University of Zimbabwe.

Will Reno is Associate Professor of Political Science at the Northwestern University, USA.

Sara Rich Dorman is a Lecturer in African Politics at the University of Edinburgh.

Blair Rutherford is a Lecturer at the Faculty of Sociology and Anthropology at Carleton University, Canada.

Crawford Young is a Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA.

PART ONE

CITIZENSHIP, NATION AND AFRICA

INTRODUCTION: CITIZENSHIP AND ITS CASUALTIES IN AFRICA

Sara Dorman, Daniel Hammett and Paul Nugent[1]

At the close of the twentieth century much conventional wisdom about the trajectory of Africa was finally jettisoned by policy-makers and academics alike. African states appeared to be diverging ever more profoundly from the model of the nation-state, but without it being clear what was taking its place. To many, it seemed that the fiction surrounding statehood was finally being exposed for all to see, with much of the continent being left without functioning states or even 'politics' in the sense of negotiated solutions to routine decision-making. African states seemed destined to be filed in some 'other' category, while the rest of the world wrestled with the rather different problems of reconciling entrenched nation-statism with the pressures of globalisation.

In fact, things have not panned out as the 'realists' predicted. Although there has been a breakdown of order within many African countries, there have been just as many attempts to revive the state—as has been the case in formerly war-torn Mozambique or Sierra Leone. Moreover, nationalism certainly has not become a relic of the past. On the contrary, in a number of cases there has been noticeable increase in the salience of appeals to nationalism which cannot simply be regarded as opportunistic. Indeed, as Crawford Young reminds us we have seen that "states may entirely collapse without disappearing as nations from the social imaginary" (this volume: 241).

The discourses of nationalism and ethnicity have instead run in parallel within and across states, sometimes clashing and at other times cross-fertilising one another, the reason being that they occupy a great deal of common ground. The weakening of central authority might have been expected to empower those seeking to openly deploy the language of ethnicity, but when so much has been up for grabs it has been possible for actors at the margins to seek to remould nationalism in a way which re-defines who belongs and who does not, a particular

[1] The authors extend their thanks to all of those who commented on this chapter, in particular to Blair Rutherford and Sam Hickey.

form of the "politics of recognition" (Englund and Nyamnjoh 2004). In the context of diminishing resources, defining the boundaries and meaning of citizenship is considered an issue of paramount importance in many countries. And this means that politics, in the sense referred to above, is very much alive.

It is arguably in the nature of nationalism to distinguish insiders from outsiders, but because this is occurring against the backdrop of acute economic distress and state reconstruction, the process is especially fraught in Africa. Putting it crudely, the stakes are much higher. There is scarcely a country on the continent where the state of the nation and the boundaries of inclusion/exclusion have not been debated in recent times, and in many instances violent conflict has ensued. This volume speaks, therefore, to some of the most important issues affecting contemporary Africa: who belongs to the nation, what is the status of lower order identities and how are resources divvyed up and ring-fenced as a consequence? The contributors, who are renowned experts in their countries of expertise, address the historical roots of national and ethnic identities, explore how these have shifted over time, identify the material and symbolic resources which are contested, and weigh up the relative importance of elite manipulation and subaltern agency. Although other cases would also merit inclusion most of the obvious candidates are examined. The remainder of this introduction teases out some of the sub-themes and draws out the links between the individual contributions in order to assist the reader to establish a clearer sense of the whole.

The State of the Nations

In recent times, considerable attention has been paid to the African state (Samatar and Samatar 2002; Herbst 2000; Olukoshi and Laakso 1996; Boone 2005) or lack thereof (Reno 1998; Dunn 2005; Boas 2005) in academic debates. But, in order to make sense of recent conflicts over land, borders and resources, within and between African states, we need to start by examining the interaction between state and nation, and how we conceptualise them. To start with the state, the relationship between pre-existing political forms, in all their diversity, and the colonial state was a rather complex one. For the first three decades of the twentieth century, colonial states were not that statish at all. They were minimalist, fiscally constrained and highly personalised. In non-set-

tler Africa, the colonial regimes often battened onto the existing power structure, adapting structures of tax gathering (as in Northern Nigeria) and using the charismatic and coercive force of African rulers. In settler states, there was much less accommodation, especially given the reality of land seizures, but the personalised nature of white rule was no less pronounced, while the tax system was highly skewed towards Africans. As Cooper and others have pointed out, it was only in the twilight years of colonialism after the Second World War that colonial states had the fiscal and administrative capacity to assume many of the functions one normally associates with the state (Cooper 1996).

Within a decade, decolonisation had led to the hasty transfer of power to Africans, but with the job of creating functioning states left essentially unfinished. The economic boom years which accompanied independence encouraged the belief that this would still be possible, but these conditions did not last. The 1970s witnessed the shocks of the global oil crisis and drought and by the 1980s the economies of most countries were in dire straits, states lacked the resources to carry out the most basic functions (such as paying school teachers on a regular basis) and personalised rule became more obvious. This has been much commented upon, but what perhaps needs to be underlined is that state-building was still work in progress at the time of independence. Many of the issues which were not resolved by then—for example the registration of title to land—became acutely contentious at the turn of millennium.

Nationalism in Africa has been the topic of study since the early years of independence (Hodgkin 1956; Lonsdale 1968; Kedourie 1971; Smith 1983), but we agree with Chipkin's argument that the task of defining the term 'nation' has been "sorely neglected in…Africanist scholarship" (2005: 134). Whereas the early literature focused on the political aspects of nationalism, and in particular the ending of foreign domination, it soon became obvious that there had to be more to nationalism than that. Like states, nations were embryonic at the time of independence. In some territories like Nigeria and the Sudan the constituent units had only been encouraged to think of themselves as sharing a national space on the eve of independence. In other cases, like Uganda, colonialism produced acute manifestations of uneven development which made it difficult to build a sense of sharing in a common citizenship. Where traditional authorities retained substantive powers, there was an additional hurdle which had to be negotiated. Arguably, the fact that the borders between African states were 'artificial' and

enclosed un-related peoples is not the most important reason why the national project had its problems (Hastings 1977; Nugent 2002). We find Eriksen's proposal that "sentiments of national solidarity can be grown from diverse seedlings" (2004: 50) entirely plausible. Moreover, as Mkandawire has suggested:

> …the problem is not so much that the nationalists accepted existing colonial borders. Rather that this acceptance gave individual states carte blanche as to what they could do to their citizens (2003: 2).

Putting it simply, the national question, as it was posed around the time of independence, turned on the problems of ensuring the perception of equal treatment, measured in terms of resource allocation and the definition of appropriate values and symbols for all the constituent parts of the nation. In many countries, like Nigeria, this came to be perceived as a zero sum game, often with tragic consequences. The post-colonial state provides the legal and material resources over which conflicts occur (Allen 1995; Young 1994), but the nation provides the legitimating framework behind such struggles. While material resources—access to land, opportunities and jobs—are often at stake, these conflicts are potent and meaningful for their contestants because they are framed and understood in terms of identity and belonging.

This brings us neatly to issues surrounding ethnicity. By contrast with nationalism, ethnicity has almost been debated to death in the last two decades (Spear 2003). The debate has turned very largely on the historicity of ethnicity: that is, whether ethnic groups or 'tribes' were rooted in older identities or were colonial inventions/constructions. Studies of nineteenth century Africa, "have emphasized that far from there being a single 'tribal' identity, most Africans moved in and out of multiple identities" (Ranger 1985: 248). Ranger goes on to state that the twentieth century saw an "immobilization of populations, reinforcement of ethnicity and rigidity of social definition" as a consequence of colonial political and economic changes (1985: 249). There is now an emerging consensus that rather than looking for decisive ruptures, it would be more helpful to see identities as in a constant process of mutation from the nineteenth century down to the present—and to acknowledge that the process has not come to a stop (Lentz and Nugent 2000).

If nations are 'imagined' (Anderson 1991), and if the contents of that imaginative package may shift over time, precisely the same is true of ethnicity (Ranger 1985; Vail 1989, Brennan 1990). Some important consequences follow from this fact. While some actors seek to define

who belongs to the nation and what it means to be a good citizen, other actors are constantly seeking to define the boundaries and moral universe of the ethnic group (Berman and Lonsdale 1992). Where the ethnic group in question crosses an international border, or where the self-proclaimed nationalists seek to marginalise members of a particular group, sources of dissonance and potential conflict arises between the actors in question. But there is also scope for negotiation. Hence culture brokers of the ethnic group may seek to lend their definition of moral rectitude to the nation as a whole. For example, the Kikuyu variant of valuing private wealth accumulation was carried over to Kenya as a whole during the Kenyatta period. In Ghana, the Ashanti variant on the same theme was regarded as a threat by Kwame Nkrumah whose architects of nationalism instead sought to define national values in a mixture of statism and collectivism. Equally, ethnic actors may seek help from state actors in defining their rivals as illegitimate claimants. The weakening of the political centre at the turn of the millennium led to precisely this bargaining in a country like Côte d'Ivoire as local actors sought validation for their own exclusionary strategies, and eventually won. Electoral democracy merely gave a different form to the bargaining process: "reduced to mere electoral competition for control of the state's resources, democracy reinforced opportunism" (Nolutshungu 1990: 91). Having briefly discussed the dynamic interaction between nation, state and ethnic group, we turn to some of the themes which recur in the pages of this volume.

Diverse People Unite!

Reacting to these internal divisions, many African states experimented with broadly inclusive nation-building strategies after Independence. In addition to new political institutions designed to minimise centrifugal tendancies, cultural manifestations of nation-building—anthems, flags, clothes, football teams, and musical icons—were also orchestrated from the centre. (Allman 2004; Apter 2005; Askew 2002; Barnard 2004; Burgess 2002; Cusack 2003; Ivaska 2002; Turino 2000). In a country such as Tanzania under Nyerere or Ghana under Nkrumah, this was part of a conscious effort to suppress allegiance to ethnic symbols. These nation-building efforts rarely led to overt conflict, despite tensions over privileging of certain cultural forms, the sidelining of those perceived as 'backward' (Allman 2004), and the gendering of the national body:

> …one of the disasters our continent has faced has been the political failure of nationalism. Because the nation has come to mean an urban, male, African elite and very often a particular tribal group that has assumed the identity of the nation and through that excluded just about everybody else.[2]

Nation-building comprised a vocabulary, and sometimes a practice, of inclusion, but both implicitly and explicitly shaped assumptions about how members of the nation should live, behave and identify themselves (Cusack 2003; Ivaska 2002; Hansen 2004). It also carried within it exclusionary tendencies, which became more pronounced at times of political or economic crisis. Geschiere and Nyamnjoh suggest that in recent years, "[i]nstead of promoting national citizenship, as implied by the idea of 'nation-building' that dominated politics in the 1970s and 1980s, these regimes now seem to be more intent on producing 'autochthons'" (Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 2000: 425). At their most instrumental, these strategies attempted to use colonial era citizenship to determine their eligibility of presidential candidates in Zambia, Uganda and Côte d'Ivoire (Whitaker 2005). Yet, we would argue that those very nation-building strategies themselves contained the seeds of the present polarisation. It is certainly true that in the 1990s, as the African state was increasingly beset by economic crises, and political tensions, we saw the emergence of shriller, more competitive discourses: "[d]emocratisation, even partial, dramatically raised the stakes of citizenship" (Young this volume: 242). Under the pressure to hold multi-party elections, leaders (national and local), feared that they were about to be excluded from the spoils of power, and sought to manipulate citizenship and redefine nationhood; making nations by creating strangers. While political and economic liberalisation constitute the current configuration against which identity politics are played out, the interaction of local and global influences threaten the survival of a state-level national identity and gives urgency to elite attempts to retain power through the moulding of citizenship. As these pressures increase citizens seek, and are encouraged, to rally around a national identity which retrenches the benefits afforded by the state against the external hordes. These political pressures contribute to the emergence of discourses of inclusion and exclusion—the 'us' and 'them'—which then form the basis of a strategic and exclusionary nationalism.

---

[2] Interview with Zackie Achmat, 27/01/2005.

The rise of strategically determined nationalisms is facilitated by the obvious fact that nations and states relate to each other in complex ways. Nationalism's 'us' and 'them' are constituted by boundaries of inclusion and exclusion both above and below the level of the state. The sense of belonging may then refer solely to the 'natio' a condition of belonging felt relating to a local community (Brennan 1990: 45). Nation-building seeks to intervene and create new broad-based loyalties, overcoming divisions. But in many states, marginal or minority groups, especially those of indigenous extraction, are excluded—intentionally or not—from the nation-building process, especially where nomadic groups remained mobile well after the erection of borders. States, like Somalia and Botswana, once regarded as relatively ethnically homogenous, used such perceptions to drive misguided assimilationist projects (Besteman 1999; Werbner 2002). Documenting increasing resistance to assimilation in Botswana, Solway notes:

> …'minority' groups do not want to seize the state…they are not irredentist or nationally secessionist. It is not Botswana citizenship that is in question, but the terms of that citizenship. And it is not the Botswana nation that is in question, but rather its cultural basis and terms of inclusivity (2004: 134; see also Nyamnjoh 2004).

Similarly, Flint and de Waal argue that in Darfur, where people had "become Sudanese" (2005: 14) over three generations of cultural and political change, "[i]n the 1980s the complaint of most Darfurians was not that the process of 'becoming Sudanese' denied them their own unique cultural heritage, but that the government in Khartoum was not treating them as full citizens" (Flint and de Waal 2005: 16). In contrast, South Africa's new coat of arms depicts rock art figures and takes as its motto 'Diverse people unite' from an extinct 'Bushman' language. Alan Barnard, well aware of the inequities in Botswana, argues:

> …it is significant…that the Khoisan, and Bushman at that—with the lowest status of all South Africa's peoples—were chosen to embody the mythical charter of the new South African multicultural nation…through them a virtual primordial identity for the nation as a whole can be imagined (2004: 19).

It is inevitable that Africa's states will struggle with political, ethnic and linguistic cleavages, yet it is what politicians do with those cleavages that matters. Whilst Cameroon is home to "over 250 linguistically identifiable ethnic groups", Awasom argues that it is the colonial legacy which remains the basis of the strongest societal cleavage (this volume: 145).

Although the reunification of the two Cameroons produced an officially bilingual state, Francophones constituted a majority. The minority Anglophones developed secessionist tendencies in the 1990s after feeling increasingly marginalised. Recognising that language "invites people to unite, but does not force them to" (Renan 1990: 16), the Cameroonian state attempted to reduce linguistic differences as a source of identification and exclusion by drawing upon pre-colonial ethnic ties across this line of cleavage. However separate educational systems have continued to reproduce a sense of difference. Since Cameroon remains Francophone dominated, the frustrations of the Anglophone minority continue, overlaid with local and ethnic tensions, and transient periods of co-operation need greater permanency in order to hold a divided nation together. Nation-building tactics in Tanzanian schools have proven somewhat more resilient, but as Bertz (this volume) argues, the reduction of overt racial divides and labelling reflects a carefully maintained ambiguity, not any simple resolution of difference.

'Twenty-Four Hours Hate' or 'Who is Who'

In times of pressure an internal other against which a 'pure' national identity is cast, becomes utilised as a political tool. Post-independence governments have been faced with the challenge of cementing a national identity within a state container that both divides communities and encloses multiple ethnic groups. This embodies itself in the identification of strangers, usually outside the state borders, through political agitations against foreigners (Hobsbawm 1993: 163), whose negativity is contrasted to a positive self-image. In the cases discussed below, the 'outsiders' are often those who migrated into the region during the colonial period, or even before, and whose claim to citizenship is thus seen as less 'authentic'. In Cameroon, for example, Sam Hickey notes that "the recent phase of democratisation (re)establish[ed] a virulent form of primary patriotism based around the politics of belonging and 'nativeness'", confronting pastoral peoples "with the origins of their subordination and marginality" (this volume: 99). Similar processes engulfed even areas of Cameroon without such profound differences of livelihood, where "…[democratization] embodied the dichotomizing representation of Cameroonians or their classification into two categories: supporters and *opposants* (oppositionists), good and bad citizens, responsible and irresponsible subjects, patriots and the non-patriots,

autochtones and *allogènes*, allies and enemies, natives and strangers…" in desperate attempts by political incumbents to retain power (Ndjio 2006: 25–26).

Similar efforts to construct and maintain insider-outsider divisions took even more violent forms in Côte d'Ivoire after the death of Houphouët-Boigny. Through a totalitarian grip over the state, President Gbagbo has encouraged and utilised ethnic hatred, xenophobia and violence to maintain power. Government repression following an attempted coup in 2003, based upon questioning who-is-who in the Ivoirian context, combined modern political and primordial ethnic facets to mobilise an exclusivist identity within the state. To entrench the power of the ruling *Front Populaire Ivoirian*, a dual demonised other has been created through government propaganda, a rereading of history and state controlled media. Against these 'others' the 'authentic Ivoirian' can be located positively and exclusively through claims to territorial autochthony (Marshall-Fratani, this volume).

The selective use of history has strengthened Côte d'Ivoire's borders. Widely ignored and given less credence in the colonial era than today, state borders have been invigorated as political, social and economic boundaries, gaining authority as markers of belonging. These markers have provided for the exclusion of the importance of immigrants to the success of the Ivoirian miracle, denigrating 'immigrants' and their families as non-nationals and non-citizens whilst simultaneously casting 'authentic' Ivoirians in positive terms. Within the state, the creation of a psychological boundary by the FPI around its historical and ethnic base in the south has cast northern Ivoirians as inherently suspect. The new internal border created by the rebellion since 2002 Marshall-Fratani suggests, "has only concretised an imaginary national border already represented in the minds of many Ivoirians" (this volume: 62).

Likewise, Tanzania, despite its record as a successful nation-building experiment has, since the re-introduction of multi-party democracy, seen opposition parties and their supporters in Zanzibar stigmatised as 'Arab' and 'foreign' (Cameron 2002). Not dissimilarly, Mugabe's campaign against political and non-governmental opposition since 2000 consisted of denying their right to represent Zimbabweans (Dorman 2003). The revival of exclusive nationalism in Zimbabwe utilised a coercive consolidation of state power mobilised through emotive discourses of a two-nation state as a colonial legacy. Equating Zimbabwean-ness with black-ness, and white as the external-imperial other, the ZANU-PF government sidelined effective opposition through the saturation of media

with government propaganda and the labelling of opposition parties as black puppets of the white project. With a highly mobilised and repressive state apparatus as well as militant youth groups and a tightly controlled pro-government media, ZANU-PF have rewritten the history of Zimbabwe to frame a new notion of nationhood and citizenship. The control of the media and mass entertainment through films and music has allowed the dualistic base of the new Zimbabwean identity to insidiously enter everyday culture (Raftopoulos, this volume).

But the creation of second-class citizenry within a state is not a new phenomenon, even within Africa. As Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja shows, these have been successful and durable political tools across the Great Lakes region, particularly in the former Belgian territories of the Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi. The emergence of the *Confederation des Associations Tribales du Katanga* (CONAKAT) in 1958 promoted the interests of the 'authentic Katangans', juxtaposed against a second class Kasaian citizenry (Nzongola-Ntalaja this volume). The dominant political grouping exercised complete control over the definition of 'authentic' versus questionable citizenship. National claims to citizenship were predicated on local claims to belonging, rather than *vice-versa*. In the 1960s emotively politicised Katangan identity was mobilised in an ethnic cleansing of second class Kasaians. Subsequently, the ruling elite drew upon primordialist ideas as well as modernist interpretations of identity to define exclusive, 'authentic' Congolese using selective interpretations of geographic and ethnic histories. Even though protected by law, citizenship rights gave little protection at times of ethnic cleansing and genocide. Nzongola-Ntalaja reminds us of the complexity of identities, reflecting status, occupation, physical characteristics but fixed under colonial rule, and patron-client ties, and of the permeability of borders in the region, as conflicts flow across states. These processes reveal how the construction of an ethnicised boundary of inclusion, the Hutu-as-Rwandan nation, allowed Hutu extremists to attempt to retain power through the creation of the demonised Tutsi 'other'. Utilising a history carved out of claims to historical oppression and an imminent threat of re-oppression, state controlled media provided a 'Twenty-four Hours Hate' to mobilise the 'Hutu nations' citizens'. Seen as "an extreme attempt not only to purge the 'Hutu nation' of the Tutsi, but also to actively engender a vision of the 'Hutu nation' in the minds of an otherwise diverse and fragmented local populace" (Baines 2003: 479) the genocide embodied nationalism at its most powerful and destructive.

Making Nationalism 'Real'? The Role of History and Education

The defence of national boundaries is predicated upon a claim to historical legitimacy. The projection of an exclusive historical project, often based upon a claim to oppression and subjugation, provides an initial boundary. The expression of this historical grievance forms an integral part of the (re)interpretation of history employed by the nation's political elite, or by dissident communities. This mutability of the past, where "[w]ho controls the past . . . controls the future; who controls the present controls the past" (Orwell 1999: 30) is key to African citizenship debates. As Renan articulated, the formation of a nation is crucially dependent upon forgetting and unity comes from brutality (1990: 11). Formalised historical teaching affords governments a mechanism, which allows a specific version of (national) history to be taught in keeping with the nation-building project. A common history is promoted, often of oppression, to engender a sense of social cohesion and group membership to the majority population, whilst inculcating beliefs and socialising the population into a particular viewpoint (Ranger 1985: 9). Through this, an 'other' is created and cast in a negative historical light against which the positive in-group identity is juxtaposed. In turn, access to this education will provide for the subsequent (re)interpretation of events, within the continual process of nation-building and reaffirmation.

Post-independence Tanzania's national project and education policy was underpinned with "desires for egalitarianism and integration through the force of a unifying nationalism" (Bertz this volume: 162). Colonial-era education policy had reinforced social divisions and claims for citizenship through "set notions of watertight compartments, some with superiority, others with inferiority and still others with hatred and ridicule" (Morrison 1976: 78 in Bertz this volume: 164). Such a policy, employed for political gain by the dominant elite, has been used in many countries with two main purposes: the perpetuation of economic and social dominance by the privileged group, and the promotion of ideas of national exclusivism. In contrast, following the end of colonialism, President Nyerere used integrated non-racialist education to reduce potentially divisive historical differences between Indian and African populations. The post-apartheid South African education system similarly seeks to provide an education based upon equality, egalitarianism and a fundamental respect for human rights (Republic of South Africa 1995). Apartheid policy provided segregated and differential education, a policy which embedded ideas of differential nationhood and citizenship

within these groups (West 1987: 1). These racially based divisions are slowly being removed through a system of racially integrated education and a common curriculum. Progress towards healing the divisions of the past is slow. Class divisions now replicate previously legislated racial divisions, although attempts are being made to incorporate education into wider policies of social integration and restitution. The simple provision of facilities is crucial to the spread of equal citizenship (CALS 2005). A further challenge lies in reconciling a history of difference with a narrative of national unity in the making.

In Zimbabwe, attempts to meet this challenge floundered in political exigencies. After some years of rewriting history textbooks and curricula to redress the colonial accounts (Barnes 2005), history was harnessed to "divid[e] up the nation into revolutionaries and sell-outs" (Ranger 2004). Utilising formal education institutions, TV, music and youth camps 'patriotic history' escalated the division between the pro-ZANU-PF faction, and opponents both black and white. Depicting the dominant divisions in the nation building project as falling along racial lines, and between urban and rural constituencies, ZANU-PF policy expelled 'alien' whites from the body politic (Raftopoulos this volume: 185) and paternalistically coerced 'misguided Africans' caricatured as "badly raised children who had strayed out of 'our [ZANU-PF's] world view'" (Raftopoulos this volume: 185) back into the fold. Rather than seeking to communicate across the divisions, the ruling elite generated a particularly vitriolic nationalism excluding sections of the population from their citizenship rights.

The constant exposure to a contrived set of ideas, as with the strict media and educational controls in Zimbabwe or the infamous radio broadcasts in Rwanda before the genocide, led to mass support and hysteria. A selective and emotive use of history and contemporary threats encourages the nascent sense of nation and citizenship. Winston Smith's experience of the daily 'Two Minutes Hate' in *1984* was such:

> …that it was impossible to avoid joining in…A hideous ecstasy of fear and vindictiveness, a desire to kill, to torture, to smash faces with a sledge hammer, seemed to flow through the whole group of people like an electric current, turning one even against one's will into a grimacing, screaming lunatic (Orwell 1949: 11).

The manifestation of the 'grimacing, screaming lunatic' in a number of African countries has been evident in both genocides and the daily violence confronted by 'others'.

Race, Space & Xenophobes

The settler states of southern Africa faced particular challenges of reconciling the competing settler nationalisms, and redressing the economic imbalances that had been built into their states. South Africa's historical trajectory which disaggregated an increasingly integrated population along ethnic and de-nationalised lines, in contrast to most British colonial policies (Moodley and Adam 2000: 51), created a multi-nationalised state. The transition to democracy in South Africa challenged the foundation of every aspect of social, political and economic life in the apartheid period—racial identity. The social hierarchy which ingrained notions of superiority and inferiority, and formed the basis of the inclusion or exclusion of groups economically, politically and spatially supposedly came to an end in 1994. Government policies of redress have sought to mitigate historical inequalities, but there has been a failure of effective political leadership to recast the template of social and national identity (Alexander this volume: 210). Perceptions of marginalisation have instead encouraged an emergence of a politicised 'coloured' identity; Afrikaner claims to identity are being re-conceptualised around minority rights, language, ethnicity and religion (Pillay 2005). Non-racialism, "the founding myth of the new South African nation" (Alexander 1995: 6), has failed and racial identities remain vital in the new South Africa (Erasmus 2001; Zegeye 2001).

At the same time, chauvinistic nationalism readily overcomes these differences when perceived threats to the economic and social security of South Africans appear. New and old boundaries of inclusion and exclusion overlap as a latent national identity is expressed against (black) immigrants. Alexander (this volume: 215) comments that "judging by the ease with which many South Africans have slipped into xenophobic behaviour, national chauvinism is latent among all strata of the society." As the end of apartheid removed internal, racialised boundaries of inclusion and exclusion, the creation of a new nation required a new 'other' which would cut across old boundaries. As in the Côte d'Ivoire, the Congo and elsewhere, immigrants form the new 'other' in South African political discourse. This is none too surprising give that apartheid education and the media never really considered South Africa as part of Africa. Ongoing media reports about 'hordes', 'barbarians' and the links between immigration, crime and unemployment sensationalise this division (Crush 2001a; Crush 2001b; Danso and MacDonald 2000; Mattes et al. 1999), creating "scapegoats for the country's current

social, economic and political ills" and the discursive construction of national identity (Croucher 1998: 639). When Nigeria played South Africa at football in 2004 at Ellis Park, Johannesburg, with a large number of Nigerians domiciled in South Africa in attendance, it was commented that, "Jo'burg with be safe tonight—with all the Nigerians at the football, who's going to be committing the crimes?"[3] With such comments commonly expressed in a backlash against '*MaKwereKwere*'—a derogatory slang term referring to 'black' African immigrants (Lemanski 2004), Zackie Achmat, one of South Africa's most high profile activists, criticises this process as dangerous:

> …national identity and people who use those as a badge for mobilisation or a tool of political mobilisation I find that repugnant, crude and stupid…I think what this country, what South Africa, needs, is a very strong movement against racism and xenophobia…I feel that the exclusionary notion of nation in South Africa is very dangerous—especially with the way we treat other African immigrants, migrants and refugees.[4]

The state's refusal to permit the creation of internal 'others' encourages the nation to define who is properly 'us' in opposition to those they are allowed to call 'them'.

The Soil of the Ancestors

Access to land symbolises local or regional citizenship in many African societies. The ultimate proof of belonging is the ability to possess—or at least make use of—part of the territory within which one resides. In this way the denial of land is also a denial of being and of belonging (Moore 2005). The claim to land across Africa is typically expressed in terms of the rights of first comers (such as the Guan in Ghana) or rights established by virtue of conquest (for example the Ngoni subgroups in Central Africa). This means that history is typically taken very seriously indeed and very old claims are hotly contested. The domination of historical discourse by ruling elites also contributes to this process, as claims to indigeneity and ancestry are often predicated on historical understandings. But we should not forget that the elites who produce history often rely on the work of local historians and

[3] Interview with Rukia in Cape Town, 17/11/2004.
[4] Interview with Zackie Achmat, 27/01/2005.

'peasant intellectuals' who have constantly sought to keep their claims alive through the colonial period to the present (Feierman 1990) The twin concepts of people and place have been used as interlinked means through which to define citizenship.

Anti-colonial nationalism was often driven by historical grievances relating to the expropriation of land and concomitant removal of legitimacy and livelihood from local populations. But this continues to be utilised in the debates of nationhood and citizenship by post-colonial leaders, as "attachment to one's community and, through it, to the soil of the ancestors or the homeland, is a fundamental dimension in the notion of citizenship in Africa" (Nzongola-Ntalaja this volume: 71). For peasants, farmers, and farm workers in Zimbabwe, land has been a persistently evocative subject. Utilising anti-colonial discourse, the ZANU-PF government has expropriated white owned farmland, amidst claims to a modern day African Robin Hood—of taking land away from white 'settlers' to provide resources for 'Africans' (Rutherford this volume). Land has been given to those citizens (black) who voice allegiance to the state, whilst simultaneously denying any legitimacy to claims of citizenship and ownership to both white and black Africans who support opposition groups, reinforcing the overlapping of Zimbabwean-ness with Zanu-PF-ness.

Zimbabwean farm workers—though black—have been excluded from the land 'redistribution' process. Like the 'northerners' in Cote d'Ivoire, Zimbabwean farm-workers are the descendents of colonial-era farm labour migrants. Even more than their peers in West Africa, the Zimbabwean farm-workers have remained economically, socially, and politically marginalised. Although formally entitled to citizenship and the vote these political rights became increasingly contested after 2000, at which point they also found themselves denied work and land: "the intimate tie made between land and sovereignty" (Rutherford this volume: 112). By linking the ownership of land with an anti-colonial discourse, Mugabe has compromised the link between property, state, and citizenship.

Within processes of accessing land in South Africa, James illustrates how the power and politics involved with this process have travelled full circle to traditional means of accessing land in South Africa. Before and during apartheid "it was the systematic denial of rights in landed property, and their alienation from those who had previously held title to landed property, that stood as a symbol for the denial of citizenship" (this volume: 124), and through this created classes of citizens through

the linking of people to place. The alienation of land by white settlers transformed KhoeKhoe and Bantu peoples into subjects, initially of a trading company as embryonic state, and later of the colonial and apartheid states. The linkage of people and place remains in post-apartheid South Africa, and land remains symbolic of citizenship. The land restitution process is inextricably linked to the forging of a new national identity in South Africa.

In modern states, the government's relationship with the individual vis-à-vis land and the establishment of property rights requires the state to protect these for the individual and in doing so not only protects the individual but incorporates them into the state (Verdery 1998: 298). This lies at the heart of process of land restitution, as certain groups pursue the idea that "only if people hold property independently of the state can they enjoy the status of the modern citizen, thus escaping from the dependence of the traditionalist 'subject'." (James this volume: 139). Others seek to access land through traditional tenure systems, where the poor receive usufruct rights through tribute to power holders or where all land is essentially family land anyway. Hughes (2006) in fact, argues that communal tenure has provided more security than other forms of tenure in Zimbabwe. But in many areas, where land would have been accessed through chiefs, agents and brokers increasingly mediate between the disenfranchised and the state for access to land. Those who seek to access land in this fashion may find that their claims to full citizenship within the community are diminished, even where their legal citizenship is not in doubt. Land remains symbolic of citizenship and nationhood, despite the encroachment of more 'modern' understandings of legal citizenship.

At the present time, the World Bank and other donors are pushing the idea that African agriculture is in crisis because of the lack of security of tenure. A proper land registration system, it is argued, would solve the problem in a country like Ghana. The attempt to privatise land in this way is likely to prove extremely contentious, reviving submerged claims and counter-claims about who really owns particular parcels of land. Far from producing greater security, in parts of Africa the result is likely to that of spreading a sense of insecurity as people fret about the possibility of exclusion. In the cities, where this process is most advanced, urban autochthony politics is on the rise. Even the ostensibly benign promise of equal access to land for all citizens across national space, such as was embodied in the Senegalese National Domain Law of 1964, has been acutely contentious (Galvan 2004). Indeed many

attribute the rise of Casamance nationalism precisely to the belated implementation of the law in that region after 1979. This was widely interpreted as a land-grab against the Jola by the Wolof and other northern Senegalese seeking to flee the dustbowls created by groundnut farming (Boone 2003: 132).

In many parts of Africa, pastoralism has been seen by state-makers and nation-builders as a threat to the rational norm. Pastoralists challenge ideas about boundaries and land-use and when there are shortages they often come into conflict with agriculturalists. Sam Hickey highlights the ways in which the Mbororo Fulani of North West Cameroon "located at the intersection of citizenship, clientelism and marginality" (this volume: 98), have been denied citizenship rights. Semi-nomadic pastoralists, their way of life was easily distinguishable from pre-existing sedentary farming communities through religious and social organisational differences. At the same time, the 'moment' of state-formation, in this case during the colonial, rather than post-colonial period, shaped their opportunities and the very nature of citizenship within the new state. In the post-colonial period, Mbororo distrust of Western education and its incompatibility with their pastoral lifestyle (Hickey this volume: 90) further excluded them from processes which would have equipped them with the tools to participate in the shaping of post-colonial Cameroonian citizenship. Instead, the Mbororo maintained neo-patrimonial relations with the colonial and post-colonial governments, but have been simultaneously seen as the internal 'other'. The creation of a boundary of exclusion within the state has reinforced the Mbororo's marginality, as the withholding of citizenship allows only for tenant rights to land. The presence of an excluded community within the state borders provides the government with a powerful and immediate 'danger' against which to frame their preferred national identity, and reinforce their political position, revealing how the construction of citizenship necessarily involves relations and processes of othering, marginality and clientelism, and that these then need to be understood as entwined rather than as necessarily contradictory or oppositional.

Citizenship's Victims or Victors?

Working with a problematic colonial legacy, political elites have manipulated history, land, and social and economic factors to exert a

collective sense of identity over their citizens. The claiming of control over the defining of citizenship and nationhood provides unrivalled political power. For leaders in unstable and fragmented states, control over citizenship entrenches their position in the power hierarchy of the society. To maintain this position it is necessary for them to cast a negative other against which to rally their nation. Divisions must then be manipulated to exacerbate tensions and foster a strong sense of oppositional collective identity, or to overcome differences to strengthen and broaden the nation. Increasing pressures on states, resource control and security in an increasingly fragmented world mean that nationhood and citizenship remain key elements of Africa's geo-political order. The most effective means to maintain nationhood remains to play upon fear—through the creation of strangers.

Yet, many of our authors remain optimistic about the redeeming power of citizenship. Will Reno identifies the nascent citizenship demands that emerge even within violent struggles over political power. Rejecting accounts of African guerrillas as simply predators, he interrogates the experiences of soldiers as proto-politicians. He suggests that in some cases, social contracts are negotiated between insurgents and local communities amongst whom they fight, in the form of rules of behaviour, reciprocities, traditional institutions, comprising a "framework for collective defence" (this volume: 228). Importantly, we need to remember that the "real goal of most predatory insurgencies is to become the next rulers of the country" (Reno, this volume: 225), And, certainly, in post-liberation Eritrea, and quasi-independent Somaliland, understandings of nationhood and obligation, shaped during the war have profoundly shaped loyalties to the state and the nation, and contributed to contingent definitions of citizenship.

In many of the cases discussed below, the introduction of multi-party politics is identified as a stress-point for political systems. Both at independence and since 1990, electoral competition has "raised the stakes on citizenship" (Young this volume: 259). Despite this, several of the authors below point to the possibility of democratisation as a solution to the crisis of citizenship. Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja calls for citizenship and political communities to include non-indigenous peoples: "it makes no sense to deny people a right to the land they have lived on for centuries" (this volume: 78). But, he insists that political institutions need also respect indigenous land rights, increase social justice, and provide a democratic culture, if this is to work (this volume: 78–79). Crawford Young, similarly, notes that if peace is to return to war-torn

states, basic sets of agreement on democratic institutions and the shape of the state must exist in order for agreements about the nation and citizenship thereof to be concluded (this volume: 241). Sam Hickey's study of the M'bororo further highlights the potential for progressive politics emerging from the margins.

But all of the case studies below reveal the depth and complexity of political and social identities in post-colonial Africa. These are not issues that can be resolved though political decisions, or legislation, nor can they be resolved by the seizure of state power. It is not simply 'a struggle to the death for state power' but as Marshall-Fratani describes the struggle in Côte d'Ivoire, but "the redefinition of the content of citizenship and the conditions of sovereignty" (this volume: 31). Given the intensity of these struggle, "deeply held sentiments and sedimented institutional arrangements" (Rutherford this volume: 118) will not easily be shifted.

Conclusion: Contested Nationalisms

It was widely anticipated that the ending of the Cold War would remove some of the factors, including proxy wars and arms sales, which had perpetuated conflict and propped up great dictators. The eventual collapse of Mengistu's Ethiopia, Siad Barre's Somalia and Mobutu's Zaire, all of which had enjoyed external support in combating secessionist threats, proceeded according to the script once that support fell away. But the 'decade of democratisation' which followed was also accompanied by the Rwandan genocide and unprecedented conflict across the Great Lakes region; brutal wars of attrition in Sierra Leone and Liberia; the spectacular collapse of the Ivorian state; renewed secessionist demands in Tanzania, Cameroon, and Senegal; and divisive struggles over land in Zimbabwe and beyond. South Africa was emerging from its own low-intensity conflict at precisely the same historical conjuncture. Here the level of daily violence actually receded, and yet xenophobia towards immigrant populations assumed a prominence that had not been anticipated. The one common link is that these conflicts—of words and weapons—have been about battles over state-formation (and re-formation) and the morphology of the nation. Identity politics has played its part, but what is often missed is that the conflict has also turned on contested nationalisms, shaped by divergent readings of history. The object is to shape and control the

state (Dorman 2005), a process involving exclusionary agendas which sit uneasily with the trappings of democracy. The perceived imperative of re-making the state is attributable in part to the failure of earlier exercises in nation-building. Lonsdale, speaking of post-colonial Kenya, emphasised that while President Kenyatta created a 'reasonably stable and prosperous state', his failure to deal with Kenya's ethnic politics meant that he created 'a false sense of both nationhood and political stability' (Lonsdale 2004: 215). This could equally well stand as the epitaph for Houphouët-Boigny who was content to fudge the issue of what it meant to be Ivorian. The supporters of Laurent Gbagbo have sought to 'clear up' this ambiguity in a way which, if taken to its logical conclusion, would involve the deportation of a large section of the population.

What has often been commented upon is that in a continent which was wracked by conflict at the turn of the millennium, very little of it was ostensibly about borders—traditionally Europe's bugbear. This is not quite true of the Horn, where both the Ogaden and the Eritrean-Ethiopian wars were partly about boundary issues, or of the Great Lakes region. But as a generalisation it contains a considerable amount of truth. However, what it ignores is that the relative stability of the international borders arises precisely from the fact that states and border peoples alike have a lot invested in their maintenance. This investment is also what makes actors insistent about having the right to define who is alien and who belongs, thereby excluding not just people from neighbouring countries but even co-nationals from other regions (as in the Democratic Republic of Congo). States may seek to claim the exclusive right to define citizenship, but when their coercive and persuasive power is equally limited it may be easier to defer to 'local' agendas. Although it is only right that the divisive politics of political elites be studied as strategies of survival by a Mugabe or a Gbagbo, what should not be forgotten is that there are other regional and local elites who often call the shots. The struggle to define the content of citizenship therefore involves negotiations between actors at different levels, whose bargaining positions reflect their perceptions of core constituencies and others which are essentially expendable. The casualties tend to be those who are stigmatised at the local level—in this case including urban settings—and who are considered expendable by the wielders of power at the national level. The same clearly works in reverse. Hence being Nigerian in contemporary Johannesburg, or white in rural Zimbabwe, is to feel decidedly exposed.

This volume offers some sense of the differing possibilities and outcomes across Africa which arise out of the working through of some key variables—including histories of colonialism and post-colonial state construction, patterns of social inequality, land pressures and the geographical location of critical resources. But these construct the structural background against which actors debate entitlements and negotiate the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion.

Bibliography

Alexander, N. 1995. "The Moment of Manoeuvre": "Race", Ethnicity and Nation in Post-Apartheid South Africa. *South Asia Bulletin.* XV: 1, pp. 5–11.

Allen, C. 1995. Understanding African Politics. *Review of African Political Economy.* 22: 65, pp. 301–320.

Allman, J. 2004. "Let Your Fashion be in Line With our Ghanaian Costume": Nation, gender and the politics of cloth-ing in Nkrumah's Ghana. In Allman, J. (Ed) *Fashioning Africa: Power and the politics of dress.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, pp. 144–165.

Anderson, B. 1991. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism.* London: Verso.

Apter, A.H. 2005. *The Pan-African Nation: Oil and the Spectacle of Culture in Nigeria*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Askew, K.M. 2002. *Performing the Nation: Swahili Music and Cultural Politics in Tanzania.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Baines, E.K. 2003. Body Politics and the Rwandan crisis. *Third World Quarterly.* 24: 3, pp. 479–493.

Barnard, A. 2004. Coat of Arms and the Body Politic: Khoisan imagery and South African national identity. *Ethnos*. 69: 1, pp. 5–22.

Barnes, T. 2005. "History has to play its part": Constructions of Race and Reconciliation in High School Historiography in Zimbabwe, 1980–2004. Unpublished paper.

Berman, B. and J. Lonsdale. 1992. *Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya and Africa, Books One and Two*. London: James Currey.

Besteman, C.L. 1999. *Unravelling Somalia: Race, Violence, and the Legacy of Slavery* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Bhaba, H. 1990. Introduction: narrating the nation. In Bhabha, H. (Ed) *Nation and Narration.* London: Routledge, pp. 1–7.

Boas, M. 2005. The border and the 'marketing' of authority in the African state system. Paper presented AEGIS European Conference of African Studies, London.

Boone, C. 2003. *Political Topographies of the African State: Territorial Authority and Institutional Choice.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brennan, T. 1990. The national longing for form. In Bhabha, H. (Ed) *Nation and Narration.* London: Routledge, pp. 44–70.

Burgess, T. 2002. Cinema, Bell Bottoms, and Miniskirts: Struggles over Youth and Citizenship in Revolutionary Zanzibar. *International Journal of African Historical Studies*. 35: 2/3, pp. 287–314.

CALS. 2005. *Almost a Boss-boy* Johannesburg, South Africa: University of Witwatersrand.

Cameron, G. 2002. Zanzibar's Turbulent Transition. *Review of African Political Economy.* 92, pp. 313–330.

Chipkin, I. 2005. 'Functional' and 'Dysfunctional' Communities: The Making of Ethical Citizens. In Robins, S. (Ed) *Limits to Liberation after Apartheid: Citizenship, Governance and Culture.* Oxford: James Currey.

Cooper, F. 1996. *Decolonisation and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Croucher, S. 1998. South Africa's Illegal Aliens: Constructing National Boundaries in a Post-Apartheid State. *Ethnic and Racial Studies.* 21, pp. 639–660.

Crush, J. (Ed) 2001a. *Immigration, Xenophobia and Human Rights in South Africa.* Cape Town: Idasa.

———. 2001b *South Africa Dogged by Racism and Xenophobia*. http://www.queensu.ca/samp/Resources/Dogged.htm

Cusack, I. 2003. Pots, Pens and 'Eating out the Body': Cuisine and the Gendering of African Nations. *Nations and Nationalism*. 9: 2, pp. 277–296.

Danso, R. and D.A. McDonald. 2000 *Writing Xenophobia: Immigration and the Press in Post-Apartheid South Africa.* Cape Town: Idasa.

Davidson, B. 1992.*The Black Man's Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State*. London: James Currey.

Dorman, S.R. 2003. From the Politics of Inclusion to the Politics of Exclusion: State and Society in Zimbabwe, 1997–2000. *Journal of Southern African Studies.* 29: 4, pp. 845–863.

———. 2005. Narratives of Nationalism in Eritrea: Research and Revisionism. *Nations and Nationalism.* 11: 2, pp. 203–222.

Dunn, K.C. 2005. The State and non-State Spaces: Rethinking Sovereignty, Autonomy and Territoriality in a Non-Westphalian Africa. Paper presented AEGIS European Conference of African Studies, London.

Erasmus, Z. (Ed) 2001. *Coloured by History, Shaped by Place: New Perspectives on Coloured Identities in Cape Town.* Cape Town: Kwela Books.

Englund, H. and F.B. Nyamnjoh (Eds) 2004. *Rights and the Politics of Recognition in Africa.* London: Zed.

Eriksen, T.H. 2004. Place, Kinship and the Case for Non-Ethnic Nations. *Nations and Nationalism*. 10: 1/2, pp. 49–62.

Feierman, S. 1990. *Peasant Intellectuals: Anthropology and History in Tanzania*. Madison and London: University of Wisconsin Press.

Flint, J. and A. de Waal. 2005. *Darfur: a Short History of a Long War.* London: Zed.

Galvan, D.C. 2004. *The State Must Be our Master of Fire: How Peasants Craft Culturally Sustainable Development*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Geschiere, P. and F. Nyamnjoh 2000. Capitalism and Autochthony: The Seesaw of Mobility and Belonging. *Public Culture*. 12: 2, pp. 423–452.

Hansen, K.T. 2004. Dressing Dangerously: Miniskirts, Gender Relations, and Sexuality in Zambia. In Allman, J. (Ed) *Fashioning Africa: Power and the politics of dress.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, pp. 144–165.

Hastings, A. 1997. *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Herbst, J.I. 2000. *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Hobsbawm, E. 1993. *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth and Reality.*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hobsbawm, E. and T. Ranger. (Eds) 1985. *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hodgkin, T. 1956. *Nationalism in colonial Africa* London: Muller.

Hughes, D.M. 2006. *From Enslavement to Environmentalism: Politics on a Southern African Frontier.* Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Ivaska, A.M. 2002. 'Anti-Mini Militants Meet Modern Misses': Urban Style, Gender

and the Politics of 'National Culture' in 1960s Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. *Gender and History*. 14: 3, pp. 584–607.
Jung, C. 2000. *Then I Was Black: South African Political Identities in Transition.* New Haven: Yale University Press.
Kedourie, E. (Ed) 1971. *Nationalism in Asia and Africa.* London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
Lemanski, C. 2004 A New Apartheid? The spatial implications of fear of crime in Cape Town, South Africa. *Environment and Urbanisation.* 16: 2, pp. 101–112.
Lentz, C. and P. Nugent. 2002. *Ethnicity in Ghana: The Limits of Invention*. Houndmills: Macmillan.
Lonsdale, J. 1968. The Emergence of African Nations: A Historiographical Approach. *African Affairs*. 67: 266, pp. 11–28.
———. 2004 Moral and Political Argument in Kenya. In Berman, B., Eyoh, D. and W. Kymlika (Eds) *Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa.* Oxford: James Currey, pp. 73–95.
Mamdani, M. 1996. *Citizen and subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism.* London: James Currey.
———. 2001. *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda.* Oxford, James Currey.
Mattes, R., Taylor, D.M., McDonald, D.A., Poore, A. and W. Richmond. 1999. *Still Waiting for the Barbarians: South African Attitudes to Immigrants and Immigration.* Cape Town: Idasa.
Mkandawire, T. 2003. African Intellectuals and Nationalism. Paper presented at the Conference on the 30th anniversary of CODESRIA December.
Moodley, K. and H. Adam. 2000. Race and Nation in Post-Apartheid South Africa. *Current Sociology.* 48: 3, pp. 51–69.
Moore, D.S. 2005. *Suffering for Territory: Race, Place, Power in Zimbabwe.* Harare: Weaver.
Ndjio, B. 2006. Millennial Democracy and Spectral Reality in Postcolonial Africa. Draft paper.
Nolutshungu, S.C. 1990. Fragments of a democracy: reflections on class and democracy in Nigeria. *Third World Quarterly.* 12: 1, pp. 86–115.
Nugent, P. 2002. *Smugglers, Secessionists and Loyal Citizens on the Ghana-Togo Frontier: The Lie of the Borderlands From 1914.* Oxford and Athens OH: James Currey and Ohio University Press.
Nyamnjoh, F.B. 2004. Reconciling the 'Rhetoric of Rights' with Competing Notions of Personhood and Agency in Botswana. In Englund, H. and F.B. Nyamnjoh (Eds) *Rights and the Politics of Recognition in Africa.* London: Zed, pp. 33–63.
Olukoshi, A. and L. Laakso. (Eds) 1996. *Challenges to the Nation-state in Africa.* Uppsala: NAI.
Orwell, G. 1999 *1984.* Secker and Warburg, London.
Pillay, S. 2005. The Demands of Recognition and the Ambivalence of Difference: Race, Culture and Afrikanerness in post-Apartheid South Africa. In Robins, S. (Ed) *Limits to Liberation: Citizenship, Governance and Culture*. Oxford: James Currey, pp. 57–73.
Ranger, T. 1985. The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa. In Hobsbawm, E. and T. Ranger. (Eds) *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 211–62.
———. 2004. Nationalist Historiography, Patriotic History and the History of the Nation: the Struggle over the Past in Zimbabwe. *Journal of Southern African Studies.* 30, pp. 215–234.
Republic of South Africa 1995 *White Paper on Education and Training*. Cape Town: Department of Education.
Renan, E. 1990. What is a Nation? In H. Bhabha. (Ed) *Nation and Narration.* London: Routledge, pp. 8–22.
Reno, W. 1998. Warlord Politics and African States. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Samatar, A.I. and Samatar A.I. (Eds) 2002 *The African State: Reconsiderations.* Portsmouth: NH: Heinemann.
Smith, A.D. 1983. *State and Nation in the Third World: The Western State and African Nationalism* Brighton: Wheatsheaf.
Solway, J. 2004 Reaching the Limits of Universal Citizenship: 'Minority' Struggles in Botswana. In Berman, B., Eyoh, D., and W. Kymlika (Eds) *Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa.* Oxford: James Currey, pp. 129–147.
Spear, T. 2003. Neo-Traditionalism and the Limits of Invention in British Colonial Africa. *Journal of African History*. 44, pp. 3–27.
Turino, T. 2000. *Nationalists, Cosmopolitans, and Popular Music in Zimbabwe.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Vail, L. (Ed) 1989. *The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa.* London: James Currey.
Verdery, K. 1998. Transnationalism, Nationalism, Citizenship, and Property: Eastern Europe since 1989. *American Ethnologist.* 25, pp. 291–306.
West, M. 1987. Confusing Categories: Population Groups, National States and Citizenship. Paper presented to the Conference of South African Anthropologists, Cape Town.
Whitaker, B.E. 2005. Citizens and Foreigners: Democratization and the Politics of Exclusion in Africa. *African Studies Review*. 48: 1, pp. 109–126.
Werbner, R. 2002. Introduction: Challenging Minorities, Difference and Tribal Citizenship in Botswana. *Journal of Southern African Studies*. 28: 4, pp. 671–684.
Young, C. 1994 *The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective.* New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
Zegeye, A. (Ed) 2001. *Social Identities in the New South Africa: After Apartheid.* Cape Town: Kwela Books.

PART TWO

INCLUSION, EXCLUSION AND CONFLICT

THE WAR OF "WHO IS WHO": AUTOCHTHONY, NATIONALISM AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE IVORIAN CRISIS

Ruth Marshall-Fratani[1]

People of the Greater West,

The current political situation of our country is linked to its recent history lived by the sons and daughters of our tribes. For forty years, misfortune, injustice, inequality and crimes have been inflicted on our tribes.

For forty years the Akans and the despot Houphouët-Boigny, the greatest thief of all time, have fought our tribes without respite. Odious crimes have been ordered and executed. One of our illustrious sons, Kragbé Gnagbé, aka Opadjélé was decapitated, and with him perished nearly 4,000 of our people. A genocide such as this cannot remain unpunished.

Our lands, our most precious possession, were torn from us by force by the Akans, led by Houphouët-Boigny with the treacherous collusion of the Dioula and a handful of our own people.

The people of the Greater West must thus unite around one of their own, Laurent Gbagbo, the reincarnation of Opadjélé. It is through him we shall be saved.

The 24 December 1999, God, in giving the power to one of our sons, wanted to show us the way. Daughters and sons of the Greater West, link hands together, the hour has come for us to be heard. The hour has come to kill the Akans and chase them from our lands. The hour has come to recuperate our land. The hour has come to clean our villages and towns of the Dioulas (Mossi) and the Akans, who are objective allies.

Yes, the hour of grand vengeance has struck. We too want our cities to become capitals like Abidjan, Yamoussoukro and Daoukro.

People of the Greater West, unite, so that power will never leave us again. We must use our guns, our machetes. Get ready. Let us kill for the survival of our tribes, to prevent the confiscation of power.

Union of the Greater West.

This extremely virulent tract was found circulating in Abidjan in April 2004, and then again in the summer of 2005. Echoing the discourses of the so-called 'Young Patriots', fervent supporters of President Laurent Gbagbo, the tract not only expressed the same violence towards

[1] This chapter originally appeared in 2006 in *African Studies Review* 49: 2. Permission to reproduce this paper is gratefully acknowledged.

political enemies determined along ethnic lines, but also made direct reference to one of the central issues in the Ivorian crisis, that of land tenure and relations between autochthonous and 'allogenous'[2] populations. The Côte d'Ivoire, once famous throughout the continent for its peace and political stability, now finds itself teetering on the brink of explosion. Since the failed coup attempt of September 19, 2002, and the division of the country into a rebel-held[3] north and loyalist south, thousands of strangers have indeed been chased from their lands, many being killed in the process. While this call to 'ethnic cleansing' of villages and towns throughout the central and south west reflects the views of an extremist minority, nevertheless, over three years of war the *Front Populaire Ivoirien's* (FPI) map of territorialised identity has partially become a reality, paradoxically reinforcing the very ideology the rebellion claims to be fighting against.

The Gbagbo regime has, as it were, undertaken to 'turn back the clock' of Ivorian history, (Chauveau 2000) marked during Houphouët's forty year reign by determined state policy favouring migration and migrants rights and promoting an ideology of an Ivorian 'melting pot'. The FPI has revived a long tradition of political opposition based on autochthons rights and nativist identity which emerged under the colonial period, and whose construction has been determined by colonial and post-colonial state policies. In this sense, the Gbagbo regime's accusation that the rebellion is a 'foreign terrorist attack' is heavy with meaning. Who is a 'foreigner' and who an Ivorian in the country today? This distinction is at the heart of the conflict, and its debate, perpetually postponed since independence, exacerbated both by economic crisis and the process of democratisation, has become increasingly radicalised over two years of conflict.[4] Interviewed shortly after

---

[2] I will use the term 'stranger' to refer to the French ethnographic term '*allogene*' which does not have an English equivalent, and which is used in contrast to the term '*autochtone*' as referring to populations of non-local origins, be they nationals or non-nationals.

[3] The original rebel movement is the *Mouvement Patriotique de la Côte d'Ivoire* (MPCI), composed largely of northern soldiers in exile or facing demobilisation from the *Forces Armées Nationale de la Côte d'Ivoire* (FANCI) who attacked Abidjan and other cities and towns in the centre and north of the country on September 19th 2002. On November 28, two other rebel groups made their appearance in the far west of the country, beyond the cease-fire line held by French troops. The *Movement Populaire de Grand Ouest* (MPIGO) and the *Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix* (MJP) had varying degrees of dependence on the MPCI, and joined their political forces during the peace talks in France in January 2003.

[4] Put in terms of party political struggle, the debate turns on the question of whether a return to President Houphouët-Boigny's albeit idealised model of integration and

the September 19th attacks, the radical Mamadou Koulibaly claimed that he thought the war would be salutary for the nation: "at last we'll be able to know who is who".[5]

In what will necessarily be a cursory attempt to trace the long and complex trajectory of the outbreak of this war of 'who is who', I argue that what is at stake in the current Ivorian crisis is not only a struggle to the death for state power, but also, and more importantly, the redefinition of the content of citizenship and the conditions of sovereignty. This conflict concerns *de facto* those countries who have furnished the majority of immigrants making up a third of Côte d'Ivoire's population, in particular Malians and Burkinabés, nearly half of whom have been born in the country, not to mention the huge mass of Ivorians of mixed heritage. Not surprisingly, the conjunction between nativism and nationalism also involves the revitalisation of an anti-imperialist discourse directed against the French presence, both civilian and especially military, and the demand for a 'second independence', which likewise expresses itself in terms of autochthony. While in some senses the Ivorian conflict appears to be a war without borders, in particular with the 'spill-over' of the Liberian war in the west, nevertheless, it is above all a war *about* borders, crystallising in liminal spaces and social categories and on emerging self-practices and lifestyles. Despite the ongoing ravages of 'ivoirité', Ivorian "representations of self are edified at the interface of autochthony and cosmopolitanism". (Mbembe, 2001:16) As Mbembe puts it:

> the disjunction and interlinking of a multiplicity of principles and norms is now the rule. It is in the interstices that the central historical action now unfolds. And the occupation of the interstices does not happen without violence—on the contrary (Mbembe 2001: 43).

The current revitalisation of discourses of autochthony, as Bayart, Geschiere and Nyamnjoh argue, is no doubt intimately linked to current processes of democratisation and liberalisation (Geschiere, Nyamnjoh 2000; Bayart, Geschiere, Nyamnjoh 2001). Some claim that the rise of autochthony as a political category is directly related to the wide vistas

---

openness is possible, (position defended by the rebellion, the main opposition party, the *Rassemblement des Républicains*—RDR, and a section of Houphouët's ex-ruling party, the *Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire*—PDCI) or whether the content of Ivorian citizenship and belonging should take a much narrower nationalist and nativist form, as expressed in the ideology of President Gbagbo's FPI and a section of the PDCI.

[5] Interview with Hoffnung, 2002.

opened up by processes of globalisation; that a 'need for closure' is the flip side of intensified global flux and openness (Geschiere, Meyer 1999). Others see it as a result of the weakening or breakdown of the nation-state in this context. One of the questions which this paper will address is the centrality of the colonial and post-colonial state to the process of the construction of autochthony as a political category. Following Geschiere et al., it appears in the Ivoirian case that the explosion of violence and counter-violence provoked and legitimated by the mobilisation of this category does not necessarily signify either the triumph of those monolithic identities 'engineered' during the colonial occupation, nor the disintegration of the nation-state in the context of globalisation. Contrary to contexts in which the mobilisation of autochthony can be or is analysed as supra-national, sub-national, or 'post-national', 'by-passing' the state or testifying to its 'weakness' in a context of globalisation, the Ivorian case appears to show the continued vitality of the nation-state; not only as the principal space in terms of which discourses of authochtony are constructed and make sense (*fait sense*), but also in terms of the techniques and categories which the political practice of autochthony puts into play. The mobilisation of discourses of autochthony and nationalism can be seen as a strategy for the redefinition, closure and control of liminal or mobile spaces and categories. Yet while the relations of power which underwrites autochthony finds their roots in the long history of state formation and epistemological structures and techniques of government accompanying colonialism, and while the current context gives it new force and performative power, there is no reason to presume it is a 'winning' strategy (*stratégie gagnante*) (Foucault 1994: 241–2). Geschiere et al are no doubt right to underline the extreme perfomative power of discourses of autochthony in Africa, as the Rwandan genocide reminds us. Nevertheless, its phantasmagorical projections and totalitarian ambitions are subjected to the messy and uncertain logics of struggle and experiences of the self. The project of government expressed in the FPI's discourse can only be strategic and programmatic- and as such, "it never works".[6] (Foucault 2004: 405)

[6] "Any governmentality can only can only be strategic and programmatic. It never works. But it is in relation to a programme that one can say it never works. […] We must analyse what type of practice governmentality is, in so far as it has effects of objectification and veridiction with respect to persons (*hommes*) themselves, in constituting them as subjects." My translation.

This means we cannot prejudge the outcome, nor reject the idea that "in the long run", and despite the violence, this confrontation will found "a new imagined community, rather than being a simple mechanism of disintegration" (Bayart, Geschiere, Nyamnjoh 2001: 194)

The Colonial State and the 'Search for Autochthons'

The first question which we need to ask when thinking about the revitalisation of autochthony is why, in Africa at any rate, does political confrontation so often wear 'primordialist' clothing? While this question is not by any means new, I think we need to go further than recent discussions concerning the construction of ethnicity and identity by the colonial state. Historians and anthropologists have rightly drawn attention to the ways in which colonial powers constructed a hierarchy of ethnic categories amongst local populations, how through a variety of techniques (including colonial ethnography), colonial power inscribed via overwhelming processes of subjectification, primordialist assignations which were in turn appropriated and made performative. While the colonial encounter thus gave rise to a 'conversion process', as Talal Asad calls it (in the sense of induction into 'modern' life) and while, as is always the case with historical change, such a process builds on the past, we should not underestimate the nature of the epistemological rupture such a process entails for the colonised. This "profound displacement" cannot be grasped by tracing the origins of an amalgam. (Asad 1996: 264) The political contestation of 'consciousness' only becomes possible when forms of self-representation are publicly represented as the sign of an authentic identity. Something new emerges, which can be determined by asking the question of:

> what new possibilities for constituting themselves these subjects now encountered? Given that there was now a possibility of recognising themselves as *authentic*, what part did this new fact play in their constitution? [...] The changed epistemic structure brought about by the conversion to modernity articulates a new range of possibilities not adequately captured by the simple alternatives of passive reception by subjects or active resistance by agents, of unoriginal reproduction or synthetic originality (Asad 1996: 265).

If colonial power subjectifies natives in terms of primordialist categories whose fundamental logic is one of biological race, we must ask ourselves under what precise circumstances these categories are in turn

appropriated and set to work under the imaginary of authochthony, as the sign of an *authentic* identity. Of course, other forms of categorisation and subjectification are operative, but I think it is fair to say that the most powerful, the most overwhelming are indeed all those assignations which have a biological form of racism at their heart and which operate not only according to the old binary black/white distinction, (upon which will be based the principle of indigeneity, autochthony and the possibility of conceiving of an African specificity, of its radical difference) but which also will form the bases of internal ethnic categorisations and normative classifications, upon which diverse cultural, political and social attributions will be attached as emanations of a fundamental, genetic and authentic form. The most striking example of this is of course Rwanda and Burundi, as Jean-Pierre Chretien has argued. (Chretien 1997), but one can also recall Lord Lugard's penchant for the Hausa-Fulani, and his claims that they emerged from a different and superior racial source. In colonial Côte d'Ivoire, the same sorts of categorisations were operative, with the French policy of creating administrative units based on 'pure autochthonous races' for which they spent a considerable amount of time searching. This question merits a much lengthier discussion than these few words here, but to put my view shortly, I do not think it is satisfying to claim that colonial racism is simply 'one of power's lies', nor a simple and old form of contempt or hatred amongst races, nor "a sort of ideological operation by which states, or a class, attempt to displace towards a mythical adversary hostilities which would otherwise be turned on them or which are at work in the social body". I agree with Foucault when he argues that:

> it is much more profound than an old tradition, much more profound than a new ideology, it is something else. The specificity of modern racism, that which constitutes its specificity, is not related to mentalities, to ideologies, to power's lies. It is related to the technique of power, to the technology of power which is at the heart of the modern state (Foucault 1997: 230).

What is striking is the ways in which these categorisations and distinctions are appropriated and made operative not only in colonial, but also post-colonial politics. In the case of the Côte d'Ivoire, numerous studies have examined at length the central role played by the colonial state, and in particular, the plantation economy it developed, in structuring civil society and crystallising forms of political identification. (Raulin 1957; Chauveau 1997, 2000, 2002a,b; Chauveau and Dozon 1985, 1987; Chauveau and Bobo 2002; Losch 2000; Dozon 1985 a,b, 1997, 2000;

Bobo 2002; Zongo 2001; Dembélé 2002) As Dozon and Chauveau persuasively argue, the plantation economy provided the context in which the colonial state was to 'produce' ethnic identity, giving rise to a territorialised and ethnicised definition of citizenship and national identity. (Chauveau and Dozon 1987). It is precisely through the processes of the 'ethnographer state' that the opportunities for social mobility, for assimilation, or on the contrary, of violent coercion, death and exclusion were determined. As Karel Arnaut notes, Maurice Delafosse as early as 1901 explains how the Mandé settled in northern Côte d'Ivoire, finally covering large territories, but nowhere constituting 'the autochthonous element'. Delafosse and other colonial agents following him noted the socio-economic and 'mental' mobility of the Dioula, their political 'superiority', their 'energetic character' and their aptitude for becoming agents of French trade and civilisation. (Arnaut 2004: Chapter 3). On the other hand, the autochthonous peoples of the southern forest belt were considered savage, backward and inapt for productive economic activity.

As Geschiere and Nyamnjoh argue, both the freeing up of labour and its categorisation and compartmentalisation have been essential processes of capitalist development everywhere, and a vital part of colonial power's project of pacification and economic exploitation. As they put it "the seesaw of mobility and fixing has been crucial in setting the stage for the emergence of autochthony movements and communal violence in recent times" (2000: 444). In the Côte d'Ivoire, colonial policy involved a complex process of both mobilising and fixing labour and populations. Plantations were developed firstly in the east, among the Agni in the 1920s and '30s, then during the 1940s and '50s in the under populated central and south west, where land was extremely well suited to growing cocoa and coffee. Alongside the French plantations, local smallholders threw themselves into the new economy with great energy, and migrants from the centre (Baoulé) and especially the north (Malinké, Dioula, Senoufo), brought in to provide labour and services in towns, sought to acquire land themselves. The French also organised the transport of Voltaïques, (Burkina Faso) to provide manual labour.[7] In 1930s a debate about land tenure and national representation had

[7] Forced migration from Upper Volta came to an end with the suppression of forced labour in 1946. In 1944 the *Syndicat Agricole Africain* (SAA) organised the voluntary recruitment of Voltaïques, and in 1951, the planters created the *Syndicat Interprofessionel d'acheminement de la main-d'ouevre* (SIAMO) which recruited until its suppression in 1960 254,782 Burkinabé workers. Houphouët continued to facilitate the recruitment of workers throughout the 1960s and 1970s.

already begun. An indigenous association with Agnis at it head was created—the Association of Defence of Autochthons Interests of Côte d'Ivoire (ADIACI)—and protested to the colonial government of the excessive use of Senegalese and Dahomeans in the administration, asking for their replacement by 'evolved indigenes'. They also complained that the Baoulé and Dioula were not content with commercial activities or manual labour, but wanted land, and called for respect of customary law on the non-alienability of land, even though they had themselves ceded considerable amounts.

The model throughout the southwest was the institution of the '*tutorat*', in which autochthonous stakeholders ceded land to clients in exchange for series of social, cultural and economic obligations, such as presents, assistance for weddings and funerals, labour, and money.

> In the western part of the forest belt of Côte d'Ivoire, however, the extent of the rights conceded by *tuteurs* and the corresponding obligations of 'their' strangers have varied. In many cases, such transfer rights verge on, or hide, largely commercial transfers of land—except for the important difference that the commercial aspect does not erase the social relation stemming from the 'gratefulness' that the migrant (or his heirs) owes to his *tuteur* (or to the latter's heirs) (Chauveau 2006: 219).

As Dozon argues, the cession of land by autochthons does not imply prior property rights; rather, from the optic of customary communal land tenure, (whose modern terms and representations are set out through the ethnographer state) it is through the process of cession that the autochthon acquires the status of landowner—thus it is not "I am a property owner therefore I sell", but "I sell, therefore I am a property owner" (Dozon 1985a: 289).

Colonial policy thus distinctly favored migrant and mobile populations, even if the explosion of local production far surpassed what the colonial state had intended or even desired. By the late forties, indigenous planting largely outstripped that of Europeans, which survived only through subsidies from the colonial state. The struggle for indigenous planters' rights and the abolition of forced labour gave birth to the *Syndicat Africain Agricole*, which represented principally those interests of wealthy indigenous planters of Baoulé and Agni origin. Under the leadership of Houphouët-Boigny, it prepared the ground for the creation of the political party which was to rule Côte d'Ivoire for over forty years, the PDCI-RDA. In both the SAA and subsequently the PDCI, autochthonous western planters and administrative heads were unrepresented, the majority of the adherents being Baoulé and

'Dioula'. From the thirties on in the west, associations were formed, such as the *Mutuelle Bété*, followed in 1944 by the *Union des Originaires des Six Cercles de l'Ouest de la Côte d'Ivoire* (UOCOCI), as well as other associations whose social composition reflected regional and ethnic affiliations—Agni, Ebrié, Mossi (Voltaiques)—whose activities, based in urban centres and particularly Abidjan, perpetuated the links between rural and urban populations and kept alive a territorialised identity amongst those living in the highly mixed neighbourhoods of the city. Over time, the large, mobile northern group, straddling the territories of what would become Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire, made up of distinct ethno-linguistic groups, but sharing a vehicular language and often religion, came to be known by the generic term 'Dioula', whose signification and valorisation varied over the colonial and post-colonial period: esteemed by the French for their mobility, their 'civilisational advance' and their industry, in the post-colonial period, 'Dioula' was increasingly associated with the somewhat contradictory values of industry (but circumscribed to the realm of manual labour) and piety, but also civilisational backwardness (lack of education, high levels of reproduction, archaic hygiene and health practices) and criminality, especially in urban centres.

Thus it is through this combined process of colonial ethnography, colonial government and economic policy that politicised territorial identity begins to take shape. As Dozon points out, it is through the ongoing presence of strangers and their demands for land that the autochthon comes to consciousness of himself as such and reclaims rights which this quality confers, (land, in particular) yet at the same time the awareness of his relatively disadvantaged position not only in his own 'home', but also in emerging national politics. (Dozon 1985a, b) Already visible in the 1930's through the creation of the ADIACI, this early crystallisation of 'civil society' representing autochthonous interests was to dramatically increase in the post-colonial period. It is from this point on that territoriality and citizenship become organically linked in political discourse. This process of assignation and setting to work is unthinkable outside the colonial state, even if, as many have noted, this power is not necessarily exercised by the institutions of the state itself, but can be found in instances of '*décharge*', as Bayart and Hibou argue (missions, schools, medical institutions, *comptoirs*) (Bayart 2004; Hibou 1999).

The processes of liberalisation which means that today, as during the colonial period, state functions are increasingly the object of

various forms of '*décharge*'—in particular with the rise of international aid, but also with the privatisation of certain sovereign functions, such as the right to kill, to extract wealth, etc.—may certainly be related to new confrontations amongst groups and the revitalisation of arguments of autochthony, as well as to processes of democratisation and the situation of economic crisis (Geschiere, Nyamnjoh 2000; Bayart, Geschiere, Nyamnjoh 2001). However, while such forms of privatisation may involve transformations of the state, they nevertheless do not undermine its principle mode of power, nor its centrality as an instance of subjectification. The technologies of power and mode of government which produced autochthony and ethnicity during the colonial period were not fundamentally put into question with the advent of independence. This position situates the historicity of ethnicity and autochthony differently than those who interpret it as the sign or an effect of the crisis or effacement of the state.

The Post-Colonial State: The 'Geo-Politics' of Immigration and Autochthony

Mbembe argues that the moment of independence does not imply a rejection of colonial power's principal modes of representation or functioning:

> When, under the colonial period, the autochthonous discourse on the emancipation of indigenous peoples and their right to self-determination emerges, the relation between leaving barbary and entering civilisation does not become the object of a fundamental critique. In the justification of the right of sovereignty and self-determination, and in the struggle for power, two central categories will be mobilised: on the one hand, the figure of the African as a victimised subject, and on the other, the affirmation of his cultural singularity (Mbembe, 2001: 24).

Panafricanism is a "discourse of inversion, in which its fundamental categories will be drawn from the myths it purports to oppose and the dichotomies which it will reproduce" (Mbembe 2001: 30). Even if the process of rehabilitation involves refusing the distinction in terms of which Africans are determined as inferior on the scale of humanity, this process does not question the fiction of race nor the original, cultural difference "based on the principle of repetition (custom) and the values of autochthony" (Mbembe 2001: 27).

If we examine those representations produced in the Côte d'Ivoire during the nationalist struggle, we find the same uncritical appropriation

of these racial constructions, glorifying cultural difference and the principal of territorial autochthony as the basis not only of self-determination, but also of national belonging, citizenship and authentic identity. The terms of opposition to the colonial state were perpetuated following independence, not least because of Houphouët's 'French turn' in the 1950's, in which he turned his back on his left-wing nationalist allies and renewed the 'colonial compromise' between the French and the migrants, in which his group, the Baoulé, had pride of place, but which also involved a political pact between the Baoulé and northern migrants and immigrants. His critics, who invariably mobilised cultural nationalist and nativist arguments against this compromise, developed an extensive literature of cultural nationalism, bemoaning the alienation of Ivoirians under the leadership of the white man's puppet (Amondji 1988). The renewal of this compromise also left many Ivorians with the impression of an incomplete or phantom form of self-determination, one in which the principal of autochthony is denied its full expression and which requires the advent of a 'second independence'.

Ousmane Dembélé shows in his discussion of the construction of the category of 'foreigner' in Côte d'Ivoire how claims to exclusive local and regional forms of citizenship are an integral part of the construction of the concept of citizenship in post-colonial Côte d'Ivoire. The advent of the independent state introduces a new notion of foreigner, in terms of which the quality of citizen as expressed in positive law should theoretically be opposed to previous notions based on autochthony. However, the relationship between foreigner and citizen continues to be thought of in terms of territorialised ethnic spaces, and perpetuates an absolutist conception of the foreigner, or stranger, as anyone from outside these territorialised communities.

> In order to affirm his status as Ivorian citizen of a local territory (*terroir*) the autochthon ends up reducing to himself and his group the attributes of the national citizen. This reduction allows him to return to an absolutist conception of foreigner, who is neither a member of his ethnic group nor a national (Dembélé 2002: 161).

This conception of citizenship rejoins that set out by Mbembe, who argues that it is in the combination of the ideological categories of origins and belonging and the spatial categories of territory and locality that *citizenship* emerges; defined as:

> essentially, the possibility of benefiting of a 'home' (*chez soi*); the possibility of excluding strangers from it; the right to protection of and access to a

> range of collective goods and resources situated in the designated space. In this context, the expression of grievances and complaints, the claiming of rights and the legitimation of struggles over resources are made through the idiom of filiation, genealogy or heritage (Mbembe 2000: 38).

Ivorians represent immigration as the sign of Côte d'Ivoire's exceptional status in the region, and yet the society's acceptance of massive numbers of immigrants into its territories gives rise to highly ambivalent discourses. On the one hand, immigration is valorised as the both the reason for the country's remarkable economic success and the sign of its moral superiority—promoting the values of pan-africanism, fraternity and generosity, as the national anthem declares. This argument continues to be mobilised during the current conflict: "what? Ivorians xenophobic? Who else has opened their arms so wide and with such generosity?" On the other, the theme of immigrants' 'rapacity' and 'ungratefulness' is increasingly evoked from the 1990s on. The Côte d'Ivoire is indeed absolutely singular in West Africa with respect to levels of immigration and internal migration. Currently, 26% of the population are non-nationals, the majority being from the northern neighbours (Burkina Faso, Mali, Guinea). However, this official global figure hides important territorial disparities concerning not only the implantation of these 'absolute' foreigners, but also does not address the demography of internal migration, which is no doubt as decisive in terms of the construction of national identity. Northern populations, such as the Malinké, Senoufo, and Dioula have migrated massively south, becoming in some case the dominant population in southern towns, particularly in the south west, whereas migrants represent only ten percent of the populations in the North (Dembelé 2002: 128).[8] The question of the status of immigrants and migrants was never resolved, making their self-identification as autochthons, in virtue of long-standing implantation, practically impossible, and implying the refusal to recognise the central role they had played in national development.

[8] In more than twenty-five of the largest cities and towns in the south, northern populations account for over forty percent of the total population. In the Indenié area for example, the town of Abengourou contains only 15 percent of autochthonous Agnis, while in the city of Daloa, in the heart of Bété country, autochthons number only 11 percent, while Ivorian Malinké and Senoufo represent 26 percent. Sixty percent of the rural population in this area are ethnic strangers (Baoulé—the largest group amongst the Akan peoples, Malinké, Sénoufo, Burkinbé, Malian). In the Krou regions of the far south-west, the population of 'strangers', principally Baoulé and Burkinabé, reaches 70 percent.

How long before a stranger is no longer a stranger? The position of second and third generation immigrants in today's war is clearly tragic; not only do they consider that they are amongst the principal architects of Côte d'Ivoire's economic success and the development of its southern towns and cities, but they have no other 'home' outside of the Côte d'Ivoire.

Houphouët and the PDCI never directly addressed the question of citizenship, and the debate concerning national belonging increasingly divided the national political space. The failure to accord citizenship rights to immigrant populations, even if they did benefit from some important *de facto* rights, such as the vote, implies in an of itself a consecration of the definition of citizenship in terms of territorialised ethnicity as opposed to positive law. Indeed, until 1972, citizenship could be automatically conferred on any person born in the Côte d'Ivoire regardless of their parents' nationality. However, in practice, very few naturalisations were granted. The question of citizenship turned firstly on the status of Burkinabé and Malian immigrants, more than 250,000 of whom arrived in Côte d'Ivoire before independence, some as early as the 1920s. Clearly they fell into a juridical void, since neither the states of Côte d'Ivoire, Mali nor Burkina Faso, upon whose creation positive law and juridical citizenship depends, yet existed. Secondly, the southward migration of northern populations of Ivorian, Burkinabé and Malian origin into regions where they had no cultural or religious affinity with their hosts created the grounds of an amalgam on ethnicist lines. Despite the fact that northern Ivorians made greater efforts than the Baoulé to 'integrate' into their host communities, they were identified together with non-national northerners in terms of what was perceived as their 'objective' cultural and religious affinities. Indeed, for many Ivorians, these cultural differences were merely the external signs of what were considered to be, more profoundly, *racial* differences, in which biological signs (height, facial morphology, skin tone) are the operative modes of identification. Indeed, when describing themselves and other ethnic groups, the term 'race' is still popularly used by many Ivorians today.

One of Houphouët's central state policies which was to fundamentally determine the ways in which ethnicity and autochthony were to be politicised under forms of cultural nationalism and give rise to an opposition which has autochthons' rights as its central claim on the state was his decree of 1963, that "land belongs to those who make it productive". Unable to pass a land bill in 1962 which would have

consolidated migrants' position on ceded land, nevertheless, the state tolerated the coexistence of distinct land regimes—until the 1998 rural land law, officially, unclaimed rural land belonged to the state, while customary law considers it the unalienable property of autochthonous communities—but used a combination of intimidation and incentive to persuade local populations to allow increasing numbers of migrants to break new land. The state deliberately used the institution of the *tutorat* to provide a 'cultural' argument for the installation of migrants, putting the accent on the 'cultural obligation' to give land to strangers for their subsistence as a sign of 'African fraternity'. At the same time, as Chauveau points out:

> up until the 1990s, village chiefs (who at the village level were recognised as state representatives), *sous-préfets*, district head men, PDCI members of parliament, and PDCI section and village secretaries were the ones in charge of passing on the instructions to receive and accommodate migrants in search of land [...] Up to the 1980s, the dependence of urban elites and their associations on the clientelistic political system did not allow those most opposed to official policy to debate these questions openly for fear of incurring repression (Chauveau 2004).

As André Marie argues, the very structure of the patrimonial state and its clientelist networks contributes to a sort of 'sur-communitarisation' which in the Ivorian context reinforces identity in terms both of ethnicity and autochthony as the principal grounds upon which access to the state and to resources may be obtained and legitimated (Marie 2002).

While enabling a relative degree of rural integration and stability, the institution of the *tutorat* was nevertheless poor compensation for what was considered illegitimate state policy. Recurrent land conflicts between Baoulé and autochthons marked the first thirty years of independence in the southwest. Less willing to participate in the social and ritual obligations of the *tutorat* than the northerners, more arrogant in the knowledge that state political power rested on what was essentially a Baoulé monarchy at its heart, the Baoulé and their state-party were the principal local producers of autochthonous ethnicity in the post-colonial period. The most striking example of violent dissension on the grounds of autochthony, which presaged in many ways things to come, was the Guébié uprising in Bété country in 1970 (Dozon 1985a: 344–8). Their leader, Kragbé Gnagbé, an urban intellectual with socialist leanings, formed the *Parti Nationaliste Africaine* (PANA) in 1967 which, while theoretically admitted by article 7 of the Constitution, constituted in practice an unacceptable challenge to the sovereignty of the one-party

state. Faced with the impossibility of legal representation, Gnagbé and small group of Guébié, Zabia and Paccolo (sub-groups of the Bété) attacked the city hall in Gagnoa in October 1970, hoisting a flag and declaring the succession of the "independent state of Eburnie", violently attacking several local state representatives and security forces in the process. The army savagely repressed the uprising and it was claimed that 3,000 to 6,000 were killed, although the numbers are no doubt ten times less. This incident, called in Bété country the 'Guébié genocide', has remained fundamental in Bété collective memory.

As Dozon argues, the Guébié incident, while extremely localised and naïve in its aspirations, nevertheless reveals the crystallisation of a political identity among the Bété intimately linked to territorial autochthony. As he notes, the fugitive 'Republic of Eburnie', despite its extremely local manifestation, projected to include all the southern forest peoples sharing common characteristics (the loose group commonly called Kru—Bété, Dida, Neyo, Bakwe, Kroumen, Guéré, etc.): pre-colonial references with regards to settlement and political structure; late colonial occupation, a plantation economy founded on smallholding, a territory which attracted tens of thousands of migrants; a socialist orientation and a weak level of representation at the state level. The transition from ethnic or tribal identity to regional consciousness had as its underpinning the principle of autochthony, and in the declaration of a 'secessionist state', this characteristic became the symbolic condition for citizenship. Indeed, not only did Kragbé's 'programme' involve multiplying prices paid to planters by three, but involved the departure of the migrants, their presence being qualified as an internal colonisation and their occupation of land as theft (Dozon 1985a: 347–8). Since Gbagbo's arrival to power, and particularly since the coup attempt in September, the Guébié affair has been continuously evoked; it was a central theme during the National Forum for Reconciliation held in 2001, and emerges in discourses and tracts such as the one cited in the introduction. The continued political salience of the Guébié incident demonstrates that autochthony does not succeed ethnicity, either temporally or spatially. The rise of regional forms of autochthony does not necessarily depend upon a change of scale, brought about, say, by globalisation. Rather, regional forms of autochthonous identity can be understood as one projection of a mode of identification in which ethnic particularisms are simply another moment: representations of autochthony in Côte d'Ivoire are expressed on continuum based on an original assignation, whose terms go from the idealised village space or

ancestral home to the black race. Indeed, the principal of autochthony itself is productive of increasingly localised and specific forms of ethnicity, since the dual principal of the purity of natural origins (filiation and authenticity) and territorialisation tend to lead back to their smallest common denominator. It is here, I think, that we can situate not only the ambivalence of autochthony, but also its plasticity as a politically mobilisable discourse of exclusion.

The Struggle for the Nation: Democratisation, Economic Crisis and the Rise of 'Ivoirité'

By the mid-1980s the edifice of the 'Ivorian miracle' was already crumbling. The decade was marked by the collapse of protectionist mechanisms and international alliances guaranteeing the stability of the rent from agricultural production, the growing difficulty of the state to integrate both local and immigrant populations within a clientelist system now severely strapped for cash, coupled with a crisis in the educational system and the formal sector and serious land shortages in the rural central and southwest, and by the social crisis provoked by the slashing of prices paid to producers in 1989. By the end of the 1980's, civil society was at the boiling point—trade unions, students movements, political parties formed from the mid 1980s on, (in particular the FPI, formed among left-wing urban intellectuals). Under intense pressure, Houphouët conceded to multiparty elections in 1990, and found himself face to face with a certain Laurent Gbagbo, leader of the socialist FPI. The decade of political protest which followed, led by the FPI, in which the party was to take strong positions against 'ivoirité', has often led observers to forget one of Laurent Gbagbo's principal campaign arguments in the 1990 presidential race. Accusing Houphouët of using northern immigrants as his 'electoral cattle', he campaigned against their voting rights and foreigners' 'preponderant' role in the national economy (Dozon 1997). The term 'foreigners', as we have seen, was, in this context, highly ambiguous, and open to local interpretation concerning the place of Ivorian migrants in what was to become the urban FPI's rural fief. It was at this time the FPI press began to publish rumours that Houphouët's prime minister (1990–1993), Alassane Dramane Ouattara, a northern technocrat from the IMF appointed in 1989 to apply the World Bank's austerity programme, was in fact Burkinabé.

Houphouët's death in 1993 had been preceded by two years of intense protest on the part of opposition parties, unions and student groups, whose *avant garde* were Laurent Gbagbo's FPI and the closely associated *Fédération Estudiantine et Scolaire de la Côte d'Ivoire* (FESCI). It was in this context of generalised contestation and the emergence for the first time in post-colonial history of a powerful figure capable of representing northern migrants, Alassane Ouattara, that Bédié launched the concept of ivoirité. The exacerbation of ethnicity as a form of political self-identification and contestation goes hand in hand with the revitalisation of autochthony as the grounds for national belonging, and is elaborated in the 'ideology' of 'ivorité' from the mid-90s on, thus rupturing the 'community of destiny' which had tied together the north and the south from the colonial period.

The first aspect of ivoirité was the use of legal mechanisms to exclude Bédié's principal rivals from power, with the catastrophic consequences of creating, *de facto*, two types of Ivorian citizen, those of 'pure' Ivorian origin, and those of 'mixed heritage'. The electoral code, voted on the 23 of November, 1994, provided for new, restricted conditions of eligibility for elected office. The candidate for President had to be "born in the Ivory Coast to mother and father themselves born in the Ivory Coast" (Obou 2000: 57–62). However, the profound echo which the elaboration of 'ivoirité' by a handful of intellectuals had amongst a large section of the population, and the performative capacity of these representations, demonstrates that it was more than a simple electoral tactic. 'Ivoirité' formulates together a series of representations concerning both national sovereignty and the content of citizenship, in which autochthony is the central sign. A group of ideologues from the PDCI formed the *Cellule Universitaire de Recherche et de Diffusion des Idées et Actions Politiques du Président Henri Konan Bédié* (CURDIPHE) and published in 1996 a study/manifesto (Touré 1996) in which a restrictive and ethnonationalist vision of citizenship was expounded: "the individual who claims his 'ivoirité' has as his country the Côte d'Ivoire and is born of Ivorian parents themselves belonging to one of the autochthonous ethnic groups of the Ivory coast" (Touré 1996: 46). Furthermore:

> It is not being segregationist to want to expose one's true roots. According to documents in our possession, we can group the ancestors of Ivorians, or pure Ivorians, into two groups: The autochthons with mythical origins, the autochthons without mythical origins. According to the table, the 10 March, 1893, at the moment the Côte d'Ivoire was born, the ancestors of all the great ethnic groups were already there (Touré 1996: 50).

And finally:

> the foreign presence menaces to rupture the socio-economic equilibrium of our country [...] the Ivorian people must first affirm their sovereignty, their authority in the face of the threat of dispossession and subjection: be it a question of immigration or political and economic power (Touré 1996: 21).

Bédié's concept of ivoirité profoundly reinforced the idea of territorialised autochthony as the ground upon which citizenship should be constructed. It also re-opened the question of self-determination, in the face of IMF conditionality and the ravages of structural adjustment and the continued, although largely diminished French presence. In this sense, Ouattara, who had spent his childhood in Burkina Faso and most of his professional life outside of the country as well as having been not only the Prime Minister who applied the World Bank's austerity programme, but also the Assistant Director of the IMF itself, was the perfect incarnation of the 'danger' facing the 'autochthons' of Côte d'Ivoire. From 1999 on, Alassane Ouattara became, almost despite himself, a highly charged, larger-than-life symbol concentrating intense and contradictory passions on his person (Konaté 2002). As one FPI supporter of northern origin asserted following the violence against the RDR during the Presidential elections of 2000:

> If they don't say that Alassane is Ivorian, I don't see who can make reconciliation work. If Alassane isn't Ivorian, we're not Ivorian either. Gbagbo isn't going to back down, and the people of the north aren't going to back down (Vidal 2002: 252).

While Bédié and his party may have been the originators of 'ivoirité' as official state ideology, Laurent Gbagbo and the FPI's project of 're-founding' the nation on nationalist lines was not developed merely as a response to the political imperatives of keeping power and exclusionary partisan politics. Rather, Gbagbo appeared as the spiritual son of Kragbé Gnagbé, positioning himself and his party as the legitimate spokesmen for the aspirations and interests of the 'autochthons'. As an historian, Laurent Gbagbo had already shown an intellectual interest in defending the idea of Bété autochthony, attempting to show in his work that the Bété, contrary to what many European ethnographers had claimed, had not in fact migrated from Liberia, but were among the original peoples present from time immemorial on Ivorian territory. His vision of territorialised ethnic spaces as well as techniques of government which would control and produce them was clearly stated

in 1998 when he claimed that the violent land conflicts opposing autochthons and strangers were "nothing to do with ethnic problems, they are technical problems and should be treated as such", going on to suggest that the northern zones could be developed "according to a rational programme which would fix autochthonous farmers in their zones" (*La Voie* 08/01/1998). His programme of government, in which he promised greater sovereignty for the Ivorian state with respect to international capital and conditionalities, (the rupture of the privileged post-colonial contract with the French was implied), better control over the population, particularly with respect to immigration through new and modern forms of identification, universal schooling and medical insurance (projects which all involve massive processes of census taking and inscription of populations) show that his political project depended upon a significant increase of administrative state power's control over the population.

The 2000 Presidential elections which saw Laurent Gbagbo elected under 'calamitous conditions', as he put it, were marked by unprecedented violence in which attacks against northerners and immigrants by FPI youth and gendarmes were justified by their supposed support for the RDR, whose youth had taken to the street demanding new elections (Vidal, LePape 2002). Speaking about the events a few months later, one FPI militant of northern origin lamented that as a northerner he and his people will be obliged to join the RDR:

> I'll never be able to say that I'm not Dioula. It's not written on my forehead 'FPI' [...] Me, in my heart I'm FPI, but people treat me as RDR. You see, that's the whole problem [...] No one distinguishes anymore. You're from the north, you're Malian, it's the same thing, once you wear a long boubou, you're from the North. They attack everybody.

However, he considered the amalgam between foreign and Ivorian northerners partly of their own making, showing the profound ambivalence nearly all Ivorians have towards immigrants, and the perceived importance of creating criteria for determining autochthony.

> They've done everything so that no one can tell them apart, Ivorian Dioulas and foreign Dioulas. It's a problem: amongst themselves they can't identify one another. [...] Foreigners came and moved in next to the Dioula from here. They were clever. They had ideas in the back of their heads. When they arrive, they pray together, do everything together. The guys say: we want the Ivorian national identity card, they give it to them, and then they say they're Ivorians. It's total confusion [...] It's because the Ivorian Dioulas don't make the distinction that everyone says now: you, you're Dioula, you're a foreigner (Vidal, Le Pape 2002: 242).

During the first two years of the Gbagbo regime, the cleavage between pro-FPI and pro-RDR populations continued to grow in the schools, universities, the rural areas and the army. The latent nationalism of the FPI became state policy, and was echoed with increasingly xenophobic and radical accents by pro-FPI youth and student movements in Abidjan. Those in the army thought to be sympathetic to the RDR were downgraded, and following a witch hunt after an apparent coup attempt in January 2001, many young NCOs joined those soldiers in Ouagadougou. exiled under General Gueï's junta in 2000. The amalgam between northerners and immigrants intensified. In the south eastern town of Bonoua, (which, not incidentally, is also the home region of President Gbagbo's extremist wife Simone) following a violent altercation between Abouré youth and the allogenous northern population, a group of young Abourés held a meeting the 22 January 2001, during which a document was drawn up and submitted to the municipal and traditional authorities. The document stipulated, amongst other things: all strangers must register with a photo; no shop, stand, or other commercial space may be used by strangers for any type of commercial activity; no stranger may engage in any commercial transport activity; prohibition of two male strangers of the same sex to occupy the same room; strict prohibition of mixed marriage or extra-marital relations (Abouré-stranger); prohibition of the building of any mosque; strangers must clean the streets and drains and pay a yearly head tax of 5000 FCFA to the royal court (*Le Patriote* 30/01/2001). At the Forum for National Reconciliation, held between October and December 2001, Jean-Yves Dibopieu, Charles Blé Goudé's successor at the head of the FESCI said the following in his declaration on behalf of the organisation:

> The FESCI demands that foreigners stay away from Ivorian politics, since they've already got their hands on our economy. We want to tell Ivorians not to have a complex about being treated as xenophobic, as is commonly accused. They want to trick us so as to invade us. We must even acclaim xenophobia at the present time, since it is a normal and natural sentiment. Yes, brother Ivorians. Being xenophobic is good (FESCI, *Forum de Réconciliation Nationale* 09/10/2001).

The War of 'Who is Who'

> This war, it's a war of identification. The Minister of State—rest in peace—Emile Boga Doudou,[9] wanted us to be able to identify all the Ivorians. And that caused a general outcry, 'cos there's lots that are foreigners, Malians and Burkinabè who came here. They've been here for such a long time, they managed to have the same documents as us, even the same birth certificates as us. Those people, they're the same ones who are opposed to identification. Because it's a problem for them. Because in the new formula of identification, when you go to get your card, you have to tell them the name of your village, so they can go and find out if you're really from that region. Because if I take the case of our Dioula brothers, when they arrive, as soon as they find a city like Yamoussouko and they settle there, have children there, do everything there, they don't return to their country of origin. And then they say they are Ivorians. We saw that it isn't right, that we have to be able to tell who is Ivorian, who isn't Ivorian. That's why they're making war on us.[10]

For the political leaders of the *Forces Nouvelles*,[11] long-standing collaborators of Laurent Gbagbo throughout the 1990s, the turning point was not principally the question of xenophobia, nor Ouattara's nationality, nor the victimisation of northerners by state security forces (even if exclusion from the army was the principal motivation behind the exiled soldiers who organised the military rebellion), but the FPI's programme of national identification. The first thing their forces did once they had taken towns and cities in the northern part of the country was to destroy national identity records and state registries. When travellers presented the new 'receipts' given out since the beginning of the identification process in the summer of 2002 at road blocks in rebel-held territory, rebel soldiers often fell into violent rages, destroying the document and menacing or physically aggressing its holder. When questioned on their motivation for joining the rebellion, many young recruits cited the national identification operation. As one traditional hunter (*dozo*) put it "I joined the rebellion because the Malinké have been here since the 12th century, and soon they'll be giving us a foreign resident's card to be able

---

[9] The Minister of the Interior, one of the FPI hard-line ultra-nationalists, was killed in the early hours of the attacks on September 19, 2002.

[10] Interview by Banégas and Marshall-Fratani, 2006.

[11] The term *Forces Nouvelles* the new name for the rebellion since the official amalgamation of the three rebel groups, the MPCI, the MJP and the MPIGO in March 2003.

to live here".[12] Indeed, during the peace talks held at Linas-Marcoussis (France) in January 2003, the rebellion's political leaders principal demands were the abandon of the national identification programme in its current form, the revision of the Constitutional conditions of Presidential eligibility, a revision of the 1998 land law, and a new law on the naturalisation of long-standing immigrants.

National identity records and the question of 'usurpation' of citizenship have been a national obsession since the early 1990's, with the introduction of the foreign resident's card by the Ouattara government. The FPI's programme differed from previous attempts to create reliable, un-falsifiable national identity records by its methodology and its conception. Motivated both by electoral calculations (national identity determining voter's lists) and ideological conviction, the FPI's policy involved the clearest consecration in the history of the country of the principal of territorial autochthony as the grounds for national identity and citizenship. The enrolment of individuals in the exercise could result in their receiving a foreign resident's card in the place of a national identity card (Al Moustapha, *Radio et Télévision Ivoirien* 18/08/2002), even though a separate process of enrolment of foreigners for their resident's cards was to be undertaken. The cost of the foreign resident's card was high (35,000 FCFA for ECOWAS, and 300,000 for other nationalities) and the law provided for hard-hitting penalties against those who unable to produce the appropriate documents, including heavy fines and expulsion, in total contradiction to ECOWAS and UEMOA regulations. The announcement of these policies only served to reinforce the impunity with which security forces racketed northern populations, often destroying their documents in the process. The parliamentary commission set up to determine the operation's procedure claimed that since every Ivorian had a village of origin, the best way to know who was Ivorian was for each citizen to return to his or her village of origin to establish their identity card.[13] Abidjan was not to be considered a 'village of origin' except for those belonging to the Ebrié ethnic group, 'historical' autochthons.

Protest over this extremely onerous, exclusionary and anachronistic method led to the adoption of a procedure which enabled the demander

[12] Interview with *dozo*, 03/2003.

[13] These propositions repeat those presented by the FPI in February 2000 to the Consultative Constitutional and Electoral Commission (CCCE) under the Gueï junta. In addition to these propositions, the FPI suggested that alongside the place of birth, the 'village of origin' should be marked on the new identity cards.

to establish the card in his place of residence, but with the obligation to cite local witnesses from his 'village of origin' who could testify that either the individual or one his parents was indeed originally from the village in question. Local commissions were to be established, involving dignitaries such as traditional chiefs, land chiefs, members of leading families and political parties to verify the claims of autochthony. Decisions had to be taken unanimously, and receipts were to be issued until verification could be effected. Séri Wayoro, Director of Identification at the *Opération Nationale d'Identification* (ONI) explains the Operation's notion 'village of origin' thus:

> the village of an Ivorian, it's firstly from the ancient Côte d'Ivoire [...] Authentically [sic], people were sedentary, they stayed on their homelands, where their parents, their elders and ancestors were born. That's what we consider as a village, the place where a person finds members of his family at their origin, before the urban phenomenon (*Le Patriote* 21/03/2002).

In the face of growing outcry from the opposition, M. Wayaro stated unambiguously several months later:

> whoever claims to be Ivorian must have a village. Whoever has done everything to forget the name of his village or who is incapable of showing he belongs to a village is a person without bearings and is so dangerous that we must ask him where he comes from (Séri Wayoro, *Notre Voie* 28/07/2002).

What better illustration of the re-enchantment of tradition and "the rehabilitation of authentic origins and belonging" and the idea that there can be no identity without territoriality, as described by Mbembe? In this conception, we can confirm with him that:

> the territory par excellence is the locality, or the village; the '*chez soi*' which includes the home, inherited land and where social relations are reinforced by a common genealogy and a cultural matrix (real or imaginary) which anchors the civic space (Mbembe 2003: 36–37).

The inanity of such a programme goes without saying in this historical context marked by mobility, urbanisation and mixed ancestry. Nevertheless, the war waged by the Gbagbo regime against "dangerous persons without bearings" is all too real, as is the violence committed by the rebellion's soldiers and recruits.

Six months into this war of 'who is who', and the southern populations had flooded back down from the north. When it came to political enemies, the rebellion appeared to follow the policy of 'take no

prisoners'. In the '*cours communes*' of Abidjan, veritable ethnic melting pots, neighbours eyed one another with suspicion, speaking in whispers. A reign of terror had taken hold of the city, with the infamous 'death squads' roaming the streets after the curfew, army officials encouraging citizens to phone into hotlines to denounce 'suspicious activity', the destruction of poor neighbourhoods and slums, regular round-ups in popular neighbourhoods where northerners were carted off like cattle in trucks, after having been stripped to the waist and relieved of their documents. It was not uncommon to drive by naked corpses on the side of the road in the early morning, hands tied behind the back and a bullet in the back of the head. In what seemed like a form of collective madness, the only voices that made themselves heard were the 'young patriots' filling the streets and neighbourhoods with patriotic rallies, and the nationalist media, all screaming hate-filled insanities daily. As an observer present during this period, I was absolutely struck by the daily escalation of events. On the one hand, it seemed that each new act or statement of violence constituted in itself an isolated event, one option amongst several, whose occurrence had nothing self-evident about it. On the other hand, the unfolding of events gave the impression of following an inexorable and terrifying logic, against which nothing could be done.

Three years later, while the reign of terror had become more sporadic or cyclical, the situation was one of radical opposition between two diametrically opposed camps, with the majority of the population fearfully watching from the sidelines. On the one hand, a protean rebellion occupying the north of the country, seconded by the major opposition parties, grouped together since 2004 under a loose coalition, the G7,[14] and on the other, the Gbagbo regime, seconded by the 'patriotic galaxy', a nebulous group of youth organisations and militias, largely controlled by power holders at the Presidency and in the FPI. While theoretically all working together in the reconciliation government put

[14] The G7 is composed of seven of the ten signatories of the Linas- Marcoussis peace accords of January 2003. Apart from the three rebel movements—the MPCI, MPIGO, MJP, now grouped together under the term 'Forces Nouvelles'—the G7 counts the two largest political parties—*the Parti Démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire* (PDCI), ex-ruling party from independence to 1999, and the *Rassemblement des Républicains*, (RDR) led by Alassane Dramane Ouattara, ex-Prime Minister (1990–3),—as well as the *Union pour la Démocratie et la Paix de Côte d'Ivoire*, created by ex-President General Gueï, and the small *Mouvement des Forces de l'Avenir* (MFA).

in place after the peace-talks in Linas-Marcoussis (France) and Accra, these two camps affronted one another in a zero-sum game of winner takes all. The loose and fragile G7 coalition has been attempting to project the image of a 'republican response' to the political crisis brought to head by the rebellion, ambition seriously compromised by its alliance with armed rebels and its intransigence vis-à-vis Gbagbo. The Gbagbo regime, in an increasingly minority position, had from the outset refused any form of political compromise likely to weaken its grip on power, engaging in a process of ultranationalist radicalisation via a vast apparatus of propaganda whose central themes are the values of autochthony and national self-determination, and parallel forms of control, surveillance and violence, most notably via informal militias and paramilitary forces. These forces have become the principal popular relays of ultra-nationalist and xenophobic government discourses, as well as being the principal agents upon whom the state has 'discharged' its functions of surveillance, information and violence.

The great majority of the principal actors in the current crisis are direct products of the same matrix of violent contestation which was formed in the schools and universities around the FPI and the FESCI throughout the 1990s (Konaté 2003). Many of the young non-commissioned officers who led the attacks, the rebellion's political leader Guillaume Soro, and Gbagbo's 'young patriot' leaders were all active participants in the movements of contestation designed to wrest power from the PDCI and its barons. The role of the youth in spearheading the confrontation over citizenship and national belonging should not be underestimated. This group, a liminal category par excellence, is the principal victim of the socio-economic crisis. The current war provides a formidable opportunity for the renegotiation of their status, and the vital role they are playing constitutes nothing less than a small social revolution.

The 'young patriots' are most highly visible in the streets of Abidjan, where, under the direction of extremely popular leaders, veritable stars of the pro-Gbagbo media, these die-hard Gbagbo supporters have taken the streets by storm. This movement, in all its organisational, sociological and ideological complexity is doubtless the most emblematic expression of the Gbagbo regime's evolution during the war; with neither a powerful army nor solid international alliances, the regime has used a process of para-militarisation of its youth to impose its political order through terror, and an ultranationalist radicalisation in order to legitimate its resistance to any form of external interference. The '*Alliance des jeunes*

patriotes pour le sursaut national', led by the self-styled 'General' Charles Blé Goudé, was born just after the attacks of September 19th, 2002, as a movement supporting the government in its resistance against the assailants from the north. Benefiting from extremely generous Presidential largesse, this movement managed to mobilise hundreds of thousands at rallies held in Abidjan in the first few months of the conflict. While the first rallies were attended by people from every political party, region and age group, the increasingly ultranationalist, xenophobic and pro-FPI discourse very rapidly discouraged the participation of more moderate populations and militants from other parties. Stigmatising in the most virulent terms a whole range of 'enemies' (the rebels and neighbouring countries, in particular the Burkina Faso and their nationals, as well as the rebels' supposed external supporters, principally France, but also the UN) the young patriots rapidly become central political actors in the crisis. They also developed into urban militia forces working for the regime, charged with surveying the opposition and denouncing 'suspicious' or 'enemy' behaviour, controlling popular neighbourhoods and creating a climate of terror throughout the city, even assisting at time the famous 'death squads' responsible for numerous disappearances and summary executions. From early 2003 on, squadrons of youths, heads shaved, clad in t-shirts and khakis, could be seen running and doing fatigues in every neighbourhood in Abidjan. In January, 2005, the infamous *Groupement patriotique pour la paix* (GPP) was involved in extremely violent confrontations between local traders and transporters, enraged by the constant racket, violence and extortion inflicted on them by the militiamen who had taken up illegal residence in a girl's boarding school. Several days later, a shoot-out between the GPP and students from the Police Academy left three dead.

These informal associations were organised on a national level, and have engaged in a process of 'gridding' southern cities and towns, enabling the least compound[15] and its occupants to be identified and watched, even going to far as to having painted marks on some compounds. It was these associations which were instrumental in the identification of opposition militants during their demonstration which ended in the killing of some 300 opposition marchers, many of whom

[15] 'Compound' is an Anglophone West African term referring to urban living spaces which generally house within a shared courtyard several families or unrelated individuals, known in Abidjan as 'cours communes' (common courtyards).

in their homes, between March 24 and 27, 2004. This movement grew over the first three years of the conflict, but over the past year or so the 'patriotic galaxy' has become increasingly schismatic, giving birth to a multitude of groups, led by petty chiefs fighting for the monopoly of the patriotic label and especially the Presidential largesse which accompanies it. As in the case of the rebellion, its internal divisions not only serve to weaken the movement, but also, and more dangerously, to radicalise it. Already in 2003, Charles Groghuet was chillingly clear about the GPP's mission:

> National reconciliation is not going to happen with these divisive accords, you can count on me. All these RDR and MPCI ministers who are around Gbagbo are looking to kill him to finally take power. We're going to liberate Côte d'Ivoire; we want to tear Côte d'Ivoire away from the sons of immigrants who want to take everything away from the Ivorians. We know that it's Alassane Dramane Ouattara, that son of immigrants, who opened the door of Côte d'Ivoire to his foreign brothers to invade us. [...]The GPP has relations with senior military officers, we confirm it. We will not allow our country, full of strong youths, to accept the new form of colonisation that France wants to impose on us. [...] We aren't fighting for a political party, even less for an individual, even if he is the President of the Republic; we're fighting to clean Côte d'Ivoire of its sons of immigrants and their spokesman, Alassane Dramane Ouattara (*Soir Info* 03.06.2003).

The rural south and south-west have also seen the rise of 'patriotic' movements, 'self-defense groups' and militias. In the early months of the crisis, 'self-defence' groups were developed in every southern town and village after being publicly solicited by the regime as a form of 'patriotic resistance'. These informal patrols, recruited amongst young autochthons, were rapidly organised with the help of local officials into hierarchic organisations. In many localities, one now finds highly structured village associations of 'rural young patriots', complete with President, Treasurer, and posts linked to activities such as security, fundraising and mobilisation. These groups are part of a loose national network, and often receive visits from the national 'patriotic leaders' on tour. At times, groups will coordinate their actions on a regional level. This process of politico-administrative organisation is accompanied by the registration and identification of volunteers, as Chauveau and Bobo observe:

> all possess an identity card proving that they are patriots serving their country, with their names, age and village of origin. These cards are used as laissez-passer on instructions given by the *Préfet* [local state administrator] (Chauveau, Bobo 2003: 20).

With the encouragement of local authorities and certain regional dignitaries with important positions in Abidjan, groups of 'young village patriots' have created a climate of terror in which strangers (northerners, Burkinabè, but also Baoulé) are chased off their land, which are subsequently recuperated 'legally' by local big men. In this process of expropriation, the youth use violence, but also pose as defenders of a 'tradition' which they accuse their elders of having abandoned and thus reaffirm not only their autochthonous rights to land but also their growing ascendancy vis à vis the older generations.

Beyond self-defense groups, regional militias comprised exclusively of young autochthons were constituted via networks leading from the Presidency to local state officials and army officers. These groups also served as fighters properly speaking during the war in the far west near the Liberian border. Both the rebellion and President Gbagbo recruited Liberian forces, resulting in a spill-over of the Liberian war onto Ivorian territory. (Marshall and Ero 2003; Marshall-Fratani 2004) The *Front de Libération de Grand Ouest* (FLGO) a militia composed essentially of autochthonous Guéré[16] youths, was recruited to fight alongside the national army (FANCI) and anti-Taylor forces, which were, through Gbagbo's support, to constitute the new Liberian rebel group *Movement for Democracy in Liberia* (MODEL) in 2003. The Ivorian rebel groups MPIGO and MJP were themselves largely composed of pro-Taylor Liberian and Sierra Leonean fighters. Between November 2002 and May 2003, battles led by Liberian protagonists set fire to the west, with fighters on both sides committing atrocious acts of indiscriminate killing, torture and rape. The confrontation between Ivorian Yacoubas, fighting together in the MPIGO and the MJP with their Liberian Gio 'cousins' and the Guérés, loyal to Gbagbo and forming a common front with their Krahn 'cousins' from MODEL, provoked a deadly inter-ethnic conflict amongst autochthonous populations who had always lived together peacefully. Yet even more deadly has been the conflict between Guéré and northern Ivorians, Burkinabé and Malians. Motivated by a politics of xenophobia, the desire to revenge the hundreds of Guérés tortured and brutally murdered by the rebellion and well as the hope of appropriating strangers' land and harvests, a systematic policy of targeting and murdering northerners has provoked a spiral of revenge

[16] The popular term 'Wê' is also used for the Guéré, as is the popular term 'Dan' for the Yacouba.

and counter revenge which has continued to claim victims, despite the creation of demilitarised 'confidence zone' by UN and French forces in 2003. As one BBC report noted in 2005; "The 'confidence zone' is a huge misnomer: "Not a week goes by without us being told of people being killed or of other serious human rights violations," Boubacar Diallo of UN agency OCHA said" (BBC World Service 08/02/2005). The anti-UN violence in Guiglo of January 2006 has been followed by sporadic but ongoing killings of strangers and counter attacks. Singular in all the violence in the west has been the complicity of state security forces, and the active participation of local and national state officials and politicians. The leader of of the FLGO, Maho Glofléi, is none other than the 3rd assistant to the mayor of Guiglo, and many other local state officials and even ministers from the region are directly involved in the expropriation of land. In an amusing and ironic illustration of the centrality of the 'reinvention of tradition' to the symbolic legitimation of autochthony, Glofléi recieves visitors while sitting on a chief's stool, dressed in chiefly regalia, whilst the Guéré, his ethnic group, have no tradition of chieftain's stools, the stool in question being of Akan origin. Expropriations are legitimated through the idiom of autochthony, reclaiming the 'lands of our fathers' from 'rebel' hands. The nebulous term of 'rebel' evokes not only the dangerousness and treachery of strangers but also reinforces the ethnicist amalgam between rebel fighters and northerners more generally.

These forces, as well as other groups like them from other cities and towns in the south were mobilised during the fresh outbreak of hostilities in November 2004, when Gbagbo unilaterally broke the cease-fire and ordered the bombardment of rebel territory. In March 2005, a new militia attacked the rebel held town of Logoualé in the west, leading to fears of a general mobilisation of militia forces throughout the south. Working under the doubtful hypothesis that the Presidential elections would be held as planned in October 2005, the FPI and the Presidency gave these militias a more political mission, consisting of preventing opposition party members from campaigning in, or even visiting, their electoral fiefs in the south west. Thus UDPCI (Union for Democracy and Peace in Côte d'Ivoire) Health Minister Mabri Toikeusse was prevented on two occasions in late 2004 and early 2005 from entering the towns of Guiglo, Bloléquin and Toulépleu, where he was to deliver ambulances and medicines (*Le Nouveau Reveil* 28/02/2005). As one observer remarked:

> failing an attack from the ex-rebels, the militiamen's mission has been modified to adapt itself to the current combat. In the forest zones of the south-west, the instructions given to the militias are clear. They consist, on the one hand, in protecting the zones held by the party in power [FPI] against any incursions from the opposition. In regions like Gagnoa, Guibéroua, Divo…, the elective posts (MPs, Mayors, and Presidents of General Councils) must remain the exclusive property of the FPI. At the same time, the regime's militiamen are to 'chase' all opposition parties from the zones where they hold elected posts […]. "In the upcoming elections, there will be no Mayor, no MP, nor President of the General Council from the PDCI or the RDR in our region. These parties are rebel parties, and we're going to prevent the votes of their militants", explained a militiaman from Diégonéfla. (*24 Heures* 16/02/2005)

A year later, these groups have been mobilised in a struggle against the revised national identification process which is required to establish voter's lists for the elections now scheduled for October 2006. Given the FPI's political opposition to this process and the ongoing blockages by the 'young patriots' as well as the refusal of the rebellion to disarm until the process has been completed, there is no chance that the elections will be held as planned.

These groups have operated throughout the south with complete impunity for the past four years. Even on the rare occasions when their activities have led to arrest and incarceration, they are inevitably released only weeks later. In his only public statement concerning the problem of urban militias in Abidjan, President Gbagbo claimed they were unarmed, only youth who enjoyed "running and doing exercise" (*Le Patriote* 19/05/2003; *24 Heures* 20/05/2003). On the problem of militias in the west, Gbagbo claimed that the attacks in Logoualé of 2005 were the work of 'local farmers' determined to chase the rebels from the 'lands of their ancestors' (whereas it has been established by UN forces that several hundred militiamen were bussed out from Abidjan).[17] One could hardly be surprised by the vehemence of the youth when the President's wife, herself a leading MP in the FPI, has called the peace accords 'an abomination' and Mamadou Koulibaly, the regime's number two, has regularly made statements on the crisis such as this:

> It's called the invasion of our country by foreigners, amongst which the most vehement are the Burkinabé who have taken up arms in the rebellion.

[17] Interviews with UN officer, DPKO, New York: 18/11/2005 and IRIN 04/03/2005.

> [...] The logic behind the colonisation of the Côte d'Ivoire by its powerful neighbour, [sic] the Burkina Faso, is based on the false hypothesis according to which numerous Burkinabé live in the Côte d'Ivoire and have been here for 3 to 5 decades. They don't know where to go and want to live here. These Burkinabé don't want to be called 'foreigners' since it sounds pejorative. Some of the most illustrious amongst them, such as 'the mentor' [Alassane Ouattara] go so far as to consider the word 'Burkinabé' an insult. [...] Can we say that all those born in the Côte d'Ivoire are automatically Ivorian? [...] We need to realise that a Burkinabé who lives in the Côte d'Ivoire continues to be Burkinabé, and his descendants continue to be Burkinabé ad vitam æternam (Le Temps 21/11/2003).

Mbembe draws attention to the ways in which local imaginaries of autochthony are converted into political and economic resources and inserted into processes of globalisation. Although different in many ways from the forms of ethno-nationalism observed in the struggles for independence, these imaginaries reproduce the old theme of autochthony, the language in which the African continent expresses its fundamental, ontological difference. During the anti-colonial struggles, the critique founding a truly 'African' politics mobilises a reading of history as conspiracy, with the African as innocent victim of a plot fomented by forces beyond all reach: "the *imaginaire identitaire* deploys itself in this framework according to a logic of suspicion, of denunciation of the other and anything that is different: the mad dream of a world without others". What is presented as a radical discourse on emancipation hides in fact the 'neurosis of victimisation' and the 'urge of difference' and develops, in reality, "a negative, circular and xenophobic thought" which "must create figures which will then be taken for real things. Thus the couple formed by the executioner (enemy) and his victim (innocent)." According to this thought, "the course of African history depends upon the conjugated actions of this couple" (Mbembe 2001: 25). In the final analysis:

> the central preoccupation is the struggle for political power and the conquest of the state apparatus by the autochthons. Everything comes back to this perverse structure: autochthony. The prose of autochthony exhausts the capacity put an end to a condition of servitude and emerge as a subject of the world (Mbembe 2001: 35).

In the discourses of the pro-Gbagbo press, party officials, presidential counsellors, agricultural spokesmen, and above all the 'young patriots', the reactivation of the imaginary of victimisation is striking. In the regime's eyes, it had done nothing to deserve this 'unjust war' and

has persistently projected the image through its media and public discourses of an Ivorian 'people' assailed from all sides, victims of an 'international plot' against the Côte d'Ivoire, where a formidable coalition of diabolical strangers have leagued together to tear the nation from their hands: the French and its multi-nationals—financiers and partners of the rebellion; the United Nations—a coalition of western interests, complicit in African genocide and intent on subjugating the African continent; the international press—rebel allies and 'intoxicators' of national and international opinion; the Burkinabé President and people—'Mossi scum' who sent their mercenaries to kill Ivorian patriots, invade the country and place one of their own in the Presidential palace; northerners in the south -'usurpers' of identity, secret agents, infiltrators. The French, particularly under fire since the events in November 2004, have most recently taken the burden of these accusations. The desire for a 'second independence' is now expressed through the most extreme propaganda, in which 'the whites' are considered entirely responsible for the country's current misfortunes. In the words of Mamadou Koulibaly "to say that they're here to keep the peace is to ridicule the international community's intelligence. They're here to organise coups d'états, mass killings and pillage" (*L'Inter* 16/03/2005). Leading FPI officials and patriotic leaders went so far as to claim that the French soldiers' deaths in November were faked, and that empty coffins were presented at the official funeral ceremony at the *Invalides* in Paris! Koulibaly has written a book, entitled '*Sur la Route de la Liberté*' (On the Road to Liberty) of which a particularly edifying review was published in a pro-Gbagbo newspaper:

> For the President Mamdou Koulibaly, the answer [to the current crisis] is Sartrien: we must at the very least liquidate the Oppressor. No compromise is possible with him. The 'Collabo' is not irremediably dangerous. He changes his mind as he changes his master. We can thus envisage winning him over. On the other hand, the Oppressor is always an Oppressor by blood, as one has a nationality by blood. And it is this blood which we must extract from him. [...] The author himself shows courage in resisting those oily formulas for protecting his career by naming the Oppressor: France. By naming the 'Collabos': the Houphouëtists. By indicating the path to follow: 'Liquidate' France (*Le Courrier d'Abidjan* 17/09/2004).

While this discourse responds in part to tactical manoeuvring against the only force capable of preventing preventing Gbagbo from re-uniting the country by force, nevertheless, it is a discourse which has a profound echo in Côte d'Ivoire, and which attempts to federate the

entire country, ('Collabos' included) against the external and eternal enemies, all the while mobilising the imaginaries of autochthony, filiation and heritage.

Mbembe argues that today, the old imaginaries of revolution, national liberation, anti-imperialism and nativism have been reactivated by the youth:

> under the flashy rags of the current international lexicon (democracy, social movements, civil society) these imaginaries now combine in opposition to globalisation, reactivating the metaphysics of difference, re-enchanting tradition and reviving the utopia of an Africa cut off from the rest of the world and de-occidentalised (Mbembe 2001: 36).

The 'young patriots' 'General', Charles Blé Goudé provided a telling example of just this sort of imaginary in his appreciations of the UN. Following the publication of the report by UNHCHR Special Commission of Inquiry on the events of March 25 2004, the regime fell into a paroxysm of outrage and defiance. Charles Blé Goudé was named in the report as one of the organisers of the 'parallel forces' used to kill civilians in their homes during and following the aborted march. Questioned on his views about the commission's report, Blé Goudé railed against the international press, who published the report before it was officially transmitted to the President:

> I've got to the point where I don't believe that Hitler was bad, or that Milosevic was bad. Because it's the same media networks that presented Hitler and Milosevic as criminals who today present me and the Ivorian patriots who suffer at the hands of the rebellion as the executioners and the rebels as the victims (*Fraternité Matin* 11/05/2004).

On the role of the UN, he has this to say:

> This report reminds us of how, in their coalition, these same imperialists used Mobutu to kill Lumumba, the hope of the Congolese people. How these same imperialists formed a coalition to humiliate and finally kill Kwame N'krumah. How these same imperialists leagued together to kill Thomas Sankara. All proud sons of Africa. Today, Gbagbo belongs in this group of atypical presidents who refuse to be used by this system to crush the African continent. It's all these things that the report reminds us of. But instead of discouraging us, this report increases our power to fight them. We're going to decolonise Africa through the Ivorian struggle. [...] Here, there's a civil society which is highly organised, there's a tradition of combatants who rise up, who denounce, who expose the secrets of the plotters. It's this civil society that they want to identify and denigrate to demoralise it. This is the objective of the UN report.

> [...] We, the young patriots of the Côte d'Ivoire, hold M. Tévoédjré [Special Representative of Koffi Annan in Côte d'Ivoire] responsible for any catastrophe which may befall the Côte d'Ivoire. Because it's on the basis of his false and partisan reports that the UN takes position. The enemy of the Côte d'Ivoire is M. Tévoédjré, who wants to use the UN Follow-up Committee to help his friend Dramane Ouattara. We hold him responsible and he won't escape if a catastrophe arrives. We're all going to perish (*Le Temps* 10/05/2004).

Sanctioned by the Security Council for his role in the anti-UN violence of 2006, Blé Goudé continues to be the vanguard for the 'pan-African' struggle against imperialism and 'neo-colonialism', rallying youth not only in Côte d'Ivoire, but also, with mitigated success, in countries such as Togo and Senegal.

Four years of conflict have multiplied by a hundredfold the climate of suspicion, paranoia and hatred already in gestation before the crisis. How far will the protagonists go in fixing the borders between friends and enemies? Where is the spatial and imaginary limit beyond which one leaves 'home' for enemy territory? In many respects, the internal border drawn by the rebellion has only concretised an imaginary national border already represented in the minds of many Ivorians; the porous national borders between Côte d'Ivoire and its northern neighbours being considered as serving only to reinforce this uncertainty and inability to 'fix' these populations in determined spaces. Mamadou Koulibaly, himself a northerner and, amazingly, himself of 'mixed parentage', has been extremely clear on the subject: "Today, the border of the Côte d'Ivoire stops at Djébounoua [village in the centre of the country]" (*Fraternité Matin* 18/08/2004). Rebellion leader Guillaume Soro's occasional menaces of secession perhaps simply restate the perception that their forces and the populations that support them have already been extirpated from the space of the nation-state. Whenever the 'people of the Côte d'Ivoire' are evoked by the 'patriots', Soro's own 'people' know that it does not include them.

By way of conclusion, I pose the question of the performative capacity of these discourses. Given the 'reality' of Ivorian populations, the multiplicity of modes of subjectification the diversity of their individual experiences and origins and the highly mixed nature of their ancestries, the totalisations and reductions expressed in the ultra-nationalist hate propaganda seem simply insane. How is it that these discourses of exclusion met so rapidly with such radical forms of mobilisation and adhesion? No single, or even series of responses seems adequate. Even if the majority of the Ivorian population was horrified from the

outset by the extremism of the President's followers, horrified by the violence perpetrated by both sides, horrified by the travesty their country has become, they appeared singularly disarmed in the face of the continued escalation. It is as if a profound doubt had seized the entire nation, paralysing its capacity to react, to rally and pull the country away from the brink. Far from allowing Ivorians to know, 'once and for all, who is who', the war has only made the question more acute and terrifying. The war has shown that in the designation of political enemies and allies, ethnicity and autochthony prove to be highly unstable and deceptive. For the southern autochthons seduced by the 'patriotic' awakening, amongst the huge mass of 'Dioula' perceived as an invasive horde, how to tell who is an Ivorian Senoufo, a Malian Malinké, who is a peaceable farmer and who a mercenary or a rebel, who an 'infiltrator', who an unarmed civilian? And the Baoulé, are they not wolves in sheep's clothing? For years they have taken land, robbed the state blind and mortgaged our future. They said they were with the us against the Dioula, but now they too have joined the rebellion. The greatest sacrilege is the traitors from our own homelands. The turncoats, like Dacoury-Tabley, Djédjé Mady, Bété 'sons of the soil'.[18] How many more are hiding within our midst? How can we tell, for once and for all, who is who?

What is clear at least is that in this process of assignation and totalisation, state power and its techniques have a capital role to play, as they did in the Rwandan genocide. The current violence is undoubtedly an effect of, rather than a merely a reaction to, both nation-state formation and globalisation (Bayart et al., 2001: 190; Bayart 2004). At the same time, today's representations of self are edified in the interstices, between global and local horizons, capturing non-isomorphic processes of flux. Particularly amongst the youth, representations of the self are liminal and unstable. It is perhaps precisely the current ambivalence of autochthony which is at the heart of this racialising, biologising tendency we can observe in the Ivorian conflict, to the extent that individuals such as Mamadou Koulibaly find themselves producing discourses on

[18] Three days following his declaration that he was joining the rebellion, Louis Dacoury-Tabley's brother, Benoit was arrested and subsequently found lying shot on an Abidjan street. When some time later, his family tried to bury him in their native village in Bété country, a frenzied group of 'young patriots', assailed the cortège and seized the coffin, attempting to pry it open before being forced back by gendarmes. Djédjé Mady, the General Secretary of the PDCI and current leader of the 'Group of Seven', was 'disinherited' in the press by members of his home village in Bété country.

the self which are quite literally schizophrenic. Appadurai has drawn attention to the key role of this ontological uncertainty in situations of ethnocide. In his argument, he focuses on "bodily violence between actors with routine—and generally benign—prior knowledge of one another" in order to "illuminate 'threshold' or trigger conditions, where managed or endemic social conflict gives way to runaway violence" (Appadurai 1999: 307). The identification of the enemy demands fixed criteria of classification and identification as well as taxonomical purity, in an unstable situation of violence which is "explicitly about categories under stress and ideas striving for the logic of self-evidence" (Appadurai 1999: 310). Perhaps Appadurai is correct in suggesting that this very uncertainty itself triggers violence, as if the ultimate 'certainty' can only be achieved through death and dismemberment. These brutal actions by no means establish certainty, indeed, they only exacerbate the frustrations of their perpetrators, and lead to cycles of revenge and pre-emptive violence, and the on-going killings between autochthons and strangers testify. Appadurai argues that the dead body as a form of closure in situations of categorical uncertainty is closely related to themes of deception, treachery, betrayal, imposture and secrecy. He reminds us that the themes of trickery, secrecy and hidden identity pervaded the prelude to the Rwandan genocide, and other situations of ethnocide in recent history (Appadurai 1999: 313). The search for secure knowledge in the midst of cadavers has been taken to extremes in the Ivorian context. Mrs Hamza-Attea, one of the lawyers leading the Collective of the Victims of the War financed by Gbagbo's wife, announced at an international conference[19] on the Ivorian conflict in 2004 that their forensic scientists had collected bones and had identified the bodies of hundreds of the thousands killed in the fighting in the west. To a stunned audience she declared; "We have the bones, and we've done tests, we know who is who, who is Wê, who is Dan, who is Malinké". The real post-mortem has yet to come in Côte d'Ivoire. It should be recalled that the Rwandan genocide occurred not only through the revival of imaginaries of autochthony and the purity of origins, but also because the international community allowed the utopia of autarchy to become a reality, averting its eyes as the killings began.

[19] Côte d'Ivoire: Consolidation of a Fragile Peace, International Colloquium on the Côte d'Ivoire, Université Saint-Paul, Ottawa, February 23–24, 2003.

Bibliography

Appadurai, A. 1999. Ethnic Violence in the Era of Globalization. In Geschiere and Meyer (Eds) *Globalization and Identity: Dialectics of Flow and Closure*. Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, pp. 305–324.

Amondji, M. 1988. *Côte d'Ivoire: La Dependence et l'Épreuve des Faits*. Harmattan, Paris.

Asad, T. 1996. Comments on Conversion. In Van de Veer, P. (Ed) *Conversion to Modernities: The Globalization of Christianity*, Routledge, New York.

Arnaut, K. 2004. Performing Displacements and Rephrasing Attachments: Ethnographic Explorations of Mobility in Art, Ritual, Media and Politics. PhD thesis, University of Ghent, Belgium.

Banégas, R. and B. Losch. 2002. La Côte d'Ivoire au Bord de l'Implosion. *Politique Africaine*. 87, pp. 139–162.

Banégas, R. and R. Marshall-Fratani. (Eds) 2003. *La Côte d'Ivoire en guerre*. Special issue of *Politique Africaine*, 89.

———. 2007. Côte d'Ivoire: Negotiating Identity and Citizenship Through the Barrel of a Gun. In Bøås, M. and Dunn, K. (Eds) *Revisiting African Guerrillas: Actors, Issues, Sectors and Trends*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Bayart, J.-F. 1998. La guerre en Afrique : dépérissement ou formation de l'Etat? *Esprit*, November.

———. 2004. *Le gouvernement du monde: une critique politique de la globalisation*. Fayard, Paris.

Bayart, J.-F. and P. Geschiere. 2001. J'Étais là Avant: Problèmes Politique de l'Autochtonie. *Critique Internationale*. 10, pp. 126–128.

Bayart, J.-F., Geschiere, P., and F. Nyamnjoh. 2001. Autochtonie, Démocratie et Citoyenneté en Afrique. *Critique Internationale*. 10, pp. 177–194.

Bobo, K.S. 2002. La Question de l'Accès à la Terre des Jeunes et des Citadins de Retour au Village: Cas de Donsohouo dans la Sous-Préfecture d'Oumé. Masters thesis, Université de Bouaké.

Chauveau, J.-P. 1997. Jeu Foncier, Institutions d'Accès à la Terre et Usage de la Ressource. Une Étude de cas dans le Centre-Ouest Ivoiriren. In B. Contamin and H. Mémel-Fotê. (Eds) *Le Modèle Ivoirien en Questions. Crises, Ajustements, Recompositions*. Karthala-ORSTOM, Paris, pp. 325–360.

———. 2000. Question Foncière et Construction Nationale en Côte d'Ivoire. Les Enjeux Silencieux d'un Coup d'État. *Politique Africaine*. 78, pp. 94–125.

———. 2002. *Une Lecture Sociologique de la Nouvelle loi sur le Domaine Foncier Rural. Formalisation des "Droits Coutumiers" et Contexte Socio-Politique en Milieu Rural Ivoirien*. Documents de travail UR RÉFO N° 6, IRD, Montpellier.

———. 2006. How does an Institution Evolve? Land, Politics, Intra-Household Relations and the Institution of the "*Tutorat*" amongst Autochthons and Migrant Farmers in the Gban region of Côte d'Ivoire. In Kuba, R. and C. Lentz. (Eds) *Landrights and the Politics of Belonging in West Africa*. Leiden, Brill, pp. 213–240.

Chauveau J.-P., and K.S. Bobo. 2003. La Situation de Guerre dans l'Arène Villageoise. Un exemple dans le Centre-Ouest Ivoirien. *Politique Africaine*. 89, pp. 12–33.

Chauveau, J.-P. and J.-P. Dozon. 1987. Au Cœur des Ethnies Ivoiriennes…l'Etat. In E. Terray (Ed) *L'Etat Contemporain en Afrique*. L'Harmattan, Paris, pp. 221–296.

Chrétien, J.-P. 1997. *Le Défi de l'Ethnisme: Rwanda et Burundi, 1990–1996*. Karthala, Paris.

Dembélé, O.. 2002. La Construction Économique et Politique de la Catégorie «Étranger» en Côte d'Ivoire. In Le Pape, M., and C. Vidal. (Eds) *La Côte d'Ivoire: L'Année Terrible, 1999–2000*. Karthala, Paris, pp. 123–172.

Dozon, J.-P. 1985a. *La Société Bété*. Karthala, Paris.

———. 1985b. Les Bété : Une Création Coloniale. In Amselle, J.-L., M'Bokolo. (Eds) *Au Coeur de l'Ethnie*. Editions la Découverte, Paris, pp. 49–85.

———. 1997. L'Etranger et l'Allochtone. In B. Contamin and H. Mémel-Fotê. (Eds) *Le Modèle Ivoirien en Questions. Crises, Ajustements, Recomposition.* Karthala-ORSTOM, Paris, pp. 770–798.
———. 2000. La Côte d'Ivoire Entre Démocratie, Nationalisme et Ethnonationalisme. *Politique Africaine.* 89, pp. 45–62.
Foucault, M. 1994. *Dits et Ecrits, Vol. IV*. Gallimard, Paris.
———. 1997. « *Il Faut Défendre la Société ». Cours au Collège de France. 1976*. Gallimard, Paris.
———. 2004. *Sécurité, Territoire, Population. Cours au Collège de France. 1977–8*. Gallimard, Paris.
Geschiere, P. and F. Nyamnjoh. 2000. Capitalism and Autochthony: The Seesaw of Mobility and Belonging. *Public Culture*. 12: 2, pp. 423–452.
Geschiere, P. and B. Meyer. (Eds) 1999. *Globalization and Identity: Dialectics of Flow and Closure.* Blackwell, Oxford.
Hibou, B. (Ed) 1999. *La Privatisation des Etats*. Karthala, Paris.
Konaté, Y. 2000. Le Destin d'Alassane Dramane Ouattara. In Le Pape, M. and C. Vidal. (Eds) *La Côte d'Ivoire : L'Année Terrible, 1999–2000*. Karthala, Paris.
———. 2003. Les Enfants de la Balle. De la FESCI aux Mouvements des Patriotes. *Politique Africaine.* 89, pp. 49–70.
Kohlhagen, D. 2002, Gestion Foncière et Conflits Entre Agriculteurs et Éleveurs, Autochtones et Étrangers dans la Région de Korhogo (Côte d'Ivoire). *Mission Report for the Research Program «Vers de Nouwelles Dynamiques Entre Loi et Coutume?»* CIRAD, Montpellier.
Le Pape, M. 1997. *L'Énergie Social à Abidjan : Economie Politique de la Ville en Afrique Noire, 1930–1995*. Karthala, Paris.
Losch, B. (Ed) 2000. *Côte d'Ivoire. La Tentation Ethnonationaliste*. Special issue *Politique Africaine.* 78.
Marie, A. 2002. Une Anthropo-logique Communautaire à l'Épreuve de la Mondialisation: de la Relation de Dette à la Lutte Sociale (l'Exemple Ivoirien). *Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines*. 166.
Marshall. A. and C. Ero. 2003. L'Ouest de la Côte d'Ivoire: Un Conflit Libérien? *Politique Africaine.* 89, pp. 88–101.
Marshall-Fratani, R. 2004. Liaisons Dangereuses: Les Implications Régionales de la Guerre Ivoirienne in *Côte d'Ivoire: Consolidation d'une Paix Fragile*, Partnership Africa Canada; Ottawa.
Mbembe, A. 2000. A Propos Des Écritures Africaines de Soi. *Politique Africaine.* 77, pp. 16–43.
Obou, O. 2000. *Requiem Pour un Code Électoral.* Presses des Universités de Côte d'Ivoire, Abidjan.
Raulin, H. 1957. *Mission d'Études des Groupements Immigrés en Côte d'Ivoire. Fascicule 3: Problèmes Fonciers dans les Régions de Gagnoa et de Daloa*. Paris, ORSTOM.
Touré, S. (Ed) 1996. L'Ivoirité, ou l'Esprit du Nouveau Contrat Social du Président Henri Konan Bédié. Acts of the CURDIPHE forum, 20–26 March, 1996 in *Ethics*, Presses des Universités de Côte d'Ivoire, Abidjan.
Vidal, C. 2002. Témoignages Abidjanaises. In Le Pape, M., and C. Vidal. (Eds) *La Côte d'Ivoire: L'Année Terrible, 1999–2000*. Karthala, Paris.
Zongo, M. 2001. *Etude des Groupements Immigrés Burkinabè dans la Région de Oumé (Côte d'Ivoire): Organisation en Migration, Rapports Fonciers avec les Groupes Autochtones et les Pouvoirs Publics Locaux.* Working Paper, Unité de recherche " Régulations foncières ", Montpellier, IRD.

Ivory Coast's Wild West. BBC World Service. 08/02/2005. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4244299.stm
Gagnoa, Ouragahio, Bayota, Sinfra…: Dans le Couloir de la Terreur. *24 Heures.* 12/03/2004.
Daloa, Duekoué, Guiglo et Bloléquin: L'Ouest Militarisé se Prépare à la Guerre. *24 Heures.* 04/11/2004.
Bouaflé, Oumé, Diégonéfla, Hiré…: Les Milices Préparent un Coup. *24 Heures.* 16/02/2005.
Menace sur le Processus de Paix—Gbagbo Prépare la Guerre Depuis le Libéria. *Le Patriote.* 27/01/2004.
Dons d'Ambulance à Guiglo, à Bloléquin et à Toulepleu: Le Ministre Mabri Toikeusse Bloqué par les "Jeunes Patriotes". *Le Nouveau Réveil.* 28/02/2005.
Smith, S. 2002 Côte d'Ivoire: Le Vrai Visage de la Rébellion. *Le Monde.* 11/10/2002.
Côte d'Ivoire: Militia Fighters from Logouale Attack Handed over to Ivorian Police. IRIN, Abidjan. 04/03/2005.
Laurent Gbagbo aux Chefs des Milices: 'Organisez-vous'. *Le Patriote.* 19/05/2003.
Gbagbo Masque les Milices. Et Pourtant, elles Existent! *24 Heures.* 20/05/ 2003.

THE POLITICS OF CITIZENSHIP IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja[1]

The death or internal displacement of millions of people in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) since independence on 30 June 1960 can be traced, directly or indirectly, to what Mahmood Mamdani has termed "the crisis of post-colonial citizenship" (Mamdani 2001: 19–39). How citizenship is defined by the state and by exclusivist political groupings has had disastrous consequences not only for people whom representatives of 'authentic inhabitants' of a given territory seek to exclude as outsiders, but also for innocent 'sons and daughters of the soil' who are caught up in the resulting political turmoil.

Exclusionary notions of citizenship have been used in Congolese politics as part of the counter-revolution against the national independence movement in 1959–62 and again as part of the authoritarian backlash against the democracy movement in 1992–96. The two major cases in which the politics of citizenship has been used in this manner are the crisis associated with the Hutu-Tutsi conflict in Rwanda and Burundi and its repercussions in the entire Great Lakes region, and ethnic cleansing in Katanga province. This paper provides a brief historical analysis of these two cases, with a view to showing how the politics of citizenship can be used to inhibit or frustrate political emancipation and democratisation. Against this destructive tendency, which has brought a lot of death and suffering to the Congo, the paper concludes with a plea for a more inclusive politics of citizenship in multiethnic and multicultural societies such as the DRC, a politics which is compatible with the promotion of democracy, economic development and political stability.

[1] The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the views of the United Nations or any of its specialised agencies.

'Authentic' vs. 'Questionable' Citizenship

The question of citizenship rights in the Congolese provinces of the Great Lakes region and in Katanga revolves around the social, economic and political weight of the people of Rwandan origin, both Hutu and Tutsi, and of people from the two Kasaï provinces, respectively. To the extent that outsiders are perceived as faring better than the local inhabitants in economic opportunities, a chauvinistic political discourse manifests itself, calling for people of questionable, doubtful or uncertain citizenship to be excluded in favour of the 'authentic' Congolese, particularly in the Great Lakes region, or for Kasaïans to leave the riches of Katanga to 'authentic Katangans'.

This distinction between authentic and questionable citizenship in the Congo has its roots in both Western and African notions of citizenship. In the Western world, according to Chantal Mouffe, the term *citizenship* or membership in a political community originated in "the classical Greek and Roman conception of man as a political being" (Mouffe 2001: 136). Since the debate by Socrates and his disciples against the Sophists, citizenship in Greek political theory implied a profound obligation on the part of the individual to identify with one's community and to "hold its interests as dear as one's own" (Massey 1997: 2). Good citizenship was therefore the antithesis of the Sophists' position that might is right and that each person should, to the best of his/her ability, pursue the satisfaction of his/her appetites with no regard for the best interests of the community as a whole (Massey 1997: 3).

That good citizenship requires a shared set of goals and values in a political community, whether it is a village, a town, or a larger grouping, is an idea that was fundamental to the very notion of a human being in pre-colonial Africa. In Bantu societies, for example, the individual was conceptualised as a *vital force*, whose existence transcends the temporal body in which a person is objectified in his/her earthly life. For this reason, the individual is fully human only through the complex web of relations that ties him or her to other vital forces, both dead and alive.[2] As I have written elsewhere, Africans are not only the first humans, they are also the humans with the greatest attachment to ancestral lands,

[2] The classic, though controversial, work on Bantu ontology is Placide Tempels, *Bantu Philosophy* (1959). For a brief summary of the political history of Bantu Africa, see Obenga 1991.

and it is on the basis of their experience in living in society from the family to larger social units that their values of solidarity such as ethnic allegiance and patriotism are born (Nzongola-Ntalaja 1997: 11–12).

It follows that attachment to one's community and, through it, to the soil of the ancestors or the homeland, is a fundamental dimension of the notion of citizenship in Africa.[3] In Africa, as elsewhere, the definition of the community implies a distinction between members and non-members. And all original legal definitions of citizenship in the world are notorious by their exclusionary character. In the democratic Greek city-states, citizenship was restricted to free and native-born men, with slaves and women taking care of productive and reproductive activities to allow their masters to engage in politics, leisure activities and warfare. In the Roman Empire, citizenship was first restricted to the residents of Rome, and was extended to all free inhabitants of the empire in A.D. 212. Moreover, the level of participation by citizens in governance was determined by class distinctions. Between 1787, when the U.S. constitution was enacted, and the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, African Americans as a group were not recognised as citizens of the United States, and did not enjoy full voting rights before the Voting Rights Act of 1965. In both Europe and North America, women did not get the suffrage until the 20th century.

While citizenship in the United States is determined by the place of birth (*jus soli*, or the law of the soil) rather than by blood (*jus sanguinis*), the definition of U.S. citizenship is expanded by extending the principle of *jus sanguinis* to children born of U.S. citizens abroad. This is identical to the traditional African notion of citizenship, in that no matter where you are born, you are the son or daughter of the original soil or homeland of the parent through whom you trace your descent. Ethnic citizenship is therefore the foundation for national citizenship in Africa, although it is also possible to acquire citizenship by naturalisation.

In the Congo, citizenship is automatically conferred to all descendants of the ethnic groups with a legitimate claim to land within the territorial boundaries of the country as set in 1885, the year of the creation of the Congo Free State by King Leopold II of Belgium. In

[3] In a July 2001 discussion in Abuja on the controversy over the *indigene/non-indigene* distinction in the States of the Nigerian federation, Professor J. Isawa Elaigwu, a prominent Nigerian political scientist, remarked that the question of citizenship and entitlements in Nigeria cannot be the same as in federal systems in Europe and North America because of the African attachment to ancestral lands.

the two major cases in which citizenship rights have been denied, the first involves the total denial of the very right to citizenship for people of Rwandan origin in the Congo, including those whose groups were inhabitants of the territory in 1885, while the second is the case of denying full citizenship rights to Kasaïans resident in Katanga since they are from a different province of origin. The first is directly tied to ethnic identity politics and the genocide of 1994 in Rwanda, and the second to colonial and post-colonial political manipulation aimed at weakening the emancipatory and democratisation processes.

Blurred Citizenship in the Great Lakes Region

Since the Congo shares borders with nine countries, and has ethnic groups straddling international boundaries in all nine frontier areas, it may be asked why the Great Lakes region has a more acute issue of citizenship and is more prone to violent conflict than the other areas. Part of the answer lies in the complex history of post-1885 relations between the peoples on both sides of the Great Lakes, which has been marked by the construction of ethnic identity in Rwanda and Burundi and its political manipulation by the colonialists; the deeper penetration of Congolese economic and political life by immigrants from Rwanda during the 1970s; and the trauma of the 1994 genocide and its repercussions for the Tutsi and Hutu, respectively.

The creation of the Congo Free State in 1885 left some Kinyarwanda-speaking people such as the Tutsi Banyamulenge, who had settled on the Itombwe Plateau of South Kivu around 1881, under Belgian rather than German rule. More people of Rwandan origin were to move into the Congo as a result of the establishment of Belgian administrative authority over Rwanda and Burundi as a mandatory power under the League of Nations in the wake of the German defeat in World War I. The two territories were annexed to the Belgian Congo in 1925 to become a unit of a single administrative entity known as *le Congo Belge et le Ruanda-Urundi*, with a single governor-general in Léopoldville (Kinshasa) and a single colonial army and constabulary force, the *Force publique.* Congolese civil servants and soldiers were posted to Rwanda and Burundi, and thousands of Rwandans were sent to the Congo to work in mines and on plantations. As people from Rwanda and Burundi who had resided in the Congo for more than 10 years were allowed to vote and eligible for political office in the national elections of May

1960, they were for all practical purposes citizens of the Congo, but legally their citizenship status remained uncertain.

Belgian colonialism was characterised by a close working alliance between the state, the Roman Catholic Church and large enterprises, particularly mining companies. Born out of a brutal legacy of primitive accumulation by the Leopoldian state and concessionary companies, the colonial trinity sought to impose its hegemony through paternalism, white supremacy and administratively imposed ethnic divisions among Africans. The Hutu-Tutsi conflict is in large part a result of the grafting of the colonial ideology of racism and paternalism on the pre-colonial social system of both Rwanda and Burundi.

Unlike the typical ethnic map in Africa, this system was unique in that the three social groups—identifiable in part by differences in physical characteristics and interrelated through clientship ties—shared the same homeland, language and culture. Although the distinctions in status and occupation tended to go hand in hand with differences in physical characteristics, the social cleavages thus created were never rigid, since they were not based on differences of race, caste or religion. As the whole social order revolved around the institutions of the kingdom and the patron-client relations associated with them, proximity and/or service to the royal court and its representatives in the provinces were an overriding factor in an individual's rank, whether the latter was Hutu, Tutsi or Twa.

Having served as faithful auxiliaries of the colonial masters for more than 30 years, the Tutsi elite became expendable when its members began to advocate for self-determination and independence in the 1950s. Tutsi political leaders in both Rwanda and Burundi were sympathetic to Patrice Lumumba's brand of radical nationalism, and thus attracted the ire of the Belgian colonialists. The missionaries, colonial anthropologists and other Belgian ideologues who had created the myth of Tutsi superiority, suddenly found it expedient to portray the Tutsi as an aristocracy of alien origins that should relinquish power to the oppressed Hutu indigenous majority. Although there is no evidence of systematic violence between Tutsi and Hutu during the pre-colonial period, this ideological reconstruction of their common history sought to depict them as antagonistic groups with centuries-old enmities.

Unfortunately, just as the old myth of Tutsi superiority had fallen on receptive ears among the Tutsi elite, the new myth of Hutu as slaves in need of emancipation was warmly embraced by the rising Hutu counter-elite in its quest for the social advantages to which Hutu

intellectuals felt entitled. The process of ethnic identity construction and mobilisation eventually led to the anti-Tutsi pogrom of 1959 in Rwanda, which resulted in thousands of Tutsi refugees settling permanently in the Congo. There, some of them assumed prominent positions in the political and economic life of the country.

The political clout of Rwandan immigrants in the Congo was best exemplified by Barthélemy Bisengimana Rwema, who served as chief of staff to President Mobutu Sese Seko between May 1969 and February 1977. The very first graduate in electrical engineering at Lovanium University (now the University of Kinshasa) in 1961, Bisengimana lost no time in using the Rwandan network of which he had been a part as former President of the association of Rwandan students at Lovanium to reach the pinnacle of power in Kinshasa. As the person responsible for formulating and coordinating public policy for Mobutu, he was the architect of the 1972 presidential decree granting Congolese citizenship as of 30 June 1960 to all people from Rwanda and Burundi who had established residence in Kivu before 1 January 1950 and lived in the Congo since then. As one of the chief overseers of the Zairianisation measures of 1973, which involved the confiscation of small and medium enterprises of foreign nationals and their free distribution to members of the political elite, Bisengimana amassed a lot of wealth and power, and used them to further the interests of Rwandan immigrants in the Congo (Ndaywel 1998: 703–704).

This was particularly evident in the ownership of large plantations and the land grab in the east, which threatened the livelihoods and future of those who saw themselves as the rightful sons and daughters of the soil. Where Rwandan immigrants were in the majority, as in the case of the Masisi area of North Kivu, the original inhabitants felt like foreigners in their own country. Thus, under pressure from its eastern members, Mobutu's rubber stamp parliament repealed the 1972 decree and replaced it with a 1981 law on citizenship, which defines a citizen as someone who is a descendant of an ethnic group found in the country within its borders as of 1 August 1885. This had the effect of relegating those Rwandan immigrants whose citizenship had been confirmed in 1972 back to the category of uncertain or questionable citizenship.

In itself, this law does not exclude all people of Rwandan origin from Congolese citizenship. The problem has been with its interpretation. Strictly speaking, groupings of people of Rwandan origin with recognisable structures of customary authority and relatively uncontested land

such as the Tutsi Banyamulenge of South Kivu should qualify under this law as Congolese citizens. Unfortunately, there were people in the Congo, and particularly in the east, who contested even the right of this group to call itself 'Banyamulenge,' and insisted that there were no permanent settlements of Kinyarwanda-speaking people west of the Great Lakes. Those who were there at the time of the partition, it is argued, were part of the pattern of intermittent invasions in pursuit of cattle and women.[4] For those supporting this argument, the only way for people of Rwandan origin to become citizens of the Congo was through naturalisation, and this was a case-by-case process rather than a matter requiring a blanket policy for all of them.

Just as the Belgians had manipulated ethnic identity as a way of weakening the independence movement, Mobutu, the very man who had brought prominence to Rwandan Tutsi in the Congo, resolved with his cronies to use the citizenship issue as one of their weapons of choice for destabilising the democracy movement between 1992 and 1996. They chose as their initial target the people of Rwandan origin in North Kivu. The regime exploited the grievances of the indigenous population, who were engaged in competition over land and other resources with citizens, migrants and refugees of Rwandan origin, both Hutu and Tutsi, who were commonly known as *Banyarwanda*. The latter were accused of seeking to dominate the indigenous groups, and the allegiance as well as the legal documents of those among them who were citizens were called into question, as everyone was considered to be of a 'doubtful nationality' or 'questionable citizenship.'

Thousands were forced to flee to security across the border, and they found refuge in Rwanda. In 1996, when Mobutu's associates tried to repeat the same experience with the Congolese Tutsi of South Kivu, the Banyamulenge, the latter's resistance provided Rwanda the excuse it needed to intervene in Congolese affairs with the pretext of trying to prevent another genocide. This is one of the justifications that Rwanda gave for its drive against the Hutu refugee camps in the Congo, which served as bases for the genocidal enterprise of the Interahamwe. The pretext of preventing another genocide was also used in 1998, when Rwanda and Uganda launched their war of partition and plunder against the Congo. The regime of Laurent-Désiré Kabila, which had been

[4] This was the most frequently used argument by delegates from eastern Congo at the Sovereign National Conference in 1992 in Kinshasa.

established in 1997 thanks to Rwandan military might, did not hesitate to exploit the anti-Tutsi prejudices of the Congolese as a rallying point of resistance against the 1998 invasion by Rwanda and Uganda.

Ethnic Cleansing and the Denial of Citizenship Rights in Katanga

Ethnic cleansing and genocide are forms of ethnic war, in which the violence involved takes the form of 'final solution' attempts at eliminating the hated group either by expelling its members from a given area or by destroying them altogether. As the most extreme manifestations of identity-based conflicts, ethnic wars require the full weight of the state and its backing for the criminal actions of both state and non-state actors. By definition, ethnic cleansing is the forcible removal of people of a given ethnic group from a geographical area in which they have been declared undesirable. As the special rapporteur of the UN Human Rights Commission noted in his 1995 report on Serbian policy in the Balkans, "population displacements are not the consequence of the war but its very purpose" (*Libération* 30/03/1999). All means necessary, including the destruction of their property, torture, rape and murder are used to scare people into running away. The surviving victims then become refugees or internally displaced persons.

Kasaïans have been attracted to the mining, railroad and associated industries of the Katanga province since the establishment of the mining industry in 1906. Most of the migrants were Luba-Kasaï, whose greater social mobility was in part a function of the extremely low levels of human security and economic opportunities in their relatively neglected south-eastern corner of Kasaï. The Kasaïans took full advantage of the training and job opportunities available in the richest province of the Congo to occupy not only the most skilled positions in the mining and railroad industries such as welders and train conductors and mechanics, but also the most senior white collar positions available to blacks in the public and private sectors of the Belgian Congo.

The founding of the *Confédération des Associations Tribales du Katanga* (CONAKAT) in 1958, with its position that the wealth of Katanga should first and foremost benefit the indigenous ethnic groups of the province, or the 'authentic Katangans', sounded the first death knell for the security and prosperity of Kasaïans in Katanga. This determination to deny the Kasaïans the exercise of their full citizenship rights in Katanga coincided with the intensification of the independence struggle,

in which most Kasaïans, including Luba-Kasaï civil servants, company clerks and skilled workers, were supporters of Lumumba's radical nationalism and proposal for a unitary form of state in post-colonial Congo. CONAKAT leaders, on the other hand, were allied with the Belgian mining and settler interests for greater provincial autonomy and a federal solution. They eventually became an integral part of the Western-led counter-revolution against Congolese independence as figurehead leaders of the Katanga secession.

Ironically, the architect of the first major episode of ethnic cleansing in 1960–62 was Godefroid Munongo, Katanga's interior minister and a descendant of King Msiri, the Nyamwezi trader who founded the state of Garenganze in the 19th century. Although he was a Congolese of Tanzanian origin, Munongo felt more of an 'authentic Katangan' than the Luba-Kasai, whose cherished ancestral cradle is actually in Katanga, in the area between Lakes Upemba and Tanganyika. While the actual number of displaced people is not known, a large portion of the Kasaïan population of Katanga was evacuated by the United Nations Mission in the Congo (ONUC) back to their provinces of origin in Kasaï. Many would return to Katanga following the end of the secession in 1963 to resume their employment or economic activities and rebuild their lives.

In 1992–94, ethnic cleansing in Katanga occurred on a much larger scale than in 1960–62. Approximately one million Kasaïans were expelled from cities and towns in which some families had lived since the beginning of mineral exploitation in Katanga. To regain their homelands in Kasai, some of the victims were forced into a long trek of up to 1,000 kilometres during which thousands perished of exhaustion, hunger and attacks by wild animals. Those who waited for trains were subjected to unsanitary living conditions around railway stations; overcrowded and slow moving trains that often derailed because of old and faulty equipment and lack of maintenance; and attacks on and off trains by the armed militia of the *Union des Républicains et des Fédéralistes Indépendants* (UFERI), the party of onetime Prime Minister Jean Nguza Karl I Bond and Katanga Governor Gabriel Kyungu wa Kumwanza. As a matter of fact, history was repeating itself, as this was the second time since independence that Luba-Kasaï residents, whose historical origin as a people is actually in Katanga, were being expelled from the province by someone who has less of a historical claim to it. For if Kyungu is Luba-Katanga by his maternal side, his paternal grandfather was Portuguese!

Conclusion

In the spirit of national reconciliation, the transitional parliament of the DRC is expected to settle the issue of citizenship with respect to the people of Rwandan origin by elaborating and adopting a new law on nationality in place of the law of 1981. A resolution of the matter in an inclusive way would certainly constitute a positive development. As a multiethnic and multicultural society, the Congo must learn from its past that tolerance for diversity and respect for multiple and overlapping identities are not only essential for national unity and solidarity; they are also indispensable for maintaining peace and stability. In Africa, as in the rest of the world, the requirements of regional integration and the forces of globalisation point to the inevitability of recognising the need for multinational and global citizenship.[5]

On the other hand, the ethnic cleansing of Kasaïans in Katanga is an eloquent testimony to the fact that laws alone do not ensure that state and non-state actors respect the citizenship rights of all citizens. It is deplorable, in this regard, that nothing has been done to bring to justice Kyungu and other perpetrators of this crime against humanity. That some of them could even continue to hold political office in the Congo today is a further indication that there is no political will to deal with impunity in a forceful way.

Africa needs to broaden the boundaries of citizenship from indigeneity to incorporate non-indigenes at all levels of the political community in the ongoing processes of democratisation, nation-building and sustainable development. This should be done with due regard to respect for individual and social rights, including the right of indigenous peoples to own their ancestral lands, but also in accordance with the national interest and pan-African solidarity. For it makes no sense to deny people a right to the land they have lived on for more than a century on the grounds that they were originally slaves or second-class strangers.

In a diverse society, rivalries and conflicts are bound to arise. In many ways, they help to pinpoint the society's fault-lines and areas in which change is necessary. Competition for power and resources will always be a feature of any normal situation. A society without conflicts, or

---

[5] In their bestseller, *Empire* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 400, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri see the "ultimate demand for global citizenship" as exemplified by the battle cry of the undocumented aliens residing in France for "*papiers pour tous*" as a major plank in the political platform of the world proletariat.

one without lines of social cleavage, can exist only in utopias. In the real world, particularly under the current constraints of globalisation, conflicts cannot be ruled out, and they may even be salutary with respect to fighting oppression and injustice.

The nature of the economic and social environment and the mode of political governance have a lot to do with the causes and dynamics of conflicts in Africa. Whether they are related to entitlements or to real or perceived oppression based on identity, conflicts can be prevented or resolved by dealing with their root causes. Identity itself is not such a cause, since identities are historically constructed. Given the fact that individuals have multiple identities, ethnicity or any other single identity cannot constitute an insurmountable obstacle to a process of nation-building in which diversity is recognised as positive. However, for this to succeed, it must be accompanied by a process of state building in which priority is given to eradicating poverty and providing all citizens with social and economic opportunities in a fair and equitable manner.

For this to happen, there is need for strengthening the democratisation process and citizen participation in the construction of a more stable and equitable political order. This should include the promotion of a paradigm shift on the nature of the state, which needs to be seen not as a private network of relations built around the ruler and his entourage, who have their turn to eat the national cake, but as a set of impersonal institutions serving the general interest. In this new paradigm, state institutions should become more responsive and accountable to their constituents through greater patriotism; a democratic culture of decision-making that places emphasis on consultations with civil society; and improved service delivery. Finally, all of this requires increased citizen participation in the management of public affairs, including conflict mitigation and resolution, the setting of local priorities through participatory budgeting, and monitoring the performance of state agencies through inclusive processes such citizen audits and community-based policing.

Bibliography

Kangomba Lulamba, J.-C. 2000. *L'enfer Kasaïen de Kolwezi: Autopsie d'une Épuration Ethnique.* Louvain-la-Neuve: Actuel; Brussels: Panubula.

Kennes, E. 2003. *Essai Biographique sur Laurent Désiré Kabila.* Tervuren: Institut Africain/CEDAF; Paris: L'Harmattan.

Libération (Paris daily), 30 March 1999.

Mamdani, M. 2001. *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Massey, L. 1997. On the Origins of Citizenship in Education: Isocrates, Rhetoric, and Kairos. *Journal of Public Affairs.* http://cicero.smsu.edu/journal/articles97/massey.html

Mouffe, C. 2001. Citizenship. In Krieger, J. (Ed) *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Mutamba Makombo Kitatshima, J.-M. 1998. *Du Congo Belge au Congo Indépendant, 1940–1960: Emergence des "Évolués" et Genèse du Nationalisme.* Kinshasa: Institut de Formation et d'Etudes Politiques (IFEP).

Ndaywel è Nziem, I. 1998. *Histoire Générale du Congo: De l'héritage Ancien à la République Démocratique.* Paris and Brussels: Duculot.

Nzongola-Ntalaja, G. 2002. *The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: A People's History.* London and New York: Zed Books.

———. 2001. Les Dimensions Politiques de la Situation de l'Afrique dans le Système Mondial. In Houtart, F. (Ed) *Et si l'Afrique Refusait le Marché?* Louvain-la-Neuve: Centre Tricontinental; Paris: L'Harmattan.

———. 1998. The State and Democracy in Africa. In Nzongola-Ntalaja, G. and M.C. Lee (Eds) *The State and Democracy in Africa.* Trenton: AAPS Books, Harare/Africa World Press, pp. 9–24.

Obenga, T. 1991. Histoire du Monde Bantu. In Obenga, T. and Simao Souindoula (Eds.) *Racines Bantu/Bantu Roots.* Libreville: CICIBA.

Tempels, P. 1959. *Bantu Philosophy.* Paris: Presence Africaine.

PART THREE

LAND AND BELONGING

CAUGHT AT THE CROSSROADS: CITIZENSHIP, MARGINALITY AND THE MBORORO FULANI IN NORTHWEST CAMEROON

Sam Hickey[1]

The contemporary politics of citizenship in much of sub-Saharan Africa has become increasingly characterised by debates over 'belonging', 'autochthony' and 'native-ness'. While this discourse and practice of citizenship has been strongly associated with violent conflict in several African countries, the focus on '*terroir*' as the basis of citizenship also closely informs everyday struggles over both economic resources and political status and power. This resurgent discourse is often employed by political elites who effectively use colonial constructions of citizenship as a means of (re)establishing local hierarchies of citizenship within multi-ethnic communities (Eyoh 1999: 292), in ways that assure 'natives' privileged access to reproductive resources and political power ahead of 'strangers'. In particular, these debates have exclusionary implications for social groups whose relationship to the land is shaped by non-agricultural forms of political economy and associated forms of cultural identity, and those groups whose historical and geographical patterns of settlement and migration differ from (or can be framed as being different to) the experience of dominant groups.

Over the past decade, Cameroon has arguably experienced a particularly virulent outbreak of this discourse of belonging (e.g. Eyoh 1999; Geschiere and Gugler 1998). In this context, several groups have become adversely incorporated into the forms and processes of politics and political economy that either emerge from or are reproduced by this discourse. Arguably the most famed example here are the hunter-gatherers and other forest people in Cameroon (Lewis 2000), who increasingly find both their livelihood and even identity under threat

[1] This paper is based on research carried out by the author in 1998, 2000 and 2002 in Cameroon, jointly funded by the UK Department for International Development and Staffordshire University. Thanks to the many people in Cameroon who made their time, knowledge, views and documentation available with such generosity, and Peter Beaney for his astute intellectual guidance. Thanks also to Nuhu Salihu whose close reading of the paper and advice led to several important changes.

from processes of sedentarisation, capitalist resource extraction and co-optation. According to a recent study of their experience as citizens under the discourse of 'autochthony':

> To the extent that autochthony is to be of the soil, Baka are not autochthonous… [they] do not have the farmers' connection to the soil, they are not rooted, they are connected to the land through their movements over it… Their connection to the land is not ancestral (Leonhardt 2004: 3).

This lack of belonging, which helps to legitimate the activities of logging companies and local agricultural communities responsible for these processes, also characterises pastoral groups in Cameroon, particularly movement-based pastoralists such as the Mbororo Fulani. In both cases, these factors are exacerbated by the non-territorial, non-hierarchical socio-political structures of such groups, which effectively left them unrecognised within the colonial process of state formation. As argued by Victor Azarya (1996), the relative political marginality of different pastoral groups throughout the twentieth century in Africa has been closely related to whether they were 'state-forming' or 'stateless' societies in pre-colonial Africa. The Mbororo'en were amongst those stateless pastoral societies, characterised by decentralised and segmentary socio-political structures, which did not seek to establish political hegemony over other groups. As noted by Phillip Burnham's studies of the Mbororo'en in eastern Cameroon:

> …these pastoral nomads stand in an ethnically segmented and often oppositional relationship to the politically dominant, sedentary Fulbe of northern Cameroon… this create[s] strong feelings of political marginalisation among the Cameroonian Mbororo (Burnham 1996: 96).

While the discourse of autochthony constitutes a common form of exclusionary politics for pastoralist and hunter-gatherer groups, the different histories of settlement of such groups in their respective areas, also strongly informs their status as citizens. Whereas the Baka are known as the 'first Cameroonians', the Mbororo'en were the last to settle in Northwest Cameroon, a region also known as the Bamenda Grassfields (Figure 1).[2] Arriving from 1916 as a semi-nomadic group,

[2] The comparison between the Mbororo'en and the Baka is limited here to their related experiences of the politics of belonging. In addition to settlement patterns, there are significant economic differences. While there has been a process of economic decline amongst the Mbororo'en in Northwest Province, their status vis-à-vis farming communities in terms of wealth has been the opposite of that encountered by hunter-gatherers,

Figure 1: Map of Cameroon.

their pastoralist livelihood, dispersed and fragmented socio-political structures, and adherence to Islam distinguished the Mbororo'en markedly from the 'native' farming populations. Arriving immediately prior to the establishment of British colonial administration in the 1920s, the Mbororo'en have typically been viewed as 'strangers' by both their neighbours and successive state regimes, despite the high levels of in-migration that characterised this area during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Nkwi and Warnier 1982).[3] The extent to which this late arrival continues to inform contemporary debates over Mbororo citizenship is strikingly revealed by the following quotes:

> The Mbororo'en will never be looked on as natives in the Northwest. With a Grassfielder who moves here from another part of the Province, we know that he is a native somewhere, that he came from somewhere. The Mbororo'en pay taxes and are permanent—they have corrugated iron roofs—but that idea of them as settlers will remain. The farmers define themselves against the Mbororo'en (Divisional Delegate for Livestock, Northwest Province, October 1998).

> We feel Cameroonians, like we own a part of Cameroon. We pay taxes and have identity cards . . . [but] . . . they believe, the native groups, that the Mbororo are strangers, and that as cattle grazers we might one day leave (Focus Group with young Mbororo men, Northwest Province, November 1998).

These quotes not only suggest the marginality of the Mbororo'en, but how this marginality emerges in dialectical relationship to mainstream constructions of what it means to be a citizen in this part of Cameroon. Moreover, this marginal status became exacerbated under the particular forms of politics that have (re)emerged in Cameroon since the early 1990s, whereby the gains of political liberalisation have been offset, and closely entwined with the intensification of neo-patrimonial politics, and (re)emergence of a politics of 'belonging'. As detailed below, these processes, and the status of the Mbororo'en 'citizens at the margins',

---

who are often forced into positions of indentured labour within farming communities. As noted later, this material difference has closely shaped the ways in which the Mbororo'en have attempted to mediate their political marginality.

[3] Drawing on earlier research (Frantz 1986), the current Mbororo population for the whole province could be placed at around 80,000 out of a total of over 1.5 million. Under the terminology employed here, the Grassfields Mbororo'en (pl. Mbororo sing.) stands for those Mbororo'en who reside within the Northwest Province. Although referred to here for reasons of space as a whole, there are significant divisions amongst the Grassfields Mbororo'en in terms of origin, clan, age and gender in particular (Hickey 2002a).

resulted in them suffering a series of sustained human rights abuses.

This chapter therefore reveals how the social histories and structures of particular groups combine with wider trajectories of state formation and politics in ways that shape citizenship rights and status. It employs Skocpol's (1992) notion of 'structural linkages' as a means of analysing state-society relations, focusing here on key dimensions of land and arrangements for political representation and participation as being key dimensions for processes of citizenship formation. The aim is to show that the case of the Mbororo'en resonates with the key dimensions and dynamics of citizenship debates within Cameroon (and sub-Saharan Africa more broadly), and perhaps also suggests a need to rethink the contours of these debates, particularly regarding the role of marginal groups as an internal 'other' against whom dominant notions of citizenship are formed, and the importance of the 'native-stranger' divide within the local and national politics of citizenship (Eyoh 1999; Konings 2003).

Citizenship under Colonial Rule: Native Administration, Land and the Mbororo'en in British Cameroons[4]

The first Mbororo'en to enter the Grassfields from northern Nigeria gained access to land through paying tribute to local landowners, thus developing "a patron-client relationship with the chief of a community" (Fisiy 1992: 4), as was the case for 'strangers' in many African communities (Shack 1979: 9). Initially, this system suited both parties and was encouraged by the colonial administration keen to diversify the region's livelihood base. However, the cattle population trebled from between 1923 and 1933,[5] and the 1930s also saw an increase in small holder coffee-farming in the Grassfields. The male farmers who dominated the coffee sector appropriated the land closest to the village settlements, pushing female (subsistence) farmers onto the higher lands also being used by the graziers (Stapelton 1948), thus initiating the high level of farmer-grazier conflicts that persist today.

---

[4] This paper is a necessarily abbreviated version of citizenship formation amongst the Mbororo'en over the past century (Awasom 1984, Hickey 2002a). Other dimensions of this case, particularly efforts by the Mbororo'en to form a 'democratic' response to the current situation, are explored elsewhere (Davis 1995, Hickey 2002b, 2004).

[5] Buea Archives, Qg 1, F:266, 02/02/1946: 12.

This emerging crisis catalysed a series of debates over Mbororo citizenship within the colonial administration during the 1940s and 1950s, centred in part on the Native Land and Rights ordinance that declared all land to be 'native' (Fisiy 1992: 31), with a native defined as "a person whose parents were members of any tribe or tribes indigenous to the Cameroons".[6] Agricultural Officers and some District Officers sought to construct the Mbororo'en as an essentially hostile immigrant group, as "strangers" and "…privileged tenants in a depressed area".[7] An influential colonial anthropologist who worked closely with female farmers advised against granting the Mbororo'en any rights, and mooted the prospect of removing the Mbororo'en from the Province altogether.[8] Meanwhile, Veterinary Officers and some researchers argued that the Mbororo'en had settled immediately, and that without land rights they would not undertake obligations relating to maintaining pastures and tax collection.[9] In terms of the native-stranger debate, it was argued that:

> …the Fulani are not alien intruders but genuine, though late-coming, members of the indigenous population. The indigenous population of Bamenda mostly reached here only about 150 years ago: the Fulani arrived 25–30 years ago…the Fulani are here to stay for the simple reason that there is nowhere else for them to go…they are going to be, if they are not already, part of the indigenous population of the Division.[10]

In 1948 the Senior District Officer largely concurred with the former argument, restricting grazing to specific permits which could be withdrawn at any time by the issuing Native Authority. Although free, grazing permits were valid for two years only,[11] ensuring that "the Fulani was there on sufferance and no other terms".[12]

---

[6] Buea Archives, Qf/a (1964) 2, Land and Native Rights Ordinance. 1964.

[7] Buea Archive Ab 17 (3), No. 580/B/316, Agricultural Officer J.D. Brown, 31/10/1941.

[8] Buea Archive Ab 17 (10), 'Report on Farmer-Grazier Relations and the changing pattern of agriculture in Nsaw', Phyliss Kaberry, 17/04/1959.

[9] Buea Archive Ab 17 (4), File No. 2000/498, 'The Status of Fulani Regarding Land Tenure in the Bamenda Division', 30/03/1949: 11.

[10] Minuted quote from J.H.D. Stapleton, Buea Archive Ab 17 (4), File No. 2000/498, 'The Status of Fulani Regarding Land Tenure in the Bamenda Division', 30/03/1949: 9.

[11] Buea Archive Ab 17 (8), 'Fulani Settlement', 1954.

[12] Buea Archive Ab 17 (4), File No. 2000/498, 'The Status of Fulani Regarding Land Tenure in the Bamenda Division', 30/03/1949: 14–5.

This status of 'citizens at the margins' was re-enforced through the ethnic-territorial basis process of state-building in British Cameroons, that was institutionalised from the 1920s onwards. As elsewhere in Anglophone Africa, the right to participate in these units of governance was based on membership of particular ethnic-territorial communities, an "innovation (that) was of particular significance to those who lived on the margins of civil society" (Mamdani 1996: 202). This inevitably excluded the Mbororo'en, whose lack of a hierarchical community power structure, late arrival and movement-based livelihood meant that they were not considered as a 'political community' to be incorporated into the colonial state, and who were therefore denied a Native Authority of their own. Although several Mbororo traditional leaders formed their own 'Fulani Native Authority' in 1942, the administration stressed that this body was "only a convenience" decreeing that "it will not be like the councils of the pagans which are gazetted as Native Authorities".[13] Despite the fact that "[a]lmost half of divisional revenues were provided by the *jangali* paid by immigrant Fulani graziers" (Chilver 1963: 137), the British colonial adage of 'No taxation without representation' (Geschiere 1993: 163) was stretched to the limit with the Mbororo'en.[14] This was a common feature of colonial rule, whereby 'stateless' pastoral groups tended to become further marginalised from political power as the colonial powers viewed them as "the most intractable of the native populations" and the most difficult to control under 'native administration' (Azarya 1996: 59).[15]

The Late Colonial Era: Democratisation and the Roots of Exclusive Citizenship

The political imperatives and processes that shaped independence in the Cameroons had mixed implications for the citizenship status of marginal groups. Political movements towards independence in British

[13] Buea Archive Ab 17 (3), 'Minutes of the meeting in Native Administration School', Ndop, 26/06/1942: 22.

[14] This was a common feature of colonial rule, whereby 'stateless' pastoral groups tended to become further marginalised from political power under colonial rule (Azarya 1996).

[15] Typical strategies by colonial rulers were to relocate the stateless pastoralists in reserves (e.g. the Maasai), resettle them as agro-pastoralists, or push them to the more arid and remote regions.

Cameroons followed a different if equally fractured trajectory to that found in French Cameroun.[16] The region achieved semi-autonomous status in 1954, and anti-colonial struggles from this point onwards focused on whether to press for greater autonomy within an independent Nigerian federation or for 'reunification' with French Cameroun. The late 1950s saw increasing support for reunification, as antagonism towards the apparently disinterested British East Nigerian administration grew. Importantly, this antipathy was coupled with perceptions that Igbo migrants from Nigeria were dominating the plantation economy and administrative sector in British Cameroons (Kleis 1980). In effect, "the very Nigerian-ness of the Igbo acted as a catalyst to the political expression of the West Cameroon 'ethnicity' " (Ardener 1996: 288), which in turn fuelled a political move towards reunification.

As such, and in the absence of any predetermined basis for unity or sense of 'nationalism' within British Cameroons, Anglophone Cameroonians defined 'their' political identity by drawing on a series of exclusive oppositions constructed between themselves and resident 'strangers'. This tendency was exacerbated by the democratisation of native authorities in the late 1950s, which was proclaimed by the colonial administration as a means of including excluded and minority groups such as women and 'strangers' (Geschiere 1993). However, "even as late as 1958, urban and rural councils excluded 'non-natives' from voting" (Sharpe 1998: 33), as political competition on the basis of 'one-person one vote' raised fears amongst 'natives' that they could lose their political power and the related control of resources, particularly land.

This period of 'democratisation' held mixed experiences for the Mbororo'en, who lacked the educated, urban elite required to form or participate in the flourishing development associations (Chiabi 1997). Their distrust of 'western' education and its incompatability with a pastoral lifestyle meant that very few Mbororo'en attended school, while a more general sense of reserve and 'otherness' amongst the Mbororo'en—codified as *pulaaku*—was a further marginalising influence. The particular culture shared by Fulani groups contributed a further dimension of marginality here, in the broad form of 'self-isolation' (Barry, 1998). The cultural code of '*pulaaku*' functions as a means of maintaining an ethnic boundary around the Fulani category, and has been described as "an ideology of racial and cultural distinctiveness

[16] For further details, see Ardener (1996) and Joseph (1977).

and superiority that ranks the Fulani above all other ethnic groups" (Burnham 1996: 106).

Nonetheless, more progressive elements amongst the Grassfields Mbororo'en attempted to use the political opportunities of the time to forward citizenship claims in the form of a petition to the United Nations. The petition complained that, "we are considered to be strangers…We have no security of tenure", and demanded that "we may be treated as part of the community, as inhabitants of Bamenda".[17] However, in the context of increased pressure on land and the onset of political competition, the few efforts by administrators to 'indigenise' the Mbororo'en into the area through development projects led to "widespread 'Fulaniphobia'…Fulani *rugas*[18] found within grazing zones on the lowlands were set on fire…the clandestine maiming of cattle was common place" (Njeuma and Awasom 1990: 224).

The late colonial era thus formed a crucial moment both for the Mbororo'en, who would effectively enter the postcolonial era as 'economic citizens' (Fraser and Gordon 1994) on the basis of their tax contributions, but with few civic, political or social rights, but also in terms of the politics of citizenship in Cameroon. This was particularly the case regarding the failure to detribalise politics (Mamdani 1996), and the tendency whereby marginal 'outsider' groups came to be constructed as the internal 'other' or 'mirror' against which new processes of citizenship formation and new categories of citizen could be defined. The late colonial period thus established the contours along which the next phase of democratisation would be played out in the early 1990s, particularly in terms of debates over insiders and outsiders.

The Politics of Citizenship under a Post-colonial Neo-patrimonial Regime: a Return to the Margins

The postcolonial Cameroon state thus "created a political space into which were interpellated subject citizens" (Fardon 1996: 29), leaving the task of citizenship formation to the independence leaders. However, following independence and reunification in 1961, the scope for citizenship participation in Cameroon was swiftly curtailed. Within a decade, a

[17] 10th November 1955, File No. B 280/75, Petition to the UN (PAB). Quoted in Njeuma and Awasom (1990).

[18] *Rugas* are settlement camps for graziers when tending cattle.

single-party system was institutionalised, and trade unions and the house of chiefs were abolished. Legal sanctions were imposed on associational activity, and 'Anglophone particularism' was suppressed (Bayart 1977). Although justified by Ahidjo with reference to nation-building and seen by Anglophone Cameroonians as an attack on their particular sense of (sub-national) political community, such acts of closure are better explained with reference to the logic of 'neo-patrimonial' rule (Gabriel 1999: 177), which demands that the president cannot allow political autonomy outside of the state (Medard 1996).[19]

In terms of citizenship formation amongst the Mbororo'en, the first decades of postcolonial rule after 1961 were in part characterised by a return to the margins. The Fulani Council collapsed, and the traditional leaders (*ardo'en*) of the Grassfields Mbororo'en would not gather as a collective again for nearly thirty years. The two most prominent Mbororo leaders[20] participated in the West Cameroon House of Chiefs until its closure in 1972. The state administration was inaccessible to the generally unschooled Mbororo'en, most of whom continued to see formal education as irrelevant to their mode of livelihood. Largely settled by now as either minorities in 'native' communities, or dispersed in peripheral settlements (Frantz 1986), interaction with the state became limited to local meetings with divisional officers concerning *jangali* (cattle-tax) collection, farmer-grazier conflicts or as a means of the administration communicating government policy. It is alleged that, during a ceremonial visit to Bamenda, President Ahidjo actively discouraged the Grassfield Mbororo'en from becoming involved in politics.[21]

Importantly, the postcolonial regime re-instated the native/stranger boundaries that were institutionalised under colonial rule. West Cameroon continued with a marginally updated version of the colonial Land and Native Rights Ordinance,[22] to the effect that the definition of a

---

[19] The term 'neo-patrimonialism' is not used here in the classic sense of teleological state theory—wherein it suffers from an attempt to draw history by analogy rather than history by process—but in reference to a particular form of politics that goes beyond formal politics and shapes the use of power more broadly (Hickey 2002a).

[20] These were *Ardo* Sabga and *Ardo* Umaru of Wum.

[21] Although a Fulani, President Ahidjo made no official attempts to treat the Grassfields Mbororo'en as a political constituency. During the opening of the Santa-Bamenda road in the early 1970s, he advised Mbororo leaders that politics was a dangerous game for them to be involved in (Interviews with Mbororo elders at Santa and Sabga), further embedding the sense in which the Mbororo'en were viewed as 'cattle-people' rather than 'citizens'.

[22] The British government's Ministry for Overseas Development recommended this continuity in policy in spite of noting that "native custom often tends to perpetuate

'Cameroonian' under postcolonial land laws closely resembled that of the 'native' under British administration, again leaving the Mbororo'en without official recognition.[23] In order to secure the revenue collected from *jangali*, the graziers were given "guaranty (sic.) of stability and security" through 25-year grazing permits, although "without ownership of any sort".[24] Despite the attempt to nationalize land through the 1974 Land Ordinances, customary norms continued to prevail, whereby 'natives' "have rights to land by virtue of citizenship in the chiefdom" (Goheen 1992: 392). A close observer of Mbororo-state relations captures the ambiguous impact of Ahidjo's land nationalisation on the Mbororo'en:

> By making the state the ultimate landlord, and grazing lands national lands, (Ahidjo) salvaged the Mbororo'en from the wrath of the villagers whom before then were the landlords. They are still landlords in custom not in law, somehow making Mbororo'en the tenants with two squabbling landlords![25]

The effect on the Mbororo'en has been differentiated, with some wealthier elements benefiting able to acquire previously communal land, turning land-hungry citizens against their chief in anger at 'their' land being allocated to 'outsiders'.[26] However, nationalisation also meant that some Mbororo'en lost grazing lands to expanding farm and urban populations, while most remained subordinate as 'tenants' rather than 'citizens' of the land.[27]

In general terms, these contours of political engagement and constitutional changes concerning pastoral access to land are familiar across sub-Saharan Africa, and have contributed strongly to the current

---

attitudes of tribal or community exclusiveness, which result in land being denied to those who will put it to good use merely because they are not members of a particular local community" (Buea Archive Qf/a (1966) 3, 'Report on Land and Native Rights Ordinance', Land Use Survey, March 1970: 227).

[23] A Cameroonian "means a person whose parents were members of any tribe or tribes indigenous to the Federal Republic of Cameroon and the descendants of such persons and includes any person one of whose parents was a member of such tribe" (Buea Archive Qf/a (1964) 2, Land and Native Rights Ordinance. 1964: 3.).

[24] Buea Archive Ab 17 (11), SCA/TE/LA, 'Proposal for the settlement of the farmer-grazier and related problems', 28/01/1962.

[25] Interview male Mbororo political activist, August 1999.

[26] Fisiy (1995: 56–7) details a process whereby *fons* sell unoccupied lands to Mbororo graziers and other "strangers" in frustration at their loss of control over this crucial political, material and symbolic resource to the state.

[27] Interviews with magistrates, divisional delegates and traditional rulers in Donga-Mantung Division, Northwest, November 1998.

situation, whereby 'stateless' pastoral societies now make up "some of the most politically marginalised peoples in Africa" (Lane 1998: 3). Entwined with this process, however, and as noted earlier, has been the tendency of pastoralist Fulani groups to interpret the cultural code of *pulaaku* with their distinctive pastoral way of life, leading to "a strong attachment to the idea of ethnic exclusiveness" (Stenning 1966: 388), as evidenced by the existence (and use) of disparaging Fulfulde terms for sedentary farmers.[28] As such cultural codes have become closely entwined with patterns of settlement and political economy, a broad, if stereotyped, pattern of engagement has emerged whereby "the natives in towns see the Mbororo'en as dirty, uneducated and having the wrong religion, while the Mbororo'en in rural areas look down on the natives" (Interview data). *Pulaaku* is a fluid entity, subject to contextual changes and influences; just as it remains subject to local interpretation and variations between different Fulbe groups across West Africa (Azarya 1999: 6–10), it is not interpreted uniformly amongst the Grassfields Mbororo'en. However, and as discussed below, the current political context in Cameroon provides a strong incentive for maintaining cultural boundaries around ethnic difference, to the extent that "the persistence of the Fulbe category can most clearly be seen . . . as deriving from the politics of ethnic difference within the context of modern West African states" (Burnham 1999: 282).

The Return of 'Autochthony' and the Politics of Belonging in the 1990s

The early 1990s were marked by a surge of political activity in Cameroon, including pro-democracy rallies, the formation of political parties, campaigns of civil disobedience, and the liberalisation of laws on 'civil society' associations. The Northwest Province was particularly involved in this expansion of political citizenship, hosting the main democratic opposition party, the Social Democratic Front (SDF), and the Anglophone movement (Krieger and Takougang 1998). This led to high levels of political tension in the Northwest, particularly around the Presidential elections of 1992 and 1997. However, although heralded as a new

[28] The four dominant strands of *pulaaku* have been identified as: fortitude in adversity and an ability to accept misfortune (*munyal*); sound common sense and manners (*hakkiilo*); reserve and modesty in personal relations (*semteende*); and dignity (*neddaaku*). For the Mbororo'en themselves, "*Pulaaku* makes the Mbororo'en unique, different. It is about dignity and hiding problems" (Interview 26a).

dawn for citizenship participation, the political upheavals of the early 1990s in Cameroon actually entailed a deepening of existing forms of political rule, and the re-emergence of the exclusive politics of citizenship catalysed in the late colonial era. The apathy that surrounded the 2004 Presidential elections in this previously vibrant political community suggests the extent to which the democratic impulse has been worn down by these more regressive forms of politics.

Although it has been argued that the key trend over this period has been the renewal of ethnicity, this is something of a misnomer, given that ethnicity had never actually disappeared as a political force. Rather, a territorial, localised and often imagined form of ethnicity provided the organisational basis upon which the colonial state was formed in Cameroon, leaving state and ethnic citizenship to effectively share the same historical moment. The politics of ethnic-regional balance characterised the project of nation-building (Nkwi and Nyamnjoh 1997a), while under 'democratisation', ethnic citizenship has re-appeared in a specific form, closely tied to notions of home and place (Eyoh 1999; Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 2000; Konings 2003).

The state has played a key role here, particularly through the new 1996 Constitution, which "classifies Cameroonians into natives and foreigners (allogenes, indigenes) and makes them foreigners in their own country" (Nkwi and Socpa 1997: 139). The language of 'belonging' and 'autochthony' is also employed by local elites, particularly in Southwest Province, where widespread and long-term patterns of labour migration have led to an influx of north-westerners into the south-west, and where the history of competition amongst political elites has made the propagation of exclusionary discourses around insiders and outsiders a potentially successful electoral strategy (Konings 2003). The settlers were initially welcomed until the tenure system began to struggle under the weight of unexpectedly high numbers of incomers (Konings 2003: 35). This resentment over the loss of local resources swiftly expanded into a wider set of political and cultural concerns regarding aversion to local development, limited attachment to the area, favouritism from the state and seduction of local women/men. Although not a precise parallel for many reasons, this dynamic bears a striking resemblance to the case of the Mbororo'en as settler-strangers within the Northwest.[29]

[29] In a reversal of the male dominated concern in the Southwest that Northwesterners were marrying local women (Konings 2003: 35), Mbororo women are feared and

Citizenship amongst the Mbororo'en under 'Democratisation'

> If you vote for the SDF, you can't complain to the Divisional Officer, but if you're in an SDF area, there is the danger of your house being burned down. So you vote for survival, according to whatever fear is greater.[30]

Levels of voter participation amongst the Mbororo'en in elections throughout the 1990s were lower than most groups in the Northwest, particularly amongst Mbororo women. The calculus of fear indicated by the above quote relates to the reluctance to antagonise the administration upon whom they rely for access to grazing land, as set against fear of reprisals from SDF-supporting neighbours, particularly as the SDF made a campaign promise to gain more land for farmers should they gain power. Most did vote for the ruling party, leading some to be attacked on their return from polling centres, while others had their compounds destroyed. The Mbororo'en similarly moved against the Provincial political tide with regards the civil disobedience campaigns in the early 1990s known as 'Ghost Town', or *Villes Mortes*, involving strikes, roadblocks, the non-payment of taxes, and the closure of markets. Otherwise strongly supported in the Northwest (Krieger 1994: 611), many Mbororo'en continued to trade cattle and pay cattle tax, partly in fear of being seen to support the opposition, and partly due to an unwillingness to accept losses to their livelihood. However, this further exacerbated local tensions and a number of Mbororo'en had their compounds invaded and cattle butchered.[31] This episode again revealed the mixture of marginality and self-isolation that characterises the Mbororo experience of citizenship. While one cattle trader noted that, in relation to the withdrawal from formal economic activities, "we live in perpetual Ghost Towns anyway, so it is not even meant for us", the tendency to avoid co-operative activities with farming populations and strategy of maintaining favour with the administrative 'big-men' reflects both the code of *pulaaku* and the lack of formal citizenship status that has left the Mbororo dependent on patron-client ties.

Although some Mbororo leaders were invited to participate in the First All Anglophone Convention in Bamenda in 1993, none did so, partly in recognition of the stakes that the Mbororo'en had in maintaining links

---

mistrusted by 'native' women in the Northwest, who consider that their 'distinctive features will bewitch local men.

[30] Interview with female Mbororo activist, November 1998.

[31] Interview with Mbororo elder, June 2000.

across the Anglophone-Francophone divide, in terms of family, clan and ethnic relations and links to Islamic centres to the north. Moreover, some activists are concerned that "Mbororo people will stand to be losers if separatists gain independence because their minority status will only worsen".[32] This fear appears to be well placed. The notion of citizenship promoted by the Anglophone movement is restricted to those members of 'indigenous' communities in the Northwest and Southwest, to the exclusion of migrant groups and later settlers (Konings and Nyamnjoh 1997: 217–8). The strengthening of an Anglophone political community would arguably reinforce the contours of exclusion for the Mbororo'en resident therein.

A Patronage Struggle over the Mbororo'en: the Predatory Rule of an 'Untouchable Citizen'

Importantly, the politics of democratisation in Cameroon failed to displace 'neo-patrimonial' forms of politics as a significant determinant of the way/s in which state power is wielded in Cameroon (Gabriel, 1999). Moreover, the politics of home has become further entwined with neo-patrimonial politics. By shifting the task of reproducing the legitimacy of the national project onto regional and ethnic 'barons' on the basis of the political loyalties that they could command, the scope of national politics inevitably became both localised and ethnicised. As Goheen (1996: 70) has noted:

> A local political base is essential to national power, and in Cameroon, national politics has focussed on regional patronage politics. The result of this has been the institution of 'ethnic barons' as power brokers between regional and national power arenas.

From the late 1980s, the localised patron-client relationships of the Grassfields Mbororo'en, developed as a response to their second-class citizenship status, became extended into a national, and far more predatory, political environment. Galvanised by the demands of political competition, one national patron targeted the Grassfields Mbororo'en as his particular client group. As detailed elsewhere (Hickey 2002a), Baba Ahmadou Danpullo has employed a variety of neo-patrimonial techniques in this campaign, including the co-option and/or repression

[32] Interview with female Mbororo activist, November 1999.

of alternative forms of representation for the Mbororo'en (both traditional and civic), the arrest and imprisonment of 'opponents', and land clearances to establish a cattle-ranch.[33]

By the mid-1990s, then, it appeared that the era of political openings in Cameroon had effectively left the Mbororo'en caught between the *Charybdis* of 'democratisation' and *Scylla* of predatory patronage. However, the political openings and human rights abuses combined to produce a strong response from the growing cohort of educated and urban-based Mbororo'en. Drawing on an associational form that is also inextricably linked to both democratisation and the politics of belonging—the hometown association—the Mbororo Social and Cultural Development Association (MBOSCUDA) has had some significant successes in its attempts to protect and promote Mbororo culture and rights since its establishment in 1992. While this process is discussed elsewhere (Hickey 2004), the general message also has implications for the way on which citizenship in contemporary Africa is theorised, the issue to which this chapter now turns.

Rethinking Citizenship: the Role of Marginality, Strangers and Clientelism

It has been argued here that the Grassfields Mbororo'en stood at the 'margins of citizenship' in Cameroon for most of past century, incorporated into processes of state and civil society formation through patron-client ties rather than as of right. The Mbororo'en can thus be located at the intersection of citizenship, clientelism and marginality in contemporary Cameroon. More broadly, this case suggests the need to refine and in some cases rethink current debates over citizenship in contemporary Africa. This is particularly the case regarding the ways in which some have argued citizenship in Africa should be constituted, particularly in terms of a shift from 'origins' to 'residence' (Mamdani 1998).

Although often constructed as the antithesis of exclusion (e.g. Silver 1994), citizenship formation itself clearly involves processes of 'exclusion' and 'adverse incorporation'. As with other marginal groups in West Africa (e.g. Konneh 1996), the Mbororo'en have not simply been excluded from the local definitions and practices of citizenship,

[33] In a letter of complaint, one Mbororo man noted that Baba Danpullo's party political links made him an "untouchable citizen", whose repressive acts go unchallenged by the administration or justice system.

but have been integral to their formation. To an extent, and in both material (through cattle tax) and cultural (through acting as the internal 'other') terms, the Mbororo'en provided the basis upon which citizenship in the political community of the Grassfields came to be imagined (Anderson 1983). The role and status of the Mbororo'en as 'resident aliens' is characteristic of the relationship of marginal groups to 'mainstream' notions of citizenship (Vogel 1991: 75).[34] Accelerated processes of citizenship formation during the late colonial era inspired the politicisation of ethnic identities in the Grassfields, which tended to draw on a series of oppositions constructed between Grassfielders and 'outside' or 'stranger' groups available for comparison. With the recent phase of democratisation (re)establishing a virulent form of primary patriotism' based around the politics of belonging and 'nativeness', the Mbororo'en have once again been confronted with the origins of their subordination and marginality.

However, what is particularly notable here is the extent to which dominant constructions of citizenship in the Grassfields, involving patriarchy as well as autochthony, has directly forced the two marginal 'others' under these processes—women farmers and Mbororo graziers—into direct competition with each other, a point noted earlier regarding farmer-grazier conflicts. As noted by Miriam Goheen (1996), men's political status has been based on women's role in agricultural labour and domestic reproduction. However, the forms of 'resistance' and coping employed by these two groups were initially markedly different. For some women farmers in the Grassfields, this has provided the basis for the emergence of a counter-hegemonic form of politics, expressed through mass protests over land and the formation of political movements (Chilver 1988, Diduk 1989, Goheen 1996). This reflects a wider pattern where marginality provides the basis upon which subaltern groups forge a stronger identity and means of mobilisation (Fardon 1988). Until recently, however, decades of marginality failed to provide the Grassfields Mbororo'en with either a form of security beyond the predations of the Cameroon State or a space from which alternative forms of political identity could be forged. Whereas farming women have opposed both traditional authorities and the graziers through their protests,[35]

[34] Ursula Vogel (1991) argues that women have not been *excluded* from citizenship as such; rather, "the point is that their subordination was an integral part of men's citizenship".

[35] In late 2003, chiefs in the Wum Division of the Northwest were held hostage for

Mbororo graziers have tended to use their relative wealth to cultivate patrons in the local state, thus reinforcing their reliance on informal patron-client relationships. This pattern has now been altered, with the new Mbororo social movement advocating for Mbororo rights on the basis of their residence rather than their belonging, revealing again the possibilities of progressive politics to emerge from the margins (Hickey 2004).

For Mamdani, two moves are required to protect marginal groups lacking citizenship status and rights in contemporary Africa: the recognition of minority rights and reform to the basis of citizenship according to residence rather than origin. However, rather than protecting minority rights, successive majority-led constitutional changes over the 1990s have been to the detriment of minorities, particularly those who can be classed as aliens (Mamdani 2001: 505). Similarly, the new 1996 Constitution in Cameroon explicitly stated that "[t]he State shall ensure the protection of minorities and shall preserve the rights of indigenous populations in accordance with the law" (Republic of Cameroon 1996). As such, the Constitution "acknowledges and enshrines ethnicity into its pages" in a way that has 'trivialised' the whole concept of minorities (Nkwi and Nyamnjoh 1997b: 9–10). This not only re-affirms the State's historical role as the creator of ethnicity as a dominant marker of political identity, but also as the key purveyor of the politics of primary patriotism.

Although Mamdani (1996) locates this failure of citizenship in Africa within postcolonial nationalist politics, it has been argued throughout this paper that the roots of exclusive citizenship in Cameroon lie primarily in the late colonial era. Some nationalist regimes in postcolonial Africa did explicitly seek to reverse this distinction between 'native' and 'citizen' in order to assert that full membership of the independent state now belonged to those who had been subjected as 'natives' under colonial rule (O'Laughlin 2000).[36] However, in part because the final transition to independence in Cameroon lacked, or was shorn of a sense of Figure 1: Map of Cameroon. Anti-colonial and nationalist fervour (Joseph 1977), this classification was never subjected to revision. Rather, the definition of local citizenship became the same as that of

---

three weeks as 6,000 women protested over a land dispute with cattle-herders (Cameroon royal palace under siege', Randy Azeng, BBC News, 12 November 2003).

[36] Even in countries such as Uganda, which sought to institutionalise 'residence' rather than 'ethnicity' as the basis of participation in local governance, the trend more recently has been for the politics of belonging to re-assert itself (Hickey 2003).

'nativeness' under colonial rule, effectively reifying the same boundaries of inclusion and exclusion that previously existed between natives and strangers, and marginalising strangers.

Debates on citizenship in contemporary Africa have been increasingly critiqued for being overly 'binary' in their conceptualisations—whether between Mamdani's (1996) 'urban citizens' and 'rural subjects' or between the traditional/modern, ethnic and national (e.g. Ekeh 1975). While agreeing with the need for greater nuance in understanding the dialectical relations (rather than mutual exclusivity) between these forms (Eyoh 1999), and the need to account for other levels and dimensions of citizenship, it is argued here that these categories of citizenship should not be read as being reified but as more complex 'subject-positions'. Individuals or groups cannot be reduced to a common essence of fixed categories such as citizen or subject; rather, these categories gain significance only insofar as different practices, discourses and institutions construct the dividing force of these categories (Mouffe 1995). What has been suggested here is that, under the contemporary politics of belonging and ethnic citizenship in Cameroon (and more broadly), it is particularly difficult for stranger groups whose identity is bound up with their livelihood and history of migration and settlement to challenge mainstream constructions of citizenship. As Leonhardt (2004) notes for the Baka, to become 'autochthonous' or 'citizens' under these conditions is to cease to be Baka. However, a recognition of the fluidity of subject-positions—in relation to changing relations of power and discourses that compete with dominant constructions—necessarily raises the possibility that certain subject-positions can be challenged and renegotiated, including by subordinate and marginal groups. Moreover, the margins of citizenship formation may offer the discursive materials required to 're-imagine' the contours of citizenship in ways that may offer genuine advances not just for marginal groups, but for a progressive politics of citizenship more generally.

Bibliography

Anderson, B. 1983. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.

Ardener, E. 1996. The Boundaries of Kamerun and Cameroon. In Ardener, S. (Ed). *Kingdom on Mount Cameroon: Studies in the History of the Cameroon Coast 1500–1970*. Oxford: Berghahn Books, pp. 267–336.

———. 1962. The Political History of Cameroon. *The World Today*. 18: 8, pp. 341–350.

Azarya, V. 1996. *Nomads and the State in Africa: The Political Roots of Marginality*. Africa Research Centre Research Series, 9. Hants: Ashgate Publishing.

Barry, B. 1998. Social Exclusion, Social Isolation and the Distribution of Income. *CASE Paper No.12*. London: Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion, LSE.

Bayart, J.-F. 1978. The Neutralisation of Anglophone Cameroon. In Joseph, R.A. (Ed). *Gaullist Africa: Cameroon Under Ahmadu Ahidjo*. US: Fourth Dimension Publishers, pp. 82–90.

Burnham, P. 1996. *The Politics of Cultural Difference in Northern Cameroon*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

———. 1999. Pastoralism Under Pressure?—Understanding Social Change in Fulbe Society. In Azarya, V., Breedveld, A., de Bruijin, M., and H. van Dijk. (Eds), *Pastoralists Under Pressure? Fulbe Societies Confronting Change in West Africa.* Leiden: E.J. Brill; Boston: Koln, pp. 269–283.

Chabal, P. and J.-P. Daloz, 1999. *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument*. London: James Currey/International Africa Institute.

Chiabi, E. 1997. *The Making of Modern Cameroon: Vol.1: A History of Sub-State Nationalism and Disparate Union, 1914–1961*. Lanham: University Press of America.

Chilver, E.M. 1988. Women Cultivators, Cows and Cash-Crops: Phyllis Kaberry's Women of the Grassfields Revisited. In Geschiere, P. and P. Konings. (Eds) *Proceedings/ Contributions, Conference on the Political Economy of Cameroon: Historical Perspectives, Leiden, June 1988*. Leiden: African Studies Centre, pp. 383–423.

———. 1963. 'Native Administration in the West Central Cameroons 1902–1954'. In Robinson, K. and A.F. Madden. (Eds) *Essays in Imperial Government*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 89–139.

Davis, L. 1995. Opening Political Space in Cameroon: the Ambiguous Response of the Mbororo. *Review of African Political Economy.* 22: 64, pp. 213–228.

Diduk, S. 1989. Women's Agricultural Production and Political Action in the Cameroon Grassfields. *Africa*. 59: 3, pp. 338–355.

Ekeh, P. 1975. Colonialism and the Two Publics: A Theoretical Statement. *Comparative Studies in Society and History.* 17: 1, pp. 91–117.

Eyoh, D. 1999. Community, Citizenship, and the Politics of Ethnicity in Post-Colonial Africa. In Zeleza, P.T. and E. Kalipeni (Eds) *Sacred Spaces and Public Quarrels: African Cultural and Economic Landscapes*. New Jersey, US: Africa World Press, pp. 271–300.

Fardon, R. 1988. 'Centre, Periphery, Boundary: Some Problems with Spatialising Problems'. In Geschiere, P. and P. Konings. (Eds) *Proceedings/Contributions, Conference on the Political Economy of Cameroon: Historical Perspectives, Leiden, June 1988*. Leiden: African Studies Centre, pp. 757–775.

———. 1996. "Crossed Destinies": the Entangled Histories of West African Ethnic and National Identities. In de la Gorgendiere, L., King, K. and S. Vaughan (Eds) *Ethnicity and Africa: Roots and Meanings*. Edinburgh: Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh, pp. 117–146.

Fisiy, C. 1995. Chieftancy in the Modern State: An Institution at the Crossroads of Democratic Change. *Paideuma.* 41, pp. 49–62.

Fisiy, C.F. 1992. *Power and Privilege in the Administration of Law.* Leiden: African Studies Centre.

Frantz, C. 1986. Fulani Continuity and Change Under Five Flags. In Adamu, M. and A.H.M Kirk-Greene (Eds), *Pastoralists of the West African Savannah*. Manchester: Manchester University Press and International African Institute, pp. 16–39.

Fraser, N. and L. Gordon. 1994. Civil citizenship against social citizenship? On the Ideology of Contract-versus-Charity. In van Steenbergen, B. (Ed) *The Condition of Citizenship*. London: Sage, pp. 90–107.

Gabriel, J.M. 1999. Cameroon's Neopatrimonial Dilemma. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*. 17: 2. pp. 173–196.

Geschiere, P. 1993. Chiefs and Colonial Rule in Cameroon: Inventing Chieftancy, French and British Style. *Africa.* 63: 2, pp. 151–175.
Geschiere, P. and J. Gugler 1998. Introduction: The Urban-Rural Connection—Changing Issues of Belonging and Identification. *Africa.* 68: 3, pp. 309–319.
Geschiere, P. and P. Konings. (Eds) 1988. *Proceedings/Contributions, Conference on the Political Economy of Cameroon: Historical Perspectives, Leiden, June 1988*. Leiden: African Studies Centre.
Geschiere, P. and F. Nyamnjoh. 2000. Capitalism and Autochthony: the Seesaw of Mobility and Belonging. *Public Culture.* 12: 2, pp. 423–452.
Goheen, M. 1996. *Men Own the Fields, Women Own the Crops: Gender and Power in the Cameroon Grassfields*. Wisconsin: Wisconsin University Press.
———. 1992. Chiefs, Sub-Chiefs and Local Control: Negotiations over Land, Struggles over Meaning. *Africa.* 62: 3, pp. 389–412.
Groelsema, R.J. 1998. The Dialectics of Citizenship and Ethnicity in Guinea. *Africa Today.* 45: 3–4, pp. 411–422.
Hansen, K.F. 2003. The Politics of Personal Relations: Beyond Neopatrimonial Practices in Northern Cameroon. *Africa.* 73: 2, pp. 202–225.
Hickey, S. 2004. Hometown Associations as Social Movements for Citizenship: The Case of MBOSCUDA in Northwest Cameroon. Paper given at Africa Studies Association, New Orleans, 11–14 November.
———. 2003. 'The Politics of Staying Poor in Uganda', *CPRC Working Paper 37* IDPM: Manchester. www.chronicpoverty.org
———. 2002a. The Role of Non-Governmental Development Organisations in Challenging Exclusion in Africa: Participatory Development and the Politics of Citizenship Formation Amongst the Mbororo Fulani in Northwest Cameroon. Unpublished PhD Thesis, Staffordshire University.
———. 2002b. Transnational NGDOs and Participatory forms of Rights-based Development: Converging with the Local Politics of Citizenship in Cameroon. *Journal of International Development*. 14: 6, pp. 841–857.
Joseph, R.A. 1977. *Radical Nationalism in Cameroon: Social Origins of the U.P.C. Rebellion*. London: Oxford University Press.
Jua, N.B. 1997. Contested Meanings: Rulers, Subjects and National Integration in Post-Colonial Cameroon. In Nkwi, P.N. and F.B. Nyamnjoh. (Eds) *Regional Balance and National Integration in Cameroon: Lessons Learned and the Uncertain Future*. Leiden: ASC/Yaounde: ICASSRT, pp. 62–66.
Kleis, G.W. 1980. Confrontation and Incorporation: Igbo Ethnicity in Cameroon. *African Studies Review*. 23: 3, pp. 89–100.
Konings, P. 2003. Religious Revival in the Roman Catholic Church and the Autochthony-Allochthony Conflict in Cameroon. *Africa.* 73: 1, pp. 31–55.
Konings, P. and F.B. Nyamnjoh. 1997. The Anglophone Problem in Cameroon. *Journal of Modern African Studies.* 35: 2, pp. 207–229.
Konneh, A. 1996. Citizenship at the Margins: Status, Ambiguity, and the Mandingo of Liberia. *African Studies Review*. 39: 2, pp. 141–154.
Krieger, M. 1994. Cameroon's Democratic Crossroads, 1990–4. *Journal of Modern African Studies.* 32: 4, pp. 605–628.
Krieger, M. and J. Takougang. 1998. *State and Society in Africa: Cameroon at the Crossroads*. Boulder, Co: Westview Press.
Lane, C.R. (Ed.) 1998. *Custodians of the Commons: Pastoral Land Tenure in East and West Africa*. London: Earthscan.
Leonhardt, A. 2004. 'The Baka and the Anti-State-between Autochthony and Citizenship'. Paper given at Africa Studies Association, New Orleans, 11–14 November, 2004.
Lewis, J. 2000. *Batwa Pygmies of the Great Lakes Region.* Minority Rights Group International Report. London: MRG.

Mamdani, M. 2001. African States, Citizenship and War: A Case-study. *International Affairs.* 78: 3, pp.493–506.

Mamdani, M. 1998. Africa: Democratic Theory and Democratic Struggles. In Mohanty, M., Mukherji, P.N., and O. Tornquist. (Eds). *People's Rights: Social Movements and the State in the Third World*. New Delhi: Sage, pp. 84–97.

———. 1996. *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*. London: James Currey.

Medard, J.-M. 1996. Patrimonialism, Neo-patrimonialism, and the Study of the Post-colonial State in Subsaharian Africa. In Marcussen, H.S. (Ed), *Improved Natural Resource Management—the Role of Formal Organisations and Informal Networks and Institutions*. Roskilde: Occasional Paper No. 17, International Development Studies, Roskilde University, pp. 76–97.

Mouffe, C. 1995. Feminism, Citizenship and Radical Democratic Politics. In L. Nicholson and S. Seidman (Eds) *Social Postmodernism: Beyond Identity Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 315–331.

Njeuma, M.Z and N.F. Awasom. 1990. The Fulani and the Political Economy of the Bamenda Grasslands, 1940–1960. *Paideuma.* 36, pp. 217–233.

Nkwi, P.N. and F.B. Nyamnjoh. (Eds) 1997a. *Regional Balance and National Integration in Cameroon: Lessons Learned and the Uncertain Future*. Leiden: ASC/Yaounde: ICASSRT.

———. 1997b. Introduction: Cameroon regional balance policy and national integration: Food for an uncertain future, In Nkwi, P.N. and F.B. Nyamnjoh. (eds) 1997a. *Regional Balance and National Integration in Cameroon: Lessons Learned and the Uncertain Future*. Leiden: ASC/Yaounde: ICASSRT, pp. 8–16.

Nkwi, P.N. and A. Socpa. 1997. Ethnicity and party politics in Cameroon: the politics of divide and rule. In Nkwi, P.N. and F.B. Nyamnjoh. (Eds) *Regional Balance and National Integration in Cameroon: Lessons Learned and the Uncertain Future*. Leiden: ASC/Yaounde: ICASSRT, pp. 138–149.

Nkwi, P.N. and J-P. Warnier. 1982. *Elements of a History of the Western Grassfields*. Yaounde: University of Yaounde.

O'Laughlin, B. 2000. Class and the Customary: The Ambiguous Legacy of the *Indigenato* in Mozambique, *African Affairs*. 99: 394, pp. 5–42.

Republic of Cameroon. 1996. *Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon*. Law No. 96–06 of 18 January 1996. New edition, February. Yaounde: National Printing Press.

Shack, W. 1979. Open Systems and Closed Boundaries: The Ritual Process of Stranger Relations in New African States. In Shack, W.A. and E.P. Skinner (Eds) *Strangers in African Society.* Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, pp. 37–47.

Sharpe, B. 1998. 'First the Forest': Conservation, 'Community' and 'Participation' in South-West Cameroon. *Africa.* 68: 1, pp. 25–45.

Silver, H. 1994. Social Exclusion and Social Solidarity: Three Paradigms, *International Labour Review.* 133: 5–6, pp. 531–578.

Skocpol, T. 1992. *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States*. Cambridge: Belknap Press/Harvard University Press.

Stapleton, J. 1948. 'In Their End is Their Beginning—A Fulani Crisis'. *The Nigerian Field.* 13: 2, pp. 53–58.

Stenning, D.J. 1966. Cattle Values and Islamic Values in a Pastoral Population. In Lewis, I.M. (Ed) *Islam in Tropical Africa.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 387–400.

Vogel, U. 1991. Is Citizenship Gender-Specific?. In Vogel, U. and M. Moran (Eds) *The Frontiers of Citizenship*. Hampshire: Macmillan, pp. 58–85.

SHIFTING GROUNDS IN ZIMBABWE: CITIZENSHIP AND FARM WORKERS IN THE NEW POLITICS OF LAND

Blair Rutherford[1]

In this paper, I situate current politics concerning farm workers and land within the broader history and debates over their citizenship in colonial and postcolonial Zimbabwe and, by extension, how the nation is imagined in this southern African country. I examine citizenship not in its legal meaning but in its moral sense. I look at how certain categories of citizens are considered more 'virtuous' than others within, and in spite of, the "rhetorical legitimacy of equality and the concept of citizenship as the basis of collective governance" inherent in the global spread of the state form since the nineteenth century (Wallerstein 2003: 673; see also Comaroff and Comaroff 1999). A crucial 'virtue' in Zimbabwe in regards to citizenship has been a state-sanctioned right to use land.

The aim in this chapter is to provide insight into how farm workers have been constituted as less virtuous citizens in regards to the agrarian question, which in turn has informed how they have been affected by the 'real world of politics' (Bernstein 2004: 220) shaping land reform in Zimbabwe today. I sketch out the ways in which farm workers have been publicly configured within postcolonial Zimbabwe by discussing how the dominant representations of their particular 'belonging' to the land and the nation emerged in the colonial period. In so doing, I discuss a few of the constitutive arrangements in the colonial period and their "routinization, even institutionalization in practice and memory" (Kaplan and Kelly 2001: 152) that have helped to publicly locate farm workers within the nation in a way to make them less deserving than other (represented) communities in regards to access to land. I next touch on how this configuration has continued in the postcolonial period. I conclude with some questions concerning current strategies of advocacy

[1] I want to express my thanks to the participants at the conference in Edinburgh who made a number of suggestive comments on this paper and, especially, to Sara Rich Dorman for her close and constructive reading of it. Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada generously supported this research. Responsibility for the chapter rests with me.

as a modest contribution to the larger debate about democracy and social justice in Zimbabwe and the region (see Cousins 2003).

Land and Citizenship in Colonial Zimbabwe

As many have noted, control over land and production on it became a crucial aim of the Southern Rhodesian administration and governments. Since the early 1900s, the agrarian question in the classical Marxist sense was played out as land expropriation, displacement of African farmers, and state subsidies in a variety of markets made European farms a crucial source of capital accumulation and a leading sector of the emerging national economy. In turn, government policies and practices actively undermined African farmers, most of whom were confined to agriculturally marginal and increasingly overpopulated native reserves that became, in practice and in colonial government intent, key sources of labour for whites in southern Africa. A so-called 'dual' colonial rural political economy emerged. It was comprised of comparatively productive white commercial farmers and generally less productive black petty commodity producers whose livelihoods were crucially linked to non-farming activities (e.g. Palmer 1977; Moyo 1995; Cousins, Weiner and Amin 1992). Such a political economy created vast inequities in access to land and means of production and was implicated in a particular concatenation of land, citizenship, and the nation (Worby 2001; Hammar and Raftopoulos 2003).

Europeans became 'settlers' of the new nation, citizens with an inherent right to purchase or receive land in the better agricultural areas.[2] They also were able to create associations to represent themselves as a constituent community of the Rhodesian nation, as 'settlers' and productive citizens of the national economy based on their presumed virtuous attributes of race, culture, and civilisation in contrast to the 'native subjects' (e.g., Murray 1970; Rutherford 2001a). Such efforts became institutionalised in legislation and policies, routinised in narratives of academia, the media and development programmes, and etched into the landscape through the infrastructure of vast farms, plantations and ranches marked as 'European'.

---

[2] There were certain qualifications such as access to capital and, for the government's European land resettlement schemes, issues such as service in the war and appropriate 'character' (see Rutherford 2001a).

'Natives' were generally classified as lacking the prerequisite attributes that would make them inherently productive citizens and that would permit them to acquire the state support to become commercial farmers. However, as in the liberal response to the division of citizens in Europe, "virtue could be taught, and it therefore offered the managed progression of rights, the managed promotion of passive citizens to the status of active citizens, a road for the transformation of barbarians into the civilized" (Wallerstein 2003: 652–653). This assumed position of trusteeship largely took the form of 'development', as in other parts of the world (Cowen and Shenton 1996).

In the 1930s and, particularly, from the 1940s onwards, government departments, a few European-organised associations, and some international donors began to target 'indigenous natives' for rural development efforts. These interventions and efforts were predicated on assumptions of trusteeship and edification of less virtuous subjects and did not accomplish their putative goals of 'development' (which is not unusual; see Ferguson 1990). However, they helped to reinforce the idea that indigenous Africans have a right to land in the colony through ties to a (state-sanctioned) 'traditional leader' such as a chief or a headman. Although these plans in the 1950s aimed to winnow the less able from the more able African farmers (as determined by European civil servants) while directing the former to the urban areas to act as a proletariat for white industrialists (Holleman 1968), productively using the land became an officially recognised goal for indigenous Africans.[3]

These policies and administrative arrangements reinforced the notion that indigenous African men could be edified, could become virtuous citizens, contributing to the nation (particularly defined as national economy) if they obey the discipline of development. According to this colonial logic, as 'native subjects' (or 'passive citizens' in Wallerstein's terms) they were potentially redeemable to the nation, in part, by becoming 'productive' small-scale farmers, leaving behind 'tradition' and 'subsistence cultivation' while adopting 'modern' farming methods. Policies were produced, state and rural African institutions and organisations established or empowered, academic studies

[3] In practice, these development interventions shaped and intersected with gendered assumptions, ethnic *cum* tribal divisions, religious divisions, and other hierarchies amongst people classified as 'indigenous Africans' (e.g. Schmidt 1993; Worby 1994, 1999; Moore 1999; Maxwell 1999; Hughes 1999; Alexander, McGregor and Ranger 2000; Nyambara 2001).

written articulating and routinising these assumptions. All helped to institutionalise the premise that at least some indigenous Africans (men, those with identifiable agricultural skills) should have the use of, if not eventually property rights to, land to farm. There were debates about whether virtue for all indigenous Africans lay in farming (or, say, for others, working in industry or being supportive house-wives; see, e.g., Barnes 1999; Kaler 1999). But this potential for virtue in farming was routinised in policies, laws, state rituals, memories, and public narratives (e.g., Worby 1998, 2000).

Farm workers were excluded from such roads for transformation for they were both foreigners and were identified as agricultural labourers for white farmers. Legislation, policies, administrative arrangements, and routinised practices helped to inculcate the assumption that as foreigners, as subordinate to white farmers, and as engaged in a lowly form of labour, their capacity to become virtuous citizens of the colony—as productive 'natives' contributing to the national economy—was not even considered. It was unthinkable.

During much of the colonial period, white farmers relied heavily on foreign workers. Mainly coming from colonial Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique, these men (and to a lesser degree women and children) came through a government recruiting agency, individual contractors, or, for the majority, on their own to work and live on white farms (Clarke 1977; Rubert 1998). Many eventually returned to their home countries. Others found employment elsewhere in the colony or neighbouring countries like South Africa. Some, however, remained on the farms and raised families on them. They were prohibited from acquiring land in the native reserves (although some did) and were configured in policy, laws, and general arrangements to be solely part of the landscape of white farms.

In the late 1950s, farm workers became even more associated with being 'foreign' as the Southern Rhodesian government began prohibiting foreign labourers from working and living in urban areas. Instead, they were to work and live on white farms and mines (Paton 1995: 123–125).

Although Southern Rhodesian mines also heavily recruited foreign workers at this time like the white farms, farm workers are more commonly viewed than mine workers as 'foreigners' today, particularly in public discourse. This could be explained due to the differential administration of the two categories of workers, influenced in part by the low status of farm labour. This institutionalised and routinised the

assumption that the virtue of farm workers as citizens of the colony lay solely in their contribution to white farms and not to the nation itself. There was no possibility for them to be 'active citizens', no putative path of transformation for the betterment of the nation under a form of trusteeship, according to the dominant discourses and institutionalised practices. Rather, they were legally constituted as 'servants' to white 'masters' and did not figure in dominant imaginations of the colonial nation other than in terms of acting as the recipient of white farmer paternalism.

For a variety of reasons, by the late 1950s farm workers were administered differently than most other categories of workers (see Rutherford 2001a). Through laws and policies and in response to lobbying by white farmers, the colonial state sanctioned white farmers as the main administrative authority to look over the well-being and edification of black workers. This 'domestic government' (Rutherford 2001a) helped to add a particular virtue of responsibility to the citizenship claims of white farmers. It also anchored the claims of farm workers firmly to that of serving white farms as opposed to the nation (Rutherford 2003, 2004a).

This arrangement also was aided by the low status of farm work. As in other countries, farm labour in colonial and postcolonial Zimbabwe has been marked by low wages and by generally poor working conditions. Modernisation narratives informing development policies in Southern Rhodesia also have characterised farm labour as backwards in contrast to industrial labour, as a transitional labour sector in a modernising labour market (e.g. Du Toit 1977; see Lewis 1954 for a paradigmatic example). Moreover, the emphasis placed on becoming self-sufficient (male) peasant farmers as a virtuous path by the colonial state (Worby 2000) and many black small-scale farmers themselves (Ranger 1985; Maxwell 1999: 113; Moore 1999) cast a negative light on those who work in farming but for others, not for themselves. Such men become morally suspect, as persons unable to be productive farmers on their own.

The history of international migration led to the characterisation of farm workers as foreigners. But it was the entrenchment of the administrative arrangements of domestic government and the simultaneous institutionalisation and routinisation of the peasant path as the laid-out route for becoming virtuous to the nation that made it very difficult for farm workers to be considered as potential moral citizens of the colony. Their claims *qua* farm workers were circumscribed to the white farms, not the nation at large.

For example, in the 1950s and 1960s the colonial state was developing systems of administration of Africans in the native reserves, urban locations, and urban and mining workplaces. These systems were designed as a way to manage the 'progression of rights' and the "promotion of passive citizens to the status of active citizens" (Wallerstein 2003). They were a means to 'develop' the colonial subjects and to control the growing nationalist movement (e.g. Howman 1953; see Holleman 1968; Murray 1970; Shadur 1994: 59–62). In addition to coercive ends, such policies and plans also enabled forms of representation of African peasants, African urban residents, and African workers as communities of potential moral citizens of the colony. No such attempts were being made for farm workers. Rather, their representation to the colony rested largely with white farmers, who used their paternalistic care and control over farm workers for their own claims of citizenship (Rutherford 2004a, 2004b).

As a consequence of this history of public representation of farm workers as a particular moral community, during the liberation war guerrillas often viewed farm workers as an ambiguous community: as Africans exploited by whites and as people whose loyalties may more inherently lay with whites than, say, African nationalists. This ambiguity continued in the post-colonial period.

Independence: Nationalism and Land

Land has become even more closely associated with the nation since Independence was achieved in 1980. The guerrilla war and national liberation itself became closely associated with a peasant struggle fighting for land in the new ZANU (PF) (Zimbabwean African National Union (Patriotic Front)) government's rhetoric (Werbner 1998) and policy prescriptions (Herbst 1990: 37ff.; Moyo 1995), as well as in academic writings.

For example, a common depiction of the 1979 meetings at Lancaster House between the warring parties and the British government that established the ceasefire and the founding constitution of Zimbabwe is that of betrayal by the colonial and imperial powers. Such a depiction underscores the nationalist claim that the Zimbabwean government needs to carry out land distribution on its own, giving up on waiting for any international assistance, to fulfill an obligation of its founding compact. As one of the government papers editorialised on the day marking Zimbabwe's twenty-fourth year of Independence:

> …there was the mistake of trusting the British and the Americans to respect the Lancaster House agreement with respect to the land question. It took Tony Blair's somersault for us to see that the leopard will never change its colours. But out of it came the Third Chimurenga.[4]

This narrative of the constitutional creation of Zimbabwe, dramatised with suggestions of betrayal by the former colonisers, configures land redistribution from whites to blacks as a fundamental component of the sovereignty of the postcolonial nation. Yet in practice, the importance of agrarian reform has ebbed and flowed. This has been a result of varying political contestations within the government and between it and donors and Zimbabwean lobby groups such as farmers associations and indigenous business groups (Ranger 1988; Drinkwater 1991; Palmer 1990; Moyo 1995, 2000; Worby 2001). Such contestations have intersected with, have built on, or have tried to direct the continuing importance of access to land in both popular memories and livelihood strategies of accumulation or survival for the majority of the national population living in rural areas.[5] Accordingly, control over land and the people using it has been crucial arenas for localised, regional and national politics (e.g. Alexander 1994 2003; Moore 1999; Maxwell 1999; Worby 2001; Hughes 1999; Nyambara 2001; Rutherford 2001a; Chaumba, Scoones, and Wolmer 2003).

Some farm workers, including those who were born outside of Zimbabwe or are patrilineally descended from foreigners, have been able to acquire access to land in Communal Areas (former native reserves) or resettlement areas, in part taking advantage of the particular politics of land in certain localities (e.g. Rutherford 2001a: 214ff.). But it was rare for farm workers to be publicly portrayed as deserving of land, of having the virtue of being able to properly use or at least entitled to have land as true 'sons of the soil'. More commonly they were viewed as the responsibility of white farmers and not the government. Let me provide a relevant example. In a speech to the white farmers' Commercial Farmers' Union in 1981, the then Minister of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development Sidney Sekeremayi distinguished

---

[4] Editorial. "Zimbabwe has matured," *Sunday Mail* (Zimbabwe) on-line, 18.04.04. See also, The Scrutator. "Revisiting the Lancaster House debate on land in Zimbabwe: Pik Botha, Stan Mudenge and Ann Grant," *Sunday Mirror* (Zimbabwe) on-line, 25.04.04 (see for instance ICG 2004: 27–28).

[5] Land has also been important for many urban Zimbabweans, particularly as joblessness increased in the 1990s with the adoption of structural adjustment policies (see Potts and Mutambirwa 1995; Andersson 2001).

types of 'squatters', referring to the large number of people occupying many white farms and state land at that time (Alexander 2003: 85–93). He differentiated between those who deserved to be resettled and those who did not. Farm workers fell in the latter category:

> The abandoned farm labourers, who remained on the farms when the owners absconded for their own security, they ran to Salisbury [Harare], London or South Africa, and they are now back [and complaining about the squatters]. These people are of Malawian or Mozambican or Zambian extraction. They have absolutely nowhere to go. Nobody can expect government now, with all the other problems, to say that these people should be accommodated elsewhere. You know as well as I do, they cannot even be accommodated in the TTLs [native reserves], and we have to make room for this type of situation (CFU 1981).

The adjective is telling: responsibility lay with the farmers who 'abandoned' the farm labourers to look after them; in light of 'all the other problems', the implication is that the government needs to accommodate other, more deserving, candidates on the land. ZANU (PF) representatives have been willing to talk about the exploitation of farm workers by white farmers as a way to undermine the moral claims of the latter to the postcolonial nation (Rutherford 2001b, 2003, 2004b). The ruling party also assisted the establishment of a union to advocate for their labour rights, albeit weakly (Tandon 2001). But the government did not commit to viewing farm workers as worthy candidates for land. In the context of the intimate tie made between land and sovereignty, public discourses in Zimbabwe generally have not portrayed farm workers as virtuous citizens, let alone capable of becoming so, as the institutionalised and routinised configuration of them as a community still weighs heavily in postcolonial Zimbabwe.

Farm Workers and the Crisis Since 2000

As the ZANU (PF) government of Robert Mugabe has forcibly and often violently enabled the expropriation of virtually all of the land owned and operated by white Zimbabweans since 2000, it has done so under the banner of completing the anti-colonial struggle against Europeans. Its spokespeople and supporters have portrayed these events as the redistribution of resources from the white 'settlers' to 'Africans', providing the 'economic sovereignty' to go along with the 'political sovereignty' achieved in 1980 after a long and violent liberation struggle.

This portrayal has been encapsulated in the ZANU (PF) electoral slogan "Zimbabwe will never be a colony again" and in its characterisation of both the on-going land redistribution and the often bloody political contest with the main opposition party, the MDC (Movement for Democratic Change), as the 'Third Chimurenga' (the third national 'struggle' or 'revolution' against colonialism). By couching its social justice goals within the wider historical narrative of the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles, ZANU (PF)'s version of events has won widespread support in Africa and beyond.[6] President Mugabe enunciated such a vision at a graveyard eulogy of a former junior cabinet minister in November 2003:

> He [the deceased] leaves this world satisfied that land, our principal heritage as a people, has been liberated, and redeemed.... When in 1980 we got our Independence, as a people we were independent, as a country we indeed were independent, but not independent was our land, our soil.... He was committed to the objectives of the Third Chimurenga which redeemed our land, thereby putting our people on a firm footing for real development. That struggle is far from over and it continues to define its own heroes.[7]

In contrast, the MDC, human rights groups in Zimbabwe and beyond, most governments and newspapers in the North (and some in Africa and other parts of the Third World), and international donors have strongly condemned the government for its initiation and condoning of violence and its great meddling in key institutions of the state such as the judiciary (Mtetwa 2004), elections (Raftopoulos 2002), and local government (McGregor 2002). From this perspective, social justice issues are to be dealt with through transparent, inclusive, and legal processes. The latest pronouncement of the MDC's intentions concerning land reform articulates such a perspective:

> The MDC is committed to land reform. The MDC government will bring Zimbabwe's land crisis to closure through a democratic and participatory process that seeks to achieve equitable, transparent, just, lawful and

---

[6] A recent example of this support is the standing ovation President Mugabe received from a crowd of South African and foreign dignitaries when he arrived for President Mbeki's inauguration in South Africa ("Mugabe gets standing ovation from SA democracy party," *SABC News*, 27.04.04; see also Freeman 2004 who insightfully discusses how widespread African support for Mugabe has put pressure on the Mbeki government's response to the Zimbabwean crisis).

[7] "Zikhali a daring participant in the struggle," *ZANU (PF) website*, 28.11.03. http://www.zanupfpub.co.zw/.

> economically efficient distribution and use of land, both for agricultural and for other purposes (MDC 2004: 16).

The latter emphasis on good governance informs much of the Northern and national anti-ZANU (PF) response to the Zimbabwean government's actions, including in terms of the land question. From this perspective, the 'Third Chimurenga' is characterised as an illegal land grab, motivated solely by narrow party political agendas which undermines the political and civil rights of white farmers while dislodging the livelihood possibilities of (black) farm workers. As an unpublished article declares:

> All over the country white farms were invaded and the farmers and their families subjected to the maximum humiliation in order to enhance the propaganda aspect of the strategy. Farm workers too were terrorised, but deliberately no mention was made of what was to become of these people when the farms were "resettled" by gangs of the unemployable.… [The government is] careful to totally ignore the fact that they [white farmers] are citizens with equal rights to all other citizens (Frizell 2004).

Farm workers here become victims in terms of their livelihoods—not their rights—unlike white farmers. This is a strong theme in current critiques of the on-going land redistribution exercise, excluding economic rights with a focus solely on civil and political rights. For these critics, the worsening economic plight of farm workers is raised as a way to critique the Mugabe government; this gives the impression that the concern critics express for farm workers does not include how they have been disadvantaged by the inherited colonial configuration of the nation, which events since 2000 only exacerbate (see Rutherford 2001b). Others critically note the inability of many farm workers to get resettlement land due to discrimination exercised by the government or localised land distribution authorities (e.g. Moyo, Rutherford, Amanor-Wilks 2000; Sachikonye 2003; Magaramombe 2001; Waeterloos and Rutherford 2004a).

But is it that easy? Does one just need to tack on 'farm workers' as a category of targeted beneficiaries for land resettlement? This is exactly what the Zimbabwean government did in its Inception Phase Framework Plan of the Land Reform and Resettlement programme Phase II of 1998, and yet farm workers are largely not benefiting but are being displaced by the current land redistribution.[8] Of course, recent events

[8] Although farm workers are not included as an intended beneficiary of the more recent Fast Track Land Resettlement programme document, Chambati and Moyo

in Zimbabwe are not 'policy-driven' (e.g. Worby 2001; Alexander 2003; Hammar and Raftopoulos 2003; Raftopoulos 2003; Bernstein 2003). But even if they were, it is important to recognise how farm workers have been publicly characterised as moral agents, as less virtuous citizens, within the landscape of the nation for this informs policies, practices and institutional arrangements concerning their relationship to land. This characterisation of their deficient citizenship makes discrimination easy, even in the face of policies purportedly concerned to improve their well-being. Let me give two brief examples.

Zimbabwean authors of a recent study examining current land administration declare:

> Ex-farm workers who are still resident on the farms and in the neighbourhood represent a silent but formidable challenge and dynamic to the establishment, meaning settlers. From the survey results, informants reported acrimonious relationships between settlers and ex-farm workers. One example is that of witchcraft accusations, as in cases where ex-farm workers are accused of having defecated in water wells and homesteads belonging to settlers: a taboo in African culture and a sign of disapproval… Furthermore, farm workers are accused of stealing and harassing new settlers (Marimira and Odero 2003: 316–317; see also Chambati and Moyo 2004: 20).

Similar sentiments of the disruption caused by 'farm workers' to 'the establishment', the new African settlers on the land, due to their immoral ways are expressed in the recent report of the presidential land review commission headed by Charles Utete. One of its recommendations reads:

> The Committee recommends that Government urgently addresses the situation of former farm workers [still residing] in the farm compounds. Their continued presence on the farms had created numerous problems arising from illegal gold panning, misuse of farm facilities and resources and general criminal activities (Utete Commission 2003: 6).

As part of its justification for this recommendation, the Commission writes:

> Regrettably, a sizeable number of farm workers remained on the resettled farms, pursuing other ways of economic survival, notably gold planning and poaching. For this category of workers, the Ministry of Public Service,

---

(2004) take a more sanguine view of farm workers and land redistribution than others, suggesting there has been some positive as well as negative effects for them.

> Labour and Social Welfare is organising them for redeployment into areas where there is a shortage of labour (Utete Commission 2003: 36).

As a moral category operating on the scale of the nation, in these narratives farm workers are less deserving than those who received land (who, in official discourse at least, are said to be mainly the 'landless,' 'war veterans,' and indigenous farmers with sufficient capital). Instead, farm workers are identified as inherently labourers, people to be 'redeployed' to areas of labour shortages, and as a nuisance to the newly settled farmers due to their lack of proper comportment. They are not conceived as possible settlers, the 'establishment' (to use Marimira and Odero's terms), in their own right. Rather, these reports sympathetic to the current land reform activities suggest farm workers lack virtue when it comes to land.

Many Zimbabweans still view farm workers as foreigners, despite a limited number actually having been born outside of the country (see Sachikonye 2003; Chambati and Moyo 2004). Many farm workers have had difficulty acquiring proper documents attesting to their citizenship and recent changes to the Citizenship Act disqualified many from legal citizenship until late April 2004.[9] The arrangements of domestic government have remained strong and have continued to be interpreted as an indication of loyalty to white farmers than the black nation (Rutherford 2001a, 2001b, 2003). Agricultural labour has remained a low status, lowly remunerated job (even more so for those who have still been able to maintain their job as farm workers since 2000; see Magaramombe 2001; FCTZ 2002; Parliament of Zimbabwe 2003; Sachikonye 2003; Chambati and Moyo 2004). Moreover, farm workers are still commonly viewed as lacking the proper discipline and productivity—the virtue of moral citizens of the nation—to direct themselves towards productively working land for themselves (Moyo, Rutherford, and Amanor-Wilks 2000; Rutherford 2001a).

The question of citizenship of farm workers relates to the history of international migration that supplied labour to white farms in colonial Zimbabwe. Yet, as apparent in the quotations above, farm workers are also identified in terms of their moral disposition that make them perceived as less virtuous as potential land holders, irrespective of questions of their legal citizenship. As I suggest in the sections above,

---

[9] "RG's Office starts issuing citizenship renunciation forms," by Fortious Nhambura, *Herald* (Zimbabwe), 5 May 2004.

these attributes were constituted and routinised in the colonial nation as land became a key domain for the exercise of citizenship.

Conclusion

The 1990s saw the consolidation of social movements in Zimbabwe pushing for democracy built largely out of the labour movement, student groups, NGOs, and churches (Raftopoulos and Sachikonye 2001; Raftopoulos 2001; Dorman 2003; Rutherford 2004a). The MDC emerged out of these movements and has helped to strongly articulate the demand for democratisation in Zimbabwe (to the peril of its members given the violent response of the ZANU (PF) government). Yet the advocacy for civil and political rights is not operating on a blank canvas. Rather, it is acting within a previously constituted field of represented communities, configured in particular ways vis-à-vis the nation. In terms of land, this not only shapes the particular claims and counter-claims of individuals and groups in particular localities but also the reception of arguments on a national scale.

Given my discussion above on how farm workers have been constituted as morally suspect citizens with limited if any virtue within the nation of Zimbabwe and whose contribution is confined to the scale of the (white) farm, let me briefly assess two current strategies of demanding social justice for them.

The first approach promotes farm workers as needing to be part of the land redistribution exercise on the basis that they have been neglected and have had their livelihoods severely disrupted since 2000. NGOs, donors, the trade unions, and some academics make this type of demand (e.g. Magaramombe 2001; FCTZ 2002; ZWCT 2003; Waeterloos and Rutherford 2004a). Although NGOs have successfully been able to negotiate with the government so they can deliver food relief to former farm workers, their lobbying for farm workers' rights have not had much noticeable success. Instead, given that Northern donors tend to support NGOs and provide at least moral support to the MDC, NGOs' messages and they themselves are often treated with suspicion by ZANU (PF) (Dorman 2003; Rutherford 2004a). Many Zimbabweans not involved in the ruling party are also suspicious of those (including NGOs, academics, donors, journalists) promoting the need to include farm workers in land reform, given this entrenched and widely held view that 'farm workers' are less virtuous (or 'quasi') citizens

in the nation (Schou 2000). For instance, I have heard Zimbabweans characterise NGO advocacy for farm workers as a way to really promote the return of white farmers, based on this presumed tie between farm workers and farmers and the connections between donors, NGOs, and the presumed sympathies of donors towards white farmers. As long as farm workers are viewed as less virtuous citizens in regards to land and the nation, demands for their rights will likely have a limited audience amongst many Zimbabweans, regardless of their political affiliation.

A second approach has been to argue for the need for their inclusion in the language of policy-makers, using data to make arguments about how assisting farm workers acquire land and other benefits fits within current development policy objectives (Chambati and Moyo 2004). An underlying assumption seems to be that avoiding an explicit discussion of the politics of current events and adopting the 'anti-political,' technical language of development (Ferguson 1990), might make policy-makers and politicians more inclined to contemplate why farm workers should also benefit from the current agrarian reform. However, by ignoring the politics shaping the current crisis, as well as the long history of politics of land in Zimbabwe itself, this approach is unable to attend to how farm workers have been configured in the nation, which I have argued strongly shapes actions towards them. As such promoters note (Chambati and Moyo 2004: *passim*) and others document (FCTZ 2002; Sachikonye 2003), land occupations have been violent and farm workers have been explicitly discriminated against. It is doubtful that reasoned appeals through technical language will change such marginalisation.

Nonetheless, these forms of advocacy for farm workers need to be commended, particularly given that such advocacy on their behalf is a relatively new phenomenon in Zimbabwe (Rutherford 2001a, 2004a). Yet, without confronting the ways in which farm workers have been represented as a community in relation to land and the nation and the deeply held sentiments and sedimented institutional arrangements that have made them as less virtuous citizens, these efforts face significant challenges. Ways and mechanisms of representing farm workers as virtuous citizens, pathways to show that they can be productive contributors to the nation, need to be vigorously pursued by a variety of Zimbabwean individuals and organisations, working with farm workers themselves. Such strategies and struggles for democracy and social justice could enable farm workers to benefit from agrarian reform. But in the real world of politics of Zimbabwe today, such a struggle is a hard, and dangerous, path to follow.

Bibliography

Alexander, J. 1994. State, Peasantry and Resettlement in Zimbabwe. *Review of African Political Economy*. 21: 61, pp. 325–345.

———. 2003. The Enduring Appeal of 'Technical Development' in Zimbabwe's Agrarian reform. In Bowyer-Bower, T. and C. Stoneman. (Eds) *Land reform in Zimbabwe: Constraints and Prospects*. Aldershot, Ashgate, pp. 133–144.

Alexander, J., McGregor, J. and T. Ranger. 2000. *Violence & Memory: One Hundred Years in the 'Dark Forests' of Matabeleland*. Oxford, James Currey.

Andersson, J. 2001. Reinterpreting the Rural-Urban Connection: Migration Practices and Socio-Cultural Dispositions of Buhera Workers in Harare. *Africa*. 71: 1, pp. 82–112.

Barnes, T.A. 1999. *"We Women Worked so Hard": Gender, Urbanization and Social Reproduction in Colonial Harare, Zimbabwe, 1930–1956*. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann.

Bernstein, H. 2004. "Changing Before Our Very Eyes": Agrarian Questions and the Politics of Land in Capitalism Today. *Journal of Agrarian Change*. 4: 1–2, pp. 190–225.

CFU (Commercial Farmers' Union). 1981. *Minutes of Annual General Meeting*. Salisbury, CFU.

Chambati, W. and S. Moyo. 2004. *Impact of Land Reform of Farm Workers and Farm Labour Processes*. Technical Paper No. 7, Review of Zimbabwean Agricultural Sector following the Implementation of the Land Reform, Harare.

Chaumba, J., Scoones, I., and W. Wolmer. 2003. New Politics, New Livelihoods: Agrarian Change in Zimbabwe. *Review of African Political Economy*. 30: 98, pp. 585–608.

Clarke, D. 1977. *Agricultural and Plantation Workers in Rhodesia*. Gwelo, Mambo Press.

Comaroff, J.L. and J. Comaroff. 1999. Introduction. In Comaroff, J.L. and J. Comaroff. (Eds) *Civil Society and the Political Imagination in Africa: Critical Perspectives*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 1–43.

Cousins, B., Weiner, D., and N. Amin. 1992. Social Differentiation in Communal Lands of Zimbabwe. *Review of African Political Economy*. 19: 53, pp. 5–24.

Cousins, B. 2003. Zimbabwe's Crisis and the Politics of Land, Democracy and Development in Southern Africa. In Hammar, A., Raftopoulos, B., and S. Jensen. (Eds) *Zimbabwe's Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of Crisis*. Harare: Weaver Press, pp. 263–316.

Cowen, M. and R. Shenton. 1996. *Doctrines of Development*. London: Routledge.

Dorman, S.R. 2003. NGOs and the Constitutional Debate in Zimbabwe: from Inclusion to Exclusion. *Journal of Southern African Studies*. 29: 4, pp. 845–863.

Drinkwater, M. 1991. *The State and Agrarian Change in Zimbabwe's Communal Areas*. New York: St. Martin's.

Du Toit, F.P. 1977. *The Accommodation of Permanent Farm Labourers*. Technical Bulletin 17. Salisbury, Rhodesia Agricultural Journal.

FCTZ (Farm Community Trust of Zimbabwe). 2002. *Report on the Assessment of the Impact of Land Reform Programme on Commercial Farm Worker Livelihoods*. Harare, FCTZ.

Ferguson, J. 1990. *The Anti-Politics Machine: Development, Depoliticization and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Freeman, L. 2004. Unravelling the Contradictions—South Africa's Zimbabwe Policy. Paper presented at Ten Years of Democracy in Southern Africa: Historical Achievement, Present State, Future Prospects conference, Queen's University, Kingston, 2–5 May.

Frizell, C. 2004. Land Lies. *Justice for Agriculture Open Letter Forum*. 257. 20.04.04.

Hammar, A. and B. Raftopoulos. 2003. Zimbabwe's Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation. In Hammar, A., Raftopoulos, B., and S. Jensen. (Eds) *Zimbabwe's Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of Crisis*. Harare: Weaver Press, pp. 1–49.

Herbst, J. 1990. *State Politics in Zimbabwe*. Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications.
Holleman, J. 1968. *Chief, Council and Commissioner: Some Problems of Government in Rhodesia*. Assen, The Netherlands: Koninklijke Van Gorcum.
Howman, R. 1953. *African Local Government in British East and Central Africa*. Salisbury: Government printer.
Hughes, D. 1999. Refugees and Squatters: Immigration and the Politics of Territory on the Zimbabwe-Mozambique Border. *Journal of Southern African Studies*. 25: 4, pp. 533–552.
ICG (International Crisis Group). 2004. *Blood and Soil: Land, Politics and Conflict Prevention in Zimbabwe and South Africa*. Brussels: ICG.
Kaler, A. 1999. Visions of Domesticity in the African Women's Homecraft Movement in Rhodesia. *Social Science History*. 23: 3, pp. 269–309.
Kelly, J. and M. Kaplan. 2001. *Represented Communities: Fiji and World Decolonization*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Lewis, W.A. 1954. Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour. *The Manchester School*. 22, pp. 139–191.
Magaramombe, G. 2001. Rural Poverty: Commercial Farm Workers and Land Reform in Zimbabwe. Paper given at the SARPN Conference on land Reform and Poverty Alleviation in Southern Africa, Pretoria.
Marimira, S. and K. Odero. 2003. An Analysis of Institutional and Organisational Issues on Fast Track Resettlement: The Case of Goromonzi District. In Roth, M. and F. Gonese. (Eds) *Delivering Land and Securing Rural Livelihoods: Post-Independence Land Reform and Resettlement in Zimbabwe*. Harare: B&D Creatif Pensant, pp. 259–268.
Marongwe, N. 2001. Farm Occupations and Occupiers in the New Politics of Land in Zimbabwe. In Hammar, A., Raftopoulos, B., and S. Jensen. (Eds) *Zimbabwe's Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of Crisis*. Harare: Weaver Press, pp. 155–190.
Maxwell, D. 1999. *Christians and Chiefs in Zimbabwe: A Social History of the Hwesa People c. 1870s–1990s*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
McGregor, J. 2002. The Politics of Disruption: War Veterans and the Local State in Zimbabwe. *African Affairs*. 101, pp. 9–37.
MDC [Movement for Democratic Change]. 2004. *RESTART: Our Path to Social Justice: The MDC's Economic Programme for Reconstruction, Stabilisation, Recovery and Transformation*. Harare: MDC.
Moore, D. 1999. The Crucible of Cultural Politics: Reworking 'Development' in Zimbabwe's Eastern Highlands. *American Ethnologist*. 26, pp. 654–689.
Moyo, S. 1995. *The Land Question in Zimbabwe*. Harare: SAPES Books.
———. 2000. *Land Reform Under Structural Adjustment in Zimbabwe*. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.
Moyo, S., B. Rutherford, D. Amanor-Wilks. 2000. Land Reform and Changing Social Relations for Farm Workers in Zimbabwe. *Review of African Political Economy*. 27: 84, pp. 181–202.
Mtetwa, B. 2004. Judicial System Under Siege. *Zimbabwe Independent* on-line, 08.04.04.
Murray, D.J. 1970. *The Governmental System in Southern Rhodesia*. Oxford: Clarendon.
Nyambara, P. 2001. The Closing Frontier: Agrarian Change, Immigrants and the 'Squatter Menace' in Gokwe, 1980–1990s. *Journal of Agrarian Change*. 1: 4, pp. 534–49.
Palmer, R. 1977. *Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia*. London: Heinemann.
———. 1990. Land Reform in Zimbabwe, 1980–1990. *African Affairs*. 89, pp. 163–181.
Parliament of Zimbabwe. 2003. *Second Report of the Portfolio Committee on Lands, Agriculture, Water, Development, Rural Resources and Resettlement*, (Presented to Parliament 11 June 2003. S.C.11, 2003).

Paton, B. 1995. *Labour Export Policy in the Development of Southern Africa*. Harare: University of Zimbabwe Press.

Potts, D. and C. Mutambirwa. 1990. Rural-Urban Linkages in Contemporary Harare: Why Migrants Need Their Land. *Journal of Southern African Studies*. 16: 4, pp. 676–698.

Raftopoulos, B. 2001. The Labour Movement and the Emergence of Opposition Politics in Zimbabwe. In Raftopoulos, B. and L. Sachikonye. (Eds) *The Labour Movement in Zimbabwe: Problems and Prospects*. Harare: Weaver Press, pp. 1–24.

———. 2002. Briefing: Zimbabwe's 2002 Presidential Elections. *African Affairs*. 101, pp. 413–426.

———. 2003. The State in Crisis: Authoritarian Nationalism, Selective Citizenship and Distortions of Democracy in Zimbabwe. In Hammar, A., Raftopoulos, B. and S. Jensen. (Eds) *Zimbabwe's Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of Crisis*. Harare: Weaver Press, pp. 217–242.

Raftopoulos, B. and L. Sachikonye. (Eds) 2001. *Striking Back: The Labour Movement and the Post-Colonial State in Zimbabwe 1980–2000*. Harare: Weaver Press.

Ranger, T. 1985. *Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War In Zimbabwe*. London: James Currey.

———. 1988. The Communal Areas of Zimbabwe. *Symposium on Land Reform in African Agrarian Systems*. Urbana Champaign: University of Illinois.

Rubert, S. 1998. *A Most Promising Weed: A History of Tobacco Farming and Labor in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1890–1945*. Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies.

Rutherford, B. 2001a. *Working on the Margins: Black Workers, White Farmers in Postcolonial Zimbabwe*. London: Zed Books and Harare: Weaver Press.

———. 2001b. Commercial Farm Workers and the Politics of (Dis)Placement in Zimbabwe: Liberation, Colonialism, and Democracy. *Journal of Agrarian Change*. 1: 4, pp. 626– 651.

———. 2003. Belonging to the Farm(er): Farm Workers, Farmers, and the Shifting Politics of Citizenship. In Hammar, A., Raftopoulos, B., and S. Jensen. (Eds) *Zimbabwe's Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of Crisis*. Harare: Weaver Press, pp. 191–216.

———. 2004a. Desired Publics, Domestic Government, and Entangled Fears: On the Anthropology of Civil Society, Farm Workers, and White Farmers in Zimbabwe. *Cultural Anthropology*. 19: 3, pp. 122–153.

———. 2004b. "Settlers" and Zimbabwe: Politics, Memory and the Anthropology of Commercial farms During a Time of Crisis. *Identities*. 11: 4, pp. 543–562.

Sachikonye, L. 2003. *The Situation of Commercial Farm Workers after Land Reform in Zimbabwe*. London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, and Harare: FCTZ.

Schmidt, E. 1992. *Peasants, Traders, and Wives: Shona Women in the History of Zimbabwe, 1870–1939*. London: James Currey.

Schou, Arild. 2000. The Adaptation of Quasi-Citizens to Political and Social Marginality: Farm Workers in Zimbabwe. *Forum for Development Studies*. 1, pp. 43–63.

Shadur, M. 1994. *Labour Relations in a Developing Country: A case study on Zimbabwe*. Aldershot: Avebury.

Tandon, Y. 2001. Trade Unions and Labour in the Agricultural Sector in Zimbabwe. In Raftopoulos, B. and L. Sachikonye. (Eds) *The Labour Movement in Zimbabwe: Problems and Prospects*. Harare: Weaver Press, pp. 221–249.

Utete Commission. 2003. *Report of the Presidential Land Review Committee on the Implementation of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme, 2000–2002*. (as extracted from *The Herald*) Harare.

Waeterloos. E. and B. Rutherford. 2004. Reform in Zimbabwe: Challenges and Opportunities for Poverty Reduction Among Commercial Farm Workers. *World Development*. 32: 3, pp. 537–553.

Wallerstein, I. 2003. Citizens All? Citizens Some! The Making of the Citizen. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*. 45: 4, pp. 650–679.

Werbner, R. 1998. Smoke from the Barrel of a Gun: Postwars of the Dead, Memory and Reinscription in Zimbabwe. In Werbner, R. (Ed.) *Memory and the Postcolony: African Anthropology and the Critique of Power*. London: Zed Books, pp. 71–104.

Worby, E. 1998. Tyranny, Parody, and Ethnic Polarity: Ritual Engagements with the State in Northwestern Zimbabwe. *Journal of Southern African Studies*. 24: 4, pp. 561–578.

———. 2000. "Discipline without Oppression": Sequence, Timing and Marginality in Southern Rhodesia's Post-War Development Regime. *Journal of African History*. 41: 1, pp. 101–125.

———. 2001. A Redivided Land? New Agrarian Conflicts and Questions in Zimbabwe. *Journal of Agrarian Change*. 1: 4, pp. 475–509.

ZCDT (Zimbabwe Community Development Trust). 2003. *Report on Internally Displaced Farm Workers Survey: Kadoma, Chegutu and Kwekwe Districts*. Harare: ZCDT.

PROPERTY AND CITIZENSHIP IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAND REFORM

Deborah James

Although nation states have apparently withered away in the face of global capitalism, national belonging and citizenship continue to occupy a position of importance or have become more significant than ever (J. and J.L. Comaroff 2000; Trouillot 2001). Despite the erosion of state sovereignty, and hence the transformation of what it means to be a citizen within the modern nation state, it remains the case that "most global processes materialise in national territories, largely through national institutional arrangements" (Sassen, cited in J. and J.L. Comaroff 2000: 324). Citizenship is no exception. Paradoxically, transfrontier mobility has augmented the importance of autochthony (Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 2000), and the ever-greater influence of transnational processes has forged increasingly ethnicised ideas about citizenship (Verdery 1998).

Where many anthropologists investigating the changing and contingent nature of citizenship have placed much emphasis on the destiny of migrants or incomers from elsewhere, my concern in this paper is how citizenship is extended or denied to those from *within* existing national boundaries. How do particular categories of people either gain access to or become excluded from a sense of entitlement to a common national identity, with all it entails? This phenomenon, which we might call 'internal citizenship', has received some attention in the scholarly literature. Anthropological studies have shown, in particular, how citizenship is often experienced through, or mediated by, forms of identification other than national/political ones. In the Middle East, for example, kinship loyalties, allegiance to tribal leaders, and religious affiliation play a part in mediating the relationship between the state and its subjects (Longva 2000; Joseph 2000). Even in a society such as the US, where patrimonial and other kinds of 'primordial loyalties' might be thought less important, citizenship has been shown to be modelled on the existing gender/race axes of identity which were laid down in an earlier era (Ong 1996).

Land and Citizenship in South Africa

Much anthropological work, then, has examined the modelling of citizenship, especially in settings where the concept is relatively new, on pre-existing social forms of identification: whether these be lineage, gender, allegiance to tribal-style authorities, or even habituated patterns of behaviour laid down by race. In this paper I explore a case—post-apartheid South Africa—in which the 'newness' of citizenship derived not from people's being unaccustomed to such a concept, but rather from its having been actively denied to people in the past. Mamdani's claim that the position of Western-style 'citizen' in a South African setting was separated from—but partly predicated on—the 'subject' status of the African rural population is by now well known (1996). With the dawn of South Africa's liberation from this system of 'bifurcated despotism', it was the aspired-to egalitarian character of citizenship which—as in other post-transition settings, such as post-Independence Mexico (Lomnitz 1999)—eclipsed all its other features. The most immediate symbol of citizenship initially lost and now—along with its egalitarian associations—to be restored, was that of land.

It is not only in South Africa that entitlement to property has acted as a template for the citizen's rights to gain access to other, broader, forms of entitlement. Although it may seem self-evident that a sense of belonging be built upon the basis of the importance of territory or place, it is often only in situations of extreme flux and under conditions of rapid transition that land comes to be invested with particular significance. One such case has been that of post-socialist Eastern Europe. Here, the threat that communally owned property would be privatised and alienated from common ownership led to a primordialised reconstruction of land as an 'inalienable possession'. Through "ideas about property, enhanced flows of capital and concepts" had the apparently contradictory effect of tying "interests to particular places" (Verdery 1998: 298).

In South Africa it was the systematic denial of rights in landed property, and their alienation from those who had previously held title to landed property, that imbued it with significance as a symbol for the denial of citizenship. In the planning of apartheid's ideologues, a system of customary tenure, closely allied to indirect rule, had rendered communally-held land in separate ethnic territories the basis of political dependency upon chiefs for the rural African population (Mamdani 1996: 21–2). It was this system which laid the foundation for the

definition of rural Africans as chiefly 'subjects' rather than as citizens able to engage with civil society. As endorsed within the grand plans of apartheid, formulated and refined during the 1950s, this system of tenure "mapped the social landscape" according to a particular conception of the innate relationship of "people to place" (Ashforth 1990: 158). The new landscape it created was an inexorably divided one. Apartheid denied citizenship—or assigned it on a second-class basis—by allocating Africans to separate territories. Undoing it thus required the uncoupling of this relationship. A unity of territory and government must be created where previously there had been division.

Space and territory were thus of key importance in apartheid's plans. Resistance to the implementation of these plans was likewise centred on space and territory (Bozzoli 2004). If land and rights became indissolubly connected in the public mind, this linkage resulted, in part, from clashes—increasingly fierce towards the end of the 1980s—between the state and the people whose property, land and citizenship rights it was threatening to destroy (Delius 1996; Seekings 2000; von Kessel 2000).

In planners' constitutionalist vision for the new South Africa, citizenship was explicitly linked to the project of overcoming the past (Enslin 2000). The drafters of the new constitution saw land as central in defining the rights that had formerly been denied, and its restoration as a means to restore those rights and with them the sovereignty and full citizenship of the African population (Ramutsindela 1998). The intention to restore land to its former occupiers thus amounted to a reinstatement of basic civil liberties which had been removed, or denied, in the past.

Land Reform in South Africa: A Thumbnail Sketch

It became clear over the course of the decade after 1994, however, that it was not a homogenous, or uniformly deprived, African population to which the rights of citizenship would be restored, but rather one which was deeply divided along lines of class. Some of the intended 'beneficiaries' of the land reform programme are former title-holding property owners while others belong to the category of people often termed 'squatters' over the course of the previous century. Both were left 'landless' in the apartheid era, but the latter had never enjoyed property rights even before it. They have gradually come to be seen in the policy literature as more 'truly landless'—and hence more deserving of the benefits of land reform—than the former.

Several branches of the programme were designed in recognition of this differentiation: *restitution*, *redistribution* and *tenure reform*. *Restitution* would concentrate on returning land to titled landowners who had lost their property during the apartheid era as a result of forced removals. Controversially, the Restitution Act of 1994 was phrased so as to render more far-reaching claims, dating from before 1913, illegitimate. *Redistribution* would allow for those Africans who had never had secure—or any—claims on landed property to group together and purchase farms with the aid of a government grant. *Tenure reform* would protect the rights of those residing on land but depending on others for their occupation of it: chiefs (in the homelands) or white farmers.

In people's aspirations to reclaim their citizenship alongside their land rights, the restitutive and redistributive aspects of land reform started to be pitted against each other in a series of fierce disputes. Redistributive approaches increasingly seemed the only way of transferring significant amounts of formerly white-owned land to the 'historically oppressed' (Lahiff 2001), since they promised to address not simply the inequities entailed in racially legislated segregation but also broader inequalities in African society. Land reform of this kind seemed to carry the promise of addressing problems of poverty, by giving poor people a place to live. From early on, though, these different aspects blurred. Loopholes became evident, as aspirant farmers with no former basis on the land attempted to prove spurious connections to it through restitution while others with a genuine sense of entitlement recognised the difficulties of proving this and attempted to benefit from redistribution instead.

The initial importance of a language of 'rights' rather than a more practically-oriented one of 'property/ownership' owed much to the presence of the human rights lawyers who played a key role in the programme's design. But an alternative and increasingly predominant line of argument, adopted by the government after the second democratic elections in 1999, began to foreground the economic benefits to be gained from secure ownership of property. The two approaches were linked in the early years of the land reform programme, which drew many human rights lawyers and officers from the land NGOs into state employment. But the government's subsequent shift towards more explicitly neo-liberal economic policies has decoupled the rights-based approach from the property-based/economic one, favouring the latter over the former. Attempts to foster a land-owning, middle-class African farming constituency are now paramount, eclipsing the previous

emphasis on safeguarding the basic residence rights and welfare of the 'rural poor' through land redistribution or tenure reform (Cousins 2000; Hall and Williams 2003). With this altered direction and the substitution of personnel which accompanied it, many former NGO activists and human rights lawyers, having briefly worked in state employment, once again rejoined the NGO sector and have used legal means to challenge the government, attempting to contest its insistence on the private property model, and to reinstate the more egalitarian vision of the programme's priorities.

Throughout all these changes, it remains the case that landed property and citizenship in South Africa are integrally linked. Land continues to *symbolise* citizenship as well as being seen as a material *outcome*, intended if not yet achieved, of citizens' exercise of their democratic rights: getting land back was one of the things 'we voted for'. But the exact mechanism of land access, and hence the precise way in which property is held, has been a matter of dispute between state and society. If one model of citizenship—increasingly favoured by the government—has come to foreground the private ownership of property, another—increasingly highlighted by NGO officers and by some of the rank-and-file landless—has idealised land as an inalienable possession which ought not to be privately owned or sold.

This paper, focusing on cases in Mpumalanga province, demonstrates two ways in which citizenship and property intersect. Firstly, restitution—despite its increasingly broad definition to include holders of 'informal rights'—was creating new social divisions between the middle class and the African poor. Countering this, there was an insistence, especially amongst the poorest sectors of the landless, that restitution was intended to benefit all Africans, and that a 'rights-based' rather than a 'property-based' or 'market-driven' version of land reform—as originally envisaged by the NGOs—should prevail. Even though this vision of redistributive justice was increasingly out of kilter with the state's approach, which was centred on property ownership and driven by planners and bureaucrats, it was not being dismissed out of hand. Rather than blankly denying the 'citizenship as inalienable land rights' approach, the African National Congress (ANC) was accommodating this egalitarian vision of citizenship by pandering to ethnically-defined regional majorities of the landless. The first section of the paper illustrates conflicting views about ownership, showing how these crystallise disputes over the nature of citizens' entitlements: whether broad and inclusive or narrow and restricted.

Secondly, property and citizenship are linked—but their connections mediated—through forms of patronage. It was initially a matter of speculation whether land claimants, reacting against their position as 'subjects', would attempt to assert individualised forms of property and citizenship, perhaps fragmenting along the increasingly sharply-defined lines of class. Or would their vision of citizenship combine "demands of individual entitlement [with] attachment to a particular community" (Kymlicka and Norman 1994: 352)? In other post-revolutionary situations, such as Mexico, it seemed necessary for people to own land without the intervention of intermediaries or of the state (Lomnitz 1999) in order to assert their rights as independent citizens. But in South Africa the landless have asserted their entitlement to remain resident upon publicly-owned land. It is only the state—through the intermediary of brokers standing between it and the people—which can grant land and hence provide the basis for citizenship, albeit of a perhaps inferior variety.

'All People Have the Right to Stay': African Owners, Tenants and the Politics of Land Reform

Restitution, at the outset, was arguably the ideological and moral cornerstone of the land reform programme overall. The drafters of the new constitution saw land as central in defining the rights that had formerly been denied, and its restoration as a means to restore those rights and with them the sovereignty, nationhood and full citizenship of the African population. Seen against the broader backdrop of the reform process, however, restitution has an ambiguous status. It restores property to those whose original ownership of it assured them a better life, even after its confiscation (Murray 1992), and thus is alleged to having been driven less by a desire for social justice and equality than by an urge to re-establish the *status quo ante*. The narrow remit of restitution gives the lie to its symbolic potency: the communities whose decades-long struggle to get 'their land back' have particular interests not shared by those demanding land on other grounds.

It is primarily the claims of former African landowners—the 'citizens' who were turned into 'subjects' when their farms were classified as black spots and when they were forcibly removed into the communally-owned homelands—which have been fore-grounded by the policy of restitution. Given this, the privileging of former ownership looks set

to strengthen a longstanding social division in South African society by returning such properties to their former owners. Land purchase, as a strategy adopted by those who strove to better themselves despite the racially-based land alienation enshrined in the 1913 Land Act, underpinned the emergence of an African middle class. Such a group were the Pedi-speaking mission converts who pooled their resources to buy the farm Doornkop, near Middelburg in Mpumalanga (B on map). When the most successful members of this titleholder class abandoned full-time farming and moved to urban areas such as Soweto in the mid-20th century, their land came to serve primarily as a residential and livelihood base for Ndebele-speaking tenants, mostly people evicted from white-owned farms who then paid rent to African titleholders. It is these former tenants and their descendents, alongside a burgeoning population of landless people *newly*-evicted off white farms and thus more recently rendered 'landless', who now vociferously demand the right to access land.

It was almost a decade after Doornkop had been given back to its former owners in 1994 that several hundred tenant families moved onto the farm, building shacks there and even starting to cultivate crops and vegetables. In doing so, they claim to have merely filled a vacuum, given that so few of the farm's *bona fide* owners had left Soweto to return to their newly-restored farm. But this did not make the owners, absentee or otherwise, any happier about the invasion. The historical charter for their anti-tenant feeling was of long standing. Owners invoked the community's original constitution, drawn up by some of their forefathers in 1933, which states that no-one 'who is not a legal purchaser of the farm' or a descendant of one may 'dwell or settle' there. The apparent xenophobia in this injunction was linked to the sense of religious exclusivity which had led Doornkop's owners, like many similar mission/Christian communities, to buy their own land in the first place.

What made this sense of exclusivity more stark in the case of Doornkop was that it echoed an ethnic cleavage. The Ndebele tenants' forebears had lived as indentured workers on white farms under conditions of virtual slavery since the defeat of the Ndzundza Ndebele polity in the late 19th century (Delius 1989). As indenture ended or became transformed into labour tenancy, so the Ndebele had gradually moved off farms during the 1960s. Some resettled in the then Lebowa homeland while others elected to live on the African-owned Doornkop, on small plots let out to them—much to fellow-owners' intense anger—by one of the titleholders himself. Their tenure here proved to be transitory when



Figure 2: Relocation sites, restitution farms and redistribution farms near Middelburg, Mpumalanga.

in 1975, along with many other Ndebele, they were relocated to the KwaNdebele homeland.

Pedi owners were uneasily aware that their opposition to tenancy echoed the ethnic/racial exclusivities of South Africa's past. On one occasion well before the serious tenant invasion of 1999 began, several truckloads of Ndebele, having been refused permission to settle on the farm, accused the Doornkop community of 'practising apartheid'. It was also rumoured that the Mpumalanga housing director had refused to provide services to Doornkop until it abandoned its elitist stance as a *Volkstaat* (lit. 'people's state', an ironic reference to the separate homelands for Afrikaners once proposed by the far-right Conservative Party).

But despite these anxieties most titleholders remained steadfast in their opposition to accepting tenants. For them, restored citizenship did *not* go along with free access to land, but rather with private ownership:

> The Ndebele came here because South Africa got freedom and democracy, and this implies that they must also have access to a living place in case they need it… [But] Doornkop is a private land—a bought land—like any other land that has been bought by a farmer. You cannot just enter a farmer's place and say "it's a democracy". They have got this wrong. They are trespassing—this is private property… (M O Mohlala)

Not all owners agreed, however, since at least some of them were complicit or actively involved in letting out plots to these outsiders. In the respective condemnations and justifications of tenancy, the moral positions adopted have been closely linked to perceived material interests and have not always coincided with the owner/tenant division. Those members of the owning community who had fewest options for making a living outside the rural context were most ready to 'sell' or let plots, and their expressed views echoed those of tenants: that land should be available to all rather than being privately owned, and hence that the basis for owner exclusivity was invalid, since this went against the promises made at the 1994 election.

Lekwetše Ratau, for example, was one of a small number of owners who had been chided for letting land out to tenants, while Joseph Kunene, considered the major offender against the tenet of exclusively-owned property, had been assaulted and (unsuccessfully) charged for similar but much more pervasive practices. Indeed, he had 'sold' several hundred plots on the farm. When tenant Enoch Mabuza asserted that land be freely available to all:

> …we voted to stay anywhere in South Africa. They say that this place belongs to their forefathers. But how could someone chase you away, when you have voted in South Africa?

His words were echoed by Lekwetše Ratau, "All people have the right to stay—the law does not allow people to be treated like this… They just want a place to lay their heads". Similar sentiments were expressed by Joseph Kunene:

> People have been thrown off farms, they're suffering. As a black person I can't allow a fellow black to suffer, so I help them to come here. The national government doesn't believe in keeping people separate, so why should we keep them separate here?

Such statements stress the use of land for the common good and de-emphasise its 'private' or exclusionary aspects. Asked to elaborate on the kind of land ownership which they saw as legitimate, tenants and their landlords alike advocated a continuation of the model which had formerly operated during the apartheid era, in the communally-held homeland areas:

> We want land to be under government control and that is where we want to stay. If the place is under government, it can always assist us in times of need. If the place is my property, I will have to provide everything for myself, such as buying this and that. I don't want that. I want the government to tell me: "stay here, there is water, your house, your toilet".

This 'communal/trusteeship' model of ownership was that which had operated in the state-owned former homelands, parts of which had belonged to the South African Bantu Trust and hence were known simply as 'the Trust'. Although this model had been established only during the 1930s and 1940s (Murray 1992: 132 *passim*), it appears from tenants' comments to have become firmly entrenched as the 'customary African' practice by the time of writing.

In disputes about who had the greatest entitlement to live on the farm—its absentee owners or the squatters with their immediate material needs—ideas of morality merged with those of custom and culture. Measured against the promises made by the ANC during its election campaign, which they and their landlords readily invoked, squatters perceived it as unfair to allow one group of privileged people to own land of which they clearly had no need, while another group was being denied land despite being much better placed to use it.

It can be seen from this case how sectors of society beyond the official reach of restitution have latched onto the discourse linking the

restoration of land with citizenship. Many present-day farm workers and farm labour tenants, with no basis for 'restitution' in terms of formerly-owned property, are nonetheless demanding the right to settle on African-owned farms. Although restitution has reinforced an existing owner/tenant division, this is challenged in terms which invoke the rights of the citizen. Members of each constituency—the title-holding Pedi newly restored to ownership of their farm and the tenant Ndebele who have flocked to live there—variously draw on repertoires advocating, or contesting, forms of moral 'good', and envisioning contrasting views of citizenship. One highlights the restored ownership and exclusivity of private property while another foregrounds the equal rights of all.

The division between these (unwilling) African landlords and their tenants—the most recently dispossessed and arguably the most conspicuously 'landless' of South Africa's people—underpins a pervasive, society-wide division. This is the rift between the African middle class and the African poor, which has endured in one form or another through the apartheid era and now looks set to be further entrenched. Analyses of post-apartheid South Africa show how the ideological nation-building project has attempted to overshadow such divisions and to downplay 'the socio-economic fault-lines in… society'. They show how the ANC's need to garner political support from the African poor becomes ever greater as social differentiation increases exponentially (Adam et al. 1998; Marais 2001). There is thus an ongoing political imperative for the ANC to straddle this social rift in order to constitute a single nation.

Delivering on the promises of land reform was initially seen as one way of accomplishing this. But the delivery has been slow and has privileged particular sectors while neglecting others. Given these delays and inequities, other nation-building tactics have been substituted. In particular contexts such as that of Doornkop, state officials have responded to owner/tenant ethnic conflicts by trying to appease the latter, facilitating their visions of citizenship by pandering to ethnically-defined regional majorities of the landless. The ANC, having promised equal rights at the election, has been 'reshaped' as the party of the poor and landless by new wave tenants holding the party to its promises, while the ANC-supporting title-holders whose land rights were restored to them, and who thus embody the inequalities inherent in private property ownership, have been redefined in the popular imagination as supporters of the opposition predominantly white Democratic Alliance (DA) party. Local perceptions of party and state, constructed in

the course of owner/tenant conflicts on African-owned land, represent a kind of 'manufacturing of consent' and a reshaping of citizenship by the landless (see James, Nkadimeng and Ngonini 2005).

As a longer-term solution, however, state officials ultimately rely on the 'redistribution' wing of the land reform programme to solve such conflicts over land and citizenship. In the case of Doornkop's squatters, it has been proposed to settle them on a nearby farm purchased for the purpose, which is to be managed by the committee of the newly-formed 'Siyathuthuka Trust' (I on map). New, highly technical and intricately planned models of ownership and managerial competence emphasise that the onus is on land reform's 'beneficiaries', once they have become the proprietors of jointly-owned farms, to take responsibility for their own economic well being (James 2006). But intended beneficiaries contest this vision. Using evocative claims like 'the earth is for all', they reject private ownership, harking back instead to models of landholding established before 1994 in which access to land was guaranteed by other, more powerful, patrons or intermediaries.

Land and Citizenship: Chiefs, Brokers and Intermediaries

Writings on other African settings suggest that it is the authoritativeness of the actor rather than the formal recognition of rights which makes for effective claims on land (Berry 1993, 2002; Lund 2002; Moore 1998: 33; but see Peters 2002). Although discourses of modern citizenship highlight the existence of market-based means for acquiring rights in property and other forms of social good—and emphasise that such rights are necessary for a citizen's ability to assume a stance independent of the state (Lomnitz 1999)—many rural landless people in South Africa see their participation in national life as necessarily mediated through affiliation to old- or new-style leaders, based on their superior capacity to access land.

Chiefs were central in apartheid's system of land-holding. Often government-appointed stooges rather than heirs in a customary line of succession, their powers derived from the custodianship of state-owned land. State policy in the new South Africa looks set, ironically, to entrench the power of these linchpins of the old order. At the same time it has unintentionally encouraged the emergence of new kinds of patrons and intermediaries.

Disputes centre on the conflict between 'traditional' and 'modern' forms of authority. There is a strong perception that "the backbone of

traditional leaders is communal land and if municipalities are introduced… that would be the end of the birthright of the… chiefs" (Hart 2002: 277–8). The new system of democratic local government, from which chiefs expressed anxiety about being excluded, allowed space for an uneasy co-existence between modern and traditional forms of power. With some ANC endorsement through the much-redrafted Communal Land Rights Bill, but also occurring independently of such institutionalised support, there is evidence of a nationwide revival of interest in, and commitment to, chiefship (Oomen 2000a, 200b; Fokwang nd.). Indeed, it is partly the relative weakness of former organs of people's power such as the civics, and perceived chaos and ineffectiveness of local government structures, that have led many people in Mpumalanga to perceive chiefs—by default—as guardians of the people's rights, and as suitable leaders of the new communities which have started to cluster around both the restitutive and redistributive aspects of land reform. One land claimant told me "I would rather be ruled by one lion than by a thousand rats". As in other parts of Africa, people were here turning to traditional authority even though this may formerly have been opposed, in the face of government failure to secure reliable land access (Andersson 1999; Hammar 2002; West 1998).

Directly after the election in 1994, officers in the Department of Land Affairs had been fiercely opposed to the involvement of chiefs and other 'big men' in the restitution process. This stance was countered by chiefs' fierce conviction that they ought to be in the vanguard of reclaiming, and that it was under their leadership that 'royal land' should be reclaimed and ploughed. But protagonists in this debate overlooked how land provides grounds for the inevitable growth of new forms of paternalism even if older ones are prevented from flourishing (see Wotshela 2001).

Despite the sidelining of chiefs, then, memories of earlier lives lived on the land did not lead to a broadly-distributed sense of entitlement, based on historical rights, to restored lands. Instead, such memories have served to establish, or widen, a rift between the state, which promises restored lands, and the people, for whose benefit they are being restored. Into this gap powerful intermediaries have inserted themselves as authoritative distributors. These men give access to land, but it is for a price.

In restitution-claiming communities, many of these leaders, in the absence of chiefs, have exploited claimants' and commissioners' difficulties in proving lineal descent by charging people a joining fee to be 'put on

the list' of land claimants. The fees escalate proportionately as a claim becomes more likely to be settled. This practice, tantamount to 'selling' land which the seller himself does not own, was widespread in urban squatter settlements even before the land reform programme began, but has since extended from urban into rural settings.

The enormous Ten Bosch land claim in the Lowveld between Nelspruit and the Mozambique border (see map), which encompasses 20,000 hectares and will cost the state an estimated R3.5 billion, provides an example. From early on, say committee members, they were instructed by the Mpumalanga Land Claims Commissioner not to lodge claims as separate chiefdoms under the four chiefs whose ancestors, with their followers, had originally been forcibly relocated in 1954. Instead, she advised each chief's constituents to elect four representatives onto a single, consolidated, Ten Bosch Committee, implying that no further progress would be made with the claim until such forms of representation had been arranged.

The consolidated claim, thus bringing together the followers of four chiefs, was judged by the consultant investigating it to include around 9,000 claimants. But the number of claimants has now, bizarrely, increased. Restitution officers discovered that places on the list of registered claimants were being 'sold', at prices which started at a modest R25 but escalated to R500 as the settlement of the claim became imminent. Most of those now coming forward as claimants are businessmen, eager to stake a claim in whatever material prosperity the claim might promise. And those committee members selling places on the list—themselves members of the chiefly clan—are alleged to have enjoyed a rise in fortunes as a result of registering claimants for money. Restitution officers, meanwhile, express their anxiety that "the poorest people, who really should get the land, may not even be on this list of people. They probably aren't, as they'd not have been able to pay".

In this case, the exclusion of chiefs and the establishment of an elected committee to represent all claimants, although driven by the Restitution Commissioner's wish to encourage representative democratic practice, have simply bolstered the influence of alternative leaders. These leaders' declaration that they have complied with the Commissioner's original request by sidelining chiefs from the claim, and that power will instead be assumed by the mayor of the newly-designated Mbombela Municipality, seems less than reassuring. The mayor is one of the members of a new political elite whose members have bolstered their ethnic power by drawing on the restitution process to glorify the

past of the chiefly clans to which they belong. Part of the economic and political sway of this new elite lies in its capacity to promise land in return for payment: a transaction which overrides, or adds a bizarre reinterpretation to, historical entitlement.

In this as in many other matters, restitution officers have learned from experience, incorporating lessons from earlier mistakes into future strategies. As a former officer explained, those working in the Commission, newly aware of the dangers of allowing local committees to register claimants, have subsequently taken steps to exclude this possibility:

> we would like to have as few people with a stake in the success of the claim as possible.… I, and others in the Commission, recognize the huge problem posed by such people, but feel that there is nothing we can do. We cannot report it to the police, since it would be impossible to get evidence (Kwape Mmela).

He added that they had become equally wary of allowing local politicians—such as ANC councillors—to have anything to do with claiming: any such intermediary tries 'to own the process'.

In the case of the Ten Bosch claim, the sidelining of chiefs thus seems merely to have opened the way for more powerful operators, with a broader constituency and hence a more modernising ethnic power base, to enter the field.

Whether or not driven by starkly economic motives, as those in the official land sector assume it is, this practice is often justified—or opposed—on moral grounds. As in the case of the newly-restored titleholder, Joseph Kunene, who had 'sold' plots on the restored farm of Doornkop although its other owners regarded such sales as illicit, land-selling is fiercely disputed. Those who benefit from such sales justify the practice by claiming to act out of charitable motives, pointing to the putative 'landlessness' of the 'buyer'/tenants; those opposing it refer to the sanctity of private property, condemning the sellers' ulterior motives which they represent as manifestations of greed or of a wish to build up personal followings and to act 'like a chief'.

The selling of land in such a context, although doubtless largely driven by opportunism and greed, must be analysed in terms of its social effects and how these are related to chiefly control and authority. Comparing the land sellers in the Ten Bosch claim with Doornkop's Joseph Kunene, it is clear that both make use of a traditionalist idiom. In the former case a modernising, but strongly ethnicised, vision of patrimonial authority was drawn upon. The exclusion of chiefs, in this

case, would also be likely to exclude their poorest subjects from 'the list', since they would be unable to pay for a place on it: at the same time the escalating price of registration would increasingly favour a moneyed and business-oriented elite which nonetheless endorsed its position through the terms provided by a neo-ethnic discourse. Using the language of restored rights which the restitution process had fostered, these people represented themselves as returning to the lands which were rightfully theirs.

In contrast, a relatively poor and socially disconnected person like Joseph Kunene was operating at a local level and seemingly unmindful of any government directives. He drew on the idiom of chiefship through his alliance with Doornkop's exiled chiefly family, which had been discredited within the Pedi titleholder group because of its compliance with the original forced removal but was attempting to rebuild its following among the landless Ndebele. Charging amounts which similarly escalated over time with the soaring demand for land, he could be easily seen as an exploiter of the rural poor and dispossessed. He maintained, however, that he was a protector of the Ndebele underclass, a procurer of the land rights from which they would otherwise have been excluded on this restitution farm, and a guardian of the non-racial and non-ethnic character of the 'new South Africa'.

These stories of brokerage are underlain by a contrast. On the one hand is the world of modernity, favouring business and enterprise, consolidating the position of an African middle class, and promising further increases in wealth to those already relatively well-placed to procure it. This was a social world whose privilege the restitution programme, mediated by wily brokers, looked bound to buttress. On the other is an emphasis on the need, through welfare provision, to protect the poor and vulnerable who are often excluded from the effects which the restoring of land rights—albeit motivated by the best of intentions—might have. Both find some justification in discourses of tradition. A broker and land-seller like Joseph Kunene straddles the two: he was selling off assets which belong to the former with the effect of incorporating the latter into the ambit of restored rights. But, in the manner of all brokers, however philanthropic, he was taking his cut: creaming off a bit along the way. This reveals a fundamental contradiction in South Africa's attempted project of social reconstruction. Even in situations where the state endeavours to provide basic rights for all, it often remains the case that these can only be accessed by going through an intermediary, who will make something for himself in the process.

Brokerage underpinned by shared origins may sound relatively benign, even if it does militate against the realisation of independent and unmediated land rights. It might be thought inevitable that people will turn to personal relationships with patrons if other, less personalised means of gaining access to land are unavailable. But there are dangers when such patronage is linked directly to political power, as it has been in the case of Zimbabwe. Mugabe's use of land as a reward for his political followers has been a sinister reminder of the devious political uses to which land can be put. As a tactic, it has been effective. Populist rallying cries, when accompanied by the distribution of resources which cannot be gained through other channels, are likely to be heard. But such a tactic is also dangerous, because those responding to such cries do not take account of the longer-term economic effects for their own and for their country's future. South Africa's leaders have insisted that, in contrast to their Zimbabwean counterparts, they will follow the legal route to land reform. It is when delays in delivering promises are indefinitely delayed that people may opt, instead, for the full-blown patronage option.

Conclusion

If we re-examine the relationship between land and citizenship in the light of these case studies, some paradoxes are evident. There is certainly a line of thought in post-apartheid South Africa, as Lomnitz asserts for Mexico (1999), that only if people hold property independently of the state can they enjoy the status of the modern citizen, thus escaping from the dependence of the traditionalist 'subject'. Disputes between those viewing private property rights as the foundation of society's economic and civil order and those advocating their restriction in order to secure property for the 'public good' are common in many settings: they replay a debate in Western thought of several centuries' standing (Hann 1998: 13). Pursuing the latter line of thought, Hann argues, following Bloch and Parry (1989), that all societies manifest a range of property types, from alienable to inalienable, but that if land becomes alienated and rendered unusable by large swathes of the populace, fears may be expressed about the future of its public—and hence morally accountable—use (Hann 1998: 33).

The counterpoint to modernist ideas of citizenship and private property has been an attempt within certain sectors to mobilise tradition

and to delineate the essence of the 'traditional land tenure system': a ploy often used by land occupiers to defend themselves from the encroachments of state planners (Hann 1998: 32). In South Africa before 1994, there was an ongoing battle between state and society over the terrain of tradition: this battle now continues but assumes new guises. People hark back to an idealised 'traditional' system in which the poor gained land access from power-holders—chiefs who themselves owed their position to the state, or white farmers engaging the services of labour tenants in exchange for rights to grazing and cultivation. In the new South Africa, given the increasingly sharp inequities of land ownership and the unlikelihood that these will be effectively redressed through mechanisms of redistributive justice, 'tradition' in its new guise involves brokers standing between the state and the landless. It is they who appear to be able to give access to land and hence provide the basis for citizenship, albeit only of a 'second class' kind.

Bibliography

Adam, H. van Zyl Slabbert, F., and K. Moodley. 1998. *Comrades in Business: Post-liberation politics in South Africa.* Utrecht, International Books.

Andersson J. 1999. The Politics of Land Scarcity: Land Disputes in Save Communal Area, Zimbabwe. *Journal of Southern African Studies.* 25: 4, pp. 553–578.

Ashforth, A. 1990. *The Politics of Official Discourse in South Africa.* Oxford, Clarendon Press.

Berry, S. 1993. *No Condition is Permanent: The Social Dynamics of Agrarian Change in Sub-Saharan Africa.* Madison, University of Wisconsin Press.

———. 2002. Debating the Land Question in Africa. *Comparative Studies in Society and History.* 44:4, pp. 638–668.

Bloch, M. and J. Parry. (Eds) 1989. *Money and the Morality of Exchange.* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Bozzoli, B. 2004. *Theatres of Struggle and the End of Apartheid*. Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press.

Comaroff, J. and J.L. Comaroff. 2000. Millennial Capitalism: First Thoughts on a Second Coming. *Public Culture.* 12: 2, pp. 291–343.

Cousins, B. 2000. Introduction: Does Land Reform have a Future and, if so, who will Benefit? In B. Cousins. (Ed.) *At the Crossroads: Land and Agrarian Reform in South Africa into the 21st Century.* Cape Town and Johannesburg, University of the Western Cape and National Land Committee.

Delius, P. 1989. The Ndzundza Ndebele: Indenture and the Making of Ndebele Identity. In Bonner, P., Hofmeyr, I., James, D. and T. Lodge. (Eds) *Holding their Ground: Class, Locality and Culture in 19th and 20th Century South Africa,* Johannesburg, Ravan Press, pp. 227–258.

———. 1996. *A Lion amongst the Cattle*. Johannesburg, Ravan Press.

Enslin, P. 2000. Defining a Civic Agenda: Citizenship and Gender Equality in Post-Apartheid Education. In Arnot, M. and J. Dillabough. (Eds) *Challenging Democracy: International Perspectives on Gender, Education and Citizenship*. London, Routledge, pp. 297–311.

Fokwang, J. nd. Chiefs And Democratic Transition In Tshivhase, mimeo, University of Pretoria.
Geschiere, P. and F. Nyamnjoh 2000. Capitalism and Autochthony: The Seesaw of Mobility and Belonging. *Public Culture.* 12: 2, pp. 423–52.
Hall, R. and G. Williams 2003. Land Reform in South Africa: Problems and Prospects. In Baregu, M. and C. Landsberg. (Eds) *From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa's Evolving Security Architecture.* Boulder, CO., Lynne Rienner, pp. 97–130.
Hammar, A. 2002. The Articulation of Modes of Belonging: Competing Land Claims in Zimbabwe's Northwest. In Lund, C. and K. Juul. (Eds) *Negotiating Property in Africa.* London, Heinemann, pp. 211–246.
Hann, C. 1998. *Property Relations: Renewing the Anthropological Tradition.* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Hart, G. 2002. *Disabling Globalisation: Places of Power in Post-Apartheid South Africa.* Berkeley and Pietermaritzburg, University of California Press and University of Natal Press.
James, D.A.X. Ngonini & G. Nkadimeng. 2005. (Re)constituting Class?: Owners, Tenants and the Politics of Land Reform in South Africa *Journal of Southern African Studies.* 31: 4, pp. 825–844.
James, D. 2006. The Tragedy of the Private: Owners, Communities and the State in South Africa. In von Benda Beckmann, F., von Benda Beckmann, B., and M. Wiber. (Eds) *Changing Properties of Property.* Oxford, Berghahn, pp. 243–268.
Joseph, S. 2000. Gendering Citizenship in the Middle East. In S. Joseph. (Ed.) *Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East.* Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. pp. 3–30.
Kymlicka, W. and W. Norman. 1994. Return of the Citizen: Recent Work on Citizenship Theory. *Ethics.* 104: 2, pp. 352–381.
Lahiff, E. 2001. Land Reform in South Africa: Is it Meeting the Challenge? PLAAS Policy Brief 1.
Lomnitz, C. 1999. Modes of Citizenship in Mexico *Public Culture.* 11: 1, pp. 269–93.
Longva, A.N. 2000. Citizenship in the Gulf States. In Butenschon, N., Davis, U., and M. Hassassian (Eds) *Citizenship and the State in Middle East.* Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, pp. 179 –197.
Lund, C. 2002. Negotiating Property Institutions: On the Symbiosis of Property and Authority in Africa in Lund, C. and K. Juul. (Eds) *Negotiating Property in Africa.* London, Heinemann, pp. 11–44.
Mamdani, M. 1996. *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism.* Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Marais, H. 2001. *South Africa: Limits to Change: the Political Economy of Transition.* (second edition) London and Cape Town, Zed Press and University of Cape Town Press.
Moore, S.F. 1998. Changing African Land Tenure: Reflections on the Incapacities of the State. *European Journal of Development Research.* 10: 2, pp. 33–49.
Murray, C. 1992. *Black Mountain: Land, Class and Power in the Eastern Orange Free State 1880s–1980s.* Johannesburg, Witwatersrand University Press.
Ong, A. 1996. Cultural Citizenship as Subject-Making: Immigrants Negotiate Racial and Cultural Boundaries in the United States. *Current Anthropology,* 37: 5. pp. 737–62.
Oomen, B. 2000a. *Tradition on the Move: Chiefs, Democracy and Change in Rural South Africa, NIZA-Cahier* no. 6. Netherlands Institute for Southern Africa, Amsterdam
———. 2000b. We Must Now Go Back To Our History: Retraditionalization in a Northern Province Chieftaincy. *African Studies*, 59: 1. pp. 71–95.
Peters, P. 2002. The Limits of Negotiability: Security, Equity and Class Formation in Africa's Land Systems. In Lund, C. and K. Juul. (Eds) *Negotiating Property in Africa*, London, Heinemann, pp. 45–66.
Ramutsindela, M.F. 1998. Compromises and Consequences: An Analysis of South Africa's Land Reform Programme. *The Arab World Geographer.* 1: 2, pp. 155–169.
Seekings, J. 2000. *The UDF: A History of the United Democratic Front in South Africa, 1983–1991.* Cape Town, David Philip.

Trouillot, M. 2001. The Anthropology of the State in the age of Globalisation. *Current Anthropology.* 42: 1, pp. 125–138.
Verdery, K. 1998. Transnationalism, Nationalism, Citizenship, and Property: Eastern Europe Since 1989. *American Ethnologist.* 25: 2, pp. 291–306.
Van Kessel, I. 2000.*"Beyond our Wildest Dreams": The UDF and the Transformation in South Africa* Charlottesville, University of Virginia.
West, H. 1998. 'This Neighbor is Not My Uncle!': Changing Relations of Power and Authority on the Mueda Plateau. *Journal of Southern African Studies.* 24: 1, pp. 141–160.
Wotshela, L. 2001. Homeland Consolidation, Resettlement and Local Politics in the Border and Ciskei region of the Eastern Cape, South Africa 1960–1996. DPhil, Oxford University.

PART FOUR

NATIONS BUILDING BOUNDARIES

LANGUAGE AND CITIZENSHIP IN ANGLOPHONE CAMEROON

Nico Fru Awasom

The modern Cameroonian nation-state is an interesting case-study of a nation forged with conflicting and contradictory identities. It displays a multiple identity morphology reflected by over 250 linguistically identifiable ethnic groups (Tadadjeu 1990: 5; Fonlon 1976: 196). Historically, "inter-ethnic cleavages in Cameroon have presented a formidable array of social, political and economic tensions" (Le Vine 1976: 272). The most notable and politically fissiparous ones were those between the Fulani Jihadists and their Southern neigbours,[1] those between the various elements of the ethically related grassfield (savannah) Bamileke—Tikar—Bamoun—Bangwa configuration of groups; and those between the coastal peoples and the aggressive, land–grabbing and dynamic hinterland immigrant groups. In addition to this fragmentary ethnic picture of the Cameroonian society,[2] can be added such crosscutting cleavages of religion (Muslim versus traditional religionist; Christian versus traditional religionists and so forth); economic modes (pastoral versus agricultural); and different levels of economic development (considerable primary and secondary industry in the south versus little in the north). The ethnic conflicts and cleavages that rock Cameroon are compounded by an ever-widening Anglophone—Francophone identification syndrome that is directly attributable to the legacies of colonialism and is visibly the nation's Achilles' heel and fault line.

Like Canada, Cameroon shares a heritage of an English and French colonial past, and English and French have come to be its official languages. While Canada with a population of 32 million has a 20 per cent French-speaking population, Cameroon with a population of 14 million

[1] A Muslim cleric, Usman dan Fodio stared a jihad in 1804 in Sokoto in North Nigeria with the aim of purifying and expanding Islam. After reaching and encompassing Northern Cameroon circa 1809, jihadists systematically harassed the Southern populations of Cameroon throughout the 19th century until the advent of colonialism (Njeuma 1974, Awasom 1985).

[2] The title of Johnson's book (1970) captures the fragmentary nature of the Cameroonian society.

has a 25 per cent Anglophone minority. But to the overwhelming number of Canadians, English and French are native and are held dearly as their cultural heritage. This is not the same as the Cameroonian situation where English and French are alien languages and are superimposed on a mosaic of over 250 African languages and dialects (Kom 1995: 146; Fonlon 1976). Nonetheless, these English and French foreign languages have the capacity for generating conflicts and this has been the Cameroonian experience since independence.

A large body of literature has treated postcolonial Anglophone-Francophone conflicts in detail (Kamto 1995; Chiabi 1997; Kom 1996; Nkoum-Me-Ntseny 1996; Chem-Langhee 1997; Konings and Nyamnjoh 1997; Jua 1999) but it tends to blur our understanding of the dynamics because it fails to underscore counter-currents emanating from historically-rooted bonds that hold the two peoples together. This paper attempts to rectify this picture by presenting a more balanced and critical survey of Anglophone-Francophone relations since the late 1950s. On the one hand it shows how 'primordial' identities were used as an argument for the reunification of the British and French Cameroons in 1961 to form the federal Republic of Cameroon. The initial enthusiasm for union soon turned sour when being an Anglophone and a minority in the Francophone-dominated state was qualification for exclusion and marginalisation. The Anglophone-ness and Francophone-ness of Cameroonians carried special tags of access to, or disqualification from, scarce state resources. This feeling of unfair treatment on modern linguistic and cultural grounds resulted in the rise of Anglophone secessionist tendencies from the 1990s. Nonetheless, the emotive bonds that brought about the Anglophone-Francophone union were often invoked to keep the Cameroon polity together, particularly after the reintroduction of multipartyism. In such a situation the African-ness of Cameroonians is invoked and is paramount. But outside periodic moments of cooperation, the minority Anglophone and majority Francophone cultures, which are a colonial legacy, served as instruments of identifying first and second class citizens with corresponding the rights and privileges. Cameroonians therefore swing between notionally 'primordial' and 'modern' identities depending on the circumstances, which has had the result of generating national cohesion while at the same time exposing the possible fault line along which an eruption can occur.

Historical Background: Colonial Legacy, Ethnic Continuum and Collaboration

Modern Cameroon, like other African countries, is a European creation. Cameroon became a German protectorate in 1884 during the scramble for Africa. During World War One in Africa, German Cameroon was conquered by the Allies and divided disproportionately into the British (western) and French (eastern) spheres. Britain acquired just one fifth of German Cameroon, composed of two discontinuous strips of territory along the eastern border with Nigeria, with a total area of 88,036 square kilometres, while France received the remaining four-fifths with a land area of 431,845 square kilometres (Mbuagbaw 1987: 78–79; Ngoh 1996: 126). This unequal partition of German Cameroon between the British and French ultimately gave rise to an Anglophone minority and a Francophone majority in the new Cameroon nation-state that emerged after reunification in 1961.

During the period of separate administration under Britain and France, the two Cameroons enjoyed an international status, first as mandated territories of the League of Nations and later as trust territories of the United Nations (Gardinier 1963; Wright 1930). The Anglo-French colonial boundary, like all colonial boundaries in Africa, was artificial at every point (Asiwaju 1978; 1984b; Atem 1984). The boundary separated ethnic groups, families and farmlands, and attempts by the British and French colonial authorities to erect and impose customs restrictions between the African peoples were resented (Chem-Langhee & Njeuma 1980: 26–30).

The ethnic groups in Cameroon that were separated by the Anglo-French colonial boundary are those clustered in the south-western quadrant in which is situated the Anglophone North West and South West Provinces, and the Francophone West and Littoral Provinces. The majority of Cameroon's 250 ethnic groups are clustered in this south-western quadrant which is geographically located along the Cameroon mountain and plateau chain, and is historically an ethnic shatter zone dividing the Niger and Congo river basins (Courade 1971; Le Vine 1976: 272; Ardener 1996).

These ethnically related Anglophones and Francophones are those Cameroonians who under in some contexts are mobilised by, or act on historically-rooted loyalties. In others, they are mobilised along French-English linguistic lines. Ruth Teer-Tomaselli (1997: x) notes that "those different ways in which at different historical moments" people address others and the recognition this implies revolves around the

identity question: "That is the moment of identity and identification". Put differently, at one point these peoples invoke their African-ness rooted in notional 'primordial' ties. At other moments they are pure Anglophones or Francophones.

The propinquity of Cameroonians of the south-western quadrant comprising Anglophones and Francophones was underpinned by the keen interest they took in the reunification struggle in the post World War Two era (Amazee 1994; Awasom 2000) in contrast to the other Franco-phones of the Centre-South, East and Grand North Provinces who are not linked to the Anglophones. The Francophone Littoral and West Province (neighbours to the Anglophones) were the stronghold of the leftist *Union de Populations du Cameroun* (UPC) party, formed in 1948 on the platform of immediate independence and reunification of the British and French Cameroons. When the French disbanded the UPC in 1955, the party moved to the British Cameroons from where it continued to operate until it was compelled to move elsewhere (Mbembe 1985, 1986; Joseph 1977).[3] During their sojourn in the British Cameroons, the Francophone politicians behaved as if the Anglo-French international boundary was irrelevant and the two Cameroons were a single country.[4]

Shortly before and after the independence of the French Cameroons in 1960, the UPC nationalists, who were engaged in an armed struggle against the pro-French Ahmadou Ahidjo regime, easily used the territory of their kith and kin in the British Cameroons as a safe haven. Re-unificationist forces, championed by John Ngu Foncha's Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP) were equally strong in the British Cameroons partly because of shared historical and ethnic ties with their Francophone neighbour. The British were opposed to the reunification of the two Cameroons[5] (Chem-Langhee 1997; Awasom 2000) because they had all along prepared that territory for integration with its Nigerian colony. Foncha therefore had to rely heavily and almost exclusively

[3] In 1957, the UPC was banned in the Southern Cameroons and the leadership of the party moved to Cairo and later to Guinea-Conakry and Ghana.

[4] For a similar attitude of the behaviour of ethnic groups split by the colonial divide see Asiwaju 1984a. The Gambian, Edward Small, exiled himself to French Senegal in the 1920s where he was agitating in terms of Senegambia as if it was a single territory (see for instance Johnson 2002).

[5] The British government threatened to withhold the 'Golden key' to the Bank of England if British Cameroons failed to join the Federation of Nigeria with which the British Cameroon was jointly administered (Tata 1990: 134–136).

on the financial and logistic support of Francophone southern politicians and to a lesser extent Francophone émigrés resident in the British Cameroons.[6] In essence, the Cameroonians in the south-western quadrant were the foremost challengers of the Anglo-French status quo, and they co-operated with each other to obliterate the obnoxious colonial divide through the reunification dream.

Foncha's victory in the United Nations-organised February 1961 plebiscites in which the British Southern Cameroons[7] voted to reunify with La République du Cameroun was clearly the fruits of political co-operation between the ethnically related peoples of the south-western quadrant across the Anglo-French colonial boundary. It is precisely for this reason that Ahidjo became scared of reunification, which brought together Anglophones and southern Francophones. Ahidjo saw in the reunification of the two Cameroons the increase in the political constituency of his southern political enemies. The British Southern Cameroonians who had opted to join La République du Cameroun were a simple ethnic extension of the rebellious peoples of southern Francophone Cameroon who were Ahidjo's die-hard opponents.

Foncha had won the plebiscite by a huge margin with 233,571 votes for La République du Cameroun against only 97,741 for Nigeria (Le Vine 1961). Consequently, Foncha emerged as a political force and was being wooed publicly and privately by "both the Ahidjo government and opposition groups in and out of the National Assembly of Francophone Cameroun" (Le Vine 1961). Foncha started holding talks with his southern allies in Francophone Cameroon comprising opposition figures such as Prince Douala Manga Bell, Dr. Bebey Eyidi, Daniel Kemajou, Soppo Prisso and UPC leaders inside Francophone Cameroun and on exile. These talks caused panic within the Ahidjo government circle as it was suspected that some sort of south-south coalition of the people of the southwestern quadrant, comprising the Anglophones and Ahidjo's southern Francophone political enemies, was in the offing (Le Vine 1961).

---

[6] Interview with Foncha at his Nkwen residence December 1997. Bamileke business interests, and Soppo Prisso, supported the weight of the reunification campaign

[7] The British Northern Cameroon, like Ahidjo's native Northern Cameroon region, had fallen sway to Usman dan Fodio's 19th century jihad (Njeuma 1978) and both neighbouring regions were religiously and ethnically intertwined with British northern Nigeria. The presence of the agents of the Sardauna of Sokoto, the great Muslim spiritual leader, determined the pro-Nigerian outcome of the plebiscite votes in the area.

The new coalition that was taking shape was a direct consequence of reunification and was a potential explosion that could unseat the Ahidjo regime in any future elections in a united Cameroon. This possibility haunted Ahidjo and his colleagues, and it is against this background that Ahidjo was upset by the loss of the British Northern Cameroons region. This region was of the same ethnic and religious extraction as Ahidjo's native Northern Cameroon region and it was lost to Nigeria in the UN organised plebiscite. Without his own kith and kin of the British Northern Cameroons to bolster his position, Ahidjo had to rely on other survival techniques based on the institutionalisation of an authoritarian system of governance, which need not delay us here (see for example Bayart 1978: 82–90; 1985; 1973: 125–144). Suffice it to state that when the bilingual Cameroon Federation took off on 1 October 1961, Ahidjo persuaded Foncha that they should restrict the activities of their political parties to their respective territories.

Under the Ahidjo-Foncha entente, Ahidjo's *Union Camerounaise* (UC) party had to operate exclusively in Francophone East Cameroon while Foncha's KNDP had to restrict its own activities exclusively within Anglophone West Cameroon (Bayart 1978: 84). The threat of an enlarged KNDP comprising Anglophones and Francophones of the south-western quadrant was therefore averted. Throughout Ahidjo's tenure (1961–1982), he succeeded in containing 'primordial' ethnic affiliations between Cameroonians of the south-western quadrant from snowballing into a political force that could challenge him. Biya was unable to prevent this realignment in the 1990s.

The Reintroduction of Multipartyism in the 1990s and the Politics of Primordial Linkages

The reintroduction of multipartyism in the 1990s witnessed, among other things, the resurgence of appeals to 'primordial' identities and the rise of the Anglophone secessionist movement. John Fru Ndi, an Anglophone resident in the Northwest provincial headquarters of Bamenda obstinately launched a political party, the Social Democratic Front (SDF) on 26 May 1990 at a time when the government was not ready to concede to political pluralism. His support base cut across the Anglophone-Francophone divide and comprised essentially people of the south-western quadrant who had fought for reunification. These peoples found common cause in their exclusion from the presidency

of Cameroon since independence despite the fact that they were the architects of the reunification of Cameroon. When Ahidjo, a northern Fulani Muslim stepped down from the presidency in 1982, he handed over power to Paul Biya, a Beti from south-eastern Cameroon. This was a repeat of the same pattern followed when Andre-Marie Mbida, Francophone Cameroon's first Premier and of the south-eastern Beti ethnic extraction, fell from power in 1957. Mbida, a south-eastern Beti, was succeeded by Ahidjo. Political leadership in Cameroon has therefore swung exclusively from the south-eastern Beti to the northern Fulani and back to the southern-eastern Beti axis. Anglophones and Francophones of the south-western quadrant were therefore united to break this monopoly of and exclusion from, the presidency.

John Fru Ndi's SDF gradually spread nation-wide but was more widely accepted by the peoples of the south-western quadrant scattered all over Cameroon than others outside this ethnic and geographical bracket. They quickly distinguished themselves as the chief opponents of President Paul Biya, the heir of their 'traditional enemy', Ahmadou Ahidjo, by organising a series of politically motivated demonstrations and strikes under the Ghost Town campaigns in the early 1990s (see for example Awasom 1998; Monga 1993) with the aim of compelling Biya to convene a sovereign national conference *á la béninoise*.[8]

During the multiparty elections organised in Cameroon since the advent of multipartism in 1990, the Anglophones and Francophones of the south-western quadrant manifested a large degree of political solidarity as the bulk of their votes went to the SDF. Before the elections the desire for change was high, given the economic malaise the country was undergoing.[9] John Fru Ndi was the popular favourite and the SDF propaganda machine created allies beyond the south-western quadrant among other Francophones especially migrants from Bamileke country and the littoral. Paul Biya obtained 39.9 per cent of the votes while

[8] The Benin rite of passage from one-party rule to democracy that Cameroonians were advocating is as follows: In Benin Republic social and economic unrest resulting from the insolvency of the treasury compelled President Mathieu Kerekou to convene a national conference in February 1990 of 488 delegates who soon declared themselves sovereign. The conference stripped Kerekou of all his powers, suspended the constitution, dissolved the National Assembly, created the post of Prime Minister, drafted a new constitution which allowed presidential term limits and multi-party elections (Fomunyoh 2001: 37–50).

[9] In 1987 an unprecedented economic crisis set in. In 1993 and 1994 civil servants witnessed double salary cuts of over 70 per cent in addition to a 50 per cent devaluation of the Cameroon Franc (CFA).

John Fru Ndi scored 35.9 per cent with the bulk of his votes coming from the Anglophone North West and South West provinces and the Francophone West and Littoral Provinces (Sindjoun 1994, 1996, Awasom 1998).[10] This esprit de corps prevailing amongst these peoples over political matters was so strong that the Beti para-military groups and ethnically biased newspapers nicknamed them the Anglo-Bamilekes.[11] Subsequent elections in the 1990s saw the SDF pulling the bulk of its votes from the Anglophones and Francophones of the south-western quadrant. The other side of Anglophone-Francophone relations is the language question.

Post-colonial 'Frenchification' of Cameroon and the Growth of the 'Let my People go Movement'

Reunification witnessed the gradual but intensive 'frenchification' of the Anglophone federated state of West Cameroon and this created shock and disillusionment[12] but this was absorbed and disguised by the existence and dynamism of the West Cameroon government in Buea composed of an executive and a bicameral legislature (the West Cameroon House of Assembly and House of Chiefs).[13] There was therefore a semblance of the exercise of power by the Anglophones in their state and at the federal level. At least there was a visible Anglophone government in Buea that was functioning and Anglophones could therefore claim a degree of political autonomy.

---

[10] Similarly the bulk of the local Government Areas and parliamentary seats won by the SDF in 1996 and 1997 elections respectively were obtained within the south-western quadrant (Sindjourn 1994; Awasom 1998).

[11] During the Ghost Town campaigns of the early '90s spearheaded by the SDF, pro-Beti newspapers particularly *Le Patriote* and *Le Temoigne* were overtly hostile to the 'Anglo-Bamis' whom they saw as the principal threat to the political survival of their kinsman, President Biya. A track circulating titled 'Operation Delta' threatened the 'Anglo-Bamis' with death if they did not evacuate Yaounde and Beti land.

[12] This was reflected in the writings of the learned Dr. Bernard Fonlon (see for instance Fonlon 1976), and the pronouncements of Anglophone statesmen, especially Prime Minister A.N. Jua (see parliamentary debates, particularly *West Cameroon House of Assembly Debates* 1965).

[13] The dynamism of the government of the Federated State of West Cameroon was translated by the formation of eleven cabinets and a change of three prime Ministers, John Ngu Foncha 1961–1965, Augustin Ngom Jua 1966–1968, and Solomon Tandeng Muna 1968–1972. Furthermore, clashes between and within Anglophone political parties diverted the attention of Anglophones from the realties of assimilation. (For details on intra and inter-party squabbles in West Cameroon, see Ardener 1967: 285–337).

In 1972 Ahidjo dashed the hopes of Anglophone autonomists by establishing a unitary state. The governments of the Federated States of West and East Cameroon disappeared and under Law no 72/LF/6 of 25 June 1972, a unicameral National Assembly of 120 deputies was established. Under Decree no. 72–349 of 24 July 1972, the United Republic of Cameroon was administratively divided into seven provinces with the federated state of West Cameroon being divided into the North West and South West Provinces.

In administrative appointments to positions of responsibility, Anglophones were generally made assistants to Francophones, the unwritten explanation being that Cameroon's institutions are of French origin and tradition[14] and not English. From this logic it was better for an Anglophone to be an assistant to a Francophone than to head a public institution because Anglophones needed time to familiarise themselves with French administrative practices. In other words, Anglophones needed to be totally assimilated to the French tradition if they were to qualify for top positions in the political and administrative hierarchy of Cameroon.[15]

That the Anglophone minority were treated as second-class citizens was an open secret. They complained about domination, marginalisation and the steady but gradual erosion of their identity by the dominant Francophone culture. But there was no overt, forceful, popular or systematic reaction against this state of affairs during Ahidjo's reign. The omnipresent state machinery crudely manhandled the few who dared, the most renowned case being Albert Mukong who spent over a decade in several political prisons in Cameroon for challenging Ahidjo's destruction of the federal constitution and the marginalisation of the Anglophones.[16]

The reintroduction of multipartyism in the 1990s witnessed the resurgence of the Anglophone question. The forceful formation and

---

[14] The presence of France in its erstwhile dependencies and its ubiquitous technical advisers in government ministries ensure a French orientation of public administration as well (Benjamin 1972).

[15] The 1992 presidential elections, which was apparently won by an Anglophone, John Fru Ndi but hijacked by the Francophone incumbent, Paul Biya, attests to this. The American embassy in Cameroon and the National Democratic Institute in Washington exposed the flawed nature of the elections.

[16] For details on Albert Mukong's saga see Mukong (1989, 1990, 1992). In 2002 the Biya government, under pressure from international human right organisations, recognised the Cameroon government's violation of Albert Mukong's human rights for decades and in an unprecedented move, it compensated him over 100 million francs cfa.

launching of Fru Ndi's SDF in 1990 was an explosion of Anglophone frustration. The Biya government and media reacted violently against it and this resulted in "*l'officialisation de l'identité Anglophone rébelle…*'" (the officialisation of Anglophone rebel identity) (Sindjoun 1995: 102).

In December 1990 the Biya administration finally bowed to pressures and introduced multiparty democracy alongside a certain degree of freedom of mass communication and association including the holding of meetings and demonstrations (SOPECAM 1991). Various groups, associations and newspapers mushroomed and started ventilating and articulating the problems affecting their respective communities or peoples. Anglophone newspapers and pressure groups boomed by selling the image of Anglophone Cameroonians as a marginalised and disadvantaged people.

President Biya reacted to mounting political pressure and Anglophone discontent by announcing the organisation of a national debate on the revision of the 1972 unitary constitution, which had substituted the 1961 independence federal constitution of Cameroon (Ndiva 1998: 1–2). Anglophones seized this golden opportunity of revisiting the constitution by presenting a united front.

Four prominent Anglophones namely Simon Munzu, Elad Ekontang, Benjamin Itoe and Carlson Anyangwe[17] took the initiative to convene an All Anglophone Conference (AAC) "for the purpose of preparing Anglophone participation" in the announced national debate on the reform of the constitution. Other issues related to the welfare of Anglophones, their posterity, territory and Cameroon as a whole was to be looked into (AAC 1993). Munzu, Ekontag, Itoe and Anyangwe turned out to be the ideologues of the Anglophone cause or better still the *ingénieur identitaire de la communautaire Anglophone*, to use Sindjoun's elegant expression (Sindjoun 1995: 90, 93). The Anglophone turnout for the conference was impressive and was indicative of their frustration and disillusionment with the union with Francophones. Over 5,000 Anglophones attended including academics, religious, business, traditional rulers and socio-professionals and the political elite.

[17] Munzu and Anyangwe were University Professors of Law at the University of Yaounde 11. Benjamin Itoe was a Magistrate and a former Minister of Justice while Elad Ekontag was a practicing lawyer. These four lawyers came to the limelight during the famous tripartite conference of October–November 1991, which was convened by the Biya government to diffuse tension in the country after a protracted period of civil disobedience campaigns organised by opposition parties (see for instance Awasom 1998).

The All Anglophone Conference issued the Buea Declaration, which in essence, called for a return to the federal form of government. They justified federalism on grounds of unbridgeable cultural differences between Anglophones and Francophones. Anglophones conceived themselves as "liberal minded, patient, open to dialogue and civilised". They asserted that they were by nature "pacific, patient, tolerant and [had] demonstrated these qualities since [they came into the union [with Francophones]". On the other hand, Francophones, who were consistently referred to as citizens of La République du Cameroun, (with great care taken to ensure that the orthography of Francophone Cameroun should be in French), were painted as black. Francophones were "autocratic, intolerant, hypocritical, dishonourable, unreliable and discriminatory". They were made the scapegoats of all Anglophone problems in Cameroon. After painting Anglophones "angels and democrats" and Francophones "demons and autocrats"[18] the authors of the Buea Declaration concluded that the only way to right the wrongs done to Anglophone Cameroonians, which were aggravated by the imposition of a unitary constitution, was a return to the federal system of government (AAC 1993).

Government's refusal to entertain the federal proposal of Anglophones pushed the Anglophone delegates to moot the possibility of outright secession.[19] Anglophones held another meeting, the Second All Anglophone Congress (AAC II) in Bamenda on 29 April 1994 and resolved to proceed to the unilateral declaration of independence of Anglophone Cameroon if the Biya regime persisted in its refusal to engage in meaningful constitutional talks (Konings and Nyamnjoh 1997: 221–227).

---

[18] The negative image of Francophones presented by the AAC's *ingenieur politico-identitaire* is constructed from the tumultuous and totalitarian tradition of Francophone Cameroon that has deeply penetrated their psyche. The French colonial administration and its post-colonial heir engaged in a protracted military confrontation with the *Union des Populations du Cameroun* political party as a method of solving a political problem. Ahidjo, like his colonial mentors, ruled Cameroon as an absolute autocrat.

[19] The Anglophone leadership actually set 1 October 1996 as the day for the declaration of independence for Anglophone Cameroon. The threat turned out to be a bluff because nothing actually happened on that day except to the speech of Ambassador Henry Fussong, the Chairman of the Anglophone Movement for sovereignty known as the Southern Cameroon National Council (SCNC). Fussong invited Southern Cameroonians to celebrate I October 1996 as a day of prayers during which a special prayer should be made to God to "save Anglophones from political bondage". He stated that the independence of the Southern Cameroons was "non-negotiable and irreversible" (*Cameroon Post* 8–14 October 1996).

The Anglophone delegates of the Second All Anglophone Congress (AAC II) that was held in the Anglophone Northwest provincial capital of Bamenda in April 1994 therefore defined an Anglophone in terms of ethnic, historical and geographical identity. It was in a further bid to minimise confusion and exclude the 'outside' and 'non-authentic' Anglophones that the AAC II decided to drop the linguistic label 'Anglophone' and adopt the historic name 'Southern Cameroons'. Its standing committee was (briefly) renamed Southern Cameroons People's Conference (SCPC) rather than Anglophone People's Conference with emphasis on the nomenclature of people rather than 'Anglophones' *per se*. It gave government 'reasonable time' to engage in meaningful talks leading to the restoration of a federal system of government in Cameroon. After a whole year, the Biya government made no overtures and the SCNC (formerly AAC) decided to go on a diplomatic offensive. On 19 May 1995, it dispatched a nine-man delegation to the United Nations and to all Western European capitals to plead the cause of the Southern Cameroons (SCNC 1995; Konings and Nyamnjoh 2003). Little was achieved beyond publicising the Anglophone agitation for autonomy.

The SCNC adopted the motto of 'the force of argument and not the argument of force', as a trademark of its pacific posture but in 1997 a series of armed attacks on military installations in the Anglophone North-West Province took place and the government blamed it on the SCNC. It youth-wing President, Ebenezer Akwanga, was arrested, detained and subsequently tried and imprisoned for 20 years for allegedly possessing illegal weapons and engaging in acts of sabotage. More than a score of other SCNC activists were sent to the Yaounde high security prison at Kondenge where they are serving long terms of imprisonment. The Biya administration refused all forms of dialogue with the SCNC and preferred to crush the movement by all means.

Because of government high-handedness in handling the SCNC, the Anglophones in the Diaspora, particularly the United States, reorganised themselves and opened a website, the www.SCNCforum under the coordination of J.J. Asongu, in 1999. The website encouraged discussions and updated its subscribers about developments in the Southern Cameroons on the struggle for statehood. The change of name followed the unilateral declaration of the independence of the Southern Cameroons in December 2001 by Justice Alobwede, which was accompanied by a government crackdown on the secessionists. The independence declaration was treated as a non-event by the Biya administration and

the Anglophones made no attempt to set up any governmental structures. The region only received troop reinforcement and was subjected to an undeclared state of siege. In line with the independence declaration, the SCNC in the Diaspora changed its website from SCNC forum to SCNATION in 2001 and proceeded to set up a High Commission in New York with J.J. Asongu as its first High Commissioner. To the SCNC, the status of the Southern Cameroons is a nation, which is under 'the colonial administration of La République du Cameroun', as they prefer to call Francophone Cameroon. They therefore view the relationship between Anglophone and Francophone Cameroon as that between an independent state and an occupying Francophone colonial power. The initiative for the progress of the Anglophone secessionist movement has therefore been displaced from the national arena to the Diaspora where it has a stronger and unimpeded impulsion.

Conclusion

Postcolonial Anglophone-Francophone interaction in Cameroon has been shaped by historically rooted and modern identities. Under one set of circumstances Anglophone and Francophone Cameroonians tend to find common ground because of their historic ties emanating from pre-colonial days. Under another set of circumstances emanating from colonial legacies, the Anglophone-ness and Francophone-ness of Cameroonians serve as instruments of identification, exclusion and access to positions of high office.

The Anglophones and Francophones of the south-western quadrant occasionally displayed a high propensity to link up and cooperate because of their historic ties or common interests. Consequently, they fought against the Anglo-French colonial boundary divide and finally achieved the reunification of the two Cameroons. But they did not benefit politically from their effort as the presidency of a reunified Cameroon eluded them in favour of Ahidjo, a Northern Fulani. When Ahidjo abdicated in 1982, he relinquished power to Paul Biya, a Beti from Francophone southern-eastern Cameroon. The peoples of the south-western quadrant therefore found a common cause in their exclusion from the presidency of Cameroon and have therefore joined their resources together to capture the presidency. This effort was manifested during 1992 presidential elections when they all rallied behind the SDF

leader from Anglophone Cameroon. This Anglophone-Francophone alliance momentarily blurred the Anglophone-Francophone divide.

Outside periodic election moments, there has been a clash of values between Anglophones and Francophones based on a minority and majority line of cleavage. Given that the institutions of bilingual Cameroon are preponderantly of French origin and inspiration and Francophones are in the majority, the tendency is for Francophone interests to prevail. The Anglophone-Francophone divide structures access to privileges and scarce resources in the nation. The frustration of Anglophones was compounded by the refusal of the government to consent to the idea of a federal constitution with the advent of political liberalisation in the 1990s. The Anglophones therefore opted for the secessionist option as a last resort.

The Anglophones, as a people, are clearly marginalised. Palliative measures such as the hasty incorporation of Anglophones into key positions heretofore reserved for Francophones only cannot serve as a lasting solution.[20] There is an urgent need for genuine and meaningful constitutional reforms in the direction of greater decentralisation and autonomy.

Bibliography

All Anglophone Conference (AAC). 1993. *The Buea Declaration* Limbe: Nooremac Press.

Amazee, V.M. 1994. The Role of the French Cameroonian in the Unification of Cameroon 1916–1916. *Transnational Journal of History*. 23, pp. 199–234.

Ardener, E. 1996. *Coastal Bantu of the Cameroons*. London: International African Institute.

———. 1967. The Nature of the Reunification of Cameroon. In Hazlewood A. (Ed) *African Integration and Disintegration*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Asiwaju, I.A. 1984a. *Partitioned Africans: Ethnic Relations Across International Boundaries*. London: C. Hurst Company.

———. 1984b. *West African Borderlands*. London: C. Hurst Company.

———. 1978. *Artificial Boundaries*. London: Oxford University Press.

Atem, G. 1984. Cameroon-Nigeria Relations 1884–1961: A Study in Political, Economic, and Social Interaction Between Two Neighbouring States. Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Calabar, Nigeria.

Awasom, N.F. 1998. Towards a New Political Culture in Cameroon in the wake of Globalisation. Seminar Paper, University of Buea, Cameroon.

[20] In 1993 Simon Achidi Achu from the Anglophone North West Province was nominated Prime Ministere and Head of government by President Paul Biya and was later replaced by Peter Mafany Musunge, another Anglophone from the South West Province.

———. 2000. The Reunification Question in Cameroon History: Was the Bride an Enthusiastic or a Reluctant One? *Africa Today*. 47: 2, pp. 99–120.
Bayart, J.F. 1973. One-Party Government and Political Development in Cameroon. *African Affairs*. 72: 287, pp. 125–144.
———. 1978. The Neutralisation of Anglophone Cameroon. In Joseph, R. (Ed) *Gaullist Africa: Cameroon under Ahmadou Ahidjo*. Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers, pp. 82–90.
———. Regime de Parti Unique et Système d'Inegalité et de Domination au Cameroun. *Cahiers d'Études Africaines*. 18: 69/70, pp. 5–35.
———. 1985. *L'Etat au Cameroun*. Paris: Presse de la fondation politique.
———. 1996. *Illusion identitaire*. Paris: Fayard.
Benjamin, J. 1972. *Les Camerounais Occidentaux: La Minorité dans un état Bicommunauté* Montréal: Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal.
Chem-Langhee, B. 1997. Anglophone-Francophone Divide and Political Disintegration in Cameroon: A Psycho-Historical Perspective. In Nkwi, P.N. and F.B. Nyamnjoh. (Eds) *Regional Balance and National Integration in Cameroon: Lessons learned and the Uncertain Future*. Yaounde/Leiden: ICASSRT.
Chem-Langhee, B. and Njeuma M.Z. 1980. The Pan-Kamerun Movement 1949–1961. In Ndiva, K.K. (Ed) *An African Experiment in Nation-Building Since Reunification*. Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 25–64.
Chiabi, E.M. 1977. Redressing Regional Imbalance in Cameroon: The Lessons from the Past. In Nkwi, P.N. and F.B. Nyamnjoh. (Eds) *Regional Balance and National Integration in Cameroon: Lessons learned and the Uncertain Future*. Yaounde/Leiden: ICASSRT, pp. 29–29.
Courade, G. 1973. *Atlas Régional Ouest 1*. Yaounde/Paris: ORSTOM.
Fomunyoh, C. 2001. Democratisation in Fits and Starts. *Journal of Democracy*, 12: 3, pp. 37–50.
Fonlon, B. 1976. The Language Problem in Cameroon in Historical Perspective. In Smock, D.R. and K. Bentsi-Enchill. (Eds) *The Search for National Integration*. London: Macmillan, pp. 189–205.
Gardinier, D.E. 1963. *Cameroon: United Nations Challenge to French Policy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Johnson, N.G. 2002. *Edward Francis Small: Watchdog of The Gambia*. Kanifing, Gambia: BPMRU Press.
Johnson, W.R. 1970. *The Cameroon Federation: Political Integration in a Fragmentary Society*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Jua, N. 1999. Framing the Anglophone Question in Post-Colonial Cameroon. Department of Political Sciences, University of Buea.
Kamto, M. 1995. La Montée des Séparatisme au Cameroun. *Génération, hors série*, 001, 10–11.
Kom, A. 1995. Conflits Interculturels et Tentative Séparatiste au Cameroun. *Cahier Francophone d'Europe-Centre-Orientale*. 5–6: 1, pp. 143–152.
Konings, P. and F.B. Nyamnjoh. 1997. The Anglophone Problem in Cameroon. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*. 35: 2, pp. 207–229.
Konings, P. and Nyamnjoh F. 2003. *Negotiating an Anglophone Identity: A Study of the Politics of Recognition and Representation*. Leiden: Brill Academic Publications.
Le Vine, V.T. 1961. The New Cameroon Federation. *Africa Report*. 6: 11, pp. 7–9, 1–4.
———. 1971. *The Cameroon Federal Republic* Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press.
Mbembe, A. 1985. *Le Problème National Camerounais*. Paris: L'Harmattan.
———. 1986. Pouvoir des Morts et Langage des Vivants: Les Errances de la Mémoire Nationaliste au Cameroun. *Politique Africaine*. 22, pp. 37–72.

Mbuagbaw, T.E. Brain, R. and R. Palmers. 1987. *A History of Cameroon*. Longman London.
Mongo C. 1993. *La Recomposition du Marché Politique Camerounais 1991–1992*. Douala: (no pub. House).
Mukong, A. 1989. *Prisoner Without a Crime*. Paris: Nubia Press.
———. 1990. *The Case for the Southern Cameroons*. Enugu: Chuka Printing Press.
———. 1992. *My Stewardship in the Cameroon Struggle*. Bamenda: Nooremac Press.
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), 1992, *Report on Cameroon Democratization Process*. Washington DC.
Ndiva, K.K. 1998. *Legislative Power in Cameroon's Second Republic: Its Nature and Limits*. Douala, Cameroon.
Ngenge, T.S. 1990. The Evolution of the Reunified Cameroon 1961–1982. Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Lagos.
Ngoh, V.J. 1996. *A History of Cameroon Since 1800*. Limbe: Presbook.
Njeuma, M.Z. 1978. *Fulani Hegemony in Yola (Old Adamawa)* 1809–1902. Yaounde: CEPER.
Nkoum-Me-Ntseny, L.M. 1996. Dynamique de Positionnement Anglophone et Liberation Politique au Cameroun: de l'identité à l'identification. *Polis*. 13: 1, pp. 68–100.
Nyamnjoh, F.B. (Ed) 1996. *The Cameroon G.C.E. Crises: A Test of Anglophone Solidarity*. Limbe: Nooremac Press.
Sindjoun, L. 1994. La Cour Suprême, la Competition, Électorale et la Continuité Politique au Cameroun: la Construction de la Démocratisation Passive. *Africa Development*. 19: 2, pp. 21–69.
———. 1996. Mobilisation Politique du Pluralisme Culturel et Crise de l'Etat-Nation au Cameroun. In Mané, I. (Ed) *État, Démocratie, Sociétés et Culture en Afrique*. Dakar: Éditions Démocraties Africaines.
Standing Committee of the All Anglophone Conference. 1993. *Federal Constitutional Draft Presented to President Paul Biya*. Buea.
Teer-Tomaselli, R. 1997. Shifting Spaces: Popular Culture and National Identity. *Critical Arts: A Journal of Cultural Studies*. 11: 1–2, pp. i–xv.
West Cameroon House of Assembly Debates, 1965. Buea: Government Press.

EDUCATING THE NATION: RACE AND NATIONALISM IN TANZANIAN SCHOOLS

Ned Bertz

As the moment of Tanganyika's independence rapidly drew near, the people of Dar es Salaam put pen to paper and sent evocative letters to the city newspapers describing their nationalist imaginings. On 6 October 1960, the Kiswahili newspaper *Ngurumo* published a letter entitled "Who is a Tanganyikan?", signed by 'One Who Wants to Know'. It is worth quoting at some length:

> . . . [A]s there is no citizenship law in Tanganyika it is difficult to know who is a Tanganyikan. But it is also easy for people who come from far away to call themselves Tanganyikans. How many of those who call themselves Tanganyikans now will be prepared to renounce the citizenship of their countries of origin? Let us ask them two or three questions: do they renounce their original citizenships? Do they renounce the benefits they get from it as expatriate servants? Do they refuse to send their children to schools which do not accept African children? Have they troubled to learn Swahili? How many of them call themselves Tanganyikans when they go to their homes abroad? Tanganyikan Africans have no choice: they can only be Tanganyikans. It is difficult to agree to call the foreigners Tanganyikans until they have shown that they love and honour this country and have identified themselves with it entirely for good or ill. In the past the foreigners have done nothing to encourage the Tanganyikans and to assure them of their being at one with them. It is necessary that Tanganyika Africans should be given precedence because they are behind in education, in civilization, and in money-earning power and business. When all are equal then no preference will be given to anyone and all will travel in the same boat.[1]

Imbued by the nationalist spirit of the hour, and influenced by the drive for independence led by the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), the letter-writer 'One Who Wants to Know' not so subtly blasted the commitment to Tanganyika of the territory's Indian

[1] From a British colonial government report that monitored the Kiswahili press, and made an English translation of important stories."Summary of the Vernacular Press, 1960–61" Tanzania National Archives (hereafter TNA) 540/DC 1/68.

residents. In issuing what were common charges at the time—the echoes of which are still heard today—the disgruntled reader listed several critical components of 'national belonging': a singular national self-identity (including a renunciation of other citizenship), an adherence to the national language (Kiswahili), and education in multi-racial schools. Underlining these ideas were desires for egalitarianism and integration through the force of a unifying nationalism, thus reiterating rhetorical notions that TANU was circulating while strategising about, in particular, post-independence education. In short, the political dynamic in late colonial Tanganyika offered nationalists explosive choices which laid bare popular and official understandings about the relationship between citizenship, education, and race. In the dialectical encounter between colonialism and nationalism, certain categories like religion, race, and ethnicity became the political bulwark of colonial power. In a related way, education was critically positioned in both the fashioning of a European colonial state and the imagination and construction of an independent African nation. Colonial governments used education to create categories of difference, and in response anti-colonial nationalists used the discourse of race to imagine an independent nation. Schools in Dar es Salaam provided one political location where this encounter occurred, but also the social and cultural spaces where daily life generated experiences that contested, subverted, negotiated, and reinforced racialised boundaries established from above.

While relations between those categorised as Indian or African during the post-colonial period were usually quite normal, race continued to be a discursive weapon for public officials and ordinary citizens alike in times of political conflict. This was due to the lingering political utility of attacking racially marked class differences, especially relevant in post-Arusha Declaration Tanzania. At the same time, after the dismantling of the colonial state's policy of segregation, interactions deepened between formerly separated people. This paper, given a starting point by 'One Who Wants to Know', will look at the changing intersections of state policy on education, nationalist sentiments, and racialised public discourse to address the issue raised above: how to evaluate whether or not Tanzanian Africans and Indians have, to paraphrase the letter-writer, 'travelled in the same boat'.

National Imaginings of Race and Education in Late Colonial Tanganyika

While nationalism in Tanganyika in some sense was a decades-old and quite diverse force, no movement captured public imagination and dictated public discourse like that of the Tanganyika African National Union. Race and education were undoubtedly two of their campaign themes, chosen in order to interact with the colonial government which had structured Tanganyikan society along those lines. TANU was formed out of the pre-existing Tanganyika African Association in 1954, and it should not be surprising that by 1955 the party was operating informal educational institutions—along the lines of the old missionary 'bush schools'—in order to fill the lacunae of educational opportunities for Africans at the same time as broadening a political base. Of course, funds were minimal and teachers scarce, so the schools were quite deficient, and might have been more important simply as a protest against the colonial failure to provide sufficient schools.

Despite TANU's growing political strength and Africans' long-standing demand for an academic curriculum and adequate provision of places such as seen in urban—and in particular, Indian—schools, integration was not raised as an option by the colonial government which feared the political repercussions.[2] Pressure from outside began in 1948, when the United Nations Visiting Mission recommended a common educational system in Dar es Salaam and in other major urban areas, a wish repeated by the 1951 Visiting Mission. Shortly before the second UN tour, Makerere University in Uganda was opened to students of all races, but the Colonial Office sought to evaluate that experiment before considering it for primary and secondary schools in Tanganyika.

This reluctance of the colonial administration to seriously consider integrated education provided an important opportunity for TANU to fulminate against the racialism of government, often invoking the foil

[2] As early as 1925, the colonial government considered integrated education, but dismissed it for political reasons. See Mbilinyi, pp. 79–80, where she quotes a very important confidential letter from the Director of Education to the Chief Secretary of Tanganyika in 1925: "With the knowledge of political developments during the last few years in India, we cannot afford to ignore the possibility of an unfortunate African political repercussion in future years as a result of the development of a closer liaison between the two races which might be the result of co-education. At present we have a healthy rivalry and a growing race-consciousness amongst the Africans and a certain feeling of resentment that the Asiatics get so many of the 'plums.'In my opinion co-education might conceivably weaken this healthy and natural rivalry and eventually lead to making common cause for political ends".

of Indian privilege. When the third UN Visiting Mission came in 1954, TANU complained that schools in Tanganyika were "merely preparing the African for being used as cheap labour for the immigrant races" (Morrison 1976: 78). Progressive Indian leaders of the Asian Association supported TANU's calls for integration, presenting their analysis of the deleterious effect of racially segregated education to the UN Mission, arguing that children in the colonial school "…system grow up with set notions of watertight compartments, some with superiority, others with inferiority, and still others with hatred and ridicule" (Morrison 1976: 78).

In face of a much more radical report from the UN Mission in 1954 than in the past, the government's chosen path of gradualism came under withering assault from the nationalists, especially after government funding continued to be doled out unequally on a racial basis. Nyerere angrily wrote in 1955:

> …[T]he decision to distribute the funds on a parity basis must have come to many people as a shock…Disparity of educational expenditure per head of the population in each racial group is always there…[but] this particular disparity is aggravated to the point of absurdity…[E]ven if the whole population had accepted the proposition…that quality makes members of the minority groups deserve more money per head for the education of their children, one would at least have expected the Authorities concerned to have considered NEED. For lack of education is one thing in which the African can claim undisputed superiority over the other racial groups (Morrison 1976: 80–1).

At the same time, government was attempting to formalise the role of multi-racialism in government structures as had been in present in education since the 1920s. After the 1948 constitution in Tanganyika introduced multi-racial legislatures, the government established a racial parity of representatives on the unofficial half of the Legislative Council. [The official half was all European.] In the 1950s, the British attempted to extend the multi-racial experiment to local government and District Councils. TANU's opposition to their moves galvanised the vast African majority, which saw that their future government might be as unrepresentative as their educational system continued to be. In this way, Tanganyikan opposition to colonialism, in particular through attacking racialised privileges of governing and in education, became racialised in its rhetoric. Pratt writes of this critical phase:

> The attempt to impose 'multiracialism' at the District level dramatized this issue in terms immediately comprehensible to the rural masses.

> Opposition to multiracialism became *the* cause in 1957 and 1958 which united the rural African and the educated and politically active town dweller. This issue aroused deep-rooted African fears that Tanganyika might yet be dominated by Asian and European minorities. The British effort to force 'multiracialism' generated in turn an African sense of racial pride. Multiracialism was dismissed as '*mseta*,' (sic) a word used for the intermixing of inferior with superior quality grains. This issue more than any other single issue in the final years of colonial rule convinced Africans throughout Tanganyika to support TANU and seek an early end to that rule (Pratt 1976: 34–5).[3]

Nyerere quickly realised the danger of this turn in practical and ideological terms. It was never his idea to foreground race as a determinant in any way of citizenship, privilege, or identity; rather, his vision was of a non-racial country that harmoniously balanced racial and religious diversity. This was a bold new approach to questions of inherited inequality, one which contrasted dramatically with what was occurring throughout southern Africa.[4] Nyerere reached out to Indians (not without a slightly threatening tone) to support the nationalist struggle, which they largely did, but also stressed to Africans the importance of following the non-racial way. While non-racialism might have worked as a political strategy, there is no doubt that public discourse loudly discussed removing Indian privilege in the name of nationalism, especially in the realm of education. In their prescriptions for the new nation, Tanganyika's residents made vociferous calls for racial equality and integration, as can be seen in Kiswahili newspapers from late 1960.[5] The racialised nature of colonial government's educational system might have shaped Nyerere's non-racial political philosophy, but there was another discussion more amongst Africans about the future of Tanganyika than it was directed at Indian privilege in the past. As Iliffe argued, "…Tanganyika's problem was not relations between

---

[3] The correct Kiswahili word for what Pratt describes is "mseto". Ironically, it has come into common Swahili today to mean governmental coalition. It still has a negative connotation for many Zanzibaris especially who are dissatisfied with Tanzanian rule of the islands.

[4] For the greatest contrasts, see the multi-racialism of colonial Rhodesia and even independent Zimbabwe, and of course the *apartheid* regime in South Africa. In Kenya, too, non-racialism as a concept never attained the same status in government circles as in Tanzania and, perhaps unsurprisingly, desegregation took longer and never reached the same levels. A good example of the effects of multiracialism and education on identity in South Africa can be found in Cross 1999.

[5] All articles taken from TNA, "Summary of the Vernacular Press, 1960–61", 540/DC 1/68.

races, but relations between Africans with different views of race" (Iliffe 1979: 552).

On the 31 August, *Ngurumo* contained a demand from Sheik Amri Abedi, President of the Tanganyika Parents' Association, that "…education from Standard I to VIII should be free, without intermediate examinations, and open to all races together—Indians, Europeans, Africans and Italians".[6] Unequal opportunities in education were also clearly linked to unfair job distribution. The 5 November 1960 edition of *Mwafrika* printed a letter from Mr. M.K.S. Bantu, who wrote that:

> …although we now have responsible government we have not got the qualifications required to do all the jobs. This is the fault of the out-going government which has not provided sufficient education. The writer hopes the new government will put all this right and says that people do not like to see government offices served by Asian and European women doing jobs which Africans should do: ditto banks.

Mwalimu (teacher) Juanita of Dar es Salaam, in a letter to *Ngurumo* on 28 October took this even further. She had taught for years at a TANU school for very little money, but she did not see such sacrifices on the part of others. Writing, "[w]e are sucking each other's blood, when it is all finished how shall we live?" she further noted that she "…hoped that the policy of integrating all schools would be realised and would put an end to her troubles". However, a 13 October letter to *Mwafrika* from Mr. Mwami Shangillah of the Technical Institute, Dar es Salaam, seemed to caution against racial integration as a panacea for society's ills: it complains of an Asian teacher of a typing class who claims that the Europeans are all very good, the Indians are not bad, but, pointing at an African, says '*Hawa bure kabisa*' [They are completely worthless].

After Nyerere promised he would accomplish integration at a reasonable pace in a Legislative Council debate on 9 December 1960, the newspapers carried supportive comments. *Mwafrika*, in an editorial the following morning, expressed satisfaction that Government was aware of its duties. It optimistically carried on:

> Government intends to remove both racial and religious discrimination from education; in the past those groups, whether racial or religious, which were able to do so built good schools for their children while those

[6] It is unclear from the file if Abedi thought Italians were a separate race. Abedi was an Ahmadi Muslim missionary and a poet, and became Dar es Salaam's first African mayor. See Iliffe, p. 551.

> communities which were without means were left behind. There are of course obstacles to integration such as language, fees, and, in boarding schools, living conditions. But all these difficulties can be overcome…

Although often employing terms of race, it is clear that class issues—like the ability of a community to subsidise schools—were very important. Or, to put it more bluntly, as Mr. Mkasinongwa of Dar es Salaam did in *Mwafrika* on 11 December 1960: "…it [is] wrong that at African schools children should have to sweep and cultivate while in schools of other races people are hired to do this".

After Nyerere's public commitment to a single school system beginning January 1962, *Ngurumo* eloquently waxed about the societal importance of the integration of education, making explicit the nationalist desires for interracial education and its crucial role in race relations:

> Although race relations are very good in Tanganyika, they are not beyond improvement. Separate education in the past has led inhabitants of this territory to feel that they were living in different countries. If what government intends to do now had been done 15 years ago, we should be reaping the harvest to-day as everyone would have been brought up together and we should understand each other so much better.

However, the cautious way in which Indians approached educational integration clearly foreshadowed the halting nature of reforms post-independence. On 22 December 1960, an advertisement appeared in *Ngurumo* announcing vacancies for Africans at the Government Indian Primary School at Chang'ombe, Dar es Salaam, but came with a stipulation: "…provided they do not discriminate against Indian children".

Educating the Nation: Race and Nationalism in the History of Tanzanian Schools

Although the independent Tanganyikan government sought to act quickly on its promises to integrate and expand education, reforms were halting during the 1961–67 period of national consolidation. Nyerere's White Paper of 1960, framed to please nationalists while initiating gradual integration to curb cultural shock, offered preferred admission (for three years) to students whose language was the medium of instruction in a former voluntary school. In Dar es Salaam, with a large number of Indian day schools, this meant practically that all Indian students continued to attend the schools they had before independence.

They were joined by Africans in English-language secondary schools, but in recognised Gujarati-, Punjabi-, or Urdu-medium schools, de facto segregation continued. Further, primary school fees remained tiered, with former European day schools charging 30 pounds per year compared to 6 pounds for Indian schools, and only 10 shillings for Swahili-medium ones. While a few wealthier African parents could afford the higher rates, for the most part this system failed to eradicate the racialised split while introducing a class divide between African haves and have-nots.

Unsurprisingly, ordinary Tanganyikans were as incensed as some of the TANU radicals who had urged faster integration prior to independence, and they pressured the government into quickening the pace. Notably, Indian languages were banned as mediums of instruction in 1963. Secondly, the fee structure was altered in primary schools, and fees were abolished in secondary schools.[7] The government was also willing to take action in individual cases to appease middle-class parents who knew that obtaining a professional job was contingent upon a secondary-school education. In 1963 and '64, Indian candidates for secondary school fared much better than Africans on the entrance exams. In response, the Ministry of Education decided to give clear preference to African students in urban areas. This decision was defended to one researcher in 1966 "…as being necessary to avoid a much more severe and uncontrolled outbreak of anti-Asian sentiment…" (Pratt 1976: 223). Thus we see the continuation of the substance and style of anti-colonial rhetoric in the post-colonial period, in particular in its racialised dimension. At the same time, this public discourse had shifted subtly, and was much more concerned with class privilege than racial privilege or segregation.

President Nyerere recognised the growing signs of class stratification promoted by the education system and other aspects of the new Tanzanian state, and was deeply disturbed. On 5 February 1967, at the Arusha Declaration, Nyerere proclaimed a new orientation to the Tanzanian state: self-reliant democratic socialism (*ujamaa*). Following the nationalisation of banks and a few industries (which was interpreted by the public similarly to school integration, as the removal of racial privilege), the government turned its attention to education. On 9 March, President

[7] Primary school fees were lowered in former European schools to 21 pounds and raised in Swahili-medium ones, with former Indian schools remaining at 6 pounds. See Cameron and Dodd, pp. 176–8.

Nyerere introduced Education for Self-Reliance (ESR). While noting that the major deficiencies of the colonial system had been addressed (racial segregation, lack of places, and non-African curriculum), Nyerere also offered a new definition of 'integration': schools were to focus on the needs of the local community, and were to produce resources useful for the maintenance of the school and the development of the nation. ESR, which would remain the basic framework until the 1980s, placed education at the centre of nation building and the continuation of the nationalist struggle from the anti-colonial movement. This package of policies, much like Nyerere's principles of non-racialism, set Tanzania apart from many of its African neighbours.[8]

Through the brief educational life histories of four Tanzanians we can glimpse the importance of everyday experience in schools, operating underneath national public discourse. Mathilda Temba was born in 1956 outside Moshi in Kilimanjaro Region. She was in primary school at the time of the Arusha Declaration, and reports that the self-dependence it urged helped her to walk the 5km every day from her village to school in the early 1970s. In secondary school, a young Mathilda suddenly encountered far fewer Indians than before in classrooms in Moshi town because they now had to qualify via examinations like everyone else. She extols these changes, and says that the Arusha Declaration created this equality and gave Africans an opportunity that only non-Africans had before, as well as a chance to be part of a 'complete mixture' of races in schools. She claims that the mixing of races caused no problems due to the strict control of teachers, and that students in general do not necessarily self-segregate by community. 'We love each other, and teach this', she adds.[9]

Mrs. Njawa has a slightly less nostalgic remembrance of the late 1960s and 1970s, although she certainly is thankful for her increased opportunities, especially as a woman. Coming out of Ruvuma Region along Lake Nyasa, she went to a boarding secondary school in far away

[8] In particular, the growth of multi-racial private schools in South Africa since 1976, and in Kenya since independence in 1963, was far faster than in Tanzania. As a result, stratification created by unequal educational opportunities increased class tension in these countries, foreshadowing what would occur in Tanzania later. Zimbabwe in 1980 followed a similar path to Tanzania by abolishing primary school fees, although it did retain them at the secondary level, and later reintroduced primary fees in urban areas. For a discussion of these issues, see Cooksey et al. 1994, Frederikse 1992, and Pampallis 1991.

[9] Interview with Temba, 17/03/2003.

coastal Lindi, at the time of the Declaration in 1967. She followed her new husband to Dar es Salaam (where he worked with the National Bank of Commerce) in 1974. She was posted to the large Uhuru Primary School, and was amazed by the diversity of the big city. She notes that it was busy, looked advanced, and that all different types of people were there so the culture was not the same as she experienced before. Her school was mixed-race, although she comments that the Indians were not to willing to sit with Africans during the breaks, something she attributed it to different cultures and, in particular, languages. In the late 1970s, Mrs. Njawa began teaching at Mtendeni School, formerly the Government Indian Junior Secondary School. She lived downtown in the bank flat her husband was allotted, and sold flowers and did knitting to make up for the small teacher's salary. She remembers that the facilities at the school were good, although the administration was poor and the classrooms overloaded. She thinks that nationalism helped alleviate racial tension because people felt that everyone was a human being, which brought love between individuals, and made Africans, Indians, and Arabs 'one family'.[10]

Hilda Mwakilasa was at Butimba Teachers' College in Mwanza at the time of the Arusha Declaration, and in 1977 joined Ukonga Primary School in Dar. It was on the outskirts of town, and she found a shortage of books and other teaching materials, and poor facilities like toilets and classrooms. Fortunately, she was soon transferred to a girls' school in Kariakoo, Uhuru Street, which was a direct descendant of the first colonial school built for girls in Dar es Salaam. She admired the facilities, but found the overcrowding awful—with up to 100 pupils in one class. This shaped her political beliefs about Nyerere's socialism and stress on equality, which she condemned. She refers to Orwell's *Animal Farm* on socialism and corruption, and argues that socialism never materialised; rather, "those who could got very rich, and those who couldn't are poor until today". After this experience, she was quite happy at Upanga Primary School, located in an Indian neighbourhood and with a majority of Indian students due to its high status as one of a few English-medium government primary schools. Here, Mrs. Mwakilasa confides, the students respected the teachers, the materials were good, and, it seems, she found happiness with people of her class.[11]

[10] Interview with Njawa, 19/03/2003.
[11] Interview with Mwakilasa, 19/03/2003.

Mrs. Rehema Panda was born in the 1950s and lived in the African working class neighbourhood of Temeke in Dar es Salaam, where her father was a government mechanic. She began primary school in Temeke in the year of Tanganyika's independence, and remembers a few Arabs, Indians, and Somalis at her school amongst the African majority. Mrs. Panda joined one of the earliest interracial classes at Jangwani Girls' Secondary School, which used to be the Government Indian Girls' Secondary School, after passing her secondary school entrance examinations in 1967. In these early days of integration, she reports that discrimination was controlled, but still present in small ways. Mrs. Panda remembers that, although it was "not much", there still was "some sort of hatred between coloureds and blacks". Indian girls would be teased for their long hair and less-than-fluent Kiswahili. This teasing was not very serious, and groups of friends could be of mixed races. After a couple of years teaching in rural Rufiji District, Mrs. Panda married and returned to Dar es Salaam to teach at a primary school in Kariakoo. She says it was fully integrated, reflecting the trading area around it, full of Indians and Arabs who had begun moving into the formerly segregated African neighbourhood early in the British colonial period. By the early 1980s, she reports that relations between students of different races were better than when she was at Jangwani, largely because 'politics had changed the situation'. She thinks that *ujamaa* taught people that 'equality was the song of the day', and students and others grew to believe that everyone is a fellow human being. Mrs. Panda also clearly recognised that this equality in Tanzania was very much a philosophical construct, and that in reality, although there were strong friendships across races, many richer students lived very differently.[12] Growing class separation, manifested in the movement of private schools, is the subject to which we now turn.

Despite a rapidly growing budget allocation to education, Tanzania understood that there was a long row to hoe with scarce resources. This realisation together with a desire to centralise school administration, especially after the Arusha Declaration's formalisation of egalitarianism in society as a government goal, created a tension between the government and private schools. Practicality won out in some sense and private schools were never banned, but they were subject to rigorous registration procedures and complete control by the government

[12] Interview with Panda, 17/03/2003.

in the setting of their syllabi and fees. As such, they grew slowly and warily. With a shortage of secondary school places available, that sector expanded much more quickly. In 1966, there were 17 private secondary schools servicing 13.7 per cent of the total, and this quickly rose to 37 in 1969 with 21.3 per cent of all secondary school students (Carnoy and Samoff 1990: 246). Private secondary schools steadily rose through the 1970s as wealthier parents demanded opportunities for their children to advance through an academic education, and 31.4% of all secondary school pupils were in private schools by 1978 (Carnoy and Samoff 1990: 246). By the late 1970s, registration of private secondary schools was eased as chronic budget shortfalls plagued the Ministry of Education, and their importance soared as the fiscal crisis worsened in the 1980s after the war with Uganda.

There is no doubt that most private schools came up unevenly, with noticeable regional, and, most importantly, class differences.[13] Unsurprisingly, Indian communities in Dar es Salaam were quick to seize the moment in the 1960s and (re-)establish schools to replace theirs which had been nationalised. Communities with access to non-governmental financing could establish schools that gave preferential treatment to their own, at the same time as allow the admission of children of a similar class background (but of different racial and religious groups) who could afford the fees. For example, concerned about the lack of places in government secondary schools, the Hindu community of Dar es Salaam opened the Shaaban Robert Secondary School (SRSS) in May 1963.[14] The school's uneasy relationship with the government was aptly summarised in a speech by the Minister for Education at the opening of a school building in 1964: the Minister indicated the need for private schools due to a paucity of government funds for secondary education, but at the same time he delivered a message that his Ministry would carefully watch and administer such schools. The

[13] The other possibility was to send children out of the country for secondary school, a trend that grew throughout the independent period. Most notably, Kenya and India were the favoured destinations. There is a long history of Africans travelling to India for schooling, a topic about which I wrote in my dissertation: "Race, Nationalism, and the Indian Diaspora of Tanzania in the Twentieth-Century History of the Indian Ocean World".

[14] Much of the information in this section is taken from a draft history of SRSS written by the then-headmaster, Mr. Thomas Mathew, an Indian citizen who had worked for many years in West Africa as a school headmaster. Other notes come from an interview with Mr. Mathew at his office at the school in Dar es Salaam on 10 September 2001.

founding members of SRSS were well aware of this, and fearful of nationalisation throughout the history of the school, in the words of Mr. Mathew (the Headmaster in 2001), they "played it safe".

Tanzania's economy collapsed in the 1980s, leading to a new era in the political and economic history of the country, and a reorganisation of schools. In the era of liberalisation, the trend toward private schooling—primary and secondary—accelerated dramatically, bringing with it growing class differences that were refracted through political notions of race and nationalism. Painful cutbacks in social services were the concomitant of the structural adjustment programs of the 1980s, and the axe fell sharply on education. One major response of the government was to gradually loosen the reins on private schools, and in 1995 President Mwinyi allowed them to set their own fees. By the early 1990s, the ratio of private to public secondary schools was rapidly approaching 2:1 (Kaiser 1996: 38). There is no doubt that affording a high quality secondary school education in Dar es Salaam became much more difficult in this period. For example, at Aga Khan Mzizima Secondary School (AKMSS), fees before liberalisation were at 9,000 shillings a year; by 2001, they were 750,000 shillings.[15] Nonetheless, Africans continued to attend the school in relatively equal numbers throughout its history (36.3 per cent in 2001), indicating that these students were part of a growing middle class.

It is also clear that while the government continued to set the syllabus post-liberalisation, efforts at nation building in schools became less important. For one, Mr. Thind, the Headmaster at AKMSS in 2001, reported that the majority of form six graduates go abroad to continue their education, rather than attending the highly selective University of Dar es Salaam.[16] Secondly, as students could choose their course stream based on prospective future careers (and competitive selective examinations), history classes as a tool of inculcating Nyerere's ideas of non-racial socialism declined in importance. One teacher, Mr. Kingu, says that, "for Asians, history is worthless" because most are trying to continue their privileged place (with enormous pressure from their

[15] Interview with Thind, 20/08/2003.

[16] Part of this is an issue of available places at the University of Dar es Salaam (UDSM), which for most of its existence only accommodated about three thousand students and was the sole university in Tanzania. This is changing, however, with the proliferation of private universities since the late 1990s and a dramatic expansion project aimed to double—at least—enrollment at UDSM over the past decade.

parents) in the economy by pursuing science or business streams.[17] Mr. Kingu also reports that the dismal situation in public schools led him to start teaching at AKMSS. While the salary is lower than what he received at Jangwani, the combination of better facilities, committed teachers, and the ability to conduct lucrative tuitions outside of class drove his decision to accept an offer at AKMSS when they recruited him. Obviously, the rise of private schools and the decline of public ones are not unrelated events.

Three history instructors at SRSS tell a similar tale.[18] One teacher reports that in history class, Africans are better represented than in the school as a whole, as, like at AKMSS, history is viewed as a less useful subject to Indians. This might indicate that while education has been substantially integrated over the period of independence, new trends of inequality are developing within individual private schools. One teacher remarks that while globalised images presented in television and newspapers make students lose their African identity, the history instructors try to reinforce it with their courses. At the same time, the stress is definitively on 'African' identity even more than 'Tanzanian' identity, and thus Indians do not relate to this instruction because they are 'not originally from here'. Another teacher goes further, arguing that as mobile people with connections to other countries, Indian students do not see the logic in studying one country's history when they very well might move on. SRSS's mission statement tries to get around this paradox—the habit of favouring globalising cultural trends by affluent students who study in a school with a nation-building curriculum—with a nod toward global citizenship, and notions of a 'world citizen' in 'education without borders'. These trends open up Indians in particular to historic charges of lacking loyalty to the country as noted by 'One Who Wants to Know', thereby scratching old suspicions which were latent but obviously not forgotten.

However, integration did achieve remarkable progress in race relations.[19] One teacher at SRSS notes that Africans have Indians as best friends, and vice versa. Others stress that membership in elective clubs

[17] Interview with Kingu, 01/10/2001.

[18] Interviews with Silas, 07/08/2001; Nchimbi, 16/08/2001; and Ludeng'hemya, 20/08/2001.

[19] Similar arguments, in particular concerning the everyday normality of race relations but the deepening of class differences, can be found in Zimbabwe, according to Frederikse 1992.

and societies is not determined in any way by race, nor does it naturally group that way. Another teacher attributes this to the urbanisation of Dar es Salaam as a mass society with different cultures. He notes that at the school there is a single spirit of commitment, without race mattering. In Dar, with some sacrifices, he believes they have created a new society for a multi-cultural life where people can coexist without confrontation. While this might not match the public discourse present in the political reality of the liberalisation era, it can be argued that in everyday places like schools, this might more closely resemble the attitude of the majority of Dar es Salaam's citizens.

This does not contradict the fact that, occasionally, public rows can become very racialised. As argued above, race is the public space that was created by the nationalist movement for the dismantling of privilege. Even though the issue might really be class, the language of race advances the complaint publicly due to its explosive political efficacy. In July of 2001, an angry parent of an SRSS student wrote a rambling diatribe to a Dar es Salaam newspaper, claiming, among other things, the following:

> …Referring to the students sponsorship programme of students who cannot afford paying their school fees, the scheme the way I see it has religious and racial inclination. Students entitled to the scheme should be Hindu and of Indian origin otherwise he/she shall not be entitled to this scheme…
>
> On top of all these I have come to know from reliable sources the management of Shaaban Robert is misusing funds by recruiting teachers from India paying them in foreign currency while Tanzanian (*wazawa*) graduate teachers never get job to the extent that many teachers in future might become shoeshiners or salesmen. This is against human ethics.
>
> As Shaaban Robert School is not registered by Ministry of Education and Culture as a seminary or religious school it should not be on denomination of Hindu religion whereby presently non Hindus are prohibited eating non vegetarian food such as beef products or on all Hindu occassions school is closed such as Divali Day (Hindu new year) and on some occassions whereby students must participate in dancing and teasing and ultimately emiting fancy colours to each other as this is a common Hindu religious practice (*Guardian* 19.7.01).

While most of the specifics of the charges above were baseless in fact, they gained great resonance in particular through their claims of Indian privilege, buttressed by mocking Indian cultural difference. At the same time, that the writer is complaining about class is clear above, and even more so in this extract:

> …I have noted that this [scholarship] scheme operates on an unfair basis because first, parents or guardians wishing their children to join the school are forced to pay compulsory donation bisides fees for a club which is known as DSM Secondary School club run under management of Shaaban Robert Secondary School.
>
> And joining the club by parents who had applied for space for their children is compulsory otherwise admission is 'not' granted.…
>
> While negotiating on amount of donation for reduction I was told by club secretary that if I was not economically well off why did I bring my son to 'this world.'
>
> This was great abuse to me but as I wanted my child to be educated I had no other say (*Guardian* 19.7.01).[20]

The writer recognises what African parents had been arguing since the early colonial period: that education was necessary to advancement. For them, the small middle class must feel very much like a 'club' for which they did not have the funds to become a 'member'. And racialising this frustration still holds great currency in the post-Nyerere, post-non-racial socialist society with its growing cleavages. As one teacher quietly remarks about this scholarship scheme row, "There is the feeling that discrimination still exists here. Its form changes, but the content is the same".

The potential for class divisions with the proliferation of private primary education is even more severe than in secondary schools, as can be seen in an analysis of the government Olimpio Primary School (OPS) in Dar es Salaam. The school was founded in 1958 by the Catholic Church, and was taken over by the government with the coming of independence.[21] Located in the middle-class neighbourhood of Upanga, Olimpio was converted into a privileged school for the children of government workers who were abroad. As it was open to all in Dar es Salaam as a day school, only a minority fraction of enrolment actually came from government families. Due to its location, it drew a heavily Indian student body, perhaps about half of the total, although it was a fully integrated school. As such, it was not terribly different from other former Indian day schools in urban areas in the first decades after independence. The school followed the government fee structure and curriculum, however, the board of OPS holds a meeting every year with parents to determine a set 'contribution' from each

[20] All errors are in the original letter.
[21] Interview with Mzee, 11/03/2003.

family. Thus, the public OPS is sort of quasi-private, funded not by a religious group or ethnic community, but an urban class. The class that sponsors this school is very much an African middle class now, despite having large Indian enrolments until the mid-1990s. Today, there are only about 50 Indian students, consisting largely of children of families who could not afford the fees at new schools after President Mwinyi authorised private primary institutions early in the 1990s. Since that time, there has been an Indian exodus from Olimpio to schools run by their individual religious communities.

The teachers interviewed at OPS had all taught through the harsh conditions of the shortages of an earlier period, so most were not against private schools in theory. However, they predicted a dire effect for race relations as class separated the schools and individual students. Mrs. Mathilda Temba says, "Now it is about money, and it depends on your money which school you like. Children change schools more as parents' income fluctuates" (Temba, 17.3.03 int). Mrs. Hilda Mwakilasa adds that this trend is not good because before, "…mingling made it easier to understand one another [across race], and it was good to know what others are doing. This can't be done with the current separation. Bad things might be happening now [for race relations]".[22] Mrs. Rehema Panda was the most severe in her evaluation of the changes in education. She says, "The long run effects of the separation of people might take us back to where we were before the Arusha Declaration".[23] While noting that Africans have more money now and that they participate in this class separation, the entire system of education is vulnerable to these new divisions: "Asians will teach business only and become money-minded, they will find they are superior, they will start exploiting, and will make others work for them so that they can earn more".[24] The move to private schools in Dar es Salaam ruptured many gains from integrated education after independence, and while race relations might be normal on an everyday level, fears of a growing class divide allow the old rhetoric of anti-Indian racialism to surface in the breaches.

[22] Interview with Mwakilasa, 19/03/2003.
[23] Interview with Panda, 17/03/2003.
[24] Interview with Panda, 17/03/2003.

'Travelling in the Same Boat?': Race, Nationalism, and Education in Tanzanian History

To move toward a conclusion of the question first raised by 'One Who Wants to Know', about whether Africans and Indians have 'travelled in the same boat', we must see race, nationalism, and education in their historical context in Tanzania. In 1951, long after the establishment of a racially segregated colonial education system, British officials debated the necessity and expense of a comprehensive social survey of Dar es Salaam. One official wrote confusedly of the diversity of people who collided into one another in rapidly urbanising Dar:

> The urban problems of most immediate concern are those of Dar es Salaam . . . (which) have for many years been foci of alien influences and centres of break-down of African culture. Nascent communities of polyglot multi-racial composition are developing. On the African side they contain representatives of perhaps almost every tribe in Tanganyika, in addition to many from outside the Territory and, on the non-African side, a plurality of mixed elements divided by race, culture, religion and language. The reduction of this complexity by systematic research . . . is a pressing requirement. Industrial disturbances have occurred in both towns. The conjunction of insufficient housing, land pressure, high costs of living, the rapid growth of population . . . have led to considerable problems . . .[25]

So what do we learn from this colonial minute? First, and most obviously, it reflects the fact that urbanising Dar es Salaam witnessed a great deal of ethnic and racial diversity, and that this mixing of peoples—and the concomitant formation of groups and their identities—profoundly matters for the history of the country. This has been seen, without a doubt, in the classrooms across Tanzania. The colonial officials quoted here were certainly aware of the importance of interracial interaction in 1951, even if they were demonstrably pretty clueless as to the manifestations of it. We additionally learn that the government correctly feared that urban stresses—such as those of labour, housing, and social service provision like education—could have effects on ethnic and racial relations, and vice versa. Also readily apparent in these 1951 colonial worries is the idea that the physical collision of different groups of

[25] Minute of 27 June 1951, quoting the "Stanner Report". TNA Secretariat File #18950, volume III, "Sociological Survey of African Population in Dar-es-Salaam Township".

people was going to set in motion dramatic changes which would affect the makeup and functioning of Tanzanian society, perhaps beyond the understanding and even control of the colonial government, especially during a time of nascent nationalism.

That this has happened is un-debatable, especially in the location of education as a central cultural and political place in the history of race and nationalism in the country. In particular, the effect of colonial manipulations of education helped to shape the racial discourse of anti-colonial nationalists. In turn, discourse about interracial encounters in Dar es Salaam affected much larger historical processes like nationalism, decolonisation, socialism, and liberalisation. However, issues hinted at in the colonial minute above are still residing in the minds and policies of Tanzanian government officials today. For example, in February 2001, the government embarked yet again on the task of determining a formal definition of who is an 'indigenous Tanzanian', a racially charged project with the goal of 'indigenous empowerment'.[26] The Minister for Commerce and Industries, Iddi Simba, reports, "We have not yet reached a stage as to define who is an indigenous Tanzanian. If you are going to be ambiguous, then you will let us down". However, in this paper it is ambiguity—or at least a fluid complexity, in reaction to racialised spaces of public discourse—that best describes racial identities and interactions in Tanzanian schools from the colonial period to the present. As seen in educational arenas throughout the country, I argue that it is the growing intense interracial interaction that has shaped the history of race in Tanzania, and deeply affected Tanzanians' personal, community, and national narratives and identities. This argument seeks to overturn the common perception that racial segregation is a more crucial organising principle over the course of Tanzanian history. Moreover, despite the continuation of racialised political rhetoric and pervasive inter-ethnic tension as typified by politicians' cries for 'indigenisation' today or those for integration heard in the high nationalist period of the 1950s and '60s, I argue that everyday relations between Tanzanian Africans and Indians can be normal, civil, and mutually valued. Of course, this is not to say that racial disputes have not and do not arise; quite the contrary, in fact. Instead, it is to argue that these

[26] IPP Media website (www.ippmedia.com), 26 February 2001. See also a pamphlet by Iddi Simba, "*Dhana Ya Uzawa*" ["The Indigenous Concept"], Dar es Salaam, May 2003.

conflicts—such as those seen where race, nationalism, and education are concerned—are simply part of the ongoing creation of Tanzanian society through everyday interactions across racial and all other boundaries. In this respect, 'One Who Wants to Know', together with all the other residents of the region, have always been travelling in the same boat, for better or worse.

Bibliography

Buchert, L. 1994. *Education in the Development of Tanzania, 1919–90*. Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota.

Cameron, J. and W. Dodd. 1970. *Society, Schools and Progress in Tanzania*. Oxford: Pergamon.

Carnoy, M. and J. Samoff. 1990. *Education and Social Transition in the Third World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Cooksey, B., Court, D., and B. Makau. 1994. Education for Self-Reliance and Harambee. In Barkan, J.D. (Ed) *Beyond Capitalism and Socialism in Kenya and Tanzania*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Cross, M. 1999. *Imagery of Identity in South African Education, 1880–1990*. Durham: Carolina Academic Press.

Dolan, L.F. 1970. *Transition From Colonialism to Self-Reliance in Tanzanian Education*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan School of Education.

Frederikse, J. 1992. *All Schools for All Children: Lessons for South Africa from Zimbabwe's Open Schools*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Iliffe, J. 1979. *A Modern History of Tanganyika*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kaiser, P. 1996. *Culture, Transnationalism, and Civil Society: Aga Khan Social Service Initiatives in Tanzania*. London: Praeger.

Mbilinyi, M.L. 1979. Secondary Education. In Hinzen, H. and V.H. Hundsdorfer. (Eds) *Education for Liberation and Development: The Tanzanian Experience*. Hamburg: UNESCO Institute for Education, pp. 76–87.

Mhina, J.E.F. 1970. Education In and Around Dar es Salaam. In Sutton, J.E.G. (Ed) *Dar es Salaam: City, Port and Region*, a special edition of *Tanzania Notes and Records*. 71 pp. 175–80.

Morrison, D. 1976. *Education and Politics in Africa: The Tanzanian Case*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Pampallis, J. 1991. Private Schooling: Problems of Elitism and Democracy in Education. In Unterhalter, E., H. Wolpe, and T. Botha. (Eds) *Education in a Future South Africa*. Oxford: Heinemann, pp. 171–185.

Pratt, C. 1976. *The Critical Phase in Tanzania, 1945–1968: Nyerere and the Emergence of A Socialist Strategy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rodney, W. 1968. Education and Tanzanian Socialism. In Resnick, I. (Ed) *Tanzania: Revolution by Education*. Arusha: Longmans of Tanzania.

Rutashobya, A. 2001. Sponsorship By Shaaban Robert Casts Doubt. Letter to the Editor, *The Guardian* 19.07.01, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

Said, M. 1998. *The Life and Times of Abdulwahid Sykes (1924–1968): The Untold Story of the Muslim Struggle against British Colonialism in Tanganyika*. London: Minerva Press.

NATION, RACE AND HISTORY IN ZIMBABWEAN POLITICS

Brian Raftopoulos

One of the central features of the Zimbabwean crisis, as it has unfolded since 2000, has been the emergence of a revived nationalism delivered in a particularly virulent form, with race as a key trope within the discourse, and a selective rendition of the liberation history deployed as a an ideological policing agent in the public debate. A great deal of commentary has been deployed to describe this process, much of it concentrating on the undoubted coercive aspects of the politics of state consolidation in Zimbabwe. My intention in this paper is to provide a more careful examination of the ideological project of the Mugabe regime and, in particularly, to concentrate on the ways in which both 'insiders' and 'outsiders' are defined in this national project. In this analysis it is important to keep in mind that, in a Gramscian sense, the Zimbabwean crisis has also resulted in the reconstruction of the post-colonial state in order to provide both the modality for and consolidate the accumulation drive of the ruling party elite in the country (Raftopoulos and Phimister 2004).

However the manner in which the ideological battle has been fought by the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front [ZANU PF] as a party and a state is of particular importance in trying to understand the ways in which a beleaguered state is attempting not only to extend its dominant economic and political objectives, but also its

> …intellectual and moral unity, posing all questions around which the struggle rages not on a corporate level but on a 'universal' plane, and thus creating the hegemony of a fundamental group over a series of subordinate groups (Gramsci 1971: 182).

For the manner in which Mugabe has articulated the Zimbabwean crisis has impacted not only on the social forces in the country but also on the African continent and in the diaspora. Such an ambitious political outreach demands that we view the Zimbabwean state as more than a "simple, dominative or instrumental model of state power," but as a state with a more complex and multi-dimensional political strategy (Hall 1996: 429; Hall 1980).

In this multi-dimensional strategy, the state has monopolised the national media to develop an intellectual and cultural strategy that has resulted in a persistent bombardment of the populace with a regular and repeated series of messages. Moreover this strategy has been located within a particular historical discourse around national liberation and redemption, which has also sought to capture a broader Pan Africanist and anti-imperialist audience. A key tenet of this redemptionist logic has been the reawakening of the Zimbabwean nation from the colonial nightmare into a more essentialist African consciousness, defined by the select bearers of the liberation legacy. As Vimbai Chivaura, a media ideologue of the ruling party expressed it:

> …right now we are destroyed spiritually. We are suffering from what psychologists say (sic) somnambulism. We are really sleepwalking, walking corpses, zombies.… We are carrying other people's world view (Gandhi and Jambaya 2002: 10).

Moreover in articulating this ideological strategy the ruling party has drawn on deep historical reservoirs of antipathy to colonial and racial subjugation in Zimbabwe, Southern Africa and Africa more generally, and on its complex inflections in the diaspora. Thus the Mugabe message is no mere case of peddling a particular form of false consciousness, but it carries a broader and often visceral resonance, even as it as it draws criticisms for the coercive forms of its mobilisation. Additionally for many progressive African intellectuals there is an internal tension over the content and form of politics of Mugabe's Pan Africanist message, particularly in the face of the of the dominant message of empire offered by the Bush/Blair axis. Thus within Zimbabwe the opposition to Mugabe is not only expressed in the political polarisation in the country, but often in the more complex forms in which the nationalist messages are interpellated within 'our selves', given both the historical resonance of the messages and the unpalatable coercive forms of its delivery. It is also a feature of this ideology that it attempts to naturalise the unity of the nation by concealing the internal ethnic tensions within the polity and the reality of Shona political dominance.

Nation and Race

In Zimbabwe the state has a monopoly control over the electronic media through such laws as the Broadcasting Services Act (2001) and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (2002). Through

such instruments the ruling party has been able to saturate the public sphere with its particularist message and importantly to monopolise the flow of information to the majority rural population. Through this extensive media control the idea of the nation has been conveyed through essentialist and Manichean terms. Thus, as a report on the ways in which Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) delivered views on the nation in 2002, concluded:

> ZBC's conceptualisation on 'nation' was simplistic. It was based on race: The White and Black race. Based on those terms, the world was reduced to two nations- the White nation and the black nation and these stood as mortal rivals. The Black nation was called Africa. Whites were presented as Europeans who could only belong to Europe just as Africa was for Africans and Zimbabwe for Zimbabweans (Gandhi and Jambaya 2002: 4).

The report further noted that in the national broadcaster's definition of nation:

> Blackness or Africanness was given as the cardinal element to the definition. The exclusion of other races deliberately or otherwise from the 'African' nation was an attempt to present Africans as having a separate and completely exclusive humanity to any other race (Gandhi and Jambaya 2002: 5).

As a constituent part of such essentialist ides on the nation, ZANU PF ideologues often presented Manichean views on national values. In a programme called 'National Ethos' Chivaura proclaimed:

> Since the value system of the Europeans, of the White man, of the Rhodesian in Zimbabwe, is exclusive, it is racist, it does not have any place for us....we should come up with this kind of ethos: Zimbabwe for Zimbabweans, Africa for Africans, Europe for Europeans. This is the starting point because that's what they do (Gandhi and Jambaya 2002: 8).

This view echoed Mugabe's attack on Blair at the Earth Summit in Johannesburg in 2002, and repeated in South Africa in April 2004. In Mugabe's words:

> And that's why I told him that he can keep his England.....Yes we keep our own Zimbabwe close to the bosom, very close (Herald 27/04/2004).

Thus the repetitive thrust of the national broadcaster's political programming has been around an essentialist perception of nation and race, linked to a crude racial dualism on national values, and bound up with a narrow and restrictive view of national unity. In the words of one of the party intellectuals:

> You must understand that as Zimbabweans and as Africans . . . . that we are trying to come up with one thinking, one vision of survival as a race because we are attacked as a race (Gandhi and Jambaya 2002: 8).

For the Mugabe regime the emergence of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change [MDC] in 1999 was a manifestation of foreign British and White influence in Zimbabwean politics. This construction of the opposition thus placed them outside of a legitimate national narrative, and thrust it into the territory of an alien, un-African and treasonous force that 'justified' the coercive use of the state in order to contain and destroy such a force. Mugabe's description of the MDC aptly captures this characterisation of the opposition:

> The MDC should never be judged or characterised by its black trade union face; by its youthful student face; by its salaried black suburban junior professionals; never by its rough and violent high-density lumpen elements. It is much deeper than these human superfices; for it is immovably and implacably moored in the colonial yesteryear and embraces wittingly or unwittingly the repulsive ideology of return to white settler rule. MDC is as old and as strong as the forces that control it; that converges on it and control it; that drive and direct; indeed that support, sponsor and spot it. It is a counter revolutionary Trojan horse contrived and nurtured by the very inimical forces that enslaved and oppressed our people yesterday (Mugabe 2001: 88).

Having discursively located the opposition as an alien political force, the full coercive force of the state was brought to bear on those regarded as 'unpatriotic' and 'puppets of the West'. Deploying elements of the police, intelligence service, army, the war veterans, party supporters and the youth militia, the ruling party has inflicted enormous damage on the personnel and structures of the opposition. As a result between 2000 and 2004, 90% of MDC MPs have reported violations against themselves, 60% have reported attacks on their families and staff, while 50% have had their property vandalised or destroyed. Additionally the MDC leadership have spent "months in police cells, in prison and in the courts, facing charges ranging from high treason and murder, to spreading alarm and despondency" (Zimbabwe Institute 2004: 16). This ruling party violence unleashed against the MDC was accompanied by Mugabe's formal renunciation of the policy of reconciliation towards the white community that his government had adopted in 1980. In 2002, in response to the white support for the opposition, he declared:

> We extended a hand of reconciliation to people like Ian Smith and said that if you want to stay in this country and obey our laws under Black

> majority rule with you coming under them, stay. Was that right or wrong? I think that today at conscience I say on behalf of the party we made a mistake. When you forgive those who do not accept forgiveness, when you show mercy to those who are hard-hearted, when you show non-racialism to die-hard racists; when you show a people with a culture-false culture of superiority based on their skin—and you do nothing to get them to change their personality, their perceptions, their mind, you are acting as a fool (Gandhi and Jambaya 2002: 9).

Commentators on the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation, building on this position, denounced those Zimbabweans who voted for the MDC as badly raised children who had strayed outside of 'our world view':

> The problem is very fundamental, and that is upbringing.... Our children, who vote against their own heritage, who vote against their own people, who vote together with whites, who fight on the side of whites, they don't know the difference between the White man's world view and our world view, the White man's agenda and our agenda (Gandhi and Jambaya 2002: 11).

Aside from the white population, urban residents have been a major target of the ruling party's coercive and ideological attacks, because of their dominant support for the opposition. Historically the relations between the liberation movement and urban workers has been characterised by ambiguities and tension. Thus, the fact that the MDC emerged out of the labour and constitutional movements, both largely urban based, cemented the view within the ruling party that this segment of the population remained a problem for nationalist mobilisation. Since the late 1990s, when a strong opposition emerged, the workers have been consistently derided as 'totemless', deracinated and at the periphery of the liberation legacy. They have been characterised as 'the ones who are leading the nation astray', unlike the peasants who are always "on the right path....not distracted by issues that are peripheral....know the fundamentals" (Gandhi and Jambaya 2002: 6). Yet unlike the 'alien' whites, who can be expelled from the body politic, black urban workers are less easily dispensed with. Therefore while ZANU PF have used various state organs against urban residents, the policy has also been to bring these 'misguided Africans' back into 'our world view.' Thus Mugabe's paternal advice to his party:

> We have a strong basis for recovering support in urban areas. There is palpable disenchantment with the opposition and people want to be walked back to their party. Let us assist them through vigorous campaigning and strong resilient structures (Mugabe 2001: 102).

Nation, History and Culture

Scholars have observed that the writing of history has often been used to 'legitimate' the nation—state, both in an attempt to 'naturalise' it as the central principle of political organisation, and to make it the "subject and object of historical development" (Berger, Donovan and Passmore 1999: xv). In Zimbabwe there has been clear evidence of this process since 2000 in particular. Terence Ranger has recently tracked the emergence of this 'Patriotic History', noting its narrowing focus, resentment of 'disloyal' historical questions, antagonism towards academic history and its highly politically charged nature (Ranger 2004). As part of the attempts to revive ZANU PF's political fortunes in the 2000 general election and the 2002 Presidential election, the ruling party placed a strong emphasis on reviving the narrative of the liberation struggle in general and the heroic roles of ZANU PF and Mugabe in particular. An unbroken thread of struggle was woven incorporating the First Chimurenga of the 1890s, the Second Chimurenga of the 1970s and the Third Chimurenga of land occupations in the period from 2000 and beyond. In the official history of the ruling party the transcendent feature of the three phases was the continuous nationalist struggle for sovereignty and dignity. From Ambuya Nehanda to Robert Mugabe and the national liberation movement the teleology of national consciousness unfolded with an ineluctable logic, contradicting the findings of the recent historiography on Zimbabwean nationalism (Raftopoulos 1999). This construction of a long and continuous past for the nation, even while confronting the challenges of modernity, is a common feature of nationalist movements (Eley and Suny 1996). Additionally in rolling out this message the emergence of the MDC and the civic movement is viewed as an interruption and detour in the 'legitimate' history of national liberation.

Mugabe has been at the forefront of proclaiming the need to write 'correct' history:

> Measures will be taken to ensure that the History of Zimbabwe is rewritten and accurately told and recorded in order to reflect the events leading to the country's nationhood and sovereignty. Furthermore Zimbabwean History will be made compulsory up to Form Four (Mugabe 2001: 65).

This position was restated by the ZANU PF Secretary for External Affairs in April 2004, noting that the party had in the last few years introduced the teaching of history in the National Youth Service scheme, a euphemism for the ruling party youth militia. As Mutasa lamented:

> We erroneously did not fan the fire of our nation and struggle for independence among our children. That fire almost went out as our children knew nothing of that invaluable history (The Voice 25/04/2004).

The government has also introduced a compulsory course, known as 'National and Strategic Studies' at colleges and polytechnics. The content of the course, according to a recent account, is a highly selective history designed to glorify the ruling party. Recent exam questions have included:

– "Which political party represents the interests of imperialists and how must it be viewed by Zimbabweans?"
– "African leaders who try to serve the interests of imperialists are called what and how do you view patriotism?" (Independent 26/03/2004)

The National Broadcaster, particularly in the year of the Presidential election in 2002, steadily churned out its version of African History, including such statements from a small group of commentators:

> Whites did not have a history. By the time we had civilisations whites were still in caves.... The oldest excavations were found in Africa especially in South Africa and in geological times, you find that the centre of the universe was Africa (Gandhi and Jambaya 2002: 7).

These commentators have also stressed the continuities of Zimbabwean and African history, as well as making apparently unproblematic links to black histories in the diaspora, in the service of the ruling party's political project of a revived Pan Africanism. Mafeje has commented that the use of 'Africanity' by some 'modern black intellectuals' has become a "pervasive ontology that straddles space and time" and extends beyond continental Africans "to all Blacks of African descent in the diaspora" (Mafeje 2000: 69). This is certainly the case in Zimbabwe where the ruling party and the intellectuals close to it have made both political and ideological links to a particular formulation of black history in the diaspora, with no attention to the historical and cultural disjunctions between the two. The showing of Alex Haley's "Roots" in the run-up to the 2002 Presidential Election was a clear illustration of this attempted linkage. In turn this notion of a common African history is juxtaposed to a homogeneous conception of Whiteness. The targets for this ideological programme have been both national and international as the ruling party has sought to legitimise and build support at both levels.

In this narrative of liberation, a common African history and Pan Africanist solidarity, the land has played a determining role as the key

marker of a common struggle. It has formed the centrepiece of the ruling party's construction of belonging, exclusion and history. The official discourse on the liberation struggle has been marked by the translation of a multi-faceted anti-colonial struggle into a singular discourse designed to legitimate the authoritarian nationalism that has emerged around the land question since 2000 (Hammar, Raftopoulos and Jensen 2003). In Mugabe's words:

> We knew and still know that the land was the prime goal for King Lobengula as he fought British encroachment in 1893; we knew and still know that land was the principal grievance for our heroes of the First Chimurenga, led by Nehanda and Kaguvi. We knew and still know it to be the fundamental premise of the Second Chimurenga and thus a principal definer of the succeeding new Nation and State of Zimbabwe. Indeed we know it to be the core issue of the Third Chimurenga which you and me are fighting, and for which we continue to make such enormous sacrifices (Mugabe 2001: 92–3).

During the 2002 Presidential election this liberation rhetoric was accompanied by a cultural programme that saturated the public with liberation war films, documentaries and dramas, promoting ZANU PF generally and Robert Mugabe in particular, while also carrying strong messages against whites. Music, coordinated by the Department of Information and Publicity, was produced in the form of the Third Chimurenga series of albums. The songs regularly included an emphasis on the sharp racial delineations in the nation. For example the song *Mwana Wevhu* (Son of the Soil.) by Taurai Mteki intoned "the Country is ours/..../Zimbabwe is for Black people." Another song by Comrade Chinx carried the same message: "They came from Britain, America... They do not know that the land is for Blacks and full of milk and honey" (Gandhi and Jambaya 2002: 12). In these songs the 'enemies of the people' were also warned, as in a song written by the then Minister of Youth, Gender and Employment Creation, Elliot Manyika: "There are some people who have become sell-outs/because of their love of money/...inability to reason./ Take such people and teach them the ZANU PF dogma/ ZANU PF was born out of blood" (Gandhi and Jambaya 2002: 12).

Amongst the most damaging aspects of the telling of this national narrative through a series of dualisms (black/white, British/Zimbabwean), and compressions of the various aspects of the anti-colonial struggle into a single field of force, has been both the simplification of ethnic divisions in post-colonial Zimbabwe, and the enormous loss of complexity of the

colonial encounter. The complexity of the settler-colonial period (not least of which included the changing relations between the black elite and different settler regimes) has been flattened into a Mugabe/Blair colonial encounter (White 2003: 97). While the demonisation of Whites has served the needs of authoritarian nationalist politics in Zimbabwe, it has prevented a more creative, tolerant and difficult dialogue on the European influences in the making of Zimbabwean identities. For such a dialogue would not be conducive for the kind of Manichean diatribes on nation and race, that have in recent years constituted the standard fare of ZANU PF politics. In Southern Africa, where the scars, memories and structural legacies of white supremacist politics are still very much alive, the politics of nationalism will for the foreseeable future, and of necessity, include the articulation of racial redress, often referred to as 'The National Question'. The form that this will take, however, will, in large part, be determined by the broader terrain of democratic struggle in particular countries.

The On-Going National Question and the South African Dimension

The Mugabe government has worked hard to generalise its model of resolving the national question, based largely on the model of land reform through violent land occupations, articulated through a Pan Africanist and anti-imperialist discourse. Moreover in this model the human rights question and the democratic demands of civic groups are dismissed as an extension of Western intervention, with little relevance to the 'real issues' of economic empowerment. It is certainly true, as Shivji has pointed, that the human rights discourse can often be the acceptable face of neo-liberalism (Shivji 2003: 115). However Shivji has dangerously underestimated the strategic importance of fighting around human and civic rights questions, when confronted by repressive nationalist regimes legitimating their politics through purportedly progressive redistributive policies. Moreover when such a position is addressed through a less than critical call for a revived nationalism on the continent (Shivji 2004), it is very difficult to understand what the progressive features of such a nationalist politics would look like. Certainly the experience of Zimbabwe's revived nationalism is not encouraging.

In South Africa the Zimbabwean debate has taken on a particular resonance, not least because of the apparent popularity of Mugabe

amongst many South Africans. On a broader level there are many aspects of the history and politics of Zimbabwe that resonate in the current South African context (Phimister and Raftopoulos 2004; South-all 2003; Melber 2003). Zimbabwean commentators close to the ruling party have not hesitated to 'shame' the South African government into taking more Africanist political positions. A recent article in the state weekly paper entitled "South Africa's black nation must stand up", was unambiguous in its intent:

> The South African black elite has demonstrated a sickening penchant and yearning for acceptance and inclusion by white liberals and the West to a point where their public conduct is such a charade that they have squandered many opportunities to take leadership not just in South Africa but also across the continent and the world. Black South African lawyers, journalists, business people and diplomats are so embarrassingly pretentious in their conduct and expression of views that they become at once annoying and irrelevant as they never come out as folks with minds of their own. By and large they seem uncomfortable to be Africans and are always keen to find an apology for their own existentialism (Sunday Mail 25/04/2004).

It has to be said that this pompous and accusatory tone is not uncommon amongst the ZANU PF elite, and it has often elicited a certain diffidence from the black elite in South Africa in their efforts not be seen as sub-imperial actors, working outside of the Africanist position. Mugabe has been particularly adept at positioning the ANC in this strategic difficulty. Joel Netshitenzhe expressed these dilemmas in a series of strategic problems that confront the ANC on the Zimbabwe question:

> How do we ensure that…persuasion makes the maximum impact? How do we avoid a situation in which our public stance achieves the opposite of our objectives, including popular mobilisation against South Africa as Big Brother trying to impose its will on others? How do we discourage the tendency towards total collapse and the emergence of a "failed state" of ethnic fiefdoms, attached to which would be complexities of a 19th century history which has close and emotional ethnic connections to South Africa (The Star 25/02/2004).

On the left of the ANC alliance the ambiguities on the Zimbabwe question have been striking, vacillating between a grudging admiration for the redistributive rhetoric of the land occupations, a distrust for perceived neo-liberal leanings of the MDC, and a concern over the repressive politics of ZANU PF. Thus Pallo Jordan has set out his analysis of the Zimbabwean crisis in the following terms:

> While a number of parties and governments have adapted to and embraced the post-liberation wave, others thought they could resist it by riding the leopard of other sources of discontent. ZANU (PF) chose the latter course and embraced illegal land occupations as though it had initiated them. It then harnessed the energy of that movement for electoral purposes using its activists to intimidate political opponents and to impress voters in to supporting it (Jordan 2003: 172–3).

Jordan then observes that, given this situation, "principled socialists have consequently felt obliged to repudiate the Ton-ton Macoute methods of Zanu (PF) while holding at a distance the MDC, a democratic opposition that seems to lack a social conscience" (Jordan 2003: 173). The Communist Party, after a good deal of hesitation, conflicting signals and weary of not straining relations with its senior alliance partner, finally emerged with a position on the Zimbabwean situation. The Party stated that the crisis in Zimbabwe was a symptom of a "stunted and perverted national democratic revolution in which a parasitic, bureaucratic bourgeoisie has emerged as the dominant class stratum". Moreover the Zimbabwean situation illustrated that "the demagogic appropriation of a progressive nationalist discourse by a bureaucratic capitalist stratum, invariably drives a wedge between radical third-world nationalism and democracy" (Nzimande 2004). Listening to the debate on Zimbabwe it is clear that the issues have been as much about South African politics as the debacle in Zimbabwe. Moreover in developing their varying responses to the contradictions in Zimbabwean politics the left has become, in Devan Pillay's apt phrase, "spellbound by the anti-imperialist rhetoric" (Pillay 2003: 62).

Moreover the 'spell' of anti-imperialism and the resonance of the race debate in Zimbabwe, has found a broader canvas for its articulation in the diaspora. In addition to cementing the support of other liberation movements in Southern Africa, ZANU PF has actively cultivated linkages with a few black civic groups in the US, UK and Australia in an attempt to build Pan Africanist solidarity around the Mugabe project. At a conference of National Liberation Movements organised in Harare in April 2004, three solidarity groups from the diaspora were in attendance namely the December 12 Movement from the US, the Black United Front from the UK and the Aboriginal Nations and People of Australia. In a statement of solidarity with the conference the Black United Front declared:

> We want to revolve and turn back to the way of our ancestors and fathers, back to the African heart, mind and spirit, freedom, justice and equality regardless of creed colour or class. We want to become an African family

> again. The most important thing is to unite- black man and the African woman to produce an African child (The Herald 26/04/2004).

Once again we can see ZANU PF articulating problems of racism in the West to the revived nationalism in Zimbabwe. It should be noted however that groups such as the December 12 Movement have been challenged within the African-American intellectual community. One critique from a group of prominent African American progressives criticised "a twisted kind of Black 'solidarity' that mirrors the 'patriotism' of the white right in the US". Furthermore they condemned those groups "issuing thinly veiled threats" and appropriating to themselves "the colours Red, Black and Green" and labelling as "treasonous all Black criticism of their current Strong Man of choice, Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe" (The Black Commentator 2003). While it can be argued that groups such as the December 12 Movement have no significant presence in Black politics in the US, the continued problem of racism in the West provides the terrain for such race-based identification. Moreover the decline of the Western left and its weakness in dealing with the issues of race in its own politics has further opened up spaces for more narrowly nationalist interventions.

Conclusion

A decade ago I wrote an article on "Race and Nationalism" in Zimbabwe. In re-reading the piece what strikes me most about the analysis, apart from an underestimation of the potential for a revived nationalist project by the ruling party, was its strictly national focus, which even then was a limitation of the article. It is now impossible to confront this subject meaningfully without addressing the broader reach of its effects at both regional and international levels. Mugabe has not only defined the national project around a selective reading of nationalist history and an exclusivist construction of the nation, he has also sought to ensure that this message resonates in other black struggles both regionally and internationally. This exclusive mobilisation around race has been a part of ZANU PF's outlook since its inception (Brickhill 1999: 35). This was unlike the different conditions in South Africa, which produced more emphasis on non-racialism in the liberation movement. However even in South Africa this tradition is already facing strong challenges as the ANC embraces a more Africanist ideological stance.

ZANU PF has set itself the task of establishing a hegemonic project in which the party's narrow definition of the nation is deployed against all other forms of identification and affiliation. In this project the media and selected intellectuals have been used to provide a continuous and repetitive ideological message, in order to set the parameters of a stable national identity conducive to the consolidation of the ruling party. As Zimbabweans listen to the radio, watch television and read the daily newspapers, all controlled by the ruling party, they are being 'informed' about what it means to be a 'good Zimbabwean,' and a 'genuine African'. They are also being told who is the 'enemy' within and without and advised to confront such 'enemies' with ruthless exclusion if necessary. For the present this political assault has seriously closed down the spaces for alternative debates around citizenship and national belonging.

Bibliography

Berger, S., Donovan, M., and K. Passmore (Eds) 1999. *Writing National Histories: Western Europe since 1800*. London and New York: Routledge.

Brickhill, J. 1999. A brief history of socialist politics in Zimbabwe. *Southern Africa Political and Economic Monthly.* 12: 9, pp. 31–37.

Eley, G. and G. Suny. (Eds) 1996. *Becoming National: A Reader*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fletcher. B. et al. 2003. The Debate on Zimbabwe Will Not Be Throttled. *The Black Commentator*, 51.

Gandhi. D. and L. Jambaya. 2002. *Towards a national agenda on ZBC: Vision 30 Revisited.* Harare: Media Monitoring Project of Zimbabwe.

Gramsci. A. 1982. *Selection from Prison Notebooks*. London: Lawrence and Wishart.

Hall. S. 1980. Race, articulation and societies structured in dominance. In *UNESCO Sociological Theories: Race and Colonialism*. Paris: Unesco, pp. 309–346.

———. 1990. *Thatcherism and the Crisis of the Left: The Hard Road to Renewal*. London and New York: Verso.

Hammar. A., Raftopoulos, B., and S. Jensen. (Eds) 2003. *Zimbabwe's Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of Crisis*. Harare: Weaver Press.

Jordan. P. 2003. Review of N. Alexander. An Ordinary Country. *African Sociological Review.* 7: 1, pp. 166–174.

Mafeje. A. 2000. Africanity: A Combative Ontology. *CODESRIA Bulletin.* 1, pp. 66–71.

Melber. H. (Ed) 2003. *Limits to Liberation in Southern Africa: The Unfinished Business of Democratic Consolidation*. Cape Town: HSRC.

Morley. D. and K. Chen. (Eds) 1996 *Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogue in Cultural Studies*. London and New York: Routledge.

Mugabe. R. 2001. *Inside the Third Chimurenga*. Harare: Government of Zimbabwe.

Nzimande. B. 2004. Towards an alternative Southern African development path: Notes for input to Policy Workshop on Zimbabwe—An SACP perspective. Paper presented at the launch of the Zimbabwe Institute, in Johannesburg on 27.02.04.

Phimister. I and B. Raftopoulos 2004. Mugabe, Mbeki and the Politics of Anti-Imperialism. *Review of African Political Economy*. 31: 101, pp. 127–143.

Pillay. D. 2003. Zimbabwe: Silence of the Left. *South African Labour Bulletin.* 27: 6, pp. 61–62

Raftopoulos. B. 1994. Zimbabwe: Race and Nationalism in a Post-Colonial State. In Kaarsholm, B. and J. Hultin. *Inventions and Boundaries: Historical and Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism*. Denmark: Roskilde University.

———. 1999. Problematising Nationalism in Zimbabwe. *Zambezia*. 26: ii, pp. 115–134.

Raftopoulos. B. and T. Yoshikuni. (Eds) 1999. *Sites of Struggle: Essays in Zimbabwe's Urban History*. Harare: Weaver Press.

Raftopoulos B. and I. Phimister. 2004. Zimbabwe Now: Confronting the Political Economy of Crisis and Coercion. *Historical Materialism.* 12: 4, pp. 355–382.

Ranger. T. 2004 Historiography, Patriotic History and the History of the Nation: The Struggle over the past in Zimbabwe. *Journal of Southern African Studies.* 30: 2, pp. 215–234.

Shivji. I. 2003. The Life and Times of Babu: The Age of Liberation and Revolution. *Review of African Political Economy*. 30: 95, pp. 109–118.

———. 2004. *The Rise, the Fall, and the Insurrection of Nationalism in Africa*. Durban: Centre for Civil Society.

Southall. R. 2003. Democracy in Southern Africa: Moving a Difficult Legacy. *Review of African Political Economy.* 30: 96, pp. 255–272.

The Black Commentator 2003. The Debate on Zimbabwe will not be Throttled. July, 51.

White. L. 2003. *The Assassination of Herbert Chitepo: Texts and Politics in Zimbabwe*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

Zimbabwe Institute. 2004. *Playing with Fire: Personal Accounts of Human Rights Abuses Experienced by 50 Opposition Members of Parliament in Zimbabwe, and 28 Opposition Candidates*. Johannesburg: ZI.

PART FIVE

PRESENT, PAST & FUTURE OF CITIZENSHIP IN AFRICA

TEN YEARS AFTER APARTHEID: THE STATE OF NATION-BUILDING IN SOUTH AFRICA

Neville Alexander[1]

With regard to the celebrations of 'ten years of democracy' in 2004, numerous contradictory claims have been made in serious and not so serious publications about the alleged achievements and failures of the new regime. Those debates are exceptionally interesting but very few of them deal with the critical questions that are determining the shape of the future society at the southern tip of the African continent. In order to get to the core issues I wish to address in this paper, I have to spell out briefly a few givens, or insights, that inform my analysis as well as my account of the state of nation-building in post-apartheid South Africa.

To begin with, Eurocentric notions of 'nation', 'race', 'ethnic groups' and other such putative social entities are hegemonic in most parts of Africa. One of the consequences of this fact is that in South Africa, we find it difficult to arrive at strategies that promote, minimally, the networking, and optimally, the integration, of the population of the country. Secondly, in spite of the tenacity of social identities, they are historical phenomena and, thus, changeable, always changing, fluid. The state, because, among other things, of its monopoly on the legitimate control and deployment of force, has what I call the paradigmatic prerogative to establish and impose the 'template' on which social identities are based.

The third given for me is the fact that prejudice and discrimination, viewed as collective behaviour, can only be changed fundamentally if social policy is approached in a holistic manner, i.e., if the material bases on which they thrive are considered to be necessary components of that which has to be changed. I understand the nation, fourthly, to be a historically specific *political* community. Whatever else the 'nation' might be for individuals and groups,[2] it is constituted by people who

---

[1] This is a revised and expanded version of a paper I originally delivered at the University of Cape Town's Summer School on 22 January 2001.

[2] Concepts of the nation based on what is called 'community of culture' and

have been thrown together through particular historical events and who have thereby acquired a community of interest in spite of contradictions of both an antagonistic and a non-antagonistic kind.

Fifthly, at a descriptive level, it could be said that any group of rulers in the present era, by whatever route they may have come to power, have, minimally, to establish or/and maintain the coherence of the state and the stability of the society in order, among other things, to attract domestic and foreign investment and to be able to trade and to conduct administrative processes in a more or less consistent manner. The inhabitants or citizens of such an average abstract modern state are, again minimally, concerned that they be allowed to get on with their own affairs and with the general business of life. However, territorial and political-military coherence and the material reality of states do not imply that there is also ideological cohesion and, therefore, social stability.

Generally speaking, people identify with the state as it exists because, given a consciousness of a larger whole, all people need to make sense of where they fit into the picture, as it were. *Ideology* refers to the systematic or paradigmatic explanations which individuals and groups of people fashion or accept in order to make their lives meaningful. In all cases, the ideas of the ruling elites are decisive in regard to the myths, beliefs, values and visions, which the generality of the population accepts. At this level, which is by no means merely 'super-structural', what has to be identified and addressed are those centrifugal moments (lines of cleavage, fault-lines) which divide the population into more or less diverging, even hostile camps. To put it differently, the ruling classes have to mobilise the consent of the entire population to their specific perspective(s) on economic, social and cultural development, i.e., they have to establish their *hegemony*, since no state could endure merely on the basis of coercion through the use of the available repressive apparatuses.

Because of the widespread belief among social scientists and politicians that the *nation state* (or national state) has overstayed its welcome on the planet, it is essential that I stress the continuing reality of this

---

'community of language' are widely held throughout the world. It would be simplistic to deny the social reality of such constructs under particular historical conditions. However, on this occasion, I have to desist from discussing these approaches. Elsewhere (among others, Nosizwe 1979; Alexander 1986; Alexander 1989; Alexander 1999 and Alexander 2000), I have discussed this complex of issues in some detail.

entity even in the era of globalisation, when the state is becoming increasingly vulnerable, not to say subject, to the interests of transnational giant corporations (see Castells 1998: 307–308). Finally, as trite as it might seem, I want to stress that all people have *multiple identities*, which are of varying importance to them. Indeed, in a state made up of many social groups of diverse national or geographical origin, the relationship between some of the typifications that people have of who they—and others—are is of paramount importance.

Nation-Building in Africa

Previous attempts at nation-building in post-colonial Africa constitute a very complex area of study. For our purposes on this occasion, however, it suffices to point to only two problematical aspects of this process. They are relevant because the experience of the independent African states, which often had been hosts to South African exiles during the anti-apartheid struggle, inevitably influenced the ways in which nation building was understood and approached by the South African political class.

One of the issues to note is that because of the hegemony of the European concept of nation, it was generally believed that national unity could only be promoted if all the people of the given ex-colonial territory spoke the same language. This had the paradoxical result that the former colonial language (usually English, French or Portuguese) was declared the sole official language as well as the main, or even the only, language of teaching, tuition or training in the educational system. This fact, in turn, had as an unintended consequence—if we view the issue from the perspective of the consciousness of most of the leaders of the independence or liberation movement—the marginalisation of the vast majority of the indigenous people. The economic and ideological reasons for this categorical decision are well known and I shall not discuss them in detail. It suffices to point to the convenience factor, since the aspiring middle class in all of these states had, in most cases, an adequate level of proficiency in the language(s) of power such that they could continue governing the territories concerned by using the existing mechanisms and institutions which, naturally, were based on the dominance of the colonial language. Linked to this—and the phenomenon represents a kind of bridge between innocence and complicity—is the fact that under the conditions of post-colonial rule,

proficiency in the ex-colonial languages became a key to access to social status, political power and economic advantage.[3] Also, there was the very real problem of resources in the short term, especially since the officialisation or even the prioritisation of any one language in the pluri-lingual countries of Africa would in most cases have led to resistance by those communities whose languages had not been thus treated. With very few exceptions (especially Tanzania and Somalia), no African language was ever given the high status that was automatically accorded the ex-colonial languages.[4]

Another area in which nation-building projects in the rest of Africa tended, justifiably, to be extremely cautious was that of ethnic relations. In most of the countries, usually as the result of colonial policy (see Curtin et al. 1981: 575–592), one or other ethnic community was dominant and in all such cases, there was, especially in the first years, a tendency to ensure that all the major groups were represented in parliament as well as in the executive. Again, this preoccupation with 'representivity' was explicable in terms of the need to minimise separatist and divisive tendencies, but in fact the policy entrenched ethnic, i.e., 'tribal', consciousness. It led to what John Saul (1979) called "the dialectic of class and tribe" which, among other things, saw the demoralising phenomenon of 'elections', which were no more than ethnic censuses. As I hope to show, this effect is exacerbated in the South African case because of the manner in which affirmative action has been conceptualised and implemented.

Enduring Legacy of the Racial Fault-Line

South Africa differed from other African countries in certain decisive respects. The obvious salience of the racial question made it very different from the rest of Africa with the exception of settler colonial territories such as Namibia and Rhodesia. 'Race' assumed the same significance in South Africa as 'ethnicity' (or 'tribe') had in other African countries. As long as segregation and apartheid insisted on ethnic and racial discrimination, most of the people, thinking of themselves as so-

---

[3] See Alexandre 1972: 86 for a discussion of language as 'cultural capital' in the post-colonial African context. More generally, see Bourdieu 1994.

[4] Amharic, in Ethiopia, had a status among most of the people of Ethiopia and Eritrea not unlike that of Afrikaans among black people in South Africa. I treat this aspect of the language question in detail in Alexander 2000.

called racial groups, intuitively opposed the forms of oppression that resulted from these policies. That is to say, they necessarily fought for improvements in their conditions of life on the basis of the very social categories which the ruling ideology had inscribed in their consciousness through the manner in which the society had been structured in order to promote the economic and social interests of the rulers. The ambivalence and fluidity of the situation is manifest in the fact that while they assumed these racial identities as 'natural', they were also open to being mobilised to reject notions of 'race' and ethnicity, which were (and are) so obviously tied to their oppression. This explains both the tenacity of the four-nations paradigm which continues to shape the consciousness of most South Africans and the sometimes desperate clinging to a 'non-racial' vision of the future which has been the hallmark of the liberation movement. In this, leaving aside many problematical and polemical issues, the people were given a firm lead by the leadership of the liberation organisations, all of whom had been reared in the universalistic ambiance of Christianity, Islam and Marxism.

The racial caste system—which is what we are dealing with at the level of social psychology—has particular consequences that exacerbate the problem of promoting a sense of national unity. The system itself derives from the historical reality of interdependent groups of people who were integrated into the economic, specifically the labour, processes of the evolving capitalist system in such a manner that none could—and can as yet—do without the others. Archbishop Tutu's mythical 'rainbow nation' is, thus, a brave attempt to make a virtue out of necessity. Not surprisingly, however, it is often abused in order to fix forever the sense of colour or 'race' that sets off one group of people from another. Of course, the Archbishop himself never intended that we should become a nation of hyphenated South Africans, where the word in front of the hyphen is always a racial epithet such as 'black', 'white', 'coloured' or 'Indian'.[5] This is the reason why I believe that his unthinking transporting of the U.S.-American metaphor, deriving as it does from the ethnic grid that serves as the U.S.-American template for social identities, will do more harm than good in the very different South African historical and demographic context. Already, we have

[5] The term 'Indian' also serves to reveal the short jump from colour to other social markers such as language, religion, region or 'culture', which are usually interpreted as indicating potential or actual *ethnic* belonging. See the reference to the work of PuruShotam below.

a whole range of so-called Khoi groups, each representing a mere handful of people, coming out of the woodwork in order to claim a place in the sunny new South Africa for the ethnic entrepreneurs who are 'leading' them.

The recent and continuing discussions about the prevalence of racism, racial prejudice and racial discrimination in the new South Africa, if they show nothing else, demonstrate the urgent need to introduce a new discourse, suggesting a very different set of metaphors, concomitant with radical changes in the ways in which wealth and resources are distributed in this country. In order to consider this matter carefully, it is necessary to look at different ways of seeing post-apartheid South African society that have been proposed by some scholars since the early 1990s in the post-apartheid debates.

In the compendium edited by Liebenberg and Rhoodie, a scathing attack on "the fuzzy notion of 'non-racialism'" was launched by Kierin O'Malley (1994: 77–88) who draws attention to the philistinism and the opportunism of so many South African intellectuals. He mentions the absurd fact, *inter alia*, that "…(a) number of former Afrikaner nationalists have apparently been able to become African nationalists without so much as a background (sic) glance" (O'Malley 1994: 78). Using the spectre of Jacobin nation-building/social engineering, O'Malley warns against the consequences of ignoring the ethnic factor. Even though his portrayal of actual and putative nation-building projects is a caricature and not derived from any systematic texts, as when he suggests that the present rulers want to eradicate "all extant cultural and ethnic sentiment" and promote "their replacement by a new unified and culturally uniform 'Nation'", his basic critique of recent radical scholarship in South Africa is valid. He adopts Horowitz's view that Western scholarship is held in thrall by a pervasive bias against ascriptive social phenomena and that this tendency is exacerbated in South Africa by the hegemony of the neo-Marxist paradigm in the anti-apartheid movement (see O'Malley 1994: 81–82). His article is a thorough-going interrogation of the consistency and *bona fides* of the new-found non-racial discourse among both Afrikaner and African nationalists. Whereas, in his view, the latter are deluding themselves in believing that social phenomena like ethnic groups are non-existent or irrelevant, the former are disingenuously chanting the mantra of non-racialism in their pursuit of a double agenda involving the permanent retention of a share of power by the minority as a group. His plea is for the recognition of the tenacity of 'ethnicity' and for the factoring

in of this element into any equation for guiding the post-apartheid nation-building project.

A similar attack was launched in 1994 by Ran Greenstein on the neglect of 'race', which he calls 'the excluded presence'. As against the neo-Marxist tendency to dismiss race "as little other than a pernicious way for making invidious distinctions among people in order to facilitate class exploitation and political oppression", Greenstein avers that:

> . . . race can and frequently does become an affirmative principle underlying individual and collective identities, partially overlapping and partially competing with other foci of identity (1994: 3).

Essentially, his article is a polemic against dogmatic 'Marxist' and other reductionist approaches to the study of ideology and identity. As such, it is without any doubt a timely and most appropriate challenge to the hubris of closed paradigmatic blueprints. His challenge to the notion that the dominant ideas of an epoch are the ideas of the dominant class(es) is a useful reminder that subaltern groups co-determine the terrain on which ideology takes shape. It does not, as I see it, weaken the thrust of Marx's aphorism which, most scholars would agree, was a kind of peroration to a dramatic theoretical breakthrough.

However, both of these essays are vulnerable to the charge of reification of social phenomena.[6] They ignore, or understate, the possibility and the actuality of the destabilisation of social identities, specifically that of inherited racial identities.[7] The recognition that all human beings are involved in a hierarchy of multiple identities is the dialectical answer to their either-or approach to the question of collective identities in practice. In my own writing, I have consistently used the metaphor of intersecting circles at the centre of each of which stands the individual. As in a Venn diagram, the space that indicates the 'union' of x number of individuals delimits a potential collective identity (Alexander 1994). This 'space' can be 'described' in principle by any marker of social difference such as language, religion, region, etc., and 'awaits' particular conditions to be 'filled' by the relevant people mobilised by

[6] Elsewhere (Alexander 2003: 186), I have suggested that what we have to do in the social sciences is to cultivate the verbalization of discourse along the lines of David Bohm's 'rheomode', so that we can describe the world in Bertolt Brecht's words as being capable of transformation ('änderbar').

[7] O'Malley and Greenstein do not address attempts to influence the deconstruction or construction of social identity from the lived experience (social reality) of the relevant identities for the people concerned.

the activists who wish to further those interests that stand to gain by the occupation of this space.

My approach to this question overlaps to a large extent with that taken by scholars such as Posel and Maré, to which I shall refer presently. I begin by taking it as given that in the first decade of the 21st century, any lingering belief in 'race' as a valid biological entity is anachronistic. Similarly, there ought to be no reason to debate the social reality of 'race'. These are matters on which scholarly consensus can be said to have been reached even though there are many different theories about why these propositions are valid.

The bibliography on the formation of racial identities, viewed as a sub-set of social identities, is a very long one.[8] However, the crucial issue I want to focus on is the fact that in modern times, it is the state that possesses the paradigmatic prerogative, in that social identities are inscribed, as it were, in the hegemonic discourse of those who wield economic, political, military and symbolic power. This is not to deny the equally well attested fact, already referred to above, that the subaltern groups co-determine the set of social or collective identities that eventually come to characterise the particular social formation. They do so by contesting, rejecting or assuming (accepting) the 'prescribed' identities.[9] Often, they also initiate such identities through self-labelling. Such labels, in turn, are sometimes 'accepted' and perpetuated by the dominant strata, if they are deemed to reinforce the promotion of the vested or perceived interests of these strata. In the final analysis, it is the state, by virtue of its monopoly on the deployment of legitimate force, that imposes or reinforces the identities that crystallise over time.

The modalities and technology of racial classification by the state are demonstrated most clearly in the early history of the implementation of apartheid. Posel, one of the few anti-apartheid scholars who has made a detailed study of these processes, concludes that:

> The architects of apartheid racial classification policies recognized explicitly that racial categories were constructs, rather than descriptions of essences.… (Posel 2001a: 109).

---

[8] Useful starting points are Balibar and Wallerstein 1991, Marx 1998, Reisigl and Wodak 2000, Hamilton et al. 2001.

[9] In the South African context, recent examples of such contestation are the labels 'Bantu', 'Coloured' and, at the time of writing, 'Afrikaner', 'Khoi' and even 'African'.

She teases out the almost caricatural irony that precisely because of the life-and-death seriousness with which the apartheid strategists and ideologues viewed the issue of 'race', their attention to detail brought them face-to-face with the anomalies and idiosyncrasies of racial identities.[10] She also traces the real trajectories by which these nefarious and totally fantasised notions became internalised to a large extent among the vast majority of the people of the country:

> If constructs, these categories were powerfully rooted in the materiality of everyday life. The ubiquity of the state's racial designations, and the extent to which they meshed with lived hierarchies of class and status, meant that apartheid's racial grid was strongly imprinted in the subjective experience of race.... (It) would be difficult to deny the extent to which the demarcation of South African society into whites, Indians, coloureds, and Africans has been normalized—for many a 'fact' of life (Posel 2001a: 109).

The Practical Political Level

Given that social identities are historical, not primordial, phenomena, the proposition that the state or, less globally, the ruling elites, have the power to create the 'template' from which such identities are derived and shaped over time, devolves a heavy responsibility on those who are placed in charge of overseeing the evolution of a new historical community in a distinctively transitional, indeed transformational, period. To take the attitude that the question of social identities is best left alone or, worse, that the inherited identities should be allowed to perpetuate themselves, is to abdicate the responsibility of leadership and to commit oneself to maintaining the old order in all but name.[11] The importance of this statement was driven home for me when I recently read PuruShotam's study on Singapore, in which she undertakes a detailed analysis of the eminently comparable race-relations paradigm that has come to determine the fate of the social groups, specifically

---

[10] The classic reference here is the apocryphal story of Pappa Doc's definition of the population of Haiti as being 95% 'white'.

[11] In a recent article, Pallo Jordan (2004), the new Minister of Arts and Culture, in comparing the South African 'transition to democracy' with that of other countries, noted pertinently that all of them had in common the need to address challenges such as the institutionalisation of a human rights culture, a sustainable economic growth path and political stability, and added that "...In the case of South Africa one has to add a fifth element: the reinvention of a South African identity".

of 'Indians', in that territory. Consider, for example, the significance of the questions she poses with regard to the category 'Indians':

> 'Indian'…is one of the two major 'minority races' that is constituted via Singaporean multiracialism.… 'Indian' as here used does not make this a case study of 'Indians', but a study of the degree and extent to which cultural hegemony, condensed in the meaningful, intertwined categories of 'modern', 'Chinese' and 'nation', prevails in Singapore. Thus, how does a population that is made a minority, precisely by its position in a category that ensures their continual secondariness to a demographically majority population, come to accept that membership and—what is more, *to work to ensure its reproduction*? Alternatively, does it really do that? Does this therefore reflect a happy balance between having a racial identity and yet being fully equal in status and positioning, that a multiracial program based on 'justice and equality for all' ongoingly manages to achieve? (PuruShotam 1998: 17).

In South Africa today, the ruling party appears to have failed to grasp the unique opportunity afforded it by history to initiate a completely different socio-psychological and cultural trajectory. It appears to see only the very obvious aspects of what—in the light of an illuminating metaphorical flash by Chatterjee (1993)—I have called 'the moment of manoeuvre'. In order to appreciate both the possibilities and the limits of the moment with regard to the promotion of national unity and the social integration of post-apartheid South Africa, it is helpful to consider what happened in a comparable situation that has a special significance for South Africans.

Social revolutions are by definition periods of radical transformation in all, or most, aspects of a society.[12] A glance at what happened in Cuba after the 1959 revolution should, therefore, give us useful pointers to what is possible, given that one of the most fundamental objectives of the revolutionary leadership was the eradication of racism and racist attitudes and behaviour.[13] With reference to the role of the state in the pre-1959 republican period of modern Cuban history, de la Fuente, in his authoritative and exhaustive study of this question, states that:

---

[12] The following paragraphs, slightly amended, are taken from an address I delivered on 3 April 2004 at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign on the occasion of the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the celebrated Supreme Court ruling in the Brown v Board of Education case.

[13] Cuba has a special political significance for South Africans and Namibians because of the unwavering support which the revolutionary government gave to their respective struggles for social and national liberation.

> …(more) often than not…it is the failure of the government to act that has contributed the most to the continuing significance of race in Cuban society. The state's limited intervention in "private" social spaces has meant that racism has been allowed to operate virtually unhindered in this sphere…(2001: 336).

After 1959, there was a concerted effort "to socialize younger generations in a new egalitarian and colour-blind social ethic" (de la Fuente 2001: 337). The same author gives an account of the advances that the Cuban revolution made in this respect and, in his own words, concludes that "…[the] impact of this radical program of social engineering should not be underestimated" (de la Fuente 2001: 337).

On the other hand, he points to the 'paradoxes' that emerged in the process. In particular, he is critical of the way in which the colour-blind ethos invisibilised 'race' and thereby rendered it difficult and even impossible to track positive (or negative) change or to launch serious public discussions of the issue:

> Thus the ultimate irony is that the same government that did the most to eliminate racism also did the most to silence discussion about its persistence (de la Fuente 2001: 338)

> Despite its antidiscriminatory position and egalitarian social policies, the revolutionary government failed to create the color-blind society it envisioned in the early 1960s (de la Fuente 2001: 322).

These conclusions have a salutary ring for even the most starry-eyed South African optimist in regard to strategies calculated to eliminate racism and racial prejudice. For, if in a society that had undergone such a profound social transformation as post-revolutionary Cuba, it is a fact that after 45 years, racial prejudice has not been eliminated and, worse still, that under conditions of the re-marketisation of large sectors of the post-Soviet Cuban economy, even exploitative racist labour practices are becoming 'normal' again, it is self-evident that in post-apartheid South Africa, where no such social revolution has taken place, we are faced with an inordinately more complex and difficult challenge.

That the attenuation and eventually the elimination of racial prejudice and discrimination will take many decades is almost self-evident. However, what the Cuban experience underlines is that the state has ample room for creating conditions in which the salience of 'race' and the rigidity of racially defined identities can be reduced and gradually changed in a more positive direction. It also raises the very difficult question, in the context of post-apartheid South Africa of how "…formerly

excluded communities (can) be recognised without perpetuating apartheid categorisations…" (Abebe 2001: 2). Franklin reminds us of the real challenge we face on the ground. With reference to the USA, he writes that:

> African-American biological features, when associated with class and cultural differences, are more indissoluble than ethnic differences in the absence of biological ones. Race ideology as it applies to African-Americans…is ever-present and "helps insiders make sense of the things they do and see—ritually, repetitively—on a daily basis"…Race thinking and interpretations of events, even when incorrect, provide coherence to both whites and blacks, albeit for different reasons.… *Breaking away from the perennial patterns of activity is a necessary precondition to eliminating the ideological categories that explain and justify the animosities embedded in everyday practices* (1993: xxiii) (Emphasis added).

It is necessary to underline two related questions that I believe require of us an unequivocal commitment, especially in South Africa, where a new historical community is coming into being. The first of these is the fact, to which I have referred above, that social identities are inherently unstable and malleable, within definite but generally unknown limits.[14] The importance of this proposition is that there is no barrier in principle to any attempt to create conditions in a conscious and planned manner that will facilitate the strengthening of certain kinds of social categories rather than others. This obviously raises the range of ethical questions connected with the notion of social engineering. In my view, all governments are involved in social engineering to some degree or another at all times. The real challenge is to ensure that through open, democratic debate in the media and in other civil-society forums an authoritarian political culture does not become the norm.

The second question, which has also been touched on earlier, is whether or not a 'race-less' society is possible or even desirable. Ellis Cose puts the crucial question in the following terms:

> …whether it is possible to divorce any system of racial classification from the practice of racial discrimination, whether a nation splintered along

[14] Space does not allow me to discuss the fascinating debates currently being conducted in South Africa about what it means to be an 'African' or an 'Afrikaner', among others. Suffice it to say that in the social laboratory of post-apartheid South Africa, we are able to observe first-hand the remaking of apparently immutable social identities.

> racial lines—a nation that feels compelled to rank people on the basis of race (aesthetically; professionally; socially; and, most insistently, intellectually)—is capable of changing that propensity any time soon (1998: 26).

In the South African debate, the one side of the argument is put very clearly and firmly by, among others, Abebe, who argues that the majority of South Africans place much greater weight on their 'primary' identity, determined by 'race' or 'ethnic group' than on the national (South African) identity:

> To deny this is to repeat the common mistake, especially on the part of the Left, to underestimate the ontological commitments to racial and ethnic identities and their role in shaping historical struggles. (Abebe 2001: 14).[15]

As against this, on the side of the so-called Left, we have to record increasing ambivalence. As the ANC-led government's vulnerability[16] to a social paradigm that includes centrally the continuation of the notion of racial identities takes ever firmer hold on the consciousness of the population, reinforced by the cynical, profit-orientated and consumerist practices of the Establishment media, ever fewer people are willing to speak up for the possibility of that different world, the race-less and, let it not be forgotten, the *classless*, society that was the lodestar of the liberation struggle. I myself continue to take as my compass the views elaborated in their seminal study by Balibar and Wallerstein in which they assert, among other things that all social identities are 'historical constructs' that are 'perpetually undergoing reconstruction'. In recent years, because of the hegemony of 'race thinking' in the 'new' South Africa, I have become more conscious of the significance of the caveat they added at the time:

> That is not to say they are not solid or meaningful or that we think them ephemeral. Far from it! But these values, loyalties, identities are never primordial and, that being the case, any historical description of their structure or their development through the centuries is necessarily primarily a reflection of present-day ideology (1991: 228).

---

[15] Also, see Greenstein 1994 and O'Malley 1994.

[16] In order to understand the social and historical sources of this vulnerability, see, among others, my analyses in Nosizwe 1979, Alexander 1986 and Alexander 1999.

The Affirmative Action Conundrum

The strategies of the post-apartheid governments to achieve 'historical redress', variously referred to as affirmative action, levelling the playing fields, redressing the imbalances of the past, corrective action, and other such elegant variations, are restricted by as many material as ideological constraints. In a sentence, the dilemma of the South African government, which was placed in office as the result of a decade of recurring waves of mass mobilisation for fundamental social transformation during the 1980s, is constituted by the fact that because there was no social revolution, it has to find constitutional and peaceful means in order to effect a gradual transfer of power to, and a redistribution of resources in favour of, in addition to the acquisition of knowledge and skills by 'the people', whom it represents.

Symbolic power, it can be said, is almost completely under the control of the leadership of the African National Congress and its allies. Those who control military and economic power have, by and large, come to terms with this fact. In the present context, it is pertinent to point out that the very same individuals who were financing the divisive 'multi-national', i.e., racist, policies of the Afrikaner National Party are today financing the 'non-racial', nation-building strategy of the African National Congress!

In the context of the 'negotiated revolution' or of a 'regime change', it is obvious that if there were to be any sudden or rapid redistribution of economic resources (wealth), the confidence of property owners and especially of investors, in the stability and sustainability of the new dispensation would vanish overnight. The consequences of such a development are, in the hackneyed phrase eternalised by John Vorster, too ghastly to contemplate. For this reason, affirmative action programmes similar to those undertaken in the USA have come to be the preferred mode of 'levelling the playing field'. With the exception of a fringe group of irredentist Afrikaner ('Boer') racists, there is not much disagreement among South Africans that historical redress is essential if peace and progress are to prevail during the next few generations. How, and how rapidly this process should happen, remains a national bone of contention.

Four anchor laws have been passed in order to effect the gradual change in favour of what is incongruously labelled 'the *previously* disadvantaged'. These are the Employment Equity Act, the Public Service Laws Amendment Act, the Skills Development Act and the Skills Devel-

opment Levy Act.[17] In a nutshell, these laws are calculated to make all workplaces and all state or state-aided institutions representative of the 'demographics' of the country, i.e., to ensure racial proportionality. The relevant 'races' are exactly the same four categories entrenched during the forty lost years of apartheid, namely, so-called Africans, whites, coloureds and Indians. The rationale for this approach is quite simply that we have to use the same categories that were differentially treated then in order to both determine the quanta of preference that will incrementally reduce the supposed handicaps (or head starts) of the different groups and at the same time also enable us to 'measure' the fact and the rate of change that it is assumed will be effected by these means. In Posel's elegant turn of phrase: "…[previously] the locus of privilege, now race has become the site of redress" (Posel 2001b: 17).

This is not the place to discuss the effectiveness or even the overall desirability of the specific strategy adopted by the ANC-led government in order to ensure the redistribution and the augmentation of economic resources, knowledge and skills. Suffice it to say that this discussion is the very stuff of parliamentary politics in South Africa today and though it is my opinion that we have here the typical emission of much sound and even more fury both of which signify nothing, it is precisely these theatrics that ought to convince us that South Africa has become what I have dubbed 'an ordinary country' (Alexander 2002). My concern is rather with the formation and entrenchment of racialised identities in a situation and in a period where precisely this eventuality might be avoided.[18]

The issues that arise are obvious to all but those who will not see. Let us, by way of example, consider the (deliberate?) confusion emanating from one of the most high-profile government bureaucrats and ANC leaders. In an article, written in the context of a debate on whether

---

[17] For the purposes of this paper, I do not consider the recent preoccupation with so-called (Black Economic) Empowerment Charters in major economic sectors, since these affect, generally speaking, only a tiny layer of upwardly mobile black middle-class individuals. For a damning indictment on the greed and venality of the emerging black bourgeoisie and black middle class, see Mda 2004.

[18] Posel 2001a; 2001b, and Maré 2001, among others have spelled out in some detail the paradoxes and the possible unintended consequences inherent in the application of this particular approach to historical redress. The History Workshop of the University of the Witwatersrand and the Wits Institute for Social and Economic Research fashioned a timely forum for many of the country's intellectuals and activists to discuss these and related issues in a high-profile conference under the umbrella title: *The Burden of Race? 'Whiteness' and 'Blackness' in Modern South Africa* (5–8 July 2001).

South Africa's 'transition to democracy' can be said to have come to an end after only ten years, he comes down firmly on the side of an indefinite process of change for the better. With regard to the question of identity, he opines, in a revealing mixture of metaphors, *pathos* and *bathos*, that:

> The legacy of apartheid is deeply embedded in everybody's subconscious, and we must draw it out, bring it out of the closet, deprive it of its subliminal abodes. Here I hasten to make a distinction between racial awareness (and embracing of difference) and racism (the use of racial categories as a basis for discrimination). I recognise the need for and urgency of a variety of interventions—quotas, empowerment targets and affirmative action. But these are much easier to achieve than undermining the psycho-social manifestations of racial typecasting.... Those born since the birth of true democracy in this country must be saved from the racist psychosis in which apartheid justifies all manner of self-interest.... (It) is not our generation that will enjoy a truly non-racial society (Morobe 2004).

This apparent unawareness of the implications of continuing the racial typecasting of apartheid's grey men in order supposedly to eliminate 'racism' is reminiscent of the cavalier approach to the AIDS pandemic displayed by some of the leaders of the ANC. For, from the point of view of the civil service (and even of large civil-society organisations), the question: who does the racial identification? obtrudes itself. As Posel points out:

> Implementing the Employment Equity Act, along with other more informal strategies of redress informed by the same racial logic, presupposes the capacity to distinguish, once again, between 'Africans', 'Indians', 'Coloureds' and 'whites' (2001b: 18).

And, Maré describes the Orwellian universe of mundane but none the less humiliating procedures that universities, among other parastatal institutions, are compelled to follow, in order to discover whether they are approaching the optimal 'demographic' proportions in respect of their student, academic as well as service staff complements. As one who has refused to submit to such legally required racial self-identification and stereotyping, I know exactly what he means when he refers to the banality of the fact that

> To meet with the requirements of the Employment Equity Act, to gain admission or be refused permission to Universities, to claim travel allowances, to play in sports teams...each requires a statement of race belonging. There is no opportunity in these forms to avoid the issue. At

> every level there is an official, from the government minister . . . to the company personnel officer or employment equity manager, to monitor adherence or compliance or progress. No provision is made for alternatives to the basic 'four races'[19] of apartheid South Africa, or to reject such classification . . . Where race is 'legally' . . . required and it has not been provided, citizens are allocated to a category by line managers or human resources personnel (2001: 7).

This unthinking (?) continuation of apartheid-style racial categorisation allegedly in order to get beyond apartheid and even beyond racism is all the more reprehensible in the context of 'post-apartheid' South Africa, because there are very obvious and completely feasible alternatives. What is required is attention to detail in specific domains of life and a national commitment to redress all disadvantage at all levels of the society, regardless of colour, creed or gender. This would mean, for example, a principled decision to problematise all racial categories and to prioritise class as a measure of disadvantage.[20] There are many ways of doing so but a simple example will suffice. On the assumption that there is an actual reason for doing so, anyone who would have been older than 16 years in 1994, could be required to say how s/he was classified racially under the apartheid system. Anyone younger than that, could be asked to indicate, if s/he knew, how one or other of her/his parents had been classified at the time. Or, to take another obvious example: in the civil service or in any relevant private-sector situation, where knowledge of an African language is already or will become an increasingly important skill, by virtue of the coincidence of home language and apartheid racial classification, more emphasis

---

[19] The equivalent forms of the University of Cape Town do, however, have a slot for a racial category that is labelled 'Unknown'.

[20] At the level of detailed implementation, of course, all such suggestions throw up countless problems. Cose 1998: 121–124, in the US context shows that this approach is not necessarily the panacea that many people believe it to be. He summarises his own position as follows:

> A system that intelligently tried to take the totality of one's experience into account and to select and nurture those who are truly most deserving would not eliminate questions of race from the admissions process, for race is a fact of life and, for some people, a component of the barriers they have had to overcome. It would, however, mean that race is not inappropriately taken into consideration, that Latino or black is not, ipso facto, taken as a surrogate for deprived.
>
> In my view, we are able, in the South African context, to approach the matter somewhat differently because of the balance of power on which the new dispensation rests. In fact, as I demonstrate below, we can use affirmative action to problematise and undermine racial identities, instead of entrenching them.

on linguistic skills would provide an organic self-correcting mechanism. This would, moreover, provide the incentive to Afrikaans- and English-speaking South Africans themselves to learn and to encourage their children to learn one of the indigenous African languages. This materially-based practice of prioritising multilingualism, in turn, would constitute one of the main pillars on which cultural and symbolic unity will be based in future.

A further issue of principle, certainly for the next decade or so, would require a clear commitment to prioritising a massive training programme as against a token 'representivity'. Of course, we should not underestimate the importance of changing managerial and administrative front-line staff in terms of the genuinely inspiring dimension of social transformation. However, this should never become a practice of merely 'putting black faces in white places'. Front-line people should not simply represent Fanonesque masks worn by unreconstructed apartheid apparatchiki. The very jobs will have to be re-conceptualised in terms of an African clientele and an African reality, at the beginning of the 21st century, that takes into consideration, for instance, the primacy of oral media—without letting up on the expansion and deepening of literacy, especially in the African languages themselves, a multilingual as opposed to a monolingual habitus, co-operative forms of action as opposed to the universally assumed instinct towards individual aggrandisement and gratification, and so forth. But, as long as jobs continue to be formulated only in terms of the inherited qualities and functions, it is axiomatic that the most likely people to fit the profile are English—and/or Afrikaans-speaking males. To move away from this kind of situation, clusters of jobs should be advertised such that, for example, a trainer is appointed together with two juniors or apprentices and part of his/her job description would be the requirement that s/he train the other members of the team over an appropriate period to become fully competent in the job.

Concluding Remarks

I want to come back to the relationship between social identities and the distribution of the social product by means of a macro-economic policy geared to the realisation of equity. What we refer to as 'race' is in our context, and in most others, always a matter of both 'race' and class. That is to say, the reality of social inequality, which is based on

obvious disparities of wealth and power between the different social groups, identified as 'races', has to be changed radically in order to bring about the conditions in which consciousness of 'race' can change. It is not enough that we tackle the problem at the super-structural level by advocating changes in the ways in which we perceive and refer to one another. This is essential—and our schooling system as well as our media are failing us for a range of contradictory reasons in this vital respect—but it has to be accompanied by visible shifts in access to and distribution of material resources and opportunities.

In regard to the latter aspect of the problem, I believe that most people on the left of the political spectrum agree that the economic policies adopted by the two post-apartheid administrations, whether because they thought they had no alternative or because some of them at least never thought beyond the attainment of the non-racial franchise and, thus, *actually* had no alternative plans, have entrenched both class and racial divisions in our society. For, it is evident beyond dispute that the few hundred aspiring capitalist entrepreneurs among the black beneficiaries of these policies are unable to change the colour coding programmed into the mode of production and of distribution that some of us continue to call racial capitalism. The thousands of young black people who, like their Afrikaner predecessors, are now beginning to occupy some of the important as well as all the unimportant posts in the civil service and in the offices of big business, besides demonstrating the embourgeoisement of decisive layers of our society, constitute the social base of rainbow-ism. It would be reasonable to say that given the very short period of post-apartheid rule, there is a certain measure of non-racial consciousness and a self-evident patriotism that has come into being among what we may loosely refer to as the middle classes. Patriotism is displayed, as in other countries today, mainly in such areas as international sport and cultural competitions. These areas are, notoriously, training grounds for the inculcation of national chauvinism, which transforms the playfulness of sporting events into the serious conflict of wars. Indeed, judging by the ease with which many South Africans have slipped into xenophobic behaviour, national chauvinism is latent among all strata of the society. This is a matter that has to be dealt with urgently at all social and political levels. Freedom of movement for people seeking work and/or security has to be viewed in exactly the same manner as the freedom for capital and trade goods to flow across state borders. South Africans, who have so much to be thankful for to neighbouring states in respect of the attainment of the present

democratic system, have to find the imagination and the courage to set an example in this globally relevant area.

Relative consensus among the middle classes should not delude us into believing that there are no areas of tension and contradiction among these sectors. On the contrary, the often ham-handed manner in which affirmative action programmes are operationalised by both the public and the private sectors has already, as I intimated earlier, given rise to disfiguring conflicts and is programming some really unwelcome social psychological features into the new South Africa such as the widespread perception that the black people who are assuming managerial and other top administrative positions are incompetent and worthy of no more than token office. Similarly, the wrong but none the less prevalent opinion among many so-called Coloured and Indian people that 'under apartheid we were not white enough, now we are not black enough', with the consequent sense of being an 'oppressed minority' is the proverbial cloud on the horizon that could herald a period of storm and stress. For, such perceptions, which are, from my own observation, all too often justified, merely deepen and perpetuate racialist attitudes and behaviour.

On the other hand, there are developments, especially among the youth, that indicate that we may be able to escape from the cages of racialised identities through the ways in which 'ordinary' people interpret their experiential realities. In an ironic twist, what I refer to as the colour-coding of wealth by working class people in the townships of South Africa may be heralding the end of racial identities in the usual biological sense, at least in South Africa. This is the opposite of the well-established practice of referring to certain types of work as 'black', regardless of the colour of the person so occupied. The 'social blackness' of prostitution or of drug-dealing as an occupation, for example, is embedded in the subconscious of most people in South Africa.

I have myself observed and often hear others confirm that it is becoming customary to refer to wealthy middle-class black people, especially those who move around in flashy motor cars, as 'umlungu'[21] or some other variant of the word meaning 'white man' or 'white woman'. This could, and probably does, mean that biologically based

[21] The singular form in isiXhosa of a generic Nguni word. Chinua Achebe, in his clairvoyant novel, *A Man of the People*, almost forty years ago already referred to this class as "the black white-men of Africa".

racial identities are viewed as rooted in a past where only 'white' people were wealthy. This transposition of 'class' on to 'race' on the ground, as it were, is the final, if paradoxical, vindication of those of us who, like Posel, believe that both class- and race- reductionism are analytical dead-ends and that:

> …what is fundamental and distinctive about the South African case is the *unity* of class and race as the source of structural differentiation in the society (Posel 1983: 62).

'Non-racialism' is the founding myth of the new South Africa. This essay, I hope, has demonstrated that, speaking generally, the political class has not yet begun to understand all the implications of this slogan. Some, evidently, *have* done so but most continue to act in a manner calculated to perpetuate racial identities and to manipulate the popular mind by using the term to signify no more than a 'myth' in the usual meaning of the term. Theirs is in fact a *multi*-racial paradigm, not unlike that which operates in a territory such as Singapore (see PuruShotam 1998). As a consequence and because of the genocidal potential of a social grid based on the perpetuation of racial and of competitive, reified ethnic identities, anti-racist leadership in government and in civil society has to be clear that the struggle continues and that, next to the AIDS crisis, one of the next historic tasks that face us is the final eradication of racial thinking, the most deadly of viruses, from the body politic. In order to do so, we have to undertake the necessary preventive measures in the economic base and in the cultural assumptions and practices of the society so that the virus cannot thrive. In a globalising world where soon even Martians will no longer be aliens but in all likelihood in fact United States citizens, and where there are virtually no barriers to the free flow of ideas, goods, capital and, under increasingly paranoid conditions, even of people, it is high time that we plan for a second Copernican revolution. This is a revolution of the conceptual universe that will populate the heads of the coming generations, no longer cluttered with superstitions such as 'race', caste and reified 'ethnicity'. Fortunately, from among social scientists it is becoming evident that these outmoded, Cartesian notions of identity are giving way to more modern understandings of flux, hybridity and change.[22]

[22] An excellent example of this is Kotzé 2004.

It is a task, the initiation of which many people inside and outside South Africa optimistically believe to be possible for those who brought about the 'miracle' of the new South Africa. But miracles are in fact terribly mundane phenomena once one begins to look into their genesis and it might be more realistic to take the view that in spite of very favourable historical conditions at present, the challenge that faces all of us is in South Africa and elsewhere is to make it possible for Sisyphus to reach the top of the mountain.

Bibliography

Abebe, Z. 2001. Imposed ethnicity. In Abebe, Z. (Ed) *Social Identities in the New South Africa*. Cape Town: Kwela Books and SA History Online, pp. 1–23.

Alexander, N. (as Nosizwe) 1979. *One Azania, One Nation. The National Question in South Africa.* London: Zed Press

———. 1986. Approaches to the National Question in South Africa. *Transformation 1.*

———. 1989. *Language Policy and National Unity in South Africa/Azania*. Cape Town: Buchu Books.

———. 1994. Comment on Liebenberg by Neville Alexander. In Rhoodie, N. and I. Liebenberg. (Ed) *Democratic Nation Building in South Africa*. Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council.

———. 1999. Language and the national question. In Maharaj, G. (Ed) *Between Unity and Diversity. Essays on Nation-Building in Post-Apartheid South Africa*. Cape Town: IDASA/David Philip Publishers, pp. 17–31.

———. 2000. *English Unassailable But Unattainable. The Dilemma of Language Policy in Education in South Africa.* PRAESA Occasional Papers, No. 3. Cape Town: Praesa/ University of Cape Town.

———. 2002. *An Ordinary Country. Issues in the Transition from Apartheid to Democracy.* Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press.

———. 2003. The "moment of manoeuvre": "Race", ethnicity and nation in post-apartheid South Africa. In Kaiwar, V. and S. Mazumdar. (Eds) *Antinomies of Modernity. Essays on Race, Orient, Nation*. Durham and London: Duke University Press, pp. 180–195.

Alexandre, P. 1972. *An Introduction to Languages and Language in Africa*. London: Heinemann.

Anderson, B. 1983. *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.

Balibar, E. and Wallerstein, I. 1991. *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*. London: Verso.

Bourdieu, P. 1994. *Language and Symbolic Power*. (Edited and introduced by John B. Thompson. Translated by Gino Raymond and Matthew Adamson) Cambridge: Polity Press.

Castells, M. 1998. *The Power of Identity. The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Volume II.* Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

Chatterjee, P. 1993. *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World. A Derivative Discourse*. London: Zed Books.

Cose, E. 1998. *Color-Blind. Seeing Beyond Race in a Race-Obsessed World*. New York: Harper-Perennial.

Franklin, R. 1993. *Shadows of Race and Class*. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press.

Fuente, C. de la. 2001. *A Nation for All. Race, Inequality and Politics in Twentieth-Century Cuba*. Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press.

Greenstein, R. 1994. Racial Formation: Towards a Comparative Study of Collective Identities in South Africa and the United States. *Social Dynamics*, 19: 2, pp. 1–29.

Hamilton, C., Huntley, L., Alexander, N., Guimaraes, A., and W. James. (Eds) 2001. *Beyond Racism. Race and Inequality in Brazil, South Africa and the United States*. Boulder, Colorado and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.

Jordan, P. 2004. South Africa at Ten. A Nation Under Construction. *This Day*, 29 March 2004.

Kotzé, A. 2004. Nà 10 j. worstel die nasie nog met die reënboog. (After 10 Years, the Nation is still Battling with the Rainbow. My translation, N.A.) *Rapport*, 11 April 2004.

Maré, J. 2001. Race Counts in Contemporary South Africa: Classification, Categorisation and Filling in Forms. (Paper prepared for the *Conference on The Burden of Race? 'Whiteness' and 'Blackness' in Modern South Africa*. Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand). Unpub. Mimeo.

Marx, A. 1998. *Making Race and Nation. A Comparison of the United States, South Africa and Brazil*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mda, Z. 2004. Suffering in the Wake of Black Empowerment. *This Day*, 28 April 2004.

Morobe, M. 2004. A Dash of Realism. *Mail and Guardian*, 16th January 2004.

O'Malley, K. 1994. A Neglected Dimension of Nation-Building in South Africa: The Ethnic Factor. In Rhoodie, N. and I. Liebenberg. (Eds) *Democratic Nation-Building in South Africa*. Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council Publishers, pp. 77–88.

Posel, D. 1983. Rethinking the 'Race-Class Debate' in South African Historiography. *Social Dynamics* 9: 1, pp. 50–66.

———. 2001a. Race as Common Sense: Racial Classification in Twentieth-Century South Africa. *African Studies Review*, 44: 1, pp. 87–113.

———, D. 2001b. What's In A Name? Racial Categorisations Under Apartheid and their Afterlife. (Paper prepared for the *Conference on The Burden of Race? 'Whiteness' and 'Blackness' in Modern South Africa*. Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand). Unpub. Mimeo.

PuruShotam, N. 1998. *Negotiating Language, Constructing Race. Disciplining Difference in Singapore*. Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter.

Reisigl, M. and R. Wodak. (Eds) 2000. *The Semiotics of Racism. Approaches in Critical Discourse Analysis*. Vienna: Passagen Verlag.

Saul, J. 1979. The Dialectic of Class and Tribe. *Race and Class*, XX: 4, pp. 347–371.

AFRICAN REBELS AND THE CITIZENSHIP QUESTION

Will Reno

Are Africa's rebels interested in having their own citizens? In other words, do rebels allow local people in places that they control to have any say in how they operate? One possibility is that rebels permit some people to buy protection. Or it may be that local people can exercise sufficient control over enough resources that they can force rebels to delegate some authority to them in exchange for their support. This latter possibility enables people to exert some control over rebels. Such people also may have an investment in the rebels' success. But even in the first instance, rebels may have to limit how they use violence in these communities. They are forced to become 'stationary bandits' who are dependent upon allegiance and productive energies of people in areas that they control, no matter how avaricious individual rebels may be (Olson 2000). Building reciprocities such as these that ultimately empower local people historically has been an integral part of creating what are now called states and vesting them with citizens, even if their rulers are self-interested (Tilly 1985).

But most African insurgencies in the last decade or two appear to be especially predatory. They have scrambled to control diamonds in Sierra Leone, Angola and Congo. The quest for timber and tradable minerals in these conflicts appears to release rebels from the need to negotiate with local communities. Doing business with foreign operators offers rebels an easy alternative to cultivating good relations with those communities in return for access to resources. These rebels do not need citizens if they can just seize resources that they can use to buy guns and to make themselves rich. They can loot local communities since their survival is not dependent upon tapping the long-term productive energies of those communities.

This view of African rebels, a staple of academic analyses of Africa's wars, presumes that these rebels are not interested in having citizens. Paul Collier, for example, argued from his position as a researcher at the World Bank that rebels in very poor countries operate like private associations with no particular interest in providing benefit to local communities. He explained:

> Most entrepreneurs of violence have essentially political objectives, and presumably initially undertake criminal activities only as a grim necessity to raise finance. However, over time the daily tasks involved in running a criminal enterprise may tend inadvertently to develop a momentum of their own' (2003: 79).

This analysis is shared across a wide spectrum. The Sierra Leonean political scientist Ibrahim Abdullah noted the tendency for predatory individuals to prevail over ideologues in that country's war (1997), for example.

It is not surprising that this view of rebels-as-violent-predators would be so widely held. There is abundant evidence that most contemporary African rebels do not seek citizens. Unlike counterparts from the 1960s or 1970s, most contemporary rebels make no pretence to rule liberated zones as show-cases for the political future that they wish to create, or mobilise local activists, or propagate an explanation about how they would rule if they overthrew the incumbent regime.

But what if some rebels do try to cultivate a stable base of support among people in places that they control? Do some communities succeed in forcing rebels to heed community wishes and interests in exchange for political and material support? In fact, both occur. In the pages below I show that substantial variations in insurgent organisation and behaviour exist within conflict zones. I examine those that have similar resources and political conditions as places where predatory insurgents prevail, but instead either produce old fashioned 'state building' rebels or have communities that manage to become well enough armed and exercise enough control over fighters to prevent conflict in the first place. During fighting in Sierra Leone in the 1990s, for example, young men with guns in some diamond mining communities, including individuals who were not even from those places, joined home guard units to protect those communities. Not far away, young men in similar circumstances joined the units of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and rogue army units to prey upon their fellow community members. Likewise, for all of its clans and clandestine overseas trades, northern Somalia harbours a relatively stable administration while southern Somalia, also with its clans and clandestine economies had forty separate militias jockeying for power in the old capital of Mogadishu (UN 2002: para. 32). What all of the more orderly places share are groups that have a capacity to force other people who carry weapons and who are in positions that potentially give them access to personal wealth to follow those groups' directives.

Explaining Rebel Behaviour

Why do rebels behave so differently in similar circumstances? I argue that widespread predation is a consequence of a particular kind of pre-conflict political economy. This condition develops out of the collapse of patronage-based political systems where rulers manipulated informal economies instead of state institutions to control people.

Initially, many rulers preferred patronage-based systems of control because they suspected that delegating authority to effective state institutions might undermine their political control. This would happen if officials used resources attached to those institutions to build their own political followings, a particular concern in socially divided countries on a continent where coups d'états had become a widespread problem by the 1960s. More than two-thirds of African states have experienced violent regime transitions, a trend that has barely abated amidst recent electoral reform (McGowan 2004). This also meant that many rulers feared that local strongmen would use their authority in their home communities to co-opt state agencies and eventually to pose a threat to regime power. Such rulers would be reluctant to build big state institutions and would be especially wary of delegating the authority that would be necessary to make them run efficiently. "Seek ye first the political kingdom" said Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah as he set out to systematically destroy a prosperous business class and marginalise managers who belonged to an ethnic group that he thought posed a threat to his power (Boone 2004: 159–74). Seen in this light, the collapse of formal state institutions was not a result of inadequate skills or resources but rather a rational policy of political centralisation and survival. But patronage that is predicated on policing associates and in destroying other social groups' independent access to resources (unlike patronage in most of East Asia) destroys state administrative and revenue-raising capabilities.

The alternative, ruling through regulating other people's access to clandestine economic activities like smuggling and illicit exploitation of natural resources, had the advantage of not requiring a large bureaucratic apparatus to generate revenues to satisfy the demands of loyal associates. Rulers could simply use their official positions to manipulate the enforcement of laws, granting selective exemption from prosecution for compliant clients. Political rivals or social groups suspected of political disloyalty would bear the brunt of prosecutions and 'reform' efforts to rein in their influence in clandestine economies.

This strategy of rule tended to militarise these economic activities, as regime favourites were allowed to form their own militias, both to protect their economic operations and to intimidate political rivals. Since this political strategy subordinates economic regulation to the short-term political imperatives of the ruling clique, it drives away would-be private investors, both foreign and indigenous, who fear that local legal systems will be biased in favour of the country's political insiders. The subsequent shrinkage of a taxable formal economy reinforced this shift of political authority away from state institutions as rulers become even more reliant on generating resources outside regular revenue agencies. Shrinking economic opportunities also limits the options of regular citizens. Most have to start looking to political patrons to gain access to this privileged economic sector. Some young men also find that joining politicians' militias also gives them preferential access to some of these 'official' illicit economic opportunities.

This process leads to what is widely recognised as state collapse, or the recession of formal bureaucratic institutions of the state. It is more useful to understand this not as the collapse of states, but as the replacement of state institutions with economic networks that are illicit in the sense of operating in defiance of formal regulations, but really are official in the sense of forming an integral part of the country's political structure. Rulers who wielded authority on this basis also found that they could convert foreigners' acceptance of their sovereignty into commercial assets that they could then use to attract a shadier and more clandestine variety of foreign partner. They could sell their sovereign right to control access to their territory, equip business partners with official documents, and shield their transactions from external scrutiny as befit their positions as sovereigns. But this would be limited to foreign partners who could generate a very high return for their investments without having to risk assets in the unpredictable legal environment of their local partner's countries. Off-shore oil exploitation is an ideal arrangement in this environment. But it extends to clandestine international transactions too. In Equatorial Guinea, for example, toxic waste dumping, drug trafficking, predatory logging and transhipment of arms are said to generate a considerable income for the country's ruling clique (Wood 2004).

Once the control of a central patron breaks down, as in Somalia, Congo, Sierra Leone or Liberia in the 1990s, the most predatory armed groups develop out of these political and commercial networks that were most closely associated with those countries' pre-conflict leader-

ships. Regime insiders retain the advantages of close ties to the president. Their militias became the cores of predatory rebel groups. They could develop further their own ties to international commercial actors that they formed in the course of their membership in the president's clandestine economy network. Thus these insiders controlled resources directly. This autonomy gives them license even to loot their own communities as they competed with their former colleagues to become the next president. The real goal of most predatory insurgencies is to become the next rulers of the country so that they can incorporate the prerogatives of state sovereignty into their own personal network of economic and political power, much as their former patrons had done.

But the cases below show that the armed groups that are most likely to provide order and a modicum of local administration develop out of political and commercial networks that were marginal to pre-conflict centres of power. These actors are as greedy and calculating as their predatory counterparts. Their behaviour, however, reflects their dependence upon local mediators to get resources and to control armed young men. They needed local notables who could protect them from the dominant political network in the capital. Often equally entrenched in clandestine enterprises as their corrupt fellow officials, they could not use violence simply to reinforce their control over economic rackets and to fight political rivals. Instead, they needed local help to hide and protect their transactions against the scrutiny of suspicious presidents and the real insiders who benefited from his personal favour. Their recruitment of armed young men in pre-conflict times was for the purpose of keeping capital-based political networks at arm's length. Since they did not enjoy presidential support, they also had to get help from local notables to recruit, organise and control armed young men to preserve their own positions.

These variations in the local structures of the political economies of patronage-based authority systems explain why some armed groups that engage in clandestine economic activities treat local people as citizens, engaging them on the basis of social reciprocities, while others do not. This does not mean that rebels interested in having their own citizens are good democrats. They may have very circumscribed notions of their community of supporters, especially if they define citizenship in exclusionary ethnic terms.

Even if outsiders find this kind of rebel government to be odious, there are two key characteristics that define rebels that have citizens.

First, these rebels provide public goods. Most often this is takes the form of order and the consistent enforcement of some basic set of rules. It is hard to exclude local people arbitrarily from these benefits. The second feature is that someone in local communities has to be able to regulate rebels' access to the resources that they need to fight. In doing so, local notables find that they are in positions from which they can insist that rebels heed community norms and interests.

This argument accepts that individual rebels can be greedy. But it observes that their social relationship of violence and resources, a consequence of their pre-conflict political marginality, means that they cannot satisfy their desires as they please. It arrives at unexpected conclusions based on the inclusion of the local contexts of the political economy of state collapse and patronage. Local social structures matter, but they matter in varying degrees and in differing ways across a single regional conflict. The combination of these factors goes a long way to explaining observed outcomes, and to answering the very basic political question: why are some rebels interested in having citizens, which is another way of asking how do governments come from in the first place, and why do some armed people cooperate with and protect local communities while others loot?

Predation and Rebels without Citizens

A country-by-country survey of Africa would find little evidence that rebels mobilise citizens who can limit their predations. After all, if rebels responded to popular opinions or sought to mobilise broad followings, the continent should be swamped with social revolutions. Freedom House in its 2003 survey determined that 17 of 48 sub-Saharan African countries are 'not free', the highest proportion of any continent (Freedom House 2003). It is the most unequal continent in income distribution, it has had the worst economic performance in the past three decades, and it is the poorest in the world (African Development Bank 2003). Surveys of public evaluations of the performance of even multiparty electoral regimes find that people express considerable disappointment with poor economic performance and the corruption of elected leaders (Bratton, Mattes, Gyimah-Boadi 2004). Moreover, the worst-off countries, those that face the internal wars that follow the collapse of centralised patronage political systems, show almost no evidence of the rise of armed political organisations that offer a different vision of the political future.

Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler offer a 'looting model of rebellion' to explain why popular social movements do not arise as corrupt patronage-based authorities collapse. They observe that "opportunities are more important in explaining conflict than are motives" (Collier & Hoeffler 2001: 2). Like the analysis in this essay, they find an explanation in the structure of incentives in the course of conflicts, but they compare separate conflicts rather than look for variation in the behaviour of different groups within them. Their analysis of 78 civil conflicts between 1960 and 1999 confirms that the availability of abundant natural resources increases the probability that armed groups will emerge to contend for this wealth. Earlier they observed:

> The risk of conflict does not appear to be increased by the severity of objective grievances. On the contrary, justice-seeking rebellions appear to be influenced by the height of the obstacles to overcoming the collective action problem' stemming mainly from the availability of looting opportunities and the difficulties of organising socially fragmented societies for collective action (Collier & Hoeffler 1999: 15).

Others observe that African rebels have little interest in mobilising populations around political projects or in organising people to fight alongside them. John Hirsch, the US ambassador to Sierra Leone at the height of that country's 1991–2002 war made the following assessment of the leader of the RUF: "Documents taken from Sankoh's residence revealed his flagrant disregard of the Lomé Agreement's ban on illegal mining… he was continuing to systematically exploit the country's diamonds for his personal benefit" (Hirsch 2001: 89). Eyewitnesses to conflicts testify that easy opportunities for individuals to loot undermine other people's efforts to create large-scale political organisations. "Death and humiliation pits the genuine adults and achievers into their shells," wrote a refugee from Liberia. "The vacuum is then filled in by the young ones who become daredevils, not caring about death or any related end. For them, chance (and not age, valuable time and energy) creates material wealth" (Nagbe 1996: 53).

Light weapons and lucrative global criminal rackets also helps empower the self-interested at the expense of those who would build coordinated political organisations (United Nations 2001; Collier & Sambanis 2002). This fragmented social and political context also divides armed groups. It devalues the social capital of those who would focus on ideological training and mass mobilisation among populations. Charles Taylor, the head of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), for example, became a successful leader on the basis of his

personal skills as a violent entrepreneur, using his connections to the old regime that he helped overthrow to develop his personal clandestine economic networks with which to arm his followers. The murder early in the conflict of Elmer Johnson, an energetic and popular NPFL leader, allegedly on Taylor's orders, underlines the difficulty that ideologically motivated commanders face. Those who push broad political programmes are at a disadvantage when their rivals concentrate on exploiting resources to buy more guns and attract followers. Thus there ought to be no citizens because there can be no rebel government, and there can be no rebel government if the surrounding opportunities and political structure inherited from the collapsing patronage-based regime enhance the value of violent, self-interested personality traits among rebel commanders.

Are all insurgents predators? After all, even in politically fragmented countries, people, including insurgents, harbour all sorts of social solidarities based on categories such as clan, ethnic and religious identities. Is this an alternative basis for 'rebel citizenship', a local social contract between community members and armed fighters? Could it become a framework for collective defence? This idea of citizenship is at odds with those popular among most international NGOs that are based upon extending individual civil and political rights vis-à-vis an existing state to people in conflict zones. This tension is real. "UN people visit us to tell us that we are not civilised because we do not understand human rights…We had our own rules long before they came".[1]

There is a surprising level of disagreement about the impact of these solidarities in the study of armed groups. While affiliated with the World Bank, Collier and Hoeffler held ethnic and religious diversity to be "surprisingly unimportant" in causing armed conflict (Collier & Hoeffler 2001: 17). Another World Bank scholar disagreed. William Easterly wrote that "the risk of civil war is two and a half times higher in the most ethnically diverse quarter of the sample compared to the least ethnically diverse quarter" (Easterly 2002: 270). How can there be this level of disagreement on such a basic question?

Motivation alone may be a poor basis upon which to approach the question of armed groups' interests, and especially with regard to their relations with local people. Group and individual motivations can be very mixed. Some individual fighters may be duped by their leaders. There are extensive reports from nearly all of Africa's recent conflicts of

[1] Interview, SPLA commander, Bahr el Gazal [rebel-held Sudan] 2003.

leaders who give fighters mood-altering drugs to motivate them before battle. Others report that their or their families' economic desperation forces them to join (Brett & Sprecht 2004). It is not hard to detect economic calculation in these situations. At the same time, however, one typically finds the same self-interested motivations among fighters in wars were rebels have administered liberated zones and sought to develop broad-based political movements. Yoweri Museveni, leader of a highly successful rebel group, for example, reported problems of fighters "drinking alcohol, escaping from camp to chase after women, stealing rations, and so on" while establishing liberated zones (Museveni 1997: 90). What Museveni called 'opportunism' could be seen in the same analytical light as explanations for why rebels become predatory, but Museveni's National Resistance Movement shows how common individual motivations among fighters can lead to quite different organisational and behavioural outcomes in the aggregate.

Pollsters offer a more sensible approach to analysing motivation. They practice their profession on the premise that individuals' attitudes change and that a wide range of interests shape the conduct of politics, including violent politics. Otherwise, why take polls? It is likely that rebel fighters also change their minds, and some harbour multiple, even conflicting opinions and motivations. That individual motives cannot be pinned down over time suggests that there is a large element of social construction of individual participation in conflicts. Moreover, individual motives may be less important in determining causes of conflicts and the nature of rebels' relations with local people. That is, relations between different groups and how groups control resources and coercion not only create opportunities. They create justifications and rationales, often *ex post*, which are not manipulative or fake, since others treat them as if they are facts.

These underlying social relationships that shape the control of resources and of coercion lie at the heart of the distinctions between groups that are predatory and those that provide public goods. This distinction does not require that rebels be altruists. On the contrary, the great bulk of evidence throughout history and across regions indicates that individual fighters try to enrich themselves when they are able (Kalyvas 2001: 99–118). What is at issue is why some treat local people as prey and others accord local people some social reciprocity, as 'citizens' in a shared political project.

Put in the context of historical state-building, this can be addressed in terms of why some groups are willing or able to pursue a long-term strategy of cooperation with other social groups while others maximise

short-term predation. This wider context, not only the motives of individuals, holds the key to understanding why some rebels can claim 'citizens' while others treat even their own communities as prey. This also points to a much bigger question: are some rebels really state-builders in the classic mould, even if contemporary attention focuses on predatory failures? If some are building states, do they want to build liberal democratic, free market states or do they think of other models? The question of citizenship is an ideal point at which to investigate these larger issues.

Rebels Who Rule

The behaviour of contemporary rebels (and others like urban vigilantes) challenges assumptions that armed groups respond to opportunities in easily generalised ways. By September 2002, for example, Afghanistan's Taliban radically reduced the production of opium in areas that they controlled to just four percent from a year earlier. In doing so, they gave up an income of $100 million, even though they were still fighting for control of the country (UNDCP 2001: iii). One can argue that they gave up short-term income to boost the price of their stock of opium. But even if financial gain guided Taliban decisions, their capacity to forego short-term benefits in the face of military challenge indicated that the group could command its followers, an impressive feat in a place better known for the divisive and self-interested reputations of local leaders and warlords.

That the Taliban regime could control resources and associates' predatory impulses way suggests that its ties to indigenous social structures gave it a means to enforce decisions about how resources and coercion would be deployed. Taliban claimed that it had a duty to help Afghan people get saved and not be sinners, and that drugs were evil. It also is likely that Taliban leaders feared that local strongmen might divert proceeds from drug trafficking to assert more localised and in some cases, predatory authority against Taliban's rule. Taliban offered a very different portrait to the predations of Sierra Leone's RUF or Liberia's NPFL, even though all operated in highly factionalised and heavily armed societies and all had access to compact, valuable resources. Severe restrictions on women's rights and its prohibitions of a wide range of Afghan cultural practices struck many as odious. But the key distinction here is that Taliban provided security, godly

virtue or whatever it and a critical mass of other Afghans defined as a legitimate societal value while fighting other factions. This is state-building, in contrast to organisationally fractured predatory rebels that pursue only the private interests of their members. But it was not state-building on a liberal democratic model, nor was it based upon unmediated openness to the world economy. These rebels with citizens showed us a different way to build a state, albeit one that does not fit standards of contemporary global norms and whose leaders' disastrous associations led it to commit political suicide.

While not rebels, Burma's government shows that clandestine economies do not necessarily produce a chaotic pursuit of self-interest among those who exercise violence. Instead, that country's government appears to use income from drug trafficking to co-opt rebels and incorporate them into a centrally organised state (Sherman 2003). A centralised authority rules over fairly peaceful northern parts of Somalia, while southern Somalia remains without a government and suffers localised violence, despite similar social and resource settings and a shared history in the old pre-conflict Somali state. Armed young men in some Sierra Leone towns joined home guard units to protect their homes during the 1990s, while fifty kilometres away their counterparts joined RUF units that then preyed upon their own communities. Why has the Ingushetia region on the western border of Chechnya failed to fall into conflict? People there are ethnic kinsmen to Chechens and suffered similar oppressions and enjoyed similar resources as their contentious neighbours.

Likewise, corruption does not simply lead to predation and state collapse everywhere, even though in all cases it serves individual interests. Transparency International's corruption index for 2003, for example, showed Kenya and Indonesia tied for 122nd place, indicating that business people surveyed considered both to be very corrupt. Yet Indonesia's economy grew at an annual per capita rate of 2.3 percent from 1991 to 2002, notwithstanding a serious crisis in 1998, compared to Kenya's annual 0.9 percent per capita contraction. Vietnam was considered to be more corrupt than Zambia, yet grew at an annual per capita rate of 5.8 percent during this time. Zambia's economy contracted at 1.2 percent per year on a per capita basis, despite the latter's lack of serious internal disruption and a sustained, if rocky transition to an electoral regime.

These comparisons show that it is not simply the level of corruption, self-interest, or clientelism that matters, so much as does the social

organisation of its resources and opportunities. In the East Asian cases, 'crony capitalism' is compatible with the provision of prosperity and order (Kang 2002). In the poor performers, usually in Africa, corruption usually is accompanied with much more explicit and intimidating exercises of violence than in the high performers. Once again, social relationships trump individual motivations. Like rebels with citizens, corruption in high-growth states shows that the outcomes of the pursuit of self-interested behaviour depend upon the social structure in which this pursuit occurs. Likewise, the outcome of rebellion in Africa depends upon the social structures of the political economy of patronage out of which rebels emerged and to which I turn next.

The Political Economy of Patronage

Though leaders of armed groups vary widely in skills and foresight, the patronage networks of collapsing states shape their choices. A key generalisation is that those leaders who appear in areas that were marginal to pre-conflict patronage networks have to rely upon locally legitimate authorities to provide them with access to resources and to organise armed fighters.

The tendency for young men in Sierra Leone's downriver mining communities to join home guard units, for example, becomes clearer when one considers that local strongmen had recruited and armed youth there before the war to defend them against presidential interference. During the 1970s and 1980s, the president distrusted local authorities in that region, since they and their fathers had sided with a political party that had lost power in the late 1960s. In the intervening years before the start of the war in 1991, several coup attempts had occurred. The long-serving President Siaka Stevens (who nearly was killed in a coup attempt in 1971) suspected that local notables in this region supported his downfall.

Their political marginality created a problem for local notables. Since the area was a centre for clandestine alluvial diamond mining, they saw that they had a good opportunity for personal profit. But to mine these diamonds, they not only had to organise their own youth gangs. They also had to defend their operations against politicians and officials who were the main beneficiaries of presidential favour. These notables found a good solution to their problem in the local custom of 'stranger-landlord' relations. Customarily, this meant that village chiefs

would take responsibility for protecting newcomers in exchange for a portion of the product of their labours. A legitimate good chief also took an interest in seeing that productive newcomers were allocated a piece of land for their maintenance and in some cases, mediated their marriage into local families. The *Poro* initiation society provided a local institutional framework for this arrangement, tying together community members and outsiders for the purpose of community defence and managing the proper relations between people (Dorjahn and Fyfe 1962).

Local notables who were more closely tied to presidential favour did not have to engage in these sorts of reciprocities to run clandestine economic operations. They simply could call upon army units or raise their own militias to protect their economic transactions. Moreover, notables who were more loyal in presidential eyes were included in joint ventures with foreign firms, further releasing them from any bonds to local communities as a precondition for access to personal benefits. These arrangements also gave officials in the capital, especially the president, the capacity to use their positions as state officials to regulate who got to do business. They could manipulate domestic laws to their favour and use their sovereign prerogative to grant selective access to foreigners to join their business operations in exchange for a commitment to serve the interests of the regime.

The primary difference between these communities lay in the relationship of local notables to armed youths in their communities. Those tied to the patronage of the regime could recruit young men though distributing opportunities to exploit local people and mine what they considered to be their diamonds, since they relied upon their ties to the capital for protection. Marginalised groups had to find ways to protect their clandestine transactions from this predatory political network. The fact that their transactions were clandestine or that diamonds were a source of wealth were not the critical factors in this case. Instead, the social relationships between local notables and armed young men and their positions in the pre-war patronage network (or their relative exclusion from it) were the most important factors in determining how violence would be used in the 1990s. By extension, these factors underlay the tendency for armed groups in marginalised communities to treat local people as citizens—building upon the reciprocities that local notables were forced to adopt before the war—and their integration of local 'traditional' institutional structures into that relationship.

In Sierra Leone, this took the form of the creation of *kamajor* home guard militias in the marginalised communities. A key organiser of the wartime militia in that region identified this relation of mutual dependence when he studied how local people armed to defend their local notables against pre-war interference from the capital (Lavalie 1983). Once the war began, they already had a mechanism for socialising youth into defence of their communities and who would inform on rebel agents. This reduced the abilities of outsiders to exploit the inevitable community rivalries and personal interests that made other communities in Sierra Leone so vulnerable to rebel atrocities. This also meant that people who wanted to mobilise armed young men to pursue their own interests during the war had to negotiate with customary authorities to get access to diamond mining and to organise fighters. While *kamajor* fighters were responsible for some human rights violations, the predations of the RUF rebels were considerably greater, with RUF responsible for 59 percent of reported violations, as against the 6.8 percent figure for government soldiers and the 5.9 percent figure for *kamajor* militias (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone 2004: 22). Moreover, one researcher identified an attempt by *kamajor* militias to incorporate specific international human rights standards into their training and operational behaviour (Hoffman 2004).

Some of the armed groups in the current conflict in Côte d'Ivoire show a similar interest in reciprocities with local communities as a basis for citizenship. There, the debate over citizenship is central to that war. *Donzow* or 'traditional hunter' militias arose in communities in the northern part of the country where the opposition leader Alassane Dramane Ouattara received particularly strong support. These militias advertised themselves as crime-fighters. But as associates of opposition figures, they could not get extensive government support for their mission. In fact, the country's president, Henri Konan Bedié, feared that these militias might be used against his regime and his political favourites.

The President sought to undermine his rival by declaring that only people whose parents were born in the country could run for president. He also struck at his rival's powerbase, many of whom had ancestors who had moved south into the country many years before, and in 1998 declared that only 'true Ivoirians' could own land. This left the militias with the recourse of organising along the lines of the excluded 'northerners' trade networks and ethnic solidarities. Like their Sierra Leone counterparts, their best option for regulating the behaviour of these armed youths lay in using customary initiation rites and the author-

ity of local religious figures to integrate them into local communities. Unlike pro-government militias, their leaders could not simply call upon the national army or police or use official backing for involvement in clandestine economies to field this force. By extension, they were not free to use these militias to further their personal ambitions at the expense of local communities, given the role of initiators and other community authorities in protecting their economic transactions and regulating fighters' conduct (Bassett 2003).

Armed groups in northern Somalia illustrate similar social dynamics. During Somalia's dictatorship in the 1970s and 1980s, the President increasingly ruled on the basis of his capacity to permit selective entry into a clandestine economy and use his control of the state to shield favourites and punish interlopers. Northern elites by-and-large were tainted by association with an old political party. Some gained entry into the presidential inner circle, but many did not. Consequently in the 1980s, many had to rely upon local elders to protect their dealings in the smuggling trade against presidential interference. They also had to appeal to elders to use local customary social arrangements to guarantee contracts since they could not rely upon formal courts or the president's militias to protect clandestine deals.

Predatory entrepreneurs did arise in the north, but local elders maintained enough direct influence in economic channels that they were able to cut off resources to these men. Armed young men who stayed in the region also faced sanctions if they misused violence. A visitor to the north in 1989 contrasted it to southern Somalia, noting the "difficulty of shooting young apprentice *shiftas* [bandits] because their clan and family backgrounds had to be taken into account, and the same holds true for any person who might kill" (Prunier 1991: 109). Moreover, the Somali National Movement's sudden expulsion from Ethiopia in 1988 forced fighters to find a quick replacement for the resources that their former patron, the Ethiopian president, had provided. This left them with little choice but to turn to local authorities who could marshal aid on their behalf.[2]

Those Somali areas in which pre-war patronage networks based in the capital had most dominated local economies have remained the most fractured and most violent. Compounding this situation was the

[2] Interview, Ahmed Mohamed Silanyo [former chairman of Somali National Movement], Hargeisa, June 2006.

tendency for the centres of pre-war patronage to draw in outsider strongmen and their armed retainers, further diminishing the power over coercion of local social intermediaries. Strongmen who owed their power and access to resources to distant patrons did not have to worry so much about the social consequences of their behaviour. And once the centralised core of the patronage network collapsed, these strongmen already possessed the skills and connections to directly exploit the economic opportunities around them. This also left them free to plunder local communities with which they had had few close social ties before the war.

Conclusions

These cases show how social relationships, especially in terms of their relations to capital-based patronage systems, are the crucial factor in shaping whether rebels decide (or are forced) to tolerate citizens or not. In this regard, Africa resembles patterns observed in other places and other times. For example, the explanation for European state-building and the preference for armed groups to seek citizens bear more than passing resemblance to the opportunities and constraints facing some armed groups in Africa today. That is, they lack the autonomy to exploit people and resources as they please. Their success is contingent upon at least a minimum level of support in local communities because that provides them with the most certain access to the resources that they need to fight and to survive.

These patterns of rebel behaviour also show that corruption and patronage may not be the problem that many observers make it out to be in Africa. As was noted above, corruption and patronage has worked differently in East Asia, despite its gigantic proportions in some instances. Instead, the difference is found in the degree of consensus among those who benefit from this non-bureaucratic exercise of power and the degree of their dependence upon local communities and diverse interest groups to continue in their positions of privilege. This also shows that clandestine economies are not necessarily sources of disorder. In fact, they may contribute to order. What is important is the degree of local community influence over these transactions, not whether officials in a capital city decide if they are legal or not as part of their own strategies of exploitation.

Perhaps some rebel groups are developing a politics based upon mutual dependence with local citizens. The recent tendency of some political establishments to try to marginalise their rivals' social power-bases wholesale, as in the debates over citizenship in Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Malawi, and Zimbabwe, among other places, may create a basis for those marginalised communities to develop their own notions of citizenship in conjunction with their opposition to state authorities. Most do not want to belong to a different state or create their own new state. Instead, they simply are able to insist on a different relationship between political authority, resources and violence.

Do rebels who have citizens become liberal democrats? Since those who attack marginalised communities often define them in ethnic terms, and since the informal institutions that these groups use for protection against state power draw upon ethnic solidarities, diaspora movements and kinship trade networks, citizenship may be defined in terms of membership in a cultural community, not on the basis of individual right. This researcher's field work experiences in some of these communities also indicate that rebel leaders are suspicious of free market economic policies. Some identify these policies with the further privatisation of state assets in the hands of the capital-based political network. Moreover, reforms in areas like land tenure threaten to dilute the powers of customary authorities who play important mediating roles in controlling armed groups' access to resources. The politics that these rebels envision may fit into the framework of existing states in Africa, but it will have a more difficult time contending with the liberal democratic, free market model upon which most multilateral international institutions and officials in powerful states insist.

In any event, rebels with citizens show how important dynamics of politics in Africa are not that much different from that in other parts of the world. Patronage, clandestine economies and even armed force are not always the pathologies that they are made out to be in many analyses. Issues of citizenship show instead the centrality of the relationship of the control of resources and violence to the nature of political authority, especially in the context of the political economy of patronage politics in Africa.

Bibliography

Abdullah, I. 1997. Bush Path to Destruction: The Origin and Character of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF/SL). *Africa Development.* 22: 3, pp. 19–44.

African Development Bank. 2003. *African Development Report.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Bassett, T. 2003. Dangerous Pursuits: Hunter Associations (*donzo ton*) and National Politics in Côte d'Ivoire. *Africa.* 73:1, pp. 1–30.

Boone, C. 2004. *Political Topographies of the African State.* London: Cambridge University Press.

Bratton, R., Mattes, R., and E. Gyimah-Boadi. 2004. *Public Opinion, Democracy, and Market Reform in Africa.* London: Cambridge University Press.

Brett, R. and I. Sprecht. 2004. *Young Soldiers: Why They Choose to Fight.* Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Collier, P. 2003. *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil Wars and Development Policy.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Collier, P. and A. Hoeffler. 1999. *Justice-seeking and Loot-seeking in Civil War*. Washington DC: World Bank

———. 2001. *Greed and Grievance in Civil War*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Collier, P. and N. Sambanis, (Eds) 2002. *Special Issues of Conflict Resolution: Understanding Civil Wars*.

Dorjahn, V. and C. Fyfe. 1962. Landlord and Stranger: Change in Tenancy Relations in Sierra Leone. *Journal of African History.* 3: 3, pp. 391–397.

Easterly, W. 2002. *The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists' Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics.* Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Hirsch, J. 2001. *Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy.* Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Hoffman, D. 2004. The Civilian Target in Sierra Leone and Liberia: Political Power, Military Strategy and Humanitarian Intervention. *African Affairs.* 103, pp. 211–226.

Jackson, R. 1990. *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World.* London: Cambridge University Press.

Kalyvas, S. 2001. "New" and "Old" Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction? *World Politics.* 54: 1, pp. 99–118.

Kang, D. 2002. *Crony Capitalism: Corruption and Development in South Korea and the Philippines.* London: Cambridge University Press.

Lavalie, A. 1983. SLPP: A Study of the Political History of the Sierra Leone People's Party, with particular reference to the period 1968–1978 Freetown. MA thesis, University of Sierra Leone.

McGowan, P. 2004. African Military Coups d'État, 1956–2001: Frequency, Trends and Distribution. *Journal of Modern African Studies.* 41: 3, pp. 339–370.

Nagbe, M. 1996. *Bulk Challenge: The Story of 4,000 Liberians in Search of a Refuge.* Cape Coast: Champion Publishers.

Olson, M. 2000. *Power and Prosperity.* New York: Basic Books.

Prunier, G. 1991. A Candid View of the Somali National Front. *Horn of Africa.* 14: 1–4, pp. 107–120.

Sherman, J. 2003. Burma: Lessons from the Cease-fires. In Ballentine, K. and J. Sherman (Eds) *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance.* Boulder: Lynne Rienner. pp. 225–255.

Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone. 2004. *Statistical Appendix to the Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone.* Freetown: Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

United Nations. 2001. *Report of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its aspects.* New York: UN.

———. 2002. *Report of the Team of Experts Appointed Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1407 (2002), Paragraph 1, Concerning Somalia.* New York: UN.

UNDCP (United Nations Drug Control Programme). 2001. *Afghanistan Annual Opium Poppy Survey 2001.* Islamabad: UNDCP.

Wood, G. 2004. Business and Politics in a Criminal State: The case of Equatorial Guinea. *African Affairs.* 103: 413, pp. 547–567.

NATION, ETHNICITY, AND CITIZENSHIP: DILEMMAS OF DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL ORDER IN AFRICA

Crawford Young

At issue in this volume are three critical identities in Africa: nationality, ethnicity and citizenship. In this chapter, I wish to explore them in comparative perspective, and to examine their interaction with a pair of defining processes of recent years, democratisation and civil disorder. The intertwined selfhoods of nationality, ethnicity and citizenship frame much of political agency. The moment of political opening which swept over the continent at the end of the 1980s, however uneven and incomplete, altered the parameters of politics and the interplay of these three identities. The hopes aroused by the wave of democratisation mingled with the apprehensions triggered by a wave of civil disorder afflicting broad swathes of Africa in the 1990s.

The idea of 'nation' in Africa, often dismissed by students of comparative nationalism as entirely artificial and ahistorical (for example, Oomen 1997: 42–43), exhibits surprising staying power. A remarkable contemporary paradox is the persistence of an affective attachment to a territorial nationality even when the state institutions are derelict. The trauma of the 1990s shows that states may entirely collapse without disappearing as nations from the social imaginary.

Weaving Together Three Identities and Two Processes

However contested the authenticity of African nationalisms may be, few debate today the vitality of ethnic attachments. Long vanished is the equation of ethnicity with traditionality that permitted some scholars and nationalist leaders of the independence generation to imagine its possible erasure once overwritten by modernity (Touré 1959). Still, the African itineraries of ethnicity, and the scope of the claims based upon it, differ in important respects from patterns in other world regions.

Citizenship has acquired new saliency in many countries in recent years, in Africa and throughout the world (Oomen 1997; Rosaldo 2003; Miller 2000; Dunkerly et al. 2002; Nanes 2003). With African

independence the colonial subject silently became nominal citizen, but during the authoritarian years this was a distinction without a difference. Democratisation, even partial, dramatically raised the stakes of citizenship; authenticity of citizen claims of some residents became sharply contested in a number of countries.

The euphoria associated with the democratic opening sweeping many countries at the beginning of the 1990s has long subsided (Ottaway 2003; Joseph 1999). However, partial restoration of authoritarian practice in a number of instances left in place important alteration in political patterns. New space for civil society continued to exist, within which issues of identity and citizenship could percolate.

At the same time, the weakened condition of many states opened the door for novel forms of armed challenge. Two large, interpenetrated arcs of conflict appeared, one stretching from the Horn of Africa south-westward to Angola and both Congos, and the other from Ivory Coast to Senegal. Zones of prolonged disorder became a basic element in the political landscape.

The challenge of this chapter is to 'connect the dots' between these three identities and two processes. To do so on a continental scale in brief compass inevitably entails broad analytical strokes, without the full opportunity to sketch in all the nuances. Let me simply acknowledge that a fuller analysis would take more ample note of the range of variation surrounding the generalisations advanced.

Naturalisation of the Territorial Nation

The history of territoriality in Africa invites the scepticism about the depth of national attachments noted above. Although some African states can invoke an historical narrative extending beyond the colonial partition (Swaziland, Botswana, Lesotho, Tunisia, perhaps Madagascar, for example), only Morocco, Egypt and Ethiopia can construct a mythology of nationhood with any time depth. The present map of Africa was entirely constructed by colonial cartography, thus bearing the original sin of alien origin and artificiality. But one is immediately confronted with the paradox of the resiliency of an attachment to the territorial units of the colonial partition that persists even in the face of state collapse.

This bizarre fact is most apparent in some of the more extreme instances of state failure. More than a dozen years have transpired since

a government in Somalia vanished, yet a Somalia lives on not only on maps and the United Nations membership roster, but also as a phantomal presence in the imaginations of a would-be citizenry. Periodic assemblies of Somali notables of various provenances assemble under external patronage in a thus far unrealised quest for a state to embody the idea of a nation of Somalia; occasional accords are reached, most recently in mid-2004, only to founder on details of implementation. In Liberia and Sierra Leone, citizens watched their states crumble before the predatory rampages of norm-less militias; even in the depth of the violence, no political movement or armed faction proposed a fragmentation of either state as a remedy for total insecurity. Although Sudan has known only ten years of peace since its 1956 independence, southern insurgents—despite untold numbers of deaths and unrelenting hardship—signed an agreement for a reunified Sudan which its top leaders (if not many of the followers) claim to desire.

Perhaps the example which best proves the extent of an internalisation of an affective attachment to a nation is the vast territory of Congo-Kinshasa. For two decades, the Congo has had little operative state; institutions of rule are derelict even in the capital city (Trefon 2004). During the period from 1998 to 2003, the country broke into four fragments, with eight African armies deployed at different times in support of one or another faction. Though secessionist claims have been heard on occasion since independence, most notably by Katanga, yet no section of the country has taken advantage of the enfeebled centre to separate. Indeed, during the recent civil war the one point upon which all parties agreed was the imperative necessity of preserving one Congo.

A pair of anecdotes will reinforce this argument. In July 2003, at the moment of signing of a peace accord in South Africa, a pair of American scholars long specialised in the region (Newbury and Newbury) arrived at the eastern frontier travelling from Rwanda. At the border, they encountered a troupe of young men engaged in a vigorous dance. Curious, they inquired as to its purpose. The performers responded that they were dancing the frontier, to celebrate the reunification agreement; once they had completed the symbolic demarcation of the frontier at that border crossing, they intended to move on to the next ones to repeat the ritual. Evidently this spontaneous performance of the nation and symbolic statement of the negative otherness of Rwanda reflected an imagined Congo community enrooted in the social consciousness.

Not far away, in the northeastern town of Bunia, a violent conflict pitted Hema and Lendu, which since 1999 had claimed an estimated 50,000 deaths. Although closely inspected the struggle was more complex than its purely communal dimension, nonetheless the ethnic parameters were inescapable. Yet the titles chosen by the militias claiming to represent the two communities both conceal an ethnic project in the semantics of nationhood: *Union des Patriotes Congolais* (Hema), and *Front des Nationalistes Intégrationistes* (Lendu). In the same vein, the major armed factions contending for power during the 1998–2003 civil war, even though their spheres of operation were regional, all clothed their claims in a rhetoric of nationalism: *Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo, Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie, Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo*. One may contrast these lexical choices with the labels chosen by parties at the time of the 1960 independence, when political movements freely employed ethnic referents (*Union des Mongo, Balubakat, Alliance des Bakongo*, among others).

The insistence upon nationality as a discourse of legitimation suggests a naturalisation of nationhood despite the historical artificiality and illegitimacy of the territorial partition of Africa. Yet this flies in the face of the debilitated condition of a number of states, afflicted by relentless economic crisis, loss of effective capacity to govern, corroded legitimacy, and even collapse. Where secessionist claims have surfaced in Africa, they have normally employed a territorial designation based upon a colonial sub-division (Katanga, Eritrea, Anglophone Cameroun, Zanzibar, Eastern Nigeria), and denied an ethnic justification even when clearly present (Casamance, Biafra).

There are some explanations for the paradox which do not require the premise of an internalised national identity. The international order remains hostile to the break-up of states, in spite of the reluctant acceptance of nearly 20 new sovereign units as a consequence of the collapse of the Communist order (the break-up of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, as well as Eritrean independence) in 1991. The European Union-appointed Badinter Commission in the early 1990s sought to rescue the principle of territorial integrity as a bedrock of international jurisprudence by affirming that fragmentation of an existing state could only legitimately occur on the basis of its territorial subdivisions; thus the fifteen former 'Union Republics' of the Soviet Union and six component republics of the Yugoslav federation could win recognition, but not Chechnya, Kosovo, or the ethnic fragments of Bosnia. On the contrary, the international community invested heavily

in military and economic support for a tenuously stitched together Bosnian entity. Though Somaliland (essentially former British Somaliland) has had a constituted government and modestly effective control over its territory for more than a decade, no state has accorded recognition. The virtual certainty of international system hostility to a secession attempt is a potent deterrent. The animus towards state fragmentation was fully incorporated into the African regional normative order, first by the Organisation of African Union (OAU) at its 1963 inaugural summit, then by the African Union (AU).

A second and important factor is the lack of any alternative guiding principle or mechanism for defining territoriality. This insuperable constraint was what drove the independence generation of leaders to embrace the colonial partition framework initially; until the late 1950s denunciation of the artificiality of boundaries was standard fare in anti-colonial pan-African discourse. As struggle intensified, its managers could only organise within the framework of the extant territorial framework. They quickly concluded that any competing principle of territorial organisation—above all the ethnic criterion—was not only entirely impracticable but politically explosive. In recent times, some academic commentators call for a reconsideration of the state system (for example, Herbst 2000: 259–72); however, none offer a persuasive formula.

Thirdly, rational choice theory is occasionally advanced as a key to unravel the puzzle. Political elites, whose livelihood is tied to the existing state framework, have too much at risk to find secession attractive. This is particularly obvious in cases like Nigeria, where most sections of the dominant class would experience catastrophic loss if access to the oil rents generated in the Niger delta were lost. In Congo-Kinshasa, regional elites in Katanga, Kasai and Kivu find ample openings to rents from local resources without embracing the risks which would accompany a separation effort.

However, even acknowledging the force of these factors, they alone do not explain why the young men in Kivu were dancing the frontier, nor why ethnic militias in Ituri insisted upon seeking legitimacy through borrowing a discourse of nation. There is some irreducible element of a naturalised sense of territorial attachment which is not only integral to elite political language, but is also one dimension of mass consciousness. To solve the riddle, we need to examine the importation of the national idea, the form it has taken in Africa, and its societal diffusion.

The Idea of Nationalism and Its Diverse Forms

The birthplace of the idea of nationalism is universally located in Europe by its many chroniclers (to cite but a few, Smith 1995; Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1990; Anderson 1983). Emerging in intimate symbiosis with the consolidating state system, and the diverse social processes associated with 'modernity', nationalism in its original form was at once a discourse of legitimation for the state, and the embodiment of emerging doctrines of popular sovereignty. Well before the genesis of nationalism, almost all the states in the Eurasian land mass from Japan to Ireland had become locked in silent embrace with the name of their dominant community, which then provided the cultural content of the national idea. At the same time, to a varying degree, the notion of nationhood might also absorb values associated with state identity: the republican tradition in France, parliamentary rule in Britain. From this variable content arose the distinction between 'civic' and 'ethnic' nationalism which has dominated much of scholarly debate (Greenfeld 1992).

From its initial European base, the idea of nationalism has migrated throughout the globe. In the process, nationalism has adapted to very different circumstances and environments. However, exegesis of theories of nationalism permits identification of universal core elements: an ideology claiming that a given human population has a natural solidarity based on shared history, common destiny, the right to independent political community. The idea of nation comports the claim to self-determination, normatively linked to the notion of popular sovereignty.

Through its global diffusion, the national idea took many different forms: a detonator of multi-national empires (Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, Russian); a unification movement for divided cultural communities (Germany, Italy); an exclusionary doctrine asserting territorial solidarity and settler domination over indigenous populations and imported servile labour yet differentiation from the metropole (the Americas, Australasia); a doctrine of self-strengthening of the historical state to resist imperial dismemberment (China, Iran, Japan, Thailand); a territorially-rooted creed of anti-colonial mobilisation (Africa, Caribbean, parts of Asia). Thus nationalism is a single potent yet protean ideology, with variable content, different pathways, and varying reservoirs of symbolic resources (Guiberneau and Hutchinson 2001). One may note that, although the

ethnic origins of nationalism were evident in its European birthplace, in the process of global diffusion the necessary link disappeared. The assertive nationalism of the United States, Brazil, or Indonesia lacks an ethnic foundation, but is no less robust.

Further, deeply embedded in the contemporary world order is the implicit premise that a state should be a nation, in existence or in becoming. Nationhood invests the abstract, juridical identity of the state with a warm, vibrant personality, capable of generating an emotive attachment. Through the alchemy of the idea of nationhood, civil society acquires a vocation of unity (Young 1994: 32). Small wonder, then, that 'nation' is so assiduously promoted by states of all descriptions.

Colonial Occupation in Africa and Its Identity Consequences

The swift imperial conquest of Africa, especially during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, resulted in major re-workings of existing identities. The colonial state imposed three axes of classification of the African subject: racially, as an African; territorially, as a native of the units of colonial partition; and 'tribal', as a member of an ethnic category. Through a complex dialectic of social construction, colonial imposition and subject agency, these three axes gave rise to a trio of salient identities by the end of the colonial era: pan-Africanism, territorial nationalism, and contemporary ethnicity. I will not pursue the pan-African aspect here (for a brief discussion, see Young 2002: 9–10), but only note that in its early forms it was mainly a discourse of the diaspora, whose lack of commitment to a territorial origin encouraged a larger vision of African solidarity. Pan-Africanism remains a significant referent, but after independence was largely domesticated by the state system through the inter-state institutions of the OAU and AU.

Territorial nationalism originates with the sorting of the African subject into the containers of the colonial partition, initially nothing more than bounded units of subjugation. However, from an early point, the particularised forms of oppression gave rise to distinctive narratives of suffering. The ramifying web of regulation and extraction followed the territorial contours. Although colonial states made little effort to foster territorial identities, educated Africans began to use the territorial category as a basis for voice. In some places, European and Asian immigrants asserted territoriality as a normative referent (for the intriguing example of Gabon case, see Pourtier 1989: I, 128–36).

After World War II, anti-colonial nationalism rapidly became a potent, ultimately irresistible force. The daily realities of struggle necessarily forced the combat for liberation into a territorial frame. In turn, nationalist organisers were driven to validate the territory as focus of solidarity. Mobilisation required a display of unity; the imperative of demonstrating to the coloniser a single voice of liberation necessitated a denial of comparable legitimacy to communal solidarities. Colonial occupants bent on delaying the day of departure often found the ethnic card tempting; their nationalist adversaries responded by exalting the territory and denouncing 'tribalism' as a backward force, antithetical to the dreams of modernity integral to the vision of liberation.

In most countries, post-colonial rulers had some awareness of the potential fragility of their new domains. Thus as a first order of business 'nation-building' entered the agenda. Retracing steps taken in the nineteenth century in Europe and the Americas, the pedagogical resources of the state were mobilised to this end, following the adage of leaders of the Italian unification movement: 'We have created Italy—now we must create Italians'. Weber (1979) famously shows how far French national identity was from permeating peasant consciousness at that time, and the critical role played by the republican schoolhouse and conscription in nationalising solidarity. Throughout Africa, a rapid expansion of the educational system, and 'Africanisation' (really, closely inspected, territorialisation) of the curriculum made the school a crucial vehicle of nation-building ambitions.

The national project was pursued in a host of symbolic domains. Portraits of the national leader adorned public and private halls across the country. The public iconography of stamps, currency and flags were silent messengers of territorial identity. Territorial consciousness was performed through singing of national anthems, and celebrating national holidays. The lexicon of international relations constituted the territory as a global collective actor. For those who traversed borders, passports and identity cards were indispensable official classifications.

National affinities took root in various corners of popular culture. Football (soccer) was everywhere the leading sport, with the national team in international matches a powerful magnet for identity, its ritualised warfare on the field a surrogate for the self in collective combat with the hostile national other. Other domains of popular culture were subliminal bearers of a national identification. In a number of countries distinctive urban music catalysed awareness of a specific national attachment. So also did the popular genres of urban art.

Important to these nationalising processes was the distancing of representations of the nation from ethnicity. Of the 53 African states, only four are named for a dominant ethnic group (Lesotho, Botswana, Somalia, Swaziland). In the first three decades of independence, single party systems were designed to exclude ethnicity from open political expression (although not of course from the informal networks of neo-patrimonial politics). Though states in the period of political opening since 1990s have largely abandoned illusions of progressive marginalisation of ethnic consciousness, the ambition remains to present national identity as an overarching territorial attachment sharply separated from the patterns of ethnic affinity encountered in civil society. Many countries forbid political party organisation explicitly tied to ethnicity or religion.

How, then, might one characterise the kind of nationalism which seems alive in contemporary Africa? The categories invoked in debates about European nationalism are clearly inapplicable; African nationalisms are neither civic nor ethnic. They lack the vibrant historical narratives and heroic mythologies which often reinforce Eurasian versions of nationalism; there is no 1389 'field of blackbirds', nor are there epic formulations such as the Nehru *Discovery of India* (1946). Rather than an active and aggressive militant consciousness, it is a more passive, unreflected attachment, well described by Billig as 'banal nationalism':

> In so many little ways the citizenry are daily reminded of their national place in a world of nations. However, this reminding is so familiar, so continual, that is not consciously registered as reminding. The metonymic image of banal nationalism is not a flag which is consciously waved with fervent passion; it is the flag hanging unnoticed in the public building (Billig 1995: 8).

Perhaps its iconic symbol is the captain of the national football team, not a tomb of the unknown soldier. A French soldier who dies on the battlefield is enshrined as *mort pour la France*; I cannot recall ever hearing a comparable expression regarding a casualty for an African army.

Yet the capacity of African nationalisms to survive the dereliction of the states to which they are enjoined suggests a naturalisation of national identity which is one defining feature of the political landscape. Much more than the original anti-colonialism now sustains it. Indeed, a positive attachment to the 'nation' seems to often coexist with a very negative view of the state, which may be experienced only as a predator which has abandoned all pretence of service provision or protection. Still, open to question is the capacity of territorial attachments

to survive very prolonged periods of slender state presence or collapse. Whether the young men dancing the frontier in Kivu in 2003 would still do so a decade hence absent some restoration of basic security and a minimally functioning state is open to question.

Ethnicity in Its African Version

> … God has not created all these ethnicities. God created a single person. People created ethnicity later.
>
> 1992 Christmas pastoral address
> Biguku parish, Uganda

The Ugandan pastor, an unwitting constructivist, aptly introduces our discussion of ethnicity. Let me suggest that this phenomenon may be defined in terms of three dimensions. Firstly, ethnicity is based on a variable list of common attributes: usually language, shared cultural practices and symbolic resources, a belief in common ancestry. Secondly, ethnicity is defined by a shared consciousness of belonging to a named group. Thirdly, ethnicity requires demarcation: the self acquires meaning by its boundary, the presence of a visible 'other'.

In the last couple of decades, comparative analysis of cultural pluralism has identified three major approaches: primordialism, instrumentalism and constructivism. One might suggest that primordialists capture one important dimension: the inner attachments and emotional ties central to identity. The ethnic subject tends to perceive, experience and perform identity in essentialised terms. The instrumentalists point persuasively to the central importance of ethnicity as a weapon in resource competition or power struggle: the 'national cake' syndrome. Finally, the constructivists show that African ethnicities have evolved or even transformed over the last century or two; contemporary communal cartography is sharply different from a pre-colonial mapping.

Although suggestions that contemporary ethnicity is a colonial invention are a vast exaggeration, the colonial state was a prime actor in the social construction dynamic. The coloniser arrived in sub-Saharan Africa with an image of the subject population as divided into discrete 'tribal' units. States have an ineluctable disposition to codify in order to rule (Scott 1998). The colonial state imposed a tribal template upon its new domains, and developed its own identity codification, seeking simplification, regrouping apparently similar entities, and rewarding collaborating intermediaries.

Missionaries were a second major agency of social construction. Language was key to evangelisation; the capital expense of biblical translation was subject to cost-benefit calculations. Standardisation of closely related speech forms, and creation of a written form had enormous impact in group definition.

Colonial anthropologists were also major players. The ethnic monograph was the standard medium of early anthropology in Africa. Given the basic participant-observer methodology, the authoritative rendering of a given cultural area required selection of a village deemed representative of a larger whole, and projecting its ethnography upon the entire ethnic community. Feedback effects were powerful; the printed word carried great authority, and educated members of ethnic communities endowed with a monograph often internalised the findings.

Taking due measure of the large impact of the colonial state and its related apparatuses in the social construction process is only one side of the story. African agency was of equal importance (Vail 1989). Colonial chiefs were often beneficiaries of enlarged definitions of an ethnic domain, and participated in its promotion. In the emergent cities, ethnic associations emerged, initially to help resolve the everyday problems of death, marriage, schooling, housing and employment, but soon becoming social, then political spokespersons. When political competition began in the 1950s, parties moved to exploit ethnic vote banks. For some groups, eminent cultural entrepreneurs appeared, in the form of historians like Sir Apolo Kagwa of Buganda, Rwandan (Tutsi) court chronicler Alexis Kagame or Yoruba Samuel Johnson, or language standardisers such as Samuel Crowther, who created a standard Yoruba based on the Oyo form. Even today, in most Ganda villages a dog-eared copy of the Kagwa history of Buganda kings can be found (Wrigley 1996: 8).

In the postcolonial period, ethnicity became closely tied to patrimonial politics, a mechanism for informal management of regional tensions. The two core issues were distribution and domination: in the ineffable Nigerian metaphor, how the 'national cake' is divided, and whose hand holds the knife which does the slicing. Although during the era of single party or military autocracy the public expression of ethnicity was often banned, and ethnic associations outlawed, behind the authoritarian veil communal consciousness thrived. When by 1980 state capacity began to shrink, ethnic solidarity became an important shelter.

Ethnicity also gradually became a more respectable sentiment. Across the world, national integration doctrines which denied cultural

diversity were in retreat. African intellectuals once attracted to the equation of 'tribalism' with backwardness reframed their discourse to accord legitimacy to ethnic dimensions of solidarity. The late Nigerian scholar-activist Claude Ake spoke for a generation in insisting that a genuine African democracy:

> …will have to recognize nationalities, subnationalities, ethnic groups and communities as social formations that express freedom and self-realization and will have to grant them rights to cultural expression and political and economic participation (Ake 1996: 132).

The democratic moment which opened about 1990 largely ended national integration projects which presumed that ethnicity could be, if not eliminated, at least confined to an underground private sphere. However, even if ethnicity had to be admitted to the public square, concerns remained about its capacity to mobilise rival communities in hostile confrontation, apprehensions which found some validation in the genocidal conflicts in Burundi and Rwanda beginning in 1993. Thus provisions for multi-party competition frequently proscribed ethnicity and religion as bases for political organisation, directly or indirectly.

However salient its instrumental uses, one may argue that much of ethnicity in Africa contrasts with European or Asian forms in its less primordialised character. There is more flux and flow to the ethnic phenomenon in Africa; to cite but one example, an examination of successive political moments in Congo-Kinshasa shows striking redefinitions of ethnic configurations (Young and Turner 1985: 138–63). The frequently multi-layered nature of communal identity adds to the fluidity; the Somali and their nesting strata of clan affinity is a classic example. Any effort to interpret Nigerian politics by assuming that Yoruba or Igbo are unitary political actors would founder on the complexity of sub-group alignments within these ethnic categories.

A further important contrast is that, with relatively few exceptions, ethnicity does not mutate into ethno-nationalism. The crucial difference between ethnicity and nationalism as forms of solidarity is the nature of the political claim arising from the identity. Nationalism is married to the doctrine of self-determination; ethnicity is joined to cultural self-preservation. In Africa, ethnicity in the political realm is—to repeat—above all mobilised by issues of domination and distribution, relative shares within a polity rather than separation from it.

The most important exception is Ethiopia, which since 1991 has formally reconstituted itself on the premise of ethno-nations. Provincial

boundaries were redrawn on communal lines, creating six ethnic units and three multi-ethnic conglomerates, without a single dominant group. To some extent, the ethnic federation enshrined by the 1994 constitution reflected some importation of Soviet nationality theory during the Afro-Marxist Derg period from 1974 to 1991. More important, the multiple insurgent movements which drove the Derg from power were ethnic, save for the Eritreans. Thus constitutionalising ethnicity as nationality with a formal right to self-determination and secession reflected the particular dynamics of regime decay and demise, which probably left no choice. The actual exercise of political power by the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Front remains centralised in the hands of Meles Zenawi and the Tigray People's Liberation Front, though in some domains, such as language policy, elements of provincial autonomy may gradually deepen the significance of the 'federal character' (Aalen 2004; Keller 2004). Placed in a larger context, Ethiopia stands as a unique pathway, which thus far has had no seductive effects on other countries.

The likelihood of ethnicity evolving into ethno-nationalism is partly contingent upon the depth and richness of the cultural ideology spun around the identity. A process of social construction in this respect is visible in a number of locations. However, few have acquired the scope of elaboration of Buganda (Wrigley 1996) or the Zulu (Hamilton 1998), where ethnic claims verge into ethno-national territory.

Also critical to the form that ethnicity in Africa assumes is the distinctive pattern of language politics. The retention of European languages as vehicles for government and the higher echelons of education deletes this issue from the roster of contentious societal issues. African languages retain a sufficiently important niche in the social and economic marketplace to remove any strong incentive for mobilisation in defence of a speech community, though some cultural nationalists are dismayed at the limited displacement of colonial languages. The powerful emotions associated in other regions with language politics are neutralised by the prevalence of what Laitin (1992) terms the 3+/−1 pattern: the socially ambitious need mastery of three speech codes: the official (European) language; an African lingua franca; an ancestral tongue. Some may need more than one lingua franca, or use the latter as a maternal language. The scope of multi-lingual practice in Africa is truly extraordinary.

Aside from the seven countries where Arab culture, language and identity are dominant, the territorial nation is thus linguistically neutral.

Of the seven Arab states, one may note that in all but Tunisia, Libya and Egypt significant groups contest the explicit ascendancy of Arabhood as defining the cultural personality of the state. Sudan is the extreme with its nearly four decades of regional civil war sparked by rejection of Arab and Islamic identity as obligatory elements in nationhood (Deng 1995).

A wild card in the evolution of ethnic consciousness in Africa is the recent militarization of ethnicity in several countries. This first emerged in Ethiopia in the multiple regional rebellions against the Mengistu Haile Meriam dictatorship, but has since become visible in Rwanda, Burundi, Congo-Kinshasa and Nigeria (on Nigeria, see Harnischfeger 2003). The appearance of ethnic militias transforms social competition into armed violence; group relations are poisoned by security dilemmas.

Citizenship as Identity

Africa like most regions of the world has recently become a stage for citizenship debates. For many years, citizenship as theory and practice was dormant as a domain for conceptual reflection. The seminal work of Marshall (1965) defined the field, portraying citizenship in modern times as a progressively enlarging domain, beginning with civil liberties in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, expanding into political rights of enfranchisement in the nineteenth, then social entitlements through welfare state provision in the twentieth. However, since that time massive international migrations and crystallisation of numerous diasporic communities have altered the terms of the debate.

Citizenship may be defined as a formal status of individual membership in a national community subject to the sovereign institutions of rule of a state. The status confers upon the citizen equal protection of the laws, guarantees of a right to belonging, entitlement to participation, and full access to the social provisions of the state. Through the doctrine of popular sovereignty, the citizen is an integral member of the civil society from which the state derives its legitimacy.

The basic nature of the colonial system relegated subordinated African populations to subject status, with a handful of exceptions (for example, the four coastal communes of Senegal). In the last hours of colonial rule, assimilative elements in French and Portuguese colonial ideologies extended a nominal metropolitan citizenship to all, but not its full substance. But colonial status and citizenship are antithetical in

their essence. With independence, the African shed the classification of French, British, Portuguese or other subject and became a territorial citizen.

The rapid displacement in most countries of the fragile democratic institutions of decolonisation by autocratic structures of rule emptied citizenship of its political content, save for the plebiscitary rituals single party leaders felt necessary. But in a number of other ways the territorial container of African independence acquired new importance. Indeed, as Herbst aptly observes, "the imposition of citizenship on each and every African was a revolutionary event" (2000: 232). Transterritorial labour migration, especially frequent between units ruled by the same European occupant, now came into question. Not long after independence, the new category of refugee emerged as a formal status, as victims of ethnic marginalisation or political repression took shelter in neighbouring lands, and came under the organised tutelage of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees. Within a decade, Africa became the largest supplier of refugee communities. Refugee status not only assured international relief, but fore-grounded the standing of such groups as non-citizen others, to be carefully separated from the citizen population. Migrants to other territories found their status precarious, subject to sudden mass expulsions: for example, 200,000 expelled from Ghana in 1969; three million Ghanaians deported from Nigeria in 1983.

Legal definitions of citizenship, as a formal juridical status, inevitably drew upon the imported jurisprudence of the former metropolitan powers. The concept was rooted in the premise of individualism; the status defining the reciprocal bonds between the person and the state excluded any intermediary attachments. Thus, as noted in the Nzongola and Hickey chapters, citizenship contained an implicit conflict with the cellular structure of society, in which the individual could not be totally dissociated from extended family, lineage, clan and ethnic community. This contradiction soon became apparent in various domains, especially issues of land rights. The citizen, as equal member of a national juridical community, enjoyed a right of free movement throughout the territory. The belonging of citizenship applied nationally, and not simply within the ancestral domain. Such nationalising notions ran counter to embedded cultural norms that land belonged to the community, and that migrant rural workers could acquire access to land only as a short-term favour, not as a permanent entitlement of citizenship. In some places, the legitimacy of urban migration from

other regions within the territory was subject to question. As Nzongola reminds us, Kasai migrants to the Katanga cities have been subject to repeated mass expulsions since 1960, on the grounds that they are not 'authentic Katangans', even if Congolese citizens.

The nature of African citizenship laws has attracted remarkably little scholarly attention; the valuable Herbst (2000: 227–47) survey is a rare exception. Several normative concerns interacted in the process. Citizenship doctrines of the former colonial occupant inevitably played a role, drawing in the classical debate between location of birth (*jus soli*) and ancestry (*jus sanguinis*) as framing principles. Pan-African ideas played some role, especially in the notion that populations of African origin had a right of belonging superior to that of immigrants. But cutting the other direction in some countries were undercurrents of resentment directed toward recently immigrated Africans, especially when they competed for land rights with indigenous groups or occupied privileged social niches. In countries where significant immigrant minorities, especially those of Levantine or South Asian origin, monopolised mercantile sectors to which African traders sought entry, reticence to according an irrevocable status of full belonging was evident.

In my reading, African citizenship laws, comparatively speaking, are relatively restrictive. Ancestral definitions predominate; of the 40 countries Herbst was able to code, 26 employed *jus sanguinis* (Herbst 2000: 237). The predominance of the ancestral criterion carries the important subliminal corollary; ethnic citizenship, as Nzongola suggests, is intertwined with national membership. Further, though the range of variation is wide, naturalisation tends to be difficult. In recent years, citizenship currents have continued to flow in a restrictive direction. For example, in Congo-Kinshasa, the defining year for determining residence on the territory assuring automatic citizenship was 1950 in the independence constitution; in 1973 this was moved up to 1960. However, even under the authoritarian ascendancy of Mobutu Sese Seko, popular pressure from eastern Congo led to the date being set back to 1885, excluding hundreds of thousands of persons of Rwandan antecedents. In Côte D'Ivoire, even when the personal dominance of Felix Houphouet-Boigny was at its apogee in 1964, he failed to push through a regime of dual citizenship for immigrants of Francophone origin. South Africa at the moment of triumph over apartheid in 1994 proclaimed its solidarity with nationals of neighbouring countries which had supported the liberation struggle; a decade later deportations of illegal immigrants from these nations took place on a large scale.

Another recent trend suggesting a deepening sense of barricaded borders is the questioning of legitimacy of political leaders by challenging their ancestry. In Ivory Coast, the refusal to allow the presidential candidacy of Allasane Ouattara on grounds of contested citizenship is one major cause of northern disaffection and the current impasse. Kenneth Kaunda, despite his long service as Zambian President, was subsequently excluded from the ballot on grounds of Malawian parentage. Rumour mills abound with tales of purported alien ancestry of rulers; in Kampala and Kinshasa whispers of alleged Rwandan ancestry of Yoweri Museveni and Joseph Kabila are widely heard.

The legal transformation of the African into a territorial citizen, in tandem with a naturalised concept of nationality, breathes new meaning into the boundaries. Even where frontiers intersect ethnic communities, a deepening sense of formalised difference co-existing with shared ethnicity is evident. Indeed, the border may provide an opportunity for attractive profit in exploiting the difference of nationality while benefiting from the social capital of ethnic trust in trans-border commerce, a phenomenon explored by Nugent (2002) for the neighbouring Ewe in Ghana and Togo. At the same time, border differentiation induces an element of negative othering, "Those who had to cross the border to purchase their wants were given a constant reminder of what made them different from their Togolese neighbours.... It is striking how widespread and deeply entrenched the negative stereotypes of the Togolese have become" (Nugent 2002: 264).

Miles (1994) provides fascinating documentation of the ways in which Nigerian and Nigerien citizenship divides borderland Hausa communities, in spite of the continuous flow of persons across a porous frontier. Difference in educational systems, the flow of political experience, and recently patterns of Islamic observation all imprint an awareness of difference upon the template of shared ethnicity.

The Wave of Democratisation and Its Limits

Two major trends of recent years interrogate the three forms of identity, democratisation and civil disorder. A wave of urban rioting in Algeria in October 1988 shattered the monolithic mystique of the ruling *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN); rather than an isolated happening, this event was precursor to a popular challenge to patrimonial autocracy which soon swept over most of the continent. Both external

factors and internal dynamics drove the surge of democratisation. The dramatic crumbling of state socialism in the Soviet orbit had potent demonstration effect. For a brief period, Western donor states and the international financial community believed that political opening was a necessary concomitant of economic reform, and a criterion for aid. Internally, single party regimes and life presidents were fatally discredited. As regimes began to crumble, a powerful contagion effect set in.

The magnitude of the wave of democratisation was astonishing; almost all countries felt its impact, and made at least token adjustments. Depending on the mode of calculation, one can arrive at a figure as high as a third of incumbent leaders who abandoned presidencies by choice or necessity. The limits of the democracy surge are suggested by the fact that, in mid-2004, 17 rulers who held office at the time of the Algerian riots in 1988 were still in harness.

Though the wave of democratisation had receded by the mid-1990s, important and lasting changes in political practice had occurred. These fell well short in most instances of consolidated democracy; terms such as 'semi-democracy' or 'virtual democracy' came into circulation to characterise situations where incumbents had ridden out the storm, or their replacements circumscribed the opportunity for opposition challenge. But in most countries the state monopoly of the media was broken, and a critical press emerged. Civil society escaped the capture of the single party apparatus, and carved out some political space. Human rights groups sprang up, often a courageous voice against repressive tendencies.

Democratisation, even incomplete, changed the rules of politics in ways which brought ethnicity into the open. In competitive elections, ethnicity inevitably became a factor in the political calculus. In a number of cases—Malawi, for example—regionalism weighed heavily in the outcomes. Only in Burundi (1993) and Rwanda (1994) did elections or their imminent prospect escalate mutual fears and antagonisms to a level paving the way for lethal ethnic violence. However, in a number of other countries successive competitive elections were held without provoking ethnic hostilities nor resulting in an outcome predominantly determined by ethnic demographics (for example, Senegal, Mali, Ghana, and mainland Tanzania).

The resources of statecraft in accommodating diversity are substantial (Young 1999). Noted earlier was the widespread practice of proscribing party organisation on the basis of ethnicity or religion. Mechanisms requiring regionally distributed membership for party registration were

also employed, as well as establishing such criteria for the calculus of votes (Kenya, Nigeria). Proportional representation electoral systems, or some combination of them with single member district voting, could foster broad communal representation (Reilly and Reynolds 1999). To the extent that backsliding towards authoritarian practice has occurred, one may argue that ethnicity is not the primary culprit.

Democratisation clearly raised the stakes on citizenship. Both locally and nationally, the return of electoral competition meant that the entitlement of belonging affected power relations, both nationally and locally. The divisive doctrine of *ivoirité* was clearly designed to exclude the large Burkinabe and other immigrant populations from voice. In eastern Congo, the fears of local populations that demographic majorities of Rwandan immigrants would seize regional control by electoral means fuelled the demand to redefine citizenship to exclude them.

The initial enthusiasm evoked by the wave of democratisation rested not only on the normative virtues of a liberal constitutional order, but also the hope that democracy would bring about renovation of the state. Political institutions and leaders who were accountable to civil society would be compelled by electoral necessity to respond to citizen aspirations for social services and security. In turn, a restored legitimacy would open the path to a more effective state, worthy of the nation which had somehow persisted through the dark years. However, democratisation soon faced a challenge unanticipated in its scope and spread: a virus of civil disorder and violence.

Spread of Civil Disorder

Armed conflict had punctuated the African landscape since the post-war period, initially in the form of military liberation movements, then in occasional separatist rebellions (Biafra, southern Sudan, Eritrea) or would-be revolutionary uprisings (Congo-Kinshasa in 1964–65). Such struggles had an evident political agenda, and unfolded in a given territorial arena. In the 1990s, a wave of violence emerged which contrasted in a number of respects with earlier uprisings. The rebels generally lacked any cause beyond power and plunder. The insurgencies became interwoven, and coalesced into the two large zones of conflict mentioned earlier (Young 2002).

This spread of disorder partly reflected the hollowed out condition of many states, weakened by prolonged economic crisis and popular

impoverishment. The corroded legitimacy of incumbent regimes made civil populations unlikely to rise to their defence. Security forces whose morale had been sapped by pay arrearages and poor supply proved unable to contain even small rebel forces. External powers, no longer in pursuit of African client states after the end of the Cold War, were not disposed to intervene to save incumbents.

But other new factors appeared. In nine instances (Ethiopia, Somalia, Uganda, Rwanda, both Congos, Chad, Liberia and Sierra Leone) insurgents from the periphery or neighbouring countries destroyed an incumbent regime, resulting in a dissolution or dispersal of existing security forces, rather than their switch of loyalty to new rulers which occurred in an earlier period when regime change occurred by coup. There were several insecurity-breeding consequences. The soldiers disappear into the bush, often with their weapons, available for sale or concealment for future use. A fraction of the officers had overseas training and advanced military skills. Thus knowledgeable practitioners of warfare diffused into the countryside, not necessarily interested in a farming career. One may note a parallel process in Iraq and Haiti, with similar destabilising consequences.

Other novel features of new age insurgency became apparent. Beyond the weaponry of dissolved armies, a large supply of arms at fire sale prices entered the international market with the collapse of the Soviet bloc. Weapons flooded into Africa, and were readily available at affordable prices. If rebel militia had difficulty in recruiting adult warriors, the option emerged of abducting children as fighters, carriers, and sexual slaves. This strategy was first systematically employed by the *Resistencia Naçional Moçambicana* (RENAMO) in the mid-1980s, then widely copied by rebel groups in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Congo-Kinshasa (Hall and Young 1997: 167–70). Insurgents also developed mercantile skills not evident in earlier uprisings in trafficking high value resources such as diamonds, gold, other scarce minerals (columbite-tantalite) and even timber to assure war finance needs were met.

Finally, neighbouring states became more willing to intervene either in support of insurgents or regimes than had usually been the case in earlier times. The Congo-Kinshasa civil war of 1998–2003 was only the most extreme case, where at different stages no less than eight African armies directly intervened, either in support of Kinshasa (Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia and briefly Chad and Sudan) or rebel militia (Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi). Complex patterns of neighbouring state involvement were also apparent in Ivory Coast, Liberia and Sierra Leone civil strife.

Thus insurgent militia such as the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) or the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone were able to subsist over extended period in spite of the overwhelming hostility of the populations in their zones of operation. Unlike earlier generations of rebels, they made little effort to win local support. Plunder of resources and abduction of fighters provided the means of warfare; there was no need for 'hearts and minds'.

These patterns of violence had several consequences for politics and implications for the three axes of identity. As violence appeared to spread in the 1990s, some of the oxygen was sucked out of the democracy movement. The incubus of endemic civil warfare elevated stability several notches in the hierarchy of political goals. Democratic opening lost some of its external appeal, and the international community became more reticent in its promotion. Ethnicity tended to be drawn into civil warfare, though in most instances (except in Rwanda and Burundi) armed factions were not explicitly ethnic movements. However, prolonged warfare in a given region tended to produce a degeneration of ethnic comity. The generalised insecurity in violence-torn regions heightened mutual fears and suspicions, and made safety seem contingent on armed community. Ethnic massacres, where they occur, enter social memories with long-lasting effects.

The stakes of citizenship also rise. The guarantee of belonging which citizenship provides becomes more crucial. Conversely, the disposition rises to challenge the entitlement to citizenship of groups alleged to be recent arrivals in the territory (Tutsi in Congo-Kinshasa, Mandingos in Liberia).

With respect to the territorial nation, its apparent survival is a crucial trump card for conflict resolution. The existing territorial frame is under serious challenge in only a couple of cases (Somaliland, southern Sudan, perhaps Ethiopia), and even in these instances a full restoration of a state adequately representing all sections and assuring genuine regional autonomy might win acceptance. In most instances acceptance of the territorial nation is a crucial point of departure in pursuit of peace.

Concluding Observations

By way of conclusion, let me offer a few closing observations. The gradual consolidation of an African form of nationalism in the post-independence period is, in my view, an important development whose significance has become apparent in the era of weakened state-ness.

Although one must not prematurely presume their permanence, territorial attachments have entered the popular consciousness as one of the un-reflected, assumed givens of social life. Whatever their limits, African nationalisms have evolved well beyond their roots in anti-colonial revolt.

Ethnicity in Africa gradually deepens around the units of consciousness which emerged as the pre-colonial social materials were reshaped by the dialectic of colonial codification projects and the creative self-assertion of the African subject. New ideological resources are fashioned, as cultural intelligentsias create indigenous literatures, ethnic histories, and improved grammars and dictionaries. At the same time, an important element of fluidity remains in the complex cultural world of multi-layered and interlocking identities.

Citizenship issues have come to the fore coincident with other trends of recent years. In Africa as elsewhere, difficult challenges remain, made more urgent by both democratisation and disorder. One may wonder whether the present tendency towards very restrictive definitions of citizenship privileging ancestral *jus sanguinis* criteria will resist migration patterns, refugee flows, and the rise of large diaspora communities in Europe and North America.

Even though democracy appears in retreat, I doubt whether there can be a return to the forms of rule which prevailed until the 1980s. Patrimonial autocracy over time gave rise to the profound crisis of state and economy which both triggered the democratisation movement, yet bequeathed it a badly damaged institutional framework. Both internal and external legitimacy require forms of governance which incorporate elements of democracy.

With respect to civil order, in the last few years there has been significant headway in restoring peace. Of the 16 instances of sustained violent civil conflicts I would enumerate, over half have found some kind of resolution, perhaps precarious. In a couple of other instances, such as Ivory Coast, accords seem possible. Worth noting is that the conflicts have ended in only one of two ways: either by military victory of one party (Rwanda, Angola, Algeria), or by externally mediated settlements. They are never resolved by direct agreement between the warring parties. In the pursuit of such accords, the disposition of all parties to accept the existing territorial unit as a basis for settlement is an indispensable asset for those seeking to mediate the conflict. Minimalist democratic process is needed to consolidate and legitimate such accords, which otherwise become merely a sharing of the booty

between armed factions. But the counter-intuitive naturalisation of nationhood opens the door.

Bibliography

Aalen, L. 2004. Federalism in Ethiopia: 'Ethnic Self-Determination' in a Dominant Party State. Conference on States, Borders and Nations: Negotiating Citizenship in Africa, University of Edinburgh.

Ake, C. 1996. *Democracy and Development in Africa*. Washington: Brookings Institution.

Anderson, B. 1983. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.

Billig, M. 1995. *Banal Nationalism*. London: Sage.

Deng, F.M. 1995. *War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in Sudan*. Washington: Brookings Institution.

Dunkerley, D., Hodgson, L., Konopacki, S., Spybey, T. and A. Thompson. 2002. *Changing Europe: Identities, Nations and Citizens*. New York: Routledge.

Gellner, E. 1983. *Nations and Nationalism*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Greenfeld, L. 1992. *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Guibernau, M. and J. Hutchinson. (Eds) 2001. *Understanding Nationalism*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Hall, M. and T. Young. 1997. *Confronting Leviathan: Mozambique since Independence*. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press.

Hamilton, C. 1998. *Terrific Majesty: Shaka Zulu and the Limits of Historical Invention*. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Harnischfeger, J. 2003. The Bakassi Boys. *Journal of Modern African Studies*. 41: 1 pp. 23–50.

Herbst, J. 2000. *States and Power in Africa*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Hobsbawm, E. 1990. *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Joseph, R. (Ed) *State, Conflict and Democracy in Africa*. Boulder, Ca.: Lynne Rienner.

Laitin, D.D. 1992. *Language Repertoires and State Construction in Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Keller, E. 2004. Making and Remaking State and Nation in Ethiopia. Typescript.

Marshall, T.H. 1965. *Class, Citizenship and Social Development*. New York: Anchor.

Miles, W.F.S. 1991. *Hausaland Divided: Colonialism and Independence in Nigeria and Niger*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Miller, D. 2000. *Citizenship and National Identity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Nanes, S. 2003. *Citizenship and National Identity in Jordan: A National Dialogue*. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison.

Nehru, J. 1946. *The Discovery of India*. New York: Meridian Books.

Nugent, P. 2002. *Smugglers, Secessionists and Loyal Citizens on the Ghana-Togo Border: The Life of the Borderlands since 1914*. Oxford: James Currey.

Oomen, T.K. (Ed) 1997. *Citizenship and National Identity: From Colonialism to Globalism*. New Delhi: Sage Publications.

Ottaway, M. 2003. *Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism*. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Pourtier, R. 1989. *Le Gabon*. Paris: L'Harmattan.

Reilly, B. and A. Reynolds. 1999. *Electoral Systems and Conflict in Divided Societies*. Washington: National Academy Press.

Rosaldo, R. (Ed) 2003. *Cultural Citizenship in Island Southeast Asia: Nation and Belonging*. Berkeley, Ca.: University of California Press.

Scott, J.C. 1998. *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*. New Haven, Yale University Press.
Smith, A.D. 1995. *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Touré, S. 1959. *Towards Full Reafricanization*. Paris: Présence Africaine.
Trefon, T. (Ed) 2004. *Ordre et Désordre à Kinshasa: Réponses Populaires à la Faillite de l'État*. Paris: L'Harmattan.
Vail, L. (Ed) 1989. *The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa*. Berkeley, Ca.: University of California Press.
Weber, E. 1979. *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914*. London, Chatto and Windus.
Wrigley, C. 1996. *Kingship and State: The Buganda Monarchy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Young, C. and T. Turner. 1985. *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State*. Madison, University of Wisconsin Press.
Young, C. 1994. *The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
———. (Ed) 1999. *Ethnic Diversity and Public Policy: A Comparative Perspective*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
———. 2002. Contextualizing the Congo Crisis: Order and Disorder in Postcolonial Africa. In Clark, J. (Ed) *The African Stakes of the Congo War*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 13–32.
———. 2002. Nationalism and Ethnicity in Africa. *Review of Asian and Pacific Studies*. 28 pp. 1–19.

INDEX

AFRICAN SOCIAL STUDIES SERIES

1. Saskia Brand, *Mediating Means and Fate*. A Socio-Political Analysis of Fertility and Demographic Change in Bamako, Mali.
2001. ISBN 90 04 12033 5

2. Axel Harneit-Sievers, *A Place in the World*. Local Historiographies in Africa and South Asia.
2002. ISBN 90 04 12303 2

3. John O. Oucho, *Undercurrents of Ethnic Conflict in Kenya*.
2002. ISBN 90 04 12459 4

4. Sandra J.T.M. Evers, *Constructing History, Culture and Inequality*. The Betsileo in the Extreme Southern Highlands of Madagascar.
2002. ISBN 90 04 12460 8

5. Kempe Ronald Hope, Sr., *From Crisis to Renewal*. Development Policy and Management in Africa.
2002. ISBN 90 04 12531 0

6. Wisdom J. Tettey, Korbla P. Puplampu, and Bruce J. Berman (eds.), *Critical Perspectives on Politics and Socio-Economic Development in Ghana*.
2003. ISBN 90 04 13013 6

7. Janet Andrewes, *Bodywork: Dress as a Cultural Tool*. Dress and Demeanor in the South of Senegal.
2004. ISBN 90 04 14107 3

8. Allen M. Howard and Richard M. Shain (eds.), *The Spatial Factor in African History*. The Relationship of the Social, Material, and Perceptual.
2005. ISBN-13: 978 90 04 13913 8 ISBN-10: 90 04 13913 3

9. Richard Kuba and Carola Lentz (eds.), *Land and the Politics of Belonging in West Africa*.
2006. ISBN-13: 978 90 04 14817 8 ISBN-10: 90 04 14817 5

10. Maghan Keita, *A Political Economy of Health Care in Senegal*.
2006.ISBN-13: 978 90 04 15065 2 ISBN-10: 90 04 15065 X

11. Dzodzi Tsikata, *Living in the Shadow of the Large Dams*. Long Term Responses of Downstream and Lakeside Communities of Ghana's Volta River Project.
2006. ISBN-13: 978 90 04 14144 5 ISBN-10: 90 04 14144 8

12. Kenneth Swindell and Alieu Jeng, *Migrants, Credit and Climate*. The Gambian Groundnut Trade, 1834-1934.
2006. ISBN-13: 978 90 04 14059 2 ISBN-10: 90 04 14059 X

13. Gerhard Seibert, *Comrades, Clients and Cousins*. Colonialism, Socialism and Democratization in São Tomé and Príncipe.
2006. ISBN-13: 978 90 04 14736 2 ISBN-10: 90 04 14736 5

14. Jeff D. Grischow. *Shaping Tradition*. Civil Society, Community and Development in Colonial Northern Ghana, 1899-1957.
2006. ISBN-13: 978 90 04 15243 4 ISBN-10: 90 04 15243 1

15. Neil C.M. Carrier, *Kenyan Khat*. The Social Life of a Stimulant.
2007. ISBN 978 90 04 15659 3

16. Sara Dorman, Daniel Hammett, and Paul Nugent (eds.), *Making Nations, Creating Strangers*. States and Citizenship in Africa.
2007. ISBN 987 90 04 15790 3